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## **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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
Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (b)(c)(d) or Section 3.5(c) of E.O. 13526 or P6/(b)(6) of the PRA/FOIA.

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



November 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*

FROM: JOSEPH MARTY *JM*

*V POTUS*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for POTUS Call to Crown Prince  
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

Attached at Tab I is the briefing memorandum for the President for his phone call with Crown Prince Abdullah.

There is currently some confusion about what Cohen plans to ask of Abdullah. We had understood that both OSD and JCS wanted to press hard for using strike aircraft based in the Kingdom for an attack on Iraq. But the initial points we've seen from OSD (Tab II) appear to ask only for use of support aircraft based in the Kingdom

[Redacted] P1(b)(1)

[Redacted] P1(b)(1)

The President's talking points don't need to address this question. But we need to have a clearer idea about what the Pentagon wants before Cohen gets on the ground in Riyadh.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Points to be made
- Tab II Cohen Points

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PER E.O. 13526

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b), (d)

Declassify On: 11/02/08

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

*2009-1292-M*  
*11/10/10 M*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH  
DATE: November 3, 1998  
LOCATION: TBD  
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
LEON FUERTH

I. PURPOSE

To prepare Crown Prince Abdullah for Secretary Cohen's visit, and to reinforce Cohen's message that Saudi Arabia needs to join us in a forceful response to the latest Iraqi challenge.

II. BACKGROUND

The President last spoke to Abdullah October 25 after the Wye Agreement was signed. When the President and Abdullah spoke at the White House September 24, the President pressed him to consider allowing us to use combat support planes based in the Kingdom if a strike was necessary on Iraq.

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)

You returned to this issue in your one-on-one after lunch. The Crown Prince agreed that existing arrangements first agreed to between King Fahd and Secretary Perry and then reaffirmed by the Crown Prince to Secretary Albright would remain in effect

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be made

2009-1212-m  
11/10/10 MS

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA



- We spoke just a week ago about a very pleasant outcome: the Wye River Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Despite some difficulties, I am pleased that this is still on track.
- Now we are faced with a new challenge: Iraq's decision to further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
- I have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of this challenge.
- He will convey my view that we must respond convincingly to Iraq's latest actions.
- Iraq's decision to further restrict and inhibit the UN inspectors is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and also of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in February.
- The Security Council has been clear and unequivocal in rejecting Saddam's actions. The statement issued on Saturday demonstrates that the Council is united.
- Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Security Council. Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime. If he does, he will become an even greater threat to his neighbors.
- Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many times in the past. I am determined to take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
- I believe it is now imperative that we begin to take the decisive action necessary to change the Baghdad regime. It will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in earnest now.
- The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a response to the current challenge and the necessary first step in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b), (d)


Declassify On: 11/02/08



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**PER E.O. 13526**

2009-1292-M  
11/10/10 M

- You told me last month in the Oval Office that you would support military action if diplomacy failed.
- You know well how actively we pursued the diplomatic route over the last three months since Saddam stopped cooperation with the UN.
  - We supported a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance, but Iraq rejected a letter from the Council last week that laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
  - That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he rejected it.
- The Security Council has no further diplomatic tools available.
- I know we can count on you to support this effort.
- If after meeting with him you wish to talk about these issues more, I will be available.



SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA



- We spoke just a week ago about a very pleasant outcome: the Wye River Agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Despite some difficulties, I am pleased that this is still on track.
- Now we are faced with a new challenge: Iraq's decision to further restrict UN inspectors' activities inside Iraq.
- I have asked Secretary Cohen to see you urgently because of this challenge.
- He will convey my view that we must respond ~~forcefully~~ <sup>convincingly</sup> to Iraq's latest actions.
- Iraq's decision to further restrict and inhibit the UN inspectors is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and also of what Iraq committed to Kofi Annan in February.
- <sup>input</sup> Iraq's action is a <sup>convincing</sup> direct challenge to the Security Council. Without a ~~forceful~~ response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
- <sup>convincing</sup> If the UN cannot monitor Iraq's weapons programs, Saddam can rapidly rebuild his arsenal, and again become a grave threat to his neighbors. An Iraq led by Saddam with money and weapons is not the neighbor you want.
- Your Royal Highness, we have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many times in the past. I am determined to take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
- I believe it is now imperative that we begin to take the decisive action necessary to change the Baghdad regime. It will take time to get rid of Saddam but we should start in earnest now.
- The plan that Secretary Cohen will brief to you is both a response to the current challenge and the necessary first step in a long-term plan to get rid of Saddam.

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Reason: 1.5(b), (d)

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4/10/10 M

- You told me last month in the Oval Office that you would support military action if diplomacy failed.
- You know well how actively ~~we~~ <sup>Since Saddam stopped cooperation with the UN</sup> pursued the diplomatic route over the last three months.
- We supported a comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance, but Iraq rejected a letter from the Council last week that laid out in generous terms how that review would work.
- That letter was a diplomatic way out for Saddam, and he rejected it. <sup>know we can count on you to support this effort</sup>
- ~~I hope you will give Secretary Cohen a positive response.~~ <sup>now we can count on you to support the effort</sup>
- If after meeting with him you wish to talk about these issues more, I will be available.
- <sup>The Sec Council has no further diplomatic tools available</sup>

diplomatic



11-4-98

7470

~~SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1998

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT CHIRAC

DATE: November 4, 1998

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *B*

98 NOV 3 PM 9:49

I. PURPOSE

To urge Chirac to accept the need for a firm and relatively prompt response to Iraq's decision to further limit UNSCOM's operations.

II. BACKGROUND

While the French have pushed for a Comprehensive Review and potential carrots for Iraq, our willingness to rely on Council actions as well as Iraq's missteps have made it more difficult for France to champion Iraq's cause. France has joined the Council in denouncing Iraq's actions since August, and has also spoken out against this most recent Iraqi violation. While French diplomats have intervened with Baghdad and pressed us to offer face-savings means for Iraq, the French have also expressed great irritation with Iraqi tactics, especially the recent decision to further limit UNSCOM's operations.

Nonetheless, Chirac may well want to offer limited incentives for the Iraqis to come back into compliance, and will oppose use of force as a self-defeating exercise. He will very likely feel a good deal less urgency about responding than we do.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be made

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Reason: 1.5 (d)

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
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


POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE


- Appreciate the clear message your government has sent to Iraq on UNSCOM. Your public statements, and decision to recall your ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view expressed by the Security Council last Saturday. Hope we can formalize this by approving the UK draft resolution now before the Council.
- The offer of a comprehensive review provided Saddam a real chance to show that he intended to meet his obligations. I think we all agree that this affords him a real opportunity to move forward. The only conclusion we can draw from the fact Saddam rejected our proposal is that he wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and missile programs.
- Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Council. Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
- We have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many times in the past. I believe we are left with no alternative except to respond with force to his challenge.
- Jacques, I want to stress that I believe we should act expeditiously to respond to this challenge.
- We have been negotiating patiently since he suspended cooperation in August. Unfortunately, Saddam has rejected all reasonable proposals. If he can effectively shut down UNSCOM with impunity, there must be a strong response or the credibility of the Security Council will be shattered.
- I have called Tony Blair, who shares this view.
- I want us to be together on this -- defending the integrity of the Security Council's decisions.
- (If asked) Can't you show more flexibility on paragraph 22 (concerning lifting the oil export sanctions if he complies with UNSCOM)?



- I think our offer on the comprehensive review, which you took the lead on, offers Saddam a reasonable way forward. As long as he has rejected it and is out of compliance, it would send all the wrong signals for us to offer new concessions. If he's serious about compliance, he ought to let UNSCOM do its work.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



If he wants  
to be hit  
why did he  
move Republican  
bonds to all  
Shia cities last  
winter? - he's

a fraud a  
~~big~~ strike  
will cause  
uprising. If  
he wants to be  
hit, only pinprick,  
not big strike



2009-12-20  
11/16/10 M

if his people  
see that

~~we are~~

world is united

when we  
act,

see how  
isolated

he is





I can go over  
SAT to discuss  
with him  
and/or ~~Chen~~  
Lorette

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE

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- Appreciate the clear message your government has sent to Iraq on UNSCOM. Your public statements, and decision to recall your ambassador, helped underscore the unanimous view expressed by the Security Council last Saturday.
- The offer of a comprehensive review provided Saddam a real chance to show that he wanted to meet his obligations. The only conclusion we can draw from the fact he rejected our proposal is that Saddam wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and missile programs.
- Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Council. Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
- We have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein <sup>so many</sup> times in the past. We should resolve to respond <sup>directly</sup> to his challenge.

- Jacques, I want to stress <sup>that I believe we should act expeditiously</sup> ~~the sense of urgency I feel about~~ responding to this challenge.
- ~~We want to be in a position to use force if necessary as soon as possible. I do not want another big buildup which allows Saddam to back down at the last minute only to precipitate another crisis in a few months time.~~ <sup>We have been negotiating since August. Unfortunately, Saddam has rejected all reasonable proposals. If he can effectively</sup>




- I have called Tony Blair who shares this view.
- I want us to be together <sup>on this</sup> ~~in~~ defending the integrity of the Security Council's decisions.

