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EXERCISE DISPLAY SELECT



AFTER ACTION REPORT

FEBRUARY 1996

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DISPLAY SELECT was a "no-fault/no-inspection" field training exercise (FTX) involving selected Federal, State, and local government agencies held at two locations in the Commonwealth of Virginia from September 18 through September 27, 1995. It was designed to exercise, and evaluate plans, policies, procedures, and systems used by Federal, State, and local responders to a nuclear weapon accident.

Planning for the exercise began with the Initial Planning Conference in June 1994 and ended with the Final Planning Conference in August of 1995. Twelve functional working groups with the charter to "develop, design, conduct, and evaluate the exercise from unique perspectives," were used to accomplish the detailed planning for the exercise. The groups met on an "as-needed" basis between the formally scheduled conferences and developed specific objectives designed to support achievement of the exercise's overall objectives. FEMA was a member of the Policy Working Group which also had representation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Joint Staff (JS), the Department of the Navy (DON), the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The major participants in Exercise DISPLAY SELECT included the Headquarters and field elements from DOD, DOE, FEMA, and other Federal departments and agencies including the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Commonwealth of Virginia and two local jurisdictions, James City County and York County, completed the list of participants.

There were three different levels of objectives for the exercise. The first consisted of overall objectives aimed mainly at exercising and evaluating the full range of Federal, State, and local government plans, policies, procedures and interfaces as they applied to a nuclear weapon accident. The second level of objectives were those developed by the working groups. These objectives were more specific and included three that were focused toward FEMA. The first objective was to "exercise and evaluate the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan." The second was to "exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of FEMA in response to a nuclear weapons accident." The last of the objectives focused on FEMA was to "exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer." The third level of objectives consisted of those developed by each of the participating organizations. FEMA's objectives were to:

- Explore/establish the joint command and control structure resulting from the concurrent use of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).

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- Validate the use of the FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex in a nuclear weapons accident response.
- Explore/establish the linkages between DOD offsite funding and the Stafford Act and the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) funding mechanisms.

The exercise scenario was based on a simulated U.S. Navy nuclear weapon accident resulting in a radiological release that contaminated land and water areas surrounding the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Cheatham Annex and the Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Yorktown, Virginia. The exercise began on September 18 when a civilian aircraft crashed into a pier at the FISC upon which two conventional and two nuclear tomahawk missiles were positioned with some demolition materials. The explosion and fire that followed the crash resulted in the detonation of one conventional missile which, in turn, destroyed one nuclear weapon and damaged the other. The smoke plume from the fire, containing radiological contamination, drifted generally southwest from the accident site and created significant problems for portions of the Virginia Peninsula. Active play continued through September 22, 1995. An administrative break was taken over the weekend (September 23-24) and active play resumed on Monday, September 25, for three more days.

DISPLAY SELECT can be characterized as an exercise that featured several significant "firsts." It was the first full-field nuclear weapons exercise in over a decade that had 24-hour-a-day play; the first nuclear accident exercise to include full mortuary affairs play; the first exercise of its type to play the FRP/FRERP interface with Federal and State elements; and the first to use an emergency rather than a major disaster declaration to initiate Federal consequence management activities. DISPLAY SELECT was also the first exercise of its type to eliminate the concept of a phased response to the accident (separating the technical response to the accident from the non-technical response to the consequences of it).

The results of the exercise highlighted the fact that while the command and control structures, roles, and relationships established between responding organizations under the FRP and the FRERP when only one or the other plan is being used were generally understood, there was confusion when both plans were in effect. This was evident during the exercise when a Presidential Emergency Declaration was issued and the question of who was in charge was raised by the senior players from the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). Confusion regarding this issue can be explained, in part, by the fact that several of the LFA senior players were new to their real-world assignments and had no experience, actual or exercise, in dealing with either plan. Adding to the confusion was the perception that the FRP was implemented by the declaration when in fact portions of it had been in effect shortly after FEMA Region III had been notified of the incident. What the LFA senior players did know was that following the declaration, a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) would be appointed. It was the role of this individual that was not understood. It should be noted that there were other exercise participants familiar with each of the plans who appeared to be equally confused. The relationship between the two plans might

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have been clarified by the draft Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP which was to have been validated in the exercise; however, due to real world operational requirements, the draft Annex had not been finalized and could not be fully validated.

Issues regarding funding (FEMA Exercise Objective 3) surfaced on the first day of the exercise when legal representatives of the LFA met with the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) and members of his staff to discuss various concerns the LFA had about compensation to the Commonwealth for expenses incurred in its response to the accident and to individuals affected by the incident. The decision by the exercise President (based on the recommendation of the exercise FEMA Director) to initially grant an emergency declaration rather than a major disaster declaration raised immediate questions regarding funding under the Stafford Act and how it differed from one declaration to the other. A briefing explaining the differences and describing other funding measures under the Stafford Act was provided to senior players and other exercise participants. Discussions of funding issues which continued throughout the remainder of the exercise revealed some interesting findings. For example, it was determined that apparently, there is no statutory authority that provides a mechanism to reimburse businesses for revenues lost as a result of customers being unable to patronize them because of a radiological emergency. The number of legal issues that arose, in addition to those dealing with funding, were enough to result in a recommendation that a post-exercise Legal Working Group be formed to further discuss them. Membership would be expected to include legal representatives from the major organizations participating in the exercise, DOD, FEMA, DOE, EPA, and others as appropriate.

Exercise DISPLAY SELECT provided FEMA an opportunity to gain insights into the potential issues that could arise in a situation in which there was concurrent use of the FRP and FRERP and reinforced the recognized need for finalization and publication of the Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP. The exercise also demonstrated the fact that there is a lack of understanding of the differences between a Presidential Emergency Declaration and a Major Disaster Declaration and the type(s) of situation where one would be preferable over the other. While there was frustration on the part of some of the members of the Disaster Field Office (DFO) over the low level of activity they experienced during the exercise, most participants agreed that it was a good learning experience and it provided them with some valuable insights into what could be expected in this type of radiological emergency.

The exercise provided FEMA with a higher degree of visibility than it had in DIAGRAM JUMP, the nuclear weapon accident exercise held in 1994. It was evident that there is recognition of the role the Agency has to play in these types of incidents and FEMA should take advantage of that fact by continuing to participate as fully as possible (within the bounds of real-world operational requirements) in these types of exercises.

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EXERCISE DISPLAY SELECT AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. PURPOSE

This report provides a record of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) participation in Exercise DISPLAY SELECT, an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-directed, Joint Staff (JS)-coordinated, Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)-sponsored field training exercise (FTX).

2. GENERAL

DISPLAY SELECT was an FTX involving selected Federal, State, and local government agencies held in the Commonwealth of Virginia from September 18 through September 27, 1995. It was designed to exercise and evaluate plans, policies, procedures, and systems used by Federal, State, and local responders to an accident involving nuclear weapons. Exercise events were designed to focus on the interaction between various command and control systems (military and civilian) and organizations that have responsibility for different portions of the response to a nuclear weapon accident. DISPLAY SELECT was a "no-fault/no-inspection" exercise. There will be no formal evaluation of the exercise by the sponsor, DNA; however, the Agency will prepare an After Action Report.

3. EXERCISE PLANNING

The planning for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT was accomplished through the use of twelve working groups, each with the general charter to "develop, design, conduct, and evaluate the exercise from unique perspectives." The groups met on an "as-needed" basis throughout the planning cycle (generally between the formally scheduled conferences) and developed specific objectives that supported those set for the overall exercise. A leader for each working group was chosen based on that individuals' experience and rank after consulting with the primary exercise planners. The working groups were as follows:

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| a. Scenario | g. Protocol |
| b. Weapons | h. Public Affairs |
| c. Hazards | i. Policy |
| d. Legal | j. Site Restoration |
| e. Communications | k. Medical |
| f. Logistics | l. Plans |

FEMA, represented by Mr. Eugene Richard (Headquarters, FEMA) and Mr. Joseph Zagone (FEMA Region III), was a member of the Policy Working Group. The group was charged with the responsibility to develop Washington and Major Command (MACOM)-level exercise play and to coordinate real-world policy discussion involving the release of information, weapon usage, and scenario problems. COL Clif Ripperger, Office of the Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for Policy Support/Emergency Planning (ODTUSD (P) PS/EP)

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chaired the working group whose other members represented Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) functions of Public Affairs and Legal, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Joint Staff (JS), Department of the Navy (DON), United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Seven formal conferences were held to accomplish the planning for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT. The Initial Planning Conference took place in June of 1994 and was followed by a Scenario Development and Site Survey Conference in September 1994. The next meeting was the Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) Conference in December 1994 and a Site Restoration Working Group (SRWG) Conference in January 1995. A MSEL Review Conference was held in April 1995 followed in June of that year by a Logistics Support Conference. The Final Planning Conference occurred in August 1995. Working Group Chairs provided progress reports at each conference and action items were identified, discussed, and if necessary, assigned to a specific organization for resolution.

4. EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Major organizations participating in the exercise included the Headquarters and field elements from the Department of Defense (DOD), DOE, FEMA, and other Federal departments and agencies including the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Individual participants from Headquarters, FEMA were as follows:

-- Mr. Joseph H. Flynn, legal counsel/advisor to the Senior FEMA Official (SFO)/Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO);

-- Ms. Cynthia S. Mazur, the exercise FEMA Director;

-- Mr. Douglas Scott, liaison to the OSD Crisis Coordination Center (CCC);

-- Messrs. Donald Benedict and Robinson Stevens, FEMA Controllers at the exercise site;

-- Mr. Daniel Wilcox, FEMA Controller/Player at the exercise site; and

-- Mr. Eugene Richard, Senior FEMA Controller at the exercise site.

FEMA Region III personnel participating in the exercise included:

-- Mr. Robert Gunter, SFO and FCO;

-- Messrs. Woodrow Brzozowski, Frank DeGregory*, Ross Fredenburg, David Hall, John Henryson, Ed Hummel*, Ray Roman*, Henry Skoczalek, Degge Thomas, Nelson Wiles*, Ms. Theresa Ciccarello* and Ms. Eileen Taylor*; all members of the Advance Element of the Emergency Response Team (ERT-A)/ERT/Disaster Field Office (DFO);

-- Mr. Joseph N. Zagone, Senior FEMA Regional Controller; and

-- Ms. Rita Calvin and Ms. Janet Lamb, visitors to the exercise.

In addition to the personnel from FEMA Region III, Mr. Tim McCoy from FEMA Region I attended the exercise as an observer.

* (performed duties in support of ESF 5)

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The following non-FEMA personnel participated as members of the ERT/DFO:

- Mr. Don Deuterrman, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Ms. Julie Burns, USCG, and Mr. Warren Mechan, FAA -- Emergency Support Function (ESF) 1;
- LTC Francis Cheng, National Communications System /Individual Mobilization Augmentee (NCS/IMA) and Mr. Paul Nestel, NCS Resource Management/General Services Administration (NCSRM/GSA) -- ESF 2;
- Mr. John Baxter, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Mr. Benny Hom, USACE -- ESF 3;
- Mr. John Figler, Public Health Service (PHS) -- ESF 8;
- Mr. Walter Lee, EPA and Mr. Bill Belanger, EPA -- ESF 11;
- Mr. John Nagy, USDA -- ESF 11; and
- Ms. Kathy Gant, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, who served as the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (FRMAC) liaison to the ERT-A/DFO:

5. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

There were three different levels of objectives for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT. The first level consisted of the eleven overall objectives listed below:

- Exercise and evaluate Federal, State and local government plans, policies, procedures and interfaces as they apply to a nuclear weapon accident.
- Exercise and evaluate public affairs plans, policies, and procedures in accomplishing an effective, responsive, and coordinated public affairs effort at the national, State and local levels.
- Exercise and evaluate command, control and communications plans, policies and procedures among the military, Federal, State and local civil government response elements and between the accident site, the various local counties and municipalities, the Commonwealth of Virginia and Washington, D.C. command centers.
- Exercise and evaluate legal policies and procedures for an effective and comprehensive legal affairs program.
- Exercise and evaluate response measures taken to accomplish timely initial accident notification, verification and follow-on civil and military reporting.
- Exercise and evaluate the notification, activation, deployment, integration and use of specialized response forces.
- Exercise and evaluate the coordination and approval process required for appropriate authorities to confirm the involvement of nuclear weapons.
- Exercise and evaluate the initial site restoration strategy through an interactive process between military, Federal, State and local government officials.
- Exercise and evaluate the full range of weapon recovery operations, including integration of U.S. military forces and local civil government emergency responders. This will further facilitate the exchange of information in developing and approving future weapon recovery plans, policies and procedures.

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- Exercise and evaluate the transfer of custody of the damaged nuclear weapon from DOD to DOE.
- Exercise and evaluate the transport of damaged nuclear weapons from the exercise to DOE Nevada Test Site (NTS).

Each of the working groups had specific exercise objectives, as well. Those applicable to the Policy Working Group, of which FEMA was a member, included:

- Exercise and evaluate the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).
- Exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of FEMA in response to a nuclear weapons accident.
- Exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer.
- Exercise and evaluate accident notification, verification and follow-on civil reporting.
- Exercise and evaluate Federal, State and local policies, procedures, and interfaces.
- Exercise and evaluate Washington-level interagency coordination of Federal policy direction and oversight.
- Exercise and evaluate national State, local and private sector policy and procedures.
- Exercise and evaluate the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) (ATSD(AE) in its role as the technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals and its relationship with the Office of the Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) for Policy Support (ODUSD(P)PS) responsible for emergency planning and policy regarding all aspects of consequence management and disaster response.
- Specifically, exercise and evaluate transfer of Joint Staff command and control of the initial DOD response effort to the appropriate Military Department or Unified Command.
- Exercise and evaluate the role of the Secretary of the Army, as DOD executive agent, for the military support to civil authorities (MSCA) in response to a nuclear weapon accident.
- Exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of the appropriate Military Departments and Services during a nuclear weapons accident.
- Specifically exercise and evaluate national-level command centers.
- Specifically exercise and evaluate accident notification and verification, and appropriate follow-on civil and military reporting.
- Exercise and evaluate the OSD/Crisis Coordination Center (CCC) in its role of supporting ATSD(AE) in the acquisition and dissemination of information about the accident.

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The FEMA-specific exercise objectives included the following:

- Explore/establish the joint command and control structure resulting from the concurrent use of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).
- Validate the use of the FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex in a nuclear weapons accident response.
- Explore/establish the linkages between DOD offsite funding and the Stafford Act and the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) funding mechanisms.

6. SCENARIO

The scenario for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT was based on a simulated USN nuclear weapon accident resulting in a radiological release that contaminated land and water areas surrounding the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Cheatham Annex and the Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Yorktown, Virginia. The exercise began at 0800 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (local) Monday, September 18, 1995, when an aircraft crashed into a pier on which two conventional and two nuclear tomahawk missiles were positioned along with some demolition materials. The ensuing explosion and fire caused one conventional missile to detonate, destroying one nuclear weapon and damaging another. The resultant smoke plume, containing radiological contamination, drifted generally southwest of the accident site creating significant problems for portions of the Virginia Peninsula.

7. EXERCISE ARTIFICIALITIES

Exercise planners recognized that certain artificialities and constraints, while detracting from the overall realism of the exercise, were necessary to facilitate accomplishment of the exercise objectives. The artificialities and constraints included the following:

- Some personnel were required to act as both controllers and players.
- Surrogates played in place of some key decision makers. The surrogates were, in most instances, junior to the principals they were representing.
- Although the exercise was played in near-real time, some events required time jumps or were accelerated to meet exercise objectives.
- The exercise scenario required a high degree of artificiality, in regard to the levels of contamination released, to fully energize the assets of Federal, State and local participants.
- Artificial data was created by the Hazards personnel to facilitate consequence management play during the final three days of the exercise.

8. CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE

Active play for the exercise was scheduled for a period of eight days. The first five days, September 18-22, focused on the response to the simulated accident at FISC Cheatham Annex.

