

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. Speech	RE: DCI Tenet Articulates Vision for Agency (5 pages)	7/21/97	P1/b(1)
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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Administration History Project

OA/Box Number: 23257

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[Central Intelligence Agency]

ip5

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

11 December 2000


Mr. Ted Widmer  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Bldg.  
Room 216  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Widmer:

The attached documents represent the Central Intelligence Agency's second delivery of information in response to the White House's tasking on 10 July 2000 concerning the Administration History Project. You will recall that our first delivery on 25 August contained copies of the DCI's unclassified Annual Report to the Congress for the years 1993, 1994, 1996-1999. Per your earlier discussions with Mr. Ken Levit this new information includes a series of unclassified DCI statements from the 1997 to 2000 time frame.

If you require additional information or wish to discuss the matter further, please contact me at (703) 482-0312, or the DCI's Chief of Staff, John Brennan, at (703) 482-7744.

Sincerely,



Deborah J. Yoder  
Executive Assistant to the  
Executive Director

Attachments  
As Stated

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INT. IGP DATE 1/24/05

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## SPEECHES / DOCUMENTS



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INT JGP DATE 1/24/05

July 21, 1997

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Tenet Articulates Vision for Agency,  
Announces New Management Team

(U) **DCI Tenet Articulates Vision for Agency, Announces New Management Team**

*In an address to employees in the Headquarters Auditorium on July 21, DCI George Tenet offered his thoughts on the directions for the Agency and named the individuals who will help him in leading the Agency. The following is a transcript of the session.*

**DDA Dick Calder:** I want to ask one question: Who would have thought? Who would have thought that last December, when John Deutch stood in this very position, extolling George Tenet as the best deputy he had ever had, that a mere seven months later we would all gather to hear from George on his first address to the Agency as the Director of Central Intelligence? There are a lot of reasons why I'm pleased, and the Agency should be pleased, about George's confirmation as DCI ten days ago. He brings to the job a unique combination of skills, experiences, and viewpoints. As the staff director of one of our principal oversight committees, he knows the Hill. His unanimous endorsement by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the Senate's unanimous confirmation speaks to a high mutual regard. Most importantly, he knows this Agency and the Community from the Hill's perspective. This is vital as we embark on a new era in the Agency. As Special Assistant to the President on the National Security Council, George was the point man for the White House on intelligence. For two years he was immersed in the day-to-day operations of our business. He was a central figure in defining the future of the Intelligence Community, by creating new directives such as PDD-35. For the past two years, George has been here, in the midst of, and leading the Agency and the Community, through—to paraphrase an old Chinese saying—interesting times. He knows us; he knows our mission; he knows our proud history; and he knows our aspirations for our future. In short, no one—no single person—has ever come into this office with such a broad perspective of the intelligence business. But equally important, beyond George Tenet's resume, is George Tenet. You are about to hear him, and what you will hear beyond the words, is someone whose commitment to the mission and values of CIA is intense,

whose excitement about what we do is palpable, and whose passion about our future direction and purpose is clear. In this special year when we are celebrating our 50th anniversary, I am honored to introduce a man whose talent, experience, and energy will lead us into the next century. Please join with me in welcoming the Honorable George J. Tenet, the 18th Director of Central Intelligence.

**DCI George Tenet:** Let me begin by simply saying how privileged I feel to be here today, standing at the helm of this Agency – one that has completed 50 years of proud service to our country-- and looking ahead with optimism and enthusiasm to the next chapter in CIA's history.

Let me say also how honored I am that the President has asked me to lead you - - the women and men of CIA - - into this new era. Together we now stand at an historic turning point - - one that is full of opportunity and challenge for all of us. If we approach this turning point with "the right stuff" - - with energy, with decisiveness, with conviction, with unity of purpose, and with an unrelenting focus on our mission - - we will do great things together. We will do great things for our country. We will be the best intelligence service in the world. As your leader, I aspire to nothing less.

Our mission is clear. At the end of the day, it is our job to ensure that our nation's leaders have the information and time they need to avert danger to the United States and, when it cannot be averted, the wherewithal to prevail. I haven't the slightest doubt about what the President and the American people expect of us:

- First and foremost, they want to know that the CIA is working to protect the lives of Americans everywhere.
- They want to know that we are working to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform and to ensure that they dominate the battlefield when they deploy to remote parts of the world.
- They want to know we are protecting Americans from other threats, such as those that come from terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.
- They want us to make sure that our diplomats have the critical insights and foreknowledge they need to advance American interests and avert conflicts.
- They want us to track and give advance warning about major geopolitical transformations in the world.
- They want us to focus not just on threats but also on opportunities - - opportunities to act before danger becomes disaster and opportunities to create circumstances favorable to American interests.

- They want our reporting and analysis to add real value to what they already know about the toughest problems facing the United States.

To live up to these expectations, we need to do two things: we need to focus and greatly strengthen our core capabilities; and we need to operate much more effectively as a team, crossing directorate lines without pause to accomplish our mission.

CIA exists because it offers unique analytical and clandestine collection capabilities that reside no place else in government. I want to improve measurably our four core capabilities: all-source analysis, clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert action.

But it is not enough to improve our capabilities, we must also focus our efforts against those targets that matter the most. Ultimately, we succeed or fail by virtue of our ability to deliver – on a continuing basis – intelligence or analysis that the policymaker could not get any other way.

What do we need to do?

- We need to produce outstanding all-source analysis that is timely, prescient, and persuasive. To do that we must be, and be seen to be, the nation's leading experts in a wide variety of fields. And through every means available to us, we must reach out to the rich body of expertise that exists outside the US government.
- We need to mount imaginative and sophisticated clandestine human and technical operations in order to get vital information our nation cannot get in any other way. I know this will involve risks, and not every operation will be a success. But I will stand alongside my people, for without risk we are often without intelligence. Concentrating our attention on these hard targets will demand the highest standards of professionalism, tradecraft and innovation. To do what our country needs, we can be nothing less than the world's best espionage organization.
- We need to be vigilant on the counterintelligence front. We would do a great disservice to ourselves and all that we hope to achieve if we neglected this arena. In the world we live in today, it is not enough to play strong offense, we must also play strong defense.
- We need to sharpen CIA's capacity to effectively employ covert action on those unique occasions when our nation's leaders conclude that an important aim can be achieved through no other means.
- And we need in all of our endeavors to use technology to advance our mission, not only to ensure we have the support infrastructure we need to perform, but also to ensure that we grow the scientific and technological expertise that allows CIA to be a

national "center for excellence" in technological innovation. The Agency that once brought our country the U-2 and imagery from space has no less an obligation today.

How do we assure our excellence in all of these arenas? I think the key is teamwork and partnership.

We must realize CIA has to be greater than the sum of its parts to achieve our true potential. We are all in this together. Everyone here matters. Whether you recruit agents, do analysis, run printing presses, work with complex technology, handle logistics, keep offices running, provide security, or furnish human resources support, you are part of a common interdependent enterprise. We need each other. We are all the CIA.

Let me be clear: CIA must operate as a partnership. And as with most partnerships, no one really gets ahead unless the whole enterprise prospers. To make this partnership work, there are some things you need from me and some things I need from you.

- From me, you need clarity of vision, honesty and a clear sense of purpose. Standing before you I cannot tell you today that I have all of the answers, but you will have no doubt about where I want us to go and about the standards we should set for CIA.
- You need to know that an atmosphere where challenging conventional wisdom and taking risks is essential to our identity as the Central Intelligence Agency. From its earliest days, CIA's greatest successes have come at times when one of our officers was able to see what others could not, dare what others would not, or refuse to give up in the face of overwhelming odds. Next to integrity and objectivity, this ethic is the most important part of our professional identity.
- You need from me commitment to an atmosphere and to programs that will encourage the full development of all our people. This means opportunities that allow us to deepen our expertise through continuous training and education. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that the people of this agency have the diversity, expertise, language skills, and "ground truth" area knowledge to stand out in Washington and in our country. And we will link our promotion and rewards system to this kind of expertise. The development of our talent is one of my highest priorities.
- You need to be able to challenge me -- and to know that I welcome it -- when I am not clear or when there is something that you simply think I need to know. As I said in my confirmation hearings, I will lead, but I will also listen.
- You need from me continuity and stability in leadership. Let me say unequivocally that there is no other job I want and no other job that has the potential

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for challenge, reward, and impact that we have here at CIA. I am signing up for the long haul. My heart and soul are dedicated to this Agency and to the people I've been asked to lead. You can expect to see a lot of me - - God willing-- and for a long time.

But as I said, this is a partnership. As such, I expect some things from you.

I need the hard work and dedication that we at CIA simply take for granted. I know I can count on that. I know you do not bring just your expertise to work. You bring your deep conviction that national security is neither a nine to five job nor just a career, but a public service of grave importance.

But beyond that, I need you to embrace the spirit of partnership that I have invoked, because I believe it is as essential to our corporate success as hard work and dedication.

- In practical terms, this means looking out for each other.
- It means supporting each other.
- It means not running other people down and not getting personal when we disagree.
- It means being decent when things get tense or when difficult decisions have to be made.
- It means being straight with each other.
- It means asking, when looking across directorates or disciplines: how can we make CIA more effective by sharing our expertise, our talents, and our experience.

And as a large organization with increasingly complex functions, we must never let process overwhelm us. We must take every opportunity to simplify what is needlessly complex. And we all need to raise our sights and keep an unwavering focus on the mission the American people have given us: to be their first line of defense in a world that still holds plenty of surprise and danger. To do that with maximum effectiveness we must pull together. We are a team. We are all the CIA.

We must all focus beyond ourselves. To be sure, our business has its share of problems and frustrations. But I cannot imagine a business with more opportunities for people to seize the initiative, exert influence, and have an impact far beyond what most people experience in a lifetime. My point is simply this: when the problems inherent in any large organization tempt us toward self-absorption or pessimism, it is probably time to remember that ours is a business with special responsibilities and enormous opportunity for achievement. If we keep our focus on our work, our morale

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will be high, and we will never have enough hours in our days.

And to those of you who hold leadership positions, I want you to do more than just define problems. I want you to solve problems. To make decisions, to press ahead, and to take responsibility for implementing them. In essence, I want you to get things done. I want you to know that you can go up the line when you need guidance or when you know the stakes are high, but I want you to have the judgment to know when keeping me informed is enough.

- Above all, I want leaders who will take care of their people.
- You should have confidence that I will care about your work at all levels, be there when you need me, and, take responsibility when CIA is on the line.

I have set forth today my expectations, values and commitments. And now I want to introduce a team of leaders for CIA who will embody and advance them with me and with you.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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001. Speech	RE: DCI Tenet Articulates Vision for Agency (5 pages)	7/21/97	P1/b(1)

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.  
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the  
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

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Clinton Administration History Project

OA/Box Number: 23257

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

[Central Intelligence Agency]

jp5

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November 19, 1997

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**Headlines:** DCI Tenet's Remarks at conference on "Does America Need the CIA?", Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, November 19, 1997

19 November 1997  
 Gerald R. Ford Library  
 Ann Arbor, Michigan  
 Does America Need the CIA?

**Remarks as prepared for delivery by DCI George Tenet**

Thank you very much, President Ford, for that kind introduction. I am delighted to be with you and the distinguished panelists you have assembled here today.

You have chosen as your topic the question of whether America still needs the CIA. I think this is the first time I've ever been asked to keynote a conference where the stated objective is deciding whether I should bother coming in to work in the morning.

You will doubtless hear many views on the CIA during this conference. In stating mine, let me break the suspense and say that my answer to your question -- does America still need the CIA -- is an unambiguous "yes". I imagine that is what you would expect to hear from me. But let me be equally clear about why I say it. In a nutshell, it flows from my conviction that the compelling factors behind the creation of the CIA are still present in the world that America must live in today.

The CIA was created by President Truman as an insurance policy against the kind of surprise that caught America off guard in World War II. He was also annoyed by the confused and conflicting nature of the reports landing on his desk from various departments. He wanted someone to make sense of them -- someone who had no policy axe to grind and someone whose exclusive mission was to work for him, and to

ensure that he was not taken off guard by dangerous developments overseas.

As I look at the world today, it is clear to me that the potential for dangerous surprise is as great as ever.

- That is true whether I look at terrorist groups whose sole purpose is to harm American interests, the biological weapons that Saddam Hussein is still trying to build and to hide in Iraq, or the programs Iran has for building intermediate range missiles and nuclear weapons.

- It is true when I look at the ethnic tensions that make life dangerous for US forces in Bosnia, the build up of North Korean forces near the DMZ, or the vast and unfinished transformations underway in countries with large nuclear arsenals, such as Russia and China.

Against that backdrop, we can debate whether or not CIA should exist, but I must tell you that I have no doubt about what the American people expect of us as long as we do. They want us to:

- Protect the lives of Americans everywhere;
- Protect our men and women in uniform and ensure that they dominate the battlefield whenever they are called and wherever they are deployed.
- They want us to protect Americans from threats posed by terrorists, drug traffickers or weapons of mass destruction.
- They want intelligence to arm our diplomats with critical insights and foreknowledge that can help them advance American interests and avert conflicts.
- They want us to focus not just on threats but also on opportunities -- opportunities to act before danger becomes disaster and opportunities to create circumstances favorable to America's interests.
- They want us to track and give advance warning about major geopolitical transformations in the world.
- And, they want our reporting and analysis to add real value to what they already know about the toughest problems facing the United States.

To live up to these expectations, we need to do four things very well.

- We need to produce outstanding all-source analysis that is timely, prescient, and persuasive.

- We need to mount imaginative and sophisticated clandestine human and technical operations in order to get vital information our nation cannot get in any other way.
- We need to be vigilant on the counterintelligence front.
- And, we need to sharpen CIA's capacity to effectively employ covert action on those occasions when our nation's leaders conclude that an important aim can be achieved through no other means.

These are essentially the 4 core mission areas of our business that I do not believe can be replicated anywhere else in our government.

It is against this backdrop, however, that we must address the key question of your conference because it is an important one. So let's talk about CIA:

- What does CIA bring to the table?
- Why is it important?
- What difference does it make?
- Is it an investment worth making?
- And perhaps most important, can the American people trust us to carry out our responsibilities in a manner consistent with the values of our democratic society?
- If we cannot answer these questions in a compelling and thoughtful way, then we should not exist.
- If we cannot prove to the President that we are making progress against the most difficult and enduring threats to our national security, then we should not exist.
- If we cannot prove that we will attack these targets with the highest standards of professional integrity, professional performance and dispassionate objectivity, then again we should not exist.

I believe we will meet these tests and, at the end of the day, we in the business of intelligence must have the courage and foresight to understand that this is precisely the kind of dialogue we must have with the American people.

For my part, I do not intend to spend a lot of time discussing the past. As in any

endeavor, we must learn from the past and never shy away from confronting mistakes. But as I said in my confirmation hearings, my gaze is fixed on the future, and on the task of creating the best intelligence service for the 21st century. Moreover, focusing on the past assumes that the CIA of yesterday is necessarily going to be the CIA of tomorrow. The fact is, the CIA has been, and must continue to be, an evolving institution. Not only have our targets changed, but the way we go about our work has changed -- in part because of the revolution in information and communications technology, and in part because of the vast amount of information which is now available to all of us.

In addition, our relationship to the rest of the federal government has changed. We are more transparent than we used to be to policymakers within the Executive branch, and more integrated into their decisionmaking. There are detailed procedures for coordinating our activities outside the United States which ensure that the President receives the views of other departments and agencies with legitimate interests in these activities before he approves them.

There also is intense scrutiny from the Congress, not only of our operational activities, but of our analysis as well. I dare say the CIA receives more oversight from the Congress than any other agency in the federal government. This is not a complaint. In fact, this oversight is our most vital and direct link to the American people—a source of strength that separates us from all other countries of the world.

So focusing on today, what do we bring to the table and what difference does it make?

I start with our analysis because, as former Director Dick Helms told our employees a few weeks ago, this is our “core function.” As I noted earlier, it is what motivated President Truman to create a Central Intelligence Agency. Truman wanted an Agency that could pull together the relevant information from all available sources bearing upon foreign policy matters, analyze it, and provide him a timely and objective assessment, free of a policy bias.

Does the President still need such a resource at his or her disposal? Having watched the decisionmaking process at the White House myself over the last five years, the answer must be a resounding “yes.” Indeed, there are far more sources of information available to a President today --and far more sources of intelligence information -- than could have been imagined in 1946.

If President Truman had trouble tracking events in the age of slow moving paper, imagine coping with the fire hose of information on world events that exists today. In my view, the CIA’s classic mission of separating fact from fiction and presenting analysis objectively has become only more important.

If the CIA did not pull it together, sort it out, and present it, who would? Some argue that individual agencies such as State and Defense should do it. But in my view, this would place an unfair burden on them. Our democratic system obliges these agencies to formulate policies on behalf of the President and to defend them in public and before the Congress. That is a heavy responsibility.

