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→ RWANDA

Aide-mémoire de la Mission Conjointe
Gouvernement rwandais-Front Patriotique Rwandais
au sujet de la création et du déploiement d'une
Force Internationale Neutre au Rwanda

New York, le 16 septembre 1993

0- Nature et Mission de la Force Internationale Neutre

Le Gouvernement rwandais et le Front Patriotique Rwandais ont adressé une requête conjointe au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, le 11 juin 1993, lui demandant la création et le déploiement rapide d'une Force Internationale Neutre (FIN) sous la responsabilité et le commandement des Nations Unies pour la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de Paix, qui a été signé le 4 août 1993 à Arusha (Tanzanie).

Cette requête, tout comme le Protocole d'Accord entre le Gouvernement rwandais et le Front Patriotique Rwandais sur l'Intégration des Forces des deux parties (article 54) détaillent les missions que les deux parties souhaitent voir assignées à la FIN, spécialement des missions de sécurité et des missions de supervision du processus de formation de l'Armée Nationale et de la Gendarmerie Nationale.

L'article 72 du Protocole d'Accord susmentionné lie la mise en place des Institutions de la Transition, à savoir le Gouvernement de Transition à Base élargie et l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition ainsi que le processus de désengagement et d'intégration des forces armées des deux parties à un déploiement préalable de la FIN.

Le calendrier de mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de paix, qui prévoit que les Institutions de la Transition doivent être mises en place dans les 37 jours qui suivent la signature de l'Accord de Paix (article 7 de l'Accord de Paix), n'a pas pu être respecté jusqu'à présent parce que la FIN n'est pas encore créée et déployée.

Compte tenu du rôle primordial que les deux parties ont accordé à la FIN dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de Paix, elles ont décidé d'envoyer une mission conjointe pour prier le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et le Conseil de sécurité afin qu'une décision positive intervienne le plus rapidement possible, sous forme d'une Résolution du Conseil de sécurité, pour la création et le déploiement d'une Force Internationale Neutre au Rwanda.

La nécessité et l'urgence d'un déploiement rapide de cette Force s'imposent pour plusieurs raisons:

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I- Raisons à caractère politique

1) Le peuple rwandais exige que le retard accusé dans le calendrier de mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de Paix soit rattrapé parce que s'il est prolongé, ce retard, spécialement dans la mise en place des Institutions de la transition, constituerait un risque d'effondrement de tout le processus de paix.

2) La volonté politique qui anime les deux parties pourrait être ébranlée si les institutions politiques n'étaient pas rapidement mises en place.

3) Les 50.000 combattants des 2 parties encore dans leurs positions peuvent, à force d'attendre les décisions politiques, céder à l'énervement compte tenu des conditions difficiles qu'ils vivent sur le terrain, et porter atteinte au cessez-le-feu.

II- Raisons à caractère humanitaire:

1) Le retour des personnes déplacées dans leurs biens ne peut se faire qu'après le désengagement des forces déployées actuellement dans les positions de combat, et le désengagement ainsi que le déminage ne peuvent être supervisés que par la FIN.

2) La saison de pluie qui s'annonce va encore une fois trouver les déplacés de guerre à la belle étoile alors que les 2 parties ont signé un accord de paix;

3) Ces personnes déplacées doivent être réinstallées le plus rapidement possible pour ne pas manquer de nouveau la saison culturale de septembre-octobre 93 et rester à la merci de la famine;

4) La rentrée scolaire de septembre-octobre 1993 est une urgence pour les enfants des zones touchées par la guerre afin que ces derniers ne râtent pas une quatrième année scolaire au risque de tomber dans la descolarisation ou l'analphabétisme.

5) Le rapatriement des réfugiés rwandais qui ont hâte de rentrer dans leur patrie ne peut se faire qu'après la mise en place du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie qui est chargé de programmer et d'exécuter ce rapatriement. La mise en place de ce Gouvernement est lié pour sa part au déploiement de la FIN comme vu ci-dessus.

III- Raisons à caractère économique

Le désengagement des forces armées des deux parties va permettre la réutilisation de la Route de Transit du Corridor Nord (Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura) et ainsi relancer les échanges économiques dans la région.

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B- Taille de la FIN

La taille (effectifs) de la FIN doit être fixée en fonction des facteurs suivants:

1) Importance et complexité des missions assignées à la FIN;

2) Le relief très montagneux du Rwanda qui rend les mouvements plus difficiles que dans le cas d'un terrain plat,

3) L'importance des effectifs des militaires des deux parties (dont le total est de plus de 50.000 personnes) dont il faut superviser le désengagement, le processus d'intégration et le processus de démobilisation,

4) La présence d'un bataillon FPR à Kigali et donc la mise côte à côte, dans la capitale, des militaires de 2 parties non encore intégrés peut constituer, comme on l'a vu sous d'autres cieux, un danger au processus de paix; d'où la nécessité de la présence d'une Force Internationale Neutre suffisante à Kigali.

C- Durée de la Mission de la FIN au Rwanda

La durée de la période de transition est fixée à 22 mois.

Cependant, il y aura lieu de considérer les modalités de déploiement ainsi que les modalités de désengagement (fin de la mission) en deux phases pour chaque cas.

1) Déploiement

Afin de ne pas retarder davantage la mise en place des Institutions de la Transition, il est suggéré de déployer le plus rapidement possible, les premiers éléments de la FIN, si possible fin septembre-début octobre 1993.

Les autres contingents seraient déployés un peu après pour renforcer les premiers contingents afin de couvrir toutes les missions assignées à la FIN.

2) Désengagement de la FIN

La fin de la mission de la FIN peut également être conçue en deux phases:

- Une réduction considérable des effectifs peut intervenir à la fin du processus d'intégration des forces armées des deux parties ainsi que du processus de démobilisation.

- Le reste des effectifs réduits pourraient être maintenu jusqu'aux élections générales prévues à la fin de la période de la Transition.

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D- CONCLUSION

Vu la demande pressante de la population rwandaise de mettre en place les institutions de Transition chargées de la mise en application de l'Accord de Paix,

La mission conjointe Gouvernement Rwandais-FPR sollicite la compréhension du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, et du Conseil de sécurité et leur demande ce qui suit:

1) l'adoption urgente de la résolution par le Conseil de sécurité en faveur du déploiement rapide de la Force Internationale Neutre au Rwanda;

2) envisager un déploiement gradué des effectifs de la FIN dont les premiers éléments sont souhaités au Rwanda avant le 10 octobre 1993.

3) comme prévu à l'article 53 du Protocole d'Accord sur l'intégration des Forces Armées des deux parties, incorporer dans les premiers éléments de la FIN les membres du GOMN (une compagnie) qui présentent l'avantage d'être actuellement sur place.

Fait à New York, le 16 septembre 1993

Dr. Anastase GASANA
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération
Chef de la délégation conjointe Gouvernement rwandais- FPR

Patrick MAZIMHAKA
Commissaire aux Relations Extérieures du FPR,
Adjoint au Chef de la délégation Gouvernement rwandais- FPR

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CC: JENNIFER WARD
NSC

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 22, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM
DECL:OADR

TO: AF - Mr. Moose

THROUGH: AF - Prudence Bushnell

FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render AR for AR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Joint Rwandan Government-RPF Delegation, Friday, September 24

I. PARTICIPANTS AND PURPOSE

You are scheduled to meet with Rwandan Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana and RPF Commissioner for Foreign Relations Patrick Mazimpaka, on Friday, September 24, beginning at 3:00 P.M. in your office. Gasana is heading a joint GOR/RPF delegation, which requested this meeting. We expect the delegation to seek U.S. support for deployment of a UN-led Neutral International Force (NIF) to help assure security during the transition and to oversee encampment, disarmament, force integration, and demobilization.

Desk officer Kevin Aiston will escort Gasana and Mazimpaka to your office and serve as notetaker, while I and Tony Marley will meet with the rest of the joint delegation in the AF Conference Room. When your meeting has concluded, Gasana and Mazimpaka will join our larger meeting. While in Washington, the joint delegation will also be calling on IO DAS George Ward, NSC Jennifer Ward, OSD/ISA/AFR James Woods, and probably USAID officials.

II. KEY POINTS

- The U.S. continues to support the peace process in Rwanda, and we understand the need for a rapid decision on deployment of a Neutral International Force to help implement the peace accords.

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- We welcomed the dispatch of the UN reconnaissance team and look forward to the release the UN Secretariat's report, which should greatly facilitate final decision on this crucial issue.

- We are actively discussing the NIF within our government and with others in the Security Council. However, we believe that a final decision on this issue cannot be made until the Secretariat has released its report.

- We are encouraged that, even in the absence of a international peacekeeping force, both the GOR and RPF continue to pursue a peaceful transition. Your continued cooperation and regular contact are a testament to your commitment to the peace process.

- We would be interested in hearing your views concerning the type of peacekeeping force you believe is necessary. In particular, how many troops did you envision and for what duration would they be deployed?

III. BACKGROUND

In the absence of a neutral international peacekeeping force (NIF), the GOR and RPF agreed on September 4 to defer formation of a broad-based transitional government, which was supposed to occur by September 10. However, the two sides have held regular meetings in an effort to promote implementation of the peace accords, with President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe meeting face-to-face on Rwandan soil on September 12. As part of this cooperative effort, the two sides agreed to send a joint delegation to New York and Washington to press for Security Council approval of a peacekeeping operation. The joint delegation also plans to visit Ottawa and Paris.

The Joint Delegation's Demarche on USUN

The delegation met with Ambassador Albright on September 16 and urged rapid deployment of a NIF to allow the interim government to form and begin the process of force integration. FM Gasana implied that there might be unrest or a breaking of the ceasefire if a peacekeeping force is not deployed soon and warned that the thousands of displaced may be threatened with widespread famine unless they can return to their homes in time for the upcoming planting season.

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Gasana told Ambassador Albright that he envisioned a peacekeeping force of six battalions (4200 troops), although he acknowledged that two battalions would provide enough security for the transition government to get underway. (NB: Although the GOR and RPF sent a joint delegation, the two sides apparently have somewhat differing views on the necessary size of the force. The RPF has stated in the past that a force of 500 to 1,000 men would probably be sufficient.) Ambassador Albright told the joint delegation that we were waiting to see the UN report, but cautioned that the Security Council was paying a great deal of attention to the escalating peacekeeping budget.

Probable UN Proposal For Peacekeeping Force

A UN assessment team visited Rwanda in late August and its findings will ultimately be turned into a report from the Secretary General to the Security Council. Although the Secretary General's report is still pending, P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) the team's findings point toward a wholly UN, multi-stage operation with troop numbers varying over the length of the operation. In the initial stage, the UN would rapidly deploy a small force to allow the transition government to get underway. Additional troops would be deployed in the next stage, which would cover the disarmament and force integration. Forces would then be drawn down in the final phase, covering the period from force integration to the end of the 22-month transition period.

The UN reconnaissance team envisioned that the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group ("NMOG"), which now numbers about 115 men, would "hold the fort" until the UN force arrives. The individual NMOG contingents might then be folded into the UN force or could simply withdraw. We will not know the total size or cost of the force envisioned by the UN team until the Secretary General publishes his report.

French Proposal For Peacekeeping Force

Deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda is a top foreign policy objective of the French. The French have told us that they support a force of approximately 1,000 peacekeepers for Rwanda, with 500-600 to be deployed in Kigali and the remainder elsewhere in the country. The French insist

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on UN troops in Kigali, and they must be deployed all at once. Otherwise, the GOR will not ask France's 300 troops to withdraw, and the RPF as a result would be unable to join the coalition government. The French said they are willing to be flexible on other issues, such as total force size and the use of OAU NMOG forces and phased deployment outside the capital. We do not know whether the French have communicated their proposal to the Rwandans, although they have told us that they can take credit for talking the Rwandans down from higher troop figures.

Attachment: Biographic Information

Drafted: AF/C:KCAiston
SECC 3072, X73139, 09/22/93

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DECL: OADR

BIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Anastase GASANA RWANDA
(Phonetic: gaSAHna)

Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation
(since July 1993)

Gasana was appointed Foreign Minister in the interim government on July 18, 1993. Prior to his appointment, he served as the Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, where he advised then Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (now the interim Prime Minister). Gasana is a member of the Prime Minister's MDR party.

Gasana is known to the U.S. Embassy P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) The Embassy reports that his academic credentials from the Sorbonne are excellent.

22 September 1993

Drafted:AF/C:KAiston

Sources: 93 Kigali 02652

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File RWANDA

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 4, 1993

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MEMORANDUM

TO:	NSC	-	Richard Clarke
			Susan Rice
			Jennifer Ward
	OSD/PK/PE	-	Sara Sewell
			Richard Brennan
	OSD/ISA/AFR	-	James Woods
			Vince Kern
			LTC Mike Harvin
	JCS/J-5	-	ADM Frank Bowman
			LTC Piotter
			LCDR Robert Williams
	OMB	-	Gordon Adams
	IO	-	George Ward
	IO/PHO	-	John Brims
			David Jensen
	IO/UNP	-	Joseph Snyder
			Susan Zelle
	PM	-	Steven Simon
	PM/ISO	-	Alex Margulies
	PM/DRSA	-	Joe Bowab
	CIA/NIC	-	P3/(b)(3)
	USUN	-	Rick Indenfurth
			David Shefford
	P	-	Bruce Thomas
			Esther Brimmer

FROM: AF - Prudence Bushnell PB

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping in Rwanda

We invite you to attend a meeting on Friday, August 6 at 2 pm at the State Department, room 3519, to determine whether the USG should support a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. You have already received an analysis of all the various options in a paper dated July 26 (circulated to all addressee offices and attached for your convenience). It seems increasingly apparent that the least expensive option that will meet our peacekeeping objectives is the one recommended by Ambassador Flaten (option five). Based on the latest developments in the field, we

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believe that this limited approach will provide the necessary level of security at a much lower cost (approximately $8 million for one year) than the much larger PKO forces (costing approximately $37.5 million) contemplated in the other principal options.

With today's signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, time is of the essence. The two sides are counting on deployment of a neutral international force to help establish a climate of security and confidence during which they can launch a transition government and start the military integration and demobilization process. A good beginning may make the difference between success and failure. Without it, the risk of renewed war and continuing emergency aid requirements (predicted to cost the USG at least $35 million this fiscal year) will be greatly increased.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted:AF/C:RMPringle
8/3/93, 7-2080
W-SECB 4944

Clearance:AF/C:KAiston

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 26, 1993

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DECL:OADR

TO: AF/FO - DAS Bushnell

FROM: AF/RA - LTC Anthony Marley
AF/C - Kevin Aiston

SUBJECT: Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda

This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.

Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the ultimate size of the force.

The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the integration of forces into the new national army and gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the entirety of Rwanda (10,169 square miles, approximately the size of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.

The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as pro-RPF.

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There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the neutral buffer zone.

Options. Six options are currently being considered for a peacekeeping force for Rwanda:

Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically and in command positions.)

Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, plus $375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated $3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about $37.5 million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the U.S. would be roughly $11 million for one year.

- Advantages:

  - The only force trusted by all parties
  - The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping organization
  - Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the Secretariat
  - Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN peacekeeping operations (both within USG and other countries)
  - Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping efforts
  - Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
  - Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in command of the entire operation
  - Would allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali (approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the capital) without losing face

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- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at $100 million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over $34 million) and obviating the need for future relief.
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as the primary body to conduct peacekeeping

• Disadvantages:

- Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation would be problematic
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own resources, as might be required by a UN operation
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation

An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel, operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost the international community at least the same amount as a UN operation (approximately $2.5 million per month reimbursed to donating countries plus $375,000 per month in operating costs), as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip transport costs of $3 million, would be $37.5 million.

• Advantages:

- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the heavily committed United Nations

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- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would provide a confidence building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)

• Disadvantages:

- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not undertake a peacekeeping mission
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping efforts
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda

Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)

Estimated costs to the international community of approximately $3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of $120 per day equals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at approximately $2.4 million per month, plus $375,000 per month for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of $3 million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $39 million.

• Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at least a small OAU force would already be on the ground

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- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and possible peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan parties
- UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

• Disadvantages:

- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command of the entire operation
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to the UN for operational command.
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
- The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda

Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force

Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid for through a voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the contributors. The costs to the international community would be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable salaries (for UN and OAU forces), $225,000 in operating costs per month, and $1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport, for an estimated total of $17.1 million for a one year operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)

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- Advantages:

  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
  - Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
  - Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the operation
  - Might minimize Russian opposition
  - Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and a probable peacekeeping success
  - Active UN involvement and participation of non-African observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government of Rwanda
  - Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

- Disadvantages:

  - Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
  - France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
  - France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
  - France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops from Rwanda
  - Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial association with Rwanda
  - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
  - The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
  - The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
  - OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command"

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Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ

Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at $620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately $725,000, or roughly $8 million per year.

- Advantages

  - Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options actively being considered
  - Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional government to begin functioning. If the coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
  - Does not require any command relationship between the UN and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both organizations.
  - An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
  - Could probably be deployed more quickly that a full-scale UN PKO
  - Requires far less manpower from the UN
  - The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
  - Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and benefit from its PKO expertise
  - Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly if conducted as a voluntary operation)
  - Active UN involvement and participation of non-African forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan government.
  - UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
  - Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems.
  - Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
  - Canada, among others, has informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
  - Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG

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- Disadvantages

- Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.
- The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.
- Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN portion could prove problematic.
- It may be impractical to include troops from more than one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove difficult to find one country willing to accept the responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.
- The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN PKOs

Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:

There would be no cost to the international community for peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would probably continue at or above current high levels (at least $100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide $34 million in humanitarian aid).

- Advantage:

- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community

- Disadvantages:

- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO
- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
- International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa
- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping support
- Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a successful end to the civil war)
- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort

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RWANDA

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

July 16, 1993

TO: AF - DAS Bushnell

FROM: AF/RA - LTC Marley

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda

Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign the peace accords ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the ultimate size of the force. The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the encampment and disarming of combattant forces, supervison of the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the integration of forces into the new national army and gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. The NIF's geographical span of control will encompass the entirety of Rwanda (10,169 square miles, approximately the size of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.

The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as pro-RPF.

Expand & hold the line

There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 personnel by the end of July, but the NMOG mandate will remain unchanged. NMOG is charged with monitoring of military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the neutral buffer zone.

Small NIF to help govt.

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USG support for a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda meets the criteria listed in PRD-13 (see attachment).

Options. We see five options for a peacekeeping force for Rwanda:

Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel could form an important part of an UN force, both numerically and in command positions.)

Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost approximately $2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, plus $250,000 per month in operating costs, or $33 million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the U.S. would be $10 million for one year.

- Advantages:

  - The only force trusted by all parties
  - The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping organization
  - Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the Secretariat
  - Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN peacekeeping operations (both within USG and other countries)
  - Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping efforts
  - Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
  - Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in command of the entire operation
  - Would allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali (approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the capital) without losing face
  - Would allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel by seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
  - Total cost of a UN PKO is less than 40 percent of the estimated cost of humanitarian aid to displaced persons ($33 million versus $100 million), with the USG's assessed share of PKO only 30 percent of its pledged share of humanitarian aid ($10 million versus $34 million)
  - Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as the primary body to conduct peacekeeping

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• Disadvantages:

- Russia (and possibly UK) may veto an assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither contributes significantly to the emergency humanitarian aid bill)
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find states willing to provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk providing resources "out of its hide" through various UN funding mechanisms
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation

Force composed of approximately 2500 personnel could be expected to cost the international community at least the same amount as a UN operation (approximately $2.5 million per month reimbursed to donating countries plus $250,000 per month in operating costs), as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost for a one year operation would be $33 million.

• Advantages:

- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the heavily committed United Nations
- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would provide a confidence building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)

• Disadvantages:

- Is contrary to what the Rwandan parties desire
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping efforts
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not undertake a peacekeeping mission

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- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- Makes it bureaucratically more difficult for the USG to provide financial assistance to the operation
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda

Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)

Estimated costs to the international community of approximately $2.92 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of $120 per day equals $252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at approximately $2.4 million per month, plus $250,000 per month for operating costs). Estimated cost for a one year operation would be $35.04 million.

- Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Could probably be deployed more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation
- Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (60-70 observers/monitors vs up to 2500 peacekeepers)
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Would probably minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding and materiel to the OAU
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and possible peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African observers, would probably make this acceptable to the Rwandan parties
- UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility to address Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

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- Disadvantages:

  - Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
  - Would be the most expensive option
  - Since funding for the non-UN portion of such a hybrid operation would possibly be problematic, the OAU (and possibly the Rwandan Government) may object on fiscal grounds
  - UN SYG Boutros-Ghali has already indicated to OAU SYG Salim Salim that he is disinclined to see the UN provide funding to the OAU for OAU peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda
  - The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command of the entire operation
  - OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to the UN for operational command.
  - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
  - The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda

Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force

Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid for through a voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the contributors. The costs to the international community would be approximately $1.1 million per month in reimbursable salaries (for the UN and OAU forces) and $200,000 in operating costs per month, for a total of $15.6 million for a one year operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)

- Advantages:

  - Would be the least expensive option
  - Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
  - Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
  - Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU

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- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the operation
- Might minimize Russian opposition
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and a probable peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government of Rwanda
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

• Disadvantages:

- Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic Front
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
- France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops from Rwanda
- France has stated that it realizes that it would not be accepted by the RPF as a neutral member of a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial association with Rwanda
- Neither France nor Belgium has indicated any interest in unilaterally providing troops to Rwanda as a <u>peacekeeping</u> force (both have deployed troops during the conflict in defense of the Government of Rwanda)
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- UN SYG Boutros-Ghali has already indicated to OAU SYG Salim Salim that he is disinclined to see the UN provide funding to the OAU for OAU peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda
- The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command"

<u>Option 5</u> - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:

There would be no cost to the international community for peacekeepers or observers but humanitarian costs would, at a minimum, remain constant at $100 million per year, with the USG pledged to provide $34 million in humanitarian aid.

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- Advantage:

  - Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community

- Disadvantages:

  - Will perpetuate relief costs, which in Rwanda are approximately 3 times higher than estimated peacekeeping costs
  - Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
  - International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa
  - Would set a bad precedent; other conflict countries might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping support
  - Ignores USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions
  - Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democraticization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a successful end to the civil war)
  - Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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ANNEX

The NIF Clearly Meets the Criteria of PRD-13

A. There Is a Threat to International Peace and Stability, Defined as One or a Combination of the Following: International Aggression; a Humanitarian Disaster Requiring Urgent Action, Coupled with Violence; Sudden and Unexpected Interruption of Established Democracy or Gross Violations of Human Rights, Coupled with Violence or the Threat Thereof.

The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people and resulted in thousands of military and civilian casualties. Most of the displaced depend on international aid to survive and many will be unable to return to their farms before the end of the planting season, raising the specter of mass starvation. The area has a long history of ethnic massacres against unarmed civilians. As recently as January of this year, forces loyal to the government attacked Tutsi civilians, leading to over 300 deaths. These horrendous conditions clearly satisfy the first criterion of PRD-13.

B. There Is an International Community of Interest for Dealing with the Problem on a Multilateral Basis.

This second criterion is easily met, since the international community has been dealing with this problem on a multilateral basis for at least a year. The OAU and Tanzania have shown their keen interest in this crisis by sponsoring and pushing peace talks in Arusha, and the U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, neighboring African countries, and the UN have all been actively involved as observers. The UN Security Council has been seized of this matter for several months and, on June 22, unanimously approved a border monitoring force on the Ugandan side of the Rwanda/Uganda border to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda. Finally, the OAU is already on the ground with its NMOG contingent monitoring the ceasefire.

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C. There Are Clear Objectives, Including an Understanding of Where the Mission Fits on the Spectrum Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.

The proposed NIF is a traditional peacekeeping mission. A ceasefire exists and is holding and both sides have requested the PKO. As agreed by the two sides, the primary mandate of the NIF would be to implement the peace accords, using traditional peacekeeping methods. In general, the NIF would be expected to:

-- Supervise the assembly and cantonment of opposing troops

-- Supervise disarmament and oversee storage of heavy arms

-- Supervise force integration and demobilization

This is a classic peacekeeping mission, and one that the UN has ample experience performing. The final peace accords will probably also request that the NIF assure security during the transition period, which might imply some peace enforcement, assuming the NIF accepts that mandate.

D. The Means to Accomplish the Mission Are Available, Including Forces, Financing and a Mandate (Regional or UN) Appropriate to the Mission.

Unlike so many global and African conflicts, the Rwandan crisis really appears solvable, if only the international community would provide its full support. The means for a UN-led NIF are available. The OAU already has troops on the ground. Addis may soon increase the NMOG to 240 and could be expected to support an increase beyond that level. These troops could be seconded to the UN and serve as a bridge and an advance force for the NIF. In addition, France has troops on the ground under a bilateral agreement with the Government. The French wish to remove these troops once the crisis has been resolved and, to facilitate their withdrawal, the French Government may be willing to provide financial assistance toward mounting a credible NIF. Canada has indicated a willingness to provide troops, and the U.S., France, and Belgium (the former colonial power) have already offered to work on force planning, on a "friends of the Secretary General" basis.

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While some may argue that financing is the one sticking point, any rational cost assessment of this issue points to NIF deployment over inaction. Without an NIF, the displaced cannot return home. Estimates for humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed $100 million. This is three times more costly than the envisioned UN-led NIF of 2,500 men, which would cost an estimated $33 million for one year's deployment. Looking at it from a U.S. perspective, the argument for a UN force is even more compelling. Our pledged share of the humanitarian costs (already $34 million) is three and one-half times more costly than our assessed share of the UN PKO would be.

Moreover, without a credible (i.e., UN-led) NIF, hostilities would probably resume, only adding to the humanitarian aid bill. When one factors in the additional costs associated with retarded economic development, which would inevitably result from a resumption of hostilities, the costs of the NIF pale in comparison. By any measure, deployment of the NIF would be far more cost effective, and would save untold lives and bring an end to the human suffering in a country that has suffered too long already.

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RWANDA

PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP MEETING
July 7, 1993
Talking Points on Rwanda

AF POSITION:

-- There is an urgent need for a UN-led Neutral International Force (NIF) to implement the Rwandan peace accords. Both sides assume that a UN-led NIF will be in place to provide security for force integration and installation of a broad-based transitional government. Without an NIF, the peace process, which has come so far, may unravel, leading to renewed fighting, large scale ethnic bloodshed, and regional destabilization.

-- If the UN is to provide the NIF, planning must begin now so that the NIF can be in place immediately after the accords are signed. The UN should send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda to begin planning, which would have the added effect of giving a significant boost to the peace negotiations.

-- The existing OAU NMOG could form the advance team for the UN-led NIF. However, pressure must be put on the OAU to expand the NMOG and to hold the promised donor's meeting to finance the expansion.

-- If a UN-led NIF meets resistance in the Security Council, the U.S. should propose a hybrid operation in which a significantly expanded NMOG (perhaps 500-600 men) would serve as the NIF, with the UN sending a small observer mission to monitor the operation and serve as technical advisers.

WHAT WAS AGREED AND WHY:

-- UNSC Resolution 846, dated June 22, 1993, established a small UN observer force to monitor the Ugandan side of the Rwanda/Uganda border to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda. 81 observers are expected to be deployed, beginning within 15 days of the resolution. The estimated cost would be $8.5 million for an initial six months period.

-- The resolution also calls on the Secretary General to report on the contribution the UN could make to assist the OAU in implementing the peace accords, and to begin contingency planning in the event the Security Council decides a contribution is needed.

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-- The U.S. supported the border force to underscore international support for a political settlement. The force makes the RPF's military option more difficult and thus facilitates the peace process. In addition, the French lobbied hard for the force and we, in turn, would like French support for expanding the NMOG, developing the OAU's peacekeeping capacity, and deploying a UN-led NIF.

RWANDA II: PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL FORCE

-- At present, Russia and the UK have expressed concerns about the financial costs of a UN-led NIF. Russia in particular fears that a UN force in Rwanda could set a precedent for drawing the UN into every conflict in Africa. While the Russians recognize the need for a peacekeeping operation, they may insist that any UN-led force be financed by voluntary contributions.

-- The U.S. and France support a UN-led NIF, but we will have to push hard for support. We must argue that preventative diplomacy through deployment of a UN-led NIF would save lives and is far more cost effective than picking up the pieces after fighting resumes. As a fall-back position, we should consider an OAU/NMOG-led NIF, with UN observers assisting. This would give the NMOG operation greater credibility while addressing UN cost concerns.

-- Although the NMOG's mandate has been extended to July 31, the planned expansion from 50 to 240 officers still has not occurred. Addis has agreed to expansion but the NMOG commander is less enthusiastic about the enterprise.

-- Even after the planned expansion, the NMOG probably would not have the experience or manpower necessary to ensure security, keep the forces separated, and oversee demobilization and force integration. However, the parties expect the NMOG to serve as a bridge and ultimately an advance party for the UN NIF.

-- Using the OAU forces as the backbone of the NIF (either under UN command or with UN observers assisting) will serve to train the OAU for future peacekeeping actions. Ultimately, they may be able to field large-scale peacekeeping operations without UN assistance. "Training" the OAU in this area would advance Boutros Ghali's agenda for peace and development of regional organizations. It is also in line with AF's policy of strengthening the capacity of the OAU to resolve regional disputes, enabling it to relieve the overburdened UN in the future.

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RWANDA

RW - PREL-UN - Briefs

United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520-3430

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DECL:OADR

TO: IO - Douglas Bennett

FROM: AF - Edward Brynn, Acting

SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN/OAU Peacekeeping Initiatives

We need your help and support for a pending UNSC resolution proposing establishment of a small military observer group on the Uganda/Rwanda border. We believe this initiative, together with advance planning for a separate United Nations/Organization for African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping force to be deployed after a settlement, are essential to safeguard against a major new escalation of violence.

Background

Longstanding ethnic conflict in Rwanda that created some 1.5 million refugees was rekindled in October 1990 by an exile invasion from Uganda; the conflict has since displaced over one million of the 7.5 million population. Estimates for humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone are $137 million, with the USG providing some $30 million. The conflict has weakened the economy and added to instability in a region already shaken by problems in Zaire and Angola. With strong impetus from the USG, discussions on a political resolution to the conflict began in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1992. We have been participating as an observer to these talks along with the French, Belgians, Germans, surrounding African countries, the OAU, and the UN. A ceasefire was established August 1, 1992 and both sides appear committed to signing a peace agreement within the next few weeks. Since September 1992 the OAU has fielded a small Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the ceasefire.

OAU/UN Initiatives

Although France is the major player in Rwanda, we have promoted conflict resolution initiatives. In line with the Syg's Agenda for Peace, one of AF's policy goals has been to strengthen the OAU's capacity for conflict resolution now in order to

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relieve the overburdened UN in the future. Rwanda is a test case for the OAU and we continue to seek UN technical and logistical assistance as a long-term objective. We are assisting the OAU bilaterally to expand the NMOG, but the regional organization is not capable of handling two other peacekeeping tasks currently under consideration, as follows.

1. UN border force: Boutros Ghali forwarded to the Security Council this week the report of the UN technical mission on establishing a border observer force between Uganda and Rwanda. Uganda and Rwanda have both requested the force to monitor their common border and verify whether lethal weapons are crossing from Uganda to Rwanda. We believe that a small (81) military observer group on the five main roads would reduce fears of another attack by the rebel forces, facilitate the peace process in Arusha, and underscore international support for a political settlement. Initial discussions with DOD and IO indicate that, with some modifications, the small military observer group proposed by the UN technical mission may be both feasible and justified. The French have pushed this issue at the UN as a high priority and have repeatedly sought our support. In turn, we have sought French support for expanding the OAU NMOG and developing the OAU's peacekeeping capacity. Failure to support the French resolution will have a strong negative impact on U.S./French relations which are currently strained over other issues.

2. UN Peacekeeping Force: The peace negotiations discussions will probably call for a UN-led peacekeeping force, following signing of the Arusha agreement, with existing OAU troops seconded to the UN force. The UN and OAU observers in Arusha have sent scenarios to their respective headquarters to this effect. No one believes that the OAU, in its nascent peacekeeping role, could perform the more involved role of implementing the peace agreement. We recently sent instructions to USUN for another joint French/Belgian/U.S. demarche on Boutros Ghali urging the UN to begin planning, on a contingency basis and without committing the UN, for a peacekeeping force during the transition period. We believe the Rwandan conflict is solvable and that failure to implement a peace agreement will seriously impact the region as well as throw Rwanda into the chaos of wide-scale ethnic violence. The Rwandan conflict meets most of the criteria proposed in PRD-13 on peacekeeping, and intervention now could prevent heavy financial and human costs later on.

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SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S JANUARY 15
LETTER ON RWANDAN DISPLACED PERSONS

1. FOLLOWING IS A RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S

JANUARY 15 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH CONCERNING THE PLIGHT OF RWANDANS DISPLACED BY CIVIL WAR. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THESE POINTS TO THE GOF VIA DEMARCHE AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL. DUE TO THE TIME ELAPSED AND THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIONS THERE WILL BE NO RESPONSE IN LETTER FORM.

2. BEGIN POINTS:

-- ON JANUARY 15, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WROTE TO PRESIDENT BUSH CONCERNING THE PLIGHT OF RWANDAN CITIZENS DISPLACED BY CIVIL WAR. THE LETTER WAS NEVER ANSWERED DUE TO THE CHANGEOVER BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS IN NO WAY SIGNIFIES A LACK OF U.S. CONCERN FOR THE HUMAN SUFFERING IN RWANDA.

-- AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S LETTER, THE U.S. HAD ALREADY PROVIDED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF EMERGENCY FOOD AND SHELTER TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA.

UNFORTUNATELY THE SITUATION HAS TAKEN ANOTHER TRAGIC TURN SINCE THEN AS A RESULT OF RESUMED FIGHTING. THE NUMBER OF THOSE DISPLACED HAS RISEN FROM 350,000 TO ALMOST ONE MILLION, WHO WILL BE THREATENED WITH STARVATION UNLESS THE WAR STOPS AND THEY CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND HARVEST THEIR ABANDONED CROPS.

-- IN RESPONSE TO THIS NEW CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE HAS ALREADY COMMITTED MORE THAN A MILLION DOLLARS' WORTH OF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE. FOOD AIRLIFTS BY THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM BEGAN FEBRUARY 25, AND A PLANELOAD OF BLANKETS AND OTHER ITEMS

PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ARRIVED MARCH 3. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO OTHER MEANS BY WHICH WE CAN RESPOND FURTHER.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF

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FRANCE AND OTHER DONORS IN PROVIDING ADDITIONAL RELIEF AS NEEDED. EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU TO SEEK A RAPID NEGOTIATED END TO THE RWANDAN CIVIL WAR AND THEREBY ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM.

CHRISTOPHER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 140600
JPM/RHC
French

The President of the Republic

Paris, January 15, 1993

Mr. President:

Like France, the United States is anxious to see stability preserved in Rwanda. At the invitation of the two Parties, it is participating as an observer in the negotiations being held in Arusha between representatives of the Rwandan Government and a delegation from the armed rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

These negotiations must lead to free elections in Rwanda in the near future. It is also essential that they allow displaced persons to be swiftly returned to the lands from which they were driven by the fighting.

There are currently 350,000 people living in tragic conditions. Suffering from malnutrition and food shortages, particularly among the younger children, they must cope with

His Excellency
George Bush,
President of the United States of America

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the lack of both hygiene and privacy and the idleness inherent when people are crowded together in such a manner.

In addition to their dire plight, I wish to emphasize the danger these people displaced by war pose in terms of security in an overpopulated country subject to extreme political tensions and a mounting crime rate.

The assistance lent by the Red Cross, the World Food Program, the European Community, and other donor countries or non-governmental organizations is no longer sufficient to meet the food needs of these people and restore to them a modicum of dignity.

In view of this tragic situation, a supplementary effort must be made. France, for its part, has decided to earmark F10 million this year to aid those displaced by war in Rwanda.

I wish that other countries, including the United States, which has always shown concern for Rwanda, would also participate in this humanitarian effort.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration. [Handwritten: Yours faithfully,]

[Signature]

François Mitterrand

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LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 15 Janvier 1993

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Monsieur le Président,

Votre pays est, comme la France, soucieux de voir préservée la stabilité au Rwanda. A l'invitation des deux parties, il participe en tant qu'observateur aux négociations qui se déroulent à Arusha entre des représentants du gouvernement rwandais et une délégation de la rébellion armée, le Front patriotique Rwandais.

Ces négociations doivent conduire à la tenue, à échéance rapprochée, d'élections libres au Rwanda. Il est essentiel qu'elles permettent aussi le retour rapide des personnes déplacées sur les terres dont elles ont été chassées par les combats.

Aujourd'hui, 350.000 personnes vivent dans des conditions dramatiques. Souffrant de sous-alimentation et de carences alimentaires, surtout les jeunes enfants, elles doivent faire face au manque d'hygiène, à la promiscuité et au désoeuvrement inhérents à de tels regroupements de personnes.

.../...

S.E. Monsieur George BUSH
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

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A côté de l'extrême gravité de la situation des intéressés, je tiens à souligner les risques que représentent ces déplacés de guerre en matière de sécurité dans un pays surpeuplé, soumis à d'extrêmes tensions politiques et à un taux croissant de délinquance.

L'aide qu'apportent la Croix rouge, le Programme alimentaire mondial, la Communauté européenne, ainsi que d'autres pays donateurs ou organisations non gouvernementales, est aujourd'hui insuffisante pour répondre aux besoins alimentaires de ces personnes et leur redonner un minimum de dignité.

Face à cette situation dramatique, un effort supplémentaire doit donc être fait. La France, pour sa part, a décidé de consacrer, cette année, 10 millions de Francs pour aider les déplacés de guerre au Rwanda.

Je formule le voeu que d'autres pays, dont le vôtre qui a toujours marqué son intérêt pour le Rwanda, puissent s'associer également à cet effort humanitaire.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, de croire à l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mes fidèles sentiments

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL: OADR

July 28, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: The Rwanda Crisis: Back From Kigali (For Now)

The U.S. military continues to plan for a deployment to Kigali. Final decision awaits a formal policy review. UNAMIR and the new Rwandan government continue to press for the rapid establishment of an airhead at Kigali. The situation in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire remains grave, but the U.S. and others are pressing ahead with delivery of urgent relief supplies. The attached memorandum reviews the latest information from the region.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: The Rwanda Crisis: The Focus on Goma

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Rwanda Crisis: The Focus on Goma

The humanitarian airbridge to Goma continues apace. Since July 22 this saturated provincial airport has received 161 relief flights. As of yesterday, the U.S. military had landed 49 flights into Goma; UNHCR and other international and nongovernmental organizations accounted for the balance. The U.S. and other donor water purification equipment in Goma produced 96,000 gallons of potable water over a 20-hour period yesterday. Due to continuing shortages of storage and tanker facilities only 14,500 gallons were delivered to the refugee camps. Additional water tankers and storage facilities are scheduled to arrive today and tomorrow. The water problem must be resolved as quickly as possible: since July 15 as many as 18,000 people have died in the Goma area, most from cholera.

An additional 10,000 refugees crossed back into Rwanda on July 27, bringing the total estimated returnees to 50,000. At the other end of Lake Kivu UNHCR reports 314,000 refugees in and around Bukavu and 100,000 in Uvira. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ogata will be in the region this weekend and hopes to meet with Secretary Perry to review the crisis. Ogata is apparently concerned that the U.S. effort has overshadowed the work of the UN and other organizations. We continue to work on a plan to assure the security of the refugee camps and disarm elements of the former Rwandan army in Zaire. Ambassador Ginsberg in Rabat has been asked to demarche King Hassan in order to secure Moroccan deployment to the region to assure security in the camps, help the Zairians disarm the rump Rwandan army, and possibly join UNAMIR at the conclusion of the Zaire mission.

General Schroeder's assessment team arrived today in Kigali. Ambassador Rawson reports that he and Schroeder met with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister (and Vice President) Kagame. The meetings were positive and the Rwandans expressed full support for the international relief effort. Kagame guaranteed the security of U.S. personnel in Kigali.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 28, 1994

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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Recognition of the New Government of Rwanda

Issue A

The RPF-led government exercises effective control over Kigali and other key parts of Rwanda. The United States Government has begun to deal with the RPF-led government as the Government of Rwanda. Ambassador Rawson exchanged diplomatic notes with the Prime Minister in which the Government of Rwanda undertook to give DOD personnel the same status as embassy administrative and technical staff. Only a government could make such assurances. Thus, the United States Government has effectively recognized the RPF-led Government as the Government of Rwanda.

In view of the RPF's effective control and of our operational needs, State believes that we should deal with the RPF-led government as the Government of Rwanda. Consistent with our general practice, we would not make an announcement that we "recognize" the RPF-led government, which could be construed as a political blessing of the current government and thus could undermine our effort to press for a government that is both ethnically and politically broad-based and other concessions. Instead, our relationship with the new government would develop incrementally. Decisions on such questions as whether to reopen the Rwandan embassy in Washington and whether to accept a new Rwandan ambassador would depend on operational needs and political developments.

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MS 10/17/12

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Issue B

In our bilateral relations, we have effectively recognized the RPF-led government as the Government of Rwanda. This creates a strong presumption that the USG would accept the seating of the RPF-led government in Rwanda's seat in the United Nations. State believes, however, that the U.S. position should be determined at the time that the issue arises.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 26, 1994

MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM H. ITOH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Rwanda Refugee Crisis: The U.S. Mobilizes

The gruesome television footage from eastern Zaire and the unfavorable press coverage of the airdrop of relief supplies near Goma belie the massive and sustained effort undertaken by the United States to provide humanitarian relief to Rwandan refugees. The U.S. military began to deploy resources on July 22, and in four days, the U.S. delivered 1,300 tons of humanitarian goods, water purification equipment, and put 750 personnel into the field, including medical and logistics teams, master loaders and engineers.

The July 24 airdrop north of Goma was roundly criticized. It was late and a few hundred meters off target but delivered 34,000 pounds of food to the refugees. At the same time, the U.S. demonstrated a flexible response to the crisis: the UNHCR asked for assistance with water and we supplied within four days five sets of purification equipment capable of delivering 3000 gallons of potable water per hour. The U.S. will airlift 17 German water purification units to Goma, along with 70 technicians and relief workers, and we have 13 sets en route to Mombasa for onward shipment to the region.

The U.S. and international efforts to respond to the crisis in eastern Zaire and Rwanda have now run into a fundamental logistical problem: paucity of runway space. The Ugandan authorities have been cooperative, but Entebbe airport is overwhelmed and its capacity has been taxed to the maximum. In Zaire, the inadequate provincial airfield at Goma cannot support the multiple missions of the U.S., France and others.

To resolve the airfield logjam, the U.S. is now looking at Kigali as a bridgehead for channeling relief supplies to the refugees. Ambassador David Rawson has secured blanket overflight and landing clearances for our aircraft from the Rwandan authorities, and the first U.S. assessment teams

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arrived in Kigali on July 26. The Kigali runway is in good condition and under UNAMIR control. Running the U.S. humanitarian operation through the Rwandan capital offers the dual advantages of proximity and magnetism: it is roughly two hours from Goma, and could attract refugees back to their country. We have put the issue of recognition of the new government aside and will concentrate for the moment on working with the authorities in Kigali to assure the success of the humanitarian mission to the region.

for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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PRIME MINISTER

Cd 88

27 July 1994

The President
The White House
WASHINGTON DC 20500

Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 23 July 1994 about the international response to the Rwandan refugee crisis.

I have been heartened to learn of both the lead you have personally taken in this urgent operation and the scale of the United States' assistance.

All New Zealanders have been greatly moved by the horrors that have unfolded in Rwanda in recent months. Since May, the New Zealand public has given more than NZ$2 million in fund-raising campaigns by the various voluntary agencies. Their appeals continue to attract generous public support.

My Government has also contributed funds to Rwanda through these agencies and United Nations organisations. To this point, Government aid has reached NZ$1 050 000, and we have pledged to match public donations up to a further NZ$1 million.

On 25 July, I announced our decision to send an airforce Hercules C130 to the Rwanda area. It will be based in Entebbe and take part in the airlift being coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The United States is also supporting this operation and I therefore expect there will be opportunities for personnel from our two countries to work together in this vital humanitarian mission.

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PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS WELLINGTON NEW ZEALAND

I fully agree that there is an urgent need to stabilise conditions within Rwanda. The refugees must be encouraged to return home quickly. I share too your view that, in this respect, the key is rapid deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. As you know New Zealand has vigorously supported this deployment in Security Council discussions.

My Government will continue to keep under review our capacity to make further assistance available. Our own military resources are, however, limited. Sending one of our Hercules C130s to the UNHCR operation represents a substantial operational commitment on our part at this time.

I appreciated your letter. The Rwandan tragedy touches us all very deeply.

Yours sincerely

Rt Hon J B Bolger
Prime Minister

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THE PRIME MINISTER

Copenhagen, 6 August 1994

The Honourable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 23 July 1994 concerning the Rwandan refugee crisis. I am deeply impressed by your efforts to assist in the international response to this humanitarian tragedy and by your initiative to raise further international support to enhance relief measures.

Since the outset of the crisis, Denmark has been following the situation closely and has taken several measures to meet some of the most urgent humanitarian needs of the affected refugee population.

The total amount from our humanitarian budget allocated so far towards the Rwandan refugee crisis amounts to 40 million Danish Kroner (equivalent to 6.4 million USD). In addition considerable contributions have been made through the European Union's relief mechanisms.

The Danish assistance has primarily been directed to Rwandan refugees in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire in order to meet immediate needs of food, shelter and medical supplies for the most vulnerable groups. The assistance has been channelled through international organizations, primarily the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as through a number of private

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international relief organizations.

