
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (b)(c)(d) or Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526 or P6/(b)(6) of the PRA/FOIA.

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20599

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



Summary of Conclusions of Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 10, 1994
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:30 - 6:30pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Haiti (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
Rick Saunders

USUN
Rick Inderfurth

STATE
Strobe Talbott
Alec Watson
Phyllis Oakley
Jim Steinberg

OMB
Gordon Adams
Alice Rivlin

DOD
Walter Slocombe
John Christenson

JCS
William Owens
John Sheehan


Justice
Phyllis Coven
Jamie Gorlick
Chris Sale

AID
Mark Schneider

Transportation
Mortimer Downer
Richard Appelbaum (Coast Guard)

USIA
Penn Kemble

CIA



The White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Richard Clarke
Mort Halperin
Eric Schwartz
Larry Rossin

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed:

1. Political Process:

a. State will prepare press guidance and other necessary steps to react should the Haitian military and members of the Haitian Parliament install an illegitimate government.

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b. State will raise the proposed French UNSC "political" resolution at the foreign minister level later this week, with a view to having it sidelined.

c. NSC and State will prepare a political actions plan encompassing recommendations for Special Advisor Gray's activities and other measures to increase pressure on the Haitian military. (S)

2. Sanctions:

a. Leon Feurth will chair an interagency task force on sanctions enforcement that will meet initially on 11 May. Relevant agencies should identify their representative to the task force and cooperate actively in its work.

b. NSC will circulate a decision paper on a unilateral commercial airline sanction. The paper will address questions raised, including how USG personnel would move in and out of Haiti. State will ask Ambassador Swing on his views about how best to implement such a measure.

c. The Haiti Sanctions Task Force will examine the possibility of freezing all private financial transactions by Haitians domiciled in Haiti. (S)

3. Migration:

a. Locating the MPC: Our priorities for locating a Migrant Processing Center (MPC) are:

-- ashore (in the Dominican Republic, Turks and Caicos, or Jamaica);

-- at a dock in those locations

-- at sea (although there are logistical problems that the Haiti Migrant Task Force should examine). (S)

The Task Force should pursue the ashore, at dock, and afloat options simultaneously. (S)

b. Diplomatic Activity on the MPC: A Presidential envoy will go to the Dominican Republic next week to discuss sanctions enforcement, citing the MPC, and US assistance programs. A senior level approach will be made to the UK regarding Turks and Caicos as a site for the MPC.


c. Third Country Resettlement: A Secretary of State letter will be sent immediately to possible third countries asking them to afford refugee status or safe haven status to some number of Haitians seeking protection. For the less wealthy countries, we will note that funds for resettlement will be available through UNHCR. The US will make funds available to the UNHCR for this

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purpose. The Task Force will examine further how much money will be needed and where it should come from. A second communications will be sent to these countries after we know more about the location of the MPC and the role of UNHCR.

d. Operation of the MPC: DOD will be the "landlord" for the MPC and will contract with a commercial cruise ship immediately. As landlord DOD will arrange for the operation of the logistics and security of the center. State, with support from INS, will administer the migrant processing. USCG will transport migrants to the MPC and (for those being returned) back to Haiti. These roles are without prejudice to a later decision on what agency should pay for various MPC related costs. The Task Force will examine further agency role on medical support.



f. Follow-on Work: The Task Force should examine North Coast sites for returning migrants and expansion of in-country processing, including a possible additional in-country processing center. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



Summary of Conclusions of Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 5, 1994
LOCATION: SVTS Room
TIME: 8:00 am-9:30 am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Haitian Migration (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office

Leon Fuerth

OMB

Gordon Adams

STATE

Strobe Talbott

James Dobbins

William Gray

USCG

Norman Saunders

James Carmichael

DOD

Walter Slocombe

John Christiansen

The White House

Sandy Berger

JUSTICE

Jamie Gorelick

Doris Meissner

Seth Waxman

NSC

Richard Clarke

JCS

John Sheehan

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that the Safehaven plan would be initiated immediately by:

1. An Announcement by Bill Gray on 5 July concerning initiation of Safehaven. (U)

2. Immediate broadcasting of this information on VOA and through USIS on Haitian commercial radio stations. USCG cutters may inform boat migrants of the policy, so that those who have boats capable of taking them back to Haiti may choose to return directly rather than go to Guantanamo. (S)

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
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3. Consultations with Jamaican government on decision that all Haitians at MPC-Kingston who have not yet been screened for political refugees status be instead interviewed for safehaven, beginning on 5 July. (C)




5. The approximately 400 Haitian migrants at Guantanamo and Jamaica who have already been given US political refugee status (based upon interviews at MPC-Kingston) would be resettled in the US. (S)

6. In country processing for political refugee status in the US would continue in Haiti, with additional staff sent to Haiti for this purpose. (S)

7. MPC-Kingston would perhaps go into stand by status once the current wave effect has been diminished. MPC-Grand Turk would be completed in mid-July. These two facilities would be used if the capacity at Guantanamo is exceeded, or if weather conditions precluded operations at Guantanamo. (S)

8. Temporary sites at US bases in Panama would open at a rate of 2500 a week, growing to 10,000 by the second week in August. At the same time, the US, Panama, and UNHCR would plan for a follow-on facility elsewhere in Panama. NSC will lead a team to negotiate an MOU with Panama. (S)

9. Expansion of Guantanamo would continue from its current capacity to 20,000. (U)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 19, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
George Tenet

P3(b)(3)

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
General Hugh Shelton
BG George Casey

State:
Secretary Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Ambassador Robert Gelbard

White House:
Jim Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Secretary William Cohen
Bear McConnell

NSC:
Jock Covey

USUN:
Ambassador William Richardson
Nancy Soderberg

Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed that a political resolution of the conflict in Kosovo should be based on the following principals outlined in State papers (*):

1. Kosovar autonomy within FRY, with separate parliament and executive, police and judiciary, and representation at Federal level;

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Declassify on: April 9, 1998

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2. Links to Serbia, including joint Serbia-Kosovo bodies to address economic, cultural, and religious affairs;

3. Guarantees for the protection and welfare of minorities;

4. Democratic elections for offices in Kosovo and at Federal level;

[REDACTED] P1/(b)(1)


6. Protection from Federal level action on issues declared to by Kosovo to affect its fundamental interests;

7. International guarantees, including the phased lifting of sanctions against FRY linked to implementation of the agreed political resolution, the application of new sanctions or other punitive measures against parties obstructing implementation, and international monitoring of all aspects of compliance.

Principals agreed that the U.S., working with the Contact Group and other allies and partners, should lead international efforts to achieve political resolution based on these principles by:

- Seeking to establish a climate for negotiation through cessation of violence, elimination of checkpoints and other obstacles to freedom of movement by all parties, withdrawal of FRY and Serbian security forces to barracks or from Kosovo, withdrawal of Kosovar fighters to designated areas, full international monitoring of the ceasefire;
- increasing pressure against Milosevic through international sanctions [REDACTED] P1/(b)(1) and strengthening the Kosovar team by broadening participation and bringing the UCK into the political process;
- Facing the parties with a full range of incentives and disincentives to encourage them to accept the package of principles as the basis for a negotiated resolution, notionally including:

For Milosevic -- sticks: a full range of punitive measures not limited to continued and additional



international sanctions -- carrots: phased lifting of sanctions and normalization of international relations linked to implementation of the agreement;

For Kosovars -- sticks: no protection from proportionate FRY/Serbian response to violent provocations, disruption of UCK financing and logistics, lifting of UNSCR 1160 to permit re-supply of FRY/Serbia weapons -- carrots: a place at the table for political representatives of UCK;

- Holding a decisive peace conference outside FRY, under U.S. leadership, to conclude the negotiated resolution.

Principals agreed that, to support the above peace strategy:

- plans should be drafted immediately to build up around Ibrahim Rugova a negotiating team that can credibly speak for the Kosovar side; planning must propose how the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) can be brought into the political process, including concrete incentives and disincentives (action: State); (S)
- plans should be drafted immediately to further increase pressure on Milosevic to suspend violence and engage seriously in negotiations including further sanctions, such as a visa-ban on senior FRY and Serbian government officials responsible for repression,

P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

In this context:

P1/(b)(1)

-- Milosevic should be offered no relief from sanctions or other concessions at this time. (S)

Principals agreed that, working with Russia and other Security Council members, the U.S. should seek a UNSC resolution endorsing international observers in Kosovo, if possible under Chapter VII (action: State).



Principals agreed on urgent consultations with key allies, especially UK and France, with a view to establishing a legal basis for possible NATO action in Kosovo not requiring UN authorization (action: State and USUN).

Principals agreed to continue accelerated NATO contingency planning; in that context, an assessment should be prepared immediately considering possible triggers or thresholds for NATO action, as well as what force might accomplish the mission without creating a destabilizing one-sided military vacuum (action: DoD).

Principals agreed that a Congressional strategy should be prepared immediately (action: NSC).

*NOTE: In some instances, general conclusions have been fleshed out, where consistent with interagency thinking. Please advise NSC if it is felt this may not be the case.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Revised 2055



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 19, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
George Tenet

P3(b)(3)

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gelbard

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
William Cohen
Berndt McConnell

NSC:
Jock Covey

USUN:
William Richardson
Nancy Soderberg

Summary of Conclusions

- Principals agreed that a political resolution of the conflict in Kosovo should be based on the following principles:

1. An autonomous status for Kosovo within the FRY which preserves existing international borders while providing

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Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: June 25, 2008

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maximum-possible self-government for Kosovo, with competencies including: a separate parliament, executive, police force and judiciary, as well as representation in the federal assembly;

2. Links between Kosovo and Serbia, including joint Serb-Kosovar bodies to address economic, cultural, and religious issues;

[REDACTED] P1/(b)(1)

4. Protections from Federal level action that would undermine the agreed-upon political status of Kosovo as well as guarantees for the protection and welfare of minorities;


5. International guarantees, including international monitoring of all aspects of compliance. ~~(S)~~

• Principals agreed that the United States, working with the Contact Group and other allies and partners, should lead international efforts to achieve political resolution based on these principles by:

• Seeking to establish a climate for negotiation through cessation of violence, elimination of checkpoints and other obstacles to freedom of movement by all parties, withdrawal of FRY and Serbian security forces to barracks or from Kosovo, withdrawal of Kosovar fighters to designated areas, full international monitoring of the ceasefire;

• Increasing pressure against Milosevic through international sanctions [REDACTED] P3/(b)(1) [REDACTED] P1/(b)(1) and strengthening the Kosovar team by broadening participation and bringing the UCK into the political process;

• Facing the parties with a full range of incentives and disincentives to encourage them to accept the package of principles as the basis for a negotiated resolution, notionally including:



- For Milosevic -- sticks: a full range of punitive measures not limited to continued and additional international sanctions -- carrots: phased lifting of sanctions and normalization of international relations linked to implementation of the agreement;
- For Kosovars -- sticks: no protection from proportionate FRY/Serbian response to violent provocations, disruption of UCK financing and logistics, lifting of UNSCR 1160 to permit re-supply of FRY/Serbia weapons -- carrots: a place at the table for political representatives of UCK;
- Holding a decisive peace conference outside FRY, under U.S. leadership, to conclude the negotiated resolution. (S)

• Principals agreed that, to support the above peace strategy:

- Plans should be drafted immediately to build up around Ibrahim Rugova a negotiating team that can credibly speak for the Kosovar side; planning must propose how the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) can be brought into the political process, including concrete incentives and disincentives (action: State);
- Plans should be drafted immediately to further increase pressure on Milosevic to suspend violence and engage seriously in negotiations including further sanctions, such as a visa-ban on senior FRY and Serbian government officials responsible for repression, P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

• In this context:

P1/(b)(1)

- Milosevic should be offered no relief from sanctions or other concessions at this time. (S)


- Principals agreed that, working with Russia and other Security Council members, the United States should seek a UNSC resolution endorsing international observers in Kosovo, if possible under Chapter VII (action: State). ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed on urgent consultations with key allies, especially UK and France, with a view to establishing a legal basis for possible NATO action in Kosovo not requiring UN authorization (action: State and USUN). ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed to continue accelerated NATO contingency planning; in that context, an assessment should be prepared immediately considering possible triggers or thresholds for NATO action, as well as what force might accomplish the mission without creating a destabilizing one-sided military vacuum (action: DoD). ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed that a Congressional strategy should be prepared immediately (action: NSC). ~~(S)~~
- *NOTE: In some instances, general conclusions have been fleshed out, where consistent with interagency thinking. Please advise NSC if it is felt this may not be the case. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20555



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 22, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

CIA:

George Tenet

P3(b)(3)

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

George Casey

State:

Madeleine Albright

Strobe Talbott

Robert Gelbard

White House:

James Steinberg

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

William Cohen

Bernd McConnell

NSC:

Jock Covey

USUN:

William Richardson (SVTS)

Nancy Soderberg (SVTS)

Summary of Conclusions

- Principals agreed on terms of reference for the Holbrooke mission, including stressing to Milosevic that he must satisfy all Contact Group demands, not only those he accepted in Moscow, and that the Allies had not ruled out any means to address the conflict in Kosovo. (S)

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Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: June 30, 2008

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- Principals agreed that we should urge Rugova to build bridges beyond his Group of 15, especially to the UCK, but that we continued to regard him as central and essential on the Kosovar side. (S)
- Principals agreed we should make clear to the UCK that we will not accept violent pursuit of independence; that we intend to take an active role in the search for a political resolution; that we would welcome UCK participation, with Rugova, in the political process. (S)
- Principals agreed that State would propose revisions to the principles for a political resolution contained in the summary of conclusions from the meeting of June 19. (S)
- Principals agreed on the need to confirm that key allies, especially the UK and France, would be prepared to participate in military actions in Kosovo without the United Nations, if necessary. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20572



