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IV-3

Decision**EXTENSION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty") convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with articles VIII,3 and X,2 of the Treaty,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII,3 of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty and the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X,2 of the Treaty,

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X,2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Moscow, Russia)

IV-4

For Immediate Release

June 4, 2000

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING
MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM DESIGNATED AS NO
LONGER REQUIRED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES
AND RELATED COOPERATION

The Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation announced today completion of the bilateral Agreement for the management and disposition of weapon-grade plutonium withdrawn from their respective nuclear weapon programs and declared excess to defense purposes. This Agreement will ensure that this plutonium will be changed into forms unusable for nuclear weapons by consumption as fuel in nuclear reactors or by immobilization rendering it suitable for geologic disposal.

Based on the 1998 Summit Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium, this Agreement charts the course and sets the conditions for such activities. It reconfirms our determination to take steps necessary to ensure that it is never again used for nuclear weapons or any other military purpose and is managed and disposed in a way that is safe, secure, ecologically sound, transparent and irreversible. It reaffirms our commitment to nuclear disarmament.

This Agreement will ensure that the management and disposition activities are monitored and, thus, transparent for the international community. It provides for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification once appropriate agreements with the IAEA are concluded.

This Agreement builds on the approaches to such plutonium management and disposition agreed at the 1996 G-8 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit. We reaffirm our intentions to continue to work closely with other countries, in particular other G-8 leaders, who have provided strong support over past years for initiation and implementation of these programs. In this regard, we hope that significant progress will be made as well at the G-8 Summit this July in Okinawa.

This Agreement will enable new cooperation to go forward between the United States and the Russian Federation. We note that the United States Congress has appropriated 200 million USD for this cooperation and the U.S. Administration intends to seek additional appropriations.

This Agreement will soon be signed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Kasyanov.

Moscow June 4, 2000

CHINA

IV-5

JOINT STATEMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China, in furtherance of their shared nonproliferation interests, have agreed to take the following steps as of today's date: (1) the United States will take the measures necessary to lift the sanctions imposed in August 1993, and (2) once the United States lifts the sanctions, China will not export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) -- that is, inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg.

Both sides also reaffirm their respective commitments to the Guidelines and parameters of the MTCR, and have agreed to hold in-depth discussions on the MTCR.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Warren Christopher

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Washington,
October 4, 1994.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

IV-6

For Immediate Release

October 4, 1994

FACT SHEET

JOINT UNITED STATES-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA STATEMENT ON
MISSILE PROLIFERATIONJOINT UNITED STATES-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA STATEMENT ON
STOPPING PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The United States and the People's Republic of China today agreed to work together to promote the nonproliferation of missiles, and to promote a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION

On missile nonproliferation, the two countries agreed to work together to promote missile nonproliferation through a step-by-step approach to resolve differences over missile exports.

As the first step, the United States will take the measures necessary to lift the sanctions imposed in August 1993. Once the sanctions are waived, China will not export ground-to-ground missiles featuring the primary parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) -- that is, inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg.

This Chinese commitment represents a global ban on exports, and goes beyond the requirements set forth in the MTCR, which calls for a "strong presumption of denial" for such missile exports. China and the United States have also resolved another important issue by China's acceptance of the U.S. position on inherent capability. Under this concept, the missile would be included in the ban if it could generate sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, regardless of its demonstrated or advertized combination of range and payload. Both countries also reaffirmed their respective commitments to the Guidelines and parameters of the MTCR, which seeks to curb the proliferation of missiles worldwide.

As the next step, the United States and China agreed to hold in-depth discussions on the MTCR. We intend to work toward a Chinese commitment to control missile-related exports according to the current MTCR guidelines, as well as to promote eventual Chinese membership in the MTCR.

In August 1993, the United States determined that certain Chinese and Pakistani entities had engaged in transfers of Category II MTCR Annex items related to the M-11 missile that required the imposition of sanctions under U.S. law.

When the U.S. Government imposed Category II sanctions on Chinese entities for the transfer of M-11 related equipment to Pakistan, we told China that our sanctions law would enable us to waive these sanctions and avoid the possibility of future sanctions if the two sides reached a comprehensive agreement on missile nonproliferation. In particular, we encouraged China to undertake negotiations on a binding missile agreement whereby China would adhere to current MTCR Guidelines and Annex. Actual negotiation to resolve the issue did not begin until September 1994.

The step we took today is a first step toward resolving the missile issue, and involves only a waiver of the sanctions put into place in August 1993. Those sanctions were Category II sanctions, which require the denial for two years of new export licenses for MTCR Annex items, and the denial of U.S. Government contracts relating to MTCR Annex items, with the sanctioned entities.

Nothing in the agreement changes the U.S. position with respect to exports or actual missile exports. And, were a Chinese missile export of the type that would trigger U.S. sanctions law to occur in the future, U.S. law would require the imposition of sanctions against the entities involved in the transfer.

U.S. law calls for the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons (and, in the case of China, certain government activities) who are knowingly involved in trade in MTCR Annex items that contribute to MTCR Category I missiles, in a non-MTCR country. Category I missiles are those capable of carrying a payload of at least 500 kilograms a distance of at least 300 kilometers.

The statement signed today and the subsequent lifting of sanctions does not affect the sanctions imposed in August 1993 on Pakistan. Since the imposition of those sanctions, we also have offered to Pakistan the opportunity to work with us to achieve key nonproliferation goals which could lead to a waiver of the sanctions. We look forward to continuing those discussions with Pakistan.

FISSILE MATERIALS.

The two countries agreed to work together to promote the earliest possible achievement of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will be an important step in our shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and will provide a vehicle for working to halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in key threshold states.

IV-7

JOINT STATEMENT

Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative

President William Jefferson Clinton of the United States of America and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation met today in New York and agreed on a Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative as a constructive basis for strengthening trust between the two sides and for further development of agreed measures to enhance strategic stability and to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies worldwide. In furtherance of this initiative, the two Presidents approved an implementation plan developed by their experts as a basis for continuing this work.

The Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative builds on the Presidents' agreement in their two previous meetings. The Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, adopted in Moscow on June 4, 2000, and the Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability, adopted in Okinawa on July 21, 2000, establish a constructive basis for progress in further reducing nuclear weapons arsenals, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty, and confronting new challenges to international security. The United States and Russia reaffirm their commitment to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability. The United States and Russia intend to implement the provisions of the START I and INF Treaties, to seek early entry into force of the START II Treaty and its related Protocol, the 1997 New York agreements on ABM issues and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and to work towards the early realization of the 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces. The United States and Russia also intend to seek new forms of cooperation in the area of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies with a view to strengthening international security and maintaining strategic stability within the framework of the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative between our two countries.

The Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative could include, along with expansion of existing programs, new initiatives aimed at strengthening the security of our two countries and of the entire world community and without prejudice to the security of any state.

START III Treaty and ABM Treaty. The United States and Russia have presented their approaches to the principal provisions of the START III Treaty and on ABM issues. The United States and Russia have held intensified discussions on further reductions in strategic offensive forces within the framework of a future START III Treaty and on ABM issues, with a view to initiating negotiations expeditiously, in accordance with the Moscow Joint Statement of September 2, 1998, the Cologne Joint Statement of June 20, 1999 and the Okinawa Joint Statement of July 21, 2000 by the two Presidents. They will seek to agree upon additional measures to strengthen strategic stability and confidence, and to ensure predictability in the military field.

NPT, CTBT, FMCT, BWC and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. The United States and Russia reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime.

The United States and Russia will seek to ensure early entry into force and effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. They will continue to work to begin negotiations to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. They will continue to facilitate the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in the world, based on voluntary agreements among states in the relevant region, consistent with the relevant 1999 Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as an important avenue for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

Discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The United States and Russia are prepared to expand their discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. These discussions will include annual briefings based on assessments of factors and events related to ballistic and cruise missile proliferation. Annual assessments will address potential threats to international security. With a view to preventing the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, political and diplomatic measures will be discussed and undertaken, using bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

Cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense. The United States and Russia are prepared to resume and then expand cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and also to consider the possibility of involving other states, with a view to strengthening global and regional stability.

The sides will consider as specific areas of such cooperation:

- Expansion of the bilateral program of joint TMD command and staff exercises.
- Possibility of involving other states in joint TMD command and staff exercises.
- Possibility of development of methods for enhanced interaction for joint use of TMD systems.
- Joint development of concepts for possible cooperation in TMD systems.
- Possibility of reciprocal invitation of observers to actual firings of TMD systems.

Early warning information. The United States and Russia, in implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches signed in Moscow on June 4, 2000, intend to establish and put into operation in Moscow within a year the joint center for exchange of data to preclude the possibility of missile launches caused by a false missile attack warning. The Parties will also make efforts to come to an early agreement on a regime for exchanging notifications of missile launches, consistent with the statement of the Presidents at Okinawa on July 21, 2000.

