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THE CHAIRMAN

February 27, 1995

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Crime  
Community  
Policing

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

LAURA D. TYSON

*Laura D. Tyson*

SUBJECT:

Crime Study

Attached is a copy of the crime study that was discussed in this morning's Weekly Economic Briefing.

Attachment: a/s

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## BUSINESS, CONSUMER, AND REGIONAL ROUNDUP

**FOMC Sees Continued Growth, Small Uptick in Inflation.** Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan testified this week that he and his fellow members of the Federal Open Market Committee expect real GDP growth to slow from 4 percent in 1994 to a more sustainable pace of between 2 and 3 percent this year. Growth at that rate should be fast enough, in their view, to hold the unemployment rate in the neighborhood of 5-1/2 percent. At the same time, they expect consumer price inflation to edge up only slightly, to between 3 and 3-1/2 percent. (On all three counts, the Fed's outlook is similar to the Administration's recently published forecast.) Greenspan also emphasized the uncertainties inherent in making monetary policy: "Events will rarely unfold exactly as we foresee them, and we need to be flexible—to be willing to adjust our stance as the weight of new information suggests it is no longer appropriate." In a speech delivered a few days earlier, Vice Chairman Alan Blinder sounded an even more cautious note. Blinder said he sees the macroeconomic risks currently as roughly balanced between inflation and recession. He reaffirmed his belief that last year's preemptive strike on inflation was the proper policy move, but went on to say that "... when you embark on a course like that, you should know when to stop and be prepared to make a preemptive strike against recession as well."

**Proof That Adding Police Reduces Crime.** It seems obvious that increasing the number of police on the streets should reduce the number of serious crimes committed. But real world data seem to show just the opposite: Cities with the highest crime rates also have the most police per capita. What's going on? The perverse association between crime rates and police intensity reflects the fact that high crime rates cause cities to put lots of police on the streets—not that having lots of police induces additional crime. A new study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research isolates the effect of police on crime by exploiting the fact that police staffing rises much more in election years (both mayoral and gubernatorial) than in non-election years. The conclusion: In large cities, each additional sworn officer reduces the societal costs of crime by at least \$100,000 per year.

**Employers Cast a Vote of No-Confidence in Educational System.** A new nationwide survey of 3,000 private firms with 20 or more employees reveals that, in interviewing candidates for non-supervisory positions, companies pay little attention to an applicant's formal educational experience. When asked to rank 11 factors according to their importance in hiring decisions, employers listed the top three as the applicant's "attitude" (easily the most important factor), communication skills, and previous work experience. Least important to employers were the applicant's academic credentials—grades, school attended, and teacher recommendations. These results contrast with the pattern in Japan, where employers screening job candidates weigh academic performance heavily.

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

USING ELECTORAL CYCLES IN  
POLICE HIRING TO ESTIMATE THE  
EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME

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USING ELECTORAL CYCLES IN  
POLICE HIRING TO ESTIMATE THE  
EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME

ABSTRACT

Previous empirical studies have typically uncovered little evidence that police reduce crime. One problem with those studies is a failure to adequately deal with the simultaneity between police and crime: while police may or may not reduce crime, there is little doubt that expenditures on police forces are an increasing function of the crime rate. In this study, the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections is used to identify the effect of police on crime. This paper first demonstrates that increases in the size of police forces disproportionately occur in mayoral and gubernatorial election years, a relationship that had previously gone undocumented. After controlling for changes in government spending on other social programs, there is little reason to think that elections will be otherwise correlated with crime, making elections ideal instruments. Using a panel of large U.S. cities from 1970-1992, police are shown to reduce crime for six of the seven crime categories examined. Each additional police officer is estimated to eliminate eight to ten serious crimes. Existing estimates of the costs of crime suggest that the social benefit of reduced crime is approximately \$100,000 per officer per year, implying that the current number of police is below the optimal level.

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Crime is a major social and economic issue in the United States. The cost of crime to victims is estimated at approximately \$200 billion per year (Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 1993). The indirect costs of crime are also substantial. Government outlays on the criminal justice system totaled \$74 billion in 1990, including \$32 billion on police protection. Private expenditures on self-protection are on the same order of magnitude.

Following the seminal contribution of Becker (1968), a large literature has addressed issues of criminal behavior and sanctions (e.g., Stigler 1970, Ehrlich 1973, Witte 1980, Myers 1983, McCormick and Tollison 1984, Andreoni 1991). One of the most surprising empirical results in this literature is the repeated failure to uncover evidence that an increase in the number of police reduces the crime rate. Of the twenty-two studies surveyed by Cameron (1988) that attempt to estimate a direct relationship between police and crime using variation across cities, eighteen find either no relationship or a positive (i.e. incorrectly signed) relationship between the two.<sup>1</sup>

There are many reasons to suspect that existing estimates of the relationship between police and crime are biased against finding that police reduce crime. The primary source of bias is the clear simultaneity between police and crime rates (Fisher and Nagin 1978).<sup>2</sup> If more

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to cross-sectional studies, there are two other sources of evidence. Quasi-experimental evidence from a study performed in Kansas City in the early 1970's found no statistically significant difference in crime when the number of police assigned to fifteen different patrol beats were varied (Kelling et al. 1974). Analysis of police on the New York subway system in the 1960's suggests that an increased police presence reduces the number of robberies slightly, but at an extremely high taxpayer cost per crime eliminated (Wilson 1983). Also, Tauchen et al. (1993) find a deterrent effect of police resources in an analysis that combines individual-level information on arrests with aggregate information on police.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, in a recent survey of the effect of police on crime, Sherman (1992) dismisses studies of the level of police resources based on cross-sectional variation in a footnote due to this

police are hired when crime is increasing, a positive correlation between police and crime can emerge, even if police reduce crime. The 1994 Crime Bill provides a good case study. In response to opinion polls ranking crime as the number one problem facing the country, a crime bill authorizing funding for an additional 100,000 police officers was passed into law.

Similarly, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity across cities will impart an upward bias on cross-sectional estimates of police effectiveness. Cities that have a high level of underlying criminality are likely to have both high crime rates and large police forces. Detroit, for instance, has twice as many police officers per capita as Omaha, and a violent crime rate over four times as high, but it would be a mistake to attribute the differences in crime rates to the presence of the police.

A final source of bias against finding that police reduce crime is the use of *reported* crimes rather than *actual* crimes in empirical studies, due to the lack of availability of the true measure. Victimization surveys find that only thirty-eight percent of all crimes are reported to the police. Even for a serious crime such as robbery, reporting rates are only 54.5 percent.<sup>3</sup> As the police presence increases, reporting rates may rise if the perceived likelihood of a crime being solved increases. Furthermore, police officers have a great deal of discretion in choosing whether or not to make arrests in many cases such as domestic disputes. It is possible that the likelihood of arrest for a given incident decreases with the officer's workload, which may in turn be a function of the level of police staffing.

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criticism, instead focusing on policing strategies.

<sup>3</sup> Definitions of the crime categories used in this study, the same as those employed by the FBI in gathering Uniform Crime Reports, are presented in the appendix.

This paper develops a methodology that goes well beyond the existing literature on the topic in dealing with the first two sources of bias: simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity.<sup>4</sup> The primary innovation of the paper is the way in which it deals with the simultaneity between police and crime. In order to identify the effect of police on crime, a variable is required that is correlated with changes in the police force, but does not belong directly in the crime "production function." The instruments employed in this paper are the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections.

Section II of this paper documents an electoral cycle in police force staffing that was previously unrecognized in the literature. Increases in the size of police forces in large cities are disproportionately concentrated in mayoral and gubernatorial election years. For instance, the mean percentage change in sworn police officers for the cities in my sample is 2.6% in gubernatorial election years, 2.2% in mayoral election years, and only 0.4% in non-election years. That relationship persists after controlling for a variety of demographic, socio-economic and economic factors.

If elections are to serve as valid instruments, then they must be uncorrelated with crime, except through variables that are included in the equation explaining crime. The most obvious ways in which elections might systematically affect the crime rate (other than through changes in the police force) are through electoral cycles in other types of social spending, or through politically induced fluctuations in economic performance. Consequently, spending on education and public welfare programs are included in the equations, as are state unemployment rates.

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<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, data restrictions make it impossible to adequately address the bias from changes in reporting behavior in the current analysis. To the extent that reporting bias is present, the results of this paper understate the effectiveness of police.

Having controlled for those factors, it seems plausible to argue that election timing will be otherwise unrelated to crime. Tests of overidentifying restrictions support that claim.

The second source of bias in estimates of police effectiveness, unobserved heterogeneity in underlying criminality across cities and over time, is dealt with in three ways. First, concerns over differences across cities are eliminated by including city-fixed effects in all specifications so that the parameters are identified only using within-city variation over time. Secondly, city-level trends are also included to account for the fact that some cities have become more dangerous over time, while others have not. These city-level trends explain a substantial portion of the variance in crime rates. Furthermore, their inclusion has a large effect (in the predicted direction) on estimates of police effectiveness, lending support to the claim that the number of police responds to rising and falling crime rates in a city. Third, socio-economic and demographic controls are included in the analysis to capture variation in a city's population over time. These controls included the percent of the population that is black, the percent of female headed households, and the percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 (the age group most likely to engage in criminal activities).

The results of the paper, based on a panel of 59 large cities over the period 1970-1992,<sup>5</sup> suggest that sworn police officers reduce crime, and the magnitude of that reduction is both substantively important and statistically significant. Point estimates are negative for six of the seven crime categories examined (murder and non-negligible manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Larceny is the only crime that has

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<sup>5</sup> These cities represent all U.S. cities with directly elected mayors and a population of over 250,000 at some point in the time period analyzed.

an unexpected (but statistically insignificant) positive sign. The elasticities of crime with respect to the number of sworn officers range from 0.06 to -1.23 across the various crimes. Civilian employees of police forces, in contrast, appear to have a negligible effect on reported crime.

Estimated at the means of the data, each additional sworn police officer reduces the number of crimes across the various categories by eight to ten per year. Using estimates of the costs of crime to victims developed by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993), the value to society of eliminating those crimes is approximately \$90,000-\$130,000 per officer per year, suggesting that the current number of police officers in large cities is below the socially optimal level.

While the particular focus of this paper is on the issue of police and crime, the methodology employed here, namely the use of political variation to identify the effects of public policies, may prove to be of much broader applicability. Because public policies emerge from a political process, electoral cycles and differences in political institutions are logical instruments for public policy changes. To the extent that the timing of elections and political institutions are relatively fixed, such instruments may provide a more plausibly exogenous source of variation than either cross-sectional or time-series analyses.

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section I summarizes the data set used in the analysis. The second section demonstrates a positive correlation between changes in the size of the police force and both city mayoral races and gubernatorial elections. Section III presents the estimates of the effect of police on crime using the variation in police staffing due to electoral cycles to identify the parameters. Section IV attempts to place a social value on the reduction in crime, and considers the public policy implications of the results. Section V offers

a brief conclusion.

### Section I: The Data

The data used are a panel of 59 U.S. cities, with observations running from 1970-1992. These cities represent all U.S. cities satisfying two criteria: (i) the city population exceeds 250,000 at some point in the time period analyzed, and (ii) the mayor is directly elected. Because mayoral elections are critical to identifying the model, six cities (Cincinnati, Virginia Beach, Norfolk, Wichita, Santa Ana, and Colorado Springs) that satisfy the population cut-off, but do not have direct election of mayors, are excluded from the sample.

Data on crime are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI, and are available annually on a city-level basis for seven types of crime: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Precise definitions of the crimes are presented in the appendix. Data on the number of police, both sworn officers and civilian employees, are also taken from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Sworn officers carry a gun and have the power of arrest; civilian employees do not.

Summary statistics on police and crime for the cities in the sample, expressed in values per 100,000 population, are presented in Table 1. Overall, there is slightly less than one reported crime per ten individuals, the majority of which are relatively minor property crimes.<sup>6</sup> Violent crime rates for the cities in the sample are more than twice as high as for the nation as

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<sup>6</sup> In fact, this number greatly understates the true crime rate for two reasons. First, less than half of all crimes are reported to the police. Secondly, when multiple offenses occur in the commission of a single crime, the FBI only records the most serious of these offenses. Thus, if a robber kills someone in the process of a hold-up, and then steals a car to flee the scene, only the murder would be included in the FBI statistics.

a whole; property crimes per capita are almost twice as frequent in these cities. One notable feature of the data on reported crime is the wide variation across cities. The crime rates for an individual crime category often vary by orders of magnitude across cities. While some of this variation is probably attributable to differences in crime definitions and reporting, the variation is nonetheless striking.<sup>7</sup> There are almost 300 police per 100,000 population, approximately 80% of whom are sworn officers.

Figure 1 shows the time series (in per capita terms) of violent crime, property crime, and sworn officers for the cities in the sample. In each case, the 1970 value of the category is indexed as 100. Violent crime has seen the greatest increase, more than doubling in these cities between 1970 and 1992. Until the mid 1980's, violent crime and property crime tracked each other fairly closely. Since that time, violent crime has steadily increased, while property crime has flattened.<sup>8</sup> The number of sworn officers has grown less rapidly than crime rates.

In addition to the data on police and crime, a number of demographic, government spending, and economic variables are included in the regressions. Ideally, those variables would be available at

the city-level on an annual basis. Unfortunately, the data limitations with respect to city-level data necessitate a number of compromises. While city populations are available annually, the only convenient data source for the percent of a city's population that is black and the percent

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<sup>7</sup> Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1994) undertake an in-depth analysis of this issue.

<sup>8</sup> Victimization surveys, unlike the reported crime statistics used in this analysis, show a declining trend in crime rates per capita (for the nation as a whole). Unfortunately, more disaggregated data on victimization is not available. For an extensive discussion of crime data in the United States, see O'Brien (1985).

living in female headed households is the decennial census. Consequently, a linear interpolation of those variables is made for non-census years. Since demographic variables tend to evolve slowly, this may serve as a reasonable approximation. The data on the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 used in this paper is also linearly interpolated from the decennial census, and suffers from the further defect that it is defined at the SMSA rather than city level.

Data on government spending for education and public welfare programs has a different complication. While annual city government outlays on such programs are available, less than ten percent of total state and local expenditures on both of those categories originate at the city level.<sup>9</sup> State outlays, however, are not broken down according to the city that receives the money. Therefore, the spending variables that are employed in this paper are combined state and local outlays per capita (in 1992 dollars) on a particular category in a given state and year. While this variable misses some of the city-level variation, it is assumed that any mayoral election cycles in such spending will be small since city budgets for such activities are also small. Finally, annual state unemployment rates are used to control for economic fluctuations. Summary statistics for the various control variables described above are presented in Table 2.

## Section II: Mayoral and Gubernatorial Election Cycles in Police Staffing

There are many reasons to suspect a link between elections and the timing of changes in the size of city police forces, particularly in big cities. First, crime is a critical political issue

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<sup>9</sup> In 1992, only eight of the fifty-nine cities in the sample spent an appreciable amount on education. Local school boards are typically financed independently from city governments.

in these cities, and has been since the crime rate began to rise in the early 1960s. Crime consistently ranks among the most important issues facing the nation in opinion surveys, and is frequently *the* most critical issue when the economy is performing well. Given the importance of crime as a political issue, incumbents will have incentives to increase the police force in advance of elections, either in hopes of actually reducing crime, or simply to demonstrate that they are "tough on crime."<sup>10</sup>

For mayors, especially, police are an ideal target for political manipulation since police departments are organized at the city level with only a few exceptions.<sup>11</sup> That both gives ultimate decision-making authority on police issues to the mayor, and also means that credit or blame concerning police performance are easily traced to the mayor by voters. Furthermore, the high rate of turnover among police officers (who can typically retire after 20 years with a full pension) and the ease of altering the size of an incoming class of cadets makes both upward and downward shifts in the size of the police force easy to accomplish. In contrast, a city's economic performance is largely outside the control of the mayor. For that reason, it is not clear that voters hold mayors responsible for a city's economic situation; Chubb (1988) finds that even governors bear little responsibility for the state economy in the eyes of voters.

While the motives of incumbent governors are likely to be similar to those of incumbent mayors, the mechanism by which governors might affect levels of city police staffing are less straightforward since the state government does not typically directly hire local police. State

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<sup>10</sup> Monkkonen (1992) details various other political uses of urban police forces over the last century, although no mention is made of election cycles in police staffing.

<sup>11</sup> In recent years, a few cities have formed a joint force with surrounding communities. Nashville, for instance, shares its police force with Davidson County.

governments do, however, provide substantial local aid to city governments (representing more than 20 percent of general revenues for large cities), as well as a more limited amount of intergovernmental grants tied specifically to local law enforcement. Besley and Case (1994) document gubernatorial election cycles for a range of fiscal variables. Although intergovernmental grants is not among the categories Besley and Case (1994) examine, the existence of cycles in intergovernmental grants would not be implausible in light of their other results.

Empirically, changes in the size of police forces do indeed tend to mirror the political cycle in large cities. A simple comparison of the mean percentage change in the number of police officers in the sample across election and non-election years reflects this pattern (standard deviations in parentheses):

	<u>%Δ Overall Police</u>	<u>%Δ Sworn Officers</u>	<u>%Δ Civilian Employees</u>
Gubernatorial Election Year (N=349)	2.8 (0.3)	2.6 (0.3)	4.5 (1.1)
Mayoral Election Year (N=402)	2.8 (0.3)	2.2 (0.3)	5.1 (1.0)
No Election (N=629)	0.7 (0.2)	0.4 (0.2)	2.2 (0.9)

Overall, police forces grow by 2.8 percent on average (with a standard error of 0.3) in

either gubernatorial or mayoral election years, but only 0.7 percent (with a standard error of 0.2) in non-election years.<sup>12</sup> Dividing police forces between sworn officers and civilians reveals similar patterns for both categories, although the standard errors on civilian employees are much larger.

Figure 2 provides a year-by-year comparison of increases in sworn officers for cities with elections in a given year (either mayoral or gubernatorial) and cities without elections.<sup>13</sup> While there is substantial year-to-year variability in the average change in the number of sworn officers, cities with elections in the current year exhibit higher rates of increase (or smaller decreases) in 20 of the 23 years. If changes in sworn officers are independent across cities and are unrelated to the timing of elections, the likelihood that cities holding elections would have higher rates of increase in 20 of 23 cases is less than one in 4,000.<sup>14</sup>

Another way of examining the robustness of the relationship between sworn officers and elections is to analyze the data on a city-by-city basis. A full list of cities, along with information on mean changes in sworn officers in gubernatorial, mayoral, and non-election years is provided in the Appendix. Excluding Washington D.C., which does not have gubernatorial elections, 43 of the 58 cities in the sample have higher mean rates of increase in gubernatorial

<sup>12</sup> Approximately 3% of the observations in the sample have both mayoral elections and gubernatorial elections in the same year. Consequently, there is a small amount of double-counting in these simple averages. The patterns are unaltered if such observations are discarded.

<sup>13</sup> Throughout the paper the analysis will tend to focus on sworn officers rather than civilian police employees. This is partly because of an a priori expectation that sworn officers will have a greater impact on crime, and partly because empirically the link between elections and sworn officers is stronger.

<sup>14</sup> Of course, changes in police forces across cities are not truly independent since grants from state to local governments will tend to covary for cities in the same state.

election years compared to years in which there are neither gubernatorial or mayoral elections. If cities represent independent observations, the odds of this pattern are less than one in 5,000 if elections do not affect police hiring. 39 of the 59 cities have greater mean increases in sworn officers in mayoral election years versus non-election years (with one tie).<sup>14</sup> Again assuming independence across cities, the likelihood of this pattern is less than one in 150 if mayoral elections have no effect on police staffing.

Those simple averages, of course, do not take into account possible correlation between the timing of elections and other factors that might influence growth of the police force, such as the state of the economy. It is also possible that election cycles in police staffing exhibit a more complicated structure than simply being high in election years and low in non-election years. Different patterns may also emerge in cities that have two year mayoral terms rather than four year terms.

To incorporate those possibilities, the relationship between police and elections is modeled more formally as follows:

$$P_{it} = E_{it}\theta + X_{it}\delta + \gamma_t + \lambda_i + v_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $P_{it}$  is the percent change in the relevant police staffing category for city  $i$  in year  $t$ ,  $E$  is a matrix of indicator variables corresponding to the years of the mayoral and gubernatorial election cycle, and  $X$  is a matrix of covariates.

Table 3 presents three sets of regression estimates of equation (1) corresponding to

overall police, sworn officers, and civilian police employees. The regressions in Table 3 allow a different intercept for each year of the election cycle for both mayoral and gubernatorial elections. The effect of mayoral election years is also allowed to vary according to whether the mayor's term is two or four years. All election coefficients are relative to the relevant omitted category, which in each case is the year directly following an election. Year indicators are included in the regressions, removing any national-level shocks to police hiring. City-fixed effects are also included; therefore the parameters are identified using only within-city variation over time.

A strong relationship between election years and police hiring continues to hold for overall police and sworn officers after controlling for the other factors. For instance, sworn officers are estimated to increase by an additional 1.3% in mayoral election years (relative to the year after the election) in cities with two year mayoral terms. For cities with four year mayoral terms, sworn officers increase by an extra 1.0 percent in election years, and also exhibit some tendency towards greater than average growth in the year prior to an election year. The individual mayoral election year coefficients are only marginally statistically significant, but are jointly significant at the .05 level in both columns (1) and (2). The largest electoral effects are for gubernatorial election years, in which sworn officers increase by an additional 3.0 percent. There is some evidence that sworn officers also increase disproportionately two years before gubernatorial elections, although there is not a strong election cycle rationalization for such a result.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Following Besley and Case (1994), who find differential tax and fiscal behavior by incumbent governors conditional on the presence of binding term limits, I divided governors between those constrained from seeking re-election and those who are not constrained. While

While the election coefficients are positive for civilian police employees, the estimates are both individually and jointly statistically insignificant due in part to imprecise estimates. That result is not surprising. To the extent that only sworn officers have a direct impact on crime, one would expect that political manipulation of police departments would be concentrated on sworn officers.

The other variables in the regression are generally statistically insignificant and carry coefficients that are substantively small. The exception to that pattern is the state unemployment rate, which has a statistically significant negative coefficient in columns (1) and (2). For each percentage point increase in unemployment, the predicted growth rate in the police force declines by over three-tenths of a percentage point.

#### Section IV: Estimating the Effect of Police on Crime

The preceding section demonstrates a correlation between elections and changes in the police force. In order for election timing to serve as an instrument to identify the effect of police on crime, it must also be the case that elections are validly excluded from the crime "production function." The primary reason that such an exclusion might be invalid would be a failure to control for other variables that are both correlated with crime and also affected by electoral cycles. In particular, spending on public welfare or education might fall into that category since such spending may have effects on criminal activities by changing the opportunity sets of potential criminals. It is also possible that state and local elections induce economic

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there was some evidence in the raw data that unconstrained governors induce more extreme cycles in police hiring, the restriction of identical behavior could not be rejected in the specifications shown in Table 3.

fluctuations akin to the political business cycle observed at the national level (Alesina and Sachs 1988). In estimating a relationship between police and crime, therefore, controls are included for state and local spending on both public welfare and education, as well as state unemployment rates. Having controlled for such factors, election cycles would appear to be plausible instruments.

Another potential source of upward bias in estimating a relationship between police and crime is unobserved heterogeneity across cities and over time. Three steps are taken to deal with such heterogeneity. First, city-level fixed effects are included in all specifications. Thus, the coefficients are identified using only within-city variation over time, lessening concern over the possible omission of explanatory variables that systematically vary across cities, and also avoiding the problem of non-comparability of reported crime statistics across cities (O'Brien 1985). Second, city-level trends are included to account for the fact that large changes in the underlying criminality of a given city can occur over time. Per capita crime in Jersey City increased by over 250% between 1970 and 1992. In contrast, San Jose saw a 30% decrease in per capita crime over the same period. For all of the crime categories examined, the city trends are jointly statistically significant at the .01 level, as are the city-fixed effects. Finally, year dummies and demographic controls are included in the analysis to further capture variation in a city's situation over time.

The effect of police on crime is allowed to enter both contemporaneously and with a one-year lag.<sup>16</sup> From a theoretical perspective, increases in the police force may affect crime with a lag. Police reduce crime either via deterrence (preventing the commission of the initial crime

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<sup>16</sup> Inclusion of longer lags did not substantially alter the findings.

due to an increased likelihood of being caught), or through incapacitation (catching repeat offenders so they cannot commit future crimes). If there are lags in the response of criminal behavior to the probability of being caught, the deterrence effect will not be immediate. Similarly, the benefits of incapacitation are realized for as long as the offender is in jail. On a purely practical level, another reason for including lagged changes in the police force is the staggered nature of the available data. Data on reported crimes are collected on a calendar year basis, whereas the size of the police force is a snapshot as of October 31st.<sup>17</sup> As a consequence, if changes in the police force occur shortly before October 31st, there is little opportunity for those changes to affect crime in the current year.

The impact of police on crime is estimated using two-stage least squares, treating the police variables as endogenous and the other right-hand side variables as exogenous. The particular form of the equations to be estimated are as follows:

$$C_{it} = P_{it}\beta + X_{it}\eta + t\theta_i + \gamma_t + \lambda_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$P_{it} = E_{it}\phi_i + X_{it}\delta + \gamma'_t + \lambda'_i + t\omega_i + \epsilon'_{it} \quad (3)$$

where  $C_{it}$  is the (logged) number of crimes in a given category in city  $i$  in year  $t$ ,  $P$  is a matrix of (logged) contemporaneous and lagged sworn and civilian police staffing variables,  $X$  is a

matrix of covariates, and  $E$  is a matrix of election year indicators. Equations 2 and 3 also include year dummies, city-fixed effects, and city-level trends. The effect of police on crime is identified via the election year indicator variables that are included in the first stage equation (equation 3), but excluded from the second stage (equation 2).

In the empirical estimation, the effect of mayoral elections on police staffing is allowed to vary across cities and the effect of gubernatorial elections is allowed to vary across states. In other words, mayoral elections in Miami are allowed to have a different effect on changes in the police force than mayoral elections in Chicago, but every mayoral election in Miami is assumed to have the same effect on the police force. Gubernatorial elections are constrained to have the same effect on police in San Jose and San Francisco, but can have different effects across states. A priori, there is no reason to believe that different mayors or governors have either equal incentives or equal capability to manipulate the police force for political purposes. Further justification for allowing the effects of elections to vary across cities is that the restriction of equal  $\phi$ 's across all cities in equation 3 is rejected at the .01 level for sworn officers.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to using such a large set of instruments. Allowing election cycles to vary by city exploits the available information more efficiently, leading to smaller standard errors than would be obtained with a more limited set of instruments. A second benefit of allowing electoral effects to vary by city is that it generates a large number of testable overidentifying restrictions. One cost of having so many instruments is that it may lead to estimates that are biased in the same direction as those obtained using OLS. If the true relationship between elections and the police force is identical across all cities, then allowing that

<sup>17</sup> The fact that the size of the police force is reported as of October 31st is quite fortuitous for this analysis since most mayoral elections and all gubernatorial elections occur in early November.

relationship to vary by city will tend to pick up "bad" variation: cities that exhibit strong electoral fluctuations in police under that scenario will tend to be the cities that (by chance) had increases in criminality in election years.<sup>18</sup> In the limit, where there is a separate instrument for each observation in the data set, two stage least squares is identical to OLS. A second drawback of having so many instruments is that convergence to asymptotic properties occurs slowly when the correlation between the instruments and the variables that are instrumented for is low (Staiger and Stock 1993). While that critique is unlikely to apply to the estimated coefficients on sworn police officers, where elections are good predictors of staffing changes, it may be quite relevant to the estimates on civilian employees where the explanatory power of electoral cycles is much lower.

Table 4 presents the results of two stage least squares estimation of equation (2) for each of the seven individual crime categories. In all specifications, feasible generalized least squares is used to take into account heteroskedasticity across cities. For simplicity, only the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged changes in police (as well as the appropriate standard errors) are reported. Since the dependent variable and the police variables are both in logs, those sums represent the estimated elasticity of crime for each category with respect to sworn and civilian police employees respectively.

The first row of Table 4 presents the estimated elasticity of various types of crime to sworn police officers. The point estimates range from 0.06 to -1.23. The estimated elasticities

are negative for six of the seven crime categories.<sup>19</sup> Only larceny carries a positive (but statistically insignificant) coefficient. For three crime categories (murder, robbery, and motor vehicle theft), the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for rape is statistically significant at the .10 level.

In contrast to sworn officers, civilian employees appear to have little systematic effect on crime, although this result must be interpreted with caution given the poor performance of the instruments in the first stage. The estimated elasticities are evenly distributed between positive and negative signs. Interestingly, the two crime categories where civilian police have the largest negative impact are burglary and larceny, the least serious of the offenses included in the analysis, and precisely the crimes where increases in sworn officers had little impact.

