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Podesta

4-21-99

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1999  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Bruce Reed  
Jose Cerda III

SUBJECT: Rep. Carolyn McCarthy's Gun Legislation

Rep. McCarthy has introduced omnibus gun legislation, much of which we can probably support. As noted below, a few provisions of her bill involving federal regulation of gun manufacturing and safety may be more controversial and less likely to be enacted than your existing proposals in those areas.

As we outline in a separate memo on potential policy responses to the Littleton shootings, we were already finishing up a comprehensive gun bill for you to announce as part of your 21st Century crime initiative. We will incorporate as many of Rep. McCarthy's provisions as possible, as well as any other solid proposals that may emerge as we learn the facts of this case.

The provisions in Rep. McCarthy's bill that most directly affect juveniles are:

- Expanding our Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative to 75 cities by 2003. This program is currently in place in 27 cities. Our FY 2000 budget would increase that number to 37. Her bill also authorizes grants for additional ATF and law enforcement personnel to combat illegal gun trafficking, which we also fund in our FY 2000 budget.
- Amending the juvenile handgun ban to include semiautomatic assault rifles manufactured before the assault weapons ban went into place. Currently, an 18-year-old can legally possess rifles, including assault rifles manufactured before Sept. 13, 1994. This provision would generally ban the possession of such assault rifles until the age of 21. As part of your crime bill, we also plan to reintroduce a provision that would make a violation of this statute a felony offense. Since existing law only provides for mandatory probation, federal prosecutors have been reluctant to bring any of these cases.
- Increasing the penalty for giving or selling a handgun or assault weapon to a juvenile for use in a violent crime. Her bill would increase the maximum penalty for this offense from the current 10 years to 20 years. In our crime bill, we planned to reintroduce the provision from your juvenile crime bill that would establish a mandatory minimum penalty of 3 years, but would maintain the current maximum of 10 years.

● Creating criminal penalties for adults who give juveniles access to certain firearms. This is similar to Durbin's "Child Access Prevention" (CAP) legislation, which we supported in principle in the wake of the Jonesboro shootings. Our crime bill will include a narrowly tailored version of this provision, which reflects Justice's concerns that a federal CAP statute should only target the most egregious cases of parental recklessness, and accordingly should be a felony offense with a stiffer penalty. The McCarthy and Durbin legislation, on the other hand, would simply make it a federal misdemeanor offense for adults to allow negligent access to firearms.

● Creating a \$50 million grant program for children's gun violence prevention education in schools. This would authorize grants to local education agencies to work with law enforcement to educate children about preventing gun violence. We will look at whether we can incorporate this kind of education into our Safe and Drug-Free Schools proposal.

Rep. McCarthy's bill includes three other provisions that the Administration could conceivably support, but which are more controversial and less likely to be enacted than your own proposals in these areas:

● Prohibiting the manufacture and importation of "unsafe guns". The legislation would give Treasury broad regulatory authority to ensure that guns are designed to be child-proof or that they include safety devices that make them so. Our child triggerlock legislation requires federal gun dealers to provide a child safety-locking device with every gun sold, but does not seek any new regulatory authority over how guns or gun-safety devices are made.

● Requiring a Consumer Products Safety Commission study on handgun safety. The legislation would authorize up to \$1.5 million for a CPSC review of how to prevent the unauthorized use or discharge of handguns by children. ATF would be in a better position to conduct such a study, since the CPSC is currently prohibited from studying any firearms issues and there is little support in Congress for giving them this authority.

● Establishing a CDC program to maintain a children's firearm-related injury surveillance system. The legislation would give CDC authority to award \$5 million a year in grants to state and local governments to establish comprehensive data bases on the nature of gun-related injuries to youths under the age of 21 in their communities. Your existing youth gun crime tracing initiative is already spurring communities to gather much of this data in ways more likely to reduce gun violence.

*Print allowed  
(13.1.00.00)*

Guns

MAY 12, 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RAHM / BRUCE / ELENA

ATTACHED PLEASE FIND SOME  
INFO I FORWARDED TO  
ERSKINE'S OFFICE ON THE  
IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN  
SURPLUS MILITARY FIREARMS.  
IT'S BEING POSITED BY  
DEMS TO CASE - I  
SHOULDN'T.

LET ME KNOW YOUR  
THOUGHTS.

CC: PETER  
JACOBY

John

## TALKING POINTS: CURIOS AND RELICS

### **Background:**

The letters you received from Senators Daschle, Rockefeller, Johnson and Representative Hefner request that you meet with the Presidents of two firearms import companies, Blue Sky Productions and Gibbs Rifle Company, regarding the importation of certain U.S. origin surplus military firearms. The firearms at issue were classified as "curios and relics" because of their association with WW II and the Korean War, and Congress expressly authorized their importation in 1984. Separate foreign policy laws, however, prohibit the resale any of these firearms without approval from the State Department. Generally, it has been the policy of this Administration -- as well as that of President's Bush and Reagan -- to bar the importation of these American-made surplus military firearms in the U.S. commercial market.

The Members mentioned above would like you to consider a proposal that Blue Sky and Gibbs Rifle have to import a limited number of some of these firearms (125,000 M-1 Garands). We strongly recommend that you do not meet with these individuals. First, and most importantly, we believe it is unwise for White House officials to discuss the approval of specific permits for the importation of firearms with potential applicants. Second, we are currently in litigation with a third importer in which we have strong foreign policy reasons for denying similar permits. And third, the Administration has strongly opposed the importation of all curios and relics as matter of foreign policy, and exceptions to this policy on other grounds could serve to undermine this decision.

These U.S.-manufactured military weapons were given or sold at deep discounts to foreign governments since 1950, and include the M-1 carbiné, M-1 Garand rifle, and the M-1911 .45 caliber pistol (see attached). The State Department estimates that there are 2.5 million of these firearms overseas, and the Treasury Department is concerned that a dramatic increase in the availability of these firearms represents a public safety threat. As a result, the Administration has exercised its authority to prohibit the importation of these weapons on foreign policy grounds -- twice threatening to veto spending bills over language requiring their importation. Last year, Congress directed the Departments of State and Treasury to report back with more details on the curios and relics issue.

### **Suggested Talking Points:**

- Thank you for contacting me regarding the importation of U.S. origin military firearms classified as curios and relics. While I cannot not comment on any specific permit application before the State and Treasury Departments, I can speak to the Administration's overall policy on curios and relics.
- We have heard concerns from both sides of the gun debate over the importation of U.S. origin military firearms classified as curios and relics, including Senator Lautenberg and others, who strongly oppose the importation of these surplus military firearms.

- As I am sure you know, the Administration has also strongly opposed the importation of these firearms. State Department estimates show that a change in our policy could result in as many as 2.5 million of these firearms being eligible for importation.
- And while I appreciate the willingness of your constituents to address some of the Administrations concerns on this matter, allowing the importation of any of these military weapons -- even the M-1 Garand rifles -- could serve to undermine our broad authority to keep other firearms out of the U.S.
- It is important to note that these weapons were provided to foreign governments for foreign policy purposes and with assurances that the U.S. Government would know of their re-transfer and end use. That is why the State Department has generally opposed the retransfer of these military weapons to the private sector.
- The State Department, in consultation with the Treasury and Justice Departments, is in the process of finalizing a report on the issue of U.S. origin military firearms classified as curios and relics. It should provide the Administration and Congress with the most recent information on this matter and help us all make an informed decision.
- Also, I will make sure that Rahm Emanuel and the White House policy staff know of your concern with our policy, and I will ask them to give the matter further consideration.

DRAFT

May 12, 1998

The Honorable Thomas Daschle  
Democratic Leader  
U.S. Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Daschle:

Thank you for your recent letter to me on the importation of certain U.S. origin military firearms classified as curios and relics. Several Members of Congress on both sides of the gun debate have voiced their concerns about this issue, and I appreciate hearing from you on this.


For two years now, the Administration has strongly opposed efforts to allow the importation of surplus military weapons, including M-1 carbines, M-1 Garands, and M-1911 .45 caliber pistols. These firearms were designed for military purposes, and millions were provided to foreign governments as a form of military aid over the past several decades. As a result, it has been the policy of this Administration -- as well as that of Presidents' Bush and Reagan -- to bar the importation of these American-made surplus military weapons in the U.S. commercial market.

Although I appreciate the willingness of your constituents to try and address some of the Administration's concerns on this matter, we remain concerned about the overall importation of these military weapons. You should know, however, that the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State -- as directed by Congress -- are finalizing a comprehensive report on the importation of U.S. origin military firearms. This report should provide the Administration and Congress with the most recent information on this matter and help us all make an informed decision.

Again, thank you for contacting me on this important matter. I have asked Rahm Emanuel and the White House policy staff to follow this matter closely.

Sincerely,

**U.S. CARBINE CALIBER 30 M1  
(M1 CARBINE)**



**CALIBER:** .30 M1 Carbine

**ACTION:** gas operated, semiautomatic (can be converted to full automatic)

**WEIGHT:** 5.5 pounds

**BARREL LENGTH:** 18 inches

**OVERALL LENGTH:** 35.6 inches

**MAGAZINE CAPACITY:** 15 or 30 round detachable magazine

**MANUFACTURERS:** Winchester, Inland Div. General Motors, Saginaw Steering Gear, National Postal Meter, IBM, Quality Hardware, Irwin Pedersen, Underwood-Elliott-Fisher, Rock Ola, Standard Products

**TOTAL PRODUCED:** 6,117,767 <sup>300 - 400</sup>


**CURRENT DOMESTIC PRICE:** \$250 - \$350 (If additional large quantities become available price will go down) Based on 1997  
BLUE BOOK

The M1 Carbine was a U.S. Military service rifle from 1941 through the late 1950,s. Large quantities of the weapon have been supplied to European, African, Latin American and Asian military forces.

In certain configurations the M1 carbine meets the definition of semiautomatic assault rifle as contained in 18 USC § 921(a)(30)(B). The following illustrates an M1 Carbine in this configuration.



NOTE: All U.S. military M1 Carbines can be easily converted to full automatic weapons by the installation of the parts illustrated below.




The conversion does not require any particular skill and can be accomplished by merely disassembling the weapon and reassembling with the above parts.

If large quantities of M1 carbines become available there is a potential for law enforcement problems with illegal conversion of weapons to machineguns. ATF has seen an increase in converted M1 carbines over the last few years due largely to availability and relatively low cost of the weapon.

(Quantities of M1 carbines have been imported from South Korea and Germany)

**U.S. RIFLE CALIBER 30 M1  
(M1 GARAND)**



**CALIBER: .30-06**

**ACTION: gas operated, semiautomatic**

**WEIGHT: 9.5 pounds**

**BARREL LENGTH: 24 inches**

**OVERALL LENGTH: 43.6 inches**

**MAGAZINE CAPACITY: 8 round clip (enbloc clip containing 8 cartridges is loaded into weapon through top of action)**


**MANUFACTURERS: Springfield Armory, Winchester, Harrington & Richardson, International Harvester**

**TOTAL PRODUCED: 5,468,772**

**CURRENT DOMESTIC PRICE: \$350 - \$500 (If additional large quantities become available price will go down)**

**The M1 rifle was the standard U.S. Military service rifle from 1936 through the late 1950,s. Large quantities of the weapon have been supplied to European, African, Latin American and Asian military forces.**

**U.S. PISTOL, CALIBER .45, AUTOMATIC  
M1911 & M1911A1**



**CALIBER: .45 ACP**

**ACTION: recoil operated, semiautomatic**

**WEIGHT: 2.43 pounds**

**BARREL LENGTH: 5 inches**

**OVERALL LENGTH: 8.62 inches**

**MAGAZINE CAPACITY: 7 round detachable magazine**

**MANUFACTURERS: Colt, Springfield Armory, Remington  
U.M.C., Singer Sewing Machine, Ithaca Gun Co., Remington  
Rand, Union Switch & Signal Co.**

**TOTAL PRODUCED: In excess of 2,500,000**

**CURRENT DOMESTIC PRICE: \$350 - \$500 (if additional large  
quantities become available price will go down)**

**The M1911 and M1911A1 pistols were standard U.S. military  
issue side arms from 1911 through the 1970's. Large  
quantities of the weapon have been supplied to European,  
African, Latin American and Asian military forces.**

BR

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1998

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE VICE PRESIDENT  
ERSKINE BOWLES  
JOHN PODESTA  
BRUCE REED  
PAUL BEGALA

FROM RAHM EMANUEL *RL*

SUBJECT GUN VIOLENCE STUDY

Attached is a study that Peter Hart Research did for Handgun Control, Inc. that I thought you would find interesting.

**KEY FINDINGS FROM A STUDY ON GUN VIOLENCE**

**CONDUCTED FOR HANDGUN CONTROL, INC.**

MAY 1998

BY

PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC.

**Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc.**

*In April, 1998, Peter D. Hart Research Associates conducted four focus groups on gun violence and solutions to the problem of gun violence for Handgun Control, Inc. Two groups were held in Phoenix, Arizona—one among women gun owners and one among a cross section of both gun owners and non-gun owners. Two groups were held in Toledo, Ohio—one among men gun owners and one among a cross section of non-gun owners.*

## **OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS**

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The results from the focus groups unmistakably demonstrate that the issue of gun violence is a grave and increasingly important concern among all sectors of the American public. The tragedy in Jonesboro, Arkansas, as well as other recent incidents of gun violence occurring in schools and among children and adolescents, has both refocused the public's attention on this issue and redefined the parameters of the problem. Children, particularly young children, are now at the center of Americans' concerns about gun safety and gun violence. The dramatic impact of the Jonesboro incident has deeply affected all Americans; in many ways, the public's concern about this and similar incidents has generated a new dialogue on solutions to the problem of gun violence.