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The last three days, September 25-27, dealt mainly with on- and off-base site restoration issues. There was an administrative break in active play over the weekend of September 23-24. When play resumed on Monday, September 25, controllers provided a short briefing to players informing them of the general level of play for the last three days, reminding them that play picked up where it ended on the preceding Friday, and alerting them to the fact that the hazards plots and other data had been artificially updated to assist in restoration play. Two "Hot Washes" were held in the exercise. The first occurred on Friday, September 22, and focused mainly on observations regarding the response to the accident. The second, held on Friday, September 27, provided players and controllers the opportunity to discuss restoration activity observations and share their overall impressions of the exercise.

9. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE EXERCISE

The DISPLAY SELECT scenario and the play that it generated were generally sufficient to provide the opportunity for the majority of participating organizations and agencies to evaluate most of the general and specific exercise objectives. Technical elements and response personnel from DOD and DOE and emergency responders from the Commonwealth of Virginia were provided a situation in which procedures for interaction between military and civilian command and control elements could be examined and policy, procedure and system deficiencies could be identified. The scenario also provided for the exercise of public affairs plans, policies and procedures as they related to a nuclear weapon accident and legal policies and procedures needed for a comprehensive and effective legal affairs program. The robustness of consequence management play in the exercise was less than optimal, due mainly to the levels of contamination that were portrayed in the scenario.

10. EVALUATION OF THE FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

The FEMA objectives for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT were developed to focus on three areas of interest; 1) the command and control structure that would result when the FRP and the FRERP were used concurrently; 2) the validity of the draft FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex; and 3) funding questions regarding the use of various legislative authorities to compensate off-site victims of the accident.

The FEMA MSEL and supporting implementers were designed to create a situation in which the FRP would be implemented and the SFO would transition to an FCO. Changes noted in the command and control structure and relationships when these events occurred were to be documented. Validation of the draft Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP was closely related to the first objective. It was expected that as Presidential declarations occurred, there would be subtle changes in the command and control structure and corresponding relationships between responding agencies and designated officials. Unfortunately, this objective could not be fully achieved due to real world operational requirements that precluded finalization of the draft Annex for the exercise. There was a significant amount of exercise play in the legal area, much of which concerned funding issues and the identification and use of various authorities to provide different types of compensation to the victims of the consequences of the nuclear weapon accident.

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There was a recurring problem that surfaced during Exercise DISPLAY SELECT which influenced the level of play at the Headquarters. During the planning for the exercise, arrangements had been made for certain staff personnel to act as members of an Emergency Support Team (EST) Response Cell, serve as the exercise FEMA Director, and to participate as players at the exercise site. Due to real world operational requirements, only one of the predesignated personnel was able to participate as planned. While last minute substitutes (all of whom performed their roles very well) were found for some of the positions required, overall FEMA involvement in the exercise was less than optimal. In this regard, consideration should be given to identifying and preparing at least two alternates for any key exercise position the Agency plans to play.

FEMA had three exercise objectives for DISPLAY SELECT. A discussion and subjective evaluation of each of these objectives follow:

Objective 1: Explore/establish the joint command and control structure resulting from the concurrent use of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).

Discussion: The focus of this objective was to identify the command and control structure that was initially established by the LFA (in this case, the U.S. Navy) to respond to the nuclear weapon accident in concert with other DOD, Federal, State and local government organizations and agencies under the broad umbrella of the FRERP. Then, when an emergency or major disaster declaration was made by the President and it was clear that the FRP was implemented, to note the manner in which the structure and relationships changed, if at all. The initial command and control structure established by the LFA when the accident occurred, was generally the same as that outlined in the FRERP and the draft Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP. A Joint Operations Center (JOC) was activated, under the operational control of the Onscene Commander (OSC), containing the LFA staff and various liaison personnel from other agencies and activities involved in the response. In addition to the JOC, two other elements were established; a Joint Information Center (JIC), under the operational control of the LFA Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and the DOE Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The Regional Operations Center (ROC), the ERT-A headed by the SFO and the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) under the control of the Director of Operations, Virginia Department of Emergency Services (DES) completed the major elements of the command and control structure established to manage and direct the initial response to the accident.

At this point in the exercise the JOC was serving as the focal point for crisis management by directing and managing on-site activities, establishing requirements and priorities with the Commonwealth, and coordinating the overall technical response to the accident. The ERT-A was coordinating with the Commonwealth, through the Regional State Liaison Officer, to determine what assistance and non-technical, offsite resource support was needed based on requirements that were being identified, priorities, and projected actions to protect the population

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from the effects of the radiological contamination. In addition, the SFO and his Legal Advisor were involved in discussions with the representatives from the LFA's Legal Element regarding funding issues expected to arise as a result of the accident and probable offsite contamination. The SFO and members of his staff were also reviewing the request made by the exercise Governor for a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration.

The FRMAC, established by DOE at the request of the Commonwealth, was coordinating and assisting in radiological monitoring and assessment activities with Federal, Commonwealth and local agencies. The Advisory Team on Environment, Food, and Health was formed and collocated with the FRMAC.

Coordination of public information activities was accomplished through the JIC and under the operational control of the Navy Public Affairs Officer (PAO). Public affairs personnel from other Federal Departments and agencies as well as the Commonwealth were provided the opportunity to participate as members of the Center.

On the second day of the exercise, the exercise President, based on the recommendation of the SFO, Regional Director, and the exercise FEMA Director, granted an emergency rather than the major disaster declaration that had been requested by the Commonwealth. At this point in the exercise, the Commonwealth could not provide specific emergency requirements that were not being met, nor provide information regarding assistance programs that were needed. In addition, the LFA appeared to be meeting the emergency needs that had been identified. When the emergency declaration was made there was confusion on the part of the LFA and some other players as to the effect it had on the established command and control structure and if it was different than it would be if a major disaster declaration had been granted. It was recognized by the LFA that with the emergency declaration the FRP was implemented (although, in reality, portions of it were already in effect) and the SFO would transition to an FCO; however, the role of the FCO was not understood by the LFA and this led to the question of "who's in charge?" The confusion was evident in an OPREP-3 message from the Service Response Force (SRF) to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (192100Z Sep 95) which stated, "Presidential Declaration of Emergency issued at 1635 local. Face to face turnover with Mr. Bob Gunter (FEMA) as Lead Federal Agency at 192055Z Sep 95. Continuing base recovery actions." In a subsequent OPREP-3 message (192200Z Sep 95) the LFA issue was clarified by a remark which read, "..... DOD remains Lead Federal Agency. Senior FEMA Official has assumed duties as Federal Coordination [sic] Officer in support of SRF." Although the message seemed to demonstrate an understanding by the SRF Commander of the command and control structure and corresponding relationships when both the FRP and FRERP were in effect, this understanding was not evident on the part of all of the response personnel and elements in spite of the efforts by the FCO, his Chief of Staff, and Legal Advisor to clarify the issue. The subsequent Presidential Major Disaster Declaration on the third day of the exercise again raised the issue of who was in charge. Ultimately, the issue was settled through an arrangement in which the Navy remained the LFA for the technical radiological response to the accident and FEMA became the LFA for the offsite, non-technical, non-radiological response in support of the Commonwealth. This arrangement, described as "co-leads," appeared to satisfy senior players. There was no physical change in the command and control structure that had initially been established at the start of

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exercise (STARTEX).

Evaluation: The basic command and control structure that was established to guide the response to the nuclear weapon accident was essentially the same as that outlined in both the FRERP and the draft FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex. The structure appeared to be adequate to respond to the effects of the accident and the needs of the Commonwealth as they were defined during the exercise. It was evident however, that while the basic command and control structure and the concept of a single LFA under the FRERP was understood by the senior players at the exercise site, the effect of the emergency and major disaster declarations and FRP implementation was not. It was initially assumed that FEMA became the LFA under the FCO when the FRP and FRERP were both in effect and there was a lack of recognition regarding the division of responsibility for the technical versus non-technical and on-site versus offsite responses to the accident and its effects. The arrangement that was ultimately agreed to, that of "co-leads" between the Navy and the FCO, appeared to be acceptable and functional. It should be noted that the co-lead arrangement did not carry over to the operation of the JIC. The Navy, as LFA, maintained control of the JIC throughout the exercise. This situation probably resulted, in part, from the fact that because of real world operational requirements, there was no representation at the exercise site from the FEMA Headquarters Office of Emergency Information and Public Affairs. The effect that these operational requirements had on other aspects of FEMA play in the exercise is discussed later in this report.

Recommendation: Efforts should continue to finalize the draft Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP, coordinate, publish and disseminate it throughout the emergency response community. Based on the specific issue that was raised during this exercise, the question of who was in charge, consideration should be given to including in the Annex, a more detailed explanation of FCO and LFA responsibilities and how each relates to the other when the FRP and FRERP are both in effect.

Objective 2: Validate the use of the FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex in a nuclear weapons accident response.

Discussion: This objective was not fully achieved. Due to the demands of real world operational requirements, the draft Annex had not been finalized.

Evaluation: Although it was not fully validated during the exercise, it appears that the information contained in the draft Annex captures the essential nature of the relationship between the FRP and FRERP when both plans have been implemented in response to a peacetime radiological emergency. The draft does not however, specifically address an issue that surfaced during Exercise DISPLAY SELECT, the issue of who is in charge when the plans are operating concurrently (see the discussion for FEMA Objective 1, above).

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Recommendations:

- Every effort should be made to revise, coordinate with all appropriate departments and agencies and finalize the draft FRP Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex as soon as practicable.
- As noted in the recommendation for Objective 1, consideration should be given to including language in the Annex that addresses the issue of who is in charge in a situation where both the FRP and FRERP are operating concurrently.

Objective 3: Explore/establish the linkages between DOD offsite funding and the Stafford Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) funding mechanisms.

Discussion: Discussion of funding issues began on the first day of the exercise when legal representatives from the LFA met with the SFO and his Legal Advisor. The initial discussions focused on concerns of the Navy regarding authorities for individual compensation for persons affected in any manner by the accident. The LFA noted that although emergency needs were currently being met and that they would provide for individual compensation, funding problems could possibly arise depending on the extent of compensation required. There were also questions from the LFA regarding the manner in which the Commonwealth was going to be reimbursed for the costs incurred in its' response to the accident (the Commonwealth had already requested a non-specified Presidential Major Disaster Declaration; a request based, in part, on the desire of the Commonwealth to use the FEMA process for administering Individual Assistance even though the Navy had a process and authority that was timely and potentially more inclusive). The SFO, his Legal Advisor, the OSC and his legal personnel, and Commonwealth representatives met on the morning of the second day of the exercise to discuss both funding issues and the exercise Governor's major disaster declaration request. During the discussion, the Navy indicated that it was running low on funds for even short-term relief and expressed concern regarding funding of costs associated with site restoration, losses to citizens not covered under the Military Claims Act (MCA), emergency response costs, and costs associated with long-term commercial recovery. Regarding the major disaster declaration request, the SFO noted that it was the position of FEMA that an emergency declaration under the provision of Section 501 (b) of the Stafford Act was more appropriate at this time due to the fact that the accident had occurred on a Federal installation and had offsite radiological consequences. The emergency declaration would ensure that maximum Federal assistance would be available to respond to both Federal and Commonwealth requirements and provide time for the development of the data that was needed to substantiate the request for the Major Disaster Declaration. The Emergency Declaration was made on the second day of the exercise with emergency assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act being provided at 100 percent Federal funding. The subsequent Presidential Major Disaster Declaration on the morning of the third day of the exercise solved the problem of reimbursement to the Commonwealth for costs incurred during the response to the accident (one of the early funding concerns). In addition, the Navy agreed to provide for individual compensation.

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Another issue that surfaced during the ongoing funding discussions concerned reimbursing owners of businesses for lost revenue that had been experienced as a result of the accident. The issue was not resolved; however it was determined that there are currently no statutory authorities that provide for this type of reimbursement.

Temporary housing was another funding issue that was considered. As a result of the discussions, the Navy agreed to use its authority under the Military Claims Act since they had more discretion in providing payment and there did not have to be a finding of fault or negligence before money could be paid.

Regarding funding under CERCLA, there were no issues raised until the Site Restoration Working Group (SRWG) began working the long-term Site Restoration Plan during the latter part of the exercise. At that time, CERCLA was discussed more in regard to clean-up standards rather than use of the Act for funding purposes.

It should be noted that the Navy, in spite of early concerns regarding funding, received several taskings to fill requests from the Commonwealth under the major disaster declaration without reimbursement. In addition, the Navy (as the LFA) did not identify any requirements under the 501 (b) Emergency Declaration to support Federal operations.

Evaluation: There was vigorous play, beginning with the first day of the exercise, of a number of funding issues. Discussions that took place between the SFO and his Legal Advisor, LFA command and legal representatives, and at times, representatives from the Commonwealth revealed several interesting items. For example, there apparently is no statutory authority that provides the mechanism for reimbursement of business losses in a situation such as that portrayed in the exercise scenario. Also, it was obvious that the funding authorities contained in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (The Stafford Act) were not widely known or understood outside of FEMA (the FEMA Legal Advisor provided a presentation regarding FEMA authorities under the Stafford act to the OSC and his staff and to the SRWG). In addition, the differences between an emergency and major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act and the funding options available under each were equally not known nor understood.

Recommendations:

- Consideration should be given to forming a Federal level working group of legal representatives from DOD, FEMA, DOE, and the EPA (and others as appropriate) to discuss statutory/legislative shortfalls in funding authorities that were identified during Exercise DISPLAY SELECT and to recommend appropriate corrective action. DOD or DOE should be the lead agency in this effort.
- FEMA should take advantage of every opportunity to provide other Federal departments and agencies with basic guidance and information regarding the Stafford Act and the authorities it provides under emergency and major disaster declarations.

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11. FEMA-RELATED POLICY WORKING GROUP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

There were a total of fourteen exercise objectives established by the Exercise DISPLAY SELECT Policy Working Group. Three of the objectives were related to FEMA activities. A discussion of these three objectives follows.

Policy Group Exercise Objective 1. Exercise and Evaluate the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).

Discussion. Since the FEMA response to the nuclear weapon accident was accomplished under the structure of the FRP, that is the only plan that will be discussed here. The FEMA response to the nuclear weapon accident under the FRP began with the receipt of the Broken Arrow report from the National Emergency Coordination Center (NECC). An Emergency Support Team (EST) (in actuality, a response cell representing the EST) was activated at FEMA Headquarters, the FEMA Region III Regional Operations Center (ROC) was activated, and the ERT-A was alerted. The ERT-A, under the direction of the SFO, subsequently deployed to the incident site, and liaison officers were sent to the JOC and the Commonwealth Emergency Operations Center. Personnel from the ERT-A began coordinating with representatives from the Commonwealth's Emergency Response Element collocated in the same area at the incident site to determine the effects of the incident on off-site areas and to identify what Federal assistance the Commonwealth required. The SFO, his staff, and the Director, FEMA Region III began consideration of the Governor's request for a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration. A recommendation was subsequently made to the exercise FEMA Director that rather than a major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration under provision of Section 501 (b), of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was more appropriate for the current situation. That recommendation was made by the exercise FEMA Director to the exercise President and an Emergency Declaration was subsequently granted. At that time, the SFO was named as the FCO and the DFO, staffed by the ERT, became operational. On the third day of the exercise, a Major Disaster Declaration was granted by the exercise President. During the remainder of the exercise, the ESF representatives continued to coordinate with their Commonwealth counterparts to identify and support response and recovery requirements and the FCO, working with the LFA, coordinated the offsite, non-radiological consequence management activities including identification of long-term recovery requirements within the structure provided by the FRP. The one area in which the response of FEMA deviated from the structure of the FRP was the joint coordination of the public information function at the JIC. The LFA PAO maintained control of JIC during the entire exercise.

Evaluation: The structure provided by the FRP was adequate to guide the FEMA response to the nuclear weapon accident portrayed in the scenario for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT.

Recommendation: None.

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Policy Working Group Exercise Objective 2. Exercise and evaluate the role and responsibilities of FEMA in response to a nuclear weapons accident.