We also have to question whether it is realistic to assume that they also can collect and persuasively present information that would often raises questions about the very policies they espouse. That, in fact, is the role that CIA often fills as an independent source of information for the President -- a source that he or she can use to evaluate the policy positions being presented.

Earlier I asked you to consider whether support for the CIA is an investment worth making. That question can't be answered without understanding and appreciating the benefits derived from the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. Espionage, if you will.

When many people assert we no longer need CIA, they often mean the clandestine part. Well, think about it. The goal of our clandestine collection is very simple: it is to get for the United States vital information it cannot get in any other way.

We are not out to duplicate or compete with open sources of information. Access to countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya is denied, and we know that these governments are trying actively to deceive us.

We may be able to discern how well they are doing in developing their capabilities or how they intend to use them by taking pictures from the air or from intercepting their communications. But I can tell you that just as frequently, a human source is the key to understanding their true intentions and capabilities.

Where does that leave us? It leaves us trying to find people on the inside -- inside hostile and repressive regimes, inside drug cartels, inside terrorist groups -- people who will help fill in the picture or provide the missing pieces of the puzzle. Seeking this information, puts our people directly in harm's way in some of the world's most dangerous environments. So we must ask seriously, is it worth the effort and the risk entailed in trying to mount such operations? To answer that, you have to consider the magnitude of the harm that hostile states or lawless groups could potentially cause. While few may threaten our national survival, they do clearly threaten American lives.

Indeed, vital interests are often at stake in our dealings with other countries even when those countries do not threaten us with violence or military action. In those cases, we need to know if what they are telling us is true, what they say publicly as well as what they say privately. When there is reason to be skeptical of what other countries

are saying to us -- when we wonder what their true intentions are -- we at CIA seek independent verification.

Finally, let me turn to covert action. The National Security Act of 1947 defines it as action taken abroad to affect political, military, or economic conditions in other countries without the role of the US Government being revealed or becoming apparent.

Of the CIA's major functions, covert action is by far the smallest. It is also the most controversial, both with the public and the Congress. During the 40+ years of the Cold War, Presidents frequently turned to the CIA to undertake operations to thwart the spread of Communism where diplomatic means were ineffective or unavailable, and where military action would have raised the *ante* to an unacceptable level.

CIA maintains a capability to carry out such operations because every President since Truman has wanted to have this option available. Moreover, Congress has wanted the President to have this option.

We can argue, of course, about how this capability has been used in the past. There have been notable failures and impressive successes. But the fact remains: our leaders have wanted this capability, and they continue to want it.

Now, as I approach the close of my remarks, I'd like to put some questions on the table with the hope that they will give concreteness to your deliberations on the "added value" that intelligence can bring to national policymaking.

Ponder if you will how important it was to the United States to know about the missiles the Soviets put into Cuba in 1962 or to understand accurately the nature of Soviet weaponry as we sought to negotiate landmark arms control agreements.

Skipping thirty years ahead, how important was it in 1992 to accurately understand North Korea's developing nuclear capability as we sought to arrest it?

And now:

- How important is it, as the US seeks to disrupt the flow of poisonous drugs into our country, to have arrested or captured all of the Cali druglords?
- Or how valuable is it to have intelligence that helped defuse a crisis in the Taiwan strait, as was the case in 1996.
- Or to accurately portray a lessening of civil strife in Rwanda just last year which made it unnecessary to place US forces at risk there?
- What value should we place on intelligence that has helped protect our troops in

Bosnia -- so that there have been no casualties to date from hostilities.

- And how would world leaders have accurately documented the war crimes that occurred there without the clear intelligence provided to our policymakers and the United Nations.
- How important is it to have a CIA that is able to detect those that would steal our technology secrets for economic and military gain, and to protect our critical civil infrastructure against computer terrorism.

The list can go on, but my point is a simple one. To those who say the CIA is just another newsgathering organization or reference service, I have to say that they just don't "get it". Our mission is not to observe, or catalog or comment, it is to warn and protect.

In a world where the US has a significantly smaller military and much less global presence diplomatically than ten years ago, global intelligence reach becomes an even more critical deterrent to bad actors. The CIA gives the President and the Congress an extraordinary unilateral advantage to shape the global environment.

So how important is it to have a CIA? Vtally important.

As CIA celebrated its 50th Anniversary in September, President Clinton honored us by addressing our employees. He said: "As your first customer, I depend upon your unique, accurate intelligence more than ever. Your work informs every foreign policy decision I make, from dealings with leaders in the Middle East to Russia."

"You, better than most, understand that we are not free from risks. We still need dedicated men and women to monitor foreign communications and sound the right alarms. We still need analysts to weave varied strands of data into logical, honest assessments, and, when necessary, into warnings, and we still need sophisticated counterintelligence to keep our secrets in and keep foreign agents out."

I've thought a lot about Harry Truman as I prepared this speech. In fact, I walked by his photo portrait on our ground floor the other day. The inscription he wrote below his photograph reads simply: "To the CIA -- a necessity to the President of the United States -- from one who knows". My fondest hope is that this conference will help the American people come to know what Harry Truman knew.

In closing, I want the American people to know that the world is safer for them because of the CIA.

- I want them to know that we have a clear sense of purpose and mission.

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- I want them to understand that our intelligence activities are conducted in a way that is worthy of their trust, confidence, and continued support.
- And I want them to know that the men and women who serve in the Intelligence Community are the very best that this nation has to offer. America should know that these men and women take serious risks every single day to protect US lives and US interests. They do so in silence, without public acclaim, simply for the love of their country.

Thank you very much...and now ...let the debate begin... *(This is UNCLASSIFIED.)*

(Editor's Note: This is an edited copy of the transcript completed by the Federal News Service of the Question and Answer session following the DCI's address on the Future of the CIA at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, November 19, 1997.)

QUESTION: How do we, how can we know what Harry Truman knew if the CIA is not more forthcoming in declassifying classified materials. I mean, we're right now in a structure dedicated to preserving historical records, and yet it's become apparent recently that the CIA systematically destroyed part of this historical record—not recently, of course, but at one point. How do we know that that's not being considered even now or in the future?

DCI: I can only give you a categorical assurance that no one is destroying historical records. Let me say to you that I believe that an open dialogue with the American people about our successes and our failures are very important.

We've recently, by example, declassified 500 national Estimates, 11,000 pages of our thinking with regards to what the Soviet Union was or wasn't. We declassified thousands of pages of information from the Venona tapes, which you may know went back into the '40s and documented Russian espionage activities in the United States. We've declassified thousands of feet of Corona imagery to give people a sense of what our coverage was.

I believe that we have to continue down the road to have a meaningful interaction with historians and scholars on critical events in our history because it serves our scholarship, it serves an instructive use to our future officers. And I believe it's a benefit to us overall. I don't believe that we should hide behind the cloak of secrecy. But as the Director of Central Intelligence I also believe that I will be fair and relentless in the protection of sources and methods. And I believe that's a balance I can strike.

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QUESTION: Does the protection of sources and methods continue indefinitely into the future, or can we see a day, if you have a 50-year rule or a 75-year rule, or whatever, where at some point we can understand how the CIA actually did its job so we know how well the CIA did its job?

DCI: Well, I can only tell you that it's now a 30 year rule by Executive Order. I can only tell that each case will be different. And there is no automatic formula . . . . I would be lying to you if I said I can promise you that I'm going to declassify 30,000 documents tomorrow without care for what the sourcing was, the human beings involved, and the technical methods involved in our collection, because some of those people are still alive and some of those methods are still valuable. Having said that, we'll do it honestly, we'll try to do it openly, and we'll try to do it in a way that engages you in a way that I think you'll trust us.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

DCI: There are a number of parts to the issue: offense and defense. We talk about information operations today, but the world is now wiring itself into vast computer networks. It wouldn't shock you to know that people are attempting to penetrate these networks and penetrate our information systems for purposes that are not entirely good.

Someone brought down the 911 system in Miami a number of months ago; shut it down for three months. A hacker hacked-in and attacked our infrastructure. These are the kinds of threats that we are attempting to discern. The sophistication is out there, the technical damage is great. You can be remote, and it's difficult to track.

On the other side, we see that these computers and these networks also afford us opportunities. And we and the military are now trying to think through what the implications are for warfare in the future and what the implications are for our domestic protection. So it's a two-sided issue, and it's a very difficult issue, one that the government is struggling to evolve a policy about.

QUESTION: About 25 years ago, there was an effort made to upgrade the Defense Intelligence Agency people and organization. There has been some competition between the CIA and the upgraded DIA. Where do we stand today?

DCI: I think we stand at a very good place. I think that there is a real synergy between the civilian agency and the defense agencies, of which the Defense Intelligence Agency is only one. We attempt to rationalize our work so that we don't duplicate our work, particularly in the analytical arena.

But more importantly, the relationship that we have with our military customer

may be our most important relationship. We pay a lot of time and attention to it. And I think if you talk to our commanders in Bosnia and ask them about the synergy between the CIA and defense agencies and the quality of information that's presented, I think they would tell you it's the best intelligence story in the history of the United States, and it's something we've worked very, very hard on.

QUESTION: What about CIA's relationship to the NSA?

DCI: The relationship with NSA is a deep one and an important one for us. Remember, I talked about clandestine operations—human and technical. And the National Security Agency is a vital component of our community. And what we've done in the last few years, that I think is unprecedented, is we have tried to break down (Jim Woolsey started this, as did Bob Gates before him) the stovepipes in these disciplines to get them to cooperate more effectively, to bring all their talents together to attack problems together. You not only save some money, but you get more creative in the process. And I think that those relationships are better than they've ever been.

QUESTION: What can students be doing in school to prepare themselves for a role in the CIA.

DCI: That's a good question. We want a lot of distinguished University of Michigan students to come join us.

What they can do is be very, very good at what they do. The CIA employee of the future will be an engineer, will be a physicist, will be a chemist, will be a political science major. But we're looking for people who have a deep understanding of their disciplines, who understand foreign languages and foreign cultures.

But we employ so many different types of people. We're looking for people that will be challenged by the opportunity we provide them to deal with some of the toughest problems we face. And in return, we promise them a career structure that will educate them and nurture them and make them want to stay with us for many, many years.

So we recruit across disciplines. And the world and the threats we face dictate that we have a more diverse work force and a talent base that's far different than one we've ever had.

QUESTION: In the history of the CIA, human sources haven't always been the best method of gathering intelligence. In fact, during the Cold War, the CIA and American intelligence was more successful with satellites and technical intelligence, whereas the East Bloc was extremely successful with human sources. And part of the reason was that in the Soviet Union, it was a closed society and it wasn't easy to penetrate.

Now, I wonder, similarly, with the new geographical areas—you've identified North Korea, Iran—I mean, it 's going to take a long time training all these students in those languages and methods. And so I wonder whether one should really develop that area or maybe build on the technical strength?

DCI: I don't think it's an "either-or" proposition, as between the technical and human. Our disciplines have to be integrated in a way that they feed off of each other. And technical collection is enormously important, particularly about big things--military deployments, rocket tests. These are all things that we need to know about.

But at the end of the day, the penetration of these difficult places—the penetration of leadership structures, the understanding of how decisions are made—sometimes can be acquired technically, but more often than not, require us to have people who have the ability to recruit people in those societies. And there is a mix that we always have to maintain.

It's not an either-or proposition. If you have a wild swing one way, I can guarantee that your Intelligence Community won't function very, very effectively in the future.

QUESTION: I know you didn't want to talk too much about the past, but I wondered if you might address how the culture of the Agency has changed since the Church period, and when, you know, it was plain that the rule of law was not all that important to the Agency, particularly overseas, and when the standard now that I think you outlined is not necessarily the national security, but national interest, defined by the Administration, I suppose. Just how has the Agency changed from those days?

DCI: I didn't live there in those days. President Ford's right, I wasn't around at the creation. But let me just say that the commitment to Congressional oversight, for example, which is far more extensive than Americans understand, the commitment to play by the rules, the commitment to keep senior policy makers informed, the commitment not to surprise people, the commitment to think through how acts, if revealed, would strike the American people—these are all things that are ingrained in the people that work for us. This is not some rogue operation running around the world doing things that are inimical to American interests. It's a difficult image to dispel. That's not what's going on.

These people—as I said in my closing—I didn't throw it out because it was a nice thing to say—their dedication and commitment to this country and to the rule of law and to the standards of decency that they know Americans expect is something that I think we are succeeding and have succeeded in ingraining in this organization. The past is full of instances where we can learn from.

I would only note that when we look at the past, the focus has always been on

what the CIA did; the focus has never been on what the policymaker asked the CIA to do. It doesn't excuse your operational behavior when it's wrong, but the picture is not as myopic as sometimes it's portrayed. There's always a policy predicate that leads you someplace, whether it's a covert action or an operation. And sometimes, historians and others should backtrack that all the way back and ask questions historically about, well, what did the policymaker expect? What kind of standards did they impose? What was their thinking about what these operations would mean or not mean? I think we have a relationship today with our policymakers that's deep and abiding, and I think we are at a far different place than many people believed we were.

You know, there's a debate about Russian analysis. Harvard has just finished an extensive study about what we said about the Soviet Union in those years. People who did the analysis may present a more mixed picture. It's not always perfect and it's not always right, but each and every day, what you print is in front of the President of the United States.

There is no other agency in the government that prints every day and makes judgments for people. You're going to be wrong sometimes. The consequences of being wrong are serious, but it's not a "gotcha" game. When you're wrong, you have to stand up and say you were wrong and correct it. And this institution is resilient enough to do it and own up to what we do wrong or right.

So I think we have exactly the right tension and exactly the right flavor for the future.

**QUESTION:** You want to recruit the best you can for the technical and political/analytical roles. You said that you'd like to hold them for their careers. And one of the great features of this society is the openness and the mobility of people between private sector, public sector, Congress, and the CIA. How open are the records—let's say the talents and skills—of the people who work for you as they seek jobs in universities or in private think tanks or in corporations (as they leave)? And what is the career set of pathways for your good people on your analytical staff?

**DCI:** I must tell you, I don't know the complete answer. When someone leaves, how much do they come and tell their employer about. They certainly should have a responsibility to tell you where they worked. And depending on where they worked, they can certainly be open about what they've done—unless people are under cover and remain under cover. Then it becomes a more difficult issue.

**QUESTION:** What are the pathways of the people building their careers after 15 years in the CIA? Do they have a publication record? Are they able to document what they could do intellectually and analytically?

**DCI:** I think that sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. It's an excellent question,


because I believe that the toughest analytical questions that face us today will require a more open engagement with our academic community and our business community, and the trading of ideas in a way that I don't think we've done in the past.

We can't—as we focus on very difficult targets—know everything. And our analysts and the people that do this analytical work do today actively engage the academic community, do today present their views. And it's something that we simply have to do more of, so the academic community can make some judgments about the quality of the people that we have.

So in an era of openness, this is a vital strategy for our success in the future.  
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## SPEECHES / DOCUMENTS



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**Headlines:** DCI's Statement on the Worldwide Threat

STATEMENT BY  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
GEORGE J. TENET  
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY  
THREATS

28 January 1998

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee again this year on the worldwide threats to our national security. I have submitted a detailed Statement for the Record and would like to summarize its key points in my opening remarks.

Before plunging into the details, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to step back for a moment and put the threats to our security into a broader strategic context. Scholars and pundits, as you know, are still struggling to capture the essence of this post-Cold War world we live in, but no one, in my view, has quite put their finger on the things that make it uniquely challenging for US interests. From the perspective of an intelligence officer, Mr. Chairman, I think it comes down to three words: **complexity, scope, and speed.**

Let me explain what I mean.

- I say **complexity** because, as my testimony will make clear, the dangers facing the United States today -- ranging from chemical warfare to terrorism, regional crises, and societal turmoil -- are linked in unprecedented ways and frequently span multiple

countries or continents. Dealing with them therefore requires multiple intelligence disciplines, along with the combined tools of diplomacy, law enforcement, and sometimes, military force.

- When I talk about **scope**, I am saying simply that today we must worry as much about a hard-to-detect small scale biological weapons producer as we do about the large scale nuclear weapons that we have focused on for years. And we must help our military achieve dominance in situations ranging from peacekeeping to sustained combat.
- And when I refer to **speed**, I mean that we are living in an era of incredibly rapid technological change. We see this in everything from weapons technology to the global communications revolution that provides the means for its rapid dissemination and which is likely to revolutionize our worldview in so many other ways.

Moving on to specifics, Mr. Chairman, I see five key challenges as I look at the world in 1998 and beyond:

- At the top of my list this year I place a set of **transnational issues** that pose dangers to the lives of all Americans, especially American troops abroad, while also threatening US strategic interests in important ways. These issues include the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), international terrorism, drug trafficking, information warfare and, most recently, the fallout from the Asian financial crisis.
- Second, Mr. Chairman, the stakes remain high for the United States in countries like **China** and **Russia** as they struggle through unprecedented political and economic transformations.
- Third, are the challenges facing us from countries that continue in the post-Cold War era to view the United States with varying degrees of hostility or suspicion--**Iraq**, **North Korea**, **Libya**, **Sudan**, and in a more complicated way this year, **Iran**.
- Fourth, we are challenged still by **regional trouble spots** that could flare into conflict, whether in the Middle East, South Asia, the Aegean, or Bosnia.
- Fifth, we must continue to be alert to **humanitarian emergencies**--caused by natural disasters, ethnic conflict, and foreign government mismanagement--that emerge rapidly and place heavy demands on US military and financial resources.

