Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User

Final Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy

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Executive Summary

As part of a program called the Phoenix Project, the City of Bridgeport is creating a maze of "looped" streets by placing concrete barriers at forty intersections throughout a drug-infested section of the city's east side.[1] Area residents and police hope that the roadblocks will deter out-of-town drug buyers from coming into the area to purchase crack, cocaine, heroin, and other illicit substances.

The idea behind the plan is that the barriers will discourage drug buying in the area by making it difficult for buyers to speed away after making a purchase. According to the Bridgeport Police Department, this approach to stopping street-level drug trafficking has never been tried on such a large scale anywhere else in the United States.[2]

Jorge Jaiman, the Bridgeport Police Department's Community Liaison Officer for the area, notes that drug dealers are unhappy about the barriers; "They're nervous because they know once the people start coming in from Fairfield and Westport to get their drugs and they get lost in all these streets, they won't be coming here anymore."[3] Officer Jaiman and others estimates that 80 percent of the drugs sold on the east side are sold to suburban buyers.[4]

According to its boosters, the Phoenix Project is just one of several efforts by the City of Bridgeport and the State of Connecticut to attack the acute drug and violent crime problems facing Bridgeport. This Abt Associates study for the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is an assessment of the efficacy of the looped streets concept as a means of reducing street-level dealing activity in the inner city. The study also assesses the validity of the Bridgeport Police Department's assertion that a large percentage of the east side's "drive buy" drug buyers are from out-of-town. Relying in part on unobtrusive direct observation by a confidential informant, Abt staff developed a detailed picture of dealing activity in a city deeply scarred by the ravages of drug dealing. Through street ethnographic techniques and other qualitative research methods, the study's aim was also to gauge community reaction to the plan and resident sentiments about how the quality of their lives is affected by local drug dealing. The report presents Abt's findings as well as recommendations for future research.

Introduction

> "A beautiful city teeming with busy life, and looking as neat as a new pin. The greatest pleasure [I take is] driving through those busy streets, admiring the beautiful houses and substantial factories, with their thousands of prosperous workmen, and reflecting that I had, in so great a measure, been the means of adding all this life, bustle and wealth to the City of Bridgeport.
>
> -- P.T. Barnum[5]

This is how P.T. Barnum once described Pembroke City, a residential development that comprises about a quarter of the Phoenix Project's target area. No longer the "Queen" of Bridgeport's victorian-era communities, today's East Main area is a jumble of working class residential dwellings, crack houses, the charred remains of rooming houses. The neighborhood offers only a glimpse of the petit bourgeois glory Barnum long ago described. After hours, Pembroke City's streets are still teeming, but now it is with the illegal business of drug selling and prostitution. The pop of automatic weapon fire is often heard after the working people have secured their homes for the night. Over the years the city has pursued a variety of approaches to stemming the drug activity and associated violence. In its frustration it has now turned to concrete barriers to cut off the merchant from the customer.

As was noted in Abt's Interim Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),[6] Bridgeport is not the first community to experiment with the use of traffic modification devices to deter street level drug activity.[7] However, while many cities have struggled to combat the problem of drug selling marketed to "drive-buy" commuter users,[8] in most cases movement control was aimed at limiting the ease with which a dangerous offender could move through a site. In contrast, the Bridgeport plan was conceived as a strategy to limit the movement of the buyer. Hence, Bridgeport's proposal, known as the Phoenix Project, modifies the standard concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The City's plan calls for limiting the movement of people who drive through a neighborhood by creating a maze of "looped" streets using concrete "Jersey" barriers at forty intersections throughout this drug-, crime- and poverty-ravaged neighborhood. The City's Police Department theorizes that stopping commuter drive-buys would greatly curtail drug-related crime in the East Main Street Area.

For the purposes of the Phoenix Project and for this study a drive-buy commuter is defined as anyone who drives into the city's East Main Street area to buy illicit drugs. According to Bridgeport officials and the Bridgeport Police Department, drive-buys account for an estimated 60 to 80 percent of drug customers in this community. Moreover, it has been strongly suggested that these commuters come mostly from well-to-do suburbs.

Abt Associates' assessment of the Phoenix Project closely followed the progress of the project from conception in October 1992 till the present. During this period, Abt staff conducted a literature review on community policing and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Staff also considered similar policing initiatives in other cities. Staff produced a Progress Report (February 25, 1993)[9] and an Interim Report (May 19, 1993)[10] based on site visits and in-depth interviews with many of those involved in the process of implementing this plan (e.g., police), as well as those who might be affected by it (e.g., residents, East Main Street shopkeepers). Data were also gathered from observations performed by a local street ethnographer and a "folk" expert, and mechanically, by use of a electronic traffic counter. Regrettably, Abt was unable to mechanically count traffic at baseline (before installation of the barriers).

This final report to ONDCP summarizes our findings based on nearly ten months of ethnographic observation of dealing activity; frequent interviews with residents, business owners, project managers, and police officers; and three rounds of site visits (April 1-2, May 20-21, and August 8-9, 1993).

During Winter 1993, Abt staff developed a picture of the East Main area and its attendant resources. Taking this inventory of community resources involved contacting the many active community and civic

organizations that are committed to improving the lot of east side residents. They include, but are not limited to, the Bridgeport Child Advocacy Coalition (BCAC), Bridgeport Futures Initiative, Regional Youth Substance Abuse Project (RYSAP) of the United Way of Eastern Fairfield County, and Save the Children. Staff also contacted the City Historian,[11] a Yale doctoral candidate in Anthropology whose research involves Bridgeport,[12] and two State Senators who were sponsors of a legislative initiative to ban assault weapons in Connecticut.[13] Further assistance with the development of a portrait of the target area at baseline came from an anthropologist consultant for the Bridgeport Health Department who provided ethnographic sketches of the community prepared for an earlier AIDS prevention and outreach effort in the target area.[14]

Abt staff also exchanged information with the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) which is managing the Strategic Intervention for High Risk Youth (SIHRY).[15] SIHRY is an innovative, state-of-the-art substance abuse prevention program targeted at inner city youth who are currently experimenting with drugs and alcohol or are characterized by other risk factors such as involvement in drug trafficking, delinquency, truancy, and family substance abuse.[16] SIHRY not only works with these at-risk children, but also supports the development of positive, drug free environments in the family, school, and community which the youth inhabit.[17]

Abt's survey of the community reveals an area that is receiving considerable attention from social service providers and policy makers alike, rather than as a community forgotten by the outside world. Nonetheless, the area remains plagued by widespread and public drug dealing. Police at the Police Officer Sector Terminal (P.O.S.T.)*, police elsewhere in the target area, and Abt's community informants all report that out-of-town drug buyers are among those attracted to the community by good prices, good quality, and a ready availability of drugs. As in other industries, buyers return if what they find is better, cheaper, and more accessible than what is available elsewhere. In the following pages we summarize important issues addressed in previous reports, discuss new information based on the latest site visits and observation data, and describe the lessons to be learned from this research.[18]

Bridgeport

Bridgeport is the largest city in Connecticut. Its proximity to New York City and Long Island Sound has been cited as a contributing factor in the expansion of the local drug trade.[19] Proximity no doubt may play a role in social deterioration to which this once booming city was subjected. But Bridgeport has many problems, and they cannot all be explained by its proximity to New York City. For instance, some are certainly the result of profound budgetary problems experienced by the state of Connecticut during the last several years. During this time, the city of Bridgeport went under receivership and was forced to cut back on many city services, including desperately needed funds for drug treatment, education and public safety. In terms of public safety alone, the city's police department is understaffed by an estimated 200 officers.[20] Other problems also include the inability of the city to assimilate many newcomers through its schools and dire employment opportunities. In this sense however, these are the result of a process that took several decades to come to fruition and that has culminated in a vibrant industrial center gone bust.

In the past, this largely blue collar industrial city was able to attract many newcomers and immigrants, including southern blacks and Puerto Ricans. The promise of an ever expanding tax base and industrial power continued. Good manufacturing jobs were available for many. The city could open its doors to countless newcomers as the word spread that Bridgeport was a prosperous place, with a

*P.O.S.T or Police Officer Sector Terminal is the community policing substation located on East Main street. See Exhibit 1.7.

surplus of jobs and a bright future. Unfortunately, the well of prosperity was slowly drying up. The bulk of industry (many unable to compete in the developing global economy) were leaving the city en mass in search of cheap labor, less regulation, and lower taxes. But despite the fact that the type of employment that allowed large numbers of people to join the mainstream middle class (and helped them assimilate a new culture through strong schools) was disappearing, many continued arriving and still do today. The city that once stood as a beacon of hope for a chance at a sound, productive life, is no longer. The prosperity that once reigned in the city of P.T Barnum has vanished.[21]

The East Main Area

Over the past year the East Main Street area has been the focus of several organizations and individuals who want to rehabilitate the neighborhood. There are many active community efforts working to salvage this neighborhood and to improve the lives of its residents.[22] Nonetheless, blatant open air drug activity remains widespread.

According to Tom Rebollar, the City's Crime Prevention Coordinator, the East Main area has the highest murder rate in Bridgeport, and shootouts sometimes force residents to sleep on the floor.[23] Previous ethnographic study of the city's east side suggests that the level of attention focused on the area recently is by no means a reflection of the level of interest shown in this community over the longer haul.[24] In fact, prior research in the community reveals that the east side is a neighborhood that has been largely ignored for over two decades by the City of Bridgeport and the Connecticut State Government. The ethnography concludes that a majority of area residents "believe they have been forgotten or neglected by city government... that city services never reach the neighborhood" and that historically there has been "a lot of dialogue about the problems... but that nothing gets delivered."[25]

Unemployment, poverty, and overall misery levels run high in the east side. Where there once were scores of small factories and workshops offering apprenticeship opportunities and decent wages to "prosperous workmen"[26] now is difficult to find more than a few run down, low wage paying fast food restaurants. East Main Street does have a viable commercial sector. But the business lining this street are predominantly family-owned *bodegas* and illegitimate drug fronts. Hence, most legitimate businesses along this strip are incapable of generating any meaningful employment opportunities for this community. Indeed, "Be all you can be" advertising billboards are a common sight, and very likely a popular source of legitimate employment in this area.

Arson in this sector of the city, along with illegal dumping and property abandonment are rampant. The burnt out hulk of the local branch of the public library suggests to area residents that the political leadership is not in tune with the proven adverse effects such eyesores may have to a community's mental health.

Sources of community cohesion are lacking. Positive role models, with the exception of officers from the police substation and Matt Jones, the *sensei* from a local martial arts academy, are scant in the community. Interviews with area residents reveal a lack of trust in the city and point to a belief that the "system' has largely failed to educate and train a vast sector of this community through its schools. Furthermore, initial community interviews suggested that residents are not well aware of the scope of Project Phoenix, or even what jersey barriers place at forty intersections throughout the community would entail. In addition, fear of crime persists along with a resentment towards the problem of blatant drug traffic. While residents express a generally positive view of the police and their role in the neighborhood, residents view the city's job in keeping up the neighborhood (i.e., cleaning its streets and keeping the streets well lighted) as poor and ineffectual.

The target area is a one square mile area (10 x 10 block) of the east side, parted by East Main Street, a mostly Latino commercial section which is run down, but vibrant. Multi-family houses line both sides of East Main.[27] About 10,000 people live in the target area, most of them Latino (about 60

percent) of Puerto Rican descent (with a newer influx of Dominican) and African-Americans (about 20 percent). The remaining 20 percent is divided into Anglos (16%) and newly arrived Asians.[28] There are identified zones of heavy drug dealing activity and prostitution along both sides of East Main, including the Washington Park area and Pembroke Street, a major gateway to a well known drive-buy location.

The East Main area is a haven for blatant open-air drug dealing. Crack, as well as powder cocaine and heroin, sustain these markets. Most of the drug dealing in this area takes the form of either walk-through or drive-buy sale/purchases. It is typical for buyers and sellers to be unconcerned about the possibility of being arrested. That is, buyers openly enquire about products and stop to purchase at the various dealing spots, and sellers conduct a great deal of "public marketing" (for instance, yelling out the names of their brands) aimed at prospective customers driving by or walking through.[29] It is not uncommon in this area to observe, non-whites, as well as whites, get out of their cars, make a deal, get back into their cars, and drive away.

Drive buys here are a fact of life. Unobtrusive observation by an Abt Associates' informant reveals that on any given night occupants of up to 140 cars, including late-model Buick Skylarks, Chevy Blazers, Nissan Trucks, Cadillacs, and Toyotas, can be observed trying to "score;" and in this process, demonstrating a "blatant disregard for the law..."[30]

Implementation

During February 1993 the City of Bridgeport was at the early implementation stages of the Phoenix Project. Delays have characterized the entire implementation period. The city was to have started work on installation of the barriers during the second week of April 1993 but implementation work did not commence until the second week of May 1993. Tom Rebollar, the Police Department's Crime Prevention Coordinator who is responsible for the implementation of the Phoenix Project, and the City appear to have erred in their assessment of how much time would be required to implement the city's ambitious plan. To their credit however, rather than plow ahead without proper consideration of all of the issues, they have moved slowly, ostensibly improving their chances for success.

According to Rebollar, pending the clarification of liability issues and the working out of new Fire and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) routes, the Bridgeport Police used the pre-implementation period to "soften" the area employing traditional police methods. However, at this point it appears that the police presence at the target area's known dealing locations has not deterred most drug dealing. Most police surveillance, aside from a handful of high profile busts during the prior few weeks,[31] appears to be characterized by cruisers patrolling randomly through the streets known for heavy dealing. During the first five days of field observations Abt Associates' confidential informant reported having observed no foot patrols.[32]

At its outset, to some, Bridgeport's ambitious traffic modification plan to combat street level drug dealing marketed to the drive-buy commuter user may have appeared as a desperate act. However, as the Phoenix Project emerged from its planning stage it became clear that this was a carefully orchestrated strategy, the scope of which reflects the dire state of the city in general and that of the East Main Street area in particular.

Perspectives on Dealing Activity in the East Main Area

With implementation of the Phoenix Project, Abt staff completed the baseline data gathering effort. Ethnographic data gathered for this research confirmed that the description of the drug dealing situation in the East Main area and its severity as presented by the Bridgeport Police Department is accurate. Although data cannot provide a definitive picture of whether drug dealing in the area is fueled primarily

by out-of-towners, recorded observations suggest two things: (1) the police department's estimate that out-of-town, drive-buy customers constitute about 80 percent of the illicit drug market share in this area is inaccurate; and (2) a clear behavior pattern by drive-buy purchasers exists regardless of whether or not they live in the city or whether or not they are white.

What Abt Staff and Others See

The East Main area does have its signs of positive change, though even these reflect strong safety concerns stemming from the high crime character of the area. One example is the recently constructed Luis Munoz Marin middle school is located on Helen Street just above Stillman. The red brick structure is an impressive one, with a high perimeter fence that surrounds the school and a parking lot. The building constructed in an arc formation, is bordered by Helen on the east and Stillman on the south and sits in the middle of what was the upper end of Hallett Street slightly below Putnam.

The Whiteway Cafe, its white neon lights against a red porcelain sign, is located on East Main at Shelton. The McGivney Community Center is located at the corner of Stillman and Kossuth. A block to the south at Kossuth and Jane is the area's burned out branch of the public library. There is an obvious dealing location at the intersection of Shelton and Brooks Streets. 355 Brooks, one of two entrances to the building on the northwest corner of the intersection, appears to be the heart of the selling location. Abt staff drove by several times and were more than once invited to purchase. The spot is located a block from P.O.S.T. which is at 1197 East Main Street, on the west side of the street between Stillman and Berkshire Streets.

On Friday, May 21, 1993, riding along with Neighborhood Police Officers Mike Sample and Jorge Reyes, Abt staff observed dealing activity at the Brooks and Shelton Streets location. The police confirmed that this is a marijuana selling location; and indeed, graffiti on the sidewalk ("Marijuana") bolster this conclusion and let the drive-buy or walk-thru customer know that this corner's dealers carry marijuana.

The area's two community policing officers pointed out for staff the phenomenon of drug product marketing. That is, according to the type of product sold at a given street dealing spot, so go the markings on the fire hydrants, walls, or side walks. These markings usually take the form of stylized graffiti "tags" written on the wall of a building at the selling location. The drive buy or walk through shopper can identify the area and products sold at the specific dealing spot by the graffiti. For example, staff noted STP which stands for Silver Top Posse and BTP for Black Top Posse. For a drive buy, all one needs to know is the color or marking of the product desired and how to recognize it. Regular buyers know their product as well as who's got it.

On a warm day Abt staff noticed much more blatant prostitution around known sex trade locations in and adjacent to the target area. Specifically, staff noticed an obvious increase in prostitution around Washington Park. Sex workers in this area include both males (and transvestites) and females. In an adjacent area, to the south of the New Haven line train lines, prostitutes frequent the streets just to the north of the Jai Alai complex. While five police officers were observed at the gate to the large parking area that surrounds the complex, Abt staff observed no foot patrols or police cars along the surrounding blocks, heavy with dealing and sex trade activity.

Other features of the target area and the adjacent blighted district to the south include a welfare office and Father Panik Village, formerly one of the nation's most infamous public housing developments. During an earlier era, to reduce dealing activity and violent crime at Father Panik, Bridgeport halved the size of the development by knocking down many of its two and three story red brick buildings. Additionally, a street that formerly ran through the now demolished part of the development was closed off and remains closed to traffic. As a result of the street closing and demolition of half of the development's apartments, the drug trade has moved to the other side of the complex. There, as Abt staff

observed during site visits, the trade continues to thrive.

The names of a block of East Main Street businesses along the southern portion of the street tell a story about the strong Hispanic character of this area. Factory Bedding and Furniture Outlet, Zien Grocery, La Dulce Vida, La Deportiva Barber Shop, Airway Driving School, a branch of the post office, Casa de Empenos, Medical Pharmacy, and Campus Office Park (an industrial park). Nearby 815 Pembroke Street used to be the area's WIC building.

The area is home to several homeless shelters: the Pembroke Street Shelter and the Brooks Street Shelter. These are both run by the YMCA. Besides these there is a shelter for single women;
Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, which used to run clear through Father Panik village to Waterview. Several years ago, the drive named in honor of the nation's proudest advocate of non violence, was barricaded to combat dealing activity and violence in the development. Today grass grows in the empty fields that stand on either side of Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive between Pembroke Street and what remains of Father Panik Village. Between the graffiti scarred jersey barriers at Pembroke and the development, quiet finally reigns where 20 or so buildings once stood. The buildings were knocked down ostensibly ending dealing and firefights in what was once the western half of the development. With the buildings gone the dealers have taken their business to Waterview, the eastern boundary of the housing complex. P-dope, synthetic heroin, is the drug for sale here. Together with the project's folk expert, who used to visit her grandmother, a longtime resident, at Father Panik, Abt staff observed dealing activity on Waterview. Dealers here are young African American men and teens, as are the many dealers who frequent nearby Seaview at Williston and Holley Streets in the city's east end.