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 30, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 8:15-9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals
Committee Meeting on Kosovo (8)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger (SVTS)

CIA:
George Tenet

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey

State:
Madeleine Albright (SVTS)
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gelbard
Richard Holbrooke (STU III)
Chris Hill (STU III)

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Jan Lodal
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Jock Covey

USUN:
William Richardson (SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg (SVTS)

Summary of Conclusions

- Principals agreed that Ambassador Hill should continue efforts to convoke and chair a meeting of the parties to discuss U.S. ideas on confidence building measures (CBMs) and principles for political resolution of the conflict. State should urgently prepare the necessary guidance on CBMs and

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principles, with a view to holding the meeting by the end of this week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Principals agreed that efforts to expand contacts rapidly with UCK leadership should continue, with close interagency coordination, making every effort to maintain Rugova as the central Kosovar political figure. (Action: State, ~~P1(b)(1)~~) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed that the Kosovo Observer Mission should be made operational as soon as possible. (Action: State, Defense) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed on the need to maintain or further accelerate NATO contingency planning. JCS will brief selected principals on the current state of planning for an air campaign. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed to make a major effort to elicit British, French and German assurance that they would, if necessary, participate in NATO action without United Nations authorization. To this end, NSA Berger and Secretary Albright will contact counterparts, stressing the unacceptability of permitting Russia to veto effectively critical NATO actions in Europe. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed to continue giving a high priority to maintaining Russian support for our efforts. To this end, Secretary Albright will contact Primakor. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed to consider how to take advantage of Milosevic's weakened position. (Action: State, CIA) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed on the need for common press guidance today. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20606



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 15, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00-6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey

State:
Secretary Albright
Strobe Talbott
Robert Gelbard
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Secretary Cohen
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Jock Covey
Stephen Flanagan
Greg Schulte

USUN (via SVTS):
William Richardson
Nancy Soderberg

Summary of Conclusions

- Principals agreed to provide maximum support for Ambassador Gelbard's efforts to achieve the best possible results in the September elections. Principals agreed on the need for a post-election strategy to establish conditions for a

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significant SFOR drawdown following SFOR's six-month review in December. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Principals agreed to maintain pressure on Belgrade while exploring Serb autonomy proposals with aggressive U.S. counterproposals. Principals agreed that continued efforts to build a coherent Kosovar negotiating team and bring the UCK into a political process would not be helped by bringing financial and other pressures against the UCK at this time. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed to continue accelerated NATO planning for a full range of contingencies. In order to enhance the credibility of possible NATO action in Kosovo, Principals agreed to consider stand-off air options that might be employed before and at lower political threshold than a full air campaign. (Action: Defense) ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed that under current circumstances, efforts to achieve a United Nations Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII would be counterproductive. ~~(S)~~
- Principals tasked the Albania IWG to review options for advancing our interests in Albania. The IWG should explore what mechanism(s) could be used to ensure more effective coordination and application of international assistance, including a "Friends of Albania" group and/or a high-level coordinator or even a "Dayton-style" implementation process. In addition, the IWG should assess options for breaking the domestic political deadlock in Albania, including formation of a government of national unity or of technocrats. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 6, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on
Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

OMB:
Jacob Lew

Vice President:
Rick Saunders
Leslie Davidson

CIA:
George Tenet

[REDACTED] P3(b)(3)

State:
Secretary Albright
Thomas Pickering
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)
Christopher Hill (via STU-III)

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Secretary Cohen
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Summary of Conclusions

- Principals agreed that it is essential to re-establish the credibility of a possible use of force by NATO. (S)
- Principals agreed on need to build allies support for the threat of or use of NATO force in Kosovo without the need for a UN Security Council Resolution. (S)
- Principals agreed on need to develop a political-military framework on use of force in Kosovo, identifying objectives and triggers and linking them to the negotiating strategy. (S)

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Classified by: Glyn Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: August 12, 2008

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- Principals agreed that publicly we should express indignation with recent Serb offensive action and that NATO should publicize that it is finalizing planning for possible air operations. ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed on the need to keep Congressional leadership informed of our efforts to solve the Kosovo issue. Secretary Cohen and Mr. Berger agreed to call key Congressional leaders. ~~(S)~~

- Principals agreed on need to develop a political-military framework on use of force in Kosovo, identifying objectives and triggers and linking them to the negotiating strategy. ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed that publicly we should express indignation with recent Serb offensive^{action} and that NATO should publicize that it is finalizing planning for possible air operations. ~~(S)~~
- Principals agreed on the need to keep Congressional leadership informed of our efforts to solve the Kosovo issue. Secretary Cohen and Mr. Berger agreed to call key Congressional leaders. ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20844



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: September 30, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:45-4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

Chief of Staff:

Erskine Bowles
John Podesta

Vice President:

Rick Saunders

CIA:

George Tenet
John Gordon

State:

Secretary Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Marc Grossman
Christopher Hill (via secure
phone)
Richard Holbrooke

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:

Secretary William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Jay Farrar

OMB:


Sylvia Mathews

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: September 30, 2008



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8/24/10 MS

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press NATO to authorize by October 2 the issuing of an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for the limited air option and phased air campaign; this should be followed by a public statement by the NATO Secretary General explaining the decision as a response to the latest atrocities and Belgrade's continued non-compliance with UNSCR 1199. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should agree to a meeting of Contact Group political directors in London on October 3 to discuss inter alia the possible elements of a political settlement; if other Contact Group members request, this could be followed up with a demarche in Belgrade by the United States, Russian and EU Presidency ambassadors. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should press the UN Secretary-General to issue his report on compliance with UNSCR 1199 no later than October 5 while working to convince the French and German governments not to seek a further UNSCR following the report. (Action: NSC, State, DoD, USUN) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should propose a special PJC meeting with the objective of keeping Russia on board while making clear that the Alliance is prepared to act despite Russian objections if necessary. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Subject to the President's approval, the USG should aim to secure NATO agreement on October 7 to authorize the issuing of an Activation Order (ACTORD) covering both the limited air option and the phased air campaign. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- General Clark should be requested to consult with the USG prior to actual execution of air strikes to ensure close coordination of diplomatic and military activities. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should plan to dispatch Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade immediately following the issuance of the ACTORD and prior to execution of air strikes to confront Milosevic with a clear set of demands aimed at attaining full compliance with UNSCR 1199. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The USG should formulate a strong message to the Kosovar Albanians and determine appropriate means for delivery. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should agree to NATO planning, without commitment, for a range of possible ground contingencies assuming a permissive environment. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG develop and implement a strategy designed to weaken Milosevic

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20860



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 5, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:30-4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo. (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
John Gordon

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Vernon Clark

State:
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Greg Schulte

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG objective is durable and verifiable compliance with UNSCR 1199. While Milosevic has taken some steps toward compliance, he has not established that compliance is real and lasting. (S)


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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: October 5, 2008

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8/24/10 M



- The United States should discourage allies from seeking a further UN resolution specifically authorizing the use of force. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(S)~~
- The United States should continue to seek an ACTORD later this week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The United States should clearly warn the Kosovar Albanians that provocative actions that disrupt our efforts, or seek to provoke a response by Serbian security forces, will cause NATO to adjust its response accordingly. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- NATO should be asked to examine the full range of options to implement an agreement, including a civilian monitoring force (perhaps based on an augmented KDOM). (Action: State, DOD) ~~(S)~~
- The United States should seek NATO agreement to a single ACTORD for the Limited Air Option and Phased Air Campaign, recognizing that the further NAC would likely be needed on the transition from the Limited Air Option to the Phased Air Campaign and on the transition between each phase in that campaign. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- JCS should notify SACEUR of the U.S. forces committed to the Limited Air Option and Phased Air Campaign, recognizing that a Presidential decision would be required prior to an ACTORD authorizing their employment. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Any forward deployment of B-52s committed to the NATO operation should wait until after ACTORD approval. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 5, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:30-4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
John Gordon

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Vernon Clark

State:
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Greg Schulte

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SPTS)

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG objective is durable compliance with UNSCR 1199. While Milosevic has moved toward compliance, it is currently unclear whether that compliance is real and lasting. (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (d)

Declassify on: October 5, 2008



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8/24/10 ml



P1(b)(7)(D)

- The United States should discourage allies from seeking a further UN resolution specifically authorizing the use of force. (Action: State, USUN) (S)
- The United States should continue to seek an ACTORD later this week. (Action: State) (S)
- The United States should clearly warn the Kosovar Albanians that provocative actions that disrupt our efforts, or seek to provoke a response by Serbian security forces, will cause NATO to adjust its response accordingly. (Action: State) (S)
- NATO should be asked to ^{examine the} ~~develop~~ a full range of options to implement an agreement, including a ^{civilian} monitoring force ^{perhaps} (based on an augmented KDOM.) (Action: State, DOD) (S) _{civilian}
- The United States should seek NATO agreement to a single ACTORD for the Limited Air Option and Phased Air Campaign, recognizing that the NAC would need ^{to} ~~to~~ agree on the transition from the Limited Air Option to the Phased Air Campaign and on the transition between each phase in that campaign. (Action: State) (S) _{further down likely be}
- JCS should notify SACFOR of the U.S. forces committed to the Limited Air Option and Phased Air Campaign, recognizing that a Presidential decision would be required prior to an ACTORD authorizing their employment. (Action: JCS) (S)
- Any forward deployment of B-52s committed to the NATO operation should wait until after ACTORD approval. (Action: JCS) (S)



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 24, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
Samuel Berger

JCS:
Henry Shelton
Edward Anderson

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Steven Black

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke

State:
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:
William Cohen
James Bodner

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Eric Schwartz

CIA:
John Gordon

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Despite some progress, FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199 remains insufficient. The principal shortfall is Belgrade's failure to withdraw the MUP to pre-conflict levels. (Information: All) (S)

- To achieve further progress toward compliance, additional pressure should be brought to bear on Milosevic. This should include:
 - early steps toward establishing a NATO force in Macedonia;
 - retargeting and reconceptualizing the Limited Air Response;
 - preparing our allies for possible military action.
(Information: All) ~~(C)~~
- The United States will also maintain pressure on the Kosovar Albanians in general, and the UCK in particular, to comply with UNSCR 1199 and to ensure the safety of international monitors. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Principals will convey this approach to their counterparts in key allied capitals, and the NSC will prepare appropriate talking points for Presidential telephone conversations over the weekend. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) (U)
- Joint Staff will initiate a revision of the Limited Air Response to expand the target list and to shift its focus from demonstration to denial, while exempting barracks to which MUP and VJ forces are obligated to return. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State will issue a public statement welcoming UNSCR 1203 as a strong endorsement of the NATO and OSCE verification missions. USUN will encourage the UK, as presidency of the UNSC, to do the same. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(C)~~
- The United States will adopt a public line indicating that there has been some, but insufficient progress toward compliance and underscoring NATO's determination to attain full compliance. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 24, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
Samuel Berger

JCS:
Henry Shelton
Edward Anderson

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Steven Black

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke

State:
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow


Defense:
William Cohen
James Bodner

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Eric Schwartz

CIA:
John Gordon



Summary of Conclusions


It was agreed that:

- Despite some progress, FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199 remains insufficient. The principal shortfall is Belgrade's failure to withdraw the MUP to pre-conflict levels. (Information: All) (C)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5, (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008

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8/24/10 MS



- The United States will press key NATO allies to increase the pressure on Milosevic by publicly recalling SACEUR's authority to conduct air operations after October 27th and by rapidly deploying a NATO force in Macedonia. Such a force would be available to help extract OSCE verifiers in an emergency or prior to the conduct of NATO air strikes; its presence would also send a strong psychological signal to Milosevic and have a stabilizing effect in Macedonia. While we should expect our European allies to contribute the bulk of this force, the United States should not rule out participation in such areas as C4I and logistics support. (Information: All) ~~(C)~~
- Principals will convey these points to their counterparts in key allied capitals, and the NSC will prepare appropriate talking points for Presidential telephone conversations over the weekend. (Action: NSC, State, DoD) (U)
- The United States will also maintain pressure on the Kosovar Albanians in general, and the UCK in particular, to comply with UNSCR 1199 and to ensure the safety of international monitors. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Joint Staff will initiate a revision of the Limited Air Response to expand the target list and to shift its focus from demonstration to denial, while exempting barracks to which MUP and VJ forces are obligated to return. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State will issue a public statement welcoming UNSCR 1203 as a strong endorsement of the NATO and OSCE verification missions. USUN will encourage the UK, as presidency of the UNSC, to do the same. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(C)~~
- The United States will adopt a public line indicating that there has been some, but insufficient progress toward compliance and recalling that SACEUR retains the authority to conduct air strikes. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 6, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:15 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

Chief of Staff:
Erskine Bowles
John Podesta

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

CIA:
John Gordon

State:
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Edward Anderson

Defense:
Secretary William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


- Our objective in the current crisis is to obtain full and durable compliance with UNSCR 1199. (Information: All) (U)
- Because of Russia's position, the United States should discourage France and the UK from pursuing an additional UNSCR specifically authorizing force. If the two countries wish to "test" Russian willingness to agree to such a resolution, we

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: October 7, 2008

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8/24/10 NS



should encourage them to do so quickly and quietly. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(C)~~

- An interagency set of questions and answers is needed to provide a clear and convincing explanation of our policy toward resolving the crisis in Kosovo. (Action: NSC) ~~(C)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20888



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: October 12, 1998

LOCATION: Secure Conference Call

TIME: 7:15-9:25 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
Samuel Berger

