

VOLUME 1
POLICY INITIATIVES OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
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CHAPTER 1: A NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

In 1993, the incoming Clinton Administration inherited a defense program structured around the 1990 "base force" concept developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe but before the failed coup attempt in Moscow that precipitated the Soviet Union's disintegration. The base force had taken initial steps toward redirecting the U.S. defense program away from the Warsaw Pact threat toward threats emerging in the post-Cold War world such as regional aggression. But it still hedged against the resurgence of a hostile and powerful Soviet threat. The following year, in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

A. BOTTOM UP REVIEW

In response to these dramatic changes, incoming Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated the first post-Cold War (i.e. post-Soviet) review of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure and foundations in March 1993. Secretary Aspin believed the department-wide effort had to be completed "from the bottom-up." The purpose of his so-called Bottom-Up Review (BUR)--released in October 1993--was to provide the direction for shifting America's focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward new dangers the United States faced.

Organization and Approach

The BUR involved close collaboration between civilian and military sectors of the Department of Defense. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, each of the armed services and, where appropriate, other defense agencies formed task forces to review major issues of military planning, strategy, forces, modernization programs and other major elements of the defense program. Numerous studies helped frame key issues for decision-makers and provided the analytical underpinning for the review. The step-by-step process for reaching conclusions was as follows:

- Assess post-Cold War era, particularly new dangers and opportunities it presented;
- Devise a defense strategy to protect and advance U.S. interests in the new period;
- Construct building blocks of U.S. forces to implement the strategy;
- Combine those force building blocks to produce options for overall force structure; and,
- Complement the force structure with weapons acquisition programs to modernize U.S. forces, defense foundations to sustain them, and policy initiatives to address new dangers and take advantage of new opportunities.

Key Findings

New Dangers. The BUR identified four key national security threats the United States faced following the Soviet Union's break-up:

- New nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) dangers as states beyond declared nuclear powers (United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China) either had acquired or were pursuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
- Regional threats such as North Korea, the ambitions of Iran or Iraq to dominate Southwest Asia, continuing civil strife in Croatia and Bosnia that could spark a wider crisis, state-sponsored terrorism, and drug trafficking in Latin America and elsewhere;
- Reversal of the democratic reform and transition underway in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere; and,
- A U.S. economy plagued by growing federal debt, sluggish growth, inadequate job creation and a large trade imbalance.

BUR Strategy. The BUR concluded that the United States would not withdraw from the world, but rather must pursue a strategy characterized by continued political, economic, and military engagement internationally. This approach would help avoid the risks of global instability and imbalance that could accompany a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from security commitments. Continued U.S. engagement was necessary to help shape the international environment in ways that would protect and advance U.S. objectives over the longer term and prevent threats to U.S. interests from arising. The new strategy also would pursue an international partnership with allies and friends to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace.

The BUR outlined a multi-pronged approach to meet the new dangers from nuclear weapons and other WMD. It included non-proliferation efforts to prevent the spread of WMD and strengthen existing export controls on WMD technologies and materials. The Administration would also pursue cooperative threat reduction with the former Soviet Union (FSU) to eliminate stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and prevent the spread of WMD-related components and expertise within and beyond FSU borders. Finally the Administration would pursue counter-proliferation efforts to deter, prevent or defend against the use of WMD.

To address the emerging regional dangers, the BUR concluded the United States needed to field forces capable, in concert with allies, of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. This capability was critical for avoiding a situation where the United States would be unable to respond effectively to aggression in one region if it was engaged in a major conflict elsewhere. Sizing forces to fight and win two major regional conflicts also

provided a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary, or coalition of adversaries, might someday confront the United States with a larger-than-expected threat.

The BUR also concluded that stationing and deploying U.S. military forces overseas in peacetime was an essential element in dealing with new regional dangers and pursuing new opportunities. U.S. peacetime overseas presence was the single most visible demonstration of our commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests. Our presence would deter adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassure friends, enhance regional stability, and underwrite the Administration's larger strategy of international engagement, prevention and partnership. Stationing forces abroad allowed the United States to improve its ability to respond effectively to crises or aggression if they occurred. Moreover, the day-to-day operations with allies afforded by U.S. overseas presence could improve the ability of U.S. forces and allies to operate effectively together. Our presence also helped ensure access to the facilities and bases we would need during a conflict or contingency, both to operate in a given region and to deploy forces from the United States to distant regions.

While deterring and defeating major regional aggression would be the most demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, the BUR also recognized that U.S. military forces would likely be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare. World events had borne this out. In the few years prior to the BUR, U.S. forces had been involved in aiding typhoon victims in Bangladesh, delivering humanitarian relief to the FSU, conducting the emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens from Liberia, and restoring order and aiding the victims of the civil war in Somalia among other missions. The Administration would consider each situation carefully in deciding where, when and how U.S. forces would be employed for peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and similar operations. Several factors would be weighed:

- Would participation advance U.S. national interests;
- Were the objectives clear and attainable;
- How would the intervention affect other U.S. defense obligations; and,
- Could the United States contribute capabilities and assets necessary for the success of the mission.

To prevent a reversal of these former communist states, the BUR advocated offering targeted aid and training programs aimed at underwriting the democratization process and market reforms. DoD would continue and intensify defense-to-defense contacts to foster mutual understanding and help democratizing states in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics institute civilian control of the military. DoD would also provide assistance to secure and reduce the Russian nuclear arsenal and to eliminate strategic nuclear armaments in the non-Russian republics, and it would solicit cooperation in regional security initiatives such as multilateral peacekeeping missions.

Finally, the BUR concluded that DoD could help address domestic economic woes and enhance U.S. economic security by stressing the productive reinvestment of defense resources, facilities, and technology into the civilian economy. With careful restructuring of U.S. forces

and support infrastructure, DoD could maintain U.S. military capabilities sufficient to meet present and future security needs while reducing the overall level of resources devoted to defense.

Force Structure. The BUR concluded that the United States could maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in its overall force structure. The way to achieve this was to implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve U.S. strategic mobility and early-arriving anti-armor capability, and to take other steps to ensure the ability to halt regional aggression.

The BUR force was smaller and less expensive than the base force. Total active-duty personnel went from 1.6-1.7 million under the base force to 1.4 million. Active Army divisions went from 12 to 10; active and Reserve fighter wings from 26-1/2 to 20; active carriers from 12 to 11, with one carrier moving into the Reserves; total Navy ships from 450 to 345; and attack submarines from 88 to 45-50. The BUR envisioned an endstrength for the Marine Corps' of 174,000 by FY99.

Defense Resources. The BUR estimated a range of savings over the FY95-99 period including \$24 billion from force structure decisions; \$19 billion from infrastructure reductions, and \$32 billion through modernization and investment decisions. These modernization and investment decisions were aimed at emphasizing key technologies—information and manufacturing technologies and advanced materials—that would help strengthen both the military and civilian sectors.

The BUR identified a number of programs remaining in production that had been designed to counter the Soviet threat; the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was an example. The Administration would need to decide which among the extant programs should be retained and how those retained should be developed over time to meet new and emerging threats.

In the case of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the BUR reconfigured the program and replaced SDI with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). While SDI had focused on defending against thousands of Soviet warheads, BMDO would focus on building defenses to protect American and allied forces in regional conflicts against theater ballistic missile attack, such as the world had seen with Iraqi Scud missiles in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. The BUR estimated that the SDI-to-BMDO realignment would generate savings of \$21 billion over FY95-99 (in addition to the aforementioned \$32 billion for other modernization and investment).

From October 1993 until the release of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary Aspin's Bottom-Up-Review served as the cardinal strategy document for the Department of Defense.

B. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in May 1997 by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, was the fourth comprehensive review of the United States military completed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 1997 QDR built on the experience with the policy and forces resulting from the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and the 1995 Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM).

The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996, included as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, required that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conduct the 1997 QDR. Congress also had required that an independent panel be established (the National Defense Panel) to review the QDR's methodology and findings. In meeting the congressional requirement, the Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs from 1997-2015. Intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced and affordable defense program, the QDR included analysis on potential threats, defense strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and resource implications. The defense strategy articulated in the QDR derived from and supported the President's 1996 National Security Strategy.

Organization and Approach

The 1997 QDR was a collaborative effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, with extensive participation from the Military Services and Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands. The Review was designed to be bottom-up and top-down. It was bottom-up in that it tapped expertise and ideas from throughout the Department and solicited additional ideas and support from beyond DoD. It was top-down because the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guided the process to ensure that all choices and alternatives provided the capabilities necessary to execute the strategy.

The QDR was structured into three organizational tiers or levels. At the first level, seven panels conducted reviews of strategy, force structure, readiness, modernization, infrastructure, human resources, and information operations and intelligence. At the second level, an Integration Group organized the panel results into a coherent set of integrated options designed to be consistent with the defense strategy. At the third level, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversaw the process as co-chairs of the Senior Steering Group, which made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary, in turn, reviewed the Steering Group's recommendations in consultation with the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

From the beginning of the QDR, the Senior Steering Group established a road map for the effort that required close adherence to the following milestones:

- The start-up and guidance phase (December 1996) identified issues, provided guidance and direction to panels, and began evaluation of the threat assessment.
- The strategy and fiscal context phase (January 1997) presented the defense strategy and projection of the fiscal environment and program risks.
- The analysis phase (February 1997) reported initial results of panel reviews.
- The integration phase (March 1997) evaluated and refined integrated options within the defense strategy framework.
- The decision phase (April 1997) presented refined alternatives to the Secretary of Defense for decision and identified issues for further evaluation.

The National Defense Panel received regular briefings on the work of the panels as well as on the integration of options and decisions. The National Security Council staff and other Administration agencies also participated at various points in the Review. As the decision options began to take shape, the Department began its consultations with Congress. The President reviewed and then approved the defense strategy and the final decisions regarding program directions.

Key Findings

Opportunities. By the time of the QDR, the threat of global war had receded and U.S. core values of representative democracy and market economics had been embraced in many parts of the world, creating new opportunities for the United States to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations. The sustained dynamism of the global economy had begun to transform commerce, culture, and global interactions.

U.S. alliances that had been so critical to U.S. security during the Cold War, such as NATO, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance, were adapting to meet the challenges of the day and providing a foundation for a stable and prosperous world. The United States was enjoying closer cooperative relations across a range of security issues with former adversaries like Russia and other former members of the Warsaw Pact. Many considered the United States the security partner of choice.

Threats. Nevertheless, the world remained a dangerous and highly uncertain place and the United States likely would face a number of significant challenges to its security between 1997 and 2015. The QDR identified four key challenges the United States would need to be prepared to meet:

- Regional dangers including the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military

power. Failed or failing states might also create instability, internal conflict and humanitarian crises, in some cases within regions where the United States had vital or important interests.

- Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies that could have military or terrorist use, destabilize regions and increase the number of potential adversaries with significant military capabilities. Of particular concern were the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery; information warfare capabilities; advanced conventional weapons; stealth capabilities; unmanned aerial vehicles and capabilities to access or deny access to space.
- Transnational dangers, including the illegal drug trade, international organized crime, uncontrolled flows of migrants, and increasingly capable and violent terrorists
- Threats to the U.S. homeland from outside: in addition to the inherent threat of nuclear arsenals in other countries, unconventional means such as terrorism, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, and attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure through computer-based information networks were growing threats.

QDR Strategy. The “shape-respond-prepare” strategy defined in the QDR determined that the most stressing requirement for U.S. conventional forces would be fighting and winning two major theater wars in overlapping timeframes. While the Bottom-Up Review had focused primarily on this difficult task, the QDR also carefully evaluated other force planning factors and placed greater emphasis on maintaining a continuous overseas presence to shape the international environment and respond, as needed, to a variety of smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric threats. The QDR sized forces for the two major theater war requirement, with the exception that naval forces were sized primarily to meet the demands of overseas presence.

The QDR also placed much greater emphasis on the need to prepare now for an uncertain future in which hostile and potentially hostile states would acquire new capabilities. The “preparing” pillar demanded increased and stable investment in modernization to exploit the revolution in military affairs and transform U.S. forces to meet 21st century challenges. The QDR concluded that DoD must fundamentally reengineer its infrastructure and streamline support structures, taking advantage of the Revolution in Business Affairs in the commercial world, in order to realize the cost efficiencies needed to modernize the force.

The “shape-respond-prepare” strategy recognized that the future force would be different in character. Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), the Chairman’s conceptual framework for how US forces would fight in the future, charted the path toward “full spectrum dominance.” At the heart of JV2010 was developing the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information to U.S. forces throughout the battlespace while denying the enemy’s ability to do the same.

The key was to develop an integrated "system of systems" that ensured U.S. forces superior battlespace awareness, permitting them to dramatically reduce the fog of war. This system of systems would:

- Integrate intelligence collection and assessment, command and control, weapons systems, and support elements;
- Connect the commanders to the shooters and suppliers; and;
- Make available the full range of information both to decision-makers in the rear and the forces at the point of the spear.

U.S. forces would achieve new levels of effectiveness across the full spectrum of conflict, from peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingencies to major theater war, thereby widening the gap between U.S. forces and adversaries, both current and potential.

Achieving such capabilities would not be an easy task and could not be done in one leap. It was a step-by-step process involving the development of new technologies, investment in new platforms and systems, new operational concepts, training and doctrine and formation of new organizational structures--a road the DoD had already started down with tangible results at the time the QDR was released.

Force Structure. The QDR decided that modest reductions in military endstrength and force structure were needed to rebalance the defense program. Enhanced capabilities of new systems and streamlined support structures would help offset these reductions. To preserve combat capability and readiness, the Services targeted reductions at streamlining infrastructure and outsourcing non-military-essential functions.

The QDR force reduced total active duty endstrength to 1.36 million from roughly 1.42 million programmed for FY97. Total Reserves were reduced from 900,000 programmed for FY97 to 835,000. Total civilian personnel decreased from 800,000 programmed for FY97 to 640,000.

- The Army was to retain 10 active, combat-ready divisions, accelerate its Force XXI modernization plan, reduce its endstrength by 15,000 and restructure its Reserve component;
- The Navy would retain 12 carrier battle groups (11 active, 1 reserve) and 12 amphibious ready groups. It would reduce surface combatants from 128 to 116, attack submarines from 73 to 50 and procurement of F/A-18E/Fs from 1000 to 548 as it transitioned to the Joint Strike Fighter. Finally, the Navy would reduce active and Reserve endstrength by 18,000 and 4,100 personnel respectively;
- The Air Force would consolidate fighter and bomber units, shift one active component fighter wing to the Reserves, retaining 12 active and 8 Reserve fighter wing equivalents; reduce active duty endstrength by 27,000; and proceed with the F-22 aircraft program to replace the F-15C/D; and,

- The Marine Corps would take modest reductions in endstrength, but maintain a 3 Marine Expeditionary Force capability and accelerate its procurement of the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft.

Defense Resources/Modernization. Operating within the budgetary constraint of roughly \$250 billion per year, the Department had been able to sustain the Bottom-Up Review force structure while maintaining high readiness and supporting quality of life programs. But funding for modernization had been insufficient, with procurement budgets stalled near the \$40 billion level.

Projected increases in funding for modernization had continually been delayed as modernization funds migrated to operations and support accounts to pay current bills. The "procurement holiday" had been acceptable in the early years following the end of the Cold War because the drawdown of forces allowed the United States to retire older equipment, leaving large stocks of modern equipment purchased during the 1980s. But by 1997, this trend in procurement was not sustainable given the changing global environment and aging U.S. equipment.

Fulfilling a strategy of shaping the international security environment, responding to the full spectrum of crises and aggression, and preparing now for the future required substantial and ready forces, together with a focused program of investments to improve the equipment those forces would employ. A focus of the QDR, therefore, was to build a solid financial foundation for a modernization program that could reliably support the future warfighting capabilities envisioned in JV2010.