On 2 August 1994 Denmark responded favourably to a request from UNHCR to arrange the purchase and transport of medical supplies to address the precarious situation in refugee camps in Goma where severe outbreaks of cholera have occurred. Within a week from now, supplies of cholera medicine from Denmark are expected to reach Goma.

On request from UNICEF the Danish Government is arranging C-130 military flights of UNIPAC medical kits from Denmark to Goma.

Denmark fully shares your view of the importance of assisting in facilitating the refugees' return to Rwanda as soon as the situation allows. The promotion of a massive return to Rwanda should be given the highest priority in the international community's response to prevent a further deterioration of the humanitarian tragedy.

The present situation highlights the need to rally behind UN peace-keeping efforts and to work together to make this unique instrument in international conflict prevention more efficient and able to respond adequately, and in time, to crises around the world.

Although Denmark is not in a position to contribute troops to UNAMIR due to large commitments in other United Nations peace-keeping missions, notably in the former Yugoslavia, we share the concern over the slow deployment of the designated troops for the expanded UNAMIR. A UN presence on the ground will contribute to creating the necessary confidence for the refugees to return to their homes.

In order to assist the United Nations in speeding up the deployment, we intend to lease up to 40 APCs to the UN Peace-keeping department for use with UNAMIR.

Yours sincerely,

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen

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August 3, 1994

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your message of July 22 informing me of additional measures taken or to be taken by the United States to address the worsening refugee crisis in Rwanda, a crisis of quite unprecedented proportions.

We fully recognize that this tragic crisis is the most urgent humanitarian challenge facing the international community. Japan will continue to be actively involved in every possible aspect of the relief effort.

Early last month, the Government of Japan pledged $9 million in financial assistance to international organizations concerned in the relief effort. Following intensive deliberation on further measures to contribute to the ongoing international effort, on July 26th, I instructed the Chief Cabinet Secretary to announce an additional relief package of $32.3 million. This package was decided upon in response to appeals from the UNHCR and other international organizations currently operating in the affected areas. I believe that that assistance will significantly help those organizations to ensure that urgently needed relief goods and services will reach those who need them.

I fully appreciate that our efforts should not be limited to financial assistance, but should also address the diverse needs in the affected areas in other ways. I have, therefore, directed the relevant government agencies to look into the

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possibilities for providing other forms of relief, including provision of relief supplies and dispatch of relief personnel, utilizing to the full the various existing disaster-relief schemes available.

The Japanese Government is to provide financial assistance in the amount of ¥70 million for non-governmental organizations which have sent their relief staff to the refugee camps, with a view to assisting their humanitarian activities. Additionally, provision of relief supplies and the dispatch of personnel are also under consideration by the government agencies concerned. For this purpose, the Government yesterday sent a fact-finding mission, consisting of government officials and a medical doctor who is experienced in the relief operation of this kind, to Rwanda and its surrounding countries.

Ardently desiring that those displaced may be able to return to their homes in safety and dignity at the earliest possible moment, I am determined to do everything possible to contribute to ending this tragic crisis, working closely with the other members of the international community.

Yours sincerely,

(signed)
Tomiichi Murayama

His Excellency
The President of the United States
Washington D.C.

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Embajada de España

Madrid, August 4, 1994

H.E. Mr. William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
WASHINGTON DC

Dear Bill,

I have received your letter dated July 23 in which you detail the efforts undertaken by the United States to alleviate the tragic situation faced by the Rwandan refugees and displaced persons near the Zairean border.

I fully share your opinion that an enhanced international contribution is urgently needed to deal with this unprecedented crisis and to ensure a safe and prompt return of the refugees to their homeland.

Sofar, Spain has made an important effort to send to Goma, on July 26, an initial shipment of humanitarian aid and emergency medical supplies, along with a team of doctors. A second shipment, to be transported by a Hercules C-130 aircraft, is being prepared. We have also reached agreements with several Spanish NGOs to organize, within our limited possibilities, regular aid shipments over the forthcoming weeks..

We are also studying the possibility of making additional contributions, in line with the suggestions contained in your letter. However, I can't but stress the fact that our capacity to participate in new peacekeeping operations is seriously constrained by the enormous effort undertaken by Spain for the last eighteen months in former Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense are in contact with the U.N. Secretariat to try to identify any possible Spanish contribution to UNAMIR.

Please accept my warmest regards,

Felipe González Márquez
President of the Government of Spain

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The Honorable
William J. Clinton
President of the
United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

August 15, 1994

Dear Mr. President,

In reference to your letter dated July 22, 1994, I would like to assure you that the Hungarian Government and citizens share your deep concern for the human catastrophe that has occurred both in and near Rwanda. The civil war and its aftermath have required enormous human and material sacrifices and their consequences threaten the population of the neighboring countries, too.

The Hungarian Government and several Hungarian non-governmental organizations are prepared to participate in the ongoing international refugee assistance operation in Rwanda. As You well know, however, the present economic situation in Hungary is extremely difficult. For this reason, we are unable to contribute to the international effort to settle the crisis in Rwanda to the extent we would like.

The Hungarian representative in Geneva has announced that Hungary, according to her capacity, would provide monetary support for international efforts to resolve the Rwandan crisis. In addition, the Government would encourage non-governmental contributions.

I would like to emphasize that Hungary unconditionally supports peace, security and the humanitarian principles. Consequently, we express our support to the efforts to settle the Rwandan crisis. Unfortunately, due to her current situation, Hungary is unable to do more.

Please, accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration.

/signed/
Gyula Horn
Prime Minister

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 29, 1994

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Operation Support Hope in High Gear

Operation Support Hope, the U.S. humanitarian mission to central Africa, continues to land relief supplies into the region. Purified water and ground transport continue to be the highest priorities, but the supply of aviation fuel is also described as "fragile," and could reduce aircraft operations. The U.S. European Command has begun to apportion its existing fuel according to need and priority (and without reference to nationality), and four tanker aircraft have been sent to the region. The refugee numbers have remained fairly constant, but the cholera epidemic has not yet peaked. The latest report on the situation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda is attached.

Thank you for your assistance.

for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Rwanda: High Level Visits Highlight Crisis

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Rwanda: High Level Visits Highlight Crisis

A number of high level visits this weekend to central Africa will highlight the crisis in eastern Zaire and Rwanda. In addition to Defense Secretary Perry (who will be accompanied by Assistant Secretary Moose, Assistant Secretary-designate Phyllis Oakley and Nan Borton from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), French Prime Minister Balladur, American Red Cross President Elizabeth Dole, and Congressman Mel Reynolds will visit Goma between July 31 and August 2. Rev. Al Sharpton from New York told the Department Friday that he plans to travel to Goma on August 4.

In the last 24 hours Operation Support Hope has expanded delivery of vital relief supplies, with priority given to water, transport, food and medicine. The Department is coordinating with the British, the UN, and DoD for an airlift of 50 trucks to the region from Great Britain. Additionally, we have asked DoD for airlift support for 66 metric tons of OXFAM water purification/distribution equipment, four to ten tanker trucks which the Finns have donated to UNICEF, and 230 metric tons of UNICEF supplies from Frankfurt. Aviation fuel to support U.S., UN and private voluntary organization missions to Goma is in short supply. The U.S. European Command has begun to apportion existing fuel in the region based on need and priority, without reference to nationality. Four tanker aircraft are now based in Harare to relieve the fuel shortage. The planes will orbit Goma for in-flight refueling, and will also likely serve as "mobile gas stations" as airfields in the region run short of fuel. Still, fuel shortages could reduce aircraft operations

Embassy Kinshasa Charge John Yates is in Goma and reports that the city itself is much recovered from the initial refugee influx two weeks ago, but deaths continue to mount from the cholera epidemic, especially in the camps north of Goma. The refugee numbers around Goma have stabilized, and ICRC has set up a new camp just across the border in Rwanda at Gisenyi.

There are reports from around Bukavu that elements of the former Rwandan army or militia continue to circulate in Zaire with their weapons. We have asked Embassy Kinshasa to urge the Zairian authorities to disarm the Rwandans, and we continue to work the notion of asking the Moroccans to deploy to Zaire to provide security for relief workers in the refugee camps. Ambassador Ginsberg has an audience with King Hassan on Monday, August 1.

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

July 28, 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

TO: Mr. William H. Itoh

FROM: Ambassador Rick Inderfurth RI per WDN

SUBJECT: USUN Reactions to Recognition of Rwanda

We understand that steps have already been taken which the State Department believes constitute de facto diplomatic recognition: diplomatic notes have been sent, our ambassador is present in Rwanda. etc. In addition, the U.S. presence in Rwanda may increase in the short term as our relief effort comes on line. Under these circumstances, witholding of diplomatic recognition would be difficult to explain. This does not mean that some temporizing might not be possible, especially while we work out the approach of the new government to the human rights abuses which occurred during the civil disturbances. But full recognition can only be delayed a very brief time.

Regarding seating a Rwandan delegation at the U.N., a state can be credentialled to the General Assembly and the Security Council without U.S. diplomatic recognition. The U.S. has not opposed credentialling in at least 20 years. We favor an inclusive UN, have opposed the politicization of the credentialling process, and typically have viewed credentialling as a technical matter. Failure to permit a Rwandan delegation to take its seat might jeopardize U.N. relief operations there.

Rwanda is scheduled to become SC President in September, a job for which it is unprepared. This is not an important enough consideration to drive our policy or recongition or credentialling, but we might urge Rwanda to waive its SC presidential turn for practical reasons.

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Finally, I am of course aware of the efforts -- including in the Security Council -- to bring those who grossly abused human rights during the civil disturbances in Rwanda before an international tribunal. I believe that inclusion of Rwanda in the discussions in the U.N. will increase, rather than decrease, the pressure on the regime to take the right steps.

In short, in view of the intensity of our activies in Rwanda and of the U.N. role there, we should not oppose the seating of a Rwandan delegation. Beyond that, we should seek to have Rwanda waive its presidency of the Security Council.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 6127

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DECL: OADR

July 27, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: The Rwanda Crisis: Fast Forward

The U.S. humanitarian mission to cope with the refugee crisis in eastern Zaire is moving swiftly to expand beyond Goma and Entebbe. The U.S. will now likely deploy by the weekend to establish a bridgehead at Kigali airport to facilitate delivery of humanitarian supplies in support of the UNHCR and international relief agencies. The attached memorandum reviews the refugee situation in eastern Zaire and discusses the status of the U.S. humanitarian mission to the region.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: The Rwanda Crisis: Back to Kigali

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The Rwanda Crisis: Back to Kigali

The humanitarian situation in eastern Zaire continues to be critical and the most pressing needs remain potable water and ground transport. Eight U.S. water purification units have arrived in Goma, along with a U.S. technical team. UNHCR estimates that 1.5 million refugees remain in eastern Zaire, although 15,000 - 20,000 have reportedly left Goma for Rwanda.

The military's plan to expand the U.S. humanitarian operation beyond Goma and Entebbe has received wide coverage in the press. A military team is now in Kigali to assess airport capacity and security. If the team recommends and receives approval for use of Kigali, the U.S. will likely deploy military personnel to Rwanda to create a logistical air base for humanitarian relief efforts in the region. We can expect 500 - 1,000 U.S. troops into Kigali within 48 hours of the final decision to deploy; within two weeks as many as 4,000 U.S. military personnel may operate from Kigali. This operation should be purely logistical and humanitarian. P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) The U.S. humanitarian operation from Kigali could act as a magnet for voluntary repatriation of refugees, a goal consistent with UNHCR's policy.

We are dealing with the RPF-led government in Kigali to address operational needs. We do not need to announce "recognition" of the government to deploy troops in Rwanda. The government has said that it would like the U.S. to turn Kigali into the logistical base of the humanitarian operation, and in an exchange of notes between Ambassador Rawson and Prime Minister Twagiramungu, the new government agreed to treat U.S. military personnel deployed to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes on the same basis as administrative and technical staff at the Embassy. The Embassy should be operational by July 30 with a skeleton staff.

The deployment of UNAMIR II remains incomplete. Defense and State have been asked to marry up likely contributors with equipment needs and press Western countries to follow our adopt-a-battalion approach. The strategy calls for the Deputy Secretary to call heads of government to urge prompt action. There are about 600 UNAMIR troops now deployed in Rwanda, including 206 additional Ghanaians which the U.S. helped equip. The rest of the U.S.-sponsored Ghanaian troops could arrive next week. Although DoD has been unable to meet all their mission-essential equipment needs, the UN is working to fill the gaps. 800 Ethiopian troops are ready for deployment by July 29, and the British will announce July 28 that they will offer three teams, including mechanical engineers, heavy engineering and field ambulance units.

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2010-0639-M-1
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26-07-1994

THE PRIME MINISTER

RUE DE LA LOI 16
1000 BRUSSELS

Dear Mr President,

In reply to your letter dated July 23, 1994 I am pleased to update you on the latest efforts by Belgium to help alleviating the plight of the Rwandan population. The Belgian Government has recently decided to contribute a new package of assistance worth 95 million FB (approximately 3 million $) to be channelled through the World Food Program and non governmental organizations. Together with previous disbursements, our humanitarian assistance to the Rwandan population since April 7, totals 342 million FB (approximately 10 million $).

We also have available in Nairobi two C130 aircrafts which could be chartered for the benefit of NGO's or international relief organizations.

Belgium will also sponsor 120 blue helmets from Malawi who will participate in UNAMIR II, for an amount of 100 million FB. We are examining at the moment with the UN Secretariat in New York the practical modalities of such sponsorship.

The Belgian Government will spare no effort in order to promote the establishment in Rwanda of a broad-based government in the spirit of the Arusha agreements as well as the return of the refugees to Rwanda.

Sincerely,

Jean-Luc DEHAENE

Mr William J. CLINTON
President of the United States
WASHINGTON DC

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Battenfield, Pat A.

From: DeShazer, MacArthur
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Cc: Battenfield, Pat A.; Steinberg, Donald K.
Subject: Rwanda -- Additional Factoids
Date: Saturday, July 23, 1994 2:11PM

~~SECRET~~

Tony/Nancy:

Here are some additional details P1/(b)(1) about the situation in Eastern Zaire and Rwanda:

-- RADIO STATION. P1/(b)(1) have successfully jammed the radio station. Initially, they jammed the station for 12 hours, stopped and monitored for another 12 – the station did not return to the airways. They know now that the radio station has moved to southern Kivu in Zaire P1/(b)(1)

-- RPF BLOCKING RETURNEES. P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) the RPF is screening returnees but not blocking them. Senior Hutu officials in Goma are said to be bribing Zaire military personnel to obstruct the return of Hutus to Rwanda. Hutu officials see those returning as cannon fodder until they can reestablish themselves. Hutus are regrouping P1/(b)(1) Zaire has moved the Hutu military to an encampment in Rutshuru on the Rwandan border. Some Hutu military in this encampment have rearmed themselves from piles of turned-in weapons left unguarded by Zairian military personnel for 24 hours.

P1/(b)(1)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1994

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The American people have been deeply saddened by the tragic events that have befallen Rwanda these past few months. The scale of human suffering is almost beyond imagination. I want to assure you that the United States is fully committed to helping Rwanda recover from the devastating events and move toward lasting peace and national reconciliation.

With this goal in mind, I have dispatched Ambassador Rawson to the region to discuss U.S. efforts to assist Rwanda and its neighbors in addressing the unprecedented humanitarian crisis. The United States has already committed over $150 million in relief aid since the crisis began. The most recent refugee flows, however, have completely overwhelmed relief organizations, and thousands of innocent civilians face death from disease and starvation. For this reason, we are moving to dispatch military personnel to the region to assist the humanitarian aid effort and help prevent a humanitarian disaster of even greater proportions.

In the end, the only solution to the immediate crisis is to create conditions in Rwanda that will facilitate refugee return. In particular, the formation of a truly broad-based government and administration would help reassure the Rwandan people and encourage refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. Rwandan authorities must also make every effort to safeguard the lands and homes of innocent refugees and displaced persons, pending their return.

Adequate humanitarian relief must be readily available within Rwanda if the refugees are to have an incentive to return. It is crucial that Rwandan authorities cooperate fully with humanitarian relief organizations and permit them use of Kigali airport and free access to all areas where assistance is needed.

His Excellency
Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu,
Prime Minister of Rwanda,
Kigali.

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Finally, every effort must be made to assure the security of refugees and displaced persons wishing to return home. We believe that rapid expansion of UNAMIR can play an important role in providing security and confidence. We have been working with the UN to accelerate deployment of these forces and have airlifted 50 armored personnel carriers into the region for use by UNAMIR forces. We are providing equipment for the UN's Ghanaian battalion and have encouraged other countries to offer equipment for the remaining contingents.

In closing, I want to assure you that the United States is working with the international community to ensure that the perpetrators of genocide and other crimes against humanitarian law are brought to justice. We hope that the UN will act swiftly -- consistent with the resolution establishing the Commission of Experts -- to create an international tribunal for Rwanda. Establishing accountability will help Rwandans to break the cycle of violence, close out this tragic chapter in their history, and move to true reconciliation.

With the concerted assistance of the international community, we believe that Rwandans can surmount this crisis and move forward. The prayers of all Americans are with Rwanda in this truly tragic time.

Sincerely,

Peter Tarnoff
Acting Secretary

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5. ACTION REQUEST: DEPARTMENT REQUESTS EMBASSY DELIVER DIPLOMATIC NOTE BELOW TO APPROPRIATE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS PROPOSING TO EFFECT A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT FOR THESE HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN ZAIRE. DEPARTMENT WANTS TO COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF NOTES BY 22 JULY 1994, OR ASAP. U.S. FORCES ARE ALREADY ON THE GROUND AND MORE ARE ARRIVING EACH DAY.

BEGIN TEXT:

{COMPLIMENTARY OPENING}... I HAVE THE HONOR TO REFER TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THE STATUS OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WHO MAY BE PRESENT IN ZAIRE IN CONNECTION WITH HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS INCLUDING THOSE PRESENTLY ONGOING AND OTHERWISE WITH RESPECT TO THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES, AS WELL AS FUTURE ACTIVITIES. I HAVE THE HONOR TO PROPOSE THAT SUCH PERSONNEL BE ACCORDED A STATUS EQUIVALENT TO THAT PROVIDED TO THE TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OF THE U.S. EMBASSY. IF THE FOREGOING IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE FURTHER HONOR TO PROPOSE THAT THIS NOTE, TOGETHER WITH YOUR REPLY, SHALL CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS EFFECTIVE FROM THE DATE OF YOUR REPLY. {COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE}. END TEXT.

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2/2

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
SERVICES DU PREMIER MINISTRE
B.P. 1334
KIGALI.

July 27, 1994.

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honor to respond to Embassy note of july 26, 1994 which reads as follows : "I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between our two Governments regarding the status of U.S. military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defence who may be present in Rwanda in connection with humanitarian efforts including those presently ongoing and otherwise with respect to their official duties, as well as future activities. I have the honor to propose that such personnel be accorded a status equivalent to that provided to the technical and administrative staff of the United States Embassy."

I have the further honor to accept your proposal on behalf of my Government. Therefore, this note and your note constitute an agreement between our two Governments, which shall be effective this date for a renewable period of three months.

Sincerely,

Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU,
Prime Minister.

His Excellency
Mr. David RAWSON
Ambassador of USA
KIGALI.

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Washington, July 22nd 1994

NOTE

The Government of Belgium would like to kindly bring to your attention some of its guidelines with respect to the situation in Rwanda.

1) Humanitarian action is now clearly a priority, but it is also in the interest of the international community to contribute to the creation of a political environment so that displaced persons and refugees could soon return, on a voluntary basis, to their places of origin. Our humanitarian aid effort would thus become more efficient and sustainable.

2) The Belgian Government has decided to send without delay a special envoy to Kigali, for a mission of political evaluation.

3) The Belgian Governement message to the new Governement in Rwanda will be articulated along the following lines:

A) Priorities:

- Return of the refugees: this is the absolute priority; the return of the peasants to their lands is necessary so that they will be able to harvest, and prepare for the second crop of the year.

- This will require that the Government of Kigali take measures to reinstate a climate of confidence. If the presence of several Hutus and perhaps even of some MNRD among the ministers in this Government may contribute to this confidence-building, it should nevertheless be clear that only a strong presence of UNAMIR II, deployed in the whole country, will be decisive in reassuring the population. Non discrimination between the ethnic groups will have to be guaranteed. UNAMIR can contribute to this.

- As far as the economy is concerned, the Government must as soon as possible make an inventory of its needs and start planning the economic recovery. On this basis, Belgium might be ready to assist with expertise and defend the Rwandan cause before international agencies and institutions.

B) Policy:

We take note of the will of this Government to be a Government of national unity, in the spirit of Arusha. However, caution is still recommended since we still do not have any element of appreciation with respect to the real commitment of the FPR to implement the principles of the Arusha Agreement,

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including the composition of the Government and the nature of the institutions.

The respect of the principles of the Arusha Agreement will be an important element in evaluating this Government, which will be judged on its deeds.

C) Trials:

The intention of the new Government to put on trial those responsible for the massacres is quite understandable. This must however be done with due respect for the independence of the judiciary and without discrimination as to the ethnic identity of the perpetrators. This will also be an important element in the restoration of confidence.

4) We wish to draw the attention of our partners on the danger of Zaïre becoming a base for the F.A.R. or the militias launching reprisal attacks in Rwanda. Measures will have to be taken to ensure their disarmament.

5) We want to express our appreciation for the important efforts the United States are about to undertake in order to answer to the calls of the UNHCR in favor of the displaced. Belgium intends to join in these efforts.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

cc Clarke
~~Steinberg~~
SRB

20 July 1994

In reply refer to:
1-94/16596

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

SUBJECT: DoD Support for Humanitarian Efforts in Rwanda (U)

(U) Last night, prior to my NightLine taping, we met to discuss DoD support to ameliorating the horrendous conditions in Rwanda. Dick Clarke and Doug Bennett joined Walt Slocombe, Admiral Owens and an array of OSD and Joint Staff representatives in the meeting. Let me offer you a synopsis.

~~(C)~~ During the next 24-48 hours we plan to move on several fronts.

P.1/(b)(1)

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

(U) Funding: Approximately $8M of the $15M DoD humanitarian assistance funds identified for transportation support remain. State is passing $19M to the UN which may be helpful as we work in concert with UNHCR; perhaps State and other agencies can offer other similar contributions. Beyond that we see two possibilities. The first is a Presidential drawdown under section 506a2, but that isn't cash and would mean pulling goods and services out of serving Army units, with possible impact on readiness. We would also be willing to pursue an emergency DoD reprogramming.

(~~C~~) As we begin to immerse ourselves more deeply, two factors are critical. First, we will be playing a supportive role to the UN and the French, nothing more. Second, while we work to save lives in Zaire, the international community must find a way to convince Rwandan refugees to return home as soon as possible.

(~~C~~) Currently, Hutu refugees prefer the uncertainties of Goma to what they see as almost certain death at the hands of avenging Tutsis. Security in Rwanda is key to bringing the refugees back. UNAMIR forces in Rwanda must provide this security; working in tandem with UNHCR, they must become a "magnet" to draw Hutus home as U.S. forces helped draw Kurds back to northern Iraq. As I told Ted Koppel last night, our model is not Somalia but Provide Comfort.

(~~C~~) Your staff is working with State and USUN to try to reconfigure UNAMIR from a heavy mostly African force to a light force with a substantial component of First World militaries with the logistical skills to assist in refugee repatriation and humanitarian assistance inside of Rwanda. Walt alerted Bob Hunter yesterday that we and the UN may be calling on our NATO allies in this regard. At the same time, we must continue to facilitate political reconciliation through international and bilateral channels. State is working this and of course we stand by to help.

cc: Strobe Talbott
General Shalikashvili

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Rwanda, 20 July 1994



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Intelligence Memorandum

Office of African and Latin American Analysis — *18 July 1994*

Rwanda: Impact of French Intervention P1/(b)(1)

The realities of operating in Rwanda have dashed Paris's initial hope that its 2,500 troops would fulfill, in less than two months, a narrow mission of protecting civilian victims of ethnic slaughter. Despite scant support from allies, the French have expanded their mission to include creating a "safe zone" in the southwest and stabilizing Rwanda through a cease-fire and negotiated settlement between the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the majority Hutus of the hardline interim government that Washington recently derecognized.

- The expanded mission is straining the French force's capabilities and risks entangling it in the struggle between the RPF and Hutus.
- The legacy of French support for the interim government between 1989 and 1993 has also complicated relations with both sides. P1/(b)(1)

The safe zone is imposing heavy burdens on French forces. They are being overwhelmed by the influx of nearly 1 million Hutus fleeing the RPF and have lost the use of their logistics hub at Zaire's Goma airport, according to P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(press reports. Paris is facing growing pressure from international human rights groups and the RPF to arrest fugitive Hutu military and political leaders in the safe zone who have admitted to ordering massacres of ethnic Tutsis.

- The RPF is threatening to invade the safe zone unless the French make such arrests and disarm remnant regime forces there.
- Radical Hutu radio broadcasts blaming Paris for the RPF's military gains are raising the odds Hutus will lash out at French troops. P1/(b)(1)

Paris' strategy for exiting Rwanda has become hostage to delays in UN deployments, growing humanitarian responsibilities, and political developments. The French intervention may already have complicated UN plans to bolster the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda from 560 to 5,500, as other African countries--fearing that the French deployment is tainting multilateral efforts--reconsider plans to contribute troops to UNAMIR.

- The RPF's capture of northwestern Rwanda may lead hundreds of thousands of Hutus to flee into the safe zone, in addition to the more than 1 million already in neighboring Zaire.
- Withdrawing French troops from the safe zone before UN troops deploy, however, would increase the panic of the 2 million Hutus there--more than 200,000 of whom have already fled into Zaire--and spark the slaughter of Tutsis still in Rwanda. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

ALA 94-20166

P1/(b)(1)

Secret

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France's Expanding Mission[1]

In mid-June, when the French Government sent 2,500 troops to Rwanda, it publicly described "Operation Turquoise" as a bridge until the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) could be reinforced from 560 troops to its authorized strength of 5,500. The mission was to end by mid-August and to be confined to protecting civilians from both Hutu extremists and the RPF. Operating from Zaire, French troops--bolstered by Western and African contingents, it was hoped--were to make forays into Rwanda to protect at-risk populations in the west.

- After the RPF captured Kigali and Butare in early July, the French expanded their mission to include protecting civilians in a humanitarian "safe zone" in the southwestern prefectures of Cyangugu, Gikongoro, and Kibuye.[2]

- More recently, P1/(b)(1) the operation is also to restore political stability to Rwanda; Paris has called for a cease-fire, Tutsi-Hutu dialogue, and formation of a government of national reconciliation. P1/(b)(1)

Running Aground on the Realities

Paris's Initial Successes. The initial phase of Operation Turquoise improved security for aid workers and for some civilians at risk. For example, press reports say the deployment of a French platoon near Cyangugu ended abuses, including arbitrary killings, of some 8,000 Tutsis at a displaced persons camp. P1/(b)(1)

Two factors made these accomplishments possible. The RPF, despite threats to attack French forces if they blocked the rebel advance, initially adopted a wait-and-see posture. Also, many Hutu government troops and civilian backers welcomed French troops, apparently believing Paris would once again aid them militarily. The situation has since become far more complex. P1/(b)(1)

Humanitarian Tidal Wave. Displaced persons--mainly Hutus fleeing the advancing RPF--have flooded into the safe zone. The press reports that at least 900,000 displaced persons are in the French zone, and some Hutus fleeing the RPF advance between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi may head to the southwest--more than 1 million of whom are now in Zaire.[3] P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

[2]We estimate that at least 500,000 Rwandans--375,000 of them Tutsis--have died since the civil war resumed on 6 April. This represents the slaughter of nearly 60 percent of the Tutsis living in Rwanda. See DI Intelligence Report ALA 94-40002, P1/(b)(1) June 1994, *Rwanda: Establishing the Demographic Baseline*, for a more detailed assessment of the scope of the killings. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

This report was prepared by P3/(b)(3) Office of African and Latin American Analysis, P3/(b)(3)

P3/(b)(3)

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Even before the massive exodus into Zaire, French commanders acknowledged that their logistic capabilities were swamped, according to press P1/(b)(1) reports. They may now have lost use of Goma airport in Zaire, which had been the French logistics hub. Deliveries of humanitarian aid to Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire are likely to displace military flights, and the RPF's capture of Gisenyi means it can shell the airport almost at will--as it did on 17 July, shutting down flight operations for a day. P1/(b)(1)

Recent Demographic Changes in the Safe Zone[a]

Population, 1 April 1994	1,645,000[b]
Changes, 1 April-18 July 1994:	
Deaths	162,000[c]
Outflow of refugees	220,000[d]
Inflow of displaced persons	900,000
Population, 18 July 1994	2,163,000

[a]All figures are estimates based on reporting from press and relief agencies and on the 1978 Rwandan Government census.
[b]Estimated total population of Cyangugu, Gikongoro, and Kibuye Prefectures.
[c]Represents mortality rate of two-thirds for Tutsi population of the three prefectures, estimated at 243,000.
[d]Includes 20,000 Tutsi refugees to Zaire and Burundi in April plus flight of 200,000 Hutu refugees to Zaire since 17 July. P1/(b)(1)

Becoming Entangled In the War. Despite French claims of neutrality, Operation Turquoise is at risk from both sides in a polarized situation P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

- French and RPF forces skirmished outside Butare on 4 July; Paris's decision to keep the RPF out of the safe zone in the southwest risks more serious clashes. The flight of Hutu officials--including the President and Prime Minister--and radical militiamen into the safe zone has led the RPF to threaten hot pursuit of the fugitives unless the French hand them over.

- P1/(b)(1) radical Hutu radio broadcasts are now blamig Paris--along with Washington and the UN--for the interim regime's battlefield disasters, raising the odds of Hutus lashing out at French troops. In particular, efforts to detain those fleeing Hutu officials who are suspected of orchestrating the slaughter of Tutsis could spark conflict with residual Rwandan Government forces. French protection of the remaining Tutsis behind government lines also could lead to clashes with Hutu regime loyalists. P1/(b)(1)

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Thorny Issue of War Criminals. Paris made no predeployment plans to deal with Rwandan leaders responsible for ordering massacres of Tutsis. Many local Rwandan officials have admitted doing so to rid their areas of suspected RPF sympathizers, according to press reports. P1/(b)(1)

French forces face increasing pressure to take action against these war criminals. An international human rights group has demanded that French troops arrest those guilty of abuses; French activists probably will make similar demands. Although such arrests may appease the RPF, they could spark violence by Hutus--already embittered by their regime's battlefield disasters and creeping loss of international legitimacy--against Tutsis, French soldiers, or other suspected enemies. At a Rwandan refugee camp in Tanzania, for example, thousands of angry Hutus mobbed relief workers after the arrest of local Hutu government officials who had admitted to orchestrating Tutsi massacres. P1/(b)(1)

Hostility From an RPF-Proclaimed Regime. The RPF says it will install this week a new government headed by a moderate Hutu prime minister and representing three other political parties, according to press reports. Distrustful of the French, the RPF-dominated regime is likely to assert its sovereignty by demanding their withdrawal--and may back up the call with a military incursion into the safe zone. P1/(b)(1)



Searching for an Exit Scenario

At the time of the initial deployment, Paris evidently assumed that all 5,500 troops authorized for UNAMIR would be in country by mid-August, when France hoped to pull out its forces and hand the humanitarian mission over to the UN. P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) UN officials say that UNAMIR will reach its full strength--as a Kigali-based operation resupplied through Uganda--no sooner than September or October. Sending UN troops to remote western Rwanda, where fighting and humanitarian needs are now most intense, would complicate the force's logistics. P1/(b)(1)



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P1/(b)(1)

Humanitarian responsibilities, the rapid pace of political and military developments in Rwanda, and domestic French politics are further complicating Paris's efforts to find a graceful exit strategy.

- A French withdrawal before the arrival of UN replacements would lead, in our view, to renewed massacres of Tutsis and possibly the flight to Zaire of most of the 2 million Hutus in southwestern Rwanda.

- At the same time, French domestic support for staying the course in Rwanda appears to be declining. The French press and even some leading figures from the ruling center-right coalition have begun questioning Paris's current as well as past policies on Rwanda.

- This shaky domestic political support and the logistic difficulties in maintaining a combat force in western Rwanda would make Operation Turquoise highly vulnerable to a concerted RPF push to drive them out, in our view. P1/(b)(1)

Implications for UNAMIR. The complications associated with the French deployment may, in turn, further delay the reinforcement of UNAMIR. Many potential troop contributors to UNAMIR are reconsidering because they fear perceived French support for the Hutu government will taint any peacekeeping effort in the RPF's eyes.

- Ethiopia's President has told P1/(b)(1) he was "disgusted" by the French deployment, and other Ethiopian officials say they will not deploy the battalion Addis Ababa is preparing for UNAMIR duty until all French troops withdraw, P1/(b)(1) This wariness of Paris's intentions appears widespread among other non-Francophone African countries.

P1/(b)(1)

Moreover, the expansion of the French mission--in particular, the creation of a safe zone--has created pressure for similar growth of UNAMIR's mission.

- In authorizing the reinforcement of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops in mid-May, the UN Security Council set as its primary mission the protection of at-risk populations and aid shipments; it specifically excluded deployment of UN troops to separate the warring parties.

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- Paris, however, is pushing for the deployment of the first UNAMIR reinforcements to northwestern Rwanda, where they would become a *de facto* buffer between RPF and Hutu regime forces that have fled to Zaire and run an increased risk of getting caught in the fighting.

- An RPF official has told P1/(b)(1) his group wants UNAMIR troops to replace the French in the southwest, where protection of at-risk Tutsis could drag UN troops into fighting with remnant Hutu militias. P1/(b)(1)

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Annex 1

P1/(b)(1)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

P.1/(b)(1)

Annex 2

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Rwanda: Deployment Of France's "Operation Turquoise," June-July 1994



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PREPARED 18 JULY 94

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DECL: OADR

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: D - Mr. Talbott

FROM: AF - Edward Brynn, Acting

SUBJECT: Nonrecognition of Rwandan Interim Government

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to formally announce that we recognize no government in Rwanda and no longer treat the Interim Government of Rwanda (IGOR) as the Government of Rwanda, or, alternatively, whether to take specific steps short of nonrecognition.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

In the constitutional vacuum following President Habyarimana's death on April 6, Hutu hardliners in the military set up an interim government (the IGOR) of like-minded politicians. Over the past three months, the Tutsi-dominated rebel RPF has steadily pushed back government forces, which now hold only about one-third of the country's territory. The IGOR had to flee the capital, and subsequently abandoned its temporary seat in Gitarama to take up residence in Gisenyi, in the northwest corner of Rwanda near the Zaire border. The RPF has just taken control of the capital of Kigali and Butare, the country's second largest city. They have reportedly announced their intention to declare a government of national unity in the next few days.

The anarchy prevalent in the IGOR-zone indicates that the IGOR has only limited control over the little territory it purports to hold. The vast majority of the killings in Rwanda have occurred in the IGOR zone, with horrific massacres of Tutsis and Hutu moderates having occurred regularly in the early weeks of the crisis. The IGOR has made no attempt to stop these killings, which are being perpetrated by IGOR

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supporters, and its leaders may well have helped plan or encourage the killings. The June 28 report of the UNHRC Special Rapporteur for Rwanda concluded that the IGOR bears responsibility for having supported the massacres and for refusing to take steps to prevent what the Special Rapporteur himself characterized as genocide. The temporary French-led humanitarian intervention is operating in the IGOR-zone. The RPF suspects that the French are using this operation to support the IGOR; however, the French stress their neutral, humanitarian role and say that they are now treating the IGOR on the same basis as the RPF -- as an armed faction.

Following Habyarimana's death, the USG deemphasized recognition issues. Although we never formally recognized the IGOR as the Government, we treated it as such as a practical matter.

Option 1: Nonrecognition

There is no legal obstacle to a USG determination that there is no longer a government in Rwanda. As a legal matter, we would base our declaration of nonrecognition on the IGOR's lack of control over shrinking territory, rather than on any objectionable policies the IGOR may have supported or abhorrent activities it may have allowed (ethnic massacres, in particular). However, the action of stated nonrecognition will clearly be interpreted as a political statement against the IGOR.

To maximize the effect, we would publicly declare that no government exists and would call for all Rwandan political parties to meet and begin talks on installing the broad-based transition government provided for in the Arusha accord. We have consulted with the French and Belgians and they have no objection to our announcing a policy of nonrecognition. Our French contact did not believe such a decision would have any adverse effect on the French operation. Following our announcement, we would close the Rwandan Embassy in Washington and members of its staff would no longer have diplomatic status. The situation of such staff, vis-a-vis their continued presence in the U.S., would have to be addressed.

Advantages to Nonrecognition

- Makes a forceful political and moral statement of our disapproval of the IGOR, which has, in one way or another, been implicated in the mass killings of Tutsis and opposition Hutus.

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- Will be perceived as holding the IGOR responsible for atrocities it allowed to occur.

- Serves as a deterrent to other regimes that might consider allowing or supporting mass killings to maintain power.

- Weakens the claim of IGOR members to be seated at any future peace talks as "the government".

- Offsets the perception of a pro-IGOR tilt that U.S. support for the French intervention has fostered in some quarters.

- Increases our leverage with the RPF, which will hail the decision, and may make them more amenable to agreeing to a cease-fire.

- Has strong domestic support on the Hill and in the human rights and NGO communities, which have repeatedly called for this action.

- Would deny IGOR officials access to funds of the Rwandan government in the U.S., thus limiting their ability to make further arms purchases and sustain the war effort.

- Strengthens the status of moderate Hutus, including Faustin Twagiramungu, who is to be Prime Minister of the broad-based transition government under the Arusha accords.

- Puts us in a better position to challenge IGOR representation at the UN, if we choose to do so. Rwanda is a member of the Security Council and is scheduled to assume the Presidency in September.

<u>Disadvantages to Nonrecognition</u>

- Would make the IGOR resistant to dialogue and make it harder to bring any acceptable members into a political settlement.

- Could endanger any Americans working behind IGOR lines as part of the relief effort. We know of only three Americans in Rwanda, none of whom is now behind IGOR lines, although others may pass through the IGOR zone as part of temporary relief convoys.

- Could increase the risk to troops participating in UNAMIR or the French-led operation, given the close association in many locals eyes between the U.S., the UN, and France.

- Presents legal and political issues, including: 1) the status of U.S. officials who travel to Rwanda as there

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would exist no recognized government to whom we could accredit such personnel; 2) the status of the Rwandan embassy and Rwandan Government bank accounts; and 3) complications in seeking consent for activities inside Rwandan territory as there would exist no recognized government to give such consent.

Option 2: Steps Against the Government Short of Nonrecognition

Alternatively, the USG might take several discreet steps intended to convey our displeasure with the IGOR, short of declaring no government exists in Rwanda. We have already refused to receive high level visits to Washington by IGOR officials. Among possible other steps are:

- o Ordering a reduction in Rwandan Embassy personnel or declaring some or all persona non grata.
- o Closing the Rwandan Embassy in Washington.
- o Freezing assets belonging to the Rwandan government. This would require overcoming serious legal obstacles.
- o Denying visas to members of the IGOR who wish to travel to the United States on official bilateral business.

Advantages

- o Would send a clear signal to the IGOR of our displeasure with their regime.
- o Would allow us to maintain some dialogue with the IGOR and their supporters.
- o Would be less likely to turn the U.S. into the enemy in the eyes of IGOR supporters, thus decreasing the risk of endangering Americans or UN, French, or other Western personnel.
- o Could hinder the IGOR's ability to purchase more arms or sustain the war effort.

Disadvantages

- o Piecemeal efforts may go unnoticed by those other than the IGOR to whom we are trying to send a message: the RPF, Rwandans generally, the international community, the domestic audience.

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RECOMMENDATION

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages, we recommend that the USG choose option 1 and declare that no government exists in Rwanda. We would clear the decision with the NSC and consult with the UN and others prior to announcing the decision.

Approved_____

Disapproved in Favor of Option 2_____

Disapproved. No change in policy necessary_____

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Drafted:AF/C:KAiston
SECC 4423, 6/30/94, 647-3139

Cleared:AF/C:RFendrick
DRL:RPowers
IO/UNP:SZelle
P:ESwicker
D:JWithers
S/P:TParker
L/AF:GTaft/LMatheson
S/CPR:LDunham
OFM:RAtkinson
EUR/WE:JLewis
NSC:MDeShazur

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Intelligence Report

Office of African and Latin American Analysis *23 June 1994*

Rwanda: Establishing the Demographic Baseline

Demographically sound estimates of Rwanda's population and ethnic composition are vital to assess the full magnitude of the humanitarian disaster, including numbers of people killed and those likely to require food aid and other humanitarian assistance. Press reports, diplomats, and aid workers cite widely different population figures. According to a revised US Census Bureau estimate, Rwanda's population as of 1 April 1994 stood at 7.6 million of which 628,000--or 8.2 percent--were Tutsis. Using the best figures available for Tutsis killed and forced into exile, we calculate that as of 1 June:

- Rwanda's total population was 6.7 million.
- Nearly 60 percent of the pre-April Tutsi population, or some 375,000 people, have been killed.
- Another 76,400 are in refugee camps.
- Slightly more than 175,000 are still alive and in Rwanda.

Our rough 1 June estimate of the total Tutsi refugee population outside of Rwanda--including Tutsis who fled the country during earlier crises as well as those who left after 1 April--is about 620,000. Together with the estimated 175,000 still alive in Rwanda, this makes a total of about 800,000 surviving Rwandan Tutsis in Rwanda and neighboring countries. P1/(b)(1)

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The Demographic Base

Our population baseline for Rwanda is an updated US Bureau of the Census estimate that there were 7,656,000 Rwandans as of 1 April 1994--before the fighting began. Prepared at CIA's request, the update revised downward a previous population estimate of 8.4 million on the basis of newly available fertility data that show a decline from 8.5 children per woman in 1983 to slightly above 6.2 children in 1994. The Census Bureau retained its assumption that death rates increased between 1986 and 1994 as a result of AIDS. Migration assumptions are based on pre-1 April refugee flows reported by the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). The revised population base was estimated from a census conducted in 1978 and a 10-percent sample of an as-yet unpublished 1991 census. P1/(b)(1)

Population Change Between 1 April and 1 June

In the Total Population. Starting with the Census Bureau's new population estimate for 1 April, we arrived at a 1 June estimate of about 6.7 million Rwandans by subtracting the 418,000 new refugees reported by the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) for Refugees and the 500,000 Rwandans killed in the ethnic slaughter, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). We are confident that UNHCR has a reasonably good estimate for refugees. The ICRC figure for Rwandans killed between 1 April and 1 June, although little more than an educated guess, is consistent with anecdotal reporting and the pre-April geographic distribution of Tutsis in the path of the killing gangs. We estimate that about one-quarter of the dead were probably Hutu. The revised 1 April population base and eventual counts of Rwandans surviving the massacres will allow us to more accurately estimate the number killed. P1/(b)(1)

In The Tutsi Component. We estimate that 628,000 Tutsis were in Rwanda on 1 April. This figure is based on the revised Census Bureau population and an estimate from the 1991 sample census that Tutsis accounted for 8.2 percent of the population.[1] A Belgian colonial census in 1959 estimated the Tutsi population at 14 percent of the total. A 1978 Rwandan census reported Tutsis comprised 9.6 percent of the population. The declining estimates are consistent with large and repeated exoduses of Tutsis since 1959 as a result of ethnic tension. P1/(b)(1)

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[1] We recognize that a 10-percent sample by definition has a larger degree of error than a national census; that the 1991 census was conducted during a period of sporadic fighting--after the Rwandan Patriotic Front's October 1990 invasion--that could have restricted census takers' access to a portion of the population; and that, in an ethnically charged atmosphere, the Rwandan census analysts might have manipulated data to favor the Hutu majority. Nevertheless, we believe that the 8.2 percent estimate for 1991 is reasonable. In 1992 a demographic and health survey conducted by the Rwandan National Office of Population and IRD/Macro International, a private contractor, separately arrived at a figure of 8 percent for Tutsis--although this estimate, too, is open to the question of data manipulation, or the desire to match earlier census data. P1/(b)(1)

This report was prepared by P3/(b)(3) Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
P3/(b)(3)

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We believe that about 175,000 Tutsis remain in Rwanda as of 1 June. Based on sketchy reports from relief agencies and our knowledge of the geographic distribution of Tutsis in Rwanda, we calculate that 375,000 Tutsis--or about 60 percent of the 1 April in-country total--have been killed. Another 76,000 Tutsis probably fled to neighboring countries. P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) These calculations are crude estimates, however, and need to be used with caution. P1/(b)(1)

Implications:

If the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attempts to form a government in coming weeks, its Tutsi civilian support base will be very slim--about 3 percent of Rwanda's current population. That percent will drop even further if the more than 340,000 Hutu refugees from the current conflict return home and Tutsi refugees do not. The total Tutsi refugee population in neighboring countries--which we calculate at over 620,000--represents the bulk of surviving Rwandan Tutsis. An RPF-dominated government would almost certainly need to convince many of these people to return to Rwanda if Tutsis are to be a force in Rwandan politics. P1/(b)(1)

Rwandan Refugees as of 1 June 1994

Asylum Country	" New" 1994 Refugees	Percent Tutsi	"New" Tutsi Refugees	"Old" Tutsi Refugees (fled 1959-64)
Tanzania	350,000	5	17,500	50,000
Burundi	50,000	95	47,500	245,000
Uganda	8,000	30	2,400	200,000
Zaire	10,000	90	9,000	50,000
Total	418,000		76,400	545,000

Note: "New" refugees are the Hutu and Tutsi Rwandans who fled during April and May P1/(b)(1) "Old" Tutsi refugees are those who fled ethnic clashes over the past several decades and are still in refugee status P1/(b)(1) The bulk of RPF forces are Rwandans from the "old" refugee group; many of the senior soldiers were exiled as very young children and the younger soldiers born to refugee families.