~~There must be a strong response or the credibility of the UNSC will be shattered.~~

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
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT CHIRAC OF FRANCE

7470  
*Make one page*

- Baghdad's decision to restrict UN inspectors' activities once again places Iraq in direct violation of its obligations to the international community.
- Iraq's further restriction of the UN inspectors violates UN Security Council resolutions and also the MOU that Iraq signed with Annan in February.
- It is clear now that Saddam really wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and missile programs.
- The Security Council has clearly rejected Saddam's actions. Saturday's Council statement demonstrates that the Council is united. P1(7)(b)(1)
- Iraq's action is a direct challenge to the Council. Without a convincing response, we risk making the Council irrelevant and emboldening Saddam to further challenge the sanctions regime.
- We have faced these challenges from Saddam Hussein too many times in the past. I am determined to take decisive action this time to respond to his challenge.
- Jacques, I want to stress the sense of urgency I feel about responding to this challenge.
- We want to be in a position to use force if necessary as soon as possible. I do not want another big buildup which allows Saddam to back down at the last minute.



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
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- I will also call (have called) Prime Minister Blair.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7552

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Chirac of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
French President Jacques Chirac

Notetakers: George Chastain, Frank Jarosinski, Jenny McGee, Jim Smith

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 4, 1998, 3:08 p.m. - 3:31 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Bill? Ah, Bill, congratulations. We are so glad in France for the historic success that you had yesterday. Congratulations. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Chirac: You cannot imagine how glad we are for you, Hillary, and the United States. The French press is extremely positive. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Chirac: It was a great feat. This hasn't been done for a very long time. (U)

The President: That's right, it's been a long time. (U)


President Chirac: That is justice, and I want to tell you from the bottom of my heart. Congratulations and please say the same to Hillary. I'd like to congratulate you also, as I wrote to you in the letter, for the Wye River agreement. We were very glad for your personal success in Wye. (U)

The President: Thank you, Jacques, we're going to have to work hard, all of us. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/05/08



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11/10/10 M


President Chirac: I'm going to use a translator now, since my English is not very good. (U)

The President: Your English is wonderful. I know you have to go to a dinner, so I'll be brief. (U)

President Chirac: No problem. (U)

The President: I appreciate the clear message your government has sent to Iraq about UNSCOM -- the public statement, the decision to recall your ambassador -- they helped to underscore the unanimous view of the Security Council. The offer of a comprehensive review, which you took the lead on, gave Saddam a chance to show he intended to meet his obligations. It would have afforded him a real opportunity to move forward, and I can only conclude he wants to force the Council to lift sanctions without giving up his WMD and missile programs. We have been negotiating patiently with Saddam since he suspended cooperation in August. I believe we now have to act promptly to respond to this challenge, because if he can shut down UNSCOM with impunity, there must be a strong response, or the credibility of the Security Council will be damaged. I know you've talked to Tony Blair about this, and I hope we can formalize the approval of the UK draft resolution that is now before the Security Council. And I also think we have to be prepared to use force, and we have to be together on it. (C)

President Chirac: Yes, but Bill, first of all I want to say the UK proposal is a very good one. We concur with it, and I think we will be able to reach agreement for unanimous adoption. Secondly, I'd like to share with you my analysis of Saddam's behavior. Naturally, some of this is just provocation; he can't resist that, and it's naturally directed at the American President and the Security Council. But the real problem is elsewhere. At the present time, the situation with the Iraqi people is deteriorating, so far as Saddam is concerned; in other words, he is beginning to be criticized. The people are suffering more and more in a material sense, and they're beginning to blame Saddam. The way Saddam thinks is the best way to regain control of the people is to pretend to be a martyr. And in the same way, insofar as Arab public opinion is concerned, he doesn't seem to be supported anymore. So as I see it then, what he's trying to do is play the martyrdom card. What he's thinking is that if there is a military strike against him, he'll regain control of those people and public opinion in the Arab world. Furthermore, he hasn't yet sent away the UNSCOM teams. And if there is a military strike, naturally,



they would all be expelled and he'll be able to go about his business as calmly as he likes. So it's clear that we find ourselves in a rather peculiar position. We have nothing to give, nothing to offer. We can't change anything in our position, which must be a position of great firmness. And this time we are unanimous, including the Russians and the Chinese. So there's nothing to negotiate. At the same time, it is in Saddam's interest to be the victim of a military strike. Which is why this time the problem is going to be very hard to resolve. We sent a two-fold message: first, we recalled our ambassador, which is a very strong message. We do it rarely, and we haven't done it here before. Second, we communicated through Tariq Aziz the risk of military action was clear, and that the world was unanimous with respect to sanctions. But in truth I'm afraid we are working here with an unarmed gun. I think it's in his own interest to be bombed. (C)

The President: How is he better off? You think even though it wouldn't help him get the sanctions lifted, the people would in their adversity be more supportive of him? (C)

President Chirac: Yes, naturally, of course. That explains his attitude. (C)

The President: But, on the other hand, that puts us in the position of saying there's no action he can't justify in defiance of the Security Council. It is a difficult problem. (C)

President Chirac: Well, I share that view completely. I'm saying indeed it's a difficult situation. He wants two things today: he wants to regain control of his own people, and look like a martyr in the eyes of Arab public opinion. And secondly, he wants to get rid of UNSCOM once and for all, and the IAEA, and he wants to be able to go about his business as he pleases. And that's why we're in somewhat of a trap here. We have nothing to offer. You know that I've always been in favor of lifting the sanctions. [REDACTED] P1/(b)(1)

[REDACTED] P1/(b)(1) After the position Saddam has taken, we can't give him anything at all. Unless we want to send Tomahawks, with all the danger and risk that would represent.

The President: It seems to me that if his people see the world is united when we act, they will see him isolated. It would not

help him with his people; it only helps if his strategy is to divide people. (C)

President Chirac: Well, we are not, of course, divided. Perhaps in the past there might have been divisions, but today we are not divided. I am completely certain that public opinion would support him. They'd rally around, and that's why he's doing what he's done. Because otherwise, the initiative he's taken would be stupid. He's a man who doesn't know anything about the outside world, but he knows his own country very well.

(C)  
The President: But we still are back to the main question. What happens to countries when they pledge to complete an inspection regime and don't do it? I mean, he was very close to being certified in the atomic area. Why did he do it, because he thought the sanctions would never be lifted, or not soon enough, or perhaps he actually does have some WMD capability?

(C)  
President Chirac: His incomprehensible and really stupefying actions can only be explained with regard to the internal situation in Iraq. In any case what's clear is there is nothing more we can give. We should give full powers to Kofi Annan and adopt the UK draft in the Security Council unanimously. We should then authorize Kofi Annan to make one last demarche to attempt to get Saddam to reverse what he's done. I think that then we have to wait and see what Saddam's reaction will be, but I fear very much there won't be any change. What he wants is to regain his influence over his own people, to regain control, and go about rearming. (C)

The President: Well, I think that you have a good grasp of this. I wonder if it would be helpful if Sandy Berger would come over this weekend and discuss it with Levitte. (C)

President Chirac: Bill, I think the plan is for Sandy Berger to come with John Holmes, the advisor to Tony Blair, and the three of them will be able to discuss together. This is already the plan. (C)

The President: That's good. All right, we'll stay in close touch, and we may have to talk again early in the week. (C)

President Chirac: Well, yes, I'm at your entire disposal as far as that is concerned, and I want to tell you in France how very

glad we are for your great success, and tell Hillary how happy we are. And bravo for Wye Plantation. (U)

The President: Thank you, Jacques, I really appreciate the kind words you have said to others, as well, about what happened at the Wye Plantation. If we can get the process kicked off and the final status talks started, then we should be working with the EU as well, to build up the economy of the Palestinians, so they will have every opportunity to keep it going. (U)

President Chirac: Yes, I agree. (U)


The President: Thank you, Jacques. Goodbye, have a good dinner. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you, Bill. I'll talk to you soon on the phone. (U)

The President: Okay, goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



635



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY RIYADH

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.
2. BEGIN TEXT.

YOUR HIGHNESS:

I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP THANKS FOR THE WARM RECEPTION AND VALUABLE SUPPORT YOU PROVIDED TO SECRETARY COHEN DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA. I AM HEARTENED BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE STAND TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING THE CONTINUED THREAT POSED TO THE REGION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR. THROUGH OUR JOINT EFFORTS, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL OVERCOME THIS AND OTHER CHALLENGES IN THE REGION AND PEACE WILL TRIUMPH.


I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS OF CONGRATULATION, EXPRESSED BY PRINCE BANDAR, OVER THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS. I TAKE THIS AS A STRONG SIGN THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE PLACE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR EFFORTS TO FURTHER PEACE AND PROSPERITY WORLDWIDE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT


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2004-1292-m  
11/10/10 m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



November 6, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*

FROM: GWENYTH TODD *GT*

SUBJECT: Message to Crown Prince Abdullah

Attached at Tab I is a short message from the President to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah thanking him for his continued support.

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah met with Bill Cohen this week P1(b)(1)

P1(b)(1)

P1(b)(1) Separately, Prince Bandar conveyed Crown Prince Abdullah's congratulations over the results of Tuesday's elections. P1(b)(1)

P1(b)(1)

We would like to see this go out today if at all possible.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of the cable at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Cable to Crown Prince Abdullah

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/06/08

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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PER E.O. 13526


2009-1292-m

11/10/10 m

Weiss, Andrew S.