Missile Non-Proliferation measures. The United States and Russia intend to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime. They declare their commitment to seek new avenues of cooperation with a view to limiting proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. Consistent with the July 21, 2000, Joint Statement of the Presidents at Okinawa, they will work together with other states on a new mechanism to integrate, *inter alia*, the Russian proposal for a Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS), the U.S. proposal for a missile code of conduct, as well as the MTCR.

Confidence and transparency-building measures. Bearing in mind their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States and Russia will seek to expand cooperation related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to promote a mutually beneficial technical exchange that will facilitate the implementation of the CTBT after its entry into force. The United States and Russia are prepared to discuss confidence and transparency-building measures as an element of facilitating compliance with, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty. These measures could include: data exchanges, pre-notifications of planned events, voluntary demonstrations, participation in observations, organization of exhibitions, and strengthening the ABM Treaty compliance verification process.

The Presidents of the United States and Russia have agreed that officials from the relevant ministries and agencies will meet annually to coordinate their activities in this area, and look forward with interest to such a meeting in the near future.

The United States and Russia call upon all nations of the world to unite their efforts to strengthen strategic stability.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

THE PRESIDENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

New York City

September 6, 2000

STRATEGIC STABILITY COOPERATION INITIATIVE

Implementation Plan

- Discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies

The U.S. will brief Russia on the update of the National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat that has just been completed, and Russia will provide its latest assessment.

- Cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense

The United States and Russia agreed to conduct a U.S.-Russian planning and simulation exercise in February, 2001 at Colorado Springs, Colorado and a U.S.-Russian field training exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas by late 2001 or early 2002. Planning meetings for the 2001 exercise will continue in Moscow in September and November-December at the Joint National Test Facility in Colorado Springs. Joint TMD exercise expert talks will also discuss the possibility of reciprocal invitation of observers to actual firings of TMD systems.

- Early warning information

By the end of this fall, the United States and Russia expect to begin preparation of the Moscow site for the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and begin renovation of the building that will house the center, as well as begin drafting concept of operations and standard operating procedures documents. The United States and Russia intend to commence operations at the JDEC in June of 2001, with full operations to begin in September 2001. Regular meetings of working groups under the Joint Commission will take place in coming months.

The United States and Russia have agreed to set as an objective the completion of a bilateral agreement on a pre-launch notification system for launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles by the APEC summit in November, while also reaching agreement on how the system will be opened up to the voluntary participation of all interested countries. They will meet to intensify negotiations in September.

- Missile Non-Proliferation measures

The United States and Russia will work to reach consensus among MTCR partners at the October 9-13 Plenary, as well as with other countries, on plans for a global missile non-proliferation approach.

- Confidence and transparency-building measures

Experts will meet this fall to review and approve additional warhead safety and security issues for expanded cooperation related to the CTBT. Experts will meet before the end of this year to consider expanded cooperation in the area of computations, experiments and materials. Experts in CTBT monitoring and verification will be scheduled to meet in late 2000 or early 2001 to consider expanded cooperation in this area.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
Helsinki, Finland

IV-8

For Immediate Release

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS
IN NUCLEAR FORCES

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings:

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the

elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: OF AMERICA:

/s/

/s/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

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IV-9

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
Helsinki, Finland

For Immediate Release

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT
CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.
- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.
- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

-- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

/S/

/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

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IV-10

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Cologne, Germany)

For Immediate Release

June 20, 1999

JOINT STATEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CONCERNING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS
AND FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY

Confirming their dedication to the cause of strengthening strategic stability and international security, stressing the importance of further reduction of strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) for the attainment of these goals, the United States of America and the Russian Federation declare their determination to continue efforts directed at achieving meaningful results in these areas.

The two governments believe that strategic stability can be strengthened only if there is compliance with existing agreements between the Parties on limitation and reduction of arms. The two governments will do everything in their power to facilitate the successful completion of the START II ratification processes in both countries.

The two governments reaffirm their readiness, expressed in Helsinki in March 1997, to conduct new negotiations on strategic offensive arms aimed at further reducing for each side the level of strategic nuclear warheads, elaborating measures of transparency concerning existing strategic nuclear warheads and their elimination, as well as other agreed technical and organizational measures in order to contribute to the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid build-up in the numbers of warheads and to contribute through all this to the strengthening of strategic stability in the world. The two governments will strive to accomplish the important task of achieving results in these negotiations as early as possible.

Proceeding from the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and from the need to maintain the strategic balance between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to continuing efforts to strengthen the Treaty, to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, recalling their concern about the proliferation in the world of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, expressed by them in the Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the Twenty First Century, adopted on September 2, 1998 in Moscow, stress their common desire to reverse that process using to this end the existing and possible new international legal mechanisms.

In this regard, both Parties affirm their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty.

The Parties emphasize that the package of agreements signed on

September 26, 1997 in New York is important under present conditions for the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty, and they will facilitate the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements.

The implementation of measures to exchange data on missile launches and on early warning and to set up an appropriate joint center, recorded in the Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation signed on September 2, 1996 in Moscow, will also promote the strengthening of strategic stability.

Discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty will begin later this summer. The two governments express their confidence that implementation of this Joint Statement will be a new significant step to enhance strategic stability and the security of both nations.

30-30-30

IV-11

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 22, 1997.**To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the "Treaty" or "CTBT"), opened for signature and signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.

Also included in the Department of State's report is a document relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate action:

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the international community for nearly 40 years, and the significance of the conclusion of negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically, each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

(III)

IV

The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on the provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data by a global network (the "International Monitoring System") consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by the International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for consultation and clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures designed to contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection request. The verification regime provides each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related to the Treaty. Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the Treaty.

Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called for test-ban negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on Disarmament (the "CD") to devote its attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements of an international monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by other key states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.

On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a "zero yield" CTBT, I stated that:

... As part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States. "I am as-

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sured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.

While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT . . .

The safeguards that were established are as follows:

The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.

The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty.

The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no

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longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

With regard to the last safeguard:

The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter affecting the supreme interests of the country and will regard any events calling that confidence into question as "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty." It will exercise its rights under the "supreme national interests" clause if it judges that the safety or reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence without nuclear testing.

To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or "NWC" (comprising representatives of DOD, JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—will report to the President annually, whether they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any minority views.

After receiving the Secretaries' certification and accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, the President will provide them to the appropriate committees of the Congress, together with a report on the actions he has taken in light of them.

If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to the Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective measures, the President will be prepared to exercise our "supreme national interests" rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.

The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.

As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that one member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption. After consultations among countries supporting the text, Australia requested the President of the U.N. General Assembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly to consider and

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take action on the text. The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first to sign the Treaty.

The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the "Organization"), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a member, will have three organs: the Conference of the State Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the operation of and provide technical support for the International Monitoring System, operate the International Data Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to establish a National Authority that will serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature, the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a conference of the states that have deposited their instruments of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this conference the participants will consider what measures consistent with international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such measures must be taken by consensus.

Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a "supreme interests" clause entitling any State Party that determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.

Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more frequently if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the

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achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures.

The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next several years to meet these challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:

will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of information available in public and private channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and

will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S. security interests and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.

My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors—the CTBT's "supreme national interests" clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.

I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, November 23, 1993.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical Weapons Convention" or CWC). The Convention includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. The Convention was opened for signature and was signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Department of State on the Convention.

In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, two documents relevant to, but not part of, the Convention: the Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission (with three Annexes), adopted by acclamation by Signatory States at Paris on January 13, 1993. These documents provide the basis for the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Preparatory Commission), which is responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Convention and for laying the foundation for the international organization created by the Convention. In addition, the recommended legislation necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, environmental documentation related to the Convention, and an analysis of the verifiability of the Convention consistent with Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, will be submitted separately to the Senate for its information.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is unprecedented in its scope. The Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and businesses and other nongovernmental entities to its obligations; subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party to international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance concerns.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is also unique in the number of countries involved in its development and committed from the outset to its nonproliferation objectives. This major arms control treaty was negotiated by the 39 countries in the Geneva-based

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Conference on Disarmament, with contributions from an equal number of observer countries, representing all areas of the world. To date, more than 150 countries have signed the Convention since it was opened for signature in January of this year.

The complexities of negotiating a universally applicable treaty were immense. Difficult issues such as the need to balance an adequate degree of intrusiveness, to address compliance concerns, with the need to protect sensitive nonchemical weapons related information and constitutional rights, were painstakingly negotiated. The international chemical industry, and U.S. chemical industry representatives, in particular, played a crucial role in the elaboration of landmark provisions for the protection of sensitive commercial and national security information.