To modernize the force, the Department established a goal of increasing procurement funding to roughly \$60 billion by FY01.¹ On the path to that goal, the QDR established somewhat lower intermediate targets of \$49 billion in FY 1999 and \$54 billion in FY 2000, which were achieved as planned. The QDR recognized that continuing efforts to reduce the costs of the defense infrastructure would be needed to achieve those targets.

QDR '97 Postscript

Building upon the work of predecessors, the 1997 QDR enabled the United States to sustain its preeminent military capabilities even as it accelerated the pace of transforming the force to meet future security challenges. Given the rapid rate of change in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War, the QDR underscored the importance of undertaking comprehensive reexaminations of the defense program on a regular basis.

¹ The FY01 Defense Appropriations Act provided approximately \$59.2 billion in new budget authority for procurement accounts.

There will be another QDR conducted under the purview of the next Administration. The 2001 QDR will respond to Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY00, which establishes the permanent requirement for a quadrennial defense review. The next QDR must be submitted to Congress no later than 30 September 2001.

CHAPTER 2: ENHANCEMENTS OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

BACKGROUND

Over the last decade, each military Service has made significant strides improving conventional capabilities, adapting the force to meet new and emerging security challenges and enhancing its ability to contribute to joint operations. The Services have sought to harness commercial sector innovation, particularly in the areas of electronics and information technology, moving closer to making Joint Vision 2010's concept of "full spectrum dominance" a reality. Each Service continues developing its ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information to U.S. forces throughout the battlespace, while denying the enemy's ability to do the same. Each has adopted a "system of systems" approach to integrate intelligence collection and assessment with command and control, weapons systems and support elements. This connects commanders to shooters and suppliers and produces the full range of information for decision-makers in the rear as well as forces at the point of the spear.

Achieving these conventional capabilities has been, and will continue to be, a step-by-step process a road the Department of Defense has already started down with tangible results. It will involve: the development of new technologies; investment in new platforms and systems; new operational concepts, training and doctrine; and formation of new organizational structures.

Among the areas where the U.S. military has experienced dramatic improvements since the end of the Persian Gulf War are the following:

- The strike capabilities of Naval and Air Force tactical aviation;
- The lethality of Army firepower;
- The capabilities of long-range bombers;
- The capabilities and lethality of munitions and munitions systems;
- Battlefield surveillance;
- Nuclear, chemical and biological defenses; and,
- Strategic mobility.

Operations throughout the 1990s demonstrated the superior capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces—individually and jointly—to execute the full range of missions. These are just a sampling of U.S. military success over the past decade, demonstrating the breadth of impact that enhancements in conventional capabilities have afforded the force:

- Air Force, Navy and Marine Corp aircraft made hundreds of precise attacks on critical fixed and mobile enemy targets during the 78-day NATO air campaign that halted Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999;
- Combat and support aircraft and cruise missile-carrying ships and submarines on several occasions launched precise attacks against key WMD-related targets in Iraq in response to Iraqi noncompliance with UN resolutions, against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the U.S. embassy

bombings in summer 1998, and against Serb forces in fall 1995 which helped produce the peace in Bosnia;

- Forces from all four services rapidly deployed to the Persian Gulf in September 1994 to successfully deter potential Iraqi aggression following a sudden buildup of Saddam's forces near the Kuwaiti border; and,
- U.S. Navy carrier battle groups also executed a show-of-force operation to reinforce deterrence in the Taiwan Straits in response to provocative Chinese missile firings near Taiwan in 1996.

As the Administration comes to an end, Army and Marine Corps forces continue to carry out effective peace implementation operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai desert. These operations have helped maintain the peace without loss of life to U.S. troops due to hostile action. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft continue to enforce no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, in cooperation with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, continue to enforce sanctions in the Persian Gulf and Adriatic and help control the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. U.S. Marines and Special Operations Forces, brought to the scene by ships and transport aircraft, have protected and evacuated U.S. citizens where local conflicts have arisen in places like Liberia, Albania, and Indonesia. Military personnel from all Services have brought timely humanitarian aid to peoples faced with natural and manmade disasters at home and abroad, including to victims of famine and disease in Somalia and Zaire, earthquakes in Turkey, a severe hurricane in Central America, and forest fires in the western United States.

A. ARMY

Over the last decade, the Army has undergone a significant shift in orientation away from preparing to respond to a Cold War scenario to developing a more flexible, sustainable and rapidly deployable force capable of global power projection across the full spectrum of operations. Since 1993, the U.S. Army has significantly enhanced its capabilities and fielded a force that has greater firepower, maneuverability, and battlespace awareness than at any time in its history. Added to these technology-driven changes are the Army's comprehensive transformation effort, and greater integration of the National Guard into the execution of the defense strategy.

Enhanced Firepower, Maneuverability, and Battlespace Awareness.

Upgrades to major land combat systems have enhanced the Army's warfighting capabilities. For example, the fielding of 456 new M1A2 tanks and 90 upgraded M1A1D tanks with the Army's III Corps has provided greater lethality and survivability to armored forces due to improved fire control, navigation, and digital capabilities.

The Army's application of information technology and the attendant creation of a Sensor-to-Shooter capability in a shared network of information represents as dramatic an innovation for the warfighter as was mechanization 100 years ago. Information technology is

enabling the Army to make quantum leaps from platform-centric to network centric engagement and from plan-centric to operation-centric warfare, whereby operators will be able to make real-time tactical adjustments as the battlespace evolves. As an example, fielding of the AH-64D Longbow helicopters, first operational in 1998 in the 1st Cavalry Division, has increased combat effectiveness in the Apache helicopters by a factor of three over the Alpha models in the early 1990s. The Longbows can handle multiple targets at standoff range. Their digital target acquisition system can automatically classify targets and allows aircraft to share target information thereby reducing exposure time. The Longbow's fire-and-forget capability critically improves the survivability and effectiveness of the launch platform.

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army confronted the difficulty inherent in strategically moving heavy forces. To correct for this shortfall, great strides have been made to improve the prepositioning of critical war stocks. Prepositioned equipment and munitions have been added in critical theaters such as the Persian Gulf, Korea, and the Indian Ocean to improve Army's capabilities for rapid response and enable Army units to enter the battle more quickly and effectively. We established APS facilities in Kuwait in 1992, in Qatar in 1994 and in Korea in 1995. Over the past 5-7 years the number of APS ships grew from four to 15. The Army now has 7 brigade sets of equipment and war reserve stocks prepositioned in 15 countries, far more than at any time in the past.

For most of the past decade the Army has worked to establish its information age force, Force XXI. The Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), a brigade-size test of 71 new equipment prototypes was conducted at Fort Irwin in March 1997, followed by a division-level AWE in November of the same year. These events led to 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas becoming the first digital division operational in early FY01. The first digital corps is slated to be operational in FY04. Central to this progress has been the activation of the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, which has moved deployed Army units from reliance on radios and telephones to full integration and use of state-of-the-art information technologies during real world contingencies, such as Bosnia, and exercises.

Army Transformation

Against the backdrop of relative peace, unrivaled economic prosperity and stampeding technological progress, the Army has been transforming itself. Forward-looking and directly linked to the expected future security environment, Army transformation will result in deployment of an *Objective Force* that is more responsive, deployable, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable than the present *Legacy Force*. The Army is sustaining a portion of *the Legacy Force* as it develops the *Objective Force* capabilities to ensure warfighting readiness for the near-term. In FY01, the Army will begin developing and fielding the *Interim Force* intended to bring online the capability to respond to immediate operational requirements worldwide while providing the strategic deterrence needed to preserve real options for the National Command Authority. These *Interim* units will be the vanguard of the future *Objective Force*.

Army recapitalization is focused on rebuilding and selectively upgrading currently fielded systems to add warfighting capability improvements, address capability shortfalls and

ensure operational readiness for meeting *Legacy Force* requirements as the force moves from its *Legacy* to *Interim* phases. The goal is to restore systems to like-new condition in appearance, performance and life expectancy while actually inserting new technology that improves reliability and maintainability.

The first Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) will come into being in March 2001, with an initial operating capability in Dec 2001. The second IBCT will become operational the follow year. These initial IBCTs will validate the concept and be steps toward development of the *Objective Force*.

Integration of the National Guard

Over the last decade, there has been enormous progress in integrating Army National Guard (NG) units into the day-to-day execution of the defense strategy. Over the last ten years our citizen-soldiers have been on point more then ever before, both domestically and overseas.

Between 1999-2000, the Guard deployed 33,000 soldiers overseas and participated in 21 Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises. Last year, the NG provided 281,275 soldier workdays to civilian authorities in 46 states in response to tornadoes, hurricanes, mudslides and winter storms. While answering the call in domestic emergencies, the NG also has been involved in Army Transformation efforts, and is slated to receive one of the first five IBCTs when they are fielded. The NG continues to convert approximately 12 combat brigades to combat service support to fill an Army-identified shortfall in capability.

In 1996, the NG established 15 enhanced readiness brigades to make use of the early deployment of Guard combat assets to major theater wars. These brigades will deploy to the warfight within 3 months after call-up. In 1997, the NG provided 3,600,000 man-days of support to federal mission requirements ranging from the Balkans to hurricane relief. Today, in Bosnia, the 49th Armor Division from the Texas National Guard is on point for the Nation as part of the NATO Stabilization Force. In October 2001, the 29th Infantry Division from the Virginia National Guard will deploy to Bosnia to relieve the 3rd Infantry Division. These units are executing effective military operations that promote important U.S. national interests.

Division Teaming between NG and Active Component divisions began in 1999 to facilitate immediate and mutual support when a partner division is assigned to a mission. An example of this was when the 49th Armor Division supported the First Cavalry Division in preparation for the latter's deployment to Bosnia. Serious consideration is now being given to apportioning NG divisions to theater commanders in chief.

Each of these advancements is key to the future and further integration of the NG, and to enhancing the Army's ability to provide a more flexible, sustainable and rapidly deployable force capable of global power projection across the full spectrum of operations.

B. NAVY

Since 1993, the Navy has greatly improved its ability to project power ashore through enhanced capabilities in its ships, aircraft, weapons, and command, control and information processing systems. The Navy has demonstrated these enhanced capabilities in a wide range of operations including:

- Precision strikes against Iraqi military sites in Operation Desert Strike (1996);
- Cruise missile strikes against terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan (1998);
- NATO's Kosovo air campaign (1999); and,
- Continuous maritime intercept operations in the Persian Gulf (since 1993).

Areas where key capability improvements have enabled these successful operations include: command, control and information processing; the Aegis combat system; precision munitions; Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles; attack submarines; amphibious ships; aircraft carriers; surface combatants; and Navy medical support.

Command, Control, and Information Processing

In the early 1990s, the Navy relied upon dedicated communications circuitry to maintain situational awareness at sea. Situational assessments and targeting information were updated via record message traffic. Today, all aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) have integrated cutting-edge information technology that provides enhanced battlespace awareness across the Navy. Critical situation assessments and targeting information are maintained so that forces moving forward and forces operating forward maintain a single, common operational understanding and awareness of the potential battlespace.

This enabling technology also allows operators and critical support personnel in the theater and in the United States to conduct collaborative planning and post-attack assessments via on-line conferencing with the joint commander and the Navy fleet and battlegroup commanders. These capabilities also enhance the Navy's ability to integrate real time with joint forces, as demonstrated by the continued effective naval contribution to joint operations around the globe.

Aegis Combat System

The number of cruisers and destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system has nearly doubled since 1993, from 30 to 55. The Aegis combat system capabilities substantially improve the ships' ability to project force ashore while providing both cruisers and destroyers with significantly more effective protection for the fleet and other friendly ships. With

improved radar systems and upgraded missiles, Aegis cruisers have the potential to provide the Navy's lower-tier defense against theater ballistic missiles.

Precision Munitions

In 1993, individual carrier battle groups had at best only a few attack aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. Today, each of the 45-50 attack aircraft on CVBGs has the ability to deliver high-precision air-to-ground munitions, some with "stand off" delivery capability.

Tomahawk Cruise Missiles

The capability of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAMs) has improved greatly over the last several years. As in 1993, the Tomahawk missile continues to be a critical naval strike asset. However, significant and lasting improvements to this lethal weapons system have continued throughout the decade. Conversion from Block II to Block III TLAMs has continued, improving the missiles' range by almost 50% (650 NM to 1000 NM) and accuracy (Block III missiles employ a GPS guidance system). The Navy has made major improvements in TLAM mission planning capabilities afloat and ashore, enabling forward deployed platforms to engage in much more rapid, flexible, and precise long-range strikes.

Further improvements are underway to develop the Tactical Tomahawk System, which will enable in-flight re-targeting and loitering over the battlespace. This system will support mission planning aboard the launch platform and other improvements, simplifying mission planning and improving strike flexibility and responsiveness significantly. The Tactical Tomahawk System is expected to achieve Initial Operational Capability by 2003.

Attack Submarines

The last of the improved Los Angeles-class submarines was completed in 1996, with major enhancements over earlier ships of this class including vertical launch systems, improved weapons, and increased firepower. Two Seawolf-class submarines have now been commissioned and delivery of a third is scheduled next year. The Seawolf class brings significantly improved combat systems, weapons, and sensors and operates much more quietly than previous generations of attack submarines making it inherently more survivable. Construction has also begun on the newest (Virginia-class) attack submarines, specifically configured for multi-mission littoral and regional operations.

Amphibious Ships

Since 1993, four amphibious assault ships have been delivered to the fleet. These ships have increased lift capacity both by providing a flight deck for helicopters and Harrier aircraft and by enhancing the Navy's ability to launch air cushioned and conventional landing craft.

The twelfth big deck ship, LHD-7, is under construction and will be commissioned in FY2001. Construction has begun on the newest (San Antonio) class amphibious transport dock ship (LPD-17).

Aircraft Carriers

Two new Nimitz-class carriers have been commissioned since 1993, and a third is under construction. A multi-year R&D program underway to develop the next-generation carrier (CVNX) will introduce a revolutionary redesign of our carriers in a phased manner. These improvements will include capabilities designed to enhance the ability of the carrier to project power from the sea, launch and recover aircraft in all weather conditions, streamline and accelerate flight deck operations, and reduce the number of mechanical systems on the ship. These improvements promise to provide significant reductions in manpower and maintenance costs over the fifty-year life of the carrier.

Surface Combatants

Since the early 1990s, the surface Navy has focused on transforming surface warfare combatant ships so they are capable of fighting and winning across the spectrum of naval operations in the information age, as it retires older, less capable ships. In addition to these improvements and others discussed above, the new land-attack destroyer (DD-21 Zumwalt-class) under development incorporates greatly reduced "smart ship" manning and a minimum of 128 vertical launch cells that will carry a wide variety of land attack as well as air and missile defense weapons. The first DD-21, of 32 planned, will be commissioned in 2011.

Navy Medical Support

Navy medicine has always prided itself on providing the best possible support to the operating forces. In the early 1990s, the Navy recognized that telemedicine offered exciting new prospects for providing enhanced care to patients afloat and in remote locations. Consequently, the Navy focused on exploiting information age advances to achieve this capability. The Navy's use of digital photography, digital medical X-ray imaging, and video-teleconferencing have led to a thirty percent reduction in aircraft carrier battlegroup medical evacuations and have improved timely resolution of emergency medical situations on deployed and remotely located units around the world.

C. AIR FORCE

Since 1993, the Air Force has greatly improved its ability to project power worldwide through enhanced capabilities in aircraft, sensors, weapons, munitions, command, control, and information processing, and strategic lift. The Air Force has demonstrated its superior capabilities across a range of operations including NATO's tremendously effective Kosovo air campaign (1999), the ongoing enforcement of the

no-fly zones over Iraq and numerous humanitarian assistance operations that required and benefited from the Air Force's strategic lift capabilities.

Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs)

The Air Force has gone from having 10% of the force capable of carrying out precision strikes in 1993 to a force where 90% of its fighters and bombers are PGM-capable, along with up to a 300% increase in PGM accuracy. The Air Force has also fielded an extremely accurate all-weather PGM strike capability, enabling precision strike operations during inclement weather like that encountered during the Kosovo air campaign.