From: WHSR  
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 1998 4:55 AM  
To: Weiss, Andrew S.  
Subject: \*\*\* NO SUBJECT FOUND \*\*\*

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~  
DTG: 140557Z NOV 98  
MSGTO: P1(b)(1)  
ORIG: WHITE HOUSE  
PREC: FLASH  
SSN: 1072  
TOR: 981114010414 M3557719



~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS  
QQQQ

MOSCOW FOR THE AMBASSADOR

AMBASSADOR: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IMMEDIATELY. ALSO, A COPY CAN BE PASSED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS,

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER ABOUT IRAQ AND AM REPLYING PROMPTLY BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP.

YOUR LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT WE AGREE ON A CRUCIAL POINT: SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS CREATED THIS CRISIS. HE HAS HAD IT WITHIN HIS POWER TO END IT PEACEFULLY. HE COULD DO SO BY RESCINDING HIS DECISION TO CEASE COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND BY COMPLYING WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS, INCLUDING IN YOUR OWN LATEST LETTER TO HIM, TO PERSUADE HIM TO TAKE WHAT WE BOTH SEE AS THE NECESSARY STEPS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS, YET AGAIN, REFUSED TO DO SO. HE IS PLAYING FOR TIME. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN HIS PROGRAMS TO DEVELOP AND ULTIMATELY TO DEPLOY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD CONSTITUTE A DIRE THREAT TO PEACE. AFTER MUCH CAREFUL THOUGHT, I ALSO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT HE WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO ATTAIN HIS AMBITION IF WE DO NOT ANSWER HIM DECISIVELY.

I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD, BORIS, ABOUT THE RISKS THAT ATTEND THE USE OF FORCE. YOUR OWN COUNSEL WEIGHS HEAVILY WITH ME. BUT SO DOES THE PROSPECT OF SADDAM'S SUCCEEDING IN HIS CAMPAIGN TO FLOUT INTERNATIONAL WILL AND TO DIVIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN SO DOING, HE SEEKS ALSO TO DIVIDE THE U.S. AND RUSSIA.

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE VENTURES TO WHICH YOU AND I HAVE DEVOTED SO MUCH OF OUR OWN ENERGY, I WILL ENDEAVOR, AS I HAVE FOR THE LAST SIX YEARS, TO SUSTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE WORK YOU AND I HAVE DONE TOGETHER. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOU TO DO THE SAME. OUR ACHIEVEMENTS ARE TOO VALUABLE, AS IS THEIR PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE, FOR US TO LET SADDAM PUT THEM AT RISK. I HOPE IN THE DAYS, WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, WE CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WHERE WE AGREE AND TO

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MANAGE WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE HAVE.


SINCERELY,

BILL

DECL: X1, X4

#1072

NNNN





IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COMM COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HACHIGIAN KERRICK RICEE SIT  
STEINBERG SUTPHEN

SIT: BLACK BOLAN COQ MARTY PASCUAL RIEDEL SUM2 TODD WEISS

SIT: NODIS

-----  
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 242027Z NOV 98,

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

QQQQ

BEGIN TEXT:

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. A COPY MAY ALSO BE PROVIDED TO ROBERT MARKARYAN IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:


DEAR BORIS:

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1172 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI CRISIS. THE INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON IRAQI COMPLIANCE AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE PRODUCED OUR PREFERRED RESULT: IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND OCTOBER DECISIONS, AND COMMITTED IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS AND TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN TO WORK WITHOUT CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS.

WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER ALL OF THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. TOO MANY TIMES BEFORE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE COMMITMENTS WHEN THREATENED BY FORCE ONLY TO TURN AROUND AND VIOLATE THEM.

THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SADDAM'S INTENTIONS. THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY UNFETTERED, UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR UNSCOM AND IAEA. IRAQ MUST PROVIDE UNSCOM AND THE IAEA WITH ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE UNSCRS. BAGHDAD'S RESPONSE SO



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11/10/10 M

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA1172 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
FAR IN THAT AREA IS FAR FROM ADEQUATE AND RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT BAGHDAD'S COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE FULLY. THAT IS WHY I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE. KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES FULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR. IRAQ MUST ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSCOM ACTIVITY TO UNCOVER AND TO THWART ITS ABILITY TO PRODUCE OR DELIVER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH SADDAM. I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE INCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS UNSCOM HAS ASKED FOR AND THE CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACT IF SADDAM ONCE AGAIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCOM'S ABILITY TO OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL REQUESTED INFORMATION NEEDED BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1172 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NONE OF US WANTS TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN THE FUTURE. FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR UNSCOM, IAEA, AND THESE ORGANIZATIONS' LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THIS SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS MESSAGE.

SINCERELY,

BILL

END TEXT

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>1172

<MSGID> M3573073

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLINTON CENTER FOR POLICY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504



7859  
REDO

November 23, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL *BR*  
CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: GWENYTH TODD *AW*  
ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Message to President Yeltsin on Iraq

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's November 17 letter on the Iraqi crisis. At your suggestion, the revised message takes into account recent Iraqi defiance on UNSCOM's document request. Despite President Yeltsin's hospitalization, we still believe it would be useful to send the message, which in any event will be double-tracked to Prime Minister Primakov.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.


Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Message to President Yeltsin
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/13/08



DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1292-M  
11/10/10 MI



~~CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS~~

IMMEDIATE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
SECSTATE WASHDC

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE PROVIDED.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:


THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LATEST IRAQI CRISIS. THE UNANIMOUS INSISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON IRAQI COMPLIANCE BACKED BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE ~~PRODUCED OUR~~ PREFERRED RESULT: IRAQ RESCINDED ITS AUGUST AND OCTOBER DECISIONS, AND COMMITTED IN WRITING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS ~~AND TO ALLOW THEIR RETURN TO WORK WITHOUT CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS.~~

WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE IRAQ FULFILLS ITS OBLIGATION. TOO MANY TIMES BEFORE, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS MADE COMMITMENTS WHEN THREATENED BY FORCE ONLY TO VIOLATE THEM LATER.

THE COMING WEEKS WILL PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SADDAM'S INTENTIONS. THERE MUST BE NO AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHAT WE MEAN BY ~~UNFETTERED, UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR UNSCOM AND IAEA.~~ THAT IS WHY I HAVE MADE CLEAR PUBLICLY THE CRITERIA THAT WE WILL USE TO JUDGE IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE. KOFI ANNAN HAS ASSURED ME HE AGREES FULLY THESE ARE IRAQI OBLIGATIONS. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO REVIEWED THEM WITH MINISTER IVANOV DURING THEIR MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR. IRAQ MUST ALLOW FULL RESUMPTION OF UNSCOM ACTIVITY AND MEET ITS OBJECTIVE TO DISCLOSE FULLY ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM.

YOU HAVE PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH SADDAM. I HOPE YOU WILL SEND HIM A CLEAR MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL DISCLOSURE AND FULL COMPLIANCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES IF HE DOES NOT. WHILE I AM READY TO SEE IF SADDAM LIVES UP TO HIS WORD THIS TIME, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS PREPARED TO ACT IF SADDAM ONCE AGAIN INTERFERES WITH UNSCOM'S

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PER E.O. 13526



2009-1292-m  
4/10/00 me

ABILITY TO OPERATE OR REFUSES TO DISCLOSE ALL INFORMATION NEEDED BY UNSCOM AND THE IAEA.

NONE OF US WANT TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IN THE FUTURE. FOR OUR PART, FULL SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR UNSCOM, IAEA, AND THESE ORGANIZATIONS' LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY WILL BE CRUCIAL TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. ULTIMATELY, OF COURSE, SADDAM ALONE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THIS SITUATION IS RESOLVED PEACEFULLY OR WHETHER HE LEAVES US NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO FORCE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ HEEDS THIS MESSAGE.

SINCERELY,  
BILL

END TEXT



Gratified to hear you still plan to push for START II. Clearly in both our security interests.

| Could be no more tangible sign of our cooperation. On CFE, I too want to move forward as fast as we can ~~and will~~ ~~talk to Madeline~~.

Financial in close for

2009-12-12-m  
11/16/10 M



12-30-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

*Man -> KAMOC  
CC -> Feog Viet  
Lina -> called off  
De -> USSR in ...*

Sustaining the Relationship

- Know recent events in Iraq strained our partnership. Received your message through Foreign Minister Ivanov.
- Share unique responsibility for ensuring that the United States and Russia enter next century as partners. Need to stay in close touch to sustain relationship.

*Qualifying*

Agenda for 1999

- Important to get our teams engaged by setting meaningful agenda for coming year: helping Russian economy recover, stemming proliferation, and strengthening arms control via START II and START III.
- Important meeting between Al and Yevgeniy set for March. Need to build toward that. Also sending Madeleine to Moscow at end of January, and Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore-DYOO-zhuh).
- Essential for you and me to give our teams right tone, direction, and momentum.

*URGENT*



Economics

- Want to support economic reform program that promotes stability and growth. Strobe discussed with Primakov.
- Still much to do. Next step is for Primakov's team to engage intensively in coming days with IMF, especially on budget.
- International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound bank restructuring efforts.
- Durable reform program can open door to resumed cooperation with IMF, which is critical for help on restructuring Russia's external debt.

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify on: 12/28/08



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PER E.O. 13526

2001-1242-  
11/10/10 W

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Iraq

12-30-98

- Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of international community. Didn't take this decision lightly. Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
- Problem remains Saddam's repeated failure to comply with UNSC obligations. He betrayed promises to you and international community.
- Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or Butler. Important to find a way forward in New York to get Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
- But can't lower standard by accepting an inspection regime that is not professional and qualified.
- Can't reward Saddam for his behavior. Sanctions won't be lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.