The implementation of the Convention will be conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW will consist of the Conference of the States Parties, which will be the overall governing body composed of all States Parties, the 41-member Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, an international body responsible for conducting verification activities, including on-site inspections. The OPCW will provide a forum in and through which members can build regional and global stability and play a more responsible role in the international community.

The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after it was opened for signature. Thus, the Convention can enter into force on January 13, 1995, if 65 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the depositary for the Convention (the Secretary General of the United Nations) by July 1994. The 2-year delay before the earliest possible entry into force of the Convention was intended to allow Signatory States time to undertake the necessary national legislative and procedural preparations and to provide time for the Preparatory Commission to prepare for implementation of the Convention.

The Convention is designed to exclude the possibility of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, thus reflecting a significant step forward in reducing the threat of chemical warfare. To this end, the Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and, direct or indirect, transfer to anyone of chemical weapons; the use of chemical weapons against anyone, including retaliatory use; the engagement in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of anyone to engage in activities prohibited to States Parties. The convention also requires all chemical weapons to be declared, declarations to be internationally confirmed, and all chemical weapons to be completely eliminated within 10 years after its entry into force (15 years in extraordinary cases), with storage and destruction monitored through on-site international inspection. The Convention further requires all chemical weapons production to cease within 30 days of the entry into force of the Convention for a State Party and all chemical weapons production facilities to be eliminated (or in exceptional cases of compelling need, and with the permission of the Conference of the States Parties, converted to peaceful purposes). Cessation of pro-

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duction, and destruction within 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention (or conversion and peaceful production), will be internationally monitored through on-site inspection.

In addition, the Convention prohibits and use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition in international law on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for the possibility for protection against and assistance in the event of use or threat of use of chemical weapons against a State Party. The Administration is reviewing the impact of the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare on Executive Order No. 11850, which specifies the current policy of the United States with regard to the use of riot control agents in war. The results of the review will be submitted separately to the Senate.

The Convention contains a number of provisions that make a major contribution to our nonproliferation objectives. In addition to verification of the destruction of chemical weapons, the Convention provides a regime for monitoring relevant civilian chemical industry facilities through declaration and inspection requirements. States Parties are also prohibited from providing any assistance to anyone to engage in activities, such as the acquisition of chemical weapons, prohibited by the Convention. Exports to non-States Parties of chemicals listed in the Convention are prohibited in some instances and subject to end-user assurances in others. Imports of some chemicals from non-States Parties are also banned. These restrictions will also serve to provide an incentive for countries to become parties as soon as possible. Finally, each State Party is required to pass penal legislation prohibiting individuals and businesses and other nongovernmental entities from engaging in activities on its territory or any other place under its jurisdiction that are prohibited to States Parties. Such penal legislation must also apply to the activities of each State Party's citizens, wherever the activities occur. Through these provisions, the Convention furthers the important goal of preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, while holding out the promise of their eventual worldwide elimination.

The Convention contains two verification regimes to enhance the security of States Parties to the Convention and limit the possibility of clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use. The first regime provides for a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits, systematic inspections of declared chemical weapons storage, production and destruction facilities, and routine inspections of the relevant civilian chemical industry facilities. The second regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an international inspection conducted of any facility or location in the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance. The Convention obligates the challenged State Party to accept the inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance concern. At the same time, the Convention provides a system for the inspected State Party to manage access to a challenged site in a manner that allows for protection of its national security, proprietary, and constitutional con-

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cerns. In addition, the Convention contains requirements for the protection of confidential information obtained by the OPCW.

The Convention prohibits reservations to the Articles. However, the CWC allows reservations to the Annexes so long as they are compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. This structure prevents States Parties from modifying their fundamental obligations, as some countries, including the United States, did with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 when they attached reservations preserving the right to retaliate with chemical weapons. At the same time, it allows States Parties some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their implementation of the Convention.

Beyond the elimination of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention is of major importance in providing a foundation for enhancing regional and global stability, a forum for promoting international cooperation and responsibility, and a system for resolution of national concerns.

I believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly strengthen United States, allied and international security, and enhance global and regional stability. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Convention, and to give advice and consent to its ratification as soon as possible in 1994.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 20, 1993.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical Weapons Convention" or "CWC"), opened for signature at Paris on January 13, 1993, and signed by the United States of America and 153 other countries to date.

The Convention includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. I recommend that you transmit the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by early 1994.

Also enclosed, for the information of the Senate, are two documents relevant to, but not part of, the Convention: the Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission (with three Annexes), adopted by acclamation by Signatory States at Paris on January 13, 1993. These documents provide the basis for the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Preparatory Commission), which is responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Convention and for laying the foundation for the international organization created by the Convention.

INTRODUCTION

The Chemical Weapons Convention is unprecedented in the scope of its provisions. It will not only require the United States to destroy its chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of an international organization, but will also subject its chemical industry and citizens to the obligations of the Convention. Specifically, the Convention will ban the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons. The CWC will also prohibit military preparations for using chemical weapons and the assistance to, an encouragement or inducement of, anyone to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a major arms control agreement having significant non-proliferation benefits.

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The Convention was negotiated in Geneva by the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and its predecessor bodies, between August 1968 and September 1992, when the CD forwarded the draft text to the United Nations (UN) for endorsement. After consensus endorsement by the UN General Assembly, the CWC was opened for signature at Paris on January 13, 1993.

The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than two years after it was opened for signature. Thus, the CWC can enter into force on January 13, 1995 if 65 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification by July 1994 with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which is the depositary for the Convention. The two-year delay before the earliest possible entry-into-force of the CWC was intended to allow Signatory States time to undertake the necessary national legislative and procedural preparations and to provide them for the Preparatory Commission, composed of Signatory States, to prepare for implementation of the Convention.

In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of State, representatives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Justice have all played important roles in the development of the Convention through participation in the negotiations in Geneva and in the development of policy in Washington. Additionally, the chemical industry (primarily through the Chemical Manufacturers Association) was actively involved in the negotiating process through consultations with the United States Government and participation in international industry meetings with CD negotiators.

Throughout the negotiating process, the United States consulted and worked closely with its Western allies in the CD (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) in the development of common Western negotiation positions on all aspects of the Convention.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The United States has been engaged in negotiations for the elimination of weapons for chemical and biological warfare over an extended period, during which the two categories of weapons have been closely linked. The two basic treaties now in force, to which more countries, including the United States, are parties, are: the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on June 17, 1925 (Geneva Protocol of 1925); and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on April 10, 1972. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war by a Party against another Party of chemical and biological weapons, but places no restriction on production or possession of such weapons. In addition, reservations attached to the Protocol by

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many countries, including the United States, preserve the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation. The Biological Weapons Convention outlaws the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological and toxin weapons and provides for their destruction, but does not contain verification provisions. (Toxins are considered both chemical and biological weapons in that they are biologically derived but act in a chemical manner. Thus, toxins are also covered by the CWC.)

Since 1968, the United States has participated in negotiations within the framework of the multinational CD, and its predecessor bodies, and since 1984 has held bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union (and subsequently the Russian Federation), with a view toward achieving an effectively verifiable and universal ban on the development, production, possession, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. The draft text of the Chemical Weapons Convention tabled in 1984 in the CD by then Vice-President Bush essentially served as the basis for the negotiations. The CD's negotiations on the Convention were concluded on September 3, 1992, when the CD forwarded the draft text to the United Nations for endorsement. On November 30, 1992, the UN General Assembly endorsed the CWC by consensus, with 145 countries cosponsoring the supporting resolution. The CWC was opened for signature on January 13, 1993, with 136 countries, including the United States, signing it during the first three days of its being opened for signature. Of the 154 Signatory States to date, four have also ratified the CWC.

The CWC calls for the Signatory States to convene a Preparatory Commission to develop detailed implementing procedures and to lay the foundation for the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is charged with verification and oversight of the implementation of the Convention. The Preparatory Commission began work in February 1993 in The Hague (site of the future headquarters of the OPCW) and will continue until the CWC's entry into force. The work of the Preparatory Commission will be formally approved at the first meeting of States Parties, which is to take place shortly after the Convention's entry into force.

The OPCW will consist of three international bodies. A Technical Secretariat headed by a Director-General will be responsible for conducting verification activities, including inspections and compiling declarations. An Executive Council, consisting of 41 States Parties, will be responsible for supervising the Technical Secretariat and performing other executive responsibilities. Overseeing the entire Convention and its bodies will be the Conference of the States Parties (Conference), consisting of all States Parties to the Convention.