The findings from these focus groups present Handgun Control, Inc., and other gun control organizations with an important strategic opportunity to address the public's growing alarm over the issue of gun violence by forging new alliances and creating new ways to solve the problem. While the focus group discussions reveal distinct limitations on the public's willingness to impose new restrictions on both gun ownership and gun manufacturers, the public's strong desire to "do something" about the problem of gun violence demands that new remedies be pursued.

## **REDEFINING THE PROBLEM OF GUN VIOLENCE**

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
Incidents of gun violence among school-age children, epitomized by the tragedy in Jonesboro, have had a dramatic effect on the psyche of the American public. The problem of gun violence is unanimously seen as a growing and serious crisis in our country. The image that Americans connect to the problem of gun violence, however, has been transformed from one of hardened criminals, gangs, and political assassinations to one of children who have wrongly and tragically

gotten hold of firearms. When asked about five major events that have dominated the news recently, focus group participants overwhelmingly point to the Jonesboro shootings as the event that most concerns them.

*Africa*

### What Recent Event Concerns You the Most?

(Number of participants rating this as the event that concerns them most)



The need to protect children from gun violence resonates strongly with focus group participants for a variety of reasons. Americans have a growing sense that children are not receiving adequate adult supervision in many facets of their lives, including developing

“It’s that plus the general violence in our society that just totally, you know...I grew up in a society, when I was a teenager, if we had disagreements, we fought each other with fists and we had fights. Now you don’t fight that way. You grab a knife or gun and it’s permanent.”

—Thomas, gun owner in Toledo

problem-solving skills and learning basic safety measures. As one gun owner in Toledo asks, “How are these kids getting ahold of these guns? And, you know, what are the parents doing about it to keep the guns out of these kids’ hands?”

In addition, Americans share a common concern that the problem of children involved in gun violence is not an isolated one and, in fact, is a problem that could occur anywhere, among any segment of the population. A 41-year-old gun

“I work in a grade school, and I see what goes on in the grade school; this is scary that these little kids can even have access to weapons like this.”


—Debra, gun owner in Phoenix

owner and school playground monitor in Phoenix describes her fear: "It just scares me, being that I've got two little kids—you think it really can't happen here, where we live is pretty crime-free, but yet, you know, this happened in a small town too, and it's just really scary to think that it could happen anywhere."

The strong association between gun violence and children is also evident in focus group participants' attitudes toward the causes of gun violence in America. Overwhelmingly, participants point to causes that involve improper storage of guns and failure to protect children from gaining access to guns.

## Perceived Causes of Gun Violence

(Number of participants rating each as an important cause, 8 to 10 on a 10-point scale)



### ADDRESSING GUN VIOLENCE:

#### THE PERCEPTIONS OF GUN OWNERS AND NON-GUN OWNERS

Perhaps the single most forceful finding from the focus groups is a noticeable shift in the attitudes and beliefs of gun owners. Whether as a result of Jonesboro and other similar incidents

"I would honestly say it should be required that the person that purchases a gun should take a class, be required to take the firearm class."

-Francesca, gun owner in Phoenix

or a subconscious, collective feeling of guilt about their own gun ownership, gun owners are demonstrating a new approach in their attitudes toward gun safety and gun

regulations. The focus group findings clearly demonstrate gun owners' strong need to distinguish themselves as "part of the solution" to gun violence rather than "part of the problem." As a result, measures that appear to help gun owners identify themselves as responsible in their own approach to handling guns, such as requiring licenses and registration, passing mandatory basic skills tests, and requiring all handguns to be sold with child safety locks, receive strong support from both men and women gun owners. Steve, a 29-year-old construction worker and handgun owner in Toledo, explains, "I am a handgun owner, and I feel that people should have the right to own a handgun, but...it should be regulated. I don't think they should be given to just anyone."

While a new attitude is evident among gun owners, it is important to point out that gun owners are searching for new ways to

"(It's) very important to know how to handle the gun and not just, you know, be spastic about it."

—Jaynelle, gun owner in Phoenix

demonstrate their own competence and feelings of responsibility about their guns—they are *not* reexamining their decision to own guns, and instead remain not only comfortable with, but adamant about their right to gun ownership. Mary Ann, a 30-year-old homemaker and gun owner in Phoenix, explains that a gun is "a tool like a knife, like a lighter; it's a tool, and it depends on the person's hand that it's in, you know. Yes, it's got potential to kill...but I don't think it's inherently dangerous."

In contrast to this new tenor among gun owners, the focus groups reveal a juxtaposing trend occurring among non-gun

owners. While non-gun owners share gun owners' utmost concern about the increase in gun violence, especially among younger children, this segment of the American public also displays

"I think there's a lot of it caused by TV and movie violence. And these kids see that stuff, and they're acting it out. The kid that shot his teacher last night, he was into this, some hard rock band, and they play songs that just preach violence, and I think that the country's got to do something about the violence on TV and in the movies."

—Harvey, non-gun owner in Toledo

greater feelings of helplessness and despair when it comes to addressing the issue. Non-gun owners' lack of confidence in their ability to effect change creates a surprising dynamic: Gun owners are actually more emotionally and intellectually engaged in addressing the issues of gun safety and gun violence than are non-gun owners.

This feeling of impotence among non-gun members stems from their impressions of the problem's root causes. Non-gun owners see gun violence as a symptom of deeper social ills, such as the breakdown of traditional two-parent families, a general decline in moral values and respect for authority, and the glorification of violence in popular culture. The connection that non-gun owners make, linking gun violence to broader, seemingly intractable social problems, creates a barrier to their full and active engagement in the search for solutions to gun violence. Charles, a non-gun owner in Phoenix, explains, "I think it (the problem of gun violence) goes back to the families, no morals, no respect, that's what I think."

Non-gun owners are also more skeptical that tough new restrictions on gun ownership will keep guns out of the wrong hands. Like gun owners, non-gun owners believe that the key to reducing gun violence lies in individual responsibility; however, unlike gun owners, they do not think that they can have much of an effect on promoting responsibility and accountability

#### GUNS AND AUTOMOBILES

*In order to buy a car, the buyer of the car must be licensed, proving that he/she has passed some basic training requirements. In addition, the sale of the car must be registered and the car must meet safety standards. Some people say that if these things are required to own a car, the same things should be required to own a gun—that is, the owner should be licensed and should have to prove that he/she has passed some basic training requirements, the gun should have to be registered, and the gun should have to meet some safety standards.*

"I like the way they set it up (the analogy between cars and guns). You go to buy a car, [and] in order to drive it, you have to have a license. So why shouldn't you have the same for a gun? You're responsible for that, like when you're driving, you have to be able to drive, same thing with a gun. You have to be able to use a gun to purchase a gun."

—Kathy, non-gun owner in Phoenix

regarding firearms. Jason, a customer services representative and non-gun owner in Phoenix, makes this point: "I find loopholes in all of them (proposed new restrictions), there's ways to get around all of them. People can still get guns, criminals will still be able to get guns. New laws won't really change that much, you've got to get back to people taking responsibility."

#### TARGETING THE GUN INDUSTRY

While both gun owners and non-gun owners are looking for reasonable and effective solutions to the problem of gun violence, both groups of Americans demonstrate a limited appetite for taking on gun manufacturers in the battle over gun safety. Responsibility and accountability are critical concepts in developing acceptable initiatives to reduce gun violence, and while the public is willing

to demand these traits from gun manufacturers, it is not willing to relieve or excuse other sources of the problem, particularly gun owners who are careless with their guns.

To test the appeal of different arguments in favor of reforming the gun industry, focus group participants were given two different analogies to the gun safety issue. First, they were asked to read a statement comparing gun ownership to car ownership and calling for similar regulations, such as licensing, registration, and passage of a minimum basic skills test. Then, they were provided with a statement that noted similarities between the irresponsible actions and potential liability of both gun manufacturers and tobacco manufacturers.

\* Focus group participants overwhelmingly accept the concept that guns should be subject to regulations similar to those imposed on cars, but reject the notion that gun manufacturers should be liable for the harm caused by their products.

The analogy between cars and guns strikes participants as a reasonable balance between creating purposeful restrictions and imposing an unfair burden on gun owners.

The analogy between tobacco and guns, however, loses support on several fronts. First, Americans do not see gun manufacturers as irresponsible in marketing their product—in fact, when participants are asked to evaluate the level of responsibility

#### GUNS AND TOBACCO

*Just like the makers of cigarettes and tobacco products, the makers of handguns should be held accountable for the harm their products cause. Guns, like cigarettes, are dangerous products that can cause grave injury and death. Like the tobacco industry, the gun industry has engaged in conduct that increases the risk that their products will cause harm—for example, some companies increase the risk of criminal violence by selling assault weapons, such as Saturday Night Specials and other guns that are favored by criminals. Some gun companies also use advertising—like boasting that their guns are resistant to fingerprints—that appeals to criminals. The gun industry also increases the risk of harm to children through advertising that encourages people to bring guns into their homes and by failing to install safety devices in guns that could prevent kids from using guns.*

*When gun manufacturers engage in conduct that increases the risk of harm, they should be held accountable for that harm. And, they should be forced to pay damages to the people they harm.*

*NOTE: For the second group of participants, we eliminated all direct references to tobacco.*

*“I think it’s a completely flawed argument because we need to have personal responsibility instead of making everyone else responsible for our choices and our mistakes.”*

*—Mary Ann, gun owner in Phoenix*

*“I don’t feel that the manufacturer should be held responsible. If they make a quality product that operates properly just like any other product was made. If there’s something malfunctioning with it, its not working properly, they are liable. If they make a handgun or rifle or whatever that is up to standard and there isn’t a problem with it, I feel the person using it, they’re responsible. It’s not the person that made that product.”*

*—Stephen, gun owner in Toledo*


of several major American industries, gun manufacturers receive notably better grades than do both the tobacco and the liquor and alcohol industries. In addition, the public is unwilling to give credence to a trend they see in many aspects of American life, that is, excusing individuals for the consequences of their behavior. Americans desperately want to reinstitute a standard of individual accountability, and blaming gun manufacturers, except for particularly egregious behavior such as advertising fingerprint resistance, strikes focus group participants as encouraging a trend of reduced individual accountability. Kathy, a non-gun owner in Phoenix, explains, "The message sounds like they're putting the blame on the manufacturers, and it's really on the owner, it's their responsibility."

### SOLUTIONS TO GUN VIOLENCE

Among all focus group participants, there is modest, and in some cases strong, support for a variety of new measures to combat gun violence. In keeping with the changing perception of gun violence as a problem affecting children, support for various restrictions increases with both the likelihood that the measures will help protect children and the perceived effectiveness of the restriction.

## Anticipated Effectiveness of Proposals to Reduce Gun Violence

*(Number of participants rating each as an effective proposal, 8 to 10 on a 10-point scale)*



"Maybe they should promote the use of trigger guards, trigger locks on guns; maybe they should sell them with a trigger lock and hope that people would use them so kids can't get them."

—Manny, non-gun owner in Phoenix

Of the eight proposed restrictions presented to participants, about two-thirds of the participants in each of the four groups give "requiring that all new handguns be sold with child safety locks" a high effectiveness rating of

either eight, nine, or 10. In addition, developing "smart" guns, banning automatic and semi-automatic Saturday Night Specials, requiring a license to own a handgun, and requiring a test of basic safety requirements are also measures that receive a great deal of support.

"There's no reason for making a Saturday Night Special. I mean the only reason it's made is for street gangs. Nobody is going to use it for target practice, nobody is going to use it for a collection."

—Bart, gun owner in Toledo

## STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE "NEW LANGUAGE" OF GUN CONTROL

The findings from these focus groups present Handgun Control, Inc., with a strategic opportunity to build new alliances and develop new solutions to help curb gun violence. The issues of gun safety and gun violence have become increasingly important concerns in the wake of the Jonesboro tragedy and other incidents involving children and guns. Several important lessons emerge from the focus group discussions, which may help HCI's efforts to develop new programs and messages aimed at diminishing gun violence.

HCI's public dialogue must center around several important components:

- Children and safety
- Individual responsibility and accountability
- *Reasonable*, rational solutions to gun violence

- HCI's public dialogue must be careful *not* to be seen as:
- Covertly attempting to ban guns and label all gun owners as "bad" or irresponsible people
  - Supporting extreme measures that insult reason and common sense
  - Supporting measures not for their effectiveness but for the sake of adding more restrictions

"We need to not legislate common sense. We need to not legislate against stupidity. That's going too far."

-Felicity, gun owner in Phoenix

- Gun owners are not only open but enthusiastic about measures that demonstrate responsibility and accountability for their actions. HCI needs to encourage, promote, and capitalize on this sense of responsibility—from education campaigns about how to store guns properly at home to support for registration, licensing, and required basic training classes.
- HCI should convince non-gun owners that something can, in fact, be done to curb gun violence—especially the needless tragedies involving young children. HCI must address non-gun owners' skepticism and reengage this population of "natural" allies in the struggle to control gun violence by providing tangible information about the effects of new restrictions.