\* (C)

Troubled by Iraqi belligerence toward coalition aircraft enforcing no-fly zones. Iraqis should understand that continued challenges could lead to serious confrontation.

*work together  
on world  
future*

- Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia relationship. We have too much crucial work to do.

***If Yeltsin says Butler abused his authority and should be replaced:***

- Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own and based on unambiguous facts.
- He discussed findings with broad range of Council members, including Russia. Problem is not with Butler.


***If Yeltsin complains that U.S. failed to consult in advance or seek a political solution to crisis:***

- Made clear in November that we'd give Saddam one last chance to cooperate. Gave him every benefit of the doubt, but we left no doubt that we'd act if he failed this test.

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON




PHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: December 28, 1998  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: TBD  
  
FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE


To call Yeltsin and set a framework for bilateral contacts that will get the relationship on track after the Iraq crisis.

II. BACKGROUND



Your December 18 letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we cannot let Saddam come between the United States and Russia, engendered a positive response. Yeltsin reportedly instructed Foreign Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine that the U.S. relationship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and that he, too, is committed to working through our differences.

As best we can gauge, Yeltsin health appears to have stabilized, which means that he can work a few hours a day. We expect that he will stick to general principles on the relationship and Iraq, but anything may be possible. He could call for Butler to be fired or complain about not being consulted prior to the bombings. Our suggestion is to keep him focused on first principles and get him to give general guidance to Primakov and his staff: the U.S.-Russia relationship matters, Russia needs to pursue a course of integration, and Russia needs to manage its



2004-1292-m  
11/10/06 M

foreign affairs and economy in a way that supports such integration, and not its isolation from the international community.

The most practical outcome from the call would be to get Yeltsin to reaffirm the importance of a solid schedule of early 1999 meetings that would tackle the tough issues before us: economics, nonproliferation and arms control. The key meeting to highlight is the Gore-Primakov session in late March. Madeleine will see Ivanov in late January. I plan to invite my new counterpart, Nikolay Bordyuzha, for a visit in February. We will also work on Cohen and Richardson seeing their counterparts.

While we cannot count on Yeltsin to deliver on specific commitments, it appears he can still set a tone for his government. The more constructive his guidance, the better the chance it will reverberate through the bureaucracy.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

TBD

### IV. SEQUENCE

We will initiate the call. You should start by affirming the importance of the relationship and let Yeltsin respond. You can close by asking Yeltsin to give guidance to his team to work with us to develop a strong and substantive calendar for 1999.

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 24, 1998

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

12-30-98


PHONE CALL WITH  
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DATE: December 28, 1998

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*



I. PURPOSE

To call Yeltsin and set a framework for bilateral contacts that will get the relationship on track after the Iraq crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

Your December 18 letter to Yeltsin, stressing that we cannot let Saddam come between the United States and Russia, engendered a positive response. Yeltsin reportedly instructed Foreign Minister Ivanov to tell Madeleine that the U.S. relationship is at the top of Russia's agenda, and that he, too, is committed to working through our differences.

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
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 12/23/08

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PER E.O. 13526



2001-1292-1  
11/10/10 MM

before us: economics, nonproliferation and arms control. The key meeting to highlight is the Gore-Primakov session in late March. Madeleine will see Ivanov in late January. I plan to invite my new counterpart, Nikolay Bordyuzha, for a visit in February. We will also work on Cohen and Richardson seeing their counterparts.

While we cannot count on Yeltsin to deliver on specific commitments, it appears he can still set a tone for his government. The more constructive his guidance, the better the chance it will reverberate through the bureaucracy.


III. PARTICIPANTS

TBD

IV. SEQUENCE

We will initiate the call. You should start by affirming the importance of the relationship and let Yeltsin respond. You can close by asking Yeltsin to give guidance to his team to work with us to develop a strong and substantive calendar for 1999.

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made



POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN



Sustaining the Relationship

*spell out*

- Know recent events in Iraq strained our partnership. Received your message through FM Ivanov, and I fully agree: ~~critically important to keep relationship on track.~~
- Share unique responsibility for ensuring that U.S. and Russia enter next century as partners. ~~Important we stay in regular touch to help sustain relationship, through challenging periods.~~

*need to*

*spell out*

Agenda for 1999

- Important to get our teams engaged <sup>settings</sup> for coming year: ~~Should set meaningful agenda centered on three key issues -- getting Russian economy back on track, stemming proliferation, and strengthening our legacy in arms control via START II and START III.~~
- Important meeting between Al and Yevgeniy, set for March. Need to build toward that. ~~I'm also sending Madeleine to Moscow at end of January. Sandy will be contacting Bordyuzha (Bore-DYOO-zhuh), to initiate a dialogue.~~
- Will ask my team to flesh out their goals and ideas. Hope you do the same. ~~Think that's essential to give relationship right tone, momentum, and direction.~~


*and*

*for you and me*

*our teams*

Economics

- Want to support a Russian economic reform program that promotes stability and growth. ~~Sent high level team led by Strobe to discuss that with Primakov.~~
- ~~Team came back with better sense of your plans, but thinks there's still much to do. Next step is for Primakov's team to engage intensively in coming days with IMF, especially on budget.~~
- International community hoping to support Russian-owned reform program that builds on realistic budget, tax reform, and sound bank restructuring efforts.



- ~~Know that coming year poses real challenges. Critical to have durable reform program in place. That can open door to resumed cooperation with IMF, which is critical for help on restructuring Russia's external debt.~~

Iraq

- Decision to strike Iraq driven by Iraqi defiance of international community. Didn't take this decision lightly. Gave Saddam every opportunity to keep his word on cooperation.
- ~~Heart of~~ problem remains Saddam's repeated failure to comply with UNSC obligations. He betrayed promises to you and international community.
- Saddam bears responsibility for what happened, not UNSCOM or Butler. Important to find a way forward in New York to get Saddam back in compliance and let inspectors do their job.
- But ~~this can't be by lowering the bar for Iraqi performance and accepting an inspection regime that is not professional and qualified.~~ <sup>standard by</sup>
- Can't reward Saddam for his behavior. Sanctions won't be lifted until we see an end to his deception and lies.
- Most importantly, can't let Saddam undermine U.S.-Russia relationship. We have too much crucial work to do. ~~Too much is at stake.~~

*If Yeltsin says Butler abused his authority and should be replaced!*

- Butler made clear that conclusions in his report were his own and based on unambiguous facts.
- He discussed findings with broad range of Council members, including Russia. Problem is not with Butler, but rather Saddam's pattern of behavior.

*If Yeltsin complains that U.S. failed to consult in advance or seek a political solution to crisis!*

- Made clear in November that we'd give Saddam one last chance to cooperate. Gave him every benefit of the doubt, but we left no doubt that we'd act if he failed this test.



- Had to preserve operational security in advance of airstrikes to protect our servicemen. Also, didn't want to give Saddam chance to disperse his forces and equipment.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

NOTE TAKERS: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver, Joel Schrader, David Higgins, Jim Smith and Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME: December 15, 1998 -- 1:00p.m. - 1:15p.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Oval Office


The President: Hello? Your Royal Highness, thank you for taking the call. I wanted to call you to tell you that I have decided to take action against Iraq very soon. I have spoken with Prime Minister Blair, and the British will participate. I know that you would prefer a peaceful solution, as would I, but it is clear that this is not possible at this time.

On November 14, I called off a military strike to try one more time to find a peaceful solution. The strong statement by the Damascus Declaration of States, placing responsibility solely on Iraq, helped us to avoid a conflict. Then Iraq committed to provide full and unconditional cooperation as provided by UNSC resolutions. Since that time, Baghdad has repeatedly violated that commitment and consistently refused to provide documents and information, barred access and harassed inspectors, lied repeatedly and destroyed documents.

I hope you will agree that we can't continue this cycle. Our strike will be significant, with the stated aim to degrade his capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors, and it will weaken his regime and thus further our long-term goal of changing the leadership in Baghdad.

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
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We will not need to use any Saudi-based assets during the strikes I have ordered.

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~~P1/(b)(1)~~ General Zinni and our military will be in touch with your military for a detailed briefing soon. This has been a difficult decision for me. If I thought diplomacy could get Saddam to comply with the inspections and keep his commitments, I would not have ordered this strike. But the record has shown that he will not voluntarily give up his weapons of mass destruction. The support of Saudi Arabia and the GCC are critical. The statement at the GCC summit made clear that Iraq is responsible for the consequences of its own decisions. I hope you will communicate to your GCC partners your support of our action. Over the next few days, I will be following developments very closely, and our people will be in close touch with yours.

Crown Prince Abdullah: That's fine, and thank you.

The President: Thank you very much, Your Royal Highness.

Crown Prince Abdullah: Thank you, Mr. President, and I hope that God will bring whatever is good for the world and for the people of the Middle East, especially.

The President: Thank you very much.

Crown Prince Abdullah: Can you give me, Mr. President, how many days, what is the time required for what you just said?

The President: We will start now and we expect to finish in a couple of days, before Ramadan. We think it's very important that we finish before Ramadan, which is why time is so short.

Crown Prince Abdullah: I hope everything will be to the best, Mr. President.

The President: I hope so, too. I wish there were another alternative, but I don't believe there is.