Discussion: The basic role that FEMA has in responding to a nuclear weapon accident is essentially the same as it is for any major disaster. The Agency is generally responsible for coordinating Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, and ensure public health and safety. In a radiological emergency such as that portrayed in the scenario for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT, FEMA is charged with the responsibility for coordinating the Federal response to the consequences of the incident on the population and the infrastructure located in the affected area (consequence management). The Federal response coordination that FEMA is charged with is specifically directed to the offsite non-radiological aspects of the incident. The Agency is also responsible for coordinating with the LFA in identifying long-term recovery requirements of the affected area and assisting, as required, in the development of plans to restore the site and other activities necessary to restore the area's economic viability. FEMA participants in the exercise and those individuals representing other Federal departments and agencies who served as ESF members all worked to fulfill the Agency's responsibilities cited above.

Evaluation: The roles and responsibilities of FEMA as outlined in the FRP and the FRERP are appropriate to the Agency's mission in dealing with the consequences of a radiological incident of the type portrayed in the Exercise DISPLAY SELECT scenario.

Recommendation: None.

Policy Working Group Exercise Objective 3. Exercise and evaluate the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer.

Discussion: The roles and responsibilities of the FCO are described in the FRP and the FRERP (in the case of an incident requiring FEMA's response to a radiological incident). Generally, the FCO who is usually appointed by the President when an emergency or major disaster is declared, is responsible for coordinating Federal activities in the declared area by working with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to identify State requirements and coordinating them with the ESFs. The FCO is also responsible for coordinating the offsite non-radiological response activities with the LFA OSC.

During Exercise DISPLAY SELECT the FCO roles and responsibilities were generally the same as those outlined above. In addition to working with the SCO to determine the Commonwealth's requirements for Federal assistance, the FCO worked closely with the LFA OSC on funding issues associated with the incident (see the discussion of FEMA Objective 3 for more information on funding issues). Due to circumstances that may have been unique to the exercise, the FCO also spent a significant amount of time "educating" senior LFA personnel as to the roles and responsibilities of FEMA in its response to a nuclear weapon accident and the roles and responsibilities of the FCO.

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Evaluation: The roles and responsibilities of the FCO set forth in the FRP and FRERP for a peacetime radiological emergency involving nuclear weapons appear to be adequate to ensure FEMA can perform its mission.

Recommendation: None.

12. COMMENTS OF FEMA PLAYERS AND CONTROLLERS

Mr. Bob Gunter, the senior player from FEMA Region III who participated in the exercise as the SFO and FCO, established a requirement for members of the DFO to provide input for a Section After Action Report. Forms were provided to players for this purpose and each Section Chief was responsible for ensuring that they were completed prior to individuals leaving the exercise site. Copies of the completed forms were provided to the FEMA Controllers. A summary of the comments is provided below with a discussion, where appropriate.

- Level of play for the DFO. There were several comments regarding the low level of play during the exercise for some members of the DFO. A number of different causes were cited ranging from the scenario to the lack of requests for assistance (RFAs) from the Commonwealth.

Discussion: Exercise planners recognized that there were artificialities in the scenario, particularly in the amount of radiation involved in the release and contamination levels resulting from it. Unfortunately, the level of contamination and the size of the affected area could not be raised and expanded without injecting an unreasonable amount of artificiality into the exercise. As a result, the Commonwealth was able to respond to most of the effects of the accident without a large amount of Federal assistance and many of the ESF representatives in the DFO did not, in fact, stay fully occupied during the exercise.

- An excessive amount of time was spent discussing legal issues with the LFA. Discussions between the SFO, his Chief of Staff, and Legal Advisor and representatives of the LFA began on the first day of the exercise. The main topics included funding, the effects of Presidential declarations (emergency and major disaster) and establishing/clarifying responsibility for various aspects of the response to the accident -- the "who's in charge" issue.

Discussion. The initiation of legal discussions by the LFA with the SFO (subsequently the FCO) and his staff of the first day of the exercise and the continuation of them throughout a large part of the exercise was somewhat unexpected. In retrospect, there were probably two factors that caused this situation. First, some of the senior LFA officials were new to their positions and the exercise provided an excellent learning environment and experience for them. Second, the DOD Controller was very aggressive in attempting to pursue issues that were of concern to the Department, issues that had a ripple effect on the FEMA players. While the discussions consumed a significant amount of the SFO/FCO and some of his staff's time, they did provide

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insights and information that was valuable in evaluating two of the FEMA-specific exercise objectives; i.e., to explore/establish the joint command and control structure resulting from the concurrent use of the FRP and FRERP and to explore and establish the linkages between DOD offsite funding and the Stafford Act and CERCLA. From an evaluation standpoint then, the discussions were important and did serve a specific purpose. The issue does raise an interesting question regarding the role that senior players should fill in an exercise, particularly a full-scale FTX. Should they be considered strictly as players or should they be players/trusted agents who could, among other things, assist in driving play toward specific exercise objectives? This is a question that should be discussed prior to the next major exercise in which FEMA is involved as a major participant.

- The physical layout of the DFO was inadequate in terms of size, furnishings, and floor layout.

Discussion. As is the case in most exercises, the facilities that are used and their basic layout is a product of certain variables such as the number of participating organizations and personnel, where the event is held, what structures are there, and the amount of funds that are available to provide for administrative and logistical support. Working within those parameters, exercise planners representing participating organizations developed basic utilization and support plans that were intended to maximize the use of available space and equipment and stay within overall funding limits. As a result, the environment in which the exercise was played was different than it would have been in a real world situation. It is also recognized that the administrative and logistical constraints added another degree of artificiality to the exercise by forcing collocation of organizations that might not occur in an actual situation. This, in turn, affected the way that relationships and coordination between some participating organizations were established and maintained.

- Participating organizations did not all play on the same schedule during the exercise. During Exercise DISPLAY SELECT, some organizations (or elements of organizations) played on a 24-hour-a-day basis while others played for only eight to 10 hours per day. In addition, not all organizations had the same functions represented during the entire eight days of the exercise.

Discussion. While it was not essential that all participants in the exercise conduct active play on a 24 hour-a-day basis or that all functions be represented for the entire exercise, the fact that there was not a consistency in the level or duration of play added another element of artificiality to the event. For example, some of the players and functions that were present for the first week of the exercise were not there during the second week. As a result, some of the issues that would have logically been raised during the latter portion of the exercise were not played or discussed. A case in point was the absence of a representative of the Commonwealth's Department of Social Services during the second week of the exercise precluding examination of the process of transitioning from feeding people in shelters to processing and delivering food stamp benefits

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and processing applications from eligible households in the affected area. Also, there was no agricultural representative from the Commonwealth after the first day of the exercise. Again, substantive issues that could have been addressed or discussed were not.

13. SUMMARY

Exercise DISPLAY SELECT, which had over 2000 participants representing 26 different organizations, featured several significant "firsts." It was the first full-field nuclear weapons accident exercise in a decade to feature 24-hour-a-day play; the first nuclear weapon accident exercise to include full mortuary affairs play; the first exercise of its type to play the FRP/FRERP interface with Federal and State elements represented and to use an emergency rather than a major disaster declaration to initiate the full-scale Federal consequence management activities; and it was the first exercise to eliminate the concept of a phased response to the accident, differentiating between the technical response to the accident and the non-technical response to the consequences of it.

From a FEMA standpoint, the last two items mentioned above, the FRP/FRERP interface and the cessation of the use of a phased response concept were among the most significant aspects of the exercise. It's clear that most people involved in emergency response operations understand the basic structure of the FRP and the general nature of the roles and responsibilities of organizations supporting the plan. Similarly, the basic structure of the FRERP and the roles and responsibilities of organizations supporting it are reasonably well understood within the community that normally deals with radiological emergencies. In Exercise DISPLAY SELECT however, it became abundantly clear that the nature of command and control relationships when both plans were active was not well understood. Some of the misunderstanding that was evident can be explained by the fact that there were senior U.S. Navy personnel playing who were newly assigned to their current positions and were not, in fact, very familiar with either the FRP or the FRERP. There also existed among other players, the longstanding misconception that when the FCO was appointed, the entire command and control structure changed and the FCO was "in charge." The exercise FCO, Mr. Bob Gunter, his Chief of Staff, Mr. Dave Hall, and Mr. Joseph Flynn, Office of the General Counsel, Headquarters, FEMA, acting as Legal Advisor to the FCO, all worked to clarify command and control roles and relationships during the exercise. The significant lesson learned in this case is that there is still a definite need to finalize the Radiological Emergencies Incident Annex to the FRP.

Funding issues were a major consideration during the exercise. In fact, the exercise FCO noted that an inordinate amount of his time and that of his Legal Advisor was spent in discussions of funding issues with LFA legal personnel. Although these meetings were time consuming, it appears that they were worthwhile and did provide an opportunity to educate players on funding under the Stafford Act and also served to highlight some deficiencies in legislation, particularly in the area of reimbursing owners of businesses for revenue losses as a result of the effects of a radiological emergency.

There were several observations from players regarding exercise design, scenario artificialities, and consistency of play among the organizations involved in the exercise. These observations will be provided to exercise planners for their consideration when developing future

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exercises of this type.

Due to the Agency's real world mission, the availability of personnel to participate in exercises is always questionable; Exercise DISPLAY SELECT was no exception. Several headquarters personnel who had been scheduled to participate in the exercise were unable to do so at the last minute due to requirements to support the response to Hurricane Marilyn. As a result, the level of play at FEMA Headquarters was less robust than planned, individuals who had been identified to act as the exercise FEMA Director were not available, and there were no personnel available from the Office of Emergency Information and Public Affairs to participate at the exercise site. While the headquarters level of play problem was solved to a certain extent by the formation of a response cell and the FEMA Region III Public Affairs Officer, Mr. Ross Fredenburg, filled in as the FEMA PAO representative at the exercise site, the unavailability of a person or persons to act as the exercise FEMA Director posed a major problem for Agency participation in the exercise. Fortunately, Ms. Cynthia Mazur, Program Law Division, Office of the General Counsel, agreed to fill that role even though she was not asked to do so until after the exercise had started and had not been previously briefed on what she was expected to do. Her willingness to participate in the exercise and actively play the role of the exercise FEMA Director significantly added to the value of FEMA's participation in the event.

In addition to Ms. Mazur, there were several other personnel from the Headquarters whose participation in the exercise was significant. These participants included Mr. Doug Scott from the Preparedness, Training and Exercises Directorate who served as the FEMA Liaison to the OSD CCC and Ms. Pauline Campbell and Ms. Peggy Miller from the Response and Recovery Directorate whose assistance with the procedures and formats for the Presidential declarations was invaluable.

The situation that arose regarding the sudden loss of personnel who had been expected to participate in an exercise is not a new one, particularly in regard to headquarters personnel. While it is obvious that operational requirements take precedence over those for exercise support, every effort should be made to provide support which has been planned. Consideration should be given to identifying at least three individuals, a primary and two alternates, to key positions that are to be played in an exercise and will be filled by an individual from FEMA Headquarters.

The FEMA objectives established for Exercise DISPLAY SELECT highlighted the fact that there is still confusion regarding the interface between the FRP and FRERP when both plans are in effect and that there is a wide range of funding issues that require further consideration. In addition, several good issues regarding exercise planning were identified by participants; issues which should be considered in future events of this type. There is recognition that FEMA is an essential component in the response to an incident such as that portrayed in the exercise scenario and the Agency should continue to take advantage of events of this type to further clarify and strengthen its role as lead for consequence management in all disasters.

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EXERCISE MIRAGE GOLD

AFTER-ACTION REPORT

MARCH 1995

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MIRAGE GOLD was a full field exercise (FFE) involving selected Federal and State organizations and agencies held in New Orleans, Louisiana, from October 16 through October 21, 1994. The exercise was the last of four events in the Mile Shakedown series and it was designed to provide an opportunity to assess the coordination, command and control, and other capabilities of participating organizations and agencies in their response to a malevolent act or acts involving nuclear materials within the United States. The three preceding events under Mile Shakedown, intended to establish the framework within which MIRAGE GOLD would be conducted and to provide exercise support data, included:

- MICA DIG, a symposium designed to identify issues expected to arise in MIRAGE GOLD and to prepare managers at the headquarters level to deal with them.
- An Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) for Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) personnel that provided personnel arrival data to be used in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.
- MILD COVER, a communications and information management exercise used to develop, set up, and test various communications and computer software systems which supported Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.

The major participants in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD included field elements from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOE, Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the State of Louisiana. Local level involvement in the exercise was limited to the FBI. All participants played from facilities located in Gretna, Louisiana. There was no headquarters play from Washington, D.C.; these elements were represented by a simulation cell at the exercise site.

Objectives for the exercise consisted of those applicable to all agencies (Interagency/General Objectives) and those that were agency-specific (Specific Objectives). In general, all of these objectives were oriented toward exercising and evaluating various plans, policies, procedures, including Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), and the interface between elements of the participating agencies. There was also interest in evaluating the transition from the law enforcement phase of the scenario to that of consequence management. FEMA's specific objectives included the following:

- Exercise and evaluate FEMA's on-scene response coordination functions for a malevolent nuclear threat with the FBI, DOD, DOE, and other agencies.
- Evaluate the interface between DOE, DOD, FBI, FEMA, and other Federal agencies at the local and national level as it pertains to the command and control,

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fact that the concept of consequence management and the responsibilities of FEMA, the State and local level jurisdictions as well as other Federal agencies are not fully understood. The initiatives that FEMA has taken such as linking all of the separate response plans for different types of disasters under the FRP making it a true "National Response Plan" should continue. The Agency should continue to participate in, and sponsor when appropriate, exercises similar to MIFAGE GOLD in order to familiarize other agencies and organization with consequence management -- what it means and what it entails. Actions should continue to finalize an MOU with the FBI which clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities of FEMA, the Regions, States, and local jurisdictions in dealing with and responding to domestic terrorist situations and events.

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- logistical support, public information, and State interface.
- Exercise the concepts and operations of a Disaster Field Office (DFO) and the Joint Operations Center (JOC) in this type of scenario, with the FBI as the lead agency.
- Evaluate the operation of a joint information system during a situation which begins as a law enforcement problem and evolves into a consequence management problem.

The exercise scenario centered on a domestic terrorist group, the Patriots for National Unity (PNU), plotting to assemble and use nuclear explosive devices in the United States. After the FBI was able to verify the group's intent and establish, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the probability of nuclear material in their possession, other agencies (DOD, DOE, and FEMA) were requested to assist in dealing with the problem. Subsequent exercise events, scripted and free play, focused on the procedures for tactical and technical operations conducted to resolve the situation and the interaction and exchange of information between various organizations at the national, regional, and local level.

The exercise began on October 16 with play continuing on a twenty-four hour a day basis until October 21, 1994. Generally, the exercise provided an excellent opportunity for participating agencies and organizations to evaluate their performance against the objectives, both general and specific. For FEMA, there were several points that became obvious early in the exercise. First, there was a lack of understanding by the lead agency (the FBI) regarding the concept of consequence management and how it would apply to the situation depicted in the exercise scenario. Second, there was an apparent belief by the FBI that tactical and technical operations to deal with the incident could be performed in relative isolation from local officials as well as the media. Third, the protection and safety of the population should efforts to locate and disable the nuclear device fail and a radiological release occur was not considered by the FBI. Fourth, there are a number of questions regarding the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) ranging from the relationship of the plans to one another to the conditions under which each would be implemented.

The results of Exercise MIRAGE GOLD highlight the fact that agencies and organizations that are not involved in providing support to the FRP, such as the FBI, do not appreciate the range of responsibility that FEMA has in any situation that could result in a threat to the safety and well being of the population and infrastructure of the country. The results also indicate that the concept of consequence management is not well understood, particularly as it applies in situations where a catastrophic disaster has not actually occurred. Last, but certainly of no lesser importance, the results of the exercise demonstrated a lack of understanding of, or appreciation for, State prerogatives in dealing with any type of threat in their domain.

Exercise MIRAGE GOLD did not produce any significant surprises, but rather reinforced the

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EXERCISE MIRAGE GOLD AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. **PURPOSE**

The purpose of this report is to provide a written record of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) participation in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD, an event jointly sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The document is intended to provide an audit trail of all phases of the exercise from planning through execution and an evaluation of the FEMA exercise objectives.