Because the election cycle variables that serve as instruments are allowed to vary by city, the specifications in Table 4 are overidentified, allowing for a test of the exogeneity of the extra instruments. To test those restrictions, the residuals from the second stage regression of TSLS are regressed on all of the exogenous variables included in the specification, as well as the full set of election-cycle instruments. The test statistic for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is computed as  $N \cdot R^2$  where  $N$  is the number of observations and  $R^2$  is the unadjusted R-squared from the regression of the residuals on the exogenous variables and the instruments. That test statistic is distributed  $\chi^2$  with degrees of freedom equal to the number of

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<sup>19</sup> A similar pattern holds when looking at the contemporaneous and once-lagged effects of sworn officers individually, rather than at the sum of those values. For all of the crime categories except murder and larceny, the contemporaneous and once-lagged coefficients are both negative and of similar magnitudes. For murder, the contemporaneous effect of sworn officers is .03 (with a standard error of .25), whereas the lagged effect is -.66 (with a standard error of .24). For larceny, the contemporaneous effect is slightly positive, while the lagged effect is slightly negative. Both estimates are statistically insignificant.

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<sup>18</sup> Experimentation with reduced sets of instruments did not reveal any systematic tendency for the 2SLS estimates to move further away from the OLS estimates.

overidentifying restrictions, in this case 208. For all seven categories, the test statistic is well within conventional bounds. The highest value of the test statistic, obtained for murder, is significant at only the .25 level. The inability to reject the overidentifying restrictions reinforces the intuition that election cycles are a reasonable choice of instrument.

The other coefficients in Table 4 are also of interest, although the results are mixed. In six of the seven specifications, the estimated elasticity of crime with respect to population is positive, although generally less than one. The restriction implied by estimating the relationship between police and crime in per capita terms is easily rejected for all of the crime categories.<sup>20</sup>

The percentage of the population that is black is generally negatively correlated with crime, while the percentage of female headed households has a generally positive effect on crime. Because of the extremely high positive correlation between those variables ( $\rho = .86$ ), however, it is somewhat difficult to interpret those coefficients separately. The percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 has the expected positive sign for all crimes except rape and murder. A one standard deviation change in that variable (1.5 percentage points) translates into an increase of more than 10% in the number of robberies and motor vehicle thefts, and an increase in excess of 5% for burglaries and larcenies.

Spending on public welfare programs carries a small negative coefficient across all of the specifications, implying that increased public welfare spending reduces crime. In contrast, education spending per capita has a positive effect in crime. One explanation for this result is

<sup>20</sup> Estimating equation (2) in per capita terms is equivalent to imposing the restriction that  $\beta_3 = 1 - \beta_1 - \beta_2 - \beta_3 - \beta_4$ . (To see this, impose that restriction on equation (2), subtract  $\ln(\text{population})$  from both sides, and rearrange terms to obtain a per capita regression.)

that educational spending is serving as a proxy for the age distribution of the population.

Changes in the unemployment rate appear to have a substantial effect on crimes where monetary gain is the primary motivation (robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft), but have little effect on "crimes of passion." A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a jump of more than one percent in the larceny, and burglary rates. Those elasticities are generally larger than those obtained using national-level time-series data (Cantor and Land 1985, Devine et al. 1988). Evaluated at the 1992 sample means, a one percentage point increase in unemployment leads to an additional 106 reported crimes per year per 100,000 population.

In order to understand how the estimates of police impact are affected by the inclusion of city-level trends and instrumenting, Table 5 presents crime-by-crime estimates of the police coefficients from three different specifications. The first specification, presented in rows 1 and 4, includes all of the variables in Table 4 except for city-level trends, and does not instrument with the election cycle. The second specification, in rows 2 and 5, is identical to the first specification except that city-level trends are added. The final specification also instruments using the election variables, and is thus identical to that presented in Table 4. If unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are present, the coefficients should become more negative moving down the columns.

Focusing first on the top three rows corresponding to sworn officers, the effects of controlling for city-level trends and instrumenting are dramatic. In the simplest specification, all seven of the point estimates on sworn officers carry an unexpected positive sign, and the estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level in six of the seven cases. Adding city trends

to control for unobserved variation in cities over time has a large effect on the estimates. Comparing rows 1 and 2, the point estimates are more negative for every crime category in the latter. Five of the seven estimates now have the predicted negative sign. The point estimates are statistically significant at the .05 level for three crimes (robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft), and are statistically significant at the .10 level for both murder and rape. Instrumenting in row 3 leads to further declines in the coefficients in five of the seven categories (but also results in standard errors approximately three times larger than those of the other specifications). It therefore appears that both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of police increases have contributed to the failure of previous studies to uncover negative effects of sworn officers on crime. The effects on civilian police employees in Table 5 are much less dramatic. Adding city-level trends has no systematic effect on the coefficients. Instrumenting does tend to make the estimates more negative.

One possible criticism of the estimates presented thus far is the relatively poor data quality for many of the covariates included in Table 4. A logical question to consider, therefore, is whether the negative relationship between sworn officers and crime is an artifact of the data problems or the particular specification employed. Table 6 re-estimates equation (2) omitting all of the covariates except for city population. It is reassuring that the estimates are virtually identical for all of the crime categories except murder and rape, where the effect of sworn officers remains negative, but is reduced. As before, tests of the overidentifying restrictions are well-within accepted limits, supporting the validity of the instruments, even when no factors are controlled for in the crime equation except for year dummies, city-fixed effects, and city trends.

The negative relationship between sworn officers and crime is robust to two further

alterations to the specification (tabular results are not provided, but full estimates are available from the author on request). First, instrumenting using only gubernatorial elections or only mayoral elections, rather than both, does not systematically affect the estimates, but does increase the standard errors. Second, inclusion of changes in *other* crimes as an explanatory variable in the regressions has little effect on the estimated effect of police. One might expect that changes in other crimes will better reflect changes in the underlying criminality of a city than will the crude demographic controls included in this analysis. While the coefficients on other crimes are generally positive as expected, the relationship between sworn officers and crime is unaltered.

#### Section V: Implications of the Estimated Effects of Police on Crime for Public Policy

While the estimates of the previous section suggest a negative relationship between sworn police officers and crime, those elasticities alone are not sufficient to determine the appropriate policy prescription. A thorough analysis of the public policy question requires careful consideration of at least four further issues. First, one must make an assumption concerning the ability of the police to affect unreported crimes. As long as criminals do not "specialize" in either reported or unreported crime, then the effect of police is likely to be similar across the two classes of crimes. In favor of that argument, a criminal does not know in advance whether a crime will be reported. It may be, however, that unreported crimes systematically differ from reported crimes (e.g., spousal assault tends to be reported less frequently than assaults at bars). If that is the case, an increased police presence may not have a large effect on unreported crimes. Secondly, a valuation must be placed on the social cost of crime. Ideally, that social

cost would include not only the value of stolen property, but also the substantial psychic costs of crime, as well as the marginal costs of precautionary actions taken to avoid being a victim of crime (e.g., home security systems, car alarms, or avoiding Central Park after dark).<sup>21</sup> Third, some consideration must be given to the social value of police activities that are not related to reductions in the subset of crimes considered in this paper. Less than a quarter of all arrests are for crimes included in this analysis. Among the criminal activities not included in this paper that impose substantial social costs are driving under the influence, drug-related activities, arson, fraud, and vandalism. Moreover, police spend only half of their time on crime related activities (Greene and Klockars 1991). Finally, one must assess the degree to which the estimates of this paper continue to be biased against finding effects of police due to changes in reporting behavior.<sup>22</sup>

While an exhaustive analysis of those four issues goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is nonetheless possible to derive rough estimates of a lower bound on the social benefits associated with increasing police staffing. The estimates that follow do not take into account any reporting bias, nor do they include any benefits of police activities except those related to the

<sup>21</sup> One might also consider what social weight is given to the monetary gain and/or utility of the criminal from committing the crime.

<sup>22</sup> Empirical studies of the importance of the reporting bias range widely. Craig (1987) finds the elasticity of crime reporting with respect to the clearance rate (arrests/reported crimes) to be 0.60, with a standard error of 0.31, using data on Baltimore neighborhoods that combines information from the National Crime Survey and data from the Baltimore police department. Levitt (1994), in contrast, finds little or no evidence that reporting rates are a function of the number of police using victimization survey data from 26 cities. Levitt (1994) also examines changes in the ratio of murders to other crimes as the number of police changes. Under the assumption that murders are always reported, but the reporting rate of other crimes varies with the number of police, that ratio might be expected to be a declining function of the number of police. No evidence of such a decline is uncovered.

seven crimes analyzed in this paper. Efforts are made, however, to deal with the other issues. Estimates of the number of crimes reduced by an additional police officer are presented under two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, police are assumed to have no impact on the rate of unreported crimes. The second set of estimates assumes that the effect of police on unreported crime is identical to the effect on reported crime. The truth is likely to fall somewhere in between those two alternatives. In measuring the costs of crime, estimates provided by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) are utilized. Those papers attempt to capture monetary costs of crime (medical bills, property loss, lost productivity) and quality of life reductions due to pain and suffering. To gauge the quality of life reductions, jury awards in civil suits, excluding punitive damages, are estimated for a wide range of injuries. Those awards are then mapped to the distribution of injuries associated with the various crime categories. These cost estimates do not include the costs of additional preventative measures taken by victims, lifestyle changes associated with the marginal crime, costs to employers, or legal costs, and therefore may understate the true costs of crime.

Table 7 presents estimates of the impact of adding one additional sworn officer. The values in Table 7 are based on the estimated elasticities from Table 4, and are computed at the sample means. Column (1) is the impact of an additional officer on reported crime. Column (2) reflects the combined decrease in reported and unreported crimes, assuming that the effect of police is identical across reported and unreported crimes. Estimates of the reporting rate for each crime are based on the National Crime Survey (U.S. Department of Justice 1992).

As column (1) demonstrates, an additional sworn police officer is estimated to reduce the number of reported crimes by approximately eight per year. While the bulk of this reduction

is due to fewer auto thefts, each officer also reduces the number of reported robberies by 1.6 per year, eliminates 0.6 assaults, and prevents a rape every eight years and a murder every twenty years. The number of reported larcenies, based on the estimates in Table 4, are actually projected to increase. When the potential effects of police on *unreported* crime is also included (column 2), the number of crimes eliminated per officer per year increases only slightly, to approximately ten. Adding unreported crimes has a relatively minor effect on crimes eliminated since most of the crimes for which sworn officers are found to be effective have high reporting rates.

Columns (3) and (4) are the Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) estimates of the monetary and quality of life losses due to crime.<sup>23</sup> For violent crimes, the bulk of the costs are associated with quality of life reductions. For property crimes, the costs are almost exclusively monetary. Column (5) combines the information in the first four columns to provide an estimate of the social value of the reduction in crime. The first value in column (5) is based only on the decrease in reported crimes in column (1); the second value is derived from the sum of columns (1) and (2). The reduction in robberies provides the greatest social

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<sup>23</sup> The Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) estimates, which update Cohen (1988), are available for rape, robbery, and assault only. The Cohen (1988) estimates are therefore used for burglary, larceny, and auto theft. I diverge from Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) in the determination of the cost of a murder. According to their estimates, the cost per murder (adjusted to 1992 dollars) is over \$2.7 million. Over \$700,000 of that value is for lost productivity. Following Schelling (1989), however, I do not include that value since the victim would have been the primary consumer of that lost productivity, and therefore it is not clear that society loses on net. The value Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) assign to lost quality of life from per murder, almost \$2 million in 1992 dollars, similarly seems too high. Therefore, I (somewhat arbitrarily) assign a quality of life reduction of \$400,000 for each murder. It is, of course, straightforward to calculate social benefits to crime reductions under alternative valuations that the reader deems more appropriate.

benefit. Each robbery eliminated has a social benefit of \$17,800. Including only the change in reported robberies (1.6) yields a social benefit of \$28,700 per officer; when the possible effect on unreported robberies is also included the social value roughly doubles. Reductions in the number of auto thefts also make a substantial contribution to social welfare -- on the order of \$22,500 to \$30,100 for an additional officer per year. Reduced murders represent a substantial social benefit of roughly \$20,000 per officer per year. The other violent crime categories (rape and assault) also make substantial contributions. The impact of burglary and larceny, however, is minor.

Summing across all seven categories, the estimated social benefit of each additional officer is approximately \$90,000 to \$130,000.<sup>24</sup> Given that an additional police officer will receive a salary of approximately \$40,000, and impose non-salary overhead costs of a roughly equal magnitude,<sup>25</sup> the number of sworn officers in large cities appears to be slightly below the optimal levels. In all likelihood, the estimates above understate the true social value of police due to changes in reporting behavior, the focus on a limited subset of crimes, and the omission of important components of the overall costs of crime, further reinforcing the conclusion that

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<sup>24</sup> To get a rough estimate of the precision of the social cost estimates, standard errors were computed assuming that the costs per crime were exact and that the estimates of the effect of police on the different crime categories were uncorrelated. Both of those assumptions will lead the computed standard errors to understate the true values. The estimated standard error on the social benefits to an additional police officer are \$17,900 when only reported crimes are included, and \$29,200 when both reported and unreported crimes are included.

<sup>25</sup> Donohue and Siegelman (1994) report that there were 812,000 state and local police employees in 1990, and total salary expenditure for this group was \$33.4 billion in 1990, for an average salary of \$41,000. The shadow cost of raising public funds should also be included in the calculation of the overall cost of an additional police officer.

there are too few police in large cities.<sup>26</sup>

Given that public welfare spending also appeared to reduce crime in Table 4, it is worth examining the cost-effectiveness of increasing public welfare spending in reducing crime. The mean level of public welfare spending per capita in the sample is \$255. A one percent increase in public welfare spending for a city with a population of 100,000 would cost \$255,000. Using the estimated elasticities from Table 4 and the estimates of the cost of crime to victims, the total social value of reduced crime is approximately \$39,000. Thus, while public welfare spending does not appear cost-beneficial in terms of crime reduction alone, this channel should not be ignored in a broader consideration of the benefits of public welfare spending.<sup>27</sup>

#### Section VI: Conclusions

Previous studies have found little systematic evidence that increasing the size of a city's police force lowers the crime rate. By controlling more effectively for unobserved differences across cities and eliminating the simultaneity between police and crime through the use of the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections, this paper does uncover evidence that police reduce crime. Estimates of the social costs of crime suggest that current levels of police staffing

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<sup>26</sup> Another consideration that is ignored in this cost-benefit analysis is the possible change in prison costs associated with the increase in the number of police. As McCormick and Tollison (1984) demonstrate, however, the effect of increasing the number of police on the number of arrests is ambiguous. When the likelihood of detection increases, a greater fraction of the crimes committed result in arrests, but some crimes that would previously have been committed are now successfully deterred and therefore do not lead to arrests. In McCormick and Tollison's data on fouls in the ACC basketball tournament, the number of fouls (arrests) drops substantially when the number of officials (police) is increased.

<sup>27</sup> For a thorough analysis of the possible cost-benefit tradeoff implied by a variety of educational and labor market interventions, see Donohue and Siegelman (1994).

in large cities are below the optimal level. Caution is warranted, however, in extrapolating the findings of this paper to a broader sample of cities. The cities analyzed here have far higher levels of criminal victimization than the nation as a whole; it is likely that the benefits of additional officers will be more limited in a broader sample of cities. The analysis of this paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. The most obvious shortcoming of the current work is the reliance on reported crime statistics. While individual-level victimization data is available, the absence of geographic indicators precludes a straightforward analysis of the relationship between police staffing and victimization. The lack of consensus in existing estimates of the magnitude of the reporting bias (Craig 1987, Levitt 1994) suggests that further work in this area is warranted. A second issue deserving more attention is the extent to which crime spills over between central cities and surrounding suburbs. The analysis presented here focuses exclusively on central cities. It is possible, however, that at least some of the decrease in crime in central cities associated with increased police staffing represents a geographical spillover of crime rather than a true reduction.

The finding that city police hiring is affected by the timing of elections adds to the short, but growing, literature documenting the effects of politics on economic decision-making (e.g., Rogoff 1990, Besley and Case 1994, Poterba 1994). This paper goes beyond those previous works, however, by using the political budget cycle as a source of exogenous variation to identify the value of public expenditures. The approach taken in this paper could in theory be applied to a wide range of public policies at all levels of government, and is likely to lead to more reliable estimates than studies based on either cross-sectional or time-series variation.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**  
(All Values per 100,000 residents except population)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Population	716,692	1,030,250	85,000	7,896,000
Total Crimes	8,902	2,586	3,105	20,690
Violent Crimes	1,162	684	103	4,353
Murder	19	12	0.7	81
Rape	68	31	4	199
Assault	521	353	42	2,386
Robbery	554	377	26	2,338
Property Crimes	7,740	2,584	3,105	20,690
Burglary	2,307	732	600	4,994
Larceny	4,364	1,403	550	10,003
Motor Vehicle Theft	1,069	693	165	5,369
Overall Police	294	110	79	910
Sworn	237	99	70	781
Civilian	57	27	5	176

Notes: All variables except population are per 100,000 residents. The sample used is a set of 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors. Data on crimes and police from *Uniform Crime Reports* published by the FBI. For a breakdown of the data by city, see the appendix.

**Table 2: Summary Statistics for Demographic, Economic, and Spending Controls**

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation		Minimum	Maximum
		Within-City	Across Cities		
% Black	23.0	2.3	18.1	0.1	78.2
% Female Headed Households	14.9	1.0	4.3	5.6	31.9
% Age 15-24	17.2	1.5	17.2	11.5	25.4
Public Welfare Spending Per Capita (1992 dollars)	255.2	56.8	126.0	33.5	847.7
Education Spending Per Capita (1992 Dollars)	765.2	79.7	122.9	445.9	1193.4
State Unemployment Rate	6.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	15.5

Notes: Summary statistics are for the 59 large U.S. cities included in the sample for the years 1970-1992. Data on % Black and % Female Headed Household are city-level data interpolated from the decennial census. % Age 15-24 is defined at the SMSA level, and is also based on decennial census. Spending data is combined state and local government spending on an annual basis, and is defined at the state level. See text for further description of data sources.

Table 3: The Election Cycle as a Predictor of Changes in the Police Force

Variable	(1) % Δ Total Police	(2) % Δ Sworn Officers	(3) % Δ Civilian Employees
Mayoral Election Timing Election Year (2-year Term)	.014 (.007)	.013 (.007)	.018 (.020)
Election Year (4-year Term)	.008 (.005)	.010 (.004)	.000 (.016)
Year Before Election (4-year terms only)	.005 (.005)	.007 (.004)	-.006 (.016)
Two Years Before Election (4-year terms only)	-.002 (.005)	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.016)
Gubernatorial Election Timing Election Year	.026 (.008)	.030 (.008)	.015 (.007)
Year Before Election (4-year terms only)	-.002 (.005)	-.001 (.005)	-.009 (.021)
Two Years Before Election (4-year terms only)	.004 (.008)	.015 (.008)	-.004 (.022)
% Δ City Population	.020 (.059)	.005 (.053)	.119 (.214)
Δ (% Black)	-.013 (.009)	-.014 (.009)	-.014 (.022)
Δ (% Female Head)	.014 (.019)	.018 (.016)	-.088 (.080)
State Unemployment Rate	-.331 (.136)	-.347 (.131)	-.413 (.503)
Δ (% Age 15-24 in SMSA)	3.131 (2.392)	2.92 (2.116)	9.638 (10.351)
Year Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
City Effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Significance of Mayoral Election Year?	.05	.02	.67
Significance of All Election Year?	< .01	< .01	.82
R-Squared	.72	.21	.07

Notes: Sample includes 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors, 1970-1992. Number of observations is 1,275. The omitted election year category in all cases is the year following an election. The effects of elections on police staffing are constrained to be equal across all cities. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: The Effect of Increased Police on Crime  
Interacting with Election Cycles and Including Covariates

Variable	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Murder	Assault	Rape	In-Civilian Police	In-City Population	% Black	% Female Headed Households	% Age 15-24 in SMSA	In Public Welfare Spending	In Education Spending	Per Capita	State Unemployment Rate	City-Fixed Effects?	City Trends?	Year Dummies?
Year Before Election	-.67	-.11	.06	-.28	-.14	-.08	-.03	.56	-.027	-.042	-2.73	-.08	.25	-.184	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
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Two Years Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Before Election	-.11	-.07	-.07	-.26	-.14	-.11	-.03	.44	-.011	-.009	-10.05	-.11	.04	-.11	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Table 5: Progression of the Estimated Impact of Police on Crime as Controls for Unobserved City Characteristics and Endogeneity are Introduced

	Murder	Rape	Assault	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft
<b>Sworn Officers</b>							
City-Fixed Effects, Year Dummies, and Demographic Controls Only	.03 (.07)	.30 (.07)	.51 (.08)	.32 (.07)	.33 (.05)	.27 (.04)	.27 (.08)
All of the Above and City Trends	-.18 (.10)	-.13 (.08)	.05 (.09)	-.29 (.08)	-.18 (.06)	.04 (.05)	-.37 (.09)
All of the Above and Instrument with Elections	-.63 (.30)	-.46 (.25)	-.28 (.26)	-.67 (.26)	-.11 (.20)	-.06 (.17)	-1.23 (.29)
<b>Civilian Police Employees</b>							
City-Fixed Effects, Year Dummies & Demographic Controls Only	.07 (.03)	.10 (.03)	.16 (.03)	.09 (.03)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.00 (.03)
All of the Above and City Trends	.12 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.16 (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.03)	.05 (.03)
All of the Above and Instrument with Elections	.05 (.08)	.03 (.06)	-.03 (.07)	.06 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.13 (.06)	.00 (.07)

Notes: All coefficients in table are elasticities. The sample is 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected mayors, for the period 1970-1992. Number of observations is 1,314. Within each police staffing category (i.e. sworn and civilian), each row represents coefficients from a different regression with varying levels of controls. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications were estimated using FGLS, allowing for heteroskedasticity across cities. Elasticities in the bottom row of each category are the coefficients reported in Table 4.

Table 6: The Effect of Increased Police on Crime  
Instrumenting with Election Cycles; No Socio-Economic Controls

	Murder	Rape	Assault	Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft
Sworn Officers	-.34 (.29)	-.29 (.24)	-.38 (.25)	-.62 (.25)	-.11 (.20)	.05 (.16)	-1.28 (.29)
Civilian Police	.03 (.09)	.02 (.07)	-.02 (.06)	.09 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.13 (.05)	.00 (.07)
City Population	.75 (.19)	.61 (.15)	.03 (.16)	.47 (.15)	.23 (.11)	.31 (.09)	1.15 (.17)
City-Fixed Effects?	Yes						
City Trends?	Yes						
Year Dummies?	Yes						


Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of the named crime category. Police variables, city population, and spending variables are also in natural logs; therefore coefficients on those variables are interpreted as elasticities. The police coefficients are the sum of the coefficients on contemporaneous and once-lagged police. The sample covers the period 1970-1992 for the 59 largest U.S. cities with directly elected mayors. City-fixed effects, city trends, and year dummies included in all regressions. Number of observations is 1,314. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications were estimated using FGLS, allowing for heteroskedasticity across cities. All regressions are instrumented using interactions between city dummies and indicator variables for the year of the mayoral and gubernatorial election cycle.

Table 7: Estimated Impact On Crime From Adding One Sworn Police Officer  
(Evaluated At Sample Means)


	Change in Reported Crimes	Change in Total Crime (Assumes Same Elasticity for Unreported Crimes)	Cost Per Crime		Social Benefit of Reduced Crime
			Monetary	Quality of Life	
Murder	-0.05	-0.05	\$17,000	\$400,000	\$20,800
Rape	-0.13	-0.19	9,800	40,800	6,600 - 9,600
Assault	-0.6	-1.3	1,800	10,200	7,400 - 16,000
Robbery	-1.6	-2.9	2,900	14,900	28,700 - 51,900
Burglary	-1.1	-2.3	1,200	400	1,700 - 3,600
Larceny	1.1	4.0	200	0	(-200) - (-800)
Auto Theft	-5.6	-7.5	4,000	0	22,500 - 30,100
Total	-7.98	-10.24	—	—	87,500 - 131,200

Notes: Based on estimates of elasticity of crime with respect to sworn police officers from Table 4 (full controls and election year instruments). Values in table are computed using sample means in 1992. Estimates of reporting rates for each type of crime are based on *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1991* (Wash, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992), p. 102. With the exception of the quality of life reduction per murder, estimates of the social costs of crime are from Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993), adjusted to 1992 dollars. The first value in the final column applies the cost of crime to the reduction in reported crimes only; the second value in the final column applies the cost of crime to the estimated change in both reported and unreported crimes.

Figure 1: Trends in Crime and Police



**Fig. 2: Yearly Changes in Sworn Police**  
Election Years vs Non-Election Years



Appendix: Data for Cities in Sample.

City	Mayor's Term	Violent Crimes Per 100,000	Property Crimes Per 100,000	Annual %Δ Crime	Police Per 100,000	%ΔSworn Gov. Elec.	%ΔSworn Mayor Elec.	%ΔSworn No Elec.
Akron	4yrs	704	6,544	3.6	204	1.2	0.6	-0.3
Albuquerque	4yrs	971	8,151	0.7	255	2.6	6.3	3.3
Anaheim	2yrs	535	6,953	-0.1	186	3.2	2.1	3.0
Arlington	2yrs	424	6,389	0.5	153	8.1	7.2	5.6
Atlanta	4yrs	2,417	10,634	3.5	369	2.3	4.8	2.2
Austin	3yrs	498	8,067	2.7	219	7.4	3.5	1.9
Baltimore	4yrs	2,031	6,974	1.3	460	-1.1	-1.7	0.0
Birmingham	4yrs	1,209	8,235	3.2	286	3.1	0.2	2.3
Boston	4yrs	1,839	9,208	1.7	436	9.4	-9.8	-1.8
Buffalo	4yrs	1,033	6,222	3.4	333	-1.5	-5.1	-2.3
Charlotte	2yrs	1,264	8,199	2.6	246	2.1	3.4	4.3
Chicago	4yrs	1,165	6,316	2.5	475	-0.5	2.7	-1.6
Cleveland	4yrs	1,468	6,880	0.4	362	-1.5	3.5	-3.8
Columbus	4yrs	781	7,516	1.5	250	1.7	3.5	2.8
Corpus Christi	2yrs	662	7,751	2.2	176	3.1	3.0	0.9
Dallas	2yrs	1,437	10,401	1.6	293	4.1	3.0	0.8
Denver	4yrs	906	8,780	-0.7	319	4.0	1.1	-0.0
Detroit	4yrs	2,139	9,071	0.3	437	0.7	10.6	-6.5
El Paso	2yrs	680	6,715	2.1	188	2.7	6.2	-0.4
Fort Worth	2yrs	1,118	10,311	3.1	242	2.4	5.0	-1.6
Fresno	4yrs	918	10,126	1.4	210	0.9	6.8	1.9
Honolulu	4yrs	250	5,865	1.2	252	2.3	4.5	3.7
Houston	2yrs	940	7,529	1.3	265	6.2	5.3	2.5
Indianapolis	4yrs	887	5,647	-1.6	258	1.1	1.4	-0.6
Jacksonville	4yrs	1,079	7,079	2.8	275	5.8	4.3	2.3
Jersey City	4yrs	1,271	6,102	4.4	416	4.5	4.5	-1.4
Kansas City	4yrs	1,602	8,341	2.3	360	0.3	4.3	0.5
Los Angeles	4yrs	1,632	7,250	0.7	320	1.9	2.6	-0.1
Louisville	4yrs	766	5,488	0.5	284	2.3	-1.6	0.0
Memphis	4yrs	1,058	6,861	3.8	243	2.5	-0.9	2.0
Mesa	2yrs	420	6,510	2.0	181	9.4	11.7	7.9
Miami	4yrs	2,577	10,567	2.3	329	2.5	4.3	0.4

Appendix: Data for Cities in Sample

City	Mayor's Term	Violent Crimes Per 100,000	Property Crimes Per 100,000	Annual Crime	%Δ Per 100,000	Police	%ΔSworn Gov. Elec.	%ΔSworn Mayor Elec.	%ΔSworn No Elec.
Milwaukee	4yrs	580	6,051	3.4		360	-0.4	1.2	0.7
Minneapolis	4yrs	1,102	8,417	2.3		225	-0.1	1.8	0.3
Nashville	4yrs	857	6,044	3.1		245	3.6	2.1	4.2
Newark	4yrs	2,709	8,736	1.8		431	11.4	-2.6	-6.0
New Orleans	4yrs	1,419	7,140	1.4		321	4.5	-2.0	-1.0
New York	4yrs	1,902	6,594	0.7		441	2.8	1.0	1.0
Oakland	4yrs	1,753	10,318	0.2		267	-2.6	-2.6	2.1
Oklahoma City	4yrs	845	8,160	3.3		217	6.3	6.3	2.6
Omaha	4yrs	655	5,743	1.4		201	2.0	1.2	0.5
Phoenix	4yrs	797	8,889	0.3		264	3.5	5.6	3.4
Philadelphia	4yrs	942	4,162	2.8		469	1.9	-2.9	-0.8
Pittsburgh	4yrs	1,100	5,939	1.2		319	-2.4	-0.8	-2.1
Portland	4yrs	1,521	10,557	1.3		240	3.2	1.5	-0.9
Sacramento	4yrs	1,018	9,147	1.1		247	2.9	0.4	2.6
Saint Louis	4yrs	2,181	10,235	1.2		507	-0.9	-0.7	-1.1
Saint Paul	4yrs	756	6,883	0.9		233	-2.8	1.2	3.3
Saint Petersburg	2yrs	1,209	7,254	1.9		257	5.2	2.4	-0.6
San Antonio	2yrs	582	8,213	2.5		181	7.6	0.5	1.5
San Diego	4yrs	676	6,927	1.6		199	7.1	4.3	1.7
San Francisco	4yrs	1,454	7,959	-0.0		333	-1.2	0.9	1.8
San Jose	4yrs	497	6,083	-1.6		167	7.1	7.1	3.5
Seattle	4yrs	1,026	9,488	1.6		285	1.7	0.0	1.6
Tampa	4yrs	1,868	10,444	4.0		300	7.1	0.3	0.0
Toledo	2yrs	728	7,408	1.4		211	-2.6	2.8	-5.2
Tucson	4yrs	695	8,938	2.7		218	3.9	4.3	4.5
Tulsa	2yrs	741	7,076	2.1		214	2.2	2.1	1.7
Washington DC	4yrs	1,890	7,101	0.2		739	—	-2.2	-1.8

Definitions of the Uniform Crime Reports Crime Categories

**Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter**

The willful killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, and justifiable homicides are excluded. Justifiable homicides are limited to the killing of a felon. Traffic fatalities are excluded.