Crown Prince Abdullah: Yes, yes. This is understood.

The President: Well, thank you very much.

Crown Prince Abdullah: Thank you, thank you, Mr. President, and I wish you success in your endeavor always.

The President: Thank you. Goodbye, sir.

-- End of Conversation --



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel

NOTE TAKERS: Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME December 17, 1998 -- 12:02 p.m. - 12:06 p.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. (U)

Prime Minister Netanyahu: How's it going? (U)

The President: Fine. I wanted to check in. We have some damage assessment that shows good results, all of our pilots have come back so far, but we have more flights today and British pilots will be up there. So far there are very low civilian casualties. They say not, but that is our information, that they're quite low. We're doing all we can to support you; beyond the extra Patriot batteries, we'll be standing by to support you if Saddam starts making threatening statements. Interestingly enough, the Gulf countries and Egypt are giving us all the cooperation we asked for. Mubarak made a pretty strong statement. My intelligence officer, George Tenet, was in today and said that so far all the military activity has been completely defensive in nature. (S)

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Do you have any indication of activity in western Iraq? (S)


The President: No. All the military activity so far has been defensive. You know, the first thing we try to take out is

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


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their integrated communications and air defense systems. So we haven't, and obviously if we do, we'll tell you as soon as we can. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Good. You know you have our support. We're keeping a low-profile, saying that we're not a part of this conflict, but we reserve the right to self-defense if they try to involve us. We prefer to stay out, but you enjoy our full support. ~~(S)~~



~~P1/(b)(1)~~ Butler is being compared to me, and me to Butler. ~~(S)~~

The President: They're equating you and Butler? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Yes, I'm Butler now. ~~(C)~~

The President: I like Butler. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Netanyahu: You have your friends who are always your friends and will stand by the United States. Always. I don't make a big issue now of our support in consideration of your needs, but let me know if I can help and I will be happy to do it. ~~(C)~~

The President: I will. We'll watch over the next day or two. I'll call back if I need to, and if you need to, call me. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Netanyahu: What do you think - let me not ask you that. We'll follow it as we go, and if there's anything you want to pass through special channels -- ~~(C)~~

The President: I'll do it. (U)

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Things here are pretty calm and we wish you the best. (U)

The President: Thank you so much. (U)



Prime Minister Netanyahu: Did you ever have a chance to follow up on our conversation? ~~(C)~~

The President: I did, and I did what I could. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Okay. (U)


The President: I did what I could. I followed up and I did what I could. I'll have another conversation in a day or two.

~~(C)~~  
Prime Minister Netanyahu: That's it. Thank you, Bill. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Netanyahu: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt

NOTE TAKERS: Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME December 17, 1998 -- 12:18 p.m. - 12:23 p.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine, and you? (U)

President Mubarak: Fine. (U)

The President: I just called to discuss a couple of things. The Iraqi operation seems to be going well. We have some damage assessment that indicates good results, and all our pilots have come back so far. (S)

President Mubarak: Good results, then? (U)


The President: Yes. (U)

President Mubarak: This is very good. (U)

The President: The strike will be significant and will continue for some time, but I think it is important to degrade his capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his neighbors as much as possible. The Gulf countries are giving us all the cooperation we need and King Fahd and Abdallah are supportive of what we've done. I think we're in good shape. I am grateful for your prompt clearance for overflights and Suez passage. (S)

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President Mubarak: Yes, we're making all the decisions needed.  
(U)

The President: I think what you said before about Saddam Hussein being entirely responsible for this chain of events was very valuable, and if you have a chance, if you will reiterate that -- (C)

President Mubarak: I already mentioned that yesterday, and today we made a communique saying that I talked to Madeleine Albright yesterday. (C)

The President: That's good. I also wanted to say that I had a pretty good trip to Gaza and Israel. (U)

President Mubarak: It was a wonderful trip, I told Madeleine Albright it was a wonderful trip, and I praised it publicly today on TV. (U)

The President: Thank you. I'm a little concerned about the possibility of a short-term problem because of the unstable political situation in Israel, because you know the temptation is always there to do things that are not constructive, and they may even wind up having elections before long. We'll try to deal with it and keep it on a good track. I'm glad I went to Gaza. I hope it helped Arafat, and I hope the historic sympathy of the Palestinians for Iraq won't undermine him too much. (S)

President Mubarak: I think your visit was a historic visit. Arafat -- whom I met yesterday -- Arafat and his group were all very pleased with that. On Iraq, expect some small demonstrations, but don't give it any attention. We had very small ones. (C)

The President: Thank you. I expected that and it didn't bother me. (U)

President Mubarak: Yes. (U)

The President: Are you doing well? (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, I'm doing very well. Your visit, your trip and speech were very well-balanced and appreciated. (C)

The President: Thank you. I think the Israeli public is coming along. The problem is, when they have elections there, Israeli



society is getting more complicated, and a lot of people get elected to the Knesset for reasons that don't have much to do with the peace process. Then we have trouble getting a solid majority to do the right thing. I'll just keep pushing. A survey in Israel indicated that 80 percent agreed with what I said to the Palestinians, so it was helpful, I think. (S)

President Mubarak: I asked P1(b)(1) one of the Labor party; I met him today and had long talks. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Mubarak: I think there'll be elections in April or even before April. (C)

The President: Yes. We'll keep working on it. (U)

President Mubarak: We're always working. We never stop working, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you, Hosni. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. Give our best regards to Hillary. Everybody appreciated her words and visit there. My wife sends her best regards. (U)

The President: Thank you. Tell her hello and that we hope she's well. (U)


President Mubarak: Thank you. I'll tell her that now. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Mubarak: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
King Hussein of Jordan

NOTE TAKERS: Jim Smith and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 17, 1998 -- 12:25 p.m. - 12:32 p.m. EST  
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Your Majesty. How are you? (U)

King Hussein: Hello, welcome home and well done. (U)

The President: I had a great time in Gaza. (U)

King Hussein: How are you, sir? (U)

The President: I thought it was a good trip. Arafat produced a big crowd; he had over 500 members of the PNC there, and a lot of others. I think it went well. (U)

King Hussein: Very, very good. That is very promising. (U)


The President: I think I struck a responsive chord. The people of Israel supported my speech, even though Netanyahu's government didn't like it much. (U)

King Hussein: It was a wonderful speech about the future. Very moving. (U)

The President: Thank you. I wanted to call and say that the situation in Iraq seems to be going pretty well. The damage assessment indicates good results, all our pilots are back so far, and from what we can see, there are very low civilian casualties. (C)

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King Hussein: That's wonderful. (U)

The President: You know, I called off this action a month ago, but in the wake of Butler's report that Iraq is not even trying to cooperate, I had no choice. The Gulf countries and Egypt are giving us the cooperation we need, [REDACTED] P1(b)(1)

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1) so we are just going forward. I know the reaction of the Arab world will become more difficult. So far, their reactions are muted and even privately supportive, but it can become more difficult with civilian casualties. I know you are probably concerned with the refugee problem. We'll stay in close touch and I will help in any way possible with a rapid response. (S)

King Hussein: To support the refugee problem would be nice. It may be beyond our ability to deal with large numbers, and we look forward to your help. (C)

The President: We'll help if we can. One other thing. In spite of the fact that I had a good trip, the political situation in Israel is quite unstable. Bibi said that in short order one of three things will happen: he'll have Levy back and four more votes; he'll have a unity government with Barak; or there'll be national elections. If there are national elections, it may well delay the Wye implementation process. We'll work hard with the Palestinians, but the resultant government might be more secure in going forward. We'll keep pushing the Israel government to implement, but we need to watch closely; it's quite unstable. (S)

King Hussein: Yes, sir. May I ask, have Arafat and the Israelis finished working out cooperation on security and intelligence? (S)

The President: I think that's on track. I think there are two big problems for the Israelis, at least for the Netanyahu government: the whole question of how to handle the prisoner releases and Arafat's speeches on declaring unilaterally a Palestinian state in May. If Netanyahu implements the next redeployment, there'll be a vote Monday, a kind of no-confidence vote. If he does not make the next redeployment, the issue is why didn't he do it, and can he do it before the elections. We'll keep pushing for full implementation. I think security is back on track and I think we'll see evidence of that over the next few days. Now there's this Iraq situation; I'll try to get Arafat not to overreact. I wish I could say it was more certain, but it's uncertain. (S)

King Hussein: Everything you contribute to gives results, sir. This time, we're full of admiration for the way you went there and everything you said. I hope it will work out. If there's anything I can say, don't hesitate. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thanks. Are you and Noor coming back through here very soon? (U)

King Hussein: I am improving all the time. They're very optimistic. I just have to have time to build up resistance, and I will come through Washington before taking my leave to go home. (U)

The President: That's wonderful news. You sound strong. Your spirits are good? (U)


King Hussein: Yes, my spirits are good. You did very well with regard to yesterday. He asked for it. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you, Your Majesty. (U)

King Hussein: Good day. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Jacques Chirac of France

NOTE TAKERS: Jim Smith, Joel Schrader and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME December 17, 1998 -- 12:38 p.m. - 12:53 p.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)


President Chirac: I just wanted to say hello and I want to talk through the interpreter, if you don't mind. First of all, I want to congratulate you on your visit to Israel and Palestine. It was a very difficult visit, but I thought you did it the best way you could. Second, needless to say, all the French people feel affection and sympathy for you for the ridiculous test you have to go through. Well, you know all that. I would not be ringing you up if I did not have a third question. When the strikes against Iraq are over, what are we going to do? What is going to happen? Do you already have a plan to get out of the crisis, to which France would be glad to contribute, or should we still be discussing things? Well, for example, if Saddam Hussein is neither killed nor overthrown, does UNSCOM go back or not? Is there tight control or not? How will the oil-for-food program be implemented? So, how do we get out of the crisis?