As a means of assisting in the development of the multilateral CWC, as well as to complement it, the United States and the Soviet Union (and subsequently the Russian Federation) have been negotiating a separate bilateral agreement providing for destruction and mutual verification of each country's chemical weapons stockpiles. At the June 1, 1990 Washington Summit, President Bush and Secretary-General Gorbachev signed the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-

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ist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons (the "Bilateral Destruction Agreement" or "BDA"). The key provisions of the Agreement are: cessation of the production of chemical weapons; destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks (all but 5,000 agent tons); on-site inspections of chemical weapons storage, production and destruction facilities; and development and use of safe and environmentally-sound methods of destruction. Further work, however, was necessary on detailed implementing procedures and updated provisions to respond to changed conditions, such as the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In March 1993, the United States and Russian delegations agreed *ad referendum* on detailed implementing procedures and updated provisions to finalize the BDA. These procedures and provisions have been accepted by the United States, but not as yet by the Russian Federation.

While important in its own right, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement is less relevant than it was three years ago. At the time the BDA was signed, the United States and the Soviet Union assumed that completion of the CWC was many years away. The intent behind the BDA was to achieve Russian commitment to chemical weapons destruction as early as possible and to facilitate progress on the CWC. The Russian Federation has yet to agree to the detailed implementing procedures and updated provisions for the BDA, citing problems with the provisions on conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to peaceful uses and costs associated with destruction of its chemical weapons. The United States has offered financial and technical assistance, predicated upon concrete Russian plans for destruction, which are still being developed. The United States is actively continuing to work with the Russian Federation at both the political level and the technical level to secure agreement on the detailed implementing procedures and updated provisions for the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and concrete plans for destruction.

In anticipation of the BDA, the CWC allows for bilateral agreements between States Parties on destruction and verification as long as such agreements are consistent with CWC provisions and are approved by the Executive Council. Since the key provisions in the BDA on verification of the destruction of chemical weapons, as accepted by the United States, are reflected in the CWC, these BDA provisions are consistent with the provisions of the CWC. If the BDA enters into force, the United States and the Russian Federation would inspect each other's destruction efforts, with general oversight by the international inspectorate.

For the following reasons, the Administration has determined that final agreement of all of the provisions of the BDA should not delay submission of the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification:

—It is in the interest of the United States to move the CWC forward. Submission of the Convention at this time to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification will enable the United States to maintain momentum toward early entry into force of the CWC in 1995 through continued leadership and application

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- of pressure on other countries to undertake the necessary processes for entry into force;
- The United States is concerned about acquisition and potential use of chemical weapons by other countries besides the Russian Federation. It is important to spur their commitment to banning chemical weapons; and
- It underscores the importance placed by the United States on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

THE CONVENTION: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Chemical Weapons Convention consists of a Preamble, 24 Articles and Three Annexes (the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information). The principal obligations undertaken by States Parties pursuant to the Convention are contained in Article I. Specifically, each State Party is prohibited from:

- (a) Developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons or transferring them, directly or indirectly, to anyone;
- (b) Using chemical weapons under any circumstances, including retaliatory use (which many countries protected under the Geneva Protocol of 1925);
- (c) Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons or assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the CWC; and
- (d) Using riot control agents as a method of warfare.

Article I also obligates each State Party to destroy its chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities as well as any chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

The provisions of the Convention apply to geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party), to items belonging to a State Party (i.e., all chemical weapons or chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses) and to the activities undertaken by a State Party's natural and legal persons. Article VII of the Convention requires States Parties to adopt the necessary measures to implement their obligations under the CWC. In particular, each State Party must:

- (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction, as recognized by international law, from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention;
- (b) Not permit, in any place under its control any activity prohibited by a State Party under the Convention; and
- (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) above to any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention, wherever by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law.

DESTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CWC

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons are defined by the CWC as the following, together or separately:

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(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; and

(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b) above.

With regard to the term "purposes not prohibited under the Convention", the negotiators of the CWC chose to define what chemical activities were to be banned by forbidding all activities except those specifically not prohibited. This inclusive approach was chosen to facilitate verification and to preclude loopholes with regard to unknown or future chemicals of possible concern. The purposes not prohibited under the Convention are:

(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;

(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;

(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and

(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.

"Toxic chemical" is defined as any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or their method of production (which ensures inclusion of toxins), and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions (e.g., binary chemical weapons) or elsewhere.

Each State Party is required to declare and destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Additionally, each State Party is required to declare all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State, and destroy those abandoned on the territory of another State party, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The Army is submitting a report to Congress on this subject as required by Section 176 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1993, Public Law 102-484.

The CWC outlines the order of destruction of specified categories of chemical weapons and requires their destruction not later than ten years after the Convention enters into force (currently predicted to be January 13, 2005). The Convention permits an extension of up to five years beyond the initial ten years. Such extensions, however, must be accompanied by specific plans for achieving the planned destruction and stringent verification measures and must be approved by the Conference.

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Each State Party must pay for the costs of destruction of its chemical weapons and verification of their storage and destruction. In the absence of bilateral verification arrangements, State Parties with chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities must pay all of the costs of verification of their destruction by the OPCW. However, if bilateral verification arrangements are accepted, the State Parties involved must pay the bilateral costs, and all State Parties proportionately pay the costs of the monitoring by the international inspectorate. The United States proposed the bilateral verification provision based on a desire for direct involvement in monitoring the Russian chemical weapons destruction effort, the existence of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and a mutual desire with the Russian Federation to minimize costs where possible. The use of the BDA in conjunction with OPCW monitoring is expected to reduce costs for the United States and the Russian Federation, and thus expenses of the OPCW as well.

The CWC recognizes two special categories of chemical weapons—old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons. With regard to all chemical weapons produced before 1925, a State Party is only required to destroy or otherwise dispose of them as "toxic waste." With regard to chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they are no longer usable as chemical weapons (1925-46 chemical weapons), the time-limits and order of destruction can be modified by the Executive Council. All chemical weapons that do not fall into these categories will be subject to the full verification and destruction regimes.

With regard to abandoned chemical weapons, the abandoning State Party is required to provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility and other resources. The State Party on whose territory the abandoned chemical weapons are located is required to provide appropriate cooperation. The ten-year destruction requirement applies to such weapons; however, in exceptional circumstances, the territorial State Party, individually or with the abandoning State Party, may request approval from the Executive Council for modification, or in the case of 1925-46 chemical weapons, suspension, of the time-limits and order of destruction.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

The CWC defines chemical weapons production facilities as any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any time since January 1, 1946:

(a) As part of the stage in the production of chemicals where the material flows would contain, when the equipment is in operation:

(i) Any chemical listed in Schedule 1 in the Annex on Chemicals (the toxic chemicals of greatest risk to the object and purpose of the CWC); or

(ii) Any other chemical that has no use, above one metric ton per year on the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, but can be used for chemical weapons purposes; or

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(b) For filling chemical weapons, including, *inter alia*, the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk storage containers; the filling of chemicals into containers that form part of assembled binary munitions and devices or into chemical submunitions that form part of assembled unitary munitions and devices, and the loading of the containers and chemical submunitions into the respective munitions and devices.

The CWC specifically excludes from the definition of chemical weapons production:

(a) Any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of chemicals specified in the above subparagraph (a) that is less than one metric ton;

(b) any facility in which a chemical specified in the above subparagraph (a) is or was produced as an avoidable by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, provided that the chemical does not exceed three percent of the total product and that the facility is subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex on Implementation and Verification; or

(c) The single small-scale facility for production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

The term "building" refers to any building, including underground structures:

(a) containing specialized equipment in a production or filling configuration;

(b) which has distinctive features which distinguished it from buildings normally used for chemical production or filling activities not prohibited under the Convention; or

(c) constructed to prevailing industry standards for facilities not producing any chemical specified in the chemical weapons production facility definition, or corrosive chemicals.

The term "equipment" refers to:

(a) the main production train, including any reactor or equipment for production synthesis, separation of purification, any equipment used directly for heat transfer in the final technological stage, such as in reactors or in product separation, as well as any other equipment which has been in contact with any chemical specified in the production facility definition, or would be in contact with such a chemical if the facility were operated;

(b) any chemical weapon filling machines;

(c) any other equipment specially designed, built or installed for the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons production facility, as distinct from a facility constructed according to prevailing commercial industry standards for facilities not producing any chemical specified in the production facility definition, or corrosive chemicals, such as: equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other special corrosion-resistant material; special equipment for waste control, waste treatment, air filtering, or solvent recovery; special containment enclosures and safety shields; non-standard laboratory equipment used to analyze toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; custom-de-

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signed process control panels; or dedicated spares for specialized equipment;

(d) production equipment which is generally used in the chemical industry and is not included in the types of specialized equipment; and

(e) other equipment commonly used in the chemical industry, such as: fire-fighting equipment; guard and security/safety surveillance equipment; medical facilities, laboratory facilities; or communications equipment.