**Forcible Rape**

The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Included are rapes by force and attempts or assaults to rape. Statutory offenses (no force used -- victim under age of consent) are excluded.

**Robbery**

The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force, or threat of force, or violence, and/or by putting the victim in fear.

**Aggravated Assault**

An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded.

**Burglary**

The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. Attempted forcible entry is included.

**Larceny**

The unlawful taking of property from the possession of another. Examples are thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property or article which is not taken by force and violence or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included. Embezzlement, "con" games, forgery, and worthless checks are excluded.

**Motor Vehicle Theft**

The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.


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*Crime -  
Community Policing*

**White House Press Release**

**In Roundtable Discussion On On Louisville Community-Oriented Policing**

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Louisville, Kentucky)

For Immediate Release

January 24, 1996

Remarks By The President  
In Roundtable Discussion On  
On **Louisville** Community-Oriented Policing

**Louisville** District Four Police Station  
**Louisville, Kentucky**

1:52 P.M. Est

Q Mr. President, Madam Attorney General, welcome to the **Louisville** Division of Police. To make the best use of your time, I want to take this opportunity to talk about where we believe the federal government has been beneficial in our efforts in developing community-oriented policing in the **Louisville** Division of Police.

First, the research and grants program gave us an opportunity to understand that random results and rapid response brought us rapid random results. (Laughter.) The second thing that we saw was that an over-reliance on statistics and an over-reliance on arrest crime rates got us away from what our focus should be, which is on the community -- their involvement, their innovation, their buy-in and their commitment. Specifically where the federal government has been most helpful to us is in creating hope.

Embattled neighborhoods have long heard "we're from the government, we're here to help you." But often, competing interests and various bureaucratic programs brought mixed results and sometimes left neighborhoods with suspicion, with mistrust, and with complacency. Obviously, developing a relationship with the police department who has the authority by law to deprive you of your liberty and even your life is somewhat difficult, and is often something that is not done very quickly or very easily.

The relationship with our Cop Board has taken time. I believe you and the White House have acknowledged through the Cops program and the Crime Bill that these kind of relationships do take time and they can transcend careers. And we appreciate your efforts in doing that. We know that in time we and the city of **Louisville** and the Division of Police, we may be one of your examples for your next State of the Union address. We hope that we can have your continued support.

We know that the members of the Community Oriented Policing Board here are committed. We know that they are receptive to our program of the District Police Source Officers. What we hope to do is these officers who are sitting in here today represent the other neighborhoods in the city of **Louisville**, so that we can take our program to them. These officers realize two things. First of all, they realize the value of the true power of working with the community. And second, they are committed to changing the face of public safety in **Louisville**.

So with your continued support, we hope to be able to make this a long-term commitment, and not one that dies. We know that our philosophy in the **Louisville** Division of Police and the city of **Louisville** is one of community-oriented government.

This Cop Board believes like you that government should work for them. And I believe in the long haul, we can persevere. Our Mayor, fortunately, also believes that local government should work for their citizens, and he has been very beneficial in providing the resources we need to try to grow neighborhood successes one neighborhood at a time.

Mr. Mayor.

Q Thank you. Mr. President, we do welcome you to **Louisville**, and you have around the table members of a community-oriented policing board, you have the members of the Block Watch organization and you have some of what we call "the Clinton Cops," the 16 individuals who we are able to move out into the neighborhoods for community-oriented policing as a result of the Crime Bill.

You should remember the Chief because he was in your office about three years ago, along with about 15 or 18 other police chiefs talking about the importance of community-oriented policing. We'd like to turn it over to you for any comments you might have, and we would love to engage you with the folks around the table to talk a little bit about the future of this program.

The President: Let me first of all thank the Chief, the Mayor and Governor Patton, Congressman Ward for making us feel so welcome. The Attorney General and her entire team who work on this are here, and we want to thank all of the citizens and the police officers who want to meet with us.

I'd like to make just a couple of brief points. First of all, when I ran for president and I began to travel the country looking for ways to bring the crime rate down, when I realized that every community I visited, that ordinary citizens were worried about crime and violence.

The one thing that came up over and over in all parts of the country that seemed to be working was, what is now known

generally as community policing. And when we finally passed the Crime Bill in 1994, which had been debated in Congress for six years. We had added to that Crime Bill a specific title to give funds to communities all across our country to create 100,000 new police officers. There was a reason for that.

Between 1965 and 1995, more or less, the violent crime rate in America tripled, but the number of police officers on our street increased by only 10 percent. And that's why we did that. Now, we're about a third of the way home, **Louisville's** gotten 16 police; I think Jefferson County has gotten a total of 36, something like that. But we're working hard to try to get more people out here.

It is now being recognized -- I know one of the major news magazines had a cover story where the New York City Police Chief the other day, talking about how crime was coming down in America because of community policing. One of the things I asked the Congress to do last night was to support this program until we finished it.

I just want to make two other points if I might. This, in my opinion, is the way the federal government ought to relate to American citizens. We put up the money and we say this money is for police, and you have to put up some, we'll put some and here it is if you want it.

And then we developed a -- I want to compliment the attorney general and the Justice Department, they developed a pretty hassle-free way of applying for the money, there's not a lot of bureaucracy in it. And then we don't tell anybody how to train the police, we don't tell them how to deploy, we don't tell them how to relate to the community. That's all things that have to be decided here at the local level. That's none of our business. We just know that we have to do what we can to give you the resources necessary to achieve the goal.

The second point I want to make, just to emphasize what has already been said, it is obvious to me that there are basically three components to success. One is having the police out there properly deployed. And the second, and maybe the most important, is having some relationship with the community. That's why I asked the American people last night to respect and work with their police officers, because if you don't have that then this won't work.

The third thing I want to say -- I want to compliment the mayor -- is that within this whole framework our biggest problem now is rising levels of violence among juveniles nationwide. And the mayor also is participating in another one of our programs and got some funds to start, I know, some sports teams and other things here to make a special effort with young people. And that's the last thing I want to emphasize. You know, we just got so many of these children out there that are in trouble, having difficulties. And the police cannot do that alone. They need people to support them in organizing and coming up with the resources to give the children in areas with high rates of crime something positive to do. And I think that **Louisville's** got a lot to be proud of on all fronts. I'm glad to be here, and I've already said more than I meant to. I'd like to listen to you now.

Q Well, let me turn it over to the lady that we named this room we're sitting in after, Mrs. MacLuton. She was last year, and the year before, and the year before, and has been for

several years, the chairman of the community oriented policing board in this neighborhood. She's been an aggressive person -- did I say aggressive -- (laughter) -- I mean strong, and she needs to tell you a little bit about what it has meant to the neighborhood and what it has meant to the folks that she lives with and helps out.

Q Mr. President, as the Mayor said, we started here about in the early '90s with the Cop program, when it was originally written as a grant to see if it would work. And the idea was we were one of the six sites chosen and -- it was in the 4th district -- and if it would work here, it would work anywhere, because we had a high rate of crime, we didn't have many citizens' involvement at the time, as far as block watches and those types of things.

I've been on board now for the past six years. I have seen it grow from just a few neighborhoods to everybody wanting to be involved in it. I think with the new district resource offices that we have we -- at first we had the Crime Prevention Offices, and they just could not be in every neighborhood talking to everybody. A lot -- we did forums, we found out that what the police department felt was problems, the citizens didn't feel in their neighborhood that that was a problem.

Now we come to the table and we work it out together. And that's what it's all about. It's a working partnership. And I think that from community-oriented policing a lot of things have developed. And now that it's going citywide and we're talking to other districts, and the districts are not, kind of, alienated from one another. We're finding out different things to use. We have hot-spot cards. Those are cards that are used when you -- to identify trouble in each area. And if you're scared to come to the police department, you just drop them in the mail.

We now have a blanket, block watch manual that everybody in the city will use as far as learning how to report crime, what to look for in a neighborhood, what to keep your neighborhood safe, how to empower yourself. I see the Clinton bill and the Crime bill as a way of empowering ourselves. I think we lost that. When we used to have beat officers and we took them off of the street and put them in the cars so they could do more area. And I think that's where we lost that one-on-one, hands-on. But I think now we're getting that back.

I think a lot of the neighborhoods, they know who rides their beat. You know, they know their beat officer. The beat officers knows who lives in their beat and who is out of place there. I think that's why Cop works. I have been here, like I said, for six years, and volunteered the whole time. It is the community volunteering -- I know federal money will not last forever. I understand that. But I think once we realize that it is a voluntary, it is me, Carolyn MacLuton, taking that control of where I live and sharing that with the police department that will make it grow and will make it a success.

Q How about the Block Watch focus? Nick is the president of the Mayor's Block Watch Council.

Q Well, I think, first, Mr. President, it's an honor and a privilege to be here with you. And what I can tell you is from where I sit, we get reports from all five districts within the city on a monthly basis. We come together monthly, it's all volunteers. And each of the members of the council are selected from within the police districts by the crime prevention officers to serve on this

council.

And I can tell you that over the past two to three years -- the three years that I've been involved, that the reports that we get on a monthly basis are very positive as -- with the crime rate going down due to community-oriented policing. Just as some success stories, I can tell you that in my own district the drug problem was reduced over the past two years by 75 percent. And that would not have happened if not for federal funds, because they have to pay the overtime for the officers to concentrate on the special crime areas.

So as I hear all the reports come in every month from all over the district, we find crime down, more drug arrests are up. And the other fact is that all the districts have different problems. For example, in some district drug use and may be a problem, and in another district, drug sales may be a problem. Where all of the officers can come together and talk to us about and we learn more about what's going on in the other districts, it can let us formulate plans to cover the whole city.

The President: Let me ask you a question. You said -- and I appreciate you saying that, but you couldn't be doing this without the federal funds. But it's also true that you couldn't be doing it if you didn't have the citizens involved --

Q Absolutely. Absolutely.

The President: And that's the point I was trying to make in The State of the Union last night, that when you're dealing with problems that are these people problems that -- whether it's crime or the -- you know, trying to get jobs into places, move people off welfare, you deal with all of these people problems, you've got to have a partnership. There is no government problem to solve this. You've got to have grass-roots citizens involved in it; otherwise, there is no way to get it done.

I sort of liken it -- we strike the match and you stoke the fire; you have to do it.

Q And every district is different, so they can tailor things for what is unique to the district in their neighborhood, because the citizens and Ms. MacLuton understands her district and Nick understand his, and they can tailor their situation to the specifics right in their neighborhood; and that's what's been so successful.

The President: Since you've been doing this, do you think the general feeling of the people that live in your neighborhood about the police has improved?

Q I think it's improved a great deal because, in the beginning, the police were always called after the fact. They never saw concerned citizens like myself and all of these people in this room because we were not the ones being called for the trouble. They only saw those, the criminal element. Now that we've come together, they've found out that there's people in the neighborhood that are willing to do whatever they can to make the police officer's job easier -- as far as reporting crime, working with them together, and I think it's a partnership. We've not always had a partnership with the police department; it was more of a -- you do as we say, we'll come in and we'll do this and this is the way it'll be.

Like Nick said, from sharing with the other districts, all these other things have come out of it by knowing what's your

problem. He said that, with drugs, youth might be a problem in my area; drug selling is a problem in his area. So the -- come about. That's what it is, and it's an exchange of ideas that has made it grow.

Q Maybe Officer Waters who has had 20-plus years on the force can give some focus as one of the district resource officers.

Q Well, the key word is partnership, because -- community-oriented partnerships. That's partnerships between the community, the residents, other city agencies. We now have the ability to utilize other agencies to do nontraditional police work in the communities, do things that people aren't used to seeing us do things that people aren't used to seeing us do in order to make their personal lives better, not just be an occupying force in this war on crime, but actually being their friends, being someone who is concerned about their day-to-day lives, not just when they have police-related problems. That's something that never before we had a chance to do.

----- This program allows us to interact with the community a great deal more, and you find that when we go into an area and we saturate it with our manpower and we remove crime, economic development can begin. I've noticed in this particular area, there are a lot of new homes that's been built, new businesses being started. These things would not happen if this was still a crime-ridden area.

When we go into an area and we try to reduce crime, it gives people insight on that particular area who feel that, yes, I would like to live in this area, yes, I would like to raise my family in this area, I would like to start a business in this area. These types of things make us feel good about what we do. We as police officers are proud people. We like to see results in what we do. We don't like to spend an entire career and not see one result. We enjoy seeing results on a day to day basis with this type of program. We thank you very much for your insight, we thank you very much for all that you have done to help us with this war on crime, and I think that with your continued help that we'll be able to do a great deal toward eliminating a lot of crime that's in America.

Q Charlie really hit on a note, because the whole focus of community-oriented policing is generally talked about in terms of crime statistics, Attorney General, and they're always looking at trying to figure out is it going up or going down. But in fact, when you begin to move in giving people a feeling of comfort and security, then a new home is built. And then, all of a sudden, a business moves a light manufacturing factory into the community and develops an opportunity for people to have jobs. And there is a ripple effect beyond just the statistics.

And I think, Charlie, you hit it right on the front of the head.

Peggy is a member of both Block Watch as well as the Community-Oriented Policing Board. Peggy?

Q Well, I think that the Community-Oriented policing is probably one of the best things that we've had in a long time. Along with the Mayor's Council, we started, under -- guidance from the Cop Board, people are appointed, as Nick said, from the different districts. But what we have is an interaction there that we, in each

district, knows what we could do to help them. We have all these things in common. The Chief -- we were very fortunate from the Cop Board to take classes, which have been offered to some of the citizens that are 12 -- we had 12 weeks, and we learned -- we learned about how many there were.

So we go back to the neighbors and say, there's no way this man can come to your house like this. You know, you've only got so many officers to cover so many things. We learned the budget, we would visit communications, how long it takes -- if an officer makes an arrest, has to go downtown, be pulled off the streets -- we learned all these things.

As we learned them, we were supposed to -- and we have -- taken the back to the community to the Mayor's council. I think this city is wonderful, people who live here -- we have a lot of problems, but we work together; always have.

Q This is the police academy, citizens police academy.

The President: Is this being done anywhere else in the country that you know of? Chief?

Q Is it?

Q San Francisco(?)

The President: I'm going to say, this is the first person I ever heard talk about that, but it makes a world of sense that it would be very good for citizens if one person on every block in a big city, for example, knew how the police department worked, what the police were up against, how the structure was, what the budget was, I think it would make a huge amount of difference; that's a wonderful idea.



Q Mr. President, I think we have a manual that we can give you, or some of your staff, that you can take back with you.

The President: Great. That's a wonderful idea.

Q Yes, we've got that right there. You want us to just bring it up and put it on the --

The President: Go ahead.

Q That's a manual -- how many classes have we run, Chief?

Q We started our fourth one last night. The county's also starting one I saw, David, with a new chief, so it's something that really gets people engaged in understanding the difficulties, and it's just an academy; it's a citizens' academy and provides an opportunity for them to better understand and appreciate.

Q But that, also like I said, comes out of the catalyst of Cop. You know, it was a way that we found out, hearing from the community, that we don't get a police officer in 10 minutes when we call. Well, why don't we?

Well, then, after we found out in talking to the police department, that's how the academy came about, so that we could give the statistics that were needed when you go to these different

neighborhoods, and these are the kinds of problems that you have come up.

Q Steve, you wanted to talk a little bit? You're reasonably new. You're in your second year, finishing your second year on the force?

Q Yes, sir. First of all, I'd like to say thank you for coming to **Louisville**, Kentucky, Mr. President -- not only **Louisville**, Kentucky, but to the west end. The west end is very dear to my heart. I live down here, I work here and I pastor a church here.

One thing, I'm not a -- and I would not pattern myself after anything that I did not think have potential to change the people. When you came out with the Crime Bill a couple of years ago, I thought about it and I said, what in the world is a Crime Bill. First of all, the Crime Bill is a plan to allow us to identify the problem. And what people must realize, the police are no good without the people, and the people are no good without the police.

First of all, you have a good plan. And the Bible says in Hosea 4 and 6, my people are destroyed for a lack of knowledge. And one thing the Crime Bill is doing is giving us an opportunity to gain some knowledge, because if you don't have knowledge, you destroy yourself and you die. Second of all, your Crime Bill has to have people who are dedicated, people who are committed to work. A lot of people would jump on the bandwagon, would not do anything -- allow people to work and then when all success happens, then everybody will jump up and say, I was with President Clinton, I was there all the time. (Laughter.) It happens like that --

Q I've seen that in local campaigns. More bumper stickers show up the day after the election.

Q Because everybody will not help you, everybody will not support you, and most of all, in this Crime Bill, the Cop, Community Oriented Policing, we have to be aware of internal destruction. Anything that is torn down is not torn down by people on the outside, it's torn down by people on the inside. Just like the Senate, Congress, the police department, and when this was first introduced, a lot of people had flack -- they said, well, we can't police anymore; they want us to be social workers. This is a social job

It does not matter how you arrest people, but it does matter how you talk to people, because I've always desired to be a police officer at a young age, but I did not always like police officers, because growing up in the south end part of Jefferson County, I was always harassed. Police came in our neighborhood; we knew they had authority, but they demonstrated their authority, and they would call us names and choke us. And I said, Lord, if I ever became a police officer, I want to police people the way I want to be treated.

And that's one thing the Crime Bill has given us an opportunity to do, is to treat the people the way we want to be treated. And last of all, you have to have execution. We have to follow through with this. You just can't -- it looks good on paper, but if you don't have people who are dedicated and people who are ready to execute it, you just have words on paper.

We have to stop being a monument. We have to move

forward to the next century. A community that is mis-educated or misinformed is a community that you have lost. And I thank God for the Cop to talk to people, because as a beat officer when I was driving around I did not have time to stop and talk to people on my beat because I was always busy answering calls with the service. And when this came in effect, the community-oriented policing, I do what they call city call complaints -- when community people call to the City Hall and complain about abandoning cars in their neighborhood, a lot of people -- even myself, you say, oh, that's a joke. That's not police work. But I found out investigating that, I was able to get cars removed. And when I looked inside of cars I found guns that were in abandoned cars. And people are using abandoned cars to store their drugs and their weapons in these cars. And if it hadn't been for the community-oriented police and the people feeling that they could call the police, and we act on what they complained about, we would never have found those guns.

And I just think it's a wonderful idea.

Q You can see the energy of the folks you've talked to. And I want you to hear from Officer Cook because I think the 16 officers who are out there doing this work and following this lead that you've set are really energized, and through them, they are able to energize neighborhood folks. And with the leadership of the citizens that you see around the table, it's an incredible collaboration that is making a difference.

Officer Cook.

Q Well, you gain trust by it. Not only do you gain trust with the community, you meet people you never met before that are a part of the ones that you need. We need each other. And so many times, beat officers can only do so much in one day. This has allowed us as a team -- and there's 16 of us, and we meet regularly to share our ideas, and each time that we meet we're coming up with newer and newer ideas. We are real excited about it because we're getting the trust back from people that lost trust in us.

Citizens as far as -- we get to gain one-on-one again. They'll tell us their problems. And they're amazed that we actually can either direct them, guide them, refer them where in the past we couldn't do that because we didn't know the sources or the knowledge to make these referrals.

And through all this, by constantly going to the community meetings and meeting with citizens and the other officers we have developed a sort of -- and we gain information and insight from officers that we work with on a daily basis. Of course, no one likes changes. And that's the thing in the community. No one likes changes because there's so many programs and there's so many daily activities and there's so many organizations that have great interest in certain -- either crime, drug, anything -- it all pertains or it all comes together where we have to work and renew what we lost.

Community policing has always been here, we have just given it a name. We've just redefined it and gave it direction and hope. But that takes time. And that takes time for everyone to adjust to that.

The President: But it looks to me like what is happening in the -- and, by the way, law enforcement is not the only place where we need to do this, as I said. But, you know, to go back and organize people on a community basis is a very important thing in

this country. I mean, if you think that's --really, we've gotten away from that in a lot of ways. And that's why so many organizations and so many government programs fail, is because there's no structure underneath it that's capable of actually carrying the load. So I'm very impressed by this.

General Reno, do you want to say anything, ask any questions?

Attorney General Reno: Mr. President, this is a beautiful manual. It's one of the best that I have seen just in its table of contents and what it's addressed at. It's just excellent. I'd be interested in what you all have learned in terms of the best programs to deal with youth and the problems that we see across the country in terms of youth violence.

Q Talking about activities for young people. As you remember, Attorney General Reno, because there were the mayors and the police chiefs joined together to try to enhance the prevention aspect, to get involved with kids early on to ensure that they would be ultimate assets, rather than liabilities. And we've had -- the athletic programs, the recreational programs, after school activities, things that we paid for and that some of the crime bill was funded for -- and, unfortunately, some was taken out and we didn't get the funding, as you remember -- we argued for it on a balanced approach. The President was focusing on enforcement as well as prevention.

But in terms of in the neighborhoods, Steve, what are you doing with the kids that you bump into? How are you interacting with the --

Q A lot of the kids, what I did over the Christmas break, I went into the Parkland Boys and Girls Club and coached basketball. I had a basketball team with my church and some of the kids in the neighborhood. We're trying to get the kids off the street to allow them to play athletics. Because if you play sports all day long and they go home, they're too tired to go rob somebody or rape somebody. I'm just a firm believer that you wear somebody out, they don't have time for anything else.

And that's why I'm excited. I just feel the enthusiasm because I grew -- I came up through the ranks of a juvenile system and I've seen the same children I'm arresting now, I arrested when they were 12 and 13 years old. It's been a revolving door. And so the sports -- we're ready to get our sports camp going through the federal funded money, which I'm excited about. Myself and Officer Waters and Officer Renee Wilson, we're trying to get the kids together, find a location and pull the kids in during spring break because what I'm finding out, when children have nothing to do that's when crime happens. We have to keep them active all the time -- because an idle mind is a devil's workshop. Officer Waters?

Q Myself, like Officer Kelsey, I coach basketball, work sometimes with the Boy Scouts. But what we're trying to do now is to reach these kids while they still have open minds, when they have something on their mind other than crime. If we can show them an alternative to crime and get them interested in other things, these are things that we're trying to build character with.

We're not looking at just the child, we're looking at the person the child is going to become. If we can make a difference now then we can make a productive human being in the future, not a

liability on the society by having to place them, incarcerate them somewhere and get no use from them. We would like to save every child. That's not going to be possible. But we can save as many as we can through our sports camps and through interacting with the kids and getting other officers, hopefully, to join us in helping us with our sports camps and going out in the community and helping us bring the kids in to, you know, enjoy some of these resources.

Q We've also expanded our Dare program beyond just the fifth grade, all the way up through middle school -- or junior high school -- in an attempt to continue to interact with kids beyond the fifth grade, where it initially was started, but up through the middle school period. Peggy?

Q Well, you know, this is the new year, new board and everything else. But if you listen, everybody's talking about basketball, everybody's talking about all those things. We have young ladies we need to reach in a different way. In this neighborhood the young ladies are out with the guys. Their behavior -- you try to talk to them, you can only mentor so many. We need to reach out with other people.

And I know churches offer these things. But the children in this district don't have the advantage of transportation, to go to all the sewing things or whatever -- just to learn the niceties that other people have. I think the resource officers are going to sort of go back to what it was like when I grew up, the policeman on the street. He's going to know everybody, they're going to know him. I think these children that are out here -- once these officers are visible and go one-on-one to the doors, they'll know that policing is back in the city. You know, they have to be held accountable.

So that's one thing with these officers. They're going to know people. We're all going to work together and I think it's going to make all the difference in the world in our young people. But we don't want to forget something for the ladies.

Q What we tried to do, although you didn't declare us an empowerment zone community, Mr. President, we became an enterprise community -- (laughter.) We decided to declare ourselves an empowerment zone community, and as a result, our citizens continue to work together for the -- (President continues to laugh.) Well, mistakes are made. (Laughter.)

We have been able, in terms of housing, child care, neighborhood youth boards to work with teenagers to get them involved in community centers -- in fact, the president of our empowerment zone board is sitting right behind you, John Lemaster. We continue to work toward job training, youth activities, after-school activities, housing, taking -- you've given us \$31 million to create a whole new neighborhood here.

Q And he can take it back, Mayor. (Laughter.)

Q But you talk about transportation -- you've provided almost \$3 million for a public transportation facility here in this community that will give people an opportunity to get to the jobs where they are located, wherever they might be in the community.

So we've tried to take your focus of a seamless approach and develop all the aspects of enhancing the opportunity in the

community that focuses on the kids, Attorney General, but also creates opportunities for child care so that they can go to work, job training so they can have the skills, transportation so they can get to the job. And as the security occurs in the neighborhoods, new jobs occur, new businesses occur, new homes are built.

The President: If I could just make one observation about it, because I think it was Officer Waters that mentioned he could get business back into the neighborhoods when the crime rate goes down -- if you look at the American economy now, basically there are two problems. I talked about one of them last night, and that is that most Americans have jobs, but it's hard for them to get a raise in the global economy because there's always so much pressure to hold down the wages. And so that's a different question. I've tried to deal with that.

The other big problem is that the national unemployment rate is 5.6 percent, but with the exception of a few states like California still getting over the terrible blow they took when the defense budget went down, for example, and the recession of the late '80s, most other places have an unemployment rate that's about four percent or 4.5 percent generally, and they there will be these pockets where the unemployment rate is 10, or 12, or 15 percent.

Q Thirty percent.

The President: Or 30 percent, yes. And you can't -- so that, if you look at it in this way, that is the number one potential market for the rest of the American economy. If you look at it that way. There are all these people living in our country that if they had jobs and they had any money, they would be growing our economy faster. They would be, in effect, if you added another one percent to the work force, that would give everybody else a raise, because they'd be buying everything everybody else produced; they would be generating a higher level of growth.

And that's another thing that I think has been overlooked. One of the main economic strategies we could follow to grow the American economy from inside would be to make all these places that have crime rates safe so investment that now might go, oh, south of the border, or anywhere else could easily flow in there to put people to work and create opportunity. I think it's something that we've really underestimated -- the economic aspect of this. I wanted to ask one other question mostly of those of you who have worked on the community boards and the crime watch. Would you say that this policing strategy makes your neighborhood safer, primarily because you can catch people who commit crimes more quickly, or because it prevents more crimes from occurring in the first place?

Q Prevents more crimes from occurring in the first place, because the neighborhood is now empowering itself, like I said before, and are getting involved, and are keeping a lot of the crime, the neighborhoods themselves can keep out of the neighborhood, by watching what moves into the neighborhood, watching the crime element that comes into the neighborhood. I think Cop is more of a preventive measure, you know, if that makes any sense. I think it prevents it.

Once the neighborhoods are cleaned up, we even come up with a strategy of a program -- what to do after it's clean to keep it clean. I think Mr. Yassway (ph.) -- we've got all kinds of material to leave you to that Cop, and that is Community --

Q Since people are living in fear in the neighborhood, then -- their homes and just come and live in fear. Cop is operated on principles as well that we can draw people together, that, rather than live in fear, you can empower yourself by going out into the community and taking charge. We look at it as a way of -- in the eyes and the ears of the police department, that when they are not there on the spot -- their patrol, we all are on the spot; for, after all, it is our neighborhood.