Expeditionary Operations

In August 1998, the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force announced the Service's planned evolution to the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). The EAF concept provides the blueprint for adapting from the Cold War Air Force—with its emphasis on containment, extensive forward basing, large force structure, and robust infrastructure—to one focused on global engagement, with one-third the forces, two-thirds less overseas basing, and four times more deployments. The ongoing realignment to the EAF concept is reconfiguring Air Force units, like their Marine and Navy counterparts, to be more expeditionary in order to better meet current and future security challenges. The Air Force has been divided into 10 expeditionary units that are paired for 90-day deployments to provide the regional commanders-in-chief with more responsive, tailored aerospace forces. In addition to improved responsiveness, this dramatic Air Force reorganization also provides for stability and predictability in the lives of our airmen and women.

Mobility

Since 1993, 64 C-17 long-range airlift aircraft have been fielded. C-17s flew half of all strategic airlift missions in the Kosovo air campaign and, by capitalizing on the C-17's ability to operate in and out of small airfields, made the concept of direct delivery to the theater (strategic movement from home airbase to airfield closest to final destination) a reality.

Command and Control and Information Processing

During Desert Storm, the Combined Air Operations Center and associated Joint Forces Air Combat Commander staff demanded the expertise and support of approximately two thousand personnel. It was inefficient to move the expertise forward to the theater of operations and greatly increased our in-theater "foot print". Today's Air Force leverages the capabilities of global connectivity to "reach back" to expertise and support in the Continental United States (CONUS) and throughout the theater. The result is a dramatic increase in efficiency, placing fewer in harms way while accelerating operations planning. Several examples:

- The Air Force can now collect and rapidly move information to aircrews just prior to takeoff and when in flight.
- In the Kosovo air campaign, the Air Force demonstrated the ability to dynamically manage multiple intelligence sensors (e.g., Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), U-2 and RC-135 aircraft, and satellite systems) and relay critical intelligence information on enemy air defense activities and targets directly to commanders, controllers, and combat and support aircraft in flight.
- Deployed Distributed Common Ground Stations now provide interoperable surveillance, information processing, exploitation, and dissemination for Joint Task Force commanders and Service component commands, moving beyond the Service-specific architectures of the past.
- Predator UAVs, which first flew in 1994, have provided real-time imagery through satellite communications that significantly enhanced surveillance capabilities to U.S. and allied forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Air Force also has integrated laser-targeting designators into the Predator UAV, which was effectively employed in Kosovo.
- The Moving Target Indicator was introduced with JSTARS and U-2 aircraft to provide wide-area surveillance, monitor ground movements, and identify and track military targets.
- Air Force operational planners and pilots now can use internet capabilities such as chat rooms and web sites to reach back to headquarters and reach laterally to other in-theater operators to share insights on critical operational developments, transmit processed intelligence information, and collaboratively plan operations.

D. MARINE CORPS

The strategic role of the Marine Corps, defined by the 82nd Congress in 1952, has remained unchanged: to provide a capable force-in-readiness that is versatile, adaptable, and powerful. While the focus of national security requirements has evolved since the Cold War, demanding contingencies at home and overseas demonstrate the continuing essential role for the Marine Corps in executing our national security strategy.

In the early 1990s, the Marine Corps was in the midst of organizing a smaller force as directed by the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review. The challenge for the Marine Corp in the coming decade was to blend its unique capabilities--as a combined arms force organized around flexible Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) that maintain the expeditionary readiness essential to naval expeditionary success--with new ideas emerging with advanced technology and a fast-changing military environment.

Since 1993, the United States Marine Corps has improved its ability to provide rapid, flexible, combined-arms responses across a range of operations. A relatively recent example of Marine Corp versatility and rapid response capability occurred from April to September 1999 when the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked aboard the USS Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group and conducted three separate, diverse operations in close succession during their deployment to the Mediterranean:

- From April to June, portions of the MEU (SOC) provided security and refugee assistance ashore as part of Operation Shining Hope in Albania during the war over Kosovo;
- At the same time they were prepared to provide ground offensive capabilities to the ongoing campaign, had that proved necessary;
- In early June, the MEU (SOC) backloaded onto their ships and, 72 hours later, landed as the first US ground forces to secure the US sector as part of the NATO-led peace implementation in Kosovo; and,
- In August, the same MEU provided humanitarian assistance following a devastating earthquake in Turkey as part of Operation Avid Response.

Some areas where enhancements in capabilities have enabled Marine Corps success in operations such as these include: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence; fixed-wing aviation; assault transport; prepositioned maritime assets; recruitment and training; experimentation with and early use of new warfighting concepts; and creation of a force for responding to chemical and biological incidents.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

An important advance in Marine Corp C4I capabilities in the early 1990s was the creation of the MAGTF C4I systems concept to accelerate and unify the development, procurement, and fielding of the Corps' command and control systems. Since 1993, the Marines have improved their ability to command and control forces through aggressive experimentation and use of technology. As an example, the new Tactical Combat Operations System (TCO) has automated the ability of Marine units to receive, fuse, select, and display information from many sources. Aboard ship, the TCO can "plug in" to interoperable Navy systems. The Global Command and Control System allows Marine Corps units to share information with force elements from other Services and with Joint Task Force headquarters.

Fixed-Wing Aviation

The ability of Marine aircraft to integrate with and reinforce naval operations has improved. In the early 1990's, Marine F/A-18s did not have the ability to drop precision-guided munitions. Today, 60% of Marine F/A-18s can deliver GPS-guided precision munitions, and all F/A-18s will have the capability by FY03. Today, every Marine Composite

Squadron includes advanced AV-8B Harrier II aircraft, and four Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons are integrated with Navy carrier air wing deployments.

Assault Transport

With substantial investments since 1993, the Marines are fielding a new assault transport capability with the MV-22 Osprey, which will reach Initial Operational Capability with delivery of the twelfth aircraft in March 2001. The Osprey will greatly improve the Corps' ability to project power from over the horizon to inland objectives. The Marine Corps will eventually field 360 Osprey aircraft. The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), whose Initial Operational Capability is expected in FY06, will allow immediate, high-speed surface maneuver from the sea to objectives inland by Marine infantry units in support of the innovative "operational maneuver from the sea" concept.

Maritime Prepositioned Force Enhancements

The Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) concept proved its worth in Operations Desert Shield and Dessert Storm when MPF support was critical in the early days of that conflict. The MPF's afloat-based, prepositioned supplies allow for greater flexibility and security in U.S. forward presence and power projection.

Since the early 1990s, the Marine Corps has acquired three additional maritime prepositioning ships (one each for the squadrons kept in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific respectively), which provides significant capability enhancements. These ships provide each MPF squadron with an expeditionary airfield capability, the supplies and equipment for a naval construction battalion, and a 500-bed fleet hospital capability. These ships will also carry equipment that was relocated from existing MPF ships to make room for additional tanks.

Making Marines

The Corps has strengthened the way it "makes" Marines. Recruit training has been modified and lengthened to expand the influence of drill instructors and includes a 54-hour "Crucible" culmination exercise as the defining moment of the recruit training experience. Following recruit training, newly-forged Marines are assigned to teams under a new program called "Cohesion" designed to develop team integrity through the assignment of Marines who stay together throughout their first term of enlistment. The result is more highly-trained Marines with a stronger appreciation for the Marine ethos. More cohesive units improve the Corps' readiness posture and combat capabilities.

Future Warfighting Concepts

Over the past several years, the Marine Corps has organized a number of large-scale experiments to test future warfighting concepts. The Marine Corps prides itself on rapidly integrating promising new concepts and equipment into its operating units. Key experiments

have included: Hunter Warrior (small unit enhancements for the dispersed battlespace), Urban Warrior (operations in an urban environment); and Capable Warrior (techniques to enable operational maneuver from the sea).

Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force

Recognizing the potentially catastrophic impact of a chemical or biological weapons attack on the American people and the requirement to respond to and manage the consequences of such an attack, the Marine Corps activated the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in 1996. CBIRF is manned, trained, and equipped to respond to chemical or biological terrorist incidents. As a national asset, the CBIRF has been alerted and sometimes deployed to support events such as: the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta; the 1997 Presidential Inauguration; the Summit of Eight in Denver Colorado; the January 1998 State of the Union Address; and, NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in 1999.

CHAPTER 3: THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents the nuclear analog to the Bottom-Up Review of conventional forces, undertaken in 1993 to address the significant changes in the security environment which face the United States, and the military consequences of those changes. The NPR was the first review of nuclear policy in the post-Cold War world, the first such review in 15 years; it was also the first review ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, security, and arms control. At the threshold of a decade of further reductions called for by the START I and START II agreements, the decisions made in the NPR process allow DoD to put its nuclear programs on a stable footing after several years of rapid change in the international environment and in DoD's forces and programs.

The Nuclear Posture Review was chartered in October 1993 to determine what the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy should be. A 10-month DoD collaborative effort, the NPR was co-chaired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. Working groups were comprised of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the unified commands. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and directed the progress of the NPR through issue briefs and the development of a final report, which was presented to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some decisions relating to the NPR were raised through the interagency process, including all relevant agencies of the U.S. government, which had the opportunity to review a wide range of options. The President approved the recommendations of the NPR on September 18, 1994.

Five basic themes of U.S. nuclear strategy emerged from the Nuclear Posture Review:

- First, nuclear weapons are playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any other time in the nuclear age. This fact served as a point of departure for the rest of the review. The Bottom-Up Review and the Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) are designed to achieve and protect U.S. conventional superiority wherever American defense commitments require it.
- The second principal finding is that the United States requires a much smaller nuclear arsenal under present circumstances. Dramatic reductions in U.S. (and, when implemented, former Soviet) forces from Cold War levels are underway.
- Third, although the security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, there is still great uncertainty about the future, particularly in the New Independent States where the process of denuclearization and reduction is underway but by no means completed. The United States must provide a hedge against this uncertainty.

Therefore, the NPR stresses prudence in the face of potential risks while also identifying some new policy departures that reflect changes in the security environment.

- Fourth, the United States does not have a purely national deterrent posture; it extends the deterrent protection of its nuclear arsenal to its allies. A very progressive aspect of U.S. nuclear posture is that it is, in part, an international nuclear posture. The NPR strongly supports continued commitment to NATO and Pacific allies.
- Finally, the United States will continue to set the highest international standards of stewardship for nuclear safety and security, command and control, use control, and civilian control.

A. ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN U.S. SECURITY

The U.S. National Security Strategy states: "We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders." Recent international upheavals have not changed the calculation that nuclear weapons remain an essential part of American military power. Concepts of deterrence and survivability must adapt to the new international environment, yet continue to be central to the U.S. nuclear posture. Thus, the United States will continue to threaten retaliation, including nuclear retaliation, and to deter aggression against the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. allies.

Alliance relationships are an important element of U.S. security. Through forward basing and power projection capabilities, overseas U.S. military presence - including nuclear capabilities - helped promote regional stability, avert crises, and deter war. In recent years, there has been a dramatic reduction in both the overall size of the U.S. military presence abroad and in the nuclear capabilities deployed overseas. Yet maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation. Although nuclear capabilities are now a far smaller part of the routine U.S. international presence, they remain an important element in the array of military capabilities that the United States can bring to bear, either independently or in concert with allies to deter war, or should deterrence fail, to defeat aggression. Thus, the United States continues to extend deterrence to U.S. allies and friends.

B. CONTEXT: LEAD BUT HEDGE

The Nuclear Posture Review considered the size and role of U.S. nuclear forces in a world in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, rather than the nuclear arsenal of a hostile superpower, poses the greatest security risk. One

goal for the NPR was to demonstrate U.S. leadership in responding to that risk. Major reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons are already underway, confirming the U.S. commitment to a smaller international role for nuclear weapons. Since 1988, the United States has reduced its nuclear arsenal by 59 percent, and either eliminated, truncated, or never fielded over 15 nuclear weapons systems. The United States has no new nuclear weapons programs, and has committed to achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, extending its testing moratorium in the interim. Program changes of this magnitude help set an example of decreasing dependence on nuclear weapons for military purposes.

U.S. nuclear weapons were for years justified by the potential for a massive conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact through the Fulda Gap which would overwhelm NATO conventional forces. The decisions of the members of the Warsaw Pact to dissolve their alliance and the subsequent transformation of the Soviet Union into independent states removed this potential threat. No equivalent threat to American vital interests can be identified in the post-Cold War era, and for very few of the existing threats are nuclear weapons appropriate responses. The NPR sought to adjust and reduce strategic programs to reflect actual U.S. needs, thereby setting an example for other nuclear powers to consider post-Cold War adjustments of their own.

Moreover, the CPI has as its central tenet the creation and furtherance of conventional responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. Far from inventing new roles for nuclear weapons in countering WMD, the NPR supports the CPI, because in a potential case of WMD threat or use, senior political and military leaders must have a wide range of responses - especially non-nuclear - from which to choose. Having the conventional capability to respond to WMD threat or use further reduces U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons.

These realities make the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) all the more important. A failure to codify the reduced role of nuclear weapons in nations' security could result in the creation of additional nuclear powers - a clear reduction in the security of all nations. The Posture Review sought to demonstrate American leadership by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security. The combination of the large negotiated reductions embodied in the START I and START II treaties and the further unilateral reductions recommended by the NPR makes tangible the U.S. commitment to Article 6 of the NPT, which calls for the nuclear powers to take steps to reduce their arsenals. Once START II has been ratified, further negotiated reductions can be considered. The notion, however, that nations are motivated by U.S. nuclear forces in making decisions about acquiring nuclear weapons themselves is simply not valid. Potential proliferators are more likely to be driven by concerns about neighbors' capabilities or the desire for prestige or regional hegemony than by decisions America makes about its nuclear arsenal. Extending the NPT indefinitely will therefore do far more to improve individual nations' security than would further declines in superpower weapons stocks.

A major focus of the Nuclear Posture Review was nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) and safety, security, and use control. The United States decided in the NPR to completely eliminate two out of its five types of NSNF, and to augment several aspects of nuclear safety

and security. These efforts were discussed with Russian civilian and military leaders in the hope that they would take similar measures to reduce NSNF and improve nuclear safety, security, and use control. The United States is prepared, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, to cooperate with and support Russia in these endeavors.

Both the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union have acted quickly and responsibly to ease Cold War tensions. Both sides have decreased their nuclear stockpiles and are eliminating the weapons which most undermine stability. U.S. and Russian weapons have been de-targeted so that they are no longer aimed at any country. With U.S. help and financial aid, Russia is moving in the direction of economic reform and working to consolidate the nuclear arsenal that belonged to the Soviet Union.

However, these policies have not eliminated the threat posed by the weapons of the former Soviet Union. Even after achieving the full reductions called for by START I and START II, each side will retain up to 3,500 warheads on strategic offensive systems. While political relations with Russia have changed dramatically in recent years, the United States must retain a nuclear capability adequate to respond to any challenge. Further, most of the strategic nuclear weapons remaining in the former Soviet Union still are deployed and capable of attacking targets in the United States. Russia remained the focus of the Posture Review not because its intentions are hostile, but because it controls the only nuclear arsenal that can physically threaten the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.

A significant shift in the Russian government into the hands of arch-conservatives could, literally overnight, restore the strategic nuclear threat to the United States. The removal of weapons located on the territory of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus is still incomplete. Other nations not allied with the United States either have declared nuclear arsenals or are capable of developing them. With this kind of instability and uncertainty, the United States must maintain nuclear weapons necessary to deter any possible threat or to respond to aggression, should deterrence fail.

The NPR called for an affordable hedge in which the approved force structure could support weapons levels greater than those called for under START II should major geostrategic changes demand it. This lead and hedge theme reflects the pragmatic partnership between the United States and Russia, in which the United States seeks both to cooperate with Russia wherever such cooperation is possible, and to prepare realistically for possible tensions or disruptions of that relationship.