#### CHALLENGE I: TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, in today's world few events occur in isolation, and national boundaries are much less reliable shields against danger. Emblematic of this new era is an

assortment of transnational issues that hold grave threats for the United States. That is where I would like to begin today.

### Proliferation

I am most concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the proliferation of WMD because of the direct threat this poses to the lives of Americans. Despite some successes for US policy and US intelligence, technologies related to this threat continue to be available, and potentially hostile states are still developing and deploying WMD-related systems. Efforts to halt proliferation continue to be complicated, moreover, by the fact that most WMD programs are based on technologies and materials that have civil as well as military applications. Finally, a growing trend toward indigenous production of WMD-related equipment has decreased the effectiveness of sanctions and other national and multinational tools designed to counter proliferation.

**Chinese and Russian** assistance to proliferant countries requires particular attention, despite signs of progress. My statement for the record provides the details but some key points should be made here.

With regard to **China**, its defense industries are under increasing pressure to become profit making organizations--an imperative that can put them at odds with US interests. Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in these countries.

On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.

But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching.

The **Russian proliferation** story is similar. On paper, Russia's export controls specifically regulate the transfer of missile-related technologies as well as missile components. But the system has not worked well, and proliferant countries have taken advantage of its shortcomings.

Iran is one of those countries. When I testified here a year ago, Mr. Chairman, I said that Iran, which had received extensive missile assistance from North Korea, would

probably have medium-range missiles capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and Israel in less than ten years.

Since I testified, Iran's success in gaining technology and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium range missile much sooner than I assessed last year.

Following intense engagement with the United States, Russian officials have taken some positive steps. Just last week Prime Minister Chernomyrdin issued a broad decree prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items that would be used for developing WMD or their delivery systems—whether or not these items are on Russia's export control list. If it is enforced, this could be an important step in keeping Iran from getting the technology it needs to build missiles with much longer ranges.

Without minimizing the importance of Russia's response, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that it is too soon to close the books on this matter. Russian action is what matters, and therefore monitoring Russian proliferation behavior will have to be a very high priority for some time to come.

Mr. Chairman, in focusing on China and Russia, we should not lose sight of other **proliferators**. **North Korea** is the most notable here, as it continues to export missile components and materials to countries of proliferation concern.

Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in focusing on **Iran's** acquisition of WMD technology—as we should since it is one of the most active countries seeking such materials—we cannot lose sight of other proliferants.

- **Iraq** retains the technological expertise to quickly resurrect its WMD program if UN inspections were ended.
- **Syria** continues to seek missile-related equipment and materials.
- Despite the UN embargo, **Libya** continues to aggressively seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and technology.

### Asian Economic Instability

Moving on to a very different transnational challenge, Mr. Chairman, the recent **financial troubles in Asia** remind us that global markets are so interconnected—and that economics and politics are so intertwined—that economic problems in one country can have far reaching consequences for others.

At the root of this crisis is a confluence of economic, social, and political factors.

- Soaring growth and financial systems that lacked adequate regulation led to a speculative boom.
- Lending decisions by banks and finance companies ignored fundamental economic risks and when export growth began to slow regionally in 1995, corporate borrowers had trouble repaying loans. Faced with high levels of short term debt and limited foreign exchange reserves, Thailand first and then Indonesia and South Korea were forced to devalue their currencies. Because of the high level of economic integration and reaction of investors, the currency crisis spread rapidly to other countries in the region.
- The crisis has been difficult to resolve, in part because governments must take some politically risky steps like closing weak banks and shelving projects that will add to unemployment.

The current troubles in Asia will, of course, have economic costs for the United States – most important, a reduction in US exports to the region. But the troubles also carry political risks. Social tensions which we already see in Indonesia and other states in the region, are likely to increase as prices go up for things like food and fuel, and as unemployment rises.

### International Terrorism

Turning now to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, I must stress that the threat to US interests and citizens worldwide remains high. Even though the number of international terrorist incidents in 1997 was about the same as 1996, US citizens and facilities suffered more than 30 percent of the total number of terrorist attacks--up from 25 percent last year.

Moreover, there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of attacks, especially against civilian targets. The most recent examples, of course, are the suicide bombings in Israel in 1996 and 1997 and the attacks on tourists in Luxor, Egypt last November. Perhaps most worrisome, we have seen in the last year growing indications of terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

In addition, a confluence of recent developments increases the risk that individuals or groups will attack US interests. Terrorist passions have probably been inflamed by events ranging from the US Government's designation of 30 terrorist groups to the conviction and sentencing of Mir Aimal Kasi and Ramzi Ahmed Yosuf as well as the ongoing US standoff with Iraq and frustration with the Middle East peace process.

Among specific countries, Iran remains a major concern, despite the election of a more moderate president. Since President Khatami assumed office in August, Iran has continued to engage in activities, such as support for Hizballah and its Palestinian

clients, that would not require his specific approval.

**Iraq, Sudan, and Libya** also bear continued watching, both for their own activities and for their support of terrorist organizations.

### International Narcotics

Turning to the **international narcotics threat**, I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, that the illicit drug industry is adapting to the counterdrug successes that we and other governments have had in recent years. Most worrisome, the narcotics underworld is becoming more diverse and fragmented. In addition, traffickers are infusing their business with new technologies to enhance their operations, hide their illicit earnings, and improve their security.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to downplay the impressive progress that has been made against drug traffickers, especially those that deal in **cocaine**.

- You know of the arrest of the Cali kingpins in Colombia—which has disrupted long-held smuggling patterns there and forced traffickers still at large into hiding.
- Drug interdiction efforts in Peru, once the world's leading producer of the leaf used to make cocaine, have seriously damaged that country's drug economy and led to a 40 percent decline in cultivation over the last two years.

The cocaine trade, however, is still a formidable challenge – thanks to the industry's ability to adapt.

- Our success against the Cali kingpins has nurtured smaller groups that now dominate trafficking through the Caribbean.
- Violent Mexican drug cartels are exploiting the Cali mafia's setbacks to wrestle away a greater share of the international drug business.
- Despite declines in Peru and Bolivia, coca production continues to expand in southern Colombia -- where the new ingredient is the involvement of insurgents who tax drug profits to fund their war against the state.

I'm also concerned, Mr. Chairman, about developments in international **heroin** trafficking.

- Worldwide production of opium -- the source of all refined heroin -- continues at record levels.
- And heroin traffickers are exploiting weak enforcement institutions in the former

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to expand traditional heroin smuggling routes from the Golden Crescent and, to a lesser extent, the Golden Triangle regions.

### International Organized Crime

As for **international organized crime**, the globalization of business and technology have given crime syndicates unprecedented opportunities for illicit activities. Yet law enforcement authorities often remain constrained by national sovereignty and jurisdictions.

Trends that cause us the greatest concern are:

- An increasingly sophisticated financial system that includes emerging financial secrecy havens, stretching from islands in the Caribbean to the South Pacific.
- A broader array of seemingly legitimate businesses that serve as fronts for criminal enterprise.
- The increasing role of gray arms brokers in arming rogue states, terrorists, and criminal groups. The activities of arms brokers make it even more difficult to judge when such actions are supported by governments and when they are not.

### Information Warfare

As you know, Mr. Chairman, all of this is occurring in what we all call the "Information Age." With that in mind, it is clear that foreign entities are aware that an increasing proportion of our civil and military activity depends on the secure and uninterrupted flow of digital information.

In fact, we have identified several countries that have government - sponsored information warfare programs underway. It's clear that those developing these programs recognize the value of attacking a country's computer systems -- both on the battlefield and in the civilian arena. In addition, I believe terrorist groups and other non-state actors will increasingly view information systems in the United States as a target.

Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that we are increasing our efforts to uncover information warfare activities. We are also developing the tools needed to improve our ability to detect and counter information warfare attacks.

- This is an enormously complex, sensitive, and innovative endeavor, Mr. Chairman, that will require insights from law enforcement and the private sector in order to fully succeed.

## CHALLENGE II: Russia and China in Transition

Moving beyond these transnational issues, Mr. Chairman, I want to focus for a moment on a second major challenge: the still unsettled state of affairs in key countries like Russia and China--one time Cold War adversaries who now have the potential to be major partners.

### Russia

Today we see hopeful signs that the seeds of democracy and a free market economy sown in **Russia** just a few years ago have taken root. Moreover, Moscow cooperates with the United States and the West in ways that were unimaginable during Soviet times.

But whether Russia succeeds as a stable democracy, reverts to the autocratic and expansionist impulses of its past, or degenerates into instability remains an open question. The answer will depend in large part on how Russia copes with several major challenges.

- Democratic political institutions, while developing, are not yet deeply rooted. The executive branch and Communist-dominated Duma often deadlock, while crime and corruption threaten to undermine confidence in political and economic reform.
- Russia has implemented many economic reforms and achieved a measure of economic stability, but long-term steady growth is still dependent on other reforms--namely ensuring that economic activities are governed by the rule of law.

The Russian military, meanwhile, continues to suffer from serious social and economic difficulties. Finding the wherewithal to pay the retirement costs of over 250,000 redundant military officers will be a particular challenge.

Despite these difficult times for the military, Russia retains a major nuclear arsenal--some 6,000 deployed strategic warheads. As long as there is even the slightest doubt about future political stability in Russia, those weapons must be a major preoccupation for US intelligence.

- We must also remain mindful that Russia continues a wide-range of development programs for conventional and strategic forces.

Finally, while Russia continues to seek close cooperation with the United States on matters of mutual concern, it is increasingly strident in opposing what it sees as US efforts to create a "unipolar" world. And Moscow continues to place a high priority on keeping others from gaining undue influence in the New Independent States--especially

in the energy rich Caucasus and Central Asia.

### China

Turning now to **China**, the leadership there has a clear goal: the transformation of their country into East Asia's major power and a leading world economy on a par with the United States by the middle of the 21st Century.

It is too soon to say what this portends, Mr. Chairman -- whether China in the future will be an aggressive or a benign power. What is clear, though, is that China will be an increasingly influential player -- one that will have the capacity to, at a minimum, alter our security calculus in the Far East.

Hong Kong's 1997 reversion to Chinese rule was peaceful but involved important changes to the political system. The Chinese Government disbanded the existing legislative council and installed a hand-picked provisional legislature. A key question now is whether new legislative elections scheduled for May will be free and fair.

Cross-strait relations with Taiwan are still tense. China has not renounced the use of force and is placing its best new military equipment opposite Taiwan.

Chinese military modernization remains a key leadership goal. China is increasing the size and survivability of its retaliatory nuclear missile force and is taking important steps toward building a modern navy capable of fighting beyond China's coastal waters.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership shows no signs of abandoning Communist political ideology, although it has committed itself to market-oriented economic reforms. These are eroding State control over major sectors of the economy as well as over the daily life of many Chinese citizens.

### **CHALLENGE III: Regional Troublemakers**

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to states for whom the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to hostility to the United States.

### Iran

Among these countries, **Iran** in many respects represents the greatest challenge we will face over the next year. It appears to us that a genuine struggle is now underway between hardline conservatives and more moderate elements represented by Iran's new President Khatami. And so the challenge is how to cope with a still dangerous state in which some positive changes may be taking place--changes that could, and I stress could--lead to a less confrontational stance toward the United States.

Khatami's strongest card is his electoral mandate - - a 70 percent vote representing mostly youth and women, as well as ethnic and religious minorities in Iran. Since assuming office in August, he has made limited but real progress toward fulfilling his campaign pledges for political and social reforms.

- He gained approval for a new cabinet that puts his people in key posts such as the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Culture.
- Censorship is now less oppressive, with previously banned periodicals reappearing and socially controversial films being shown.
- And against this backdrop, there is even renewed debate about a central tenet of the revolution - - rule by a supreme religious leader.

Progress is likely to be fitful, however, and hard-line elements remain formidable obstacles.

- They still control the country's defense and security organizations, for example, and therefore exert heavy influence on issues most vital to the United States.

Statements by Khatami and his foreign ministry suggest he is trying to play a more constructive role in the international community. It is simply too early to tell, however, whether this will lead to demonstrable changes in Iranian policies that matter most to the United States. We have seen no reduction in Iran's efforts to support Hizballah, radical Palestinians, and militant Islamic groups that engage in terrorism.

Moreover, even as it attempts to improve its international image, Tehran is continuing to bolster its military capabilities. Iran is improving its ability potentially to interdict the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. It has acquired Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is upgrading its antiship-missile capabilities.

- And, as I noted earlier, Iran continues its efforts to acquire the capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction.

### North Korea

Turning to **North Korea**, we also face a more complex challenge than last year--some progress but in the face of a worsening economic and social situation and a continued real military threat.

The North is still observing the terms of the Agreed Framework that directly relate to freezing its nuclear reactor program. The IAEA has maintained a continued presence at Yongbyon since the May 1994 refueling of the reactor, and P'yongyang and the IAEA

continue to discuss steps the North needs to take to come into full compliance with its safeguards commitments.

Amidst these signs of progress, however, a combination of economic stagnation and social decay continues to raise doubts about North Korean stability.

North Korea's spreading economic failure is eroding the stability of the regime of Kim Chong-il. Industrial and agricultural output continues to drop. The North's most recent fall grain harvest was far less than the 4.5 million tons the North needs to meet even minimal rations. Crime, corruption and indiscipline, including in the security services and military, are increasing, and people are more willing to blame Kim Chong-il for their plight.

While Kim reportedly is aware of the economic problems and their impact on soldiers and civilians, his legitimacy remains closely tied to his father's legacy. As a result, P'yongyang likely will avoid an avowedly reformist agenda and will try to package any reform experiments in traditional ideological terms. As such, significant improvements in the economy do not seem to be in the cards.

Its economic weaknesses notwithstanding, North Korea retains a military with the capability to inflict serious damage on South Korea and the 37,000 US troops deployed there.

- The North's offensive posture along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) means that it could go to war with little additional preparation.
- And North Korea's long-range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles near the DMZ, some of which could deliver chemical warfare agents, can hit forward defenses, US military installations, airfields and seaports, and Seoul.

### Iraq

Mr. Chairman, Iraq, under Saddam, continues to present a serious threat to US forces, interests and allies. Our principal aim must be to ensure that Saddam does not have weapons of mass destruction or the capacity to regain any he has lost.

As my statement for the record points out in greater detail, we assess that Iraq continues to hide critical WMD production equipment and material from UN inspectors.

- Continued UN sanctions can keep pressure on his regime and cast uncertainty over Saddam's hold on power.
- But, as you know Mr. Chairman, Saddam is pushing more aggressively than last year to erode the sanctions regime.

More than seven years of sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iraq's economy. Inflation is soaring, the civilian infrastructure is deteriorating, and the Iraqi population continues to suffer from high rates of malnutrition and inadequate services--in part because of Saddam's manipulation of relief supplies. Key regime officials and support organizations remain largely immune to the harsh living conditions facing the general population and even live off revenues generated through illicit trade--a fact that engenders resentment and poses an underlying threat to Saddam and his family.

While its military forces continue to slowly deteriorate under UN sanctions and the arms embargo implemented after the Gulf War, Iraq remains an abiding threat to internal oppositionists and smaller regional neighbors.

#### CHALLENGE IV: REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS

Mr. Chairman, I propose again this year to provide you a brief description of where we stand in several potential "hot spots." As I did last year, I will focus on the situation in the **Middle East, South Asia, and Bosnia.**

##### Middle East

- With regard to the **Middle East**, Mr. Chairman, my bottom line message must be that the region is more volatile and more troubled than when I testified here last year. Many of the threats I have discussed today intersect in the Middle East, where the historic strife and distrust that mark the region are now aggravated by the spread of sophisticated weapons programs, an upsurge in terrorism, and demographic trends that point to heightened social tensions.
- Against this backdrop, the **peace process** has foundered, with dangerous implications for all of the parties.
- **Iraq**, as noted earlier, continues to defy the international community's effort to deny it the means to again commit aggression.
- And some of the fixed points have begun to change, **Iran** in particular, but not so conclusively as to permit a dropping of our guard.
- Meanwhile, **world demand for imported energy** will ensure the region's strategic importance, along with the active, and sometimes competitive, engagement of many nations.

In short, Mr. Chairman **the period ahead is one of enormous challenge** for the United States as it seeks to ensure stability, prosperity, and peace in this most critical of regions.

### South Asia

In **South Asia**, relations between India and Pakistan remain poor. The long-standing dispute over Kashmir remains a major sticking point. A modest India-Pakistan dialogue is underway, though progress is certain to be slow and subject to abrupt setbacks. We cannot be sure this tentative dialogue will continue when a new Indian government assumes office after national elections in March.