Commenting on the Phoenix Project plan back in May 1993, Charles Brilvitch, the city historian, expresses mixed feelings about the idea. Brilvitch recalls visiting a friend who owned a home on Sigourney Street, a drug-infested area of Hartford, Connecticut, another community in which traffic flow modification was experimented with, some years ago. He notes, "The barriers were all graffiti covered and they served as a surface against which to smash beer bottles."[33]

Police Sources

During Abt's site visit to the East Main area in early April 1993, staff met with Kevin Hanks and Jorge Jaiman of P.O.S.T. Concerning the open air dealing in the area, both men stress that the Phoenix Project is not all the City is planning to do to combat the problem. At that time, Jaiman related that he hopes the city will have a high visibility interdiction effort in place pre-barriers. This, he said, should be accompanied by a police effort to identify gang members, a "light the night" program, and neighborhood tree plantings. The area has deteriorated, according to Jaiman, because of neglect. He notes that having P.O.S.T. in the area has reduced problems within the immediate area around the storefront office, displacing dealing activity to the side streets. P.O.S.T., located on East Main between Shelton and Ogden, has also put in place an anonymous reporting system and serves as a location for the exchange of information on local dealing activity.

In April 1993 Jorge Jaiman reported that it took P.O.S.T. several months to build trust in the community. At the outset, Captain Torres, Chief Executive Officer for Community Services, and Chief Sweeney, held mass community meetings to explain the community policing initiative. As mentioned above, Jaiman, who expects more arrests over time to send a message to area residents and out-of-towners alike, believes that 80% of the buyers are suburbanites.[34] Of the buyers he says the police have identified, many are white, 15-25 year olds from towns like Shelton, Wilton, Greenwich, and Stamford. Jaiman sees a lot of late-model BMWs and other upper end cars in the area. A magnum shot of crack that sells on the east side for $5 (one or two hits) goes for $20 in Shelton. A $20 rock sells for $60. According to Jaiman, only 20% of the trade involves local buyers but locals and suburbanites alike scoop up the local products which include crack, cocaine, p-dope or synthetic heroin, heroin ("manteca,"

"tecata"), and weed. Jaiman describes the dealers as nomads who go where the heat is not.

A fireplug of a Vietnam veteran who once trained soldiers in lethal martial arts and now provides gang intelligence for the police department, Jorge Jaiman explains that dealing in the target area is controlled by two gangs, the Latin Kings and The Nation. The gangs disallow drug use by members themselves. The two groups are reportedly involved in a three-year-old turf battle that Jaiman expects to explode shortly into a full blown gang war. Jaiman notes the recent killings, including that of the girlfriend of a leader of the Latin Kings.[35]

The City is also experiencing probes into the area by the Crips and two Jamaican American gangs, the Rats and the Cats.[36] The east side also has some Indonesian and Vietnamese gang activity as well as white supremacist, neonazi gangs.[37] The Hells Angels, loosely affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood, have moved back into Bridgeport and are reportedly trying to unite to make a run for drug territory. For now, according to Jaiman, most of the east side's runners and small time street sellers are "wanna bees," not the upper echelon of the Latin Kings.

In May 1993, Tom Rebollar, Crime Prevention Coordinator for the Bridgeport Police Department reported that in implementing the Phoenix Project the department is trying to anticipate displacement of the drug trade into other areas of the city including one known as the Hollow, a neighborhood to the west of downtown. Bridgeport, Rebollar acknowledges, is a local point of distribution outside of New York City for drugs. While he claims that there has been no negative community reaction to the plan, Abt's field work indicated that this may have more to do with the fact that until recently, many, if not most community residents, still knew little or nothing about the plan.[38] During Abt's April 1993 site visit Tom Rebollar reiterated that the objective of the Phoenix Project is to disrupt the drug bazaars that predominate on many side streets of the east side. The merchants come from other areas of the city to sell here, he adds, and Phoenix is an attempt to reinstill some sense of order in this community.[39] He is hopeful they will be able to secure funding to raze the many area buildings that are burned out and abandoned and serve as staging grounds for street-level drug selling.

Several local stores are reportedly also involved in the drug business as money launderers. According to Bridgeport Police, a well known operation is run by the Soto family. Police allege that Soto is a high ranking Latin King and point to several store-front businesses along East Main Street that are part of the Soto Latin Kings.[40]

Ethnographic Sources

Ethnographic sources estimate that only about 10-30 percent of the area's drug dealing is fueled by out-of-town drive-buy customers, a number substantially lower than the 80 percent estimate provided by the police but nevertheless a significant percentage. A solid drug-use problem among African Americans, caucasians, and Hispanics city-wide suggests that even if "white people" from out-of-town stopped coming in from the suburbs, the East Main area would still have a considerable drug and crime problem. Abt's confidential informant, an individual with extensive community/drug treatment expertise reports that he personally knows some of the whites observed buying in the East Main area to be Bridgeport residents.[41]

Although analysis of the initial data revealed that about 44 percent of observed drive-buys were white, the East Main area itself has a white population of about 16 percent;[42] and, whites represent about 21 percent of all clients attending two different drug treatment programs that recruit only city residents.[43] These two factors suggest that though some white drive-buy customers may come from out-of-town, a large sector of whites buying drugs in this community are not from the suburbs.

About 72 percent of all drive-buy customers stopped their cars right at the dealing spot. Only 27 percent of all drive-buys trying to "score" had to loop/drive around. Similarly, about 80 percent of those who stopped conducted a "public transaction" where a drug deal occurred after stopping. This indicates that drive-buys know exactly where they are going to score in this area; and, as the police point out, there

is a clear modus operandi for scoring. Hence, regardless of where the buyers come from, blocking drive-buy access could have some impact in reducing dealing activity in this area.

Further preliminary examination of the "commuter" factor was undertaken. After selecting for only drive-buys where a transaction was observed, crosstabulation indicate that there are no significant differences between white and non-white drive-buys who drove right to the dealing spot (78 percent and 76 percent respectively). On the other hand, whites were more likely to drive-buy during the early morning hours than non-whites (48 percent and 32 percent respectively). This however, does not necessarily mean that most white buyers who come in during the late night are from out-of-town. Exhibits 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 summarize the observations of Abt's confidential informant.[44]

Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User

Observations By Confidential Informant

Exhibit 1.1



72 percent of all drive-buy customers stopped their car at the dealing location. Frequently, an observable public transaction took place.

Number of Drive-buy Purchasers

(n=76)

Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User

Observations By Confidential Informant

Exhibit 1.2

Active marketing of different products in the area is a public endeavor with little regard for law enforcement. Frequently, dealers advertise their products to drivers and passers by, while lookouts watch for any police activity that might disrupt business. As shown on the graph, 80% of all observed dealings occurred in public view. The names of the different products along with the markings that distinguish them are presented to those who either walk or drive by through the area. Dealers yelling "Black Top Posse" to prospective clients would be an example of this phenomenon.



Type of Dealing Situation Observed

(n=76)

Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User

Observations By Confidential Informant

Exhibit 1.3

Got out of car, scored
80%

Many drive-buy purchasers know the area well. It is not uncommon for them to get out of their cars and "score". Abt assumes that many individuals come predominantly from other communities within the city itself. Similarly, those who cruise around are more likely to be "outsiders" from surrounding towns and suburbs, less familiar with the East Main area and therefore more reluctant to get out of their cars.



Went down the street
7%

Cruised and Purchase
13%

Drive-buy Purchasers' Behavior

(n=76)

Ethnographic and informant sources also point out that the drug dealing problem on the east side is fueled by walk-thrus as much as by drive-buys. Jersey barriers cannot keep walk-thrus away.[45] Initial intelligence from dealers reveals that, in fact, they are more informed about the barriers plan than many area residents. Their organizations believe they can find ways to weather the storm.[46] Moreover, alternative methods of conducting business already exist. Even before the first of the barriers were installed drive-buy customers were able to park their cars several blocks away, walk to a specific spot and wait for a bicycle or hand delivery.

Concerning the use of reverse stings, a common method used in Bridgeport and elsewhere to apprehend buyers, Abt's folk expert offers a negative assessment of the efficacy of such strategies in the East Main area. For the folk expert, the usefulness of reverse stings is at best temporary and confined to snaring those who are not only from out-of-town, but also are new to buying in the area. There are several reasons for this. For example, locals who deal or are used to buying in the area know who is who. In many drug operations there are "runners" whose sole job it is to direct traffic to the sellers or let the buyers know what product is available. It would be very rare for locals to buy from undercover cops. Those buyers most likely to purchase from an undercover are most likely to be from out-of-town or otherwise new to the area, buyers who do not have a product and face to relate this to yet and are therefore more likely to fall for the reverse sting. Locals do not buy from undercover cops.

The Barriers

The East Main Street-Pembroke Street exit (# 28) off I95 empties into Nichols and East Main.[47] Upon exiting the highway, the first installation of Jersey barriers (painted "traffic" yellow) can be seen down Pembroke Street, at Barnum. A "Wrong Way" sign at Pembroke and Barnum Streets forces traffic to turn right or left at the intersection.

Turning left and then right at Brooks Street, one can enter the first (and to date only) of the City's looped streets areas. From the south, the first barrier loops traffic around to the right, at the corner of Brooks and Maple. Exhibit 1.4 is a map of the East Main Street area. Exhibits 1.5 and 1.6 show views of the looped streets areas as conceived by the Phoenix Project's planners.

As reconfigured, it is necessary to turn right at the intersection of Pembroke and Maple Streets. One can loop back around to Barnum and turn right on Barnum continuing to East Main Street, the first block beyond Brooks. At East Main, turning right and then making another right into Maple Street provides a view down Maple Street at four sets of barriers.

The new traffic pattern forces the driver up to Arctic where one can turn right, over one block to Pembroke, right again to Maple, and thus left and then right at the next intersection at Maple and Pembroke Streets where the second set of barriers is located. Photographs of the area and the barriers (attached) capture the Phoenix Project at implementation. Few patrol cars frequent the area during the morning hours. Nor, before noon, does a passer-by see much evidence of dealers "hanging out" waiting for customers. Dealers tend to start work around mid-day, working into the early-morning hours. Dealing activity in Bridgeport, as well as elsewhere, tends to increase as it gets later in the day.

During site visits to the East Main area Abt staff drove through the target area, as if actually trying to "score." On one occasion, driving a new Toyota Tercel with Massachusetts plates, staff were clearly identifiable as outsiders. Project staff drove through the area using different vehicles on each of the visits. This, together with the lengthy time interval between site visits, make it highly unlikely that dealers or others with whom staff made only the most casual acquaintance, recalled us from one visit to the next.

Map of the East Main Street Area

Site of First Installation of Jersey Barriers

Exhibit 1.4



Map of the East Main Street Area

Site of First Installation of Jersey Barriers

Exhibit 1.4b



1. Representation of the barriers concept along Maple, Pembroke and Jane Streets.


Exhibit 1.5
LOOP STREET
30' ROADWAY
50' ROW
PROPERTY LINE
SIDEWALK
PARALLEL PARKING
16' MIN CARRIAGEWAY
4'D PLANTERS (3)
16' JERSEY BARRIER
STREET


Exhibit 1.6
NO PARKING WITHIN 25' OF INSIDE CORNER
ENFORCED WITH PLANTERS AND
CURB/STREET MARKING
4'D PLANTERS
16' JERSEY BARRIER
10' EMERGENCY PASSAGE
CHAIN W/ SIGN
LOOP STREET
RETURNING STREETS TO PEOPLE
1992 SEPT
1" = 10'
16' MIN CARRIAGEWAY
30' ROADWAY
10'
10'
50' ROW
PROPERTY LINE
SIDEWALK
PARALLEL PARKING
PARALLEL PARKING
SIDEWALK
PROPERTY LINE

Exhibit 1.7
Photographs of the East Side area

Exhibit 1.7
Photographs of the East Side Area

Exhibit 1.7
Photographs of the East Side Area

At the corner of Maple and Hallett Streets one encounters the third set of Jersey barriers. Each of the sets includes several highway-orange 55 gallon drums and is set in asphalt. After passing the final set of barriers at Hallett and Maple, staff took a left on Helen Street and drove north past an old, long-abandoned red brick factory building and a curiously sparse cemetery that begins at Arctic and runs north and east for several blocks.

Community Interviews (n=35)

Thirty five interviews were conducted with a cross-section of the East Main Street community during June 1993. The sample included 20 females and 15 males (17 Hispanics, 10 African Americans and 8 whites). The residents' responses to the installation of Jersey barriers around the neighborhood are mixed. Resident responses in the albeit small sample reflect a willingness to give the plan a chance. That is, residents believe that "something is being done for Bridgeport" and the barriers deserve the residents' patience. Overall, there was an increased sense of confidence in the police and in the City, and an appreciation that something is being done to stem the rampant drug activity in the neighborhood. Taken as a whole, resident attitudes are changing towards a more accepting view of the Phoenix Project. In general, there is the sentiment that the quality of life in the neighborhood is improving. As to the long-term future, a sort of "wait and see" attitude prevails among this group of residents.

On the other hand, the interviews suggest that area resident's still have many questions about the barriers and that strong concerns linger about the disruption they will cause in resident's lives. For example, there remains deep-rooted confusion about this plan. Although the Phoenix Project is by and large a law enforcement approach, interviewees' remarks reveal that some area residents believe that the plan's aim is to keep "children out of trouble" or "decrease drug abuse" in the area.[48] In addition, the sample could not name the number of barriers to be installed, nor the locations; thus revealing no real sense of the inconveniences that the barriers might bring to the area. Abt's consultant interviewer reports that this is due in part to the fact that ten months into the project, many area residents are only now becoming aware of Phoenix Project. Most residents, it seems, are still not fully aware of what the project entails or how it will affect their lives over the long run.

Several interviewees expressed the view that the project would not work because "buyers will park and walk to the sellers."[49] Indeed, some of those interviewed used nearly identical language to describe the *park and buy* phenomenon. For example, a Hispanic male told the interviewer, "The barriers have not helped the neighborhood because cars park outside and [buyers] walk to the dealing spot." Similarly, a white female remarked that, "They [buyers] park their cars elsewhere and walk to [the] dealers."[50] This women went on to say that she thought that the barriers create inconvenience for neighborhood residents without clear results. Moreover, several June 1993 interviewees reported that young children, nine to thirteen, can be seen making drug deliveries on bikes to those who walk-buy and wait for a delivery.

Several of those interviewed, particularly women, said they saw an advantage in the project in improved children's safety. However, one respondent observed that she was very scared of the barriers because vehicles in high speed chases may use the sidewalk to try and go around the barriers.

Street-level dealing, gang activity, and prostitution are common complaints of this group of area residents. They see these activities as common features of the community. Complaints about inadequate public safety measures, especially at night, were voiced and interviewees identified an increase police presence as one of the most immediate community needs.

Most of those interviewed said they thought the problem of drugs in the East Main area is due to "outsiders." Since the Police Officers Sector Terminal (P.O.S.T.)[51] opened the growing perception in the area is that drug activity and crime have decrease in the immediate area. In addition, some of the interviewees who live adjacent to where the first several barriers were installed told Abt's interviewer that

they have seen a reduction in traffic, that the streets are calmer, and that there have been fewer drug sellers and buyers. A seventeen year resident of the area opined that the few barriers in place have helped to slow the drug flow. A Hispanic female pointed out that "[Project Phoenix] is a great idea as long as it minimizes drug [activity] and crime in the neighborhood;"[52] while a Hispanic male who works in the area stated, "I am very much against the idea. It is a burden."[53] Another Hispanic female resident remarked that "The project would be great, but only if the long [Jersey] barriers were left without the orange garbage cans and a drainage system was installed so water and trash do not collect and sit there."[54]

Concerns Over the Barriers

While interviews with area residents suggest that many neighborhood people accept the installation of the jersey barriers and other aspects of the law enforcement response to the problem of street-level dealing, others are troubled by the latest answer in a series of approaches put forth to little avail.[55] Sure the situation is out-of-control they acknowledge, but the solutions must not interfere with the delivery of public services and the carrying on of legitimate community activity. Bridgeport fire officials, for example, are reportedly among those not enamored of the idea of installing traffic barriers at many intersections throughout the East Main area.[56] The Fire Department evidently feels that the concrete barriers designed to disrupt the open air drug bazaar in the city's East Main may be impediments to emergency vehicles too. According to Bridgeport Police Chief Thomas Sweeney, the project involves concessions. He notes, "We're balancing a lot of interests in the interest of stabilizing a neighborhood. Yes, it's going to take some relearning — for the police too."[57]

The maze created by the barriers and other traffic-control devices presumably will make the area less inviting to suburban drug buyers than the easy-in, easy-out access previously provided by local streets and their proximity to Interstate 95. But the maze, say fire, ambulance, and citizen spokespersons, could have other effects too. "It's certainly going to slow us down. We already have a tough enough time keeping within a four minute response time. It's not a safety concern for my people, it's for the civilians," said fire Supt. Patrick Shevlin, president of Firefighters Local 834.[58]

The Bridgeport Police Department appears to have isolated potential supporters of the plan by not consulting with them in advance. Bridgeport Ambulance which provides emergency medical services to the city was not included in any talks regarding the Phoenix Project and did not know where the barriers were going to be placed until it was given a map in early May 1993. Clyde Nicholson, head of the Citizens Rights Organization went as far as to say the barriers constitute more of a hazard than a help to the neighborhood. Rhetorically, he asks, "If a house is on fire and they have to circle the block or they make a wrong turn, what are we going to do, wait until a family burns up."[59]

Business as Usual?

The less than complete effectiveness of the city's drug interdiction efforts in the East Main area may be seen in the continued presence of selling by the Green Top Posse at Williams and Maple Street. The Green Top Posse controls this corner and the block to the south of Maple. As recently as Monday, August 9, 1993 suspected dealers could be seen hanging out on the porch of the big victorian house on the southwest corner and in front of Williams Grocery and Deli a little south of Maple on the east side of Williams.

Abt's community informant reports that on Fridays a smart block captain can make $10,000 by directing a number of dealers and runners along the sidewalk. The captain comes along around every hour or so to collect money. The captain does not let dealers accumulate more than $500 at a time.

According to the informant there are lots of local kids with machine guns including *Mack Nines* and *Tens*, that offer multi-bullet discharge. Adds the informant, "Some of these guys are good too. They will take a car, single it out, and shootout the windows. When? Anytime, Sunday in the daytime."[60]

In recent months a new, potent grade of heroin has spread throughout Connecticut's cities and killed dozens of people.[61] In Bridgeport, ten deaths are attributed to the potent drug. Because the heroin is so strong, users do not have to take it intravenously to get the desired rush. This eliminates the risk of contracting AIDS from contaminated needles.[62] This year police in Connecticut cities have found heroin that is 50 and 60 percent pure, purity levels unheard of a few years ago when the heroin on the street was usually in the 5 percent range. "Instead of buying prepackaged heroin from their New York suppliers, Connecticut dealers are buying pure heroin and then cutting it themselves," says the head of the New Haven Police Department's narcotics squad. "But it is an art to cut heroin, and these guys often don't know what they're doing, so they come up with these hot loads that kill people."[63] Adds, a Hartford narcotics officer, "Most of the heroin has been stepped on several times by the time it hits the street. But we also seize very pure heroin every once in a while. Last week, for instance, we found pure heroin on a guy who had it sewn into the tongue of his shoe."[64]

The potent heroin first showed up in the state's Latin-American neighborhoods but now is being sold by other white and black dealers as well. A very-high-profit item, dealers can make more money selling heroin than they can selling cocaine.[65] What the new high-grade heroin forebodes for the East Main area it is still too early to tell. Arguably however, the largely ineffectual barriers plan will have no greater impact on the fight against high purity heroin sales than it has had on street-level sales of crack, p-dope, and marijuana.