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20530

July 19, 1997

TO: Bruce Reed 456-2530  
 Rahm Emanuel  
 Jose Cerda

FROM: Nicholas M. Gess, Director  
 Office of Intergovernmental Affairs  
 U.S. Department of Justice, Room 1340 Main  
 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
 Washington, DC 20530-0001  
 (202) 514-3465 (office)  
 (202) 514-2504 (facsimile)  
 gessni@justice.USDOJ.gov (EMAIL)

SUBJECT: Gun Violence in LA

# PAGES: (including cover sheet)

REMARKS: Please see attached

Att: Michelle



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20530

July 19, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce Reed  
Assistant to the President  
and Director, Domestic Policy Council

Rahm Emanuel  
Assistant to the President

FROM: Nicholas M. Gass *NMG*  
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs  
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Firearms Violence in Los Angeles, CA

Attached is a copy of a just-released privately-funded study reflecting the dire state of affairs respecting firearms violence in Los Angeles County. Please especially note that 100 young people died in Los Angeles due to gunfire in 1996, while none died in Boston.

Enclosure  
cc: Jose Cerda

Power	Date	# of Lines
Fax Note	7-18	13
To	MATT LEVINE	
Fax	302-514-2504	
From	SUSAN SHAW	
Phone	310-204-2348	

# STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 1996

A Survey by Women Against Gun Violence,  
The Victims Remembrance Project  
©1997

P.O. Box 1501  
Culver City, CA 90232-1501  
(810) 204-2348



Women Against Gun Violence, a coalition of individual members and over 100 organizations statewide representing thousands of women and men, is dedicated to preventing gun violence and the proliferation of firearms. Through educational programs, coalition building, media advocacy, and technical assistance to policymakers, Women Against Gun Violence develops and articulates strategies for reducing gun violence while raising awareness of violence as a public health issue.

State of Gun Violence in Los Angeles County: 1996, a survey by Women Against Gun Violence, was supported by private donations and by a grant from The California Wellness Foundation. This survey is a product of The Victims Remembrance Project of Women Against Gun Violence. Researched and written by Susan Shaw and Kirsten Knutson. Data collection by Rita Hirsch, The Victims Remembrance Project chair, and Joyce Green. Additional assistance from Lauren Arnault, Linda Ashman, Pat Busk, Eleanor Levine, Carol Ann Taylor, Joy Turner, Missy Zeitsoff and Ann Reiss Lane. Thanks to Alan Abrahamse, PhD, Rand, Elizabeth McLoughlin, ScD, Pacific Center for Violence Prevention, Billie Weiss, Los Angeles County Department of Health Services/IVPP, and Susan Sorenson, PhD, UCLA School of Public Health, Violence Prevention Program, for their assistance and encouragement. Women Against Gun Violence is a project of Community Partners.

©1997 Women Against Gun Violence

Copies are available for \$5. Checks should be made payable to Community Partners for WAGV.

Mailing address: Women Against Gun Violence  
P.O. Box 1501  
Culver City, CA 90232-1501

The Victims Remembrance Project data for 1996 are available, by political district or postal code, for U.S. Congress, California State Senate, California State Assembly, Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and Los Angeles City Council. For more information, please call Women Against Gun Violence at (310) 204-2348.

## STATE OF GUN VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: 1996

Source: Women Against Gun Violence, The Victims Remembrance Project

- Deaths by gun of Los Angeles County residents remain at epidemic levels, according to results of The Victims Remembrance Project survey of gun violence in 1996 by Women Against Gun Violence.
- Every political district in Los Angeles County suffered fatalities from gun violence. No district was immune.
- An average of four Los Angeles County residents a day died in gun violence in 1996.
- Every day and a half, a youth age 18 and under was killed by a gun in Los Angeles County in 1996, on average.
- A total of 1,398 residents lost their lives to guns in Los Angeles County in 1996.
- Gun violence took the lives of 236 of Los Angeles County youth age 18 and under in 1996.
- The percentage of youth dying by gunfire increased in the last six months of 1996 to 18% of the total gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents, compared to 16 % in the first half of the year.
- One out of every five Los Angeles County residents who died in gun violence in 1996 was age 18 and under.
- Six children under the age of nine were victims of gun-involved homicides in Los Angeles County in 1996.
- One out of every twelve gun deaths of Los Angeles County youth in 1996 was a suicide.
- Almost one out of every four Los Angeles County residents who were shot accidentally in 1996 was age 18 and under.
- On the average, one Los Angeles County resident died every six hours in a gun-involved homicide, suicide or unintentional shooting in the year 1996.
- The ages of 1996 local gun violence victims ranged from two to 93.
- In 1996, residents of the City of Los Angeles accounted for nearly one-half of the total gun-involved homicides of residents of Los Angeles County, which includes 87 other cities and unincorporated areas.
- 100 of the City of Los Angeles youth age 18 and under died by gun violence in 1996.

The Victims Remembrance Project (VRP) of Women Against Gun Violence seeks to ensure that the gun violence crisis, in human, public health and economic terms, is abated and that those silenced by gun violence have a voice. The VRP, which is funded in part by a grant from The California Wellness Foundation, represents the most current and comprehensive Los Angeles County gun violence data available.

The Victims Remembrance Project involves the collection of data each month from Los Angeles County death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths (homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings) of Los Angeles County residents are recorded and coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

*The Victims Remembrance Project of Women Against Gun Violence*

# Guns Kill 236 Los Angeles County Youth In 1996 \*

## HOMICIDES

- 2, De Ajanas A'khanis Morgan
- 2, Leticia Renteria
- 3, Alberto Hernandez
- 3, Dylan Allen Stanfield
- 5, Oscar Vega
- 8, Evelyn D. Torres
- 11, Juan Carlos Coronel
- 11, Paul Alex Youhanian
- 11, Tonisha Mashun Williams
- 12, Antwan Dontle Cook
- 12, Derrick Anthony Webster, Jr.
- 12, Obedicia Lopez Rocha
- 12, Lydia Leticia Jaquez
- 12, Masael D. Torres
- 14, Adrian Romeo Solis
- 14, Aurelio Vega Navarro
- 14, Donny Estrada
- 14, Jorge Armando Quijerez
- 14, Jose Alberto Gonzalez
- 14, Joseph J. San Nicolas
- 14, Margarita Ramirez
- 14, Marlo Cruz Correa
- 14, Marquez Anthony Tucker
- 15, Adrian Andrade
- 15, Alex Medina
- 15, Andy William Rivas
- 15, Carlos Alfredo Reyes
- 15, Carlos Roy Rodriguez
- 15, Charles Gene Durio
- 15, Darrell Lamont Clay, Jr.
- 15, Eduardo Gomez
- 15, Edwin Omar Ponce
- 15, Elijah Van Styles
- 15, Ennis Megal Deley III
- 15, Jacqueline Nico Utzig
- 15, James Hamael Lane, Jr.
- 15, Jason Owen Turgeon
- 15, Jesus Enrique Suarez
- 15, Jonathan Aguirre
- 15, Jorge Alejandro Martinez
- 15, Keith Ericson Shava-Medina
- 15, Lefanoga Cruz Asoeu, Jr.
- 15, Marlon Edmar Quintanilla
- 15, Miguel Angel Rios
- 15, Myron Jerome Brown, Jr.
- 15, Richard Joseph Renteria, Jr.
- 15, Ricky Rudy Kurham
- 15, Sunny Aranda
- 15, Steve Alexander Medina
- 15, Tracy Ann Landers
- 16, Anthony Nicholson, Jr.
- 16, Amaro S. Delgado
- 16, Carlos Arreola
- 16, Christopher Jason Lopez
- 16, Daniel Matthew Gonzalez
- 16, David Martinez
- 16, David Ruben Ramirez
- 16, Eliasta Ferrell
- 16, Elmer Wilfredo Alvarado
- 16, Eric Osorovany Vega
- 16, Eric Kelly Costley
- 16, Estaban Gadiuca
- 16, Octavio Dravo
- 16, George Armando Torres
- 16, Herbert Leonardo Diaz
- 16, Jaime A. Miranda
- 16, Jesus Franco Garcia
- 16, Jesus Armando Caballero
- 16, Joaquin Galindo, Jr.
- 16, John Michael Stanley
- 16, Jose Esoban Muj
- 16, Jose Guadalupe Rosales
- 16, Jose Martinez
- 16, Larry Rankins II
- 16, Leala Saul Samsuango
- 16, Luis Humberto Gonzalez
- 16, Mario Perez
- 16, Mario Rodriguez, Jr.
- 16, Martino Joaquin Percy
- 16, Melinda Carmody
- 16, Patrick Bourn
- 16, Randy Morais
- 16, Ronald Jerome Curtis, Jr.
- 16, Roheed Daron Hamilton
- 16, Sean Thomas Rodriguez
- 16, Sharnika Tucker
- 16, Shydi Rashad Mitchell
- 16, Uriel Cabrera Perez
- 16, Veronica Nava Daniel
- 17, Aaron Patrick Johnson
- 17, Adolfo Vargas, Jr.
- 17, Alan Steve Corralis
- 17, Alelni Ortiz
- 17, Alex Osorvni
- 17, Angel Anthony Ortega
- 17, Angel Maxique Johnson
- 17, Angel Ricardo Garcia
- 17, Armando Alcazar
- 17, Billy Michael Gallegos
- 17, Brenda Ziomara Hughes
- 17, C. Evaron Rice III
- 17, Clinton L. Collier III
- 17, Corey Valjean Childs
- 17, Courtney J. Triplett
- 17, Danny Cabrera Hernandez
- 17, David Tony Ortiz
- 17, Dawone Liberty Thomas
- 17, Derrick Lamour Boone
- 17, Eduardo Mejia
- 17, Edwin Villa
- 17, Elias Alfredo Vargas
- 17, Krulliano Parra
- 17, Ernio Joey Avila
- 17, Francisco Ramirez
- 17, Francisco Velazquez
- 17, Gilbert Francisco Melendez
- 17, Gregorio Palacios
- 17, Hanika Gwendyan
- 17, Hugo Enrique Aguirre
- 17, Indeson Porat Reyes
- 17, James Mark Melgondono
- 17, Jason Ashley Hynds
- 17, Jesus Julian Hernandez
- 17, Jimmy Rodriguez
- 17, John Mendosa
- 17, Jose Garcia
- 17, Jose Hernandez
- 17, Jose Manuel Rivera
- 17, Juan Bernabe
- 17, Juan Mendoza Garcia
- 17, Juan Quintanilla
- 17, Julio C. Garzon
- 17, Justin Morlin Hart
- 17, Ke'drick Lee Green-Oatts
- 17, Leah Inrob Green
- 17, Leonard R. Gonzalez
- 17, Marcos Ian De La Cruz-Cody
- 17, Martin Gilbert Asoev
- 17, Martin O. Elias
- 17, Mike Carrillo
- 17, Pablo Reyes, Jr.
- 17, Peter Robert Carrillo II
- 17, Rafael Scott Cortez
- 17, Rashad Cornelius Ernst
- 17, Raul Felix, Jr.
- 17, Ricardo Ramos
- 17, Rolando Ibarra
- 17, Ronald Fernando Alfaro
- 17, Scott T. Smith
- 17, Victor Hernandez
- 18, Andre L. Salas
- 18, Anthony Gage III
- 18, Agnoine Mido Mims
- 18, Caylo Israel Mata
- 18, Carlos Orlando Salgado
- 18, Carlos Vargas, Jr.
- 18, Christian O. Rivera
- 18, Christopher Robinson-Lewis
- 18, Curtis Lee Walton, Jr.
- 18, Damian Thomas Bell
- 18, Darnell Jeffery
- 18, David Clayton
- 18, David G. Roy
- 18, Dawnyle Washington
- 18, Earl Michael Thomas, Jr.
- 18, Eddie Reyes Alvarez
- 18, Edgar Acortano
- 18, Edgar Cesar Martinez
- 18, Eric Villalobos
- 18, Francisco Javier Facio
- 18, Francisco Parocua
- 18, Freddy Rodriguez
- 18, Gabriel Estrella
- 18, Gary Maurice Pries, Jr.
- 18, Gorman Enrique Martinez
- 18, Greg Thomas, Jr.
- 18, Hector Manuel Sanchez
- 18, Henry E. Alonzo
- 18, Jaime Montalvo
- 18, Jason David Martinez
- 18, Jerck Johnson Armstrong
- 18, Jermine Dashawn McGhee
- 18, Jeronimo Garcia
- 18, Jorge A. Leou
- 18, Jorge Alejandro Capuchiano
- 18, Jose Antonio Arias
- 18, Jose Carlos Ruvalcaba
- 18, Jose Ismael Cisneros
- 18, Jose Luis Jimenez
- 18, Jose Lupe Cervantes
- 18, Juan Althous Priolo
- 18, Juan Carlos Galvez
- 18, Juan Carlos Ortiz
- 18, Julio Roberto Carrera
- 18, Karren Omar Jones
- 18, Lawrence Vega, Jr.
- 18, Les Ambra Shaurlette Smith
- 18, Luis Adrian Preciado
- 18, Manuel Ortiz, Jr.
- 18, Marcus James Blanton
- 18, Mariano Moreno
- 18, Miguel Enriquez Lopez
- 18, Miguel-Angel Castaneda
- 18, Nghia Quoc Ha
- 18, Oscar Esteban Padilla
- 18, Raiahela Antoinette Watkins
- 18, Rasool Hussein Gilmore
- 18, Samuel Manuel-Elvis Riley
- 18, Sergio Armando Gonzalez
- 18, Tostu Tella, Jr.
- 18, Tony A. Corley
- 18, Vilivito Feilo
- 18, Vincent Antonio Miller-Tylica
- 18, Wakema Anita Allison
- 18, Armando Ignacio Hernandez, Jr.