The stakes of conflict are high, because both countries have nuclear capabilities and have or are developing ballistic missile delivery systems. Although Indian and Pakistani officials say deterrence has worked for years, it would be at risk in a crisis.

### Bosnia and the Balkans

Turning to **Bosnia**, Mr. Chairman, the story is progress but with significant remaining challenges. On the positive side, developments in recent months have somewhat improved the prospects for Dayton implementation.

- The emergence in the Republika Srpska of a government backed by Muslim and Croat deputies is a breakthrough that --if sustained -- could accelerate the pace of Dayton implementation.
- At the same time, the High Representative is using his new authority to impose solutions on the parties to reinforce central institutions.
- Bosnia's military forces remain demobilized with their heavy weapons stored in sites that are regularly inspected by SFOR. Furthermore, each army has significantly reduced its heavy weapons under the Dayton-mandated arms control agreement.
- Iran has terminated its military aid and training in Bosnia and has focused its involvement on economic assistance.
- Although Bosnians are a long way from regaining their pre-war standard of living, significant economic growth has resumed and unemployment is starting to decline.

Relatively little progress has been made, however, in implementing minority returns and other provisions of Dayton relating to freedom of movement and resettlement. The OSCE goal of 220,000 returns in 1997 was only about half met, and the bulk of those who did return went to majority areas.

Looking to the future, most Bosnians recognize that continued international engagement is essential for keeping the peace. Such involvement is required to

continue weakening the hardline nationalists who are obstructing Dayton, and national elections in 1998 might increase the political clout of opponents of the nationalists who currently dominate the three communities.

In addition, a number of volatile issues could still disrupt the gradual process of reconciliation. These include the Brcko arbitration decision--postponed last year but expected in March and the UN's stated goal of returning 50,000 refugees to minority areas during the first six months of 1998. In addition, continuing mutual distrust between Muslims and Croats will hamper the effort to create a functioning Federation.

I must also note the threat of instability in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, where animosity remains high between the 90 percent Albanian majority and the local Serbian residents. There is increasing support for violence as a way to resolve the situation.

### The Aegean

Turning to the Aegean, there is reason for increased concern about tensions between Greece and Turkey, particularly in the wake of the EU summit decision to proceed with membership negotiations with Cyprus--while rebuffing Turkey's application--and the expected arrival of SA-10 air defense batteries from Russia this summer. Ongoing disputes over air and sea delineations in the Aegean have also heightened long-standing Greek-Turkish animosity.

### **CHALLENGE V: HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES**

Mr. Chairman, last year I concluded my briefing by discussing with you the challenge posed to US citizens and interests by **humanitarian crises** whose origins often go back many years but which can escalate with dramatic suddenness. I regret to say that the dimension of this challenge remains unchanged.

- The totality of the problem is similar to that I described last year: 34 million people worldwide unable to return to their homes; more than 20 million internally displaced; 14.5 million refugees.

As it was last year, **Africa** is the region most troubled by these crises--with attendant calls on US and UN resources to assist relief operations and attendant risks to US citizens caught up in violence.

We have no reason to believe that 1998 in Africa will be any more stable than was 1997. The instability in central Africa that led to the overthrow of governments in Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville) last year lingers, and it is probably only a matter of time until serious problems erupt again in Burundi and Rwanda. Apart from ethnic and political conflict, for the coming months the impact of El Nino, particularly in southern and

eastern Africa, will bear careful watching--especially water shortages and consequent food scarcity.

**CONCLUDING COMMENTS**

I hope these and the other challenges I have discussed with you today illustrate why I opened these remarks by referring to **complexity, broad scope, and speed** as the touchstones of this new era . These challenges will require the most sophisticated intelligence collection and analysis that we can produce. Only by continuing to invest in this kind of effort can the Intelligence Community play the role it must in protecting American lives, guarding American interests, and sustaining American leadership.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your questions at this time.

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## SPEECHES / DOCUMENTS



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April 6, 1998

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Remarks on "Information Security Risks, Opportunities, and the Bottom Line"

(U) Remarks as prepared for delivery by DCI George J. Tenet at the Sam Nunn NationsBank Policy Forum

"Information Security Risks, Opportunities, and the Bottom Line"

Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta

April 6, 1998

Senator Nunn, President Clough, Dean Freeman, General Marsh, Ladies and Gentlemen:

On February 26, the Washington Post reported that eleven US military systems were subjected to an "electronic assault." While the perpetrators were not initially known, they hid their tracks by routing their attack through the United Arab Emirates computer systems. While no classified systems were penetrated and no classified records were accessed, logistics, administration, and accounting systems were accessed. These systems are the central core of data necessary to manage our military forces and deploy them to the field. In the end, we found that two young hackers from California had perpetrated the attacks via the UAE under the direction of a teenage hacker from Israel.

This shouldn't surprise us. A recent DoD study said that DoD systems were attacked a quarter of a million times in 1995. As a test, a Defense Department organization that same year conducted 38,000 attacks of their own. They were successful 65 percent of the time. And 63 percent of the attacks went completely undetected.

We have spent years making systems interoperable, easy to access, and easy to use. Yet we still rely on the same methods of security that we did when data systems consisted of large mainframe computers, housed in closed rooms with limited physical access.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are currently building an information infrastructure—the most complex systems the world has ever known—on an insecure foundation. We have ignored the need to built trust into our systems. Simply hoping that someday we can add the needed security before it's too late is not a strategy.

Protecting our critical information infrastructure is an issue that I am deeply concerned about and one that requires attention from us all. Our national security and our economic well being depend upon it, and I am thankful that Senator Nunn and others have chosen to bring this issue to the forefront to engage the leaders of industry in finding creative solutions to this difficult issue.

I want to explore three themes today.

--First, we are growing increasingly dependent on information systems for commercial and government activities.

--Second, our adversaries recognize this dependence and are developing tools to attack our information systems.

--Third, protecting our systems will require an unprecedented level of cooperation between government and the private sector.

Our American way of life increasingly relies on electronic networks for the flow of essential information. As General Marsh just said, information networks are becoming a backbone service we take for granted, much like we take electricity for granted today. Every time we flick on a light switch, every time we use an ATM, every time we pick up the phone ,we rely on the secure and uninterrupted flow of digital information and the computers that control it.

Protecting our critical information systems and the data on them will be key to our survival as the world's leading economic power and as the world's leader in information technology. You know far better than I that the Internet and other digital networks will create enormous opportunities for American business in a world where electronic commerce and information flows without geographic boundaries.

The business of national security also relies on information technology and information systems. More than 95 percent of all defense telecommunications travel on commercial circuits and networks. Many of these networks provide vital connectivity between facilities here and those overseas. These links allow the Defense Department to operate with greater efficiency and at considerable savings.

Operation Desert Storm highlighted the increasing reliance of US forces on information-based technologies. Seven years ago deploying to the Gulf meant not only high-tech weaponry and sophisticated intelligence systems but also a communications volume of 100,000 messages and 700,000 telephone calls a day. There is little doubt that information superiority will be key to surviving and winning military conflicts in the 21st century.

Unfortunately, our heavy and growing societal and strategic dependence on information technologies and information systems has created vulnerabilities—vulnerabilities to our economic institutions, to the systems supporting public needs, to our privacy, and to our military capabilities. I know that the extent of our vulnerability is still to be studied and debate.

While the technical experts sort out the strengths and weaknesses in our information systems, I, as the Director of Central Intelligence, have the job of determining what foreign entities may be doing to penetrate, damage, or destroy our information systems; in short, I'm talking about Information Warfare.

The White House, the Congress, the Defense Department, and public audiences like you increasingly ask me about the IW threat. I am here to tell you that the threat is real and it's growing.

The number of known potential adversaries conducting research on information attacks is increasing rapidly and includes intelligence services, military organizations, and non-state entities.

Technology will increase the sophistication of their capabilities and will continue to reduce the cost of attack and the risk if security remains where it is today.

So it is reasonable to expect that, unless something is done to improve security, the number of attacks and the damage they can do will continue to grow.

Attackers have plenty of incentives.

--Trillions of dollars in financial transactions and commerce moving over a medium that has minimal protection and sporadic law enforcement.

--Increasing quantities of intellectual property residing on networked systems.

--And the opportunity to disrupt military effectiveness and public safety, with elements of surprise and anonymity.

Who would do such a thing? Attackers include national intelligence and military

organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial competitors, hackers, and aggrieved or disloyal insiders. Each of these adversaries is motivated by different objectives and constrained by different levels of resources, technical expertise, access to the target, and risk tolerance.

All of these adversaries are competent to conduct cyber attacks, but the state sponsored terrorists and military IW people pose the greatest risk to our critical infrastructure because they have the greatest knowledge and resources.

I can tell you that foreign governments and their military services are paying increasing attention to the concept of "Information Warfare." Foreign military writings discuss the importance of disrupting the flow of information in combat. The battlespace of the future will also extend to our domestic information infrastructure, such as our electric power grids and our telecommunications networks—in short, the foundations of our economy.

Terrorists and criminal groups have been using encryption and other information technologies to hide their operations for some time. Terrorist groups now have their own web pages. The emerging trend now is for these groups to use those technologies offensively; that is, to gain access to information systems in order to damage them or to steal data. I can tell you that the level of sophistication of their attacks is growing.

The IW threat is something we all have to worry about and take action to protect ourselves against. Many of the threats that private sector CEOs face are similar to ours in government—the same cyber tools, techniques, and skills are used against both our assets. I call this "shared vulnerabilities." Though expensive, building reliable security measures is less costly than suffering the theft of the "crown jewels." And the more widespread the use of effective security technology, the lower the cost. Bank CEOs don't think twice about making physical security investments in vault doors, alarms, and so forth—investments which are hugely more costly than the investments currently being made in cyber security. But how many vault doors will banks need in an era of cyber cash and smart cards?

The most important action that I can take as Director of Central Intelligence is to provide adequate warning of cyber threats to our nation's security decisionmakers in Washington and military command posts overseas. Through existing mechanisms, threat information can be passed to the private sector.

To perform our warning function, intelligence analysts need to have the information that will allow them to assess foreign intentions and capabilities.

Unfortunately, cyber threats are a difficult intelligence target. They are cheap, they require little infrastructure, and the technology required is dual use. In short, they are exceptionally easy to conceal.

In addition, intrusion detection technology is still in its infancy. When attacks are detected, the source of the attack is often disguised. Attacks are difficult to trace, particularly since the US government is not allowed to conduct hot pursuit without a warrant.

These are enormous challenges and we in the Intelligence Community are taking them on. Most importantly, we have taken steps to focus our analytic and collection resources on this threat. I have also taken steps to increase the level of cooperation between intelligence analysts and their counterparts in the law enforcement community.

We as a nation need to develop totally new ways of thinking about this problem. Just as we took on the Soviet nuclear threat in the middle of this century, we will need new collection disciplines, new analytic approaches, and new partnerships to deal with the information warfare threat in the 21st century. Neither government nor industry can solve these problems alone. We will have a much better chance of finding solutions if we work together over the long haul.

So what is needed is obvious to all—security. What is less discussed is the need to bind a system of trust to the security systems. This is the only way that security will be truly achieved.

What do I mean? Security is concerned with locks, fences, and guards. Trust is about whether they work. In network terms, security is not just about encryption, but also is about authentication, digital signatures, data integrity, and non-repudiation. Trust is about key management, digital certificates, and policy—such as what your privileges are, what you are authorized to do with your digital signature.

Much of the public discussion and rhetoric is about encryption—with little attention focused on what is needed to make the use of encryption trustworthy. The technology to bring good information security to networks is fairly well developed and understood. It is based on the use of public key encryption and digital signatures. The means to provide trust is less well understood and is called key management infrastructure. It is the system that binds public keys to users and provides the trust component in electronic security.

The true potential of encryption will not be realized without key management infrastructures that provide this trust. These infrastructures allow the generation and distribution of encryption keys to a large number of people, making it possible for millions to communicate easily with each other without advance preparation to distribute an encryption/decryption key. They ensure that communications across networks are trustworthy—so that individuals will have confidence in the identification of those with whom they communicate.

Efforts to provide key management infrastructure services for products with encryption are currently uncoordinated, immature, and lagging behind the introduction of electronic commerce services.

The result is twofold:

--First, products without a supporting infrastructure are usually not interoperable or scalable.

--Second, the security of new network services is poor. The use of encryption without digital certificate services, digital signature, and authentication provide inadequate trust for widespread use.

The problem of trust will require shared effort across industry and government. Neither of us can solve it alone. The lack of trust is neither an entirely public nor an entirely private problem.

The risk electronic networks pose without solving the trust issue is common to government, business, and citizens alike. Reducing that risk will require coordinated efforts within and between the private and public sectors.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot keep building new capabilities on a poor foundation of security. We cannot ignore the need to build trust into our information systems any longer. It is folly to hope that someday we can add needed elements before it's too late. The longer we wait, the more our country is exposed, and the costlier it will be to address the problem.

Think about it—we share the same network with our adversaries. I will say it again: We are staking our future on a resource that we have not yet learned to protect. The number of known potential adversaries conducting research on information attacks is growing rapidly. Technology is increasing the sophistication of their capabilities. Meanwhile, if our security remains where it is now, the risks and costs of attacking us will keep getting lower. Government and industry are in this together and we must work the problems together.


The need for cooperation between government and industry in building trustworthy key management infrastructure is paramount to meeting our common interests of electronic networks that meet our business needs without introducing vulnerabilities into those systems.

This may be among the most important questions for American leadership as we approach the next century. The vitality of our industry depends on it, the security of our country depends on it, and the solutions depend on trust.

If we are going to lead the world in information technology, we must recreate the trust that existed between our government and industry that allowed us to lead the free world for over 40 years. We still have the power to lead by our example, and we still have time to do this right.

I want to again express my gratitude to Sam Nunn, Georgia Tech, Emory University, and NationsBank for giving me this opportunity to present my perspective on this compelling national security issue. Sam Nunn continues to be a driving force on this topic and I am looking forward to continuing the dialogue. *(This is UNCLASSIFIED.)*

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cJuly 15, 1998..

**Headlines:** (U) cDCI-Statement\_on\_Declassification ;**(U) DCI Statement on Declassification**

The core of my job as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is to mobilize the collection and analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. intelligence agencies to ensure that our national leaders have the information necessary for informed policy decision making. Although much of our work must be done in secrecy, we have a responsibility to the American people, and to history, to account for our actions and the quality of our work. Accordingly, I have made a serious commitment to the public release of information that with the passage of time no longer needs to be protected under our security classification system.

Indeed, the CIA, like all agencies of the U.S. Government, is charged by Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information often retains its sensitivity for many years—even decades—there will eventually come a time when the information produced by such sources and methods can be released to the public without harm to the national security. While the Executive Order provides us authority to protect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and we must take care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses to work with us, the goal of our declassification program is to identify and release as much of the information as we can, as soon as we can, without harm to our national security interests.

**Growing Demand for Information**

(I suspect, in fact, that the public has relatively little appreciation of the extent to which the CIA is already involved in declassification efforts.)

- We declassify records requested by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Review Board.

- We declassify records requested by the State Department for its *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.

- We declassify records in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. And the public is probably unaware that not only are we required to answer requests from American citizens and corporations, but also from foreign nationals and foreign organizations as well.

- We declassify records in response to special requests from the Executive Branch and Congress, to include documents pertaining to POW/MIA matters, foreign human rights abuses, Gulf War Veterans illnesses, Nazi gold, and a myriad of other topics under investigation by Executive agencies or congressional committees at any given time.

- And we are reviewing for declassification all nonexempt records 25-years old or older. In the case of the CIA, this amounts to some 40-60 million pages of classified materials.

None of this is easy. There are no shortcuts here. It takes experienced, knowledgeable people sitting down with each document and going over it page by page, line by line. There is no alternative. We take our obligation to protect those who have worked with us in the past very seriously. We also have to consider the impact of release on our ongoing diplomatic and intelligence relationships.

A mistake on our part can put a life in danger or jeopardize a bilateral relationship integral to our security.

Suffice it to say, the demands for declassification review far exceed the capabilities of the personnel who are available under current budgetary limitations to perform it. This forces us to make choices in terms of what information will be reviewed first. In setting these priorities, the Agency is guided by its responsibilities under the law and Executive Order, as well as by the policies established by the DCI.

### Agency Releases

As a result of these efforts over the past five years, a significant amount of material of historical importance has been declassified:

- Over 227,000 pages of records on the assassination of President Kennedy have been released to the National Archives and Records Administration.
- Over 500 National Intelligence Estimates and more than 11,000 pages of finished

intelligence on the former Soviet Union have been released; we expect to release another 100 Soviet NIEs this year.

- About 1,800 pages have been released on the Guatemala covert action and approximately 3,000 pages are ready for release on the Bay of Pigs.
- We have released over 4,000 pages from our intelligence journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, and have reviewed over 14,000 pages for the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.
- An additional 31,000 pages of materials on various subjects have been released since 1992, including history source documents, monographs, and histories.