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill
James O'Brien

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Gregory Schulte
Donald Bandler

CIA:

P3/(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States will press for an affirmative ACTORD decision at the October 12 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. (Action: State) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reasons for: 1,5 a,b,d
Declassify on: 10/12/08

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
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8/24/10 M

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
- Prior to the decision, the United States will deploy to key capitals talking points on conveying a general sense of the Holbrooke negotiations. The Secretary of State will call French and British counterparts as well as the UN Secretary General. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Special Envoy Holbrooke will travel to Brussels to brief NAC Permanent Representatives on the state of negotiations and then return to Belgrade. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Based on results from Ambassador Holbrooke's discussions with Milosevic, the United States will consider extending the timeframe for executing air strikes after ACTORD. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21013



Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Iraq

DATE: November 12, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 6:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Iraq (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Chris Bolan

State:
Madeleine Albright
Tom Pickering
Martin Indyk
David Welch

DOD:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

CIA
George Tenet
John Gordon
P3/(b)(3)

JCS
Hugh Shelton
Vernon Clark
Thomas Wilson

White House
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC
Bruce Riedel

Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed:

- We would implement our diplomatic strategy setting the stage for possible military action with POTUS messages to Israel, Russia, China, and Japan supplemented by diplomatic messages to others. Presidential phone calls on Friday would further prepare the ground with the UK, Saudis, Kuwaitis and UNSYG. (Action: NSC, State) (S)

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
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Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 11/27/08

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- We would focus public attention on the Doha Damascus Declaration Group statement. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- Secretary Cohen will engage with Minister Mordechai again on Patriots and retaliation issues. (Action: DoD) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21013



Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Iraq

DATE: November 13, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Iraq ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

Chief of Staff:
Maria Echaveste

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Chris Bolan

CIA
George Tenet
John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

State:
Strobe Talbott
Tom Pickering
Martin Indyk
David Welch

JCS
Hugh Shelton
Vernon Clark
Thomas Wilson

DOD:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC
Bruce Riedel

Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed:

- To prepare a message to Iraq via their UN Permanent Representative to deter any use of chemical or biological weapons. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~

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
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Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
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- To prepare the necessary diplomatic messages to explain and garner support for a military strike. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~
- To prepare a declaratory policy with press strategy. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~





Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Iraq

DATE: November 15, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Iraq (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

OVP:
Leon Fuerth (via Secure Phone)
Chris Bolan

CIA
George Tenet
John Gordon

State:
Strobe Talbott
Tom Pickering
Martin Indyk
David Welch

JCS
Hugh Shelton
Vernon Clark
Thomas Wilson

DOD:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick


NSC
Bruce Riedel


Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed:

- We will encourage UNSCOM and the IAEA to aggressively test Iraq's unconditional commitment to full cooperation. State will coordinate contact with UNSCOM and the IAEA. (Action: State, Defense, P/(b)(1)) (S)
- We will develop a 48-hour action plan for rapid transition to use of force scenarios. (Action: NSC) (S)

- Principals will make coordinated calls to Congress. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- The buildup of military forces in the Gulf will be adjusted to avoid over-extending Gulf host access, unnecessary expense and other factors. Defense will develop a plan for management of the asset buildup. (Action: Defense) ~~(S)~~





Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Iraq

DATE: November 17, 1998
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Iraq (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

<u>Chair:</u> Samuel Berger	<u>USUN</u> Peter Burleigh via SVTS
<u>OVP:</u> Leon Fuerth via secure video	<u>Chief of Staff:</u> John Podesta
<u>State:</u> Madeleine Albright Tom Pickering Martin Indyk David Welch	<u>CIA</u> George Tenet John Gordon
<u>DOD:</u> William Cohen Walter Slocombe	<u>JCS</u> Hugh Shelton Edward Anderson
	<u>White House</u> James Steinberg Donald Kerrick
	<u>NSC</u> Bruce Riedel


Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed:

- We will engage with UNSCOM to consult closely with each other on our planning and actions. USUN will be the principal channel of communications. (State, USUN, NSC) (S)
- Agencies will review their options for rapid reaction to any Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM/IAEA. (All) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 11/18/08



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21032



Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Iraq

DATE: November 20, 1998

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Iraq (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <u>Chair:</u>
Samuel Berger (via SVTS) | <u>USUN</u>
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS) |
| <u>OVP:</u>
Leon Fuerth
Chris Bolan | <u>Chief of Staff:</u>
John Podesta |
| <u>State:</u>
Madeleine Albright
Tom Pickering
Martin Indyk
David Welch | <u>CIA</u>
John Gordon
P3(b)(3) |
| <u>DOD:</u>
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe | <u>JCS</u>
Hugh Shelton
Robert Wagner |
| | <u>White House</u>
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick |
| | <u>NSC</u>
Bruce Riedel |

Summary of Conclusions

Principals agreed:

- Principals reviewed State's strategy for managing the Comprehensive Review. Slovenia will be approached to chair a committee of the whole to execute the Review. An optimal outcome will be an agreed compendium of Iraq's outstanding obligations and a time frame for their accomplishments. State

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Reason: 1.5 (b), (d)
Declassify On: 11/20/08

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
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8/24/16 ms

will implement a diplomatic strategy for securing support.
(State) ~~(S)~~

- We will engage closely with the Secretary General and UNSCOM Chairman to keep the burden of disclosure on Iraq regarding outstanding documents and other requests. (State, USUN) ~~(S)~~
- Principals reviewed State's strategy for engaging with and strengthening the Iraqi opposition. State will appoint a Special Representative to the Iraqi Opposition (SRIO) as soon as possible. Our emphasis at first will be political support and a step by step approach. We will not rule out the option of training and arming the opposition. We will brief the regional states on our approach to the opposition and how it interacts with other elements of our Iraq policy. (State)
~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

0281



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 15, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
George Tenet

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Harriet Babbitt

State:
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Michael Hurley

OMB:
Robert Kyle

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: January 15, 2009

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It was agreed that:

- OMB will work with State and NSC to determine how to meet FY99 funding requirements for Kosovo. (Action: OMB) (U)
- The USG should proceed with the strategy described in the State Department paper with two exceptions: (1) ~~P1/(b)(1)~~
~~P1/(b)(1)~~ and (2) the USG should not take steps to interfere with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) funding until there is a fuller assessment of the probable effectiveness. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassador Hill should continue with his proposed approach to negotiating an interim political settlement, although progress should be reviewed on a regular basis. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Pressure should be increased on Belgrade to bring its security forces into compliance with the Clark-Naumann agreement and to cooperate with the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in creating positive change on the ground. This should be done by profiling Belgrade's non-compliance and non-cooperation and taking steps within NATO to maintain the credibility of its Activation Order. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG and OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) should move forward quickly with creating positive change on the ground through training local police, preparing for local elections and implementing community development projects. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should send a clear message to the KLA that further provocations or breaches of the cease-fire will not lead to NATO intervention but to international condemnation and sanction. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should adapt its public line to condemn more forcefully acts of violence by the KLA and its role in provoking violence, while still acknowledging that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the crisis in Kosovo. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The feasibility and effectiveness of interfering with KLA funding should be fully assessed. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0302



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 18, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

CIA:

George Tenet

~~██████████ P3(b)(3) ██████████~~

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Michael Moseley

State:

Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering

White House:

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

Defense:

William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

NSC:

Greg Schulte

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- In responding to Belgrade's non-compliance, the USG should consider options that rest between complete disengagement and a long-term military commitment. (Action: All) (S)
- The PC will meet on Tuesday, January 19th, to review the results of the Clark/Naumann visit to Belgrade and to consider U.S. strategy if Milosevic rejects NATO demands. (Action: NSC) (S)


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Reason: 1.5(a, b, d)
Declassify on: 1/19/09

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 17, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Lawrence Rossin

White House:

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann


NSC:

Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Michael Hurley

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press for Generals Clark and Naumann to travel to Belgrade as soon as possible. (Action: DOD) (S)
- The USG should encourage the Russian government to make a public statement condemning Belgrade for the massacre in Racak

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and calling for an investigation by the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). (Action: State) (C)

- The USG should use the next day's meeting of the UN Security Council to press for a strong statement condemning the FRY but not to press for adoption of the draft resolution, thus far blocked by Russia, placing additional sanctions on the FRY for its non-cooperation with the ICTY. (Action: State, USUN) (C)
- JCS should be prepared to present the updated targets for the Limited Air Response to the President on Tuesday, January 19. (Action: JCS) (S)
- A paper should be developed for consideration by NSC Deputies on possible air strikes and other scenarios. (Action: NSC) (S)
- The Secretary of State should issue a press statement reinforcing the NATO statement on the massacre in Racak. (Action: State) (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0349



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 19, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 6:30 - 8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

State:

Madeleine Albright

Thomas Pickering

Marc Grossman

Defense:

William Cohen

Walter Slocombe

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

CIA:

George Tenet

John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

George Casey

Scott Fry

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

James Steinberg

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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
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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the mission's full withdrawal. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State should contact her Russian and Norwegian counterparts to ensure their full support for linking Ambassador Walker's retention to the future of the mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Subject to the President's agreement, the USG should begin to develop a consensus within the Alliance on a NATO ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, that would aim to achieve a "status quo ante plus," including:
 - stricter limits on Serb security forces;
 - a KVM with greater authority and assurances of safety;
 - identify and bring to justice those responsible for Racak;
 - cooperation with the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and
 - agreement to elements of autonomy for Kosovo including local police and elections. (Action: NSC, State, DoD)

~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 20, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:

Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Christopher Hill

Defense:

William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

CIA:

George Tenet
John Gordon

[Redacted: P3(b)(3)]

JCS:

Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte
James Baker

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: January 20, 2009


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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should secure NATO support to issue an ultimatum, and be prepared to conduct air strikes, in order to achieve a "status quo plus ante" to include:
 - retaining the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission in place with strengthened authority and guarantees for its security;
 - Milosevic's agreement to proceed with "Track II" of the strategy agreed by the Principals on January 15, including local police and elections;
 - Milosevic's agreement to cooperate with the ICTY in investigating the Racak massacre;
 - Milosevic's commitment to negotiate an interim political settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The NATO ultimatum should be part of an overall political strategy that addresses the Kosovo Liberation Army, options for implementing a settlement, and options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The APNSA and Secretary of State would call appropriate counterparts to make clear that Belgrade reversing its decision to expel Ambassador Walker is necessary but not sufficient to bring the FRY into compliance with its international obligations and commitments to the OSCE and NATO. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(C)~~





Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 22, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

CIA:
George Tenet
John Gordon

Vice President:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

[Redacted: P3(b)(3)]

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Scott Fry

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
phone)

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should secure allied agreement and Russian support for a strategy that combines a NATO ultimatum to Belgrade, a

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Declassify on: January 22, 2009

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strong warning to the Kosovar Albanians and Contact Group "adoption" of an interim settlement in order to prevent violence from escalating and to make progress toward a negotiated solution. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The USG should contribute forces to the "over-the-horizon" Tier III component of the NATO Extraction Force as long as the force's mission is focused solely on extraction. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The USG's public line on the possible commitment of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo (other than for the Extraction Force) should rule out any such commitment in a non-permissive environment and indicate that, in the case of an interim agreement being signed, the Administration would need to consider this question carefully in full consultation with the congress and allies. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: January 29, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

CIA:

George Tenet
John Gordon

Vice President:

Leon Fuerth (via secure voice)
Christopher Bolan

[REDACTED] P3(b)(3)

JCS:

Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Scott Fry

State:

Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
James O'Brien

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

Defense:

William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Miles Lackey

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


- The USG will seek, as part of NATO's "final warning," to give Secretary General Solana the authority to execute air strikes (limited air campaign plus phase one) prior to the end of the Contact Group negotiating period in response to FRY provocations or major non-compliance. The Kosovar Albanians

should also be put on notice that their activities during the negotiating period could affect Solana's decision. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The USG can agree to NATO undertaking contingency planning for a possible NATO-led force to help implement an interim settlement, as long as it is understood that the USG has taken no decisions on such a force or a U.S. contribution. (Action: State/DoD) ~~(S)~~
- Following a meeting with the President on February 1st, Principals will meet with Congressional leadership to consult on the question of a NATO implementation force and a possible U.S. contribution. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 13, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

State:

Madeleine Albright

Thomas Pickering

James Dobbins

Defense:

William Cohen

Walter Slocombe

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

CIA:

George Tenet

P3/(b)(3)

JCS:

Hugh Shelton

George Casey

Scott Fry

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

Christopher Hill (via secure
phone)

White House:

James Steinberg

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte

Miles Lackey

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Any changes to the military chapter of the interim settlement should be cleared in advance by DoD. (Action: State, DoD)

(C)

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Reason for: 1.5 (a) (d)

Declassify on: March 16, 2009

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
- The USG should request the North Atlantic Council to task the NATO Military Authorities to plan for air operations beyond the initial package of strikes already planned in NATO. The planning should include options to respond to: (1) FRY offensive operations in Kosovo and (2) FRY attacks on NATO forces. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The VJ should be warned through military channels of the consequences to the VJ of NATO air strikes, so as to undermine VJ support for launching a military offensive in Kosovo. (Action: DoD) ~~(S)~~

- Assuming that the talks in Paris will not produce an agreed interim settlement, the Principals should reconvene to consider the following two paths:
 - First, using a Kosovar Albanian "yes" and Serb "no" to pose a credible threat of NATO air strikes with the aim of securing Belgrade's acceptance of the interim settlement, while ensuring that NATO is ready to execute air strikes to reduce Belgrade's capability to conduct offensive operations in Kosovo;