## SUICIDES

- 11, Jeremy Shane Tisinger
- 12, Carl Fern Jones
- 13, Jorge Luis Cruz
- 14, Chase Robert Garman
- 16, Vincent Dean Fejerman
- 16, Ruben Shah Kossaini
- 17, Richard Alan Caudell
- 17, David Andrew Flores
- 17, Jesse H. Saucedo, Jr.
- 17, Richard Balthasar, Jr.
- 18, Michael Thomas Plouffe
- 18, Manuel Arguimbau
- 18, Derrick Michael Buehoff
- 18, Yacenia Garcia
- 18, Anthony Adrian Vasquez
- 18, Jeremy David Evans

## ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS

- 11, Marcos Alfredo Uribe
- 14, Aaron Lamond Hopson
- 15, Jonathan Flores
- 17, Brandon C. Edmund

\* Listed by age, type of gun death



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Chair

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Gunshot Victims

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

A PROJECT OF  
COMMUNITY PARTNERS

The Honorable  
California State Assembly  
P.O. Box 942849  
Sacramento, CA 94249

Dear Assemblymember

Women Against Gun Violence is notifying you of the tragedies of gun violence known to our organization that have occurred in your district since June 1996.

We thought you should know the names and ages of the youth who lost their lives:

Arturo S. Delgado, 16  
Clinton L. Collier III, 17  
Aaron Patrick Johnson, 17  
Laish Inreb Green, 17  
Greg Thomas, Jr., 18  
Edgar Cesar Martinez, 18  
Raishale Antoinette Watkins, 18  
Damian Thomas Bell, 18

During the last six months of 1996, there were 39 gun deaths in your district: 33 homicides, 5 suicides and 1 accidental shooting. Please remember them and the over 37,000 other human beings in the United States who die each year from gunfire--nearly 5,500 victims in California alone where guns are the leading killer of children.

Women Against Gun Violence is a coalition of women and organizations who have banded together to stand firm on the basic principle that women, children, and families have the right to be free from firearm violence in our homes, schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces. The means are stopping the proliferation of handguns and enacting prevention measures; the result is a safe future for our families.

Strategies for the prevention of gun violence include job creation, educational opportunities, conflict resolution training, recreational activities enhancement, community policing, safety programs, and the reduction of television violence. Limits must also be established for the manufacture, sale, accessibility, availability, and use of handguns, including Saturday night specials. In addition, illegal gun trafficking must be stopped.

Action must be taken by legislative bodies to end this epidemic of gun violence. With 25,000 members among our more than 100 partner organizations, Women Against Gun Violence will be watching your votes. We are counting on you to help us create a better society, for our children's sakes. We cannot spare one more life.

Sincerely,

Women Against Gun Violence

## State of Gun Violence in Los Angeles County: 1996

Source: The Victims Remembrance Project of Women Against Gun Violence

The following lists the 1996 total Los Angeles County resident gun deaths which occurred in each political district by elected official at the local, state, and federal levels. The elected officials are ranked in order of total number of gun deaths. The victims died in either gun-involved homicides, suicides, or unintentional (accidental) shootings.

### Ranking by total Los Angeles City resident gun deaths by City Council Member:

	<u>HOMICIDES</u>	<u>SUICIDES</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Mark Ridley-Thomas	76	3	1	80
2. Rita Walters	64	7	0	71
3. Nate Holden	63	6	1	70
4. Mike Hernandez	55	13	0	68
5. Rudy Svorinich	56	10	0	66
6. Ruth Galanter	30	12	2	44
7. Richard Alatorre	26	12	0	38
8. Jackie Goldberg	28	7	0	35
9. John Ferraro	18	14	0	32
10. Richard Anthony Alarcon	24	7	0	31
11. Laura Newman Chick	12	17 **	0	29
12. Joel Wachs	16	10	0	26
13. Mike Feuer	9	13 **	0	22
14. Hal Bernson	12	6	0	18
15. Marvin Braude	4	12 **	0	16

### Ranking of total resident gun deaths by L.A. County Supervisor:

	<u>HOMICIDES</u>	<u>SUICIDES</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke	481	70	7	558
2. Gloria Molina	229	60	1	290
3. Don Knabe	138	68	1	207
4. Zev Yaroslavsky	92	86	0	178
5. Michael D. Antonovich	77	86 **	2	165

\*\*Please note that an equal or greater proportion of the gun deaths in these districts are suicides rather than homicides. In the U.S., the proportion of suicides committed by gunfire is increasing.<sup>1</sup> Suicide (by all methods) is the third leading cause of death in adolescents aged 15-19 years old<sup>2</sup>, and the agegroup 65 years and over has the highest rates of suicide.<sup>3</sup> And guns are the favored means of committing suicide in the United States.<sup>4</sup> In fact, an estimated 34% of gun-involved suicides may be attributed to a gun being present in the home, and suicides attempted by gun have a much higher likelihood of being fatal than suicides attempted by other means.<sup>5</sup> Thus, even if a community does not currently experience a large number of gun-related homicides, the underlying problem of gun-involved suicide remains; the epidemic of gun violence has no boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the US: 1996* (116th edition) Washington, DC, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Fatal and Nonfatal Suicide Attempts Among Adolescents - Oregon, 1988-1993*; 44:312-315.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>4</sup> Becke JJ, Marcy JA, Ryan QW, Parrish RO. Guns in the Home, Homicide, and Suicide. *Journal of American Medical Association*. 1994; 272:R47-R48.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

### Ranking by total resident gun deaths by State Assembly Member:

	<u>HOMICIDES</u>	<u>SUICIDES</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Carl Washington, Jr. - D	137	12	2	151
2. Roderick Wright - D	117	11	1	129
3. Richard E. Floyd - D	92	19	0	111
4. Edward Vincent - D	84	13	1	98
5. Kevin Murray - D	73	17	3	93
6. Louis Caldera - D	74	18	0	92
7. Antonio Villaraigosa - D	46	18	0	64
8. Martha M. Escutia - D	54	7	1	62
9. Tony Cardenas - D	38	9	0	47
9. Martin Gallegos - D	35	12	0	47
11. George Runner, Jr. - R	17	28 **	1	46
11. Bob Hertzberg - D	23	23 **	0	46
11. Sally Havice - D	32	14	0	46
14. Diane Martinez - D	32	12	0	44
14. Steven Kuykendall - R	26	17	1	44
14. Grace M. Napolitano - D	34	10	0	44
17. Gary G. Miller - R	17	16	0	33
18. Bob Margett - R	15	16 **	1	32
19. Wally Knox - D	9	22 **	0	31
19. Jack Scott - D	19	12	0	31
21. Scott Wildman - D	12	18 **	0	30
22. Debra Bowen - D	10	18 **	0	28
23. Sheila J. Kuehl - D	6	21 **	0	27
24. *Tom McClintock - R	8	6	0	14
25. *Fred Aguiar - R	7	1	0	8

D - Democrat

R - Republican

\* These districts' constituencies are comprised of portions of other counties in addition to a portion of Los Angeles County. Because the reported gun death totals include only Los Angeles County resident deaths, the actual gun death totals in these districts may be higher. Tom McClintock's district is comprised of Ventura County and Los Angeles County. Fred Aguiar's district is comprised of San Bernardino County and Los Angeles County.

\*\*Please note that an equal or greater proportion of the gun deaths in these districts are suicides rather than homicides. In the U.S., the proportion of suicides committed by gunfire is increasing.<sup>1</sup> Suicide (by all methods) is the third leading cause of death in adolescents aged 15-19 years old<sup>2</sup>, and the agegroup 65 years and over has the highest rates of suicide.<sup>3</sup> And guns are the favored means of committing suicide in the United States.<sup>4</sup> In fact, we estimated 34% of gun-involved suicides may be attributed to a gun being present in the home, and suicides attempted by gun have a much higher likelihood of being fatal than suicides attempted by other means.<sup>5</sup> Thus, even if a community does not currently experience a large number of gun-related homicides, the underlying problem of gun-involved suicide remains; the epidemic of gun violence has no boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the US: 1996* (116th edition) Washington, DC, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Fatal and Nonfatal Suicide Attempts Among Adolescents Oregon, 1988-1993*; 44:312-315.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>4</sup> Backs JJ, Macey JA, Ryan OW, Parrish RO. Guns in the Home, Homicide, and Suicide. *Journal of American Medical Association*. 1994; 272:847-848.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

**Ranking by total resident gun deaths by State Senator:**

	<u>HOMICIDES</u>	<u>SUICIDES</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Teresa Hughes - D	221	25	3	249
2. Diane E. Watson - D	188	28	4	220
3. Richard Polanco - D	119	36	0	155
4. Ralph C. Dills - D	102	37	0	139
5. Charles Calderon - D	88	17	1	106
6. Herschel Rosenthal - D	62	32	0	94
7. Hilda Solis - D	69	24	0	93
8. Betty Karnell - D	58	31	1	90
9. Richard Mountjoy - R	33	32	1	66
10. Adam Schiff - D	31	29	0	60
11. Tom Hayden - D	15	44 **	0	59
12. *Pete Knight - R	17	28 **	1	46
13. *Cathie Wright - R	7	6	0	13
14. *Ruben S. Ayala - D	7	1	0	8

D - Democrat

R - Republican

\* These districts' constituencies are comprised of portions of other counties in addition to a portion of Los Angeles County. Because the reported gun death totals include only Los Angeles County resident deaths, the actual gun death totals in these districts may be higher. Pete Knight's district is comprised of Inyo County, Kern County, San Bernardino County, and Los Angeles County. Cathie Wright's district is comprised of Ventura County and Los Angeles County. Ruben S. Ayala's district is comprised of San Bernardino County and Los Angeles County.

\*\*Please note that an equal or greater proportion of the gun deaths in these districts are suicides rather than homicides. In the U.S., the proportion of suicides committed by gunfire is increasing.<sup>1</sup> Suicide (by all methods) is the third leading cause of death in adolescents aged 15-19 years old<sup>2</sup>, and the agegroup 65 years and over has the highest rates of suicide.<sup>3</sup> And guns are the favored means of committing suicide in the United States.<sup>4</sup> In fact, an estimated 34% of gun-involved suicides may be attributed to a gun being present in the home, and suicides attempted by gun have a much higher likelihood of being fatal than suicides attempted by other means.<sup>5</sup> Thus, even if a community does not currently experience a large number of gun-related homicides, the underlying problem of gun-involved suicide remains; the epidemic of gun violence has no boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the US: 1996* (116th edition.) Washington, DC, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Fetal and Neonatal Suicide Attempts Among Adolescents - Oregon, 1988-1993*; 44:312-315.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>4</sup> Secker JJ, Murrey JA, Ryan CW, Parrish RO. Guns in the Home, Homicide, and Suicide. *Journal of American Medical Association*. 1994; 272:847-848.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

### Ranking by total resident gun deaths by U.S. Representative:

	<u>HOMICIDES</u>	<u>SUICIDES</u>	<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Juanita McDonald - D	197	23	2	222
2. Maxine Waters - D	161	19	1	181
3. Julian C. Dixon - D	122	24	4	150
4. Lucille Roybal-Allard - D	99	16	1	116
5. Xavier Becerra - D	78	28	0	106
6. Steve Horn - R	61	20	0	81
7. Esteban E. Torres - D	56	19	0	75
8. Howard L. Berman - D	52	20	0	72
9. Matthew G. Martinez - D	49	16	0	65
10. Howard P. "Doc" McCoon - R	23	33 **	1	57
11. Jane Harman - D	23	28 **	1	52
12. Henry A. Waxman - D	17	33 **	0	50
13. David Dreier - R	21	26 **	1	48
14. *Brad Sherman - D	17	30 **	0	47
15. James Rogan - R	21	20	0	41
16. *Jay C. Kim - R	14	6	0	20
17. *Ed Royce - R	6	9 **	0	15

D - Democrat

R - Republican

\* These districts' constituencies are comprised of portions of other counties in addition to a portion of Los Angeles County. Because the reported gun death totals include only Los Angeles County resident deaths, the actual gun death totals in these districts may be higher. Brad Sherman's district is comprised of Ventura County and Los Angeles County. Jay C. Kim's district is comprised of Orange County, San Bernardino County, and Los Angeles County. Ed Royce's district is comprised of Orange County and Los Angeles County.