And through these principles, it kind of has steered concern to the captain here at the district -- Chief of Police, and even to the Mayor that -- you hear -- what we're trying to do to not only just take back to show something has been done, but this principle will become a way of life, and the way of our children as we, as concerned citizens, walk the streets; we don't just leave them in a recreational place, but as we walk in the streets, we walk with them, because children have to learn how to be responsible when they're our age, and so when their peers see them, that they have the nerve and guts and have some dignity about standing up in their neighborhood, they can walk tall, and then we change the criminal minds of others that will follow the children.

Therefore, they become leaders at an early age and I'm willing to say they are the future of our generation as they become grown and then start living their lives. But as they grow up, they become empowered with a sense of principle and have a foundation of love and to share it throughout the community. So we may do this, which is what --

Q Mr. President, it is interesting how Mr. Yassway gets right back to where you were last night in your State of the Union -- the family. You know, what we're doing here is really going to help our community, and it helps our communities become better communities. But we know the base of every community is the family unit. And your remarks last night in the State of the Union were right on point; we need to continue to be mindful that every one of the programs that we promote and encourage gets back to that basic unit of our society.

I was the first to stand last night, was very excited, because maybe we have, as Democrats, allowed ourselves not to be on the right side of the family issue, which is just so absurd, because there is only one side. If we continue these kinds of things Mr. Yassway says with children seeing their parents act in a certain way, the children are going to act in a certain way. Use good grammar at home -- I was lucky, my grandmother and my mother corrected my grammar every day of my life. But, by golly, I end up speaking well. That's the kind of thing we need to get back to, and I'm glad to -- (laughter) --

The President: I was so afraid you were going to say good. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. President, we have to move on. It's 3:00 p.m. I know the Governor wanted to say something in closing.

Governor?

Q - It's just obvious that these neighborhoods, and I'm sure similar neighborhoods and communities all over the nation want to be safe, and the vast majority of the people are the victims of the crime. And it's obvious that they have to be empowered. They have to do it. This is not something that can be top-down driven,

but they have to be empowered. And your leadership on a national level, through the mayor, all the way down to the district police department -- ultimately, it has to come out of the community. It seems like, Mr. Mayor, that you all have developed the right approach. I've been enlightened, as has the President -- I've got to check my grammar here -- and it was enlightening for me to learn the details of this program that I wasn't familiar with. So I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the program.

Q It's good to have you with us, Governor.

The President: Let me just say in closing that -- I want to go back to the last question that I asked. What our goal is, you know, and all of the -- I want to thank the police officers around the table who participated, as well as the citizens -- when I ask is the primary benefit of this system that it helps you catch people quicker when they commit crime so it helps prevent crimes in the first place.

I think in the end it will do both. But the answer of prevention is very important. I mean, we have to get back to a point in our country when the crime is the exception rather than the rule. I mean, and I thought it was so perceptive when you said that some police officers were wondering, well, are they going to turn me into social workers, or is this right or wrong.

We don't want police forces to be occupying armies in our cities. We want them to be skilled, we want them to be able to shoot, we want them to be able to protect themselves, we want them to be able to protect other people. But we should be working toward a goal in America where the crimes are the exception, rather than the rule. We can't be in a position anymore where the fastest growing job category in the United States are prison guards; and where the fastest growing part of the state budget is investing in more prisons. And I say that as a former governor who as built as many prisons, I guess, as anybody on a per capita basis.

And you have to put people in jail, and if they're dangerous you've got to leave them there a long time. But every child that you keep from committing that first armed robbery, from firing that gun the first time, from doing that first drug deal -- every child you do that to, you've done ten times as much than you even do when you make an arrest.

And I think what you see here -- to go back to what the Congressman said -- is that the further you get away from this neighborhood toward Washington, D.C., and the more distance there is between Washington and you, the harder it is to communicate. And so simple messages tend to come through even though they may be wrong. And you say, well, this person says the answer is personal responsibility; and this person says somebody ought to help solve it. And the truth is, the answer is both. The answer is both. And that's what you all have done here. I take my hat off to you. And I've been very moved by what I've heard today and I must say I'm very encouraged. And we'll keep trying to help you and you keep carrying the load and we'll keep cheering.

Q Thank you, sir.

The President: Thank you. (Applause.)

End

2:38 P.M. Est



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# THE BIG BLUE HIRING SPREE

*Crim  
Community  
Policing*

**Hiring lots of new police is a popular way for a city to demonstrate its vigilance against crime. But hiring them too fast is a recipe for disaster.**

**F**ive years ago, there was a police shortage in Houston, to put it mildly. Due to budget constraints, no new officers had been hired for a full three-year period between 1986 and 1989, not even to compensate for attrition. The police academy shut its doors during that time. By 1991, manpower had dropped to 3,900—nearly 15 percent below its peak level of the mid-1980s.

At the same time, crime rates were creeping higher and higher. In the fall of

1991, residents were spooked enough to jettison their five-term incumbent mayor in favor of Bob Lanier, a political neophyte who based much of his campaign on one simple promise: more police, and lots of them.

By all accounts, Lanier has delivered. During his four years in office, he has placed nearly 1,000 additional officers on the streets, either through overtime or new hires. And his stated intention is to continue, to bring the force to around 5,200 officers, one-third more than its

**BY CHARLES MAHTESIAN**

increase during the same time.

It amounts to, for many cities, a police hiring spree. "We are hiring more now, and have been over the last few years, than we have done before," says Bernard Cohen, a criminologist at Queens College in New York. "Crime, in most surveys, shows up as one of the most important issues. So people are ready for new cops."

Overlooked amidst the clamor for more police are a few troubling questions about the possible consequences. Too often, a rush to put officers on the street has significantly diluted the quality of individual police departments. The attempt to meet the twin goals of hiring and diversity tends to widen racial divisions within a force. And then there is the nagging question of whether more cops actually correlates to less crime.

**W**ithin law enforcement circles, any discussion of the hazards of binge hiring invariably begins with Miami and Washington, D.C., the two cities burned worst by binge hiring in the past. Together, they offer a textbook lesson in how not to hire police.

In 1988, troubled by the prospect of more than 2,000 impending officer retirements and a city administration that seemed ill-prepared to address the situation, the U.S. Congress coerced the D.C. government into adding 1,500 new officers over a span of 20 months. Department officials raised concerns about processing and training so many new officers in such a short time frame, but to no avail. Congress had threatened to withhold \$430 million in aid to the city unless the hiring took place.

Despite the worries, there was at least some reason to think the department could accomplish the task. Back in the early 1970s, the District had managed to add a similar number of officers in a short period without much problem. But the second time, the city was not so fortunate. Within a matter of months, the rushed hiring process had produced frightening returns. From the time they walked out academy doors until the *Washington Post* detailed their transgressions in 1994, the D.C. police classes of 1989 and 1990 became involved in untold mischief, not only within the department but on the streets. This hiring-binge cohort accounted by itself for more than half the officers arrested on criminal charges, more than half of those brought up for discipline, and half the officers whom the U.S. attorney

described as so tainted that they could not be put on the witness stand to testify.


Around the time the D.C. binge classes were beginning their academy training, Miami was climbing back from the depths of its own scandal, one that was smaller in scale, yet more lurid in scope. In the early 1980s, Miami, too, was encouraged by the federal government to bulk up its police force in order to deal with massive immigration and with the tide of drugs entering the country. City commissioners voted to nearly double the size of the force.

As would be the case in Washington, it did not take long for the city to feel the impact of the wave of new hires, though not in the way it expected. In what became known as the "River Cops" scandal, several newly hired officers formed their own drug-running ring and made millions on the side by selling confiscated cocaine. One hired a hit man to kill a witness who was scheduled to testify against him. All in all, nearly a hundred officers ended up being purged, and a disproportionate number came out of the rush to put new badges on the streets. By the end of the scandal, nearly one-tenth of the force had either been accused or convicted of felonies.

The similarities between Washington and Miami were no coincidence. Both departments lowered admission standards, expedited or haphazardly completed background checks, and cut corners on training in order to meet hiring goals and timetables. Large numbers of unprepared rookies were rushed into service. At the D.C. police academy, instruction time was reduced in everything from driving to the laws of arrest. Once the newcomers arrived at the precinct, they lacked proper supervision and oversight.

Neither city had given much thought to the effect that too many new hires would have on the force. "The impact was just tremendous," says former Miami Police Chief Perry Anderson, a 24-year veteran who took office after the scandal. "The River Cops were hired as a result of the system falling down."

What the Miami and D.C. fiascoes prove is that expanding a police force is a delicate process that requires not only money and determination but patience. And it is patience that tends to be in short supply. "A hiring rush is impossible to do well," says Joseph McNamara, a former police chief in San Jose, California, who is now at the Hoover Institute. "The



1991 level and roughly the number that a recent management study selected as the ideal complement for the Houston police department. It also seems to be the ideal complement for Houston voters, who last fall reelected Lanier with more than 80 percent of the vote.

Houston is one of scores of cities these days where voters are equating more police with less crime. So that is what their elected officials are giving them. With the help of federal subsidies provided by the Clinton administration's 1994 crime bill, the number of police officers nationwide is expected to increase by more than 100,000 over the next six years. Chicago has already received federal funding for 321 new officers. Philadelphia will get 153 new cops on the beat.

Some fast-growing cities, most of them in the South and West, are adding police at an even more frantic pace. Between 1990 and 1993, the force in Las Vegas, Nevada, grew by 23 percent, reaching a level of 1,428 sworn officers. Charlotte, North Carolina, registered a 16 percent

dilemma is that police financing is so politicized and haphazard. The only answer is a long-term commitment to a level of financing. It has been feast or famine in the past."

**B**ob Lanier took office in Houston in the middle of a police famine. The city had actually started hiring new recruits prior to his election, but in 1991, when he became mayor, the force was still hundreds of officers below its 1986 peak.

When Houston began rehiring, it quickly learned some of the lessons that other cities had learned before. Charged with a sudden mandate to train 250 new officers within a year's time, recruiters found it nearly impossible to find enough qualified applicants to fill the first class of 70, let alone two more classes of that size. Union officials wondered aloud whether Houston was following the same route as Miami. "We were going so fast," one recruiter said at the time, "sometimes I felt like we should just take 50 badges and throw them off the top of the Pennzoil building."

The fact is, however, Houston has come through its hiring spree of the 1990s in pretty good shape. Even with the big infusion of new officers, it has remained relatively untouched by scandal in comparison to New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia—the only four cities with police departments larger than the HPD. The main reason is that Houston recognized in time just how many new police it could rea-

city's population boom, still limits its academy to less than 100 recruits a year. "The quality of an officer is more important than sheer numbers," says Sergeant Christopher Hoye, the department's director of in-service training. "That's why we don't run 400 or 500 candidates through per year at the academy." The D.C. academy, during its binge, processed 1,500 over a two-year period, even though it was built to handle only 300 recruits per year.

Houston also has increased the length of the training period from 18 weeks to six months. Now, the HPD requires more than 1,000 hours of class time and 640 hours of field training for new recruits. Both are well above the requirements of most other large cities. "That's the reason we haven't suffered some of the misconduct," says Assistant Police Chief C.O. Bradford, who oversees the professional development command. "Of course, we've had our share of things, but nothing serious like what you've seen reported in some other cities."

**W**hat Houston has not been able to avoid, however, is the internal controversy over race and ethnicity that accompanies virtually every urban police hiring spree. Its consensus on how new officers should be trained has not been matched by any consensus over what the demographics of the department should be.

"There's no question that the work force probably needs to better reflect the community it serves," says Doug Elder,

		GENDER	
		YEAR	
		MALE	FEMALE
Chicago	1990	87%	13%
	1995	81%	19%
Detroit	1990	80%	20%
	1995	79%	21%
Houston	1990	90%	10%
	1995	89%	11%
Los Angeles	1990	87%	13%
	1995	83%	17%
New York	1990	87%	13%
	1995	86%	14%
Philadelphia	1990	85%	15%
	1995	81%	19%

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics

effect stands in front of police headquarters, offering the beckoning faces of an Asian female, a black male, a Latina and a white male. Indeed, though the Houston police academy's first 11 classes between 1989 and 1992 were 66 percent white, those figures have steadily reversed: The latest class to graduate from the academy was 74 percent minority. Anglos are still welcome, but any student of popular culture can read between the lines of the television and radio recruitment ads and recognize that while the HPD is looking for a few good men and women, it wants most of them to be brown or black.

Given the history of the HPD and most

**'The larger the police force, the larger the racial divide,' one criminologist says. 'That's a problem that's going to explode over the next 10 years. There's tremendous tension simmering below the surface.'**

sonably accommodate in a short period.

Houston integrated about 1,000 officers over a five-year span, rather than in two or three years, the way D.C. and Miami had tried to do it. Staggering the recruitment and adding new officers at a slower pace allowed the HPD the luxury of retaining relatively stringent admission requirements, among them 60 hours of college credit for each officer.

It is a strategy that other departments have attempted to follow. Las Vegas, in the midst of increasing its force from about 1,100 to nearly 1,500 in response to the

head of the city's largest police organization, the Houston Police Officers Association. "On the other hand, do you give away the entire operation for the sake of artificial numbers to reflect something? If the citizens are not being served and we're not hiring the right people to do the job, we've created a bigger mess than it was intended to solve."

As in every city, the move to add new officers in Houston has been used as an instrument for changing the makeup of what has always been an overwhelmingly white male institution. A billboard to that

big city forces, it is undoubtedly a welcome change for many. A 1992 study conducted by the University of Nebraska reported that only five of the 50 largest cities had reached levels of employment for both black and Hispanic officers that corresponded to their populations. In Houston, even after a long-standing and concerted effort to recruit minorities, the police force remains nearly two-thirds white, while the city as a whole is now more than half minority. And the HPD is whitest at the top. "If you look at the command structure—the sergeants, lieutenants and cap-

# PROFILES

## ETHNICITY

	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	OTHER
	70%	24%	6%	0%
	64%	25%	9%	2%
	47%	52%	1%	0%
	40%	58%	2%	0%
	74%	14%	11%	1%
	65%	18%	15%	2%
	63%	13%	21%	3%
	53%	15%	27%	5%
	76%	11%	12%	1%
	68%	13%	18%	1%
	73%	23%	3%	1%
	65%	30%	4%	1%

stics and individual police departments

tains," notes Michael Adams, a criminal justice professor at Texas Southern University, "the department is still not very representative of the community."

Yet the faster the HPD has moved to diversify, the more racially divided the police force has become. In the old days, it was African-American officers who sounded the alarm about the hiring and promotional process. They perceived the HPD as being inattentive to their concerns at best, and blatantly racist at worst. Twenty years ago, when it became obvious that minorities were not scoring as well as Anglos on certain sections of a promotional exam, a group of black officers filed a class-action suit charging that the exams were discriminatory in nature.

But by last summer, white officers were the ones taking their grievances to court. Five whites filed a reverse discrimination suit in August alleging that white promotees were assigned to the least desirable divisions while minorities were sent to the most high-profile and most sought-after jobs. A group known as the White Officers Association also sued the HPD last year, charging that it had been denied the right to recruit members at the academy during cadet training hours—a right accorded minority-based police associations.

That groups of white officers should file suit against a 65 percent white department merely reflects the logic of the current hiring process. From the time a potential applicant first meets a Houston police recruiter to the time when that individual takes a test for promotion to higher rank, he or she becomes part of a race and gen-

der-based bean-counting contest that has left the officers themselves splintered into a handful of different interest groups, ranging from the two most broadly constituted officer organizations, the HPOA and the Houston Police Protective Union, to smaller, ethnicity-based groups such as the white officers, the Afro-American Officers League and the Organization of Spanish-Speaking Officers.

About the only thing the bickering police organizations can agree on anymore is the need to increase the comparatively low pay given to Houston cops, and that effort has gone nowhere in recent years largely because the groups are so hopelessly divided. So just as in many other large cities, the Houston police department ends up with a corps of low paid, alienated officers on both sides of the racial divide. At \$25,786 in annual salary for entry-level officers, Houston cops not only make less than those in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, but they also lack the collective bargaining rights authorized to police unions in those cities.

The racial tensions within the Houston force mirror what is going on in all the other big cities that have chosen to mix hiring sprees with rapid diversification. "The larger the police force, the larger the racial divide," says Bernard Cohen, the Queens College criminologist. "That's a problem that is going to explode over the next 10 years. There's tremendous tension simmering below the surface."

But it may be unfair to expect anything different from police departments when cities themselves are unable to reach agreement on racial or gender hiring goals and timetables. In the police hiring game of the 1990s, one group's gain is another's loss.

The Los Angeles city council learned that lesson in 1992 when it attempted to put its stamp on the LAPD by demanding that the force increase the number of female officers from 13 percent to 44 percent by the year 2000. A highly intrusive move whose feasibility was questioned even by the Women Police Officers Association, it immediately provoked a reaction from Hispanic and African-American officers concerned over its potential impact on efforts to hire from within their own communities. "The society is divided along racial lines, and the police departments are as well," says David Walker, a Houston police veteran who is now chief in Benton Harbor, Michigan.

"I don't know that the police department could be any different than the city itself."

**D**espite the attendant difficulties of its hiring spree, it is hard to argue with the Houston police department's recent record of success. Calls for service increased by more than 100,000 between 1991 and 1994, and yet priority response time decreased from 6.3 minutes to 4.6 minutes in that same period.


In fact, since Lanier instituted his hiring program, the Houston crime rate has actually declined as well. The number of murders, rapes, robberies, burglaries and auto thefts has steadily decreased since 1991. Violent crimes as a whole dropped 7 percent between 1991 and 1992, then dipped 8 percent between 1993 and 1994.

Of course, there are other factors beyond the police hiring spree that have had a powerful effect on local crime. Crimes reported to police aren't just dropping in Houston, they are dropping all across the nation—8 percent in 1994 in cities with more than a million people. Meanwhile, in Texas, a statewide prison construction boom has kept many repeat offenders behind bars.

Although Houston officials try, it is difficult to make a persuasive case that the crime rate correlates directly with the size of the police force. The District of Columbia, for example, far outpaces any other city in number of officers per 10,000 residents, yet its homicide rate remains disproportionately high. In Miami and Atlanta, homicide rates increased in the 1980s even as both forces increased in size. "Hiring more officers doesn't stop criminals from conducting criminal behavior, it just displaces it," says Tony Narr, a senior research associate at the Police Executive Research Forum. "More important than sheer numbers is how those numbers are utilized."

Of course, to Houstonians it hardly matters why crime is down in their city, just so long as it remains that way. Even in the face of evidence to the contrary, voters and city officials there and elsewhere continue to believe that more officers mean less crime. There's nothing wrong with that—as long as they manage to keep a few things in mind when it comes to hiring more cops, none more important than the speed with which it is done and the qualifications of the people they choose. **G**

**INSIDE THE  
BUDGET TALKS**




**FINALLY, WE'RE  
WINNING  
THE WAR AGAINST  
CRIME.  
HERE'S WHY.**

New York  
Commissioner  
William Bratton,  
a leading  
advocate of  
community  
policing

C R I M E

AND



DEER

Crime rates are down across the U.S. — some dramatically. Is this a blip or a trend? With so many factors in play, it may be a bit of both

By RICHARD LACAYO

**W**ANT TO SEE A CIVIC MONUMENT THAT NO CITY would ever want? Go to New Orleans and proceed to the intersection of Congress and Law streets, just a few blocks from the tourists' Latin Quarter. Walk anywhere in that neighborhood of trashed storefronts and blunt-shouldered housing projects. It won't take long to find walls that are spattered with grimy little craters. Those are bullet holes. Every one of them is an unofficial memorial to the mayhem that was daily life around there until not so long ago.

Starting in the late 1980s, drug dealers had claimed the place as their own, part sales ground, part killing ground, where they seized market share the hard way, with drive-by shootings and turf wars. At the nearby St. Philip Social Service Center, preschoolers learned to dive for the floor in "shooting drills," then stay there until their teachers sounded the all clear. By 1994 there were three or more killings each month on the streets outside. Standing now where the unthinkable used to be the unremarkable, police lieutenant Edwin Compass III looks around with a shudder. "I'd bet it was the most dangerous block in the U.S."

The good thing about monuments is they commemorate the past. Last year the city inaugurated a Community Oriented Policing Squad (COPS), now headed by Compass, a name so foursquare no novelist would dare invent it. With secondhand furniture and federal money, police set up round-the-clock substations in vacant

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**COMMUNITY POLICING**

Daylight basketball is just one aspect of the cops' increased presence in the Desire project in New Orleans. With a new police substation, gang bangers have fled

CRIME

apartments at three of the city's most dead-ly projects. The 45 cops assigned to them work foot patrol, get to know the law-abiding residents and sweep out the street dealers. They also help pick up trash, combat graffiti and round up kids who play hooky.

That mix of shoe leather and social work has made a difference. By the end of last year killings around the three projects had dropped 74%. A dozen dead bodies per annum is still no small problem. But if you don't happen to be one of them, it is cause enough for celebration. Lately, the neighborhood even sees its share of those spontaneous street parades that are defining outbreaks of civic life in New Orleans. What are people celebrating? Maybe just the return of their freedom to move around.

New Orleans is not alone. After years of depressing and implacable upswing, serious crime is retreating all around the U.S. In the nine cities with a population of more than 1 million, the decrease in violent crimes was 8% in 1994. Nationally, murders fell 12% in the first six months of 1995, and serious crimes of all kinds dropped 1% to 2%. The suburbs, long a growth area for felonies, posted declines between 4% and 5% last year in violent crime.

What makes these numbers important, not just encouraging, is that they extend what is plainly a sustained retreat from the crack-fueled crime wave of the late 1980s. According to the FBI, violent crimes started to decline in 1993. As always with crime, an area of famously wiggly trend lines, the downward curve is not to be found everywhere. Minneapolis, Minnesota, for instance, is still puzzling over why in 1995 homicides climbed more than 56% over the preceding year. Even with the downward trend, crime rates remain bloodcurdlingly high, especially when compared to the relatively peaceable kingdom of, say, 1965. (Murder victims per 100,000 then: 5.1 in 1994: 9.) And there are widespread predictions that another tidal wave will break as soon as the milk-toothed children of the '90s crowd into their saw-toothed teens. Whoever called economics the dismal science must not have heard about criminology.

For all that, even the experts in bad behavior are intrigued. Something is happening here. The question is, Why? The lineup of contributing factors includes most of the usual suspects: a decline in the proportion of young males in the general population, the leveling off of crack cocaine use, a moderate unemployment rate and tougher sentencing that gets more felons off the street and keeps them off longer.

Certainly demographics is part of it. Very simply, there are fewer people in the




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STRICTER SENTENCING

The U.S. prison population has more than doubled over the past 15 years, which means that many repeat offenders have been taken off the streets. But finding a place to put them all is getting harder. At the California Institution for Men, in China, prison officials have had to turn the sports facility into a bunk room.



most crime-prone category, which is males from the ages of 15 to 29. The crime spree that began in the 1960s was largely the work of baby boomers as they moved into those years. The same boomers are tipping into their 50s, an age when you're just right for fly fishing but not much good with a semiautomatic. The bad news, however, is that today's smaller cohort of teenagers is more prone to crime than its elders were at the same age. Among 14- to 17-year-olds, for instance, murder rates skyrocketed over the past decade.

The trade in crack cocaine also appears to have changed. Perhaps it has lost its cachet. "As with any drug epidemic, the attractiveness of the drug begins to wear off, partly because users see so many of their friends dead," says James Q. Wilson, the UCLA professor who is one of the nation's most prominent thinkers on crime. That's important, because crack was the great im-

petus to crime in the late 1980s as big new dealers muscled in. Another theory is that the trade has simply stabilized in "mature market," as they say in the business schools, with surviving distributors less likely to clash over territory.

As for prison populations, those 1 more than doubled in the past 15 years. Most criminologists believe that a relatively small population of repeat felons is responsible for a disproportionate share of crime. Lock away the most energetic thieves and killers, and you make a sedentary business. "Most prisoners are violent or repeat offenders," says Will Bennett, the former Secretary of Education and drug czar. "Prisons do cut crime. Last week Bennett's Council on Crime in America, a commission he co-heads with Griffin Bell, who was Attorney General under Jimmy Carter, issued a report that violent crime is still higher than p

community policing

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Murders per 100,000



**ECONOMY**

Though crime and unemployment don't rise and fall perfectly in tandem, policymakers recognize that people without jobs are a crime wave waiting to happen. Parbe Meyer, 20, works at the NightRider Overnight Copy Service in Chicago. He got there through Jobs for Youth, a largely privately funded program that guides young people from impoverished neighborhoods to their first job in the workplace.

Incarceration rate per 100,000



records indicate because so much of it goes unreported. They urged even more aggressive jailings.

But time and again, the experts are also returning to an explanation they would have played down in the past: more effective policing strategies. It is respectable once again to believe that cops can have a real impact on crime rates, an opinion that has been seriously out of fashion among professional students of crime. For decades they held that crime was too deeply connected to underlying social causes, meaning everything from the state of the economy to the breakdown of the family. Such things are still assumed to play their part in producing crime. What has changed is the view that police are useful only to chase down bad guys after they strike.

All over the U.S., the decade of the '90s has seen a rapid reinvention of how the po-

lice do their jobs, especially in major cities. A change from squad cars to foot patrolling, a shift to "proactive" policing that seeks to dissolve problems such as open-air drug marts rather than just rack up arrests, the more frequent establishment of cross-agency task forces to target specific problems such as car theft or drug crime—all are now commonplace. This decline in crime rates is more than a demographic phenomenon," says Jeremy Travis, director of the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Justice Department. "Public policy can make a difference. Police can make a difference."

Exhibit A for supporters of the new policing is New York City, where major crimes—murder, rape, robbery, auto theft, grand larceny, assault and burglary—is in something like statistical free fall, dropping 17.5% last year. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his police commissioner, William Bratton, both insist that the reason is their devotion to new ways of doing police business. John DiIulio Jr., a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, says that since the mid-'80s top brass who embrace a similar shift in philosophy have risen to key positions in cities all around the country. "So now you're seeing better policing. Not miracles or panaceas, but better policing."

To the extent that is true, police have had to pull themselves in two disparate directions—tougher and softer, as the cops

program in New Orleans illustrates. Tougher means more aggressive intervention. "If we see somebody we don't know, we ask them what they're doing there," says Compass. "If the story doesn't check out, we arrest them for trespassing. Now we don't see as many drug dealers around here." But at the same time, it has meant more neighborhood-friendly tactics, the foot patrolling and problem solving that form the loosely defined strategy called community policing. "We do neighborhood cleanups, counseling on child abuse, you name it," says Officer Djuana Adams. "We help the children with their homework, and they show up for treats when they get good grades."

New Orleans is also learning what other cities have discovered when they moved more officers away from the patrol-car policing that limited them to 911 emergency-response calls. The lesson: face-to-face contact between cops and the people they work among, with no windshield in between, helps to restore trust. For a city like New Orleans, which has recently seen some spectacular instances of police corruption, that is an invaluable side benefit. "I felt better almost as soon as the police moved in," says Brenda Holmes, who lives at Desire, the New Orleans housing project with the most poignant name. "They've given us our lives back."

The potential synergy between cops and residents works not only in big cities:

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D C L UK SW W J T S A N

**CRIME**

Taylor, Texas, about 28 miles northeast of Austin, has just 13,300 people. But no place is too small for the drug trade. Five years ago, crack moved in among the cotton gins and railroad tracks, bringing with it assault, rape, car theft and murder. Crime got so bad that Mae Willie Turner, 79, and her sister, Gladys Hubbard, 73, could no longer sit at night on their front porch. "The place was infested," says Turner.

So they got off the porch and joined Turn Around Taylor, a community-action group designed to help locals take back their town. It was conceived by Herman Wrice, a Philadelphia management consultant who organizes citizen-led anti-crime groups as part of a federal program. And the man who brought in Wrice and his ideas was Fred Stansbury, the police chief who arrived in Taylor in 1993, on an April day when a local teenager was killed in a gang fight. "We wanted a program where the community felt it had a proprietary interest," he says.

That's what they got. Most weeks Turner and Hubbard put on jackets with slogans such as UP WITH HOPE, DOWN WITH DOPE and joined other demonstrators on streets where the heaviest dealing happened. Stansbury got the town council to designate "downtown" Taylor as a historic district, which meant a ban on the public consumption of alcohol. The group even persuaded the Texas National Guard to bulldoze 48 worn-out buildings near the railroad tracks that had become weekend squats for drug dealers and their out-



**669**  
Population age 15 to 29 in millions

Year	Population (millions)
1975	~55
1985	~60
1995	~65

**671**  
**DEMOGRAPHICS** Teenagers are the most crime-prone group. At the Mount View Youth Service Center in Denver, juveniles in custody for various offenses line up for lunch

tomers, who used to come in by car and train. Taylor these days is more like it used to be. "I can sit on my porch anytime now," says Mae Willie Turner.