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POINTS ON RWANDA FOR THE SECRETARY FOR TELCON WITH FM JUPPE
Friday, June 17, 1994

-- We agree that there is an immediate need to stop the killings in Rwanda and that this must be our first priority.

-- For this reason, we support your proposed plan for a multinational French-led force to intervene now and "bridge" the gap until the regular UNAMIR contingents can arrive.

-- In order to assure the success of the mission and the full support of the international community, we recommend you address the following issues:

-- The mission should have the sanction of the UN and should be fully coordinated with UNAMIR. We would prefer a Security Council resolution authorizing the mission.

-- We agree that other countries should contribute troops to this initiative, [redacted] P1/(b)(1) We are encouraged to hear that the Senegalese and perhaps others have agreed to join.

-- [redacted] P1/(b)(1)

-- In the meantime, we need to accelerate efforts to deploy an expanded UNAMIR. We are working hard to help expedite deployment. We have completed the lease with the UN for 50 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) and hope to start delivery next week.

-- We are looking at equipment needs, particularly for the Ghanaian battalion, which we are trying to get on the ground as soon as possible. We will do our best to help equip them and hope you can do the same with other contingents.

-- The U.S. has no intention of sending troops into Rwanda.

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H. M. Kigeli V J.B.N.
1501 Gallatin Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20011
U.S.A.

Washington,

May 2, 1994

The Honorable William Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

I write today to request of you a brief meeting between us. As the deposed King of Rwanda, I believe that I have information which will be useful to you and the people of the United States.

As you know, the crisis in Rwanda is tremendously complex and yet the solutions can be sorted out. I would like to suggest that I assist the United Nations as Elder for Refugees. As such, the Rwandese peoples and all those in the midst of the Rwandan diaspora will respond in a swifter fashion. I believe that with my leadership, I will enable a peace'process to proceed at a faster peace.

You may be aware that I was the Constitutional Monarch of Rwanda and that I support all democratic functions, then as now. As you consider the options in a peace accord for Rwanda, it is important to remember that the peoples of Rwanda generally support and indeed, desire a true democratic government. This democracy has not been achieved in the past thirty three years nor have the peoples of Rwanda been allowed to be repatriated in our home country, Rwanda. While the odds against us as refugees have been daunting, we have never given up hope that we will be able to return to Rwanda and work together within a democratic structure.

To suggest that a United Nations peacekeeping force be put in place is admirable...but it is a hollow suggestion without the necessary infrastructure to ensure democratic elections for the leadership of our country, not unlike what was recently held in South Africa.

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When we get together, I would also like to go over with you the position we share with the United Nations and the assurances that I am making a very clear statement that I make no claim to impose myself upon Rwanda as King: the people of Rwanda deserve the choice of a democratically elected head. Nonetheless, I do represent the interests of millions of refugees from Rwanda. Every day that goes by, it is most likely that another 20,000 persons from my country may be killed in this senseless and criminal military insurgency which has gripped Rwanda and supported by a group of debased civilians.

I cannot begin to tell you the sheer and utter disaster which is befalling the people of Rwanda. The peoples of Rwanda desperately need your help and leadership. This crisis is without equal. I can assure you that the reports of the rivers flowing into Tanzania which are said to be full of dead bodies is correct information. The refugee groups cannot sustain this debacle, not can I bear to seat by without doing every thing I am able to assist the peoples of Rwanda. They deserve our attention and I beg of you a brief audience.

Sincerely,

Kigeli

King Kigeli V
301- 565-9457

CC:

The Hon. Madeleine Albright,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
The Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
The United States Senate
The Hon. Donald Payne,
The United States House of Representatives
The Hon. Ibrahim Gambari,
The United Nations Security Council
The Hon. Rene van Rooyen
United Nations High Commisson for Refugees
Ms. Mary Ellen Grandfield,
The U.S. Department of State: Central African Affairs

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S-O: P:BTHOMAS OSD:VKERN
JCS:BBARTOLAIN NSC:
OSD:MGREENSPON

AF, IO, HA, INR, P, PM

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

REF: STATE 127262

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH A KIGALI-BASED UN FORCE AS PROPOSED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT. THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL. WE PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY, MAY 16 TO EXPLAIN THE PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL AND REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE UN FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI TO PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE WOULD

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DEPLOY TO BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN BURUNDI NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS TO SECURE AND ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WITHIN RWANDA, AND PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THOSE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH SECURITY FOR UNHCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED PERSONS TO THE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ALSO SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND RELIEF CONVOYS IN THE ZONE.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN FORCE COMMANDER TO DEFEND THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO INCLUDE UN FORCES, CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.

6. ASSUMPTIONS. {A} THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE WOULD REMAIN IN KIGALI TO HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER; {B} WELL TRAINED, DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION; {C} THE UN HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE ZONE IN RWANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH BASE OPERATIONS IN, AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SECURE ZONE THROUGH, BURUNDI; {D} UNHCR WOULD RUN THE CAMPS, AND THE UN FORCE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; AND {E} THE UN AND THE NGOS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE THE UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UN FORCE WOULD DEBARK IN BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A FORWARD SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.

8. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT 6,000-6,500 UN FORCE PERSONNEL PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS.

9. END POINT. RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS OR UNSC DECISION TO END MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS. YY

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Revised with attachment. INR

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 27, 1994

9412462

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DECL: OADR

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: INR - Toby T. Gati

SUBJECT: Attempted Conflict Resolution in Rwanda and Burundi: What Went Wrong?

The killings that erupted in Rwanda on April 7 and in Burundi last October are rooted in zero-sum politics: one ethnic group must be on top and the other on the bottom. Domination by one group--through one-party systems or military regimes--since independence has produced massacres, millions of refugees, and insurgencies. In the late 1980s the Tutsi Burundian President and the Hutu Rwandan President began to move toward democratic multiparty systems that could have included both groups and bridged the ethnic chasm. But the lack of power-sharing mechanisms that give each group adequate security guarantees provoked intervention by military extremists, Tutsis in Burundi and Hutus in Rwanda.

In 1993 the Burundians approved a democratic constitution that concentrated power in the Presidency. The election of a Hutu President in July frightened the Tutsis and, together with the President's plans to "restructure" the largely Tutsi army, led to a coup attempt by Tutsi military extremists in October, the President's murder, and uneasy power-sharing between the army and remnants of the Hutu government.

The failed Rwandan transition was initially more promising because the August 1993 Arusha accord provided for explicit power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis in the government and the army. The October turmoil in Burundi, however, caused Rwandan politicians to have second thoughts about Arusha. The RPF also threatened to use a provision of the accord to impeach the President for past human rights abuses. Hutu extremists in the military feared being ousted with him and almost certainly shot down his plane to keep him from implementing the accord.

The current fighting in Rwanda could go on for years. Even if the RPF takes Kigali, the government forces could hole up in the northwest and wage guerrilla warfare, especially if they obtain outside arms. Talk of an international investigation into human rights abuses will reinforce their determination to fight.

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Rwanda and Burundi can only resolve their ethnic conflicts peacefully by trying again to construct power-sharing systems. Domination by one group would not work any better than it has in the past. Partition would not work either because ethnic boundaries cannot be neatly drawn. Although de facto partition is taking place in Rwanda, the RPF-controlled areas still have Hutu majorities and are likely to become ungovernable.

Given the scale of killings in Rwanda, there is only a remote chance that the Arusha accord could be revived in the near term. Power-sharing in Burundi is still a possibility but is dependent on the drafting of a new constitution with explicit "rules of the game." Any talk of reforming the Burundian military should be postponed until its commanders are convinced that Tutsi interests are protected by a new constitution. Otherwise, Burundi risks more military-instigated massacres that also would fuel the Rwandan fighting. The attached paper discusses Rwanda's and Burundi's failed efforts at power-sharing which resulted in the current massive humanitarian crisis.

Attachment:
Issues Paper.

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Drafted: INR/AA:AReid/7-7648

Cleared: INR/AA:VFarley/7-6130

Approved: INR/DAS: BWood (Acting)

File Name: Rwandacon

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ATTEMPTED CONFLICT RESOLUTION
in RWANDA AND BURUNDI: WHAT WENT WRONG

For four hundred years the Tutsi minority was on top and the Hutu majority on the bottom. The situation in Rwanda was reversed by the 1959 Hutu Revolution, but the country's Hutus still fear that Tutsis, if given a political toehold, will come out on top again. In Burundi the Tutsis maintained control until the July 1993 democratic elections put a Hutu in the Presidency; Tutsis now fear the vengeance of the long oppressed majority.

Rwandans and Burundians will not be able to use democracy to resolve their ethnic conflicts unless they adopt power-sharing mechanisms that protect minorities against majorities and vice-versa. The two countries are the most polarized in the region. Political competition is less intense in most other African states because it is spread out among a larger number of competing groups.

Burundian democratization.

In 1988, two years before the international community began to pressure African states to democratize, then Burundian President Buyoya opted for democratization as a way of bridging the country's ethnic divide. His program culminated in July 1993 elections that put a Hutu President in power for the first time. The new President--Ndadaye--attempted some power-sharing by including Tutsis in his cabinet. Nevertheless, Tutsi extremists in the army staged a coup the following October that resulted in the President's death, ethnic massacres of both groups, and uneasy power-sharing between the military and the remnants of the Hutu government.

Why did the Burundi transition break down? A too-powerful Presidency. Buyoya made serious mistakes in democratizing. The democratic constitution that he unveiled in early 1993 concentrated power in the presidency. Both ethnic groups sought the Presidential prize, but only one could win it. Alternatively, a division of power between the President and the legislature and cabinet could have resulted in a stabilizing collegial leadership.

The lack of explicit provisions for power-sharing. Although President Ndadaye named eight Tutsis to his 20-person cabinet, including a Tutsi Prime Minister, their appointments depended on his sufferance. There were no explicit constitutional provisions for minority representation in the executive. An electoral system of proportional representation assured the Tutsis of legislative seats, but they were meaningless given the overwhelming power of the Presidency.

Mishandling the military. Tutsis make up an estimated 70-90 percent of the army and 98 percent of the officer corps. The army's history of intervention in Burundi politics meant that it had to be consulted about the democratization process and

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brought on board. An abortive coup had taken place in March 1992. Buyoya, through US Embassy Bujumbura, arranged to have USAID and the African-American Institute sponsor a conference in February 1993 on the role of the military in a democracy. The army chief of staff announced the army's support for Ndadaye's election in June, but some elements staged another unsuccessful coup in July.

The trigger of the October coup apparently was Ndadaye's plan to restructure the military. While trying to reassure Tutsis by appointing a Tutsi as Minister of Defense and retaining many Tutsi commanders, he made the paramilitary gendarmerie solely responsible for internal security duties that it previously had shared with the army. The gendarmerie was to be increased in size, presumably by recruiting Hutus. The President also began the formation of a new largely Hutu Presidential Guard.

Ndadaye's successor, Ntaryamira, continued to press for military reform. His Foreign Minister, who visited Washington in March 1994 in search of financing for the reforms, indicated that the government was trying to build up countervailing forces to the army. The gendarmerie would be doubled to 7,000 men, and the Presidential Guard would be 4,000 men (its size is currently 1,100), while the 13,000-man army would be reduced in size. The Foreign Minister admitted that the government had not yet negotiated these reforms with the military.

The Minister of Defense recently made reform proposals that are much more modest than the Foreign Minster's. They say nothing about downsizing the army or removing it from internal security duties, instead calling for better command and control, more respect for human rights, and more ethnically balanced recruitment (with no numerical goals). If Burundians are to avoid a repeat of October 1993, they will have to construct a political system that gives the Tutsi minority a guaranteed share of power before they try to reform the military.

The need to rewrite the Burundi Constitution. Burundians already have begun to strengthen minority guarantees. In early 1994 the President agreed to give opposition parties 40 percent of the seats in the cabinet. But any guarantees will have to be explicitly spelled out. Some Tutsis have called for a new Constitution that permits the selection of a Prime Minister from a different ethnic and political group than the President, creation of a Senate, and a minority veto on certain types of legislation.

Rwandan democratization.

In 1990 former Rwandan President Habyarimana also began to democratize, but grudgingly, in response to both internal (Hutu moderates and Tutsis) and external pressures. His new government, which came to include representatives of the three leading internal opposition parties, negotiated the August 1993 Arusha accord with the RPF that ended the insurgency and established a temporary power-sharing system. Hutu extremists--civilian and military--almost certainly carried out

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the April 6 downing of the plane carrying Habyarimana (and Burundi President Ntaryamira) to prevent him from implementing the accord.

Explicit power-sharing. The Rwandan negotiators of the Arusha accord recognized the need for power-sharing more clearly than did the Burundians. Explicit "rules of the game" were formulated. Power was shifted from the President to a transitional cabinet and legislature. A set number of seats were allocated to the President's MRND party, the RPF, and four internal opposition parties. Decisions were to be taken by consensus. If this proved impossible, the accords provided for overrides of three-fifths in the legislature and two-thirds in the cabinet, except on certain critical issues such as defense.

The accord also included explicit power-sharing in the military. Unlike Burundi, two warring armies--the Rwandan army and the RPF--had to be integrated into a new national force. The RPF got 40 percent of the new military slots, including 50 percent of the command positions above the company level.

The Rwandans postponed elections for 22 months. The government wanted elections earlier, but the RPF objected because it would lose, both because of its minority status and the government's control of the electoral apparatus. The RPF and many moderate Hutus probably hoped that the transitional government could test and hone power-sharing mechanisms, leading to their incorporation in a permanent constitution.

Revenge politics. The RPF leaders wanted power-sharing but not national reconciliation. They refused to give amnesty for human rights crimes and hinted at bringing Habyarimana to trial. One provision of the Arusha accord pushed through by the RPF and political opposition provided for the President's impeachment by a two-thirds vote of the transitional legislature. The people around Habyarimana, including Hutu extremists in the military, knew that they would be ousted with him and were determined not to give up the benefits of power that they had enjoyed for 20 years.

Political infighting. Rwanda's political parties were the implementors of the accords. The two-thirds and three-fifths required for overrides and control of the transition led to maneuvering within and among the parties. The mid-1993 split in two major opposition parties intensified the maneuvering and held up the formation of the transitional government.

Burundi's horrible example. Developments in the two states are intertwined. The election of a Hutu President in Burundi helped persuade Habyarimana to sign the Arusha accord. The killing of the President and the ensuing massacres caused Rwanda's Hutu politicians to have second thoughts about their attempted transition. There is a good chance that Rwandans could have implemented Arusha and avoided the post-April 6 massacres if it had not been for the breakdown in Burundi's transition. Current international pressures for reform of the Burundian military are likely to provoke another coup attempt in

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Bujumbura and more ethnic killings, which, in turn, would fuel the Rwandan fighting.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

3626

MAY 5 1994

I-94/16544

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts (U)

Sandy,

(C) I understand that during their luncheon yesterday Tony Lake raised with Dr. Perry the possibility of jamming Rwandan radio broadcasts. We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming is an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC Advisor seeks.

(C) International legal conventions complicate airborne or ground based jamming and the mountainous terrain reduces the effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset, is the only suitable DOD jamming platform. It costs approximately $8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection.

(C) I believe it would be wiser to use air to assist in Rwanda in the relief effort, particularly in neighboring countries, like Tanzania. This weekend we will be assisting with air lifts to Tanzania for the UNHCR (blankets and plastic sheeting) and an American NGO, AmeriCares (medical supplies). In addition, we are developing several additional options for providing excess DoD non-lethal supplies such as food and medical supplies to refugees. Furthermore, we are considering funding commercially contract relief flights into Kigali in support of the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other relief groups.

Frank

Frank G. Wisner

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2010-0639-M 1

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-May-1994 10:08 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Press Points on Rwanda

Rwanda

Background

Secretary General Boutros Ghali said yesterday that the slowness and inadequacy of the U.N. and international response to the tragedy in Rwanda was a "scandal". He blamed "donor fatigue" for the difficulty he is having in persuading nations to contribute to the 5500-troop force authorized by the United Nations. Only Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia have said publicly that they are ready to provide troops. The Secretary General's representative is completing a visit to Rwanda where he has secured support from the RPF and RGF to bring in peacekeepers.

There is an inaccurate public perception that the U.S. has been stalling the reintroduction of U.N. peacekeepers into Rwanda. In fact, we have strongly supported an expanded U.N. role in Rwanda, and have been working with the U.N. to ensure that the force achieves maximum benefit by protecting those Rwandans most at risk. There is a dispute: we believe a force in the South is preferable, the U.N. wants a Kigali-based operation that will then fan out throughout the country. While working with the U.N. to define the role for these troops, we have not delayed the process.

Meanwhile, the fighting continues in Rwanda between the RPF and Rwandan government, with the country roughly divided in half now. The RPF has expanded its control of large areas of Kigali, including the airport. There are no indications that the mass killings are stopping and the humanitarian crisis looms large as famine and disease threaten the large displaced population.

Points

-- We share the deep concerns of Secretary General Boutros Ghali over the need to end the killings in Rwanda, to achieve a ceasefire and to prevent further humanitarian disaster.

-- We actively support UN efforts to send 5500 troops for Rwanda into seek to ensure the safety of Rwandan people at

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risk of brutal massacre and to assist distribution of humanitarian assistance. The Vice President actively pushed this in his meeting two weeks ago in South Africa with U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim and Tanzanian President Mwinyi. Several African countries have indicated their intention to provide troops for this effort. We hope these troops can be introduced into Rwanda very soon.

-- We will provide financial support and will consider logistical and material support as appropriate. We do not intend to provide U.S. troops for this effort.

-- We have been working with the U.N. to ensure that the mission for these peacekeepers is well-defined, assists the maximum number of Rwandans at risk and meets the other criteria outlined in the President's directive on peacekeeping. However, these discussions have in no way slowed down the recruitment of peacekeepers for the mission.

-- We also supported the U.N. decision to immediately deploy additional peacekeepers to Kigali to bring the mechanized battalion there up to full strength (up from 450 at present to 800) and to reintroduce about 160 U.N. Military Observers into Rwanda to review the situation on the ground.

-- In addition, the Security Council approved a U.S.-backed arms embargo on Rwanda.

-- In addition to this peacekeeping role, we have actively addressed the tragedy in Rwanda over the past seven weeks through humanitarian and diplomatic efforts.

  - o We've provided a total of about $35 million in humanitarian aid in this fiscal year.

  - o The President has made several tough statements which have been beamed into Rwanda and read directly to leaders of the RPF and Government forces.

  - o We have supported ceasefire talks in Arusha under Tanzanian President Mwinyi and other regional leaders.

  - o At the recent meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, we supported efforts to identify those responsible for the killings and insist that they be held accountable for their actions.

Distribution:

FOR: Natalie S. Wozniak (WOZNIAK)
FOR: Calvin A. Mitchell (MITCHELLC)

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CC:	Dan W. Mozena	(MOZENA)
CC:	Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-May-1994 11:45 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Update for CNN

TOM:

Attached are updates on Rwanda and South Africa, based on developments since last Wednesday. They are intended to supplement rather than replace the existing guidances.

Rwanda Update

-- We're taking a number of steps to try to bring a ceasefire in Rwanda and end the senseless violence. We're working with the U.N. and Organization of African Unity to find ways to protect refugees on both sides of the Rwandan border.

-- We're supporting regional leaders, especially the Presidents of Tanzania and Uganda, who are working to resolve the crisis. New talks are set for today (Tuesday) in Arusha, although it is uncertain whether the parties will show up. Our Ambassador to Tanzania will attend and help facilitate the discussions.

-- I recorded a message of peace on Saturday which is being pumped into Rwanda through VOA, BBC and other stations. We have already received indications that it is being heard, if not heeded, by the government and RPF leadership.

-- Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck and Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson will leave Monday night for the region, including Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania to shore up the regional leaders' efforts to achieve peace and protect refugees in Rwanda. We have asked that the UN Commission for Human Rights send a team to the region to investigate the current abuses.

-- Senior USG officials have been contacting Government and RPF leaders on a daily basis to urge a ceasefire and renewal of negotiations.

-- We intend to provide more emergency relief assistance for the region. A team of U.S. refugee officers in Tanzania is going to the border with Rwanda to assess the situation.

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South African Elections Update

(It is possible that the election results in South Africa will be announced before the President's appearance on CNN. If so, he should congratulate the winners -- including Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and most of all, the South African people themselves for having voted in such tremendous number and with such patience and good humor despite the threats, intimidation and long lines.)

-- I sent a delegation headed by Reverend Jesse Jackson to South Africa to observe the elections on my behalf. They came back this weekend, and reported that the over-all feeling in South Africa is euphoric.

-- They saw literally thousands of examples of courage and compromise throughout the four days of the elections. In some of the most conservative farming areas, blacks and whites were walking to the polls side-by-side in massive numbers, despite protests and intimidation. Throughout this region, white farmers had opened up their farm to voter education programs and were so excited themselves that they could be seen driving their black farm workers to the polls.

-- This spirit of compromise and cooperation bodes well for South Africa's ability to come to grips with its most difficult problems in the post-election period.

Distribution:

FOR:	Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAK)
FOR:	Calvin A. Mitchell	(MITCHELLC)
FOR:	Tara D. Sonenshine	(SONENSHINE)
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FOR:	Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC:	Records	(RECORDS)

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9 May 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Regional Response to the Crisis P1/(b)(1)

1. African countries are unlikely to adopt a formal stance on Rwanda until they debate the issue at next month's annual summit in Tunisia of the heads of state of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[1] The secretaries general of the OAU and UN disagree about which organization should take the lead in organizing a peacekeeping operation, and whether it should be made up exclusively of African troops under OAU direction as UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali has proposed. OAU Secretary General Salim has stated that any expanded peacekeeping presence should be organized under UN auspices and build on the existing UNAMIR presence to include African and non-African troops. He has promised to ask African countries to contribute some of the necessary troops. It is unclear, however, how much enthusiasm OAU members remote from the crisis have for participating in a Rwandan operation. P1/(b)(1)

2. **Expanded Peacekeeping Presence.** Rwanda's protagonists have sent an equivocal message regarding UN proposals to place an expanded force there. Despite the interim Hutu regime's claims that it wants UN peacekeepers to return, the small UNAMIR mission that remains in Kigali is concerned that it will be targeted by hardline Hutu militia and Army personnel. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1) After originally rejecting participation, Nigeria's UN representative now says his country is willing to provide one of the additional battalions that the UN seeks--if the United States provides financial and logistic support. P1/(b)(1)

3. **Organization of African Unity.** The 52-member OAU has traditionally looked to Tanzania and the UN to take the lead in mediating the Rwandan crisis, while it plays a supporting role. Tunisian President Ben Ali, who is scheduled to replace Egyptian President Mubarak as OAU Chairman at the June summit, supports the organization's efforts to develop a modest capacity for

[1] OAU foreign ministers meet from 6 to 11 June to set the agenda for the summit in Tunisia to be held 13-15 June. P1/(b)(1)

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conflict prevention and resolution. Ben Ali is not as well known as Mubarak among the OAU's Sub-Saharan African majority, however, and unlike Egypt, Tunisia does not have a history of diplomatic activism south of the Sahara. P1/(b)(1)

4. The OAU was sharply critical of the UN Security Council's 21 April decision to withdraw all but 270 of 2,500 UNAMIR peace monitors from Rwanda, calling the action short-sighted and callous. Although deeply concerned about Rwanda, the OAU is still trying to get its 47-member, Tunisian-commanded military observer mission in Burundi fully deployed and operational. This effort has been under way since last November. Between September 1992 and October 1993, the OAU--in its first such operation ever--placed a 50-man, Nigerian-commanded Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda that sought with mixed success to monitor the cease-fire between the government and RPF rebels. P1/(b)(1)

5. **Burundi.** The country's shaky Hutu-led government and senior officers of the restive, Tutsi-dominated armed forces are seeking to preserve fragile stability by remaining neutral toward Rwanda. Bujumbura does not want a large influx of Rwandan refugees, but cannot adequately prevent arms in the hands of its civilian population from reaching Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Any UN-sponsored punishment of Rwandans for human rights violations will be a sensitive issue for those in Burundi who have been responsible for similar excesses following the murder of the country's first Hutu president in last October's Tutsi-led coup attempt. P1/(b)(1)

6. **Tanzania.** President Mwinyi's government appears willing to continue to be an honest broker, trying to bring Rwanda's two sides back into the Arusha accord. Despite the cost and frustration of this effort, Tanzanian leaders view power-sharing as the best chance for encouraging the large Rwandan refugee population in Tanzania to return, P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

7. **Uganda.** While trying to appear neutral by expressing a willingness to broker a cease-fire and proposing a regional summit on Rwanda, President Museveni continues to sympathize with Rwanda's Tutsi rebels P1/(b)(1)
P1/(b)(1)
P1/(b)(1) He sees this as a payback for their help

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prior to his seizure of power in 1986, and as the best way to repatriate hundreds of thousands of Tutsis living in southern Uganda. RPF leader Kagame headed Uganda's military intelligence before taking leadership of the Rwandan Rebel Front. Many RPF troops fought in the Ugandan Army, and Museveni's tribe has ethnic ties to Rwanda's Tutsis. P1/(b)(1)

8. Museveni has deployed additional Ugandan troops to the border area in recent weeks. He claims to favor extending the mandate of the Uganda-based UNOMUR observer mission to cover the entire length of the Rwanda-Uganda border to support an international embargo on arms to Rwanda. With only 81 members, however, UNOMUR cannot effectively monitor the border and has no capability to patrol Lake Kivu across which arms can be smuggled. P1/(b)(1)

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10. **No Easy Road Ahead.** Differing interests among Rwanda's neighbors, together with the depth of animosities between Hutus and Tutsis in both Rwanda and Burundi, will complicate any UN or OAU-led intervention. In the interest of a timely deployment, any force that is mounted may have to include troops from non-African countries in addition to Africans. Such an effort will be difficult in the absence of diplomatic progress toward a cease-fire and a reduction in violence. Readying African contingents for transport and deployment could prove time-consuming as demonstrated by the experience of moving battalion-sized forces from Tanzania and Uganda to Liberia to assist West African peacekeepers already in place. Africans will also want a UN mission to have clearly defined objectives and a definite end point. P1/(b)(1)

11. Rwanda's neighbors are likely to display mixed responses to any UN human rights investigation of ethnic killings in Rwanda and to any arms embargo. Accusations of favoritism will almost certainly be raised by the Rwandan regime and the rebel RPF if only Rwanda's Hutus appear to be singled out for human rights violations or if an arms embargo is applied that

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Regional Response to the Crisis P1/(b)(1)

appears to harm one side only. Rwanda's Hutus regard Uganda--along with Belgium--as favoring the Tutsis; Tutsis see Zaire and France as pro-Hutu. P1/(b)(1)

Refugee Situation in the Region

Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi are struggling with the influx of more than 310,000 Rwandan refugees who have fled the systematic massacres of civilians as well as the civil war between the Rwandan Tutsi rebels and the Rwandan Army. Refugee-receiving countries are concerned that the refugees will bring arms and contribute to violence, and that some may be foreign military personnel disguised as refugees. Expatriate relief workers often add to tensions by their presence in areas where they can observe military movements and by their demands that local military forces provide security.

- At least 250,000 Rwandans have crossed into remote western Tanzania and have been moved to an area some 18 kilometers from the border. International agencies are scrambling for funds, workers, and relief goods to avert a health catastrophe from cholera, measles, and other diseases.

- At least 60,000 Rwandans have fled to Zaire, Uganda, and Burundi. Zaire hosts at least 3,300 refugees and Uganda has some 5,500. Although the numbers are relatively small, the remoteness of the border camps and poor transport systems are straining the relief effort. At least 50,000 Rwandan Tutsis have fled to Burundi. In addition, about 210,000 of the 270,000 Hutu refugees who fled from Burundi last fall have returned from Rwanda. The fragile ethnic balance in Burundi could easily be upset if local people believe their relief supplies are being diverted to the recent arrivals. P1/(b)(1)

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
1994 MAY 20 PM 9:16

MESSAGE NO. CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET/ORCON~~ No.Pages C+4

FROM:	Tobi T. Gati (Officer name)	INR/FO (Office symbol)	Ext. 7-8933 (Extension)	6531 (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: **Rwanda-Geneva Convention Violations**

TO: *(Agency)*	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	~~Anthony Lake~~ CLARKE RICE STEINBERG DESHAZER	202 456-2255	West Wing/WH

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION X PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer:

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Wood I

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 16, 1994

~~SECRET/ORCON~~
DECL: OADR

TO: AF - Mr. Moose
L - Mr. Harper

FROM: INR - Toby T. Gati

SUBJECT: Rwanda - Geneva Convention Violations

There is substantial circumstantial evidence implicating senior Rwandan government and military officials in the widespread, systematic killing of ethnic Tutsis, and to a lesser extent, ethnic Hutus who supported power-sharing between the two groups. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has also killed Hutus in battle and has admitted targeting extremist Hutus whom it believes to be responsible for massacres of Tutsis. Unlike government forces, the RPF does not appear to have committed Geneva Convention defined genocidal atrocities.

* * *

Bloody, inter-ethnic struggles between Tutsis and Hutus date back to the colonial period. An estimated 20,000 Tutsis were killed between 1959 and 1964 during the struggle for independence when the Tutsi monarchy fell, but the recent killings far surpass anything in Rwanda's history. Since the April 6 downing of an airplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira, massacres in Rwanda have claimed from 200,000 to 500,000 lives, according to international humanitarian organizations. We believe 500,000 is an exaggerated estimate, but no data is available, if systematic killings began within hours of Habyarimana's death. Most of those killed have been Tutsi civilians, including women and children.

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Some Rwandan government troops, Hutu militia and extremist Hutu youth squads often trained or armed by security forces are the main perpetrators. Killings by the predominantly-Tutsi RPF are much fewer in number and have occurred mainly in battle. There are credible reports that the RPF has summarily executed Hutu militia alleged to have been involved in the massacres and the RPF has admitted to such killings. While the RPF has generally protected Hutus within the territory it controls, Tutsis behind government lines continue to be killed by government supported militias.

Geneva Convention Criteria. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime and Genocide establishes there criteria to identify acts of genocide: 1) killing members and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 2) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and 3) imposing measures intended to prevent births and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Killing and harm. International organizations, foreign diplomats and indigenous eye witnesses have reported systematic executions of Tutsis in villages, schools, hospitals, and churches by Hutu militia, the Presidential Guard, and military forces. Many have been killed or gravely injured by machete-wielding militia members because they are ethnic Tutsi, have Tutsi physical characteristics, or support Tutsis. Government forces have also attacked sites where Tutsi civilians have sought refuge, such as the UN-protected Amahoro stadium in Kigali. They have prevented others from leaving a stadium in Cyangugu and have selected and killed some of those inside.

Numerous credible reports claim that government officials, including national and local, officials have also exhorted civilians to participate in the massacres, often utilizing the militant Hutu radio station, Milles Collines. The new government named following Habyarimana's death is comprised primarily of hard line Hutus opposed to compromise with Tutsis and includes individuals believed to have been involved in Tutsi killings. It has taken little, if any action to halt the killings, most of which have occurred behind government lines.

Unbearable living conditions. Campaigns of ethnic cleansing against Tutsis appear well-planned and systematic. Homes are often destroyed and looted after the occupants have been killed. Hospital staffs have witnessed the execution of Tutsi patients. An estimated one million persons have been displaced and another 350,000 Tutsis and Hutus have fled the country. Inadequate nutrition and

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medical care are claiming additional lives and diseases such as cholera and hepatitis threaten thousands more. Sources of drinking water have become polluted by thousands of corpses thrown into rivers, lakes and wells. Government officials and soldiers have denied or limited access by international relief workers to threatened groups, thus preventing them from obtaining needed food and medical care. Government forces and militia have killed dozens of UN, Red Cross and other relief workers and attacked ambulances bearing the injured.

Measures to prevent births. Tutsi children, along with their parents, are being mutilated and killed. In one town, pregnant women at a maternity clinic were massacred. International humanitarian agencies estimate from eight to 40 percent of the Tutsi population may have perished.

Who Killed the Presidents. The assassins of Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira may never be known. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

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Drafted: AA/JMann/77698

Cleared: AA/JMann/77698

Approved: INR/PDAS: PCWilcox, Jr.

File Name: NONAMERWANDAKILLLGS.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 9411350

May 16, 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

PDD-25 requires Deputies Committee-level approval of all U.S. votes in the United Nations Security Council to establish new peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Core Group is to provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies in their decision.

The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new" mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the decision factors set out in PDD-25.

Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.

Deborah Ebrahim for
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Discussion Paper on Rwanda

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Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

date 4 / 28 / 94

_____ACCEPT _____REGRET _____PENDING

TO: Ricki Seidman
Assistant to the President and
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Record a message to the people of Rwanda for broadcast over VOA and other international radio stations

PURPOSE: By turning the international spotlight on the warring parties in Rwanda and reminding them that the world is aware of what they are doing, we hope to help stop the killing, get the parties to agree to a cease-fire, resume negotiations under the Arusha accord and move toward national reconciliation.

BACKGROUND: The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate, with reports of upwards of 100,000 deaths in largely communal violence. There are mass flows of refugees towards Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. Peace talks in Arusha and elsewhere, which we asked Tanzanian President Mwinyi to host, have not gotten off the ground as Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Government forces refuse to meet. The RPF has called a unilateral cease-fire, but has said that unless there is movement from the Rwanda government forces by April 29, they will launch an all-out offensive.

Radio is the principal medium of communications in Rwanda and the President's message would reach all the parties. It would complement our other efforts to end this tragic situation.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: April 28, 1994

DURATION: 1 minute

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MS NARA, Date 10/17/12
2012-0139-M-1
MS 10/17/12

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Declassify on: OADR

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cc: Stephanie Streett

LOCATION:	Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS:	The President
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:	The President will read a brief statement into a VOA tape recorder.
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be provided by NSC.
MEDIA COVERAGE:	White House photographer; possible release of statement and photograph.
FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE:	No
VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE:	No
SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE:	No
RECOMMENDED BY:	Anthony Lake
CONTACT:	Donald Steinberg, 395-3391

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DECL: OADR

BACKGROUND ON RWANDA CRISIS

Violence on Two Levels

On April 6, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane crashed outside Kigali under suspicious circumstances, killing President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi. The plane was probably shot down, but the attacking party is not known. This event sparked massive violence on two levels:

First, elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military, hardline Hutu militias from Habyarimana's MRND party and the right-wing CDR party, and Hutu extremist gangs began killing Hutu opposition politicians (including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and Tutsi opposition leaders and civilians. The killings began in Kigali, but eventually spread throughout the country.

Second, fighting quickly broke out between Rwandan government forces and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), effectively resuming the civil war that began in October 1990 and was to have ended on August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord. The RPF has advanced steadily and now controls much of Kigali and much of the northern and eastern portions of the country. The newly created interim government, made up primarily of Hutu hardliners, has fled to Gitarama, southwest of Kigali.

Status of Cease-Fire Talks

With U.S. encouragement, the Tanzanian government, which served as host and Facilitator of the Arusha peace talks, has attempted to bring the parties back together to negotiate a cease-fire and relaunch the peace process. On May 3, the Rwandan government and the RPF sent delegations to attend talks in Arusha, but the talks broke down two days later when the RPF refused to sign a cease-fire agreement because a similar document was to be signed by the interim government, whose legitimacy the RPF does not accept. The RPF wants instead to talk directly with the Rwandan military command.

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The Humanitarian Crisis

The violence has left at least 100,000 dead (probably more), displaced hundreds of thousands internally, and forced over 300,000 Rwandans to flee to neighboring countries.

The Internal Problem. As many as one million persons throughout the country may have been displaced by the conflict. There are small enclaves of threatened groups gathered (trapped) in places of refuge in Kigali and other areas of Rwanda, above all behind government lines in the south and west. These people have sought refuge in stadiums, hotels, churches, and other discrete locations and cannot leave primarily because of road blocks and marauding gangs of irregular (Hutu) militia. Humanitarian assistance cannot be delivered to these groups without facing the threat of thugs and uncontrolled militia. ICRC's current target groups of internally displaced or persons in need is as follows:

Kigali	25,000
North/northeast	170,000 (expected to top 200,000)
Southeast	200,000
West (Gitarama)	100,000
South (Butare)	No estimates available

Refugees. Current estimates and locations of refugees are:

Tanzania	(Ngara)	250,000
Burundi	(North)	50,000
Zaire	(Goma, Bukavu)	8,500
Uganda	(Southwest)	5,500

These refugees do not face any immediate threat to their security. Although there were reports of large numbers of people trapped on the Rwanda side of the border in late April, it is unclear whether such mass groupings still exist.

The Humanitarian Needs. Specific needs have yet to be quantified. Food, medicines, blankets, and kitchen utensils are already being delivered. ICRC reports it has delivered 45 tons of medical supplies to health facilities within Rwanda as well as supplying surgical teams and field hospital facilities. ICRC is feeding 25,000 people in "safe havens" in Kigali and continues to distribute food to 60,000 persons in the northern Rwanda. It has also provided a first food distribution to 220,000 refugees in Ngara, Tanzania. The UN Department of Humanitarian affairs issued a flash appeal for $11.5 million to cover organizational and start-up costs for UN and NGO's anticipating becoming involved in the relief effort. ICRC's initial emergency appeal was for roughly $30 million. UNHCR has indicated a need for $38 million and has begun airlifts of relief supplies to Tanzania. Distribution poses major problems.

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International Intervention Force

Government/RPF Views. Rwandan government forces have been in retreat, and the interim government would support almost any form of intervention. The RPF opposes any interpositional force or peacemaking operation designed to impose a cease-fire in the conventional war. They have also suggested they would oppose creation of large protected areas where Hutu extremist militia and thugs might flee to avoid RPF retribution. However, they have said they would support an intervention designed to deliver humanitarian aid and protect civilians threatened by the thuggery.

UN Proposal. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,000 to 8,000 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves. The force would be expected to break through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarm roving gangs, who are often untrained youths armed only with machetes. The force would not become involved in trying to stop or somehow protect the general population from the conventional war between government and RPF forces, which is causing far fewer casualties than the marauding gangs and militias. Initial plans provide for the force to be staged out of Kigali. Fighting continues in Kigali and the airport remains unsecure, making movement of troops and supplies by air difficult. Dallaire believes this mission can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. SYG Boutros-Boutros Ghali has called for an African force. Nigeria has offered a battalion, two other (unidentified) African battalions are said to be available and Dallaire believes Australia may be willing to provide at least 1,000 troops to UNAMIR. The total cost for such a force is estimated at $150-200 million per year.

Position of the OAU. The OAU was disappointed with the UN Security Council's decision to withdraw the bulk of the UNAMIR forces in the initial stages of the crisis. OAU SYG Salim Salim supports an expanded international force in Rwanda, but prefers the operation to be UN-led, with the OAU merely helping to identify African troop contributors.

Security Council Resolutions. The NAM and New Zealand have both circulated draft resolutions that call for a Chapter VII UN operation. The NAM draft would give the force the mandate to restore law and order in Rwanda and establish a secure environment for relief efforts. The New Zealand draft would have the force protect displaced persons and relief operations.

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The Burundi Factor. The Burundi interim President supports greater UN action in Rwanda. However, any operation in Rwanda which would require deployment through Bujumbura or into northern Burundi could meet with strong resistance from the Burundi military, might draw Burundi into the conflict, and could destabilize Burundi.

The U.S. Response to the Crisis

Humanitarian. The U.S. is examining several options to address the humanitarian disaster, including in particular a military operation to establish secure zones near the borders in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Under this option, humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The forces would be deployed outside the immediate war zone, making operations and logistics less difficult. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. The protected zones created would not encompass enclaves of threatened persons in Kigali or other areas in the interior.

The U.S. government has already contributed approximately $28 million in food, relief items, and earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees and persons displaced following last October's coup attempt and subsequent widespread violence. In response to the Rwanda crisis, the Administration approved $15 million in additional funding for new relief efforts in the area and has set aside an additional $13 million in food commodities for that purpose.

Diplomatic. The U.S. has used diplomatic pressure in an effort to stop the killings, put a cease-fire in place, and bring the parties to the negotiating table. We have spoken directly to Rwandan government officials, the Rwandan military, and the RPF, in Washington, via diplomatic channels in other locations, and by telephone to Rwanda and have reinforced these private contacts with high-level public appeals and statements by the President and the State Department.

We have worked to mobilize the international community. HA Assistant Secretary Shattuck, U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson, and Refugee Programs DAS Brunson McKinley traveled to the region the first week in May and found broad support for aggressive multilateral action to help Rwanda. We encouraged the efforts of the Tanzanian Government, as Facilitator of the Arusha process, to reconvene peace talks and sent an observer to the May 3 talks.

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The U.S. encouraged the Organization of African Unity, other regional states, and our European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a cease-fire and resume talks. We pushed for approval of a strong Security Council statement, issued April 30, which demands that the interim government of Rwanda and the RPF take effective measures to prevent attacks on civilians. We also encouraged increased involvement by the UN Human Rights Commissioner, who now plans to travel to Rwanda.

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Rwanda/Burundi

Background

The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate, with reports of upwards of 100,000 deaths in largely communal violence. The rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) continues to make gains in fighting, and have taken over parts of Kigali. There are mass flows of refugees towards Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania. UNAMIR is being drawn down to 270 soldiers, but we and others have insisted this draw-down does not threaten lives of Rwandans under their protection. The RPF is arranging the evacuation of Rwandans previously guarded by UNAMIR at the Amahoro Stadium and the King Faisal Hospital.

Peace talks in Arusha and elsewhere, which we asked Tanzanian President Mwinyi to host, have not gotten off the ground as RPF and Government forces refuse to meet. Our ambassadors in Tanzania and Uganda are deeply involved in these efforts. Ambassador Rawson returns to the region soon to assist this process. On Friday, we issued a tough statement condemning the continued violence and mentioning specific leaders of Rwandan armed forces, thus putting them on notice. We will soon announce $15 million in new humanitarian assistance funds for Burundi and Rwanda.

Meanwhile, the situation in Burundi remains strangely calm but tense. A coup attempt was nipped in the bud, but the largely Tutsi government is having problems in disarming Hutu militia, who fear a potential massacre if they are left unarmed. Renewed widespread commnunal violence is clearly a strong possibility.

Talking Points

-- We are all shocked by the terrible violence that continues to rage in Rwanda and worried over increasing instability in neighboring Burundi.

-- I appreciate the efforts of our ambassadors in Tanzania and Uganda to try to bring together the Government forces and the RPF to reach a ceasefire and a political settlement. I hope we'll continue this diplomatic effort and be alert for other ways to involve regional leaders in resolving this crisis.

-- We all recognized the sad reality that the U.N. peacekeepers were sent to Rwanda for a very different kind of mission from the one they face now, and that most had to be removed. But I'm still interested whether you see a role for the U.N. or the OAU in protecting the most vulnerable Rwandan people, especially those refugees that have fled to border regions.

-- I'd also like to get your views on what we might do now in Burundi to ensure that it does not face the same kind of ethnic killings we're now seeing in Rwanda.

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List of Participants

The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David Rawson, U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda
Sandra Rawson, Wife of U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda
Joyce Leader, Deputy Chief of Mission
Laura Lane, Economic/Consular Officer
Ken Kowalchek, Administrative Office
Walter Meyer, Communications Programs Officer
Bruce McGowan, Public Affairs Officer
Dirk Dijkermann, Acting AID Mission Director
Prudence Bushnell, Head of the State Department Rwanda Task Force
Alan Holmes, Head of the Defense Department Rwanda Task Force
Donald Steinberg, Senior Director for African Affairs, NSC Staff
Richard Clarke, Senior Director for Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
RICKI SEIDMAN

SUBJECT: Drop-by on State Department Task Force on Rwanda This Evening

Purpose

To drop-by the Rwanda Task Force during your visit to the State Department.

Background

This evening you are scheduled to arrive at the State Department at 7:20 p.m. to participate in the Jefferson Dinner. We suggest that you arrive 15 minutes earlier and accompany Secretary Christopher for a brief drop-by with the Task Force on Rwanda. The Task Force has been in operation 24 hours a day since Thursday and has been responsible for coordinating the difficult but successful evacuation of American citizens from Rwanda. The Task Force's professional expertise and close coordination, under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell, AF/C Director Arlene Render and Deputy Director Reed Fendrick, resulted in no American deaths or injuries. Your brief visit would highlight your personal interest in the fate of those citizens and would serve as a gesture of support for all State Department employees who staff similar task forces in difficult crisis situations. The latest situation report is attached at Tab B.

If you agree, Secretary Christopher would meet you in the lobby and escort you to the seventh floor of the State Department. He would take you through the State Department Operations Center to the Task Force area where you could visit informally with the current staff team. Proposed talking points are attached at Tab A.