Conclusion

Since the Phoenix Project's inception, Bridgeport officials have maintained that the initiative will be a success. Specifically they declare that the East Main Street community will recover and that beautification campaigns, community policing approaches, reverse stings, high visibility interdictions, renewed neighborhood involvement, social action programs, and traffic modification are the tools with which the city will achieve this renewal. Bridgeport officials proclaim these high expectations to the community, the media, dealers and passers by alike.

The Bridgeport Chief of Police, the Crime Prevention Coordinator, and area police officers maintain that outsiders, mostly well-to-do suburbanites who drive in the East Main area to buy drugs, represent the lion's share of the drug buyers in this community. Once they are gone, the problem of street drug dealing will subside. The City, through its police department, has stressed, for example, that local dealers are already nervous because they know that soon suburbanites will stop driving into the area to buy. Indeed there has been changes in the neighborhood since the P.O.S.T. open on East Main Street. Heavy street dealing activity has declined along the blocks in the closest proximity to the P.O.S.T. In fact, the P.O.S.T. has become one of the last bastions of order and organization in an area that looks, at best, beaten down. Residents who live in the immediate vicinity of the P.O.S.T. may even have seen a slight improvement in the quality of life and may feel safer, at least until five o'clock in the afternoon when P.O.S.T. closes its doors for the day.

While the enthusiasm of city officials for the Phoenix Project is admirable, this study suggests that there is little cause for celebration in the slow implementation of the program to date. Ten months of observation have detected no neighborhood beautification campaigns or "light the night" programs, no high visibility police actions. Instead, project staff have witnessed a neighborhood still ridden with filth and the burned out hulks of torched buildings in every direction one looks. While city officials inform the public of all the improvements that will be made to the neighborhood, to date, the situation in this neighborhood remains very much unchanged. Blatant open air dealing continues to thrive.

In interviews with Abt staff and with a consultant hired by Abt, many community residents stated that they feel the city has done a consistently poor job when it comes to traditional municipal services such as providing police protection, garbage collection, cleaning up littered properties, removing abandoned vehicles, fixing street lights, and responding to homeowners' complaints. For many it is difficult to believe that the City of Bridgeport possesses the resources that will be necessary to make a dent in this situation. For example, the east side is full of burned-out properties, creating a haven for those who feed on deterioration and decay. In the view of the sociologist James Q. Wilson this is one of the strongest indicators that no one cares about a community. In the East Main area, litter and abandoned properties abound. The burned out hulk of a local branch of the Bridgeport Public Library is a fine example of Wilson's Broken Windows theory. When a city allows the public library to remain a target at which local gang members fire their automatic weapons, the message is clear: the city does not, or can not afford, to care. On the other hand, interviews with a small sample (n=35) of area residents conducted in June 1993 suggest that these interviewees do feel that the City is becoming more responsive to their concerns and that the installation of barriers along Maple Street has contributed to a decline in drive-buy drug traffic. This expression of area resident approval of Bridgeport's plan and action, together with June interviewee comments that suggest the barriers and P.O.S.T. may be improving the quality of life of area residents, are encouraging. So too are the numbers recorded by the mechanical traffic counter installed on Pembroke Street between Maple and Arctic Streets. The counter, in operation from June 28 through July 28, 1993 recorded low vehicle counts (Under 40 cars per hour) at what would be considered peak dealing hours, Friday and Saturday evenings between 12:00 and 1:00 am.

Nonetheless, the lack of police resources sufficient to deal effectively with drug activity in this area was a frequent concern cited by interviewees. Residents complain of an inadequate police presence in the area in the night and evening. The P.O.S.T. closing at 5:00 pm on weekdays is a severe limitation on the efficacy of community policing in this neighborhood. Many times more important than the barriers to the eradication effort is a strong police presence. Initial intelligence gathered during the second site visit pointed to dealers being more informed about the barriers plan than many area residents and that alternative methods of conducting business already existed. For example, drive-buy customers were always able to park their cars several blocks away and walk to a specific spot where they can wait for a bicycle- or hand-delivery.

For ten months, Abt staff have interviewed area residents and dealers and observed the East Main area's dealing scene. Several of the dealers interviewed have been selling drugs for over a decade and many have seen law enforcement interdiction efforts come and go. Reports from Abt's confidential informant also capture the comments of long time area residents who have seen several high visibility approaches (though none of this magnitude) come and go over the years. On the whole, these observers believe that after some initial hoopla and circumstance, the dealing situation will return to normal. Even one of the area's biggest dealers, pointed out to Abt staff by police and later interviewed in private, declared that while business might go down temporarily, "it is definitely not drying up."[66]

Abt's confidential informant reports that on any given night there continues to be considerable drive-buy traffic in the East Main area. But, reports the informant, there is also a fair amount of walk-thru traffic with the same purpose.

Several area residents and community workers have expressed the view that if the aim of the City's plan is to close off the East Main area to white people, then the problem of crime and drugs will not be solved; and further, that even if it is reduced, this reduction will not be sufficient for law and order to claim a victory. These critics refer to the long standing community problems such as inadequate job opportunities and scant substance abuse treatment services that need to be adequately addressed as part of any plan to restore sound community life. They observe that other initiatives should have been tried first and that publicity about the initiatives should have been kept to a minimum.

Bridgeport City Historian Charles Brilvitch's anecdote about Hartford, where after a few weeks

jersey barriers became graffiti ridden and a surface against which to smash bottles, is telling. As early as Abt's second visit to the target area, shortly after the first (and only) of the barriers to be installed to date, staff remembered those prophetic words as they looked upon Maple Street's graffiti-covered, litter-strewn barriers. Extending the barriers plan to the entire 10 X 10 East Main target area will result in a significant expansion of surfaces against which bottles might be broken and on which *tags* scrawled.

If realized, the City of Bridgeport's plan would modify traffic flow, encircling an entire neighborhood within the boundaries of decay and violence. The plan evidences an impressive collaboration between the City, the State of Connecticut, the Connecticut National Guard, local contractors, and others. Yet with the exception of the Strategic Intervention For High Risk Youth (SIHRY) program and the construction of the Luis Munoz Marin School, there has been inadequate attention given to developing plans for the effective delivery of basic city services, community law enforcement, drug treatment services, and community economic development assistance. In the view of Abt's confidential street informant, a long time Bridgeport resident, the East Main area is a neighborhood that has been largely ignored for over two decades by the City of Bridgeport and the State.[67] The Bridgeport Police Department has demonstrated a high level of commitment to this project and to this community. But regardless of how much of a positive presence several community police officers may be, they cannot offer all of the basic and special services a city is expected to offer; and they cannot provide employment and other opportunities such as home ownership programs to community residents. Their role remains at best, only one component of a community's response; that of providing law enforcement to the community.

Issues For Further Research

Two shortcomings of the above described research are (1) that it has come to an end with only a fraction of the plan having been implemented, and (2) that staff were only able to make less than optimal use of mechanical traffic counters to capture drive-buy traffic flow at baseline and after installation of the barriers. In order to enable Abt to continue to follow developments in Bridgeport, Abt encourages ONDCP to consider further funding of Abt's research in the City. There is a need to refine our understanding of the phenomenon of drive-buy drug markets so that policy and practice may better respond to the challenge of cutting off access by the out-of-town and local buyer alike. While this study and many others confirms that out-of-town buyers represent a quantifiable share of the urban drug market, an assessment of just how important that market share is to the continued viability of the trade eludes policy researchers and law enforcement alike. Future research might also consider New York City's response to the problem of drug dealing directed at the drive-buy customer in two demographically distinct areas of New York, the neighborhood around the Manhattan-side of the George Washington Bridge in Washington Heights, and the Brownsville/East New York community in Brooklyn.[68] Many of the questions Abt posed in Bridgeport can be asked about drug-related activity in the Washington Heights and Brownsville neighborhoods and of New York's response. The New York City Police Department has employed a variety of strategies to combat street-level drug selling in these areas. The range of approaches has included street closings, the rerouting of traffic, 'reverse' stings, car seizures, and the use of 'Tactical Narcotics Teams' (TNT), defined as "mobile concentrated overlays of plain-clothes and undercover narcotics officers deployed to supplement normal police activity in identified target areas for about 90 days."[69]

Consideration of New York's response to this significant phenomenon represents an important evolution of Abt's research in the field. How one of the nation's largest cities responds to commuter user drug markets presents useful lessons for the nation as a whole. In addition to documenting the city's approach, the proposed research is important because it will further contribute to our understanding of the role of nonresident users in maintaining the viability of urban drug markets. With the growing

acknowledgement that urban drug-related criminal activity is a regional as well as local urban problem. the results of the proposed research will help policy makers fine-tune their response to the problem.

Because of Abt's work on this topic, staff are up-to-speed on the issues and have developed a professional synergy that benefits the quality of their research. The proposed work would employ many of the urban ethnographic and other qualitative research techniques that the researchers have honed in Bridgeport.[70] Additionally, Mr. Epstein brings to the project a detailed familiarity with both the Manhattan and Brooklyn neighborhoods and has indispensable contacts in the New York City Police Department and the Manhattan and Brooklyn District Attorney's Offices.[71] He is also a New Yorker with family ties to the Brownsville/East New York area. Mr. Sifre's fluency in Spanish will facilitate access to the Spanish speaking residents of Washington Heights. The drug trade in Washington Heights is reputedly controlled by immigrants from the Dominican Republic.

Further study of the topic of drive-buy commuter drug markets would also make use of mechanical traffic counters to capture traffic flow at baseline, and following implementation of particular interdiction strategies. Use of this technology in the Bridgeport study was less than optimal.

The proposed work would begin with a narrowly-focused literature review on drug elimination strategies in New York City. Much of the important research was identified by proposed staff during the literature review phase of the Bridgeport commuter user project.

The proposed research offers a contrast between two urban drug markets on the question of the importance of drive buy or commuter customers. It also captures for a national audience the response of one of the nation's largest cities. The proposed project offers the promise of refining observation and measurement techniques for evaluation of anti-commuter user efforts. It would draw upon the observation techniques used in Bridgeport with particular emphasis on the use of local ethnographers to provide in-depth information on the context and impacts of urban dealing activity directed at drive-buy drug purchasers. Abt proposes to augment the ethnographers' information by seeking independent local contacts or "folk experts" whose normal course of work involves them in some way in the life of the communities being observed. Abt expects that this expansion of measurement/observation methods will both sharpen the ability of staff to draw conclusions about factors effecting impacts of anti-commuter user efforts and will capture the role of commuter users in two urban drug markets.

Glossary

Bodega:	Little store (Spanish).
BCAC:	Bridgeport Child Advocacy Coalition.
BJA:	Bureau of Justice Assistance. U.S. Department of Justice.
CASA:	Center On Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University.
CPTED:	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.
Dojo:	School, academy (Japanese).
EMS:	Emergency Medical Service.
HCTC:	Housatonic Community-Technical College.
OJJDP:	Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
ONDCP:	Office of National Drug Control Policy.
POST:	Police Officers Sector Terminal. A community policing substation located on East Main Street.
RYSAP:	Regional Youth Substance Abuse Project of the United Way of Eastern Fairfield County.
Sensei:	Teacher, instructor (Japanese).
SIHRY:	The Strategic Intervention for High Risk Youth is directed by the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University.
Spliff:	Large cigar-like marijuana cigarette (Jamaican).
Tag:	A graffiti writer's name, written on the side of a building, jersey barrier, bus, or other surface.

Appendix A

Excepts from Confidential Informant's Field Reports

(Written) Report to Abt Associates, Saturday, 7/16/93, Discussing Earlier Visits to the Area

This is my first day on assignment. It is a Saturday at 5:00 pm and it is quite warm and sunny. My first social contact is a 25-30 year old Hispanic male whom I've known for a few years. I asked him what his views were about the police having jersey barricades placed at strategic locations throughout the community for the sake of curbing drug trafficking. His initial response was that it creates an inconvenience to get from one street to another because you now have to go around in a wide circle instead of going directly to your destination as you could before. Next he stated that he had been living in the area for a decade and he had seen drug trafficking and violence steadily increase year after year. Because of this it is very difficult to be optimistic about seeing any measurable change except for the worse. He proceeded to say, in spite of his misgivings, that anything that could potentially make the area safer and reduce the drug problem would be much appreciated.

My next conversation on the matter was with an 18 year old Hispanic youth who is one of the dealers. He offered that it would be "business as usual" regardless of what the police do and if the police strategy has a noticeable impact on sales, he would move to a location that gave him free access to sell his products. I was fortunate enough to talk with a white male customer about 35 years of age who said he would continue to buy drugs from area dealers until the police presence in the community was so widespread and so many white motorists were stopped, questioned, and searched that it would be "ludicrous" for him to continue frequenting the area. It is now 11:00 pm and I see two white females walk up and buy drugs from one of the dealers. They are in their early twenties and they appear to be carefree and unworried about where they are at and what activity they are engaged in. I tell one of my young dealer friends that "I'm peace like" that "I'm chill like," that "I'm cool like that," I'm dope "like that," "I'm black like that," and "I'm out, yo tomorrow, Homeboy."

I am now on my way to the _____ Street area and it occurs to me to stop by a drug program in the area to get their views on the police strategy to curb out-of-town drug trafficking in the area. It is a Sunday at 6:00 pm and the weather is absolutely majestic. The sun is shining, the sky is like blue velvet and there is a pleasantry that abounds everywhere. My first conversation was with a male Hispanic counselor, 40-45 years of age. He says that based on his experience it is a cosmetic effort to try to convince the public that this is a serious venture to attack the problem. He continues by saying that if and when they begin stopping cars and making arrests it will only be for a short period of time and then the police presence will diminish and the problem will return to full force again. One salient point that he and a Hispanic woman who is the Director of the program make is that there needs to be effective strategies developed to deal with the problems within the community instead of focusing on out-of-towners who occasionally come through to buy drugs. After leaving the program I focused my interests on the target location and the happenings therein. There is a great deal of frolicking going on amongst the young merchants, hurling firecrackers at one another while also pausing to serve the walk-thru and drive-up customers in open view. At this juncture there is a late-model blue Firebird pulling up with two white females who look to be 25 years of age. They yelled out they wanted two bags of "Playboy" and "one blue bag" and were promptly served and drove off. I began an interesting conversation with a white male about 25 years old who frequents the area. He was telling me that he had just been released from jail on a murder

rap and immediately I was unnerved. I summoned my instincts and began entertaining this conversation as if I were quite impressed with this callous misdeed. He continued to volunteer all the details of the incident and when opportunity presented itself I asked him his viewpoint about the barriers. He responded by saying, "Ain't no thang chicken wang," meaning that "the show will go on" regardless because there are products to be sold and money to be made. At that point a patrol car rode by and everyone yelled "Five O" and folks began heading for cover with astonishing rapidity. I laughed to myself and said, the "Live theater of the streets" is an incredible experience. It is now 11:30 pm and in the words of Simon and Garfunkel I am "Homeward Bound."

The next day I spoke with a couple of Spanish friends in their early thirties and one black friend in his forties that live in the area and got somewhat mixed opinions. They all believed that it wouldn't have much impact but somehow they were anxious to see some evidence of positive effect because they really want a safer, healthier neighborhood. In conclusion, we have a diverse array of viewpoints and it will be interesting to see how the situation unfolds. If I may opine myself, I believe that some efforts will be made to what degree nobody knows and only continued vigil on the matter will yield any meaningful insight.

(Written) Report to Abt Associates, Sunday, 6/13/93 (5 pm ....)

I went to the _____ Street area to observe the drug trafficking scene there. It is 5:00 pm and the joint is jumping. Fire crackers, ash cans, firebombs are exploding all over the place and I believe it is a scene that would embarrass what is happening in Somalia. Things are so madly out-of-control fireworks are being hurled at the customers. There is bold dispensing of drugs in open view and quite a few caucasians are stopping right on the corner buying drugs even though there is a police squad car one block away. This is the best evidence I've witnessed so far that things simply have not changed at this juncture because the "law is on the scene and it is business as usual." I saw about 20 different cars with caucasians drive through and purchase and be on their merry way. At this point I believe that whenever the police begin to employ the "element of surprise" and start making arrests and stopping suspicious vehicles it could impact on the way business is conducted but right now everybody is yelling "Playboy," "Cookies," "Blue Bag" at the top of their lungs and the customers are snapping them up as if they were tickets to a Michael Jackson concert, virtually uninterrupted. [Regarding the barriers] As I mentioned in an earlier report, some residents were quite disturbed by this because they have to use circuitous means to get where previously they could go more directly before the barriers. The primary cause of consternation is the notion that the police want to protect out-of-town "white" customers from coming into their area to buy drugs where there is no such strategy in effect to deal with the massive, devastating problem within their community. This situation bears closer watching over a longer period of time to determine if there is going to be an appreciable change in the order of things.

Appendix B

How Things Work

According to Abt's folk expert, the dealing game for small time runners goes as follows:

"You get about $750 worth of crack or coke. Then you break that stash up according to the sizes used most commonly in that market, maybe into $10 and $20 bags. Now the point is to sell your stash as soon as possible in order to get another one. A dealer can make up to $250 off each $750 stash. Five dealers would each get a $750 stash. They all know each other, they belong to the same gang and in fact they are probably friends. They each name their product and advertise it on the street. But at the same time they are competing with each other because you want to get rid of your stuff ASAP in order to get another stash and sell more. It is typical for one lieutenant to have 4-5 runners working for him. Another phenomenon in this area is that people drive to the area in a cab to cop and leave. In other words cabs serve as cover."

The corner of Arctic and Hallett streets is a well known dealing location. According to our folk expert, Utrado's Liquor store at the southeast corner of Hallett and Arctic is one place to buy locally. A hollowed-out can in the back of the store holds the buyer's stash. Little else is for sale in the store. On Monday, August 9, 1993, when Abt staff drove through the area, several Latino men stood lounging along the Arctic and Hallett sides of the building. During a previous visit, in the late afternoon, project staff had observed several Latino teens hanging out in front of Emily's Kitchen, a sad-looking restaurant with a faded sign and front. on the northwest corner of Hallett and Arctic. Diagonally across the street from Utrado's the young men appeared to be working the block from this location.