The single greatest imponderable in the crime debate is the role of gun control. Or decontrol: last week Texas became the

28th state to allow people to carry concealed weapons. The rationale is to discourage crime—supporters say felons will think twice about assaulting people who may be armed. Florida became the first state to pass such a law in 1987. Since then, more than 150,000 people there have ap-

**Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb**

**T**HEY ARE JUST FOUR, FIVE AND SIX YEARS OLD RIGHT NOW, BUT already they are making criminologists nervous. They are growing up, too frequently, in abusive or broken homes, with little adult supervision and few positive role models. Left to themselves, they spend much of their time hanging out on the streets or soaking up violent TV shows. By the year 2005 they will be teenagers—a group that tends to be, in the view of Northeastern University criminologist James Alan Fox, "temporary sociopaths—impulsive and immature." If they also have easy access to guns and drugs, they can be extremely dangerous.

For all the heartening news offered by recent crime statistics, there is an ominous flip side. While the crime rate is dropping for adults, it is soaring for teens. Between 1990 and 1994, the rate at which adults age 25 and older committed homicides declined 22%; yet the rate jumped 18% for youths between 14 and 17, the age group that in the early '90s supplanted 18- to 24-year-olds as the most crime-prone. And that is precisely the age

group that will be booming in the next decade. There are currently 39 million children under 10 in the U.S., more than at any time since the 1950s. "This is the calm before the crime storm," says Fox. "So long as we fool ourselves in thinking that we're winning the war against crime, we may be blindsided by this bloodbath of teenage violence that is lurking in the future."

Demographics don't have to be destiny, but other social trends do little to contradict the dire predictions. Nearly all the factors that contribute to youth crime—single-parent households, child abuse, deteriorating inner-city schools—are getting worse. At the same time, government is becoming less, not more, interested in spending money to help break the cycle of poverty and crime. All of which has led John J. DiIulio Jr., a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton, to warn about a new generation of "superpredators," youngsters who are coming of age in actual and "moral poverty," without "the benefit of parents, teachers, coaches and clergy to teach them right or wrong and show them unconditional love."

Predicting a generation's future crime patterns is, of course, risky, especially when outside factors (Will crack use be up or down? Will gun laws be tightened?) remain unpredictable. Michael Tonry, a professor of law and public policy at the University of Minnesota, argues that the demographic doom-sayers



671

plied for permits to pack a gun. But two recent studies suggest loopholes in the law have also allowed felons, ordinarily forbidden to carry a gun, to do so legally. On the other hand, gun homicides in Florida have declined 29% since the law was introduced. Michael McHargue of the Florida

department of law enforcement shrugs, saying, "If you look at the overall statistical picture, we don't believe the law made any impression."

The effectiveness of gun laws that are stricter is no easier to compute. In the three cities with the most dramatic recent

declines in homicide—New York, Kansas City and Houston—police have very aggressive strategies for separating felons from their firearms and stemming the flow of cheap, illegal handguns. Chicago is currently celebrating a decline in homicides from 930 in 1994 to 823 last year. Police think part of the reason might be that Illinois' new, stricter penalties for felonies involving a firearm have persuaded many gang members and drug dealers to leave the guns at home. "We'll arrest a whole crew and still find no guns," says Paul Jenkins, the Chicago police department's director of news affairs. But while the anecdotal evidence is suggestive, it is nothing like firm. "If we knew the reason for success, we'd do a lot more of it," says Jenkins. "We'd bottle it."

For now, keep the bottles uncorked. Talk to most experts in law enforcement, and they soon complain about the paucity of solid research to identify what works against crime. Norval Morris, a professor of law and criminology at the University of Chicago, compares the state of knowledge in his field to that in medicine earlier in the century, when doctors were commonly in the dark as to whether their treatments worked, or why. "Testing the consequences [for crimes] of different drug policies, different housing practices, different police practices—it's very, very rarely done," he says.

In the 1988 presidential election, when rising crime was an issue, Willie Horton became the wanted-poster child who


are unduly alarmist. "There will be a slightly larger number of people relative to the overall population who are at high risk for doing bad things, so that's going to have some effect," he concedes. "But it's not going to be an apocalyptic effect." Norval Morris, professor of law and criminology at the University of Chicago, finds DiIulio's notion of superpredators too simplistic: "The human animal in young males is quite a violent animal all over the world. The people who put forth the theory of moral poverty lack a sense of history and comparative criminology."

Yet other students of the inner city are more pessimistic. "All the basic elements that spawn teenage crime are still in place, and in many cases the indicators are worse," says Jonathan Kozol, author of *Amazing Grace*, an examination of poverty in the South Bronx. "There's a dramatic increase of children in foster care, and that's a very high-risk group of

kids. We're not creating new jobs, and we're not improving education to suit poor people for the jobs that exist."

Can anything defuse the demographic time bomb? Fox urges "reinvesting in children": improving schools, creating after-school programs and providing other alternatives to gangs and drugs. DiIulio, a law-and-order conservative, advocates tougher prosecution and wants to strengthen religious institutions to instill better values. Yet he opposes the Gingrich-led effort to make deep cuts in social programs. "A failure to maintain existing welfare and health commitment for kids," he says, "is to guarantee that the next wave of juvenile predators will be even worse than we're dealing with today." DiIulio urges fellow conservatives to think of Medicaid not as a health-care program but as "an anti-crime policy." —By Richard Ziegler

Reported by Sam Altschuler and Peter Kaminski/New York



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Princeton's John DiIulio warns of "superpredators"

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helped elect George Bush. In 1993 Bill Clinton neutralized the Republican advantage by positioning himself as a tough-on-crime Democrat who favored the death penalty and would put 100,000 new police officers on the streets. In an interview with TIME, Clinton said last week that the country has embarked on a historic change: "What's happening now across America essentially closes the door on an era that began with the murder of Kitty Genovese 30 years ago." In that milestone episode of public indifference, Genovese, a young New Yorker, was murdered while dozens of people ignored her screams for help. "I think now we have ended both the isolation of the police from the community and the idea that the community doesn't have a responsibility to work with the police or with its neighbors."

Clinton's tough talk on crime helped him win back some of the Reagan Democrats who had fled the party. But with crime rates falling, the issue may lose some of the importance it had for voters two years ago. Though Americans still tell pollsters that crime is at the top of their concerns, that may change as lagging perceptions catch up to new realities. Meanwhile, the President sees the political advantage as his. Though crime has hardly been mentioned in the Republican primaries, the Clinton-Gore Re-Election Committee spent a surprising \$2.4 million last summer on TV spots that ran in 24 states, touting the President's record on crime.

As the year goes on, expect Clinton to attack congressional Republicans for their attempt to rescind the 100,000-new-cops provision in his 1994 crime bill. In the White House version, municipalities get the money only if they use it to hire new officers and use them in community-policing programs. Republicans want to send that money instead in bloc grants to states to use as they see fit. Last month the President vetoed the appropriations bill that would have distributed his police money that way. "I don't tell all these folks how to deploy the police," said Clinton, "or what they should do all day. All I say is there has to be a community-policing strategy because that's by definition grass-roots reform, and we know that it works."

Or at least that it is part of what works. There may be a conjunction of half a dozen lucky developments that are holding crime in check right now. The trick will be to find the way to keep it all working. But for once, it is possible to suppose the trick is one we can manage.

—Reported by Jyl Dawson/New Orleans, James Carney and Elaine Shannon/Washington, Hilary Hyton/Taylor and Bob Kaminari/New York, with other bureaus



PHOTO BY ERIC POOLEY FOR TIME

**Police Commissioner William Bratton set out to prove that cops really can cut crime. The experts scoffed—but felony rates have dropped so far, so fast, that no other explanation makes sense.**

**#638**

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By ERIC POOLEY

**C**RIME IS FALLING FROM THE NEW YORK sky, but New York City police captain Thomas Lawrence looks as if he's been out in the sun too long. It's just past 7 on the third morning of the new year, and Lawrence, who runs the 10th Precinct in midtown Manhattan, is standing on a podium in the command control center at police headquarters—the "war room." His face is bright red and a little clammy. His body is wired up tight. He is surrounded by shelves of statistics, screens filled with computerized maps and charts and N.Y.P.D. bosses, who, amazingly, seem to know as much about crime in his precinct as he does. "It's been 30 days since we've seen you, Tom," says Chief of Department Louis Anemone, a dark tone creeping into his voice. "And we're seeing an increase in robberies."

"What's the pattern here, Cap?" asks Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple, the department's thickest, dandyish crime guru. Using a laser pen, Maple scribbles on an overhead map, tracing robbery patterns the way John Madden diagrams football plays. Maple circles an archipelago of red dots: muggings along Ninth Avenue. "What are you doing to take these guys out?"

Lawrence launches into a first-rate description of his anticrime efforts, but the CEO of this organization—a slim, well-tended man who wears his reading glasses slung low on an impressive nose—barely looks up from his papers. Police Commissioner William Bratton designed these Comstat (short for computer statistics) meetings as a way to make his 76 far-flung precinct commanders—and 38,000 cops—accountable for the crime rate. Nobody had ever done it before, and it's working: total felonies in New York City are down 27% in just two years, to levels not seen since the early 1970s.

Crime had been falling gently since 1989, thanks to community policing strategies, a thinning in the ranks of the crack-head army and thousands of new prison beds and new cops. But as Comstat took hold in May 1994, the drop became a giddy double-digit affair, plunging faster and faster than it has done anywhere else in the country, faster than any cultural or demographic trend could explain. For two years, crime has declined in all 76 precincts. Murder is down 39%, auto theft 35%. Robberies are off by a third, burglaries by a quarter. No wonder Comstat has become the Lourdes of policing, drawing pilgrim cops from around the world—Baltimore,

.18K



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EDIT: #2 for Cap Ledo Body

NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTION: The Commissioner, visiting the Manhattan station house, wants an additional 10% drop in crime.

London, Frankfurt, Zimbabwe, Taiwan— for a taste of New York's magic.

If those waters seem bitter to some— cops who can't take Comast's pressure, black and Latino leaders who say some of Bratton's cops carry his aggressive style too far—"That's too damn bad," says Bratton. Success isn't pretty, even for his troops. Effective precinct commanders such as Lawrence (crime was down 15% in his precinct in 1995) merely get pulled to a medium rate at Comast. Those who show up unprepared, without coherent strategies to reduce crime, are fired

when victims suffered broken bones, not for lips or black eyes. Crimes in the category plummeted in his precinct.


"You have delivered big time," says Bratton, standing to address his Comast managers. He reminds them that when he was hired away from the Boston Police Department in January 1994 by Mayor-elect Rudolph Giuliani, who had made crime and quality of life his major campaign themes, Bratton had asked for an immediate 10% decrease in crime (the request was

denied)—more than even Giuliani expects. If he gets it, New York's crime rate will be half what it was five years ago. That, he says later, "should show the criminologists who refuse to give police credit."

Some experts doubt that Bratton is responsible for any of New York's crime drop. "It's like trying to take credit for an eclipse," says former New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly. Others are watching Bratton with mouths agape. "I've never seen anything like it," says University of Maryland criminologist Lawrence Sherman, who has studied 30 police departments in the past 25 years. "Police chiefs routinely say, 'Don't expect us to bring down crime, because we don't control its causes. But Bratton says just the opposite. It's the most focused crime-reduction effort I've seen. It will take time before we can say how much effect it has had, but this clearly is new. When I sat in at Comast, I thought, Bratton is using crime data for management by objective—a basic idea that's never been tried before.'"

There's more to the Giuliani-Bratton strategy, of course, than terrifying captains at early-morning meetings. Though their predecessors, Mayor David Dinkins and Kelly, deserve real credit for putting more cops on the beat, Giuliani instructed

of all precinct bosses have been replaced under Bratton. Those who survive get unprecendented autonomy but have to demonstrate extraordinary results. Some feel pressured to shove their stats, as the New York Daily News reported last fall, a commander in the Bronx told his troops that assault arrests could be made only




THE JANUARY 11, 1996

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THE BEAT GOES ON: Despite Bratton's tough policies, some community patrol officers, like John Cayenne of Brooklyn's 77th Precinct, still have a soft touch

Bratton to do something Dinkins would never have allowed: use those cops to crack down on minor offenders, public drunks, potheads, those who urinate on the street, aggressive panhandlers, graffiti scribblers and "squeegee pests," who converged on cars at stoplights to clean windshields for spare change.

This quality of life campaign tested a principle that Giuliani and Bratton had believed for years—the "Broken Windows" theory, first put forth in 1982 by criminologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. Wilson and Kelling argued that minor violations create a disorderly environment that encourages more serious crime. "I chose Bill Bratton," says Giuliani, "because he agreed with the Broken Windows theory." Sure enough, as arrests for small offenses rocketed, New York's streets became notably more civil. Then Maple, who has been Bratton's aide-de-camp and crime strategist since Bratton was slashing subway crime as New York's Transit Police chief in the early 1990s, proposed an intriguing corollary to the theory.

He wanted to go after shootings, and he knew that gun possession and drug dealing were intertwined. "It's relatively hard for a uniformed patrolman to catch someone carrying drugs," Maple says. "But as we'd seen, it's easy to catch someone for an open can of beer on the street." Thus what the cops call "beer and piss patrol" became a tactic for apprehending more serious criminals. "Your open beer lets me

check your ID," says Maple. "Now I can radio the precinct for outstanding warrants or parole violations. Maybe I bump against that bulge in your belt; with probable cause, I can frisk you." Civil libertarians have been screaming, but shootings, gun murders and other signs of firearms use are down—proof, Bratton says, that thugs are leaving the guns at home.

This is a significant departure from the

Murders	1995	Change	Percent
<b>#666</b>	48	-32%	
San Antonio	194	140	-28%
New York City	1,571	1,182	-25%
San Diego	119	94	-21%
Houston	379	304	-20%
St. Louis	248	203	-18%
Miami	129	111	-14%
New Orleans	421	364	-14%
Chicago	930	823	-12%
Washington	399	360	-10%
Atlanta	153	145	-5%
Dallas	291	276	-5%
Detroit	525	514	-2%
Los Angeles	836	828	-1%
Phoenix	244	244	0%
Baltimore	321	325	+1%
Denver	85	90	+6%
Boston	85	98	+15%
Minneapolis	62	97	+56%

service-oriented "community policing" introduced during the Dinkins administration, when beat cops were encouraged to be problem solvers for a neighborhood. (Now the patrolmen funnel these issues to their precinct commanders.) The Bratton version of community policing is to devise strategies that target specific criminal behavior. Special squads are dispatched to hit high-crime hot spots, while others track down illegal guns. Precinct detectives now interrogate suspects not just about the crimes they may have committed but also about other gun and drug dealers they know. Eventually, Bratton believes, all the policies begin to dovetail, and crime drops through the floor. "Most criminals commit multiple crimes," he says. "We're processing crime data faster than ever before, so we can identify patterns early and stop them after three crimes instead of 30. If you do that city-wide, you'll knock the crime rate down."

But what some rank-and-file cops refer to as "Bratton taking the cuffs off us" has increased force, abuse and discourtesy complaints to the Civilian Complaint Review Board 30%. Many of the complaints have never been investigated by the CCRC and are impossible to evaluate. Still, some New Yorkers fear the N.Y.P.D.'s new swagger. "A lot of people aren't comfortable with this style," says Kelly. "It goes to the question of what kind of policing we want in America. You can probably shut down just about all crime, if you're willing to burn down the village to save it. Eventually, I think, there will be a backlash, and crime will go back up. But Bill will be gone by then." **BRATTON**

asked about persistent rumors that he'll soon jump ship, Bratton says even if he stays only another year, "that's enough time to consolidate our gains, so that long after I'm gone, my successors won't retreat." As for Kelly's burning-village imagery, Giuliani and Bratton dismiss such talk as sour grapes, pointing to the benefits of reduced crime being enjoyed by those hardest hit by it: Latinos and African Americans in the poorest parts of New York City. "The crime reduction has been across the board, in every neighborhood," says Bratton. That means four fewer people killed on the wealthy Upper East Side, but 51 fewer killed in war-torn East New York. The people who live there have noticed the change. "It used to be that I was throwing myself on the floor with my son all the time," says Elisandra Beltran, 27, "because of the bullets flying through my window. But now I haven't seen a bullet hole in a year." She doesn't much care who gets the credit, just as long as the bullets don't fly anymore.

—With reporting by Elaine Rivers/New York



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1-19-96

Dear Commissioner Bratton,

Congratulations on the Time  
cover and more importantly, on  
your success in reducing crime in  
New York.

I thank you too for your support  
of our anti-crime efforts and I  
hope we can pursue them. I look  
forward to your continued success  
and our continued partnership.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Date: 10/21/94 Time: 19:59

Crime -  
Community  
Policy

Crime-Bill Grants: Moffett, Okla., Isn't So Sure It Wants the

MOFFETT, Okla. (AP) There hasn't been this much excitement in Moffett since a poultry company tried to dump chicken sludge on the edge of town last year.

Last week, the federal government awarded this tumbledown town a three-year grant of \$106,000 from the crime bill to make the dirt streets of Moffett safer, and the 340 locals have been in a dither ever since.

For one thing, they don't have a police department or much of a crime problem either, some say.

To get the money in hand, they have to come up with a 9 percent match, or about \$11,600, Justice Department spokesman Bert Brandenburg said. That is about \$1,000 more than the town's annual budget.

For a community that had to hold a barbecue to raise \$2,000 to clean up after the Arkansas River flooded the town in 1990, that's real money. But Brandenburg said the town has three years to provide the matching money.

"I wish in a way it never came through," says Ruby Lindsey, who raised her children in this town that's seven blocks long and four blocks wide. "It's caused a lot of friction between a lot of people."

The grant was applied for by Jimmy Jones, who was fired last year after 18 months as the town's lone police officer. Folks say they ran out of money and patience with Jones, who patrolled in his own 1977 Pontiac Firebird with a red light propped on the dashboard after the town's Ford LTD "wore plumb out." Jones had had squabbles with town leaders over whether he was doing his job.

Now David Lindsey, Ms. Lindsey's ex-husband and one of two town councilors, is accusing Jones who was paid \$120 a week of applying for the grant simply to get his job back.

Brandenburg said the town's mayor and two City Council members, including Lindsey, signed the application, which cited the proximity to a rough part of Fort Smith, Ark., and problems with domestic abuse.

"We would never send somebody money when they either didn't need it, couldn't use it or could not afford the matching requirement," Brandenburg said Friday. "They specifically asked for this amount of money on these terms."

For his part, Jones says that he does want his job back but that he also believes the town needs police protection.

The rest of the townsfolk are taking sides, and city leaders are looking into what to do next.

Mayor David Carolina says there's not much need for law enforcement in this sleepy town. The 78-year-old, who collects aluminum cans for extra money, says the biggest problem is speeding.

"Kids are speeding up and down this highway," Carolina says of the potholed, country lane that runs through town. "All we need is one policeman part time."

He lets out a belly laugh when told that the county undersheriff is recommending a police chief and three officers for the town.

"We don't need one, let alone three," he says, stuffing a wad of chewing tobacco under his lip. "I told them to give me the best pistol they can get and I'll do it."

To be sure, this town of rundown shacks, an auto salvage yard, a pool hall and septic tanks has had its share of trouble.

A few years back, vandals broke into the elementary school and

stole a TV and VCR. Then there was that time when someone was dumping trash in everyone else's garbage cans. And it has had its town bullies and fistfights.

``There are fights between people, but most of the people are kin,'' Ms. Lindsey said.

Two of those recent fights have led to murder, and one of those slayings stemmed from a dispute over drug money. Brandenburg said the grant application noted domestic abuse and mentioned a 1993 death.

In the 1940s and '50s, Moffett was a party town for soldiers on leave. But when too many servicemen turned up drunk or dead after a night of gambling and womanizing in Moffett, the military posted a sign at the edge of town: ``Off Limits to All Military Personnel.''

The sign stood for decades until a car plowed it down. Now there's not much left here but widows and stray dogs and abandoned tractors.

Brandenburg said Moffett is a poor town where the average household income is less than \$5,000, 115 percent below the poverty level. He said high unemployment, a low literacy rate and the low income contributed to a recipe for problems.

The application said the town is vulnerable to drug trafficking, either from a nearby rundown area of Fort Smith or from Interstate 40 and U.S. Highway 64. It said domestic abuse ``appears to be cycling continuously through the years.''

Brandenburg said Moffett wanted officers who would be able to respond to domestic abuse and drug use complaints, make arrests and get people help.

Before the grant, one of the biggest things to happen here was a successful fight against a plan by a poultry processor to dump chicken guts, blood and parts on the outskirts of town.

Sallisaw County Undersheriff Danny Hoover, who occasionally patrols the town, says Moffett better get serious about law enforcement.

``Common sense will tell you when they know there's no law, the crime's going to come here,'' he says after giving a kid a lecture about how to walk away from a fight.

But Ruby Lindsey isn't so sure. ``Lawmen come in here and stir up trouble,'' she says. ``We have no bad people here.''

APNP-10-21-94 1958EDT

File:  
Crime -  
Community  
Policing



## Perspectives on Policing



July 1993

No. 17

A Publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,  
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

# Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem

By George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton

The current generation of police leadership, tuned to changes in American society, technology, and economics, is revising the strategy of municipal policing. Whether identified as community or problem-oriented policing, the current changes represent nothing less than a strategic shift in the basic "business" of policing. As dedicated as they are, as supported by research, as responsive to neighborhood demands for change, this generation of reformers finds regeneration and strategic repositioning as difficult as has any other. Why is it that innovators of every generation have so much difficulty shifting the strategies of their organizations and professions?

For police executives, three sources of resistance seem to be foremost in their minds and conversations: unions, detectives, and mid-management. This paper will deal with mid-management. We have repeatedly heard top police executives say with frustration, "If only it wasn't for mid-management," or "If only I could wipe out lieutenants, I could really change this department." The experience with team policing during the 1970's seemed to confirm this impression empirically. Sherman et al. conclude in their case studies of team policing: "Mid-management of the departments [studied], seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and, in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans."<sup>1</sup>

Yet, there are problems with this formulation. Review of the literature on mid-management presents a more complicated picture. On the one hand, many articles, especially those in journals of a semipopular nature, portray mid-managers as a dying breed in organizations, especially in those organizations that are being downsized or in which their services or products are information-based. Certainly, many organizations are portrayed as top-heavy, especially at mid-managerial levels. This is not just a "pop" view; Peter Drucker states it strongly.

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

**Michael J. Russell**  
Acting Director  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice

**Mark H. Moore**  
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University

[M]iddle managements today tend to be overstaffed to the point of obesity. . . . This slows the decision process to a crawl and makes the organization increasingly incapable

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## **Clinton Presidential Records Digital Records Marker**

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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.


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Publications have not been scanned in their entirety for the purpose of digitization. To see the full publication please search online or visit the Clinton Presidential Library's Research Room.

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Crime -  
Comm.  
Policies



Office of Policy Development  
United States Department of Justice  
10th and Constitution Ave. NW  
Washington, D. C. 20530

TO: Bruce Reed + Jose Cerda FAX: ( ) 456 7431

FROM: Grace Mastalli

VOICE: (202)  
FAX: (202) 514-8639

Total Pages (excluding this cover): \_\_\_\_\_

Additional Message:

Edits welcome.

1 "PART Q—PUBLIC SAFETY AND CITY POLICING;

2 "COPS ON THE BEAT"

3 "SEC. 1701. AUTHORITY TO MAKE PUBLIC SAFETY AND

4 COMMUNITY POLICING GRANTS.

5 "(a) GRANT AUTHORIZATION.—The Attorney Gen-  
6 eral may make grants to States, units of local government,  
7 Indian tribal governments, and other public and private  
8 entities to increase police presence, to expand and improve  
9 cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and  
10 members of the community to address crime and disorder  
11 problems, and otherwise to enhance public safety.

12 "(b) REHIRING AND HIRING GRANT PROJECTS.—  
13 Grants made under subsection (a) may be used for pro-  
14 grams, projects, and other activities to—

15 "(1) rehire law enforcement officers who have  
16 been laid off as a result of State and local budget  
17 reductions for deployment in community-oriented po-  
18 licing; ~~and~~

19 "(2) hire and train new, additional career law  
20 enforcement officers for deployment in community-  
21 oriented policing across the Nation; and

22 "(c) TROOPS-TO-COPS PROGRAMS.—(1) Grants made  
23 under subsection (a) may be used to hire former members  
24 of the Armed Forces to serve as career law enforcement  
25 officers for deployment in community-oriented policing,


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Insert after line 21 on page 16-

"(3) procure equipment, technology, or support systems, or pay overtime, provided that the applicant for such a grant demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, that expenditures for such purposes would result in an increase in the number of officers deployed in community-oriented policing equal to or greater than the increase in the number of officers that would result from a grant for a like amount for the purposes specified in paragraph (1) or (2).

Grants may be awarded pursuant to paragraph (3) only in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, and may not exceed 20% of the funds available for grants pursuant to this subsection in fiscal year 1995 or 10% of the funds available for grants pursuant to this subsection in fiscal year 1996.

*Crime -  
Comm. Policy*



Office of Policy Development  
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*Crime - Ed's  
Comm Policing*

February 14, 1994

Miss Meg Greenfield  
The Washington Post  
1150 15th Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001

Dear Miss Greenfield:

Please find attached an op-ed piece in strong support of the provision included in the Senate-passed crime bill providing funding for 100,000 additional police officers.

As the Executive Director of the National Association of Police Organizations, representing more than 150,000 police officers nationwide, I want you to know how important I feel the commitment of additional police resources is to fighting the war on crime.

There is broad consensus among the law enforcement community that a return to the days of having a "cop on the beat" is essential in our efforts towards taking back our nation's streets. As law enforcement officials, we know that an increased police presence on the streets can deter crime significantly. With the funding in the Senate-passed crime bill providing for 100,000 police officers, I feel confident that together, we will win this war on crime.

On behalf of police officers all across the country, I hope that you will print my op-ed piece.

You may reach me at (202) 842-4420. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Robert T. Scully  
Executive Director

Attachment

As the American people prepare for the 21st century, the scourge of crime and violence that has been afflicting our country continues to spiral out of control. Gun violence, drug-related crime and other forms of criminal behavior have been eating away at the moral and spiritual fabric of our society and wasting vast human and economic resources.

As police officers, it is our job to fight crime and to protect the citizens of the communities in which we live. And the police of this country have been working diligently round-the-clock to protect the American public from this rising tide of crime. But, we cannot win this war on crime without some help. We need, as we say in police jargon, some backup. The backup we need most is a measure included in the Senate-passed crime bill that provides funding for 100,000 more police officers.

We know from experience that an increased police presence on the streets can deter crime significantly. There is broad consensus among the law enforcement community that a return to the days of having a "cop on the beat" is essential in our efforts towards taking back our nation's streets. 100,000 more police officers across the country would enable us to fully embrace and implement the "cop on the beat" program nationwide. Officers walking a daily beat become problem-solvers and engage citizens in an ongoing partnership to solve and prevent crime. Police departments around the country know that they cannot fight crime alone, they must work with their community to make our county's neighborhoods safe again.

In Houston, after Mayor Lanier put the equivalent of 655 more police officers on the city's streets, the crime rate dropped an amazing 21.7% in just two years.

The vast resources which would put 100,000 more police officers on the streets would give individual police officers the authority to work with neighborhood residents on community crime problems. Again, a partnership between the police and the communities we serve, is a critical part of the long-term answer to the recurrent problems in our society.

Unfortunately, this funding is in serious jeopardy. Lawmakers in Washington continue to debate the more controversial elements of proposed anti-crime legislation although there is near unanimity on this measure that will have an immediate effect on reducing crime in this country. We simply cannot allow this proven public safety legislation to be held hostage to the myriad of contentious anti-crime issues like habeas reform and the death penalty.

While there are other proposed anti-crime measures that law enforcement needs for its daily work such as an assault weapon ban, funding for more prisons and boot camps for non-violent offenders and measures to combat youth violence, we, of the National Association of Police Organizations, representing over over 150,000 police officers throughout the country, believe that funding for 100,000 police officers is of paramount importance.

Law enforcement officers are not generally recognized as a lobbying force in

Washington, but on the crime issue, we do know best. Congress should listen to our pleas and act without further delay.

to [initials] 12/2

File: Comm Policing  
Document No. 045227

CM- cc: JOSE  
+ REVIEW  
TO ME

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12/2 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:

SUBJECT: AG LETTER RE HIRING POLICE OFFICERS

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PASTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McLARTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	QUINN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NEEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RASCO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PANETTA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RUBIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAGGETT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SEGAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EMANUEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SEIDMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GEARAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	STEPHANOPOULOS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
GERGEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TYSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GIBBONS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VARNEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HALE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WATKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HERMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LAKE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	REED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LINDSEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McGINTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MYERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NUSSBAUM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: NO RESPONSE NECESSARY

RESPONSE:

JOHN D. PODESTA  
Assistant to the President  
and Staff Secretary  
Ext. 2702



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D. C. 20530

November 29, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton  
President of the United States  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

With all of the attention now being focused on the Crime Bills and specifically on hiring additional police officers, I am pleased to advise of you of the progress the Department of Justice is making towards distributing the \$150 million appropriated for police hiring.