Following your visit to the Task Force, Secretary Christopher would escort you to the Benjamin Franklin Room on the eighth floor to begin the Jefferson Dinner.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Mrs. Clinton would be welcome to join you. Alternatively, she could be escorted to the eighth floor to join Mrs. Christopher.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to do a 15 minute drop-by with the Rwanda Task Force.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Latest Situation Report

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 28
SITUATION AS OF 0545 EDT, 04/11/94

- (U) A C-141 carrying 20 Amcit missionaries and most of Embassy Kigali's staff is scheduled to depart Bujumbura for Nairobi by 0630 EDT. (Embassy Nairobi/TFRW01 telecon)

- (U) Consular update information as of 0500 EDT: The Gakoni orphanage group, including eight Amcits (Sitrep 27), intended to split up; part of the group, including six of the eight Amcits, planned to drive from Rwamagana to Tanzania; two Amcits decided to return to Kigali with UNAMIR escort and plan to depart 4/11. The group driving to Tanzania planned to cross at Rusumo and will radio Carl Wilkins (Sitrep 26), who will then contact Embassy Nairobi. Embassy Bujumbura believes that three Amcits remain in Butare, Rwanda near the Burundi border; approximately 22 Amcits from Adventist University in Mudende reached the Zaire border at Gisenyi and all have crossed into Zaire; six additional Amcits are for the moment staying in the Rwanda/Zaire border town of Cyangugu. (Embassy Nairobi and Embassy Bujumbura/TFRW01 telcons)

- (U) RPF Commander Major-General Paul Kagame told Reuter Sunday that two battalions of 600 fighters each were battling towards Kigali to reinforce a rebel battalion already there. According to the French Embassy in Nairobi, the main body of the RPF is within 10-15 kilometers of Kigali. (Reuter Report April 11; Nairobi 06380)

- ~~(C)~~ [redacted] confirms that the French evacuated President Habyarimana's family. The French also passed on unconfirmed reports of the assassination of RPF leaders Kanyarengwe and Bizimungu. [redacted]

[redacted]

David Pierce
Coordinator

Peter Petrihos
Senior Watch Officer

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

09 April 1994

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

1. Renewed ethnic fighting in Rwanda this week dramatically ends efforts by the Hutu-dominated government and Tutsi rebels to implement an August 1993 peace accord. Both sides were committed a to 22-month program of demobilization, refugee repatriation, and democratic elections in 1995. P1/(b)(1)

Colonial Background

2. Unlike most African states, Rwanda was not an artificial creation of colonial rule but was absorbed by German East Africa in 1899. Rwandan and Burundi had been kingdoms for several centuries. After the First World War, they became territory of the Belgians. In 1959 Hutus toppled the Tutsi monarchy; Rwanda became independent in 1962. Rwanda's first Hutu President was overthrown in 1973 by President Habyarimana who dominated Rwandan politics until his assassination last week. P1/(b)(1)

Ethnic Background

3. Rwanda's ethnic groups, which speak the same language and have largely the same religion, have a long history of ethnic bloodletting that dates back to the 15th century when the Nilotic Tutsis moved south to dominate the agricultural Hutus. More than 100,000 people have been killed in ethnic fighting since independence, triggering an exodus of 500,000 Tutsi refugees. After 30 years, these numbers have grown to over a million Tutsis. Some Tutsis, who comprise about 15 percent of the population, are successful business people, but most are marginalized. P1/(b)(1)

Post Independence Politics

4. Rwandan politics had been dominated for years by President Habyarimana's virtually uncontested rule marked by an obsession to keep Hutus in control. Growing internal pressure in recent years began to challenge his authoritarian rule however. He divided power among the country's major institutions, marginalized rivals and favored bringing to power Hutu elites from

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

his northern stronghold. He has used hardline Hutus to disrupt efforts to foster ethnic reconciliation with the Tutsi minority, almost certainly sanctioning violence against Tutsi civilians. P1/(b)(1)
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Tutsi Invasion...

5. About 2000 Rwandan exiles from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) based in Uganda invaded northeastern Rwandan on 1 October 1990, threatening President Habyarimana's regime and raising the specter of renewed ethnic violence in the region. Initial successes by the exile force--which managed to enter the Rwandan capital--prompted Belgium and France to send troops to protect their nationals and secure the airport. Zaire, which had a mutual defense agreement with Rwanda, also provided some 1200 troops to aid Rwandan forces. The initial invasion of about 2000 Rwandan Tutsi deserters from the Ugandan Army was joined by other Tutsis and disaffected Hutus, bringing the exiles' strength to what we estimate may have numbered 20,000. Following early combat success, the RPF guerrilla force was hampered by logistic constraints and the Rwandan Army, benefiting from military resupply by France, Belgium, Egypt, and South Africa contained the rebels primarily to the northeastern Mutara region. P1/(b)(1)

...Evolves into Peace Talks

6. After nearly a year of negotiations held in Arusha Tanzania, in August 1993 the Hutu government and the Tutsi rebels signed the peace accord giving the Tutsi minority seats in a multi-ethnic cabinet, slots in the armed forces, and a process for resettling Tutsi refugees. Mutual distrust undermined efforts to implement the agreements, but both sides agreed to the deployment of UN troops to serve as a confidence building force. Until this week, UNAMIR's 2500 man force had been relatively effective and quick to investigate claims of cease-fire violations. Last December, the rebels sent a 600-man bodyguard force to Kigali to protect rebel leaders participating in talks over forming a multi-ethnic coalition government. P1/(b)(1)

...But Tensions Recently Increased

7. Efforts to form the transitional government--which should have been installed in September 1993--recently stalled with both sides blaming each other for the delays. The RPF, increasingly impatient with what it viewed as Hutu President

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

Habyarimana's manipulation of the 1993 accords, recently threatened to return to war if progress was not made toward forming the multi-ethnic government. The RPF also refused to allow a Hutu supremacist party, the Coalition for Defense of the Republic (CDR), to take a national assembly seat until the CDR demonstrated its commitment to the Arusha accord. With Rwanda's two main opposition parties--the Liberal Party (PL) and the Movement for a Democratic Rwanda (MDR)--divided by ethnic based power struggles, Habyarimana and the Tutsi rebels attempted to secure a more prominent role in the future transitional government.

8. Although the Arusha accords appeared to be falling apart, meetings last week in Kampala and Tanzania on resolving ethnic conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda offered some hope that civil war would be averted in Rwanda. P1/(b)(1)

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Troubled Outlook

9. The renewed conflict in Rwanda will undermine UNAMIR'S mandate, fuel massive refugee flows and, threaten ethnic reconciliation in neighboring Burundi. Civil war in Kigali will almost certainly slow peace efforts between neighboring Burundi's ethnic Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated military--which launched a coup last October killing Burundi's Hutu President and his direct line of succession, triggering more than 700,000 in refugees in the region and unleashing ethnic bloodletting which left scores of Burundians dead.

10. Moreover, if the RPF rebels engage government forces in Kigali the fighting is likely to be more intense as the RPF seeks to seize the government. In addition, the RPF is unlikely to seek an accommodation with the newly named interim government, which they see as a continuation of hardline Hutu political domination. We believe that the rebel forces are probably more disciplined than government forces who have always looked to the Paris to

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

support them in the capital. Even if the RPF defeats government forces, they are unlikely to be able to maintain control of the Hutu majority in Kigali. P1/(b)(1)

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SUBJECT: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis

Annex: Rwandan Political Parties

MNDR (Movement for Democracy and Development): Ruling party founded in 1975...represents northern Hutu interests.

Interhamwe: MRND youth movement...said to be paramilitary wing for MRND.

CDR (Committee for the Defense of the Republic): Hutu supremacists party formed in 1992...responsible for violent mass actions opposing ethnic powersharing...support base in former President Habyarimana's northern stronghold.

MDR (Movement for a Democratic Rwanda): Formed in 1970s...democratic tradition..strong in south.

LP (Liberal Party): Primarily Tutsi...strong in south...allied in Hutu MDR

RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front): Tutsi movement founded in 1979..platform calls for settling 500,000 Rwanda refugees in neighboring countries...military movement filled by Tutsis formerly in Ugandan military.

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Rwanda General Map and Buffer Zone Area



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Dr. Theodore SINDIKUBWABO **RWANDA**
(Phonetic: sindeekoobWAHBO)

Interim President (since 8 April 1994)

Designated Interim President under constitution...almost certainly an ethnic Hutu...political, ethnic views unknown; however, comes from southern region which has vied with Habyarimana's northern clan for power...Minister of Public Works during 1962-63...became medical doctor in 1969...Minister of Health from 1972 until Habyarimana seized power in 1973...became member of Habyarimana's ruling MNDR party...elected to National Development Committee (Rwandan National Assembly) in late 1970s...appointed speaker in 1989...age about 70. P1/(b)(1)

Jean KAMBANDA
(Phonetic: kahmBANdah)

Prime Minister (since 8 April 1994)

Hutu...member Democratic Republican Movement (MDR); belongs to hardline faction opposed to powersharing with Tutsis...elected head of local MDR chapter in southern region in 1993...made unsuccessful bid for Prime Minister in early 1993...former banking official, P1/(b)(1)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
WGRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 1
SITUATION AS OF 2100 EDT, 04/07/94

- (U) Amb. Rawson called at 4 PM EDT and reported relative quiet, although a period of shelling had just started. There are no reports of Americans killed or injured. Americans are being advised to stay at home and stay away from windows.

- (U) The RPF battalion left their compound this afternoon and began fighting with the Rwandan military. The airport is controlled by Rwandan government paracommandos. No political figures have come forward in the crisis. Rawson reported the south of the country is apparently calm, but there is some violence in the north.

- (U) The military announced the formation of a crisis committee and called for a meeting with the government Friday morning. There are unconfirmed reports that the Ministers of Social Work, Information, and Agriculture have been killed. Eleven UNAMIR are confirmed dead. UNAMIR's Kigali sector headquarters was hit and caught fire, but there were no apparent injuries.

- (U) The Ambassador said the Belgians were considering evacuation, but the French thought it premature. He thought evacuation by land to the south would be the least dangerous option. Of the 250 Amcits, about 170 would want to leave.

- (U) The UN Security Council approved a statement strongly condemning the violence and attacks on UN personnel. The statement demands that free access to the airport be restored and urges all parties to implement the Arusha accord and respect the ceasefire.

- ~~(C)~~ M approved ordered departure of all USG employees and dependents and temporary suspension of operations in Kigali. The Belgian Embassy said the GOB decided to defer decision on evacuation until tomorrow. Although Burundi has stayed quiet so far, ordered departure for dependents and non-essential personnel for Bujumbura has been requested.

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Reed Fendrick
Reed Fendrick
Coordinator

Carol Heineck
Carol Heineck
Senior Watch Officer

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUSHNELL

SUBJECT: WGRW01: WORKING GROUP FORMATION TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

The Secretary has directed that AF form a 24-hour Working Group to coordinate all departmental activities to deal with the situation in Rwanda and Burundi. Situation Reports are to be submitted to the Senior Watch Officer at 0600 and 1800 EDT daily.

All cables and other documents relating to this Working Group should include the following identifier as the first item on the subject line: WGRW01.

The Working Group will be located in Task Force Room 1 - non-secure telephones: 202-647-6614, 6616, 6617 for internal Department of State business and 202-647-0900 for congressional, public and press inquiries. The number 202-647-0900 is the only number which should be given to the press or general public. The Task Force can also be reached on the following secure telephone numbers: STU III - [redacted] (b)(7)(c) and the State Department MLP-1 interface #2010.

The Working Group Director will be AF Acting Assistant Secretary Bushnell. Representatives from the following bureaus will participate in the Working Group:

- AF	-DS
- INR	-PM
- CA	-IM
- PA	-H
- IO	

for Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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check with JCS

In response to the recent developments in Rwanda, the Department of Defense has pre-positioned military transport aircraft and helicopters in the region to assist, if necessary, with the evacuation of American citizens from Rwanda.

Throughout the past two days, we have ~~closely coordinated~~ been working with our NATO allies, especially with the Belgians and the French, particularly with respect to the French action last evening to secure the airport in Kigali.

At the present time, all Americans in Rwanda are reported to be safe. Despite some positive developments on the ground, such as the establishment of a provisional government and the announcement of a temporary ceasefire, the situation in Rwanda remains uncertain. The ordered departure remains in effect. Americans ~~will be~~ are being evacuated as soon as ~~it is~~ possible. ~~to do so safely.~~

#1 — PAO
#2 — AID Pop'n
#3 — AID Employee

Convoy in radio

21

Modende

Monique

5

Cons
DCM

3 convoys

L half-way to border

— Convoy

— move beyond

— Belgian requests

2 gendarmes a piece — gone back

270

how many Americans → ? 130 people left

258 American

other nationalities

how many left

EUCOM — helicopters

Sandy Stewart

200 Marines

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(4)

Belgia

Given Eifel
Jill Daughters
Mark

→ CW/BW April / Elisa

→ Bob Boreson –
April Jackson

→ Gordon – OPIC

→ Addl

→ Rwanda

→ Furse

April →

→

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

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Apr-1994 16:00 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Reporting on Rwanda

Jill Daugherty tells me that CNN from Nairobi is reporting that:

A first convoy of Americans and other Westerner has made it out of Rwanda and to the hotel in Bujumbura. They are scheduled to be taken to Nairobi in C-130 aircraft. Two other convoys are still on the Rwandan side of the border. They will come out tomorrow. All of these convoy include Americans and other Westerners. There is a "fourth" convoy of Embassy officials (sic), but CNN is not informed as to their whereabouts. There are no U.S. troops in Rwanda escorting the convoys.

I told her that I couldn't comment on any of this, but warned her off the fourth convoy story. I also pointed out the danger in CNN trying to provide too many details on what's going on in this sensitive situation.

Good
(TL 4/9)

Don

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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DECL:OADR

April 8, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Request for Department of Defense participation in joint U.S.-Belgian-French evacuation of expatriates from Rwanda and for Department of Defense provision of appropriate air support on a non-reimbursable basis

The situation on the ground in Kigali remains chaotic and violent. The French and Belgian Governments share our concern over the security of our respective nationals, and have suggested informally that we coordinate our efforts in any evacuation.

Belgium may be prepared to dispatch approximately 800 troops to Rwanda to assist in any evacuation, but may require U.S. airlift assistance to move these forces and their equipment. France may be prepared to contribute four Jaguar fighter planes in support of an evacuation operation.

The Department of State requests that the Department of Defense participate in planning for a joint U.S.-Belgium-France operation to evacuate our respective nationals from Rwanda. The Department of State also requests that the Department of Defense be prepared to provide all appropriate airlift support to such an operation.

Department of State will reimburse the Department of Defense for airlift of U. S. citizens. The Department of State will consult the Department of Defense and the National Security Council on other funding issues, including whether reimbursement should be sought from the French and Belgians, and/or whether the President should be asked to order a drawdown of defense services under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Thank you for your assistance in this important matter.

for [signature]
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0639-M-1
MM 10/17/12

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RWANDA WEEKLY REPORT
Friday, December 9, 1994

SUMMARY

In the "Final Report of the Commission of Experts", the commission concluded that though serious breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity were perpetrated by both sides, only the Hutus were involved in genocide, and recommended that investigations be continued. USMission in Geneva reports that the UN Human Rights Center is operational and reasonably consolidated. The U.S. is funding training for all field staff and officers and the EU will contribute a team of 50 fully equipped personnel. There appears to be fewer difficulties in camp security, and according to IFRC Delegate in Kibumba, IFRC is in control of food distribution which is working. MSF/France and IRC are pulling out of refugee camps, but plan to remain in Rwanda. On the issue of troop contribution for possible UN security operations in refugee camps, several posts were instructed to demarche their hosts government, we received mixed responses. Vice President Kagame arrives in the U.S. on December 9 at the invitation of Secretary Perry and will be in Washington until December 12. Meanwhile, in a meeting with AF/C Director, former Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye stressed the need for the new Rwandan Government to apply the principles of Arusha, accountability for the killers, disarmament and disbanding of the militias, and criticized the government for

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MS 10/17/12

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not doing enough to ensure the safety of the refugees. The next meeting of Friends of Rwanda will be held in New York on Friday Dec. 16, two new friends (Spain and OAU Secretariat) have been invited to attend. Though we want to maintain the momentum, the Regional Refugee prepcon scheduled for Addis next week is looking doubtful unless we can get preparations on track.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

Preparations are ongoing for the visit of Vice President Kagame, who has been invited to the U.S. by Secretary Perry. Kagame arrives Friday, December 9, his official program begins December 12, and he leaves Washington December 14. In addition to DoD, he is scheduled to meet with the NSC (Lake), State (you (with A/S Shattuck and Oakley), A/S Moose, and A/S Bennet), USAID (Atwood), and the Hill.

We have set the next Friends of Rwanda meeting for Friday, December 16, from 9:30 am to 1:15 pm in New York, and have instructed USUN and our embassies in "Friends" capitals to extend invitations. We have invited two new "Friends", Spain (they expressed a desire to attend) and the OAU Secretariat (invited at Belgium's suggestion). The agenda will address concrete next steps on the major topics from the first meeting (camp security, refugee conference, human rights monitors, Tribunal, and political dialogue). The end of the meeting has been reserved for information sharing on each country's

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assistance programs in Rwanda and any preventive diplomacy activities countries may be engaged in Burundi.

On December 5, former Rwandan Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye met with AF/C to discuss his views on the current situation in Rwanda. Dismas, who lives in Europe now, served as prime minister from April 1992 to July 1993 and comes from another wing of the MDR, PM Twagiramungu's party. He stressed the need for the new Rwandan government to apply the principles of Arusha. In his view, the GOR was applying the accords selectively, based on the RPF's unilateral interpretation. AF/C Director Render asked about Hutu moderates not involved in the killings with whom the GOR might engage in a dialogue. Dismas had no names to suggest but said there were groups representing Hutu moderates who could be involved in such a dialogue. Dismas criticized the new government for not doing enough to control reprisals or to assure refugees that their security, property, and basic rights will be protected and respected. He called for accountability for the killers, disarmament and disbanding of the militias, and integration of innocent ex-far soldiers into the Rwandan army. AF/C outlined the USG's efforts to resolve the crisis and to stress the need for a political solution and respect for human rights.

LEGAL ISSUES

Judge Goldstone is going to Rwanda on December 19 and 20 to meet with the Rwandan Government to gain support for the

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Tribunal and also to meet with NGOs. He will likely be accompanied by a UN Surveyor who will identify a site for the Prosecutor's office. Also likely to accompany the Judge will be a USG team to participate in identifying and equipping the site.

We are awaiting responses from USG agencies on our request for detailees to the Tribunal and may ask Mr. Wirth to make telephone calls.

UNAMIR

Deployment: There is no new information on UNAMIR deployment.

Mandate: State 323818, instructing several posts to demarche their host governments regarding troop contribution for a possible UN operation to provide security in the eastern Zaire refugee camps, went out December 5. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1) will consider participation in any of the three possible operations the Secretary General is contemplating, but anticipate that their contribution would be limited to a small police contingent.

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STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(LOU) Commission of Experts: - The "Final Report of the Commission of Experts" was released on Friday, Dec 2. The Commission concluded that individuals from both sides to the armed conflict perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and had perpetrated crimes against humanity. However, the evidence they collected indicated that only the Hutus were involved in genocide. They recommended that investigations (which were begun by the Commission) of ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law attributed to the RPF be continued by the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

(UN) Human Rights Monitors: Twenty-eight vehicles to be used by the Human Rights Monitors in Rwanda were airlifted to Kigali from Kuwait this week by the U.S. Air Force. The vehicles are being airlifted from Kuwait. The first load was delivered December 7 and the remainder will be delivered December 9. This will bring the number of vehicles available to the monitors up to 48. An additional 50 vehicles are to be shipped by the UN from Mozambique for delivery around the New Year.

US Mission in Geneva provided a status report on the human rights field mission in Rwanda. The UN Human Rights Center maintains that the operation is now reasonably consolidated and is operational. There are 62 field officers and 6 consultants

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in Rwanda. One hundred field staff are to be deployed by the end of the year. A training course for all field staff has been created and all field officers, including those already in Rwanda will be given the training (the U.S. is funding the training). The EU will make available a team of 50 fully equipped personnel who will remain under EU authority. Their specific mission has not yet been defined.

Field officers have made field trips to investigate alleged human rights violations. They are involved in collecting information, reporting about the movement of returnees, visiting jails and other institutions, and consulting with other international agencies and NGO's. According to Geneva, the human rights mission has funds sufficient to operate for only two more months.

REFUGEE SITUATION

Zaire Refugee Camp Security: We have had no reports of security flare-ups like that of two weeks ago when Zairian troops opened fire on refugees. Those refugees who had been living outside of the major camps have now been moved into the camps, reportedly with few difficulties in assistance though space is an issue.

A briefing today (12/8) by an American citizen (Charles Hendrix) who was the IFRC (International Federation of Red

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Cross/Crescent Societies) Delegate in Kibumba camp from August 1 until a week ago presented a far less alarming view of insecurity there than the view presented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) based on its work in Kibumba. Consistent with the IFRC's earlier press statement that it was in control of food distribution in the camps where it was working -- a press statement issued more or less in response to the declaration of the 15 NGOs -- Hendrix said that food was being distributed at the local "cell" level and would soon be given directly to heads of household, even though the refugee leadership was not entirely happy with the plan. Curiously, the WFP representative at this week's weekly Geneva briefing on Rwanda said that security of food distribution was not a major problem in the Goma camps at present. Refugee situations are always dynamic!

During the Geneva-based Friends of Rwanda meeting, the troubling news emerged that Boutros Gali had told Mrs. Ogata to stand down on sending a security assessment team to Zaire to design a police package until BBG gave the word. We do not know the reasoning behind BBG's position; perhaps he wants to see the results of the troop-contributor canvassing exercise. Since UNHCR had hoped to deal with the immediate security need (any troops could not likely be fielded for some months), this delay is not helpful.

<u>NGO Departures from Zaire</u>: As you know, MSF/France has already left Bukavu because of the ethical dilemma of assisting those

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who may be guilty of genocide, and has Goma because its emergency program there was finished. MSF/F has announced that it is leaving all Rwandan refugee camps (i.e., those in Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania as well) because of the ethical dilemma. IRC has told us that it plans to leave Zaire by the end of March, but will remain working inside Rwanda and with refugees in Tanzania. The American Refugee Committee, also a signer of the declaration, has told us that it will not leave Zaire.

Regional Refugee Conference: P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1) You will remember the biplay between the UNHCR and OAU representatives at our Friends of Rwanda meeting about which organization was in the decision-making role about the conference. The OAU appears to be holding out for a plenary regional conference in March with the prepcon to be held in early January (January 10 per UNHCR). Although we are concerned about keeping up the momentum, P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

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ASSISTANCE TO GOR

On December 8, AF hosted a meeting of AID, PRM, IO, and DRL to discuss each bureau's/agency's current and planned assistance programs in Rwanda. AF is preparing a matrix summarizing the information, which will be used for the Kagame visit and the upcoming Friends meeting.

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BURUNDI: KEY FACTS

Background to Crisis: Centuries of Tutsi dominance seemed to be coming to an end with the democratic presidential election in June 1993, which Melchior Ndadaye's pro-Hutu FRODEBU party swept with more than 60 percent of the vote. The election results, however, have been subverted by the Tutsi controlled military. A coup attempt last October resulted in the murder of President Ndadaye--as well as his constitutionally designated direct successors. This year, Ndadaye's appointed Hutu successor died in the plane crash that also killed Rwandan Hutu President Habyarimana, and the Tutsi opposition has blocked Acting President Ntibantunganya's efforts to gain legitimacy and control the government.

Ethnic Dimension: 6.1 million population is divided between the Hutu (85 percent) and the Tutsi (15 percent). The two ethnic groups have a history of bloodletting which includes Hutu uprisings against Tutsi oppression in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988 and has left hundreds of thousands dead. Ethnic violence left more than 50,000 dead, created 600,000 refugees, and displaced about 1 million Burundians from October 1993 to April 1994.

Refugee/Displaced Persons Population: More than 1.3 million displaced persons and former Burundian refugees who have returned are still receiving humanitarian assistance. In addition, nearly 220,000 Burundian refugees remain in Zaire, Tanzania and Rwanda as of 15 July. There are at least 200,000 Rwandan refugees in northern Burundi as of 4 August. Bujumbura is a hub for humanitarian relief operations in Burundi and the region.

Military Role: Tutsis dominate the 13,500-strong armed forces, which include the Army, Gendarmerie, and Security services. The coup-prone military is viewed as the Tutsis' insurance policy; it launched aborted coups in July and October 1993, and April 1994.

Size of US Community: Due to the 8 April 1994 Ordered Departure Status in Bujumbura, the Embassy is limited to 20 personnel. There are also are some 80 private US citizens in Burundi.

Foreign Military or Other Presence: There are approximately 30 of the authorized 47-man OAU monitoring contingent deployed throughout Burundi. Paris has 21 military advisers in Bujumbura, and 15 gendarmes on temporary duty training Hutus for a projected 1100-strong Presidential Guard force. About eight relief agencies--including WFP and OXFAM--operate in northern Burundi. There are about 715 Belgians and 260 French nationals in Burundi.

Colonial Background: Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962. German and Belgian rule in the 20th century highlighted ethnic differences in Burundi, as colonial authorities gave Tutsis disproportionate access to education and government jobs, laying the groundwork for continued Tutsi dominance and Hutu resentment.

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Mrs. Agathe HABYARIMANA
Embassy of Rwanda
12, rue Jadin
75017 PARIS

Paris, May 19, 1994

His Excellency Bill CLINTON
President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

In the face of a wavering international community before the Rwandese tragedy since the assassination on April 6 of the President of Rwanda, my husband, Juvenal HABYARIMANA, I am appealing to the influence you wield over world affairs as President of the United States to bring Rwandans to dialogue without foreign interference.

It is amazing that the Ugandan President, Yoweri MUSEVENI, declared in Kampala on Wednesday, May 11, 1994 -in his first peace initiative in the region since the outbreak of violence in Rwanda- that he would welcome a regional conference of Heads of State to reach a cease-fire, in return for a promise to inquire into the massacres in Rwanda. MUSEVENI is the instigator of the war in Rwanda. It is this war that ushered in the culture of violence never before known in Rwanda and rekindled old ethnic demons. Excited by military and diplomatic successes, RPF rebels and sympathizers have developed in recent months a high degree of intolerance and arrogance that have resulted in extreme tension in Kigali. The assassination of President HABYARIMANA whose charismatic influence over the people was contested only by his political adversaries, even as the people were discovering their "politics of greed", proved enough to ignite violence in the entire country.

The killings were further fueled by the resumption of hostilities between the RPF and government forces, rendering the forces that usually could help the population inaccessible to stop the massacres. It is not too late to

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intervene in Rwanda, however, the cease-fire must be essentially unconditional to prevent more bloodshed.

I am calling on you, Mr. President, because I feel you that you were not indifferent to the Rwandese crisis right from the outset of the war in October 1990 by the RPF from Uganda; since you had instructed your representatives in Kigali and other capitals of the region to try and bring the Rwandans to dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and the restoration of peace. From the beginning of the new crisis, you have denounced the assassination of the Heads of State of Rwanda and Burundi. I condemn the massacres that followed the President's death and also deeply regret the death of the UN peacekeepers.

After President Habyarimana's assassination, the RPF launched a large-scale offensive against government forces allegedly to stop the killings. In reality, the assassination and and the immediate ground offensive were part and parcel of the same plan, long prepared by the RPF and its ally, Uganda, to seal a military victory in Kigali. The timing of the events -after a failed last-ditch recommendation endorsed by the representative of the U.S. Secretary General in Kigali, the representative of the O.A.U. Secretary General, the Ambassadors of observer countries, namely the U.S.A., France, Belgium and Germany, to allow all parties officially registered in Rwanda at the date of the signature of the Arusha Accord, to participate in the transitional National Assembly, as provided for by the Accord- is eloquent. ***ONLY*** *the RPF had rejected the recommendation further prolonging the statemate. The DAR-ES-SALAAM conference on April 6, convened by President MWINYI of Tanzania, was President HABYARIMANA's last effort to defuse the impasse in Rwanda, months after he himself had been sworn in, on January 5, 1994, as a step towards implementing the Arusha accord. With his assassination, the specifics of the entire Rwandese political crisis have completely changed. Today, one in five Rwandese is displaced or a refugee. There is not a single Rwandese family that is not in mourning. Nevertheless, it is outrageous that foreign media misinformation has led people to believe that only Tutsis were killed, or that only the government forces have committed exactions.*

Moved by the tragedy, Mr. President, you made a humanitarian decision to disburse funds to assist Rwandese and Burundian refugees.

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Moved by the tragedy, Mr. President, you made a humanitarian decision to disburse funds to assist Rwandese and Burundian refugees. Also, in a statement to the U.N., you suggested the creation of a protection zone for refugees and displaced people along the Rwandese border, to be monitored by an international force. I am closely following all the efforts that you and also other Western countries, are making to try to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandese people. Please allow me to point out, however, that for all the concern over this suffering, the desire to tackle its root causes seems to be lacking.

A cease-fire between the warring factions should have been imposed more than a month ago through an international go-between force or other means of pressure at the disposal of the international community or countries helping the belligerents. The different military contingents that came to Kigali to help evacuate foreign expatriates should have been allowed to stay and, in a concerted manner, transform themselves into an intermediary force. That did not happen, because it would have hampered, or so it seems, the RPF "liberation" effort of Rwandese. In addition, I am extremely shocked by the silence of the U.S., Belgium, Great Britain, the U.N., and even the O.A.U. before the blatant implication of Uganda in the Rwandese conflict, despite being denounced several times not only by the Rwandese President in international institutions but also through reports by experts in the conflict.

It is a well-known fact that Ugandan President, Yoweri MUSEVENI, is prolonging the Rwandese crisis by continuing to help the RPF towards a military victory. The RPF continues to use the Ugandan territory, the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) and its arsenal as a rear base. The RPF is invited to take the floor in all international forums hosted in Kampala. At the time of the assassination of President HABYARIMANA, the 7th Panafrican Congress was taking place in Kampala. While addressing an audience still under the shock of the tragic news, the Ugandan President did not appear the least affected by the sudden disappearance of his former Rwandese and Burundian counterparts, whom he had seen and shaken hands with only the day before. He did not even care to ask this audience of Panafricans to observe one minute of silence. Meanwhile, the RPF was waiting to make a long speech in plenary session on the theme "Rwanda: the reasons of the current impasse", in which emphasis was laid on the "manoeuvres" of HABYARIMANA. Afterwards, the

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RPF held two press conferences with full coverage by the lcoal press. In one instance, HABYARIMANA's disappearance was presented as a blessing in disguise.

Today, with all the talk on an arms embargo against Rwanda, nobody cares about a U.N. observer force that was supposed to have been deployed along the Ugandan border as part of the UNAMIR. The increased involvement of Ugandan troops on the RPF side since last month as well as the constant shipping of heavy weapons from Uganda have never been denounced by the UNAMIR, whose commander has been lavishing praise on the RPF for its military feats on the front. In Kigali, the government forces were surprised find out that positions previously held by the UNAMIR Belgian contingent had been taken over by the RPF, with heavy weapons already in place. At MULINDI, the rebel headquarters in the north, Belgian troops are reported to have been training the RPF fighters.

*The sharp reduction of the UNAMIR troops in Rwanda followed by the sudden shutting down of Western Embassies in Kigali, leaving no communication link with the outside world, is yet another indication that the international community was convinced that a page of Rwandese history had been completely turned, and that they had to wait -a matter of just a few hours- for the new masters of Kigali, the RPF rebels. Such failure to assist people in danger was a serious error of judgment on the part of the international community. By failing to decide on a peacekeeping force in Rwanda, the Security Council is once again allowing the RPF to pursue its goal of military victory, assured of the continued military support from Uganda. Yet more than 85% of the Rwandese population dread the domination of a movement already labelled as the "**KHMERS NOIRS**". The international community has also been silent before the RPF's intransigence to hold talks with the Rwandese interim government that has the support of at least six million people in the country. The President of this interim government is a wise man, with extensive experience in Rwandese politics.*

Lasting peace in Rwanda is only possible through a political compromise. Bringing the warring parties to dialogue wth an immediate cease-fire is what can save the Rwandese population. Encouraging directly or indirectly, through delaying tactics, a military victory of one of the belligerent parties amounts to condemning the Rwandese population to further suffering. Prior to September 30, 1990,

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Rwanda was listed by all Western capitals, almost all international agencies as well as NGOs, as a model of development, strict management, and political stability. All that vanished as if by magic after the October 1, 1990 attack by the RPF, a rebel movement that has also been successful in tarnishing the image of the country through misinformation and solid media propaganda. ***History will record that the great Western democracies have blindly crushed the overwhelming majority of an industrious and very friendly people, in favor of a small group of adventurers in arms from a neighboring country.*** *In stark violation of all the international conventions on refugees; to destroy everything those Western democracies unsparingly helped built in Rwanda over the years.*

It is not too late to save what still can be saved. May I ask you, Mr. President, to take a vigourous initiative towards imposing an immediate cease-fire in Rwanda, stopping the Uganda President from interfering in Rwandese affairs, and helping convince the warring parties to conclude a new peace accord for a short period of transition. Then general elections could be organized to give the Rwandese people a chance to choose their leaders before the whole world, instead of those leaders being imposed by force.

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Mme HABYARIMANA Agathe
c/o Ambassade du Rwanda
12, rue Jadin
75017 PARIS

Paris, le 19 mai 1994

A Son Excellence Bill CLINTON
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

Monsieur le Président.

Devant les hésitations de la Communauté Internationale sur la tragédie qui frappe le Rwanda depuis l'assassinat, le 6 avril dernier, du Président de la République Rwandaise en la personne de mon mari, Juvénal HABYARIMANA, j'ai l'honneur de faire appel à tout le poids d'influence sur les Affaires du Monde que vous avez en tant que Président des Etats-Unis pour ramener les Rwandais au dialogue sans ingérence des intérêts étrangers. Il est surprenant, par exemple, que le Président ougandais, Yoweri MUSEVENI, pour sa première initiative de paix régionale depuis le début de la crise rwandaise, déclare le mercredi 11 mai 1994 à KAMPALA qu'il souhaitait la tenue d'une conférence rassemblant les Etats de la région pour parvenir à un cessez-le-feu en échange de la promesse d'une enquête sur les massacres du Rwanda. Yoweri MUSEVENI est l'intigateur de la guerre au Rwanda. C'est cette guerre qui a initié la culture de la violence auparavant inexistante au Rwanda. C'est cette guerre qui a ravivé les vieux démons ethniques. Excités par les succès militaires et diplomatiques, les combattants et les sympathisants du FPR ont développé ces derniers mois une intolérance et une arrogance qui ont fait monter à KIGALI une tension qui était devenue explosive. L'assassinat du Président HABYARIMANA, dont le charisme sur la population n'était contesté que par ses adversaires politiques alors que le peuple avait découvert leur jeu de la "politique du ventre", a suffi pour déchaîner la violence sur tout le territoire. Les massacres ont été en outre encouragés par la reprise et la poursuite des combats entre le FPR et les forces gouvernementales ; ce qui ne disponibilisait pas les forces de l'ordre susceptibles d'intervenir auprès de la population pour arrêter les tueries. Il n'est pas trop tard pour intervenir au Rwanda, mais un cessez-le-feu ne doit être assorti d'aucune condition car les tueries peuvent continuer.

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Je fais appel à Vous, Monsieur le Président, car Vous n'avez pas été indifférent face à la crise rwandaise depuis le déclenchement de la guerre d'octobre 1990 par le FPR opérant à partir de l'Ouganda. Vous avez en effet donné mandat à vos représentants à KIGALI et dans les capitales de la sous-région, de contribuer à ramener les Rwandais au dialogue en vue d'une réconciliation nationale et d'un retour à la paix. Depuis la nouvelle crise, vous avez condamné l'assassinat simultané des chefs d'Etat du Rwanda et du Burundi. Je condamne les massacres qui ont suivi l'assassinat du Président. De même, je déplore la mort de casques bleus dans les mêmes circonstances.

Aussitôt après l'assassinat du Président HABYARIMANA, le FPR a engagé une offensive d'envergure contre les forces gouvernementales sous le prétexte d'arrêter les massacres. En réalité, l'assassinat du Président et le déclenchement d'une nouvelle offensive ont été préparés de longue date par le FPR et son allié ougandais. Les deux faits procèdent d'un même plan de conclure une victoire militaire, après avoir refusé une ultime recommandation consignée par le représentant du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU à KIGALI, le représentant du Secrétaire Général de l'OUA, les Ambassadeurs des pays observateurs dont les Etats-Unis, la France, la Belgique et l'Allemagne, d'accepter que tous les partis agréés au Rwanda à la date de la signature de l'Accord d'ARUSHA, puissent, comme le prévoyait l'accord, être représentés au parlement de transition prévu par l'Accord d'ARUSHA. C'est le FPR SEUL qui a refusé cette recommandation, installant de nouveau une situation d'impasse. La Conférence de DAR-ES-SALAAM du 6 avril 1994, à l'initiative du président MWINYI, était la dernière carte que le Président HABYARIMANA a tenté de jouer pour débloquer la crise, alors qu'il s'était personnellement engagé dans l'esprit de l'Accord de paix en prêtant serment le 5 janvier 1994. Son assassinat a bouleversé toutes les données de la crise politique rwandaise. Nous nous retrouvons aujourd'hui avec un rwandais sur cinq en situation de déplacé ou de réfugié. Il n'y a pas une famille rwandaise qui ne soit en deuil. Il est regrettable cependant que la désinformation par la presse étrangère laisse croire que seuls les Tutsi

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sont morts au Rwanda ou que seule la partie gouvernementale a commis les exactions.

Ému par ce drame, Vous avez, Monsieur le Président, pris une initiative humanitaire, en débloquant des fonds pour secourir les réfugiés du Rwanda et du Burundi. De plus, dans une proposition à l'ONU, Vous venez de suggérer la création d'une zone de protection le long des frontières rwandaises avec une force internationale qui assurerait la sécurité des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées. Autant dire que je suis parfaitement attentive à des efforts que Vous en particulier, mais aussi tous les pays occidentaux qui ont suivi la crise rwandaise, déployez pour désamorcer la souffrance du peuple rwandais. Je me permets cependant de Vous faire observer que s'il y a souci de soulager les souffrances, il y a beaucoup moins de volonté d'en arrêter les causes.

Un cessez-le-feu entre les belligérants rwandais aurait dû, depuis plus d'un mois déjà, être imposé par une force d'interposition ou d'autres moyens de pression dont disposent la communauté internationale ou les pays amis des belligérants. Les différentes nationalités de soldats venus évacuer leurs ressortissants du Rwanda auraient pu, avec la bonne volonté des dirigeants de leurs pays respectifs et de manière concertée, rester à KIGALI et se transformer en une force d'interposition. Cela n'a pas été le cas parce qu'il ne fallait pas gêner, semble-t-il, l'opération de "libération" des Rwandais par le FPR. D'autre part, je suis particulièrement choquée par le silence des Etats-Unis, de la Belgique, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'ONU, voire de l'OUA, face à l'implication de l'Ouganda dans le conflit rwandais, malgré de multiples dénonciations de ce pays par le Président rwandais dans plusieurs instances internationales ; malgré aussi des rapports des techniciens en la matière.

D'aucuns savent parfaitement que c'est le Président ougandais Yoweri MUSEVENI qui prolonge la crise rwandaise en promettant à ses amis du FPR la poursuite de son soutien jusqu'à une victoire militaire. L'Ouganda, la NRA et tout son arsenal, constituent en effet la base arrière

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pour le FPR. Sur le plan diplomatique, le FPR est invité à prendre la parole dans tous les forums internationaux qui se déroulent à KAMPALA. Lors de l'assassinat du Président HABYARIMANA, se tenait à KAMPALA le 7e Congrès Panafricain. Dans sa communication devant une assemblée encore sous le choc de la nouvelle, le Président ougandais n'a même pas fait semblant d'être affligé par la disparition brutale de ses deux homologues qu'il a vus et embrassés la veille. Il n'a même pas demandé à cette assemblée de panafricanistes d'observer une minute de silence. Quant au FPR, une longue communication lui est réservée en séance plénière sur le thème "Rwanda : les raisons de l'impasse actuelle". L'accent est mis sur les "manoeuvres" d'HABYARIMANA. Deux conférences de presse sont données par le FPR avec une pleine couverture par la presse locale. L'une d'elle présente la disparition d'HABYARIMANA comme une bénédiction déguisée.

Aujourd'hui, alors qu'on reparle d'embargo sur les armes au Rwanda, personne ne sait ce que la MINUAR a fait de la force onusienne d'observation le long de la frontière rwando-ougandaise qui avait été envisagée puis fusionnée avec la MINUAR. Or l'engagement des troupes ougandaises aux côtés du FPR depuis le mois dernier et des armes lourdes provenant de l'Ouganda n'a jamais été dénoncé par cette même MINUAR dont le commandant ne cesse de multiplier les déclarations sur les progrès militaires du FPR sur le terrain. A KIGALI, les forces gouvernementales ont été surprises de constater que les positions abandonnées par le contingent belge de la MINUAR ont été aussitôt occupées par les combattants du FPR qui y ont trouvé des armes lourdes déjà installées. Dans le quartier général du FPR à MULINDI, les belges auraient participé à l'instruction des éléments du FPR.

La réduction subite des troupes de la MINUAR au Rwanda et la fermeture rapide de toutes les Ambassades occidentales à KIGALI, sans même laisser une seule antenne de contact est un autre signe que la communauté internationale était convaincue qu'une page de l'histoire du Rwanda est définitivement tournée et qu'il faudrait attendre les nouveaux maîtres de KIGALI qui, en l'esprit de tous les fuyards étrangers, devaient être le FPR en

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l'espace de quelques heures. Cette non-assistance à personnes en danger a été une erreur grave de la communauté internationale mal inspirée. Cette même communauté internationale au Conseil de Sécurité n'ose pas se prononcer encore une fois sur une force d'imposition de la paix, satisfaisant ainsi l'exigence du FPR qui, assuré d'un appui continu de l'Ouganda, cherche à tout prix une victoire militaire. Or, plus de 85 % de Rwandais redoutent une domination de ce mouvement assimilé déjà aux "Khmers noirs". La communauté internationale se tait également devant l'intransigeance du FPR, refusant le dialogue avec le gouvernement intérimaire au Rwanda, alors que au moins six millions de Rwandais sont derrière ce gouvernement. Le Président intérimaire est lui-même un homme sage qui a l'expérience de la vie politique rwandaise.

Une paix durable au Rwanda n'est possible que sur un compromis politique. Aider les Rwandais à revenir au Dialogue avec un cessez-le-feu immédiat est un acte salutaire pour tous. Encourager directement ou indirectement par des retards de procédures une victoire militaire de l'un des belligérants est une condamnation du peuple rwandais pour longtemps dans la souffrance. Il ne mérite pas ce qui semble être comme une punition alors que l'on sait que jusqu'au 30 septembre 1990, le Rwanda était encore cité dans toutes les grandes capitales occidentales, et dans la quasi-totalité d'organismes internationaux et des ONG, comme pays modèle de développement, de rigueur de gestion et de stabilité politique. Tout a basculé comme par miracle le premier octobre 1990 avec l'attaque du FPR par ailleurs très efficace dans la propagande médiatique et dans la désinformation. L'histoire retiendra que les grandes démocraties occidentales ont condamné aveuglément une grande majorité d'un peuple laborieux et très accueillant, en faveur d'un petit groupe d'ambitieux venus en armes d'un pays voisin ; donc en violation de toutes les conventions internationales en matière de traitement des réfugiés pour détruire tout ce que ces mêmes démocraties occidentales avaient aidé sans réserve à construire au Rwanda.

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Il est encore temps de sauver ce qui peut l'être. Je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, de prendre une initiative énergique dans le sens d'imposer un cessez-le-feu immédiat au Rwanda, d'empêcher le Président ougandais à poursuivre ses ingérences dans les affaires rwandaises, de persuader les belligérants à conclure un nouvel accord pour une courte transition débouchant rapidement aux élections générales, pour qu'enfin le peuple rwandais puisse manifester au Monde entier son propre choix au lieu d'être imposé par les armes.

Agathe HABYARIMANA

A. Haby

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Next Steps: Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal

I. Summary

The USG has done considerable work towards the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for Rwanda. Our current priorities fall into two groups: (1) obtaining a UN Security Council mandate for a tribunal and (2) providing concrete USG support to a tribunal. Work has also been done on related issues, including requests that other governments detain suspected perpetrators and efforts to expedite deployment of human rights monitors. With the return of Assistant Secretary Shattuck from the region, we are moving forward on these related issues.

A proposed new IWG on War Crimes, co-chaired by L, DRL, and USUN/W, would coordinate USG activity on a war crimes tribunal for Rwanda. An ad hoc group along these lines already has held several meetings and organized the work outlined in this memorandum.

II. A UN Security Council Mandate

Background:

-- On July 1, the Security Council established a Commission of Experts to conduct preliminary investigations of reported atrocities for the purpose of assisting the Council in determining whether to institute proceedings. The Commission is to complete its work in four months. The USG is pressing for more rapid conclusion of the Commission's work, including the issuance of an interim report to facilitate the early establishment of a tribunal. (Assistant Secretary Shattuck reached agreement with the British and French that they would support issuance of such a report).

-- The USG has publicly announced its support for establishment of a tribunal for Rwanda. We believe that this can be most effectively done through a Security Council resolution that expands the mandate of the current War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, so that the two initiatives are on equal footing, develop uniform law and share resources.

-- At the urging of Assistant Secretary Shattuck, the new Government of Rwanda has announced its support for a tribunal, assuming that it is established quickly. The new Government has also publicly condemned "individual acts of vengeance and summary executions" within Rwanda.

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2010-0639-M-1
MS 10/17/12

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-- State has explained our proposal to the UN's Chief Prosecutor for Yugoslavia, Judge Richard Goldstone, who reacted positively to the prospect of supervising both efforts. USUN has consulted with members of the P-5; all but China (which prefers to exhaust other remedies, such as the possibility of domestic trials) support establishing a tribunal. We have also made demarches in the capitals of key Security Council members and African states.

Next steps for Rwanda:

-- In order to expedite the establishment of a tribunal, we will press for an interim report by the Commission, noting the request of the Government of Rwanda and the role that a tribunal would play in promoting stability in Rwanda and surrounding countries. We will also continue to build support for a tribunal and for our proposed structure, paving the way for a resolution establishing a tribunal.

-- To overcome concerns that we are "endrunning" the Commission, we will stress that establishment of a Tribunal would not render the Commission meaningless. Instead, the Commission's work would provide a starting point for the Tribunal and offer ongoing evidence of the international community's response to the atrocities.