2. **GENERAL**

MIRAGE GOLD, a full field exercise (FFE) involving selected Federal, State, and local agencies was held in New Orleans, Louisiana, from October 16 through October 21, 1994. The exercise was designed to provide an opportunity to assess the coordination, command and control, and other capabilities of participating organizations and agencies in their response to a malevolent act or acts involving nuclear materials within the United States. It was the final event in a series of four that comprise the Mile Shakedown exercise series. Other exercises in the series included:

- MICA DIG, a symposium held in the Washington, D.C., area involving representatives from senior management levels of the major participating agencies. It was intended to prepare managers at the headquarters level to deal with the issues expected to arise in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.
- An Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) involving Department of Energy (DOE) personnel and contractors that participate in/support the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) program. The EDRE served to test the deployment readiness of the NEST and to provide phased personnel arrival data to be used in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.
- MILD COVER, a communications and information management exercise, held in New Orleans, Louisiana, at the MIRAGE GOLD exercise site. MILD COVER was used to develop, set up, and test various communications and computer software systems that were to be used to support Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.

3. **EXERCISE PLANNING**

The planning for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was accomplished under the overall Mile Shakedown planning structure which consisted of the following elements:

The Mile Shakedown Steering Committee, whose membership included the Exercise Director, Chief and Deputy Chief Planners, four operational group leaders, and representatives from each major participating organization (DOD, DOE, FBI, FEMA HQS, and FEMA Region

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VI). The Committee was responsible for ensuring that the overall planning effort remained on schedule and that agreed upon goals were met. Organizational members were responsible for ensuring that the planning staff properly addressed each organizational interest, objective, and goal during the planning process. In addition, they had authority to make decisions and commit their organizations as necessary to facilitate operational planning. The Mile Shakedown Steering Committee generally met on a monthly basis during the planning for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD.

The Mirage Gold Planning Group, headed by the Chief Planner, was responsible for all planning activities and the transition to the execution phase of the exercise. The Planning Group was supported by three subgroups; the Scenario Planning Group, the Operations Group, and the Exercise Support Working Group. The general responsibilities of each of these elements is discussed below.

The Scenario Planning Group was responsible for developing an effective and realistic scenario consistent with the exercise objectives and the development of a Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) for the exercise. It was also responsible for developing appropriate injects to ensure meaningful intelligence, media, tactical, and consequence management play in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. Representatives from each of the major participating organizations served as members of the Scenario Planning Group and met on a monthly basis during the planning phase.

The Operations Working Group was the element charged with planning all of the operational aspects of the exercise. It was also responsible for management of the scenario after the exercise began and the overall evaluation. Planning for Opposition Force (OPFOR), Controllers, Air/maritime operations, players procedures and orientation, and development of the Operations Plan (OPLAN) for the exercise were accomplished by this Working Group.

The Exercise Support Working Group was responsible for planning and providing support to all of the other planning groups as well as planning support to the players during the exercise. Support responsibilities included the development of a Control Staff Communications Plan, identifying logistical support needs, developing Safety and Security Plans for the exercise, developing an Operations Security (OPSEC) Plan, and planning safety training for exercise controllers and players.

The Washington, D.C. Planning Group was responsible for planning the MICA DIG table top exercise and the Washington, D.C. Simulation Cell (WDC SIMCELL) participation in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. For the WDC SIMCELL, the Planning Group identified the level of simulated play in the Washington, D.C. area and developed items for the MSEL (including implementers) to ensure meaningful and realistic responses for the simulated Headquarters of the various participating organizations.

The final two planning groups under the Mile Shakedown Steering Committee included the EDRE Planning Group and the MILD COVER Planning Group. The EDRE Planning Group was responsible for planning the DOE EDRE exercise, the results of which provided input to the planning for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. The MILD COVER Planning Group had the responsibility of ensuring the exercise (MILD COVER) was a valid and meaningful test of the communications systems, equipment, and personnel that were to support Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. FEMA representation to the Mile Shakedown Steering Committee, the Scenario

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Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was the fourth and final event in the MILE SHAKEDOWN series. It was held in October 1994, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Approximately 850 people from four major Federal agencies, the FBI, DOE, DOD, and FEMA participated in the exercise as players, controllers, and observers. Representatives from the State of Louisiana also participated. Gathering this number of people from various elements of four agencies to take part in the exercise provided an excellent forum for developing an understanding of and participation in the varied command and control relationships typical of a multi-agency operation.

The remainder of this attachment will deal with the problems noted during the exercise that have a direct or indirect effect on FEMA or are of interest to the Agency. It should be noted that several of the problems are either directly stated or implied in the Exercise MIRAGE GOLD AAR, the document to which this attachment is appended. In addition, the FEMA exercise objectives are stated in the AAR and will not be repeated here. In order to keep this document unclassified, the problems noted will not be quoted verbatim, but will be paraphrased. The problems noted, with recommended corrective action where provided, are as follows:

- **Problem:** The planning period for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was very lengthy (over a year in duration). As a result, planners changed as did many key issues.

Recommendation: A shorter planning period (one year or less) with senior agency planners providing exercise agreements, requirements, and guidance should be used to avoid large numbers of changes.

- **Problem:** Many of the same issues and problems are encountered by planners for major exercises.

Recommendation: A repository of planning documentation for similar exercises should be established. In addition, the same planners should be used for similar type exercises, where possible.

- **Problem:** Exercise objectives established early in the planning process were not considered as various decisions were made later in the process. As a result, activities that occurred during the exercise did not always support them.

Recommendation: Exercise objectives must be considered any time there are changes proposed or made in the scenario, operations, or logistics for the exercise.

- **Problem:** The Exercise Planning Guide was not presented for approval until July, 1993 although the objectives for the event were adopted in February, 1993.

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Working Group, and the Washington, D.C. Planning Group was provided by Mr. Eugene Richard (Headquarters, FEMA) and Mr. Leland Peyton (FEMA Region VI).

4. EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Major participants in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD included field elements from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Washington headquarters elements of these agencies were simulated by controllers located in the WDC SIMCELL at the exercise site. The Exercise Command Post (ECP), DOD/DOE Command Post (CP), Joint Operations Center (JOC)/FBI CP, FEMA CP (Consequence Management Cell [CM Cell]), and the Technical Operations Center (TOC) were located in various buildings at the Brown and Root Warehouse Complex, Engineer Road (Route 3017), Gretna, Louisiana. A Visitor's Center was also established in a portion of the building housing the CM Cell.

Personnel involved in the exercise from Headquarters, FEMA included:

-- Ms. Lisa Weldon who attended as an observer of the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) operations particularly as they related to the interface with the FBI Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC); and

-- Mr. Eugene Richard who served full-time as the Visitor's Operations Manager.

FEMA Region VI personnel participating in the exercise included:

-- Mr. R.L. "Buddy" Young, Mr. Jim McClanahan, and Mr. Jim LeGrotte, participating as SFOs;

-- Mr. Charles Barnes, Mr. Graham Nance, Mr. Dale Hoff, and Mr. Danny Rawson, all serving as members of the SFO's staff;

-- Mr. Leland Wilson, Ms. Reba Kestler, Mr. Bob Hendrix, Mr. John Roberts, and Mr. Larry Earp, functioning as members of the Consequence Management Cell;

-- Mr. Billy Penn, Mr. Kyle McCain, and Ms. Sherry Wainright participating as Public Affairs Officers and potential members of the Joint Information Center; and

-- Mr. Leland Peyton and Mr. Russ Bookser, serving as WDC SIMCELL and CM Cell Controllers, respectively.

In addition to these named personnel, FEMA Region VI partially activated the Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Denton, Texas, to support the deployed exercise participants. This activity was terminated when the actual disaster response to the flooding in Texas intervened.

Individuals participating from the State of Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness included:

-- Mr. Brett Kriger, playing as the Director of the State EOC; and

-- Messrs. Mike Brown and Art Jones, also representing the State EOC.

Contractor support to FEMA was provided by the following individuals from TITAN:

-- Messrs. Jack Crittenden and Paul Carlson, both of whom acted as

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Controllers in the WDC SIMCELL and CM Cell, respectively; and

— Mr. Dick Leadbetter who assisted Mr. Richard in the operation of the Visitor's Center.

It should be noted that the list of participants from FEMA Region VI changed on the first day of active exercise play for the Agency due to a real world disaster situation in the State of Texas and the necessity for several players, including the Regional Director to leave. The remaining personnel from the Region reorganized and continued their participation in the exercise.

5. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

Objectives for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD consisted of those applicable to all agencies (Interagency/General Objectives) and those detailed by individual agencies (Specific Objectives). The Interagency/General Objectives for the exercise were:

- Test the command and control systems in a full field deployment against existing Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- Given policy decisions from MICA DIG, test how well these decisions are incorporated in a field deployment.
- Evaluate the OPSEC, protection, and security of personnel and equipment against plans and procedures.
- Evaluate the transition of control of an investigative crisis management operation (assault and forensic activities) to nuclear evaluation activities (including consequence management) using plans/procedures as a basis for evaluation.
- After the deployment of the response elements, evaluate the FBI/Key agency intelligence functions, including a full Interagency Intelligence Cell (IIC) function against existing plans, procedures, and training.
- Given the results of MILD COVER, evaluate the procedures, hardware, and training for inter-agency use of the automated data system, which includes the Key Agency Activity (KA) Form, with the data system hardware (interface). This will also include the fusion of all pertinent KA information.
- Evaluate the policies, procedures, and training for public affairs functions, national media issues, and local media issues.
- Given that the resolution of a malevolent nuclear threat results in some concerns about the spread of radioactivity, evaluate the transition from the law enforcement phase to consequence management against existing policies and procedures.
- For a nuclear threat in the exercise host city, evaluate the interface between appropriate Federal response elements against existing plans, procedures, and training.

The FEMA exercise-specific objectives included the following:

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Recommendation: A study should be directed by key Nuclear Search Team (NEST) policy makers to determine the effect(s) of unilateral State and local decisions/actions on NEST operations. Once effects are determined, measures to successfully complete NEST missions should be identified.

Problem: Compartmentalization of any aspect of an exercise has the potential to disrupt the flow of play and lead to non-attainment of some exercise objectives, particularly if it involves the control function.

Recommendation: Exercise control functions must be as fully integrated as possible. If compartmentalization cannot be avoided, the control staff must completely understand how the functions are to play in the exercise, resources required, and the potential effect on overall exercise safety and security.

Problem: Controllers were provided software and a database to use in injecting, tracking, and commenting on events key to the exercise. It was noted that controllers did not take full advantage of the software.

Recommendation: The use of software needs to be stressed during controller training. Fields in the software should be reviewed to ensure adequacy to accept controller comments; if necessary, the fields should be modified.

Problem: The lead Federal agency (the FBI) conducted operations without communicating or coordinating adequately with other organizations. A true Joint Operations Center (JOC), integrating all organizations, was not established. As a result, information sharing and coordination was not completely effective.

Recommendation: Establishment of a JOC in an interagency operation is essential to good coordination and effective communication. There are MOUs, directives, and other documents in existence that provides for JOC establishment and operations; however, some agencies have no policy for inclusion in a JOC. In these cases, coordination and formal arrangements must be made with the FBI to develop such policy.

Problem: Due to operations security (OPSEC) concerns, there was confusion during the exercise regarding the amount of information that the FBI could share with FEMA to enable the Agency, State, and local authorities to proceed with consequence management planning.

Recommendation: National level guidance is needed to resolve policy issues

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- Exercise and evaluate FEMA's on-scene response coordination functions for a malevolent nuclear threat with the FBI, DOE, DOD, and other agencies.
- Evaluate the interface between DOE, DOD, FBI, FEMA, and other Federal agencies at the local and national level as it pertains to the command and control, logistical support, public information, and State interface.
- Exercise the concepts and operations of a Disaster Field Office (DFO) and Joint Operations Center (JOC) in this type of scenario, with the FBI as the lead agency.
- Evaluate the operation of a joint information system during a situation which begins as a law enforcement problem and evolves into a consequence management problem.

6. SCENARIO

The scenario for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was developed to provide for the following:

- Tactical play for the FBI Hostage Response and Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (HRT and SWAT);
- DOD tactical and technical (Explosive Ordnance Demolition [EOD]) play;
- DOE technical play for the NEST and the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (FRMAC); and
- FEMA play in conjunction with the FRMAC/NEST, State, and local officials operations in planning the consequence phase of the incident.

Active exercise play began with intelligence received from an FBI confidential informant that a domestic terrorist group, the Patriots for National Unity (PNU) was in the New Orleans area plotting to assemble and use nuclear explosive devices in the United States. Subsequent investigation by the Bureau, combined with intelligence inputs and results of searches conducted by various methods, resulted in the identification of several target areas where terrorists and improvised nuclear devices (INDs) were or could be located. These locations were in diverse locations in the greater New Orleans area and comprised actual operating points for the activities of operational forces. Notifications of the incident were made to appropriate agencies (i.e., DOE, DOD, and FEMA) and personnel and equipment were directed to deploy to the New Orleans area. Subsequent exercise events, scripted and free play, focused on the procedures for tactical and technical operations conducted to resolve the situation and the interaction and information exchange between various organizations at the national and local level.

7. GUIDANCE FOR EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Guidance for players in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was provided in a Player's Guide (Annex N, Exercise MIRAGE GOLD OPLAN) distributed to all participants prior to the exercise. This document contained a brief history of the New Orleans area, climatological data for the area, and general information regarding the exercise including:

- Purpose
- Security

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- **Problem:** The format for MSCA support requests differ between the FEMA/DCO Handbook and the operations plan (OPLAN). This could result in confusion as mission emphasis shifts from technical/tactical operations to the consequence management/emergency assistance mission.

Recommendation: The formats should be reconciled and standardized.

- **Problem:** Procedures separating technical and tactical responses to incidents such as those portrayed in the MIRAGE GOLD scenario from MSCA activities are lacking. As a result, funding and channels of authority are not totally clear.

Recommendation: Procedures should be developed to ensure that incident response and MSCA are separately processed, approved, and funded.

- **Problem:** The lack of uniformity noted in reporting to WDC by the various agencies involved in the exercise could lead to coordination problems at the Federal level.

Recommendation: Create a standardized situation report (SITREP) plan.

- **Problem:** NEST lacks a well-defined process for effective consequence management.

Recommendation: The NEST organization should include a joint team consisting of representatives from FBI, DOE, DOD, FRMAC, FEMA, State, and the potential LFA. The team should meet regularly to coordinate plans and actions for consequence management.

- **Problem:** The FBI did not institute an interagency Joint Information Center (JIC). As a result, agencies did not have an opportunity to coordinate media related issues.

Recommendation: FBI personnel should be made aware of the scope of their responsibilities as LFA and the fact that all other agencies depend on their leadership to accomplish their respective missions. LFA personnel must be sensitized to look beyond the immediate operational requirements toward overall coordination responsibilities.

- **Problem:** Senior agency officials from the FBI, DOD, FEMA, and in some cases DOE, without technical backgrounds may make flawed decisions because they don't understand the consequence of their decisions of technical matters.

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- Exercise MIRAGE GOLD Information
- Administrative Details
- Safety Plan

Objectives of the exercise were presented; however there was nothing regarding the lead-in scenario.

Individuals designated as Controller's for the event received the MIRAGE GOLD CONTROLLER HANDBOOK (Appendix 4, Annex B, MIRAGE GOLD OPLAN). This comprehensive document included information on:

- Control Philosophy and Operational Concepts
- Safety
- Security
- Exercise Command Post
- Exercise Control Center
- Scenario Control Requirements
- Control Procedures
- Control Operations
- Controller Training
- Tabs A-G providing information on the control staff organization, various facility layouts, a controller training schedule, and controller turnover (shift change) procedures.

FEMA participants were provided two additional publications to assist them in the exercise. The first document entitled, "EXERCISE MIRAGE GOLD SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR FEMA PLAYERS," provided the concept and objectives, background scenario and start of exercise (STARTEX) information, and a discussion of the concept of consequence management as it was envisioned to apply in the exercise.

The second publication, "EXERCISE MIRAGE GOLD SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR FEMA CONTROLLERS," contained the exercise concept, a listing of FEMA and State participants (both player and controllers), the FEMA exercise objectives, evaluation/data collection guidance and worksheets, an exercise time line, a chronological MSEL listing, and all of the FEMA MSEL implementers.