These discretionary funds have been made available as a result of the supplemental appropriations bill you signed in July. We expect these funds to help pay for up to 2,100 additional officers. One-half of the money is available for jurisdictions with populations at or above 150,000; the other half is for the smaller jurisdictions. In this manner, we hope to ensure that small and rural jurisdictions as well as the largest metropolitan areas will ultimately benefit from having additional police officers.

We will make awards to jurisdictions that document a clear public safety and economic need and that plan to use the money to develop or expand their community policing efforts. Applications are being considered in three rounds; all applications must be received by December 1. We are planning a rolling awards process in which applications that are considered, but not funded in one round, will be reconsidered in later rounds. We expect the first award announcements to be made in late November; most will be made in December and early 1994. Additional program details are available from the attached Fact Sheet.

Summarized below are the Justice Department's most significant accomplishments and the current status of the applications/award process.

**PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**

- \* On August 30, I announced that the Department had widely disseminated the grant application kit, which included a telephone number potential applicants could call for technical assistance.

- \* Immediately after mailing out the grant application kits, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) began operating the telephone Response Center. This technical assistance line provides information to potential applicants about the Police Hiring Supplement Program and its requirements, as well as information about community policing. The Center has responded to about 3,000 callers from across the country, many of whom have expressed their appreciation at being able to call Washington and receive assistance.
- \* We established a reviewing system to ensure that every application would be scored fairly based on standard criteria. Employees from the Office of Justice Programs, in addition to their other responsibilities, have willingly and enthusiastically accepted this very manpower-intensive challenge of reviewing and processing an extraordinary volume of grant applications.


#### STATUS OF APPLICATIONS

- \* By the end of Round 2 (November 1), the Department received a total of 1,624 applications requesting federal funds to help hire (or rehire) more than 8,800 additional sworn law enforcement officers.
- \* Of the 1,624 applications received thus far, 91 percent (1,475) are from jurisdictions serving populations of 150,000 or less. More than half (921 or 57%) are from jurisdictions serving populations of less than 25,000. Eight (8) applications have been received from jurisdictions with populations of more than two million. ✓
- \* Most applicants (80%) are municipal police departments, followed by county police and sheriffs (16%). The remaining four percent come from Indian tribes, consortia, special police, and state police.
- \* Local law enforcement agencies from every State have submitted applications. Attached is a summary table that lists the number of applications and the number of police requested from local agencies in each State.
- \* The number of officers requested ranges from 1 to 61, with an average of 4 in jurisdictions serving populations under 150,000, and an average of 23 in larger jurisdictions.
- \* About 12 percent of all applicants are requesting an increase in the Federal share.

Overall, we are struck by the genuine interest in and support for community policing. This support cuts across the spectrum of jurisdictions, regardless of size or the nature of their crime problem.

Told  
you  
so

Respectfully,



Janet Reno

Attachments



# Department of Justice

## POLICE HIRING SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM

### FACT SHEET

#### PROGRAM GOALS

- To increase the number of sworn law enforcement officers serving areas where they are needed most.
- To improve the long-term ability of law enforcement agencies to engage in community policing by deploying additional sworn law enforcement officers.
- To improve public safety through innovative crime prevention, including community policing.
- To hire additional law enforcement officers to increase sworn officer deployment and expand community policing designed to prevent crime, promote problem solving, and enhance public safety.
- To rehire law enforcement officers who have been laid off (as a result of state and local budget reductions) to increase sworn officer deployment and expand community policing.

#### FUNDING

- The \$150 million available for this program is part of the supplemental budget appropriation requested by President Clinton. \$75 million is available for jurisdictions at or above 150,000 population; \$75 million for those below 150,000.
- Grant funds are available only for the salaries and fringe benefits of hired or rehired sworn law enforcement officers over a three-year period. Funding for overtime costs is prohibited.
- The program will provide funding to hire up to 2,100 officers.

#### AWARD AMOUNTS

- \$1 million maximum for jurisdictions below 150,000 population.
- \$2 million maximum for jurisdictions between 150,000 and 749,999.
- \$3 million maximum for jurisdictions between 750,000 and 2 million.
- \$4 million maximum for jurisdictions above 2 million population.

#### FEDERAL SHARE

- Federal share per officer may not exceed the greater of: (1) 75 percent of the total salary and benefits over the life of the grant, up to a maximum of \$75,000; or (2) 50 percent of the total salary and benefits

POLICE HIRING SUPPLEMENT - CUMULATIVE STATUS REPORT  
 APPLICANTS BY STATE

PAGE 1 OF 3

DATE OF REPORT: 11/08/93

APPLICANTS BY STATE	ABOVE 150,000 POP.		BELOW 150,000 POP.		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Alabama	2	1%	43	3%	45	3%
Alaska	1	1%	6	0%	7	0%
Arizona	6	4%	28	2%	34	2%
Arkansas	1	1%	17	1%	18	1%
California	14	9%	89	6%	103	6%
Colorado	2	1%	24	2%	26	2%
Connecticut	0	0%	16	1%	16	1%
Delaware	2	1%	6	0%	8	0%
District of Columbia	2	1%	0	0%	2	0%
Florida	14	9%	57	4%	71	4%
Georgia	3	2%	45	3%	48	3%
Hawaii	1	1%	1	0%	2	0%
Idaho	0	0%	8	1%	8	0%
Illinois	2	1%	92	6%	94	6%
Indiana	2	1%	31	2%	33	2%
Iowa	1	1%	30	2%	31	2%
Kansas	2	1%	16	1%	18	1%
Kentucky	0	0%	31	2%	31	2%
Louisiana	3	2%	22	1%	25	2%

POLICE HIRING SUPPLEMENT - CUMULATIVE STATUS REPORT  
 APPLICANTS BY STATE

PAGE 2 OF 3

DATE OF REPORT: 11/08/93

APPLICANTS BY STATE	ABOVE 150,000 POP.		BELOW 150,000 POP.		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Maine	0	0%	17	1%	17	1%
Maryland	4	3%	17	1%	21	1%
Massachusetts	2	1%	30	2%	32	2%
Michigan	4	3%	53	4%	57	4%
Minnesota	3	2%	33	2%	36	2%
Mississippi	0	0%	36	2%	36	2%
Missouri	5	3%	39	3%	44	3%
Montana	0	0%	8	1%	8	0%
Nebraska	2	1%	10	1%	12	1%
Nevada	1	1%	4	0%	5	0%
New Hampshire	0	0%	20	1%	20	1%
New Jersey	3	2%	48	3%	51	3%
New Mexico	1	1%	10	1%	11	1%
New York	11	7%	81	5%	92	6%
North Carolina	4	3%	44	3%	48	3%
North Dakota	0	0%	8	1%	8	0%
Ohio	7	5%	60	4%	67	4%
Oklahoma	2	1%	42	3%	44	3%
Oregon	1	1%	22	1%	23	1%

POLICE HIRING SUPPLEMENT - CUMULATIVE STATUS REPORT  
 APPLICANTS BY STATE

PAGE 3 OF 3

DATE OF REPORT: 11/08/93

APPLICANTS BY STATE	ABOVE 150,000 POP.		BELOW 150,000 POP.		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Pennsylvania	3	2%	60	4%	63	4%
Rhode Island	1	1%	10	1%	11	1%
South Carolina	0	0%	30	2%	30	2%
South Dakota	0	0%	5	0%	5	0%
Tennessee	3	2%	26	2%	29	2%
Texas	11	7%	48	3%	59	4%
Utah	4	3%	19	1%	23	1%
Vermont	1	1%	7	0%	8	0%
Virginia	9	6%	30	2%	39	2%
Washington	5	3%	46	3%	51	3%
West Virginia	0	0%	12	1%	12	1%
Wisconsin	2	1%	33	2%	35	2%
Wyoming	0	0%	3	0%	3	0%
Puerto Rico	2	1%	1	0%	3	0%
Guam	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1476</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1624</b>	<b>100%</b>

\* Total includes the Virgin Islands, which was excluded from the table.

## Steering Committee


Mary Rhodes <i>Mayor</i>	Henry Garrett <i>Police Chief</i>
Debbie Lindsey-Opel <i>Assistant to Mayor</i>	Larry Olivarez <i>Corpus Christi Police Department</i>

## Coalition Members

Tim Akard <i>President</i> <i>Crosstown Ford Sales, Inc.</i>	Ophelia Ita <i>Corpus Christi Council of PTA's</i>
The Rev. E.F. Bennett <i>Community Advocate</i>	Sandra Larson <i>The Women's Shelter</i>
Linda Bridges <i>T.R.I.P. Program</i>	John Longoria <i>Chair, Education/Youth</i> <i>Boys &amp; Girls Club</i>
Rudy Cantu <i>Chair, Substance Abuse</i>	Bob Maxheimer <i>President</i> <i>Apartment Association</i>
Ram Chavez <i>Community Volunteer</i>	Al Morales <i>Co-Chair, Neighborhoods</i> <i>SouthBay/Harbor Village</i>
Scott Corliss <i>Community Volunteer</i>	Chris Nelson <i>Executive Director</i> <i>United Way</i>
R. Blake Farenthold <i>Citizens Police Academy</i>	Danny Noyola <i>West Oso Junior High</i>
Mike Griffiths <i>Chief Juvenile Probation Officer</i>	Dan Ramirez <i>Co-Chair, Neighborhoods</i> <i>Housing Authority of Corpus Christi</i>
Gwen Henzi <i>Valero Refining Company</i>	Grace Rank <i>Chair, Violent Crime</i> <i>Community Advocate</i>
George Hodge <i>Corpus Christi Housing Authority</i>	Dr. Henry Santana <i>CCISD</i>
Lee Houston <i>Community Volunteer</i>	Wayne Tatman <i>Executive Director</i> <i>YMCA</i>
Honorable Jack Hunter <i>Judge, 94th District Court</i>	Erich Wendl <i>Maverick Markets</i>

***We would also like to thank the many volunteers who served on the individual task forces and all of the community members who shared their ideas. Without their efforts, this coalition would not have been successful in identifying effective, non-traditional crime prevention concepts and programs.***

# Texas Cities Action Plan for Crime Prevention



## Corpus Christi Initiative

*"I believe T-CAP will change our community. The process reflects a true grass-roots approach — turning traditional crime prevention upside down. Through your participation, you have the opportunity to help shape our future. The time line is short for a project of this magnitude, but the potential rewards are tremendous. I hope you will make the commitment to help us achieve our goal of a better city for ourselves and, more importantly, for our children."*

Mary Rhodes' comments at the initial T-CAP Coalition meeting  
November 1992

With that opening, 26 community volunteers started a revolutionary process for this city. They had a prototype — Texas Cities Action Plan for Crime Prevention (T-CAP) — and tremendous moral support from the National Crime Prevention Council, but no proof their efforts would do more than gather dust on the shelf.

Mayor Mary Rhodes appointed the coalition and chaired the meetings. City Manager Juan Garza and Police Chief Henry Garrett actively supported the project as well. The coalition divided into specialized task forces, and each chairperson had the latitude to consult experts and conduct additional research.

This report represents a consensus among members of the coalition after 12 months of extensive research requiring more than 80 meetings and consultations with more than 500 people throughout the community.

## Neighborhoods Task Force

The Neighborhoods Task Force believed in "taking" into the streets. Their experiences included a nocturnal bus tour of neighborhoods—traveling dark streets and until park and even being approached by drug peddlers, despite their uniformed police escort.

Eight town hall meetings generated information from residents of public housing properties, multi-family complexes and single-family homes. Mayor Mary Rhodes, coalition members and the Police Department also hosted a live call-in program, which was broadcast on the Cable Access Channel and a local radio station.

## Substance Abuse Task Force

The Substance Abuse Task Force invited an esteemed group of service providers to sit down at the same table to identify needs and resources. Their efforts helped stimulate ideas, open new lines of communication among the agencies and consolidate services.

## Violent Crime Task Force

This task force divided into subgroups to study the root causes of crime and identify how it might be prevented.

They emphasized children and youth. The group also evaluated legislation and community information programs to identify gaps where crime prevention effort might be effective.

## Education-Youth Task Force

This task force gathered 150 young people together — traditional academic achievers as well as those who were at-risk students — at a local Boys and Girls Club for an intense, one-day conference on crime prevention. The task force also determined where additional recreation facilities might be needed, evaluated successful programs and considered how social service agencies might better serve the youth population and the community.

## Vision Statement

By the year 2000, Corpus Christi will be a community committed, philosophically and financially, to the well-being, education and success of children. Governments, schools and individuals will work together diligently, interacting and sharing ideas and concerns to improve the quality of life for all citizens. Everyone will be an active participant in promoting a safer and healthier community.

## GOAL

# 1

Increase City support and information to neighborhood organizations; empower organizations to access City and other resources to reduce crime.

**BACKGROUND:** Our country has moved from the front porch to the couch. We have stopped communicating with our neighbors and started watching *America's Most Wanted* instead. Restoring a sense of community is crucial to reducing both crime and the fear of crime.

Statistics indicate that well-kept neighborhoods typically have lower crime rates. Increased police involvement, which includes positive contact with youth, helps promote healthier neighborhoods and decreases the fear of crime.

## OBJECTIVES

### A Handbook on "How to Establish a Neighborhood Association"

This handbook would give citizens a step-by-step process for establishing and maintaining a Neighborhood Association. The booklet would include sample newsletters, projects and telephone numbers for Neighbors on Watch representatives and potential "mentors" for new associations.

Volunteers from existing associations would help design the handbook to address all neighborhoods, including multi-family and public housing properties.

### City-wide Council of Neighborhood Associations

This organization, representing all neighborhood associations, would meet on a quarterly basis to respond to the needs of neighborhood associations city-wide.

The Mayor would be invited to serve on this council; city representatives would provide feedback as needed. Members would solicit and assist other neighborhoods interested in establishing associations.

### Mayor's Commission on City Neighborhoods

This commission would identify neighborhood issues, evaluate needs and potential solutions (including the supervision of grant writing, where appropriate) and report its findings directly to the Mayor. Commission members would study neighborhood issues such as lighting, parks, burglaries, building code violations, new construction and general security.

Representation would include the Mayor, City Manager, two members each from the Council of Neighborhood Associations, the Corpus Christi Apartment Association, the Corpus Christi Housing Authority, Police Department, Fire Department and the Corpus Christi Builders Association. The City Engineer and City Architect would be other potential members.

### Police store-front locations in targeted neighborhoods

Store-front locations for police officers would establish a positive presence in neighborhoods, bringing the police and the people closer together. Ultimately, this leads to better utilization of public safety services such as Bike Patrols, Operation Identification and the Neighbors on Watch concept.

The biggest obstacle to such non-traditional public safety approaches is funding. Police and other resource allocations must be expanded to implement them.

## GOAL 2

**Reduce violent crime on a long-term basis by promoting prevention and intervention strategies with at-risk families.**

**BACKGROUND:** Nationwide, one of every three families experiences domestic violence. Seventy percent of Texas children whose homes are scarred by spousal abuse are physically, emotionally or sexually abused themselves. Eighty-nine percent of prison inmates today report having been sexually abused as children.

Social research shows that victimized children develop rebellious aggression, frustration, powerlessness, low self-worth and anger. These children are at high risk for committing violent crimes as adolescents or adults.

Research over the past two decades confirms that educational and support services for expectant parents can significantly reduce the risk factors associated with child abuse. Intervention and remedial treatment for child victims can reduce or even eliminate the risk of their committing violent crimes in their lifetimes.

### OBJECTIVES

#### Child Advocacy Center

The legal system would prove less traumatic to child victims of physical or sexual assault if a single interview accommodated the needs of all agencies. The proposed Child Advocacy Center would facilitate these services.

Similar centers have proven extremely successful in many Texas communities and across the nation. These home-like facilities (staffed by trained, certified interviewers) expedite the trial process and minimize the chance of long-term negative effects for the victim.

The Police Department, District and County Attorney's offices, Department of Protective and Regulatory Services and others having a "legal right to know" would determine the operational requirements of the facility. The Child Abuse Prevention Council would be contracted to house the center.

#### Court-ordered parental educational classes

All parents seeking custody or visitation rights would be required to attend this training. The intensive three- to eight-hour curriculum would familiarize parents with the immediate and long-range effects of their interactions on their children. The training would stress interpersonal and coping skills to minimize trauma to their children.

The Corpus Christi Family Law Association (CCFLA) would work with judges to implement this program in district and county courts. HUGS would help develop and provide the curriculum. CCFLA and CAPCOST would increase public awareness of the program.

#### Supervised Parent Visitation Center

At this neutral location, children could be dropped off and picked up for visitation with no direct contact between angry parents. Staff members (either paid or volunteer) trained in conflict resolution skills would mediate between the parents. An in-house chaperon would allow controlled visitation, when appropriate. Chaperons would also be available for supervised visitation away from the center.

CCFLA will study parental visitation centers in other communities to develop guidelines for establishing the center. Their recommendations will be forwarded to the appropriate City and County officials.

#### Family Life Curriculum; Healthy Start Program

A Family Life Curriculum teaches family unity, trust, respect and active coping skills to children in kindergarten through the twelfth grade. The program helps them develop communication and reasoning skills, self-sufficiency and life goals.

A home visitation program to offer neo-natal education has substantial potential for positive results. CAPCOST would be asked to sponsor this Healthy Start Program and to help target funds, train visitors and administer the start-up activities in April 1994.

#### On-going legislative and judicial reform

Concerned citizens, working with established committees, must identify gaps where the system does not best serve the interests of the community. Areas for possible modification include: punishment standards, court systems, victims' rights and services, law enforcement and treatment processes.

#### "Discipline with Dignity" Program

This program would offer educators alternative ways to handle disruptive students. "Discipline with Dignity" principles foster respect, cooperation, mediation and self-responsibility. By modeling non-violent skills in problem solving, decision making, coping, stress management and communication, educators can encourage appropriate behavior in their students.

Implementing this program would require a consensus from area school districts. The Education Service Center, Region II, would arrange in-service workshops. The Child Abuse Prevention Council of South Texas would also assist with the program.

#### Enhanced crime prevention services emphasizing home and personal safety

Opportunities for violent domestic crime can be reduced by separating battling family members and/or removing potential victims from danger. The management of domestic and family violence cases must be reviewed and revised to mandate arrest, prosecution and counseling.

Programs and classes in the prevention of sexual assault, domestic violence and property loss would be more widely promoted.

#### Corpus Christi Commission for Children, Youth and Families

This commission would be established by ordinance as a formal city commission. Members would evaluate family issues, target and obtain funds and work closely with the community.

## GOAL 3

**Develop active partnerships between governments and citizens to work with other agencies in identifying strategies for crime intervention and prevention.**

**BACKGROUND:** Only by working together will people and the police improve the quality of life in a community. The police must act not only as enforcers, but also as advisors, facilitators and supporters of new community-based police initiatives.

This philosophy embodies an organizational strategy which decentralizes police service. Police officers then become the department's direct line to the community.

Corpus Christi and Nueces County are currently looking for ways to deal with rising youth crime and gang violence. Officials who deal with young offenders — children who commit serious offenses and have not been reached by prevention programs — need a facility that offers intervention and rehabilitation before commitment to the Texas Youth Commission.

Closed high school campuses and alternate placement for suspended students would eliminate unsupervised discretionary time and help reduce daytime juvenile crime.

### OBJECTIVES

#### Store-front locations for law enforcement personnel

(See Goal #1, Objective #4)

#### "Weed and Seed" program

This comprehensive effort would combat violent crime, drug use and gang activity in high-crime neighborhoods. Coordinated efforts by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies would target and "weed out" the most violent offenders. This multi-agency effort would "seed back" to the community prevention, intervention and treatment programs.

Area organizations are already redirecting current resources to develop this program. Full-scale federal funding is also being pursued.

### **Juvenile intermediate sanction facility**

This facility would offer juvenile offenders the chance to redirect their lives before incarceration. On-site research showed that these facilities can reduce the percentage of violent offenders who, once released, resume their criminal behavior.

Developing a local facility will require collaborative efforts by the Nueces County Juvenile Probation Department, the Corpus Christi Police Department and other agencies. Existing community resources — school districts, MIIMR, PDAP, Coastal Bend Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, LULAC National Educational Service Center, Gulf Coast Council of La Raza, CADENA and others — must also be coordinated.

### **Reducing daytime juvenile crime**

Daytime juvenile crime could be reduced through full-time alternative placement for suspended or expelled students. Steps have been taken to coordinate this plan with area ISD's; a permanent solution will require continued support. The cost and logistics of operation, however, require further study.

Year-round school, with consistent calendars for all districts, would help balance youth discretionary time and minimize the opportunity for negative activities.

Another way to reduce daytime juvenile crime would be to eliminate the practice of allowing CCISD students to leave campus during lunch.

### **Crime Prevention Resource Center**

Innovative ideas about crime prevention are often lost in the shuffle and never reach the people who could develop them. This center would consolidate all relevant materials and serve as a clearinghouse of information for the community.

The center could be housed at Texas A&M - Corpus Christi, with the university's approval.



**Promote more user-friendly government by consolidating and networking the public and private sectors of our community.**

**BACKGROUND:** Recurring issues for all task forces were communication/access to government officials and the attitudes of city employees who deal with the public. Often, negative perceptions and information voids are created from a failure to communicate effectively. The government must provide information to the public that is accessible and understandable.

### **OBJECTIVES**

#### **Police Department Community Ombudsman/Facilitator Program**

During community meetings, several complaints about police non-emergency services recurred: confusion, non-responsiveness and inability to reach the appropriate office or officer. Such treatment leads to apathy and discourages community responsiveness and cohesiveness.

A main telephone number, staffed by police officers well-versed in the entire police organization and city services, would make it easy for citizens to access law enforcement officials in non-emergency situations, 24 hours a day.

#### **Public information about services and issues**

Public meetings revealed that citizens often have trouble finding information about community and police services (e.g. the availability of Info-Line, Neighbors on Watch, home and business police surveys) and such general issues as youth curfew and parental responsibility.

Service agencies must educate the public about all available services. This information can be distributed through brochures and flyers, public service announcements, report card jackets, etc. The media could also help develop educational programming about issues and services.

## GOAL

# 5

**Reduce juvenile crime through innovative youth-oriented projects and services, offering positive opportunities for youth during both school and non-school hours.**

**BACKGROUND:** Tomorrow's crime prevention solutions depend on the way our community addresses the needs of our youth today. The first step is to break through the bureaucracy that surrounds our youth-oriented services. Barriers and duplication must be eliminated.

Providing positive experiences during non-school hours — the largest block of time for an adolescent — has increasingly become the responsibility of the community. If this responsibility is neglected, the City faces increasing costs for crime, welfare and health care, as well as a diminished work force in the future.

Resources are scarce, however; existing ones must be used as fully as possible. School facilities, for example, could provide an excellent site for recreation, counseling and family activities in non-school hours.

## OBJECTIVES

### Youth Sports Network

Youth recreational activities have been fragmented throughout the community, resulting in duplicated services and wasted funds. The ultimate losers are the youth.

The Youth Sports Network brought representatives of these services together to coordinate their activities. The consortium coordinated funding and use of facilities. Currently, participants are evaluating extending recreational activities into the evening.

### Closed campuses and alternative placement

(See Goal #3, Objective #3)

### On-campus support groups

Peer pressure and stress can easily undo the work accomplished by in-patient drug and alcohol programs. Counseling must extend into the school environment through on-campus support groups.

Initially, only students who have received in-patient care would be eligible for this program. Schools would provide classrooms for regular counseling sessions.

### Televised "Kids Club"

This club would provide educational entertainment for at-risk youth, ages 7 - 12. At least 25 children would join the club each quarter; approximately 200 would participate during the first two years. Kids Club would educate children about the abuse and illegal use of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs. Members would also receive other crime prevention information, support and supplies.

PADRES and CADENA would play key roles in organizing and maintaining the club.

### Family Relationship Skills Education

(See Goal #2, Objective #4)

### Facilities and programs to occupy youth during non-structured time

Positive activities for young people away from the school environment are important tools in long-term crime prevention objectives. The coalition will therefore encourage the use of schools, City buildings and area churches for youth-only activities during the summer, in the evenings and on weekends.

### Security action plans for all school campuses

Action plans depend on two factors: evaluating existing campus security and practicing violence prevention. Local ISD representatives, community agencies and the public are currently developing specific action plans for campus security.

## GOAL

# 6

**Fully utilize and enhance existing community resources through collaborative planning and funding efforts.**

**BACKGROUND:** A community's ability to address its problems depends on reliable and open communication channels. Only then can existing programs be assessed and promoted; only then can new information and ideas be exchanged.

The T-CAP process successfully brought community leaders together in a non-traditional format, encouraging groups that do not typically communicate to share information.

## OBJECTIVES

### "How To" manual for organizing youth groups

The key to a positive youth group lies in the success of existing groups. United Way of the Coastal Bend would help examine these success stories and identify ways to duplicate the benefits.

This research, organized into a "How To" manual, would be distributed through schools, churches, apartment complexes and other places where young people gather — prime sources for positive youth interaction and community service.

### A forum to discuss ideas with all school districts

Administrators from each ISD would convene regularly for these public meetings, which would encourage comments and ideas from interested citizens or groups. Their work could also reduce the duplication of school and community efforts.

Possible suggestions for discussion include: curfew law printed on report card jackets, 100 percent participation in school clubs, mandatory community service for graduation and developing a consistent marketing message.

### Community Planning Council/Human Investment System

Key issues for a Community Planning Council include: shifting emphasis from numbers served to program effectiveness; establishing cooperative efforts between United Way of the Coastal Bend and community foundations; encouraging businesses to be more supportive of youth needs; and generating greater interest in community service work.

A Human Investment System would organize community efforts for cohesive service delivery without duplication. United Way is already developing this plan, but community representatives and agencies must participate as well.

Monitoring of available state and federal funds and grant writing assistance would be available as well.

### A central co-op for gathering materials

Citizens do not always know how to make donations to needy agencies. This co-op would distribute their serviceable goods, with United Way serving as a "one-stop" clearinghouse to simplify the giving process. Qualified organizations would then access the items through United Way.

### City-wide simulcast of one-hour program

This broadcast would educate families about crime prevention strategies and the abuse and illegal use of drugs and alcohol. Local agencies would develop the script, urging continued discussion and study. Area radio and television stations would cooperate with local agencies to broadcast the simulcast.

The greater the number of participating stations, the more impact the message will have. CADENA has simulcast a similar program on a more limited scale; they could serve as a lead agency.

## GOAL

# 7

Promote a safer community by mandating physical changes (e.g. access, visual surveillance, lighting).

**BACKGROUND:** The philosophy behind Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is simple: Well-cared-for property is less amenable to criminal activity. Criminals perceive an increased risk of being spotted and an increased probability that the neighborhood is concerned about fighting crime. Maintaining such neighborhoods also requires increased outdoor activity, which has been proven to reduce crime.

## OBJECTIVES

### Formalized crime prevention through environmental design

This program would evaluate a neighborhood's safety and security through its physical characteristics. Police, Planning, Engineering and other City departments would help determine the feasibility of this CPTED ordinance. Implementation is not immediately anticipated, but the coalition believes in its value in long-term crime prevention.

### Revisions to laws regulating care-of-premises violations

A task force, organized under the Mayor's Committee on Neighborhoods, would work to expedite action against violators of property codes. Certain state and federal laws affect what can be done; local ordinances and practices, however, must be evaluated as well.

### Revisions to local ordinances related to street lighting

Well-lighted streets and neighborhoods are proven deterrents to crime. Several areas in our community, however, are not adequately lit. The Mayor's Commission on Neighborhoods would evaluate the standard for street lighting, recommend enhancement and oversee their implementation.

### Ordinance requiring bar owners to notify the city when liquor licenses are up for renewal

Because liquor license renewal is a state function, local jurisdictions are unaware of the timing. This ordinance would alert the police department when the liquor licenses of area bars are up for renewal, giving police and residents an opportunity for feedback. The coalition must evaluate this proposed ordinance further through the City's legal staff.

**The National Crime Prevention Council, under its cooperative agreement with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, provided assistance and support to the planning process. Additionally, the Anne Burnett and Charles D. Tandy Foundation of Fort Worth, Texas, provided resources for the production of this document. Our thanks to NCPC and especially the state coordinator, Stefanie Sanford.**

# Boston Globe

12/1/93

Community Policing

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1993

## Clinton cites officer for aiding in Maverick Square comeback

By John Ellement  
GLOBE STAFF

Tony Feudo was taking out the garbage when his commander called to tell him that President Clinton had singled him out for praise in a speech from the White House yesterday afternoon.