The CWC requires the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities by not later than ten years after the entry into force of the Convention. However, chemical weapons production facilities may be converted temporarily for use as destruction facilities. In addition, in exceptional cases of compelling need, States Parties may request approval from the Conference to convert chemical weapons production facilities to purposes not prohibited under the Convention. However, approval is contingent on the State Party's acceptance of stringent specified in the CWC which, *inter alia*, preclude the use of a converted facility to produce, process or consume Schedule 1 or 2 declaration and international monitoring of such activities and parameters for the State Party's conduct of such activities (e.g., very limited production of Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes, very limited Schedule 1 production capacity, and the use of only two Schedule 1 production facilities for protective purposes, which are to be subject to stringent verification measures).

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

The CWC contains two verification regimes implemented by the Technical Secretariat to enhance the security of States Parties, which are designed to preclude the possibility of clandestine chemical weapons production, storage and use. The first regime provides a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, initial visits and systematic inspections of chemical weapons storage, production and destruction facilities and relevant chemical industry. This regime specifies requirements regarding the extent of and time-frames for access to the facilities, inspection procedures to be used by the international inspectors, rights and obligations of inspectors and inspected States Parties during inspections, and inspection reports. The second regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an international inspection conducted of any facility or location in the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party in order to clarify and resolve questions of possible non-compliance.

The challenge inspection procedures were the most sensitive and difficult treaty provisions to develop, as negotiators sought to balance the need for an adequate degree of intrusiveness to address compliance concerns with the need for protection of sensitive, non-chemical weapons related facilities and information of national security concern. The State Party to be inspected is under the obligation to accept a challenge inspection and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance concern. At the same time, the Convention provides for a system of managed access to a challenged

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site which allows for protection of the inspected State Party's national security and constitutional concerns.

The CWC provides protection against abuse of challenge inspections in two ways: (1) it contains procedures to deter the challenging State Party from abusing the process; and (2) even more importantly, it contains inspection procedures which permit the protection of a State Party's sensitive, non-chemical weapons facilities and locations and preservation of its constitutional rights.

To deter abuse, the CWC contains provisions for both the requesting and inspected State Parties to have their concerns about compliance and possible abuse of the system addressed by the Executive Council at both the beginning and the conclusion of the inspection. A State Party must submit a request for a challenge inspection to the Executive Council and the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. If the Executive Council considers the request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of the Convention, it may, within 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide (by a three-quarter majority vote of all its members) against carrying out the challenge inspection. After a challenge inspection, the Executive Council will review the final report of the inspection team and, in addition to addressing concerns about whether any non-compliance occurred, will address concerns regarding whether the request was within the scope of the Convention and whether the right to request a challenge inspection was abused. If the Executive Council concludes that there was abuse, it may recommend to the Conference measures to be taken against the requesting State Party and examine whether that State Party should bear any of the costs of the inspection. Finally, in addition to these specific provisions to address abuse, there is a general provision giving States Parties the right at any time to request the Executive Council to consider issues arising under the Convention, which could include concerns about abuse of the rights provided for under the CWC.

With regard to protection of States Parties' sensitive non-chemical weapons facilities and constitutional requirements, the CWC provides protection through, *inter alia*: the timeframes specified to provide access; limitations on observers; and the process of managed access at the site.

After receiving notification of an undeclared site to be inspected, the inspected State Party may take up to five days to provide access to the site. This time period allows inspected States Parties adequate time to prepare a site for inspection. Activities with regard to securing the site, however, will take place during this time period. Once at the site, the period of inspection itself is limited to 84 hours, extendable only by agreement with the inspected State Party.

The requesting State Party can request to have an observer accompany the inspection team. However, the inspected State party has the right to disapprove the participation of such an observer. If the inspected State Party allows the participation of an observer, it can limit the access and activities of the observer at the site.

The inspected State Party has the final say in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged site. The inspected State Party will negotiate with the inspection team the fol-

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allowing: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the final or requested perimeters; the particular inspection activities (including sampling); the performance of particular activities by the inspected State Party; and the provision of particular information by the inspected State Party. For example, under the "managed access" principle, the inspected State Party may give only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, may shroud sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems, and it may restrict sampling and sample analysis.

However, the inspected State Party is under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that generated the challenge inspection if it provides less than full access to places, activities or information.

An analysis of the verifiability of the Convention consistent with Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, will be submitted separately to the Congress.

ORGANIZATIONAL BODIES OF THE CWC

To prepare for the implementation of the CWC, a Preparatory Commission consisting of all Signatory States has been established to develop the detailed implementing procedures and to establish the structure and operational procedures of the OPCW. The two-year delay for entry into force of the CWC was designed to allow time for the Preparatory Commission to accomplish these tasks and enable implementation of CWC provisions upon entry into force.

The Preparatory Commission began its work in The Hague in February 1993. The results of this work, including the Preparatory Commission's recommendations, will be approved by the Conference at its first meeting following the entry into force of the Convention.

All countries ratifying the CWC will become States Parties to the CWC and will make up the membership of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the CWC. The OPCW, with headquarters in the Hague, will consist of the Conference of the States Parties and its Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.

The Conference, which will consist of all States Parties to the CWC, is the principal organ of the OPCW. The Conference is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CWC and acting in order to promote its object and purpose, including reviewing compliance with the CWC. In non-compliance cases of particular gravity and urgency (e.g., alleged use of chemical weapons) the Conference will bring the matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. It will also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and Technical Secretariat, and may issue guidelines in accordance with the CWC to either of them for the exercise of their functions.

The executive Council will be the executive organ of the OPCW and will be responsible to the Conference for its actions. In addition to carrying out the powers and functions outlined in the CWC, as well as functions delegated to it by the Conference, the Executive

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Council will promote effective implementation of and compliance with the CWC, supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party, and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties. The Executive Council has the right and duty to consider any issue or matter within its competence affecting the CWC and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference.

The Executive Council will consist of 41 States Party, with each State Parties having the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Council. The members of the Executive Council will be elected by the Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the CWC, the composition of the Executive Council will be structured in such a way as to give due regard to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of chemical industry, and to political and security interests. Through the application of the criteria specified for membership, the United States expects to have a permanent seat.

The Technical Secretariat will be comprised of a Director-General (its head and chief administrative officer), inspectors, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Conference will appoint the Director-General upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, and he or she will be responsible to them for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will assist the conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions as well as carry out other functions specified in the CWC. A major responsibility of the Technical Secretariat will be to collect and monitor States Parties declarations, and conduct routine and challenge inspections. The Technical Secretariat will inform the Executive Council of any problem arising with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with the CWC that come to its attention in the performance of its verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned.

AMENDMENTS

Changes to the Articles and key provisions of the Annexes (protection of confidential information, challenge inspections and related definitions) may be made only through a stringent, formal amendment process requiring the support of a majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote, followed by ratification or acceptance by all the supporting States Parties.

For the remainder of the Annexes, as with previous arms control agreements to which the United States is a party, changes of a technical or administrative nature, i.e., minor changes, based on future technological developments and practical experience, are permitted pursuant to a simplified procedure which does not involve ratification or acceptance. These changes can be made with the approval of two-thirds of the States Parties. However, changes to the remainder of the Annexes that are not of a technical or administra-

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...tive nature must be made pursuant to the formal amendment process.

RESERVATIONS

The basic obligations of the CWC are set forth in the Articles, with the more detailed implementing procedures contained in the Annexes. The convention prohibits reservations to the Articles. However, the CWC allows reservations to the Annexes so long as they are compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. This structure prevents States Parties from modifying their fundamental obligations, as some countries, including the United States, did with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 when they attached reservations preserving the right to retaliate with chemical weapons. At the same time, it allows States Parties some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their implementation of the Convention.

DURATION; WITHDRAWAL

The Convention will be of unlimited duration. However, as with other arms control agreements, each State Party has, in exercising its national sovereignty, the right to withdraw from the CWC if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the CWC, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. A State Party must give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary (the UN Secretary-General) and the UN Security Council. Such notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

The withdrawal of a State Party does not, however, in any way affect its duty to continue fulfilling its obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly, the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

CONFERENCES

The first meeting of the Conference of the States Parties will be convened no later than 30 days after entry into force of the CWC; this is expected to occur in the spring of 1995. Three years after the entry into force of the CWC, the Conference will meet to decide if the verification regime for "other chemical production facilities" should be delayed or eliminated. Not later than one year after the expiration of the fifth and tenth years after the entry into force of the Convention, and at such other times as may be decided upon within that time period, the Conference will convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of the Convention. Such reviews will take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. Similar sessions will be convened at five-year intervals thereafter, unless decided otherwise. Special conferences may be convened at other times at the request of States Parties to address compliance concerns.

