

**NLWJC - KAGAN**

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**CM014      284980SS**

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**OA/ID Number:** 21724  
**Scan ID:** 284980SS  
**Document Number:**

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**Folder Title:**  
CM014

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
<b>S</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>

105  
Federal  
Tobacco  
Claims

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

284980 SS  
CM014  
98 NOV 17 PM 5:46

November 16, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Bruce Reed  
Elena Kagan

SUBJECT: Federal Tobacco Claims

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Let's Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

POTUS 11/23  
HAS NOT  
SEEN  
~~PH~~

Sean-

9/18

DO NOT give time to POTUS  
until you hear from me. Still  
waiting to hear from Podesta --  
might need a cover note.

Phm

Has on  
credenza with  
package

98 NOV 17 PM 6:46

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Let's Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: 11-17-98 ACTION / CONCURRENCE / COMMENT DUE BY: 11-18-98

Subject: Federal Tobacco Claims

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NASH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PODESTA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	REED	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ECHAVESTE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RUFF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SMITH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BEGALA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SOSNIK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BERGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPERLING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BLUMENTHAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRAMPTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STERN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IBARRA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STREETT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KLAIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TRAMONTANO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LANE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VERVEER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LEWIS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<p>2/24/99            Not sent to POTUS            per Phil Caplan.              c. Cleveland</p>		
LINDSEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
LOCKHART	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
MARSHALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
MOORE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			

REMARKS: Please advise

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
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Hardcopy pages are in poor condition (too light or too dark).

Remainder of case not scanned.

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Duplicate letters attached - not scanned.

Only table of contents scanned.

No incoming letter attached.

Only tracking sheet scanned.

Photo(s) not scanned.

Bill not scanned.

Resolution not scanned.

Comments:

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