### Improvements:

In order to improve further our ability to review and release information, effective last October, I established the Office of Information Management (OIM) to serve as the umbrella organization and focal point for all declassification and release programs within the Agency. I have asked the Director of OIM, Ed Cohen, to ensure that all of our programs are effectively coordinated and our limited resources efficiently managed, taking the fullest possible advantage of the latest automation technology. I am pleased to report that our output is increasing and shortly we will report numbers that will dwarf our prior successes.

I also tasked Ed with ensuring that we have in place a records management system that preserves and protects our records in full compliance with the guidelines established by the National Archives and Records Administration. Indeed, without a records management system that facilitates the identification of pertinent records in a timely manner, the declassification effort is itself made considerably more difficult.

### Plans for Historical Declassification

Notwithstanding these improvements in our ability to cope with the growing demand, we continue to face the dilemma of where to apply our available resources. This becomes particularly important, I believe, where documents of historical interest are concerned. Out of this vast universe of classified information potentially available for review, where do we focus our declassification efforts that would make the most difference?

I am announcing today the priorities that will guide the Agency's historical declassification efforts for the foreseeable future.

Top priority must continue to be given to the review and release of information

related to the JFK assassination for so long as that particular inquiry continues. We must satisfy our statutory and moral obligations in this regard.

Top priority must also be given on a continuing basis to support of the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, which constitutes the basic historical record of American foreign policy. It is important that the public, through access to these volumes, be able to judge for itself the contribution made by the Intelligence Community to the successful conduct of the Cold War.

I should also note that the Congress has asked that I give priority to the review and release of information on Guatemala-Honduras human rights violations. We are responding to requests from the Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission and to the Honduran Government Human Rights Ombudsman, and responding to hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. We are doing everything we can to complete work on this by the end of the summer.

At the next level of priority are records that will enable the public to understand the role of the Intelligence Community in the shaping of national policy. To assist me in establishing priorities among these records, I have consulted with my Historical Review Panel, chaired by Dr. S. Frederick Starr from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and composed of six other distinguished academics and historians: Dr. Lewis Bellardo, Dr. Robert Jervis, Dr. Ernest R. May, Dr. Page Putnam Miller, Dr. Robert Pastor, and Dr. Henry S. Rowen. After considering the recommendations made to me by a majority of the panel and consulting with my own staff, I have directed the Office of Information Management to review those records that pertain to policymaking at the highest levels—that is, National Intelligence Estimates and the National Intelligence Daily.

In addition, to help scholars research/explore the contribution of intelligence to the development of policy, the office files of former Directors of Central Intelligence also will be reviewed for declassification. In keeping with normal archival practice, we will proceed systematically, to consider the earliest records first, presuming they would be less sensitive and result in the release of a greater number of documents. We also will consider records within a complete series rather than selecting records that pertained to particular topics in order that historians could gain as complete a picture as possible of a particular situation. I am hopeful that as certain projects such as the JFK assassination records review are completed, additional resources can be directed toward this effort.

Finally, I want to comment on the plans announced by two of my predecessors to review for possible declassification records on 11 covert actions undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s. The first tranche of documents—consisting of some 3200 pages—related to the Bay of Pigs soon will be released to the public. The remaining records related to the

Bay of Pigs will be reviewed for release immediately thereafter. Work also is continuing on Guatemala--about 1800 pages were released to NARA last May and some 16-17,000 additional pages are being processed for release. We also will initiate declassification reviews, as soon as resources are available, of the materials involved in the covert actions undertaken during the Korean War, and in the Congo, Laos, and Dominican Republic during the 1960s. These reviews will be undertaken in the order I've just described.

We will address the remaining five covert actions identified by my predecessors as soon as the others have been completed. The fact is, we do not have sufficient resources at the current time to review the documentation involved in these five remaining covert actions. Moreover, in some cases, because of national security and foreign policy concerns, the amount of information that could be released about a particular program would be limited, and in other cases, the volume of documentation is so great that reviewing them for declassification would virtually prevent the release of other documents, which, in the view of my Historical Advisory Panel, should be given a higher priority. These include National Intelligence Estimates and finished intelligence analyses on the former Soviet Union, as well as the early records of the Office of the DCI. I have opted, therefore, to hold the reviews of these covert actions in abeyance for the time being.

I also wish to point out that our support to the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series--which I mentioned earlier will be given top priority--will itself lead to the publication of information concerning covert actions as they relate to the subject matter of particular volumes in that series. Indeed, it's possible that certain of the covert action programs selected by my predecessors for declassification review could be addressed on a more expedited basis as part of our support to the *Foreign Relations* series.

In closing, let me reiterate my belief that the American people are best served by having available the information necessary to understand how their government functions. In the case of CIA, this means information about its activities that allow the public to judge its impact and effectiveness over the years.

No other nation's foreign intelligence agency has voluntarily released as much information about its past as has the Central Intelligence Agency. And within the limits imposed upon me by law not to jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, impinge on our liaison relations with other countries, or interfere with our ability to carry out the Agency's mission, we will build upon that record in the years ahead. (This is UNCLASSIFIED.)

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July 15, 1998

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Indeed, the CIA, like all agencies of the U.S. Government, is charged by Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information often retains its sensitivity for many years--even decades--there will eventually come a time when the information produced by such sources and methods can be released to the public without harm to the national security. While the Executive Order provides us authority to protect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and we must take care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses to work with us, the goal of our declassification program is to identify and release as much of the information as we can, as soon as we can, without harm to our national security interests.

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### **Agency Releases**

As a result of these efforts over the past five years, a significant amount of material of historical importance has been declassified:

- Over 227,000 pages of records on the assassination of President Kennedy have been released to the National Archives and Records Administration.
- Over 500 National Intelligence Estimates and more than 11,000 pages of finished intelligence on the former Soviet Union have been released; we expect to release another 100 Soviet NIEs this year.

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- About 1,800 pages have been released on the Guatemala covert action and approximately 3,000 pages are ready for release on the Bay of Pigs.
- We have released over 4,000 pages from our intelligence journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, and have reviewed over 14,000 pages for the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.
- An additional 31,000 pages of materials on various subjects have been released since 1992, including history source documents, monographs, and histories.

**Improvements:**

In order to improve further our ability to review and release information, effective last October, I established the Office of Information Management (OIM) to serve as the umbrella organization and focal point for all declassification and release programs within the Agency. I have asked the Director of OIM, Ed Cohen, to ensure that all of our programs are effectively coordinated and our limited resources efficiently managed, taking the fullest possible advantage of the latest automation technology. I am pleased to report that our output is increasing and shortly we will report numbers that will dwarf our prior successes.

I also tasked Ed with ensuring that we have in place a records management system that preserves and protects our records in full compliance with the guidelines established by the National Archives and Records Administration. Indeed, without a records management system that facilitates the identification of pertinent records in a timely manner, the declassification effort is itself made considerably more difficult.

**Plans for Historical Declassification**

Notwithstanding these improvements in our ability to cope with the growing demand, we continue to face the dilemma of where to apply our available resources. This becomes particularly important, I believe, where documents of historical interest are concerned. Out of this vast universe of classified information potentially available for review, where do we focus our declassification efforts that would make the most difference?

I am announcing today the priorities that will guide the Agency's historical declassification efforts for the foreseeable future.

Top priority must continue to be given to the review and release of information related to the JFK assassination for so long as that particular inquiry continues. We must satisfy our statutory and moral obligations in this regard.

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Top priority must also be given on a continuing basis to support of the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, which constitutes the basic historical record of American foreign policy. It is important that the public, through access to these volumes, be able to judge for itself the contribution made by the Intelligence Community to the successful conduct of the Cold War.

I should also note that the Congress has asked that I give priority to the review and release of information on Guatemala-Honduras human rights violations. We are responding to requests from the Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission and to the Honduran Government Human Rights Ombudsman, and responding to hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. We are doing everything we can to complete work on this by the end of the summer.

At the next level of priority are records that will enable the public to understand the role of the Intelligence Community in the shaping of national policy. To assist me in establishing priorities among these records, I have consulted with my Historical Review Panel, chaired by Dr. S. Frederick Starr from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and composed of six other distinguished academics and historians: Dr. Lewis Bellardo, Dr. Robert Jervis, Dr. Ernest R. May, Dr. Page Putnam Miller, Dr. Robert Pastor, and Dr. Henry S. Rowen. After considering the recommendations made to me by a majority of the panel and consulting with my own staff, I have directed the Office of Information Management to review those records that pertain to policymaking at the highest levels--that is, National Intelligence Estimates and the National Intelligence Daily.

In addition, to help scholars research/explore the contribution of intelligence to the development of policy, the office files of former Directors of Central Intelligence also will be reviewed for declassification. In keeping with normal archival practice, we will proceed systematically to consider the earliest records first, presuming they would be less sensitive and result in the release of a greater number of documents. We also will consider records within a complete series rather than selecting records that pertained to particular topics in order that historians could gain as complete a picture as possible of a particular situation. I am hopeful that as certain projects such as the JFK assassination records review are completed, additional resources can be directed toward this effort.

Finally, I want to comment on the plans announced by two of my predecessors to review for possible declassification records on 11 covert actions undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s. The first tranche of documents--consisting of some 3200 pages--related to the Bay of Pigs soon will be released to the public. The remaining records related to the Bay of Pigs will be reviewed for release immediately thereafter. Work also is continuing on Guatemala--about 1800 pages were released to NARA last May and some 16-17,000 additional pages are being processed for release. We also will initiate declassification reviews, as soon as resources are available, of the materials involved in

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the covert actions undertaken during the Korean War, and in the Congo, Laos, and Dominican Republic during the 1960s. These reviews will be undertaken in the order I've just described.

We will address the remaining five covert actions identified by my predecessors as soon as the others have been completed. The fact is, we do not have sufficient resources at the current time to review the documentation involved in these five remaining covert actions. Moreover, in some cases, because of national security and foreign policy concerns, the amount of information that could be released about a particular program would be limited, and in other cases, the volume of documentation is so great that reviewing them for declassification would virtually prevent the release of other documents, which, in the view of my Historical Advisory Panel, should be given a higher priority. These include National Intelligence Estimates and finished intelligence analyses on the former Soviet Union, as well as the early records of the Office of the DCI. I have opted, therefore, to hold the reviews of these covert actions in abeyance for the time being.

I also wish to point out that our support to the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series--which I mentioned earlier will be given top priority--will itself lead to the publication of information concerning covert actions as they relate to the subject matter of particular volumes in that series. Indeed, it's possible that certain of the covert action programs selected by my predecessors for declassification review could be addressed on a more expedited basis as part of our support to the *Foreign Relations* series.

In closing, let me reiterate my belief that the American people are best served by having available the information necessary to understand how their government functions. In the case of CIA, this means information about its activities that allow the public to judge its impact and effectiveness over the years.


No other nation's foreign intelligence agency has voluntarily released as much information about its past as has the Central Intelligence Agency. And within the limits imposed upon me by law not to jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, impinge on our liaison relations with other countries, or interfere with our ability to carry out the Agency's mission, we will build upon that record in the years ahead. (*This is UNCLASSIFIED.*)

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July 15, 1998

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Statement on Declassification

(U) DCI Statement on Declassification

The core of my job as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is to mobilize the collection and analytical capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. intelligence agencies to ensure that our national leaders have the information necessary for informed policy decision making. Although much of our work must be done in secrecy, we have a responsibility to the American people, and to history, to account for our actions and the quality of our work. Accordingly, I have made a serious commitment to the public release of information that with the passage of time no longer needs to be protected under our security classification system.

Indeed, the CIA, like all agencies of the U.S. Government, is charged by Executive Order 12958 with instituting declassification programs to provide for the timely release of information it had previously classified. While intelligence information often retains its sensitivity for many years--even decades--there will eventually come a time when the information produced by such sources and methods can be released to the public without harm to the national security. While the Executive Order provides us authority to protect the identity of our confidential human sources indefinitely, and we must take care not to violate the confidence of any foreign government who chooses to work with us, the goal of our declassification program is to identify and release as much of the information as we can, as soon as we can, without harm to our national security interests.

**Growing Demand for Information**

I suspect, in fact, that the public has relatively little appreciation of the extent to which the CIA is already involved in declassification efforts.

- We declassify records requested by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

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October 20, 1998

**Headlines:** (U) Statement by the President

**The White House  
 Office of the Press Secretary**

For Immediate Release  
 October 20, 1998

**Statement by the President**

Today I have signed into law H.R. 3694, the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999." The Act authorizes Fiscal Year 1999 appropriations for U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

The Act is the product of the dedication and effort of many people in the Congress and my Administration. I believe that the Act will help our Nation maintain a strong intelligence capability and preserve the safety and security of our country.

I am pleased that the Act provides enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and their family members. This is extremely important given the continuing terrorist threat against U.S. citizens and interests. I also note that the Act names the CIA Headquarters Compound in Langley, Virginia, the "George Bush Center for Intelligence." This is an appropriate and well-deserved tribute to former President Bush.

Sections 601 and 602 of the Act enhance significantly our ability to conduct effective counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations. In addition, section 604 expands the government's ability to conduct wiretaps when investigating a broad range of Federal felonies. The Attorney General will develop comprehensive guidelines and minimization procedures for the use of this expanded authority and will amend procedures currently contained in the manual for United States attorneys to provide appropriate protections for the rights of

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
Americans. Until such guidelines and procedures are finalized, the government will conduct wiretaps in accordance with standards provided under current law. The Department of Justice will include statistics on the use of the expanded authority in its annual wiretap report to Congress.

Finally, I am satisfied this Act contains an acceptable whistleblower protection provision, free of the constitutional infirmities evident in the Senate-passed version of this legislation. The Act does not constrain my constitutional authority to review and, if appropriate, control disclosure of certain classified information to the Congress. I note that the Act's legislative history makes clear that the Congress, although disagreeing with the executive branch regarding the operative constitutional principles, does not intend to foreclose the exercise of my constitutional authority in this area.

The Constitution vests the President with authority to control disclosure of information when necessary for the discharge of his constitutional responsibilities. Nothing in this Act purports to change this principle. I anticipate that this authority will be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and that when agency heads decide that they must defer, limit, or preclude the disclosure of sensitive information, they will contact the appropriate congressional committees promptly to begin the accommodation process that has traditionally been followed with respect to disclosure of sensitive information.

William J. Clinton

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April 26, 1999

**Headlines:** (U) Remarks by President George Bush at the Dedication Ceremony for the George Bush Center for Intelligence

REMARKS BY GEORGE BUSH, 41ST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
 AT THE DEDICATION CEREMONY FOR THE  
 GEORGE BUSH CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE  
 MONDAY, APRIL 26, 1999

President Bush:

Mr. Director, thank you for those overly kind remarks.

Let me thank the great team that we have running CIA. I think all the former Directors here would agree that in George Tenet we have one of the very, very best.

May I thank General Gordon with whom I worked closely when I was President of the United States, the Deputy here, who is doing a superb job, too.

I want to thank the Marines for showing up.

I, of course, want to thank Rob Portman [Rep. Rob Portman, (R.Ohio) who introduced the legislation to name the CIA Compound after President Bush.]

I told Barbara that all of this hoopla was a little overwhelming, and she knew exactly the right thing to say. She always does, my loving wife after 54 years, 6 months—whatever it is. (Laughter) Who's counting? "George, just remember," she said, "They only name things after you when you're dead or really old." (Laughter)

You mentioned the parachute jumps, Director. I landed very proud. Jumped out of the plane at 12,500 feet, fell at 120 miles an hour for 7500 feet, pulled the rip cord, floated

down into the tranquil sands of Yuma, Arizona. And said to my wife, "Now what do you think?" She said, "I haven't seen a free fall like that since the '92 election." (Laughter) Anyway, she is thrilled to be here.

And of course I want to thank Senator Shelby and Senator Kerry and Representative Goss and Norm Dicks who I don't think is here, and every other Member of Congress who had a hand in making this wonderful event in my life happen.

I would be remiss not to single out Rob Portman who served on my team when I was privileged to be President. And if I'd known he was going to do this, I think we could have given him a nicer office there at the White House. (Laughter) Thank you, Rob, very much, and all of you who had a hand in this wonderful, wonderful event in my life.

I want to thank, as a matter of fact, Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. You know I had some disagreements with Congress during my four years. What President doesn't? And after a few dust-ups, I didn't know how such a vote in the Congress might go on this high honor. Part of me expected it to be – this is a true anecdote – like the vote in Midland, Texas, when the School Board decided to name a local school after me. That was just a few years ago, I'd just left the White House. The vote was three to two. It's true. (Laughter) The two guys that voted "no" had a lot of excuses, but anyway, that was it. But this was much nicer. (Laughter) You guys touched my heart.

So to George Tenet, our great Director, and everyone at CIA, all I can say is that the gratitude in my heart literally knows no bounds.