-- We will expedite efforts to reach agreement with key governments on a structure that will combine the two operations effectively and without diminishing the effectiveness of either effort.

III. Concrete USG Support for a Tribunal

Background on the Yugoslav Tribunal:

-- The USG has made a $3 million voluntary contribution to the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in addition to the USG assessed share of the $11 million U.N. budget for the Tribunal during 1994. We have made available 22 prosecutors, investigators and regional experts to the prosecution staff and have provided approximately $300,000 in materials and services for mass grave exhumations.

-- During the last year State-DOJ-DOD-USUN teams interviewed Yugoslavia witnesses in order to collect information that could be used in those prosecutions. About 800 refugee interview reports are being made available to the Prosecutor.

-- The USG will shortly provide the Prosecutor with a detailed report on ethnic cleansing during 1992.

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-- Pending legislation would authorize the drawdown of goods and services (up to $25 million) to be provided to the Yugoslavia Tribunal and any other such tribunal established by the Security Council. Report language explicitly refers to Rwanda in this context. (This is an extension of existing drawdown authority for FY94, of which $6 million was drawn down by the President in May to cover the cost of USG personnel detailed to the Tribunal. These provisions authorizes use of existing funds, but do not appropriate new funds).

Next steps for Rwanda:

-- Information-Gathering. Under the lead of USUN/W, agencies are actively gathering information on the atrocities in Rwanda. This includes not only USG-sourced information, but also reaching out to NGO's and the academic community to prepare reports and to assist in organizing the voluminous amount of media (print, radio, TV) reports.

-- We will prepare a report for the Commission of Experts as quickly as possible covering what we can compile within the next few weeks. A second report (with perhaps more to follow) will be prepared as more information is gathered through the investigative teams (see below) and other sources.

-- Investigative Teams. To demonstrate progress during establishment and organization of an expanded Tribunal to cover both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the USG should send investigative teams to Rwanda and neighboring countries. We will need to identify personnel for such teams, including experienced prosecutors and regional experts, and to determine which incidents should be investigated by them. Our teams would coordinate with the Commission of Experts and local governments, and consult with Judge Goldstone.

-- Agencies should identify (1) personnel for investigative teams and for assignment to the Tribunal pursuant to the pending legislation and (2) sources of funding for the expanded tribunal.

-- We will press other governments to contribute personnel and funding to the expanded Tribunal. We should also consider whether investigative teams from other governments could be deployed. Support for the Commission should also be considered if it would help the Commission to complete its work rapidly.

-- We will work with the new Government of Rwanda to assist the building of its justice system.

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, September 28, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (C) Next Steps for Burundi: Six candidates have been presented for president. The parties to the powersharing agreement are to decide on a consensus candidate, who will then be presented to the National Assembly for approval. The deadline for approval is the October 12. (Bujumbura 3314)

- - (LOU) U/S Wirth Encourages Burundi's Democratic Progress: In meetings with Burundi government officials, U/S Wirth congratulated the government on Burundi's continuing commitment to the democratic process. Burundi government officials voiced cautious optimism for the timely resolution of the presidential succession issue and gratitude for past and ongoing U.S. support. (Bujumbura 3317)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell Briefs Belgian MFA Official on Rwanda/Burundi: Belgian MFA's Director for Sub-Saharan Africa, Edmond De Wilde, agreed with USG assessment of the situation in Burundi and told DAS Bushnell that Belgium intended to provide financial assistance to Rwanda and Burundi. (Bussels 10591)

- - (U) UNAMIR Flights to Kigali: UNAMIR has announced that, due to the return of commercial service to Kigali, only UN personnel will be transported on UNAMIR flights after September 30. Embassy Kigali is asking UNAMIR to extend its deadline for transporting U.S. diplomatic personnel from Kigali to Nairobi. (Kigali 1624, 1641)

- - (C) UNAMIR Assists Radio Rwanda: UNAMIR reportedly has completed helping Radio Rwandan Technicians repair and put into operation the FM transmitter at Cyangungu. The station will have the capacity to facilitate broadcasts into eastern Zaire and refugee camps situated along the borders. (Yaounde 9007)

P1/(b)(1)

- - (C) Tanzania to Detain War Criminals: During a meeting with Ambassador Anderson, Augustine Mrema, Deputy Prime Minister of Tanzania, indicated that Tanzania would use the necessary force in the Rwandan refugee camps to detain war criminals accused by the international community. (Dar es Salaam 6230)

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2012-0639-M-1
MS 10/13/12

- - (C) Tanzanian Response for Refugee Security: Tanzanian Deputy Prime Minister Mrema told Ambassador Anderson that the only option Tanzania will accept for improving the security in the Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania is to strengthen the Tanzanian military and police. Mrema insisted that the international community provide the resources to enable the Tanzanian military and police to do their jobs. Mrema said that Tanzania will not accept foreign troops on its soil. (Dar es Salaam 6246)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 27, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (~~C~~) U/S Wirth Meets with Rwandan Vice President Kagame: U/S Wirth met with Vice President Kagame in Rwanda to discuss recent allegations of killings by the RPA and a broad range of issues facing the new Rwandan government. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

- - (LOU) Rwandan President Bizimungu in Washington: President Bizimungu will be in Washington on Wednesday, October 5. Bizimungu has requested meetings with the NSC, Deputy Secretary, A/S Moose, and others, time permitting. He is apparently requesting meeting with Congressional leaders on the same day. (Kigali 1632)

- - (~~S~~) General Motors Dealership in Kigali: The government of Rwanda has agreed to the establishment of a Rwandan owned and operated General Motors Dealership. The franchise is expected to go to Tribert R. Rujugiro, a long time Rwandan Patriotic Front financier and Tutsi businessman in South Africa. (Yaounde 8922)

- - (U) Operation Support Hope: A total of 376 U.S. forces remain in the region; 299 in Entebbe, 3 in Kigali, 48 in Mombasa, and 26 in Nairobi. (Nairobi 17705)

- - (LOU) UNAMIR Deployments: According to the UN, the initial 312 Tunisian troops expected to deploy on September 28 are now scheduled to deploy by commercial aircraft on October 3. The remaining 600-plus troops will complete deployment by October 16. A Nigerian contingent of 260 troops is to self-deploy on September 30. DOD will provide airlift to the Malians on a date to be scheduled. No deployment date is scheduled for the Zambians, who are still experiencing loadlift problems. India is scheduled to begin its deployment of up to 1,000 troops on September 30. (State 260118)

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2012-0639-M-1
MR 10/13/12

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Monday, September 26, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Last U.S. Military Flights to Kigali: The last U.S. military flight to Kigali is scheduled for today. The Joint Task Force/Entebbe will close completely on September 27. (Kampala 7783)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell to Southeast Rwanda: During a two day visit to southeast Rwanda, DAS Bushnell pressed the GOR and UN officials about reports of large numbers of refugees still fleeing southeastern Rwanda. Interlocutors offered a variety of explanations for the reports, including both RPA and Interhamwe intimidation. DAS Bushnell and delegation saw nothing specific which would corroborate any of the explanations offered. However, a combination of new departures to Tanzania, new arrivals from Burundi and what appeared to be new recruits from the RPA, suggests that something is preventing refugees from returning home. (Kigali 1612)

- - (U) RPA Activities: The RPA has reported that it continues to search homes throughout Rwanda for arms and ammunition. Persons harboring weapons have been arrested. The relief community is concerned that this policy may cause panic throughout Rwanda. (Nairobi 17539)

- - (U) Refugee Flow into Tanzania: UNHCR estimates that approximately 1,000 people per day continue to cross into Tanzania from Rwanda. (Nairobi 17539)

- - (S) Ex-FAR Gathering in Tanzania: According to reports [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) ex-FAR are gathering in Tanzania and in northern Rwanda and appear to be preparing to confront the new Rwandan government. Reports indicate the ex-FAR are carrying out a campaign of harassment against Rwandan refugees who are trying to return to Rwanda. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) UNHCR Reports Ex-FAR in Tanzania: UNHCR has reported that dozens of ex-FAR soldiers have left refugee camps in Zaire and have gone to Ngara, Tanzania. Concern exists that these soldiers may be regrouping to launch a possible guerrilla war. (Nairobi 17539)

- - (LOU) Repatriation Not an Option: According to DART representative Farnsworth and Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator Petrie, refugees in Tanzania do not see repatriation as an option. Highly influenced by the camp leadership structure, refugees are convinced that certain death awaits them should they return to Rwanda. Reports of Tutsis seizing land in the south and northeast Rwanda are reinforcing these fears. (Nairobi 17542)

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2012-0639-M-1
MS 10/17/12

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Friday, September 23, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) UNHCR Comments to the Press on Alleged RPA Killings: According to the press, UNHCR Spokesman Ron Redmond said on September 23 that "an unmistakable pattern of killings and persecution by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) aimed at Hutu populations in certain parts of the country was the unavoidable conclusion drawn from the reports" available to UNHCR. "Estimates suggest that the number of victims may have been in the thousands each month," referring to the two-month period from late July to the present. (Reuter 9/23)

- - ~~(C)~~ UNAMIR Reports on Reprisals in Southeast Rwanda: UNAMIR information officers investigated three out of seven cases of RPF abuses described in a UNHCR report dated September 8, 1994, and reportedly found that all three were inaccurate, if not outright fabrications. (Yaounde 8851)

- - ~~(C)~~ U/S Wirth Demarches GOR on Reports of RPA Atrocities: In a meeting with Rwandan Prime Minister Twagiramungu, U/S Wirth expressed USG concerns regarding the seriousness of Gersony's findings. Twagiramungu responded that he understood the damaging consequences of the reports, and that the GOR wanted to investigate the allegations and have others do the same. The GOR agreed to from a joint GOR-UN committee to look into the allegations. (Kigali 1606)

- - ~~(C)~~ Commission of Experts on Rwanda: The Commission of Experts on Rwanda has developed a preliminary listing of investigations which it believes should be carried out in Rwanda. The Commission's proposal was presented to the USG team of investigators during their visit in Geneva on route to Rwanda. (Geneva 8150)

- - ~~(C)~~ GOR Reaches Agreement with General Motors: The government of Rwanda has reached a tentative agreement with General Motors (GM) to purchase 90 vehicles immediately to replace civilian government vehicles stolen or destroyed. Once the funding issue has been resolved for the first 90 vehicles, another 150 vehicles will augment the initial purchase. The plan eventually calls for a total of 3100 civil service vehicles to be purchased by the GOR, totaling 130 million USD. The GOR plans a separate venture with GM to purchase military vehicles. (Yaounde 8849)

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MS 10/17/12

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- - (U) GOR Announces Offensive Against Militiamen: According to RFI in Paris, a Rwandan government spokesman announced that a major offensive will soon be launched against the Hutu extremist militiamen in the southeast of the country. The Rwanda Patriotic Army will kill the criminals, said the spokesman, accusing the Interahamwe of continuing to carry out atrocities. (FBIS London DTG 231321Z SEP)

- - (LOU) End of UNOMUR: As of September 21, UNOMUR, the Uganda/Rwanda border force, completed its mission. Of the 80 troops that comprised UNOMUR, 24 will join UNAMIR in Rwanda. (Kampala 7778)

- - (U) Tanzania Camp Conditions: Preliminary reports from DART indicate that the camps in Tanzania are unsustainable according to NGOs. Rwandans continue to arrive in Tanzania, reportedly fleeing reprisals by the RPA. DART and UNREO have interviewed several refugees in the Karagwe district (northern camps) who reported atrocities in areas around Byumba and Rutare in northeast Rwanda similar to those reportedly occurring in southeast Rwanda. (Nairobi 17461)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, September 22, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (C) Kofi Annan on Rwanda: U/SYG Kofi Annan told Embassy Nairobi he had addressed in strong terms with the Rwandan government the issue of allegations of killings of returnees by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Annan told the government that a joint U.N., UNHCR, and government investigation of the killings should be carried out quickly. Annan also said he would be raising with the U.S., a possible ICITAP police training program for Rwanda. (Nairobi 17257)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell Meets with Rwandan Prime Minister Twagiramungu: In a meeting with DAS Bushnell, PM Twagiramungu commented on the issue of reprisal killings. The PM said the GOR was not equipped to monitor and control all alleged incidents of reprisals; nevertheless, the GOR would not tolerate acts of vengeance if discovered. He emphasized that 60 RPA soldiers had already been arrested for abuses. PM asked the U.S. for assistance in speeding constitution of a international tribunal and expressed concern that the government was being unfairly characterized as narrow-based. (Kigali 1588)

- - (U) Rwandan President Bizimungu Accuses West of Failing to Support his Government: In his address to an international conference on Rwanda held in The Hague September 16-17, Bizimungu accused the West of failing to support his government. Bizimungu said the West was wrong to regard the conflict in Rwanda as tribal war. He believed the conflict had its roots in "colonialism" and asserted that "opportunistic politicians" had provoked violence with their divide-and-rule policy. Bizimungu reproached the international community for failing to take actions against those who planned the holocaust and are living in neighboring countries. (The Hague 5967)

- - (C) SYSG Abdullah Optimistic about Burundi Democracy: SYSG Abdullah indicated to Embassy Bujumbura that he is more optimistic for democracy, stability and peace in Burundi than at any time since April. Despite the deadline extension from September 21 to September 24 for registering presidential candidates, Abdullah believes the president will be selected by next week. (Bujumbura 3268)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, September 21, 1994, at 1400 hours

- - (S) Kagame Takes Hard Line on Cross-Border Operations by Ex-FAR Forces: Rwandan Minister of Defense Kagame states that the Rwandan government will not stand idly by and allow ex-FAR forces to conduct organized cross-border operations. Kagame said the first time such an attack occurs, the GOR will launch attacks into the country or countries from which they originate. Retaliation will be directed at the perpetrators and not the host governments. (Yaounde 8739)

- - (C) UNAMIR Force Commander Addresses Security in Goma: UNAMIR Force Commander (FC) said an expanded UNAMIR II operation should be a last resort to handling the security problems in the refugee camps. He feels that a separate UN mission under Chapter VII would be the best option if a UN force was to be deployed. He agreed that contingents prepared to join UNAMIR, like the Indians, might be diverted to a new mission under a separate mandate and then incorporated into UNAMIR once that separate mission was complete. In addition, the FC pointed out the need to get UNAMIR troops on the ground in southeast Rwanda as soon as possible. (Yaounde 8740)

- - (C) Tunisian Troops Ready to Deploy: The government of Tunisia (GOT) has asked the UN to begin the airlift of the first company of their contingent on September 28. The remainder of the contingent will be ready two weeks later. The GOT advance party reports that enough equipment is in place for the first two companies. GOT Chief of Staff Hassine asked the U.S. to confirm with the UN that airlift will arrive September 28. P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) Spanish Sending Team for Rwanda UN Mission: According to the Spanish embassy in Nairobi, Spain is sending a 19-member team of paratroopers and airmen to serve with the UN in Rwanda. (Reuter 9/21)

- - (U) Japanese Soldiers to Join in Rwanda Relief Efforts: An advanced team of 23 Japanese soldiers accompanied by their defense minister left today to assist in Rwandan relief efforts. The Japanese will act independently of the UN and will work in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda but will not go into Rwanda. (Reuter 09/21)

- - (LOU) Human Rights Monitor: Special Procedures Chief Mautner-Markhof told the U.S. Mission in Geneva that 20 human rights monitors should be in Rwanda by the end of this week, and they hope to have as many as 50 by the end of the month if the agreement with the UN volunteers comes into force. USYG Hansen in a meeting with the humanitarian liaison working group proposed extending a loan from DHA's central emergency revolving fund to address HCHR Ayala-Lasso's appeal for USD 10.5 million. No country opposed this proposal. (Geneva 8005)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 20, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Rwanda to Hold Security Council Presidency: The Security Council has decided to allow the Presidency of the Security Council to be held by Rwanda in December 1994. (USUN 3909)

- - [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] a real threat exists that RPF soldiers may commit acts of revenge against Hutus if they believe that the new Rwandan government is not paying adequate attention to the issue of apprehending and trying those responsible for war crimes, including genocide. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted]

- - (S) Ex-FAR Agreed in Principle to Move: [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] the ex-FAR reportedly agreed in principle to be moved from the Zaire-Rwanda border area to the interior of Zaire under the following conditions: none of the new camps would be located more than 100 km from the Goma-Bukavu area, and 4,000 ex-FAR would be allowed to remain in the already-established refugee camps to provide protection to Hutu refugees there. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted]

- - (U) Operation Support Hope Troops: The total number of U.S. military personnel in the region as of September 20 is 478; 382 in Entebbe, 3 in Kigali, 92 in Nairobi, and 1 in Mombasa. (Rwanda SVTS 9/20)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell in Burundi: On September 19, DAS Bushnell met with a broad cross-section of government, opposition, and military leaders in Bujumbura. All interlocutors were appreciative and supportive of the role of the OAU in Burundi. Another ten observers set to arrive this week will bring the number to 37 out of the authorized 47. FRODEBU members felt the OAU observers have made a difference, and asked that they be increased to 200. (Bujumbura 3231)

- - (C) Hate Radio Revival: Meeting with DAS Bushnell (see previous item), the interlocutors expressed concern about the revival of the "hate radio" which incited the Hutus to kill Tutsis. The Defense Minister asked about assistance in identifying the location of the radio broadcasting ethnic hate messages. Ambassador Krueger replied that he had been assured that a response would be forthcoming this week. (Bujumbura 3231)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Monday, September 19, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) European Parliament Recognizes Kigali Government: The European Parliament on September 16 passed a resolution recognizing the new Rwandan government. The resolution also indicates the parliament's support for establishing an international tribunal to try those who perpetrated genocide and crimes against humanity. (FBIS Abidjan DTG 161803Z SEP)

- - (LOU) UN Human Rights Program in Rwanda: 23 human rights monitors are now being sent to the field. Chief of Field Operations for Rwanda, William Clarance, has taken up his post in Kigali. According to HCHR Ayala Lasso, the human rights team will simultaneously carry out monitoring, confidence building activities, and technical cooperation, as well as investigate into alleged violations. Security will be coordinated with UNAMIR. The human rights officers will act as an information-gathering network, but all investigations will be conducted by a separate unit of specialists. The target figure of 147 comprises all human rights staff, and includes specialized personnel for investigations and technical assistance. HCHR estimates a total of USD 10.5 million will be required to cover the entire 147 officers for six months. (Geneva 8006)

- - (C) The Power is On: Central power was restored in Kigali on September 16. A power outage occurred on the same evening. DART speculates the power system functions only during the day and is turned off at night due to the system's limitations. (Nairobi 16968)

- - (U) UNHCR Encounters Difficulties During Repatriation Efforts: UNHCR/Goma and UNHCR Gisenyi repatriation officers report border guards on the Rwanda side of the Rwanda/Zaire border are causing difficulties in refugee repatriation. The Rwandan border guards believe UNHCR is selectively offering assistance in repatriating certain refugees, and the guards are therefore intentionally complicating the repatriation process. (Nairobi 16969)

- - (U) Refugee Movements: UNAMIR reports that between August 23 and September 12, about 11,250 persons left Rwanda for Zaire, and 15,961 persons left Zaire to return to Rwanda. Since September 9, 7,346 refugees have returned to Rwanda from Zaire. Refugee flows from south Kivu, Zaire, have begun to increase after a brief decline when the RPA first moved into the area. UNREO reports the number of people fleeing from Rwanda into Tanzania continues to surpass the number of refugees who are returning to Rwanda from camps in Tanzania. (Nairobi 16968)

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- - (U) Mines Require Massive Clean-up Effort: The UNAMIR mine engineer team reports the region around Ruhengeri will require a massive clean-up. At least one mine injury is reported per day. UNAMIR is training RPA units in mine clearing, but these units are poorly equipped. (Nairobi 16969)

- - ~~(C)~~ OAU Burundi Observer Mission: In a meeting with DAS Bushnell in Addis Ababa, OAU SYG Salim opined that the Burundi Observer Mission was doing well under the circumstances. Salim stated that continuing problems for the observer teams were transport and communications. (Kigali 1566)

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DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT: Operation SUPPORT HOPE Transition

Purpose. To respond to the 7 September Ad Hoc Group tasking to address five specific aspects of Operation SUPPORT HOPE: A summary of DoD accomplishments; the status of the turnover; the latest UNHCR requests; the timeline for withdrawal; and some considerations in the event reinsertion of U.S. troops is necessary. The first two aspects are considered together in section I, the remaining aspects are addressed in individual sections.

I. Accomplishments and Transition Status

Overview. We are now five months into the Rwandan emergency. The unprecedented large-scale, rapid population movements that characterized the earlier months have largely ceased though hundreds are still reported to be fleeing Rwanda daily; lesser numbers are repatriating. The goal of massive refugee repatriation is still elusive though many of the 1960-era mainly Tutsi refugees are reported to be moving back to Rwanda. The regional Rwandan and Burundi refugee, returnee and internally displaced person caseload is over six million. The refugee/returnee population of some three million can be expected to remain at that level for at least another six months.

The magnitude of the Rwandan massacres, which began in April, and the subsequent refugee crisis, overwhelmed the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already operating in the region. The role of U.S. military forces, therefore, was to rapidly reinforce relief agencies in-place until they could recover and mount effective operations.

While the emergency period is not yet over, the crisis faced in mid-July appears to be behind us. The planned departure of the U.S. military by no means ends our work in the region. The USG will remain committed to helping alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people in the months ahead through a variety of agencies. This paper will focus on the critical decisions facing the President before the departure of U.S. forces is complete.

Humanitarian Operations. The USG signed up to support/perform four of eight UNHCR-requested service packages using JTF SUPPORT HOPE:

- Pkg #1 - Airport Services (Goma, Bukavu)

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- Pkg #2 - Logistics Base Services (Goma)

- Pkg #7 - Water Management (Goma)

- Pkg #8 - Airhead Management (Entebbe - Kigali was added later to respond to logistical and operational imperatives/opportunities).

Accomplishments. US military forces began deploying on 22 July to the Rwandan Crisis Area (RCA). At Goma, Zaire, the point of greatest need, a US Army water purification unit began pumping pure water on 26 July, and the next day produced 24,000 gallons of water. Also on 26 July, the USAID funded Portable Water Supply System, airlifted from California, began purifying water. The unit has purified an average of nearly 396,000 gallons per day. Production continued to increase as airlift, substantially assisted by the US Air Force, brought in donor-nation assets that by 1 August were producing 431,000 gallons per day. By 12 August, available water systems were saturated and US military production was taken off line. ***The number of camp deaths dropped from 3000 to 600 refugees per day and from 13 August on, by UN assessment, water production and distribution exceeded consumption.***

The JTF took the same approach to the movement and receipt of humanitarian assistance, rapidly expanding airport capabilities at Goma and Entebbe, and then Kigali and responding to emergency requests for air movement of humanitarian supplies. As a result of expanded logistics and land route capabilities, UNHCR requested that all agencies stop airlifting food to Goma on 14 August.

The result of JTF operations in support of UNHCR and in close coordination with NGOs has been to substantially reduce the number of deaths in the refugee camps, provide needed crisis humanitarian assistance to the several million Rwandan refugees and displaced persons, and allow UNHCR and NGOs to gain breathing space in which to establish the infrastructure necessary to deal with refugee management in the ensuing months.

Transition. JTF SUPPORT HOPE successfully ***accomplished*** Service Packages #1, #2, and #7 and effectively transitioned operations to other agencies after providing critically-needed start-up. Package #8 is nearing final transition at Kigali and Entebbe.

JTF SUPPORT HOPE is currently transitioning U.S. military operations

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supporting the humanitarian relief effort in the Rwandan Crisis Area to UNHCR and NGOs. A successful transition has already occurred in Goma and, pending formal policy review, is planned to conclude in Kigali and Entebbe by 30 September. Our goal is to achieve a seamless, mutually satisfactory handover from the U.S. military to traditional humanitarian assistance agencies, particularly the UNHCR which has the lead on refugee relief. A detailed JTF assessment of missions completed and/or handed over to UNHCR, NGOs, UNAMIR, and contractors is included at TAB 1.

An important part of a smooth transition for bringing U.S military forces out of Rwanda will be our public outreach strategy. That strategy would underline our accomplishments and the fact that DoD's unique capabilities are no longer needed. The DoD strategy along with contingency press guidance is at TAB 2.

DoD's assistance in arranging and financing inter- and intra-theater humanitarian airlift under its regular humanitarian assistance authorities (Section 2551, Title II of the DoD Appropriations Act, 1994 (PL103-139) and Title 10) is distinct from the issue of SUPPORT HOPE's continued life and will continue insofar as resources are available.

II. Additional UNHCR Requests for Assistance

With respect to ongoing U.S. military assistance under Operation SUPPORT HOPE, on 7 Sep UNHCR forwarded requests for additional relief capacity that it believed could only be covered by military assets. UNHCR requests centered around critically needed logistics capacity for air delivery, a service that UNHCR wanted extended for another six months. Although the situation in the region is still very fragile, this is much longer than we want or need to commit U.S. military assets absent significant renewed violence and population displacements.

The SecDef has stated that U.S. military support should be considered only if it is a unique, military capability not found in IOs, NGOs, or other countries. There is interagency consensus that DoD has met the conditions of the President's tasking. We must now decide what if any additional military assets must be brought to bear to ameliorate the longer-term crisis.

UNHCR/Geneva staff, including the High Commissioner and her Deputy, met 13 September with LTG Schroeder in Geneva to review UNHCR's requests. LTG Schroeder underscored that U.S. military assets could only be used in accordance with the SecDef's statement above.

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UNHCR subsequently withdrew its earlier requests in favor of four items, two of which are stand-alone strategic airlift requests already approved for delivery and not related to the JTF withdrawal.

It remains the disposition of the USG to support the UN in Rwanda. The U.S. military's presence in the RCA may be required beyond September 30, but this is not likely. ***The President will ultimately make this determination.***

UNHCR has requested a prescribed load list of maintenance and repair parts and packaged POL to support the equipment on the attached list (previously donated US equipment out of U.S. military active duty stocks) for a period of 6 months.

We agree, in principle, that the USG should provide spare parts for equipment it has provided. Requests will be addressed through normal DSAA/J4 channels, not the JTF, as the equipment was donated "as is, where is". DoD may be able to provide parts as part of the Section 506a2 Drawdown. Where we may not be able to provide parts and fuel for UNHCR equipment, UNAMIR's Brown and Root service contract should be able to cover the gap through normal procurement channels. UNHCR-UNAMIR consultation/agreement on spare parts transfer would be required. Fulfilling this requirement will help meet UNHCR requirements to improve camp security since we provided some equipment that is being used to break down the camps.

UNHCR has also requested Geneva aircell (LO) participation in monitoring and technical assistance for Rwanda emergency for six months and evaluation of aircell operations, as well as training for further such emergencies.

DoD should support this request at an appropriate level of staffing. This support is independent or the JTF and has no effect of JTF withdrawal.

DoD, as well as OFDA, will continue to entertain inter- and intra-theater airlift requests on a case-by-case basis and if approved, operate them on a reimbursable or non reimbursable basis, depending on the mission.

Although site preparation was not one of the eight service packages the USG offered to provide in July, at that time camp security was not a prominent issue. Security in the camps is now a predominant -- arguably the predominant -- issue

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requiring international attention. There is a general consensus that security would be enhanced by breaking the camps into smaller, more manageable units and relocating/removing intimidating elements. OFDA is currently funding equipment and personnel in coordination with UNHCR to prepare new camp sites in the Goma area. While this crucial process might be expedited if the U.S. military were to make personnel and assets available to UNHCR to assist in site preparation/ reorganization, such a commitment would entail combat forces for security and the concomitant issue of those forces' rules of engagement. Such U.S. military involvement would require further consultation with UNHCR. In accordance with the SecDef's direction that there be no "mission creep", DoD would not support this expansion of requirements, particularly at a time when it is withdrawing from the region.

III. Withdrawal Timeline

As of 12 September 1994, the US military had the following forces operating in the Rwanda Crisis Area (RCA):

Entebbe, Uganda	528
Kigali, Rwanda	5
Mombasa, Kenya	122
Nairobi, Kenya	19
Total	674

Subject to a Presidential decision, it is the JTF intent to transition all US missions to the UNHCR, NGOs, UNAMIR, contract or regional governmental agencies and withdraw US military personnel and equipment NLT 30 September 1994. JTF plans that by 15 September, personnel will have been withdrawn from Kigali, and operations closed in Mombasa and Nairobi. This would leave approximately 500 US military personnel in Entebbe supporting strategic and intra-theater airlift of humanitarian cargo in the RCA. Withdrawal of forces will occur roughly IAW the following timeline:

12 - 17 Sep	Entebbe: - 124	Mombasa: -122	Nairobi: -19
18 - 24 Sep	Entebbe: - 61	Kigali: no change	
25 - 30 Sep	Entebbe: -343	Kigali: -5	

U.S. forces would continue C130 operations from Entebbe to support Kigali, Goma, and other strategic/intra-theater lift requirements until 30 September. After that time, U.S. Government support for humanitarian

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airlift would be handled under regular humanitarian assistance authorities as noted above.

IV. Requirement to Reinsert Forces

In the event of a reoccurrence of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in the RCA and a decision to recommit US military troops, either Entebbe or Kigali would be the focus of US military planners, depending on the security situation within Kigali. If Kigali remains secure, reaching crisis locations such as Goma and Bukavu would be easier for NGOs via the Kigali-Goma or Kigali-Bukavu airport/road network, and it would provide a secure aerial port of departure for USG-directed military airlift assistance and would at the same time provide appropriate USG signals of support to the GOR.

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Tab 1

DoD Fulfillment of Operation SUPPORT HOPE Tasks

Package #1 (Airport Services at Goma and Bukavu). Once in theater, JTF Support Hope site survey teams assessed both airfields. Goma was found to be suitable for immediately expanded air operations, however, Bukavu was not. Bukavu could only accommodate C-130 type aircraft and the runway was in very poor repair. Further, a Goma-size refugee crisis anticipated in Bukavu when the French withdrew from SW Rwanda did not materialize. JTF focused its efforts on expanding the operations at Goma. The Goma airfield was certified for night operations on 25 July 1994. Airfield throughput increased from 82 stons to over 290 stons by 2 August. With the increased activity the runway began to deteriorate; however, the primary need had been met and land transport was providing 600 tons/day. Operations were then shifted to Kigali as the hub for humanitarian relief flights and the amount of aid arriving by air into Goma dropped off. The JTF turned over equipment to UNHCR and closed operations in Goma on 25 August. The JTF continues to fly humanitarian relief missions into Goma on a daily basis. UNHCR remains in charge of Goma airfield and its scheduling. Aircraft servicing and material handling equipment in Goma is operated by "CARE of Canada" under contract to UNHCR. Additionally, one US 10K forklift remains in Bukavu to be returned prior to US redeployment out of the area on 30 September. The US military donated no equipment and has no contracts remaining in effect to support this effort.

Package #2 (Logistic Base Services). The establishment of tactical airlift control elements (TALCEs) at Goma, Entebbe, and Kigali provided much of the structure ***that accomplished this task.*** As the situation matured, the logistics management function of the TALCEs transitioned to the Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) which performs a logistics coordination function. At Entebbe, the UNHCR airlift planners and the Combined Logistics Cell developed combined UN-US military priorities for airlift and coordinated the use of ground and air transportation for the region. In Kigali, the CMOC and the NGOs (now over 70 organizations) coordinate logistic services in an On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). The Kigali CMOC has been primarily providing military expertise to the OSOCC; but as UNAMIR becomes more actively engaged in this process, the CMOC's role is declining. As the US military withdraws, a single contract is being contemplated for lease to UNAMIR of equipment enabling 500,000 gallons of water production, purification, and

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transportation capability and 1 million gals of storage capacity to support operations in Rwanda.

Package #7 (Water Management in Goma). The first US military reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) arrived in Goma on 25 July. Also on 26 July, the Portable Water Supply System, which was airlifted from Travis AFB, CA and USAID-funded, began purifying water. The unit has purified an average of 395,778 gallons per day. Water production rose sharply from 26 July through 13 August as NGO and other capabilities came to bear. Initially, water distribution lagged behind production and storage. As more equipment (such as the British OXFAM system) arrived, this situation was reversed. ***On 13 August, the local UNHCR director reported he had more than enough water and livestock was being watered.*** The relief operation now has the capability to produce over 1.5M gallons per day. Production capability now exceeds consumption without depleting storage. Refinements/improvements are needed in refugee access to water; but this is not a function of water production. Some water purification equipment and water distribution trucks have been transferred to Kigali. The US donated 10 x 5K gallon tankers, 12 x 3K gallon semi-trailer mounted fabric tanks (SMFT), and tractor/trailer rigs to ensure adequate water distribution capability remained in the Goma area. In addition to the direct mission to provide water management in Goma, USG and US military also provided engineer support to UNHCR. A Swedish support team is in place and prepared to assume and expand USAID-funded PWSS water purification/chlorination activities.

Service	To Whom	Who Pays	Length
Water Production by PWSS	UNHCR	USAID	9/20
*Campsite Preparation and sanitation by Assist LTD	UNHCR	USAID	Renew 60 days

The US military has also drawn down the following equipment from active duty stocks to be donated to support Goma operations (USG donates to UNHCR under 19 August 1994 Presidential Drawdown Authority):

12 X M818 Tractors
12 X M871 Trailers
12 X 3K GAL SMFTS
10 X 5K GAL tractor/trailer

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Tab 1

*2 X D7 Bulldozers
*2 X CAT 103 Graders
*1 X M920 Tractor
*2 X M870 Trailer
*2 X M1009 CUCV
*5 X GP Large Tents
*5 X GP Medium Tents
*5 X GP Small Tents
*20 X Commercial 6 Man Tents

* Contract/equipment provided to UNHCR in support of general humanitarian operations in Goma.

Package #8 (Airhead Management in Entebbe and Kigali).

Entebbe remains the hub for US military operations in the region through 9/30. The TALCE and C-130's stationed there will continue to support intratheater airlift of supplies. The CMOC coordinates with the UNHCR Air Cell to ensure a smooth throughput of supplies by both air and ground transportation. UNHCR is transitioning from Entebbe to the Kigali hub.

Kigali airfield was opened by the JTF on 30 July once the country came under control of the RPF and fighting ended. It has supplanted both Goma and Entebbe as the focal point for UNHCR/NGO coordination and activity. The airfield now has a capacity estimated at 1000 palletized tons per day with requirements approximately half that figure. The FAA recertified the field for ILS and VOR-DME on 17 August. Sabena Airlines began civilian flights on 3 September. The airfield's civilian manager is in place and UNAMIR runs the tower operation. UNHCR is operating the marshaling yard without backlogs. The Kigali materials handling equipment (MHE) and aircraft servicing equipment is a combination of repaired Rwanda Air equipment and equipment used by the Overseas Development Administration in support of UNHCR. Shell of Uganda, LTD is negotiating a fuel contract. Elements of the TALCE are now flying into Kigali and Goma from Entebbe on a daily basis, as required, to assist in specific offload actions requiring US military support. ***UNHCR Air Cell in Geneva confirms that the movement of the TALCE has had no effect on air movement into Kigali (no NGO requests for landing clearance/offload have been denied and all NGO/UNHCR scheduled flights are being offloaded without delay.)***

The following contracts remain outstanding to support this effort:

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Tab 1

Service	To Whom	Who Pays	Length
Fuel Services for Kigali Airport	Contractor	Airport Authority	INDEF
Material Handling Equipment MHE (labor)/Entebbe	UNHCR	UNHCR	INDEF
Maintain marshal yard/Entebbe	Uganda Air	UNHCR	INDEF
Transload operations/Entebbe	Uganda Air	UNHCR	INDEF
Offload Cargo/Entebbe	UNHCR	USG/ UNHCR	28 SEP
Palletized offload/Entebbe	Contractor	USG	30 SEP
Fuel Services/Entebbe	SHELL OIL	USER	INDEF

USG has donated DOD VASI (approach) Lights to the Kigali Airport Authority to support flight operations. In addition the following DOD equipment was donated under 19 August 1994 Presidential Drawdown Authority to the UNHCR in Kigali in support of water distribution operations.

6 X M931 5T Tractors
6 X 5K Gallon Water Trailers

The JTF continues to transfer responsibility for this package to the UNHCR and national authorities. Most significant is JTF TALCE support to Goma, Kigali and Entebbe airports, which will continue to wind down until all of the functions are transferred NLT 28 September. Training of local airlift control personnel has been or is being conducted to facilitate turnover of this mission.

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Tab 2 A

PUBLIC OUTREACH STRATEGY FOR RWANDA

OBJECTIVES: As we leave Rwanda, we need to take the opportunity to drive home the success of the operation publicly. This would help in several respects:

1. Shoring up military morale by commending their efforts.

2. It offers an offensive opportunity to challenge criticism that we did not accomplish what we set out to do, as well as criticism that we should stay longer.

3. It is an opportunity to make our case that we can engage in humanitarian operations without falling prey to mission creep, and that we can turn over an operation to a UN regional coalition with at least some success.

4. The timing is such that this pullout could be close to some action in Haiti, even more reason to be highlighting a military success story. (Unless it is so close that it would be eclipsed in the public eye.) We may think Haiti is a very different mission from Rwanda, but the US public tends to lump all operations together when measuring success.

POSSIBLE WAYS TO MARK THE PULLOUT:

1. Presidential White House event. A White House ceremony would show the President's appreciation and pride for the military's accomplishments, including Generals Schroeder and Nix, as well as some of the rank and file that bore the brunt at Goma. This need not be limited to military recognition. It could include participation of the humanitarian groups, and maybe UNHCR reps that helped bring the death tolls down so quickly, even the former San Francisco fire chief who flew the water systems over on short notice.

We envision a short talk by the President citing the accomplishments of the mission, anecdotes describing how these groups worked together quickly under the most difficult conditions. Perhaps more importantly, it is a chance to explain why we went in, why we left when we did, how UNAMIR will carry on, and (if we can say definitively) what would bring us back in. If we can conclude our development of a broader policy for our

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Tab 2 A

involvement in humanitarian crises in time, this would be an excellent occasion to unveil it.

We could research whether there are any appropriate awards for those involved. There are probably not individuals who would qualify for acts of heroism, but there may be some kind of humanitarian service medals for units or civilians.

2. Editorials. We recommend two types of editorials to coincide with the pull-out; one by Secretary Perry or his designate titled something like "Ten Reasons Why We're Proud of Our Contribution to the Rwanda Crisis. " This could draw from the impressive list of accomplishments that Gen. Schroeder offers in his recent memo to the EUCOM DCINC. Or, it could more broadly describe how Rwanda shows that we can get in and get out without suffering mission creep.

Secondly, it would be very useful to have an op-ed piece from one of the humanitarian organizations that the military worked with in Rwanda. It's always tricky to solicit these from outside groups, but they carry a lot more weight than self-congratulatory pieces. We have two suggestions: C. Payne Lucas from Africare, or Julia Taft from InterAction who went with Dr. Perry to Rwanda.

3. Winning Over UNHCR. The only bad press we have gotten recently seems to have come from UNHCR sources. (That's where J. Smith got his leads.) While UNHCR people on the ground in Rwanda are pleased with our efforts, we need to work hard to win over the Geneva headquarters people. We recommend that Schroeder "out-brief" Mrs. Ogata and her staff as the pull-out occurs, and then, if PA concurs, offer a press briefing for Geneva-based reporters.

4. Reports To Congress. Finally, the various reports we owe to Congress over the next few weeks need to be taken into account. Though one is classified, they can be used as the basis for some of our public materials. Two, we need to make sure that the reports are consistent with what we will be saying publicly, and we must be ready to defend them publicly as they leak.

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DRAFT PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE WITHDRAWAL

Statement: "The final U.S. military personnel and equipment participating in Operation Support Hope in Rwanda will leave by September 30. The requirements for the crisis response capability provided by the U.S. military have been met and a successful transition has occurred at Goma, Zaire. The Joint Task Force are currently transitioning all U.S. missions supporting the humanitarian relief effort in Rwanda to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). By September 30, transitions will be complete at Kigali and Entebbe, as well, and the remaining 500 U.S. military personnel will depart.

"Since the initial UNHCR request July 19 for considerable assistance from the international community, the U.S. rapidly reinforced the relief agencies already in place until they could recover and resume effective operations. We have essentially completed the specific tasks President Clinton directed in his July 22 speech. As a result, the UNHCR and NGOs are now able to take over the responsibility for continuing the humanitarian aid mission."

Q1. Has the U.S. reneged on some of its promises to the UNHCR for support?

A1. There is no discrepancy between the tasks identified by President Clinton and what we delivered. Specifically, the U.S. government agreed to support four areas: (1) Airport Services, (2) Logistics Base Services, (3) Water Supply and Distribution, and (4) Establish and Manage an Airlift Hub in Uganda. We have successfully accomplished the first three areas and are nearing final transition on the final area at Kigali and Entebbe.

In addition, we have provided equipment and transportation to support UNAMIR.

Q2. What did we do for each area and who is now doing those tasks?

A2. Airport Service: Bukavu was rejected early on as totally

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unsuitable for expanded, 24-hour operations. Instead, we established 24-hour operations at Kigali to receive and forward supplies to Bukavu. In addition, 24-hour operations were established at Goma.
After the primary need was fulfilled at Goma, operations were shifted to Kigali as the hub for relief flights and the JTF turned over equipment to UNHCR on August 25. UNHCR remains in charge of the Goma airfield and its scheduling. Aircraft servicing and material handling equipment is operated by "CARE of Canada" under contract to UNHCR. One U.S. 10K forklift remains at Bukavu and will be returned before the U.S. departure.

Logistics Base Support: We established logistics elements at Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali. Ground transport to Goma now accounts for between 400 and 800 tons per day. UNAMIR has been taking over the coordination of ground and air transportation. We will be leasing some equipment (water tankers, tractor/trailers, water filtration systems, etc.) to UNAMIR upon departure.

Water Supply and Distribution: We began providing purified water to 1.2 million refugees at Goma only 40 hours after alert. The relief operation now has the capability to produce over 1.5 million gallons per day--more than consumed. Contractors are now providing the water production capability and related support. Some DoD equipment has been drawn down from active duty stocks and donated to the UNHCR to support Goma operations. These include tractors, trailers, engineer equipment, and tents.

Establish and Manage an Airlift Hub in Uganda: We established air operations element at Entebbe, which remains the central hub for relief activities throughout the area. We continue to support the intratheater airlift of supplies in coordination with the UNHCR air cell. UNHCR is transitioning from Entebbe to the Kigali hub. The Kigali airfield began civilian flights on September 3. The airfield's civilian manager is in place and UNAMIR runs the tower operation. The materials handling equipment and aircraft servicing equipment is a combination of repaired Rwanda Air equipment and equipment used by the Overseas Development Agency in support of UNHCR.

Q3. If the UN and various NGOs are there, is there not a continuing need for the U.S. to remain?

A3. Our intent has always been to turn over the humanitarian aid

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mission to UNHCR, contractors, and NGO/PVO. We brought our unique logistical capabilities to bear at a time when the crisis overwhelmed the UN and non-governmental organizations. These unique capabilities can greatly enhance humanitarian relief operations, but the principal mission of DoD remains U.S. defense. The Secretary of Defense pledged that "As soon as we complete the aspect of the relief which is unique to U.S. military,...we're going to phase these operations over to the UN and to the non-government organizations that provide relief."

Q4. Why has the U.S. declined to provide the additional assistance requested by the UNHCR?

A4. The immediate crisis is over. We provided our unique logistics capability at time when it was essential to the saving of lives. All of the additional UNHCR requests can be met by non-U.S. military agencies. In fact, the relief effort is already transitioning to routine, sustainable and long-term efforts that can be and are being supported by NGO/PVO.

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ENCLOSURE

SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR GOMA REFUGEE CAMPS

1. **PURPOSE.** To provide an assessment of the military requirements to ensure the security of the refugees and NGOs residing or operating in Goma refugee camps.

2. **SITUATION.** There are still approximately 850,000 Rwandan refugees remaining in five refugees camps in the vicinity of Goma, Zaire. Although the immediate threat of disease and starvation has been alleviated through the intervention by US and UN military forces and NGOs, a long-term concern remains for the security of the refugees and NGOs in those camps. The chief threat to the security of the camps is the remnants of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR). This force of over 20,000 members of the defeated army is clustered within the Goma region, where they operate as intact combat units. Although only lightly armed, they do control sufficient numbers of small arms weapons to endanger the security of the camps and the supply lines to distribute food and supplies.

3. **MISSION.** UN forces deploy to Zaire to conduct military operations to provide internal and external camp security for the refugee camps in the vicinity of Goma, security for refugee supply lines of communications, and security for the key supply distribution points in the Goma area.

4. **ASSUMPTIONS.**

- The UN security force will be authorized and supported by the UN.

- The UN security force will have the permission of the Zairian government to operate within its borders. The force will withdraw if permission from the government of Zaire is revoked.

- The Government of Zaire will not permit the ex-FAR to conduct sustained combat operations within the Zairian borders, but does not have the capability to prevent them from doing so.

- Goma airfield will remain operational to support both the refugee and military security operations.

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- The number of refugees will remain approximately the same as current figures -- 850,000.

- The security force will provide for its own logistical support. The NGOs will provide the logistical support for all refugee care.

- Because of the mission to protect the safety of the refugees, the security force will operate under a Chapter VII mandate from the UN.