C. REDUCTIONS IN THE U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

The deep reductions in non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons that have been underway for several years and will continue under START I and START II are clear evidence that the United States is reducing the role that nuclear weapons play in its military posture. Throughout the last several years, nuclear targeting and war planning have undergone several reviews and adjustments to account for the decline of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet breakup, and will continue to change in response to further developments in international

affairs. In fact, there have been significant changes in the U.S. nuclear posture since the end of the Cold War:

- There are no nuclear weapons in the custody of U.S. ground forces;
- Naval NSNF are no longer deployed at sea;
- Strategic bombers have been taken off day-to-day alert;
- The total U.S. active warhead stockpile has been reduced by 59 percent (79 percent by 2003). Deployed strategic warheads have been reduced by 47 percent (71 percent by 2003, when START I and II are implemented);
- NSNF weapons have been cut by 90 percent, and the NATO stockpile has been cut by 91 percent;
- Nuclear weapons storage locations have been reduced by over 75 percent; and,
- The number of personnel with access to nuclear weapons has been cut by 70 percent.

The Department also is reducing substantially the worldwide airborne command post fleet -reflecting the decline in the likelihood of a superpower confrontation. Since 1989, the programmatic implications of START I and II, and the two earlier Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on U.S. nuclear programs, also have been quite substantial. Program terminations, or systems that were developed but never became operational, include the small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Peacekeeper rail garrison, Lance follow-on, New Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile, Tactical Air to Surface Missile and Short Range Attack Missile¹¹. Other programs were truncated -- systems were either fielded in fewer numbers than originally envisioned or, in the case of the B- 1, will be converted to conventional-only usage. These truncations include Peacekeeper, B-2, B- 1 (which will drop its nuclear role), Advanced Cruise Missile, and the W-88 warhead. There are also a number of nuclear systems that were retired from service and never replaced; these include the Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile, FB- 111, Minuteman II, Lance, Short Range Attack Missile-A, Nuclear Depth Bomb, and C-3/C-4 Backfit nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In all, spending on strategic nuclear forces, in constant 1994 dollars, dropped from \$47.8 billion in 1984 to \$13.5 billion in 1994, or 14.0 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively.

D. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

Two basic requirements necessarily guide U.S. planning for strategic nuclear forces: the need to provide an effective deterrent while remaining within START I/II limits, and the need to

allow for additional forces to be reconstituted in the event of a reversal of currently positive trends.

The NPR examined a wide variety of options for strategic nuclear force structures, ranging from ones which increased platforms over those previously planned, to a minimal force that eliminated ICBMs and reduced the number of SSBNs to 10. The Review examined what force levels were needed to handle the most stressing case that could develop - deterring a hostile Russia. The President approved the NPR's recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. This force will maintain flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further and assumes that Russia ratifies and implements START II. At this level, the United States would have adequate weapons to:

- Deter a hostile Russian government by holding at risk a range of assets valued by its political and military leaders;
- Maintain a strategic reserve force to ensure continued deterrence of other nuclear powers; and,
- Account for weapons on systems which are not available due to maintenance and overhaul.

The NPR did not change the total number of warheads the United States planned to retain under START II. However, the Review did identify ways to streamline forces by reducing the number of platforms carrying these warheads. As a result of the NPR, U.S. strategic nuclear-force structure will be adjusted to comprise:

- 14 Trident submarines - four fewer than previously planned - carrying 24 D-5 missiles, each with five warheads, per submarine. This will require backfitting four Trident SSBNs, currently carrying the Trident I (C-4) missile, with the more modern and capable D-5 missile system;
- 66 B-52 bombers - down from 94 planned in 1993 - carrying air-launched cruise missiles (AGM-86B) and advanced cruise missiles (AGM-129);
- 20 B-2 bombers - the same number previously envisioned - carrying gravity bombs; and,
- 450/500 Minuteman III missiles, each carrying a single warhead.

In addition, no new strategic nuclear systems are either under development or planned.

The NPR re-examined the concept of a triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers as the basis for a strategic deterrent and determined it remains valid for a START I [-size force. Today, the United States relies on fewer types of nuclear

weapon systems than in the past. Hedging against system failure of a leg of a triad - either because of technical failure of a delivery platform or warhead, or technological breakthroughs by potential adversaries - is a primary reason to retain a triad. Each leg also has unique characteristics and specific advantages.

SLBMs

Under START II, the SLBM force will provide about half of the 3,000 to 3,500 accountable warheads that the United States will be permitted to deploy. Because of this increased reliance on the SLBM force and the continued need for survivable weapons to enhance stability, the NPR determined that the conversion of four submarines to carry the more modern D-5 missile was appropriate. Conversion of these four submarines from the older C-4 missile ensures that the U.S. force can remain intact without danger of age-related problems crippling missiles that would carry 40 percent of SLBM warheads.

The SLBM force, which is virtually undetectable when on patrol, is the most survivable and enduring element of the strategic nuclear triad. A significant portion of the SSBN force is at sea at any given time, and all submarines that are not in the shipyard for long-term maintenance can be generated during a crisis. Moreover, the Trident II (D-5) missile - with its improved accuracy, range, and payload relative to previous SLBMs - allows the SLBM force to hold at risk almost the entire range of strategic targets. In order to have adequate, survivable, at-sea weapons to support deterrence, accountable SLBM warhead levels need to be maintained close to the START II limit of 1,750. With the 14 SSBN option selected by the NPR, the United States will retain a significant capability to hedge against a failure of the START II Treaty or unforeseen changes in the world, because the D-5 missile loaded on the Tridents will carry fewer warheads than the maximum allowed by START Treaty limits. The 14 boat force also maintains the security of two-ocean basing, further enhancing operational effectiveness and stability.

ICBMs

ICBMs provide the United States a prompt-response capability. START II requires the downloading of ICBMs to one warhead, but does not place a sublimit on the total number of single-warhead ICBMs. Approximately 500 Minuteman IIIs will be retained and downloaded to one warhead apiece. ICBMs also increase the cost ratio to an adversary of attempting a first strike. Retaining approximately 500 single-warhead Minuteman IIIs provides for a reduced but prudent ICBM force.

Bombers

There is no START II sublimit on the number of bombers. Because bombers are dual-capable, they fulfill two important functions: they serve as an integral part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, providing a hedge against a catastrophic failure of either the SSBN or ICBM leg of the triad, and they provide an important conventional capability in MRCs; 100 bombers

in a conventional role are tasked for MRCs. Retaining 66 B-52s and 20 B-2s will allow the bombers to serve these functions.

E. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed that the United States has not only a national deterrent posture, but an international nuclear posture. Indeed, the United States extends the deterrent protection of its nuclear arsenal to its allies. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of NSNF, which are not covered by START I and START II. For nearly 50 years, the United States has maintained a sizable military presence in regions deemed vital to American national interests.

Alliance commitments and the unique characteristics of nonstrategic nuclear forces were primary considerations in the NPR's consideration of what the NSNF force structure should be. The Nuclear Posture Review considered numerous options, ranging from one more robust than today's structure to elimination of NSNF entirely. As a result of the NPR, the following decisions were made regarding U.S. nonstrategic nuclear force structure:

- Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable aircraft;
- Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM/N) on surface ships;
- Retain the option to deploy TLAM/N on attack submarines (although none are currently deployed, they could be deployed if needed); and,
- Retain the current commitment to NATO of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and CONUS and the deployment of nuclear weapons (gravity bombs) in Europe.

These NSNF decisions have the effect of permanently eliminating the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on naval surface ships - a step that could encourage the Russians to reciprocate - while maintaining a nonstrategic nuclear force capable of fulfilling U.S. commitments to allies.

F. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

Nuclear-related command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and operations have undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War. For example:

- Strategic bombers are off alert;
- ICBMs and SLBMs have been de-targeted;

- U.S. command post structure has been reduced;
- The operating tempo of the worldwide airborne command post structure has been reduced. The National Emergency Command Post, formerly used only for a nuclear role, is now the National Airborne Operation Center and is available to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for civil emergencies;
- Systems durability requirements have been reduced by two-thirds; and,
- The C31 portion of the DoD strategic nuclear budget has been reduced from \$3.4 billion to \$2.1 billion.

Nevertheless, to maintain viability, the C31 structure must maintain capability to carry out key missions: early warning; threat assessment; connectivity of the National Command Authority; dissemination of emergency action messages for the launch of nuclear forces, if necessary; and safe, secure force management. With these considerations in mind, the NPR made the following decisions regarding strategic C31:

- Continue adequate funding of critical programs;
- Correct existing/projected communication system and tactical warning/attack assessment deficiencies; and,
- Support intelligence systems which provide timely information and threat characterization and warning indicators.

G. INFRASTRUCTURE

In order to maintain a streamlined and adjusted nuclear posture, DoD must sustain the infrastructure to support U.S. nuclear forces. The Nuclear Posture Review focused its examination of the nuclear infrastructure on two key areas: the industrial base for strategic missiles, reentry systems, and guidance, as well as for bombers; and support by the Department of Energy (DOE), which is responsible for producing and maintaining nuclear weapons for the Department's systems. The NPR made the following infrastructure recommendations:

- Replace the guidance system and re-motor those Minuteman IIIs which are retained;
- Continue D-5 production past 1995 to maintain the strategic ballistic missile industrial base (this is a secondary advantage of backfitting the 14 SSBNs to be retained with the D-5 missile);
- Fund the sustainment of the guidance and reentry vehicle industrial base;

- With regard to bomber infrastructure, no specific funding was found to be necessary, since Stealth and commercial aircraft should keep the industrial base healthy; and,
- Provide the Department of Energy - the supplier of nuclear weapons - with DoD's requirements:
 - Maintain nuclear weapon capability (without underground nuclear testing);
 - Develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base;
 - Demonstrate the capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in the enduring stockpile;
 - Maintain the capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads;
 - Maintain a science and technology base needed to support nuclear weapons; and
 - No new-design nuclear warhead production is required.

H. SAFETY, SECURITY, AND USE CONTROL

The United States sets the highest international standards for the safety, security, and responsible custodianship of its nuclear arsenal. There have been dramatic force reductions since the end of the Cold War which have contributed greatly to the increased safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons. U.S. strategic warheads have been cut by 59 percent since 1988; non-strategic nuclear forces have been cut by 90 percent. As a result of these reductions, nuclear storage sites have been reduced by 75 percent. The Nuclear Posture Review concerned itself with maintaining the U.S. lead role in nuclear safety and security issues.

The NPR thoroughly reviewed the recommendations of the Fail-Safe and Risk Reduction (FARR) Commission of 1992 and determined that the vast majority of them had been implemented or were well underway. Among the FARR recommendations the NPR singled out for continued implementation were:

- Completing the Trident Coded Control Device (CCD) in 1997, providing for system-level CCI)s or permissive action links (PALs) on all U.S. nuclear weapons by 1997; and,
- Seeking alternatives to those recommendations that a test moratorium may preclude (for example, protection equivalent to Category F PAL on all new weapons).

Conclusion

In the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense struck a prudent balance between leading the way to a safer world and hedging against the unexpected. In the post-Cold War environment, the United States continues to require a nuclear deterrent. The strategic triad was streamlined and adjusted, as were nonstrategic nuclear forces, to account for the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security.

CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD

A. The African Crisis Response Initiative(ACRI)

ACRI is a Department of State funded, Defense supported training initiative intended to enhance the capacity of selected African militaries to respond effectively to peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations on the continent. At present, ACRI's emphasis is on training based on a common Chapter 6 peacekeeping doctrine and supplying interoperable communications equipment, which will enable the units to work together more effectively. The decision to deploy ACRI-trained troops is a sovereign decision of the ACRI partner.

ACRI began as a response to the 1996 crisis in Burundi. Initially, the proposed response from the United States Government was to train a three-brigade force of African soldiers designed to intervene in Burundi and other African crises. At first, the Africans remained suspicious of American motives and rejected this model.

Today, ACRI's long-term objective is to train up to 12,000 military personnel to respond to requests from international political entities such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity or a sub-regional organization such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ACRI-trained troops could also deploy as part of a multinational coalition force for peacekeeping.

From July 1997 to the present, ACRI has conducted battalion initial training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin. Initial training was scheduled for October 2000 in Kenya. ACRI has conducted battalion follow-on training for Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, and Mali. Future follow-on training is scheduled for all ACRI partner nations. Initial and follow-on training in Ethiopia has been deferred until resolution of the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict. Follow-on training in Uganda and Cote d' Ivoire has been placed on hold (due to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the case of the former, and a coup, the case of the latter). To date, ACRI has provided training and non-lethal equipment to almost 6,000 peacekeepers from seven African militaries.

The initial brigade staff training took place in Senegal during October 2000 with Kenya to follow in April of 2001.

During initial battalion training, U.S. Army instructors train African soldiers in a highly professional interoperable program of instruction in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. The ACRI program -- for both initial and follow-on training -- exposes the host military to the full range of peacekeeping tasks, from convoy escort, logistics, and protection of refugees, to negotiations and command and control. ACRI has increased both the level and character of involvement of non-governmental, private voluntary and international organizations in ACRI training in order to increase African peacekeepers' capacity to respond

to complex humanitarian emergencies. A series of four follow-on events offer a mix of commuter assisted exercises, refresher as well as battalion staff training activities.

B. The Department of Defense and HIV/AIDS prevention Activities Under the *LIFE* Initiative.

At the urging of the Administration, the Department of Defense allocated \$10 million beginning in FY 01 to support the LIFE (Leadership in Fighting an Epidemic) initiative in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. DOD's role will be limited to assisting African militaries in the design and execution of training programs that affect the spread of HIV infections within the uniformed services. The United States Navy has been appointed as the Department's Executive Agent and has tasked the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) in San Diego as the implementing agency.

POLICY OBJECTIVES.

DOD has established four policy objectives in its LIFE initiative program:

- To offer a full spectrum of training and prevention packages for the purpose of covering all the states of sub-Sahara Africa with the understanding that states with historic defense relationships with the USA will receive more resources;
- To continue the program beyond FY 02 as long as funds are appropriated for its use;
- To integrate the program into and make use of other USG programs as well as those HIV/AIDS programs managed by allies and the UN; and,
- To synchronize and integrate program activities into CINC engagement activities to the extent possible.

In Africa, HIV rates in military and uniformed populations often exceed the rates in the civilian populations. Experience with HIV prevention in the U.S. military and among basic trainees in Thailand provides a model for effective intervention in African military populations. It has been demonstrated that programs to assess knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors, coupled with epidemiological measurements, can be done while maintaining confidentiality and with a high level of voluntary participation. Assessment of the components of HIV risk in African military populations will develop the regional profile to design and guide prevention activities. Although the administration's *LIFE* Initiative focuses on sub-Saharan Africa and India, under *LIFE* Initiative legislation, DoD proposes to focus on training and prevention activities only for African military services within countries where the USG has defense ties. Countries are prioritized by severity of impact, the number of new infections, the potential for greatest impact, and existing USG programs on which to build.

Regional Specific Military-based Education: Based on findings of the regional diversity of AIDS in Africa and through work with UNAIDS, regional research centers, and

African militaries, DoD will support military-based education and training activities in select African countries. DoD can build on its unique tri-service military education programs developed to prevent alcohol abuse and STDs, as well as the region-specific HIV prevention work by NGOs and USAID. Programs will be coordinated with similar USAID and HHS activities to the fullest extent practical. This project is expected to contribute to long-term and sustained HIV prevention in Africa. Moreover, these activities will be integrated into *existing defense engagement and research activities* to the greatest extent possible. The approach would proceed by stages that:

- Assess HIV prevalence and risk behaviors;
- Develop or augment a regional prevention plan;
- Implement through training and develop infrastructure; and ,
- Evaluate the effect of prevention efforts.
- Refine and incorporate the program into the military culture for enduring impact

Enhanced military education of African UN Peace Keeper forces. African military personnel deployed far from their home base for long periods in conjunction with UN peacekeeping activities may experience a different HIV risk profile than soldiers remaining at home. The Army collaborated with the Civil Military Alliance to Combat HIV and AIDS (CMA) to develop HIV prevention modules for training UN peacekeepers pre-deployment and they will continue to work with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) personnel in activities related to HIV/STD prevention.