\*\*Please note that an equal or greater proportion of the gun deaths in these districts are suicides rather than homicides. In the U.S., the proportion of suicides committed by gunfire is increasing.<sup>1</sup> Suicide (by all methods) is the third leading cause of death in adolescents aged 15-19 years old<sup>2</sup>, and the age group 65 years and over has the highest rates of suicide.<sup>3</sup> And guns are the favored means of committing suicide in the United States.<sup>4</sup> In fact, an estimated 34% of gun-involved suicides may be attributed to a gun being present in the home, and suicides attempted by gun have a much higher likelihood of being fatal than suicides attempted by other means.<sup>5</sup> Thus, even if a community does not currently experience a large number of gun-related homicides, the underlying problem of gun-involved suicide remains; the epidemic of gun violence has no boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the US: 1996* (116th edition), Washington, DC, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report: Fetal and Nonfatal Suicide Attempts Among Adolescents- Oregon, 1988-1993*; 44:312-313.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census.

<sup>4</sup> Sachs J, Mercy JA, Ryan GW, Parrish RC. Guns in the Home, Homicide, and Suicide. *Journal of American Medical Association*. 1994; 272:847-848.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*.

# CITY OF LOS ANGELES GUN DEATHS OF RESIDENTS IN 1996

## By City Council District\*

07/21/97 MON 08:41 FAX 202 514 7884

DOJ OPLIA

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012

District #	City Council	JANUARY-JUNE			JULY-DECEMBER			1996 TOTAL					
		H	S	A TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	
1	Hernandez	25	8	0	37	25	5	0	31	55	13	0	68
2	Wachs	4	4	0	8	12	6	0	18	16	10	0	26
3	Chick	6	8	0	14	6	9	0	15	12	17	0	29
4	Ferraro	7	7	0	14	11	7	0	18	18	14	0	32
5	Fleur	5	8	0	13	4	5	0	9	9	13	0	22
6	Galante	13	9	1	23	17	3	1	21	30	12	2	44
7	Alarcon	15	2	0	17	9	5	0	14	24	7	0	31
8	Ridley-Thomas	43	7	1	51	33	2	0	35	76	9	1	86
9	Waters	28	3	0	31	36	4	0	40	64	7	0	71
10	Holden	41	4	1	46	22	2	0	24	63	6	1	70
11	Brecht	3	5	0	8	1	3	0	4	4	12	0	16
12	Bernson	6	4	0	10	5	2	0	7	12	6	0	18
13	Goldberg	9	5	0	14	9	2	0	11	28	7	0	35
14	Alatorre	15	10	0	25	11	2	0	13	26	12	0	38
15	Svornich	32	5	0	37	24	5	0	29	56	10	0	66
<b>Total, By Type</b>		<b>266</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>493</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>640</b>
<b>Youth, By Type</b>		<b>44</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100</b>
(age 18 and under)													
H Homicide S Suicide A Accident		Los Angeles County Residents Gun Deaths											
* Based on residence of victim, not location of shooting		1996 Homicides 1017											
Non-residents not included		1996 Suicides 370											
		1996 Accidental Shootings 11											
Source: Women Against Gun Violence, The Victims Remembrance Project		1996 Total 1398											

Methodology: Data was collected from death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents were coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

# LOS ANGELES COUNTY GUN DEATHS OF RESIDENTS IN 1996

## By Supervisor District\*

District #	LA COUNTY	JANUARY-JUNE				JULY-DECEMBER				1996 TOTAL			
		H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL
1	Molina	119	35	1	155	110	25	0	135	229	60	1	290
2	Brathwaite Burke	258	37	5	300	221	33	2	256	481	70	7	558
3	Yaroslavsky	47	45	0	92	45	41	0	86	92	86	0	178
4	Knabe	69	32	1	102	69	36	0	105	138	68	1	207
5	Antonovich	41	45	2	90	34	41	0	75	77	86	2	165
<b>Total, By Type</b>		<b>626</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>729</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>669</b>	<b>1097</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1398</b>
<b>Youth, By Type</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>236</b>
<i>(age 18 and under)</i>													
		H Homicide	S Suicide	A Accidental		<i>Los Angeles County Resident Gun Deaths</i>							
		* Based on residence of victim, not location of shooting.				1996 Homicides				1017			
		Non-residents not included.				1996 Suicides				370			
						1996 Accidental Shootings				11			
						1996 Total				1398			
		Source: Women Against Gun Violence, The Victims Remembrance Project											

Methodology: Data was collected from death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents were coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

**LOS ANGELES COUNTY GUN DEATHS OF RESIDENTS IN 1996**  
**By State Assembly District\***

District #	CA Assembly	JANUARY-JUNE				JULY-DECEMBER				1996 TOTAL			
		H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL
36	Runner, Jr.	7	13	1	21	10	15	0	25	17	28	1	46
38	McClintock	4	4	0	8	4	2	0	6	8	6	0	14
39	Cardenas	19	2	0	21	19	7	0	26	38	9	0	47
40	Hertzberg	11	14	0	25	12	9	0	21	23	23	0	46
41	Kushi	4	10	0	14	2	11	0	13	6	21	0	27
42	Knox	7	12	0	19	2	10	0	12	9	22	0	31
43	Wilkinan	5	7	0	12	7	11	0	18	12	18	0	30
44	Scott	13	7	0	20	6	5	0	11	19	12	0	31
45	Villaralosa	29	14	0	43	17	4	0	21	46	18	0	64
46	Calders	44	11	0	55	30	7	0	37	74	18	0	92
47	Murray	40	12	2	54	33	5	1	39	73	17	3	93
48	Wright	57	5	1	63	60	6	0	66	117	11	1	129
49	Martinez	21	5	0	26	11	7	0	18	32	12	0	44
50	Escutia	22	4	1	27	32	3	0	35	54	7	1	62
51	Vincent	51	5	1	57	33	8	0	41	84	13	1	98
52	Washington	73	6	1	80	64	6	1	71	137	12	2	151
53	Bowen	4	11	0	15	6	7	0	13	10	18	0	28
54	Kuykendall	9	10	1	20	17	7	0	24	26	17	1	44
55	Floyd	48	7	0	55	44	12	0	56	92	19	0	111
56	Harvie	18	5	0	23	14	9	0	23	32	14	0	46
57	Gadagos	11	3	0	14	24	9	0	33	35	12	0	47
58	Napolitano	16	4	0	20	18	6	0	24	34	10	0	44
59	Margett	6	11	1	18	9	5	0	14	15	16	1	32
60	Miller	11	11	0	22	8	5	0	13	17	16	0	33
61	Aguiar	6	1	0	7	1	0	0	1	7	1	0	8
<b>Total, By Type</b>		<b>636</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>1117</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1498</b>
<b>Youth, By Type</b> (age 18 and under)		<b>104</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>236</b>
H Homicide S Suicide A Accident		Los Angeles County Resident Gun Deaths											
* Based on residence of victim, not location of shooting.		1996 Homicides 1017											
Non-residents not included.		1996 Suicides 370											
		1996 Accidental Shootings 11											
Source: Women Against Gun Violence, The Victims Remembrance Project		1996 Total 1498											

Methodology: Data was collected from death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents were coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

**LOS ANGELES COUNTY GUN DEATHS OF RESIDENTS IN 1996  
By State Senate District\***

District #	CA SENATE	JANUARY - JUNE				JULY - DECEMBER				1996 TOTAL			
		H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL
17	Knight	7	13	1	21	10	15	0	25	17	28	1	46
19	Wright	3	4	0	7	4	2	0	6	7	6	0	13
20	Rosenthal	31	16	0	47	31	16	0	47	62	32	0	94
21	Schiff	18	13	0	31	13	16	0	29	31	29	0	60
22	Pofanco	72	25	0	97	47	11	0	58	119	36	0	155
23	Hayden	11	23	0	34	4	21	0	25	15	44	0	59
24	Solis	33	8	0	41	36	16	0	52	69	24	0	93
25	Hughes	124	11	2	137	97	14	1	112	221	25	3	249
26	Watson	96	17	3	116	92	11	1	104	188	28	4	220
27	Karnette	27	15	1	43	31	16	0	47	58	31	1	90
28	Dills	52	18	0	70	50	19	0	69	102	37	0	139
29	Mountjoy	18	22	1	41	15	10	0	25	33	32	1	66
30	Calderon	38	8	1	47	50	9	0	59	88	17	1	106
32	Ayala	6	1	0	7	1	0	0	1	7	1	0	8
<b>Total, By Type</b>		<b>536</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>1017</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1398</b>
<b>Youth, By Type (age 18 and under)</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>236</b>
H Homicide S Suicide A Accident		Los Angeles County Resident Gun Deaths											
* Based on residence of victim, not location of shooting.		1996 Homicides										1017	
Non-residents are not included.		1996 Suicides										370	
		1996 Accidents										11	
Source: Women Against Gun Violence, The Victims Remembrance Project		1996 Total										1398	

Methodology: Data was collected from death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents were coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

**LOS ANGELES COUNTY GUN DEATHS OF RESIDENTS IN 1996**  
**By U.S. Congressional District\***

District #	U.S. CONGRESS	JANUARY-JUNE				JULY-DECEMBER				1996 TOTAL			
		H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL	H	S	A	TOTAL
24	Sherman	12	15	0	27	5	15	0	20	17	30	0	47
25	McKeon	9	16	1	26	14	17	0	31	23	33	1	57
26	Berman	26	8	0	34	26	12	0	38	52	20	0	72
27	Rogan	11	9	0	20	10	11	0	21	21	20	0	41
28	Dreier	11	18	1	30	10	8	0	18	21	26	1	48
29	Waxman	11	19	0	30	6	14	0	20	17	33	0	50
30	Beenra	50	19	0	69	28	9	0	37	78	28	0	106
31	Marinot	29	6	0	29	26	10	0	36	49	16	0	65
32	Dixon	65	15	3	84	57	8	1	66	122	24	4	150
33	Royal-Allard	47	10	1	58	52	6	0	58	99	16	1	116
34	Tomes	29	8	0	35	27	13	0	40	58	19	0	75
35	Waters	65	7	1	93	76	12	0	88	151	19	1	181
36	Hamann	12	14	1	27	11	14	0	25	23	28	1	52
37	McDonagh	103	12	1	116	94	11	1	106	197	23	2	222
38	Horn	30	10	0	40	31	10	0	41	61	20	0	81
39	Royce	3	3	0	6	3	6	0	9	6	9	0	15
41	Kim	9	6	0	15	5	0	0	5	14	8	0	20
<b>Total, By Type</b>		<b>536</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>739</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>1017</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1396</b>
<b>Youth, By Type</b>		<b>105</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>236</b>
<b>(age 18 and under)</b>													
H Homicide S Suicide A Accident											<b>Los Angeles County Resident Gun Deaths</b>		
* Based on residence of victim, not location of shooting.											1996 Homicides		1017
Non-residents not included.											1996 Suicides		378
											1996 Accidental Shootings		11
<b>Source: Women Against Gun Violence. The Victims Remembrance Project</b>											1996 Total		1396

Methodology: Data was collected from death certificates at the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Vital Records Division and at the Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder/County Clerk, Public Records Division. The gun deaths of Los Angeles County residents were coded to the districts of government officials at the local, state, and federal levels.

07/21/97 MON 08:43 FAX 202 514 7864 DOJ OPLIA 310 204 6643 P.14

**WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

Fri 7/18  
12 noon

DATE: 7-18-97

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Radio Address: Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McCURRY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BOWLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McGINTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McLARTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NASH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PODESTA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RUFF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MATHEWS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SMITH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
RAINES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	REED 	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SOSNIK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ECHAVESTE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LEWIS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EMANUEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	YELLEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GIBBONS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STREETT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
IBARRA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPERTING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
RADD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TARULLO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MARSHALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VERVEER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HILLEY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALDMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KLAIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>Kagan</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BERGER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LINDSEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Comments to Lowell Weiss 62777

RESPONSE:

7/17/97 9:45 pm

**PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON  
YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE RADIO ADDRESS  
JULY 18, 1997**

Good morning. Today I want to talk about the important progress we are making in our efforts to get guns out of the hands of violent teenagers.

My Administration has put in place a community-based strategy to confront crime -- relying on more police, tougher punishment, and better prevention. This strategy is working. For the past five years in a row, we have seen serious crime drop nationwide. Last year we saw the largest one-year decline in violent crime and murder in 35 years.

Even the juvenile crime rate showed some decline in 1995. But we know that juvenile violence is still a huge problem. We know children are killing children -- for shoes, for jackets, for turf. We know that too many children are drawn to guns and violence as a way of life.

The facts are plain. The flood of guns onto our streets has reached staggering proportions. The number of teenagers committing crimes without guns is the same today as it was in the 1970s. But the number of crimes teenagers commit with guns has soared by 300%. That is simply unacceptable. We must cut off the flow of guns to teens.

In too many cities, when a gang member is caught committing a crime with a smoking gun in his hand, the gun is simply put in the police locker and the trail grows cold. So we launched a national initiative to trace every gun seized from criminals in 17 cities to find out where these guns are coming from and how they find their way onto our streets.

A year later, the first results are in. We now have a treasure trove of vital gun information for investigators nationwide. We know where children are getting guns. We know how children are getting guns. We know what kinds of guns they're getting.

It is now clear that many guns are finding their way quickly from licensed retail stores to black markets that serve gang members and other violent teens. In less than a year, in 17 cities alone, law enforcement officials seized nearly 10,000 guns that started on legal shelves and ended up in the possession of violent teens.