An incident that occurred during Abt's May 1993 visit to the target area confirmed for staff the sophistication and level of organization that has evolved in the street-level drug trade. While driving east along Arctic near Hallett staff observed a caucasian woman, in her early twenties, dressed in black, riding a small bicycle up and down the street. Staff noted her because Anglos dressed as she was are unusual for this area. Around ten minutes later staff were parked on Hallett facing south between Arctic and Jane, watching the activity at the corner of Hallett and Arctic. A small group of Hispanic teens worked the northwest corner of the intersection while several other young Hispanic men stood outside of Utrado's Liquor Store, a known drug location, at the southeast corner of the intersection. Abt Staff noticed the caucasian woman, apparently a spotter for the operation, arrive and begin speaking with the knot of teens on the northwest corner. After a minute or so, she looked up Hallett and, spotting our car, pointed excitedly at us. Apparently, our car had been taken for DEA or Bridgeport Five O and we thought it best to leave the area for a while.

Appendix C

Site Observations of Abt Staff

In addition to the extensive driving Abt staff did through the target area, staff also walked East Main Street and the surrounding blocks to get a qualitative feel for the area. The following summarizes some of the things Abt staff observed.

East Main is cut in two at East Washington Street by the Conrail New Haven line railroad tracks. To the south of the tracks lies an area nearly void of legitimate businesses. This area, not itself a part of the Phoenix Project target area is home to Bridgeport Jai alai. At night, prostitutes frequent this marginal area, offering their wares to Jai alai spectators and locals alike. I95, the interstate, also passes here. Buyers reportedly exit the highway, drive over to Pembroke and other area streets, and turn left, accessing the known drug selling areas.[72]

Washington Park, an entire city block of green with an architecturally striking iron bandstand and walkways littered with crack vials, is bordered by East Washington, Noble, Barnum, and Kossuth. At 269-71 Barnum, between Noble and Park, is one of the area's most notorious crack houses. Drug selling activity and prostitution are well known features of this area.

During a recent site visit, beginning at P.O.S.T. on East Main, Abt staff walked south to Barnum Avenue. Located directly across East Main from P.O.S.T. is Matt Jones Karate Academy. A defining feature of the street, the *dojo* headed by Sensei Jones, is very much involved in setting an example formed on discipline and hard work for kids in the community. Impeccably clean, the martial arts school is a world away from the video arcade a block to the south between Ogden and Shelton that is opened but dark and quiet. Three or four strung out men lurch up the block. East Main is a busy commercial strip. There are few empty storefronts though most of the blocks could do with a coat of paint. At Maple in a once substantial property is the Iglesia de Dios Pentacostal. An empty lot now sits next door and across the street is Compare Foods, the area's only supermarket, though there is also a well-stocked green grocer across from P.O.S.T. A man sells barbecued kabobs from a truck next door to Compare Food, in front of La Moda Clothing. A shoe store on the east side of East Main bears on its door a decal of the East Main Revitalization Association, a civil group which several years back moved off of East Main.

Arctic Sports Shop, a community institution, is at Arctic and East Main. Discoland Botanica is also there, as is a branch of Chase bank. Riccio's hails from an earlier age when the area was home to a large Italian immigrant community but in recent years shops like La Dulce Vida, a Caribbean pastry shop, have filled the empty storefronts on the thoroughfare. Frank's News/Louis Lunch survives at East Main off Barnum.

The Bridgeport Community Health Center is located on Barnum, between East Main and Brooks. The center is across the street from Housatonic Community-Technical College (HCTC) which is housed in an old industrial facility. HCTC borders one of the East Main area's heaviest dealing locations, Pembroke and Brooks Streets.

The college, which has been seeking better quarters elsewhere for twenty-five years, is presently one of the few remaining pillars of the East Main community.[73] But, under a recent decision by the governor and other government officials, the college will soon move to the near-vacant Hi-Ho Mall in the downtown area. In his January 13, 1993 announcement of the plan, Governor Weicker said, "A downtown campus for HCTC will best serve the needs of its students, and at the same time strengthen the City of Bridgeport."[74] Sharing the governor's enthusiasm for the project is Bridgeport Mayor Joseph Ganim. Ganim notes that, "This decision will result in a major positive

impetus for downtown Bridgeport."[75]

The target area, the 137th District, is served by Rafael Irizarry, a Democrat. He is presently up for reelection. Once a major blue collar area, many former laborers have died off or moved on as the local economy has declined with factories closing down or leaving the city. Others remain in the community and work elsewhere or not at all.

Over the last twenty to thirty years, the community has suffered a downward spiral. Gangs run rampant, the high school dropout rate and rate of teen pregnancy have skyrocketed, and, come five o'clock, residents rename the area "Beirut." According to Tom Rebollar, this is when the predators start hitting the street, where they will stay until early morning.[76] He adds, the area has the highest murder rate in the state. So far this year there have been over 20 homicides city-wide, many within the Phoenix Project target area.[77] The killings in the 10 x 10 block target area mean sleeping on the floor and boarded up windows for many residents of this violent part of Bridgeport's east side.

Despite its currently dilapidated state, the East Main area is also home to Pembroke City, one of four recently designated historic districts in Bridgeport. A planned residential development of 266 homes, dating from the mid 1800s, the area was the brainchild of P.T. Barnum.[78] According to Charles Brilvitch, the city historian, Barnum's requirements for people who bought houses in the area were: "They couldn't drink, they couldn't smoke, and they couldn't keep a pig."[79] Pembroke City is defined by the streets Arctic on the north, Beach on the east, Clarence on the south, and William on the west.

REFERENCES

1. "To Stop Drug Sales, Bridgeport Barricades Its Streets," *The New York Times*, 5/18/93, p. B5.

2. Ibid.

3. Id.

4. Id.

5. From the autobiography of P.T. Barnum, in Brilvitch, C., "Pembroke City Historic District," (Bridgeport, CT: City Historian, 1990), p. 13.

6. Epstein, J. and Sifre, S., "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User," Interim Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 5/19/93).

7. Kennedy, D.M., "Closing the Market, Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa Florida," *Program Focus* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, April 1993); also see Hayeslip, D.W., "Local-level Drug Enforcement: New Strategies," *Research in Action* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, March/April 1989).

8. For example: Operation Cul de Sac in Los Angeles employs a series of gates and other environmental design features to close off areas of Los Angeles that have suffered from significant dealing activity directed at buyers from the larger area as well as local users. New York City, Detroit, and Tampa and Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, are just a few of the many U.S. cities that have experimented with the rerouting of traffic and car seizures to deter out of town drug buyers from patronizing inner city drug markets. In Detroit, the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney's Office has used Michigan Comp. Law § 333.7521, Property Subject to Forfeiture (West 1992), to seize the cars of "drive buy" drug buyers under the theory that the buyer's car is a "container," as defined in the statute, for the controlled substance or other illicit drug. "Pushoff," the name of the Wayne County program, has made vehicle seizures a primary strategy against retail drug buying in the county.

9. Epstein, J. and Sifre, S., "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User," Progress Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 2/25/93).

10. Epstein, J. and Sifre, S., "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User," Interim Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 5/19/93).

11. Charles Brilvitch.

12. Bruce Knox.

13. State Senator Alvin Penn and State Senator John B. Larson, the president pro tempore.

14. Merrill Eisenberg, Ph.D.

15. Interview with Janice Hirota, Ph.D., Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, New York, NY, 4/23/93.

16. "Strategic Intervention For High Risk Youth. The First Six Months" (NY: Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, March 1993), p. 1.

17. The CASA study is a three year process and documentation study of strategic interventions for at-risk youth (age 11-13) in six cities. In addition to Bridgeport, the other cities are Seattle, Memphis, Austin, Newark, and Savanna. Funding for the demonstrations which offer a collaboration of services is through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as through foundations including Rockefeller, Ford, and Anna Casey (Bridgeport is an Anna E. Casey Foundation New Futures site). Some of the support is for policing work. CASA has contracted with the Urban Institute for an impact study of the demonstrations.

In Bridgeport the SIHRY program consists of a service intervention component and a criminal justice component. The lead agency for the demonstration project is the Bridgeport Futures Initiative. The program, which includes case managers and social service providers, is run out of P.O.S.T. on East Main. Case managers, termed "youth mentors," will also provide mentoring service. The Bridgeport demonstration's target area coincides with the Phoenix Project target area. On the east side, SIHRY's after school activities program for at-risk youth includes weekly rap sessions conducted by Family Services Woodfield, tutoring sessions at the Orchard Boys and Girls Club, and recreation activities through the Luis Munoz Marin School. Some of the activities include chess, poetry, photography, knitting, and basketball. Additionally, some of the youngsters are attending health education classes offered through a local community health center. Leisure time activities such as bowling, movies, and a hockey game are scheduled for at least once a month and the program is now developing plans for summer activities. These are expected to include "Outward Bound" type physical challenge courses, organized community service activities, and job exploration programs (Source: "Strategic Intervention For High Risk Youth, The First Six Months" (NY: Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, March 1993), p. 18).

18. The first phase of the plan involved installation of a total of 12 barriers at four intersections along Maple, Caroline, Hallett, and Brooks and putting up signs around the affected areas. The decision to begin here, in what is regarded as the target area's heaviest dealing location, rather than near P.O.S.T., the area's community policing substation, appears to be an acknowledgement that Maple, Caroline, and Hallett (and Pembroke) present the target area's most pressing concern. Eventually, each looped area ia to be posted with signs that read, "You are entering a looped street area" and "Don't park here." The looping is designed to create limited "gateways" into that part of the city.

19. See "AIDS Outreach to Female Prostitutes and Sexual Partners of Intravenous Drug Users," Second Annual Partners Report to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., December 1990).

20. Interview with Tom Rebollar, Crime Prevention Coordinator, Bridgeport Police Department, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

21. For the east side and Bridgeport generally, obstacles to a way out of the morass of poverty, crime, and violence are formidable. The area's redevelopment potential is perhaps further dimmed by one of the state's highest real estate tax rates, $67 per $1,000 assessment. Nonetheless, with five historic districts, a handful of young Bridgeport real estate developers are employing a rarely used Federal tax credit to help finance the rehabilitation of middle-class victorians in the city. The credit applies

only to properties in historic districts and the work must be done according to specifications of the National Register of Historic Places, consisting largely of restoring the exteriors to their original condition. Owners receive a tax credit of 20 percent of the cost of renovation on their Federal taxes if they do not live in the house themselves. They may however, live in one unit of a two-family or multifamily building and still receive a reduced credit. Additionally, in an effort to assist in the redevelopment of historic houses the city exempts them from the first year of taxes at the higher assessment resulting from rehabilitation. In addition, the new tax rate is phased in at 10 percent a year over a 10-year period. (Source: Charles, E., "Victorian Rehabs for Bridgeport's Needy, *The New York Times*, 3/28/93, p. 9).

22. One such effort is the Strategic Intervention for High Risk Youth (SIHRY). The Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) directs SIHRY, an innovative substance abuse prevention program targeted at inner city youth who are currently experimenting with drugs and alcohol or are characterized by other risk factors such as involvement in drug trafficking, truancy, or family substance abuse. CASA staff work out of the police officers sector terminal (P.O.S.T.) located on East Main Street.

23. Interview with Tom Rebollar, Crime Prevention Coordinator, Bridgeport Police Department, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

24. Eisenberg, M. et al., Appendix E: The Bridgeport Project, Unpublished Report, (Bridgeport, CT: Bridgeport Health Department, 1992).

25. Ibid.

26. From the autobiography of P.T. Barnum, cited in Brilvitch, C., "Pembroke City Historic District," (Bridgeport, CT: City Historian, 1990), p. 13.

27. Abt staff site visit/interview with police community liaison Jorge Jaiman, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

28. Eisenberg, M. et al., Appendix E: The Bridgeport Project.

29. Confidential informant's report to Abt Associates Inc. on dealing activity on _____ Street, Bridgeport, CT, 4/4/93, 5:00-10:00 pm.

30. Confidential informant's report to Abt Associates Inc. on dealing activity on _____ Street, Bridgeport, CT, 4/9/93.

31. Peck, R., "15 Buyers Nabbed in Police Drug Sting," *The Connecticut Post*, 4/25/93, p. A8.

32. Abt staff acknowledge that due to the nature of undercover narcotics operations, little is known about these efforts by the Bridgeport Police Department and other law enforcement organizations such as DEA.

33. Interview with Charles Brilvitch, City Historian, Bridgeport, CT, 5/4/93. A recent visit to Maple Street in Bridgeport found graffiti, broken bottles, and other litter collecting around the barriers. To date, none of the barriers have been spruced up by local children or artists and no planters have been placed around the base of the barriers.

34. Bridgeport Police Chief Thomas J. Sweeney has been widely quoted as saying 70% of east side buyers are from out-of-town. Also see, "Bridgeport Proposes Cutting Drug Buyers Off at Intersections," *The New York Times*, 10/29/93, pp. A1, B4.

35. Interview with Bridgeport Police Department community liaison Jorge Jaiman, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

36. Jamaican American drug sellers control the trade around Newfield Avenue, an area of the city with many Jamaican American residents. On Newfield Avenue, the products includes cocaine and sensimilla. Spliffs sell for $5. Interview with Abt Associates' confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

37. NFL (Niggers for Life) is another African American gang important to the drug trade in the city (Source: Abt Associates' confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT).

38. See Epstein, J. and Sifre, S., "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User," Interim Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 5/19/93).

39. Interview with Bridgeport Police Department Crime Prevention Coordinator Tom Rebollar, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

40. When Abt staff returned to East Main Street on Monday, August 9, 1993 Joel Epstein visited the Soto Insurance Agency at 1039 East Main Street. After being buzzed into the recently opened storefront, staff observed an agent standing behind a counter talking to a young Latino couple in Spanish about a vacation they were planning. The sparsely furnished office contained a few small racks with travel brochures. It was impossible for Abt staff to independently confirm the statement of Officer Reyes that the business is a front for Latin Kings' money laundering of drug money.

41. Interview with Abt Associates' confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT, 5/14/93.

42. Eisenberg, M. et al., Appendix E: The Bridgeport Project.

43. Evaluation of Social Support Services for Drug Abusers in a Non-Traditional Setting, On going National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) funded research by Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA, Grant No. 5R18DA07003-03.

44. Abt staff received and computer-processed 76 baseline observation forms completed by a confidential street informant. Site observations concentrated on one of the major dealing spots of the east side, where Abt's informant has gained trusted access to the block lieutenant and the crews of dealers and runners who control dealing on the block. In order to protect the informant, his cover and the location at which he observes dealing activity have been omitted. Observations took place on five different occasions with about a one week interval between observation (during April 1993), starting on April 4th and ending on April 18th. The informant conducted the same number of observation entries per occasion (15), except on April 18th, when 16 were conducted. Finally, all 76 observations were conducted on the same two days of the week (Fridays and Sundays, 40% and 60% respectively). On these days, observation extended over several hours. Two series of observations (31) were conducted from 1:00 am to 7:00 am. One series (15) started at midday and extended onto

the early night, and the remaining 30 started at 8:00 pm and extended into the early morning hours.

45. Interview with Maggie Sanchez, Bridgeport, CT, 5/14/93.

46. Interview with Abt Associates' confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT, 5/14/93.

47. Highway Exits in Bridgeport (Exits 25-29): Exit 30, Airport; Exit 29, Stratford Ave.; Exit 28, Pembroke-East Main Streets, Jai Alai, and Housatonic Community College; Exit 27, University of Bridgeport and downtown.

48. Abt consultant's report on latest set of community interviews (n=35), Bridgeport, CT, June 1993.

49. Ibid, female African American area resident expressing her view of the Phoenix Project.

50. Abt consultant's report on latest set of community interviews (n=35), Bridgeport, CT, June 1993.

51. P.O.S.T. is the Bridgeport Police Department's community policing substation in the East Main neighborhood. The office on East Main Street is also home to the Strategic Intervention For High Risk Youth (SIHRY) Program.

52. Abt consultant's report on latest set of community interviews (n=35), Bridgeport, CT, June 1993.

53. Ibid.

54. Id.

55. Interviews with residents of the East Main area conducted by an Abt consultant, April 1993 thru August 1993, Bridgeport, CT. Abt's consultant, an AIDS outreach worker for the Bridgeport Health Department, grew up on Maple Street in the target area.

56. Daly, M.J., "Street Barriers Cause Worry, *The Connecticut Post*, 5/23/93, p. A3. This article quotes Assistant Fire Chief Joseph R. DiCarlo as saying, "We don't like it. Anything that could potentially slow us down, we don't like... But we'll live with it."

57. Ibid, citing Bridgeport Police Chief Thomas J. Sweeney.

58. Id., citing Fire Supt. Patrick Shevlin. The situation of firefighters in Bridgeport is already unenviable. In early July 1993 a firefighter was shot while fighting a blaze that heavily damaged a 12-family house. Commenting on the shooting the Bridgeport Fire Chief Gerald F. Grover remarked, "Firefighters were once considered the good guys, but today, in a certain segment of society, they're seen as authority figures." See "In Bridgeport, Fire Officials Are Outraged By a Shooting," *The New York Times*, 7/16/93, p. B4.

59. Daly, M.J., "Street Barriers Cause Worry, *The Connecticut Post*, 5/23/93, p. A3, citing Clyde Nicholson.

60. Interview with Abt's confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT, 6/29/93.

61. "Dozens of Deaths Linked to New Potent Grade of Heroin," *The New York Times*, 7/19/93, p. B5.

62. Ibid.

63. Id., citing New Haven Police Department narcotics squad chief Sergeant Archie Generoso.

64. Id., citing Hartford Police Department Sergeant Bert Huertas.

65. Id., citing Sergeant Bill Schaeffer of the Connecticut State Police drug task force.

66. Interview with alleged Latin Kings' dealer. Bridgeport, CT, 5/14/93.

67. Interview with Abt's confidential informant, Bridgeport, CT, 5/14/93. The informant is a long-time Bridgeport resident and a former dealer who has long been involved in drug treatment outreach work.

68. Both areas have experienced significant problems with drug dealing directed at drive buy commuter customers.

69. See Sviridoff, M., Sadd, S., Curtis, R., Grinc, R., "The Neighborhood Effects of Street-Level Drug Enforcement -- Tactical Narcotics Teams in New York -- An Evaluation by the Vera Institute of Justice" (New York: Vera Institute of Justice. August 1992), p. 1. Also see "The Community Prosecution Team: A Comprehensive, Community-based Prosecution Strategy to Fight Violent Crime and Revitalize a Neighborhood" (Brooklyn, NY: Kings County District Attorney's Office, September 1992).

70. See Epstein, J. and Sifre, S., "Bridgeport: Cutting Off Access By the Suburban User," Interim Report to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 5/19/93).

71. Among others, Mr. Epstein, will rely on Detective Thomas Smith of the Intelligence and Analysis Unit, Central Narcotics, New York City Police Department and Assistant D.A. Alan Lewis of the Kings County District Attorney's Office.

72. Heading east, out-of-towners get off I95 at the East Main Street exit. Heading west, buyers exit the interstate at Pembroke Street.

73. M. Santelle, "Hi-Ho! Hi-Ho! It's Where Our School Will Go!" *Housatonic Horizons* (Bridgeport, CT: Housatonic Community College, 1/25/93), p. 1.