~~(S)~~

The President: First of all, I think that the trip to Israel and Gaza went great. But there are great difficulties there, as you know. The Netanyahu government is not stable and there may be new elections before long, and the political situation in Israel will make it difficult to go forward on the peace process. So I thought it was important to go and I hope we can keep going forward with the Wye agreement. The trip was a success. Secondly, I think in terms of what happens next, I

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think it would be good if UNSCOM can go back there. If he does not let them back, then we have to keep the sanctions on. We have to keep that in force if he threatens his neighbors. We have to keep the oil-for-food program. If there are medical problems to be met, we may need to meet them and think about how to dramatically expand it to meet other needs and help the country develop and minimize military expenditures. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: Do you think we will be able to send UNSCOM back in to do its work? ~~(S)~~

The President: I don't know. I think there may be a chance if he thinks he can get the comprehensive review. But I think the important thing is for us to say we would like to do it and I think we need to expand the oil-for-food program in the meantime. Really the whole idea behind the oil-for-food program was to return the people as close to normalcy as possible without a big military build-up. I think there is a chance he will take UNSCOM back under the right circumstances, if we make clear that if he keeps his commitments, we'll keep ours. Maybe Levitte could talk to Sandy Berger about it. I'm glad you're thinking about it, because I've been thinking that we should talk about where we all go from here. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: There is no doubt about that. Do you think Saddam Hussein could accept having UNSCOM back? If not, what do we do? ~~(S)~~

The President: I think he might if the French Government asks him, if he understood from my point of view all the commitments are still on the table so long as there is actually compliance. I further think we should also be for a broader oil-for-food program. That is the only way we in the United States can move toward an end to the sanctions regime. What I am looking for is a strategy to end the danger that his WMD program causes and to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people. I think that for me I have not ruled out the possibility that we could go back to a situation where Iraq is committed to implementing the Memorandum of Understanding that Saddam and Kofi Annan reached. ~~(S)~~

President Chirac: In any case, France has taken a very clear position that Saddam Hussein bears responsibility for the situation and, in actual fact, I just repeated that a short while ago on TV. So my concern now is about the modalities for getting out of the crisis and France is quite ready to associate itself with any discussion of how to do so. ~~(S)~~

The President: I will have Sandy Berger follow up with you. I'm very grateful for the statement you made at the UN. It was very, very helpful. We need to work through the UN to get a resolution to this. I hope -- you know, the Russians are going to try to do something to express their opposition to what I have done and to Butler in particular. I hope France will not join this, and will perhaps work to become a mediating force. What's done is done; we need to talk about the future and how to help the people of Iraq. I'm glad to focus on that with you. I think you are in a unique position to reach out to the Russians and Chinese to get us on a responsible course and figure out where we all go from here. (S)

President Chirac: That is precisely the issue. That is the position I took on television. (U)

The President: Well, that is great. Thank you very much, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: I do not intend to associate myself with any criticism, even on Butler, [REDACTED] P1/(b)(1)

[REDACTED] P1/(b)(1)

[REDACTED] P1/(b)(1) I have given instructions to our ambassador to the UN that everything is to be done so there is no division. (S)

The President: Thank you very much for that. (U)

President Chirac: Everything -- so that there should be a common position. We hoped Saddam Hussein would have understood by now. I don't know if you have spoken to Yeltsin, but I found him in extraordinarily good form. I tried to talk to him about the Iraq affair. I think he's being pushed toward criticism by Primakov and the Duma, but I found him -- Hello? (S)

The President: Jacques, I lost that. Who did you find in extraordinarily good form? (U)

President Chirac: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. (C)

The President: He's doing better? Good. I'm going to talk to Primakov and then I may call Yeltsin, but I'm glad to hear that he's doing better. That's good news. (C)

President Chirac: You ought to ring him up. Yeltsin is much calmer in this respect than Primakov. And I tried to calm him down, but he remained very bothered by this affair because of



domestic public opinion. But I think if you ring him up it will be a very good thing. (S)

The President: Thanks very much. I will. (U)

President Chirac: Well, Bill, we will keep in touch. I'm glad to have you on the phone. Please give all my best greetings to Hillary. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)


President Chirac: I hope to see you soon, because we have a meeting in two months in Washington. (U)

The President: I'm looking forward to it. Thank you. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom

NOTE TAKERS: Roger Merletti, Bonnie Glick and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME: December 18, 1998 -- 9:42 a.m. - 9:51 a.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Tony? (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Hello. (U)

The President: How are you? So far so good. Everything is going as well as can be expected. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Good hearing from you, Bill. I think there are two issues we need to think through. How much more do we need to do with Ramadan coming up? Secondly, then, what is the strategy for the day after? Those are the two things that concern me, but so far it's been successful. Your assessments are showing we did well. What is your consensus? (S)

The President: So far it looks good. Our initial assessment is really good, but it's too early to make any judgments. I'm looking at the reports and they look good, and I think politically we're getting good support in the region, and the world, except the Russians are mad because they weren't consulted first. But if we had they would have told the Iraqis. (S)


Prime Minister Blair: That's right. On the other hand, it would have been difficult to say that to them. (S)

The President: Then I think we'll face some questions in the Council of how to go forward. We ought to try to go back to

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something to devise a system that could lead to immediate and meaningful actions by Iraq, like documents being given back over. Then we can look to broaden oil-for-food to make it look like we have no problem with the Iraqi people. This is what I think we should do in terms of the UNSC. I had a pretty good talk with Chirac yesterday. What's your domestic situation?

~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Blair: Pretty good. Parliament is fine. I think the most important thing for people is they understand that we have reduced his military capability significantly. One of the things is that you are not able to kill him personally. We don't want to harm the civilians, so you target these particular buildings. What I think is important is to show that his command, control, and delivery system is so damaged that his ability to mount offensive attacks and cause trouble in the region is greatly reduced. If we were in a position to announce that we put back his military capability by several years, I think people would be supportive. The public is ambivalent. They don't want lots of people killed but they would like to see that his military is damaged. They want to know after 4 days of bombing something has been accomplished. We've got to be able to say to people here's what hitting these targets means and he's a significantly reduced threat. See what I mean? ~~(S)~~

The President: We've got to have our military and intelligence folks as a guide. It has to be fact driven. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Blair: Butler's report detailed all the weapons that the UNSCOM people have uncovered and included a detailed, blow-by-blow account of hassle and obstruction. We need a constant diet of fact for the public of what these systems could have done and what destroying them gives us. That's what keeps opinion with us, and it allows us to say, "Look, this thing has had an effect. His ability to pose a danger has been reduced." You don't want to get back into the UNSCOM business, or we'll be doing this every three months. I think we need to tie up the military side and then have a political strategy. We need to get into a situation where there are demands made of him. I think from my conversation with Chirac this morning, if we get the right basis of a diplomatic initiative together, France would be able to say to Iraq, "You've got to get these things together or you'll get hit again at the end of Ramadan." I think it forces Saddam into a policy of containment that is considerable without landing us into where we were. ~~(S)~~

The President: Yes, I agree with that. We need to work together on it tomorrow or in the next couple of days. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Blair: Yes. (U)

The President: Our intelligence is pretty clear that Usama bin Laden may be ordering some sort of attack in the next couple of days and it's important that we work together on this. I hope you'll get a review on this. ~~(TS)~~

Prime Minister Blair: Our people will cooperate in any way. ~~(S)~~

The President: I know your guys are skittish about giving us something. I think your lawyers are worried. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Blair: I will work on that. (U)

The President: Ok. One more thing - Northern Ireland. You did well. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Blair: Yes, I think we will get somewhere on the decommissioning stuff. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I'll be in touch. If we can do anything else to help you on this, let me know. (U)


Prime Minister Blair: Thank you. (U)

The President: Ok. Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan

NOTE TAKERS: Joel Schrader, James Smith and Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME December 18, 1998 -- 11:48 a.m. - 11:54 a.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Prime Minister? (U)

Prime Minister Sharif: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. Thank you for taking my call. (U)

Prime Minister Sharif: It is a great pleasure listening to your voice. (U)

The President: Thank you. I really enjoyed our meeting earlier this month, and I hope the rest of your visit to the United States was a good one. (U)


Prime Minister Sharif: It was very good, and I thank you for your kind and generous hospitality. (U)

The President: Well, thank you. Let me say, too, that I understand we have reached a solution to the F-16 issue. (C)

Prime Minister Sharif: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: And I am very pleased by that. I know you want to complete this by the end of the month, and we will do everything we can to meet that deadline. (C)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (b), (c), (d)  
Declassify on: 12/21/08



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Prime Minister Sharif: That is very kind of you. I will announce this myself to the people of Pakistan in the next few days. ~~(C)~~