C. U.S. - South Africa Defense Committee

Background. After decades of apartheid, South Africa became a non-racial democracy in 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) was elected as a majority government with 63 percent of the popular vote, and Nelson Mandela became President. Since 1994, South Africa has undergone an enormous political, economic, and social transformation in an effort to overcome the inheritance of a fragile economy isolated by years of sanctions and a regime under which less than twenty percent of the population enjoyed full political and economic rights. A critical element in the political transition has been the amalgamation of the various armed forces active in South Africa into the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF).

Through such limited tools as exercises, IMET, military-to-military contacts, and Foreign Military Financing, DOD has played a modest role in helping to further SANDF transformation. The kick-off occurred in the fall of 1993 with a DOD-conceived and USIA-funded visit by senior commanders (four Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), four SADF) to the U.S. for a month. Contacts at the most senior level proved elusive at first. MOD Modise was invited by then-SECDEF Perry for a counterpart visit in October 1996. Modise declined due to the unresolved status of the ARMSCOR debarment case. (ARMSCOR is a program to produce and purchase military equipment for the SADF.) DOD proposals to consider establishing a joint military commission were politely fended off for the same reason. It was not until considerable progress in resolving the ARMSCOR case was registered in early 1997 that the SANDF's attitude began to change. The

Defense Committee was inaugurated as a part of the U.S.-South African Binational Commission in July 1997. MOD Modise traveled to Washington for the event, concurrently conducting a brief counterpart visit. Secretary Cohen reciprocated in February 1999, the first-ever SECDEF visit. In December 1999, MOD Lekota conducted a week-long counterpart visit, which Secretary Cohen returned in February 2000.

Establishment of the Defense Committee. The Defense Committee of the U.S. – South African Binational Commission (BNC) was established on 29 July 1997 for the purpose of facilitating cooperation on defense issues. The Defense Committee consists of five working groups: Military Relations, Programs, Security Assistance, Acquisition and Technology, and Environmental Security. Defense Committee meetings are utilized to report back to principals on progress, problems, and new projects. Principals can use Defense Committee meetings to provide guidance and direction to working group activities. The Defense Committee reports on progress to the Binational Commission whenever such meetings occur. Since the inaugural meeting in July 1997, full Defense Committee meetings have been convened in June 1998, July 1999, and June 2000.

D. Regional Security Education Centers

Background

In the 2000 Annual Report to the President and Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William S. Cohen, reported on the military requirements of the national defense strategy. U.S. military engagement around the world is a key means of shaping the international security environment. The challenge to the Department is to prioritize its peacetime activities to ensure that efforts are concentrated on those of greatest importance. These priorities vary by region and situation according to the national security interests involved.

Engagement to Shape the Environment

In the wake of the failed August 1991 coupe in Russia, the U.S. European Command's Plan and Policy Directorate began to develop proposals to expand defense and security contacts in the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The intention was to establish an institution that could have a positive influence on the development of security structures appropriate for democratic states. In October 1991, a proposal was developed to use the facilities of the U.S. Army Russian Institute to create a European Center for Security Studies where they could rapidly develop opportunities to work with Central/Eastern European and Eurasian defense establishments.

The proposal was submitted to Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in February 1992. He endorsed the plan on March 17, 1992. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, approved the EUCOM proposal that summer, and the staff began to develop a charter for the proposed center.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney signed DOD Directive 5200.34 in November 1992, establishing the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies as an element of the U.S. European Command under the authority, direction, and control of the Commander in Chief, EUCOM. The Marshall Center became a German-American partnership initiative when a Memorandum of Agreement was signed on December 2, 1994, between Headquarters EUCOM and the German Ministry of Defense.

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies was dedicated on June 5, 1993. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Commander in Chief, EUCOM, hosted the ceremony which inaugurated the Center with the charter of stabilizing and thereby strengthening Post-Cold War Europe. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and German Minister of Defense Volker R  he were the keynote speakers.

Marshall Center's Success Creates Success

The Marshall Center was the first of the regional centers and has often been referred to by Secretary Cohen as the "gold standard" of the regional Center program. As a leading transatlantic defense institution, the Marshall Center is dedicated to creating a more stable security environment by advancing democratic institutions and relationships; peaceful engagement; and enduring partnerships between the nations of America, Europe and Eurasia. The Marshall Center offers civilian and military professionals from over 45 countries a wide selection of post-graduate studies, conferences, foreign area studies, and language courses. The faculty and staff come from more than eight countries, including Poland and Russia.

The Regional Centers are emerging as an important aspect of U.S. policy in engagement as they truly exemplify the goal of shaping the future environment. This vision for a true community of nations in a world that is at peace, prosperous, and committed to dialogue will be a hallmark of the Clinton administration's legacy as a new world emerges in the 21st century.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii's Senior Senator visited the George C. Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany. Impressed with the Center's success, in 1994, he introduced congressional language to establish the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Navy was instructed to take \$3 million of existing budgeted funds and create the Center as a direct reporting unit to the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command.

On 4 September 1995, the APCSS stood up at a ceremony at the Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii. The Honorable William J. Perry, then U.S. Secretary of Defense and General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined with Admiral Richard C. Macke, Commander, U. S. Pacific Command and 33 foreign dignitaries to cut a 72-ft. long ribbon opening the Center. DoD Directive 5200.38, giving official authorization to the Center, was signed January 29, 1996.

In September 1996 with 23 fellows from 12 countries the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies opened in temporary quarters in the Waikiki Trade Center. Over the next five years APCSS conducted ten executive courses and two senior executive courses at the Waikiki Trade Center while a permanent facility was being sought. On June 12, 2000, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies moved to its permanent location at Fort DeRussy. On August 23, 2000, the building was officially dedicated, with over 300 VIPs and special guests in attendance. Speakers included: Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii; Mr. Stanley K. Roth, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Department; Admiral Dennis Blair, U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, Dr. William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense; and retired Lt. Gen. H. C. Stackpole, U.S. Marine Corps, President of the Center.

The Center complements the U. S. Pacific Command's strategy of maintaining positive security relationships with all nations in the region. The Center builds on the strong bilateral relationships between the U. S. Pacific Command and these governments and their armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on the broader multilateral approach to addressing regional security issues and concerns. Patterned after the Marshall Center, the purpose of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is *to enhance cooperation and build relationships through mutual understanding and study of comprehensive security issues among military and civilian representatives of the United States and other Asia-Pacific nations.* To accomplish this mission, the Center has three primary academic elements; the College of Security Studies, the central focus; a Conference Division, and a Research Division.

The Center's focus is on building relations among future leaders and decision-makers within the region. The participants range from mid-to-senior in rank (i.e. Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General, and their civilian equivalents). To date, 12 executive courses and two senior executive courses have been conducted in the Center's College of Security Studies, yielding a total of 552 alumni from 39 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. Many of the graduates of the Asia-Pacific Center have returned to their countries and have been promoted to positions of higher responsibility within their governments.

The 39 countries represented are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and the United States.

In addition to the executive courses, the Center's Conference Division has conducted 40 conferences and seminars with over 2,200 participants from 56 countries. These conferences and seminars are focused on the current leaders and contemporary issues in the region. The Research Division writes and edits conference and seminar reports from each program, and produces occasional papers and other relevant research. The researchers also lecture and teach electives in the College. The Asia-Pacific Center, with its 100 faculty and staff has established a solid foundation and operates with three guiding principals in all three academic endeavors: *non-attribution, transparency, and mutual respect.*

In his September 4, 1995 keynote address during the opening of the Center, the Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense said, "Each nation can make a difference for peace, and each nation should try." The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies provides the vehicle and forum to make this possible.

The Hemispheric Center for Defense Studies

The Hemispheric Center for Defense Studies was founded two years after the Asia-Pacific Center. In August 1995 at the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) held in Williamsburg, Latin American civilian and military defense officials expressed deep concern over the relative lack of civilians prepared to deal knowledgeably with defense and military issues. The following year at the second DMA held in Bariloche, Argentina, Secretary of Defense William Perry proposed a regional center to address this concern. Secretary Perry envisioned a program modeled on the Marshall Center's program for Eastern European countries, but tailored to the unique requirements of the Western Hemisphere where many countries were trying to strengthen civilian leadership in revitalized democracies. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) was formally established by DoD Directive 3200.13, dated 3 September 1997. CHDS is located at the National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.

Unlike other DoD centers, the Center focuses on civilian defense education rather than education or training for military officers. The primary mission is to educate civilians in planning and management of security and defense; and to familiarize them with military institutions, issues, and decision-making processes. Moreover, the Center was charged with promoting collaboration between civilians and military in defense matters and stimulating national, regional and international dialogue on defense and security issues.

In its three years of existence, CHDS has developed five distinct programs that permit it to implement its mission and vision strategically with short-, medium-, and long-term components.

The Resident Program features a core three-week course on Defense Planning and Resource Management, held four to five times per year. Participants are government executives (office director and above), 05-06 military and police officers, legislators, academics, NGO and media personnel. Military personnel are limited to 25 percent by design. The resident courses focus on civilian leadership in policy and program design and implementation. It includes lecture, work group and simulation activities. The three-week long course has hosted some 472 students from all the countries in the region (except Haiti and Cuba). CHDS in response to persistent requests from Washington-based diplomats and attachés hosts a one-week intensive course once a year for them. A total of the 544 student who have participated in the Residential Program of these 72 percent have been civilian; and 71 percent of these have been government employees.

The Senior Leader Seminar (SLS) targets very senior government executives and legislators who cannot be absent for the three-week program. The first SLS was held on Capitol Hill in March 1999. Participants were the heads of defense committees in the region's legislatures and senior defense ministry officials (deputy and assistant secretary level). It focused on legislative roles and responsibilities in defense. A second SLS was held in El Salvador in August 2000 and concentrated on the formulation of legislative policy for defense and on strengthening legislative oversight capabilities.

CHDS On-Site Seminars are intensive workshops held in partnership with local institutions on specific themes with the core focus being the civilian and military collaboration in defense policy-making. The on-site format allows CHDS to reach a larger number of Latin Americans. The seminars provide CHDS with an opportunity to introduce pedagogy and tools developed in the "laboratory" of the resident course. To date, seminars they have taken place in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay and Colombia.

The Education and Defense Seminar is CHDS' annual effort to influence the quality and content of the academic curriculum in defense studies, international relations and political science. Over time, the EDS seminars are meant to help Latin American universities prepare civilian leaders versed in defense and security studies and analysis. In addition, the seminar fosters communication and collaboration between civilian university programs and the region's professional military education programs.

The Outreach, Research and Distributed Learning Program focuses on making information on defense studies easily available on the Internet. It also encourages innovative research and writing on Latin American defense themes which is particularly important because there is a lack of materials on the Latin American experience. CHDS organizes a monthly dialogue on defense issues, known as "Tertulias," for Latin American scholars, diplomats, military personnel and interested U.S. participants. Increasingly, the CHDS clientele is interested in developing distance learning education modules that will permit access to a variety of our course material.

CHDS serves as a catalyst for defense studies throughout the region. It is currently working to establish a network of institutions and individuals who will communicate on defense issues via an Internet-based discussion forum and will have access to a shared electronic library. In addition, CHDS intends to publish a peer-reviewed academic journal in support of scholarly research in defense and security studies on the CHDS Web site in January 2001. The Center's goal is to provide easy access to defense research materials from all over the world.

The Africa Center for Security Studies

On October 21, 1999, the Africa Center for Security Studies became the fourth center in Dakar, Senegal, Africa. President Clinton proposed establishing the Africa Center in April of 1998 during his historic six-nation trip to Africa. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies was

designed in conjunction with African nations and is intended to promote the exchange of ideas and information tailored specifically for African concerns.

Like the earlier centers, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) is regionally-focused and dedicated to providing security and strategic studies to promote professional defense education and democratic institutions for rising civilian and military leaders. The Center helps foster regional stability and cooperation, encourages more accountable democratic governance, and create lines of communication between and among Americans and the future leadership of participating African countries. ACSS was designed to provide a forum for senior African military and civilian leaders to discuss issues of concern, and to participate in rigorous academic and practical seminars on civil-military relations, security strategy, and defense economics.

Since its establishment in October 1999, the ACSS has conducted two flagship seminars. The Center's inaugural event was a Senior Leader Seminar (SLS) held in Dakar, Senegal, in November 1999. In conjunction with the Government of Senegal, the Center sponsored a two-week seminar that allowed 115 civilian and military personnel from 43 African nations, 6 European countries, and representatives from 10 sub-regional and non-governmental organizations to come together. This SLS marked the first time such a diverse group of senior African leaders had come together to address substantive issues in an apolitical forum.

The Center's second event was a Leadership Seminar, in Gaborone, Botswana, in July 2000. Again relying on host-nation partnership, this seminar reached 111 African, European, U.S. participants and well as participants from international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. The Africa Center also provided academic support to the ministerial-level east Africa sub-regional symposium (Golden Spear 2000) co-hosted by USCINCCENT and Kenya in July 2000.

Looking to the future, the Africa Center will continue to reach out to both current and future leaders of Africa. Starting in October 2001, the Center will conduct four events per year in Africa. In addition to its flagship seminars, the Africa Center is developing several other programs and activities, such as robust alumni and outreach programs, collaborative academic ventures with African, European, and US institutes, and support to the unified commanders and other U.S. government engagement efforts on the continent.

Near East South Asian Center for Strategic Studies

Secretary Cohen established the fifth and newest center, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in January 2000. Like the other four regional centers NESA represent a critical element of the President's National Security Strategy. This center is an inclusive, neutral institution where strategic issues can be addressed, understanding deepened, partnerships fostered, defense-related decision-making improved, and cooperation strengthened among military and civilian leaders from the region and the United States. Secretary Cohen inaugurated the NESA Center, affiliated with the National Defense University at Fort McNair

in Washington, D.C., on October 30, 2000. Its Inaugural Seminar was in November 2000 with over 25 senior regional military and diplomatic professionals from throughout the region in attendance. The NESAC Center plans to offer its first resident seminar in the spring of 2001.

E. Defense and Military Contacts with the States of the Former Soviet Union

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, a key U.S. objective has been to assist the states of the Former Soviet Union with the transition into stable market democracies fully integrated into the international community and to make them cooperative partners in promoting regional security and stability, arms control, and counterproliferation. Created in 1994, the CTR Defense and Military Contacts Program is the primary policy instrument to support bilateral peacetime military engagement between the U.S. Department of Defense and the military establishments of CTR-eligible NIS states (i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan).

Contacts funded by the program are designed: to assist in the restructuring and downsizing of NIS defense establishments and to professionalize their military units; to promote democratic civilian control of NIS militaries; and to establish programs of cooperation on counterproliferation, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

By helping the non-Russian NIS states develop professional militaries, the program promotes regional security and the sovereignty and independence of these states, which is a critical national security interest of the U.S. The military contacts program is also an important tool for shaping the future development of the Russian armed forces as an institution that reinforces Russia's orientation as a democratic state, living at peace with its neighbors and constructively engaged in regional security structures.

Examples of bilateral defense and military events funded by CTR include:

- Counterpart meetings between U.S. and FSU senior military leaders and defense officials (e.g., Assistant Secretary-level meetings of Bilateral Working Groups and of the Defense Consultative Group, meetings between senior military commanders, etc.);
- Staff discussions on issues of mutual interest (e.g., counterproliferation, NCO development, civilian control of the military, Shared Early Warning discussions with Russia, etc.);
- Unit visits and familiarization exchanges (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program exchanges);
- Port calls and ship visits; and,
- Bilateral exercises.

Initial familiarization exchanges between DoD and four NIS states, slow to begin in 1994-96, have been replaced by a robust program of substantive/operational contacts between

DoD and military counterparts from seven NIS states. Approximately 400 military contacts are programmed for FY2001. This represents a four-fold increase over FY1997 events, much of this increase coming from increased military contacts with the non-Russian NIS.