74. Ibid.

75. Id.

76. Interview with Bridgeport Police Department Crime Prevention Coordinator Tom Rebollar, Bridgeport, CT, 4/1/93.

77. "To Stop Drug Sales, Bridgeport Barricades Its Streets," *The New York Times*, 5/18/93, p. B5.

78. B. Ryan, "Another Bridgeport Emerges as a Leader With A Past," Connecticut Section, *The New York Times*, 3/21/93, p. 1.

79. Ibid, p. 8.

GUNS, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AREAS

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GUNS, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AREAS

By:
David Kennedy

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Executive Summary

There has recently been an enormous increase in gun-related violence among young black males. The statistics are stark. According to figures from the National Center for Health Statistics, the firearm murder rate for black males aged 20 to 24 more than doubled between 1985 and 1990, rising from 63.7 (per 100,000) to 140.7. Among 15- to 19-year-old black males, the firearm homicide rate nearly tripled, from 37.4 to 105.3. This latter figure is more than ten times the rate (9.7) for white males in the same age group.

This violence is widely believed, in both popular and professional circles, to be the result of drug use and the drug trade. However, recent research suggests that urban violence is less directly related to the drug trade than it has been in the past, and that many violent incidents commonly thought to be drug related—because they occur between dealers, between members of drug-dealing gangs, or at a known dealing location—are in fact not. Instead, young males appear to be killing one another over jewelry, sneakers, or insults. Or gang territory: in studying street gang crime in Chicago from 1987-1990, Carolyn and Richard Block concluded that gang-motivated homicides were most often turf-related (gang turf, not drug turf); only 8 of 288 homicides were related to drugs.

There is also evidence that inner-city communities have become so threatening that youths *not* involved in the drug trade are arming themselves and joining gangs for self-defense. The drug trade and drug-related violence has almost certainly contributed to this situation. But a cycle of fear, gun acquisition, violence, and more fear appears to have taken on a life of its own. In cities like Milwaukee and Washington, D.C., youth homicides continued to increase in the early 1990s, even as the drug trade diminished. Therefore, policy measures focused only on drug abuse, drug dealing, and drug-related violence will not alone arrest or reverse the escalating spiral of violence.

It is nonetheless important that urban youth violence be considered in the context of drug policy. Drug trafficking is still central to the fear gripping many inner-city communities, and thus measures aimed at suppressing trafficking should be pursued. Moreover, one of the real drug policy success stories of the last ten years has been the development of extremely effective approaches for combating street drug markets.

What appears to be key is a shift away from the traditional approach of simply seizing drugs and arresting dealers towards a comprehensive and integrated strategy of market disruption. The basic game plan of such a disruption scheme is to coordinate active community involvement with the resources of multiple government agencies in order to shower the drug market

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with a barrage of measures, which together make it so difficult for the market to operate that it literally collapses. Tampa's much heralded QUAD program was something of a model operation. Where six months of conventional enforcement had failed to curtail street trafficking, six months of the QUAD program virtually eliminated public drug dealing, bringing considerable reductions in violence, disorder, and fear.

It is also essential that authorities attack the problem of gun possession among youths. For even if the drug trade were entirely eliminated in major cities, it would still leave an ample supply of weapons in the hands of young men with short fuses. Unfortunately, gun control laws—at least as they are ordinarily framed—are unlikely to have much impact on youth gun violence. Since such laws can only restrict the legal sale of guns, they do not inconvenience gun-carrying youths, few of whom obtain their weapons through licensed gun dealers.

While the idea is untested, it seems to make more sense for anti-gun policy to target the illicit gun market. It also seems that an illicit-market policy should rely on the market disruption strategy used effectively against drug markets, extending it to guns.

Introduction

There has recently been an enormous increase in gun-related violence among young black males. The statistics are stark. According to figures from the National Center for Health Statistics, the firearm murder rate for black males aged 20 to 24 more than doubled between 1985 and 1990, rising from 63.7 (per 100,000) to 140.7. Among 15- to 19-year-old black males, the firearm homicide rate nearly tripled, from 37.4 to 105.3. This latter figure is more than ten times the rate (9.7) for white males in the same age group.[1]

This violence is widely believed, in both popular and professional circles, to be the result of drug use and the drug trade. Commentators typically point to one or more of four connections between drugs and violence. First, drug dealers shoot each other in territorial and other business disputes. Second, drug users engage in violent behavior as a consequence of intoxication or the long term effects of chronic substance abuse. Third, users commit predatory crimes to obtain money to support their drug habits. Fourth, the drug trade has created an environment in which market participants are fatalistic, inured to violence, and heavily armed, leading to the escalation of what would otherwise be less significant conflicts.

There is truth to all these propositions. However, recent research and analysis suggests that they do not offer a sufficient explanation for the recent increase in urban gun violence. In particular, there is strong evidence that inner-city communities have become so threatening that youths *not* involved in the drug trade are arming themselves and joining gangs for self-defense. The drug trade and drug-related violence has almost certainly contributed to this situation. But a cycle of fear, gun acquisition, violence, and more fear appears to have taken on a life of its own. Therefore, policy measures focused only on drug abuse, drug dealing, and drug-related violence will not alone arrest or reverse the escalating spiral of violence.

For several reasons, it is nonetheless important that urban youth violence be considered in the context of drug policy. For one thing, as long as much of the violence is perceived to be drug-related, drug policy will be asked to address the problem. Moreover, drug trafficking itself remains a major cause of urban fear, and thus measures aimed at suppressing trafficking should be pursued and improved. Lastly, drug policy has acquired a sophistication

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1 Lois A. Fingerhut, "Firearm Mortality among Children, Youth, and Young Adults 1-34 Years of Age, Trends and Current Status: United States 1985-1990," in *Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics*, 231 (Hyattsville, Md.: National Center for Health Statistics, 23 Mar. 1993). For an analysis of some of these data, see Dewey Cornell, "Juvenile Homicide: A Growing National Problem," *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* 11 (1993):388-396.

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about interventions into illicit drug markets that holds some promise for application to illicit gun markets.

This report briefly explores the complexities of the youth violence dynamic, with particular focus on connections to drug use and trafficking. The report also discusses some of the related policy implications, including steps for employing Federal enforcement authority.

Sources of Urban Violence

Assessing the extent to which drug use and drug trafficking contribute to urban violence is difficult. As noted in the introduction, there are a number of possible connections between drugs and violence. Moreover, evidence of the connections is mostly circumstantial or anecdotal in nature, and there are other explanations that may in part account for the apparent links.

Drug Abuse and Violence

For several years prior to 1985, the firearm homicide rate among black youths actually declined.[2] Since 1985, the rate has skyrocketed. The change appears to coincide with the explosive spread of cocaine and crack abuse in inner-city neighborhoods. Given that drugs often appear to lower inhibitions and increase aggressiveness, it is understandable that crack abuse is routinely cited as a principal cause of urban violence.

The claim is not easy to prove, however. Of all psychoactive substances, alcohol is the only one that has been shown in behavioral experiments to commonly increase aggression.[3] (And even this conclusion is disputed by some researchers.[4]) Furthermore, with some drugs, such as heroin and marijuana, intoxication appears to generate pacific rather than aggressive pharmacological effects.[5]

This does not mean that violence is unrelated to substance abuse. What it does suggest is that links between violence and drug use are extremely complex, involving not just intoxication but the long term effects of chronic abuse, as well as the interaction of drug use with social, economic, cultural, and psychological factors.

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[2] Jeffrey A. Roth, "Firearms and Violence," National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, February 1994).

[3] See Jeffrey A. Roth, "Psychoactive Substances and Violence," National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, February 1994). For a more thorough discussion, see Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds., *Understanding and Preventing Violence* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993).

[4] Jeffrey Fagan, "Intoxication and Aggression," in *Drugs and Crime*, ed. Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), 241-320.

[5] Withdrawal from opiate addiction appears to increase aggression.

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For example, drug consumption may foster violence, even if intoxication does not immediately incite aggression. Substance abuse routinely hurts school and job performance, makes its victims more present-oriented and less likely to delay gratification, and damages relationships with friends and family. Furthermore, because drugs are illegal and widely disapproved-of, heavy drug use tends to isolate addicts from law-abiding society and immerse them in a criminal subculture. All of this, one assumes, makes violent and other criminal behavior more likely.

Many heavy drug users also commit crimes, some of which are violent, to finance their habits. According to a 1989 survey of convicted jail inmates, 39 percent of cocaine and crack users claimed to have committed their current offense to get money to buy drugs.[6] Moreover, addicts often obtain drug money by selling drugs, an activity that forces many of them to engage in violence.

Drug Trafficking, Gangs, and Violence

That drug dealers are often involved in violent incidents is not surprising. Drugs are illegal, and so business arrangements cannot be enforced by law. And in the absence of peaceful customs for resolving business disputes, disagreements between dealers, or between dealers and customers, are likely to be settled by force. Since the business is violent, dealers arm themselves, making it likely that many violent encounters will prove deadly.

But it is not clear how much of the violence among drug dealers is a function of the drug trade itself, as opposed to the personalities of dealers, or the character of their communities. The drug trade rewards those who are successfully able to use intimidation and violence to protect their positions. (Those who fail get killed, arrested, or scared away from the business.) And violent drug dealers generally live and work in economically depressed inner-city neighborhoods, where violence is common, independent of the drug business, in part due to a culture that seems not to allow youths to walk away from a confrontation peacefully while maintaining reputation and self-respect.

In studying active drug dealers in the Central Harlem and Washington Heights neighborhoods of New York City, Jeffrey Fagan found some evidence

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[6] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Profile of Jail Inmates, 1989*, Special Report NCJ-128097 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, April 1991). It should be noted that since most crimes are opportunistic rather than planned, the notion of a single cause for a crime is somewhat misleading. See Philip J. Cook, "The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities," in *Crime and Justice, An Annual Review of Research*, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, vol. 7 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986).

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to support the idea that violent drug dealers are individuals who would be violent in others lines of work. Fagan reported an association between violent behavior within the drug business and violent behavior outside of it. "[I]t appears," he concluded, "that processes of self- and social selection result in the participation of generally violent and criminally active people in drug selling."[7]

Violent incidents that occur between drug dealers, between members of drug-dealing gangs, or at a known dealing location, are commonly assumed to be drug-related (that is, caused by disputes over drug transactions, money, selling sites, or by intoxication).[8] However, recent research suggests much of the violence thought to be drug related is in fact not.

For example, studies in Chicago and Los Angeles indicate that in neither city is the connection among drugs, gangs, and homicide particularly strong. Gang violence is common, but it is more connected with turf disputes than with drugs (or with drug turf). The larger and more organized gangs, which are most heavily involved in dealing, have actually been less violent. The highest levels of homicide are associated with small, poorly organized gangs, and appear particularly concentrated along the common (and thus disputed) borders of their turf. In studying street gang crime in Chicago from 1987-1990, Carolyn and Richard Block concluded that gang-motivated homicides were most often turf-related; only 8 of 288 homicides were related to drugs.[9]

The research does not explain why gang violence escalated beginning in the mid-1980s. What it does show is that the new violence is almost exclusively gun-related, and that the guns used are more powerful than in the past. In Chicago, concluded the Blocks, "Virtually the entire increase in the number of street gang-motivated homicides seems attributable to an increase in the use of high-caliber, automatic, or semi-automatic weapons."[10]

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[7] Jeffrey Fagan, "Drug Selling and Licit Income in Distressed Neighborhoods: The Economic Lives of Street-Level Drugs Users and Dealers," in *Drugs, Crime, and Social Isolation*, eds. Adele V. Harrell and George E. Peterson, 99-146 (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1992).

[8] See, e.g., Paul J. Goldstein, Henry H. Brownstein, Patrick J. Ryan, and Patricia A. Bellucci, "Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually Based Event Analysis," *Contemporary Drug Problems* 16 (1989):651-687.

[9] Carolyn Rebecca Block and Richard Block, "Street Gang Crime in Chicago," National Institute of Justice Research in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, December 1993).

[10] Ibid.

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In general, the connection between drug trafficking and growing violence—especially youth violence—seems to be getting murkier. There is no question that violence accompanies drug dealing, particularly in the largely youthful street crack trade. Nor is there any question that the rise in juvenile black male homicide, which began in the mid-1980s, coincided with development of crack cocaine markets in inner-city areas. Nor, as well, is there any doubt that the crack trade contributed heavily to the huge increases in youth homicide in cities like Washington, D.C. and New York during the mid- and late 1980s.

But the violence now appears to be less directly related to the drug trade. In Milwaukee and Washington, D.C., youth homicides continued to increase in the early 1990s, even as the drug trade diminished. And researchers like Robert Wasserman, who conducted a detailed examination of apparent drug-market killings in Richmond, Virginia, are finding that even murders occurring in and around dealing sites rarely arise from arguments about drug money or turf. Instead, the murders stem from a variety of interpersonal disputes among acquaintances or strangers that easily become fatalities because one or more of the disputants is armed. To be sure, many of the weapons involved were probably acquired with the proceeds of drug dealing and have become part of the normal business equipment of street-level dealers. The extent to which the irritability that often results from chronic use of stimulants such as cocaine contributes to the violence has not been determined.

Many of the homicides and assaults that most disturb communities do so precisely because they seem so inexplicable, unconnected to the drug trade or anything else that seems meaningful to an outside observer. Young males are killing one another over jewelry, sneakers, sidelong glances, or for no apparent reason at all. The drug trade perhaps set this in motion, but it appears to be a less and less proximate cause.

Fear and Guns

It appears that we may have entered into a distinct second phase of the impact of drugs and drug trafficking on troubled communities. In the first, trafficking and competition among traffickers caused high levels of violence, just as occurred during Prohibition. This violence was, however appalling, in a fundamental respect *instrumental*: it served, or in a reasonably direct way emerged from, business interests.

However, unlike the violence that in earlier decades accompanied marijuana and heroin dealing, violence did not remain contained within the crack trade. An unfortunate combination of circumstances appear responsible for the vio-

lence spilling over into the surrounding community. The pharmacological effects of crack were one factor. Also important were the economic and social deterioration of the inner-city, which made neighborhoods more vulnerable than they were in the 1960s and 1970s, and aspects of the crack trade that are not typical for other illegal drug businesses—very young dealers, centralized retail distribution operations, curbside sales.[11]

Traffickers, many of them young and not particularly measured, armed themselves.[12] More important, drug dealers were so numerous and widely distributed throughout the community, and so open and vulnerable in their interactions, that the gangland ethos of the drug trade came to govern even more ordinary interactions.

After conducting in-depth interviews with a number of young murderers in 1992, Washington D.C.'s Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis summarized prevailing attitudes:

> The range of alternatives of which they were aware were hopelessly limited. Virtually all of these youth summarized their alternatives with remarks tantamount to "kill or be killed." First, they had the belief ... that if they did not kill the victims, they would have been killed by the victims. So their response was the only possible one if they were to preserve their own lives. ... These youth were keenly aware of the significance of one's reputation. ... They considered killing as the ultimate message to others that they will not get away with being disrespected.

The level of fear this has created in troubled communities is so high it is difficult to comprehend. In a recent survey by Joseph Sheley and James Wright of students in ten inner-city high schools, 40 percent of respondents reported having been shot at or threatened with a gun; nearly half knew schoolmates who had actually been fired on. A 1993 national poll by LH Research found that 30 percent of black adults know a child who was wounded or killed by another child with a gun. Young people, it is said, are planning their own funerals; they talk not about "when" they grow up, but "if."

Not surprisingly, more and more youths are arming themselves. Many studies show a much higher prevalence of weapon acquisition and carrying than can plausibly be attributed to drug-related factors. In a state-wide Cen-

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[11] For a discussion, see Analey Hamid, "The Political Economy of Crack-Related Violence," *Contemporary Drug Problems* 17 (Spring 1990):31-78.

[12] See Joseph F. Sheley and James D. Wright, "Motivations for Gun Possession and Carrying Among Serious Juvenile Offenders," *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* 11 (1993):375-388.

ters for Disease Control survey of Massachusetts high school students, fully 37 percent of boys reported having armed themselves with guns, knives, or other weapons. Sheley and Wright report that 22 percent of the males they surveyed in inner-city high schools possessed guns, and a third carried a gun at least occasionally.

John Silva, head of security for the Cambridge, Massachusetts school system, says that the most significant reason kids carry guns is "because they're afraid." He claims he can no longer predict which students will arm themselves: it used to be only the tough kids, but now it could be any of them. In the 1993 LH Research poll, 33 percent of black adults reported knowing "a child who was so worried he or she got a gun for self protection." Similarly, Sheley and Wright report that among the inner-city high school students they interviewed, "the desire for protection and the need to arm oneself against enemies were the primary reasons to obtain a gun, easily outpacing all other motivations."

In such an environment, the "senseless" shootings that have become an urban commonplace should come as no surprise. Not only are many urban youths armed, edgy, and surrounded by violence, but they believe that they cannot ignore an insult or walk away from a potential fight without irretrievably losing face. Perhaps it is surprising that there is not even more gun violence.

So far, this is a largely urban problem. It may not remain so. In recently completed research, Joseph Sheley and Victoria Brewer have found alarmingly high rates of gun possession among suburban youth.[13] Both the rates of possession and the reason for acquisition—fear—are roughly the same as for urban youth. The difference, at least for the moment, is that suburban youths tend to leave their guns at home or in their cars rather than carry them routinely. It is not possible at present to establish just why suburban youths are so afraid; in particular, whether there are similar historical links to the drug trade, or what might trigger a change to more frequent carrying. But there is no reason to assume that the youth gun violence problem will necessarily remain contained in urban, minority neighborhoods.

[13] Joseph F. Sheley and Victoria E. Brewer, "Possession and Carrying of Firearms Among Suburban Youth," forthcoming.

Policy Strategies

Drug Market Strategies

Drug markets are among the worst insults to the safety and security of communities. Drug markets—especially cocaine and crack markets—are characterized in many cities by a youthful, mercurial workforce; the routine carrying and use of increasingly high-powered guns; high levels of violence and disorder; and very high levels of community fear. The wave of street violence, especially youth violence, that began in the mid-1980s was sparked by the invention of crack and the creation in many cities of robust and extremely troublesome street crack markets. For all practical purposes, the drug problem as the public sees it—core urban communities gripped by fear, out-of-control kids packing heavy weapons, a spiraling urban homicide rate—*is* a drug-market problem.

All drug markets are not created equal. The most important distinction is between *street* and *indoor* markets. Street markets, especially street crack markets, are open, highly visible, and obtrusive. They operate for the most part as retail outlets, selling small amounts of drugs to many customers; they attract customers from outside the communities in which they are located; and they present numerous and ready opportunities for conflict and violence: disputes over dealing turf, disputes over customers, disputes over drugs and money, and disputes between dealers and police. By contrast, indoor markets are less visible; they tend toward larger-quantity dealing, and a smaller, more local, and more intimate customer base; they are more easily controlled and hence more secure for participants; and they are less prone to disputes of all kinds. All drug markets present trouble for communities, but street drug markets are the worst trouble of all. Eliminating them would be a huge stride toward quelling drug-related violence and disorder.