The President: I have been trying to do this for four years. It's been a point of embarrassment to me, and I've been trying to put it right. I feel very good about this. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Sharif: I will tell the people of Pakistan that this is what the President of the United States has done for Pakistan, that this matter is resolved. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me also say that I called you about another issue that is urgent, and I need your personal help. We have reliable intelligence, and quite a lot of it, that Usama bin Ladin intends to strike a U.S. target very soon, perhaps in 48 hours, and that the operations -- there may be two of them -- are being orchestrated by bin Ladin from within Afghanistan. Now, all I can tell you is this is not in reaction to Iraq; he's been working on this. I think it is imperative the Taliban do everything it can to bring him to justice. I think Pakistan has a lot at stake in the Taliban being accepted in the international community, and if this happens it will become virtually impossible. We have warned the Taliban repeatedly that we will hold them responsible, and we will warn them again. I wanted to ask you to do whatever you can to stop this immediately. I cannot overstate the importance or urgency of it. He has this cooking in the next several days here. We are talking to the Saudis again about it. Anyway, I wanted to tell you I am very, very worried about it and the consequences if it occurs. ~~(TS)~~

Prime Minister Sharif: I understand your anxiety and your position, Mr. President. You know, I told you in Washington that the Taliban are very stubborn and very uncooperative people. I told you what transpired between us and the Taliban and also Saudi Prince Turki, who came especially from Saudi Arabia on that particular issue and they were very stubborn. We will do everything we can, I assure you. I will send my people tomorrow to Afghanistan to meet with them and discuss this with them, and tell them this will not be in their interest and it will serve no purpose, that it will invite retaliation and a world reaction. I will do whatever I can, I can assure you of that, but you must understand they are very stubborn and uncooperative. ~~(TS)~~

The President: Yes, I understand, but there's a difference between being uncooperative and not giving him up, and being uncooperative and allowing him to conduct operations. Those are fundamentally different things. I hope you can bring that home to them. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Sharif: I wish I can. (U)

The President: I know you will try; that is all I can ask you to do. (U)

Prime Minister Sharif: I have and I will. They don't listen to us all the time. I'm very disappointed with their attitude.

~~(S)~~


The President: Thank you. Thank you very much. (U)

The President and Prime Minister Sharif exchanged closing pleasantries. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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8436



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom

NOTE TAKERS: Matt Sibley, Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard, Jenny McGee, David Higgins and Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME: December 19, 1998 -- 5:43 p.m. - 5:51 p.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Hi Bill. (U)

The President: Hey Tony. I just got my briefing on the bomb damage and am pleased with the way things have gone, and I think the operation should end now. I hope you are pleased with British participation. It was quite important. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: Sure, it has been a job well done. (U)

The President: Yes, I am really proud of them. [REDACTED]

P6/(b)(6)

[REDACTED] P6/(b)(6)

[REDACTED] P6/(b)(6)

(U)

Prime Minister Blair: I think what is important now is that we really show people, one, that we've significantly damaged his capabilities in a very precise way and in a sense that we have not brought him down. The point is we have reduced significantly the threat he poses to the rest of the world that is a darn sight better than leaving him in breach of his UN obligations and us taking no action against him at all. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree with that. (U)

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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
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Prime Minister Blair: I think it has been an operation with a purpose. The purpose has been achieved. He is back in his box, and we now have to work out a strategy for containment and stability. (C)

The President: I agree with all that. I think we should say we will continue to contain him, restate the redlines for use of force: no threat to his neighbors, no developing WMD, and no movement against the Kurds. I also think we should say we support the extension of the oil-for-food. And, when it comes to UNSCOM and the IAEA, I can tell you we will welcome their return to Iraq, and I intend to say we will work on their return but only after concrete, affirmative, and demonstrable action by Iraq showing that it will provide full cooperation necessary for UNSCOM and the IAEA to do their job. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I think that is exactly the right thing to say. (U)

The President: The Russians and the Chinese are hot and really angry at me right now -- and the burden is on us to work hard to manage the Council. I think they are a lot madder at me than you. But we will get through it. If we would have given them all the advance notice they wanted, we would have had a very different operation these last three days. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: The truth of the matter is that we have not acted other than what we said we would. We said we would act without further warning, and if we had not, they would think we were not serious at all. (C)

The President: Everything was terrific. We did exactly what we said we would do and I am very pleased. Our people said the work we did with the British was great and the cooperation was great. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: I think it is tremendously important that as much material as possible about the damage is released as soon as possible. We need to build up a picture of what we've achieved in military terms. In a funny way people will be pleased that none of our service people have been killed and relieved it was a short campaign. On the other hand, they will want to know what it is that we actually did in military terms -- the more detailed we can get the better. (C)

The President: I agree with that, and I will support it. And I think our people have shared all the information. I really want

to do that just like you say. I've got the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and General Shelton here with me now and we will follow up. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Okay Bill. When are you going to go out and say something? It is about quarter to 11 here now. (U)

The President: Yes, go out now and do it. I'm going on in a minute. Just go on now. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: I will do a short statement. (U)

The President: We are going out right now. They say I'm scheduled to go out in five minutes. I have got a three-minute statement, so why don't you just wait and go on out. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Okay, that is great. Our people need to stay in close touch. (U)

The President: Let me ask you . . . I have a three-minute statement. Let me go give it and if you want to answer questions. . . (U)

Prime Minister Blair: I am not going to answer questions. (U)

The President: I am not going to answer any questions either. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Our defense guys thought it would be good if we could release the aftermath of the Ba'ath Party headquarters hit. (C)

The President: I will check with them. I thought they were going to do that. Al Gore is on the phone with them. We will check on it. (U)


Prime Minister Blair: All right. (U)

The President: Good show. Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Bye-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --



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QQQQ

**SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN**

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BORIS:


PAGE 2 RHEHAAA1426-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I AM WRITING YOU PERSONALLY TO MAKE SURE WE DO WHAT WE HAVE OFTEN DONE BEFORE: KEEP U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE TRACK YOU AND I LAID DOWN NEARLY SIX YEARS AGO. THE MOST IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE -- THOUGH BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONE -- IS IRAQ.

YOU AND I HAVE WORKED CLOSELY FOR MANY YEARS TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ AND SADDAM HUSSEIN COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE DECISIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR COMMON EFFORTS, INCLUDING THOSE YOU, YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH AND MINISTER IVANOV HAVE UNDERTAKEN ON THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK, HELPED PREVENT SADDAM FROM ACQUIRING THE CAPABILITY TO THREATEN HIS REGION AND THE WORLD WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. LAST MONTH, OUR EFFORTS PERSUADED SADDAM TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO FULL COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM.

UNFORTUNATELY, SADDAM HAS BETRAYED HIS PROMISES TO YOU AND TO ALL OF US IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT SADDAM HAS CHOSEN A COURSE OF DEFIANCE. DESPITE THE PROMISES HE GAVE IN ORDER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE

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AGAINST HIM, SADDAM HAS ENGAGED IN A DELIBERATE AND WIDE-SCALED EFFORT TO OBSTRUCT UNSCOM FROM CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE. INDEED, WE KNOW THAT IRAQ ORDERED THE DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS-RELATED DOCUMENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF AN UNSCOM INSPECTION.

I KNOW WE DISAGREE ON THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ. HOWEVER, BOTH TONY BLAIR AND I CONCLUDED THAT SADDAM'S ACTIONS LEFT US NO OTHER CHOICE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I SOUGHT EVERY AVENUE AVAILABLE IN ORDER NOT TO UNDERTAKE THE ACTIONS I AUTHORIZED ON DECEMBER 16. AL GORE DISCUSSED OUR REASONING AND ACTIONS WITH YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH. FROM AL'S REPORT, THEY HAD A GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGE. AL TOLD ME OF YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT CHAIRMAN BUTLER. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE PROBLEM IS IRAQ'S UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPLY; THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH BUTLER.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA THAT YOU AND I HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD IS FAR TOO IMPORTANT AND, TO MY MIND, FAR TOO SOUND, TO BE SUBVERTED BY SADDAM

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA1426 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HUSSEIN. I REGRET THAT YOU CHOSE TO WITHDRAW YOUR AMBASSADOR FROM WASHINGTON. EVEN WHEN OUR GOVERNMENTS DISAGREE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU AND YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH HAVE ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND SEEK TO ADDRESS OUR DIFFERENCES.


OUR CHALLENGE NOW IS TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO MAKE SURE THE RELATIONSHIP STAYS ON TRACK. FOR ONE, LET'S MAKE SURE RHETORICAL EXCESSES DO NOT PREVENT US FROM FOCUSING CONSTRUCTIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY ON NEXT STEPS TO ENSURE SADDAM'S COMPLIANCE. WE ARE READY TO ENGAGE WITH YOU ON HOW WE ENSURE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT DEVELOP ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS. AL AND MADELEINE STAND READY TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH YEVGENIY MAKSIMOVICH AND IGOR SERGEYEVICH ON THIS, AS WELL AS THE MANY OTHER ISSUES THAT MAKEUP OUR COMMON AGENDA.

SINCERELY,  
BILL

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
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**FROM:**  
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**Pascual, Carlos E.**

**To:** @NSA - Natl Security Advisor  
**Cc:** @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia  
**Subject:** FW: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**Importance:** High  
**Message Flag:** Read  
**Flag Status:** Flagged



PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1) Recalling Vorontsov for consultations was a relatively low-key protest. [REDACTED] P1(b)(1) Yeltsin [REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
was shown on TV today reviewing maps with a military representative.