- ROE will permit the use of deadly force beyond the requirements for force protection. The ROE will allow such force in the protection of refugees and NGOs.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS/FORCE STRUCTURE.

a. The security force will be organized as a combat brigade task force, headquartered in the vicinity of Goma airfield. The brigade will be organized and equipped to conduct five major missions:

(1) Provide internal security for the camps.
(2) Provide external security for the camps.
(3) Provide security for NGO-provided refugee supply convoys moving from Goma airfield to the camps.
(4) Provide for their own force protection.
(5) Provide security for airfield.

b. Organization. The brigade task force would be organized with a headquarters element, a light infantry battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion, an aviation battalion, an augmented MP battalion, an engineer company, and a tailored combat support battalion.

c. Operations. The brigade will operate from Goma airfield with the following forces:

- The mechanized battalion provides continuous convoy security operations for all NGO convoys between the airfield and the camps.
- The light infantry battalion operates from the airfield, in conjunction with the aviation battalion, as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to reinforce any of the refugee camps. Additional missions may include reconnaissance-in-force patrols

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throughout the area to maintain a high visibility. The QRF may also provide additional local security for the airfield.

- The MP battalion will be organized with 6 MP companies. One company will be assigned to provide internal security (law and order operations) for each of the five camps, with one company in reserve at the airfield. The MP companies will provide for contingency protection against external threats until the employment of the QRF.
- The aviation battalion will provide lift assets (3xUH-1 companies) for the QRF and fire support (1xAH-1 company) for all of the brigade's missions.
- The engineer company, augmented by an EOD detachment, will operate out of Goma airfield in general support of the brigade. Missions will focus on maintenance of fortifications, mobility operations in support of the mechanized battalion's operations, and NGO convoys and EOD support.
- The combat support battalion will be tailored to provide maintenance, transport, and all supply services to sustain the brigade.

d. Manning. The following is a recommended manning level for the security brigade:

- Brigade Headquarters:	60
- Mechanized Battalion:	800
- Light Inf Battalion:	600
- Aviation Battalion:	400
- Engineer Company:	230
- MP Battalion: (6xCo)	1200
- Combat Support Battalion:	1000
- **TOTAL**	**4290**

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, September 15, 1994 at 0930 hours

- - (C) Security in Burundi: At 10:00 p.m. on September 14, armed bands of civilians attacked military positions near the Panorama Hotel in Bujumbura. Gunfire was exchanged and police say the armed civilians retreated to the hills. On the same night, the house of Francois Ngeze, a prominent opposition hardliner, was attacked with a grenade and sniper fire. Burundi military sources report that gendarmes guarding the house resisted the attack. Ngeze was the figurehead Hutu proposed to head the Committee for Public Safety established immediately after the October coup attempt, and is considered a turncoat by many Hutu. (Bujumbura 3183)

- - (S) Deployment of Three RPA Battalions is Complete: The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) completed deployment of three battalions to the former humanitarian protection zone by September 14, ahead of schedule. The local Hutu population appears to be gaining confidence in the RPA and does not support the Hutu militia activities. P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) Bukavu Airport Remains Open: DART reports the Bukavu airport remains open, and there are no indications it will be closed in the near future despite earlier reports that it would be closed for two months for repairs. (Nairobi 16762)

- - (C) Former Rwandan Ambassador to Kenya Seeks Refugee Status: The Rwandan Ambassador to Kenya, Habimana Cyprien, appointed by the former government, has inquired about U.S. refugee status for himself, and his family at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. (Nairobi 16712)

- - (C) Rwandans Flee to Kenya: Embassy Nairobi has received a document from an organization calling itself the Rwandan Community in Kenya. The document alleges that Hutu extremists of the former Rwandan government have taken refuge in Kenya. Embassy Nairobi believes it is likely that the Kenyan government is aware of their presence. The embassy is investigating the possibility that this group, as well as others from the former Rwandan government, is present in Kenya. (Nairobi 16715)

- - (U) Rwandan Refugees in Region: UNHCR reports that the current number of refugees in the region are as follows: 850,000 in Goma, 450,000 in Bukavu, 473,000 in Tanzania, 316,000 in Burundi, 160,000 in Uvira, and 10,000 in Uganda. (OFDA Meeting 9/15).

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, September 14, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (C) Security in Burundi: Burundi Interim President Ntibantunganya met with Burundi government, military and party leaders late September 13 asking their cooperation in dealing with the outbreak of violence in the northeastern neighborhoods of Bujumbura. According to the Burundi Defense Minister, 200 - 300 militants were responsible for the disturbance. The military has evacuated some residents and will search each area for guns before allowing residents to enter. There is a heavy military presence surrounding one of the two sports fields where residents have temporarily been relocated. ICRC is providing water and biscuits. (Bujumbura 3145)

- - (C) RPA Deployment Continues: Rwanda Patriotic Army deployment into the former humanitarian protection zone continues. Some coordination problems concerning the deployment exist between UNAMIR and the RPA which are expected to be resolved soon. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) RPF is going into the southwest in larger numbers than expected. More than 1,000 troops reportedly moved in Sunday and Monday. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) the troops did not have UNAMIR escort and supposedly refused to stop at UN checkpoints. There have been no reports of clashes between the RPF and Hutus in the zone. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1)

- - (C) UNAMIR Deployment Update: The Zambian contingent's main body now will not be ready to deploy to Rwanda until September 23. The delay is due to problems in obtaining the necessary equipment some of which the Zambians have purchased from South Africa. The Tunisian deployment has been delayed for an undetermined time due to the UN's decision not to use the German (U.S.-origin) APC's. According to USUN, the Indians may replace the Tunisians as the next major UAMIR contingent to deploy following the Zambians. India has offered 800 troops to arrive by the end of the month. Total UNAMIR force strength as of September 13 was 4,145 persons. (SVTS 9/14, Lusaka 5354, USDAO Yaounde 8570)

- - (U) Operation Support Hope: As of September 14, there are 663 U.S. military personnel assigned to Operation Support Hope stationed in the region: 517 in Entebbe, 4 in Kigali, 123 in Mombasa, and 19 in Nairobi. (JTF/J3)

- - (U) Assessment of Southwest Rwanda Displaced Persons Camps: Population estimates in the camps, according to DART and IRC, were often inflated, reflecting more the numbers of people receiving food aid. The sense of security among the displaced populations in the northern camps in Gikongoro is fairly good. Many refugees reported that they would return home "when the UN tells us we can go back", or when "the UN says it will bring trucks for us." The displaced persons in the southern most part of the region report a greater sense of apprehension about their personal security and fear possible reprisals by the RPA. (Nairobi 16529)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 13, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) President Bizimungu Plans to Visit Washington: Rwandan President Bizimungu plans to travel to Washington on a private visit either prior to or immediately following his UN address on October 6. The advisor to Bizimungu has requested meetings with President Clinton, Secretary Christopher and A/S Moose. Bizimungu also plans to meet with the chairmen of HFAC and SFRC Africa subcommittees, World Bank, and IMF officials, and General Motors. (Kigali 1531)

- - (C) Gunfire in Bujumbura: Heavy gunfire broke out late September 12 and continued into the early morning of September 13 in the northeastern neighborhoods of Bujumbura (Kamenge, Cibotoke, and Kinama). Embassy Bujumbura has confirmed police reports of an increase in military presence in the area. The embassy activated the warden system advising Americans to avoid the three northeastern neighborhoods. (Bujumbura 3130)

- - (U) Security in Goma: In general, the security situation in the camps and Goma is relatively calm, however sporadic incidents continue. A well equipped Zairian military intelligence unit of approximately 30 personnel is now stationed in Goma, and discipline appears to have improved slightly among Zairian forces. (Nairobi 16523)

- - (U) Refugee Camp Site Preparation and Improvement: Assist/UK engineers and project coordinators have started arriving in Goma to implement the OFDA-funded Action AID Assist Refugee Camp Site Preparation and Improvement program. Implementation has not begun as they are awaiting the arrival of necessary heavy equipment. (Nairobi 16523)

- - (C) Alternative Site for Benaco Camp: UNHCR has found an alternative site for the Benaco camp. According to Ursula Aboubacar of UNHCR, the GOT has approved this site. In addition UNHCR has agreed to pay the salaries of 300 Tanzanian policemen to patrol the Benaco camp. (Geneva 7840)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Friday, September 9, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (S) Reports of Ugandan/RPF Troops in Burundi Army: Embassy Bujumbura has received reports that Ugandan and/or RPF troops are present in the Burundi Army. The embassy and Washington are investigating the reports. (Bujumbura 3067)

- - (U) American International School to Open in Burundi: Classes at the American International School of Bujumbura are scheduled to start on September 28. (Bujumbura 3070)

- - (C) Bomb Blasts in Bujumbura: A grenade exploded in the central market in Bujumbura on September 9, resulting in extensive casualities and possibly several deaths. Thieves took advantage of the chaos to steal. (Bujumbura 3079)

- - (U) OAU Renews Mandate of Burundi Mission: At the request of the Burundi government and in accordance with the OAU Secretary General's report, the OAU has decided to renew the mandate of its mission to Burundi for an additional three months, from September 7 - December 17. (FBIS Abidjan DTG 082049Z SEP)

- - (LOU) New Currency for Rwanda: Prime Minister Twagiramungu announced that Rwanda would be printing new currency. Post notes that printing new currency and clearing out the old is but one measure necessary for the resuscitation of Rwanda's economy. (Kigali 1519)

- - (C) Tanzanian Defense Minister Offers Option on Rwandan Refugees in Tanzania: Tanzanian Defense Minister Kinana suggested to the Charge that a combination of Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Kenyan military could protect and escort Rwandan refugees in Tanzania back to Rwanda and help them rebuild their homes. Kinana added that international community funding would be necessary to launch such an operation. (Dar es Salaam 5778)

- - (LOU) Dillon to Lead Special Mission: Ambassador Dillon, appointed by UN SYG Boutros-Ghali to head a special mission to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, is to conduct a "preliminary orientation mission" of approximately ten days, beginning on September 10 in Kigali. Based on his findings, Dillon plans to refine his objectives, then return to the region in October. (State 243839)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, September 8, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Press Reports UN Fears New Guerilla War in Rwanda: According to the press, SRSG Khan reports UN military personnel have spotted men in military fatigues, with guns and supplies, crossing into southwest Rwanda from Burundi and Zaire. Khan said in a press conference that sniping and shooting had increased in the southwest former humanitarian protection zone. (Reuter 9/8)

- - ~~(S)~~ RPA Troops to be Deployed: The Rwandan Minister for Internal Affairs and Communal Development reportedly announced that 150 Rwandan Patriotic Army Troops would be deployed to each of the three prefectures in the former humanitarian protection zone. P1/(b)(1) predicts that the hand-over from UNAMIR to the RPA will be completed within 4 weeks. P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1)

- - ~~(C)~~ Radio Station for UNAMIR: The U.S., UK and the UN agreed on a division of responsibility for providing a radio station for UNAMIR. The U.S. will provide production facilities and equipment on a reimbursable basis. The UK will provide 5 transmitters and the engineers required to install them. The UN will coordinate the project, including arranging for transportation, reimbursement, and staffing. (USUN 3712)

- - (LOU) Zambian Deployment to UNAMIR: Army Deputy Chief of Operations Colonel Chewe told Poloff September 8 that the 700-man main body of the Zambian contingent will not be ready for deployment to Rwanda until approximately September 16. (Lusaka 5240)

- - ~~(S)~~ UNAMIR Completes First Phase of Disarmament: The Ethiopian contingent of UNAMIR successfully completed the voluntary disarmament of ex-FAR elements in Cyangugu. Reports indicate that further disarmament efforts may encounter more opposition and spark violence which could be directed at UNAMIR. P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) Improved Conditions in Refugee Camps: DART Deputy reports that conditions in the refugee camps in Goma have improved and that while initially overwhelmed, UN agencies and most NGOs are well established and aggressively addressing the most urgent needs of the refugee population. However, measures need to be taken to improve security and to support the population in the longer-term. (Nairobi 16199)

- - (U) UN Sending Security Assessment Team to Refugee Camps: A UN team is to evaluate the security in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and suggest ways of handling the problems. Aid workers continue to report finding dozens of bodies of people who have died overnight in the camps. Aid workers suspect Hutu extremists are killing people to keep them from returning to Rwanda. (AP Report 9/7)

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INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Operation SUPPORT HOPE Transition (U)

1. (U) **Purpose**. To provide information on the transition of JTF SUPPORT HOPE operations to UNHCR, NGOs, and PVOs.

2. (~~C~~) JTF SUPPORT HOPE is currently transitioning* US military operations supporting the humanitarian relief effort in Rwanda to UNHCR, NGOs, and PVOs. A successful transition has already occurred in Goma and will conclude in Kigali and Entebbe by 30 September. The actual date of transition at both locations is situationally dependent with timing keyed to the ability of UNHCR, UNAMIR, and the other organizations to assume the tasks performed by the JTF.

3. (U) The USG signed up to perform four of the eight UNHCR service packages:

- Pkg #1 - Airport Services (Goma, Bukavu)
- Pkg #2 - Logistics Base Services (Goma)
- Pkg #7 - Water Management (Goma)
- Pkg #8 - Airhead Management (Entebbe, Kigali).

JTF SUPPORT HOPE has successfully accomplished Service Packages #1, #2, and #7 and transitioned operations to other agencies. Package #8 is nearing final transition at Kigali and Entebbe.

4. (U) **Package #1 (Airport Services at Goma and Bakavu)**. Once in theater, JTF Support Hope site survey teams visited both airfields. Goma was found to be suitable for expanded air operations however Bukavu was not. Bukavu could only accomodate C-130 type aircraft and the runway was in very poor repair. The airfield would not be able to support the required operations tempo. Additionally, JTF logisticians determined that it was more efficient to service refugee camps from Goma and Kigali than from Goma and Bukavu. (NOTE: UNHCR wants to improve Bukavu airfield and is currently pursuing contract options. However, planned improvements will not increase capacity only address existing deficiences such as loose gravel surfaces. During work, the airfield may be closed for a month.) JTF focused its efforts on expanding the operations at Goma. The Goma airfield was certified for night operations on 25 July 1994. Airfield throughput increased from 82 stons to over 290 stons by 2 August. With the increased activity the runway began to deteriorate; however, the primary need had been met and land transport was providing 600 tons/day. Operations were the

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shifted to Kigali as the hub for humanitarian relief flights and the amount of aid arriving by air into Goma dropped off. The JTF turned over equipment to UNHCR and closed operations in Goma on 25 August. UNHCR remains in charge of Goma airfield and its scheduling. Aircraft servicing and material handling equipment in Goma is operated by "CARE of Canada" under contract to UNHCR. Additionally, one US 10K forklift is on loan to UNHCR in Bukavu (to be returned prior to US redeployment out of the area on 30 SEP), or on 15 SEP when the airfield may be closed for repair by the Zairean airfield authority.

a. (U) The following contracts remain in effect to support this effort: None.

b. (U) USG Equipment to be left to support Goma air lift operations: None required per UN airfield manager.

5. (U) Package #2 (Logistic Base Services). The establishment of TALCEs at Goma, Entebbe, and Kigali provided much of the structure to accomplish this task. As the situation matured, the logistic management function of the TALCEs transitioned to the Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC). The CMOC at Entebbe, in conjunction with the UNHCR airlift planners and the Combined Logistics Cell, developed combined UN-US military priorities for airlift and coordinated the use of ground and air transportation for the region. In Kigali, the CMOC and the NGOs (now over 70 organizations) coordinate logistic services in an On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). The Kigali CMOC has been primarily providing military expertise to the OSOCC; but as UNAMIR becomes more actively engaged in this process, the CMOC's role is declining.

a. (U) The following contracts remain outstanding to support this effort: None required.

b. (U) USG Equipment to be left to support this effort: None required.

6. (U) Package #7 (Water Management in Goma). The first US military ROWPUs arrived in Goma on 25 July. Water production rose sharply from the 26th through the 13th of August as NGO and other capabilities came to bear. Initially, water distribution lagged behind production and storage. As more equipment (such as the British OXFAM system) arrived, this situation was reversed. Production capability now exceeds consumption without depleting storage. On 13 August, the local UNHCR director reported he had more than enough water and livestock were being watered. The relief operation now has the capability to produce over 1.5M gallons per day. Some water purification equipment and water distribution trucks have been transferred to Kigali. The US donated 10 x 5K gallon tankers, 12 x 3K gallon SMFT bags, and tractor/trailer rigs to ensure adequate water distribution

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capability remained in the Goma area. **In addition to the direct mission to provide water management in Goma, USG and US military also provided engineer support to UNHCR.**

a. (U) The following contracts are in place to support this effort:

Service	To Whom	Who Pays	Length
Water Production by PWSS	UNHCR	USAID	INDEF
*Campsite Preparation and sanitation by Assist LTD	UNHCR	USAID	Renew 60 days

b. (U) USG Equipment to be left to support Goma operations (USG donated to UNHCR):

12 X M818 Tractors
12 X M871 Trailers
12 X 3K GAL SMFTS
10 X 5 KGAL tractor/trailer
4 X M931 5T Tracotrs
4 X XM1098 5KGAL Water Trailers
*2 X D7 Bulldozers
*2 X CAT 103 Graders
*1 X M920 Tractor
*2 X M870 Trailer
*2 X M1009 CUCV
*5 X GP Large Tents
*5 X GP Medium Tents
*5 X GP Small Tents
*20 X Commercial 6 Man Tents

* Contract/equipment provided to UNHCR in support of general humanitarian operations in Goma. (vice the stated mission of water production).

7. (U) **Package #8 (Airhead Management in Entebbe and Kigali)**.

• Entebbe remains the hub for US military operations in the region. The TALCE and C-130's stationed there will continue to support intratheater airlift of supplies transloaded from strategic airlift. The CMOC coordinates with the UNHCR Air Cell to ensure a smooth throughput of supplies by both air and ground transportation. UNHCR is transitioning from Entebbe to the Kigali hub. The senior UNHCR representative in Entebbe is expected to depart on 22 September.

• Kigali airfield was opened by the JTF on 30 July. It has supplanted both Goma and Entebbe as the focal point for UNHCR/NGO coordination and activity. The airfield now has a capacity estimated at 1000 stons per day with requirements approximately half that figure. The FAA recertified the field for ILS and VOR-DME on 17 August. Sabena Airlines

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began civilian flights in on 3 September. The airfield's civilian manager is in place and UNAMIR runs the tower operation. UNHCR is operating the marshalling yard without backlogs. The Kigali MHE and aircraft servicing equipment is a combination of repaired Rwanda Air equipment and equipment used by the Overseas Development Agency in support of UNHCR. Shell of Uganda, LTD is negotiating a fuel contract.

a. (U) The following contracts remain outstanding to support this effort:

Service	To Whom	Who Pays	Length
Fuel Services for Kigali Airport	Contractor	Airport Authority	INDEF
Material Handling Equipment MHE (labor)/Entebbe	UNHCR	UNHCR	INDEF
Maintain marshal yard/Entebbe	Uganda Air	UNHCR	INDEF
Transload operations/Entebbe	Uganda Air	UNHCR	INDEF
Offload Cargo/Entebbe	UNHCR	USG/ UNHCR	28 SEP
Palletized offload/Entebbe	Contractor	USG	30 SEP
Fuel Services/Entebbe	SHELL OIL	USER	INDEF

b. (U) USG has donated VASI Lights to the Kigali Airport Authority to support night operations. In addition the following equipment was donated to UNAMIR in Kigali in support of airport operations

6 X M931 5T Tractors
6 X 5 KGAL Water Trailers

c. (U) UNHCR has requested the USG provide the following airport handling equipment for the Kigali airport (This request is currently in staffing):

2 X 25K Loaders
1 X 40K Loaders
4 X 10K Forklifts
3 X Generators
1 X High Mobility Vehicle
1 X Airfield Lighting System.

P1/(b)(1)

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P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

US military personnel in Entebbe providing strategic and intratheater airlift of humanitarian cargo to the RCA. US forces will continue operations from Entebbe to support Kigali, Goma, and other strategic/intratheater life requirements until 28 September. It is the JTF intent to have transitioned all US missions to the UNHCR, NGOs, UNAMIR, contract or regional governmental agencies and to have withdrawn all remaining US military personnel and equipment P1/(b)(1)

9. ~~(C)~~ Summary. Requirements for the crisis response capability provided by the US military are met. Transitioning of JTF operations in Entebbe and Kigali is proceeding smoothly. The CMOC(-) will remain engaged in Kigali with JTF operations on course to be complete P1/(b)(1)

Reference
* CJTF Support Hope memo, "Rwanda Repositioning Plan", dtd 06 Sep 94

Prepared by: LTC Mike Esper, USA
J3, JOD, EU/CC, 52541
C4/EUCOM3/566

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, September 7, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - ~~(C)~~ Donor Demarche on Burundi: The resident donor community believes a group demarche to cut development aid in the event of coup planning would be ineffective and would amount to an accusation which the donor community is not ready to make without specific evidence. The resident donor community believes that the message that aid will be shut off has already been unequivocally conveyed. (Bujumbura 3048)

P1/(b)(1)

- - ~~(C)~~ Participation in OAU-UNHCR Refugee Symposium: Former President Buyoya and the president of the National Commission for Repatriation are expected to represent Burundi. Justice Minister Gerard Kamanda Wa Kamanda will represent Zaire at the OAU-UNHCR Refugee Symposium on September 8-9 in Addis Ababa. Home Affairs Deputy Refugee Section Head Don Mwaisella will represent Tanzania. Mwaisella is knowledgeable about the security situation in the camps but will not be able to make any commitments on behalf of the GOT. (Dar es Salaam 5720, Kinshasa 5309, Bujumbura 3048)

- - (LOU) Camp Security in Tanzania: The 300 extra policemen from the GOT have not arrived. Embassy Dar es Salaam remains concerned about the security at Benaco particularly as individuals suspected of war crimes are identified. NGO leaders are divided in their estimates of the security situation in the Ngara district and the Benaco camp. Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), the largest and most experienced NGO in Tanzania, the Red Cross, and UNHCR believe relief workers overreacted to the June 15 disturbance. TCRS and the Red Cross accept the current security risks as what one expects to face when working with refugees. CARE and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) remain concerned with the possible deterioration of security. (Dar es Salaam 5694)

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- - (U) Displaced Persons in Rwanda: According to UNREO estimates, some 500,000 - 800,000 people are displaced in Rwanda, predominately in the southwest former humanitarian protection zone. UNREO has proposed a plan of action focused on reintegrating displaced persons currently in the southwest. Their approach is based on attracting people back to their home areas, rather than pushing them out of their present locations. (Nairobi 16139)

- - (U) Shortage of Seeds and Tools for Rwanda: Despite efforts of several organizations to distribute seeds and tools, only one-third of the seeds and tools requirement has been met. If seeds are not planted before September or early October, estimates indicate that Rwanda will require more than $100 million in food aid in the coming months. (Nairobi 16137)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 6, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - ~~(S)~~ Prime Minister Kengo Responds to USG Queries: In a September 5 meeting with acting Charge, Kengo reported that ex-FAR soldiers had been separated from civilians, but that prefects from Rwanda and informal militia still intimidate refugees and prevent repatriation. Kengo said he had not approached third countries to help with security, except the U.S. and France. Kengo showed no desire to explore the possibility of private contractors to provide security in the camps. (Kinshasa 0581)

- (U) U.S. Military in Region: Total U.S. military presence in the region is 828 troops: 674 in Entebbe; 3 in Kigali; 131 in Mombasa; and 20 in Nairobi. The TALCE continues to commute from Entebbe into Kigali during the day when needed. (USCINCEUR DTG 061201Z SEP, JCS SVTS - 9/6)

- - (U) UNAMIR Update on Security: UNAMIR reports conditions in Rwanda are generally secure. Continuing reports indicate Interhamwe activity in the former humanitarian protected zone in the southwest. Kigali is considered stable, but 2-3 security incidents are reported per night in Kibungo in the southeast. Following a visit to the area, UNAMIR's deputy force commander decided to deploy Ghanaian UNAMIR troops from the southwest into Kibungo. Troops are expected to arrive in Kibungo within the week. The International Medical Corps estimates the population of Kibungo has increased from 32,000 to 112,000 in the last few weeks due in large part to the number of Rwandan expatriates returning from Burundi. (Nairobi 15991)

- - ~~(S)~~ Ex-FAR Moving into Southwestern Safehaven: P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) some 4,500 soldiers and militiamen loyal to the former Rwandan government, who maintain communications with Hutu commanders in Zaire, are operating in the former humanitarian protection zone. P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) RPA Liaison Officers to Enter the Former Humanitarian Protection Zone (FHPZ): At the request of UNAMIR II, liaison officers from the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) are being deployed in FHPZ. The deployment will take the form of one RPA officer per UNAMIR II battalion. This movement of RPA elements is the first step in handing responsibility of the zone over to Rwandan authorities. (USCINCEUR DTG 061201Z SEP)

- - ~~(C)~~ Zairian Troop Rotation Ends in Hijacking: The Zairian Department of National Defense attempted to carry out Prime Minster Kengo's promise to rotate Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) stationed in Goma. When 250 FAZ discovered that their destination was Kitona, they hijacked the aircraft, forcing it to land at Kinshasa. GOZ will attempt to relocate these troops to western Zaire. (USDAO Kinshasa 05272)

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Proposed New Ambassador: Anastase GASANA
(Phonetic: gah SAH nah)

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

Anastase Gasana, a Hutu moderate, served as Foreign Minister in the coalition government which was in place at the time of the April 6 plane crash that took the life of President Juvenal Habyarimana. Members of the Rwandan military killed some of Gasana's cabinet colleagues, and a Hutu extremist interim government was formed. Gasana was in Tanzania at the time the crisis broke and thus survived the upheaval. The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the hardline interim government forces in July and set up a new coalition government; Gasana will be the first Ambassador to the United States representing the new government.

Gasana, age 44, is a member of the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), one of the main (predominantly Hutu) parties in the coalition government. In recent years, the MDR has been allotted the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as other less prominent ministerial portfolios.

Gasana studied at the University of Paris (Sorbonne and Paris-V) for seven years, earning advanced degrees in sociology and linguistics. Prior to being named Foreign Minister in July 1993, Gasana served as director of the cabinet in the Ministry of Education (1992-1993) and Secretary General in the Ministry of Transport and Communications (1991-1992). Before taking up government service, he spent nine years as a professor at the University of Rwanda.

P6/(b)(6)

He speaks French and some English, in addition to his native Kinyarwandan. He is married and the father of five children.

A thorough search of U.S. Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

Sources consulted include:

P3/(b)(3)

Curriculum Vitae of Anastase Gasana, provided by the Government of Rwanda (Aug. 22, 1994)

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POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: U.S. Role in Suppressing or Promoting Radio Broadcasts in and around Rwanda

DISCUSSION: Broadcasts by extremist Hutu radio stations were influential in causing the massacre of Tutsis during the civil war and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Hutus to Zaire. We continue to receive sporadic reports of hate messages being broadcast by these stations to Hutu refugees in camps across the Rwandan border.

- Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda (now operated by the new RPF government) has broadcast appeals for the Hutu refugees to return home, but these broadcasts have been largely ineffective for a variety of reasons: technical, program content, and the influence of former Hutu officials and the ex-FAR in the refugee camps.

- At the request of the NSC, DoD formed an Interagency Working Group (IWG) chaired by the PDASD(SO/LIC) to address Rwanda radio broadcast issues.

CURRENT STATUS: In order to provide the basis for a policy decision on the appropriate U.S. role in either suppressing extremist Hutu radio broadcasts, promoting Rwandan government broadcasting and/or supporting UNHCR/UNAMIR broadcast requirements, the working group engaged in several tasks:

P1/(b)(1)

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- On 26 August, USUN received a request from the UN for assistance in "leasing a mobile radio station" for Rwanda on an "extremely urgent basis." The request stated a requirement for five 2KW FM transmitters, a broadcast studio, a program distribution system and other miscellaneous supplies.

- Further discussions on 31 August among USUN Amb Inderfurth, UN Asst SYG Rizza, UK Amb Hannay and UN DPKO representive Beissel clarified the request.

  - A recent UN DPKO mission to Rwanda returned with the recommendation that UNAMIR establish an independent broadcast capability in order to maintain a perception of neutrality.

  - P1/(b)(1) The UN confirmed that money is not the issue, but rather that the UN had no broadcast engineers to set up and run a station, and that procurement would take 4-6 months. What the UN wants is for U.S. and UK to provide the equipment and expertise through donation, lease or purchase through an LOA.

  - The preferred UN option is that the U.S. provide all studio production equipment and 26 broadcast engineers while the UK provides the transmitters; backup option is the same except the U.S. also provides a base transmitter on a reimbursable basis.

- USUN requested a meeting at the UN on 2 September where DoD and USIA/VOA representatives with radio expertise could provide a coordinated position on what the USG could offer. That meeting has been rescheduled for 7 September.

- P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) AFRTS has indicated they have some excess studio production equipment that could be provided to the UN; VOA may also have equipment that could be used and may be able to offer suggestions to the UN as to a source of non-U.S. technical personnel . Per agreement of the Ad Hoc Group, U.S. personnel should not be deployed to Rwanda to support broadcast operations.

- These and other related support issues will be resolved at a PDASD(SO/LIC) chaired IWG on 6 September to prepare for the meeting with the UN on 7 September.

Prepared by: P6/(b)(6) OASD(SO/LIC)SS, P6/(b)(6)

Approved by Director, Special Support

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Memo

To: Susan Rice, National Security Council
Fax: 202 456 9360
From: Rene Lemarchand, DG/REDSO/USAID/Abidjan
Re: Burundi situation

cc. George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State
Carol Lancaster, Assistant to the Administrator, USAID
Larry Garber, Center for Democracy Global Office AID/W
Myron Golden, Chief of Mission, Bujumbura
Bill Pearson, Director, REDSO/Abidjan

Dear Ms. Rice: By way of a follow-up to our phone conversation of yesterday, and in response to your request, I enclose copy of a draft proposal for a conference on Burundi designed to save the Barundi from themselves. This is the result of an informal session I had in Brussels recently with other Burundi specialists. Our hope is that such a conference might be jointly sponsored by the European Communities and USAID/Bujumbura. It reflects my concern and that of several other observers of the Burundi scene that we might end up having another Rwanda on our hands unless we move quickly to come to terms with the crisis. The agenda outlined below was hammered out in the course of a broad-ranging tour d'horizon I have had in Brussels on August 24 with Professor Filip Reyntjens, of the University of Antwerp, and Brigitte Erler, President of a German Human Rights Association. The French version is in the process of being finalized, along with the German version. Bear in mind, however, that this is only a draft, submitted for your consideration, and comments.

PROJECTED ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE ON BURUNDI

1. Context and Purpose of the Conference

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Burundi has been largely overshadowed in public attention by the Rwanda disaster: the country is on the brink of civil war, and is being pushed ever closer towards the abyss by extremists at both ends of the ethnic spectrum. The emergent alliance between elements (Tutsi) of the army with smaller opposition parties (also Tutsi-dominated), the continuing constitutional impasse, the widening gap between the capital city and countryside, the ongoing ethnic cleansing operations, along with the pressures towards polarization originating from Rwanda -- such are the harbingers of disaster looming on the horizon.

In order to avoid another Rwanda, the logic of self-generating violence must be replaced by the logic of a political dialogue among all parties concerned. It is a matter of urgency, therefore, that the principal diplomatic missions in Bujumbura (Germany, France, Belgium, US, the European Communities), together with the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, take the

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initiative in inviting the key political actors to take part in negotiations. Along with the Frodebu and the army, these actors are the constitutive elements of the civil society, including Churches. The engagement of diplomatic missions in this effort is of critical importance: their role is to provide a framework of interaction, a catalyst as it were for getting a dialogue under way. In the last analysis, of course, it will be for the Barundi themselves to solve their problems with the means of their own choosing.

Unlike previous seminars and conferences, this experiment aims at getting a genuine political dialogue underway, which would go beyond the exchange of views and instead pave the way for solutions.

Hence the need to identify issues and problems, clarify the position of key political actors on such issues, suggest possible solutions and see how these can be translated into more technical (e.g. juridical) language.

2. Implementation

As noted earlier, such a round-table (or "national dialogue") could conceivably be organized under the joint-auspices of the Special Representative of the UN, Mr. Ould Abdallah, and the Embassies of Germany, France, Belgium, the US and the European Union.

The functions of such a meeting would be purely consultative. The aim is to provide the government and parliament with advisory opinions on issues. It is for the authorities concerned -- parliamentary and governmental -- to assume their own responsibilities in giving substance to such recommendations through appropriate constitutional, legislative, budgetary and administrative instruments.

The conclusions of the debate would be formulated in the form of consensus, insofar as it is feasible. If not, both the majority position and that of the minority would be officially registered in the minutes of the conference.

The Chairmanship of the conference will be assumed by one or several Burundi personalities enjoying sufficient trust to carry out their functions effectively. Possible choices might be Msgr. Ntamwana or Msgr. Bududira serving as joint-Chairmen.

3. Participants

Participants to the conference would include:

* Political parties registered as of January 1st 1994 (3 representatives for each party represented in parliament, one for each of the others)
* Three representatives from the army
* One representative for each of the organizations of the civil society (human rights organizations, women's organizations, youth groups, trade-unions, etc.)
* One representative for each of the Churches
* Five provincial governors

Even though numbers alone are not of crucial importance since decisions will not be taken by a vote, it is important to aim at a balanced representation opf the interests at stake, without, however, seeking "ethnic parity" at every level. The

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political field must be maximally included in the debates.

At certain points in the discussion it will be necessary to involve national and foreign "experts", as for example when the time will come to translate political solutions into technical terms.

4. Agenda

It will be up to the participants to determine the agenda of the conference. Yet, without prejudging their choice, it is possible to make some suggestions as to what issues might conceivably be discussed. For each of the items on the agenda it will be useful to proceed in three steps: we need to identify the issues, to formulate a political solution, and explore the technical aspects of its implementation.

(a) Institutional/Constitutional Issues

* What should be the appropriate constitutional framework for promoting national reconciliation and consolidating democracy?

* What kinds of institutions should be specifically designed, within or outside the constitution, to ensure the protection of minorities, the emergence of a democratic consensus, the institutionalization of abritration procedures, and a genuine division of powers at the national, provincial and local levels?

(b) Security Issues

* How to establish effective institutional controls over the army and widen the scope of recruitment into the military and the police

* How to redefine the relationships between the army, the gendarmerie and diverse police forces

* How to stem the flow of weapons into the country and bring private militias under control

* How to maintain a modicum of peace and order in the countryside

* What kinds of external military assistance is needed, including an international police force, in order to deal effectively with each of the above?

(c) Administrative and Judicial Issues

* Public and para-public administration: the issues range from the promotion of a competent and politically neutral civil service, to the reorganization of recruitment procedures, and the search for efficiency and representativeness

* Justice and Rule of Law: key issues include how to raise the credibility of the judicial apparatus, the training of jurists and auxiliaries, mechanisms for the protection of human rights; in short, how does one convert a judicial system based on patronage and ethnic favoritism to one based on merit?

* Refugees and the Land Problem: how to establish appropriate procedures for the repatriation of refugees, for the financing of resettlement and the adjudication

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recd 10/20 cc Sharpe

The Presiedent
of the Republic of Poland

Warsaw, September 9, 1994

- unofficial translation -

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing in reference to your letter of July 23, 1994.

We in Poland attach great importance to the enormous tragedy in Rwanda and to the efforts of the international community to aid this devastated country which you mentioned in your letter.

All Poles were deeply moved by this tragedy and the inhuman living conditions existing in the refugee camps. Polish charitable and church organizations began collecting financial and humanitarian assistance for Rwandan refugees. This activity has been supported by the government of the Republic of Poland, which has granted appropriate funds to buy and ship medicines and medical equipment to Rwanda.

Taking into consideration our present possibilities, which are unfortunately very limited, we sent in August of 1994, two airplane loads of government and privately donated aid for Rwandan refugees. This assistance, which was delivered to the refugee camp in Goma was deemed to be very appropriate and much needed. Polish doctors were among of the first

His Excellency
William J. Clinton
The President of the United
States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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to go to Rwanda under the program organized by the World Doctors Association. Through these activities Poland has contributed to the international humanitarian effort aimed to save the lives of Rwandan refugees in danger of dying from hunger and illness. I was very pleased to hear that our activities were appreciated by the international co-ordinators of the assistance effort to Rwanda, especially by International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.

I would like to emphasize the participation of a great number of Polish priests and nuns in this humanitarian effort. Many of them did not leave Rwanda during the most serious fighting. Despite thrests to their life, they remaind in Rwanda to provide material and spiritual support as well as shelter to the oppressed and those trying to escape.

Our efforts are not limited exclusively to providing humanitarian assistance. Three Polish officers are serving in Rwanda under the auspices of UNAMIR. To increase Polish participation in this mission would be difficult. Over two thousand Polish military personnel are already serving in Polish military contingents participating in the peace keeping operations of the United Nations. Such significant involvement places a strain on our resources and prevents us from sending our military contingent to Rwanda.

At the same time I have the pleasure to inform you, Mr. President, that your suggestion to have Poland provide military equipment to one of African battalions is being very carefully considered by the Ministry of Defence.

I fully share your opinion, Mr. President, that further degradation of the situation in Rwanda cannot be allowed and that it is absolutely necessary to undertake serious efforts to resolve the situation.

Sincerely,

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Lech Walesa

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Friday, September 2, 1994, at 1400 hours

- - (C) Improved Security Situation in Burundi: Embassy Bujumbura reports that the security situation in Burundi has improved. The embassy believes Burundi continues to move on a resolutely democratic path and the likelihood of stability rather than instability is consistently increasing. (Bujumbura 2984)

- - (C) SRSG Khan Will Lead Mission to Kinshasa: SRSG Khan will lead a mission to Kinshasa to assess GOZ willingness and ability to provide security in the refugee camps and border areas as well as transport ex-FAR personnel and former Rwandan government officials. In a September 1 meeting with Ambassador Inderfurth, USYG Annan felt the best option for policing the camps is to encourage the GOZ in creating a trained border force. (USUN 3642)

- - (C) Tunisians To Deploy: Major General Baril told Ambassador Inderfurth that the Tunisian advance party was scheduled to deploy on September 8 with the main body to deploy in 15-45 days depending on when the necessary equipment is available. (USUN 3642)

- - (U) Dillon to Coordinate Regional Approach: The SYG has asked a retired former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Robert Dillon, to visit the Rwandan region as an UN envoy to help coordinate a regional approach to refugee and human rights problems. (USUN 3657)

- - (C) Displaced Persons Increase Around Kigali: The number of displaced persons around Kigali appears to be increasing. Estimates indicate more than 15,000 displaced persons in the area. UNHCR is planning to create a camp in Kigali for these people. (USCINCEUR DTG 021200Z SEP)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, September 1, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Cable Communication Reestablished: Telegraphic communication with Embassy Kigali was reestablished on August 31, 1994. (Kigali 001501)

- - (C) Tunisian Deployment to UNAMIR Delayed: The UN has told the government of Tunisia to delay the deployment of its advance party to Rwanda because of a lack of equipment and funds to transport the equipment and the main body of the GOT contingent. Four Tunisian officers slated for positions in the UNAMIR II headquarters will depart for Kigali via commercial air on September 2. P3/(b)(3)

- - (U) Rwandan Refugees in Region: UNREO estimates the total number of Rwandan refugees in the region to be 1,670,000: 230,000 in Bukavu (UNHCR estimates 420,000 in the Bukavu area, per Nairobi 15781); 800,000 in Goma; 410,000 in Tanzania; and 230,000 in Burundi. The number of refugees crossing into Tanzania has decreased from 1,000 to 500 per day. UNHCR estimates 46,000 Rwandan refugees have died since the beginning of the crisis and reports the death toll in all camps has decreased to an estimated 300 per day. (Nairobi 15746)

- - (U) U.S. Troops in Region: Total U.S. troops in the region number 1,348: 889 in Entebbe; 126 in Kigali; 313 in Mombasa; and 20 Nairobi. (Ingalsbe, OFDA Meeting 9/1)

- - (S) Morale of Ex-FAR Appears Low: Efforts by the former Rwandan army leadership to rally former troops have met with mixed results. Many are suffering from disease and malnutrition. Reports indicate a large segment of ex-FAR personnel prefer an honorable solution to the war and would rather return to Rwanda than remain in exile in Zaire. P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1) P3/(b)(3)

- - (S) Ex-FAR Leadership Continue Insurgency Threats: A small group of military "extremists" of the ex-FAR leadership are using the threat of insurgency to intimidate the Kigali government. According to UNHCR Ngara, bandits, former Hutu militiamen and ex-FAR soldiers are conducting small-scale attacks, causing a precarious situation. P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, August 31, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - ~~(S)~~ Rwandan Ministers Refuse to Participate in Bilateral Discussions with Zaire: The Rwandan delegation arrived in Goma on August 28, but refused to participate in ministerial-level talks until Zaire returns property stolen by ex-Rwandan government officials and disarms Hutus in Zaire. P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1) P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

- - ~~(S)~~ UNAMIR to Disarm Ex-FAR in Former Humanitarian Protection Zone: An increasing number of armed ex-FAR personnel are beginning to appear in the former Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ). Most are claiming to be former gendarmes who were supposedly rehired by the French to maintain law and order. UNAMIR forces have been directed to disarm these "gendarmes". P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

- - ~~(S)~~ Rwandan Patriotic Army Response to Ex-FAR Presence: In response to the increased ex-FAR presence, the RPA deployed at least four battalions along the border of the former HPZ. Reports indicate if UNAMIR fails to disarm the ex-FAR, the RPA may mount operations in the former HPZ to neutralize the threat. P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) UNAMIR Begins Rwandan Police Training: UNAMIR has begun to train the first 100 of an eventual 200 gendarmerie recruits. No information is available on the ethnic breakdown of the recruits. (USCINCEUR DTG 311200Z AUG)

- - ~~(C)~~ Local Human Rights Advocates Resume Work in Rwanda: Key local human rights advocates have begun to monitor the current situation and to investigate how the massacres were organized and carried out. The advocates are working under the auspices of an umbrella human rights organization. (Bujumbura 092935)

- - (LOU) Japanese to Support Rwandan Relief Effort: The Japanese will support their contribution to the relief effort with two bases of operation, Nairobi and Goma with a total of 390 military personnel. A portion of the military in Goma will be a ground defense force element to provide physical security for the Japanese contingent. (Nairobi KE//DC 15648)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Monday, August 29, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (~~S~~) Presidential Succession Issue Expected to be Resolved: [redacted] P1/(b)(1) told Embassy Bujumbura that the Hutu government and the main Tutsi opposition party may resolve the presidential succession issue by August 30. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) is against the deployment of UN Human Rights Monitors at this time because he believes that such deployment would be counterproductive. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1) Bujumbura 002907)

- - (U) Zaire-Rwanda Bilaterals Begin: Zairian Justice Minister Kamanda Wa Kamanda and Defense Minister Grand Admiral Mavua Mudima, both Deputy Prime Ministers, headed a Zairian team meeting with the Rwandan delegation which began August 28 and will continue through today. They are discussing issues concerning refugees, and security. (Kinshasa 05094)

- - (~~C~~) More UNAMIR Troops Arrive: Malawi and Zambia contingents began joining UNAMIR on August 28. UNAMIR now numbers over 3,800 personnel. Reports indicate that the U.S. may be asked to transport 50 German APCs to Kigali for the Tunisian Battalion which is now on the ground. (USCINCEUR DTG 291200Z AUG)

- - (~~C~~) Deputy Director of UNREO has Stated the Crisis in Rwanda is Over: Mr. Charles Petri, Deputy Director of United Nations Rwanda Emergency Operations, has stated that the crisis in Rwanda is over and that he is disengaging from some relief operations and is transitioning back to the UNDP this week. This change is significant, indicating a shift in UN focus to routine operations. (USCINCEUR DTG 291200Z AUG)

- - (~~C~~) Irish Government Commitments of Military Personnel to UNHCR: The Irish government has committed 65 defense force personnel to ongoing aid efforts in Rwanda/Zaire. [redacted] P1/(b)(1) [redacted] P1/(b)(1)

- - (U) Refugees in Tanzania: Refugees continue to arrive at the rate of 10,000 - 12,000 per week. The total number of refugees is estimated at 450,000. According to UNHCR reports, new Rwandan refugees say they have fled because the RPF had begun burning their homes and killing family members. Burundian refugees claim to be fleeing attacks and harassments by the Burundi military. More Burundians reportedly plan to leave Burundi after the coffee harvest is complete. UNHCR hopes to eventually move refugees from camps to smaller, dispersed parcels of land where they can become more self-sufficient. (Nairobi 15457)

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- - (C) Possible Sources of Violence in Southeast: Pol-Miloff Tony Marley, reported based on his trip to Kibungo that the reports of violence may have come from three sources: Tutsi refugees from Burundi returning in large numbers into areas leading to clashed with locals; incidents caused by RPA's lack of discipline; and Hutu extremists cross border incursions and propaganda. Apparently a few days ago a fire fight occurred between Hutu extremist militia and RPA personnel. Both sides suffered casualties. Bodies seen in the river may have been both RPA and Hutu militia. Reports indicate that some displaced camps in the southeast have disbanded due to security problems and many of the inhabitants have chosen to go to Tanzania. (Marley/Aiston Telcon 8/29)

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Rwanda/Burundi SVTS - 8/31

TASKINGS

- - State/PRM will consult with UNHCR on JCS plans to complete the hand-over and withdrawal from Kigali and Entebbe.

- - State/AID will draft and clear interagency paper listing the needs of UNAMIR and UNHCR.

- - State to demarche the government of Zaire to determine more precisely the Zairian plan for moving ex-FAR forces and ex-government officials.

- - IO will instruct USUN to begin immediate, low-key consultations with the UN, UNAMIR troop contributors and other concerned parties in New York about the possibility of expanding UNAMIR's mandate and AOR to enhance security in the refugee camps in Zaire.

- - IO will instruct USUN to press UN to deploy Tunisians immediately..

- - OSD is to seek clarification on UN's radio equipment request.

- - OSD to inquire if USG can lease jamming equipment and provide to UNAMIR?