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COSTS OF THE CONVENTION

The costs of the OPCW activities will be paid by States Parties in accordance with the UN scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the OPCW. The same formula applies to the costs of the Preparatory Commission. The United States share is a little more than 25 percent. States Parties' financial contributions to the Preparatory Commission are to be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular OPCW budget. Additionally, States Parties with chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities are responsible for the costs of their destruction and international verification. However, as discussed earlier, if OPCW-approved bilateral verification arrangements paid for by the States Parties involved are in place, all States Parties will pay proportionately for the international monitoring required.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

The Convention requires that each State Party establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties. Each State Party is required to notify the OPCW of its National Authority at the time the CWC enters into force for that State Party.

The United States National Authority function will be performed by the formal interagency decision-making body chaired by the National Security Council staff, expanded to include representation from other agencies as appropriate. An executive office operated by ACDA, designed as the Office of National Authority (ONA), will be responsible for coordinating and facilitating administrative and logistical matters relating to CWC implementation. The ONA will provide the point of contact for the liaison of the United States with the OPCW in The Hague.

The recommended legislation necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention will be submitted separately to the Congress. In addition, environmental documentation related to the Convention will be forwarded separately to the Senate for its information.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this Report is the Article-by-Article Analysis of the Convention, including the Annexes, as well as the two documents relevant to the Convention and sent for the information of the Senate (the Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text of the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission).

I believe that this Convention, by banning chemical weapons in the manner described above, will significantly enhance the national security of the United States and its allies and will contribute to global and regional security. I therefore recommend that the Convention be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible in 1994.

Respectfully submitted,

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William H. Aching

Attachments: As stated.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 1, 2000

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSEGaston Hall
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

11:23 A.M. EIVT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. When you gave us such a warm welcome, and then you applauded some of Dean Gallucci's early lines, I thought to myself, I'm glad he can get this sort of reception, because I gave him a lot of thankless jobs to do in our administration where no one ever applauded -- and he did them brilliantly. I'm delighted to see him here succeeding so well as the Dean. And Provost Brown, thank you for welcoming me here.

I told them when I came in I was sort of glad Father O'Donovan wasn't here today, because I come so often -- I know that at some point if I keep doing this he will tell me that he's going to send a bill to the U.S. Treasury for the Georgetown endowment. (Laughter.)

I was thinking when we came out here and Bob talked about the beginning of the school year that it was 35 years ago when, as a sophomore, I was in charge of the freshman orientation. So I thought I should come and help this year's orientation of freshmen get off to a good start.

I also was thinking, I confess, after your rousing welcome, that if I were still a candidate for public office I might get up and say hello and sit down, and quit while I'm ahead. (Laughter.)

I came today to talk about a subject that is not fraught with applause lines, but one that is very, very important to your future: the defense of our nation. At this moment of unprecedented peace and prosperity, with no immediate threat to our security or our existence, with our democratic values ascendant and our alliances strong, with the great forces of our time, globalization and the revolution in information technology so clearly beneficial to a society like ours, with our diversity and our openness, and our entrepreneurial spirit.

At a time like this it is tempting, but wrong, to believe there are no serious long-term challenges to our security. The rapid spread of technology across increasingly porous borders, raises the specter that more and more states, terrorists and criminal syndicates could gain access to chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons, and to the means of delivering them -- whether in small units deployed by terrorists within our midst, or ballistic missiles capable of hurtling those weapons halfway around the world.

Today I want to discuss these threats with you, because you will live with them a lot longer than I will. Especially, I want to talk about the ballistic missile threat. It is real and growing, and has given new urgency to the debate about national missile defenses, known in the popular jargon as NMD.

When I became President, I put our effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the very top of our national security agenda. Since then, we have carried out a comprehensive strategy to reduce and secure nuclear arsenals, to strengthen the international regime against biological and chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and to stop the flow of dangerous technology to nations that might wish us harm.

At the same time, we have pursued new technologies that could strengthen our defenses against a possible attack, including a terrorist attack here at home.

None of these elements of our national security strategy can be pursued in isolation. Each is important, and we have made progress in each area. For example, Russia and the United States already have destroyed about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the last decade. And we have agreed that in a START III treaty, we will go 80 percent below the level of a decade ago.

In 1994, we persuaded Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, three of the former Soviet Republics, to give up their nuclear weapons entirely. We have worked with Russia and its neighbors to dispose of hundreds of tons of dangerous nuclear materials, to strengthen controls on a list of exports, and to keep weapon scientists from selling their services to the highest bidder.

We extended the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely. We were the very first nation to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty, an idea first embraced by Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower. Sixty nations now have ratified the test ban treaty. I believe the United States Senate made a serious error in failing to ratify it last year, and I hope it will do so next year. (Applause.)

We also negotiated and ratified the international convention to ban chemical weapons, and strengthened the convention against biological weapons. We've used our export controls to deny terrorists and potential adversaries access to materials and equipment needed to build these kinds of weapons.

We've imposed sanctions on those who contribute to foreign chemical and biological weapons programs, we've invested in new equipment and medical countermeasures to protect people from exposure. And we're working with state and local medical units all over our country to strengthen our preparedness in case of a chemical or biological terrorist attack, which many people believe is the most likely new security threat of the 21st century.

We have also acted to reduce the threat posed by states that have sought weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, while pursuing activities that are clearly hostile to our long-term interests. For over a decade -- for almost a decade, excuse me -- we have diverted about 90 percent of Iraq's oil revenues from the production of weapons to the purchase of food and medicine.

This is an important statistic for those who believe that our sanctions are only a negative for the people, and particularly the children, of Iraq. In 1989, Iraq earned \$15 billion from oil exports, and spent \$13 billion of that money on its military. This year, Iraq is projected to earn \$19 billion from its legal oil-for-food exports that can spend none of those revenues on the military.

We worked to counter Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology, convincing China to provide no new assistance to Iran's nuclear program, and pressing Russia to strengthen its controls on the export of sensitive technologies.

In 1994, six years after the United States first learned that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program, we negotiated the agreement that verifiably has frozen its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Now, in the context of the United States negotiations with the North, the diplomatic efforts by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry and, most lately, the summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, North Korea has refrained from flight testing a new missile that could pose a threat to America.

We should be clear: North Korea's capability remains a serious issue and its intentions remain unclear. But its missile testing moratorium is a good development worth pursuing.

These diplomatic efforts to meet the threat of proliferation are backed by the strong and global reach of our armed forces. Today, the United States enjoys overwhelming military superiority over any potential adversary. For example, in 1985, we spent about as much on defense as Russia, China and North Korea combined. Today, we spend nearly three times as much, nearly \$300 billion a year. And our military technology clearly is well ahead of the rest of the world.

The principle of deterrence served us very well in the Cold War, and deterrence remains imperative. The threat of overwhelming retaliation deterred Saddam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction during the Gulf War. Our forces in South Korea have deterred North Korea in aggression for 47 years.

The question is, can deterrence protect us against all those who might wish us harm in the future? Can we make America even more secure? The effort to answer these questions is the impetus behind the search for NMD. The issue is whether we can do more, not to meet today's threat, but to meet tomorrow's threat to our security.

For example, there is the possibility that a hostile state with nuclear weapons and long range missiles may simply disintegrate, with command over missiles falling into unstable hands; or that in a moment of desperation, such a country might miscalculate, believing it could use nuclear weapons to intimidate us from defending our vital interests, or from coming to the aid of our allies, or others who are defenseless and clearly in need.

In the future, we cannot rule out that terrorist groups could gain the capability to strike us with nuclear weapons if they seized even temporary control of a state with an existing nuclear weapons establishment.

Now, no one suggests that NMD would ever substitute for diplomacy or for deterrence. But such a system, if it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has complicated the task of preserving the peace. Therefore, I believe we have an obligation to determine the feasibility, the effectiveness, and the impact of a national missile defense on the overall security of the United States.

The system now under development is designed to work as follows. In the event of an attack, American satellites would protect the launch of missiles. Our radar would track the enemy warhead and highly accurate, high-speed, ground-based interceptors would destroy them before they could reach their target in the United States.

We have made substantial progress on a system that would be based in Alaska and that, when operational, could protect all 50 states from the near-term missile threats we face, those emanating from North Korea and the Middle East. The system could be deployed sooner than any of

the proposed alternatives.

Since last fall, we've been conducting flight tests to see if this NMD system actually can reliably intercept a ballistic missile. We've begun to show that the different parts of this system can work together.

Our Defense Department has overcome daunting technical obstacles in a remarkably short period of time, and I'm proud of the work that Secretary Cohen, General Shelton and their teams have done.