One of the significant drug policy/police strategy success stories of the last ten years has been the development of extremely effective measures against street drug markets. The key has been a shift from relying on interdiction and enforcement to the direct *disruption* of street markets. The overall aim is to make it so difficult, or so unprofitable, for the market to function that it collapses. Disruption strategies are crafted around particular dealing sites (even when multiple sites are involved) and typically involve measures to make it difficult for dealers and drive-through buyers to connect; steps to increase the perceived vulnerability of dealers and, especially, consumers; enhanced (and often anonymous) community intelligence; measures (using multiagency municipal teams) to address disorder and physical blight; inno-

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vative moves to inhibit drug commerce (such as, simply, pervasive police presence at dealing sites); heavy enforcement; and community organizing.

The approach has worked against all the basic street-market forms. Tampa's QUAD program virtually eliminated a city-wide, geographically dispersed street crack market.[14] Houston's Link Valley operation entirely dislodged a massive, concentrated cocaine market serving drive-through customers from several states.[15] Washington D.C.'s Orange Hats of Fairlawn used community activists to suppress a low-level but intransigent neighborhood-scale problem. Tampa's was something of a model operation. Police made it difficult for buyers to find street dealers by using heavy enforcement to keep the dealers moving around; made buyers feel vulnerable by publicizing "reverse stings" in which police posed as dealers and arrested buyers (and seized their cars); interfered with business by loitering around dealing sites; used community allies to locate and seize drug stashes; cooperated with city authorities to knock down abandoned houses, and shut down businesses, being used for dealing; and used local ordinances to clear crowds from known trafficking sites. Where two years of traditional enforcement had failed against the city's street trafficking, six months of the new approach virtually eliminated public dealing and brought considerable reductions in violence, disorder, and fear. Similar results have been obtained in other citiss.

The Limits of Gun Control

It is important to realize that little currently on the policy table will have much impact on youth gun violence. There are things that can be done, some of which draw directly on the work done in drug policy over the last ten years. But the measures typically considered—drug policy as such, gun control, and stiffer and more certain sanctions—will not have much impact.

Drug policy has limited reach because, as has been described, urban violence is no longer simply a drug and drug trafficking phenomenon. Drug markets remain a primary source of community and youth fear, and suppressing drug markets should remain near the top of the policy agenda. But the atmosphere of fear, arms, and easy violence would survive even if drug markets suddenly disappeared altogether.

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[14] See David M. Kennedy, "Closing the Market: Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida," National Institute of Justice Program Focus, NCJ 139963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, April 1993).

[15] Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 21-28.

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Gun control—at least as it is ordinarily framed—also has limited reach. In most cities with serious juvenile gun problems—including, notably, Washington D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles—juvenile purchase, possession, and carrying of guns is already illegal. By and large, youths obtain their guns on the black market.[16] As has long been known, determined proscribed persons such as felons have no difficulty obtaining illegal weapons. These markets are so robust that guns routinely trade on the street at *below* their normal retail price, and in many cities there are actually vigorous rental markets. Neither the Brady Bill nor any other gun control measures likely to be passed soon will have more than a marginal impact on those black markets.

The illicit gun market draws from multiple, geographically dispersed sources: thefts from homes, thefts from gun dealers, improper sales from licensed dealers, private dealers. There are currently, according to most estimates, some 200 million guns, including 70 million handguns, in private hands in the United States. The Brady Bill will slow the supply of new weapons into the civilian stockpile, but only somewhat, and will do nothing about the movement of guns from current stockpiles onto the black market. Proposals to limit the number, and raise the costs of doing business, of Federally licensed dealers face the same drawbacks. Next-generation steps like a Federal firearms permit and requiring all gun transactions to pass through licensed dealers with strict reporting requirements would make things much more difficult for black marketeers, but they face a very uncertain political future and would take decades, at best, to be effective: not nearly soon enough for the urban gun crisis.

Illicit gun markets will in fact be very resistant to any centralized, national strategy. The black market in guns appears to be, for the most part, composed of many small local operations, often not solely engaged in gunrunning, rather than large dedicated organizations. Even groups that move weapons from states with loose gun laws to states with strict ones typically consist of only a few people with a car (or a gym bag and a bus ticket). Many black-market gun dealers appear to be fences selling guns as they would any other commodity, more or less as thieves bring them in.[17]

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[16] See Shaley and Wright, "Gun Acquisition."

[17] Mark H. Moore, "Keeping Guns From Criminal Offenders." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 455 (1981):92-109.

Banning assault weapons will also help little. For all the fear they inspire, assault weapons are responsible for relatively few homicides; most urban gun criminals use ordinary handguns.[18]

Strategies to make punishment for gun crime swifter, more certain, and more severe are also unlikely to have much impact on the juvenile gun problem. As Wright, Sheley and Smith have argued, "Convincing inner-city juveniles ... not to own, carry, and use guns requires convincing them that they can survive in their neighborhoods without being armed, that their unarmed condition will not cause them to be victimized, intimidated, or slain."[19] As long as the choice is felt to be between getting killed and going to jail, kids are likely to risk going to jail. And for some offenders the prospect of even severe punishment may seem so unreal, or so meaningless, as to vitiate these approaches. Washington D.C.'s Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis concluded that, for the youth murderers they interviewed, "being arrested and imprisoned are not viewed as a stigma, but rather as a rite of passage to manhood ... [they] do not expect to live long."

Gun Market Approaches

All is not necessarily lost, however. It is possible that recent drug policy holds an important lesson for the youth gun problem. Drug markets and gun markets are very different. But the basic logic of operations to disrupt street drug markets may apply to gun black markets as well. Market disruption strategies rely on comprehensive interference in the marketplace, using a wide variety of innovative techniques to drive players out of the market or reshape it into a less destructive form. There are some initial reasons to hope that attempts to disrupt juvenile firearms markets might succeed. First, some of the legal and status issues that make dealing with the adult illicit market so difficult appear to be, at least, attenuated. Juvenile purchase, possession and carrying of guns is already illegal in many jurisdictions and will likely soon be illegal in more, if not proscribed nationally by Federal legislation. Youths caught buying and carrying guns, and those caught selling guns to them, are fairly obvious lawbreakers. This is a far more straightforward operational environment than the adult gun market.

Equally important, public feeling on youth and firearms is universally negative. Few, if any, people think it a good idea for kids to carry guns. There

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[18] Out of roughly 15,000 gun homicides in the U.S. in 1993, fewer than 100 involved assault weapons.

[19] James D. Wright, Joseph F. Sheley, and M. Dwayne Smith "Kids, Guns, and Killing Fields," *Society*, November/December 1992, p. 89.

would likely be strong official and community support for measures to disrupt the youth gun market. This is critically important; all of the successful strategies to disrupt street drug markets have depended heavily on active community cooperation. That will be as true, if not more so, of gun-market strategies. But there is good reason to think that if disruption strategies can be designed, communities will help.[20]

If they can, it is likely to be through custom-designed local strategies, developed and implemented primarily by local authorities. There are several reasons for this. First, it is unlikely that any foreseeable federal gun control legislation would much interfere with the youth trade, or that federal enforcement capacity will be enhanced enough to be of substantial impact nationwide. The lead is going to have to be taken by local authorities, who have a largely unrealized capacity to attack key elements of local markets. Second, local markets are likely to differ sufficiently enough to require different disruption strategies. Patterns of acquisition and distribution are apt to be different in states like Georgia, which has few restrictions on gun sales, and Massachusetts, which is heavily regulated; and in cities like Chicago, where murders are largely gang-related, and in cities like Washington, where deadly violence is still more connected with drugs. Moreover, the powers that authorities have to act differ across cities and states. Third, the youth gun problem is unlikely to be very vulnerable to strategies focused on one or a few of its aspects. If pursued in piecemeal fashion, stiff penalties for selling and buying, measures to reduce the movement of guns from the legitimate to the black market, or steps to reduce youth fear are unlikely to have much effect. A comprehensive strategy with mutually reinforcing tactics tailored to local circumstances might.

There is very little in the way of research on youth gun markets. The work of Wright, Sheley, and Smith—the notable exception—suggests that in broad outline they don't look all that different from adult black markets: kids "borrow" guns from their homes and from friends, and buy them from friends, drug dealers, and to a much lesser extent from legitimate vendors. There is no research that is both rich enough and specific enough to inform an attack on any particular city's market. How do kids acquire guns in, say, Baltimore? Why do they? What proportion of kids with, or kids wanting, guns are dangerous repeat offenders, and what proportion are motivated more by fear and other factors? What factors encourage those who own guns to carry them? Do they buy from the same sources as adult offenders, or from different ones? Is there a distinct illicit gun market, or are they passed along

[20] A significant concern, however, is that cooperating community residents have less information to offer the police about illegal guns than they do about drugs. See J. Wilford Shaw, "Community Policing to Take Guns Off the Street," *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* 11 (1993):361-374.

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channels also used for drugs and other contraband? Is the urban market essentially local, or intercity/interstate? Are there many sources of supply, or relatively few? How large is the current stockpile? How open is the trade? Do sellers feel totally secure, or are they wary; what makes them willing and unwilling to sell? Are there different supply channels to hard-core and soft consumers? Are particular weapons in vogue? How does information about sources of supply reach consumers, and how widely is it known?

One way to think about classifying such information, and corresponding interventions, would be in terms of the key "factors of production" of the black market in firearms. At first blush, these factors of production of the youth gun market, and possible policy interventions for each, might include:

1) Supply

This translates primarily into measures to 1) make transfers to youth illegal, where they are presently not; 2) prevent the movement of firearms from the legitimate to the illegitimate market, from whence they can be sold to minors, and 3) reclaim weapons already in the illegitimate market. Measures would include:

- Federal, state, and local youth gun control legislation;
- Federal and local measures to increase vendors' interest in ensuring purchasers are not proscribed;
- Joint federal/local operations against large and interstate traffickers;
- Increased regulatory surveillance of random and/or suspicious dealers and purchasers;
- Increased regulatory surveillance of dealers and purchasers of weapons known to be in youth vogue;
- Increased regulatory surveillance of bulk or frequent purchasers;
- Differential regulatory treatment of vendors of weapons known to have reached the black market;
- Enhanced penalties/prosecution for middlemen;
- Increased security of privately-held firearms, including target hardening of residences (possibly differentially gun-possessing residences) and weapons themselves (safes, trigger locks, other: door-to-door on smoke alarm model);
- Buybacks and amnesties;
- Community intelligence on weapons stockpiles.

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2) Security of sellers

The goal here to inhibit trust between sellers and buyers, perhaps splitting the illegal market so that the youth market loses appeal even to vendors still operating illegally.

- Differential investigation of trails of guns found in youth possession or involved in youth crime;
- Differential penalties for sales or transfer to youth;
- Joint liability for crimes committed with illegally sold guns, perhaps with additional penalties for crimes committed by minors;
- Stings;
- Buy/busts;
- Intelligence/state's evidence plea bargains for youth offenders;
- Federal concentration on interstate/large organizations involved in youth firearms supply;
- Community/parent/youth intelligence;
- Hotlines;
- Criminal justice system priority on sanctioning youth market vendors.

3) Security of buyers

The goal here is to inhibit trust between sellers and buyers, but also to increase costs and friction to less dedicated users.

- Stings;
- Sell/busts;
- School/gang/project intelligence;
- Community/parent/youth intelligence;
- Hotlines;
- Differential investigation of trails of guns sold by youth vendors;
- Intelligence/state's evidence plea bargains;
- Differential penalties/status definitions for youth possessing weapons;
- Intensive parole/probation supervision for firearms offenders/kids involved in street disputes;
- Criminal justice system priority on sanctioning youth buyers.

4) Incentive for sellers to sell firearms

Measures, possibly on the drug asset-forfeiture model, to take profit out of trade:

- Inventory seizure, asset seizure, attention to other illegal ventures of youth vendors;

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- Intensive supervision of court-involved vendors;
- Revocation of federal firearms licenses;
- Surveillance and other business inhibiting measures, such as neighborhood protests of known dealers.

5) Income of buyers.

- General crime-prevention measures;
- Street drug trade prevention.

6) Incentive for buyers to have firearm.

The goal is to increase safety and quality of life in high-gun areas.

- Measures (worked out with communities) to detect and deter carrying;
- Violence prevention measures;
- Drug trade prevention measures;
- Dangerous youth offender incarceration measures and gang violence control;
- Violence prevention curricula;
- Style/violence culture alterations;
- Peer measures (SADD analogue).

7) Labor

The goal is to raise costs and lower benefits to dissuade new entrants.

- Identify and incarcerate sellers.

8) Venue

- Civil abatement of businesses allowing, or fronting for, youth gun dealers;
- Eviction and forfeiture in gun-dealing houses and apartments;
- Neighborhood protests of known dealers.

Drug Violence and Federal Enforcement Capacity

The Federal government has had an important role to play in developing and promoting drug market-disruption strategies. It has encouraged the development of community and problem-solving policing, from which the disruption approach emerged. It has supported examinations of drug markets and

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discussions of possible interventions, which have been useful to practitioners designing particular operations. And it has supported descriptions and evaluations of important pilot programs, documenting their form and effectiveness. It is not too much to say that as a result we now know how to shut these markets down.

It is, nonetheless, still common to encounter police and other local authorities who are almost completely unaware of this work. Outside of relatively small circle of leading-edge practitioners, the preferred response to street markets continues to be traditional and largely ineffective. If we are to make serious progress against drug-related violence, this must change.

This represents a major challenge facing Federal policymakers. Historically, the Federal role against drugs has involved interdiction, high-level enforcement activities, a degree of correctional and treatment capacity, and the support of local law enforcement. As the limits of interdiction, enforcement, and corrections against our current drug problems become clearer, the importance of supporting and promoting local capacity grows. The most important role the Federal government can play here is to speed the development and adoption of innovative and effective local responses to pressing problems. In the case of street drug markets, the response has been developed, and to a remarkable degree: most communities and police departments can look at the experience that has been accumulated to date and see the outlines of a solution that would fit their needs. But adoption and implementation of the response is lagging seriously. The market disruption approach is an important invention that deserves to be as widely understood and supported as interdiction, enforcement, demand reduction, and treatment.

This suggests that the Federal government should work to promote local adoption of market-disruption strategies. Exploring, reporting, and evaluating disruption strategies has resulted in a body of clearly positive results, and considerable experience with framing and implementing responses to particular local market forms. The Federal government could build on this success. Every city and department with serious street-market problems should have a clear sense of the strategy, the range of possible tactics, and the implementation issues involved. Activist measures (seed grants, regular state and local working conferences, easily accessible technical assistance, personnel exchanges, topical problem-solving newsletters, a Federal information clearinghouse, etc.) could be taken to smooth and speed adoption and implementation.

It is also important for the Federal government to focus its own enforcement capacity on drug-related violence. Traditionally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the FBI have considered violence a consequence rather than an independent attribute of drug trafficking, and viewed the

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overall fight against trafficking to be the best way to reduce violence. Violence reduction as such (as opposed to the destruction of trafficking organizations, convictions, and the seizure of drugs and assets) has not been a primary goal nor a standard performance measure for these organizations. Consequently, the propensity to violence of particular drug figures, particular drug organizations, and particular forms of trafficking has not figured prominently in their calculations of how to deploy their enforcement resources. Both agencies should consider how to address this issue and create institutional incentives to treat violence reduction as a primary goal.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

A L E R T

Date: October 19, 1994 Time: 05:24PM

TO: LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICERS
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You are advised that the facsimile for S 1614, entitled Better Nutrition and Health for Children Act of 1993, was too long to FAX, and is being sent to you by Special Messenger.

Your views on this enrolled bill were previously requested on October 11, 1994 (EB Request #378).

The two-day response deadline referenced in the previous request begins today.

JAMES C. MURR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

INTERIM REPORT

ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP OF DRUG USE AND VIOLENCE IN THE GENERAL POPULATION

Prepared for:

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Executive Office of the President
750 17th Street, N.W., Eighth Floor
Washington, DC 20500

Prepared by:

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Research Triangle Institute

Under Subcontract to:

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ONDCP Task No.: 94E ■ February 1995

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INTRODUCTION

This interim report includes two components: a literature review covering the historical relationship between drug use and violence and an analysis plan for analyzing the relationship between drug use and violence using data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA). It is the first deliverable under Task No. 94E of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Contract No. DC2C03 to CSR, Incorporated. The task was funded through Modification No. 3 to CSR's subcontract with the Research Triangle Institute (RTI).

DRUG USE AND VIOLENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Violence is a significant problem of growing dimensions in the United States. It is one of the Nation's major public health problems (Rosenberg and Fenley, 1991), as well as a disruptive force, both socially and economically, for many communities, families, schools, and other institutions. Relative to other social and health problems, research on the causes and the prevention of violence in the United States has not received the attention it deserves (Reiss and Roth, 1993; Viano, 1990).

The relationship between illicit drug use and violence has been a consistent theme of research in this country for several decades. The interest in this relationship was generated by three presidential commissions: the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. All the reports of these commissions—published between 1967 and 1973—considered the relationship between drug use and violence, and all the publications of these commissions' emphasized the relationship between heroin use and income-generating crime.

Most of the attention on the relationship between drug use and violence has focused on the relationship between heroin and robbery, a relationship that has been supported by numerous empirical studies. Studies have found that some heroin addicts commit the violent

property crime of robbery to support their costly drug habits. In addition, studies have found that heroin users are not at elevated risk for involvement in nontheft-related assaultive crimes. Some studies have found relationships between the use of amphetamines and barbiturates and assaultive personal crimes (Greenberg, 1976; Tinklenberg, 1973). For example, in three studies of incarcerated delinquents, barbiturates, followed by amphetamines, were identified as the single substance most likely to enhance assaultive behavior (Goldstein 1989). Barbiturates have been found to be the most likely substance that leads to violence. With respect to marijuana use and violence, the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (1973, p. 76) concluded that "neither informed current professional opinion nor empirical research, ranging from the 1930s to the present, has produced systematic evidence to support the thesis that marijuana use, by itself, either invariably or generally leads to or causes crime, including acts of violence."

In the mid 1970s, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) formed the Panel on Drug Use and Criminal Behavior to develop a state-of-the-art summary of what was known about drug use and criminal behavior. This panel convened a series of workshops and commissioned papers by experts in the field. The panel's findings were summarized in *Drug Use and Crime: Report of the Panel on Drug Use and Criminal Behavior* (NIDA and Research Triangle Institute [RTI], 1976). Again, the relationship between drug use and crime was primarily characterized as one that involved crimes of theft (including robbery) committed by heroin users to support their drug use.

The perceived basis for the relationship between drug use and violence shifted during the next decade. Drug users were found to be frequently involved in violent crime, not only robbery, but often homicide and assaultive offenses (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Johnson et al., 1985; Stephens and Ellis, 1975). Often the violence was associated with drug distribution. With the emergence of crack-cocaine and violent crack-cocaine markets in the mid-1980s, the relationship between drug use and violence became even more visible.