- - State to approach USIA about radio transmission equipment for UNAMIR.

- - AF to prepare a paper on what steps are being taken to encourage reconciliation and reintegration of Hutu moderates in Rwanda.

- - State to prepare a list of possible private contractors to provide security in refugee camps.

- - P1/(b)(1) circulate paper on the security issues in Tanzania.

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S #

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ No. Pages 4

FROM: Jules Frost (Officer name) | AF/C (Office symbol) | 647-1707 (Extension) | 4246 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Updated Rwanda/Burundi Strategy Papers

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Ms. Susan Rice- FYI	395-7310	303
JCS	Col. Perry Baltimore	614-9405	
OSD	Mr. Vince Kern	697-8824	4B747

FOR: CLEARANCE [X] INFORMATION [ ] PER REQUEST [ ] COMMENT [ ]

REMARKS: Attached are the updated Rwandan and Burundi strategies (minor changes from what you were sent 1-2 weeks ago). We have OSD clearance on the Rwandan paper. We need JCS clearance. We need both OSD/JCS clearance on Burundi by COB Tuesday. We will assume your clearance if we we do not hear from you by then.

S/S Officer: RSR

FORM DS-1750

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E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 10/17/12

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RWANDA STRATEGY: SHORT TERM GOALS

* Foster a broad-based government that respects rule of law and transparent governance.

* Avoid the creation on Rwanda's borders of a permanent, hostile Hutu diaspora.

* Save lives in refugee and displaced person camps and stabilize camp environments.

* Ensure the successful conclusion/hand-off of Operation Support Hope in both its humanitarian and political/military aspects.

* Help stem any further large scale exodus into surrounding countries.

* Foster conditions for the safe return and ultimate reconciliation of Rwandan refugees and internally displaced and encourage voluntary repatriation once conditions are ripe.

* Help establish credible national and international systems for identifying, apprehending, trying and punishing those guilty of atrocities, including genocide.

* Help re-establish basic economic and social service infrastructure so that Rwanda can become largely self-reliant.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO MEET THESE GOALS:

- Continue to press the Government of Rwanda to ensure the protection and respect for the human rights of all Rwandans.

- Continue to press for rapid deployment of UNAMIR.

- Deploy human rights monitors as a confidence building measure and to help avert further outflows of refugees.

- Press for establishment of a functional war crimes tribunal and collect evidence for prosecution of persons who committed atrocities, including genocide.

- Establish mechanisms for the detention of persons suspected of atrocities, including genocide, and assist frontline states in efforts to detain such suspects.

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- Press for disarmament and demobilization of the former Rwandan army and integration of appropriate elements into a broadly-based national Rwandan army.

- Work to shut down/counter hate-mongering radio stations, working with UNAMIR or other organizations.

- Assist frontline states to maintain security in refugee areas.

- Reinforce efforts to re-establish structures of government and civil society within Rwanda.

- Create and coordinate an appropriate assistance strategy.

- Help UNHCR implement a strategy to repatriate refugees.

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BURUNDI STRATEGY: SHORT TERM GOALS

* Help Burundi resolve its presidential succession crisis.

* Work to prevent the situation from deteriorating.

* Help put the country on a path to democracy, stability, and national reconciliation.

ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN TO MEET THESE GOALS

- Diplomatic pressure on the parties to complete succession talks, with demarches on the (Tutsi) opposition reminding them who won the elections and cautioning them against overreaching.

- Diplomatic support for facilitation efforts of SRSG Abdallah.

- High-level visits and statements to demonstrate strong U.S. support for Burundi's fragile democracy and remind Burundians the international community is watching closely.

- Support for a regional refugee conference in Bujumbura.

- Pressure on the OAU to augment and make better use of its small observer force.

- Financial support to the UNHRC and its Plan for Human Rights Technical Advisory Services (U.S. contribution - $300,000).

- Efforts to suppress/counter clandestine hate radios.

- Demarches to Burundi authorities to be even-handed in meting out justice.

- Implementation of our Rwanda strategy, including examination of use of Bujumbura as an air hub for the relief effort. (Our Ambassador in Bujumbura and UN SRSG Abdallah believe use of the airport for military relief flights would have a stabilizing effect, and AF, IO, DRL, and PRM support the idea; PM opposes because they do not believe it would have a stabilizing effect, DoD has security concerns, and relief needs could be serviced from Kigali.)

- Exploring dispatch of qualified human rights monitors at the appropriate time.

- Dispatch of facilitators (e.g., African elder statesmen), possibly through the OAU, to help the two sides find common ground and isolate extremists.

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- U.S. military contacts with former IMET students and moderate Burundi (Tutsi) military officials, encouraging moderation and professionalism.

- Encouraging greater Church involvement in reconciliation efforts, with demarches on the Vatican and local church leaders.

- Exploring the possibility of greater NGO involvement in conflict resolution.

- Support for creation of informal "Friends of Burundi" group at UN to consider other initiatives of preventive diplomacy.

- Coordinated donor strategy to make development aid levels contingent on continued stability and democratization.

- Exploring the possibility of a UN arms embargo.

- Once succession is resolved, support for constitutional reforms aimed at satisfying concerns of both sides and avoiding a repeat of the January/February and current succession crises.

- Support for accountability for those murdered during and after the October 1993 coup attempt, through international assistance to the local judiciary following installation of a more stable government.

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Friday, August 26, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (~~C~~) UNHCR to Open Office in Southeast Rwanda: Embassy Kigali has spoken with UNHCR concerning reports of harassments of Hutus in southeast Rwanda. UNHCR told Charge Leader that they are setting up a three-person sub-office in Kibungo, which will allow them to monitor the situation. (Leader/Aiston Telcon 8/26)

- - (U) Rwandan Patriotic Army May Absorb Selected Ex-FAR Personnel: Charles Muhire, RPA's Director of Training, told Pol-Miloff the RPA will accept selected ex-FAR personnel, but it discounts any sort of pre-set percentage called for in the Arusha Accord. Muhire stated, "We are absorbing them, not sharing with them." The RPA plans to downsize and integrate the ex-FAR personnel over an unspecified time-period rather than the 22 months called by the Arusha Accord. (Kigali Fax 8/25)

- - (U) Ex-FAR Personnel Return to Rwanda: Reports indicate that approximately 600 ex-FAR personnel have returned to Rwanda and are now loosely held in RPA camps around Kigali. Major Cyiza, ex-FAR gendarme officer and founder of the current Cyangugu Gendarmerie, told Pol-Miloff that his gendarmes have escorted more than 200 ex-FAR soldiers to Butare since August 13. Cyiza requested that USG officials visit the ex-FAR personnel now in RPA camps, and provide peacekeepers to help guard the assembly areas and logistical support for the continued operation of his 250-person gendarmerie. (Kigali Fax 8/25)

- - (~~C~~) UNAMIR Troop Number Continues to Increase: The total number of UNAMIR troops now deployed is 3,700. The British redeployed their troops to southwest Rwanda at the request of the UN. Redeployment of the Australians is to be complete by today. An advance contingent of 75 Zambian peacekeepers have been deployed with the main body to follow in two weeks. The government of Mali has requested U.S. support in finding transport for the Malian UNAMIR contingent of 200 troops. (Bamako 5906, Lusaka 4979, London 13672, OSD SVTS 8/26)

- - (~~C~~) Kengo Requests Help in Moving Ex-FAR from Border Area: Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has formally requested USG and UN assistance for the transportation and care of ex-Rwandan Army elements who have taken refuge in Zaire. UNHCR Regional Bureau Director Morjane disclaims UNHCR responsibility for resettling the 20,000 ex-FAR soldiers or the 100 former RPF political leaders identified by the GOZ to be removed from border area camps. (Kinshasa 5031)

- - (U) Belgian Airline Sabena to Resume Flights to Rwanda: The Belgian national airline Sabena says it will resume flights to Kigali on September 2. (Reuter Report 8/25)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, August 25, 1994, at 1400 hours

- - (~~C~~) Conditions in Goma are Improving: UNHCR reports an increased number of refugees are leaving the camps and returning to Rwanda. JTF will complete repositioning today, signifying that the mission in Goma is complete. (USCINCEUR DTG 251200Z AUG)

- - (~~C~~) GOR Prime Minister Expresses Skepticism: Prime Minister Twagiramungu expressed to Charge Leader August 21 his skepticism about the RPF's commitment to democracy and his ability to work with them. He speculated that Vice President Kagame may have lost control of mid-level officers. The PM says that former army chief of staff Col. Bagasora and MRND party secretary-general Nzirorera orchestrated the April massacres. 64 RPF soldiers are in the custody of the new GOR. Three soldiers have reportedly been executed for their crimes in accordance with the RPF system of military justice. The PM says that the national assembly should be sworn in within the next month. (8/25 Kigali Fax)

- - (U) The New GOR Holds a Political Rally: August 24 in Ruhengeri, 6,000-7,000 persons attended a peaceful rally held by the new GOR to introduce itself to the citizens and to demonstrate concern for the common people. President Bizimungu was the featured speaker. The GOR apparently is planning a total of 11 rallies. The next rally is scheduled for August 27. (8/24 Kigali Fax)

- - (U) Rwandans Remain Insistent to Leave Rwanda: UNHCR estimates that 15,000-20,000 Rwandans who have reached the Bukavu border remain insistent on leaving Rwanda. UNHCR and CARE are transporting Rwandans from Rusizi II to camps about 80 km inside Zaire from Bukavu. (OFDA Daily Report 8/25)

- - (U) Southeast Rwanda/Tanzania: UNHCR has received reports of 12,000 people crossing into Tanzania, possibly Burundians traversing the southeast corner of Rwanda. Press reports 20 to 30 bodies in the river at Rusumo Falls with bullet wounds and hands tied behind their backs. Embassy Kigali and DART plan to investigate these allegations. UNHCR believes it finally concluded an agreement with the GOT for the support of 300 additional GOT soldiers to assist in policing the camp. (Dar es Salaam 4996, OFDA Daily Report 8/25)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, August 24, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (C) Bujumbura Remains Calm as Deadline Approaches: As the Burundian government's August 26 deadline for the resolution of the presidential succession issue approaches, Bujumbura remains calm although tensions are beginning to rise. The USG continues to press the government and opposition leaders to break the impasse. (Bujumbura 2858)

- - (U) UNHCR Estimates a Total of 2,063,000 Rwandan Refugees in Neighboring Countries: 1,450,000 in Zaire, including 850,000 in Goma; 398,000 in Tanzania; 200,000 in Burundi; and 15,000 in Uganda. (Nairobi 15195)

- - (C) UNAMIR Troop Numbers Increase: Over 3,200 UNAMIR troops are deployed, including 850 Ghanaians, 800 Ethiopians, 300 British, and 250 Canadians. Of these, ten companies (120-140 soldiers per company) are in sector 4, the former humanitarian protection zone. UNAMIR has set up a headquarters in this location which will act as a relay between UNAMIR bases in the region and the headquarters in Kigali. The UN reached agreement with the government of Tunisia on the list of equipment to be provided for the deployment of 850 Tunisians. Embassy Tunis reports the first of three groups will self-deploy on or about September 1. (USCINCEUR DTG 241200Z AUG, PM/ISP)

- - (C) Radios: The range of Radio Kigali is basically limited to Kigali. Charge Joyce Leader reports that she has not heard of any reports of hate radio broadcasts in the last few days. (Leader/Aiston Telcon 8/24)

- - (C) Bukavu Crisis Appears Over: In the Bukavu area, the crisis appears to be over. The UNHCR reports newly-arrived refugees have moved into and settled in newly established camps. (USCINCEUR DTG 241200Z AUG)

- - (C) Zairian Government Proposes to Remove Former Rwandan Government Officials from Goma-Bukavu Camps: Zaire's Prime Minister Kengo and Interior Minister Gustav Malumba have proposed the relocation of former Rwandan government officials and their families (1,000 people) from the Goma and Bukavu camps. GOZ has informed 100 high personages of the former Rwandan regime that they have seven days to return to Rwanda or accept relocation to western Zaire. Parallel planning is occurring to relocate members of the former Rwandan army. The UNHCR is being asked to help with transportation. (Kinshasa 4953)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, August 23, 1994, at 1400 hours

- - (C) DART/Kigali Estimates: Between 40,000-50,000 people are congregated on the slopes overlooking the border bridge and river at Bukavu. Tensions have eased at the border as movement of Rwandans in the southwestern zone has slowed to a trickle and life appears to be returning to normal. (OFDA Daily Report, Nairobi 15088, Leader/Aiston Telcon 8/23)

- - (C) The Rwandan Government plans next week to name territorial administrators for all areas of the country including the southwestern safe zone. (8/23 Leader/Aiston Telcon)

- - (C) UNAMIR posted guards around the Tutsi camp near Cyangugu. (8/23 Bushnell/Riza Telcon)

- - (C) SYGSR Lakdhar Bahimi is to demarche Zairians on disarming the former Rwandan army in Zaire. (8/23 Bushnell/Riza Telcon)

- - (C) Ambassador Krueger reported this morning that former Burundi President Bagaza, who has strong support among some Tutsi extremists, is announcing his candidacy for the presidency. (8/23 Krueger/Aiston Telcon)

- - (LOU) The main body of the Malawi contingent (150 troops) and the Belgian equipment for those troops are expected to arrive in Kigali about 9/1/94. (Brussels 09233)

- - (C) Presidential Mission: Plans for the Presidential Mission to Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern Zaire scheduled for August 27-30 continue to progress. Participants will include NGO officials, trade unionists, church leaders, and other prominent private citizens. The purpose of the mission is three-fold:

- to signal support for political reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi;
- to help enlist continued support and contributions for public and private relief efforts; and
- to analyze the humanitarian relief effort.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 22, 1994

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Rwanda: Repatriation Policy Paper

Attached please find the Department of State's Action Plan for Voluntary Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees. The paper has been cleared by the Office of the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Agency for International Development. Many of the actions are underway or completed.

This paper should be viewed as an overall framework, providing general guidelines on how the USG should proceed vis-a-vis our objective of seeing voluntary repatriation. Clearly, evolving events will require modifications in the strategy as we seek to implement the specific outlined actions.

We intend to share the elements of this action plan with both the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The inter-agency clearance process evoked great interest in the repatriation plan and elicited differences of opinion with regard to the fundamental issue of whether or not the USG should more actively encourage refugees to return to Rwanda. Some believe that the USG should aggressively help the new government to broadcast the message of reconciliation and correspondingly should be involved now in psychological operations campaigns in pressing the refugees to return. The prevailing view, however, is that given uncertainties about the new government's behavior, reports of reprisals against some returnees, and the deep divisions among Hutus and Tutsis, the USG should do all it can to promote reconciliation and help to ensure that those political conditions are created which are requisite to voluntary repatriation. Active encouragement of refugees to return should be pursued by the USG only as security improves and confidence building measures are put in place.

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Strong difference of opinion also exists regarding the issue of whether to explore with the new Rwandan government, either now or at some point in the future, the possibility of some form of amnesty (as is standard in refugee repatriations around the world) that would promote repatriation without undermining the principle of accountability or allowing those in leadership positions to go unpunished for the recent killings. The prevailing view, is that the USG should not endorse any type of amnesty for Rwandans at this time.

Thank you for your assistance.

Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

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ACTION PLAN FOR VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES

I. USG Policy on Rwandan Repatriation

-- The early return of the refugees to their places of origin is the most sustainable response to their plight. However, repatriation must be voluntary. No refugee should be forcibly returned to a place where s/he has a well-founded fear of persecution. The choice to return is made by the refugees themselves.

-- All of our actions should be coordinated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and like-minded members of the international community. Our mission in Geneva advises that UNHCR's Plan of Action for Repatriation should be available the week of 8/15. Logistical concerns should not be allowed to take higher priority than concerns over physical and legal protection.

-- Full conflict resolution is not necessarily a pre-requisite for effecting a voluntary repatriation program. Repatriation could become itself an essential part of the process of national reconciliation and peace, rather than simply a result of it. As confidence building measures are put in place inside Rwanda and as security improves, the USG will seek to more actively encourage refugee return. In the interim, the focus should be on creating the political conditions requisite for voluntary repatriation.

-- The U.S. must continue to act to address the urgent life-saving needs in Zaire and other refugee-hosting nations while planning continues for repatriation.

II. Context for Repatriation

Creating a context for voluntary repatriation (and for the return of the internally displaced to their homes) requires action on several fronts -- building confidence/a sense of security (among the refugees/displaced and within the new government), being ready with a material capacity to assist return movements, and taking action to prevent disinformation being spread by former government leaders in the refugee camps.

Refugees will choose to go home when they believe that they will be secure in Rwanda. They did not flee their country because they were hungry; nor will they return because an international relief effort might provide food and other aid to them in Rwanda. Most in Zaire are still too fearful and/or weak to return to Rwanda. Refugees not only fear retribution/revenge from the RPF but also fear getting caught in the cross-fire between any future RPF and defeated Rwandan troop conflict.

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Actions should be taken with a view to promoting national reconciliation, including accountability, and avoiding the creation of cleavages or worsening of existing ones.

III. Benchmarks for Encouraging Repatriation

All actions suggested in part IV of this paper should be pursued. However, the USG should proceed cautiously in actively promoting repatriation (through radio announcements, psychological operations campaigns, public announcements) beyond general statements of support for repatriation until such time as there are better indicators that refugees can return or are returning in safety. Examples of such benchmarks are:

--UNAMIR is deploying in key refugee return areas in Rwanda.

--French forces are effectively replaced by UNAMIR troops.

--Reports of retribution of returnees and/or other Hutus become isolated events.

--The movement of Rwandans leaving Rwanda largely ceases.

--Sufficient human rights monitors are deployed throughout Rwanda.

--UNHCR more actively encourages repatriation--beyond general support for repatriation as is now currently the case.

IV. Specific Actions

A. Military/Peacekeeping

* Fully deploying UNAMIR to enable the U.N. force to show a deterrent presence throughout the country. Joint UNAMIR-RPF patrols have been suggested. Joint patrols can cut both ways in terms of giving civilians a sense of security depending on their relative fear of the RPF.

  ACTION UNDERWAY: DOS and DOD continue robust efforts to stand up a full strength UNAMIR.

* Disarmament and demobilization of rump FAR forces and Interahamwe militia, both inside Rwanda and in Zaire and Tanzania. Outside Rwanda, this would also involve enhancing the ability of the GOZ and GOT to take forceful measures. Such actions inside Rwanda by UNAMIR could require a change in its mandate and place such forces in a non-neutral position.

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ACTION: Vice President Gore to call King Hassan of Morocco re: provision of troops for refugee protection in Zaire. DOS to make demarches and to review whether there is any useful, advisable way, under existing DOS appropriations for foreign or security assistance, that we could help Zairean and Tanzanian forces.

A number of potentially very knotty issues need further study and resolution. For example: Who currently owns the weapons? Whoever holds them? The "new" government of Rwanda? The governments of Zaire and/or Tanzania? Who would authorize the confiscation and/or destruction of the weapons? The government of Zaire? The UN? The USG? Under what authority? Who would pay for a "buyback", or destruction? The U.S.? the UN? Who would carry out the confiscation/destruction? Zairian troops? Moroccan troops? Some other party? What if those holding the arms refuse to cooperate, either benignly or violently? Is force to be used? Under what authority?

B. Human Rights

* Establish credible national and international systems for identifying, apprehending, trying, and punishing those guilty of genocide. This would certainly enhance the RPF's confidence in the international community's commitment to justice and to protection of the Tutsi minority and might undercut the potential for summary justice. It might equally strike fear in the Hutus which could become an obstacle to repatriation.

ACTION: DOS to redouble efforts on UNSCR authority for detention and arrest of those responsible for genocide in advance of the actual establishment of a war crimes tribunal. Such authority would not be translated into consideration for U.S. troops involved in humanitarian operations to become involved in detention of suspected individuals or groups. A/S Shattuck will make recommendations on his return from the region on expanded UNSC resolution. Government of Rwanda officials confirmed to Shattuck that they would observe due process and abide by the spirit and letter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that they support the creation of an international war crimes tribunal. Shattuck carried message to RPF that the international community is working to set up swiftly a war crimes tribunal, which is an essential element in achieving accountability, justice and national reconciliation.

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* Urgently field enough human rights monitors so that the entire country can be covered. As is to be done in Burundi, the U.N. Volunteer (UNV) program might be called upon to quickly field staff.

ACTION: DOS to discuss with both the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the new special Commission of Experts. AID/OTI to provide funding for some monitors.

* Prevail upon the RPF to smartly and publicly discipline those who may have been guilty of exacting summary justice.

ACTION: Amb. Rawson to make the case in Rwanda with parallel demarches to RPF representatives in Washington, New York, and European capitals.

* Facilitate, as needed, ICRC - RPF contacts with the objective of training the armed elements in the proper treatment of non-combatants in times of conflict.

ACTION: DOS

C. Political

* Review whether the continued existence of the French zone makes sense in terms of creating confidence. On the one hand, it is thought to have kept the bulk -- but certainly not all -- of those displaced who fled the RPF advance from moving into Zaire. There are fears that a French withdrawal would precipitate a new massive outflow to Zaire. On the other hand, there could be great suspicion about who continues to need special protection and why. The possibility of refugees moving from Zaire to a kind of intermediate zone leads to the problem of simply exchanging refugee status for displaced person status.

ACTION: Amb. Rawson to discuss in Kigali with Dallaire, SRSG Khan, the French, UNHCR, ICRC, and other relief entities with a feel for the situation; advise Washington of suggested action, if any.

* The issue of <u>recognition</u> of the new Rwandan government is behind us. On the assumptions that the recognition will have (a) boosted the confidence of the Tutsis that the world is now prepared to protect their interests, (b) enhanced their willingness to allow the return of far superior numbers of Hutus, and (c) increased our leverage in demanding that the new government perform well with respect to basic human rights, we should be alert to how we

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can use that leverage to create a sense of security. We must also be alert to the possible negative perceptions of the rump FAR forces in Zaire and the possibility of hostile action against our nationals.

ACTION: Exercise leverage.

* Convince the RPF to take an active role in disbanding displaced person camps, particularly those of the "strategic hamlet" variety that it has set up in eastern Rwanda.

ACTION: Amb. Rawson to make the case. As with the issue of a possible amnesty, engage RPF confidants to carry the same message.

* Impress upon the RPF the necessity of taking -- and publicizing -- steps to protect access of the refugees and displaced persons to lands and properties that they left behind. Land questions should be dealt with promptly, fairly, and transparently. The recent reported evictions of returnees who were squatters in abandoned homes in Kigali were hopefully done in that spirit.

ACTION: Amb. Rawson to make the case in Rwanda with parallel demarches to RPF representatives in Washington, New York, and European capitals.

* Press the RPF to take a generally less controlling approach to the NGO community on such issues as project and staffing approvals, freedom of travel. This might lead to increased funding and would certainly enable the NGOs to be better advocates about the sincerity of the RPF with respect to returning refugees and displaced persons.

ACTION: Message to be delivered by DOS and USAID in Washington and the field.

* Put in place regional agreements (or a series of bilateral agreements) that will allow for the voluntary return and accommodation inside Rwanda of the "old" refugee population of which the RPF had been a champion. This amounts to a re-activation of the UNHCR regional plan of action as prescribed by the Dar Declaration of 1991.

ACTION: DOS to press UNHCR in concert with regional demarches.

* Disseminate a positive message to refugees and displaced persons about the possibilities of voluntary return. The substance of the message would need to be worked out with the RPF (to assure that guarantees would be respected) and

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with UNHCR. All RPF representatives around the world would need to both hear for their own education and to disseminate the same positive messages. A public affairs component of UNAMIR, UNESCO-assisted broadcasts to refugees, U.S. psychological operations messages to refugees, and USIA (and other international) broadcasts should carry a coordinated message. The text of the UNHCR pronouncement of 7/26 regarding voluntary repatriation should be part of a series of positive messages.

ACTION: DOS, DOD and USIA--once benchmarks have been met and UNHCR concurs.

* Explore with UNHCR ways in which USG might be helpful in assisting selected refugee leaders to return to Rwanda to check out the situation and then return to the camps to talk to others.

ACTION: DOS with UNHCR.

* Begin organized voluntary repatriation movements with the 18,000 Tutsi Rwandan refugees who fled to Zaire during the initial wave of violence and whose security is now threatened, according to UNHCR, by the still armed Hutu soldiers/militia. Those Tutsi refugees in Tanzania could also be moved as part of the first movements. While such a move would make sense from a refugee protection standpoint, it must be handled very carefully to avoid creating the impression that Hutu refugees would not also be safe or that Tutsis are somehow being favored by the new government and by the international community.

ACTION: DOS to discuss with UNHCR.

* Maintain open borders in both directions so that there is no suggestion that would-be refugees are trapped inside Rwanda or that would-be returnees are being prevented from doing so by political/military forces.

ACTION: DOS to demarche Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda, as well as having Amb. Rawson raise this issue with the RPF.

* Integrate former Rwandan military into a new national military force.

ACTION: DOS, bilaterally and through the U.N., to actively promote with the new government those portions of the Arusha Accords dealing with integration of ex-FAR forces into the current ex-RPF army to form a national military force.

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* Form a government of national unity.

  ACTION: DOS to continue to urge the new government to include significant numbers of moderate Hutus to build the case that the Rwandan government and military are representative of the whole nation.

D. Material Assistance

Background

UNHCR has already issued a basic outline of the material assistance for seven way stations linking Goma to Kigali that will be required to support spontaneous return movements. Its overall repatriation plan is expected to be unveiled the week of 8/15 in Geneva.

In addition to UNHCR, the ICRC, WFP, UNICEF, IOM, World Vision, CARE, International Rescue Committee, Medecins sans Frontieres, Samaritan's Purse, and DOD have already signalled their intentions to work in a returnee program. The UK military has offered to set up way stations for returnees as part of strengthening UNAMIR. UNDP is looking for UNV staffers to restart a program in the health sector. And the European Community has expressed initial interest in funding repair of basic infrastructure in the context of facilitating refugee return.

* Preposition food and non-food items such as household tools, blankets, and WHO emergency health kits in Kigali for onward distribution along repatriation routes as repatriation picks up.

  ONGOING ACTION: U.S. military is assisting with airlift.

* Provide logistics assistance to UNHCR, WFP and NGOs building and operating way stations by delivering relief supplies to way stations.

  ACTION: Should NGOs be unable to fulfill their plans to deliver relief supplies to way stations, DOD could temporarily do so as a stop-gap measure, in support of repatriation in conjunction with "Phase II" of operations in Rwanda.

* Explore presence of mines in Rwanda and need for demining as related to repatriation/reintegration.

  ACTION: DOS and DOD

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E. USG Coordination

Establish an inter-agency working group to followup on the specifics of the repatriation plan.

ACTION: To be established and chaired by DOS.

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 22, 1994, at 1400 hours

-- (C) Zaire Reopens Border After One Day Closure: The Zairian border at Bukavu was closed to refugees entering from Rwanda morning August 20. However, after the US and UNHCR interceded August 21, Zairian Prime Minister Kengo agreed to reopen the frontier. News services reported that another border crossing approximately 6 miles south of the bridge at Bukavu was later opened to Rwandan refugees. (Kinshasa 4855, 4856, and Geneva 7272)

-- (C) UN SYG Proposes Military Presence in Eastern Zaire: UN SYG Boutros-Ghali made a rare appearance at the Security Council August 19 to review options for preventing the catastrophe in Rwanda from being repeated in Burundi. He proposed positioning a military force on the Zaire side of the border, which could intervene quickly if violence erupted in Burundi. Many Security Council delegations urged caution. This idea will be discussed further on Tuesday, August 23. The SYG also said he thought a UN presence in Rwanda would be necessary for years to come. (USUN New York 3451)

-- (U) Special Rapporteur Concerned by Insecurity in Rwanda: Following a second visit to Rwanda, UNHRC Special Rapporteur Degni-Segui has concluded that banditry, summary executions, and the near absence of civil authority are discouraging refugees from returning home. Degni-Segui praised initial steps taken by the new government, but called for further action, including the immediate deployment of UN human rights monitors throughout the country. (Geneva 7279)

-- (C) NAR Soldiers Terrorize Hutus: Hutu refugees recently arrived in Burundi report that torture and intimidation by Rwandan army troops caused them to flee. (Bujumbura 2822)

-- (C) Threat from Ex-GOR is Priority for VP Kagame: In an August 20 meeting with CINCEUR George Joulwan, Rwandan Vice President Kagame said that his priority concern is the continued effort by ex-GOR personnel in neighboring countries to destabilize the new government and prevent refugees from returning home. Kagame asked for (unspecified) international assistance to halt the intimidation of refugees wanting to return home and to limit the freedom of action enjoyed by ex-GOR officials in southwestern Rwanda, and in refugee camps in Tanzania and especially Zaire. (8/20 Embassy Kigali Fax)

-- (U) U.S. Military Draws Down in Goma: The U.S. military is starting to phase out its operations in Goma and is scheduled to withdraw completely from Goma by August 26. A formal ceremony was held on August 22 to mark the transfer of U.S. military heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers, road graders) to the UN relief operation. (OFDA 8/22 daily update)

-- (U) USGS Vulcanologists Doubt Eruption is Imminent: Initial reports from the USGS survey team in Goma indicate no immediate threat of an eruption, despite the recent smoke plume and lava flow. (Kinshasa 4855)

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STATUS OF UNHCR REPATRIATION WAY STATIONS

8/10/94

The Concept

--On August 8 UNHCR shared its initial draft plan for repatriation of Rwandans. This plan includes a discussion of both protection and assistance measures to be undertaken by UNHCR.

--Included in the plan is the establishment of seven way stations linking Goma to Kigali to provide assistance to refugees returning to Rwanda from North Kivu. Based on assessed needs, additional stations will be created on secondary roads and between Ruhengeri and Kigali. UNHCR's planning assumption is that 5,000 refugees will leave Zaire daily.

--The purpose of these way stations is primarily for expediting the repatriation process and alleviating physical hardship to needy returnees. (The return and reintegration process is a broader, longer-term one involving aid to re-established communities.)

--The following services will be provided at way stations: health care facilities; food (consisting of Humanitarian Daily Rations and High Protein Biscuits); water; shelter for overnight rest and administrative activities; transport for vulnerable groups; and a package of non-food relief items will be provided at the first way station.

--At way stations the vulnerable groups will be identified and provided with special care. Unaccompanied minors will be registered and transported to UNICEF and ICRC centers elsewhere in Rwanda.

Status (as of 8/9)

--As many as 125,000 refugees are reported to have returned from Zaire, including an estimated 100,000 from Goma. UNHCR has actually registered only 30,000 at the Goma-Gisenyi crossing. Almost all returned without benefit of way stations.

--UNHCR relief supplies and field equipment began arriving in Kigali on July 27. Contracts have already been established with CARE, CRS, LWF, MSF/F, MSF/H and MSF/B for various services.

--Medical assistance is already being provided at three way stations by NGOs (MSF, CR, Concern) and the Canadian military is assisting with a fourth.

--As of August 6, UNHCR/Kigali started to deliver blankets, soap bars, and jerry cans to the three centers run by NGOs. Water bladders and 1.5 MT of high protein biscuits will also be delivered.

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--Food: UNHCR has submitted a request to the USG for provision of 500,000 HDRs to Kigali. The request is pending OFDA approval. WFP has distributed 30 MT to way stations and has prepositioned 342 MT in Gisenyi.

--Transport: Food and non-food items will be transported by WFP trucks and any other available trucks. Buses will be sub-contracted from a source in Nairobi.

--Water: ICRC in cooperation with other NGOs (Save the Children, Oxfam, MSF/H) may be in charge of the water tankering and distribution operations.

--Domestic supplies: At the first way station in Ruvabu, a package of blankets, jerrycans, hoes, soap, mats and vegetable seeds will be provided to each family.

--UNHCR outlines a number of actions which must take place in order to get the repatriation plan fully underway. These include fielding both international and local staff, locating housing for staff, identifying office space at field locations, establishing a budget for the operation, providing water tankers for UNHCR staff in Kigali, delivery of trucks to Kigali, identifying sufficient warehouse space, purchase and delivery of relief items, signing an agreement with WFP on food assistance, establishing telecommunications links and coordinating with other UN organizations.

--At this point in time the, 4 way station locations are providing medical care and some food to the trickle of returnees.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

--A policy decision to be made is what role, if any, the U.S. military should play in Rwanda with regard to the repatriation program. As UNHCR is the lead agency, all of our efforts should support its program. We have asked UNHCR what role they forsee for the U.S. military in Rwanda and are awaiting a response.

--The timeframe for repatriation may be beyond that envisioned for U.S. military involvement.

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 19, 1994 at 1400 hours

-- (C) French Confirm August 21 Withdrawal: Senior Quai and Elysee contacts confirmed to Embassy Paris that the French troop withdrawal from the humanitarian zone remains on track for August 21. Foreign Minister Juppe is to make a televised statement to that effect later in the evening. The French said that they might have agreed to leave their troops in place a few extra days to ensure a more orderly transition, had the Rwandan government asked them. (Paris 22856)



said that ex-FAR soldiers were looting and maliciously dismantling buildings in and around Cyangugu in full view of the French, who do nothing to stop it, claiming their mandate does not cover such activities. Earlier this week, Ministers of the former government were allowed to hold three rallies in Cyangugu, in which they urged people to flee. (Embassy Kigali Fax)

-- (LOU) Despite Press Reports, Zaire Border Still Open: Some August 19 press reports indicated that Zaire had closed its border with Rwanda, permitting Rwandans to leave but not to enter Zaire. However, U.S.G. sources confirmed that the border remained open, with a slight increase in the number of refugees crossing -- now about 10,000 per day. (FBIS Abidjan 1908171394)

-- (LOU) Burundi Parliamentarian Assassinated: A member of the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU party was assassinated in Bujumbura this afternoon. Embassy Bujumbura is developing further details on the incident. (8/19 Krueger/Aiston Telcon)

-- (C) New Negotiating Positions in Bujumbura: The government coalition has presented its latest negotiating position at talks on presidential succession in Burundi. The proposal calls for an interim government to rule for four years, a public investigation into the events following the October 1993 coup, the disarming of civilians, and dismantling of militias. The opposition is seeking a strengthened role for the prime minister and creation of a national council to set broad policies and guidelines for the country. (Bujumbura 2812).

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 18, 1994, at 1400 hours

-- (C) Kagame and Bizimungu Rebuff Pleas to Let French Stay: In a meeting with Charge Joyce Leader early August 18, Vice President Kagame repeated his earlier insistence that French troops withdraw by August 22. Following their meeting, A/S Moose spoke by telephone with Kagame and later President Bizimungu to urge that they reconsider. Kagame again declined to change his mind, but said the decision would be up to Bizimungu. In a subsequent 45-minute conversation with the Rwandan President, Moose told him that the international community would not understand if the GOR resisted an extension of French troop presence that might prevent another exodus of refugees. But Bizimungu was adamant that the French deployment must end on August 22, saying that UNAMIR has had ample time to prepare for the transition and should move faster to deploy other western troops to Southwest Rwanda.

-- (C) Khan's Plan to Enhance UNAMIR Effectiveness: SRSG Khan told Charge Leader that he will recommend to the UN additional steps to enhance UNAMIR effectiveness. He will press for a temporary Chapter Seven mandate in the safe zone and seek approval for a UN monitoring force on the Zairian side of the border. He told Leader he may also propose that the border with Zaire be closed. (8/18 Leader/Aiston Telcon)

-- (C) French Attache Says Troops Will Monitor Situation From Zaire after Withdrawal: Departing French Military Attache in Washington, BG Alain Faupin, told PM DAS Cook August 17 that a contingent of French troops would remain in Zaire after the withdrawal from Rwanda to monitor the actions of the Hutus and resupply of the francophone African troops participating in UNAMIR. Faupin insisted that domestic political conditions in France precluded extending the troop deployment in Rwanda. However, he said that the August 22 withdrawal date might slip "by a few days" to ensure that the UNAMIR replacements are fully deployed. Operation Turquoise has been too successful, he observed, for the French to jeopardize the entire mission by departing before relief forces are in place.

-- (S/NF) Displaced Persons Continue to Head Towards Zaire: AID's DART team cites UNHCR estimates that 30,000 refugees have crossed the Zaire-Rwanda border in recent days. Other sources indicate that approximately 10 - 15,000 persons per day were on the move towards Bukavu August 16-17. (OFDA Daily Report, Nairobi 14749, P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1)

-- (C) UN Human Rights Commissioner Heads to Region: HCRC Ayala Lasso left Geneva August 17 en route to Kigali and Bujumbura. In a pre-departure meeting, he told US Mission Geneva that he sees an urgent need for human rights monitors in Rwanda, and would like to see 100 in place by the end of September. Ayala Lasso rued the lack of funding for the monitors and other HCRC programs, however we learned separately that the French and British have agreed to provide some additional financial support. (Geneva 7198)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Wednesday, August 17, 1994 at 1400 hours

-- (LOU) SRSG to Urge Bizimungu (Again) to Allow French to Stay: SRSG Khan has been instructed by Kofi Annan to urge Rwandan President Bizimungu to reconsider his decision not to allow French troops to remain in Rwanda after August 22. Charge Joyce Leader also is scheduled to meet with Bizimungu and Kagame today to press them to reconsider. Meanwhile, we are receiving conflicting signals as to French willingness to extend their deployment. We continue to demarche them at the highest levels to agree to keep troops in Rwanda.

-- (C) Arusha Summit on Rwanda/Burundi Ends with no Conclusive Plan of Action: The hastily-called summit on August 16 in Arusha to discuss the situation in Rwanda and Burundi provided a forum for regional leaders to voice their opinions on conflicts in the sub-region, but achieved little of substance. In barely-veiled criticism of Zaire, the neighbors agreed that they should help end the hate radio broadcasts and intimidation of Rwandan refugees who want to return home. The summit unanimously called for bringing to justice those guilty of genocide. Several participants -- including Rwandan President Bizimungu -- called on the French to leave Rwanda. This mini-summit achieved no concrete results, and Embassy Dar Es Salaam warns that the meeting may undercut support for a broader international conference on refugee issues, as proposed by A/S Moose during his recent travel to the region. (Dar Es Salaam 5173)

-- (U) Freed Burundi Opposition Leader Will Join Succession Talks: Bujumbura remains calm following the release of Hitimana, a marginal opposition figure whose arrest sparked a short-lived general strike August 7 - 11. The Prime Minister announced that Hitimana will now join the ongoing presidential succession talks. (Bujumbura 2766)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, August 16, 1994 at 1400 hours

-- ~~(C)~~ Rwandan President Says French Troops Must Leave: President Bizimungu told SRSG Khan August 16 that the Rwandan government would not permit French troops to remain after August 22. Khan told Charge Leader that he considers this a definitive no. However, we have instructed Leader to urge the Rwandan government again to agree to allow the French to stay on. (8/16 Leader/Aiston Telcon)

-- ~~(C)~~ SRSG Khan Offers Six-Point Plan to Stop Refugee Flow: Seeing little hope for a continued French presence, Khan is proposing a six-point plan to pre-empt an exodus from the safe zone:

- UNAMIR will replace the French force man-for-man, drawing on the newly-arrived Ethiopian and Ghanaian contingents, plus francophone African troops converted from Operation Turquoise;
- Aid deliveries will be coordinated with the arrival of UNAMIR forces in order to associate the presence of troops with tangible relief benefits;
- NGO's will saturate the safe zone, to increase the visibility of a reassuring international presence;
- The Rwandan government will continue its public affairs campaign to persuade displaced persons that it is safe to return home;
- UNAMIR will provide support and protection for refugee representatives to visit their home areas and then report back to the camps on security conditions; and
- UNAMIR will try to obtain mobile broadcasting trucks to air radio programs that will counteract the hate campaigns of Hutu extremist stations. (8/16 Leader/Aiston Telcon)

-- ~~(C)~~ Relief Agencies to Channel Refugees to Bugarama: In their contingency planning for a new exodus from the safe zone, relief agencies propose to channel displaced persons to Bugarama in the southwest corner of Rwanda. If refugees then cross the border into Zaire, they are likely to move into the Ruzisi plain, which is more accessible to relief efforts than Bukavu. (8/16 OFDA daily briefing)

-- ~~(C)~~ Ethiopian Troops Arrive in Kigali: Ethiopia deployed 120 personnel and six patrol vehicles to Kigali August 15, with an additional 275 men and 5 vehicles scheduled to arrive August 16. A further lift of heavy equipment is scheduled for later in the week. Charge Leader reports that Ethiopian forces which landed in Kigali are already en route to the safe zone. P1/(b)(1) P1/(b)(1) and 8/16 Leader/Aiston Telcon)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 15, 1994, at 1400 hours

-- (U) Conflicting Reports on Refugee Movements in Safe Zone: AID's DART team reports that approximately 5000 people per day are fleeing from southwest Rwanda to Zaire, and another 2000 are entering Burundi daily according to French news agency AFP. However, Emboffs who visited the Bukavu area August 12-13 reported only "a trickle" of refugees, and Ambassador Krueger observed no increase in flows on the Burundi side. (OFDA Daily Report; FBIS Abidjan 140817094)

P1/(b)(1)

-- (C) Rwandan Officials Agree to Cooperate with French: President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame told Ambassador Rawson they would cooperate with the French to avoid a new outflow of refugees. But the Rwandan officials charged that French forces were telling refugees to leave the zone, refusing to permit returnees from Zaire to pass through the zone, and allowing government property to be looted. Despite these reservations, we understand UN SRSG Khan later obtained Kagame's agreement to allow the French to stay another week. (8/14 Rawson/Aiston Telcon)

-- (C) Ethiopians Plan Partial Deployment to Rwanda: The Ethiopian Defense Ministry has informed P3/(b)(3) that it plans to begin airlifting "at least some" personnel and equipment to Rwanda August 15. Ethiopian MOD officials and P3/(b)(3) are coordinating the "heavy lift" of additional personnel and equipment on a later date. P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1) P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1)

-- (U) Security Council Team Departs Bujumbura: The high-level Security Council Team left Bujumbura August 14 at approximately 1800 local time. In a brief press conference before departing Burundi, they said they had stressed to both sides that the patience of the international community was running out, and urged them to reach agreement soon on presidential succession. (8/15 Krueger/Swan Telcon)

-- (C) UNHCR Employee Killed in Northern Burundi: A Nicaraguan employee of the UNHCR was killed at his home in Kirundo on August 14. UNHCR officials believe that the intended target of the attack was a local government administrator who was visiting the employee's home. Nevertheless, gendarmes have stepped up security at the homes of other foreigners in the area. (Bujumbura 2736)

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 12, 1994, at 1500 hours

-- (LOU) Volcanic Activity Continues: Smoke emissions and lava pools were observed at two volcanoes near Goma. Despite this more visible activity, USGS geologists have assured OFDA that the potential for eruption is no greater now than it has been for the past two months. Two USGS vulcanologists will travel to Goma next week to perform an on-site assessment and install electronic monitoring equipment. (Augsburg DTG 111410Z AUG and August 12 OFDA briefing)

-- (U) UNHCR is Planning for New Refugee Flows: UNHCR is reviewing contingency plans for responding to another mass movement of refugees. The review was prompted by concerns about possible instability following French withdrawal from the Humanitarian Protection Zone or another outbreak of ethnic violence in Burundi. UNHCR is also concerned that a volcanic eruption could prompt refugees in Zaire to cross back into Northwest Rwanda. Representatives of the UN agency are meeting today with NGO's in the northwest, to discuss requirements for shifting relief efforts to this region. (Geneva 7042 and August 12 OFDA briefing)

-- (C) Ethiopians Announce Participation in UNAMIR: In an August 11 press release, the Ministry of Defense publicly announced plans to deploy peacekeepers to Rwanda, once remaining "minor points" have been negotiated with the UN. In a separate letter to UN officials, the Ethiopians detailed their requirements for financial reimbursement, transportation, and provision of supplementary equipment. Once these issues are resolved, Ethiopian Ministry of Defense sources report that their peacekeeping contingent could depart for Kigali on or about August 19. (FBIS EA 1108210594 and P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1) P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

-- (C) Belgium/France to Have Low-Level Diplomatic Presence in Kigali: Belgium will maintain a one-person "special mission" in Kigali, and France is sending someone out in the next few days to establish a small diplomatic facility. Neither country has a timetable for re-opening an Embassy. (Paris 22189, Brussels 8910)

-- (C) New UNAMIR Force Commander to Take Charge: Canadian Major General Guy Tousignant has been named the next UNAMIR force commander. He will take over from Dallaire in about two weeks. P3/(b)(3) P1/(b)(1)

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Rwanda/Burundi Daily Situation Report

August 10, 1994 at 1500 hours

On August 9, French troops turned over control of part of the eastern sector of their "Safe Zone" to two companies of Ghanaian forces, totalling approximately 250 troops. A third company is to arrive later this week. The transfer of authority seemed to proceed smoothly and did not provoke any noticeable refugee exodus. Only a few hundred people were observed moving from Gikongoro toward French-controlled Cyangugu. The French continue to man check points and conduct weapons searches in areas where their troops remain. No one was observed openly carrying firearms in the zone, although some youths wore hats bearing symbols of CDR extremists. Observers report that the population density in the zone is far greater than anywhere else in the country. UNAMIR is transporting local officials from the zone to meet with representatives of the new government, as part of the effort to reassure the population in the zone.

The three-day-old general strike and student-led protests in Bujumbura began to ease August 10. Following a television appeal August 9 by Defense Minister Fyiroko, heavily armed troops tightened security. Meanwhile, UNSYRG Abdallah reports progress in government/opposition negotiations to divvy up internal security portfolios -- a key sticking point in the Presidential succession talks.