8. EXERCISE DOCUMENTATION

Documentation of the exercise was provided through the use of both photo and video recording teams as well as written means in the form of Lotus Notes, a commercial software package. This software enabled controllers to annotate the MSEL data base as implementers were injected and to document player's actions in response to them. In addition, controllers could make comments in the Lotus Notes data base as a primary means of coordinating control activities and documenting all player activities, not just those occurring in response to implementers.

9. CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE

Exercise MIRAGE GOLD began with three days of training for controller personnel.

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The training was designed to: (1) familiarize controllers with the operation of the communications and software used to control and document the exercise; and (2) to familiarize controllers with the contents of interagency agreements and the structures developed to implement them so that interagency and individual agency objectives could be tested. Controllers were also provided a tour of selected exercise target and search areas. This tour was valuable in providing controllers with first hand knowledge of the characteristics of these areas, the distances between them, and an appreciation of what the players would actually be doing at each location.

The exercise began on October 16, at 7:55 A.M. (160755 STARTEX) with twenty-four hour a day play continuing until the end of the exercise (ENDEX) on October 21, at 1:38 A.M. (210138). A "Hot Wash" was conducted at 10:00 A.M. on October 21, 1994. Senior representatives from each participating agency were provided the opportunity to comment on the exercise and provide their perceptions of success in attaining the exercise objectives, both interagency and agency-specific.

10. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE EXERCISE

The Exercise MIRAGE GOLD scenario provided an excellent opportunity for participating organizations and agencies to evaluate their performance against the majority of both general and agency-specific exercise objectives. Tactical and technical elements from the FBI and DOD were provided challenging and realistic situations in which command and control systems could be exercised and the transition from investigative to technical processes practiced and evaluated. The scenario provided for the examination of policies, procedures, and training for public affairs and media issues and the interaction between participating organizations to prepare for the transition from a primarily technical, law enforcement, and tactical problem to one of consequence management.

It appeared that investigative, technical, and tactical aspects of the exercise were generally conducted in accordance with accepted standards. Deficiencies were noted, however, in the interaction between the FBI (the Lead Federal Agency [LFA]), FEMA, and the State of Louisiana in the planning for and transition to the consequence management phase of the exercise. In addition, the procedures for responding to media inquiries and the sharing of information with organizations and agencies outside technical and tactical channels could be improved. The deficiencies that were noted as they relate to the FEMA objectives are discussed below.

11. EVALUATION OF THE FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

The FEMA objectives for Exercise MIRAGE GOLD were developed to provide an opportunity to examine the interaction between FEMA (represented by staff from FEMA Region VI), the State, and the other major participating organizations (DOD, DOE, and the FBI) that would usually be involved in responding to a domestic terrorist incident involving nuclear material, the type of situation portrayed in the scenario for this exercise. While there are plans for dealing with the effects of a release of radiological material (the Federal Response Plan [FRP]

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and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan [FRERP]), there are no formal FEMA plans, policies, procedures, or other guidance yet developed to address how the Agency would interact and coordinate with other departments and agencies (D/As) and organizations prior to a release.

The FEMA MSEL items and corresponding implementers were designed to create situations in which the SFO and his staff, individuals representing the Region VI ROC, representatives from the State of Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), and FEMA Headquarters could jointly plan, with the participants noted above, for the coordinated Federal response to the potential consequences of the incident on the at-risk population and infrastructure (consequence management). The manner in which the interface and coordination was accomplished was to be documented, evaluated, and made available to provide input for the development of formal documentation (e.g., plans, policies, procedures, and/or MOUs) that would guide the response to this type of incident.

As is the case with most free-play exercises, there was a difference between the anticipated actions and those that actually occurred in response to the scenario and implementers. For FEMA, these differences can be attributed to the following factors: (1) aggressive play by the State representative; (2) certain actions taken by the FBI SAC; (3) the loss of several key participants from Region VI during the initial hours of exercise play when the Region Director and several members of his staff were forced to leave due to real world disaster requirements (floods in Texas); and (4) the subsequent delay in beginning play due to the personnel departures. In addition to these factors, certain exercise artificialities affected the overall nature of play by the Agency. The influence these factors had on exercise play and the manner in which they affected each FEMA exercise objective is discussed below.

FEMA had five exercise objectives for MIRAGE GOLD. A discussion and subjective evaluation of each objective follows.

Objective 1: Exercise and evaluate FEMA's on-scene response coordination functions for a malevolent nuclear threat with the FBI, DOE, DOD, and other agencies.

Discussion: The focus of this objective was on the interaction between the SFO and the FBI SAC, the DOE Senior Official (ESO), and the Defense Senior Representative (DSR). As noted above, there is no specific FEMA plan, agreement, procedure, or other formal guidance detailing the relationships between the Agency and these organizations for the type of incident depicted in the exercise scenario, although a draft MOU with the FBI has been developed by FEMA. Exercise MIRAGE GOLD appeared to be an ideal forum in which these interactions could be observed and documented since it was expected that the JOC would be configured by the FBI SAC (the LFA) with all of the senior representatives from DOD, DOE, and FEMA collocated there on a full time basis. Under this arrangement, it was anticipated that the planning for consequence management and preparation for the transition to it would be accomplished in a joint, coordinated manner similar to that used for the technical and tactical

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activities. However, the FBI SAC opted to organize and operate the center in such a way that the SFO and other senior persons (except the ESO) were not collocated there but operated from their respective command posts (CPs). They were assembled in the JOC only when the SAC felt the situation warranted. As a result, the flow of information regarding the overall incident and the current situation was almost nonexistent, during the early stages of the exercise, outside of purely technical and tactical channels. For example, the initial requests by the State EOC to the JOC (the FBI SAC) for information regarding the nature of the situation met not only with negative results, but with questions regarding how the State even knew of the incident. This reluctance to provide information to the State may be attributable, in part, to the SAC or other members of the JOC not being completely familiar with the actions that had occurred early in the exercise scenario (FBI Headquarters requesting FEMA resources), the manner in which FEMA would make notifications of the incident down to the State level, and the concern that the FBI had with operational security. The FBI response also reflects an exercise artificiality; i.e., a conscious decision not to include local law enforcement personnel as exercise participants. Had these personnel played, there would have been no question that information regarding the incident was being passed from the local to the State level on a continuing basis and the State would not have been asking the FBI for information. In any event, this concern for operational security did much to limit the amount of information that was shared initially and set the stage for subsequent problems as the exercise progressed. The SAC did make a decision on October 18 (181230) to include the SFO in SAC briefings and as a participant in any news conferences that might be held.

In contrast to the situation experienced by FEMA and the State in dealing with the FBI, coordination with DOD (the DSR and his staff) and DOE (FRMAC representatives) proved to be very good. Individuals from these organizations, FEMA, and the State did move ahead with consequence management planning. There is no indication that the results of this planning was ever requested by the SAC nor are there any instances noted where the procedures for transitioning to the consequence management phase of the operation were discussed by the FBI with any other organization or agency. In short, the FBI stayed focused on the investigative and tactical aspects of the incident with little or no regard or interest in the actions that would have to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency as they related to consequence management.

Evaluation: Coordination between FEMA (the SFO), the State, DOD (the DSR), and the FRMAC was very good. The DSR and his staff understood the concept of consequence management and the role that the State, the FEMA Region, and FEMA Headquarters had to play in responding to the type of situation portrayed in the exercise scenario. This ease of coordination is attributable, at least in part, to the familiarity of DOE and DOD personnel with FEMA's functions and responsibilities under the FRP and the operational requirements established under Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). DOD, DOE, FEMA, and the State also displayed good coordination throughout the exercise. For example, DOD, FEMA, FRMAC, and State representatives met to jointly develop contingency plans for possible outcomes of the situation. The planning produced

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two lists containing anticipated State requests for assistance under two different scenarios. One list consisted of requests that could be anticipated in the event of spontaneous evacuation without any release of radiological materials (no detonation of nuclear device(s)). The other list dealt with requests that could be expected should a detonation occur.

Recommendation(s):

- The draft MOU between the FBI and FEMA for domestic terrorist incidents should be reviewed in light of the problems noted during Exercise MIRAGE GOLD, revised (if necessary), staffed among the participants, and finalized as quickly as possible.
- The initiative to link discrete disaster plans such as the FRERP, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, FBI Contingency Plans, and others under the FRP should continue on a priority basis.

Objective 2: Given a credible nuclear threat, evaluate FEMA's interaction with DOE, other Federal agencies, and with State officials during the implementation of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).

Discussion: The manner in which the scenario developed after this objective was written and the decision to focus on the tactical and technical aspects of locating and disabling the nuclear device(s) and apprehending the terrorists effectively precluded full evaluation of this objective. It was determined, during the latter portion of the exercise planning process, that there would be no release of radiological material even if disablement procedures were inappropriate. As a result, there was no expectation that the FRERP would be implemented unless such a decision was driven through player action.

Although the FRERP was not implemented, members of the FRMAC were at the incident location as part of the DOE element. These individuals coordinated closely with State and DOD personnel in the contingency support plan development process as noted in the discussion of Objective 1.

Regarding the FRP, there was a partial activation of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5, Information and Planning, scripted into the MSEL (items 180820, 180835, and 181755). The objectives of these implementers was to stimulate discussion with the personnel in the JOC regarding what the ESF could provide, to obtain updated information regarding the situation, and generate discussion regarding the possible activation of additional ESFs. When these implementers were injected there were no discussions or questions regarding them from any of the other participating organizations, nor was there any consideration given to activating additional ESFs.

Evaluation: There was no exercise play regarding the FRP other than scripted implementers. As a result, no evaluation of this portion of the objective can be made. Similarly, there was no implementation of the FRERP nor was there any consideration given to

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implementation during the exercise. As a result, no evaluation is provided. Although the exercise scenario did not provide a situation in which full implementation of the FRP or the FRERP would be widely considered, the absence of any questions regarding possible activation of additional ESFs or discussions regarding FRERP implementation may indicate a lack of familiarity with the plans, or the concept of consequence management planning as it applied to the scenario.

Recommendation: FEMA should continue to stress the concept of consequence management planning in any future exercises of this type where the scenario does not specifically provide a situation where the FRP and the FRERP would obviously be implemented. In addition, the Agency should continue to look for opportunities to present and discuss the concept at the national level.

Objective 3: Evaluate the interface between DOE, DOD, FBI, FEMA, and other Federal agencies at the local and national levels as it pertains to the command and control, logistical support, public information, and State interface.

Discussion: The intent of this objective was to further evaluate interactions between the major participating organizations and agencies as well as the State and local jurisdictions as they specifically pertained to command and control, logistical support, and public information. Although there was an implementer injected by FEMA (FEMA 180800) regarding availability of a Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Multi-Radio Van that could have resulted in actions relating to logistical support, the lack of any reaction by the FBI to it effectively ended further play. The interface between FEMA, DOD, and DOE was evident in the joint effort to identify support needs of the State should an evacuation be directed or occur on a spontaneous basis (the planning discussed under Objective 1).

The structure for command and control of technical and tactical forces appeared to be adequate to coordinate investigative and tactical activities by the FBI, the DOE search activities, and the DOD and DOE efforts related to disarming the IND. There were questions regarding command and control of DOD tactical forces; however they are outside the sphere of this report. The activities of FEMA, the FRMAC, the DSR, and the State which focused on support to the State were conducted outside of the technical and tactical command and control structure in an ad hoc, but coordinated manner.

The release of public information was the sole responsibility of the FBI as the LFA. Initially, there was a reluctance to release any information regarding the incident, not only to the public but to the State and FEMA. Repeated requests for information by the media were essentially stonewalled by the Bureau due its concern with operational security and the possible adverse effects the release of any information could have on the investigative, tactical, and technical processes. Free play activity by the State on October 18, in which the Governor of Louisiana called the President for information regarding the incident caused the FBI to begin addressing the problem of public information and also start sharing information with the State

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and FEMA. This activity by the State not only got the attention of the FBI, it also caused the Chief Controller to become concerned that this play was going to disrupt the exercise timeline and skew play away from the technical and tactical aspects of the event. As a result, further play regarding possible evacuation of the population was not pursued and consequence management planning was essentially accomplished between DOD, DOE, FEMA, and the State without FBI participation.

Evaluation: The interface between FEMA, DOD, DOE, and the State was generally good. The interface between FEMA, the State, and the FBI was initially nonexistent and it wasn't until the State aggressively elevated its play to the Presidential level that the FBI acknowledged the validity of State (and probably FEMA) involvement. It was obvious that consequence management planning was not an FBI item of interest.

Recommendation: The recommendations made for Objectives 1 and 2 apply to this objective as well.

Objective 4: Exercise the concepts and operations of a Disaster Field Office (DFO) and Joint Operations Center (JOC) in this type of scenario, with the FBI as the lead agency.

Discussion: As noted in the discussion of FEMA Objective 1, the FBI SAC opted to organize the JOC without the presence of senior representatives from DOD and FEMA. These individuals were subsequently invited to attend meetings and briefing, however. The obvious concern was with the investigative, tactical, and technical aspects of the situation and that's where the emphasis was placed. Since they weren't involved in the minute-by-minute operations of the JOC, the DSR, FRMAC, SFO, and State began a coordinated planning effort for consequence management; an effort that occurred almost outside of the exercise.

Based on the exercise scenario, a DFO structured as described in the FRP was not established. However an SFO (the Director, FEMA Region VI) and staff was sent to the incident site and a liaison person from the Region was sent to the State EOC (simulated within the CM Cell). The primary function of the SFO and staff was to serve as the coordinator for consequence management planning with the State and other Federal agencies at the national level.

Evaluation: This objective was not written for evaluation; however, it was apparent that the operation of the JOC with the FBI as the lead agency was oriented toward the investigative, tactical, and technical phases of the operation and little, if any, regard was given to consequence management.

Recommendation: The objective of exercising the concepts and operations of a JOC should continue to be included in future exercises with scenarios similar to that of MIRAGE GOLD. The same objectives should be played for a DFO, when appropriate.

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Objective 5: Evaluate the operation of a joint information system during a situation which begins as a law enforcement problem and evolves into a consequence management problem.

Discussion: This objective, more than any of the others, served to highlight the problems that exist at the operational level (i.e., the local level) in understanding the concept of consequence management and the planning that must be done to ensure the safety of the population in this type of scenario. The initial reluctance by the FBI SAC, functioning as the lead Federal agency for the incident, to provide information to any other agencies or organizations, except DOE, created an exercise media problem that continued to grow as the exercise progressed. Not only did it cause a media problem, it resulted in a situation where there was concern that the exercise timeline might be affected if aggressive play by the State continued; play that was driven by the State's inability to get information from the FBI and the developing feeling that they (the State) were being "stonewalled" regarding the actual status of the situation. While it may be argued that the amount of interest and information generated by the exercise media may have been unrealistic (the media would not have had as much information as they did based on the situation) the fact that the media must be dealt with is an inescapable fact, particularly in an environment where the electronic media can and will provide "instantaneous news." Consideration must also be given to the fact that if the media perceives that something is happening and it is unable to obtain information from a credible source, it may very well begin to speculate. This speculation may cause undue concern among the general public and result in a situation worse than that which would occur if less than complete information was provided by a credible source.

Evaluation: The operation of a joint information system under the conditions portrayed in the scenario of Exercise MIRAGE GOLD was unsatisfactory. It is considered unsatisfactory primarily due to the manner in which media and State requests for information were responded to and the fact that a Joint Information Center (JIC) was not formed until approximately mid-way through the exercise (182322).

Recommendation: The operation of a joint information system should be considered as a subject to be addressed in a tabletop exercise where the advantages and disadvantages of various information release policies can be thoroughly examined. The tabletop could also be used to further discuss the point in an ongoing operation when responsibility for the joint information system should shift from one agency to another.