 - Second, disengaging from the talks without a concluding threat of air strikes, while keeping NATO ready to respond to further FRY offensive operations or atrocities. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 15, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Samuel Berger

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:

Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:

William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

Chief of Staff:

John Podesta

CIA:

George Tenet

P3/(b)(3)

JCS:

Hugh Shelton
George Casey
Scott Fry

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)
Christopher Hill (via secure
phone)

USDEL IN PARIS:

Greg Schulte (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

White House:

James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
Miles Lackey
James Baker

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: March 16, 2009

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- We will continue preparations for a credible NATO response to a Kosovar Albanian "yes" and a Serb "no" with the aim of securing Belgrade's acceptance of the interim settlement, while ensuring that NATO is ready to execute air strikes to reduce Belgrade's capability to conduct offensive operations in Kosovo. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies should analyze the implications, particularly in light of the upcoming visit of Russian PM Primakov, of: (1) ending the Paris talks this week and moving to air strikes soon after; and (2) taking additional time to build Allied, Congressional and public support for air strikes. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- NATO plans for air operations beyond the initial package of strikes should continue, focusing on options to respond to: (1) FRY offensive operations in Kosovo and (2) FRY attacks on NATO forces. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 16, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

State:
Madeleine Albright
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins

USDEL in France:
Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:
James Steinberg
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
James Baker
Miles Lackey

CIA:
George Tenet

P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- In coordination with the allies and Russia, a strong message should be delivered to Milosevic warning against the beginning of an offensive (Action: State) (S)


- Deputies should prepare a timeline that takes into account the need for (1) deliberate planning for air strikes; and (2) intensive diplomatic efforts in Belgrade. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The first round of air strikes should not be launched without agreement in principle on a substantial follow-on package. With this in mind, Secretaries Albright and Cohen and Chairman Shelton will contact their counterparts to emphasize the need for careful planning and to build consensus for substantial air operations. (Action: State, DOD, JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Secretary Richardson should not accept Milosevic's invitation to visit Belgrade unless Milosevic provides assurance that (1) he will not begin an offensive during or immediately after the trip; and (2) will discuss all implementation issues. Principals will consider further whether the Secretary should carry with him a letter from the President. (Action: State)

~~(S)~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: March 20, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Samuel Berger

JCS:
Hugh Shelton
Edward Anderson
Scott Fry

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

State:
Madeleine Albright
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill (via secure
voice)

Defense:
William Cohen
Walter Slocombe

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
James Baker
Miles Lackey

CIA:
George Tenet

P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Secretary Albright would dispatch Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade to impress upon President Milosevic that NATO military action was imminent and that he faced a stark choice between pulling back his forces and accepting an interim settlement, or the consequences of NATO's action.

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: March 23, 2009

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- Ambassador Holbrooke should seek to secure Milosevic's agreement on two basic points: (1) an immediate cease-fire and (2) reductions in the VJ/MUP and establishment of a NATO-led implementation force based on Chapter 7 of the Rambouillet Accords.
- Ambassador Holbrooke should make clear that we would only be willing to consider changes to other parts of the agreement after acceptance of those two points and if the changes can be agreed by the Kosovar Albanians.
- NSC Principals would need to consider any requests from Milosevic for sanction relief.
- Ambassador Holbrooke should be ready to leave Belgrade immediately if Milosevic launches a major offensive.
(Action: State) (S)
- Agencies should arrange for a series of update phone calls to key Congressional staff the following day. (Action: State, DOD, NSC) (C)



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: August 26, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m.- 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Jim Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

~~P3/(b)(3)~~

OVP:

Rick Saunders
Leslie Davidson

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

State:

Thomas Pickering
Robert Gelbard
Marc Grossman

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Richard Sklar (via SVTS)

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Stephen Flanagan
Len Hawley


Summary of Conclusions

- Deputies reviewed preparations for the September 12-13 elections in Bosnia. They agreed to Ambassador Gelbard leading a Presidential observer mission during the elections. (Action: State) (S)
- Deputies reviewed the continuing crisis in Kosovo and agreed on the need to insist that Milosevic undertake concrete steps to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. (Action: State) (S)

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: August 28, 2008



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- Deputies agreed that Kosovo should be put on the agenda for the forthcoming Summit with President Yeltsin with the objective of increasing pressure on Milosevic and convincing him that he is no longer protected from a military response. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies agreed on the need for an early review of the policy issues being framed by the pol-mil planning in support of potential NATO operations in Kosovo. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies discussed briefly the findings of the Albania policy review. They decided to schedule an additional meeting to complete their consideration and formal approval of the policy review. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: August 26, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania (S)

PARTICIPANTS

Chair:

Jim Steinberg

OVP:

Rick Saunders
Leslie Davidson

State:

Thomas Pickering
Robert Gelbard
Marc Grossman

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:

Richard Sklar (via SVTS)

CIA:

John Gordon

[Redacted: P3(b)(3)]

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC

Greg Schulte
Stephen Flanagan
Len Hawley

It was agreed that: Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies reviewed preparations for the September 12-13 elections in Bosnia. They agreed to Ambassador Gelbard leading a Presidential observer mission during the elections. S.H.
2. Deputies reviewed the continuing crisis in Kosovo and agreed on the need to insist that Milosevic undertake concrete steps to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. S.H.
3. Deputies agreed that Kosovo should be put on the agenda for the forthcoming Summit with President Yeltsin with the objective of increasing pressure on Milosevic and convincing him that he is no longer protected from a military response. NSC, S.H.

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: August 28, 2008


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4. Deputies agreed on the need for an early review of the policy issues being framed by the pol-mil planning in support of potential NATO operations in Kosovo. NSC

5. Deputies discussed briefly the findings of the Albania policy review. They endorsed the general approach reflected in the summary paper, particularly the recommendation to encourage European leadership of the proposed "Friends of Albania" mechanism. They decided to schedule an additional meeting to complete their consideration and formal approval of the policy review. NSC



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20750



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 4, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Donald Kerrick

Chief of Staff:
John Podesta

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

CIA:
 P3(b)(3)

State:
Strobe Talbott
Ronald Asmus
Christopher Hill

AID:
Harriet Babbitt
Michael Mahdesian

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OMB:
Robert Kyle

NSC
Donald Bandler
Greg Schulte
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar
James Baker

USUN:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

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Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: September 4, 2008

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Chris Hill should continue his efforts to achieve an interim agreement between Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The interagency should develop appropriate guidance for the U.S. Mission to NATO on the initiation of the formal force generation process for air operations. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies should review the Kovovo Pre-Settlement Pol-Military Planning document distributed at the meeting and be prepared to reconvene the following week to address whether and under what circumstances the USG should contemplate the use of force, to include the type of force and the possible consequences. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Consideration should be given to convening a Deputies Committee meeting on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 9, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30-4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Harriet Babbitt
William Garvelink

OVP:
Rick Saunders
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
David Weisman
George Casey

State:
Strobe Talbott
Marc Grossman
Julia Taft

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
James Schear

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Stephen Flanagan
James Baker
Eric Schwartz
Len Hawley

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:
John Gordon

~~P3/(b)(3)~~

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Delivery of additional vehicles to the U.S. component of the Kosovar Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) should be expedited.
(Action: DoD) ~~(S)~~

- Contingency planning should be initiated for humanitarian relief (including, for example, air drops) in the absence of a political settlement. (Action: State, AID) ~~(S)~~
- Military planning for the U.S. contribution to the NATO air campaign plan should be expedited. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Principals should consider the question of whether the USG should lead NATO in issuing an ultimatum, to be followed if necessary by the phased employment of airpower, with the objective of compelling Milosevic to take concrete steps to avert a humanitarian catastrophe and achieve a political settlement. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 26, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:

Harriet Babbitt

State:

Strobe Talbott
Marc Grossman

JSC:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Robert Wagner

Defense:

Walter Slocombe (via SVTS)
Bernd McConnell

NSC

Greg Schulte
Mara Rudman
Len Hawley
Nicholas Dowling

OMB:

Robert Kyle

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

SECRET

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (d)
Declassify on: September 28, 2008


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Summary of Conclusions

Subject to confirmation by the Principals Committee it was agreed to:

- Maintain the momentum toward possible NATO air strikes, using the coming week to develop a consensus among allies on the nature and timing of a NATO decision the following week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Rather than seeking a NATO ultimatum, to press NATO to be ready to initiate air operations "at times and places of our own choosing" if Milosevic fails to comply with requirements already established by the UN, NATO and Contact Group. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To use the coming week to finalize military preparations, including by securing NAC authorization to issue an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for all air options, ensuring that targeting is based on the objectives agreed by the PC and developing a "lighter" ground option for implementation of a peace settlement. (Action: State, DoD) ~~(S)~~
- To pursue other ways to leverage Milosevic, including military-to-military contacts with General Perisic. (Action: State, DoD) ~~(S)~~
- To continue to develop further humanitarian relief strategies for best-case and worst-case scenarios. (Action: State, USAID) ~~(S)~~
-  P1(b)(1)
- To explain our objectives and efforts to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To initiate an intensive effort over the coming week to develop Congressional and public support. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 2, 1998
LOCATION: SVTS
TIME: 5:00 - 6:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

OMB:
Robert Kyle

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

CIA:
John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Edward Anderson

NSC:
Greg Schulte

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Starting Monday, Deputies would meet daily via SVTS or in person to oversee diplomatic and military activities related to Kosovo. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be added as necessary. (Action: NSC) (S)
- Deputies agreed on the necessity of briefing Principals and the President prior to NATO issuance of Activation Order. The Joint Staff will develop a briefing to Principals laying out, phase by phase, the military plan of action to support and complement diplomatic efforts. (Action: JCS) (S)

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Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)
Declassify On: 10/3/08

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- Deputies agreed to meet on 5 October to review status of timelines, military planning, as well as strategies for dealing with Allies, UN, UCK, neighboring states, Congress and communications prior to the Principals Committee meeting.
(Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 4, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke

State:
Strobe Talbott
Marc Grossman
Philip Goldberg


White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense: (via SVTS)
Walter Slocombe

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling
Jay Farrar

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The President should call Prime Minister Blair to urge the UK to change its strategy of seeking UN Security Council Resolution to authorize a NATO action despite Russian opposition. (Action: NSC) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: November 11, 2008

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


- State should prepare a paper synchronizing steps to evacuate U.S. citizens from the FRY and close the embassy. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- NATO should be requested to develop a "light" option for implementing a peace settlement. (Action: State, DoD) ~~(S)~~
- USUN should develop a summary for public use of the UNSYG's report on FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199. (Action: USUN) (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 5, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

OMB:
Robert Kyle

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

CIA:
[Redacted: P3(b)(3)]

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Robert Wagner

NSC:
Greg Schulte

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State should seek additional information regarding Yeltsin's phone calls to President-elect Schroeder and United Nations SYG Annan concerning the outcome of Ivanov's meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade. (Action: State) (S)
- State should develop a strategy to counter allied interest in seeking a further United Nations Security Council resolution specifically authorizing force. (Action: State) (S)

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
Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)
Declassify On: 4/05/98

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- The President should be asked to contact PM Blair to discourage the UK from seeking a further resolution and to ask that the UK not link a decision on authorizing air strikes to a decision on generating ground forces to implement a settlement. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- ~~_____ P1/(b)(1)~~
~~_____ P1/(b)(1)~~ OSD should consider options to respond to possible hostage situations. (Action: ~~P1/(b)(1)~~ OSD) ~~(S)~~
- State should produce a paper laying out the timing of steps to be taken to evacuate the U.S. embassy, the U.S. component of KDOM, NGO personnel and other U.S. citizens, including coordination with the evacuation of other foreign nationals. JCS should provide input regarding possible force protection measures for Task Force Able Sentry in Macedonia. (Action: State, JCS) ~~(S)~~
- JCS should develop a range of options for implementing a peace settlement in a permissive environment to be included in a paper for Deputies. (Action: NSC, DoD, State) ~~(S)~~
- State and USUN should develop a public response to the United Nations SYG report on compliance with UNSCR 1199, as well as a public fact sheet on the report. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(S)~~
- State should develop a message with a strong warning to the Kosovar Albanians that while the United States is prepared to galvanize NATO support for the use of force, any provocative actions by armed elements of the Kosovar Albanians will force the Alliance to reconsider its approach. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~




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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20865



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 6, 1998
LOCATION: SVTS
TIME: 7:15 - 7:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
[Redacted] P3(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Anthony Wayne

USNATO:
Douglas McElhaney (via STU III)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Mara Rudman
Anthony Blinken

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States should agree to a Contact Group meeting in advance of the NAC taking up the ACTORD decision as long as it is clear that the Contact Group allies were prepared to approve on ACTORD. (Action: State) (S)
- Following Principal's approval, State should provide the following guidance for Special Envoy Holbrooke in his continued meetings with Milosevic:

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Reason: 1.5(a)(b)(d)
Declassify On: October 6, 2008

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
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-- compliance: insist on full compliance with the requirements set out in the terms of reference for Ambassador Holbrooke's mission;

-- verification: require Milosevic to accept a robust air and ground verification package;

-- durability: require Milosevic to agree to a concrete timetable for negotiations based on Ambassador Hill's draft statement; also make clear that NATO would retain the right to initiate air operations against the FRY if he fails to remain in compliance. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Deputies agreed to meet later to review mission essential task lists and force structure options for a verification mission. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~




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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20871



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 7, 1998
LOCATION: SVTS
TIME: 2:45-3:50 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Harriett Babbitt

OVP:
Richard Saunders

USIA:
Penn Kemble

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Edward Anderson
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USNATO:
Sandy Vershbow (via STU III)