Some people argue that the only way kids are getting guns is by stealing them from adults. But the reality is even more disturbing: Many violent teenagers are buying guns in bulk from shadowy suppliers -- a criminal network that channels semiautomatic weapons to the streets.

Make no mistake: Gun traffickers are behind the surge in deadly youth violence. We

have learned how they operate. Now we are shutting them down.

In Milwaukee, for example, we've done just that. Thanks to the tracing reports we now have, law enforcement officials noticed an obvious pattern: Several guns used in gang-related murders, armed robberies, and drive-by shootings had originally been purchased by one particular security guard. Police investigators quickly discovered that the guard was selling brand new semi-automatic weapons from the trunk of his car. Police swept in and arrested the guard in April. He pled guilty to serious trafficking charges and will be sentenced next month.

Our gun-tracing initiative has been such a success that we are now going to expand our efforts to 10 more cities, including Philadelphia and Los Angeles. We will also work with Congress to hire more ATF agents to work with local police officers and prosecutors to nail traffickers based on the new leads we are generating every day.

We have a chance to build on our progress by passing a smart, balanced juvenile justice bill that does more than just talk tough. We need to provide for more prosecutors, tougher penalties, and better prevention programs for at-risk juveniles. We should require that every new gun has a child-safety lock. And we should prohibit violent teenagers from buying guns once they become adults.

Next week, the Senate will have an opportunity to begin voting on a juvenile justice bill that contains some of these provisions. I urge them to be comprehensive -- not just to increase penalties but also to block children's access to guns. Anything less will be a juvenile justice bill in name only.

If we are to stop the flow of guns to children, we also must continue to perform background checks on gun-buying adults. Background checks of gun buyers mandated by the Brady law have already stopped more than 250,000 fugitives, felons, and stalkers from buying handguns -- some of which would have ended up in the arsenals of youth gangs. Although the Supreme Court recently struck down portions of Brady law, the overwhelming majority of local police officers are continuing to perform background checks voluntarily -- because they work.

In the past year, we have started to crack the code of the black market in illegal weapons. We are tracing the guns, targeting the traffickers, and taking more of our children out of harm's way. And with dedicated prosecutors and tough police, we will spread our success to cities across the nation. Together, we will rid our communities of the scourge of youth crime.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFO ON YOUTH GUN  
INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

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\* EMBARGOED UNTIL 10:06 AM  
SATURDAY — VIOLATORS  
WILL HAVE TO DEAL  
WITH RAHM!

---

- PETER JACOBY	- BRUCE REED
- TRACEY THORNTON	- ELENA KAGAN
- LYNN CUTLER	- RAHM
- BARRY TOLU	EMMANUEL
- CHRISTINE STANEK	

**YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE  
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<u>Section</u>	<u>Attachment</u>
Talking Points	1
List of Phase Two cities	2
Copy of Memo from Sec. Rubin and Attorney General Reno	3
Executive Summary of Report	4
Relevant graphs, charts and points in brief	5

***ALL INFORMATION EMBARGOED UNTIL  
SATURDAY, JULY 19, 10:06AM***

# ATTACHMENT

1

## EXPANSION OF THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE JULY 19, 1997

### BACKGROUND:

- On July 8, 1996, President Clinton directed the Attorney General and Secretary Rubin to implement a pilot program in 17 cities to trace as many guns as possible, especially those trafficked to kids.
- Under this pilot program, the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), Federal and local law enforcement in each city worked together to submit all crime guns seized for tracing and use this information to identify and locate illegal gun traffickers.
- Since then, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has provided local police departments and ATF special agents with specialized training, computers and software -- and traced as many guns as possible through the National Training Center. Today's report details the findings of this effort.

### FINDINGS OF TODAY'S REPORT:

- **Confirms kids and guns is a serious problem in all 17 cities.** Juvenile and youth crime guns account for nearly half (45%) of the firearms recovered from crime scenes and criminals.
- **Reveals that kids use some of the most concealable and dangerous guns.** While 80% of youth and juvenile crime guns are handguns -- and 60% are semiautomatic pistols, only 70% of adult crime guns are handguns -- and less than half, or 47%, are semiautomatics.
- **Crime guns used by kids are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and models.** The 10 most popular types of crime guns account for 25% of all crime guns. In some cities, this percentage is as high as 50% for youth or juveniles (e.g., Birmingham, Memphis).
- **At least 25% of the crime guns used by kids move rapidly (3 years or less) from first retail sale to crime scenes.** That means that a significant portion of legally purchased guns are quickly and illegally diverted to kids and criminals.
- **The number of trace requests nearly doubled in the 17 pilot cities.** While not all traces submitted could be completed, for a variety of reasons, overall requests submitted to ATF jumped from about 20,000 to 37,000.

## HOW TRACING WORKS

- **The Shikes Case.** Shortly after the YCGII was launched, ATF and the Milwaukee Police Department received a tip that an individual named "Larry" was selling guns to gang members. This individual was Larry Shikes, and he was selling guns from the trunk of his car in the parking lot of the grocery store where he worked as a security guard.

A review of trace information on Milwaukee crime guns revealed that Shikes had originally purchased several guns that were recovered in connection with youth gang crimes -- including homicides, assaults and drive-by-shootings. Shikes' illegal activity was further documented by undercover purchases of additional shotguns and handguns.

Shikes was arrested in April 1997. He pled guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and providing firearms to convicted felons. He is scheduled to be sentenced next month.

## ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:

- **A new anti-crime tool.** By submitting all crime guns for tracing, the YCGII is showing law enforcement at all levels how young people are getting guns. This is critical information that will allow law enforcement to prioritize the investigation of gun traffickers.
- **Guns are being trafficked to kids.** ATF traces and investigations clearly show that certain corrupt gun dealers are selling guns to large volume traffickers and straw purchasers, who are in turn funneling guns to our youth. With more tracing information and enforcement resources, we can crackdown on these traffickers and break-up the supply of guns to kids and criminals.
- **Brady checks important.** Background checks are needed to help keep guns from being illegally diverted. So it's critical that state and local law enforcement continue their commitment to Brady.

## TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

- **More Cities, More Resources.** Today, the President will expand the YCGII to 10 more cities. The Treasury Department will commit \$11 million to augment its tracing efforts next year, and the Department of Justice will dedicate funds from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to help provide training to participating state and local law enforcement agencies. Additional funds will also be sought for ATF agents from unobligated funds.

# ATTACHMENT

2

**THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE  
PHASE TWO CITIES  
JULY 19, 1997**

Chicago, Illinois  
Los Angeles, California  
Detroit, Michigan  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania\*  
Houston, Texas  
Miami, Florida  
Tucson, Arizona\*  
Minneapolis, Minnesota\*  
Gary, Indiana\*  
Cincinnati, Ohio

Most cities were selected because of the high number of firearms and violent offenses committed by juveniles and youth. Those cities marked with an asterisk (\*) were chosen because, unlike the national trend, they have experienced increases in violent crime.

# ATTACHMENT

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

July 18, 1997

Dear Mr. President:

On July 8, 1996, you announced the start of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), a collaborative effort among law enforcement officials in 17 cities to reduce youth firearms violence by disrupting the illegal markets that put firearms in the hands of juveniles and youth. The YCGII brought together four significant law enforcement themes of this Administration: first, that we work in a collaborative effort with our state and local law enforcement partners; second, that we make smart and effective use of our limited law enforcement resources; third, that we do everything possible to lower the level of gun violence across the Nation; and fourth, that we make a special effort to reduce youth gun violence.

In the one year since your announcement, we have learned a great deal and have made substantial progress in developing a sophisticated infrastructure to combat illegal gun trafficking. Perhaps most important, we have learned that universal tracing of crime guns in particular communities is achievable. During the past year, gun tracing requests in the 17 pilot cities nearly doubled. Over the coming year, we will strive to increase the number of localities that trace all guns linked to crime.


Through universal tracing, we can greatly improve the quality of crime gun data that is being collected. This will result in law enforcement being better able to identify illegal gun traffickers and develop investigative priorities. For example, we have documented that illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms, particularly semi-automatic weapons. This information is critical, for it permits federal, state, and local enforcement officers to assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.

The Departments of Treasury and Justice are fully committed to this important Initiative. While the initial results are encouraging, we have much more to do. In the next year, we will continue working with state and local officials in the original 17 sites to improve gun tracing and enforcement strategies. We will also be working with additional cities, sharing what we have learned and assisting them in establishing their own gun tracing systems.


With your leadership and your support, our goal of effective action against illegal firearms markets that supply juveniles and youth will be achieved. By stemming the flow of illegal firearms to juveniles and youth, we expect that the level of violence in our communities will continue to drop.

We are attaching for your information a brief summary of the Initiative, as well as a comprehensive report compiled by the Department of Treasury describing results of ATF's analyses of crime gun trace information in the 17 pilot cities.

Sincerely,



Robert E. Rubin  
Secretary of the Treasury



Janet Reno  
Attorney General

SUMMARY OF  
NATIONAL ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING STRATEGY  
&  
YOUTH CRIME GUN  
INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Since 1993, this Administration has developed several successful approaches to fighting violent crime and the proliferation of illegal firearms. New laws such as the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban gave us significant tools to prevent criminals from obtaining certain types of firearms.

In 1994, the Departments of Justice and Treasury announced the Administration's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative (AVCI). The AVCI promotes cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in working together to develop coordinated investigative priorities within individual communities. In many communities, gun violence and the proliferation of firearms among juveniles and gang offenders has been identified as the most important violent crime problem. Local task forces in Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) cities, such as Boston, Baltimore, Memphis, and Milwaukee, have been successful in identifying and prosecuting numerous individuals who have brought illegal firearms into our communities.

We have recognized that stopping illegal gun trafficking before it begins has a greater impact and requires fewer resources than pursuing firearms once they have reached the hands of criminals through the illicit trafficking market. Since 1994, the Department of Treasury has pursued an "Anti-Trafficking Strategy," which targets illegal gun trafficking at its source. In addition, we worked to strengthen the licensing of dealers and assure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations, resulting in over a 50% drop in the number of federal firearms licensees.

Reducing the numbers of licensed dealers is not enough, for even with the dramatic reduction, there are still approximately 110,000 licensees. Thus, we have also strived to identify dealers who may be illegally selling firearms, as well as non-licensed individuals who buy and sell firearms that originally were purchased lawfully. Historically, identifying these persons and the resulting trafficking patterns has been difficult. But this is where the YCGII shows great promise.

For the past few years, researchers in Massachusetts had sought to identify the original legitimate source of every gun seized by the Boston Police Department, to determine whether there were any specific patterns that could help law enforcement stem the flow of illegal firearms to criminals. ATF also developed a computer program, Project LEAD, that could take that data, commonly referred to as "trace information," and use it to identify individuals and locations that might be involved in illegal firearms trafficking.

The combination of these two projects was tested in a few additional localities and then greatly expanded last July, when the President announced the YCGII in 17 cities across the country. Through the YCGII, we have learned a great deal more about gun trafficking in just one year.

- Approximately 25% of the crime guns used by juveniles (age 17 and under) and youth (ages 18-24) move rapidly from their point of first retail sale to recovery by law enforcement agencies. Through investigative experience, ATF has learned that recovery of new firearms often signals increased illegal diversion of weapons.
- Illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms. This information is critical. Law enforcement officers have become familiar with these patterns and the guns involved, and assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.
- In most participating cities, the state in which the community is located is the single largest source of recovered firearms successfully traced to retail sale. The identification of the sources of the firearms allows law enforcement more efficiently to investigate the primary sources of illegal firearms (whether operating intrastate or interstate). Collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is needed to mount an effective response, and strategies must be designed that take into account different local illegal market conditions.
- Preliminary research of selected communities by the ATF's National Tracing Center indicates that between 9% and 20% of recovered firearms have had their serial numbers obliterated, and were originally purchased as part of a multiple-gun sale and then illegally trafficked. Firearms traffickers remove serial numbers in an attempt to defeat tracing. Crime labs can now often restore these serial numbers, providing us with new and important investigative information.
- Handguns predominate among recovered crime guns. Seven out of ten guns recovered from adults are handguns, while for juveniles and youth the number is eight out of ten. As for the type of handguns, 47% of the firearms recovered from adults are semi-automatic handguns, 58% of those recovered from juveniles are semi-automatic handguns, and 61% of those recovered from youth are semi-automatic handguns.

These are just a few examples of the statistical data that

is being provided to each of the participating cities, which will assist local law enforcement officials in setting investigative priorities based on the patterns unique to their community. It is through the expansion of this type of information, which can only be obtained by increased crime gun tracing, that we will be able to more broadly assist individual investigators in their cases across the nation.

The YCGII has developed tools that can be used in cities throughout the country to strengthen enforcement efforts against illegal traffickers to juveniles and youth. By expanding comprehensive crime gun tracing to additional cities, increasing the development of crime gun trace analyses, increasing federal, state, and local training in trafficking investigations, and continuing federal-state-local collaboration in trafficking investigations and local violence reduction initiatives, we will ensure the effectiveness of our nationwide effort to disrupt this lethal trade and reduce juvenile and youth firearms violence.