Although contacts with Russia continue to be managed by the Joint Staff and executed by all components of the DoD, beginning in FY1998, US European Command and US Central Command assumed responsibility for planning, executing and coordinating all staff-level defense and military contact events with the non-Russian NIS. CINC involvement in the planning and execution of DMC events has greatly expanded the scope and size of the program and has ensured greater coordination between DMC contact events and regional CINC Theater Engagement Plans.

F. U.S.- Russian Shared Early Warning Initiative

On June 4, 2000, President Clinton and President Putin signed the "Memorandum Of Agreement Between The Government Of The United States and Government Of The Russian Federation On The Establishment Of A Joint Center For The Exchange Of Data From Early Warning Systems And Notifications Of Missile Launches".

This agreement - which is the first time the United States and Russia have agreed to a permanent joint operation involving U.S. and Russian military personnel - is a significant milestone in ensuring strategic stability between the United States and Russia. It establishes a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow for the exchange of information derived from each side's missile launch warning systems on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

The exchange of this data will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing the danger that ballistic missiles might be launched on the basis of false warning of attack. It will also promote increased mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides.

The JDEC will build upon the successful establishment and operation during the millennium rollover of the temporary joint center for Y2K Strategic Stability in Colorado Springs. The JDEC will be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with American and Russian personnel.

The JDEC is also intended to serve as the repository for the notifications to be provided as part of an agreed system for exchanging pre-launch notifications on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This agreement is currently being negotiated separately.

G. Security Cooperation

The United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system was born and thrived during the cold-war period when the U.S. was helping to rebuild other parts of the world and using our military resources to influence foreign governments on a more direct basis. The end of the cold-war brought lower global defense budgets, greater defense industrial competition

worldwide, and emphasis on coalition warfare. Our traditional methods for providing U.S. defense articles and services were not responding well to these changes.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) was the organization responsible for overseeing and implementing FMS and Security Assistance as a whole. In addition to FMS, Security Assistance includes the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, leasing U.S. Government military equipment to friendly foreign governments, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Direct Commercial Contracting (for FMF customers only), and drawdowns of United States military equipment for provision to friendly foreign governments.

In the spirit of the Clinton-Gore Administration's Reinventing Government initiative, DSAA embarked on the complicated task of reinventing Security Assistance. DSAA's ability to effectively administer Security Assistance programs and fulfill its mission as a tool of foreign policy was inhibited by various laws, policies, and regulations that reflected the cold-war era. Foreign Customer complaints that the United States' FMS system was slow and cumbersome; U.S. industry's dissatisfaction with the export control aspect of FMS; and the general perception that foreign military sales were rapidly declining, resulted in a decision by the Agency to examine alternative ways of doing business.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Hamre, issued a 12 May 1998 memorandum bringing the DoD organizations responsible for acquisition, policy, and export control into the process, since they all affected, or were affected by, FMS. Dr. Hamre became the catalyst for dialogue with State Department and subsequent improvements to the U.S. Government export control process through the Defense Trade and Security Initiative. The Security Assistance reinvention effort was projected to be a multi-year effort.

The DSAA later became the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #40, on 1 October 1998. This name change was substantive due to the realization that our approach of dictating requirements and providing aid to foreign governments and international organizations was outdated. The Agency's approach in the 21st century had to focus on our allies as partners and coalition participants if we were to be successful in our mission. Furthermore, the Agency's expanding role under the Defense Reform Initiative suggested a name change to better reflect our increased mission responsibilities. Under DRID #12, issued 22 Dec 1997, Humanitarian Assistance and Demining Programs were transferred to the Agency effective 13 March 1998. This transfer allowed policy staff to concentrate on corporate level planning and oversight and consolidated program management and resources under a single manager. It also capitalized on the expertise of the Agency's staff. Under DRID #34, issued 5 May 1998, the Warsaw Initiative (Partnership for Peace) program management functions were transferred to the Agency effective 1 October 1998. Again, the transfer was directed to align security cooperation functions under one agency and capitalize on the expertise of the Agency's staff.

G. POW/MIA Affairs

1993

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) was initially established as the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office by Department of Defense Directive 5110.10 on July 16, 1993, under the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, and provided centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) affairs within the Department of Defense (DoD). The Office provides DoD participation in the conduct of negotiations with officials of foreign governments in efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of missing American service men and women; assembles and analyzes information and maintains data bases on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action; declassifies DoD documents for disclosure and release according to section 1082 of Public Law 102-190 (50 U.S.C. 401) and Executive Order 12812 of July 22, 1992; and maintains open channels of communication on POW/MIA matters between the Department and the Congress, POW/MIA families, and veterans service organizations (VSO) through periodic consultations and other appropriate methods.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, Alan Ptak, negotiated the Trilateral Agreement for Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) operations in Laos during a trilateral summit in Honolulu, Hawaii. This agreement served as the basis for trilateral investigation and excavation efforts in Laos. These operations involved Lao personnel working side by side with JTF-FA personnel in conducting joint operations, along with witnesses from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), to recover remains of missing American servicemen.

In reciprocation for a US delegation visit to Beijing at the end of 1992 to discuss POW/missing personnel issues, a Chinese delegation headed by a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official visited the US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) in April, 1993. These two visits resulted in US expert teams conducting four Vietnam War-era investigations in southern China, and one World War II-era investigation in Tibet. Five sets of remains were repatriated from the WWII crash site in Tibet.

1994

DPMO initiated efforts by the Defense Science Board to develop quality standards for future DoD use of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) in the identification of remains associated with Americans missing from past conflicts.

The DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs visited the three Indochina countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and visited Hanoi on a follow-on trip for trilateral negotiations. The main reason for these trips was to underscore a Presidential Delegation's message of the past summer that the U.S. Government (USG) continues to place a high priority on the POW/MIA issue. A secondary goal was to conduct specific and detailed discussions designed to focus joint efforts on areas that would enhance and accelerate the accounting effort.

1995

On February 17th the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, submitted a report to Congress in response to the requirements of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 103-337, Section 1034. This report, compiled by the DPMO, contained "a complete listing by name of all such personnel about whom it is possible that officials of the SRV can produce additional information or remains that could lead to the maximum possible accounting for these personnel, as determined on the basis of all information available to the USG." The DPMO-developed report was the result of a comprehensive review of each case involving an American who never returned from Southeast Asia (SEA). It listed 2,211 Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as a result of the Vietnam War: 1,621 in the SRV, 505 in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 77 in the Kingdom of Cambodia, and eight in the People's Republic of China.

DPMO issued the "Department of Defense Policy for Handling Requests Regarding Disposition of Artifacts Associated with Unaccounted for Americans" on June 2, 1995. This document provided DoD policy for handling requests by next of kin for the return of artifacts associated with unaccounted-for Americans (to include POWs and MIAs).

1996

The DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, James Wold, traveled to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in January to explain the 1995 Comprehensive Review of Cases for SEA to foreign government officials. The results of the review as reported to the Congress were discussed in detail, and the need for the various governments to assist the USG by accomplishing unilateral actions was further emphasized. Over 450 requests for unilateral action were delivered to the three SEA governments during February - June of this year. Upon completion of the actions identified by the comprehensive review the cases of many Americans missing from the war in SEA were moved closer to resolution.

The DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, and other DPMO policy and support personnel traveled to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in March as part of the Presidential delegation led by the Deputy Secretary for Veteran Affairs, Herschel Gober. The delegation determined that progress continued to be made in the President's four key areas for POW/MIA activity following the July 1995 normalization of relations with Vietnam, namely:

Concrete results from efforts by Vietnam to recover and repatriate American remains;

Continued resolution of "Last Known Alive" (LKA) priority discrepancy cases;

Vietnamese assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos; and,

Access to Vietnamese POW/MIA-related documents, archives, and oral history interviews.

The delegation reemphasized the need for continued cooperation by all three governments, particularly in accomplishing the unilateral activities developed in the comprehensive review.

DPMO analysts and policy officers prepared a detailed report of the work accomplished in SEA within the context of the comprehensive review. This allowed DoD to provide an annual follow-up to the November 13, 1995 Report on the Comprehensive Review of Cases to assess the impacts which the comprehensive review had on USG accounting efforts in Southeast Asia and indicated the overall changes in the status of cases.

DPMO analysts embarked upon a detailed study of the Vietnamese remains recovery and remains storage processes. This allowed DPMO to update the USG position regarding Vietnamese' remains recovery and storage from the position reflected in the 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate and the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) 1990 study, to include the vast amount of information gathered as a result of the joint U.S./SRV operations conducted in Vietnam.

DPMO developed the procedure, which the USG would use in the future to account for individuals who become missing, as a result of hostile action when live or mortal remains repatriation is not possible. This allows DoD to adopt a realistic representation for those it believes it is still possible to achieve a full accounting through the recovery and repatriation of remains, and to terminate active recovery efforts for cases identified for no further pursuit. DoD began to use this process for "no further pursuit" cases associated with the war in SEA.

DPMO contracted with several prominent Cambodian scholars to assist in the examination and exploitation of a major body of Democratic Kampuchea-era documents. This provided heretofore-unavailable details on the names and activities of revolutionary forces and others in areas of known American casualties. The language skills of these individuals were also used to conduct oral history interviews with veterans and other knowledgeable persons. This placed every remaining Cambodian loss (76 total) in its own unique historical context, and it either identified leads or established that further efforts were unlikely to resolve an individual case through the recovery of remains.

As a follow-up to the 1995 Comprehensive Review, DPMO coordinated an investigation for JTF-FA and the intelligence community of over 3,000 actions involving leads to account for servicemen missing in action from the war in SEA. Panels consisting of three flag officers reviewed the cases of 13 unaccounted-for Americans (seven Vietnam losses, five Laos losses, and one Cambodian loss) and determined that, based on existing evidence, all were confirmed dead. The panels recommended that the individuals be removed from the corresponding discrepancy case lists, and reduced the number of discrepancies to 48, 76, and 17 Americans on the lists for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, respectively.

The U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) and JTF-FA continued to conduct operations and investigations in China throughout 1996. The primary activity concerned investigations into Vietnam-era losses over Chinese territory and the interview of former Vietnamese "boat people" in China, who might have information on cases

and burials in Vietnam. CILHI prepared operations to recover and repatriate remains from a World War II B-24 crash site. Chinese President Jiang Zemin presented President Clinton with a photo album and videotape of the crash site and dog tags of those on board, during the November 1996 Asian Pacific Economic Conference meetings in the Philippines.

In January 1996, DPMO began a series of direct talks with North Korea on the issue of Korean War remains. In May several long-standing issues were finally resolved which had, heretofore, blocked progress towards joint recovery operations. The U.S. and North Korea agreed to conduct two joint recovery operations in 1996. Although there were negotiation problems with North Korea that delayed the second joint recovery operation until weather concerns forced a cancellation, this first joint operation has set the precedent for future operations. Direct contact with the North Korean Government also provided the USG a means to raise other POW/MIA-related issues, such as live sighting reports and archival investigations. Because of these activities, the percentage of Korea-oriented queries from concerned citizens and family members more than tripled between 1995 and 1996 (from 5% to 18% of all inquiries).

In May 1996, the Secretary of Defense signed the "Korean War Accounting Policy Statement." DPMO drafted and coordinated this statement, which formally committed DoD to the accounting effort for servicemen missing from the Korean War. This statement provided the basis for establishing a Korean War outreach cell within the U.S. Army—the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center (CMAOC), and proved instrumental in the accelerated growth of the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) to process an increase in DNA tests for identifying remains.

DPMO coordinated the establishment of a Korean War Family Outreach Cell to reestablish contact with the almost 6,000 families of Korean War servicemen from the Army whose remains were never recovered or identified. DPMO also facilitated an agreement with CMAOC to cover funding for AFDIL's expenses in expanding to meet an expected increase in Korean War-related DNA testing. This provided the Army an up-to-date network of notification for relaying case-specific information, and helped it acquire DNA reference samples from appropriate family members for the Korea War DNA reference sample database.

In a meeting with the Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Mr. Walter Slocombe discussed the importance of increasing Chinese cooperation on the Korean War accounting effort. Pointing to successes in joint US-PRC WWII and Vietnam War accounting efforts, Mr. Slocombe called for an archival initiative that would allow US access to pertinent information from PRC Korean War archives.

The POW/MIA issue remained under intense scrutiny from concerned citizens and Congress:

- DPMO responded to over 325 written queries and 325 telephonic queries from Members of Congress;
- DPMO participated in three open Congressional hearings and one closed hearing; and,

- DPMO principals participated in ten update briefings to Congressmen and their staffs regarding unaccounted-for servicemen from SEA, Southwest Asia, the Korean conflict, and the unaccounted-for in general. These briefings provided focused background information on individual loss incidents, the status of remains recovery, and the specific sequence to be employed to resolve the cases.

1997 After completing the first-ever joint recovery operation in North Korea in 1996, a DPMO-led DoD team successfully negotiated an agreement with the North Koreans in May and June to conduct three joint recovery operations and a precedent-setting archival research review at the Pyongyang War Museum. DPMO also coordinated a historic visit to North Korea by representatives of three major VSOs and the Korean War family association, along with the media to observe one of the recovery operations underway. DPMO concluded 1997 by successfully negotiating an agreement for five joint recovery operations and an expanded archival research effort in 1998.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre, signed the first DoD Directive on "Personnel Recovery," establishing policy and assigning responsibilities throughout DoD for personnel recovery. This established DPMO as the lead to ensure the full weight of the nation's military, diplomatic, and intelligence capability is brought to bear to guarantee the safety and successful recovery of isolated service members. DPMO organized the first comprehensive personnel recovery conference, which successfully provided a process for key decision makers to use to identify the major issues relevant to personnel recovery into the future.

DPMO successfully promulgated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among DPMO, the DIA, and the U.S. Pacific Command that clearly delineates intelligence functions and responsibilities for each organization in support of resolution of the POW/MIA issue in Southeast Asia. This MOU ensures the USG takes full advantage of all intelligence means at its disposal to achieve the fullest possible accounting; takes advantages of the unique strengths and capabilities of each organization; and clearly recognizes DPMO policy oversight over the entire mission, DIA's leadership in intelligence support to the POW/MIA issue as directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and JTF-FA's in-country operational leadership and responsibilities.

In several high- and mid-level visits with Chinese counterparts, US officials from DoD, State Department, and the National Security Council stressed the importance of expanding Chinese cooperation on POW/missing personnel initiatives to include Korean War accounting efforts. In a meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, China's Chief of the General Staff stated that China is willing to provide positive cooperation in response to direct inquiries on Korean War cases. In Guangxi Province, a CILHI recovery team began operations to recover the remains from a World War II B-24 bomber crash site. CILHI would conduct operations at this again in 1998 and '99, eventually recovering and identifying all 10 crewmembers.

1998

In early 1998, DPMO was instrumental in conducting a comprehensive review process in efforts to identify the Vietnam War remains in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The results of diligent U.S. government research and forensic investigation lead to the identification of the Unknown Soldier.

In March 1998, the President determined that, based upon all information available to the U.S. Government, the government of Vietnam was fully cooperating in good faith with the U.S. in the four areas related to achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans unaccounted for as a result of the Vietnam War. In the year since the President first certified full faith cooperation on the part of Vietnam, analysis of over 16,500 artifacts and over 28,000 archival items has yielded information that correlates to over 1,900 cases involving missing Americans. Consequently, U.S. analysts made solid progress on 213 cases involving 372 unaccounted-for Americans due, in part, to information gleaned from numerous joint U.S./Vietnamese operations and investigations conducted unilaterally by the Vietnamese during this past year. These efforts culminated in the identification of the remains of 26 personnel.

DPMO spearheaded DoD efforts to conduct joint U.S.-Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea recovery operations in North Korea. Five joint recovery operations were held in 1998, and they resulted in the repatriation of the remains of 22 American servicemen. It also set the stage for an even greater expansion of joint accounting efforts. To this end, DPMO drafted and coordinated an accelerated Korean War recovery plan that provided the basis for increasing DoD recovery assets to conduct more realistic and aggressive recovery efforts. Fenced from other geo-political issues, the joint accounting effort has proven to be the one consistent success story in the developing bilateral relationship with North Korea.