OMB:
David Morrison

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Len Hawley

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State should prepare a cable describing the legal basis for NATO action for dispatch to USNATO and all NATO posts tonight, October 7. (Action: NSC) (S)

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
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a) (b) (d)
Declassify On: October 7, 2008

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
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- The United States should draft a decision sheet authorizing ACTORD and any other associated decisions for deployment of NATO at the appropriate time. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State should ensure that its evacuation planning takes into account UN, allied and friendly diplomatic missions, NGOs and FRY nationals associated with U.S.-sponsored programs. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State should reconfirm the timing of the ordered departure and final embassy closure. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG should refine plan to include a NATO headquarters supporting KVM with a quick reaction force over-the-horizon. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- State should ensure that Russian FM Ivanov gets briefed on Holbrooke state-of-play prior to Ivanov's meeting with Milosevic, and that SecState gets backbriefed on Ivanov's meeting with Milosevic prior to the Contact Group meeting. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 8, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 8:00-9:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Edward Anderson

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

USNATO:
Douglas McElhanney (via
STU III)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Len Hawley
James Baker
David Leavy

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that, subject to affirmation by Principals:

- The United States position regarding the relationship between NATO and the Kosovo Verification Mission would be one of coordination, not control. (Information: All) (S)
- The United States position regarding NATO missions for Kosovo Verification would be that of supporting KVM with administration, logistics, communications and intelligence, as

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Reasons for: 1.5, (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 8, 2008

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well as providing a Quick Reaction Force for in extremis extraction. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~


- NATO would not enforce compliance on the ground. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~
- KVM should provide its own protective security. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~
- The Verification Regime needed to apply where appropriate to the Kosovar Albanians. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will refine the Kosovo Verification Mission papers for approval by Principals. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare an instruction cable to Special Envoy Holbrooke incorporating the KVM papers to define what we want in terms of an agreement from Milosevic. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare a cable to describe to allies the Verification Regime at a higher level of generality. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20885



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 9, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
David Weisman

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow
(via STU III)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Len Hawley
James Baker
David Leavy

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- JCS would brief Deputies at their October 10 meeting on military planning to include national contributions, readiness at ACTORD, and requirements to secure base access. (Action: JCS) (S)
- The United States would encourage the NATO Secretary General to press allies for an ACTORD decision on Monday. (Action: State) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reasons for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 9, 2008

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
- State will resolve with France its position on the requirement for a second decision following ACTORD and prior to execution of air strikes. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- JCS should ask SACEUR to minimize the release of targeting information to allies. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) planning should be further developed and presented to Deputies at their October 10 meeting. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The KVM concept should not be conveyed to NATO and OSCE until Special Envoy Holbrooke has concluded his negotiations with Milosevic. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~
- The Deputies should review plans for International Public Information and PSYOPS. (Action: NSC, State and JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The Deputies should review humanitarian relief planning for various contingencies at their meeting on October 10. (Action: State) (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20886



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 10, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:00 a.m.- 12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
David Weisman
Thomas Wilson
Robert Wagner

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne
Julia Taft


Special Envoy: (via STU III)
Richard Holbrooke

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USNATO: (via STU III)
Alexander Vershbow

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

White House:
Donald Kerrick

CIA:


NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Eric Schwarz
Donald Bandler
Len Hawley
James Metzl
David Leavy

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovo IWG should develop estimated personnel requirements for the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and NATO forward support headquarters. (Action: NSC) (S)


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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reasons for: 1,5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 16, 2008

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- The United States would encourage the NAC to deliberate ACTORD as late as possible on October 12, in order to allow Ambassador Holbrooke additional time for his discussions in Belgrade. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of Defense will make a public announcement of the B-52 deployment to the United Kingdom to increase pressure on Milosevic. (Action: OSD) ~~(S)~~
- The United States will identify possible candidates for the directorship of the Kosovo Verification Mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will contact the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to caution against dissemination of Holbrooke negotiating positions and KVM details. State will also advise OSCE that we will consult with them fully on the KVM once the Holbrooke negotiations are concluded. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- High-level contacts will be made with France and Italy to solicit their support for a NATO decision to authorize ACTORD without the need for a subsequent NAC decision prior to execution. High-level contacts will also be made with Russia to explain the rationale for the NATO decision. (Action: NSC, OVP, State) ~~(S)~~
- State will declare ordered departure for Embassy Belgrade on Sunday evening, October 11, with drawdown to core personnel on Monday, October 12. The decision on timing of Embassy closure will be deferred pending outcome of Holbrooke discussions on Tuesday, October 13. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will instruct USNATO to request that SACEUR be tasked to include a detailed PSYOPS annex in Kosovo military planning. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The International Public Information IWG will refine and provide themes for IPI/PSYOPS to ensure inclusion of operational, domestic FRY, Kosovar and Serb Diaspora messages. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will develop a coordinated timeline for diplomatic, military, humanitarian and KVM events between October 11 through 48 hours following ACTORD. The Kosovo IWG will develop options for imposing penalties for incremental non-compliance. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 11, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:00-3:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

Special Envoy
Richard Holbrooke

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow
(via STU III)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Richard Holbrooke (via STU III)
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Eric Schwarz
Donald Bandler
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar
James Metz
David Leavy

CIA:


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Holbrooke should seek language that:
 - Explicitly commits Milosevic to compliance with UNSCR 1199.
(S)

- Seeks to avoid setting limitations on the duration of the agreement. ~~(S)~~
- Mandates investigation of war crimes without specifically referencing ICTY. ~~(S)~~
- Provides for a NATO forward support element. ~~(S)~~
- Embassy Belgrade would go to ordered departure at 1200 local on October 12. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- SACEUR would arrange for a high-level briefing for incoming German government officials, stressing need for allied solidarity and importance of German Tornado aircraft to the air campaign plan. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Secretary of State would call Italian Prime Minister Prodi seeking strong support for a parliamentary decision on ACTORD and Italian participation. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG would develop for Deputies an options paper providing alternatives to a NATO Forward Element for KVM administrative and logistics support. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 12, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:00-7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO (via STU-III)
Sandy Vershbow
Douglas McElhaney

State:
Marc Grossman
Tony Wayne

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
David Leavy
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN (via SVTS)
Peter Burleigh
Nancy Soderberg

CIA:
P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The U.S. Mission to the United Nations will develop a strategy for handling the Kosovo Verification Mission and NATO Air Verification Mission in the UN. (Action: USUN) (S)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 a,b,d
Declassify on: October 13, 2008

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
- Deputies will provide the NSC with comments on the Draft Master Talking Points. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- The Air Verification Mission paper should be circulated at NATO. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- There was no longer a requirement to send Milosevic a letter spelling out U.S. requirements for compliance with UNSCR 1199. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~
- A message will be sent to all NATO capitals and Russia encouraging them to accept and help implement the verification mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will explore further ways of surging Embassy, KDOM and humanitarian personnel back into Serbia and Kosovo. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Norway should be approached about serving as sponsor nation for the OSCE Verification Mission. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20889



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 12, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson


White House:
Donald Kerrick

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Len Hawley
Mara Rudman

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovo IWG will develop a plan for implementation to stand up the Kosovo Verification Mission, the air verification regime and the quick reaction force as soon as possible. (S)
(Action: NSC)
- The Kosovo IWG will develop a list of essential tasks to be carried out to include press, public diplomacy, and Congressional strategies; dealing with Allies; engaging NATO; engaging OSCE and the way ahead for political settlement. (S)
(Action: NSC)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 13, 2008

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- State will direct Embassy Belgrade to cease further implementation for closing. ~~(S)~~ (Action: State)
- Following agreement, Special Envoy Holbrooke will travel to Vienna to explain the agreement and commitment to compliance to CIO and permanent representatives. ~~(S)~~ (Action: State)



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 12, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:00 - 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

White House:
Donald Kerrick

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Len Hawley
Mara Rudman

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

CIA:
[Redacted: P3(b)(3)]


G.K.

Summary of Conclusions

Deputies met to review the immediate tasks for a Kosovo end game in the event of an agreement being struck in Belgrade. (S)

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovo IWG will develop a plan for implementation to stand up the Kosovo Verification Mission, the air verification regime and the quick reaction force as soon as possible. (S)
(Action: NSC)



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
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- The Kosovo IWG will develop a list of essential tasks to be carried out to include press, public diplomacy, and Congressional strategies; dealing with Allies; engaging NATO; engaging OSCE and the way ahead for political settlement. (S) (Action: NSC)
- State will direct Embassy Belgrade to cease further implementation for closing. (S) (Action: State)
- Following agreement, Special Envoy Holbrooke will travel to Vienna to explain the agreement and commitment to compliance to CIO and permanent representatives. (S) (Action: State)
- Upon the OSCE Chairman-in-Office initialing the agreement, State will lift travel restrictions and return Embassy Belgrade to normal operations. (S) (Action: State)
- ~~USUN will table draft UN Security Council Resolution endorsing and supporting the agreement. (S)~~

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done*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 13, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 10:00-11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Sandy Vershbow (via STU-III)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
David Leavy
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:
John Gordon

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovo IWG will develop benchmarks for measuring FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199 during the 96-hour period following the ACTORD extension. (Action: NSC) (S)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 13, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 6:30 - 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Frederick Barton

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne


White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
David Leavy
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:

 P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- JCS and CIA should prepare a set of specific requirements for VJ and MVP withdrawals for General Clark to use in Belgrade on Thursday, October 15. (Action: JCS and CIA) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare a draft UN Security Council resolution endorsing the OSCE and NATO verification missions. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 13, 2008

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- The Deputy Secretary of State will talk to the NATO Secretary General to determine how NATO will formally accept the air verification mission. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare an information cable on the OSCE verification mission and its implementation for use in OSCE capitals. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Deputy Secretary of State will represent the United States at the Contact Group meeting in Paris on October 14 to stress the need for full compliance and implementation of the verification regime. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will begin discussions with Russia on Russian participation in the OSCE and NATO verification missions. (Action: State). ~~(S)~~
- The issue of the sponsoring nation, size and location of the NATO Quick Reaction Force requires immediate refinement. (Action: State/OSD) ~~(S)~~
- Our objectives should be to achieve a rapid surge in KDOM and humanitarian relief activities prior to the expiration of the 96-hour "pause" on ACTORD execution. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 14, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m.- 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

USAID:
Frederick Barton

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien


Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via
STU-III)

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

CIA:


NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
David Leavy
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States would press for NATO's Secretary General, SACEUR and OSCE's Chairman-in-Office to travel to Belgrade to

sign the agreement on the NATO and OSCE verification missions and to press Milosevic on compliance with UNSCR 1199.

(Action: State) ~~(S)~~


- State should ensure that Ambassador Chris Hill accompanies NATO SYG Solana and OSCE CIO Geremek. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The United States would insist on Milosevic signing the Air Verification Agreement on behalf of the FRY. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Special Envoy Holbrooke will report to the Contact Group via a telephone conversation with FM Vedrine. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The United States would press the NAC and the NATO Military Committee to expedite work on a credible NATO reaction force for the *in extremis* extraction of Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and other specially designated personnel. (Action: State and OSD) ~~(S)~~
- State should prepare a list of incentives and assistance to offer the Kosovars in return for supporting a negotiated political settlement. (Action: State and AID) ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20906



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 15, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
John Donovan

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Harriet Babbitt

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

OMB:
Bob Kyle
Cameron Leuthy

CIA:

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States will seek NAC consensus on an ACTORD extension to October 28. (Action: State and OSD) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 16, 2008

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
- The United States will not support rescinding the ACTORD until we are satisfied that the FRY has completed the withdrawal of security forces. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Following extension of the ACTORD, the United States should be ready to purpose specific requirements for the withdrawal of forces to be met by FRY during the interim period between Friday, October 16 and October 28. (Action: State and OSD) ~~(S)~~
- The United States is willing to accept the UK's draft UNSCR language, providing for "all necessary means," as long as the language is not watered-down and is not interpreted as meaning that a UNSCR is a necessary legal prerequisite for NATO action. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare a paper on FRY democratization for consideration by the Deputies. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The NSC will prepare a paper on the FRY media crackdown for consideration at the next Deputies Committee meeting. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- State will prepare a paper on civil reconstruction in Kosovo for consideration by the Deputies. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will expedite the return of essential employees for Embassy Belgrade, although the return of dependents is not authorized until further notice. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will explore means of expediting the enlargement of the KVM. (Action: NSC and State) ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20911



Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 16, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Harriet Babbitt

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne

White House
Donald Kerrick
Maria Echeveste

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Jamie Metzl
Len Hawley
Jay Farrar

CIA:
[Redacted box containing P3(b)(3)]

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States accepts the NAC's decision to extend ACTORD only to October 27, rather than October 28 [due to the formation of the new German government on the 28.] (S)
(Information: All)

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Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: October 16, 2008

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- The United States will request the NATO Secretary General to send SACEUR back to Belgrade to press for continued withdrawal of security forces. (Action: State and JCS) ~~(S)~~
- The United States will press NATO to expedite planning for a Reaction Force to extract KVM and other designated personnel "in extremis." (Action: State and OSD) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will speed up the surge in the U.S. KDOM component and encourage allies to do the same. (Action: NSC and State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IPI Sub-IWG will examine means of countering FRY's crackdown on the media. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- For the Deputies Committee meeting on October 19, the IWG will prepare a listing of specific tasks, conditions and standards that will insist the FRY meet by October 27. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- State will explore the possibility of opening an Embassy Office in Pristina. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- USUN will press for language in the UNSCR, endorsing the verification regime that retains for NATO its independence to assess compliance and take military action. (Action: USUN and State) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 19, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 - 12:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID
Harriet Bobbitt