UNHCR officials explained to EUCOM August 9 that the minimum "survival" requirement for water is 7 liters per person per day in an emergency, but 15 - 20 liters in a long-term refugee situation. At the initial stages of the emergency, UNHCR estimated a need for only 80 tanker trucks. However, UNHCR has agreed to prepare an updated assessment of current water needs in Eastern Zaire.

At an August 9 meeting of legal advisors to the five permanent members of the Security Council, all but the Chinese agreed that an institution of international character should be created to deal with the crimes committed in Rwanda. The Chinese wish to consult further with the Rwandan and other African governments before taking a position. In a related development, the new Rwandan Justice Minister endorsed the proposed international tribunal in an August 8 letter to the UNSYG.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 10, 1994

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Rwanda: Delivery of Relief Supplies Continues

U.S. military forces continue to speed delivery of water and relief supplies to refugees in Goma and other camps. There are now 2,592 U.S. military personnel in the operational zone, including 278 in Kigali. With British and German help, U.S. forces are providing nearly 800,000 gallons of potable water per day. Joint Task Force plans to airlift some 6 - 10 trucks from Mombasa on August 9 for use by the World Food Program in Kigali.

Security conditions deteriorated in Burundi. Approximately 1200 rock-throwing Tutsis demonstrated in Bujumbura August 8, reprising the violent protests of the past weekend. And there are reports of increased ethnic violence in northern Burundi, including attacks on Hutu refugees from Rwanda.

With French troops scheduled to withdraw by August 22, UNAMIR is lining up Ghanaian and Ethiopian troops to move into the French zone. Force commander Dallaire has reportedly obtained assurances from the RPF that its forces will not seek to enter the zone until UNAMIR has established control.

Thank you for your assistance.

Max Robinson for
Acting Executive Secretary

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 9, 1994

The French Joint Staff is still planning to withdraw its troops from Rwanda by August 22. However, the French have begun to acknowledge the possibility of an extension, if their disengagement would obviously destabilize the situation in the protected zone. Even after withdrawing, the French may leave 500 personnel, medical support, and unspecified equipment in Goma. A key element of French planning is the arrival and positioning of an 800-man Ethiopian contingent. Paris is seeking US assistance to transport the Ethiopians to the Cyangugu area of Southern Rwanda in time for them to overlap with the departing French forces.

Embassy Bujumbura staff reported that a general strike continues in the capital with rock-wielding youths gathered at various intersections around the city. According to press reports, several people were killed during the August 7-8 protests. Embassy staff confirmed that 38 village homes were burned August 2 in the Muramvya region of Burundi. There were no injuries. All but one of the burned houses belonged to Hutus, whose homes reportedly were destroyed in retaliation for an arson attack on a Tutsi family.

In its August 8 update, UNHCR reported a total of 2,576,000 internally displaced Rwandans (more than half in the French Safe Zone) and 1,643,000 refugees in surrounding countries (more than two-thirds in Zaire).

Some 2000 refugees continue to flee daily from eastern Rwanda to Tanzanian camps. Refugees also still flow into Bukavu, Zaire. However, UN and AID field workers report that some internally displaced persons are beginning to return from the border area to their homes in Butare and Gitarama in central Rwanda.

UNHCR's Goma office reported that men wearing Rwandan armed forces uniforms beat a man to death August 8. The office believes the victim was trying to persuade refugees to return home, but other sources suggest he was accused of being an RPF spy.

~~SECRET~~

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THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318

Admiral Jacques Lanxade
Chief of Staff
French Armed Forces
Paris, France

Dear Jacques,

I want to take this opportunity to let you know what we are doing to support deployment of the Ethiopian battalion in support of UNAMIR II in Rwanda and ask your support for that action.

Currently, movement of the Ethiopian battalion into Rwanda is our highest priority for helping stand up the expanded UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda. I understand that initial concerns of the Government of Ethiopia (TGE) have been answered by the UN, but several additional concerns have now been raised that are currently being worked out between TGE and the UN. I expect those issues to be resolved shortly as well, and our airlift of Ethiopian forces and equipment to commence soon thereafter.

I know you are anticipating the arrival of Ethiopian and other UNAMIR forces to help ensure adequate security is maintained in SW Rwanda while you finish the mandate of Operation Turquoise and withdraw your forces. I share your concern over avoiding another massive exodus of refugees out of the region, and support the UNAMIR proposal to deploy UNAMIR forces into the current French zone for providing security and helping to maintain calm before French forces withdraw.

I ask your patience in awaiting the arrival of additional UNAMIR forces, a significant part of which will be the Ethiopian battalion, before withdrawing your forces. I fully expect the Ethiopian battalion to be deployed into the region by late August, with subsequent tactical employment into the French zone perhaps ten days after that, and we are committed to expediting that deployment schedule.

Warm regards,

Sincerely,

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INTELLIGENCE NOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 11, 1994
0600 EDT

RWANDA: Assessment of Volcanic Activity near Goma

Current volcanic activity near Goma poses no immediate threat to refugees or relief operations, according to the NMCC. There have been no earth tremors or violent eruptions of gas or lava associated with the current activity, and there is no indication that current activity will increase or worsen. Lava flows would have to increase substantially to threaten the road connecting Goma with refugee camps located 5 NM east of the volcano.

The CIA does not expect a major eruption in the immediate future, but cautioned that US Geological Survey (USGS) experts cannot rule out the activity as a possible precursor to a major eruption. The USGS experts indicated lava flows from a major eruption could reach refugee areas north of Goma within one hour.

Nyiragongo Volcano, which erupted yesterday, is part of three crater chain located approximately 9 NM due north of Goma City and Goma Airport. The activity appears isolated to the main crater. The eruption caused a smoke plume to rise up to 18,000-20,000 feet. At the southern base of the volcano, a fire is burning in a snake-like line approximately 1,000 feet long, running northwest to southeast; it appears to have been started by lava flowing from tunnels or from a smaller crater on lower side of mountain. **No** lava has been observed flowing over the main volcano crater.

Bet on RPF

Local residents describe this activity as a common occurrence and nothing to be too concerned about. European press contacts are also unconcerned.

WALT SLOCOMBE

Sources: NMCC and CIA telcons

Dart team

French

UNHCR and UN

French

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

Convince RPF

UNAMIR doesn't exist

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RWANDA					
	CLARKE		ERSHBOW		CLARKE
	BERGER		KERRICK		BEERS
	SODERBERG		LEBOURGEOIS		RICE
	TOM				SCHWARTZ
	SENS		SCHIFTER		ROSSIN
	SWOLIN		FRIED		DARRACH
			BURNS		BELL
	FLERTH		BEYRLE		ANDREASEN
	OVERSTAFF		GOTTEMOELLER		HAHN
	MANETTA		FORSYTHE		WITKOWSKY
			LINDYK		JONES
	ANDRICOS		SATTERFIELD		FONEMAN
	DANVERS		ALAMSON		HARRIS
	KRECZKO		ROTH		AOKI
	BAKER		SLETTINGER		CLEMENTS
			KRISTOFF		TENET
	ROSS				GENTON
	MITCHELL		FEINBERG		MISLOCK
	SPALTER		ROCHA		
			BLAKEMAN		HALPERIN
	FALVER				SPIRO
	KYLE		STEINBERG		
	WHYMAN		DESHAZER	Y	REED
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	PUNKE		CHYBA		COMMS
	MURASE				MCGRATH
			SCHEID		ALEXANDER

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Volcano

Fuchs

44 hrs to
Mombasa to Kigali
1000 Amer

Bujumbura

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DECL: OADR

Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

August 11, 1994 at 1300 hours

-- (U) Volcano Erupts Near Goma: A volcano located 10 km north of Goma erupted early evening August 10. Lava is flowing from a fissure on the south side of the cone. Local residents indicate that such volcanic activity is common in the region. The volcano is approximately 9 km north of the airport and 5 km west of the nearest refugee settlement. The main camps are located at least 25 km away. Military personnel in Goma report no immediate threat to air or relief operations. However, a major eruption could threaten a wider area and disrupt the relief effort. (CINCEUR DTG 110001Z AUG)

-- (U) Zairians Demonstrate in Goma: Several thousand Zairian demonstrators clogged downtown Goma morning August 11. They are protesting the presence of Zairian troops sent from Kinshasa. The demonstrations have disrupted access to the UNHCR and ICRC offices in Goma, and are impeding travel from the Goma airport to the main water point used by the US military. (Kinshasa 4599)

-- (U) Tutsi Throws Grenade in Bujumbura Central Market: A youth belonging to the Tutsi Royalist Party threw a grenade into Bujumbura's crowded central market early afternoon August 11. Seven people were injured, one seriously, but the market remained open. The youth has been taken into custody. The military have confined students to the university campus to guard against further unrest. (8/11 Embassy Bujumbura telephone report)

-- (S) UNAMIR Troops Now Number 1,114: As of August 6, UNAMIR troops totalled 1,114 -- including 520 Ghanaians, 298 Canadians, 180 British, and 140 others. The British are scheduled to beef up their contribution to 634 early the week of August 15. The Ethiopians continue to negotiate the terms of UN reimbursement for their participation. In addition to UNAMIR forces, troops deployed to French-led "Operation Turqoise" numbered 3,038 as of August 7. P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1) P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1)

-- (LOU) NGO's are Broadcasting, but so are Hutu Extremists: UNHCR reports that radio stations operated by Rapporteurs Sans Frontieres are on the air in Goma and Bukavu. The new government has declined to permit a station in Kigali until a Minister of Information is named. RSF broadcasts have so far focused on public health, but UNHCR will be contributing messages on repatriation soon. Meanwhile, a Hutu station, inciting violence against Tutsis, has been heard broadcasting from Bukavu. (US Mission Geneva 6989, P3/(b)(3), P1/(b)(1)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

9 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

Summary We are now two weeks into Operation Support Hope. Last week I said we had turned the corner in stemming the immediate crisis for refugees. That confident statement was based on knowledge of both what we had done, but also on the actions we had in progress. Today UNHCR agrees the corner has been turned and says the structure is now in place to handle the situation. GEN Joulwan's team is beginning to focus on turning over responsibilities, having fulfilled their primary job of launching the immediate efforts and putting in place a command and control structure. Fortunately, so far there is still a willingness of other countries and international organizations to participate. We are reviewing these offers carefully to make sure we do not duplicate their efforts and, if necessary, we are assisting them to get set up on the scene. To the extent we can spread the load early, this will make it easier for our forces to extract themselves without disrupting relief operations. The visit by Mrs. Gore and GEN Shalikashvili went well.

Water Last weekend we had the capacity to produce up to a million gallons of pure water a day; today we are distributing that amount every day. Much of this has been done with German or US civilian purification units and using Finnish tankers.

Airports Our teams are working at four airports to keep them operating 24-hours a day and speed the movement of supplies.

Heavy Equipment While we have heavy equipment on the scene doing camp preparation, road and sanitation work, we are seeking replacement equipment from other countries, particularly Germany.

Medical We are augmenting UNHCR medical teams in Goma. Canadian, British and Australian hospitals will open soon in Rwanda and will be the nucleus for the way station concept to encourage refugees to return. The US role is limited to support from Kigali, if required.

Kigali In Kigali we have provided generator fuel to the city and the water system is now operational.

Transportation We have trucks at Mombassa, but so does the World Food Program. If the WFP agrees, we will fly some of the trucks and transport the rest by rail. To the extent possible we want to use trucks from organizations that will be staying for the long term and avoid the expense of shipping ours in and out.

Radio The Germans have offered to fix the radio station and "Reporters Without Borders" is constructing an antenna in Goma to broadcast to the refugees.

Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC) These centers are up and running at Goma, Kigali and Entebbe. These centers coordinate US military operations with the 50 plus non-governmental organizations and UNHCR personnel. They are part of the organizational structure we have brought to this chaotic situation.

UNAMIR We are working a complete list of what the UNAMIR commander will need to replace the French. An orderly transition will help keep over one million refugees in the current French zone, and avoid another mass migration. We will do much of the transport, but a number of European countries are donating equipment.

Force Protection We are providing timely intelligence information to our people in the field to protect our personnel.

Bill Perry

cc: Vice President Gore / Leon Fuerth
Secretary Christopher / Strobe Talbott
Assistant to the President Lake / Sandy Berger
CJCS Shalikashvili/ VCJCS

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X71688

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 5, 1994

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Rwanda: More Supplies and Troops En Route

The U.S. Embassy in Kigali is now open.

The U.N. Rwanda Pledging Conference resulted in pledges of $137 million in cash and $437 million in in-kind contributions for overall needs. Much of what was pledged is not new money.

The remainder of the Ghanaian contingent to UNAMIR should arrive in Rwanda between August 10 and 15, and the supplies being furnished by the Netherlands for the proposed Zambian contingent will be ready by August 15.

The humanitarian situation in Zaire is improving. With clean water and better sanitation more widely available, fewer refugees are dying from cholera. Unfortunately, cases of dysentery, meningitis, and measles are on the increase. Ten U.S. and nine Finnish water trucks have eased distribution problems. South Africa has offered to sell additional water tankers.

Meanwhile, Hutu hardliners have resumed clandestine radio broadcasts. Combined with rearming soldiers and militiamen loyal to the former government, they are intimidating refugees who might be tempted to return to their homes. The UN is working with Reporters Without Borders to set up a radio station to counter hardline Hutu propaganda.

Thank you for your assistance.

Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Friday, September 2, 1994, at 1400 hours

- - (C) Improved Security Situation in Burundi: Embassy Bujumbura reports that the security situation in Burundi has improved. The embassy believes Burundi continues to move on a resolutely democratic path and the likelihood of stability rather than instability is consistently increasing. (Bujumbura 2984)

- - (C) SRSG Khan Will Lead Mission to Kinshasa: SRSG Khan will lead a mission to Kinshasa to assess GOZ willingness and ability to provide security in the refugee camps and border areas as well as transport ex-FAR personnel and former Rwandan government officials. In a September 1 meeting with Ambassador Inderfurth, USYG Annan felt the best option for policing the camps is to encourage the GOZ in creating a trained border force. (USUN 3642)

- - (C) Tunisians To Deploy: Major General Baril told Ambassador Inderfurth that the Tunisian advance party was scheduled to deploy on September 8 with the main body to deploy in 15-45 days depending on when the necessary equipment is available. (USUN 3642)

- - (U) Dillon to Coordinate Regional Approach: The SYG has asked a retired former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Robert Dillon, to visit the Rwandan region as an UN envoy to help coordinate a regional approach to refugee and human rights problems. (USUN 3657)

- - (C) Displaced Persons Increase Around Kigali: The number of displaced persons around Kigali appears to be increasing. Estimates indicate more than 15,000 displaced persons in the area. UNHCR is planning to create a camp in Kigali for these people. (USCINCEUR DTG 021200Z SEP)

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ROMANIA

August 3, 1994

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THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President,

I received with great interest your letter of July 25 on the efforts you are undertaking in order to assist in providing relief in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis and I salute your prompt humanitarian response on this issue.

The situation in Rwanda raises great concern due to the huge human losses involved that turned it into one of the major tragedies of mankind at this end of century.

Entirely sharing your consideration and position on this matter, I wish to inform you that Romania is ready to contribute - to the extent of her capabilities - to a joint effort, with other states and UN support, aimed at bringing an end to this crisis. Therefore, I want to let you know that, as a reaction to the previous UN action and appeals on this issue, Romania has already set up a military medical team of 22 experts to take part in the missions provided for in the logistic system designed by the UN. The UN Secretariat has been informed about this action and about our readiness to supply that contribution.

In addition to the above-mentioned team, my country is also prepared to furnish all necessary personnel for a military camp hospital in case the US or another country would provide the facilities and equipment.

./.

The Honorable WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
President of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Washington, D. C.

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Regarding material aid, I am sure you are aware of Romania's difficult situation, due the hardships imposed by the transition period. Therefore, we feel sorry for not being able to contribute now the extent of our desire, to this exceptional humanitarian effort. Furthermore, I wish to point out our willingness to consider any other feasible alternative that might accommodate our present limited means with our determination to act in Rwanda.

Let me also advise you Romanian NGOs, such as the national Red Cross, are currently assessing the possibilities of joining our Government's efforts in this endeavour.

I shall keep you informed on all further developments regarding my country's efforts related to ending this painful crisis.

Please accept, dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ion Iliescu

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

RWANDA CRISIS
(TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER)

I write to inform you of our efforts to assist in the international response to the Rwandan refugee crisis and to urge you to support a greatly enhanced international effort to deal with this tragedy.

This morning I announced an immediate and massive increase in the American response, including an additional $75 million in cash and commodities to assist in the relief effort.

I also ordered our Defense Department to establish and manage an airlift hub in Uganda, which will be used as a staging area for around-the-clock shipments of relief supplies to the refugees. Consultations are underway now with the government of Uganda.

I directed our Military to assist in expanding airlift operations near the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu by providing personnel and equipment to enable airfields to operate on a 24-hour basis. We must increase the capacity to receive, transfer and distribute goods at these airfields, as our aim is to move food, medicine and other supplies to those in need as quickly as possible.

Finally, I directed the Military to establish a safe water supply and to distribute as much water as possible to those at risk. Safe water is essential to stop the outbreak of cholera and other diseases that threaten the refugees.

These efforts only address four of eight essential "service packages" identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the overall relief task is more than the civilian relief organizations and the U.S. and French military units can handle. In particular, the UN has identified road servicing and road security, site preparation, provision of domestic fuel and sanitation facilities as additional essential "service packages." If you have military units that can operate with ours and the French to deliver these packages, assist in providing and delivering parts of the packages to which the United States has already committed, and/or provide other humanitarian relief (such as medical care and engineering services), I urge you to have your military commander immediately contact the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and General George Joulwan at the U.S. European Command. I also urge that you make financial assistance available to the UN and non-governmental organizations which are responding to this crisis.

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Second, we must make it possible for the refugees to return home as quickly as possible. For them to have confidence that they can do so in safety, the UN peacekeeping force UNAMIR must be fully functioning. Unfortunately, it has taken months to deploy, due in part to a lack of equipment for African nations that have pledged to join UNAMIR. The United States has proposed the "Adopt a Battalion" plan whereby nations would pair with African units to ensure they are equipped and can deploy. We have paired with the Ghanaian battalion, and have delivered 50 armored personnel carriers for that unit last month. I urge you -- either alone or in concert with others -- to offer to the UN to deploy a peacekeeping contingent of your own forces to UNAMIR or to offer to pair with and equip one of the African nations that have offered to join. Every day that UNAMIR is not yet fully functioning is another day that refugees will be unable to return. As a result, many will die in the terrible conditions their exile has caused.

I deeply appreciate your careful consideration of these concerns.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 5, 1994

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
DECL: OADR

TO: USUN - Ambassador Albright

FROM: INR - Toby T. Gati

SUBJECT: African support for UNAMIR II

UNSCR 918, passed on May 17, 1994, calls for a 5,500-member UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) peacekeeping force. By the end of May, five Sub-Saharan African states had pledged over 3,000 troops for what has always been envisaged as a largely African peacekeeping force (see attached list). To date, thirteen Sub-Saharan African states have made pledges exceeding 4,500 troops. While additional African states may offer still more soldiers, medical personnel or modest amounts of equipment, serious financial and logistical problems may prevent their actual deployment.

* * *

A Pan-African response. The vast majority of the units offered are to be drawn from five states--Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe--which collectively have offered to send some 3,500 troops. Ghana's contingent is already in Kigali and some elements are soon to deploy to western Rwanda. Several hundred Senegalese, a Chadian company, and a small multinational Francophone contingent are already serving with French troops in "Operation Turquoise". The French and the government in Kigali are now intensely discussing whether the government will accept the transfer of these Francophone troops to UNAMIR. This transfer is vital to UNAMIR's future because most of the pledged African troops are from English-speaking countries, while the only world language spoken by most Hutus is French.

Good intentions and limited capabilities. Most African states have offered only troops. Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and other potentially large peacekeeping contributors have indicated that they will require some combination of medical supplies, communications equipment, airlift support, vehicles, and other logistical assistance to deploy their troops for protracted operations in Rwanda. International support for these African peacekeepers thus far has been limited to US assistance to the Ghanaian contingent, and Belgian aid for the Malawian unit. The

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Netherlands' offer of vehicles for the Zambian battalion is not enough for them to be deployed.

Misgivings about the mission. Command and control arrangements for UNAMIR II have not yet been made and areas of operation have yet to be selected for various units. In addition, the division of administrative and budgetary responsibilities between national and UN personnel is still vague. Ethiopian officials have expressed serious reservations about the current lack of a clear mission statement for UNAMIR II. These issues, as well as concerns about the cost and mode of transporting their contingents to Rwanda, are shared by the vast majority of prospective African troop contributors.

Distractions and discouragement. Several African leaders are afraid their troops might experience the same failures and frustrations they encountered in other peacekeeping operations. Recent Zimbabwean casualties in Somalia will magnify the doubts Harare previously expressed about deploying to Kigali. Zambia's desire to have troops available for a possible Angolan peacekeeping force may also convince Lusaka to reassess its pledge to UNAMIR II, particularly if political and logistic concerns are not promptly addressed. The need to clarify UNAMIR II's Chapter Six peacekeeping mission will grow more urgent if Hutu military and militia members currently in Zaire seek to launch a low-level insurgency against the RPF in the near future.

Attachment:
Tab 1: Summary of the status of proposed Sub-Saharan African troop contributors.
Tab 2: Proposed contributions of each country.

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Sub-Saharan African States which have pledged troops to UNAMIR

Large Contributors

Ghana. The Ghanaians currently have about 400 troops in Kigali, some 200 of which have been in place since January, 1994. President Rawlings sent another 206 soldiers in July and 280 are preparing to be dispatched as soon as equipment needed for the UNAMIR contingent began to arrive in Kigali. These additions would bring Ghanaian forces up to full-battalion strength.

Ethiopia. A reconnaissance team was scheduled to arrive in Kigali August 4 in advance of an 815-man military contingent. The Ethiopians appear ready to use their own assets to transport their personnel and equipment, but will request the US/UN to ferry their heavier gear. Addis could begin deploying on August 28 with its own transport, and as soon as August 14 with US/UN help. P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1)

Senegal. The 243 Senegalese troops on the ground in Operation Turquoise are prepared to switch to UNAMIR when the French withdraw. France will equip them. In early July Senegalese military leaders were concerned that they would be perceived as pawns of the French but now that the RPF appears to be willing to accept Francophone African contingents in UNAMIR this probably is no longer a problem.

Zimbabwe. Harare provided 10 observers for UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) and, when the massacres began in Rwanda, it volunteered a motorized rifle battalion (800 men) for a UN peacekeeping force. Its offer was predicated, however, on assistance from the UN to outfit its force. Zimbabwe's original estimate of its requirements totaled $16 million. It was initially thought that South Africa might be willing to satisfy most of its supply needs. Now that South Africa has decided to limit its involvement to humanitarian relief and APCs, Pretoria's contribution might only cover part of Zimbabwe's vehicular requirements. Harare has become increasingly concerned about danger its troops may face and is reluctant have them serve under dual or French command. The longer deployment is delayed, the greater the chances that Zimbabwe will find some excuse to renege on its offer.

Zambia. If Zambia can get its logistic needs met by the UN or US, it will provide an 800-man battalion and has an "advance team" ready to go to Rwanda. The Netherlands' offer of vehicles will not suffice to permit deployment.

Nigeria. The UN has asked Nigeria to transfer to Rwanda one of its companies from the battalion now deployed to Somalia. The reinforced company is nearly ready to deploy.

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Small Contributors

Mali. Mali agreed to send a reinforced company of 150 men to the expanded UNAMIR force on June 1. Mali also offered on July 26 to send a 40-person civilian medical team, with doctors, epidemiology and water experts. The team needs transportation, meals, and quartering assistance but not per diem or any other reimbursement. The Malians have not yet deployed.

Congo. The 40 Congolese presently with Operation Turquoise are planning to switch to UNAMIR when the French withdraw. The French will equip them.

Guinea. Although Guinea in late June agreed in principle to send at least 150 troops to participate in UNAMIR, the logistics for the deployment of the troops have not been worked out.

Niger. Niger announced on July 8 that it would send a 43-man infantry unit to take part in UNAMIR, but initially to serve under French command in Operation Turquoise.

Malawi. All five officers which Malawi provided to UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) were evacuated to Nairobi when fighting broke out on April 6, but three have since returned to Kigali. Belgium's decision to earmark $3.07 million to sponsor a 120-man army company has made further Malawian participation possible. A final decision on participation may hinge on Malawi getting satisfactory answers to questions it has posed to the UN on the nature of the UNAMIR mission, UNAMIR's organization, and logistical support.

Operation Turquoise Contributors (Not already mentioned above)

Chad. As of July 28, Chad had provided 132 military personnel in support of Operation Turquoise. Chadian-French relations have been chilly, and Chad used the opportunity to press the French to make good on its promises of post-CFA devaluation financial assistance. Chad is the only African contingent serving in Operation Turquoise which had refused to convert to UNAMIR control once the French withdrew, although recently it reversed its position.

Guinea-Bissau. President Vieira announced on July 12 that Guinea-Bissau would send a company of 45 men to support Operation Turquoise. The troops will arrive soon.

Mauritania. Mauritania sent a 10-man medical team to join Operation Turquoise. It will stay until the French depart.

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RWANDA: UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise Contributor's Table

as of 8/2/94

COUNTRY	DATE COMMITTED	NUMBERS	STATUS
Large Contributors			
Ghana	May 19	Battalion(800)	On ground, short a company
Ethiopia	May 25	Battalion	Needs equipment
Senegal	May 26	550 men	Needs equipment
Zimbabwe	May 27	Battalion	Needs equipment
Zambia	June 14	Battalion	Needs equipment
Nigeria	May 10	300 men	Nearly ready to deploy
Mali	June 2	150 men	Needs equipment
	July 26	40-person medical team	
Congo	June 6	Infantry Company(100+?)	40 on ground with Operation Turquoise
Guinea	June 29	Company(120)	35 on ground with Operation Turquoise
Niger	July 11	40 men	All on ground with Operation Turquoise
Malawi	July 20	Rifle company(120)	Needs equipment

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CONTRIBUTORS TO FRENCH-LED OPERATION TURQUOISE AS OF 8/2/94

COUNTRY	NUMBERS	STATUS
Senegal	243	On ground
Chad	132	On ground
Guinea-Bissau	45	Will arrive "soon"
Niger	43	On ground
Congo	40	On ground
Guinea	35	On ground
Mauritania	10	On ground

These African forces were recruited and transported to Rwanda by the French within weeks of the French late June deployment. Total troops, with the French, were 3,153 as of August 2, 1994.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520
August 5, 1994

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: Acting Secretary Moose

FROM: INR - Toby T. Gati TTGati

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Security, War Crimes, and the RPF

Rwanda's new government, installed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), supports in principle the idea of an international tribunal to prosecute those who committed war crimes. The RPF is skeptical, however, of the international community's ability to identify, apprehend, judge, and punish those responsible. More importantly, the RPF, whose base of support is a tiny minority of the population, is obsessed with security. Despite RPF professions of support for human rights, it will take "justice" into its own hands, covertly if necessary, and will oppose or avoid any foreign pressure seen as inhibiting its control over the country. The combination of Tutsi retribution against tens of thousands of Hutus responsible for the genocide and the deep fear and resentment of Tutsis held by most Hutu refugees will effectively stall refugee repatriation, cripple human rights monitoring efforts, and fan cross-border violence.

* * *

International Tribunal: Yes, but... . The RPF on several occasions has called for international prosecutions of those responsible for the genocide, and the new regime has allowed a UN "Commission of Experts" into the country to investigate human rights abuses. But leaders of the new government have recently reaffirmed their intention to go ahead unilaterally with trials for "more than 30,000" persons thought guilty of war crimes. In so doing, they have emphasized their skepticism of the UN's ability to conduct numerous trials in a timely manner.

Security threat. The RPF is more interested in security than justice. Though twelve of the 18 top officials in the new government, including the president and prime minister, are Hutus, its power base lies among the Tutsi minority. Historically counting for some 14 percent of the population, since the recent genocide Tutsis may amount to less than five percent of Rwanda's pre-exodus population. Surviving Tutsis are acutely aware of their vulnerability.

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Deep Hutu animosity toward and fear of Tutsis are displayed by the genocide, the panicked exodus to neighboring countries, and the refusal of the vast majority to return. The RPF/Tutsis now face perhaps 20,000 former Rwandan army troops who are regrouping in Zaire and another 3,000 reportedly in refugee camps in Tanzania. In addition, thousands of Hutu militiamen, responsible for much of the killing, live among the more than two million refugees outside the country. Virtually the entire 32,000-member former civil service, including local officials appointed by President Habyarimana, is also suspected of organizing the genocide. Many of these hard-line "opinion leaders" mobilized tens of thousands to participate in the killing spree, and now are acting to prevent Hutus from repatriating.

Though some Hutu leaders privately express an interest in returning, most talk of regrouping for a new battle to eventually reconquer the country. Already, small Hutu militia bands are reported to be operating in the French controlled safe zone. Hard-line army units are reported in isolated parts of the northwest, while Hutu militias are likely hiding in the hills of RPF-controlled areas, staging hit and run attacks and banditry. Though they pose no near-term threat to RPF rule, they will be a persistent thorn in the side of the new government and will make many rural areas dangerous to Tutsis and foreigners.

Human rights. The Hutu threat--and the Tutsi reaction to it--bodes ill for international efforts to protect human rights. There have been numerous recent reports of systematic killings of Hutus by the RPF, some of which are credible. The RPF is reportedly attempting to screen refugees and seeking to identify those--both in neighboring countries and among the returnees--involved in the genocide. RPF forces and Tutsis will likely dispense more summary "justice" which will also claim the lives of at least some innocent Hutus. The continuing flow of thousands of refugees into Tanzania suggests that significant human rights violations are occurring in eastern Rwanda, an area which has been under RPF control for several months and to which foreign access has been strictly limited.

Public Relations. Unlike the hard-line Hutus during their post-April 6 blood lust--when they openly called on the populace to kill all Tutsis--the RPF/Tutsis will attempt to target their enemies selectively and make an effort to cover up their crimes and extra-judicial executions. They seek the economic assistance and political legitimacy of the international community and will try to retain the moral high ground they earned from their 30 years of refugee status.

P1/(b)(1)

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P1/(b)(1)

P1/(b)(1) But Westerners in remote areas are likely to be targets of desperate Hutu bandits or individual Tutsis resentful of foreign interference in the devastated country they once again rule.

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Drafted: INR/AA:FEhrenreich/77148

Cleared: INR/AA:VJFarley/76130

Approved: INR/DAS: BWood, Acting

File Name: RWMEMO940803.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 6356

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August 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Request for Special Air Missions Aircraft

Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck will lead a four-person delegation to Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and refugee camps in Zaire. The objectives are to discuss accountability issues with the GOR/RPF and the Burundi government; to assess the security situation in the Goma camps; to gather information for recommendations concerning the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, detention of former Rwandan government/military leaders and the placement of human rights monitors in Rwanda. Mr. Shattuck will be accompanied by Mr. Josiah Rosenblatt, Offfice Director for Multilateral Affairs, Ms. Crystal Nix of the Legal Advisor's Office, and Mr. Richard Barton of USAID.

Travel via Special Air Missions aircraft from Frankfurt to Kampala, Kigali, the refugee camps in Goma and to Bujumbura is necessitated by the onerous schedule, the lack of commercial flights to Kigali and Goma, and the need for maximum flexibility during the multi-country consultations. A Special Air Mission aircraft will enable Assistant Secretary Shattuck to concentrate fully on his consultations and will symbolize to the nations in the region the importance the United States places on containing further bloodshed in the region. Mr. Shattuck's mission also will underscore the need to begin accountability for those who committed the atrocities in Rwanda.

It is requested that Mr. Shattuck's travel be designed a Presidential mission and that a Special Air Missions in-theater aircraft be made available on a non-reimbursable basis to transport Assistant Secretary Shattuck and his party. Susan Rice of the NSC staff participates regularly in discussions at the Department on this issue and can provide additional insight on the need for the designation of Presidential Mission.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

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E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MS NARA, Date 10/17/12
2012-0639-M-1
MS 10/17/12

Translated from Russian

August 4, 1994
Kremlin, Moscow

Dear Bill,

I fully share your assessment of the extraordinary humanitarian situation prevailing in Rwanda. Russian officials who were involved in assistance deliveries to that country were simply shocked by this unprecedented human tragedy. I absolutely agree that we must act jointly in order to implement the UN Security Council's decisions on Rwanda as you and I agreed in Naples.

Let me tell you that in addition to the steps we have already taken to help Rwanda I will be instructing the Ministry for Emergency Situations and the Defense Ministry, in coordination with Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to immediately contact the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the US Command in Europe to consider taking joint actions aimed at providing and delivering humanitarian assistance to Rwanda's refugees. I am also ordering prompt consideration of the possibility of providing material and technical equipment to the Zambian battalion fielded for participation in the UN mission to help Rwanda and the possibility of sending military equipment and materiel for other African countries' military units that would be leased to them through the UN Secretariat.

It is my expectation that Russian and US representatives will also cooperate closely in pursuance of the decisions taken in

His Excellency
Mr.William J.Clinton
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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Geneva on August 2 by the special international conference on providing emergency humanitarian assistance to Rwanda so as to assure tangible results.

I am confident that by joint efforts and in cooperation with the whole international community we will be able to prevent death and alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people.

Sincerely,

Boris Yeltsin

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Его Превосходительству
Господину Уильяму Дж.Клинтону
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г.Вашингтон

Дорогой Билл,

Целиком согласен с твоей оценкой чрезвычайной гуманитарной ситуации,сложившейся в Руанде. Российские представители, участвующие в доставке помощи в эту страну, были просто потрясены этой невиданной человеческой трагедией. Полностью разделяю мнение, что нам нужно действовать совместно в целях реализации решений Совета Безопасности ООН по Руанде, как мы об этом договорились в Неаполе.

Информирую тебя, что в дополнение к уже предпринятым нами мерам по оказанию помощи Руанде я поручаю Министерству по чрезвычайным ситуациям и Министерству обороны в координации с МИД России немедленно вступить в контакт с Управлением верховного комиссара ООН по делам беженцев и Европейским командованием США для проработки совместных действий по предоставлению и доставке гуманитарной помощи руандийским беженцам. Я поручаю также в кратчайшие сроки рассмотреть вопрос о возможности материально-технического оснащения батальона, выделенного Замбией для участия в составе миссии ООН по оказанию помощи Руанде, а также проработать возможность выделения военной техники и оборудования для воинских подразделений других африканских стран на условиях аренды по линии секретариата ООН.

Рассчитываю, что представители России и США будут тесно сотрудничать и по итогам состоявшейся 2 августа с.г. в Женеве специальной международной конференции по оказанию чрезвычайной гуманитарной помощи Руанде, чтобы обеспечить ее весомые результаты.

Уверен, что совместными усилиями и в сотрудничестве со всем мировым сообществом нам удастся предотвратить гибель и облегчить страдания сотен тысяч людей.

С уважением,

Б.ЕЛЬЦИН

4 августа 1994 г.
г.Москва, Кремль

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Rwanda: Water Up...So Too Hutu Militancy

The humanitarian operation in and around Goma continues to focus on production and delivery of potable water. Although production still exceeds delivery capacity, UNHCR reports that the current level is 60 percent of the requirement for basic survival needs in the camps. The U.S. and international organizations need to do more, but we are at least gaining on the problem. We remain concerned about the reports of remnant Rwandan army units in Zaire: General Bizimungu, the chief of staff of the Rwandan government forces, is in Goma, and the military chain of command seems intact. President Mobutu has promised that his security forces would disarm Rwandan military personnel in Zaire and would not allow Zairian territory to be used to destabilize Rwanda. Mobutu's "pledges" on this and many other issues, however, have proven in the past to be of questionable value. The latest report on the situation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda is attached.

Thank you for your assistance.

Catherine Barry
for Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

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Rwanda: Militant Hutus and the Water Supply

U.S. military personnel in Goma continue to coordinate with UNHCR on expanding the production and delivery of potable water to Rwandan refugees in the camps. Two days ago production exceeded 1.1 million liters per day; UNHCR reports today that production has reached 60 percent of the level required to meet the basic survival needs in the refugee camps. Clearly the U.S. and international relief organizations need to do more, but we are at least gaining on the problem. The U.S. landed five Finnish water trucks and six U.S. tankers in Goma on August 3.

Reports continue to circulate about increased activity of the former Rwandan military in Zaire. General Bizimungu, the chief of staff of the defeated Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), is in Goma, and the RGF command structure remains somewhat intact (albeit depleted). We are concerned that the Zairians have been less than successful in disarming the Hutu militants and former RGF in and around Goma. Charge Yates reported from Goma that piles of small arms were under the nominal control of the Zairian military at the border, but that the soldiers evinced greater interest in smoking mild hallucinogens than guarding the weapons. Of perhaps greater moment, the Zairian armed forces may have seized and consolidated RGF heavy weapons (howitzers, helicopters and armored personnel carriers) under light guard to the north of Goma. We are investigating these reports, and will weigh in again with the Government of Zaire to urge it to assume its responsibilities to disarm the Hutus and secure RGF weaponry. President Mobutu has promised that his security forces would disarm Rwandan military personnel in Zaire and would not allow Zairian territory to be used to destabilize Rwanda. Mobutu's "pledges" on this and many other issues, however, have proven in the past to be of questionable value.

In an effort to gain Moroccan agreement to deploy to Zaire, President Clinton will send a personal letter to King Hassan.

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August 2, 1994

6275

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Operation Support Hope to Kigali

The initial contingent of 63 U.S. troops arrived in Kigali over the weekend, just ahead of the visit of Secretary Perry. The troops have begun to secure the Kigali airport and make it 24-hour operational. As a result of the U.S. mission, the capacity of Goma airport has nearly doubled and relief supplies continue to pour in. Under Secretary Moose approved July 29 the resumption of operations at Embassy Kigali. Ambassador Rawson and a skeleton staff will work with the RPF-led government to facilitate the work of Operation Support Hope and to encourage the new Rwandan authorities to create conditions to encourage a return of refugees. The latest report on the situation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda is attached.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment: Rwanda: Advancing the Bridgehead to Kigali

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Rwanda: Advancing the Bridgehead to Kigali

The approval by the President July 29 for the use of Kigali as an additional forward airbridge opens the way for the U.S. to expand the reach of Operation Support Hope. The initial contingent of 63 U.S. military personnel arrived in Kigali over the weekend to secure the airport and make it 24-hour operational. The U.S. European Command estimates that Kigali can handle 25-30 aircraft daily. As of Sunday, 1499 American troops have been deployed to the region in support of the U.S. humanitarian operation.

Secretary Perry's delegation held productive meetings with Rwandan President Bizimungu and Vice President (and Defense Minister) Kagame in Kigali on July 31. The two Rwandan leaders offered full cooperation with the U.S. mission, and guaranteed the security of our forces. The Rwandans also promised that returning refugees would face no retribution. Prime Minister Twagiramungu told General Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, that the new Rwandan government will accept African units associated with the French intervention as part of a UNAMIR II contingent -- a major shift in the RPF's position. Perry also had a useful exchange in Entebbe with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ogata.

In Goma, the U.S. humanitarian operation priorities remain the support of UNHCR and increasing the production of potable water. Water production in the area is increasing, as is the ability to deliver it to the camps. U.S. equipment produced 157,000 gallons of water yesterday, and we delivered 155,000 gallons. Refugees continue to cross back into Rwanda: UNHCR estimates that 10,000 returned on July 27, and an additional 15,000 returned on July 28. The senior UNHCR representative in Goma believes that the total number of refugees in the Goma area has been closer to 700,000 than the widely-employed figure of 1.2 million. Refugees continue to leave the French "safe zone" in southwestern Rwanda for Bukavu. Following Prime Minister Balladur's trip to the region over the weekend, however, the French position on withdrawal of their forces before August 22 has become more supple and less categorical. Recent statements by Balladur and French Defense Minister Leotard indicate that the French withdrawal will be coordinated with UNAMIR in order to minimize the fragile calm in the "safe zone."

Ambassador Ginsberg met August 1 with King Hassan to discuss the possible deployment of Moroccan troops to Zaire to provide security in the refugee camps. The King evinced some concerns about the use of his troops in Zaire, but did not give a clear refusal. Assistant Secretary Moose may travel to Rabat following his trip to central Africa to weigh in with the Moroccans if this could help speed the dispatch of Hassan's troops to Zaire.

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P1/(b)(1)

Intelligence Report

Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology — *2 August 1994*

Rwanda: International Humanitarian Donations P1/(b)(1)

Rwanda: International Humanitarian Donations

Since early April, the international community has contributed almost $700 million to Rwandan crisis relief, according to P1/(b)(1) press reports.

- The European Union and its member states have contributed over $440 million--over 60 percent of all donations to date.
- Japan, Sweden, Canada, and Switzerland have also contributed substantial amounts.
- In addition to cash, many countries have donated food, medical supplies, and transportation equipment. Twelve countries--including Australia, Belgium, Italy, and Russia--have donated aircraft for humanitarian purposes. P1/(b)(1)

More than one-half of the donations have come since 22 July, when the UN Secretary General appealed for additional aid for the crisis.

- Following the UN appeal, Japan more than quadrupled its contributions and Germany doubled its donations, according to press.
- In addition, since the Secretary General's appeal, the number of countries assisting increased; the Czech Republic, Israel, South Korea, and Egypt--among others--have joined the countries making donations to Rwanda.
- Nevertheless, donations since the appeal total $360 million--still well short of the $434 million requested. P1/(b)(1)

This report was prepared by P3/(b)(3) Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology.

P1/(b)(1), P3/(b)(3)

PSM 220-94

P1/(b)(1)
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Rwanda: Humanitarian Activities By Area, July 1994



Services Provided

- Food, supplementary food, and/or distribution
- Medical services and supplies
- Water programs and system repairs
- Non-food items and distribution
- Unaccompanied children services
- Sanitation
- Transportation

Relief Agencies

AICF	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AMDA	Association of Medical Doctors for Asia
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
AOC	Air Operations Cell
ARC	American Refugee Committee
CARE	Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere
Caritas	Catholic Organizations for Charitable and Social Action
CD	Catholic Diocese, local
CI	Compassion International
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
EDZ	Eglise du Christ au Zaire
GED	German Emergency Doctors
GOAL	Irish GOAL
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Socities
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IMC	International Medical Corps
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
LZ	Local Zairois
MDM	Medecins du Monde
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
/Bel	Belgium
/Fr	France
/Dut	The Netherlands
/Int	International
/Sp	Spain
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres
RRC	Rwanda Red Cross
SCF/UK	Save the Children Fund/UK
SOS	SOS International
SP	Samaritan's Purse
TDH	Terre des Homme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program
WR	World Relief
WVRD	World Vision Relief and Development

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1994

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6314

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Rwanda Relief Continues

The U.S. and international relief operation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda continues to mitigate the humanitarian crisis in the region. The refugee numbers, however, remain of concern, and a clear picture of the flow back into Rwanda has yet to emerge. Kigali airport is now 24-hour operational; since the arrival of the U.S. troops, 31 relief flights have landed 105 tons of humanitarian aid. The U.S. remains seized with the issue of security in the refugee camps in Zaire: King Hassan has expressed reluctance to commit troops to Zaire, and reporting from a variety of sources suggests that the former Rwandan armed forces remain encamped together under a semblance of order and discipline. The latest report on the situation in eastern Zaire and Rwanda is attached.

Thank you for your assistance.

Max Robinson
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

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Rwanda: Relief, Refugees and Security

Kigali airport is now 24-hour operational, paving the way for an expansion of the U.S. and international humanitarian missions to the region. Since the arrival over the weekend of U.S. military personnel, 31 relief flights have landed carrying 105 tons of humanitarian supplies. As in Goma, the supply of water for the Rwandan capital is a critical issue. Although the delivery system is largely functional in Kigali, power is problematic. The U.S. has agreed to furnish up to 10,000 liters of diesel fuel for ten days to run the generators, and water could begin to flow as early as August 3.

The refugee situation in eastern Zaire remains in flux. UNHCR figures for August 2 reflect more accurate reporting and counting by UNHCR and NGO field personnel. UNHCR estimates that the Rwandan diaspora has approached 2 million, with Zaire home to an estimated 1.4 million refugees. In and around Goma the figures have closed in on a median figure between the widely-employed number of 1.2 million and our August 1 (under) estimate of 700,000: UNHCR now believes that about 925,000 Rwandan refugee remain in the Goma area. Further to the south, there are more than 400,000 Rwandan refugees concentrated around Bukavu and Uvira.

Security in the camps in Zaire remains a major concern. King Hassan of Morocco has demonstrated little enthusiasm for a deployment of his troops to provide security in the refugee camps in and around Goma and Bukavu, although the Moroccans seem willing to provide other forms of humanitarian relief. Ambassador Ginsberg believes it highly unlikely that Hassan will yield on the troop issue unless the President or Vice President make a personal appeal. Ginsberg does not, for the present, recommend such a call, but Under Secretary Wirth reported today that the NSC might recommend a POTUS-Hassan call (or a presidential letter). The Moroccan demurral takes on particular significance in light of disturbing reports of former Rwandan armed forces encamped together in Zaire under relatively disciplined command. A food riot at a camp near Kibumba, possibly incited by Hutu militia, also underscores the need for rapid deployment of external security forces.

The RPF-led government continues to make encouraging noises on reconciliation and deployment of UNAMIR II. UNAMIR commander General Dallaire told the U.S. today that the RPF had agreed that the Ghanaian contingent could move into the French "safe zone" upon the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise troops. According to Dallaire, the RPF further agreed that its forces would not deploy to the southwest (a move which could precipitate another wave of refugees). Finally, both the RPF military leaders and the new Rwandan civilian authorities have agreed to permit African troops engaged with the French in Operation Turquoise to don "blue helmets" and join UNAMIR II at the conclusion of the French-led mission.

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