12. SUMMARY

FEMA's opportunity to participate in Exercise MIRAGE GOLD proved to be a valuable experience in several respects. The exercise clearly demonstrated the lack of understanding that exists in agencies not familiar with the FRP regarding the concept of consequence management in an environment where a catastrophic emergency/event is possible but has not yet occurred. It

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was also evident that the channels of communication between the FBI and other organizations and agencies not directly involved in investigative, tactical, or technical operations in a domestic terrorist environment such as that portrayed in the exercise scenario would be difficult to establish. While the Bureau's reluctance to share information outside of these elements is understandable from an operations security standpoint, it is a matter that needs to be addressed at the headquarters level where mutually agreeable procedures can be developed that will enable the FBI and FEMA to do their respective jobs. The concept of State sovereignty and an appreciation of the actions that a governor might be expected to take to ensure the safety of the population of his State must be understood by representatives of Federal departments, agencies, and organizations who may be called upon to respond to a domestic terrorist situation. Questions that were asked and discussions that were held regarding the FRP and the FRRP applicability in this type of situation points out another problem that exists in structuring a Federal response to a domestic terrorist situation where nuclear materials may be involved. The issue of what plan is applicable at what point in time was discussed and no firm conclusions were reached. This is an issue that needs resolution.

On a positive note, the coordination between FEMA Region VI, the State, the DSR staff and the FRMAC representatives appeared to be very good. Planning for support of potential State requirements under several different possible scenarios proceeded in spite of the lack of information on the current situation. The relative ease with which this planning proceeded can be attributed in large part to the experience gained by emergency management planners from these organizations under the FRP and, in the case of DOD, planning procedures and relationships developed for their MSCA mission. Participation in exercises of the FRP obviously contributed to this base of experience.

Corrective actions that can be taken to address the problems noted during Exercise MIRAGE GOLD are generally straightforward. The concept of consequence management and the role that FEMA plays needs to be presented to senior management and planners of all departments and agencies. Not only must the concept be understood, but the manner in which planning is accomplished, the participants, and their information requirements must be recognized. Initiatives to finalize an MOU or other procedural agreement between FEMA and the FBI should continue and efforts to modify the FRP and make it *the single* Federal Response Plan (the National Response Plan) should be aggressively pursued. As these initiatives are carried forward, FEMA should continue to participate in appropriate nuclear accident/incident exercises.

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ATTACHMENT

EXTRACTS FROM

"MILE SHAKEDOWN: A SERIES OF EXERCISES AFTER ACTION REPORT," First Draft, January 28, 1995, Published by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada

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This attachment to the Exercise MIRAGE GOLD After Action Report (AAR) provides additional observations/problems noted by planners and participants from organizations and agencies other than FEMA. The source of these comments is the Department of Energy document, "MILE SHAKEDOWN: A SERIES OF EXERCISES AFTER ACTION REPORT," First Draft, January 28, 1995, published by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada. Due to the length of the report (116 pages), only those items of interest to FEMA have been selected for inclusion here.

In the Executive Summary of the report, MILE SHAKEDOWN is described as an inter-related series of four interagency exercises that were designed to evaluate the federal capabilities to deal with domestic nuclear terrorism. The first exercise in the series was MICA DIG, a seminar held in Washington, D.C. in December 1993, intended to highlight interagency policies that might affect plans and the execution of a field exercise (MIRAGE GOLD). Issues arising out of MICA DIG were to be brought to the attention of appropriate interagency councils for possible resolution prior to MIRAGE GOLD. The overall objectives for MICA DIG were:

- Examine existing federal agency policies concerning response to malevolent nuclear weapons emergencies.
- Familiarize participants with issues and options that may arise as the result of a malevolent nuclear weapons emergency.
- Provide a forum for open discussion of policies among senior decision makers.
- Facilitate senior officials from each agency meeting their counterparts from other key federal agencies.
- Identify issues that must be resolved before MIRAGE GOLD.

The second event in the series was a no-notice Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) in June 1994. While the primary objective of the EDRE was to exercise alert, notification, and deployment plans and procedures up to airlift readiness, there was a secondary objective to the exercise. This objective was to develop a realistic schedule for the arrival of various DOE assets in the exercise area since many of them (people and equipment) would be prepositioned prior to the exercise. FEMA was not a participant in this event.

In September 1994, the third event, a communications exercise was conducted. Exercise MILD COVER was used to establish the communications systems that were to be used during Exercise MIRAGE GOLD. Since FEMA was not responsible for providing any communications capabilities for the exercise (MIRAGE GOLD), the Agency was not involved in this event either.

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Recommendation: The Exercise Planning Guide should be produced immediately following adoption of the exercise objectives.

- **Problem:** Exercise support was planned and conducted by one agency. As a result, dissemination and collection of information was difficult and the ability to reach consensus on various issues was exacerbated.

Recommendation: A support planner should be provided by each agency involved in the exercise.

- **Problem:** Consequence Management was insufficiently exercised during MIRAGE GOLD.

Recommendation: Although MIRAGE GOLD was not seen as (and in fact was not) the proper exercise for examining consequence management and public affairs issues, it did point out the need to have an exercise with that focus. The next exercise of this type should deal mainly with consequence management and public affairs. FEMA, DOE, DOD, and the FBI should develop policies and procedures for early development of an exercise of this type.

- **Problem:** Security requirements precluded some FEMA and all State and local agencies from having access to detailed, technical aspects of exercise developments.

Recommendation: All planners should have security clearances appropriate to all circumstances of the exercise. FEMA should apply for appropriate clearances for their key personnel.

- **Problem:** Initial plans called for active play from Washington, D.C. (WDC). Late in the exercise planning cycle (approximately two months prior to the event) a decision was made to simulate WDC involvement through the use of a simulation cell.

Recommendation: If WDC HQ play is considered appropriate, high level commitment from agency heads should be obtained early in the planning cycle.

- **Problem:** State and local authorities are responsible for the health and safety of the local population, do not operate under the control of a specific Federal agency, and may take independent action to protect personnel when a credible threat is perceived.

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regarding the integration of FEMA and the State into operational aspects of incident response to ensure that consequence management is accomplished concurrently. In this regard, policies and procedures must be developed and formalized for sharing information, coordinating, and including local jurisdictions so that all agencies involved (FBI, DOE, and DOD) can plan and respond as an integrated team.

- **Problem:** Coordination of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) with other Federal agencies lacked completeness.

Recommendation: The orientation of the FRMAC should be as a Federal center, not a DOE center. It should be collocated with FEMA, the State, and potential LFA with liaison to the FBI, DOE, and DOD.

- **Problem:** Restrictions on funding and exercise of certain authorities precludes DOD from "leaning forward" to assist FEMA, State, and local jurisdictions in consequence management prior to the declaration of an emergency.

Recommendation: There was no recommendation made in the report.

- **Problem:** Meetings held by the Defense Senior Representative (DSR) dealing with consequence management were not always attended by a FEMA representative. As a result, there was some confusion in the overall planning effort.

Recommendation: Policies and procedures should be established to ensure early coordination between appropriate agencies planning for consequence management using the most current and complete information available on the current situation.

- **Problem:** The DSR's responsibility to direct Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is not clearly defined. The failure to provide definition could result in potential funding and exercise of authority problems.

Recommendation: Responsibility for MSCA planning, coordination, and implementation for DOD should remain as it is currently structured. When FEMA is notified of an incident, along with State and local jurisdictions, the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) on the DSR staff should provide the appropriate MSCA staff with all relevant information required to accomplish consequence management and the emergency assistance mission.

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This same problem is also found at the lower levels of the NEST.

Recommendation: A series of charts and short videos should be developed by the NEST to provide basic information to players about key technical problems, issues, and operations.

MIDWEST FLOOD CRITIQUE REPORT

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MIDWEST FLOOD CRITIQUE REPORT

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

SCOPE OF THE DISASTER

Beginning in the spring of 1993 and continuing throughout the summer, the Midwest experienced unprecedented rainfall and flooding. The upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers and their tributaries flooded farms and communities as never before. Massive Federal assistance was needed, and continues to be provided, to assist States, communities, and individuals as they recover from the Great Midwest Flood.

Although attention now focusses on long-term recovery and mitigation, life and property saving emergency response measures were crucial in the earlier stages of this disaster. FEMA and other Federal agencies supported floodfighting, supplied drinking water, and provided emergency sanitary and water purification facilities, offered temporary communications, and coordinated provision of temporary housing and food. These services helped communities minimize potential damage, reduce the risk of disease, and kept citizens sheltered and fed.

The U.S. government demonstrated a highly successful cooperative effort among 26 Federal agencies acting through the structure of the Federal Response Plan. Other Federal agencies, including the Small Business Administration, the Department of Agriculture, and the Army Corps of Engineers, provided and continue to provide a tremendous amount of assistance both under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and through their own authorities and programs.

As a result of the flooding, the President declared major disasters in nine States, thus making Federal assistance available under the Stafford Act. The initial declaration was made on June 11, for the State of Minnesota. As the flooding spread, declarations followed for Wisconsin (July 2), Missouri (July 9), Iowa (July 9), Illinois (July 9), South Dakota (July 19), Nebraska (July 19), Kansas (July 22), and North Dakota (July 26). Additional counties were added to the original declarations in all nine States through the summer and early fall as flooding continued, and as damage estimates became better known. In all, a total of 533 counties were declared eligible for assistance under the Stafford Act.

On August 12, the President signed a \$5 billion supplemental appropriation for 11 Federal agencies to provide funds for disaster relief in the stricken area. Current damage estimates under the Stafford Act alone are \$1.1 billion. To date, 53,000 applications have been received for assistance under the Individual and Family Grant Program, and 102,000 applications for Temporary Housing Assistance, with total cost estimates of \$81 million and \$210 million respectively. Estimated funding under the Public Assistance Program approaches \$490 million, with over 48,000 Damage Survey Reports from the nine States. On December 3,

Congress approved the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Assistance Act of 1993, which increased the funding available under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. The current estimate of funding under mitigation is \$129 million.

This multi-Region and multi-State disaster was very different from the quick and concentrated onslaught of Hurricane Andrew in south Florida. Though FEMA's response to the Midwest floods was widely acknowledged as greatly improved compared to Hurricane Andrew, this disaster nonetheless revealed additional challenges and problems. For example, permanent staff from Headquarters and all 10 FEMA Regions, and disaster reservist staff from across the country, were needed to fill key management and staff positions to support disaster operations. Such a widespread and long-term level of support posed new staffing issues that FEMA must address.

In an effort to learn from this experience, and to improve operations further--particularly in multi-Region and multi-State events -- FEMA hosted a Midwest Flood Critique. The purpose of this report is to capture the proceedings of plenary sessions of the critique.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE REPORT

From December 6-9, 1993, the Midwest Flood Critique was held in St. Louis. Critique participants included Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs), deputy FCOs, the individuals in charge of response operations (if different from the deputy FCOs), Individual Assistance Officers, Public Assistance Officers, Program Support Officers, Hazard Mitigation Officers, Public Affairs Officers, and key management staff of the Central Processing Office. Incoming Response and Recovery Chiefs also attended. In addition, each of the nine Midwest States was represented and a one day session was held to discuss their concerns.

The critique only highlighted various operational issues; it was not intended to be the *only* meeting on flood operations. Various program offices have held and will continue to hold meetings and workshops concerning specific issues. A separate evaluation of the Federal Response Plan will also be held with other agencies at the National level. Evaluations with other Federal agencies have been conducted in several Regions.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the critique were to (1) gather input from key State and Federal players; (2) discuss lessons learned and identify corrective actions to be taken; and (3) provide a timely opportunity for incoming Response and Recovery managers to learn from previous managers.

BACKGROUND

A memo was distributed from Richard Krimm, Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate, on October 1, 1993, requesting the submission from both Regional and Headquarters personnel of key issues arising during the Midwest flood operations. Once all issues were submitted, they were sorted to determine those of greatest common concern. The most prominent issues formed the basis for critique discussions. A series of meetings were then held with personnel from various Headquarters offices to determine the format and the main topics for the critique.

METHODOLOGY

The critique was structured around plenary discussion sessions on the broad issues identified prior to the critique. Notes of each day's sessions were taken, and a summary made available the next day. Although not summarized in this report, program areas held their own individual off-line sessions. This report is not intended to detail *all* of the concerns and discussions expressed at the critique -- only the highlights. Originally, breakout sessions were intended to be part of the critique, however, they were not formally included, due largely to a lack of time. It has been recommended that they be included in future critique agendas.

STATE PRESENTATIONS

The emergency management directors of the nine States involved in the disaster were invited to present their observations and lessons learned. Each State was allocated 20 minutes for a presentation and discussion. Presentations were thoughtful and well organized, helping to set the stage for internal FEMA discussions for the remainder of the critique. Emergency management is, after all, a partnership -- State insights are and will continue to be vital to the assessment process. A consolidation of their key concerns can be found in Appendix A.

FEDERAL PRESENTATIONS

Other Federal agencies are also important to response operations. Although presentations from the other Federal agencies involved in the Midwest flood operations were not included in the critique agenda due to time constraints, there will be other Headquarters and Regional meetings to evaluate operations from the perspective of the other Federal agencies.

In addition to plenary discussion sessions, presentations were made on the current Federal environment and ongoing activities. Special Assistant to the President Kathryn Way indicated that the President is pleased with James Lee Witt and FEMA. She also noted that the Presidential Steering Committee needs input from the people of the Midwest to ensure that policies developed in Washington are working as expected. Department of Agriculture representative Oleta Fitzgerald addressed the group concerning the Department's roles in long-term recovery. She noted that Agriculture Secretary Espy was given the lead for long-term recovery by the President because of the number of the extensive agricultural damage.

CRITIQUE EVALUATION

An evaluation form was circulated to all of the registered attendees in an attempt to gather information concerning participant expectations for and reactions to the Midwest Disaster Critique, including the appropriateness of the critique format and size. Although the response rate for the evaluation was very low, most respondents felt that: (1) the critique provided an opportunity to express their concerns; (2) the group was too large; and (3) disaster operations should be critiqued regularly but the format should be designed around smaller groups.

OVERARCHING CONCERNS

The following are major concerns and themes that repeatedly surfaced during the critique.

- Improved Customer Service. Disaster programs need to focus on the clients -- identifying who the clients of each program are, what their needs are, and how they can best be served. Providing customer service should be an Agency priority.
- Emphasis on and Integration of Mitigation. Mitigation needs to be emphasized as a continuous process existing independently of disaster declarations and as an integral part of all programs, including Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Response Programs.
- Training. Training and other performance supports are vital to ensure efficient and predictable disaster operations. Many people responsible for managing and supporting disaster operations at all levels were not adequately trained to perform their duties or to effectively use support resources available to them. In many instances, training and performance supports, such as standard operating procedures, were not available.
- Standards and Standardization. Disaster operations lack consistency from person to person, Region to Region, and disaster to disaster -- due to the lack of standardized procedures, policies, and philosophies. A systematic effort is needed to establish performance and program standards in order to identify job, personnel skill, and training requirements, and to measure the effectiveness of processes.
- Conflicting Resource Needs. The tasks of carrying out ongoing programs and responding to disaster-driven events are often in conflict for resources, especially the resources of time and people. FEMA must define the minimum essential requirements for both tasks and dedicate resources to achieve them. Discipline to dedicate the required resources is required in order to improve programs.
- Preparation for the Spring Floods. There is a need to prepare for the spring floods by incorporating lessons learned from current Midwest flood operations, particularly in the areas of staffing, Regional responsibilities, Individual Assistance/Public Assistance processes, and Central Processing Office operations. In this regard, FEMA should plan and organize the teams, propose prevention measures, plan with the States, and pre-position resources.

ABOUT THE ISSUES

After the Critique, Headquarters reviewed the meeting notes and organized the discussions and comments into 13 major topic areas:

- Mitigation
- Standards and Evaluation
- Training and Performance Support
- Staffing and Resources
- Congressional Affairs
- Public Affairs
- Central Processing
- Individual Assistance
- Public Assistance
- Long-Term Recovery
- Coordination/Information Sharing
- State-Federal Relations
- Response

Issues were framed and discussion points and recommendations captured in gist for each of these areas. The key objective was to capture the concerns of critique participants, not to analyze or evaluate what was presented for inclusion in this report; no Agency agreement or consensus should be implied. However, the issues and points of view raised at the critique were very valuable and useful to FEMA management and staff as they continue to improve disaster operations and prepare to respond to the anticipated spring flooding.