One test proved that it is, in fact, possible to hit a bullet with a bullet. Still, though the technology for NMD is promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven. After the initial test succeeded, our two most recent tests failed, for different reasons, to achieve an intercept. Several more tests are planned. They will tell us whether NMD can work reliably under realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have yet to be tested.

There are also questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to deal with countermeasures. In other words, measures by those firing the missiles to confuse the missile defense into thinking it is hitting a target when it is not.

There is a reasonable chance that all these challenges can be met in time. But I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.

Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time. Instead, I have asked Secretary Cohen to continue a robust program of development and testing. That effort still is at an early stage. Only three of the 19 planned intercept tests have been held so far. We need more tests against more challenging targets, and more simulations before we can responsibly commit our nation's resources to deployment.

We should use this time to ensure that NMD, if deployed, would actually enhance our overall national security. And I want to talk about that in a few moments.

I want you to know that I have reached this decision about not deploying the NMD after careful deliberation. My decision will not have a significant impact on the date the overall system could be deployed in the next administration, if the next President decides to go forward.

The best judgment of the experts who have examined this question is that if we were to commit today to construct the system, it most likely would be operational about 2006 or 2007. If the next President decides to move forward next year, the system still could be ready in the same time frame.

In the meantime, we will continue to work with our allies and with Russia to strengthen their understanding and support for our efforts to meet the emerging ballistic missile threat, and to explore creative ways that we can cooperate to enhance their security against this threat, as well.

An effective NMD could play an important part of our national security strategy, but it could not be the sum total of that strategy. It can never be the sum total of that strategy for dealing with nuclear and missile threats.

Moreover, ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear weapons, as I said earlier, do not represent the sum total of the threats we face. Those

include chemical and biological weapons, and a range of deadly technologies for deploying them. So it would be folly to base the defense of our nation solely on a strategy of waiting until missiles are in the air, and then trying to shoot them down.

We must work with our allies, and with Russia, to prevent potential adversaries from ever threatening us with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction in the first place, and to make sure they know the devastating consequences of doing so.

The elements of our strategy cannot be allowed to undermine one another. They must reinforce one another, and contribute to our national defense in all its dimensions. That includes the profoundly important dimension of arms control.

Over the past 30 years, Republican and Democratic presidents alike have negotiated an array of arms control treaties with Russia. We and our allies have relied on these treaties to ensure strategic stability and predictability with Russia, to get on with the job of dismantling the legacy of the Cold War, and to further the transition from confrontation to cooperation with our former adversary in the most important arena, nuclear weapons.

A key part of the international security structure we have built with Russia and, therefore, a key part of our national security, is the anti-ballistic missile treaty signed by President Nixon in 1972. The ABM treaty limits anti-missile defenses according to a simple principle: neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other side's nuclear deterrent, and thus tempt the other side to strike first in a crisis or to take countermeasures that would make both our countries less secure.

Strategic stability, based on mutual deterrence, is still important, despite the end of the Cold War. Why? Because the United States and Russia still have nuclear arsenals that can devastate each other. And this is still a period of transition in our relationship.

We have worked together in many ways. Signed an agreement of cooperation between Russia and NATO. Served with Russian troops in Bosnia and Kosovo. But while we are no longer adversaries, we are not yet real allies. Therefore, for them as well as for us, maintaining strategic stability increases trust and confidence on both sides. It reduces the risk of confrontation. It makes it possible to build an even better partnership and an even safer world.

Now, here's the issue: NMD, if deployed, would require us either to adjust the treaty or to withdraw from it -- not because NMD poses a challenge to the strategic stability I just discussed, but because by its very words, NMD prohibits any national missile defense.

What we should want is to both explore the most effective defenses possible, not only for ourselves, but for all other law-abiding states, and to maintain our strategic stability with Russia. Thus far, Russia has been reluctant to agree, fearing I think, frankly, that in some sense, this system or some future incarnation of it could threaten the reliability of its deterrence and, therefore, strategic stability.

Nevertheless, at our summit in Moscow in June, President Putin and I did agree that the world has changed since the ABM treaty was signed 28 years ago, and that the proliferation of missile technology has resulted in new threats that may require amending that treaty. And again, I say, these threats are not threats to the United States alone.

Russia agrees that there is an emerging missile threat. In fact, given its place on the map, it is particularly vulnerable to this

emerging threat. In time, I hope the United States can narrow our differences with Russia on this issue. The course I have chosen today gives the United States more time to pursue that, and we will use it.

President Putin and I have agreed to intensify our work on strategic defense, while pursuing, in parallel, deeper arms reductions in START III. He and I have instructed our experts to develop further cooperative initiatives in areas such as theater missile defense, early warning and missile threat discussions for our meeting just next week in New York.

Apart from the Russians, another critical diplomatic consideration in the NMD decision is the view of our NATO allies. They have all made clear that they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in a way that preserves, not abrogates, the ABM treaty. If we decide to proceed with NMD deployment we must have their support, because key components of NMD would be based on their territories.

The decision I have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies' questions and consult further on the path ahead.

Finally, we must consider the impact of a decision to deploy on security in Asia. As the next President makes a deployment decision, he will need to avoid stimulating an already dangerous regional nuclear capability from China to South Asia. Now, let me be clear: no nation can ever have a veto over American security, even if the United States and Russia cannot reach agreement; even if we cannot secure the support of our allies at first; even if we conclude that the Chinese will respond to NMD by increasing their arsenal of nuclear weapons substantially with a corollary, inevitable impact in India and then in Pakistan.

The next President may nevertheless decide that our interest in security in 21st century dictates that we go forward with deployment of NMD. But we can never afford to overlook the fact that the actions and reactions of others in this increasingly interdependent world do bear on our security.

Clearly, therefore, it would be far better to move forward in the context of the ABM treaty and allied support. Our efforts to make that possible have not been completed. For me, the bottom line on this decision is this: because the emerging missile threat is real, we have an obligation to pursue a missile defense system that could enhance our security.

We have made progress, but we should not move forward until we have absolute confidence that the system will work, and until we have made every reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of deployment, and maximize the benefit, as I said, not only to America's security, but to the security of law abiding nations everywhere subject to the same threat.

I am convinced that America and the world will be better off if we explore the frontiers of strategic defenses, while continuing to pursue arms control, to stand with our allies and to work with Russia and others to stop the spread of deadly weapons.

I strongly believe this is the best course for the United States, and therefore the decision I have reached today, is in the best security interest of the United States. In short, we need to move forward with realism, with steadiness, and with prudence, not dismissing the threat we face, or assuming we can meet it, while ignoring our overall strategic environment, including the interests and concerns of our allies, friends and other nations. A national missile defense, if deployed, should be part of a larger strategy to preserve and enhance

the peace, strength and security we now enjoy, and to build an even safer world.

I have tried to maximize the ability of the next President to pursue that strategy. In so doing, I have tried to maximize the chance that all you young students will live in a safer, more humane, more positively interdependent world. I hope I have done so. I believe I have.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 11:50 A.M. EDT (L)

VI. United Nations

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VI-I Speech by Secretary Albright, September 2000



Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
Remarks to the 55th United Nations General Assembly
New York, New York, September 12, 2000
As released by the Office of the Spokesman
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V-1

As Prepared for Delivery

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues and special guests, good morning. I am honored to address this Assembly on behalf of the United States and to reinforce the eloquent message President Clinton conveyed during last week's Millennium Summit.

Because my father worked here when I was young, I have always considered myself a child of the UN. And because I had the privilege to serve here as America's Permanent Representative, I feel at home and so will speak plainly.

The members of this body reflect virtually every culture, ethnicity and geographical region. We are city and country, inland and island, tropical and temperate, developing and industrialized. We are as diverse as humanity.

And yet, in responding to the daunting demands of this new era, we are bound together by the interests we share and the ideals to which we aspire.

We all have a stake in building peace and relieving poverty, championing development and curbing disease.

We all want to see the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction reduced, refugees cared for, children nourished, the environment protected, and the status of women advanced.

We all believe the benefits of globalization must be allocated more broadly within and among societies. Because if the new technologies are to ease old problems, they must help the many who today lack access and skills; so that every village becomes a home to opportunity and every school a midwife to hope.

As the Millennium Summit reflected, we have no shortage of worthy goals. We are right to aim high and take on the mightiest tasks.

But as the Secretary General has said, progress depends on working together. We need "all hands on deck," pulling in the same direction. For each of us, that responsibility begins at home. Because the international community cannot help any nation that is not striving to help itself.

Each government has an obligation to observe international norms on human rights, uphold the rule of law, fight corruption and raise awareness about HIV/AIDS.

But in the 21st Century, no nation can protect and serve its people simply by going it alone. That's why we will all benefit from strengthening regional bodies such as the

OAS and OAU, ASEAN and the OSCE.