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
Marc Grossman
Anthony Wayne
William Walker

USNATO: (via SVTS)
Alexander Vershbow

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Len Hawley
David Leavy
Jay Farrar

OMB
Donald Miller
Cameron Leuthy

CIA:
[Redacted] P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- In his forthcoming meeting with Milosevic, SACEUR should convey the specific requirements with regard to withdrawals of units from Kosovo and return of Kosovo based units to garrison. (Action: JCS) (S)

- State will dispatch a cable to NATO and OSCE capitals encouraging support for enhanced KDOM and describing humanitarian progress on the ground. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will develop a strategy for dealing with the UCK to convey the serious complications resulting from provocations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo IWG will produce a daily fact sheet summarizing indications of progress including IDP returns, humanitarian aid delivered, international contributions and KDOM surge. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- DOD will provide \$5M in funding for U.S. support of KDOM surge and KVM stand-up for the first quarter FY99. State will obtain necessary Presidential waivers to earmark PKO funds from January 1, 1999 and beyond. (Action: State and OSD) ~~(S)~~
- All necessary support will be provided to KVM Director William Walker in the accomplishment of his mission. This will include fixed wing military air support for travel to and from the theater and rotary wing support for travel in the theater provided either by contract or military air support. (Action: DOD and State) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 20, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:00 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Harriet Bobbitt

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
Strobe Talbott
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow


White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Cameron Leuthy

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Eric Schwarz
David Leavy
Jay Farrar

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

CIA:
John Gordon



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Senior members of the Administration at sub-cabinet level would make calls today to key allied capitals in order to

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008


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
stress the need for allied solidarity and alliance determination in the face of possible Serb non-compliance.
(Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~

- State would name a senior-level diplomat as liaison with UCK representatives. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- An unclassified "Kosovo situation report" should be produced daily in order to assist in public information efforts.
(Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- More effort should be devoted to explaining Administration policy to influential members of Congress. (Action: NSC)
~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 21, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Rick Barton

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Antony Blinken
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Mara Rudman

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Cameron Leuthy

CIA:
John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The phased disengagement negotiated by General Clark should be treated as a step toward full compliance; however, our goal

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008


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2009-0983-M
8/24/10 MI

should remain full withdrawal of non-Kosovo based forces from Kosovo. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~

- The United States should strengthen its engagement across the board with the Kosovar Albanians as part of a strategy to contain the UCK and support progress toward a political settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- DoD should consider briefing allies on U.S. military planning to conduct evacuations of international personnel in Kosovo pending the establishment of a NATO force with such a mission. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- Preparations should be made to establish an Executive Committee (ExComm) on Kosovo. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 22, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 9:00 - 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Rick Barton

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Anthony Blinken
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Mara Rudman

OMB:
Cameron Leuthy

CIA:

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States should consider options short of rescinding the NATO Activation Orders for air operations in order to

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008

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
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8/24/12 nos

sustain the pressure on Milosevic. (Action: NSC, State, DoD)

~~(S)~~

- The option should be retained of asking the NATO Secretary General or SACEUR to travel to Belgrade in the coming days to press for further compliance. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The government of Brazil should be discouraged from supporting the Russian approach to a UN Security Council resolution endorsing the NATO and OSCE verification missions. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 26, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow


State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
James Bodner

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Antony Blinken
David Leavy
Mara Rudman

CIA:



JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Hill will remain in Belgrade to press Milosevic on any remaining areas of non-compliance as identified by CIA.
(Action: State, CIA) (S)

- If the FRY is in substantial compliance by October 27th, the United States will seek a NAC decision to leave SACEUR with the existing authority to execute air strikes, should the NAC judge that the FRY is failing to make continued progress toward full compliance, or that there has been a substantial degradation in FRY compliance. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The United States should press key allies and the NAC to make public statements concerning the early activation of the full NATO Air Verification Mission and a NATO force in Macedonia. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 27, 1998

LOCATION: SVTS

TIME: 6:30 - 7:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth

Special Envoy: (via INMARSAT)
Christopher Hill

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James Pardew

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow


Defense:
Walter Slocombe

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
David Leavy

CIA:
John Gordon



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


- KDOM will investigate the status of two VJ units possibly out of compliance. (Action: State) (S)
- State should instruct the U.S. KDOM Director to brief the press prior to the meeting of the NAC to assess FRY compliance. (Action: State) (S)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008

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- USNATO will urge the NATO Secretary General to make a statement to the press following the NAC meeting. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The President and Secretary of State will make press statements following the statement by the NATO Secretary General. (Action: NSC and State) (U)
- State will ask the UNSYG to instruct the UNHCR to step up its efforts to facilitate the return of displaced persons. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will dispatch the Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration to Kosovo by the end of the week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~





Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 27, 1998
LOCATION: SVTS
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy: (via INMARSAT)
Christopher Hill

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

CIA:

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Eric Schwartz
Mara Rudman
David Leavy

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- There exists very substantial FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199, sufficient for NATO to withhold air strikes at this time.
(Information: All) (U)
- Central to continued compliance is UCK restraint. State will develop a focussed strategy for engaging the UCK. The NSC

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008


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will brief influential members of the Albanian-American community. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~

- State will provide a strategy for OSCE ramp-up to implement KVM. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Designated agencies will continue calls to Members of Congress following the NAC meeting to assess FRY compliance. (Action: All) (U)



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 28, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Harriet Bobbitt

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS from
NY)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Donald Bandler
Anthony Blinken
Len Hawley
Mara Rudman
David Leavy



OMB:
Robert Kyle

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States should begin focusing on the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of compliance. To that end, NSC will prepare a compilation of commitments and requirements applicable to VJ and MUP forces remaining in Kosovo.
(Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

- DoD will task the DATT to demarche the FRY General Staff on continuing noncompliance by the VJ. (Action: DoD) ~~(S)~~
- State will direct the Chief of Mission to demarche Belgrade authorities on the continued presence of MUP units normally deployed elsewhere. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



- State will provide its advice on the expansion of U.S. diplomatic presence in Pristina and Podgorica. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- State will consult with the OSCE on its expectations for a NATO extraction force. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The NSC will engage Germany on approving ACTORD for the NATO Air Verification Mission. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Interagency work should begin on a political-military plan for Kosovo implementation encompassing appropriate tasks for verification, security and civil implementation. Priorities should include local police development and quick-impact reconstruction projects. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~
- An Executive Committee on Kosovo will be established in accordance with PDD-56. The ExComm will be co-chaired by the NSC and State. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20959



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 30, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Rick Barton

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
Marc Grossman
Robert Beecroft
James Pardew
James O'Brien

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

Special Envoy: (via STU-III)
Christopher Hill

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Gregory Kaufmann

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow


White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS from
NY)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Len Hawley
Mara Rudman
David Leavy

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Cameron Leuthy

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

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Reason for: 1.5, (a) (b) (d)
Declassify on: November 3, 2008

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2009-0923-1
8/24/10 MS

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovo ExComm will prepare a paper on demining in Kosovo.
(Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State should respond to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and seek to allay his concern about KVM safety.
(Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Politico-military planning and the ongoing negotiations should assume that there will not be a NATO-led military force deployed in Kosovo to assist in implementing a settlement.
~~(S)~~
- The Kosovo ExComm will synthesize the discussion papers on civil implementation, reconstruction, police and democratization into a single set of high priority requirements for the next 20 weeks with particular focus on police, reconstruction, community development and elections. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- Pending Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs approval, the Joint Staff will authorize the redeployment of B-52s from the United Kingdom to home base on Tuesday, November 3. (Action: JCS and DOD) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassador Hill will seek to meet with Milosevic on Monday, November 2 to press for additional MUP withdrawals from Kosovo. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 2, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy: (via STU-III)
Christopher Hill

State:
Marc Grossman
James Pardew
Michael Sheehan

USNATO: (via STU-III)
Alexander Vershbow

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

NSC:
Donald Bandler
Nicholas Dowling
Len Hawley
Keirn Brown
David Leavy
Valerie Guarnieri

CIA:

AID:
Harriet Babbitt
Frederick Barton

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed:

- To approve the Kosovo IWG police paper for immediate implementation. (Action: State and Defense) (S)
- The Special Envoy will report frequently on the progress of negotiations toward political settlement. (Action: State)

(S)
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
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 10, 2008

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2009-0983-1
8/24/10 MS

- To urge the NATO Secretary General to brief Macedonia early in the planning process for an Extraction Force. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To develop a set of priority civil reconstruction projects as an inducement for Kosovar Albanian cooperation in a negotiated political settlement. (Action: State/AID) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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


Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 6, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
 P3/(b)(3)

OVP:
Richard Saunders
Christopher Bolan

AID:
Harriet Babbitt

State:
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien
James Pardew

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:
James Bodner
Joseph Kaufman

Special Envoy: (via Secure
Phone
Christopher Hill

USUN: (via SVTS)
Nancy Soderberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Mara Rudman
Anthony Blinken
Nicholas Dowling
Len Hawley

OMB:
Robert Kyle
John Burnim

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should develop a Kosovo funding strategy incorporating USG funding, international donations and private sector assistance. (Action: State) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 12, 2008


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2009-0983-M
8/24/10 MS

- The Special Envoy should accelerate discussions with the Kosovar Albanians so that the latest settlement draft can be presented to the Serbs by the end of the week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG needs to work with Ambassador Walker, COM Miles and U.S. KDOM Director Byrnes on a proactive strategy to prevent, react to and manage incidents on the ground. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21016



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 17, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 9:30 - 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Bosnia (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
Frederick Barton

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Charles Wald

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew

Special Envoy:
Christopher Hill

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:
Douglas McElhaney

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Cameron Leuthy

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling
Jay Farrar
Philip Gordon
Matthew Gobush
Valerie Guarnieri

CIA:
John Gordon

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State will follow-up with KDOM on reports that VJ soldiers detained the entire population of the village of Ljubidza, near Prizren. (Action: State) (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 17, 2008


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2009-0983-1
8/24/10 Ans

- The humanitarian sub-IWG will press UNHCR for better estimates of numbers and disposition of displaced persons inside Kosovo. (Action: ExComm) ~~(C)~~
- State will prepare an update on the timing of the standup of OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission. USIA and other press offices should publicize associated milestones. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- USG should implement the international donor strategy recommended in the paper provided by State taking advantage of the upcoming U.S.-EU Summit. (Action: State/NSC) ~~(C)~~
- DoD will provide the personnel requested by SACEUR for the headquarters of the NATO Extraction Force in Macedonia. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(C)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 18, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 pm.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon
P3/(b)(3)

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Charles Wald

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne
James O'Brien
Chris Hill (via secure phone)

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

USNATO:
Douglas McElhaney (via secure
phone)

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS/NY)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassadors Hill and Walker should see Milosevic as soon as possible to press for (1) the withdrawal from Kosovo of MUP reinforcements normally based outside Kosovo and (2) the withdrawal of all MUP from Malisevo. The two ambassadors should also continue to press the UCK leadership to exercise

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 24, 2008

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
2009-0935
8/24/10

restraint in Malisevo and elsewhere to facilitate these withdrawals. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Early development of local police to replace the MUP remains a priority. Prior to the election of local Kosovar authorities, newly-constituted local police should be community-based with an appropriate link to the OSCE mission. (Action: State.) ~~(S)~~
- A political settlement should provide for elections as soon as conditions permit and the necessary OSCE implementing structure can be put in place. To achieve the aim of early elections, a thorough voter registration campaign may need to take the place of a pre-election census. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassador Hill should aim to conclude an interim political settlement prior to the end of December. The goal is a settlement endorsed by the Contact Group and agreed by representatives from Belgrade and a broad spectrum of the Kosovar Albanian community. As a fallback, Ambassador Hill should be prepared to press Belgrade to enact unilaterally the contents of the agreement as an elaboration of Milutinovic's 11-point declaration of October 13th. The DC will meet with Ambassador Hill in early December to provide instructions prior to the final negotiations. (Action: State, NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The ExComm should:
 - determine how best to coordinate contacts with UCK representatives;
 - provide an assessment of the full range of inducements and penalties available for dealing with the UCK.(Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 24, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 2:30 pm.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Meeting on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

~~P3(b)(3)~~

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
James Pardew
Lawrence Rossin
James O'Brien

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)
Christopher Hill (via secure phone)

Treasury:
Mark Medish
Loren Dohm

USNATO:
Sandy Vershbow (via secure phone)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
William Wood

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Nicholas Dowling
Matthew Gobush
Philip Gordon

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- We should continue to keep pressure on Milosevic to withdraw excess MUP from Kosovo and to remove all MUP from Malisevo in exchange for reassurances concerning UCK restraint. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: November 30, 2008

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8/24/10 MS

- State should provide Deputies an overview of Kosovo funding requirements, showing the anticipated U.S. share. (Action: State) (U)
- State should support Ambassador Walker in seeking a new Italian candidate for the KVM deputy responsible for police. (Action: State) (C)



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 2, 1998

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

AID:
David Adams

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
George Casey
Charles Wald

State:
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien
Lawrence Rossin

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)
Christopher Hill (via secure
phone)

Treasury:
Richard Newcomb

USNATO:
Douglas McElhaney

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell


White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
William Wood

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Eric Schwartz
David Leavy
Nicholas Dowling
Jay Farrar
Philip Gordon
Matthew Gobush

OMB:
John Burnim


CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should not at this time begin preparations for possible action to interfere with UCK finances. (Information: All) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassador Walker and Shaun Byrnes should continue to work to reduce tensions in Malisevo, first by establishing a KDOM presence in Malisevo and subsequently by seeking the withdrawal of MUP. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The State Department should develop a plan for financing USG activities in Kosovo in the absence of an FY 99 supplemental appropriation. (Action: State) (U)





Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 7, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:00 - 11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke
Christopher Hill

State:
Marc Grossman
James Pardew
Lawrence Rossin

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow

Defense:
James Bodner
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Anthony Blinken
Nicholas Dowling

CIA:
John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Hill should brief the Contact Group on the current draft of the peace settlement and ask them to endorse it as a "basis" for negotiations. The draft should also be presented

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)
Declassify on: December 11, 2008


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8/24/10 m

to the Kosovar Albanians as a "basis" for negotiations rather than as a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition. While Ambassador Hill should try to conclude an agreement by the time of the U.S.-EU Summit, we should not make this a deadline or raise undue expectations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- To prepare for the possibility of an agreement not being reached by the end of the year, the ExComm should examine the feasibility of:
 - preparing to conduct elections as soon as possible after signature of a political settlement early next year;
 - conducting elections prior to a signed agreement with the aim of broadening Kosovar Albanian support for and participation in the negotiating process. (Action: ExComm) ~~(S)~~
- The USG press line on FRY democratization should be reviewed to strike the right balance between promoting political pluralism and supporting our negotiating strategy. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies should review USG strategy toward Montenegro, which should seek to:



- advance democracy and the independent media;
- avoid any perception that the USG is encouraging secession. (Action: NSC, State) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

21116



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: December 22, 1998
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (C)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

~~P3/(b)(3)~~

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Frederick Barton

State:
Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne
James O'Brien

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:
Christopher Hill

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Michael Hurley

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The ExComm will prepare a report on progress in the establishment of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and actions that the USG should take to expedite its deployment. (Action: State, NSC) (C)
- The ExComm will prepare a paper for NSC Principals on USG strategy for preventing a resumption of hostilities in Kosovo while creating conditions for longer-term stability. The strategy should address: the role of KVM; our leverage with

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (b), (d)

Declassify on: December 22, 2008

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
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Belgrade and the UCK; efforts toward a political settlement; and means to create "facts on the ground" through the development of local police, the implementation of community development projects and the conduct of local elections.

(Action: State, NSC) ~~(C)~~

- DOD will proceed with the delivery of additional Highly-Mobile Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to the U.S. component of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) with the understanding that the vehicles will not be drawn down and transferred to the OSCE without DOD's consent. (Action: DOD; State) (U)



~~SECRET~~

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0160



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 11, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee on
Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

AID:
Frederick Barton

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Lawrence Rossin

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy: (via SVTS)
Richard Holbrooke

USUN:
Alan Romberg

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Rodney Bent

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Phillip Gordon
Matthew Gobush

Chief of Staff:
Steven Ricchetti

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- USG strategy must not rely on the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) managing a series of crises like the present one

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a) (b) (d)

Declassify on: January 12, 2009


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2009-0983
8/24/10 MS

involving the seizure of eight VJ soldiers by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The USG should use a successful resolution of the current crisis to convince all sides of their mutual interest in (1) taking steps to avoid further incidents, (2) cooperating with KVM, and (3) pursuing positive change on the ground and an interim political settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The three-track strategy described in the State Department paper should be presented to NSC Principals after being modified to reflect the Deputies' discussion. The revised paper should:
 - describe and assess the following two options for the negotiations: (1) continuing to focus on an interim political settlement; or (2) shift emphasis to pursuing the incremental implementation of a settlement based on the commitments already made by Belgrade;
 - describe and assess two broad options for handling the KLA: (1) seeking to co-opt KLA moderates and isolate the extremists by creating positive change on the ground and offering to bring the KLA into the political process; or (2) threatening to apply negative pressure if the KLA fails to abide by the cease-fire, cooperate with KVM or allow negotiations to proceed; and,
 - identify which elements are currently funded or unfunded. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should consider what strategy to pursue if conditions deteriorate to the point that the three-track strategy described in the State Department paper can no longer be implemented and consideration must be given to the withdrawal of KVM. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~





Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 16, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:00 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Lawrence Rossin

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Michael Hurley

Chief of Staff:
Steven Ricchetti

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The President should immediately issue a statement condemning the massacre at Raçak and calling for justice and compliance. (Action: NSC) (S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: January 19, 2009

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- The USG should press NATO:
 - to issue a statement condemning the massacre at Racak, demanding that the FRY cooperate with an ICTY investigation and comply with its previous commitments to the OSCE and NATO, and recalling that the NATO Activation Orders for air operations remain in effect;
 - to dispatch Generals Clark and Naumann to Belgrade to impress upon President Milosevic the gravity of the situation and NATO's expectations and to report back to the NATO Council;
 - to ask General Clark to brief the NATO Council on his updated planning for air operations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Objectives for NATO air operations should remain basically unchanged, i.e., to degrade Belgrade's ability to conduct repressive security operations in Kosovo. The majority of targets in the Limited Air Response should be in Kosovo, although a number of facilities elsewhere in Serbia that support operations in Kosovo should also be targeted. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- A pol-mil timing plan for air strikes should be developed. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should discourage the United Kingdom from calling for an early meeting of the UN Security Council to avoid undercutting our efforts in NATO. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Congressional leaders and staff should be informed of the current situation and the U.S. response. (Action: NSC, State, DOD, CIA) (U)

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 17, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

Chair:
James Steinberg

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Lawrence Rossin

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:



JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Michael Hurley

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press for Generals Clark and Naumann to travel to Belgrade as soon as possible. (Action: DOD) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should encourage the Russian government to make a public statement condemning Belgrade for the massacre in Racak

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 19, 2009


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and calling for an investigation by the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The USG should use the next day's meeting of the UN Security Council to press for a strong statement condemning the FRY but not to press for adoption of the draft resolution, thus far blocked by Russia, placing additional sanctions on the FRY for its non-cooperation with the ICTY. (Action: State, USUN) ~~(S)~~
- JCS should be prepared to present the updated targets for the Limited Air Response to the President on Tuesday, January 19. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~
- A paper should be developed for consideration by NSC Deputies on possible air strikes and other scenarios. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- The Secretary of State should issue a press statement reinforcing the NATO statement on the massacre in Racak. (Action: State) (U)



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0348



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 19, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Lawrence Rossin

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
James Baker
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Mark Tavlariades

Chief of Staff:
Steven Ricchetti

CIA:
John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The Deputies would recommend to the PC that the USG warn Milosevic that the expulsion of Ambassador Walker as Director

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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
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of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would cause the United States to withdraw its participation from KVM and that this would inevitably lead to the full withdrawal of the mission. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

- The Deputies would propose for the PC's consideration the following four options based on the assumption that Milosevic refuses NATO's demands:

- securing NATO support to issue an ultimatum, backed by the threat of air strikes, in order to strengthen KVM's authority and secure Belgrade's commitment to cooperate with the ICTY and to proceed with "Track II" of our strategy, including local police and local elections;
- committing NATO to deploy a military force to assist the KVM in implementing an interim political settlement once agreed by the parties;
- using air and if necessary ground forces to impose an interim settlement;



- Sub-options of the fourth option should be further developed. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0359



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 20, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Lawrence Rossin


Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:



JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
James Baker
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Mark Tavlarides

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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
Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ambassador Walker should remain in place, despite Belgrade's declaring him persona non grata, as long as Belgrade does not seek to hinder his ability to perform his functions or endanger him physically. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Ambassadors Hill and Pardew should meet with Milosevic and deliver U.S. requirements for "status quo ante plus." (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- USG should use the meeting of Contact Group political directors to build consensus for USG strategy. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- USG should aim to have the NAC agree to issuing an ultimatum on Saturday, January 23. The NAC decision should authorize SACEUR to conduct air operations after 96 hours unless there is a NAC decision to stop these operations. The USG would ask SYG Solana and General Clark to deliver the ultimatum to Belgrade. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Further consideration should be given to options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 20, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg


OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
Lawrence Rossin

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:



JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)


Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
James Baker
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Mark Tavlarides

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:



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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: January 20, 2009

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hind his duty to perform his functions

- Ambassador Walker should remain in place, despite Belgrade's declaring him persona non grata, as long as Belgrade does not seek to ~~remove~~ or endanger him physically. (Action: State)

(S)

hinder his ability to perform his functions


- Ambassadors Hill and Pardew should meet with Milosevic and deliver U.S. requirements for "status quo ante plus."

(Action: State) *(S)*

- USG should use the meeting of Contact Group political directors to build consensus for USG strategy. (Action: State) *(S)*

- USG should aim to have the NAC agree to issuing an ultimatum on Saturday, January 23. The NAC decision should authorize SACEUR to conduct air operations after 96 hours unless there is a NAC decision to stop these operations. The USG would ask SYG Solana and General Clark to deliver the ultimatum to Belgrade. (Action: State) *(S)*


- Further consideration should be given to options for the "day after" air strikes if the ultimatum does not succeed in securing NATO's requirements. (Action: NSC) *(S)*



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0398



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 21, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:30 - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (8)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (Secure
Phone)
Douglas McElhaney (Secure
Phone)

State:

Thomas Pickering
Lawrence Rossin

White House:

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
James Baker
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Mark Tavlarides

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

CIA:

John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should press Allies to endorse a full strategy backing issuance of an ultimatum to the FRY, consisting of:
 - a demand that Belgrade fully comply with its commitments under the October agreements, agree to stricter restrictions on Serb security forces, cooperate with an

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 22, 2009


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ICTY investigation of the Racak massacre, rescind the PNG of KVM Director Bill Walker and fully cooperate with KVM;

- a FRY agreement to accept the Hill-Petritsch draft interim settlement;
- a statement to Milosevic that, unless he agrees to these conditions, NATO will use force to achieve compliance;
- a clear statement to the KLA that NATO will not execute the ultimatum unless the KLA agrees to honor the cease-fire and accept the Hill-Petritsch settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- Deputies agreed that Allied agreement should be obtained and the ultimatum issued as soon as possible. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The January 22 Contact Group Meeting in London should be used to explain the ultimatum strategy to CG nations. With respect to some CG nations' views regarding the necessity of deploying ground forces to implement a cease-fire and/or settlement, Deputies agreed that:
 - the ultimatum be issued as soon as possible, as it represents the best approach to reaching a political settlement;
 - the specific modalities of enforcement of the settlement and possible U.S. participation could be addressed later. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The demarche on an ultimatum to Belgrade should be delivered to NATO capitals on January 22. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- A proposal for a U.S. contribution to XFOR Tier III would be developed. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0482



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 25, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.


SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

 P3/(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien
James Pardew

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (secure
phone)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg
Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Antony Blinken
Mara Rudman
David Leavy
Chuck Allen
Michael Hurley

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Pending the results of Secretary Albright's discussions in Moscow, the USG should continue to press NATO allies for an explicit warning to Belgrade, backed by the threat of air

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: January 25, 2009

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
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strikes, to be issued prior to a Contact Group Ministerial meeting later in the week. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- The text and annexes of the draft interim settlement should be quickly finalized and distributed to allies. The annex on police and security matters should provide for the progressive withdrawal of Serb MUP to be completed within the three-year period of the agreement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 26, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (secure
phone)
Christopher Hill (secure voice)

State:
Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James O'Brien
James Pardew

White House:
Donald Kerrick

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:
Greg Schulte
David Leavy
Chuck Allen
Michael Hurley
Mark Tavlarides

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

CIA:
John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States can agree to a NATO warning to be issued prior to the Ministerial meeting of the Contact Group under

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Reason for: 1.5 (a) (d)

Declassify on: February 4, 2009

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8/24/10 m


the understanding that the Contact Group meeting would be followed by an explicit NATO ultimatum backed by the re-activation of the Activation Orders for the Limited Air Response and Phase I of the Phased Air Campaign. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

- Relevant agencies should prepare to make Congressional up-date calls prior to the NATO warning. (Action: NSC, State, DOD, CIA) ~~(C)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504.

0657



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 1, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John Gordon

P3/(b)(3)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Charles Wald
George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering
Lawrence Rossin
James O'Brien
James Pardew

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Miles Lackey
Matt Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State will circulate to Deputies a paper on the negotiating concept for the upcoming negotiations at Rambouillet on an

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: February 2, 2009

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
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8/21/10 m

interim political settlement for Kosovo. (Action: State)

~~(C)~~

- OMB will prepare a proposed answer to Congressional questions about funding for possible U.S. participation in implementing the military and civil aspects of an interim settlement. (Action: OMB) ~~(C)~~



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0734



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 3, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Charles Wald
George Casey

OVP:

Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)

State:

Thomas Pickering
Lawrence Rossin
James O'Brien

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell


NSC:

Greg Schulte
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley

Deputy Chief of Staff:

Steve Ricchetti

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The United States should consult with NATO allies on the draft military annex to the Kosovo interim settlement. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: February 3, 2009


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2009-0983-m

8/24/10 M.