REPORT ORGANIZATION

This report is organized in two sections: (1) thirteen topic areas that include a brief statement of the issue, discussion points raised by FEMA critique participants and by State critique participants, and recommendations; and (2) the conclusion. In addition, Appendix A provides a consolidation of key concerns from the nine declared States; Appendix B provides the list of attendees; and Appendix C provides the critique agenda.

MJ PAJAK

FOREWORD FROM PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON



The era of big government is over, but the era of big challenges is not. People want smaller government, but they also want active and effective national leadership. They want government that provides them the means and opportunities to meet their responsibilities and solve their own problems.

That's why Vice President Al Gore and I have spent so much time and energy in the first term reinventing government — making it work better, but cost less. We have had some terrific help from the Administration's management team as well as the career federal workforce. I want to thank and congratulate everyone who helped.

We've done pretty well. The federal workforce is the smallest in thirty years and the deficit has been cut by 60 percent. But this smaller, cheaper government is accomplishing more than ever. We've created more than 11 million new jobs. The crime rate is down four years in a row. So is the teen birth rate. Welfare reform is becoming a reality. And many government agencies are getting fan mail for providing better service.

But there is a great deal more to do. We must give Americans the tools to make the most of their lives, to renew national confidence that we can solve our most difficult problems when we work together, and to advance America's role as the world's strongest force for peace, freedom, and prosperity.

These are big jobs for a smaller government. This small book can be a big help. The lessons in it are tried and true. I urge you to pay careful attention to these ideas, as we prepare for the challenges before us.

Bill Clinton



BLAIR HOUSE
PAPERS

JANUARY 1997

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON
VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW

* * *

INTRODUCTION BY VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE



In 1993, President Clinton asked me to figure out how to make government work better and cost less. We called it reinventing government. The need to reinvent was clear. Confidence in government — which is simply confidence in our own ability to solve problems by working together — had been plummeting for three decades. We either had to rebuild that faith or abandon the future to chaos.

We had reason to hope we could succeed. Corporate America had reinvented itself to compete and win. The same ideas and some new wrinkles were starting to work at the state and local level. But it was going to be incredibly difficult, the largest turnaround ever, and management experts said it would take at least eight years.

Not quite four years later, my hope of succeeding has grown to confidence. We have thousands of examples of reinvention — islands of excellence in every agency — delivering better service and saving

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money. And public confidence in government has rebounded — up nearly 9 percent since 1993, according to a recent Roper poll. We are succeeding. We know how to do it.

Everyone in government knows big challenges remain. It is time for faster, bolder action to expand our islands of excellence and reinvent entire agencies — time to entirely reinvent every department of government.

So, even before the second inauguration, President Clinton and I called the new Cabinet to Blair House to give them their reinvention marching orders. This book contains the instructions we gave the Cabinet in a set of papers on that Saturday, January 11, 1997.

The papers are:

- *practical* — there is not much about paradigm shift theories and such
- *written as rules* — we left out the things we were unsure of
- *focused on the highest impact rules for reinvention success*
- *golden* — built on the experiences of the brightest, most creative, heroic people in public service so far.

The book divides our papers into three chapters. The first chapter is about how to *deliver great service* — treating the public the way top companies treat their customers. Remember, we are trying to restore America's confidence in solving big problems through self-government, problems like drugs and crime and the need for better education. How can people trust government to do big things if we can't do little things like answer the phone promptly and politely?

The second chapter tells how to *foster partnership and community solutions*. We have to do big things without big government. Luckily, partners are ready to help. Businesses have proven effective partners in achieving a cleaner environment, worker safety, and other regulatory compliance goals. Communities can solve their own problems with a little help and opportunity from their federal partners. And when labor and management work as partners, everybody wins.

The last chapter is about how to *reinvent to get the job done with less*. The first section there is the most important for top leaders. It describes the key to unlocking the enormous, unused, human potential of the federal workforce. Unlocking that potential will make everything else possible — it is the only way. The chapter has other tips for surviving

Identify Your Customers and Win Them Over.

In 1993, with Executive Order 12862, the President called for a revolution in government's customer service to deliver services equal to the best in business. In response, agencies throughout the government are making changes that customers have noticed. Here are some examples of the successes, as well as the challenges that remain.

Agency	A few examples of first term success	Some challenges for the second term
State	Passport applications are available on the World Wide Web.	Get passports issued fast for all applicants, with no long waits in line.
Veterans Affairs	Service is so fast that the NY benefits office turned its waiting room into a museum on six wars.	Improve beneficiary satisfaction through greater integration of VA's health system with DoD's
Treasury	Drug seizures are up while airport delays are down.	Convince Americans they'll get fair treatment from IRS.
Social Security	Business Week rated SSA's 1-800 service as the best in business, better than LL Bean or Disney.	Dramatically cut the multi-year wait and the huge backlog in disability claims.

goals and values of the organization, and could use them to adjust quickly to changing circumstances. I also said how federal employees would recognize success: When they wake up in the middle of the night and can't get back to sleep right away, they will be thinking about how to do their jobs better.

Where reinvention has taken hold federal employees do that. Their faith in the system has been restored. Applied to every part of government, these ideas can do the same for America.

Not long ago, most Americans believed that we could do practically anything by working together — defeat communism, go to the moon, you name it. We can have that faith in unity again. We can have the strength of unity again. We need it for the 21st Century.

...



RENEWAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
THE FEMA ONE-YEAR REPORT

APRIL 1993-APRIL 1994

DEDICATED TO THE EMPLOYEES OF FEMA



FOREWORD

I was sworn in as Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on April 5, 1993. My charge from the President and the Congress has been to revitalize FEMA to make it the effective organization that it must be to manage the effects of disasters in this country. The renewal of FEMA has proceeded at a fast pace. We have undergone a major reorganization, and successfully responded to 38 Presidential Disaster Declarations -- including two of the Nation's largest disasters.

This report presents a comprehensive overview of activities at FEMA during my first year. It has been prepared to chronicle significant achievements and their basis for building emergency management capabilities. The report is structured to detail our renewal efforts, provide an overview of accomplishments, summarize disaster response and recovery activities, and highlight initiatives that will continue the renewal of FEMA.

FEMA is now an outward-looking organization -- an organization of "people helping people." Customer service and establishing partnerships are the themes upon which we are building a better foundation. We have worked to strengthen our partnerships with the many governmental and private sector organizations who have responsibilities and interest in emergency management. We have worked to significantly improve response to our customers -- the American people who are or may be affected by disasters.

I have fully embraced the principles of the National Performance Review and the objectives of the Clinton Administration as we have made changes at FEMA. I am proud of the FEMA employees who have accepted the many challenges. Changes in attitudes and agency culture are continuing as we implement new programs, find ways to reduce costs, and refine our operations. With pride, I dedicate this report to the employees of FEMA -- including our Disaster Assistance Employees without whom we could not have helped the people and communities who are dependent upon us for assistance.

Although much has been accomplished, much remains to be done to effectively mitigate against the effects and costs of disasters. FEMA cannot build the future of emergency management without commitment and support of its partners. We must continue the renewal of FEMA and emergency management. We must identify and implement those actions that support FEMA's goals. I ask you to work with me to continue to build on our vision, our mission, our goals, and our programs to make a difference in the years ahead.

I look back on my first year at FEMA as one of growth, of change, of building a foundation for the future of emergency management. Through commitment and input of many, FEMA is now in a position to provide leadership and support. I look forward to the challenges of continuing the renewal of FEMA and development of an effective emergency management system throughout the country.


James E. Witt
Director

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Renewal of Emergency Management

THE FEMA ONE-YEAR REPORT

April 1993-April 1994

I. Introduction

James Lee Witt was sworn in as the Director of the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) on April 5, 1993, and immediately initiated a renewal of FEMA and the country's emergency management system. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive summary of major accomplishments and initiatives undertaken during his first year as Director of FEMA.

During the period of the report, the country experienced an unusually high level of disaster activity. Unusual tornado activity, winter ice and snow storms on the East Coast, wildland fires (which also affected residential areas in Los Angeles), the Northridge, California, earthquake, and severe weather placed demands on emergency management and government officials throughout the country. Hurricane Emily threatened the East Coast but fortunately moved out to sea without causing major damage. Of 53 requests for a Presidential Disaster Declaration submitted by governors of affected States, the President declared 38 major disasters. These declarations included the extensive Midwest Floods and the Northridge earthquake. Recovery efforts from Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake continued to demand considerable attention.

The Director emphasized basic leadership and management philosophies, thus improving FEMA's capabilities and image, redirecting resources to an all-hazards, risk-based management approach, developing new and innovative programs, reorganizing along functional lines, and strengthening partnerships in emergency management. This report outlines how FEMA has progressed in these and other critical areas. It also identifies actions that have been initiated to continue the renewal of FEMA and to build a solid foundation for improved emergency management capabilities throughout the country.

II. Leadership

A. *Vision*: For the first time, a vision for emergency management was established. The vision provides for: "a public educated on what to do before, during, and after a disaster to protect themselves, their families, their homes, and their businesses; structures located out of harm's way and built according to improved codes; governments and private organizations with proven effective plans, necessary resources, and rigorous training for disaster response; and community plans, prepared in advance, for recovery and reconstruction after a disaster."

Based on this vision, short and long term goals and programs can be defined by the emergency management community to make the vision a reality. FEMA uses this vision to

make its basic decisions about how current emergency management needs are met. More importantly, a collaborative effort with Congress was initiated to define responsibilities and actions to achieve the vision. The long-term program will involve the Congress, the Administration, the Federal Government, State and local governments, private and voluntary organizations, and individuals.

II. Mission: The FEMA mission had not been updated for more than 10 years. Based on input from FEMA employees, our partners in emergency management, and a reassessment of our responsibilities, a mission statement was defined: "The mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is to provide the leadership and support to reduce the loss of life and property and protect our institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery."

C. Goals: Five mission-associated goals and one organizational goal were adopted upon which management decisions and programs are based. Accomplishments on each of these goals are defined throughout the report.

1. Create an emergency management partnership with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, volunteer organizations, and the private sector.
2. Establish, in concert with FEMA's partners, a national emergency management system that is comprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards in approach.
3. Make hazard mitigation the foundation of the national emergency management system.
4. Provide a rapid and effective response to any disaster.
5. Strengthen State and local emergency management.
6. Revitalize the Agency and develop a more effective and involved cadre of FEMA managers, permanent employees, and disaster reservists.

D. Agency Management Plan: Based on the new vision, mission, and goals, in January 1994 the Director identified priorities to be achieved by the end of FY 94. Coordinated Agency implementation plans were developed for each priority, with key actions and responsibilities of headquarters and regional offices identified. The need for organizational supporting plans and reporting mechanisms was identified. For the first time, a comprehensive Agency document described priorities and responsibilities of each part of the organization.

In late March 1994, an unprecedented meeting of FEMA managers was held at the FEMA Special Facility. The meeting provided a much-needed opportunity to work together to resolve long-standing issues, identify responsibilities, and agree on key actions to implement mutual priorities. Managers recommended that similar meetings be held every 6 months throughout the renewal process.

Plans are being made to begin early development of the FY 95 Management Plan. The management planning process will be tied to strategic planning, budget and procurement processes, and performance and evaluation systems. Managers will be responsible for identifying priorities for their organization, and involving all employees in accomplishing those priorities.

E. Agency Environment/Culture: An open and trusting environment where all employees can contribute and are valued is desired. The Director has personally taken steps to create such an environment. On his first full day, the Director personally greeted FEMA headquarters employees as they entered the building. He has visited 9 of the 10 FEMA regional offices, and takes every opportunity to visit FEMA facilities and individual work areas. He has also stated that all employees will be valued and treated with respect. He instituted an "Open Door" policy where time is set aside each week for FEMA employees to talk to him about their concerns and ideas. He gave his attention to renewed equal rights programs, cultural diversity, sensitivity training, and upward mobility opportunities.

Throughout the first few months, the Director hosted a series of brown bag lunches. Participants were randomly selected and invited to meet with their peers. One of the most significant meetings was for selected regional administrative staff who were given the opportunity for training and exposure at headquarters.

The Director uses various means of keeping all employees informed and involved in the renewal process. He has directed all managers to hold staff meetings at least weekly, and to share information with their employees. Informative memoranda to all employees are released frequently. A periodic newsletter has been turned into a monthly publication for sharing information from the Director and among all parts of the organization. An "all hands" meeting was held on October 18, 1993, to inform employees of the new organizational structure and management assignments. Vice President Gore participated and complimented FEMA employees for their efforts in responding to the Midwest Floods and implementing the initiatives of the Administration.

On October 19, 1993, the Director signed a labor-management agreement with representatives of each of seven employee bargaining units to establish the FEMA Labor-Management Partnership Council. This agreement was one of the first signed to implement Executive Order 12871. The purpose and objectives of the Council are to help renew and improve FEMA to ensure that the Agency delivers the highest quality services to the American people; to identify problems and craft solutions to better serve FEMA's customers

and mission; and, to improve labor-management cooperation by forming a partnership supportive of the above objectives. Under the agreement, the 16-member Council is comprised of seven union-appointed FEMA employees and nine FEMA management representatives. The Associate Director for Operations Support was appointed as the Labor-Management Partnership Council Chair. The Director also established an honorary Labor Relations Award to recognize significant contributions in the labor-relations field.

Director Witt determined that FEMA could not be an inward-looking bureaucracy with isolated organizations, complicated processes, and separate agendas. All employees were encouraged to reach out to external organizations to involve them in developing improved and innovative emergency management programs. This practice has been embraced and demonstrated in recent disaster response initiatives. All of FEMA is now involved in disaster response activities, either through organizational responsibilities or individual emergency assignments. The disaster burden no longer resides with one part of the organization. The culture is changing to one dedicated to meeting the needs of its customers, both internally and externally.

F. *National Performance Review (NPR)*: In the past year, FEMA has been actively involved with the Vice President's NPR. The renewal of FEMA was guided in large part by the principles developed by NPR. FEMA directly participated in the NPR effort in the following ways:

* *FEMA Report*: FEMA prepared a companion document to the NPR Report that detailed the new vision, mission, goals, and major policies. The report detailed how FEMA is developing legislation, new policies and organizational plans to invigorate the Agency with this refocused mission.

* *Reinvention Laboratory*: All of FEMA has been designated as a Reinvention Laboratory. In addition to processes and organizational structure changes, a concept for mini-lab development was implemented. Nominations for Reinvention mini-labs were sought and will be implemented on an ongoing basis until all possible programs and processes have been revised to meet Agency goals and improve operations.

* *NPR Recommendations*: Four recommendations for FEMA action were included in the Vice President's NPR report. Action has been initiated to implement each of the four recommendations. The recommendations and general actions taken to implement each of them are as follows:

1. *Shift emphasis to preparing for and responding to the consequences of all disasters*: The Agency mission and goals now clearly reflect an all-hazards emergency management emphasis. FEMA's reorganization dismantled the specific-threat structure and realigned all resources into an all-hazards functional structure. Assets previously dedicated to national security programs are available to prepare for and respond to consequences of all disasters. The Director formed a National Security Steering Group to review FEMA's national security

functions and to ensure necessary capabilities are maintained in the new organizational structure. A review of all Agency positions to determine the need for security clearances was initiated. (As part of the review, determinations on position sensitivities are also being made.)

2. *Develop a more anticipatory and customer-driven response to catastrophic disasters:* When Hurricane Emily threatened in August 1993, FEMA, other Federal Agency officials, Urban Search and Rescue teams, medical teams, and specialized equipment were deployed to North Carolina to meet the storm. Each FEMA region has appointed State liaison officers who make contact with State officials as a disaster is threatening, or immediately after one occurs. Overall improvements were demonstrated in response to the Northridge, California earthquake that occurred on January 17, 1994. The Director deployed to California early afternoon of the same day, along with other Federal officials. Urban Search and Rescue teams were alerted for potential deployment, if needed. Many lessons learned as a result of the Northridge earthquake are being incorporated into Agency policies and functions. Development of a concept for deployment of disaster assessment teams and management teams was initiated. During the March management conference, two regional offices were assigned responsibility to develop centers of excellence: Region IV in Atlanta, Georgia, as the Center of Excellence for disaster close-outs and Region VIII in Denver, Colorado, as the Center of Excellence for outreach and community relations. With input from all parts of FEMA and our partners in emergency management, the Centers will develop policy and related planning, procedural, and training documents.