After several years of consistent, high-level pressure from USG officials, China agreed to consider meeting with the DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, Robert Jones, on Korean War accounting. This had proven to be a difficult issue on which to get cooperation from the Chinese. Through persistent incorporation of DPMO's views into the talking papers of every senior USG official who met with the Chinese, DPMO kept this issue in front of the Chinese. The Chinese continue to cooperate on Korean War accounting as they have on World War II and SEA-related cases.

Secretary of Defense Cohen discusses details of Korean War accounting efforts during two separate meetings with the Chinese Minister of National Defense and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman. A family member of one of the missing crewmen from the B-24 crash site in Guangxi Province dedicates a memorial plaque at the site, an area christened for posterity as a "Sino-American Friendship Zone."

In July 1998, the new DPMO DASD, Robert Jones, conducted a policy oversight visit to Vietnam. During his visit, he stressed the importance of Vietnamese cooperation and that unilateral recovery efforts were the key to building a strong bilateral relationship with the US. He also assured government officials that the accounting issue remained among the highest national priorities with the US government and the American people. In return, each minister

with whom he met stressed their desire for continued cooperation on all accounting efforts to include Last Known Alive and Live Sighting cases.

Since January 1994, when the government of Laos agreed to work with JTF-FA's archival research team to search its archives, libraries, museums and film repositories, DPMO has kept constant pressure on the Lao to provide access to its historical films stored in Hanoi. The U.S. had knowledge of approximately 162 film reels of Lao films being stored by the Vietnamese, some titles with obvious POW/MIA relevance. This four-year effort reached fruition on July 8, 1998 with the DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, participating in the arrival of 1,081 reels of Lao wartime footage in Vientiane and observing the review of the first of these reels at the Lao National Film and Video Archive Center.

The POW/MIA oral history program (OHP) seeks to interview knowledgeable former adversaries to obtain information about POW/MIA policies, procedures and incidents that could help resolve individual loss incidents or shed light on the live prisoner issue. Establishing an oral history program in Laos was a critical step to develop new leads related to these unresolved cases. Until 1998, the Lao had allowed only three interviews, all occurring prior to 1994. In July, the Lao government arranged an OHP interview with a former POW camp guard. The Lao promised to continue to support OHP interviews and pledged to arrange others.

DPMO hosted the first Strategic Planners conference, which brought together key DoD and other government agency members of the POW/MIA community. The conference developed a USG strategic plan for the POW/MIA issue. The first draft of the plan was submitted for informal coordination in late December to the key stakeholders in this issue.

In August 1998, the DoD Policy on "Private Citizens Visiting Incident Excavation Sites" was approved. Should non-DoD personnel, especially family members, decide to visit an active excavation site, despite the hardships and difficulties associated with such an undertaking, the USG will not accept liability or responsibility for providing arrangements for guides, interpreters, drivers, vehicles, and housing accommodations. If such visits are properly coordinated and scheduled, field-operating agencies will assist visiting non-DoD personnel on an "as possible" basis, as long as such assistance does not interfere with on-going operations. DoD will consider exceptions to this policy only in those cases in which the individuals have direct personal knowledge pertinent to the investigation or excavation in question, and that knowledge or expertise is not available from any other source.

Also approved this year was the DoD Policy regarding "Disposition of Artifacts Pursuant to the Missing Persons Act." This policy pertains to requests by next of kin for artifacts that have been recovered by the USG to include personal effects, USG-issued equipment, aircraft wreckage, weapons or ammunition, and the unidentifiable. In cases where artifacts are possessed by a foreign government or foreign national, the USG will not become directly involved in attempts by next of kin to gain possession in cases for other than POWs. All USG communication with next of kin involving such requests will be conducted through Service casualty offices or Service mortuary affairs offices, as appropriate.

The DoD Policy on "Second Testing of mtDNA" was developed, and it clarified DoD policy on the use of mtDNA for identifying human remains. It also addresses the right of the person authorized to direct disposition (PADD) to obtain a second opinion. MtDNA testing is a consumptive process, and consequently, the DoD policy is that remains in the custody and care of the DoD will not be taken for private, second-opinion analysis prior to the identification of the remains and a transfer of custody to the PADD.

The DoD Policy on "Non-DoD Worldwide Recoveries" was also developed. This policy provided the criteria by which DoD would evaluate requests from outside agencies for DoD assistance to perform non-DoD recovery operations.

The DoD Policy regarding "Underwater Remains Recovery Operations Associated with Unaccounted-for U.S. Service Personnel" was also developed. It provided DoD policy regarding the use of underwater recovery services to achieve the fullest possible accounting. DoD will undertake reasonable efforts to recover personnel lost at sea based upon the following: safety/risk management considerations, the availability of recovery assets, and technical determinants (accurate location of the loss incident, correlation between the loss and an unresolved case, and ability to conduct the recovery safely).

The DoD Policy on "Forensic Identifications" was developed and coordinated with the Total Army Personnel Command. This policy provided guidance in giving the Primary Next of Kin (PNOK) the option of accepting less than biologically conclusive identifications on remains held at CILHI. In addition, it encouraged CILHI to present these cases in entirety considering all circumstantial, historical, and scientific evidence to support an identification to PNOKs. The PNOK then has the option to allow the case to be forwarded to the Armed Forces Identification Review Board for determination.

Researchers from the Vietnam War Working Group discovered a brief autobiographical sketch written by the former Russian Co-chairman of the Commission, General Dmitri Volkogonov. Writing in August 1994, the now deceased Volkogonov said he discovered a "sensational" document in a Russian archive that assigned the KGB the task of "delivering knowledgeable Americans to the USSR for intelligence purposes." Volkogonov later was shown a copy of the actual KGB plan, but the chief of the Russian foreign intelligence service assured him that the plan was never implemented. Because the document was dated from the late 1960's, the Joint Commission has concluded that American POWs in Southeast Asia may have been the targets of the KGB plan.

The Vietnam War Working Group went to considerable lengths investigating this discovery and in supporting the approach to the Russian government on this issue by high-level American officials, including Vice President Gore and Secretary of State Albright. In addition to pursuing this ongoing inquiry, the working group continues to pursue leads that would enable a better understanding of the "735" and "1205" documents. Efforts are underway to access the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense for Vietnam War-era materials that might aid in accounting for missing service members from that conflict.

1999

DPMO completed a study on the organization, systems, and results of Vietnam's recovery and repatriation of American remains during and after the Vietnam War. This *Remains Study* supported one of the President's Four Criteria. While some questions are still to be answered, the study showed that the number of remains recovered and stored by the Vietnamese is lower than previously believed. In support of the Remains Study, U.S. analysts conducted a series of technical discussions with Vietnamese experts on the recovery, storage, and repatriation of remains. Increasingly productive and candid, these talks resulted in an increased level of openness and exchange between the two governments, including the turnover by the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP) documents never before seen by U.S. government.

In August, DPMO representatives traveled to Vietnam to conduct technical talks on the U.S. accounting efforts in Southeast Asia. The purpose of the talks was to assess the progress made in recovery efforts in Southeast Asia and to coordinate the DASD's visit to Southeast Asia later in the year.

DASD Jones visited Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in November in order to update government officials on US accounting efforts and increase cooperation in key accounting areas. In every case, government officials pledged increased cooperation with the USG and DPMO to resolve all outstanding cases.

As a result of the Korean People's Army's intransigence on the method of returning remains recovered in North Korea, DPMO conducted only three of six scheduled joint recovery operations in North Korea in 1999, resulting in the recovery and return of thirteen sets of remains. DPMO also conducted a successful archival mission in Pyongyang in April. In October DPMO successfully negotiated a new method of returning remains—direct repatriation from Pyongyang to Yokota AB, Japan. The DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, led a DoD delegation to Pyongyang on October 25 to repatriate remains under this new procedure. During that mission the DASD met face to face, for the first time, with his counterpart in the Korean People's Army—Lieutenant General Lee Chan Bok, Commander of the KPA's Panmunjom Mission. A subsequent repatriation from Pyongyang was conducted on November 11.

DPMO led a U.S. delegation to Berlin in December 1999 to work with the North Koreans on plans for joint recovery operations in 2000. The North Koreans, however, attempted to unilaterally link the conduct of joint recovery operations to a large-scale economic assistance package. DPMO rejected this linkage and both sides left Berlin without an agreement. DPMO remained ready to engage North Korea on this vital humanitarian effort, but would not allow them to use this issue to extort extravagant resources from the United States.

Also in December, DPMO agreed to form a working group with the Republic of Korea

Ministry of National Defense to look for ways to improve accountability operations in South Korea.

The Chinese government identifies a counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for accounting discussions with DASD (DPMO). DASD Robert Jones met twice in 1999 with this counterpart, Mr. Chen Mingming. Mr. Chen reiterated that China is willing to investigate clear and specific requests for information on Korean War cases, but pointed out that the Korean War archives are controlled by the People's Liberation Army and remain classified. During his second visit, DASD Jones presented 44 cases to the Chinese for investigation.

2000

In March 2000, the Secretary of Defense made an historical trip to visit Vietnam. During his visit, the SECDEF reiterated the United States' commitment to accounting for missing Americans. In addition, he offered U.S. scientific assistance to the Vietnamese in accounting for their own fallen soldiers. An offer was made to bring Vietnamese scientists to the U.S. for forensic training. Three Vietnamese scientists are scheduled to receive training at the Armed forces DNA Identification laboratory in Rockville, Maryland in 2001.

Also in March, the Library of Congress published a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief on POW/MIA Status and Accounting Issues. The brief discussed the controversy over the possibility of live Americans still being held captive by Vietnam, North Korea and the former U.S.S.R.

In August 2000, DASD Jones conducted a policy oversight visit to Southeast Asia. During his stop in Vietnam, DASD Jones paid office calls on Vietnamese officials assuring them that the accounting mission would continue until all Americans were accounted for.

In a January, 2000 meeting in Beijing, DASD Jones and Mr. Chen agree to initiate an Oral History Program, wherein US researchers interview Chinese veterans who worked in the POW camp system during the Korean War. DPMO experts interviewed the first four of these camp workers in September 2000. The Chinese also agree to facilitate US open-source archival research in China, and to participate in academic exchanges focused on Korean War history projects. During a July visit to Beijing, Secretary of Defense Cohen stressed once again the importance of Chinese cooperation on Korean War accounting efforts. The Chinese continue their excellent cooperation on WWII accounting initiatives, notifying the Ambassador and DoD that PRC investigators had discovered two more crash sites in Tibet.

In June, the North Koreans agreed to return to the negotiating table in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and discuss the resumption of JROs without preconditions. Both sides agreed to a total of five Joint Recovery Operations for 2000, with the first beginning in July and the last ending in November. As of the completion of JRO 4 in September, a total of 50 sets of remains have been recovered and repatriated to the United States.

In September, DASD Jones traveled to Pyongyang to participate in the repatriation

ceremony for remains recovered during JRO 3 in concert with the National POW/MIA Recognition Day and to initiate dialogue with the KPA for future operations. As had occurred in 1999, the North Koreans attempted to unilaterally link the conduct of JROs to a large-scale economic assistance package, but the USG refused to do so. The DASD's efforts to move negotiations forward were further complicated by the North Korean's perceived diplomatic slight, when airline workers from American Airlines attempted to check the baggage of the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly prior to his flight from Germany to New York to attend a United Nations plenary session. The North Koreans indicated to the DASD that failure to respond to assistance requests could jeopardize December negotiations for 2001 operations.

In late September, Deputy DASD Alan Liotta traveled to Pyongyang for Technical Talks aimed at resolving outstanding operational issues from ongoing JROs, as well as attempt to coordinate talks for JROs in 2001. He emphasized the North Korean should submit requests for aid within the legal framework established by the USG, and attempted to get the North Koreans to commit to the next round of talks in December without preconditions. Though the North Koreans made no commitments on the details of the talks, they reaffirmed that there were no preconditions for holding negotiations. They also signaled their willingness to cooperate by taking Mr. Liotta and party on a tour of the Chosin Reservoir, making them the first Americans to visit this area since the war. Such a tour is a prerequisite for attempting to excavate an area.

In addition to DPMO's general contributions, there are significant mission-specific contributions that will be discussed.

Personnel Recovery

Historically, during times of conflict, DoD's emphasis and capability to execute effectively personnel recovery have increased temporarily to meet the requirements of the circumstances. During peacetime, as defense budgets declined and the force structure was reduced, the Department's formal personnel recovery capability often took a back seat to more pressing operational needs. In recent years, however, an expectation by the American citizenry that DoD be capable of engaging in conflict with minimal or no loss of American lives has placed tremendous pressure on our elected leaders and the leadership of DoD to develop capabilities within our Armed Forces to realize those expectations.

On September 14, 1994, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, stated in a memorandum to the DoD leadership that, "The preservation of life and well-being of U.S. service members and DoD civilians placed in harm's way, while defending U.S. national interests, is and must remain one of [the] Department's highest priorities." He recognized that in today's environment of Military Operations Other Than War, diminishing capabilities, and concomitant U.S. commitments, reliance on *ad hoc* personnel recovery solutions was an unacceptable trend. In an effort to help reduce this trend, he designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict as the policy proponent for Personnel Recovery. He charged him with "coordination and deconfliction of the military

aspects of personnel recovery,” and directed him to “establish and oversee a comprehensive plan for personnel recovery policy for DoD.”

Before the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict could make significant progress toward the Deputy Secretary’s directive, legislation enacted with the FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, required the Secretary of Defense to establish a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to have responsibility for Department of Defense policy relating to missing persons. The intent of Congress was to merge the responsibilities for past, present and future missing personnel accounting efforts with the policy oversight for DoD live personnel recovery matters, thereby creating one office responsible for the entire spectrum of issues related to missing persons. It directed that the office be responsible for:

Policy, control, and oversight within the DoD of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons (including matters related to search, rescue, escape, and evasion); and,

Coordination for the DoD with other departments and agencies of the USG on all matters concerning missing persons.

In response to direction by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe, redesignated the Defense POW/MIA Office as the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) on August 15, 1996. This dramatically increased the scope of DPMO’s responsibilities, which would encompass not only the historical accounting mission, but also the responsibility for policy oversight over all matters pertaining to future personnel recovery matters. Indeed, for the first time since the signing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Secretary of Defense now had a single office responsible for policy, control, and oversight of the entire process--from the time of loss through search and rescue, to recovery of the individual, his/her remains, or a conclusive determination of fate. It set the stage for DPMO to provide consistent and effective DoD leadership of the issue, which would foster a unified commitment and support for recovering isolated personnel before they become unaccounted-for.

DPMO began to exercise its new responsibilities by establishing a goal of implementing a unified system for the live recovery of isolated personnel, post-hostility accounting, and an identification system by the end of FY 2002. Since then, DPMO has taken numerous steps to begin consolidating control and oversight of personnel recovery policy at the DoD level.

Strategic Guidance

DPMO successfully interjected personnel recovery guidance into key Department of Defense documents to help ensure the Combatant Commands, Services, and other offices of DoD incorporate personnel recovery considerations into their operational and contingency planning.

- ___ Defense Planning Guidance; 1997 – 1999
- ___ Contingency Planning Guidance; 1997 – 1999
- ___ Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; 1998
- ___ Strategic Intelligence Review; 1997 – 1999

Policy

DPMO has promulgated policies that clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout the Department encompassing all aspects of personnel recovery. These policies help to preclude *ad hoc* planning and execution of personnel recovery functions by requiring effective organization, and proactive preparation and training for personnel recovery operations.