"I was overwhelmed," said Feudo, a Boston police officer for the past 14 years. "I really am."

Since February, Feudo has been working a walking beat in East Boston's Maverick Square as part of the department's shift toward community policing that emphasizes cooperation between police and residents to prevent crimes from occurring.

During that time, Feudo and the other officers of Area A-7 have developed a strong rapport with residents and business leaders that has allowed police to crack down on the drug dealing and prostitution that marred Maverick Square.

Feudo and the residents also worked to beautify the square, for example, by restoring a "rather handsome flagpole" that had fallen into disrepair and not been used for 14 years. They hoisted the US flag and the black POW-MIA flag, Feudo said.

He also said he and residents got the city to restore and repaint park



**OFFICER ANTHONY FEUDO**  
Praised by Clinton

benches in the square. Senior citizens, who would only visit the square once a month to cash pension checks, now are a regular sight in the area.

"Now what I am seeing is the elderly come and sit down in the park benches, when they actually avoided Maverick Square in the past," Feudo said.

Speaking from the White House, President Clinton praised Feudo by name before signing the Brady bill, which requires a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases.

Clinton said some police officers have gone "beyond the call of duty," people like Anthony Feudo of Bos-

ton, who took a tough section of East Boston and transformed it from a neighborhood full of fear to one in which elderly people now feel safe sitting on benches again."

Feudo's work was brought to the attention of the White House by Joan Brody, the community policing coordinator in the office of Commissioner William J. Bratton. Brody sent a package of information about Feudo's recent selection as a Neighborhood Policing officer by a private Boston foundation.

Feudo's candidacy for that job was endorsed by the Maverick Neighborhood Coalition, an umbrella group for the tenants association at the Maverick housing development and other residents of the square.

"Officer Feudo helped the neighborhood to do the positive things which get people to know one another and make for increased neighborhood pride," the coalition wrote in October.

Feudo said he believes the key to drawing the community into working with police is a regular, visible presence that shows business people and residents alike the police are with them.

"I think I may have made a slight difference," he said. "And I think the community wanted to make a difference."

THE BOSTON HERALD; WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1993

# Clinton blasts violence as he signs handgun bill

By JOE BATTENFELD  
**WASHINGTON** — In an emotion-packed ceremony, President Clinton signed the Brady handgun bill into law yesterday and deplored what he called the "crazy" escalation of gun violence.

Clinton, in a podium-pounding lecture, declared the new law is a first step toward "taking our streets back" without infringing on the longtime rights of gun owners.

"Don't let anybody tell you that this won't work," he said.

Clinton, recounting personal experiences with guns, was careful to defend gun owner-

ship as an important part of American culture, but blasted the proliferation of handguns as out of control.

"We have taken this important part of the life of millions of Americans and turned it into an instrument of maintaining madness," he said. "It is crazy."

The law, which goes into effect in 90 days, will require states to establish a five-day waiting period and background checks for handgun purchases.

It is named after former White House press secretary James Brady, who was wounded in the handgun assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981.

Brady and his wife, Sarah, who led the seven-year struggle to pass the law, received a loud standing ovation at the signing ceremony yesterday.



BRADY

Many people in the audience wiped away tears as the Bradys thanked Clinton and others responsible for passing the bill. Also speaking was Melanie Musick of Atlanta, who said she believes it could have prevented her husband's shooting

death three years ago.

"I can't bring my husband back but I do know the Brady bill is going to save lives," Musick said.

The White House made the ceremony a major event, jamming the East Room with members of Congress, law enforcement officials and other handgun control advocates. Boston Police Commissioner William J. Bratton was among those invited to the ceremony.

Congress finally passed the Brady bill last week, but GOP leaders have promised to push for amendments weakening some of its provisions early next year.

## Boston cop cited in president's address

By BEVERLY FORD

Officer Anthony Feudo was taking out the garbage when a call came informing him that President Clinton had mentioned his name in a White House speech marking the signing of the Brady bill.

"I was overwhelmed," said Feudo, a beat officer in East Boston's Maverick Square who was cited by Clinton as an example of Boston's community policing effort.

Feudo, a 14-year Boston Police Department veteran, said he believes Clinton mentioned his name after reading a promotional package prepared by the department that highlighted his community policing achievements.

"It's unbelievable," he said. "I'm just an ordinary patrolman who hasn't done anything different than the other 1,600 policemen out there."

But Feudo's commanding officer, Capt. Robert Cunningham, said the 43-year-old officer has embodied the spirit of community policing since taking over his walking beat earlier this year.



ON THE JOB: Boston Police Officer Anthony Feudo chats with East Boston businessman Jay Lee yesterday after Feudo was cited by President Clinton during his Brady bill address. Staff photo by Mark Gortner

Through Feudo's efforts, Cunningham said, residents and business owners united to clean up the square and paint an abandoned flagpole, which was dedicated to a local veteran.

"The people in East Boston love him," said Cunningham. "And it's nice to see him get this kind of recognition."

But for Feudo, perhaps the best recognition came when an

elderly man told him, "If you ever get in trouble, Tony, I'll be right behind you."

"That," said Feudo, "was when I knew community policing had really taken root."

*Concern over drugs and crime spur neighborhood groups to come up with new answers to old problems*

## Failed Federal Policies Trigger Local Activists

By David Holmstrom

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

BOSTON

SOMETHING distinctly apolitical but revolutionary is happening in communities and city neighborhoods around the United States. More and more neighbors are coming together in concerned and determined community groups.

Government entities are being bypassed, and so-called intractable social problems such as drugs, violence, and housing are being dealt with directly.

"What we are seeing is an uneven community-based movement slowly taking responsibility for local problems because the federal government in many of its social programs has been a failure," says Fernando Menendez, director of the Management and Community Development Institute at Tufts University near Boston.

Some social scientists say that despite costing billions of dollars over a generation, many federal social-service programs proved to be only well-meaning palliatives. Top-heavy with bureaucracy, the experts say, and prone to exclude local differences as marginally important, federal programs often surrounded social problems from the top, but had little follow-through or flexibility to remedy them at the bottom.

"There is no doubt that community people who are working to solve some of these problems are acting as if the federal government doesn't exist," says Roger Conner, executive director of the American Alliance for Rights & Responsibilities (AARR) in Washington, D.C. "The federal government is locked into a left and right debate," he says, "which is totally irrelevant now. Most community problem-solvers are nonideological because the problems are so severe."

Although driving drug dealers out of neighborhoods and stopping crime has been the recent impetus for lots of angry single-purpose groups

taking back the streets, community-based groups have in fact been part of American communities for years. The difference now is that single and multipurpose nonprofit organizations are close to being the major force in direct problem-solving at the local level.

No national statistics exist, but some experts say that as much as 60 percent of the social-service budget of many county and local government agencies are man-

aged now by nonprofit community organizations. A study by the Urban Institute found that as far back as 1979, 55 percent of governmental social services in the US were under contract with private or nonprofit organizations. Another study in New York state disclosed that between 1981 and 1987, employment in nonprofit organizations grew three times as fast as government employment.

"There are three kinds of organizations," says Mr. Menendez, "those that provide direct services, those that advocate on behalf of a cause, and those that get together to solve their own problems. There is a tremendous demand now for private and public dollars because there is a shift of responsibility without resources. All this started in the Reagan administration when he said many social programs were not the province of government."

**B**UT even without resources, concerned neighbors are organizing to improve many unsafe and distressed communities. The growth of community organizations is a return to historic American pragmatism, argues Mr. Conner of AARR, the leading activist group for the "communitarian" movement (representing a balance between individual rights and community responsibility).

"If you go back to historian Alexis de Tocqueville," says Conner, "he concluded that Americans were problem-solvers, not averse to taking things into their own hands. Right up through the progressive era, the proper response was for community volunteers to figure out how to solve problems. Then came the professionalism

of social work and the police. Ordinary citizens were told they needed to put problems in the hands of experts who really understand. Give us your money and go back to your private life, is what they said. What we have discovered is that social workers go home at night."

Community problems can be so severe and intertwined that successful community-based organizations, such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) in New York, recognize the need to expand their services.

Started by the Ford Foundation in 1979, LISC is the largest community-development support organization in the US, working with 875 community development corporations (CDCs), building houses and raising money to launch other community projects.

In 1992, LISC launched an initiative to help CDCs start to develop strategies that reach beyond housing, such as new business, after-school programs, and combating crime and drugs. "If we peel away the political rhetoric of both parties," states the 1992 LISC annual report, "as the nation moves to retool its urban policy, there is a heartening consensus, a belief that self-help and community initiative must be a crucial component of any new social agenda."

Some social scientists like Menendez think the White House has been preoccupied with health care and international problems. But the staggering problems of inner cities are moving toward the top of the national agenda.

"I think the hole [of social problems] is so deep," Menendez says, "that it is going to take a long time to get out of it. But I think Clinton has the realization that there has to be some kind of an integrated concern and

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plan. In fairness to Reagan, his administration tried to address the problem and said the federal government can't do all this stuff. But I don't think the solution is the market place, as he did. When the nation was founded, we created the non-profit sector and said it was exempt from the rules of the market because there are things that need to happen."

File:  
Crime -  
Community Policing

September 13, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRUCE REED  
JOSE CERDA III

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID BAYLEY'S ARTICLE IN THE  
NEW YORK TIMES, "THE COP FALLACY" (8/16/93)

Since the crime bill is about to be introduced this week, we wanted to follow-up on your note to us about Professor Bayley's article questioning the value and effectiveness of deterring crime through increased police visibility. Professor Bayley's arguments are valid, and we believe the provisions that have been incorporated into the final draft of the crime bill should substantially alleviate some of the concerns raised in his article.

**Bayley's Argument in Brief**

Professor Bayley argues that society can't afford to hire enough cops to make a deterrent difference in crime. Why? Because the possibility of increasing police visibility is governed by a 10-for-1 rule -- that is, to get one officer on the street you need to hire 10 more. First, not all of police officers are patrol officers assigned to a beat, and, second, even patrol officers have to spend a percentage of their time performing administrative duties that take them off the street.

Bayley also claims that politicians will insist on the police officers funded in your bill being divvied up across the country, making only a small number of officers available to cities and further reducing the chance that increased police presence will have any deterrent impact.

Conclusion: Putting more police on the street to deter crime is a bankrupt policy, not to mention ineffective and costly. We should put off hiring more police until police get in the business of preventing crime -- for example, by making better use of community policing.

**DPC's Response**

In drafting your policing initiative, our working assumption was not that increased police visibility will deter crime, but that expanding the number of officers engaged in community policing will help to prevent crime. We envisioned a program that would serve as a catalyst to help promote community policing and crime prevention in police departments throughout the country -- not one that would line our streets with uniformed police.

For this reason, we recruited a community policing professional, who has trained countless police chiefs and police departments throughout the country, to help us draft the community policing language in the crime bill and in the police hiring supplemental appropriations. In addition, HUD's COMPAC and Education's Safe Schools legislation includes language tying police officers to be funded through those proposals to community policing. National Service's public safety personnel will also work in support of community policing programs.

Once the crime bill language is officially introduced, it will be abundantly clear that your policing initiative is not about traditional policing -- and not simply about deterring crime through increased police visibility. Eighty-five percent of these monies will go towards hiring (and re-hiring) police officers "for deployment in community-oriented policing," while the remaining fifteen percent will fund problem-solving training, community crime prevention, agency coordination efforts and other innovative crime prevention programs that are utilized by departments embracing the community policing philosophy.

As to the number of officers going to individual cities, we would make two points. First, a small number of officers can make a difference. The average police department in America today consists of less than 20 officers, and we believe as few as five new officers engaged in community outreach and long-term problem solving can have a huge impact in smaller municipalities. Second, policing monies will be awarded to communities based on the strength of their community-based policing plans and public safety need. Specifically, communities will have to submit long-term strategies that explain how many officers they want, for what purpose, how the community intends to eventually fund these officers, and how this plan ultimately reorients a department to community policing. These strategies will also have to reflect consultation with community groups, public and private agencies, and coordination with other government entities and initiatives.

Conclusion: Your proposal is not about hiring more police to produce a visible crime deterrent; it is about hiring more police to expand community policing. Technically speaking, additional police manpower is not required to implement community policing. But, practically speaking, additional manpower is an effective means of expanding community policing, particularly in smaller jurisdictions. To date, community policing efforts have been dependent on progressive police chiefs (usually in larger jurisdictions) that are willing to challenge the current method of delivering police services. These chiefs have taken on unions, challenged communities to look beyond police response times and fought with city councils or state legislatures to get support for their programs. By expanding the number of police personnel and community policing at the same time, your policing initiative will help spread community policing to jurisdictions that might not otherwise be willing to "risk" using their current police resources to experiment -- and help promote crime prevention on the scale that Professor Bayley calls for in his article.

*Crime - Comm. Policy*

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC LIAISON AND  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS



TO: Elizabeth  
OFFICE: Intergovernmental Affairs - WH  
FAX NO: 456-6220 PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Bert Brandenburg  
NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 6  
PHONE: 514-3465 FAX NO: 514-2504

COMMENTS: This has also been faxed to  
DPC, which faxed it to  
Air Force One.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Office of the Director

Washington, DC 20531

MEMORANDUM TO: Laurie Robinson  
Acting Assistant Attorney General

FROM: Jack A. Nadol *Jack A. Nadol*  
Acting Director, BJA

SUBJECT: Pending Grant Awards of Major Public Interest

DATE: September 20, 1993

Listed below are several pending grant awards for BJA programs in which there is great public interest. You may wish to bring these to the attention of the Department.

**Demonstration Sites for Community-Oriented Policing Program**

The purpose of this program is to demonstrate and assess a comprehensive department-wide community policing prototype in selected law enforcement agencies and communities. Under the community-oriented policing concept, emphasis is on police effectiveness and community involvement.

Five Sites to be funded in FY 1993:

St. Petersburg, FL -----	\$200,000
Hillsborough County, Tampa, FL -----	\$200,000
Knoxville, TN -----	\$200,000
Denver, CO -----	\$200,000
Austin, TX -----	\$200,000

**Demonstration Sites for Comprehensive Gang Initiative**

The purpose of this program is to demonstrate a comprehensive program to prevent and control emerging and chronic urban street gang drug trafficking and violent crime. Selected sites will implement and test a comprehensive gang prevention and control prototype being developed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). To be effective in preventing and controlling gang and drug trafficking related crime, State and local public and private resources must be concentrated and targeted at specific gang activities.



**Four sites to be funded in FY 1993:**

Seven Hills, OH	~~~~~	\$100,489
San Diego, CA	-----	\$200,000
Suffolk County, Boston, MA	-----	\$200,000
Denver, CO	-----	\$200,000

**Correctional Options Demonstration Grants**

The purpose of this program is to demonstrate the development and implementation of correctional options within existing correctional systems that provide alternatives to traditional modes of incarceration and offender release programs. The term "correctional option" denotes community-based and weekend incarceration, boot camp prisons, electronic monitoring of offenders, intensive probation, and any other innovative sanction designed to have the greatest impact on youthful offenders. Seven FY 93 demonstration grants will be awarded in the amount of 1,000,000 each to develop and implement these alternatives.

1. Washington Department of Corrections
2. Maricopa County (AZ) Adult Probation Department
3. The Connecticut Office of Policy and Management
4. Vermont Department of Corrections
5. South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
6. The Alabama Department of Corrections
7. District of Columbia Superior Court

**InterAgency Transfer of Funds Between DOE and BJA**

The Department of Education will transfer \$1,500,000 to BJA before the close of the fiscal year by InterAgency Agreement. These funds will support a grant to cities in schools for implementation of a drug and alcohol prevention component for "Safe Havens" in 20 Weed and Seed sites, as well as training and technical assistance in connection with the implementation of the component.

**Anti-stalking Code Implementation and Violence Against Women**

BJA will commission the National Criminal Justice Association to

Extended Page 2.2  
BJA will commission the National Criminal Justice Association to conduct a series of regional seminars on a model anti-stalking code for the states. These seminars will be carried out under a \$235,000 grant in conjunction with the National Conference of State Legislatures; they are designed to assist the states in a review and adoption of state-of-the-art legislative and programmatic



approaches to the stalking problem. BJA will also award \$100,000 to the city of Baltimore to demonstrate the use of a coordinating council approach to combatting violence against women. The council will involve concerted action by the local criminal justice system (court, prosecutor, police and corrections) and local social service agencies. We expect this demonstration project to be a precursor to two others which will be made in early FY94 to the State of Virginia and to Santa Clara County, California.

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### Community-Oriented Policing Program Demonstration Grants

- The Office of Justice Programs' Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) began development of a comprehensive model for community-oriented policing in Fiscal Year 1992. The model is being developed through a Community Policing Consortium of law enforcement organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and the Police Foundation. The model addresses the planning, development, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of community-oriented policing.
- The prototype is intentionally flexible to allow for local needs and circumstances. It provides a broad framework law enforcement departments may adapt in implementing community policing department-wide.
- BJA will provide Fiscal Year 1993 funding to demonstrate and refine the model in five law enforcement agencies throughout the country for the next three to five years. The two Florida sites are: St. Petersburg and Tampa (Hillsborough County). The other sites are Denver, Colorado; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Austin.

Sites are Denver, Colorado; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Austin, Texas.

• The goal of these demonstrations is to determine and assess the key elements of community policing; develop a consensus about the definition of community policing; determine the needs of law enforcement relating to community policing; enhance police-community interaction; provide on-going information and support to law enforcement relating to community policing; and disseminate the findings of the demonstration project to law enforcement.

• During the first year of this program, sites will conduct a comprehensive needs assessment to identify areas needing change in order to ensure successful implementation of the prototype. In addition, sites must develop a three-to-five-year strategic plan for implementing the prototype that will be reviewed by BJA and the Community Policing Consortium. The strategic plans will differ from site-to-site according to differing needs.

• BJA and the Consortium will provide intensive technical assistance to the demonstration sites throughout this program. BJA will sponsor a cluster meeting of the five demonstration sites in late October to discuss the prototype, review program guidelines and financial issues, and begin the exchange of information necessary to ensure the program's success.

#### St. Petersburg Demonstration Site

• BJA will award a \$199,970 grant to St. Petersburg, Florida, to demonstrate the community policing prototype. The grant will be

awarded by September 30, 1993.

- The St. Petersburg Police Department implemented citywide community policing operations in December 1991. Twenty percent of the city's sworn uniformed personnel are currently committed to community policing, and the city recently implemented a plan integrating the deployment of all community policing officers and with traditionally oriented officers through all 48 sectors of the city.

- Over the next five years, the department will expand its application of the community policing philosophy so that every police employee will approach his/her job from a problem-solving or problem-oriented perspective.

- The St. Petersburg demonstration project will include a number of task forces/committees that will be involved in the design and development of this program. Community involvement is a critical component. Oversight of these efforts will be conducted by a Project Core Team, consisting of the Mayor, the Chief of Police, and three Assistant Chiefs.

- All the resources of the St. Petersburg Police Department will be made available to the program.

#### Hillsborough County (Tampa) Demonstration Site

- BJA will award a \$200,000 grant to the Hillsborough County (Tampa) Sheriff's Office to demonstrate the community policing model. The grant will be awarded by September 30, 1993.

- Hillsborough County's demonstration project targets both inner-city slums and remote rural areas within the county.

- Sheriff Cal Henderson's 890 officers provide law enforcement to over a half million people spread over nearly a thousand square miles ringing the City of Tampa.

- This project proposes a three-stage strategy:

- The first stage plans, implements, and measures the basic community policing model in the two test sites--one urban (East Tampa) and one rural (Wimauma). This model is based on community officers assigned to community stations with clerical staff.

- The second stage expands the test sites to include multiple adjacent communities in order to completely incorporate community policing into the patrol squads that cover these two large test areas.

- The third stage implements the community policing prototype throughout the operations of the Sheriff's Office.

August 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, WHITE HOUSE FELLOW

SUBJECT: COMMUNITY POLICING

This brief memoranda provides a follow-up to your August 23rd conversation with the Chiefs of Police from St. Louis, Ft. Pierce, Austin, Prince George's County, and Greensboro at NIJ's community policing conference. For a number of years now, I have provided technical assistance and training in community policing to police and city officials throughout the country, including three of the above-mentioned chiefs, and I would like to take this opportunity to follow-up with you to underscore community policing's essential elements. In addition, with community, government and political expectations raised concerning community policing, it is important to have a full picture about the level of progress the police profession has made thus far.

- Community policing is best understood through its component parts -- community engagement and problem solving. These two are integrally linked and must exist in tandem in a department doing community policing. Community engagement just for the sake of improving the police relationship to the community is community relations, not much more. And a problem-oriented approach that does not focus on the crime and disorder problems that communities care about misdirects scarce police resources and undermines police accountability to the public. Many police departments only rely on community engagement limiting their effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder problems.

- Community policing is not a return to a style of policing done in earlier times. Although some in the profession make this claim, it is generally because they were not around 30 or 40 years ago in policing or are truly unfamiliar with those times in our policing history. Not all communities had officers assigned to their areas who were helpful to its residents. Communities of color often do not have as fond memories of policing in their neighborhoods. In addition, the working environment in police departments was paramilitary (in many, it still is), and departments placed a high value on conformity -- both of which are characteristics that do not lend themselves to community policing. Officers, in most police departments, were seen as crime fighters, nothing more, and had few skills to help them do anything but criminal apprehension.

- Most police departments that claim to have implemented

community policing are only in the beginning stages of their efforts -- even those who have been at it for a few years. The chiefs that you met the other day represent some of the better community policing departments, yet only a handful of the officers in each of those departments is actually engaged in community policing. Most police officers, even in the better departments, remain unengaged from community policing efforts. This is true, in part, because many chiefs have opted for a split-force concept of community policing where only a small group of officers engage in community policing while the majority go about business as usual engaged in traditional reactive, incident-driven policing. In addition, for those few departments that have opted to implement community policing department-wide, a long-term (probably 10 years), transformational change will be required, offering little in terms of quick successes.

- Community policing is not a series of programs (block watch and mentoring) nor a series of tactics (foot patrol and bike patrol). It is a philosophy that requires the transformation of the way we deliver police service. It requires police to change their organizations internally -- how they recruit, train, deploy, supervise, evaluate, transfer and promote personnel. It requires police to change the way they provide service. Under community policing, officers will be analyzing crime and disorder problems, working with the community on a search for alternative solutions, implementing solutions, and evaluating their effectiveness in between responding to calls for police service. It requires police to change the way they interact with the public -- engaging the public in the responsibility or co-production of public safety. It requires police to change the way they interact with the criminal justice system, reserving for the system only the most serious, deserving or problematic of offenders. It requires police agencies to change the working environment internally, the way first line supervisors and management interact with officers. And it requires police agencies to look to new training and technologies to better understand neighborhood crime and disorder problems. Community policing is all about tailoring solutions, based on thoughtful, in-depth analysis, to unique neighborhood crime and disorder problems, not applying generic models from other communities and overlaying them to the problems of another community.

- Community policing is probably most effective in a community which believes in community-oriented government -- where services are shared, customer-driven, integrated, and turf battles kept to a minimum. Yet we are only just learning about the effectiveness of community policing. In many places, boasts of reducing crime is unsubstantiated when put to greater scrutiny. This is not to say community policing doesn't reduce crime. Rather it must be done right and done well (thoughtful analysis and tailored solutions), and efforts must be focused on specific crime and disorder problems -- larcenies from the parking garage, drug dealing in a park, theft of social security

checks from an apartment house's mailboxes, drug sales in a mobile home park -- but most police departments are not doing this.

- Most police departments fail to measure the effectiveness of their community policing projects, (i.e. did moving the bus stop away from the vacant lot and environmentally redesigning the bus stop shelter really reduce purse snatchings?) Unless the profession is encouraged to document its efforts, it is unclear how assessments can be made.

- Finally, community policing departments are going to have to focus on their primary business -- crime control and prevention. To some extent, it is easier, as many police do, to focus less on this primary function and concentrate time and limited resources on projects that, while related, are the work of other government agencies (inspecting housing violations, clearing unkempt lots and parks, removing graffiti, establishing park basketball leagues). Police should only provide referrals and work with government officials to make sure the referrals actually work. Otherwise, these new tasks are extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and the hazard is that they distract police from their focus on crime control and prevention. In the long run, community policing will be judged, not on its ability to be a more efficient provider of other government services, but in its ability to prevent and control crime.

Community Policing

Brady&assault weapons

Balance b/w opportunity & responsibility

Certainty of punishment -- boot camps;

    juvenile court program: rigorous academic; fix boats

tourists get shot b/c they don't have guns (Edna Buchanan -- Nightline)

Moynihan -- breaking epidemic of violence

August 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, WHITE HOUSE FELLOW

SUBJECT: COMMUNITY POLICING

This brief memoranda provides a follow-up to your August 23rd conversation with the Chiefs of Police from St. Louis, Ft. Pierce, Austin, Prince George's County, and Greensboro at NIJ's community policing conference. It is intended to fill in some of the gaps that are inevitable in such a short discussion about a topic as complex as community policing. For years now, I have provided technical assistance and training in community policing to police and city officials throughout the country, including three of the above-mentioned chiefs, and I would be remiss if I did not follow-up with you to underscore community policing's essential elements. In addition, with community, government, and political expectations raised concerning community policing, it is important to have a full picture about the level of progress the police profession has made thus far.

- Community policing is best understood through its component parts -- community engagement and problem solving. These two are integrally linked and must exist in tandem in a department doing community policing. Community engagement just for the sake of improving the police relationship to the community is community relations, not much more. And a problem-oriented approach that does not focus on the crime and disorder problems that communities care about misdirects scarce police resources and undermines police accountability to the public. Many police departments only rely on community engagement limiting their effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder problems.

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departments, yet only a handful of the officers in each of those departments is actually engaged in community policing. Most police officers, even in the better departments, remain unengaged from community policing efforts. This is true, in part, because many chiefs have opted for a split-force concept of community policing where only a small group of officers engage in community policing while the majority go about business as usual engaged in traditional reactive, incident-driven policing. In addition, for those few departments that have opted to implement community policing department-wide, a long-term (probably 10 years), transformational change will be required, offering little in terms of quick successes.

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- Most police departments fail to measure the effectiveness of their community policing projects, (i.e. did moving the bus stop away from the vacant lot really reduce purse snatchings?) Unless the profession is encouraged to document its efforts, it is unclear how assessments can be made.

- Finally, community policing departments are going to have to focus on their

primary business -- crime control and prevention. To some extent, it is easier, as many police do, to focus less on this primary function and concentrate time and limited resources on projects that, while related, are the work of other government agencies (inspecting housing violations, clearing unkempt lots and parks, removing graffiti, establishing park basketball leagues). Police should only provide referrals and work with government officials to make sure the referrals actually work. Otherwise, these new tasks are extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and the hazard is that they distract police from their focus on crime control and prevention. In the long run, community policing will be judged, not on its ability to be a more efficient provider of other government services, but in its ability to prevent and control crime.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ELI SEGAL, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SERVICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY UPDATE

Outlined below is a compilation of unmet needs in the public safety field, as identified by practitioners in criminal justice. Clearly these do not represent all of the unmet needs in the field, especially since local communities have not been surveyed. Generally, though, this list will provide you with examples that you and your staff can use in your briefings and also gives some insight into what practitioners in the field currently perceive as their unmet needs.

Suggestions for Service Assignments Made by Practitioners Representing the Field

Police

**Handling Minor Investigations** National Service Officers (NSO's) can be trained to conduct routine investigations of misdemeanor crimes like larcenies and even more serious crimes like burglaries. They can be trained to look for patterns in crimes as a way to increase solvability factors for these types of crimes.

**Staffing Telephone Reporting Unit:** NSO's can be trained to take reports by phone of past crimes. Some citizens prefer to provide information over the phone to police personnel (if there are no clues to the identity of the offender) rather than wait for an unpredictable amount of time for police to respond to the scene of the crime. In Ft. Pierce (FL), 12% of police calls for service are handled by phone without the need to dispatch an officer. In other jurisdictions, an ever higher percent of calls for service can be handled by phone. Staffing a telephone reporting unit frees up police officers for prevention efforts and allows officers to be more proactive.

**Assisting in Residential Crime Prevention:** NSO's can be trained to identify environmental weaknesses in residential properties that contribute to crime (i.e. faulty locks, hedges obstructing view from street, open accessible windows, poorly lit stairwells).

**Mediating Complaints:** NSO's can be trained by local jurisdictions engaged in community-based mediation of complaints to assist in dispute resolution.

**Attending Community Meetings:** NSO's can attend community and neighborhood watch meetings to develop an understanding of community concerns in the areas they work. They can then team up with the community to solve neighborhood crime and disorder problems. NSO's can be the police liaison to community groups, providing groups with crime data and helping to look for crime patterns that might assist in solving or preventing crimes.