Because of their unique expertise and regional legitimacy, they can be instruments for solving some of the hardest challenges we face. But they will succeed only if we raise our expectations of these organizations, call upon them to act boldly and back them when they do.

Regional bodies can contribute much to the purposes outlined in the UN Charter, and the goals established during the Millennium Summit. But here again, they cannot do it all.

The role of the United Nations is also vital, because no other institution combines a comprehensive mandate with near universal representation and global reach.

We all have an interest in the UN's success. That is its greatest strength, and also its burden -- because 189 nations have to work very hard if they are to agree.

I remember when I came to New York in 1993, I was told by cynics that the UN was too bureaucratic to change, and too big ever to achieve consensus on measures to improve its governance.

Those cynics were wrong. With support from many countries, we have made impressive progress.

Compared to seven years ago, the UN accomplishes more and wastes less. Accountability has increased and duplication diminished.

The inspector general's office -- which did not exist in 1993--has grown steadily more rigorous and is responsible for tens of millions of dollars in savings. A culture of transparency and results is slowly but surely taking hold.

Moreover, both UN Headquarters and the entire UN System are better led than they have ever been.

UN leaders and members can take pride in the gains made, but we all know there is much more work to be done.

That's why we must back the Secretary General's efforts to further improve UN management, recognizing that every dollar wasted is a dollar lost to the fight against poverty and the UN's other urgent goals.

We must also move ahead rapidly to strengthen peacekeeping, because it is the most visible and vital yardstick of UN success, and for people in strife-torn regions, often the difference between a normal life and no life at all.

There is no magic formula for curing the ills that have plagued UN peace operations in the past. But the report just prepared by Ambassador Brahimi's team is a solid place to start.

As President Clinton said last week, "we need to ensure that UN peacekeepers can

be deployed with the right training and equipment," and the right rules of engagement so they can achieve, not merely attempt, their missions.

This will require a larger peacekeeping staff, on permanent assignment, comprised of the best talent and experience we can find.

It will require military planners the world over to recognize that training for peace operations is a legitimate part of every nation's security strategy.

It will require the ability to deploy rapidly not only UN military forces, but also civilian police and experts in law enforcement and judicial reform.

It will demand improved coordination between military peacekeepers and civilian builders of peace, so that missions begun are completed and recovery bred by reconciliation can take hold.

And it will require additional resources from my government and from each of yours. And by "additional", I mean resources that should not come at the expense of other core UN goals.

The United States will heed the Secretary General's request that we work together to consider and implement the best recommendations of the Brahimi report.

Whether for peacekeeping or programs, the UN also needs a sustainable and equitable system of financing. We do not have that today. Member states, including my own, must do a better job of making payments on time. But we must also look afresh at the method used to allocate responsibility for UN costs.

Last week, the Security Council called for adjustments in the scale of assessments. This plea has been echoed by dozens of other countries and should be acted upon by the General Assembly this fall.

A more equitable system should provide a much stronger foundation for UN programs and missions. It should preserve the special responsibility for peacekeeping of the Security Council's permanent members. It should retain a heavily discounted rate for the poorest countries.

And it should reduce the UN's over-reliance on payments from the United States, while at the same time enabling my government to write a check to the UN for nearly \$600 million in prior obligations.

Clearly, adjustments are long overdue. The UN needs a firm and reliable financial base. In the weeks ahead, the United States will be pleased to work with you to accomplish this landmark goal.

Further improvements in management and peacekeeping and a sounder financial base are a vital step toward a stronger and more effective United Nations.

But we must also stand up to the campaign launched by Baghdad against the UN's authority and international law.

Security Council Resolution 1284 provides an effective plan for protecting world security through resumed weapons inspection and monitoring inside Iraq.

It has expanded the Oil-for-Food program that has delivered \$8 billion in humanitarian supplies to Iraqi civilians, with \$6 billion more on the way. And it would enable Iraq -- through compliance with the Resolution's terms -- to achieve an early suspension of sanctions.

Thus far, Baghdad has flatly refused to accept the Resolution. The regime's strategy is to ignore its UN Charter obligations, and seek to preserve at all costs its capacity to produce the deadliest weapons humanity has ever known.

We must continue to do all we can to ease the hardships faced by Iraq's people. But we must also defend the integrity of this institution, our security and international law.

The Millennium Summit illustrated the UN's long-standing role as a forum for articulating consensus goals. But achieving these objectives will require action at all levels -- from local to global.

It will also require a willingness to move well beyond the limits and habits of the past.

Today, the UN is taking on a wide array of new issues, what I call "people issues," because they so directly affect the lives of our citizens.

They include the challenge of protecting our planet by limiting greenhouse gas emissions; securing safe water supplies; halting desertification; and putting a stop to trafficking in human beings. They especially include the fight against HIV/AIDS, which was highlighted in a letter to the Secretary General signed by the women foreign ministers last night. These and similar challenges are sure to be important components of 21st Century diplomacy, and because they are global in scope, require a global response.

The UN is also playing an increased role in areas where Cold War divisions once held it back. Over the past decade, UN entities have contributed much by prosecuting war criminals, promoting democracy, supporting human rights and aiding the fight against illegal drugs.

These issues require a willingness to take a stand, as the UN has done in holding accountable the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the Balkans; striving to end rebel outrages in Sierra Leone; and expressing opposition to the long-standing and ongoing violation of basic human rights in Burma.

And let me say this morning that when the Burmese government tries to blame the victims for the crime, and say that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party are responsible for their own repression, I can only reply that much the same was once said about Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. The world is not fooled. And we must not be silent.

Some argue that speaking out in defense of human rights constitutes interference in internal affairs. I believe it helps to fulfill the purposes of the UN Charter.

Because when international norms are assaulted, the UN must do more than simply observe injustice, or report upon it, or sympathize with the victims. We must do all we can, where we can, to stop the perpetrators.

This requires the active backing and participation of UN members, so that respect for international law becomes steadily more universal, and the incentives for observing global standards progressively more clear.

The result, if we are united and determined enough, will be a world of greater security, justice and peace. Realistically, this is essential if we are to achieve the ambitious social goals we have set.

But there is one other essential element, as well, and that is democracy. This past summer in Poland, for the first time, more than 100 nations came together to reaffirm democratic principles and ensure that the democratic tide remains a rising tide around the world.

We did this not because democracy always produces good governments, for it does not. But we are convinced by the evidence of the old century that the hopes we share for the new will more readily be accomplished if people are able to live and work in freedom.

Democracy is the one road we can all walk down together and the best system yet devised for sowing and growing the seeds of economic opportunity.

In promoting democracy, we are not attempting to impose our values on anyone else. In fact, this is not possible. Because democracy, by definition, enables citizens within a country to shape their own destinies in accordance with their own convictions and ideals.

Make no mistake. In any country, at any time, dictatorship is an imposition. Democracy is a choice.

As we have learned during the last 55 years, the UN provides no guarantee of global peace or prosperity. But it can play a vital role as catalyst and coordinator, and as a bridge connecting the contributions of one to another.

To those who would judge it harshly, I would respond not by pointing first to the deliberations of diplomats such as myself, in surroundings such as this.

Instead, I would point to the day-to-day efforts of UN workers caring for refugees, feeding children, providing shelter, and preventing disease.

I would point to the men and women on the front lines from Port-au-Prince to Freetown, and from Kosovo to Kisangani, doing some of the world's hardest work -- and as we were reminded by the recent slayings of UNHCR employees in East Timor -- also the most dangerous.

It is their efforts and sacrifice -- in partnership with so many indigenous and other non-governmental organizations -- that truly remind us of the UN's purpose and of our kinship with one another.

This is, I expect, my last official speech to a UN audience. And as I stand before you, I am deeply conscious not only of our many accomplishments, but also of the tasks not yet completed.

I am grieved by the conflicts that still rage, and the basic rights and freedoms still denied.

I am frustrated by the gaps that still exist between our ideals and actions, and alarmed by the deepening material divide that ultimately threatens every nation, rich and poor alike.

There are those who say it is naïve to think that the future can be made better than the past.

I am reminded that this institution was founded by men and women who were as realistic as any human beings could be -- for they were the survivors of the worst conflict our world has known -- and determined that succeeding generations should be saved from Holocaust and war.

They had faith. Surely we must, as well; that by working together within and outside this organization, we can move together, step by step toward the lofty goals we have set. And thereby bring about a world more peaceful, prosperous and free than it has ever been.

Since 1993, it has been my privilege to work with so many of you, from every part of the globe, in support of the interests we have in common and the dreams our people share.

This morning, I want to thank you for your friendship; pledge my cooperation in the months immediately ahead; and ask respectfully, in turn, for yours. And promise, as well, to serve the cause of international progress and individual liberty not only for as long as I am in office, but for as long as I am alive.

Thank you all very much.

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