3. *Create results-oriented incentives to reduce the costs of a disaster:* A headquarters/regional task force was convened to review the Stafford Act and consider revisions that would meet the objectives of this recommendation. Recommendations will be developed and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for approval. The FEMA Inspector General was asked to review the declaration process and make recommendations for improvements. An Agency priority was established to develop a strategy for increasing the participation in the flood insurance program by 20 percent. FEMA worked with Congress and the Administration on several pending legislative initiatives that are designed to reduce the cost of disasters. The Director also established as an Agency priority design of mechanisms to increase flexibility in how States use Federal funds to meet their emergency management priorities.

4. *Develop skilled management team among political appointees and career staff:* The number of political appointees was reduced from 37 to 22, and those who have a background in emergency management are significantly increased over previous Administrations. In addition, three senior managers are career FEMA employees. To further this enhanced skill level, the Director identified as an Agency priority the need to develop a management training program for all managers. Immediately upon appointment, all new regional directors are provided an orientation program at headquarters. The orientation is designed to give them Agency perspective on policies and programs, and to have the opportunity to get to know headquarters managers before they undertake their new assignment. In the new

organizational structure, senior executive management assignments were changed so that different perspectives could be added to the new functional structure.

G. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): FEMA applied to the Office of Management and Budget to conduct a GPRA pilot project on use of information technology to support emergency management programs. Even if not approved as a pilot project, the Director has determined that the proposal will be the basis for developing a strategic plan and taking advantage of technology to support emergency management functions. The pilot project will also be used as the instructive process for implementing Agency strategic planning required by the GPRA. The concepts of the GPRA -- performance measurements, achieving results, accountability -- are being incorporated into Agency policy and evaluation mechanisms.

H. Performance Agreement with the President: A formal proposal will be submitted after review with the NPR staff.

I. Customer Surveys: In response to Executive Order 12862, FEMA is conducting comprehensive surveys of the Agency's customers in order to develop customer service standards. Focus group meetings and interviews were conducted with individuals who had applied for disaster assistance after the Northridge earthquake. The input from these sessions was used to develop a survey to be pilot tested with disaster applicants affected by Hurricane Andrew. A customer survey strategy was developed and outlined in the initial report required by the Executive Order. Plans are being made to survey our other large customer base -- State and local officials. Internal customers are also being queried about their needs and ideas before programs are developed or changed.

J. Internal Regulation Reduction: A plan to reduce regulations by 50 percent by the end of FY 95, a year ahead of the requirements of Executive Order 12861, was drafted. Assignments of responsibility for review and revision of existing regulations were aligned consistent with the new organization structure. Part 44 Code of Federal Regulations which outlined FEMA's organizational structures, missions, and functions had not been updated in more than 10 years. A revised Final Rule which described the new organization and appropriate delegations of authority was drafted for internal comment prior to publication in the Federal Register. Considerable latitude is included in the delegations of authority to provide for further delegation to the lowest level possible within the organization. The need for a management strategy to delegate further and empower people at all levels to perform was identified and initial plans made for implementation of such a strategy. A concept for delegations of authority to Regional Directors and working relationships with Associate Directors, Administrators, and Office Directors was drafted.

K. Regulatory Initiatives: In response to Executive Order 12866 and a request from the Vice President's Counsel, FEMA identified two regulatory initiatives to be undertaken during the next year. The regulations for public assistance authorized by the Stafford Act are being revised, emphasizing a streamlined process, mitigation strategies, environmental and

sustainable development considerations, and reduced disaster costs to the taxpayer. The second regulatory initiative is associated with developing internal regulations and delegations of authority that will empower employees to take actions within established policies.

L. *Streamlining*: FEMA's initial streamlining plan, required by Presidential memorandum dated September 11, 1993, identified a number of potential cost savings without impacting the number of employees on board. Many of the initiatives already identified will contribute to streamlined operating procedures. A review of FEMA facility costs and functions performed in those facilities was initiated to identify long-term cost savings in reduced operating costs. Each senior manager has been tasked through an Agency priority to propose to the Director ways of saving money at targeted facilities.

III. Reorganization of FEMA

A critical element of the renewal effort was overhauling the Agency's organizational structure. The structure existing in April 1993 reflected priorities of previous Administrations and had been in place for many years. A number of external reports had criticized the Agency for its stovepipe structure, inefficiencies, and resultant duplication of effort. Recommendations were that FEMA should fully integrate assets and capabilities reserved for national security purposes into the overall Agency all-hazards mission. FEMA needed to reorganize to meet its new mission and goals.

In June 1993, the Director initiated a fast-track, unconventional approach to reorganizing a troubled FEMA. His intent was to get maximum input from all employees and put a new organizational structure in place quickly to minimize disruption of critical FEMA services and the impact on employees. He appointed a four-person project team to coordinate the process and finalize recommendations. Input from employees was actively sought, with more than 100 written suggestions submitted. Senior managers met in a 1-day "retreat" to identify organizational issues and propose a structure. Selected senior managers participated on an ad hoc committee to review organizational issues and proposed structures. The basic organizational structure, with programs and functions aligned within the structure, was completed in time for the Director to review it with the Vice President on August 7, 1993, when they met to discuss FEMA's renewal efforts.

The Vice President and Director Witt announced FEMA's new organizational structure and management assignments at an "all hands" meeting on October 18, 1993. The managers were detailed to their new positions and tasked to complete staffing assignments within the new structure. Mission and function statements were developed, personnel actions were completed, space allocations were made, and employees were assigned to specific positions and functions. All paperwork was completed and the new organizational structure became effective November 28, 1993.

Throughout the reorganization process, the Director kept employees involved and informed as to the progress being made. The reorganization accomplished these major objectives:

- " Alignment of Agency programs and activities along functional lines
- " Consistent organizational structure at headquarters and regional offices
- " Increase in supervisor to employee ratio and reduction of two layers of management
- " Consolidation of support functions, including those for disaster response, into one Directorate
- " Assignment of disaster response functions throughout the new organizational structure

No employees were reduced in grade or subjected to reduction-in-force as a result of the reorganization. Employees who had previously been supervisors maintained their grades based on program or technical expertise. To ensure the most effective use of people and their skills, and to give employees a new opportunity, a program was initiated for employees to request transfer to another part of the organization. Consistent with Agency needs, requests are being reviewed to satisfy individual preferences wherever possible.

Overall the new organizational structure is functioning as intended. FEMA's response to the Northridge earthquake was enhanced by changes in management and the new organizational structure. If anything, the people of California benefitted because the whole Agency pulled together to support response operations. In June 1994, a 6-month review will be initiated to identify any adjustments that need to be made.

IV. Interorganizational Relationships

A. *Congress*: Strengthening FEMA's relationships with Members of Congress and their staff has been a critical focus of Director Witt's activities over the last year. To accomplish this, he appointed a professional experienced in Congressional operations and intergovernmental coordination to be Director of FEMA's Office of Congressional and Governmental Affairs. Further, the Director made it a personal priority to be accessible to Members and staff for hearings and meetings, in the field and in Washington, D.C.

In the last year, the Director has testified 15 times before 8 different Committees and Subcommittees on subjects ranging from FEMA's annual appropriations, to the Midwest Floods, to flood insurance, to the Northridge earthquake, and emergency supplemental appropriations. As the direct result of his accessibility and his interest in establishing a proactive and meaningful dialogue with Members and their staff, the perception and image of the Agency held by the Congress has greatly improved.

Members of Congress have come to appreciate that they are part of the emergency management partnership. Nowhere has that feeling been more evident than in disaster response. Under Director Witt's leadership, FEMA's Office of Congressional and

Governmental Affairs focused its efforts during this year's disasters on proactively informing and coordinating the exchange of information on Agency response and recovery activities with Members of Congress and their staffs, and seeking ways in which we could better work together. For example, FEMA used information provided by Members of Congress and their staffs to improve service to disaster victims in the field.

B. Other Federal Agencies: FEMA continued to work with other Federal agencies in seeking ways to improve Federal involvement in emergency management activities. In the new organizational structure, national security planning and Federal Response Plan activities were combined in the Interagency Planning and Liaison Division in the Response and Recovery Directorate. This Division was designated as the primary point of contact for other Federal agencies to work with FEMA to develop response capabilities and identify requirements for training, exercises, and other related activities.

The Director has met a number of times with the interagency Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, which is the focal point for FEMA coordination within the Federal Government for planning and responding to major disasters. He also met personally with a number of Cabinet and Administration officials to discuss mutual responsibilities in emergency management. These high-level commitments were demonstrated in response to the Northridge earthquake when the Director, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and the President of the American Red Cross went to Los Angeles the day of the earthquake. The Secretaries of Commerce, Education, and Health and Human Services visited repeatedly throughout the recovery, as did the Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA). SBA has now joined in the Federal Response Plan effort as a full participating signatory member.

For the first time, an intergovernmental focus was included in the Joint Information Center after the Northridge earthquake. Public Affairs/communications representatives from each Federal Agency involved worked together to exchange and provide information as a single clearing house for Federal information related to the disaster response. FEMA is working with the White House Communications Office to improve this function, so that representatives are identified and trained ahead of time to respond to the next catastrophic disaster.

All FEMA organizations were encouraged to increase their working relationships with Federal agencies, and new initiatives are underway to reinvent and improve our working relationships with these critical members of the nationwide emergency management partnership.

C. State and Local Governments: One of the Director's first actions was to write to each State and territorial emergency management director to propose a risk-based, all hazards emergency management system, based on a foundation of mitigation. He met in June 1993 with State Directors to solicit their input and support in the development of a nationwide

partnership. An unprecedented number attended such a meeting: 52 State and territorial directors participated, and pledged their support and cooperation.

The Director also established a more proactive approach for all FEMA organizations, especially the regional offices, to work with State and local officials. A regional employee was assigned as liaison to each State to work with the emergency management organization, and then with the Governor and State officials immediately upon occurrence of a disaster warning or event. Regional officials have become better acquainted with their State and local counterparts, and have reached a better understanding of their organizations, policies, and procedures. The effectiveness of this approach has been demonstrated in response to the Midwest Floods, the Northridge earthquake, and the series of other less extensive but still serious disasters during the Director's first year at FEMA.

In general, a new attitude and environment was created as the basis for working with State and local officials. Policies and initiatives were directed toward allowing flexibility for States to identify their own priority and program needs, reducing the administrative burdens for receiving FEMA funds, and achieving performance-based results that ensure a better emergency management capability.

D. *Intergovernmental*: Coordinating FEMA's diverse interactions with national, State, and local constituency groups has been assigned as one of the critical functions of FEMA's Office of Congressional and Governmental Affairs. FEMA has a vast and vocal constituency that includes State emergency managers, firefighters, floodplain managers, dam safety engineers, State and local elected and appointed officials, business officials, etc. Given the importance of FEMA's audience to emergency management, the Director has participated in over 50 different meetings of constituency organizations and officials during the last year. He has made a particular point of establishing relationships with each of the major fire and emergency service organizations in the country.

A fulltime position now exists in FEMA's Office of Congressional and Governmental Affairs to serve as a focal point for intergovernmental relations in the Agency. A strategy for communicating and coordinating information with these interest groups is currently under development. The intent of the strategy is to facilitate existing relationships with national, State, and local public interest organizations, bring a "big picture" perspective to the Agency's overall interaction with these audiences, identify opportunities to better communicate with these groups, and promote the comprehensive dissemination of information to the broader emergency management community.

Clearly, a strong intergovernmental affairs program is a critical component of the Director's goal to create a national emergency management partnership, and is important to the success of the Agency's mission. This was certainly the case following the Northridge earthquake, when the Director made community outreach and intergovernmental coordination a key facet of the response and recovery operations.

E. *FEMA Advisory Board*: Previously, members of the FEMA Advisory Board primarily represented a national security perspective and were not from the broad constituency that FEMA must work with to develop an effective nationwide emergency management system. The Director appointed a 16-member Board that has representatives from Federal, State, and local governments (including elected officials), emergency management organizations, voluntary organizations, and the private sector. An initial meeting resulted in the Board passing a series of resolutions in support of emergency management. The Board will meet twice yearly to provide recommendations to the Director on key emergency management issues.

F. *Emergency Food and Shelter*: More than \$130 million was made available in FEMA's FY 1994 budget for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. Over 10,500 agencies in more than 2,600 communities across the country receive funding through this program for rent/mortgage/utility assistance, and supplemental funding for mass shelter and food programs. Within less than 5 weeks after funds were made available, the first checks were mailed to recipients. This timing was critical because the funds reached the organizations who provide shelter and food to vulnerable families and individuals before the start of the life-threatening winter months.

For the first time since inception of this program in 1983, FEMA published a technical assistance manual to illustrate some of the creative and innovative ideas and practices that have been implemented by recipient organizations. FEMA continued to chair the National Board, and participate in the Washington, D.C. InterAgency Council on the Homeless to develop a Federal plan to end homelessness in the District of Columbia. A major initiative with the Defense Commissary Agency was undertaken to link local feeding organizations with commissaries in their local areas to receive any excess edible food.

G. *Public*: Critical to the new FEMA vision is "a public better educated on what to do before, during and after a disaster..." Consequently, considerable emphasis has been placed on developing a national strategy to educate the American public and providing guidance for family and individual protection. A waterproof card to be distributed nationally is being developed with FEMA's teleregistration and information hotline, and to provide tips that are useful before, during, and after disasters. Several initiatives (described in other portions of this report) will provide better information to people after disasters, including use of the National Weather Service radio system for broadcasting disaster information, continuing publication of the Recovery Times, and broadcasting on the disaster-specific Recovery Channel.

H. *Media*: The Director of FEMA's Emergency Information and Public Affairs Office (EIPA) is an experienced media and public affairs professional, and has used his background to proactively build media relations and involve them in disaster awareness/preparedness initiatives. The EIPA Office hosted initial briefing sessions for regional and syndicated correspondents to explain the disaster declaration process and FEMA's programs, functions, and responsibilities. As a nationwide emergency information

program is implemented, briefings will be held on a regular basis. Opportunities were sought throughout the year to bring the emergency management message before the American public through the media. The FEMA Director and other officials made themselves available for interviews with the media, to explain in an honest and open manner information about its disaster operations and programs. Consequently, favorable news reports have become the rule.

I. *Business*: The EIPA has developed a business and industry guide for preparedness in the workplace. A recruitment project has been undertaken to develop corporate sponsorship and partnerships for making emergency preparedness products and information available throughout the business community. FEMA has supported public awareness programs sponsored by such businesses as Home Depot, Clorox, Allstate Insurance, and Georgia Pacific. The American Franchise Association is just one organization now cooperating with FEMA to improve emergency preparedness, and is exploring setting up Franchise Emergency Action Teams to have a role in disaster response.

Contacts are continuing with the private sector to get input on how FEMA can include them in the national emergency management partnership. These contacts have resulted in making emergency management information available through their products, such as paper placemats in fast-food restaurants. FEMA has also provided publications and materials that can be adapted by the organization for their own emergency management programs.

The business community has also expressed its interest in providing services and commodities after a disaster. Their participation in developing a national donations management strategy has helped overcome problems that previously existed after a major disaster. For instance, after Hurricane Andrew in Florida disposal of unusable clothing and other products became a major problem. FEMA is exploring how to make contributions and services from private organizations available after disaster response, similar to how Federal resources are made available to support State and local needs.

V. Mitigation

A. *National Mitigation Strategy*: In one of his first speeches after his confirmation (to the National Earthquake Conference in Memphis, Tennessee, May 5, 1993), the Director expressed his intention to develop a national mitigation strategy. His commitment to the concept of mitigation, and its importance as a foundation for emergency management, was confirmed during the reorganization by creation of the Mitigation Directorate. For the first time, FEMA's mitigation programs -- Floodplain Management, Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, National Hurricane Program, National Dam Safety Program, and post-disaster mitigation programs -- were brought into one organization.

A draft statement, "Towards a National Mitigation Strategy," has been prepared and, once approved, will be published and distributed to FEMA's constituencies. The concept of