**Preparing Reports of Past Crimes:** If the offender has left the scene of the crime (so the threat to safety is eliminated), a NSO can take a crime report in the field, not just by phone. In many jurisdictions citizens can wait hours before police officers are available to take reports of past crimes because police time is committed to citizen calls involving more immediate hazards. NSO's can improve a police department's response time to citizen calls by assisting with the preparation of field reports.

**Analyzing Crime Data:** Officers engaged in community policing try to gather information from sources inside and outside of their police agencies to help them better understand the crime or disorder problems they are trying to work with the community to resolve. Officers need help sifting through the information gathered. For instance, in the case of a robbery, an officer should find out some of the following information: Has there been a pattern of robberies at the bus stop? What does past crime data reveal? Do plans from the City Planning Commission show why the bus stop was located in front of a vacant unfenced city lot? Does the city bus company perform studies before they locate bus stops? This information, and a variety of other information, needs to be collected and analyzed before a solution to a crime problem can be crafted. NSO's can help officers gather and analyze information and data increasing the possibility that crime problems will be solved.

**Reducing Crime Directed Against the Elderly:** In those communities where seniors are routinely victimized, NSO's can tailor assignments to prevent senior victimization. If seniors are frequently robbed while doing their weekly grocery shopping, NSO's might set up a transport system escorting seniors to and from the market to prevent a crime from occurring. If seniors' monthly social security checks are being stolen, NSO's can work with seniors and local banks to set up direct deposit systems.

**Latent Print Examination:** NSO's can be trained, as in Tucson, to lift and analyze fingerprints from burglarized residential and commercial establishments.

**Crime Scene Investigation:** NSO's can safeguard and evaluate evidence at the scene of past crimes, as in Kansas City and Tucson.

**Handling Minor Traffic Accidents:** NSO's can respond to the scene of minor traffic

accidents when no enforcement action is needed, as in San Diego, to take reports and see to injured victims.

**Providing Information to the Public Concerning Crime Prevention:** NSO's can be trained in crime prevention techniques. Once trained, they can work with community groups, as in San Diego, and with school children, as in New York, on neighborhood crime prevention initiatives.

**Providing Social Service Referrals:** NSO's can be trained to provide social service referrals to citizens, as in San Diego.

**Conducting community surveys:** NSO's can help community policing officers gather information about crime or other problems by going door to door and completing community surveys, as in New York City. Surveys are a very useful way to learn greater detail about a particular continuing neighborhood problem like daily drug dealing on a specific corner, (time of day, type of drug, witness information, etc.) or multiple robberies from a specific convenience store (items stolen, time of day, crime prevention techniques used, etc.), or the extent of a confidence scheme (who is being conned and how does the con artist gain the trust of the victim). Once information is gathered, NSO's can work with community policing officers to tailor solutions to the problems the surveys outlined.

**Training Police Officers in Foreign Languages:** NSO's who are proficient in foreign languages such as Spanish, Korean, or Vietnamese (Mung) could spend time teaching officers basic language skills. In some communities, officers are unable to communicate with part of their citizenry because of a language barrier. Police must be able to communicate effectively often in times of crisis, and would benefit from any foreign language training that will facilitate communication. For instance, in Westminster (CA), 23% of the city's residents are Vietnamese, yet 75% of the city's reported robbery victims and 46% of the reported victims of car theft were Vietnamese. However, only a handful of police personnel are able to speak with the Vietnamese citizens at the time they are most need of help (when they have been victimized). Students proficient in foreign languages can be of invaluable assistance to police departments in many cities that struggle to communicate with portions of their population.

**Staffing Anti-Gang Initiatives:** NSO's can work with police to help staff anti-gang programs whether they include a focused one-on-one approach like mentoring with gang members or through group organizing via community work projects. In addition, NSO's can help set with the help of community members gang prevention initiatives steering at-risk youth away from gang involvement.

**Latchkey Program Development:** NSO's can work with community members to set up programs that address the needs of latchkey children. This focus on prevention can be tailored to impact upon particular crimes like vandalism, gang graffiti, and shoplifting.

**Teaching Students Conflict Resolution Skills:** NSO's, working with police, can be trained to teach conflict resolution skills to elementary and middle schools students. Working with children in this vulnerable age group could help prevent school crime, generally, and assaults

on school grounds, specifically.

### **Prosecutors' Offices**

**Providing Victim/Witness Assistance:** NSO's can help victims and witnesses prepare for their duties testifying in court. NSO's can explain the court process, notify victim/witnesses of court appearances and guide them through what can often feel like a reliving of the victimizing experience.

**Assisting with Investigations:** Prosecutors and investigators in many jurisdictions could use the assistance of an NSO to gather facts and pursue leads in cases. The range of needs might include reviewing a robbery crime scene to analyzing financial data in fraud investigations.

**Demonstrative Evidence Artist:** Many prosecutors' offices need help in creating and preparing exhibits for trial to support the facts of a case. Exhibit preparation might include taking photographs, preparing illustrations, or mapping out locations for display.

**Developing Drug Prevention Outreach Programs:** NSO's could organize and schedule anti-drug educational programs in schools, assist in mentoring programs for families of convicted offenders of drug crimes, and maintain statistical data on drug crimes and trends.

**Developing Environmental Crimes Awareness Programs:** An NSO can work under the supervision of a prosecuting attorney to develop model education programs useful in informing local businesses of new laws and innovative compliance options raising compliance and awareness levels. NSO's can follow-up with newsletters informing the community and industry of prevention options and prosecutorial actions.

**Linking up Domestic Violence Victims to Services:** NSO's could work in state courts linking up domestic violence victims to needed social services. Often domestic violence victims have needs well beyond what is provided by mere court adjudication of their physical abuse claim including need for additional medical services, financial support, housing, and employment.

### **Courts**

**Staffing Neighborhood Courts:** NSO's could help staff neighborhood courts which have captured criminal justice practitioners' interest. Community courts help make judicial proceedings more accessible by locating court rooms and their attendant services in less formal, more convenient, settings and to be community oriented they will require a high level of service to the surrounding area and business residents and NSO can help provide the

staffing of these services.

**Mediating as part of Alternative Dispute Resolution:** NSO's can be trained to participate in some of the new approaches to resolving differences for low level, non-violent, offenses. In New York City, a new community court will be opening soon and it is in this kind of environment where innovative alternatives might be attractive.

**Providing Assistance to Court Users:** NSO's could provide assistance to pro se litigants in completing forms for filing cases and in keeping them informed about case progress. NSO's could also staff information desks so court users could acquire information about case status and courthouse rules and procedures.

**Court Appointed Advocacy:** NSO's can be trained to act as court appointed special advocates (CASA's). In Spotsylvania County, Virginia where CASA's were used to represent abused and neglected children before the court, the foster care caseload and length of foster care stay was cut in half.

**Providing Drug Treatment Referrals:** NSO's could provide the link between courts and drug treatment providers. NSO's could help courts identify available substance abuse treatment and aftercare to offenders.

### **Probation**

**Providing Probation Support:** NSO's can be trained to assist probationers find job training programs, housing, and employment. Currently, probation officers overloaded with cases cannot find time to provide these important services, which contributes to the pressure to incarcerate low-risk offenders.

### **Drug Abuse Prevention**

**Drug Abuse Prevention Programs:** No one is better at conveying to young people the temptation and danger of drug abuse than other young people. In close partnership with local schools and anti-drug professionals (from counselors to cops), NSO's could form drug abuse prevention teams to engage in anti-drug curriculum development, videos on drug abuse, and anti-drug use billboard advertising.

### **Community and Institutional Corrections**

**Reducing Recidivism through Education:** Practitioners in the field assert that 75% of people in prison can not write above a 4th grade level. NSO's can work with non-violent, low-risk offenders providing educational services including literacy training and G.E.D. preparation. In addition, they can be trained to provide life skills courses and vocational skill building including training in innovative jail industries programs. The focus of these efforts would be on reducing the high recidivism rate among offenders.

**Facilitating Discharge Transition:** In many facilities, discharged inmates receive busfare and little else. NSO's can be trained to provide discharge transition services preparing offenders for job hunting, interviewing, filling out applications, and checking account and money management. This will better prepare those who have served their time for their transition into a new environment.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## NATIONAL SERVICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

The President's National Service Plan will offer Americans opportunities to serve our country and receive awards to pay for post-secondary education. According to Congressional estimates, by 1996, as many as 100,000 participants will be able to engage in service in one of four priority areas: education, environment, human needs and public safety.

Localities, associations, and other entities that are seeking National Service positions will develop plans for service. In all instances, programs will be required to meet important unmet needs, provide skills to participants, and not displace existing workers. Based on quality criteria developed in conjunction with experts, a Federal corporation and individual state commissions will then together select national service programs for funding.

The public safety component of National Service will include opportunities for participants in police agencies (sworn and non-sworn), as well as non-sworn opportunities in the courts, prosecutors' offices, community and institutional corrections, treatment, community-based organizations, and victim services. The Act aims to provide significant and substantive opportunities for National Service participants to work in challenging, skill-building assignments. Some National Service participants will be law students, others criminal justice or psychology majors. Some will need training to help prepare them for their National Service assignment. The bill proposes that participants receive an educational award of nearly \$5,000 for one year of service. Police departments, courts, prosecutor and defender offices, criminal justice service providers, as well as non-profit organizations interested in reducing crime and violence can apply for assistance including federal assistance towards: a modest stipend, healthcare and childcare benefits, and training costs of the National Service Officer.

**Police practitioners** have suggested some of the following assignments for National Service Officers (NSO's) who could be trained to meet these unmet needs:

- conducting community surveys of neighborhood crime and disorder problems
- working on projects to prevent senior victimization
- staffing a police substation

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- performing residential and commercial crime prevention surveys
- assisting police officers in analyzing crime data and developing solutions to problems in their community policing beats
- representing the police department in elementary and secondary schools and working with students on crime prevention, drug awareness, and conflict resolution skills
- setting up a citizens' police academy to educate the public about police operations
- attending community meetings and providing a liaison between police and the community
- teaching police officers the basics of foreign languages needed for interaction in diverse communities
- examining latent prints at past crime scenes
- staffing a telephone reporting unit -- taking reports of past crimes

These are just some of the suggestions proposed thus far by police chiefs, police union leaders and police officers. As for the sworn component of National Service, here is how it works. If a local or state policing agency would like to create a cadre of high quality police recruits, they will be able through National Service to offer individuals the opportunity to serve as a police officer in exchange for an educational award. National Service will provide a one year educational award of \$4,725 (and \$9,450 for two years) to individuals interested in serving as police officers. In the case of sworn personnel, the federal government will not be able to pay the salaries of these new local recruits, however, it will help police departments with funds to train these new officers.

**Court administrators, prosecutors, and judges** have suggested some of the following assignments for National Service Officers (NSO's) who could be trained to meet these unmet needs:

- staffing neighborhood courts
- assisting domestic violence victims navigate the court system and linking them to needed social services
- representing abused and neglected children as court appointed advocates
- monitoring court orders for guardianship

- preparing victims/witnesses for their appearances in court
- researching points of law for district attorneys' offices in preparation for trial
- preparing exhibits for trial
- developing, organizing and scheduling anti-drug educational programs as part of a court liaison program with schools
- developing model education programs tailored to inform local businesses of new environmental laws and innovative compliance options
- training middle and secondary school students in conflict resolution skills
- assisting with court-ordered mediation

**Victim assistance providers** have suggested some of the following assignments for National Service Officers (NSO's) who could be trained to meet these unmet needs:

- training high school students in peer counseling
- helping domestic violence victims navigate the court system and linking them to needed social services
- monitoring community restitution programs
- representing abused and neglected children as court appointed advocates
- serving as crisis intervenors at crime scenes and on hot lines
- staffing victim assistance desks in neighborhood courts
- coordinating victim counseling volunteers
- training middle and secondary school students in conflict resolution skills
- helping communities develop disaster relief plans
- working on projects to reduce victimization of senior citizens

**Community and institutional corrections personnel** have suggested some of the following assignments for National Service Officers (NSO's) who could be trained to meet these unmet needs:

- supervising offender work programs and staffing intermediate sanction programs including home arrest
- supervising probationers and parolees engaged in community compensatory service and restitution projects
- teaching offenders basic reading, math and computer literacy skills
- teaching offenders life skills including job preparation and personal fiscal management
- teaching jail industries in marketable areas like data management, construction, and the automotive trades
- staffing prison libraries and training prison library staff
- teaching correctional personnel literacy instructional skills, as well as the basics of foreign languages needed for interaction with diverse populations

These are just some of the suggestions proposed thus far by practitioners in the field. The President hopes to have the first National Service Officers on the streets for the summer of 1994.

## Walking the Beat on Mean Streets

### Tough Neighborhoods Put Community Policing to the Test

File:  
Community  
Policing

By LYNETTE HOLLOWAY

Officer Michael Lopez was walking his beat in East New York, Brooklyn, recently when the barrage began: rocks, bottles and debris hurtled toward him from the rooftop of a housing project.

Officer Lopez ducked, ran for cover and, getting the message, established a new policy: never to walk alone near high-rises again.

"I was on the job and people were throwing things at me," Officer Lopez said. "It was clear that some people didn't want me there."

As a community police officer, Officer Lopez is supposed to build ties and cooperation within neighborhoods to help fight crime, but in the 75th Precinct, one of the city's most violent and a place where mistrust of the police runs high, that is no easy task.

Community policing is being phased in throughout the city and some progress has been reported in more stable neighborhoods. But the most important and difficult test for New York's new crime-fighting philosophy will come in high-crime neighborhoods like East New York, where officers work in an atmosphere of fear, hostility and alienation, the kind of tension that affects relations between the police and minority residents throughout the country. Residents say they sense the officers' fear, increasing the friction.

#### Limits to Community Policing

The idea behind community policing is to get officers out of squad cars and onto the streets of neighborhoods. Many experts say the limits of this type of policing are exposed in East New York and areas like it because these communities often lack the civic cohesion that can help prevent crime. This in turn raises the question of whether community policing can work in areas of profound deterioration.

"Other than New York, no other city has tried this philosophy in places as tough as East New York," said Anthony Pate, director of research of the Police Foundation in Washington. "I would think that would be one heck of a challenge."

Top police officials are optimistic that the two-and-a-half-year-old community policing plan can work, even in East New York and other comparably tough areas like Bushwick, Brooklyn, and Washington Heights in Manhattan.

"I think it's too soon to judge whether the plan is working," said Suzanne Trazoff, deputy police commissioner for public information. "We're about midstream in terms of completing it. When you take officers out of cars and put them on the streets it demystifies and personalizes their jobs. That in itself has to change something. It's going to take longer in tougher neighborhoods like East New York."

In the 75th, 38 community police officers are divided into 26 beats throughout the six-square mile precinct. As they walk their beats, they are expected to create networks of cooperation and information-sharing among residents and solve persistent crime problems. Officers have started green thumb programs, growing cabbage and tomatoes in vacant lots

where crack houses once flourished; coordinated street clean ups and most significantly, reached out to the area's youth in the hopes of changing their attitudes about the police.

But such efforts go only so far in East New York, which often resembles a war zone with its many charred buildings, trash-filled vacant lots and barren streets. With a per capita income of \$8,013, it is one of the city's poorest communities. The 75th Precinct counted 90 murders within its borders last year, second only to the 34th in Washington Heights, and the number is up sharply this year, 71 through June. Overall crime fell 3.1 percent last year but that was far below the 7.8 percent drop for the entire city.

#### Code of Silence Envelops the Street

The rules that govern the everyday existence of the people who live on these streets prohibit them from developing close ties with the police, enveloping them in a code of silence almost as strong as that of the "blue wall" of silence that is said to exist among police officers.

Some residents retreat into homes surrounded by ornate iron bars and buy their aspirin, toothpaste, and hair products from drugstores that are completely enclosed in bullet-proof shields. Tenant patrols or neighborhood watch groups are fragmented, if they exist at all.

"People don't want you to come to their houses because the criminals might think they're giving up information," said Officer Lopez, who works in an area west of Pennsylvania Avenue once labeled the "Dead Zone" because of all of the vacant lots and the frequency of killings there. "They could get hit. So I do a lot of work by phone."

Besides working the phones in a cramped office on the second-floor of the 75th Precinct station house on Sutter Avenue, Officer Lopez and his

partner, Kevin Kenney, spend their days running drug dealers and prostitutes off corners. Also, as they walk their beats, they rely on tips from strangers who walk by rattling off places where drugs can be found. Usually in the exchanges, the officers do not break their stride, avoid eye-contact and discussions.

Recently, on a rainy and humid day, the officers showed a visitor around the Dead Zone, renamed the "Field of Dreams" in a public relations effort to bolster community

pride. It is the hope that one day the lots will be filled with new homes.

The officers strolled past barking dogs, abandoned buildings used by addicts as shooting galleries and life-size murals etched on the sides of buildings in memory of slain drug dealers. The light rain disappeared as it hit the pavement during the walk.

#### Search of Bushes Is Part of the Job

They spoke to Stoney, a known drug user, dealer and pimp, who stood outside an abandoned red-brick building adjacent to a sprawling vacant lot just off Snediker Avenue and New Lots Avenue. The man's apparently jangled nerves made the officers stop and search the bushes behind him.

After a few seconds, they found the booty, a large plastic bag filled with 36 vials of crack cocaine worth almost \$200. The vials were inside smaller heat-sealed plastic bags stamped with the Playboy insignia.

Denying that the drugs belonged to him, Stoney wandered onto Snediker Avenue with a look of disbelief, stopping suddenly at the intersection with his eyes downcast and his forehead leaning into his palms. He stood there for awhile before wandering away. The day before, the officers had found 31 vials of crack cocaine that belonged to him.

"This is what we do," Officer Kenney said. "This is how we make community policing work. It may seem insignificant, but I feel we're making a difference. We don't make an arrest but there's some street justice involved. His boss will want to know what happened to the drugs for two days in a row."

Community policing works better in some parts of East New York than in others. Police Officer William Selock patrols the City Line, about three miles east of the Field of Dreams. Officer Selock feels relatively safe walking his beat, strolling among merchants and residents along Liberty Avenue, a commercial stretch. The City Line is a more stable, working-class area where a mix of white, black and Hispanic people live and shop. Residents have everything to gain by working with the police in this part of the community.

"I had never heard of East New York in my life before I was assigned here," said Officer Selock, 32 years old, who grew up and lives in Nassau

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County on Long Island. "I asked some friends about it and they told me I was going to the worst precinct in the city. They said it was drug infested, a hell hole.

"When you come out and walk around you find there are so many good people here."

## Merchants Recite Personal Crime Stats

Alan Adams, 30, owns the Sneaker Barn at 1139 Liberty Avenue. He says his store has been burglarized twice and he has been robbed six times in the last 18 months.

After the sixth robbery, he tried to rally the support of neighboring merchants to hire four full-time security guards to patrol the block.

"It boiled down to them saying to me, 'You have what they want. It's not our problem,'" he said. So he hired one guard to watch his store at night.

"I don't have a death wish," Mr. Adams said. "I'm making money here just like I would in any other neighborhood, except here you have a few wise guys."

In many parts of East New York, residents feel shunned, saying the politicians come around only at election time and the officers who serve their communities do so with great trepidation.

Many residents say they do not know their community police officer. They talk angrily about how often officers will approach them, especially at night, with their guns drawn; their finger trembling on the trigger. And how they could become the next Rodney King because of a sudden movement on the shadowy streets. But they say they also understand that East New York's violent past makes it hard for officers to behave any other way.

"Believe me the cops around here say '38 first and talk later,'" said Kevin Folks, a father of three who lives at Florentino Plaza, a housing project at 2215 Pitkin Avenue. "We know they're afraid of us. If they would put more black officers in the neighborhood, the tension would ease. You don't see black cops patrolling Howard Beach or Bensonhurst. Why do they have all of these whites here?"

Mr. Folks, 37, said he would be glad to work with his community police officer in cleaning up his neighborhood. But he rarely sees anyone who regularly patrols his block. And when he does see police officers, they're

there on emergencies.

"It's like they're sending us a message of 'Don't call us until ya'll are out there killing each other,'" Mr. Folks said recently as he stood outside his apartment complex surrounded by more than 20 officers waiting for two teen-age robbery suspects who had holed themselves upside the building. "They need to patrol this area better, but they're afraid."

A short distance from the Florentino Houses, Gaspar Francis, 15, and his cousin, Dwight Francis, 15, were among a crowd of gawkers who gathered on Miller Avenue between Hegeman and New Lots Avenue after a despondent landlord killed two tenants and then himself after an argument over whether water was being wasted in the apartment. They reflected for a moment on the police officers who patrol their neighborhood.

"The police officers around here, they walk around in the daytime like they're all big and bad," said Gaspar, dressed in baggy jeans and a T-shirt. "It's a different story at night. They act like they're afraid. They can't get to their patrol cars fast enough. When they get to the cars, they drop their keys because they're so nervous."

## Even Police Officers Say They Get Scared

A young officer who regularly patrols the block admitted his fear. He declined to give his name.

"It's a crazy, bad block during the night," he said. "I wouldn't walk around there at night."

Earl Williams, chairman of Community Board 5, which covers East New York, has witnessed police officers being taunted by residents — young and old.

"Sometimes these young officers that they hire come in here with fear written all over their faces," he said. "Young people spot this and the insults begin: 'I dare you to arrest me or to pull your gun on me.' The adults will stand on the roof and throw rocks and bottles at them. I've seen it happen. It's just terrible."

Mr. Williams, unlike Mr. Folks, does not believe that increasing the number of black officers on the precinct's 75 percent white force of 383 officers will improve relations.

"A lot of black officers don't get the respect from the folk in the community," he said. "They look at them as sell-outs. They look down on that. I don't know the solution."

James Saunders, president of the 75th Precinct Council, a civilian advisory panel, lamented that all people ever do is complain about the police but very few of them get involved.

"More residents have to get involved instead of going home and closing themselves off behind burglar bars like they're in prison," said Mr. Saunders. "We have to get involved. The police can't do the job alone. A lot of the problems that we have have nothing to do with policing."

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**The White House**  
**Office of the Press Secretary**

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**For Immediate Release**

**August 11, 1993**

**THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PLAN  
TO EXPAND COMMUNITY POLICING AND REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE**

*It is time for America to make a serious commitment to community policing, to having people back on the beat, working the same neighborhoods, making relationships with people in ways that prevent crime . . . . How will the federal government provide 100,000 more police officers? First of all, by getting the crime bill passed.*

**Bill Clinton**  
**Detroit, Michigan**  
**October 17, 1992**

The first duty of government is to keep its citizens safe. The Clinton Administration is offering a number of initiatives to prevent crime and reduce gun violence:

- \* Expand community policing in cities and towns across America by putting up to 100,000 more officers on the streets.
- \* Keep handguns out of the hands of criminals by passing the Brady Bill, which will require a five-day waiting period before purchasing a handgun, and taking other measures on assault weapons that will begin to end the arms race in our streets.
- \* Provide community boot camps, which give young people discipline, training, and a better chance to avoid a life of crime, and provide criminal addicts with drug treatment.
- \* Pass a crime bill that increases penalties for gun offenses, reforms habeas corpus procedures to raise counsel standards and limit appeals, and imposes federal death penalties for killing a federal law enforcement officer and other heinous crimes.

## **PUTTING 100,000 MORE OFFICERS ON THE STREET**

A first step we can take to reduce crime in America is to put more police on the streets, walking the beat and working with neighbors as partners against crime. The Clinton Administration's anti-crime initiative will expand community policing throughout the nation. This innovative way of thinking about policing has already helped reduce crime in several communities across the country. From New York to St. Louis to Los Angeles, police departments are using this approach to put more police on the streets.

The Clinton Administration has launched a government-wide effort to put 100,000 more officers and public safety personnel on the street:

**Supplemental Appropriations:** Congress passed and the President signed into law on July 2 an FY93 supplemental appropriations bill that included \$150 million in community policing grants to hire and rehire police officers. This competitive grants program will become available to states and localities in early September, and will put more than 2,100 new police on the streets over the next three years.

**Policing and Public Safety:** The cornerstone of the President's community policing plan to put police on the street is the Policing and Public Safety program that will be part of this year's crime bill. An expansion of the Cop-on-the-Beat legislation introduced by Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY), the Justice Department program will challenge communities to implement community policing by providing grants, training, and technical assistance for police officers. The program is authorized at \$3.4 billion over the next five years, which will help communities put up to 50,000 new officers on the street. The Administration will make full funding for this program a priority.

**Police Corps:** This four-year, \$100 million program will give college scholarships and police training to as many as 4-5,000 students who are willing to make a four-year commitment to serve their communities as police officers. As Governor of Arkansas, President Clinton instituted the nation's first state Police Corps program.

**Safe Schools Initiative:** Schools should be a safe haven for children, free of weapons, drugs, and crime. Education Secretary Richard Riley has introduced emergency Safe Schools legislation, based on a proposal by Rep. Schumer and others, that will enable local education authorities to hire security personnel and pay for police officers who include schools as part of their community policing "beat". The Administration's budget request includes \$475 million for Safe Schools over the next five years, which would fund up to 4,000 sworn and non-sworn officers.

**Community Partnerships Against Crime:** Some of the nation's worst pockets of crime are concentrated in neighborhoods with public housing. To help make public housing safer, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Cisneros is transforming his department's Drug Elimination Grant Program into a more effective program called Community

Partnerships Against Crime (COMPAC). The Administration's budget request includes more than \$700 million over the next five years to put as many as 5,000 sworn and non-sworn officers to work in law enforcement, security, and community policing in public housing.

**National Service:** Up to one-quarter of the slots in the national service plan Congress is expected to put on the President's desk in September will be available for young people who choose to pay their country and their communities back through public safety and law enforcement. The program could put up to 25,000 young people to work as non-sworn personnel for local police departments, crime prevention groups and other public safety efforts. The President hopes to put the first National Service participants to work by the summer of 1994.

**Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities:** The economic plan which the President signed into law August 10 will create jobs in depressed urban and rural areas around the country by targeting growth incentives and investments into nine Empowerment Zones and 100 Enterprise Communities. The Administration's budget request includes up to \$500 million for up to 6-7,000 officers to do community policing in these areas, because businesses can't create jobs where the streets are not safe. While the Empowerment Zone proposal passed as part of budget reconciliation, the Appropriations Committees have not approved the Administration's budget request.

**Troops-to-Cops:** As we downscale the military in the aftermath of the Cold War, we need to put our best trained, most talented men and women to work keeping America safe here at home. To help police departments tap into the pool of talented military personnel, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich will make as much as \$10 million from the Defense Diversification Program available to retrain up to 1,500 veterans who are leaving the military for jobs with state and local police departments.

**Paying for Public Safety:** Funding for these policing programs is included in the Administration's budget baseline for FY 1994-98. If additional funds are required for these and other Administration initiatives, the Administration will continue to pursue additional budget cuts, including ones the Administration sought but has not yet achieved in Congress this year. It is expected that Congressional leadership and the National Performance Review will identify additional savings. Community policing programs assume some state/local match.

## **REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE**

The Clinton Administration is committed to passing the Brady Bill, and reducing the wave of gun violence that is plaguing America.

**Brady Bill:** This legislation -- named for former Reagan press secretary James Brady, and championed by his wife Sarah -- will impose a five-day waiting period for

handgun purchases, and require background checks so that we can help keep handguns out of the hands of criminals. The Brady Bill passed both houses of Congress last session with bipartisan support.

**Assault Weapons:** Recent attacks on children at a swimming pool in Washington, D.C., and on a law firm in San Francisco have underscored the need for Congress to consider legislation addressing the sale and availability of semiautomatic assault weapons -- the guns of choice for drug- and gang-related crime.

**Presidential Action:** Today, the President will sign Presidential Memoranda to suspend the importation of assault pistols, which are not covered under the existing assault weapons import ban, and to toughen enforcement of compliance procedures in issuing federal firearms licenses to gun dealers.

### **COMMUNITY BOOT CAMPS FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS AND DRUG TREATMENT FOR CRIMINAL ADDICTS**

In Arkansas, Governor Clinton pioneered the use of community boot camps, which provide young people the discipline, education, and training they need for a better chance to avoid a life of crime. The Administration will work with Congress to convert closed military bases and other appropriate facilities into a system of boot camps. Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Lee Brown and Attorney General Janet Reno will work to ensure that we use the criminal justice system to provide criminal addicts with drug treatment.

### **FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY**

The Administration will ask Congress to pass crime legislation that provides the death penalty for nearly 50 offenses -- including killing a federal law enforcement officer and killing state officers in the course of cooperative investigations with federal agencies.

### **HABEAS CORPUS REFORM**

Senator Biden has introduced breakthrough habeas reform legislation, with strong support from district attorneys, state attorneys general, and the Administration. The legislation will, for the first time, limit inmates to filing a single, federal habeas corpus appeal within a six-month time limit. At the same time, the legislation will also assure that all indigent capital defendants will be represented by counsel who meet specific, rigorous experience and qualification standards.