- The text of the remainder of the draft settlement should be conformed to accommodate the draft military annex. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The United States should delay a decision on when the agreement would enter into force until we have more information on the timing of a possible force deployment. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- The IWG should further assess the timelines contained in the draft annex. (Action: NSC) ~~(C)~~






Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 7, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
 P3/(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Anthony Wayne

U.S. Rambouillet:
Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Alan Romberg

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:
Robert Kyle


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Annex 1A could be tabled at Rambouillet on February 10, after approval at NATO, with the following changes:

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: February 8, 2009



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8/24/10 m

- Accepting proposal to add 1,000 VJ border forces as long as they are command and control/logistics personnel and COMKFOR is authorized to review the situation in 90 days;
- Accepting a flexible 5km security zone;
- Accepting deletion of reference to ICTFY as long as the overall agreement retains reference to compliance with the Tribunal and it is understood that KFOR has the right to assist it in fulfilling its investigative and judicial responsibilities in Kosovo;
- Supporting UK proposal inviting the UN Security Council to endorse the Framework Agreement if necessary to secure support for Annex 1A; and
- The United States will break silence on NATO's Concept of Operations to clarify responsibilities between KFOR and KVM and ensure that key and supporting military tasks are consistent with the January 29 Principals' decision. ~~(S)~~
- Public security issues should be addressed by establishing an Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) under KFOR command and control and clarifying KVM authorities, as well as -- if feasible -- arming monitors and setting up contact teams. Annex 2 should be adjusted as necessary and be ready to table on February 10. ~~(S)~~
- JCS, DOD and OMB should work to refine the projected number of forces that would be required to implement a peace agreement, likely force structure, possible U.S. troop contribution and associated costs for review by Deputies and Principals. ~~(S)~~
- Agencies should analyze the implications of the Roberts Amendment on preparations for a possible U.S. force contribution. ~~(S)~~
- The next round of consultations with the Hill should take place this week and confirm that the decision whether to commit U.S. forces depends upon whether there is a satisfactory peace agreement to implement; provide Congress more information about the force structure, projected U.S. troop contribution and costs; and describe our exit strategy. ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 8, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:30 - 7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via SVTS)
Robert Hall (via SVTS)

State:
Strobe Talbott
Marc Grossman
James Pardew

U.S. Rambouillet:
Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via secure
voice)

USUN:
Nancy Soderberg
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Brian Smith

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley

CIA:

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: February 9, 2009

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Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- We should continue efforts to persuade the French to drop their proposal to specify in Annex 1A that the UN Security Council is invited to authorize the establishment of KFOR. We should also continue to work with the UK and France to find a mutually acceptable alternative formulation. (Action: State)
~~(S)~~
- Provisions concerning the drawdown of VJ/MUP forces and KLA forces should parallel each other as much as possible. (Action: USDEL Rambouillet) ~~(S)~~
- Preliminary estimates suggest a potential U.S. force contribution of just under 4,000 at a cost of \$900 million to \$1.3 billion for FY-99 and \$1.1 to 1.7 billion for FY-2000. Civilian costs would likely constitute another 10 percent.
~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0951



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 9, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

OVP:

Richard Saunders
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James Pardew

U.S. Rambouillet:

Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

White House:

Donald Kerrick


OMB:

Robert Kyle
Brian Smith

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

CIA:

 P3/(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: February 10, 2009

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
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2009-0983-1
8/24/20 MI

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


- The U.S. Delegation to the Rambouillet talks:
 - Should keep open the possibility that OSCE monitors will be authorized to carry arms for self-defense; and
 - May accept the British proposal to invite the UN Security Council to pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and adopting the agreements in the Military Annex, including the establishment of a multi-national military implementation force in Kosovo. (Action: USDEL Rambouillet) ~~(S)~~
- The United States will not break silence on SYG Solana's proposal to hold a force generation conference on February 15. (Action: USNATO) ~~(S)~~



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1059

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 12, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:45 p.m.


SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:



OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Charles Ward
George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James Pardew

U.S. Rambouillet:

Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Alan Romberg

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The decision whether to extend the negotiations another week should be made on February 14. (Action: State/NSC) ~~(S)~~

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason for: 1.5 (a) and (d)


Declassify on: February 16, 2009

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
2004-0963-
8/24/10 M

- Planning for the possibility of a breakdown in the negotiations caused by the Serbian side should begin. Timelines showing the actions that would need to be taken to prepare for NATO action, withdraw KVM and drawdown Embassy Belgrade should be prepared for Deputies consideration. (Action: State and JCS) ~~(S)~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 15, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Donald Kerrick

OVP:

Leslie Davidson

State:

Thomas Pickering
Anthony Wayne
James Pardew

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:

Alan Romberg

CIA:

P3(b)(3)

JCS:

Charles Ward
George Casey

US NATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

U.S. Rambouillet:

Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

White House:

Donald Kerrick

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
James Dobbins
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- We should reinforce with Allies that if Belgrade does not agree to the draft settlement, it will face air strikes.
(Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: February 16, 2009

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
2009-0983-m
8/24/00 m

- We should prepare for consultations with Congress about the possibility of air strikes in the event the talks fail. (Action: All) ~~(C)~~
- The timeline for the breakdown scenario should be revised to reflect discussion on coordinating with Allies, pressing Belgrade, consulting with Congress and pursuing active public diplomacy. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- We should develop options for the post-Phased Air Operations period. (Action: JCS/DOD) ~~(S)~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1127



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 17, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 12:30 - 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Charles Ward
George Casey

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins
James Pardew

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Alan Romberg

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro
P.J. Crowley

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The negotiators should show the Kosovar delegation the military and security annexes as soon as possible. (Action: USDEL Rambouillet) (S)

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
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: February 18, 2009
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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0983-m
8/24/10 ml

- KVM should retain responsibility for civilian implementation of the settlement, but the EU can assume a leading role in economic reconstruction and development. The KVM, EU and KFOR should consult and cooperate in carrying out their respective areas of responsibility. (Action: USDEL Rambouillet) ~~(C)~~
- The reference in NATO's Operations Plan to support for KVM is acceptable. (Action: JCS) ~~(C)~~
- The OSCE should direct the KVM to begin its drawdown on February 19, and Embassy Belgrade should prepare for possibility of ordered departure on February 20. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- JCS should review targets for Phased Air Operations. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 18, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins
James Pardew

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith

CIA:
John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey
Scott Fry

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

USDEL in France:
Greg Schulte (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)


White House:
Donald Kerrick

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The Kosovar Albanian delegation should be reassured that the draft agreement meets its essential concerns, particularly as the deadline approaches. (Action: USDEL in Rambouillet) ~~(S)~~
- The purpose of an air campaign against Serbia should be to diminish its capacity to use force against the Kosovar Albanians. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 19, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:30 - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
Scott Fry
George Casey

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Anthony Wayne

U.S. Rambouillet:
Greg Schulte (via secure voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

Special Envoy:
Christopher Hill (via secure
voice)

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Michael Daniel


NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
James Baker
Miles Lackey
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

CIA:
John Gordon


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The timing of the KVM drawdown should depend on the judgment of Ambassador Walker. (Action: State) (U)
- We should seek agreement at the NAC on a follow-up package to an air campaign intended to deter Serb repression against Kosovo Albanians. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 20, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

OVP:
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via secure
voice)

State:
Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Anthony Wayne

U.S. Rambouillet:
Greg Schulte (via secure voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:
Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

White House:
Donald Kerrick

OMB:
Robert Kyle

NSC:
Miriam Sapiro
James Baker
Miles Lackey
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro
P.J. Crowley


CIA:
[Redacted] P3/(b)(3)

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Ordered departure from Belgrade should begin on February 22 if it appears that only the Serb side will not agree to the text. In such case, KVM withdrawal would begin on February 23.
(Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The Executive Committee should examine options for addressing a situation in which both sides do not accept the agreement.
(Action: All) ~~(S)~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 22, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 8:30 - 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
video)

OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

State:

Thomas Pickering
James Pardew
Anthony Wayne

USDEL in France:

Greg Schulte (via secure
voice)
Christopher Hill (via secure
voice)
James O'Brien (via secure
voice)
Lawrence Rossin (via secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Bernd McConnell

USUN:

Peter Burleigh (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

White House:

Donald Kerrick

OMB:

Robert Kyle

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
David Leavy
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro
P.J. Crowley

CIA:

[Redacted] P3/(b)(3)

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Embassy Belgrade and USDEL Rambouillet should protest in the strongest terms our concern about incidents directed against KVM. (Action: State) ~~(C)~~
- Options for addressing a negative answer from both sides on the proposed settlement should be presented to Principals for decision and include (1) close down Rambouillet and limit our engagement; (2) close down Rambouillet and have Chris Hill return to the region; (3) continue Rambouillet; and (4) change terms of negotiation. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~
- Given concern about a possible Serb offensive, a proposal to approach Milosevic with an offer to crackdown on sources of KLA funding and weapons in exchange for his drawing down to the VJ and MUP levels specified in the October 1998 agreements should be presented to Principals for review. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 24, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.


SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:



OVP:

Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:

Thomas Pickering
Marc Grossman
James Pardew
James Dobbins

USNATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufman

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro
Miles Lackey
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Chuck Allen
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: February 25, 2009

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
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2009-0483-11
8/24/10 M

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:



- State would prepare a detailed gameplan for the next few weeks designed to achieve the following objectives: (1) keeping the Kosovars on board; (2) bringing the Serbs along; (3) getting Allied and Russian support; and (4) preventing an outbreak of hostilities. It is particularly important to develop new ways of increasing pressure on Serbia. (Action: State) (S)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: February 26, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
James Steinberg

CIA:
 P3(b)(3)

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

JCS:
Joseph Ralston
George Casey

State:
James Dobbins
James Pardew

USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

White House:
Donald Kerrick

USUN:
Alan Romberg

NSC:
Greg Schulte
Miles Lackey
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:
Robert Kyle
Bryan Smith


Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:


- The USG should press for early agreement on an interim settlement for Kosovo in accordance with the overall approach

contained in the State Department paper on "Getting to March 15." This should include:

- using Senator Dole's visit to Kosovo, a KLA visit to Washington and outreach to Albanian-Americans to help confirm Kosovar Albanian agreement to the interim settlement prior to March 15;
- continuing to put pressure on Belgrade, including through the dispatch of senior-level envoys, independent of the position of the Kosovar Albanians; and
- continuing to link the threat of air strikes to both agreement on an interim settlement and FRY compliance with its October commitments. (Action: State, DOD)



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 2, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 1:15-2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

JCS:

Edward Anderson

John Donovan

OVP:

Richard Saunders

Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

State:

James Dobbins

James Pardew

Special Envoy:

Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)

Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte

James Baker

David Leavy

Miles Lackey

Michael Hurley

Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Robert Kyle

Bryan Smith

CIA:

John Gordon

P3(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

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Reason for: 1.5 (a, d)

Declassify on: 3/2/09

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8/24/10 MS

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should lay the groundwork for a NATO statement indicating that Serb intransigence at Evreux would provide justification for air strikes. At the same time, the USG should ensure that NATO retains Serb non-compliance with its October commitments as a separate justification for air strikes, while signaling that agreement to the interim settlement is the best way for Belgrade to come into compliance. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should continue to insist on a NATO-led implementation force. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- The USG should ensure that Contact Group allies take a common approach in dealing with the FRY, using the following day's "quad" meeting in Brussels and contacting the German MFA prior to Foreign Minister Fischer's planned trip to Belgrade. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- NSC Principals will need to consider how to notify Congress prior to the deployment to Macedonia of U.S. personnel in NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 8, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

James Steinberg

CIA:

John McLaughlin

OVP:

Richard Saunders
Christopher Bolan

JCS:

Joseph Ralston
Edward Anderson

State:

Thomas Pickering
James Dobbins
James Pardew
James O'Brien

USNATO:

Alexander Vershbow (via secure
voice)

Defense:

James Bodner
Joseph Kaufmann

White House:

Donald Kerrick

USUN:

Nancy Soderberg (via SVTS)
Alan Romberg

NSC:

Greg Schulte
Miriam Sapiro
Miles Lackey
Michael Hurley
Chuck Allen
Matthew Vaccaro

OMB:

Bryan Smith

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- USNATO should work with key allies on March 9 to lock in agreement on a strategy for dealing with Serb intransigence;

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)
Declassify on: March 9, 2009

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for presentation to the NAC on March 10. (Action: USNATO)

~~(S)~~

- State should develop a strategy for addressing the implications of a "no" from the Kosovar Albanian side. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- We should recommend that Secretary General Solana make a statement concerning Kosovo at the beginning of his March 12 visit to the United States. (Action: State/USNATO) ~~(S)~~

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1917

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 17, 1999

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:

Donald Kerrick

JCS:

Edward Anderson

George Casey

OVP:

Leon Fuerth

Leslie Davidson

USNATO:

Douglas McElhaney (via secure
voice)

State:

James Dobbins

James Pardew

USDEL in France:

Lawrence Rossin

James O'Brien

Defense:

Walter Slocombe

Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:

Miriam Sapiro


James Baker

Miles Lackey

P.J. Crowley

Matthew Vaccaro

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- State would develop a diplomatic strategy that encompasses the closure of peace talks in Paris. (Action: State) (S)
- State and Defense would develop guidance for USNATO on our strategy and timetable. (Action: State, DOD) (S)

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Reason for: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify on: March 18, 2009


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2009-0983-m

8/24/10 ml


- There are benefits to continuing the Paris talks until March 19, although we would defer the decision to the Co-Chairs. (Action USDEL Paris) ~~(C)~~



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1944



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: March 18, 1999
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting
on Kosovo ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair:
Donald Kerrick

JCS:
Edward Anderson
George Casey

OVP:
Leon Fuerth
Leslie Davidson

Special Envoy:
Richard Holbrooke (via SVTS)

State:
James Dobbins
James Pardew


USNATO:
Alexander Vershbow (via secure
phone)

Defense:
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kaufmann

NSC:
Greg Schulte
David Leavy
Michael Hurley
P.J. Crowley
Chuck Allen
Mark Tavlarides
Matthew Vaccaro

USUN:
Alan Romberg

CIA:



Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The USG should seek a NATO statement underscoring its preparedness to undertake military action following the adjournment of the Paris peace talks. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

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- Ambassador Vershbow should make clear to the NATO allies that the USG was not seeking to determine the timing of possible NATO air strikes based on the visit of Prime Minister Primakov. (Action: State) (C)