- ___ DoD Directive 2310.2, "Personnel Recovery." The original DoD Directive 2310.2 signed on June 30, 1997 established personnel recovery policy and assigned responsibilities throughout DoD, and designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD executive agent for personnel recovery. It also established the framework for interagency coordination of DoD policies on personnel recovery. In October 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Rudy de Leon, signed a revision to 2310.2, which updated policy and realigned responsibilities for personnel recovery. It also redesignated the DoD executive agency for personnel recovery from the United States Air Force to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
- ___ DoD Directive 1300.7, "Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct." This revision to DoD Directive 1300.7, outlines policy and realigns responsibilities to develop and execute the Code of Conduct training for members of the U.S. Armed Forces according to the 1976 Defense Review Committee Report.
- ___ DoD Instruction 1300.21, "Code of Conduct Training and Education." DoD Instruction 1300.21 implements policy as prescribed in DoD Directive 1300.7, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to develop and execute Code of Conduct training for members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- ___ DoD Instruction 2310.4, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel." DoD Instruction 2310.4 implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for repatriating U.S. military, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor service employees who have been POWs, held hostage by terrorists (inside or outside the continental United States), detained in peacetime by a hostile foreign government, evading enemy capture, or were otherwise missing under hostile conditions.
- ___ DoD Instruction 2310.6, "Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery." This instruction, signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, implements personnel recovery

policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures under DoD Directive 2310.2 to develop and execute Non-conventional Assisted Recovery procedures for U.S. military personnel, DoD civilian employees, contractors and other designated personnel isolated during military operations or as a direct result of developing or ongoing crises prior to U.S. military intervention.

—“National Search and Rescue Plan.” Provides a National Search and Rescue Plan for coordinating civil search and rescue services to meet domestic needs and international commitments.

Crisis Response

- Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) – Formed by DPMO in mid-1997 under the auspices of DoD Instruction 2310.3, “Personnel Recovery Response Cell Procedures,” which DPMO promulgated, the PRRC has become an effective group that meets prior to and during a personnel recovery incident, to provide expeditious, coordinated policy options to the Secretary of Defense.
- Operation DESERT FOX – Iraq, Fall 1998. Convened PRRC prior to onset of operations to heighten awareness of PRRC responsibilities in the case of an isolating incident.
- Operation ALLIED FORCE – Kosovo, Spring 1999. Manned National Military Joint Intelligence Center providing expert Combat Search and Rescue advice during Vega 31 and Hammer 34.

Interagency Coordination of Personnel Recovery

DPMO has constructed mechanisms that institutionalize means of cooperation on personnel recovery matters between DPMO and the interagency community (*e.g.*, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State (DOS)). These bonds take advantage of the unique capabilities of each department or agency, combining them to maximize the opportunity to recover isolated personnel, and help to ensure that the signatories will cooperate more closely during personnel recovery incidents to ensure the nation applies the full spectrum of its instruments of power to maximize the USG opportunity to resolve personnel recovery incidents successfully.

- DoD/Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Memorandum of Agreement on Mutual Support to Personnel Recovery--Originally signed in 1995 and revised in 1998, this memorandum of agreement ensures unity of purpose and coordinated mutual support by the DoD and the CIA on personnel recovery policy, research and development, training, planning, and operations.
- DoD/DOS Memorandum of Agreement on Mutual Support to Personnel Recovery-- This memorandum, which is in final draft, defines and establishes guidelines for cooperation and mutual assistance between the DOS and the DoD with respect to

policy, training, planning, and operations for personnel recovery.

U.S. – Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs

The objectives of the U.S. – Russia Joint Commission (USRJC) are to determine whether American servicemen are being held against their will in the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU), and, if so, to secure their immediate release and repatriation; to locate and return to the U.S. the remains of any deceased American servicemen interred in the FSU; and to ascertain the facts regarding American servicemen whose fates remain unresolved.

The USRJC is organized into four working groups, each representing a key area of investigation. These groups encompass World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. The latter group has focused on American aircraft lost during the Cold War period as well as Soviet military personnel unaccounted-for from Korea, Afghanistan, and other areas of conflict. The Commission meets in regular plenary session at least once each year.

1993

The U.S. side of the USRJC conducted its first investigation in the FSU in August. This investigation occurred in Armenia at the site of the September 2, 1958 crash of a C-130. The Commission, led by U.S. co-chairman Ambassador Malcolm Toon, inspected the crash site, conducted interviews of witnesses to the incident, and oversaw the beginning of the site excavation work of the team from CILHI. The CILHI team was on-site for over two weeks and recovered hundreds of skeletal fragments. However, all were too small with which to perform DNA matching.

1994

The remains of Captain John Dunham were recovered from an RB-29 shootdown that occurred on October 7, 1952 and were repatriated September 16, 1994, following a joint U.S. - Russian excavation. Capt. Dunham was buried at Arlington National Cemetery on August 1, 1995. This was the first identification made under the direction of the USRJC.

1995

A Joint Interim Report on the USRJC on POW/MIAs was presented to Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov made the presentation in Moscow at the 50th anniversary commemorating the end of World War II in Europe.

1996

The "Comprehensive Report on the USRJC on POW/MIAs" was published. This report documented the four-and-one-half years of the USRJC activities in Russia.

1998

President Clinton named Major General (U.S. Army, retired), Roland Lajoie as co-chair

of the USRJC on POW/MIAs. Gen. Lajoic replaced the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Malcolm Toon.

Research in the personal archives of the former Russian co-chairman of the Commission, Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov, uncovered an autobiographical sketch written by Volkogonov in August 1994. This sketch was published posthumously in September 1998. In it Gen. Volkogonov wrote that he discovered a sensational document in a Russian archive that assigned to the KGB the task of “delivering knowledgeable Americans to the U.S.S.R. for intelligence purposes.” The plan was dated from the late 1960’s. The U.S. side of the Commission concluded that American POWs in SEA might have been the targets of the KGB plan. President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Secretary of State Albright, as well as high-level Joint Commission officials, have addressed the memoirs on several occasions with their Russian counterparts, seeking clarification from the Russians on the meaning of Gen. Volkogonov’s revelation.

1999

In September Secretary of Defense William Cohen appealed to the Russian Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, for expanded U.S. access to Russian military archives. Minister Sergeyev supported complete access to POW/MIA-related materials held in the archives of the Russian Defense Ministry.

2000

The Secretary of Defense met with the Russian Defense Minister in Moscow in June and again pressed the case for widened U.S. access to POW/MIA-related information in Russian Defense Ministry archives.

The “Report to the Presidents of the U.S. and Russia on the activities of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs” was published. This report documented the activities of the USRJC after 1996, when the first Comprehensive Report was published.

Research and Analysis

Research and analysis is the analytic backbone of DPMO, responsible for all the studies and assessments necessary to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all Americans captured or unaccounted-for as a result of past and future conflicts. The Research and Analysis Directorate’s primary focus is on cases from the Korean War and the War in SEA, but it is also involved in losses from World War II, the Cold War, the Somalia Action and the War in the Persian Gulf. Research and Analysis exploits all available intelligence community assets to expeditiously collect, process, analyze and disseminate information that could lead to the recovery of American personnel or case resolution.

The Research and Analysis Directorate was engaged in two important projects relevant to the history of the Clinton – Gore Administration.

“A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving Unaccounted-for Americans in Southeast Asia, Report by the Department of Defense,” November 13, 1995. This

comprehensive review represented the first time such an exhaustive assessment had been conducted since the end of the Vietnam War. The results represented the findings of DoD analysts assigned to DPMO, JTF-FA, and CILHI. The conclusions allowed the U.S. to identify the best process to resolve the remaining cases. JTF-FA incorporated the results into a work plan and shared them with the families of the missing Americans as well as the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. At present, the comprehensive review is continuously updated, and it remains the cornerstone of the analytic process upon which ongoing investigative efforts are based.

“Vietnam’s Collection and Repatriation of American Remains,” June 1999.

This is a major study of Vietnam’s wartime and postwar program to recover U.S. remains in preparation for eventual repatriation. The questions of how many remains Vietnam unilaterally recovered and held in storage, and whether all of these remains have been repatriated, have been a matter of great interest to family members, concerned citizens and U.S. policy makers. It directly affects efforts to reach the fullest possible accounting and to assess the degree of Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

Archival Research

The Special Projects/Archival Research (SPAR) Directorate of DPMO oversees all archival research efforts for all the wars in which the U.S. has participated. SPAR closely coordinates its efforts with the other DPMO directorates to identify the archival facilities to visit and the specific types of information to collect.

DPMO conducts archival research to retrieve empirical evidence concerning the circumstances of loss on servicemen unaccounted-for for nearly 50 years, beginning with World War II and continuing to the present. Researchers gather information from historical records repositories, libraries, and special collections, which, in turn, is used by casualty analysts and mortuary specialists conducting field operations. In addition, the researchers copy the information gathered from these archival facilities and send it to the National Archives (NARA) or the Library of Congress, when it then becomes part of a special collection and is made accessible for public research.

Congressional interest in the Korean War POW/Missing Personnel issue in the mid-1990’s led to the appropriation of \$1M in the FY 1995 defense budget towards locating Korean War records. The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, with this funding, located 25,000 pages of Korean War materials germane to the issue; most of the documents were located at various locations within NARA. Included in these materials were thousands of eyewitness reports that clarified the fates of some POWs, as were documents generated from the POW Returnee Debriefing Program.

Also affecting Korean War-era archival research was the enactment of 50 U.S.C. 435 (the McCain Bill), which designated the Archivist of U.S. as the custodian of Korean War documents. This legislation also made NARA responsible for administering special archival collections concerning the Korean War and making them available to the public.

Archival research conducted by SPAR archivists also led to the creation a large database of unaccounted-for Americans from the Korean War era. This document, entitled "Personnel Missing - Korea" (PMKOR), is a baseline to provide the fullest possible accounting of those servicemen who did not return from the Korean War. Additionally, this publication is a comprehensive listing of those individuals who were not accounted-for after repatriation events in 1953. Individuals whose remains were returned or recovered after OPERATION GLORY (concluded in 1954) are listed, with an appropriate notation, to indicate the date of recovery and identification. There are in excess of 160,000 data fields contained on PMKOR. The entire document was entered onto the DPMO web site in early 1999. Through PMKOR, the individual Services have a better tool to reestablish contact with the thousands of families with whom they have lost contact over the years.

Another large project, developed by SPAR researchers, is entitled "The Korean War Aircraft Loss Database" (KORWALD). This database contains over 3,400 loss incidents to include Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft losses, and it also contains information on aircraft type and tail number, date of loss, circumstances of loss, status of crew, crash location, and the blood chit number, if available. The data is cross-referenced to over 800 hard-copy field search case files that contain detailed circumstances of loss on our aircrews. No complete record of Korean War aircraft losses existed prior to this time. Analysts can electronically search the database and then refer to the hard-copy field search case files for details on specific losses. This document will be a significant research tool for analysts, historians, researchers, and academicians.

Additional archival research by SPAR personnel led to the creation of a database on Korean War POW returnee debriefings. These debriefings contain information on loss incidents, POW physical status, movements and locations after capture, POW camp descriptions, reports of death, and possible burial sites, all of which contribute directly to field search cases. The database currently contains information from over 3,600 briefs, with over 64,000 sighting reports, and it can be expanded. Although most of the debriefings are from Army personnel, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps debriefings are also included in the database, which will eventually be placed on the DPMO web site.

Under the aegis of the Congress in the mid-1990's, DPMO began a bona fide worldwide program for information that could lead to the fullest possible accounting of U.S. servicemen and selected civilians missing from World War II, the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Since the Congressional mandate, DPMO archival researchers have located more than 400 libraries, archives and special collections in both some 20 foreign repositories and more than 100 domestic archival facilities, that could hold information concerning our Nation's unaccounted-for personnel. During the last few years, DPMO has been successful in reviewing records in Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Canberra, Pyongyang, and Seoul, as well as U.S. archival collections. Specifically, in 1999, SPAR archivists made their third archival trip to Pyongyang visiting the Victorious Fatherland War Museum and the People's Study House, as well as the Sinchon Museum. These visits represent the first-ever recorded by U.S. government archivists to Pyongyang archival facilities.

SPAR archivists conducted additional foreign research at the 900-year old Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, in London and at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva. Initial information found at both of these international archival repositories suggests that there are possible historical leads concerning Americans missing from the Korean War. Specifically, SPAR's initial visits to the ICRC yielded lists of Americans that correlated information recorded in OPERATION BIG SWITCH and OPERATION LITTLE SWITCH from the Korean War. In addition, classified records in the ICRC repository could also yield significant information about unaccounted-for Americans from the Korean War.

In late 1999, SPAR, as agent for the DASD, POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, sponsored a trip for a four-man archival research team from the SRV to review archival repositories in the Washington area. SPAR arranged for the SRV archivists to be provided with 42 CDs containing 390,000 pages of Vietnam War data from the Marine Corps with an additional 670,000 pages to be sent to them at a later date. In addition, NARA provided the SRV team with ten boxes of indices of all available records on the Vietnam War. The Department of Veterans Affairs, in turn, provided the SRV researchers information on scientific studies recently carried out concerning Agent Orange. Future efforts with the SRV may include discussions for the establishment of a mutual archival research effort by both U.S. and Vietnamese researchers.

Public Outreach Program

The commitment of the USG to seek the fullest possible accounting for missing service members from all conflicts is a national policy of the first priority.

That commitment is a promise to its citizens that the government will expend every effort in this humanitarian mission, and that its citizens will be kept informed on the progress. This has been the commitment of DPMO since its creation in 1993.

One aspect of the work to uphold the commitment is to ensure that all of the various constituencies in this issue (families, Congress, active duty military, veterans, general public, news media) have full and free access to the government's work. Therefore, a significant outreach effort carries that information directly to the media – national, international and local—and to veterans, their leadership and their organizations.

The Family Support Team

The Family Support Team exists to address family concerns with our Government's accounting efforts. Led by DPMO's Special Assistant for Family Support, the team is comprised of Defense Casualty Liaison Officers from each service. Together, the team works to foster open, clear and credible communications. To improve DPMO's overall credibility with the public, the Family Support Team uses fairness, dignity, and understanding as its guiding principles towards families. The Family Support Team's goal is to improve the dissemination of answers, the illumination of POW/MIA accounting facts, the effectiveness of

publications, and the timeliness of correspondence for families while providing the availability of direct access to government officials working POW/MIA accounting. In Family Support, the families always come first.

Family Updates

The Family Support Team coordinates "Family Updates" sponsored by DPMO to promote personal contact with family members of America's missing. DPMO conducts these meetings monthly in different geographical areas throughout the United States selected to provide direct accessibility and personal attention for the greatest number of family members. During these meetings family members are updated on the Government's accounting efforts for missing service members. Families are also afforded the opportunity to ask one-on-one questions of government officials. In 1995, the first year of the update program, DPMO conducted 4 updates. Approximately 115 family members attended these meetings. Since then, the numbers have increased dramatically. In 1999, 794 family members attend ten "Family Updates". In the year 2000, we are projecting similar numbers. Since 1995, over 2,500 family members have participated in the Update program. In October of 2000, the family support team launched a pilot education program for families new to the POW/MIA issue.

Expanded Family Updates

The Family update program has been a resounding success. Since the Update outreach effort primarily focuses on major metropolitan areas, there are a few geographical areas across the country not included in the program schedule. The objective of the Expanded Family Update program is to provide information concerning ongoing US government accounting efforts to those families in sparsely populated areas currently not reached by the Family Update program. In November 1999, after extensive research and preparation, a DPMO team met with 14 family members representing 7 cases in Bangor, Maine.

H. Annual Government Briefings

DPMO actively promotes, coordinates and conducts briefings tailored to family organizations, interested in the US Government's accounting efforts. Each year, DPMO provides briefings to the families of missing service members from Vietnam, Korea, and the Cold War. Since 1993, over 2,000 family members have attended these briefings.

Correspondence/Inquiries

The Family Support Team coordinates input from DPMO's directorates, DoD Supporting Organizations, and source documents in response to family inquiries. They draft and send correspondence to families, the Services, and the State Department to ensure accuracy and timeliness. In 1999, the family support team responded to 469 family member inquiries. Thus far in the year 2000, family support has answered 417 separate inquiries.