I left here some 22 years ago after a limited tenure, and my stay here had a major impact on me. The CIA became part of my heartbeat back then, and it's never gone away. In my opinion, of the many agencies comprising the Executive Branch, the men and women of CIA – many of whom I'm privileged to say are here – exemplified the best about public service. Here service to country comes first. You're ever vigilant, always looking out for the nation's best interests, but rarely getting the credit that you deserve. You never sit at the head table; never get singled out. You are there out of love of country.

This is the full measure of devotion that you bring to your work, and that Barbara and I tried to bring to ours. I got some things right, and I'm sure I could have done many things better. But I hope it will be said that in my time here, and in the White House, I kept the trust and treated my office with respect. I know you do that every single day, and I know I tried. (Applause)

I also know that I walked in here 24 years ago untutored in the arts of intelligence. I see my first Deputy, Dick Walters, sitting there. He will certainly attest to that. And he helped me. You had every reason to be suspicious of this untutored outsider who had –

though he came out of a non-political post in China, spent a lot of my time in partisan politics. I understood the anxiety and concerns on Capitol Hill about that. But this Agency gave me their trust from Day One.

Your mission is different now than it was back then. The Soviet Union is no more. Some people think, "what do we need intelligence for?" My answer to that is we have plenty of enemies. Plenty of enemies abound. Unpredictable leaders willing to export instability or to commit crimes against humanity. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narco-trafficking, people killing each other, fundamentalists killing each other in the name of God. These and more. Many more. As our analysts know, as our collectors of intelligence know – these are our enemies. To combat them we need more intelligence, not less. We need more human intelligence. That means we need more protection for the methods we use to gather intelligence and more protection for our sources, particularly our human sources, people that are risking their lives for their country. (Applause)

Even though I'm a tranquil guy now at this stage of my life, I have nothing but contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing the name of our sources. They are, in my view, the most insidious, of traitors.

And when it comes to the mission of CIA and the Intelligence Community, George Tenet has it exactly right. Give the President and the policymakers the best possible intelligence product and stay out of the policymaking or policy implementing except as specifically decreed in the law.

Because of your support – the same support given to a fledgling DCI 24 years ago – George Tenet is able to do that. Just that. Able to provide the President the best intelligence possible in the entire world.

For Douglas MacArthur, Duty, Honor, Country represented a great moral code of conduct and chivalry for those who guard this beloved land. That's true here at CIA. It's true all across the Intelligence Community – the huge community that comes together under the leadership of the Director. This complex might well have been named for more deserving men who preceded me as DCI. You think of Bill Donovan or Allen Dulles or Dick Helms here with us today. Giants in their field. Or it might have been named for people like Welch, or Buckley [CIA officers Richard Welch and William Buckley killed in the line of duty.] And like all of them, and so many more, I'm proud to have served with the men and women of CIA. (Applause)


It has been said that "patriotism is not a frenzied burst of emotion, but rather the quiet and steady dedication of a lifetime." To me, this sums up CIA – Duty, Honor, Country. This timeless creative service motivates those who serve at Langley and in intelligence all across the world.

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It is an honor to stand here and be counted among you. Thank you very, very much.

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## SPEECHES / DOCUMENTS



April 26, 1999

**Headlines:** Remarks of DCI George J. Tenet at the Ceremony of the George Bush Center For Intelligence (As Prepared for Delivery)

**Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence  
George J. Tenet  
Introducing President Bush  
at the ceremony  
designating  
the  
George Bush Center for Intelligence  
April 26, 1999**

**(As Prepared for Delivery)**

This is a great day at the Central Intelligence Agency - a great day for our CIA Family. I know that I speak for every man and woman in this place when I say: Welcome Home George and Barbara Bush!

Mrs. Bush, in your autobiography you tell a wonderful story about your husband. A reporter once asked him what he considered to be his greatest accomplishment. In the seconds before the President answered, you tried to guess what he'd say. Would it be bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end? Leading the coalition in the Gulf War? But the President replied: "Our kids still come home."

Mr. President, we hope that you and Mrs. Bush will always come home to visit us at CIA. We consider it an honor to have our compound named after you, and we will do all that we can to make you and our wonderful country proud of us. We are deeply proud that you are part of our CIA Family. As you

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know, the sense of family is very strong here. We care about each other; we take care of each other. We are part of a community that pulls together in times of crisis and sorrow and celebrates together in times of joy, as we are doing today.

And fifty years from now, Mr. President, when a future generation of intelligence officers is serving our nation here at the George Bush Center for Intelligence, they, too, will be inspired -- as we have been -- by the values of Duty, Honor and Country to which you have devoted your life. I would now like to read to you from a very special letter of congratulations, which says, in part:

"Dear George:

"I want to join the men and women of the Intelligence Community -- and all Americans - in saluting you, as our nation designates the Central Intelligence Agency complex as the George Bush Center for Intelligence."

"When you assumed your duties as Director of Central Intelligence in January 1976, the nation had just endured one of the most tumultuous periods in its history. Many Americans had lost faith in government. Many asked whether the CIA should continue to exist."

"As Director, you accomplished a great deal. You restored morale and discipline to the Agency while publicly emphasizing the value of intelligence to the nation's security. You also restored America's trust in the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community.

"Of course, we honor you today for more than your tenure as Director; in your lifetime of service to America, you served not only as the head of the Intelligence Community but also, as President, as the nation's chief intelligence consumer. As President, you stood for American leadership around the world - leadership for freedom and democracy, peace and prosperity.

"As you know, in my time as President, I have turned to you more than once for your wise counsel, and I have benefited greatly from it. And I have been well served by the talented and dedicated men and women who make up the Intelligence Community that you did so much to preserve and strengthen.

"On behalf of all Americans, I want to thank you for your patriotism and leadership, and I want to convey to you my warmest congratulations on receiving this fitting tribute.

"Sincerely, Bill Clinton, President of the United States"

Mr. President, President Clinton and Congressman Portman have just eloquently described why our headquarters compound will forever bear your name, and why all of us at CIA think so highly

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of you. There are men and women in the audience today who had the honor and privilege of serving under your leadership as Director of Central Intelligence. Many more here had the honor and privilege of serving in this Agency and in the Intelligence Community under your Presidency. The rest of us just consider it an honor and privilege to pay tribute to you as one of this nation's most distinguished public servants: war hero, Member of Congress, UN Ambassador, Chief Envoy to China, Director of Central Intelligence, Vice President and then President of the United States.

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When we first learned about Mr. Portman's initiative, the gesture seemed so fitting to us - and not just because you are the only DCI to have become President of the United States, but for so many other reasons as well. Every component of this Agency feels indebted to you in some way.

Our Directorate of Administration remembers to this day the exceptional attention that you and Mrs. Bush devoted to the needs and concerns of the men and women of this Agency and to their families. Never has a DCI written so many thank-you notes to his employees! Your belief in the fundamental importance of our work never faltered; your strong leadership restored our confidence; more important, it restored the American public's confidence in us.

To the wizards in our Directorate of Science and Technology, you have been a champion of scientific intelligence - a leader who deeply appreciated the crucial role that technology plays in protecting our national security. You won the hearts of our "masters of disguise" on your 52nd birthday. They gave you one of their famous "make-overs." Not long after, a stranger quietly took a chair at an important intelligence meeting. Nobody had a clue until your familiar voice emanated from this guy with red hair, a big nose and thick glasses. He said: "Sweatin' under this thing!"

The unbiased assessment of our Directorate of Intelligence is that throughout your long years of public service you have been among their most dedicated, enthusiastic and discriminating customers. You have always understood how vitally important it is for our national leaders to be able to make their decisions based on the most complete information and best analysis possible. As Director of Central Intelligence, as Vice President and as President you read every single Daily Brief that the Intelligence Directorate produced. Even if they doubted that anybody else in the government was reading their stuff, they could always count on you! As you know, our analysts pride themselves on the accuracy of their predictions. They will always be among your biggest fans, even though, Mr. President, you didn't always call it right. After President Ford asked you to take the CIA job, and you answered the call to duty, you wrote the following to your good friend, Congressman Bill Steiger: (quote) "I honestly feel my political future is behind me " but hell, I'm 51, and this new one gives me a chance to really contribute."

Last but not least, you have the undying respect of the fearless officers in our Directorate of Operations. You were a staunch defender of the need for human intelligence " for espionage -- at a very tough time when it really counted. But that's not the only reason why you rate with the Directorate of Operations. You are the only former DCI and President to jump

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out of a plane " not once, but twice. As a young naval aviator, you refused to leave your burning plane until the very last second. Then, as a retired civilian, you dove out of a perfectly good plane just for the heck of it! You are definitely their kind of guy!

Mr. President, all of us from CIA -- whatever the Directorate -- agree that there has been no stronger an advocate and supporter of our work than you. We couldn't have asked for a more interested and engaged intelligence consumer, a more constructive advisor, a more knowledgeable leader of our national security community, or a more faithful friend of the men and women of this Agency than you. And we are very, very grateful to you for that, Mr. President.

I don't have to tell you that each and every day, the dedicated men and women of the CIA provide the President of the United States and other decisionmakers the critical intelligence they need to protect American lives and advance American interests around the globe.

Thanks in great measure to your leadership, our country no longer confronts the worldwide threat from a rival superpower that we did during the Cold War. But as the 21st century approaches, we must contend with a host of other dangerous challenges" challenges of unprecedented complexity and scope.

The United States remains the indispensable country in this uncertain and chaotic world. And time and again, the CIA has proven itself to be the indispensable intelligence organization, helping America build a more secure world for people everywhere.

To the patriotic men and women who work here at CIA, this isn't just a job, it's a commitment to serve our wonderful country. That kind of commitment lasts a lifetime. It continues long after any of us leave here. All of us feel that way, and that's another reason why we think the world of you, Mr. President. Because we know that you feel that way, too.

In January, 1977, as you and Mrs. Bush prepared to move your family back to Texas and figure out what to do next, you delivered a farewell address to the employees. You thanked them for their unselfish dedication to our country" a dedication that, I can assure you, is undiminished today. You concluded your gracious good-bye with these words, and I quote:


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"I take with me many happy memories. Even the tough, unresolved problems don't seem so awesome; for they are overshadowed by our successes and by the fact that we do provide the best foreign intelligence in the world. I am leaving, but I am not forgetting. I hope I can find some ways in the years ahead to make the American people understand more fully the greatness that is CIA."

Mr. President, over the decades and to this very day, you have found many, many ways to help us fulfill our vital Intelligence Mission in behalf of the American people. You did not forget us, and we will never forget you. Thank you.

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October 18, 1999

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Remarks at the Oscar Iden Lecture,  
Georgetown University

**Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence  
George J. Tenet  
Oscar Iden Lecture, Georgetown University  
October 18, 1999**

My thanks to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. My appreciation also to the Iden family, whose generous gift to Georgetown made this evening possible.

It's great to be back at Georgetown. It was here that I learned to respect the integrity of facts, to separate fact from fiction, to try to think searchingly and systematically about the world in all its complexity, and to view the advancement of knowledge as a way to serve the greater good. And what I learned at Georgetown I have carried with me throughout my personal and professional life, right into the CIA.

When Cas Yost asked me to address you, I saw it as an excellent and enjoyable chance to discuss the vital importance of intelligence with educators and especially with the rising generation of international affairs students who will be grappling with the national security challenges of the next century.

**Intelligence Helps Us Shape the Future**

When you leave here tonight, there are two things that I want you to remember. First: On the eve of a new century, our country has unprecedented opportunities to advance American ideals and interests. And second: US Intelligence can be the vital enabler of those opportunities if we infuse it with the right ethos and support it by sustained investments.

Today, America finds itself with overwhelming military pre-eminence, unparalleled political reach and immense economic power. We must not let this historic moment slip through our fingers. In my view, the Intelligence Community's highest calling is to help policy makers identify opportunities to advance democracy and peace in the world. The more we can *act*, the less we need to *react*. In the end, being alert to historic opportunities may do as much – if not more -- to secure our freedoms and ensure our well being in the next century as combating the many threats that we face.

The United States has the opportunity:

To help consolidate democracy in former totalitarian states.

To help bring a comprehensive and lasting peace to the Middle East.

To stabilize struggling regions by helping more nations prosper in the global economy.

By helping our country seize these historic opportunities, we should ask what we might save in American lives and treasure – in defense, in peacekeeping operations, in foreign aid.

Some of you may remember the comic strip "Pogo" by the late Walt Kelly. I often think about Pogo's frustration when he mused, "We are faced with insurmountable opportunities."

That is where intelligence comes in. We help policymakers overcome insurmountable obstacles every day. US Intelligence gives our national leaders the insight and the flexibility they need to take advantage of the vast opportunities before us. We broaden our decisionmakers' choices and help them think through the difficult policy dilemmas they face. We provide a very clear and constantly updated picture of events inside key countries, of technological developments across a wide array of issues, and a projection of future trends in all of those arenas.

I would like you to think about the Intelligence Community as the **ultimate** opportunity cost. What our nation invests today on intelligence – on developing good sources, on new collection methods, on hiring new analysts and on training them – may mean the difference tomorrow between success and disaster, life and death – not just for those involved in intelligence, but for the men and women of our armed forces and for all of our citizens. Armed with the world's best intelligence, our national leaders may be able to avert an emerging crisis, or minimize the costly fallout from one. When you are in the dark, you have to prepare for everything. With the insights intelligence brings, you can make prudent decisions about where to put your limited resources.

Placing a value on intelligence is not a simple "bang for the buck" calculation. But I would ask you to consider tonight:

What is it worth for our country to have the ability to understand and infiltrate terrorist groups that target American citizens at home and abroad?

Do you want a window on the dynamics between reformers and conservatives in Iran? What is it worth to know the status of Iran's nuclear program? Or Tehran's intentions with regard to terrorism?

What is it worth to know if and when the North Koreans will test launch a new missile capable of sending a nuclear payload to the United States?

What is it worth to our military to have the intelligence support it needs to deploy anywhere in the world to protect American interests, values and lives?

What is it worth to locate a downed F-16 pilot in hostile territory during the middle of a shooting war **even before** that pilot has been able to get out of his parachute? And to have those same technical intelligence systems that located that pilot be able to guide the search and rescue teams to bring him – or her – safely home?

These are not just rhetorical questions. They are very real. And the answers will have profound consequences not just for our Intelligence Community, but for our country.

It's not news to you that the world is in the midst of a technological revolution. Today, having an information edge is critical to success in almost every field. The field of intelligence is no different. And I must tell you that the pace of technological change is rapidly outstripping our existing technical edge in intelligence that has long been one of the pillars of our national security.

Compounding the problem, advanced technology is no longer in the exclusive domain of government. The genie has exploded out of the bottle and he is providing information to any and all masters – from CNN to terrorists. Friends and foes alike have the same access we do to high-powered, portable computers and communications systems safeguarded by encryption.

US Intelligence no longer has a monopoly on overhead imagery. Very soon, **anyone** who can pay will be able commercially to obtain real-time, one meter high-resolution satellite pictures of any place on the planet. This will have major implications for denial and deception and surprise – both on our part and on the part of our enemies. US Intelligence will have to work with even greater ingenuity to give our policymakers and military commanders a critical information advantage.

The telecommunications industry is making a \$1 trillion investment to encircle the world in millions of miles of high bandwidth fiber-optic cable. What does that mean? It means that the challenge for signals intelligence has grown, and that our targets are harder than ever to cover.

To ensure that our country preserves its precious unilateral advantage in information, the Intelligence Community has developed an investment strategy. We have asked Congress to allocate large amounts of money over many years to build our next generation of satellite imagery and signals collection systems. I will be blunt with you: Though not nearly on the scale of the investments being made by the private sector, the price tag for these new intelligence capabilities is high. Nonetheless, I see our choice in rather stark terms: do we invest, or do we allow ourselves to become deaf and blind? And we are not only talking about the investment in these collections systems alone, but also in the technologies and people we need to turn more and more of that collected material into useable intelligence. There is a significant price tag beyond satellites.

We traditionally have justified advanced imagery and signals collection systems by emphasizing the important role they play supporting our military. And I do not deny or diminish that role. But we have to show how our collection systems will not only enhance our military capabilities but our entire national security posture – our ability to shape an international environment favorable to our interests and our values.

In other words, if we receive the kinds of investments in intelligence that I am talking about, then we have to deliver.

### **What You Should Expect of your Intelligence Community**

What should you expect of the Intelligence Community in return for this investment?

First and foremost, that we will call it as we see it. We will deliver intelligence that is objective, pulls no punches, and is free from political taint.

Next, that we will not only tell policymakers about what is uppermost on their minds – we will also alert them to things that have not yet reached their in-boxes.

That we will respond to the President's and other decisionmakers' needs on demand – juggling our intelligence priorities and capabilities as necessary to meet the most urgent missions.

That we will innovatively develop cutting-edge technologies and apply them to our collection and analysis work.

That we will uphold our country's laws always.

Finally, that we will take risks. Analytical risks – making tough calls when it would be easier to waffle. Operational risks to secure vital information or to take some necessary action.