# ATTACHMENT


4



# **The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative**

## **Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities**

Department of the Treasury  
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms





UNDER SECRETARY

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUBIN**

**FROM:** Raymond W. Kelly  
Under Secretary (Enforcement)

**SUBJECT:** Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Attached are reports prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for the 17 communities participating in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. They fulfill three goals by:

- (1) Documenting how juveniles and youth illegally obtain firearms;
- (2) Enabling Federal and local enforcement agencies to assess the illegal firearms problem in their communities and develop strategies to combat it;
- (3) Reporting on greatly increased ATF tracing of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies.

The following are among the reports' findings about firearms recovered by enforcement agencies:

- Firearms rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to an illegal market account for at least a quarter of the firearms that police recover from juveniles and youth.
- One out of ten firearms recovered by police is from a juvenile (17 and under). When youth (ages 18-24) are included, the number changes to four out of 10.
- In 15 of the 17 sites, the majority or the single largest supply of the crime guns successfully traced comes from retail sources *within* the State. Jersey City and Washington, DC, are the only sites where the largest single source of successfully traced crime guns is outside of their State or borders.
- Seven out of ten crime guns recovered from adults are handguns. For juveniles and youth, the number is eight out of 10.
- Half of all crime guns recovered by police are semiautomatic pistols, which are also the preferred weapons for juvenile and youthful offenders (60 percent).
- While thousands of different kinds of firearms are available, crime guns are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and calibers in each city.
- Preliminary research shows that a high percentage of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale by a federally licensed gun dealer and then illegally trafficked.

During the course of the initiative, trace requests from the 17 sites nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from 20,000 to more than 37,000 requests. Trace information is stored in the National Tracing Center's illegal firearms trafficking information system, Project LEAD, which enforcement officials use in the identification of illegal traffickers. By expanding the volume of tracing, participants in the initiative not only provided data needed to identify community patterns, but have added significantly to the investigative information available to make cases against illegal traffickers.

We are confident that these reports will enable local enforcement officials, working with State and Federal authorities, to better protect our young and the public by preventing the illegal trafficking of firearms to those who would use them to commit violent crime.

# ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

## Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

### Introduction

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative is a 17-city demonstration project aimed at reducing youth firearms violence. Officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), police chiefs, local prosecutors, and U.S. attorneys are developing information about illegal trafficking of firearms to young people and new methods of reducing the illegal supply of firearms to them. The initiative was developed by ATF and its National Tracing Center, funded by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement and the National Institute of Justice, and announced by President Clinton on July 8, 1996.

### Purposes of This Report

Since July 1996, participants have tested a new method of developing and providing information about the illegal sources of firearms to youth. Federal and local enforcement officials in each jurisdiction voluntarily agreed to submit information on all recovered crime guns to ATF's National Tracing Center. ATF developed the tools to analyze the information. ATF is publishing this report of its analyses for the following purposes:

**To provide new information about illegal firearms activity by community.** These reports provide an overall view of firearms associated with illegal possession or activity in a jurisdiction. They identify the types of firearms that enforcement agencies most frequently recover, the types of crimes with which these weapons are associated, the time it takes for firearms to move from a federally licensed firearms dealer to recovery by enforcement officials, and the source States of these firearms. This is the first time ATF has developed and published standardized reports on recovered crime guns.

**To identify differences in adult, juvenile, and youth illegal firearms activity.** These reports analyze firearms recoveries by age group, with a focus on young people. The information establishes whether patterns of crime gun acquisition differ by age group. While ATF has previously collected information from enforcement agencies on firearms recovered from juveniles from across the country, this is the first time ATF has been able to provide age-based analysis by local jurisdiction. This analysis provides enforcement officials with a new and important tool for reducing illegal juvenile and youth access to firearms.

**To expand access to firearms-related enforcement information.** These reports share ATF firearms-related enforcement information with other enforcement agencies. The reports thereby provide a new, common foundation for collaboration among ATF, the offices of the U.S. attorney, and local police and prosecutors, as well as other agencies concerned with youth violence. Using this information, police departments and local prosecutors may choose to modify resources devoted to firearms trafficking interdiction, and local task forces may choose to pursue firearms trafficking cases in Federal or State courts.

**To initiate community, State, and national reporting on firearms trafficking.** These reports provide a model for standardized, annual ATF reports on firearms recoveries at the city, State, and national level. State and national reports using firearms recovery information provided by every jurisdiction allow regional and national patterns to be identified.

**To enable enforcement officials to focus their resources where they are likely to have the greatest impact on illegal trafficking to juveniles and violent youth gang members, as well as adult criminals.** Specific investigative information about the illegal sources of crime guns can be obtained by a variety of

methods, including Project LEAD, ATF's computerized illegal firearms information trafficking system, debriefing armed arrestees, and other street sources. These reports do not provide additional investigative information (such as the identities of federally licensed gun dealers or retail purchasers repeatedly associated with new crime guns). Rather, they provide analyses that can be useful in deciding how best to focus investigative resources to reduce the illegal firearms supply used in violent crime.

*Strategic targeting of illegal sources of juvenile and youth crime guns.* Information about the percentages of a jurisdiction's crime guns recovered from juveniles, youth, and adults allows investigative priorities to be established and assessed. For instance, enforcement officials may choose to use Project LEAD to look for federally licensed gun dealers and first purchasers linked with crime gun traces associated with juveniles and youth.

*Strategic targeting of illegal sources of certain crime guns.* Enforcement officials also can draw on the reports to develop other enforce-

ment strategies. Federal investigators already look for high volume traffickers operating across jurisdictional lines, whether interstate or intrastate, and use Project LEAD to investigate the illegal sources of guns used in violent crimes. Drawing on these reports, Federal and local officials can jointly decide to use Project LEAD and other investigative tools to target the illegal sources of various groups of crime guns: firearms with obliterated serial numbers; firearms most often used by juveniles and youth in violent crimes; illegally trafficked firearms most popular among juveniles, violent youth, and violent gangs; firearms with short "time-to-crime" rates, which are likely to have been deliberately trafficked; and firearms originating in-State or firearms originating out of State.

*Optimum, balanced local enforcement strategy.* By combining a focus on high volume traffickers with targeted trafficking enforcement efforts using trace analyses and information about local conditions, enforcement officials can work toward the optimum strategy for reducing local illegal access to firearms, especially by juveniles and violent gang members.

## What This Report Contains

**Information about crime guns.** A crime gun is defined, for purpose of firearms tracing, as any firearm that is illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected by enforcement officials of being used in a crime. Report E shows the crime types most frequently associated with crime gun trace requests.

**Comprehensive crime gun trace data by community.** The report presents information about how many crime guns were submitted for tracing. Participants in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative voluntarily agreed to trace *all* crime guns recovered in their jurisdiction. Police departments are not required by Federal law to maintain or supply crime gun recovery information and have not historically submitted all crime guns for tracing. Lack of comprehensive tracing has precluded certain kinds of crime gun analyses since there may not have been enough crime gun trace requests from particular jurisdictions to identify community-wide patterns. The voluntary tracing agreement under this initiative was intended to overcome this problem.

**Information from National Tracing Center traces.** The information in this report is derived from data contained in requests for crime gun traces that enforcement agencies submitted to ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC) and from the results of traces that the NTC conducts. An *NTC trace* uses records maintained and made available by the firearms industry to identify the history of a firearm's ownership. A *successful NTC trace* describes firearm ownership from the manufacturer or importer through the wholesaler to the first known retail dealer. Depending on the investigative circumstances, the NTC trace may also identify the first retail purchaser, and sometimes even subsequent purchasers. Because of the structure of Federal firearms regulation and recordkeeping requirements, however, it is generally not possible for the NTC to trace a crime gun beyond its first retail sale using firearms industry records. To further trace a crime gun's path, ATF must conduct an *investigative trace*, in which special agents investigate

the subsequent chain of possession. Investigative traces are extremely resource intensive and are generally conducted only where there is a specific investigative need.

**Analyses of requests for crime gun traces.** The report contains certain analyses that are based on the information contained in *requests* for crime gun traces. These analyses do not depend on the NTC successfully completing the traces. Information available for all crime guns submitted for tracing, whether or not the crime gun is successfully traced by the NTC, includes the number of recovered crime guns in a community, the type of firearm (e.g., revolver, rifle), and its manufacturer and caliber.

**Analyses of successful NTC traces.** The report also contains certain analyses that are based on the results of *successful NTC traces*. Information available only for crime guns successfully traced by the NTC includes the time it takes for a crime gun to move from its last known retail sale to recovery by enforcement officials, and the State in which the crime gun was sold.

**Analysis of incomplete traces.** The report shows the number of successful NTC traces and explains why the NTC closed the remaining traces without a successful NTC trace. This information is intended to assist in increasing the number of successful NTC traces.

**Analyses by adult, youth, and juvenile age categories.** The report generally presents information in four age categories: adults (25 and over); youth (ages 18 through 24); juvenile (17 and under); and all age categories combined.

**Crime gun trace information for a 10-month period.** The patterns depicted in this report are based on crime guns for which trace requests were submitted to the NTC during the period of July 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997. The NTC provided project training in August and September 1996; project tracing then began in all sites. Early trace requests may not include as complete information as later traces.

# General Findings From the Participating Communities

This section presents general findings based on experience in all 17 participating communities. These 17 communities may not comprise a valid sample for purposes of national analysis. However, this is the largest collection of community-based information yet available on recovered crime guns.

## List of Participating Communities

The communities participating in this initiative, and on which the findings are based, are:

Atlanta, Georgia  
Baltimore, Maryland  
Birmingham, Alabama  
Boston, Massachusetts  
Bridgeport, Connecticut  
Cleveland, Ohio  
Inglewood, California  
Jersey City, New Jersey  
Memphis, Tennessee  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
New York, New York  
Richmond, Virginia  
St. Louis, Missouri  
Salinas, California  
San Antonio, Texas  
Seattle, Washington  
Washington, DC

This section is divided into two parts: (1) comprehensive community-based crime gun tracing and (2) local illegal firearms markets. These findings are intended to give enforcement officials in each community a wider perspective on its use of crime gun tracing and on its violent firearms crime and trafficking problems, particularly as they involve juveniles and youth.

## General Findings:

# Comprehensive, Community-Based Crime Gun Tracing

The 17 participating sites jointly tested the feasibility and utility of an enforcement policy of submitting all recovered crime guns in a community to the National Tracing Center (NTC) for tracing. Based on this experience, ATF reaches the following conclusions:

**Comprehensive, community-based crime gun tracing is achievable.** Trace requests from the 17 sites during the 10-month period nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from approximately 20,000 trace requests to more than 37,000 trace requests. Tracing volume in all of the sites increased. Police departments in all of the sites had official policies requiring tracing of all recovered crime guns for all or part of the project period. Eight of the communities reported that they had a general tracing policy before the initiative began. One site, Jersey City, was part of a state-wide agreement by enforcement officials and prosecutors to trace all crime guns. One State, Virginia, mandates tracing of all firearms recovered by State and local enforcement agencies. Sixteen of the seventeen participating police departments continue to have a written or stated policy of tracing all recovered firearms.

**Technical improvements in local and State tracing capability increase crime gun tracing levels, efficiency, and accuracy.** Working with local and State enforcement officials, ATF has tested three methods of facilitating comprehensive crime gun tracing. The methods vary according to the jurisdiction's volume of recovered firearms, recordkeeping procedures, and level of computerization. Costs of such technical assistance are low and the benefits high, both for the police departments and ATF. Because of technical improvements, for instance, New York City's requests for traces jumped to close to 13,000 crime guns during the 10-month project period, from fewer than 4,000 crime guns during the same time period the previous year. San Antonio's tracing rate increased 500 percent, to close to 2,000 crime gun traces during the project period from fewer than 400 traces during the same period the previous year.

**Comprehensive crime gun tracing achieves its primary purpose: to increase the number of investigative leads to illegal traffickers derived from NTC tracing.** The primary purposes of NTC crime gun tracing are to assist in solving individual gun crimes and to increase the amount of investigative information about illegal gun trafficking available to enforcement agencies. Crime gun trace information is added to the NTC's Project LEAD. This information system aggregates crime gun trace information from enforcement agencies throughout the Nation, and identifies links among those traces. For instance, Project LEAD could link a crime gun that enforcement officials in Inglewood, California, submit for tracing with a crime gun that enforcement officials in Jersey City, New Jersey, submit for tracing by showing that both were sold by the same Federal firearms licensee or purchased by the same individual. By nearly doubling the volume of trace requests from the 17 communities, ATF and local and State enforcement agencies have significantly increased the amount of trace information in Project LEAD and the number of investigative leads available to enforcement agencies throughout the country.

**As demonstrated by these reports, comprehensive crime gun tracing can also be used to assist enforcement agencies by identifying major crime gun patterns in a community.** By simply submitting trace requests on all recovered firearms, enforcement officials can check for patterns and trends on crime guns in their community. When the NTC can successfully trace these crime guns, additional strategic and investigative information is available.