Framework for Understanding the Relationship Between Drug Use and Violence

Research on the relationship between drug use and violence suggests numerous ways in which alcohol, drugs, and violence relate to each other. For example, Paul Goldstein

(1985) proposed a "tripartite" conceptual framework for understanding drug-related violence. He suggested that drug use contributed to violence in three ways:

- Through the psychopharmacologic effects of drugs (psychopharmacological model);
- Through the economic compulsive needs of addicts to maintain their supply of drugs (economic compulsive model); and
- Through the violence produced in the course of drug trafficking activities (systemic model).

Goldstein's psychopharmacological model suggests that some individuals may exhibit irrational behavior as a result of ingesting specific substances. For example, (1) drugs may cause individuals to become "excitable and/or irrational and...act out in a violent fashion," (2) the "irritability" associated with drug withdrawal symptoms may induce violence, or (3) "some individuals may ingest substances purposively to reduce nervousness or boost courage and thereby facilitate the commission of a previously intended crime" (Goldstein et al., 1989, p. 655). An important issue that remains unresolved with regard to this model is whether violence is a direct effect of drug use or whether it is a self-fulfilling prophecy because certain drugs acquire a reputation for stimulating certain responses and may be purposely ingested to get this effect.

Goldstein's economic compulsive model suggests that some drug users engage in criminal activity to obtain money to support their drug habits. This aspect of the relationship between drug use and violence has received the most attention over the years and is the one best supported by research findings. Research shows a strong association between the frequent use of heroin and cocaine and involvement in income-generating crime, including the violent offense of robbery. The evidence is particularly convincing because the frequency of a drug user's involvement in income-generating offenses increases during periods of heavy drug use and decreases during periods of infrequent use or nonuse. Chaiken and Chaiken (1990) suggest that individual crime commission rates are two or three times higher during periods of heavy drug use.

Goldstein's systemic model suggests that violence is intrinsic to the "normally aggressive patterns of interaction within the system of drug use and distribution" (Goldstein et al., 1989, p. 656). This model encompasses a variety of pathways to violence including disputes over drug-selling territory, disputes over drugs, elimination of informers, and punishment for selling counterfeit drugs.

Goldstein's tripartite conceptualization of drug-related violence has been useful as a framework for logically categorizing drug-related violence and for conducting empirical research on the relationship between drug use and violence. However, the actual relationship of drugs to violence often is not so simple—a single occurrence of violence may involve two or even all three models. Further conceptual elaboration of the framework and testing of specific hypotheses developed from it are required to advance current understanding.

To untangle the complexity of the relationship between drug use and violence and to identify specific features of the problem, Exhibit 1 following this page presents an elaboration of Goldstein's (1985) models. The exhibit provides the following information:

- Distinguishes phenomenologically different kinds of drug-related violence;
- Identifies both specific and general factors to explain the underlying motivations and enhancing conditions for drug-related violence;
- Suggests nondrug-etiological factors that may underlie or influence the nature and extent of the relationship between drug use and violence; and
- Identifies the types of drugs used thought to be related to violence.

Drug-related violence usually will not be classifiable clearly into one of the three models. Violence may, for example, involve elements of both systemic and psychopharmacological models. Moreover, although Goldstein's classification system was intended to distinguish different causal mechanisms in the relationship between drug use and violence, it is likely that much of the violence that appears to be caused by drug use actually is only related to drug use indirectly. Drug use and violence may occur together, but

Exhibit 1

Framework for Understanding the Relationship Between Drug Use and Violence

Goldstein's Models	Violence Motivations and/or Mechanisms	Underlying and Contributing Etiological Factors	Types of Drugs Used
Psychopharmacological Model (Drug effects make user violent.)	• Anger/aggression • Drug-induced or drug withdrawal irritability	• Drug interactions • Psychopathology • Deviance disavowal • Drug use prevalence	Alcohol Amphetamines Cocaine PCP Barbiturates
Economic Compulsive Model (Drug user engages in predatory violence to obtain money for drugs.)	• Money to buy drugs	• Economic profitability\ deprivation • Individual, social and cultural conditions • Price of drugs • Lack of nonviolent means of income	Heroin Cocaine
Systemic Model (Violence results from interaction in the drug distribution system.)	• Market regulation, maintenance, or expansion • Retaliation for "ripoff"	• Economic profitability/ deprivation • Individual, social and cultural conditions • Absence of legal dispute settlement	Heroin Cocaine Marijuana

their co-occurrence may not indicate that drug use is causally relevant to the violence. Other factors may explain the violence. Goldstein's framework is intended to permit judgements about why, under what conditions, and to what extent drug use or drug trafficking generates violence. Not explicit in the framework are the many other forms of violence not related to drugs. Nevertheless, only a fraction of the overall level of violence in our society is caused by or even related to drug use and drug trafficking.

Other Research

Several studies on the relationship between drug use and violence focus exclusively on homicides, which represent the lethal extremity on the continuum of violent behavior. Estimates on the percentage of homicides that are drug related vary from less than 10 percent to more than 50 percent. Studies that distinguish the specific degrees of drug-relatedness with respect to Goldstein's models conclude that drug trafficking (i.e., the systemic model) accounts for the greatest proportion of drug-related lethal violence. Relatively few homicides were attributed to either psychopharmacologic or economic compulsive factors. For example, based on the review of homicide incident records and personal interviews, Przyblaski and Block (1991) estimated that approximately 2 percent of all homicides in Chicago could be attributed to the psychopharmacologic effects of drugs. Goldstein et al. (1990) estimated the figure in New York to be 7.5 percent, although the definition of drug-relatedness included alcohol as well as illicit drugs. Similarly, low percentages were estimated for homicides that could be classified as economic compulsive.

Other than homicide studies, most empirical research on the relationships between drug use and violence and drug use and crime has depended on information from special populations, such as arrestees, inmates, and drug treatment clients. The percentage of arrestees and inmates that report or test positive for drug use has consistently been substantially higher than that of the general population (National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 1991; U.S. Department of Justice, 1989). Conversely, known addicts and drug treatment clients typically report a much higher incidence of criminal activity than the general population (Ball, Shaeffer, and Nurco, 1983; Collins, Hubbard, and Rachal, 1985). Such findings have been interpreted as supportive of a direct causal association between drug use and criminal behavior, including violence. However, the extreme selectivity of these samples

precludes definitive conclusions about the causal nature of the observed associations or their generalizability to the larger population.

Recent data show a strong empirical association between drug use and violence. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program of the NIJ, which collects and analyzes urine samples from recently arrested persons in 24 cities, found in 1992 that the percentage of male booked arrestees testing positive for any drug ranged from 48 percent in Omaha, Nebraska, to 77 percent in San Diego, California. The percentage of female booked arrestees testing positive for any drug ranged from 44 percent in San Antonio, Texas, to 74 percent in Cleveland, Ohio. (The DUF program conducts laboratory analyses to test for the presence of 10 drugs: cocaine, opiates, marijuana, phencyclidine [PCP], methadone, methaqualone, benzodiazepines, propoxyphene, barbiturates, and amphetamines [NIJ, 1992]).

In addition, self report surveys of jail and prison inmates and of youth in custody show that substantial percentages were under the influence of drugs or both drugs and alcohol when they committed offenses (Beck, Kline, and Greenfeld 1988; Harlow, 1991; Innes, 1988). For all types of offenses, the percentages of incarcerated populations who said they were under the influence of drugs when they committed their offenses ranged from 28 percent to 39 percent. Those incarcerated for drug offenses reported the highest rates of being under the influence of drugs or drugs and alcohol—from 25 percent to 36 percent of those who committed violent offenses and from 31 percent to 40 percent of those who committed property offenses.

Clearly, evidence from a quarter century of research indicates a very strong drug use-violence empirical relationship-including a relationship with violent crime. The heroin use-robbery relationship has been found consistently, and more recent evidence suggests that drug use patterns and drug trafficking may be associated with other violent crimes against persons.

Identifying Patterns of Drug Use and Violent Crime

To identify patterns of drug use and violent crime, analyses of the relationship between drug use and violence should distinguish the frequency of drug use and the type of

drug. Specifically, research suggests that it is the level of drug use that is predictive of criminal activity rather than drug use per se. Drug users go through periods of heavy use and periods of lesser use or nonuse, and their crime-committing behaviors vary over time depending on the amount of drug use. For drug users, periods of addiction or daily drug use are accompanied by much higher crime commission rates than periods of lesser drug use. For example, ratios of 6:1 and 8:1 have been found between crime rates in periods of high and low usage, respectively (Reiss and Roth, 1993).

Other important variables in examining patterns in the relationship between drug use and violence appear to be the duration and frequency of drug use. The distinction between the immediate and long-term effects of drug use is an important one to make when examining patterns and relationships between drug use and violence. Some have referred to this distinction as the acute and chronic effects of alcohol and drugs. Acute effects are the near-term pharmacological effects that a psychoactive substance has on the user; for example, reaction time may be altered, judgement may be impaired, and mood may be elevated. Chronic effects are those that may result from drug use over a long period of time, such as personality deterioration, physiological disorders, and neurochemical malfunctioning. When considering drug effects that may be related to violence, acute effects are probably more important than chronic effects because alcohol and drugs affect behavior shortly after consumption. Conceptually, acute and chronic responses are distinct, and they should be considered as such to help clarify how drug use causes violence (Collins, 1989).

Previous research indicates that the motivation for involvement in crime by frequent drug users is usually monetary gain (Harrison, 1992; Goldstein, 1985; 1989). Thus, many addicts commit offenses to obtain money and/or goods that can be traded for drugs, or they become involved in drug trafficking to finance their drug habits. Evidence shows that the majority of violent crimes committed by addicts are crimes that arise from the illicit drug trafficking system (Harrison, 1992).

The Relationship Between Drug Trafficking and Violent Crime

One of the commonly cited etiologic factors in the incidence of violence is the trafficking of illicit drugs. Strong implications exist regarding the role that drug trafficking

has played in increasing violent crime in the United States. Because limited research exists on this topic, it is difficult to know what proportion of the increase in violent crime is related to drug trafficking and to what extent policy and news media attention accurately reflect the magnitude of the problem. Some reasons why research is scarce in this area are as follows:

- The relationship itself is complex and thus scientifically challenging and costly to study;
- Relevant empirical data are difficult and sometimes dangerous to collect; and
- Policymakers' concerns for the relationship between drug trafficking and violence have escalated to major proportions only in the last decade; therefore, there has been limited time to accumulate a body of knowledge.

The limited body of systematic knowledge about the relationship between drug trafficking and violence in turn limits the conclusions that can be drawn.

Several reasons for the relationship have been suggested. The following sections present the use of violence in drug trafficking as a form of social control or competitive advantage and the prevalence of violence in drug trafficking by drug type.

Drug Trafficking Violence as a Means of Social Control or Competitive Advantage

Some research characterizes the relationship between drug trafficking and violence as market regulation; that is, violence encourages adherence to rules of exchange and other aspects of the illegal drug business and gives those who control the violence a competitive market advantage. This reasoning is supported by the fact that the illegal drug business does not have access to legitimate social and legal mechanisms for regulating its activities. If a drug dealer does not pay for a drug consignment as agreed, the aggrieved party has no recourse to the courts to enforce the "contractual" agreement. Thus, the illegal drug business regulates its market and enforces its own rules by using violence or the threat of violence to impose order.

Violence sometimes is used in the drug trade to establish a market advantage. For example, a drug dealer may use violence or the threat of violence to protect current selling areas and customers, to maintain control, or to eliminate competition. A drug dealer also may use violence to expand the drug selling territory and customer base by eliminating competition.

The market disruption theory also has been suggested as an explanation for the relationship between drug trafficking and violence. This theory hypothesizes that violence periodically characterizes illegal drug markets when established trafficking patterns are disrupted. Violence thus is characteristic of destabilized drug markets and subsides when order is restored. Market disruption might be precipitated by law enforcement operations (Reuter, 1991), changes in social and economic circumstances in communities (Hamid, 1990; Johnson, Williams, Dei, and Sanabria, 1990), or attempts to gain monopoly control over a market (McBride, Burgman-Habermehl, Alpert, and Chitwood, 1986).

Further evidence indicates that the drug distribution system is related to violent crime in recent homicide studies. Studies of homicide cases suggest substantial numbers result from drug trafficking and/or include individuals who are involved in drug trafficking. For example, Hefferman, Martin, and Romano (1982) conducted research about drug trafficking-related homicides in the 46th police precinct in the Bronx, NY, in 1981. During the first 9 months of 1981, 50 homicides occurred of which 42 percent (n=21) were determined to be drug related. A plot of the geographical locations of the drug-related homicides showed that all 21 homicides were located in a 7-by-5 block area where the precincts' drug dealing was concentrated. On the other hand, the 29 homicides that were not drug related appeared to be randomly scattered across the entire precinct. It may be inferred from these results that a high incidence of homicides in urban locations will co-occur with a high incidence of narcotics trafficking.

Goldstein et al. (1989) studied 414 homicides that occurred in New York City between March and October 1988. Based on police knowledge and information from files, the homicides were categorized into Goldstein's framework (i.e., psychopharmacological, economic compulsive, and systemic models) or as not drug related. Approximately 53 percent of homicides were drug related, 39 percent of which were classified as systemic (related to the

drug trade). The police identified 29 percent of the perpetrators as drug traffickers and believed 34 percent of the victims to be drug traffickers.

Other empirical evidence, although less specific regarding the perpetrator's primary motivation, implicates the increased likelihood of violence within or surrounding drug trafficking. For example, Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) asserted that the risk of injury or death for those involved in drug trafficking is very high. They estimated that 200 individuals involved in the illicit drug market are killed each year. In addition, Fitzpatrick (1974) indicated that one-quarter of Federal drug treatment program client's deaths were homicides. McCoy, McBride, Rivers, and Russe (1978) also found that within their study population of heroin addicts who have sought treatment, murder was the leading cause of death. Police records indicated that those homicides occurred during a drug deal or as the result of a drug deal.

It follows that if there is a relationship between homicide and drug trafficking that there also may be a relationship between nonlethal violence and drug trafficking. However, there has been far less research on the relationship between nonlethal violence and drug trafficking. Research to date indicates that those involved in drug trafficking are significantly more likely to have carried a gun or a knife and are more likely to have committed violent personal crimes (Altschuler and Brounstein, 1991).

Previous research on male juveniles residing in inner cities shows that persons who sell drugs are significantly more likely to commit violent crimes than are nonsellers. The delinquency rate for those who use drugs versus those who sell drugs is significantly different. Those who use drugs commit more property offenses, while those who sell drugs commit more violent offenses. Those who sell drugs also are more likely to carry a weapon, have used a weapon, have threatened someone, committed robbery, carried a concealed weapon, been part of a group that attacked someone, and committed burglary. It appears that drug selling, not drug using, is an important factor in the commission of violent crimes (Altschuler and Brounstein, 1991).

Prevalence of Violence in Drug Trafficking by Drug Type

Some drug trafficking markets may be more violent that others. Several researchers suggest that crack-cocaine trafficking is more violent than other more established drug markets, such as those for heroin and marijuana. Law enforcement agencies have reported that the increased use and distribution of crack-cocaine are paralleled by a proportionate rise in such crimes as burglary, robbery, and homicide (Harruff, Francisco, Elkins, Phillips, and Fernandez, 1988). Goldstein and colleagues (1989) proposed that the characteristic crack-cocaine distribution system is an important source of drug-related homicides.

Youth, minority, group membership, and low socioeconomic status seem to be the primary demographic characteristics among crack-cocaine traffickers. Inciardi (1990) studied adolescent drug users in high crime and drug use areas. Inciardi showed that the greater the youth's involvement in crack-cocaine trafficking, the more likely he or she was to be a regular drug user. In addition, those dealing crack-cocaine committed more violent crimes on a por capita basis than those who did not deal or were only casually involved and selling less frequently.

Fagan and Chin (1990) examined the use of violence and aggression among crack-cocaine and other drug sellers in New York City. Their total sample included 559 respondents from the drug sellers' neighborhoods who had been arrested for drug possession or sales, residents who matched the arrested population but had avoided legal intervention or drug use or drug sales, and individuals in residential drug treatment. Their research indicates that crack-cocaine sellers often are more violent than other drug sellers. Crack-cocaine sellers also are involved in more violent acts outside the drug selling context than other drug sellers and nonsellers. Based on their research, Fagan and Chin (1990) concluded that violence associated with crack-cocaine trafficking reflects the social and economic disorganization of the neighborhood where crack-cocaine is concentrated.

Conclusions

Even though the relationship between drug use and violence has been consistently documented—in both the popular media and the social sciences—it only is recently that attempts have been made to assess this problem on a national level. Research findings have been interpreted as supportive of a direct causal association between drug use and criminal behavior, including violence. However, most of the research has depended on information from special populations, and the nonrepresentativeness of these samples precludes definitive conclusions about the causal nature of the association or their generalizability to the larger population. Therefore, although research provides comparatively good information on drug use and trafficking among incarcerated individuals, it contributes little to understanding the relationship between drug use and violence in the general population.

To establish the relationship between drug use and violence in the general population, additional research is needed. Because there is a dearth of information in this area, RTI will, under this task, analyze the 1991 NHSDA to assess the relationship between drug use and drug trafficking and the commission of violent crimes among the general population. The NHSDA, sponsored by NIDA, has been conducted periodically since 1971 to provide estimates of the prevalence, patterns, and consequences of drug use in the United States. In 1991 the NHSDA added questions about criminal activities using a self-administered answer sheet. The questions addressed offenses including the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Crime Index offenses, as well as several individual offenses that have high rates of arrest, making it possible to assess the relationship between drug use, drug trafficking, and violent crime among the general population. This analysis will result in a new and important perspective to approach this issue as well as progress in determining whether a relationship between drug use and violence exists in the general population, and if so, whether the direction and strength of the relationship can be determined.

ANALYSIS PLAN FOR STUDYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUG USE AND VIOLENCE IN THE GENERAL POPULATION

The analyses will be performed on data from the 1991 NHSDA. If time and computer resources permit, the analyses will be repeated with 1992 data. All analyses will be

conducted using the SUDAAN (Software for Survey Data Analysis) statistical software package (RTI, 1991), which is specifically designed to take into consideration the multistage cluster sample design of surveys such as the NHSDA.

The overall purpose of the analyses will be to measure the strength and statistical significance of the relationships between self-reported drug use and several measures of violence and/or illegal activity, while controlling for a number of background demographic variables. Because the illegal activity measures (the "dependent" variables) all are measured as simple dichotomies, multiple logistic regression will be used to assess these relationships. Drug use measures also will be dichotomous variables, while the demographic controls will include a mixture of categorical and continuous variables. The relationships between drug use measures and illegal activity measures will be represented as adjusted odds ratios, which reflect the likelihood of a positive outcome (e.g., illegal activity = yes) for one value of a predictor (e.g., drug use = yes) relative to another value of a predictor (e.g., drug use = no).