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1) the Russians did not cancel today's PJC with Defense Ministers. Although they stopped Minister Sergeyev from attending, they still held the meeting with their ambassador in the chair. In addition, the Russian DCM told me they are buying Vorontsov a two-way ticket, even though he is scheduled to leave permanently early next month.

[REDACTED] P1(b)(1)  
[REDACTED] P1(b)(1) For this reason, the letter Clinton-Yeltsin letter on its way to you is particularly important. Strobe has asked that we do all we can to get it out tonight.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Campanella, Anthony  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 1998 5:50 PM  
**To:** @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Black, Steven K.; Saunders, Richard M.; Fuerth, Leon S.; Marty, Joseph H.; Riedel, Bruce O.  
**Subject:** RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. RECALLED [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**Importance:** High

Paul Simons of State Deptmt reported that the Russian DCM called Ambassador Sestanovich to tell him that the Russian Ambassador to Washington has been recalled. There was no reason given, but State assesses that it is in regards to U.S.-UK actions in the Gulf.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 17, 1998



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Letter to President Yeltsin on Iraq

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a Presidential message to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq crisis. Strobe feels that a tailored message to Yeltsin may help cushion some of the Russian pique about the strikes.

Mamedov told Collins this morning that Primakov had reacted "very emotionally" to the strikes and was blindsided. The Vice President had a lengthy telephone conversation with Primakov on Thursday to explain that we went the extra mile to give Saddam a chance to comply and that our actions were fully consistent with existing UN Security Council resolutions. Despite our efforts, the Russians withdrew tonight their ambassador from Washington.

The letter underscores the continued importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and places the blame for the strikes squarely on Saddam's defiance. We strongly recommend a handwritten note from the President at the end of the letter to show the President's personal interest. The letter will be sent by confidential fax and will be double-tracked to Prime Minister Primakov's office.

Concurrence by: Leon Fuerth, Joe Marty *AW*

RECOMMENDATION


That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

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Reason: 1.5(d)  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER ✓  
SUBJECT: Letter to Russian President Yeltsin on Iraq

Purpose

Approve a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the Iraq crisis.

Background

Not surprisingly, the Russians have been highly critical of the airstrikes against Iraq. Strobe and I believe that a tailored message from you might help allay some of Yeltsin's and Primakov's anger over the strikes. The Vice President called Primakov on Thursday afternoon to reassure him that we gave Saddam more than enough chances to comply with his obligations and that our actions were fully authorized under existing UN Security Council resolutions. On Thursday evening, the Russians recalled their ambassador from Washington, who was scheduled to leave within a month.

Your letter outlines our rationale for the attack and rebuts Russia's public complaints. It also emphasizes the enduring importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and calls on the Russian leadership not to let Saddam drive a lasting wedge between us. A copy will also be provided to Prime Minister Primakov's office.


RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A and add the following handwritten note: "Boris - I know how committed you are to a better future for your country and to our partnership; I trust you know how deeply I share and support your goals. We must not let Saddam destroy what we have built."

Attachment  
Tab A Letter to President Yeltsin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 12/1



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11/10/10

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton  
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak  
Notetakers: David Higgins, Matt Sibley,  
Doug Bayley, Jim Smith

DATE, TIME: December 30, 1998, 10:00-10:33 a.m.,  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. It is nice to hear your voice. (U)


PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I think it is important for us now to talk about the future of Russia-U.S. relations. I have always shared with you in a very frank way our views about our relationship and have always paid heed to what you had to say. Through those very frank exchanges, on many occasions we proved we were able to find solutions to very critical and very crucial problems. (C)

I want to be quite straightforward. I want to tell you how sad and sorry I was about the military action by the U.S. and UK against Iraq. Because what is at stake is not just the person of Saddam Hussein but our relations with the U.S. I believe what we need to do now is reconstruct the unity of action in the UN Security Council, and also to actively work for our joint and agreed actions in the future. I am sure that we can draw lessons from what has happened because we must not allow the situation to happen which would impose a threat to the great and positive accomplishments that you and I have scored. (C)

We are faced now with quite a few very difficult tasks. Some of them we discussed when you came to Moscow in September, and we

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can not deal with all those unless there is a measure of good will from both sides. I talked to Primakov about Iraq. We have to turn what has not been the best page in Russian-U.S. relations. I got your message, and I agree with you the best way to get our relationship back on the right track is to try to move the action forward in practical steps and moves. At this point in time, one of those critical steps would be active steps forward in the Primakov-Gore Commission. I value very much their last conversation. (C)

The main task now is to move forward in the area of economic cooperation between Russia and the U.S., especially on the eve of the critical phase of the next round of our discussions with the IMF. I would like to continue to look forward to the support you promised before. (C)


We also agreed, you and I, that we must do everything to assure a very rapid transition from START II to START III. Of course, you are aware that I, myself, and Primakov, did everything we could to assure prompt and early ratification of the agreement. You are fully aware of that. Regrettably, at this point in time, prospects for passing this agreement have deteriorated. Still, despite this, we will move in a very straightforward and consistent way to get this task accomplished. (C)

To be able to move forward in this manner, I suggest you and I instruct Ivanov and Mrs. Albright, in the course of their meeting at the end of January, to concentrate on finding solutions to the CFE Treaty. This is really critical in terms of the future of European security and the future relationship between Russia and NATO. (C)

1999 will be a very important year in terms of the development of the Russian-U.S. relationship. In the foundation underneath that relationship, we must leave behind a very good inheritance. In concluding my remarks, I wish to extend to you and your family, very good wishes in the New Year. Now I pass the floor to you, Bill. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. First of all, I wanted to thank you for your good review of the issues. It is good to hear you sounding so good. (C)

Let me just briefly say a word or two about Iraq. I agree we have to figure out how to go beyond here and continue to build our relationship and keep it going. I obviously did not want to take military action. In March, when the memorandum Saddam



signed with Kofi Annan was violated, we didn't act militarily. In October, we went out of our way to avoid it. In November, when the Security Council voted to condemn Iraq 15-0, I called off the attack at the last minute because he said he would comply. The position we were in was that when the report came back saying he was not in compliance with UNSCOM, we and the British felt we had no choice. (C)

We have to figure out how we go from here. We can't let Saddam undermine the U.S.-Russian relationship. One thing I am very troubled by is the belligerence Iraq is showing against coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone. If they keep shooting missiles at our planes, this could lead to a very serious confrontation. I don't want further military action, but they need to stop that. (C)

Let me say a word about the agenda for 1999. It is very important for us to get started on supporting the Russian economic recovery, strengthening arms control, and stemming proliferation. I am encouraged Madeleine is coming to Moscow at the end of January, and, of course, Gore and Primakov will meet in March. It is important you and I give our teams the right tone, direction, and momentum. (C)

I understand the difficulties you have in ratifying START II now, but am glad you continue to support it. It would be terrible if you and I finish our terms without START II and START III. It would be good for our security interests and good for your economic interests. There would be no more tangible sign of our cooperation. On CFE, I, too, want to move as fast as we can. I will see what can be done. I know it is important to you, and the Duma has been holding up START on the basis of it. (C)

On the economy, let me just say, I think you know I want to do more to support your economic recovery and reform, and I obviously want to help all I can with the IMF. I think the entire international community is interested in supporting Russian reform with greater investment from both multilateral and private sources, building on a realistic program. As we discussed in the past, we believe you can get billions and billions of dollars in energy investment with changes in the laws to protect investments there. (C)

What is the critical thing here is a durable reform program that will lead to resumed cooperation with the IMF, which will bring support from the international community. That is also

important to restructure your external debt. We are also working on other measures with Primakov to help specific sectors of the Russian economy. ~~(C)~~

I want to do all I can, but I think Mr. Primakov's government has to support sufficient reform for me to convince the IMF to invest. It is important to get the whole world community putting money into Russia instead of taking money out. ~~(C)~~


The other thing I wanted to emphasize, the final thing, is we have to get this IMF deal done because that opens the door to all other good economic things. We will do all we can to help. We don't want to see the Russian people hurt any more, but there have to be some positive moves to get the IMF to move forward. ~~(C)~~

Well, Boris, I wanted to thank you again for the call. It was great to hear your voice. Please give Naina our best. Hillary sends you a big hug for the New Year. We have to work on all these things together, and we will. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I thank you, Bill, for what you just said. One final question I want to raise and that relates to the April summit in Washington. Of course, you should understand our final decision to participate would depend on the way the discussion goes forward concerning the new NATO strategy. We are very seriously concerned over plans underway to expand the theater of NATO activity. This would not take notice of UN Security Council decisions, and this is what really gives us a lot of concern. A lot of things depend on whether or not it is possible to find agreement on the CFE Treaty. I would say that we agreed with you that we need to turn this page in our relationship which has not been the best one. Let us stay the course. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I like that. I do hope Russia will be able to come to Washington in April. We have a good partnership between Russia and NATO. The agreement we signed is a good one; we don't have conflicting issues for the future. We need to discuss changes we are trying to make and walk you through them. I hope you can feel comfortable enough to have Russian participation. It would be a big plus, in view of the agreement we signed for a partnership between Russia and NATO. ~~(C)~~

I look forward to talking and working with you. Thank you for the phone call. It has been a good one, I think. ~~(C)~~



PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I also think we have had a very constructive conversation, and we really got to understand what each of us was telling the other. What remains is to work until we realize what was just discussed. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Please pass my best wishes to all the members of your family. I wish you a happy New Year and Merry Christmas. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. Good bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