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You should expect all of those things from us, and that is what we will deliver. I am asking our people to think independently and creatively, to constantly challenge the conventional wisdom, to confront the toughest problems and look far beyond the immediate, and always to act with the highest standards of professionalism.

Most importantly, I am charging the men and women of US Intelligence to dare. We agree with Britain's elite Special Air Service motto, "Who dares, wins."

At the same time, there must be a realistic expectation of what intelligence can do. We are not omniscient and we are not perfect. The fact is, we simply cannot provide continuous, contiguous coverage for every issue of concern. And when so much of our mission involves warning and prediction, and when we must carry it out 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, around the globe, we are bound to make mistakes, both in analysis and operations. We strive not to make them, but when we do, my promise to the American people is that we will take responsibility and learn from them.

We accept the fact that we must live within the world so aptly described by President Kennedy when he said that our successes are often unnoticed while our failures are paraded in public. The terrorist attack that is foiled, the nuclear shipment that is intercepted, the regional crisis that is forestalled, the coup that is foretold, may never make the news. And that's fine. We are not in this business for headlines or kudos. We are in it to make a critical difference -- to advance our nation's interests and values.

We live in a world still in transition from something that was very well understood -- the bipolarity of the Cold War -- to something that has yet to crystallize into a system that can be readily named. As a result, I believe the potential for surprise is greater than at any time since the end of World War II.

We hope not to be surprised often, and we certainly hope not in an area we deem vital. In May 1998, India tested a nuclear weapon. We had correctly judged that the Indians would respond to Pakistan's recent missile launch and that eventually they would test nuclear weapons. But we judged -- wrongly -- that the Indians would fire a missile tit-for-tat before they tested a nuclear weapon. This episode clearly illustrates my point that it is the nature of our high-risk, high-stakes work to get it wrong some of the time. I would also say to you that we would not be doing our job if we were to shrink from making tough calls about very difficult issues.

In complex military operations there are all too many chances to make mistakes. I will make no excuses for the intelligence errors that led to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We have identified what went wrong and we have taken corrective measures.

But do not lose sight of the larger point. U.S. intelligence played an integral role in a highly complex and ultimately successful military operation in which 9,300 sorties were

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flown and not a single allied pilot was lost in combat. Our intimate knowledge of the weapons systems our pilots were facing and the targets that they were up against helped keep our pilots safe. That is a remarkable achievement for US Intelligence.

The men and women of US Intelligence are not just intelligence officers. They are American intelligence officers. Our performance is measured against the highest standards of professional and personal excellence. If we fail to meet those standards, we will stand up and be accountable, then we will figure out what went wrong and we will fix it.

But always, always we must continue to dare – not only in our dangerous work abroad but also in the predictions that our analysts make to policymakers here in Washington.

If America is to have the world's best intelligence, we must be fully engaged, we must be ready to risk, and we should not let the fear of sometimes getting it wrong get in the way of doing our job.

I have made a commitment to our people. If they do their jobs the best way they know how – with professionalism and integrity -- if they stick their necks out and dare, I will back them up. And I hope that the American people will do the very same.

### What Your Intelligence Community Does for You

I have discussed the opportunities that I see for US intelligence in today's world. But for every opportunity out there, there are also challenges and threats -- real or potential.

In fact, it is our country's great power and our values that make us the most attractive target in the world. There are nations and groups who are envious of who we are, what we have and what we stand for – and, yes, they are willing to act against us. What are the threats that keep me awake at night?

International terrorism, both on its own and in conjunction with narcotics traffickers, international criminals and those seeking weapons of mass destruction. You need go no further than Usama Bin Ladin –the perpetrator of the East Africa bombings. He has declared the acquisition of weapons of a mass destruction a religious duty and identified every American as a legitimate target.

The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along with ever-longer range missiles capable of delivering them not just as far as our deployed forces in South Korea and the Persian Gulf, but to the continental United States as well.

Rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea continue to pose grave threats to their neighbors, to regional stability, and to American forces.

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We face a growing cyber threat – the threat from so-called weapons of mass disruption. Potential targets are not only government computers, but the lifelines that we all take for granted – our power grids, and our water and transportation systems.

And while dealing with these new, unconventional threats, we must keep a relentless focus on more traditional concerns such as political and economic trends in volatile regions like the Middle East and South Asia and the trajectories of major countries in transition, such as China and Russia.

The challenges I just mentioned are among our highest intelligence priorities. And I pledge to all of you that we at the CIA and in the Intelligence Community will continue to go after them with all that we've got.

We cannot offer you an iron clad guarantee against any of the threats that face our country, but I think our record is impressive. Let me tell you a little about that record:

Every day, the men and women of US Intelligence give our country an enormous unilateral advantage:

In the last year, US Intelligence was responsible for stopping terrorist bombings against American facilities overseas, and we have been successful in apprehending a number of terrorist figures—including some linked to Usama Bin Laden.

Chances are when you hear about a major take-down of an international drug trader overseas, that US Intelligence has provided valuable information and insights to assist law enforcement.

We have supported the Middle East peace process by helping the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority deal with terrorism. And we provided imagery and mapping support to American negotiators that helped resolve the centuries-old border dispute between Ecuador and Peru.

We have assisted the State Department in the safe evacuation of American citizens in harm's way abroad, including operations during the past year in the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Indonesia.

We have helped the United States develop a long-range strategic perspective by preparing assessments that project years ahead on issues as diverse as the global economy, worldwide demographics, and leadership succession patterns in key regions.

And time and again, we have alerted field commanders to threats against our deployed forces and those of our allies. Aided by the most sophisticated intelligence, for more than eight years now American pilots have flown daily missions over the Iraq

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No-Fly Zone with zero casualties. It is not an exaggeration to say that every day, somewhere in the world, US Intelligence is saving American lives.

We do all of this – and more -- even as we are asked to take on new, non-traditional roles.

We examined the state of worldwide Y2K preparations. Based on our study, the President offered help to various countries in overcoming Y2K problems.

In recent years, we have assisted the international community in high-resolution mapping of natural disasters, such as wildfire damage in Indonesia, the damage from Hurricane Mitch in Central America. Most recently, we helped Turkey and Greece after the recent earthquakes.

During the massive humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Kosovo, we assisted international relief efforts in locating and responding to the needs of displaced populations. And we continue to assist the International War Crimes Tribunals in The Hague to bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice.

None of these efforts is traditional intelligence work, but each makes an important contribution to the success of American diplomacy and our greater interest in the well being of the international community.

As you can see from the sheer range of areas in which we are engaged, our operational agenda is running hotter than ever – hotter than anyone expected in the aftermath of the Cold War – from Somalia, to Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Kosovo, East Timor. You can be sure that the list will go on.

Deciding to engage is not our call. The President calls, we serve whenever and wherever – and whatever the other national security priorities and resource constraints may be. Whether or not you agree with a particular policy decision to intervene, American Intelligence never has the luxury of sitting on the sidelines.

### **Meeting 21<sup>st</sup> Century Intelligence Challenges**

It is my highest priority as Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that in the next century, US Intelligence is ready to help the President and other American policymakers deal with the unprecedented scope of opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. In short, to ensure that US Intelligence can continue to perform its vital national security mission successfully in the future.

Seventeen months ago, I launched a Strategic Direction plan for the CIA which now encompasses the entire Intelligence Community.

I told our people that we had to take charge of our destiny. That we would do all that was within our power to maintain our edge and our vibrancy. That we had to streamline and re-align ourselves and adopt best business practices like the best in the private sector. That we would think big and think different. That we would work smarter and in new ways so that we would have the agility and the resiliency to do what the President – this President or a future President -- wants and the American people expect. And that we were going to do all of that because it is the right thing to do.

And that is exactly what we have done and are doing. We have increased our agility. We have innovated. We have found efficiencies. And we are now at the stage at which strategically targeted, sustained funding can make an enormous qualitative difference. I am glad to say that our strategic efforts have been well received by the President and the Oversight Committees on Capitol Hill. And if we continue to receive their bipartisan support, over the next five to seven years, we will have positioned the Intelligence Community to perform its vital mission successfully in the next century.

Our strategic program entails strengthening our clandestine and analytical services to achieve greater operational reach and greater analytical depth. We will put more collectors in the field and more all-source analysts on key accounts. And we will back them to the hilt with both human and technical support.

We are working more effectively across disciplines and across Agencies, because most of the challenges we face are so complex that no one part of our intelligence community – not just human intelligence, not just signals intelligence, and not just imagery intelligence -- can tackle them alone.

We are coordinating more closely than ever with our colleagues in law enforcement. You cannot defeat threats to our country from terrorists, proliferators and cyber attackers unless intelligence and law enforcement work together.

We also realize that the US Intelligence Community does not have a monopoly on brains or insight, so we are reaching out to experts in academia and industry.

We will significantly recapitalize our signals and imagery systems.

We are working with industry to leverage their expertise and revolutionize the ways we acquire technology. Everyone knows what an arms race is. We are in a continuous **intelligence** race. You may have heard about the new enterprise In-Q-It – one of the many innovative approaches we are taking to help us with state-of-the-art information management. With offices in Silicon Valley and Washington, DC., In-Q-It will operate as a non-profit firm specializing in information technology development. Harnessing the capabilities of the private sector to deal with tough intelligence problems is part of a very proud tradition

going back to the earliest days of our Intelligence Community.

Most importantly, we are building up and empowering our greatest assets of all: our people. At the end of the day, the men and women of US intelligence -- not satellites, or sensors or high-speed computers -- are our most precious asset. All of our technological advantages are worthless without the best and brightest people our country has to offer.

CIA is now engaged in our biggest recruiting drive since the end of the Cold War. We face major competition from the private sector. To the Georgetown students in the audience, I say, I hope you will seriously consider a career in US intelligence. We cannot offer you a private sector salary. No one in the Intelligence field worth his or her salt is in it for the money. You will never get rich. But we can offer you a deeply challenging and satisfying vocation -- and a mission unequaled anywhere in American society. You would be joining some of the finest men and women you would ever hope to meet. I am proud to say, a good many of them -- about 400 at CIA alone -- are Georgetown graduates.

That, then, is where we are and where we are going as an Intelligence Community. And I am convinced that we are on the right path.

### A Moment of Challenge and Decision

In closing, let me say that, like you, the men and women of the Intelligence Community are proud that our country is a force for good in the world. By engaging, America can make a difference -- as the President has said, an indispensable difference.

And when our country engages to do good -- in order to make that critical difference -- our national leaders must have every possible tool at their disposal -- diplomatic tools, military tools, and intelligence tools. That is the only way to ensure that we accomplish our national objectives.

Along with the Intelligence Community, the State Department and the military are crucial pillars of our national security. Each reinforces the other. Each must be strong, or all are dangerously weakened. If the steady erosion of America's diplomatic capabilities continues, our entire security structure will be dangerously undermined.

I believe that we as a nation are at an historic decision point. We are fortunate to have more choices than any other nation as our country considers the security challenges of the next century. What our country does or does not do now -- the tremendous opportunities that we seize or that we squander -- can make an important difference in the way events unfold. What we choose to do today will either enlarge or narrow the options we have in the future.

As we confront a 21<sup>st</sup> Century of unprecedented opportunities and more diverse and dispersed threats, our Intelligence Community is stretched to the limit. That is not a comfortable position to be in – not for the Intelligence Community, not for our national security community as a whole, and not for our country.


My deep concern is that if we as a nation do not make serious, sustained investments in intelligence over the next five to seven years — if we do not prepare wisely — we will find that we have missed opportunities and foreclosed options that we will dearly wish we had. It is a classic case of pay now, or pay later. And paying later would be much more painful. Intelligence is not a free good. At the end of the day, you will get the intelligence that you pay for. And when it comes to intelligence—when American lives and vital interests are at stake — second-best is not acceptable.

I put it to you that what our country really cannot afford is to make the wrong choices. In a world of unparalleled opportunities, threats and complexities, do we really want to opt for less presence, less information, less insight, less capacity, or less agility? If we allow that to happen, I certainly would not envy future Directors of Central Intelligence and future Presidents of the United States.

I hope that I have given you a sense of the role that I believe U.S. intelligence must play in the years ahead and the sustained investments that I believe are in our interest and that we must make. And that is why I welcomed this opportunity to speak to you tonight.

Thank you for listening. I look forward to hearing from you this evening and I will be happy to take your questions – as well as your answers.

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TRANSCRIPT  
US INTELLIGENCE AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR  
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY  
DCI GEORGE TENET LUNCHEON REMARKS  
AND INTRODUCTION OF PRESIDENT BUSH

FRIDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1999

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GEORGE TENET: Good afternoon.

At this time of great sadness for everyone here at College Station, I want to first express the deepest sympathy of the men and women of the intelligence community. Like our fellow Americans, we too have been watching the unfolding tragedy here on television and have been touched by the magnificent way that everyone at the University and in the town have responded as one united community.

We are all thinking especially about the families and friends of the injured, and of those who lost their very young lives. As a parent, I cannot imagine more devastating news than this. Our prayers - the prayers of the men and women of our intelligence community - are with them, and we wish that God grant them strength at this terrible hour and comfort them in their sorrow.

On behalf of the intelligence community, I also want to express my sincere appreciation to the George Bush School of Government and Public Service and Texas A&M University for co-hosting this conference with CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. You have managed to extend exceptional hospitality to us, even in the face of great tragedy, so we feel an even deeper responsibility to ensure that this conference makes a significant intellectual contribution to the understanding of a pivotal period in our history.

The men and women of US intelligence are proud of the contributions that they made to defending the security of the free world during five grim decades of the Cold War. We believe that a careful study of our role in that great global struggle will show that time and again US intelligence provided American leaders with critical information and insights that saved American lives and advanced our most vital interests.

During the perilous peace that was the Cold War, the stakes, the risks, and the uncertainties were higher than at any time in our history with the possible exception of the Second World War.

Keeping the Cold War from becoming a "hot" one was the overriding goal of American national security policy and US intelligence. An intelligence effort of such magnitude and fraught with such great risk and uncertainty was bound to have its flaws, both operational and analytical. But I believe the overall record, a record you have heard a little bit about this morning, is one of very impressive accomplishment.

Today we look back on the Cold War from a temporal distance of ten short years. It is already a world away, replaced by a new and more hopeful reality in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. And it is separated from us by a new generation of young people who have no personal recollection of what it was like to have lived on either side of the Berlin Wall - that metaphor in reinforced concrete and barbed wire for totalitarian repression.

It was a time when all humankind lived under the appalling threat of nuclear annihilation. Those forced to live behind the cruel Wall, closed off from the rest of the world, knew constant fear and countless indignities. They struggled to keep hope alive. It was for us, the lucky ones living in liberty, to stand fast in defense of the freedoms that we cherish, and keep faith with the oppressed on the other side.

Ultimately, after the sacrifice of millions of irreplaceable human lives and trillions of dollars in treasure, the human spirit on both sides of the Wall triumphed.

To the students of Texas A&M today who have grown up with practically unlimited opportunities to travel the globe and roam at will within the borderless world of the Internet, the Berlin Wall - and the physical, political and psychological barriers to the free flow of people, ideas, and information that it represented - must seem absolutely surreal. But for the generations that lived in its shadow it was very real and very dangerous.

No one knows better than the men and women here today who carried the heavy burden of high office during the Cold War decades. And no one carried a heavier burden than the President of the United States. Every American President from Harry Truman onward knew that he would be tested in the crucible of the Cold War, and that he had better be ready to meet the challenge. Our country was blessed to have had leaders -- Republicans and Democrats -- who met the challenge.

All of us here who have ever served in government remember raising our right hands and solemnly swearing to an oath to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies. But after saying "so help me God", only one of us here today was given the awesome responsibility of leading the Free World. And on inauguration day in 1989, none of us including our new President, could have known that soon, far sooner than any of us imagined, we would be living in a world transformed. Nor could he or any of us know that his own Cold War crucible would be to help as only the President of the United States could help, to bring that chilling war to a virtually bloodless conclusion.

This is a history conference. Many of you are historians. You are all familiar with the "Great Man Theory" of history. Our distinguished luncheon speaker does not subscribe to it - at least as it could be related to himself. By all accounts, he suffers from a severe genetic case of New England modesty.

But if you were to view history as a succession of great moments to which leaders must rise or invite disaster, surely it will record that this man was equal to the great moment that came to him. That brief historical span when in three short years, with astonishing speed, the Berlin Wall fell, political revolution swept through Eastern Europe, Germany reunified within NATO, and the Soviet Union collapsed. From the security of ten years of hindsight, it is hard to remember that not one of those peaceful outcomes was inevitable.

If ever a man and a moment were made for each other, George Bush and the end of the Cold War were the perfect match. To meet his moment, President Bush drew on his vast experience in international affairs, on the instincts and judgments he had honed over a lifetime of service in war and in peace, on the decency and humanity at his very core, on a gifted national security team and the key personal relationships he had cultivated, and last, but not certainly least, on the strengths of the greatest intelligence system that the world has ever known.