The analyses will be limited to respondents ages 18 to 49. Youth will not be included because certain demographic control variables are either unavailable or not applicable for this age group. Older adults will be excluded because the peak years for most forms of drug use and illegal activity are in the late teens and 20s, and because sociodemographic control variables may operate differently for older respondents.

Dependent Variables

Respondents were asked in the survey whether they were involved in certain activities in the past 12 months that might have been illegal. The following activities will be used to measure each respondent's use of violence and participation in criminal activities:

- Hit someone or been involved in a physical fight;
- Hurt someone badly enough to need bandages or a doctor;
- Used a weapon, force, or strong-arm methods to obtain money or things from a person;

- Taken something from a store without paying for it or taken money or property; and

- Damaged or destroyed property.

Respondents also were asked in the survey whether they had been arrested and booked for various crimes (not counting minor traffic violations) during the past 12 months. The set of dependent variables in the analysis will include being arrested and booked for:

- Any crime;

- A violent crime (e.g., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or simple assault); and

- A property crime (e.g., larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, or arson).

Prior to the analysis, the two-way cross-tabulations will be examined between every possible pair of the above set of measures. If any pairs exhibit extremely strong associations, dropping one or more of the measures will be considered before proceeding further.

Drug Use Measures

Drug use measures all will be defined on the basis of self-reported use within the past 12 months. For the more commonly used drugs (i.e., alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and psychotherapeutic agents used for nonmedical purposes), a distinction will be made between any use and more intense use. Intense alcohol use will be based on the number of times the respondent was drunk or high on alcohol within the past 12 months, while intense use of other drugs will be based on the frequency of use within the past 12 months. Definitions for the drug use measures, all in reference to the past 12 months, are as follows:

Alcohol

- Any use of alcohol
- Intense use of alcohol (drunk once per month or more often)

Marijuana

- Any use of marijuana
  Intense use of marijuana (once per week or more often)

Cocaine (including crack-cocaine)

- Any use of cocaine
  Intense use of cocaine (once per month or more often)

Psychotherapeutic drugs

- Any use of psychotherapeutic drugs
  Intense use of psychotherapeutic drugs (any class of psychotherapeutics once per month or more often)

Other drugs

- Any use of inhalants
- Any use of hallucinogens
- Any poly-illicit drug use (use of three or more types of illicit drugs—including marijuana, cocaine, inhalants, hallucinogens, heroin, and psychotherapeutics).

The list of drug use indicators in the analysis will include a self-report measure for selling illicit drugs during the past 12 months.

Control Variables

Most sociodemographic control variables are categorical and thus will be represented in the analysis by one or more dichotomous indicators, often referred to as dummy variables. Each indicator will represent one level of the categorical variable. Complete representation of each categorical sociodemographic variable will be provided by inclusion of k-1 dummy variables (where k is the number of categories in the original variable). The level that is not explicitly included in each model will be referred to as the reference category and is typically the modal category from the original measure. Those levels are in the list below.

Age, number of jobs during the past 5 years, and number of moves in the past 5 years, all will be measured as continuous variables. Additionally, to accommodate potentially significant nonlinear effects of age, both an age and an age-squared term will be included as controls in the multivariate models.

Variable	Levels
Age	(Continuous)
Age-squared	(Continuous)
Gender	Male, female
Race/ethnicity	Hispanic, white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, other
Metropolitan status	Large (>1 million), small (<1 million), nonmetro
Geographic region	Northeast, North Central, South, West
Education	Less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate
Occupation of chief wage earner	White collar, blue collar, service, did not work
Household income adjusted for family size	Less than 100 percent of poverty level (low), 100-300 percent of poverty level (medium), over 300 percent of poverty level (high)
Marital status	Married, divorced/separated, never married, widowed
Employment status	Full-time, unemployed, other
Number of jobs in past 5 years	(Continuous)
Number of moves in past 5 years	(Continuous)

Analytic Strategy

In implementing the analysis plan, a logistic regression analysis will be conducted. As a prelude to this analysis the percentages of each drug use and illegal activity measures will be computed and displayed. The prevalence of the drug use and illegal activity co-occurrence also will be computed. These descriptive statistics will be provided for the full subsample (ages 18 to 49), by age (18 to 25, 26 to 34, and 35 to 49), and by gender.

For the logistic regression analyses, each violent or criminal behavior measure will be analyzed separately. These measures will be the dependent variables in a series of multiple logistic regression models. For each dependent variable, a logistic regression model will be assessed that initially includes only a single type of drug use as the predictor variable(s). For alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and psychotherapeutics, there will be two indicators (i.e., an indicator for heavy use and an indicator for intense use). For the other categories of drugs, only a single indicator (any use) will be included. Because eight dependent variables are being examined, and eight types of drug use plus drug selling, a total of 72 (8*9) logistic regression models will be assessed.

For each dependent variable, a second set of models will be examined that include the list of sociodemographic control variables as predictors. Results from these analyses will quantify the strength and significant of the relationships between drug use and criminal activity after adjustment for many potentially confounding factors. Due to the anticipated small number of respondents reporting both drug use and criminal behavior, interaction terms involving sociodemographic variables will not be examined.

Because users of one type of drug are typically more likely to use other drugs, it is possible that positive effects seen for some drugs could be due to confounding with other types of drug use. Based on the results of the analyses described in the preceding paragraphs, any drug-use behaviors that are strongly related to the outcome measures will be selected and include these measures as variables in a third set of regression models. There is some danger in "over-control" with this approach, with an attendant loss on statistical power, and therefore results from these analyses will be interpreted cautiously.

For each of the basic 72 regression models, the results will be displayed as a sequence of three odds ratios and the level of statistical significance of each. The first will be the unadjusted odds ratio, the second will be adjusted for sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent, and the third will be adjusted for sociodemographic characteristics plus measures of other types of drug use. The results will be organized by outcome variable, and interpretations will be provided regarding the patterns of results both within and across these outcomes.

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DEFINING DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE

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BOTEC Analysis
CORPORATION

DEFINING DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE

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Background

Reducing the violence connected with the use and trafficking of drugs is a primary objective of federal drug policy.[1] Yet, data on drug-related violence are not regularly collected and reported. This would seem to handicap efforts to formulate and carry out anti-violence policies. Without readily accessible and reliable data, it is difficult to assess the nature and extent of drug-related violence, to determine if and how the problem is improving or worsening, and to identify the successes and failures of policy interventions.

How to rectify this situation is by no means obvious. It is one thing to gather data on robberies, assaults, or murders. Such crimes are defined as *acts* (although mental states and other circumstances can be considered aggravating or mitigating factors). A robbery, for example, is the unlawful taking of another's property in his immediate presence by the use of violence or intimidation.

By contrast, when a violent incident is termed "drug-related," what is being described is not an act, but rather a *contributory cause* of an act. This complicates the identification of drug-related violence, since contributory causes can rarely be proven in individual cases. We know that smoking is a contributory cause of lung cancer; indeed, it is possible to estimate with some precision how many lung cancers are caused by smoking. But because there are many other causes of lung cancer (just as there are many causes of violence other than drugs), it is not possible to look at an individual case of lung cancer and determine whether smoking was responsible.

What makes the identification of drug-related violence even more difficult is the fact that there are many ways in which drugs can contribute to violence. Jones stabs Smith and takes his money. Consider a few of the possible drug connections: Jones has an expensive drug habit and was short of cash; Jones was intoxicated; Jones and Smith were rival drug dealers; Jones' parents were heavy drug users and abused and neglected him as a child; Jones carries a knife because he is afraid of the drug dealers in his neighborhood.

Because there are so many possible connections between drugs and violence, in few cases of violence will the police have enough information about the victim, the perpetrator, their backgrounds, and the nature of their dispute to make a definitive assessment of the role played by drugs. Moreover, in those communities where drug-related violence is most prevalent, almost all

[1] See *The 1995 National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1995).

violent incidents will have some connection to drugs. Even where the use or sale of drugs has no immediate link to a violent crime, the characters of those involved are likely to have been importantly shaped by growing up or living in a violent, drug-involved neighborhood.

This report provides a preliminary discussion of the issues involved in attempting to define and collect data on drug-related violence. It briefly surveys the possible connections between drugs and violence, discusses the difficulties of collecting data using particular definitions of drug-related violence, and suggests a possible approach for future data collection.

Drugs-Violence Connections

Explanatory Frameworks

It has become common for researchers to characterize drug-related violence according to a highly influential typology advanced several years ago by Paul Goldstein.[2] Goldstein offered three models: the psychopharmacologic, the economically compulsive, and the systemic. The psychopharmacologic model suggests that drug abuse will cause some individuals, either in the short run or long run, to be more prone to violent behavior. Intoxication and addiction, which in certain circumstances appear to encourage careless and combative behavior, are the key mechanisms. The economically compulsive model accounts for violent behavior that is economically motivated, specifically by the desire to obtain money with which to buy drugs. The systemic model captures the violence intrinsic to the drug trade—violence among dealers or between dealers and customers.

It is possible to further refine these distinctions. For instance, James Collins has suggested four different causal frameworks for violence attributable to drinking (or, in other words, four different types of psychopharmacologic violence): pathological (violence directly caused by the effects of alcohol ingestion on the brain), cultural (violence under the influence attributable to cultural attitudes and learning), deviance disavowal (violence under the influence blamed on alcohol), and situational (violence prompted by drinking contexts).[3]

Perhaps the most comprehensive framework for classifying drug-related violence is the one developed by the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior. The panel distinguished four levels of analysis: broad social and economic forces, interpersonal encounters, individual behavioral development, and neurobehavioral and other biological processes. The panel also categorized factors according to the temporal proximity to a violent event, ranging from *immediate* to *situational* to *predisposing*. The table below gives some examples of how different risk factors fall into these categories:

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[2] Paul J. Goldstein, "The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework," *Journal of Drug Issues* 14 (1985):493-506.

[3] James J. Collins, "Suggested Explanatory Frameworks to Clarify the Alcohol Use/Violence Relationship," *Contemporary Drug Problems* 15 (1988):107-121.

Examples of Possible Risk Factors for Violence Related to Drugs

Level of Observation	Temporal Proximity		
	Predisposing	**Situational**	**Immediate**
Social and Economic Forces (Macrosocial)	Legal economic opportunities leave cities; illegal drug markets fill the gap.	Disputes between rival dealer organizations or buyers and sellers.	
Encounters Between People (Microsocial)	Informal "rules" of illegal drug markets are in flux.	Bizarre behavior provokes violent attacks.	Perpetrator overreacts to insults.
Psychosocial	Pre-existing psychosis modifies temporary drug effects on behavior.		Psychotic episode.
Neurobehavioral	Chronic drug use changes brain chemistry.	Effects of smoked "crack" cocaine on behavior.	Altered neural activity.

Source: Adapted from Jeffrey A. Roth, "Psychoactive Substances and Violence," National Institute of Justice Research in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, February 1994), p. 3.

Identifying Drug-Related Violence

If identifying links between drugs and violence is difficult in theory, it is even more challenging in practice. Many factors other than drugs contribute to violence, and so violence that appears, at first glance, to be clearly drug related, may seem less so upon closer examination. And vice-versa. Two crack dealers, bearing weapons acquired in the trade, shoot it out over an insult unrelated to their business. Is that drug-related violence? A teenager in a neighborhood plagued by drug-related violence, who does not use or sell drugs, but carries a gun for self-protection, shoots another teenager who he believes is threatening him. Is that drug-related violence?

Some recent research illustrates how difficult it is to sort out such complications. In 1988, with the cooperation of the New York City Police Department, Paul Goldstein and several colleagues tried to determine the percentage of the city's homicides that were drug-related.[4] In seventeen of

[4] Paul J. Goldstein, Henry H. Brownstein, Patrick J. Ryan, and Patricia A. Bellucci, "Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually-Based Event Analysis," *Contemporary Drug Problems* 16 (1989):651-687.

the city's seventy-five precincts, the "routine" paper work completed in each homicide report included a data collection form asking detailed questions about possible drug connections—drug use or selling by victims or perpetrators, cause of dispute, location of homicide (e.g., crack house or other drug selling location), and so on.

Of the 414 homicides on which such information was collected, 218 (52.7 percent) were determined to be drug-related. Applying Goldstein's tripartite framework, systemic violence was by far the most common drugs-violence connection, accounting for 162 of the 218 drug-related murders.

In comparison to these findings, consider the research of Carolyn and Richard Block. The Blocks conducted a careful study of 288 gang-motivated homicides in Chicago from 1987-1990.[5] They concluded that these homicides were most often turf-related (gang turf, not drug turf); in their view, only 8 of 288 homicides were related to drugs. Admittedly, the distinction between gang turf and drug turf sounds a bit like a distinction without a difference. However, the Blocks found that many of the gang homicides were concentrated in turf areas—especially on disputed turf—that were not drug dealing locations. They also found that gang homicides were most common on the turf of the Latin Kings, and least common on Vice Lords' turf. Of Chicago's major gangs—Latin Kings, Vice Lords, Latin Disciples—the Latin Kings were the least involved in drug dealing, while the Vice Lords were the most involved. It should be noted that researchers have found a similarly weak relationship between gang violence and drug dealing in Los Angeles.[6]

It is important to point out that the striking disparity in the New York and Chicago findings cannot be readily explained by differences in the definition of drug-related violence. In conducting their research, the Blocks employed Goldstein's tripartite definition, just as the New York study did. But if definitional differences cannot explain the apparent gap in drug-related violence between the two cities, what does? It is true that the Chicago study examined only gang homicides, while the New York research looked at all murders. Yet it is hard to believe that gang homicides are less than one-tenth as likely as other murders to involve drugs; if anything, one would expect gang homicides to be more frequently tied to drugs.

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[5] Carolyn Rebecca Block and Richard Block, "Street Gang Crime in Chicago," National Institute of Justice Research in Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, December 1993).

[6] Malcolm W. Klein, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Lea C. Cunningham, "'Crack,' Street Gangs, and Violence," *Criminology* 29 (1991):623-650.

It is also hard to imagine that the nature of homicides is completely different in New York and Chicago. It seems more plausible that much or most of the discrepancy is attributable to differences in research method (and possibly subjective judgments). In other words, had the research methods of the New York study (and perhaps the proclivities of the New York researchers) been applied to the Chicago homicide cases, it is likely that considerably more incidents would have been classified as drug-related.

In fact, it is clear from the Blocks' study itself that a broader conception of "drug-related" could significantly change their findings. The Blocks concluded that "virtually the entire increase in the number of street gang-motivated homicides seems attributable to an increase in the use of high-caliber, automatic, or semi-automatic weapons."[7] But surely many of these weapons were acquired for use in the drug trade (and with the proceeds of drug dealing).

[7] Block and Block, "Street Gang Crime in Chicago," p. 7.

A Data Collection Alternative

The foregoing discussion illustrates the difficulty of developing definitions of drug-related violence that could, in practice, generate reliable and consistent data. But specific definitions are only necessary if the goal is to classify individual incidents as either related or unrelated to drugs. And it is not clear that classifying (and counting) violent incidents in such binary fashion is an appropriate objective. Any such classification will depend not only on somewhat arbitrary definitions, but also on subjective judgments in applying those definitions, in part because information about individual incidents will typically be incomplete. Furthermore, simple numerical estimates of drug-related violence do not reveal much about the underlying causal connections between drugs and violence.

It is possible, however, to collect data about drug-related violence without choosing a particular definition (or set of definitions) of drug-related violence. One approach would be to gather information about the circumstances surrounding violence incidents, in particular information about circumstances that are relevant to suspected drugs-violence connections. As they did in Goldstein's study of New York homicides, the police could complete a data collection form asking detailed questions about potential drug connections. Among other things, questions would explore drug use and dealing by the victim and perpetrator, the nature of any relationship between them, the immediate pretext for their dispute, their criminal history, gang involvement, weapons (possession, type, and use), and how the incident location is situated in terms of drug dealing and gang turf. Where appropriate, answers would specify the particular drugs involved (including alcohol).

Presented below is a preliminary sketch of such a data collection form.

Violent Crime Data Collection Form

Demographic Information

1. Age of perpetrator (note if unknown): _____
2. Sex of perpetrator (circle one): Male Female Unknown
3. Race of perpetrator (circle one): Caucesian Black Hispanic Asian Other Unknown
4. Age of victim (note if unknown): _____
5. Sex of victim (circle one): Male Female Unknown
6. Race of victim (circle one): Caucasian Black Hispanic Asian Other Unknown

Offense Circumstances

7. What was the nature of the offense (circle all that apply)?
   Murder Nonnegligent Manslaughter Negligent Manslaughter
   Rape Other Sexual Assault Robbery Assault Other
8. Did the offense occur at a known drug selling location (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
9. Did the offense occur in connection with a drug sale (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
10. What was the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim (circle one)?
    Spouses Relatives Friends Associates Acquaintances Strangers Unknown

Weapons Involvement

11. Was the perpetrator armed (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
12. If yes, was the weapon employed in the crime (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
13. Was the victim armed (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
14. If yes, was the weapon employed in the crime (circle one)? Yes No Unknown

Drug Use and/or Possession

15. Was the perpetrator intoxicated at the time of the offense (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
16. If yes, which drugs were involved (circle all that apply)?
    Alcohol Cocaine Crack Heroin Marijuana PCP Methamphetamine Other Unknown
17. Did the perpetrator possess drugs at the time of the offense? Yes No Unknown
18. If yes, which drugs (circle all that apply)?
    Cocaine Crack Heroin Marijuana PCP Methamphetamine Other Unknown
19. Was the victim intoxicated at the time of the offense (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
20. If yes, which drugs were involved (circle all that apply)?
    Alcohol Cocaine Crack Heroin Marijuana PCP Methamphetamine Other Unknown
21. Did the victim possess drugs at the time of the offense? Yes No Unknown
22. If yes, which drugs (circle all that apply)?
    Cocaine Crack Heroin Marijuana PCP Methamphetamine Other Unknown

Drug Dealing and Gang Involvement

23. Has the perpetrator been involved in drug dealing (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
24. Does the perpetrator have any prior drug convictions (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
25. Has the victim been involved in drug dealing (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
26. Did the victim have any prior drug convictions (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
27. Is the perpetrator a member of a gang that sells drugs (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
28. If yes, what is the name of the gang? _____
29. Is the victim a member of a gang that sells drugs (circle one)? Yes No Unknown
30. If yes, what is the name of the gang? _____

When compiled over a period of time, the answers to such a questionnaire would form a database of information about violent crime. Because the database would permit the analysis of patterns and trends in the circumstances of violent crime, police, policy makers, and researchers might be able to learn more about the drug-related causes of violence. They also might be able to identify some of the key factors behind increases and decreases in violent crime.

Equally important, the database would facilitate specific policy assessments. Suppose, for example, that a city introduces a community policing program designed to reduce violence between drug-dealing gangs. Unless information about the circumstances of violent incidents were recorded in systematic fashion, it would be difficult to distinguish a policy success or failure from a generalized fall or rise in violent crime. However, with the kind of database envisioned here, it would be possible to track changes (before and after the new policy) in the number of violent crimes where both the perpetrator and the victim were known to be members of rival drug-dealing gangs.