Thus equipped, with skilled, quiet statecraft, he wisely shaped the policies and guided the actions of the sole remaining superpower through some of the most dramatic, consequential and dangerous years of the 20th Century. At such a momentous time, the American people were fortunate indeed to have George Bush as their President. Germany and America's other European partners were fortunate to have him as their ally. Mikhail Gorbachev was fortunate to have him as a counterpart. And the brave peoples of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were truly fortunate that such a man as he was the leader of the Free World.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honor and pleasure to present to you the only President of the United States to have served as Director of Central Intelligence, our 41st Commander in Chief, George Bush.

(DCI George J. Tenet remarks) (Memorial Ceremony) (President Bush's remarks)  
(Judge William Webster's remarks) (Dr. Robert Gates' remarks)

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May 25, 2000

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Remarks at Johns Hopkins University Diploma Ceremony

*"As Prepared for Delivery"*

**Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence  
 George J. Tenet  
 at the  
 Johns Hopkins University Diploma Ceremony  
 Baltimore, May 25, 2000**

Thank you, George. I know the real reason why you and the selection committee asked me to be the commencement speaker. Directors of Central Intelligence cannot say much, so you knew I would be brief. Besides, my security detail tells me that it is not good to be the only thing standing between 979 graduates and P.J.'s.

Dr. Brody, Provost Knapp, Distinguished Deans and Trustees, Members of the Class of 2000, Families, Friends, Graduates,

It has been a long four years – struggle and hard work, moments of anxiety and joy, learning how to manage on your own. Congratulations Parents, you've made it. Oh, and congratulations to the graduates as well.

I came here on an important mission today. In fact, I came here to give a mission to you, The Class of 2000, and I hope that you will decide to accept it. It is not a Mission Impossible. In fact, it is a Mission full of possibility. Your Mission is this: Whatever you do in life, wherever you go, find a way to serve your community, your country and the world.

Every one of you is smart and you know how to work hard, or you would not be receiving a Hopkins degree. You have every reason to be a success in the profession that you pursue. You are capable of making plenty of dollars. But the jury is still out on this important question: Will you make a difference?

The diploma that you receive today represents the fulfillment of a serious commitment that you made to yourself. It also symbolizes the enormous commitment that other people in your life made to you. Your parents may have paid a lot of tuition, but most important, they paid a lot of attention, and so did your mentors – your grandparents, aunts and uncles, big brothers and sisters, school teachers, professors, coaches, clergy, neighbors and friends – who helped you along the way.

Each of you is here today because some wonderful human beings took the time to make a difference in your life. They gave you a heritage to live up to. They gave you opportunities that they never had. They gave you moral support and a moral compass -- a set of values and a sense of possibility. They challenged you and inspired you to excellence. Whatever you have accomplished – whatever you will accomplish – you owe in great measure to them.

If any of you think you earned a Hopkins ticket to success all by your good-looking self, holed up on D level in the M.S.E., you are either delusional or very lonely, or both. I think your families and your mentors, and all who love and care about you and helped bring you to this day, deserve a big round of applause.

The Mission of Service to your community, your country and the world that I give to you today is worthy of one of your most distinguished alumni Woodrow Wilson, who is often accused of idealism. Wilson once said: "Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American."

Like every American, I am proud of our country and the fact that our nation uses its unequalled power for good. But I do not believe for one minute that the love of freedom, or the thirst for justice, or a compassionate regard for the well-being of other people on this planet are uniquely American traits. As the foreign students graduating today can attest, people all over the world feel these same things, and countless numbers are prepared to serve and sacrifice for their sake. And if that makes you an idealist, may we all have the character to plead guilty as charged, starting with me.

In the intelligence business, you have to be tough and deal with the world as it is. But I can tell you that success in the intelligence business depends equally on a strong sense of idealism, despite what some in Hollywood or the conspiracy theorists would have you believe. The people who work with me are some of the most dedicated and talented Americans you would ever hope to meet. They are conscientious citizens and concerned parents like you in the audience, who want to see their children grow up safe and free in a world that is at peace. And they have devoted their lives to that cause.

Every single day, the men and women of US Intelligence match their wits – and risk their lives -- against tough people and tough countries that do not share those ideals: terrorists, rogue regimes, drug traffickers, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. They do it with some of the most amazing technology ever developed. Even more impressively, they do it with integrity and brains and courage– and more often than not, they do it anonymously. Though you will seldom hear about them, I hope that you will never, never take them for granted. I hope that all of you will do what I do: say a prayer each day for the brave and patriotic Americans who silently defend us in a world that is as dangerous as it is so full of promise.

America finds itself with military pre-eminence, unparalleled political reach and overwhelming economic power. This historic moment may not last, but for now; American leadership makes a crucial difference in this world. You may think that I spend all of my time looking for threats. But it is also my job as Director of Central Intelligence to alert the President to the unprecedented opportunities we have as a nation. Opportunities:

To help consolidate democracy in former totalitarian states.  
 To help bring peace to the Middle East and other strife-ridden areas of the world.  
 To help struggling nations increase their prospects for success in the global economy.  
 To help strengthen the rule of law in countries whose stability is threatened by unfettered crime.  
 And so many others.

It is the job of US Intelligence to give our national leaders the insight and the flexibility they need to act rather than re-act – to look beyond the immediate and try to shape the future.

The Intelligence Community is now working on a study of what the world might be like in the year 2015. Now it does not take an Einstein to realize that predicting the future is fraught with problems. In fact, Einstein once said: “I never think of the future. It comes soon enough.”

All you have to do is reflect on the astonishing events of the last century -- two world wars, several vanished empires, the dominance of air power, the appearance of nuclear weapons to name just a few -- to see the perils of projection. All of these would have been hard to predict even ten or fifteen years before they occurred. And the world of 2015 may be dramatically different than we expect it to be today.

Just consider what the world was like only fifteen years ago:

- Back in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had no clue that he would be the last Soviet leader.

- The Sunday morning talkshows were not talking about “globalization.”
- The American public was just beginning to awaken to the scourge of AIDs.
- Nobody had heard of Bosnia Herzegovina, Osama bin Ladin – or Britney Spears and the Backstreet Boys.
- In 1985, Steve Wozniak, the designer of the first Apple computer, told *USA Today*, and I quote: “I don’t think home computers will become commonplace. It’s difficult to justify why many homes would need one.”

That was then. This is now. Our world has entered an epoch of transition -- a time of historic opportunities and unprecedented dangers. We live in an age when:

- Rapid technological advances fascinate and enrich us, but also create new vulnerabilities. Those who would do grievous harm have greater reach and destructive power than ever before.
- Ours is an age of tremendous medical advances and an AIDs pandemic that threatens massive regional unrest.
- It is an era when the end of repressive regimes and the advance of democracy are all too often accompanied by outbursts of ethnic hatred that are extraordinarily difficult to contain.

But on a lighter note, let me say that for all the welcome opportunities and the unwelcome surprises in this world, some things remain remarkably consistent. Two cases in point: In 1985, the biggest male pop artist actually was known as Prince. And just last week, he became formerly known as “the artist formerly known as Prince.” And, on this very day, May 25, in 1985, the Bluejays won the NCAA Division I Lacrosse Championship over Syracuse -- and I am betting that you are about to do it again!

As we learn in sports, life throws curves. We could be struck by luck – or by lightning. We human beings – however powerful or brilliant, good or evil – are fallible, flawed, fickle and fragile. And many of the factors that change our lives and our world radically for the better – or for worse -- are inherently unpredictable and outside our ability to control.

As human beings, as Americans, and as citizens of this world, our great hope and responsibility is to use the will and the knowledge and the power we do have to try to shape the future for the better. As new graduates, I hope that you feel this challenge in a special way.

What are some of the trends that we identify today that hold far-reaching implications for the world of 2015? I will cite just a few, and not those you might expect from a Director of Central Intelligence. I would ask you to consider that:

- In the last year, Internet use in China jumped from 2 million to 10 million. I will let the math majors extrapolate to 2015. But what will that mean? What will the impact be of an ever growing proportion of China's population entering cyberspace – a place where few respect orthodoxy of any sort?
- There will be over 7 billion people in the world in 2015, a billion more than today. More than 95% of this additional population will be born in developing countries – countries that are least able to cope with the pressures this growth will create. What are the implications for regional stability?
- We expect the threat from infectious diseases – some re-emergent, some entirely new -- to keep growing over the next 15 years, despite important progress that is being made.
- And think about the most commonplace – and necessary – of commodities: water. Water, in and of itself, has not been a cause of war for more than 4500 years. In fact, water shortages often have stimulated sharing arrangements. But by 2015, about a third of the world's population will be living in water-stressed regions. We must ask ourselves: This time, will the result be cooperation or conflict?

My question to the Class of 2000 is, fifteen years from now, what will your lives be like?

I hate to break this to you, but in 2015, you will be in your mid-thirties. By then, you are likely to have spouses, mortgages, kids, 20 extra pounds and established careers. But will you have enthusiasm? Will your life have meaning or will you be going through the motions? Will you know who you are and stand up for what you believe? Will you be living your life in a way that does honor to the wonderful people here with you now – your family and your mentors who have enriched your lives, broadened your horizons and helped launch you on the road to success?

What you do with your lives over the next fifteen years -- how you choose to live them -- can make all the difference -- not only to you, but to countless people in this world whom you will never meet. Because of you – and your generation -- the world of 2015 can be much less dangerous – and much more humane and healthy – than my best intelligence analysts now dare to imagine. But will you help to make the world of 2015 a better place to live? Will you put your first-class education to work for your community, your country and the world?

As we contemplate the possible scenarios for 2015, one thing that my top analysts and I cannot know – and one thing that can make a powerful difference – is what is on your

minds and what is in your hearts.

Whatever your chosen field -- medicine, public health, environmental science, international relations, languages, physics, mathematics, biology, engineering, IT -- even if, God forbid, you become a lawyer like George Soterakis threatens to do -- or quit physics and engineering to become a financial oracle and media mogul like Mike Bloomberg -- I hope that you will consider engaging in some form of public service.

Service in government -- devoting at least part of your career to it -- is one option that I hope you will think about, though I realize that government is not the obvious career choice in a prosperous, dot-com age. If you want excellence in government, then exceptional people must be willing to serve in it.

For those of you who cannot resist the pull of the private sector -- hey, this is the United States of America, go for it, make a fortune. But I can tell you with confidence that you will be even wealthier if you remember to "give something back." Devote a significant percentage of your profits to charity. Become a private philanthropist like your founder Johns Hopkins. Out-give Bill Gates. The key is to contribute some of yourself, as well as your money, to a good cause.

Every one of you can make the time to serve on a school board, volunteer at a local shelter, or mentor a kid who needs someone to care. When you do that you are actually exerting tremendous power: the power to create hope and opportunity.

I seldom reveal secrets, but, in closing -- and in summary -- I will share some with you now. You could call them "George Tenet's Seven Secrets to Success":

Tenet #1: Know who you are. My mother escaped from southern Albania on a British submarine just as the Iron Curtain was closing -- never to see her family again. My father came to America just prior to the Great Depression speaking no English, without a nickel in his pocket or a friend in sight. Imagine their courage. I talk about them with great pride to make my point. Each of you has family stories of courage and sacrifice. They tell you what your values are and who you are as men and women -- never forget them. They will guide you through the darkest days in your life, and sweeten your happiest moments.

Tenet #2: Honor the service and the sacrifice of men and women who protect this country and our values. As you sit in Starbucks tomorrow night sipping your espressos and your cappuccinos -- remember the men and women in military uniform, the law enforcement officers, and the intelligence officers working around the globe and around the clock to protect your way of life -- putting their lives on the line, so that you can pursue your life's dream in total freedom. Honor their service. Better yet, be inspired

by their example to render service yourself.

Tenet #3: Follow your heart and dare to take risks. If you do not wake up every day with great passion for your work, you will be miserable. Do not just go through the motions. Never put yourself in the position of regretting what you did not try to do. Every experience – whether it is good or bad – if it is based on passionate belief and doing what you love -- will give you the will and the character to learn, grow and persevere. Stand up for yourself and your dreams. Do not lose your youthful idealism for the world.

Tenet #4: Fight hatred and prejudice wherever you see it. If there is one thing in today's world that is most responsible for the turmoil we see, it is ethnic hatred. It haunts us across continents – in the Balkans, in central Africa, in the Middle East, and even here in our own country. The fundamental lack of tolerance that men and women show for each other drives so much of the instability that we confront. We all carry prejudice of one sort or another inside us. Purge it from your souls and never turn a blind eye toward hatred when you encounter it.

Tenet # 5: Laugh as much as you can. Never take yourself too seriously. Have the ability to stand back and admit your shortcomings and failures with humor and grace. This ability will help you weather any storm.

Tenet #6: Take care of the people around you. If you take care of people, they will always take care of you. Many of you will rise like meteors to the top of your chosen professions. On the way up, treat the people around you with the decency and respect and generosity that have been shown to you. Have a kind word. Offer a helping hand. And when you reach the top, show a little humility. Why? Because there will come a day when the crash occurs. When failure comes. When you plummet down the ladder. The fall will be gentle if people remember you as a caring, considerate human being.


The Seventh, and final Tenet is: Love and serve your country. In no other country in the world could someone like me stand before you as Director of Central Intelligence. Americans are given opportunities that no other country provides. If you do not get a lump in your throat when the National Anthem is played or the flag passes by – come to your senses and recognize that you live in the greatest country in the world.

When you put my “Seven Tenets” together, they add up to one big secret for success as a human being, and it is this: Serve someone other than yourself, something bigger than yourself.

This is the Mission that I give to you today. I hope that you will choose to accept.

May God bless you and your families. Thank you.

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August 11, 2000

**Headlines:** (U) DCI Letter to Congress on Recent Decisions regarding the Release of Chile Documents

(U) **Text of DCI Letter to Congress on August 11 on Recent Decisions regarding the Release of Chile Documents**

I write to update you on our Chile declassification efforts. Declassification decisions require the most careful consideration. I believe we have taken a measured, rational approach in supplementing the declassification guidelines initially issued by the National Security Council (NSC) in November 1999. The CIA guidelines reflect our fundamental commitment to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I believe the Agency can be proud of its Chile declassification efforts. We have devoted several thousand hours over a nine month period to this endeavor. The review was thorough, intensive, and dedicated to the release of as much relevant information as possible consistent with my statutory obligation to protect sources and methods.

With regard to the latest release of material, we have finished our exhaustive review of documents related to human rights and terrorism issues and the records associated with the major covert action undertaken to provide support and encouragement to groups seeking to mount a coup against the Salvador Allende government in 1970. I have also evaluated the proposed release of other material related to Chile during 1962-1975. As part of this review process, I asked the Directorate of Operations to prepare an assessment of the proposed release of the 1962-1975 material and its potential impact on current operational equities. I carefully reviewed that assessment in my effort to make a declassification decision that reflects both the interest in providing information to the public as well as my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have made the following determinations. First, I have approved for release more than 500 documents comprising thousands of pages pertaining to human rights abuses, terrorism and other acts of political violence that occurred during 1968-1991. I

believe these documents will add important material to the historical record without inhibiting our ability to protect sources and methods. Second, I approved for release several hundred documents representing close to 1,000 pages pertaining to the major covert action undertaken in Chile in 1970. Again, I believe the release will illuminate the historical record without damaging intelligence sources and methods.

Finally, I decided to withhold at this time other documents from the 1962-1975 time frame. I made this decision by carefully evaluating the records after they had been reviewed and redacted. This decision was not made in an effort to shield from release human rights or other information sought by the NSC Directive. It was solely made because, in their aggregate, these materials present a pattern of activity that had the effect of revealing intelligence methods that have been employed worldwide. While I am not at this time releasing the additional documents, I have agreed to allow them to be reviewed one more time, with the assistance of State Department and the NSC, to ensure that there is not some subset of these documents that may be released without doing harm to intelligence sources and methods. I also want to reemphasize that we are in no way trying to withhold information embarrassing to the United States Government.


What I have offered for release in this final tranche fully meets the scope of the NSC directive which called for review and release of records pertaining to human rights abuses, terrorism and acts of political violence. This final release will include:

- numerous operational documents detailing the covert action designed to provide support and encouragement to groups seeking to mount a coup against Salvador Allende government in 1970.
- the first significant release of documents related to topics discussed during the Church Committee hearings.
- Directorate of Operations intelligence reports chronicling the activities of subversive groups, including information pertaining to the groups' kidnapping efforts, plans to mount economic sabotage, and reports that suggest the groups' involvement in a number of assassination attempts.
- information on the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt; operational cables describing Pinochet's handling of human rights issues, and reports on the efforts of Pinochet and Manuel Contreras, a former head of DINA, to try to implicate the CIA in the murder of Letelier.
- several documents that discuss CIA's non-involvement in the 1973 coup which toppled Allende from power as well as several National Intelligence Estimates and relevant Directorate of Intelligence publications.

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As a result of careful review and redaction, I believe this final release of information strikes the correct balance in providing the public with historically important information pursuant to the NSC directive while also meeting our vital statutory obligations. *(This is UNCLASSIFIED.)*

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