**Refinement of tracing guidelines and practices will result in greater consistency in trace analysis reporting.** While participants have followed or are following comprehensive tracing policies, tracing procedures vary. For instance, practices may differ for tracing firearms that have obliterated serial numbers, are recovered by school authorities, are found without identified possessors or are known to be stolen, or are antique. In addition, there are variations in how the exact location of where the firearm was recovered is reported. For this reason, a few crime guns recovered in nearby jurisdictions may have been included in reports from some of the 17 sites. Finally, during this special initiative, enforcement agencies may have submitted all available firearms rather than only firearms recovered after the initiative began. Trace levels can be expected to stabilize if technical improvements are made and as the NTC refines tracing guidelines.

**Faster NTC trace completion time benefits enforcement agencies.** The faster a crime gun trace can be completed, the sooner the trace information can be entered into the Project LEAD illegal trafficking information system and the sooner it can be used by enforcement officials in investigations of illegal traffickers. The NTC presently completes trace requests in an average of 9 days. Crime gun-related investigations would benefit from faster completion times. Two factors affect completion time: NTC resources and the speed with which Federal firearms licensees make records available. The firearms industry has recently pledged to assist the NTC in speeding up crime gun tracing by making more records accessible electronically.

**Increasing the number and percentage of successful NTC traces benefits enforcement agencies.** The NTC successfully completed approximately 37 percent of the traces requested during this project. Reasons for lack of successful NTC tracing include lack of needed information about the firearm in trace requests (23 percent), lack of Federal firearms licensee records (7 percent), and legal and resource limitations on tracing older firearms (33 percent). Not all trace analyses depend on successfully completing trace requests. However, the benefits of crime gun tracing for enforcement agencies are maximized if traces are successfully completed. Many of the reasons preventing successful NTC tracing can and should be addressed.

**Training in crime gun tracing benefits enforcement agencies.** Working together, police departments and ATF fulfilled their goal of tracing all recovered crime guns, with a minimum of training. However, some sites were more successful than others in submitting the full amount of crime gun-related data that can be used in Project LEAD and in trace analyses. In particular, a few sites provided insufficient possessor date of birth information to provide reliable analysis by age category. Most importantly, 23 percent of the trace requests overall were submitted with insufficient firearms information to successfully complete the traces. This reflects several factors, including that some police departments' internal firearms-related procedures are more conducive than others to comprehensive crime gun tracing. Training in crime gun tracing and a collaborative effort between the NTC and State and local enforcement agencies are needed to improve the level of information provided in trace requests.

## General Findings: Local Illegal Firearms Markets

This section summarizes enforcement findings and conclusions based on crime gun trace information from the 17 participating communities. The category "adult" includes ages 25 and over, "youth" includes ages 18 to 24, and "juvenile" includes ages 17 and under.\*

**Adult crime guns predominate.** Most crime guns are recovered from adults. While youth firearms crime remains a special priority because of high rates of youth violence, adult firearms crime still predominates. In the largest city among the participants, New York, where almost 13,000 crime guns were submitted for tracing, juveniles under age 18 account for 11 percent of the crime guns, youth ages 18 to 24 account for 34 percent, and adults age 25 and over account for 55 percent. Only in Bridgeport does the adult crime gun category not constitute a plurality.

**Juvenile crime guns are a significant percentage of the total.** One out of ten crime guns is recovered from a juvenile. Juvenile crime gun trace requests accounted for at least 10 percent of the total traces requested, with three exceptions, Cleveland (6 percent), Milwaukee (8 percent), and Richmond (9 percent). The percentage of juvenile crime guns submitted for tracing was over 20 percent in two cities: Seattle and Memphis.

**Juvenile and youth crime guns comprise almost half of the total.** Juvenile and youth crime guns combined account for 45 percent of the crime guns requested for tracing, while adult crime guns account for 55 percent of the total.

**Handguns predominate.** Eight out of ten crime guns traced are handguns. Handguns include semiautomatic pistols, revolvers, and derringers. In all sites, handguns are the largest category of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies. The percentage of crime guns accounted for by handguns recovered from all age groups ranged from 63 percent in Salinas, to 98 percent in Atlanta.

**A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are handguns.** Juvenile and youth crime guns are more likely than adult crime guns to be handguns. Eight out of ten

juvenile and youth crime guns traced are handguns, whereas seven out of 10 adult crime guns are handguns. Of the crime guns recovered from *juveniles*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 73 percent in Salinas to more than 90 percent in five cities: Cleveland, New York City, Seattle, Richmond, and Boston. Of the crime guns recovered from *youth*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 67 percent in San Antonio to more than 90 percent in three cities: Washington, DC, Memphis, and New York City. Of the crime guns recovered from *adults*, the lowest percentage of handguns is in Seattle and Memphis, 56 percent. Handguns account for between 80 and 90 percent of the adult crime guns in four cities.

**Semiautomatic handguns predominate.** Semiautomatic handguns are more common crime guns than revolvers. Semiautomatic handguns range from a high of 67 percent of crime guns in Atlanta, to a low of 39 percent in St. Louis. Revolvers supplied no more than 41 percent of crime guns in any site. Half of all the crime guns recovered are semiautomatics.

**A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are semiautomatic handguns.** In each site, juveniles and youth are more likely to be associated with semiautomatic handguns than are adults. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 66 percent of the *juvenile* crime guns in Boston, to a low of 47 percent of the juvenile crime guns in Baltimore and Birmingham. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 71 percent of the *youth* crime guns in Memphis, to a low of 46 percent of the youth crime guns in Salinas. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 54 percent of the *adult* crime guns in New York City and Washington, D.C. to a low of 35 percent of the adult crime guns in Birmingham and Milwaukee. Overall, 47 percent of the adult crime guns are semiautomatics. Semiautomatics constitute 61 percent of the youth crime guns and 58 percent of the juvenile crime guns.

\* Not all sites were considered for each of the findings below. Where the number of cases was insufficient for the particular finding, the site was excluded. A technical note with further explanation is available from ATF.

**In each site crime guns are concentrated among a relatively few kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber.** The top 10 types of crime guns, by manufacturer and caliber, represent a disproportionately large share of the total number of recovered firearms. The greatest concentration is in Inglewood, where the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for 48 percent of the total; 58 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 52 percent. Even in Milwaukee, where the concentration is the least, the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber still account for 21 percent of the total; 567 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 79 percent. Overall, the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for more than 9,000 crime guns, or 24 percent, while 1,207 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for the over 28,000 crime guns remaining, or 76 percent.

**Crime gun concentration by kind of firearm, by manufacturer and caliber, is relatively greater among juveniles and youth than among adults.** The highest concentration among *juvenile* crime guns is in Birmingham where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 52 percent of recovered juvenile firearms. The highest concentration among *youth* crime guns is in Memphis where the top 10 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 46 percent of recovered youth firearms. By comparison, the highest concentration among *adult* crime guns is in Bridgeport, where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 36 percent of the recovered adult firearms.

**In general, the State in which the community is located is the largest single source of its successfully traced crime guns.** In 12 of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies a *majority* of the successfully traced crime guns. This majority ranged from a high of 77 percent in San Antonio to a low of 54 percent in Seattle. In three of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies more crime guns than any other single source State, while the combination of all other States

supplies more than half of the successfully traced crime guns. This plurality ranges from a high of 47 percent in St. Louis to a low of 13 percent in New York City. There are two exceptions: for Jersey City, the top two source States are Virginia and Florida, each supplying 14 percent of the successfully traced crime guns, while New Jersey supplies 10 percent. No crime guns were traced to first retail sales in Washington, DC.

**Many recovered firearms are rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to a black market that supplies juveniles and youth.** This is shown by the proportion of guns recovered by law enforcement officials that are new, that is, bought less than three years before recovery by enforcement officials. New guns in young hands signal direct diversion — by illegal firearms trafficking, including straw purchases, theft from federally licensed gun dealers, or a combination of all of these. Enforcement officials can often identify the illegal sources of new firearms by following up on trace information. By contrast, older crime guns are more likely to have passed through numerous hands before entering illegal commerce, requiring other methods, such as debriefing criminal offenders, to identify their illegal sources. Based on crime guns recovered and submitted for tracing during the initiative, ATF estimates that new crime guns comprise between 22 percent and 43 percent of the firearms recovered from *juveniles*, between 30 percent and 54 percent of the firearms recovered from *youth*, and between 25 percent and 46 percent of the firearms recovered from *adults*.<sup>\*</sup> This finding leads to our conclusion that an effort to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate illegal firearms traffickers can reduce the illegal firearms supply that supports criminal activity by young people.

**Crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are likely to have been illegally trafficked.** Local tracing practices with respect to firearms with obliterated serial numbers varied too much during this initiative to provide consistent community-based analyses of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers. Therefore, reports on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are not

\* A technical note explaining how these ranges were calculated is available from ATF upon request.

Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Team Crime Gun Identification Initiative

provided for the participating sites. However, preliminary research by the NTC in selected communities indicates that between 9 percent and 20 percent of recovered firearms have their serial numbers obliterated. NTC analysis indicates that *a very high percentage of firearms with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale and then illegally trafficked.* Restoration of obliterated serial numbers is often possible by either ATF or police department laboratories. Restoration of these serial numbers and tracing of the firearm should be given high priority.

**Preventing trafficking in new firearms to youths and juveniles.** Crime gun tracing is identifying many investigative opportunities for enforcement officials. The fact that many young people are using relatively new firearms, purchased from Federal firearms licensees that are maintaining records, provides significant opportunities for

enforcement agencies to identify illegal traffickers. Project LEAD and trace analyses can facilitate the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of illegal suppliers of these crime guns.

**Preventing trafficking of older firearms.** Preventing the trafficking of older firearms requires a different approach. Older firearms enter the illegal market through several routes: they are sold by federally licensed gun dealers as used firearms, they are sold as used firearms on the legal secondary market (i.e., private sales exempt from federal regulation), they are stolen and resold through gun traffickers, or they are stolen personally by the crime gun possessor. Finding the source of older guns requires, in addition to crime gun tracing, debriefing of arrestees associated with crime guns and investigation into the chain of transfers of the crime gun beyond the first retail purchaser.

## Future Crime Gun Trace Analysis Techniques

The ATF National Tracing Center is continuing to develop new techniques to analyze crime gun traces. These will further increase the ability of enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute illegal traffickers. Future developments will include the following:

**Reporting on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers that cannot be restored.** The NTC has established a data base for crime guns for which serial numbers have been obliterated and cannot be restored. Collection of this information is critical to the NTC's efforts to report on crime gun trafficking.

**Improvements in Project LEAD.** Project LEAD, ATF's illegal firearms trafficking information system, is being improved to add indicators that will suggest new types of leads to trafficking investigators. In addition, special agents will be able to access Project LEAD in real time.

**Reports on multiple purchases of crime guns by a single purchaser.** When a Federal firearms licensee sells two or more handguns in five business days to a single purchaser, the licensee must notify ATF of these sales in writing. ATF provides a multiple sales form to simplify this notification. Information supplied by Federal firearms licensees on multiple sales forms is integrated into Project LEAD for use in

illegal firearms trafficking investigations. In the future, information on crime gun traces associated with multiple purchases can be included in crime gun trace analysis reports.

**Reports on crime guns that possessors report to be stolen.** The submission of trace requests for firearms known by enforcement officials to have been stolen was inconsistent among participating sites. NTC procedures will be altered to permit accurate reporting of this information. Currently, less than 1 percent of all crime guns submitted for tracing to the NTC are reported to have been stolen.

**Use of a ballistics identification system to help identify firearms traffickers.** ATF has pioneered ballistics technology that allows enforcement agencies to link recovered bullets and cartridge cases with recovered crime guns. To facilitate identification of traffickers and other criminals, the ballistics data base and the NTC crime gun data base can be linked, and ballistics-related information can be captured in crime gun trace analyses.

# The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative and Related Local Initiatives

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on leadership and innovations in a number of jurisdictions where enforcement agencies have been focusing on reducing illegal access to firearms. Three important examples follow:

**Project LISA: New Jersey's statewide crime gun tracing system.** Locally developed crime gun information systems, such as Project LISA in New Jersey, have served as local models for Project LEAD, ATF's national crime gun information system. Information on all recovered crime guns statewide is entered into the LISA system, enabling enforcement officials to identify juvenile and adult offenders. U.S. Attorney Faith Hochberg organized this statewide system through a memorandum of understanding among all enforcement officials in the State.

**The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire.** The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Boston under the leadership of Commissioner Paul Evans, U.S. Attorney Don Stern, and ATF Special Agent in Charge Jeff Roehm. David Kennedy, a senior researcher at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, developed the project under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. Participants also include the Department of Probation, youth outreach workers, the Department of Parole, the Department of Youth Services, and school police. The strategy combines: (1) a local, State, and Federal effort to crack down on the illegal gun supply and (2) a local, State, and Federal strategy to deter violence by youth gangs.

**The Boston Gun Project: crime gun supply reduction.** This project developed comprehensive tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of arrestees especially gang members arrested for weapons, drug, and violent offenses, for information leading to local gun traffickers. ATF agents, police, and prosecutors are using traditional criminal investigative techniques to identify and prosecute specific traffickers.


Participants are also developing an enforcement strategy based on trace analysis to disrupt Boston's illegal youth gun market. This focuses on guns recovered less than two years from first retail sale, guns with two or more crime gun traces, guns recovered from members of violent gangs, and guns identified as particularly popular with gang members. ATF and police are restoring obliterated serial numbers, tracing those firearms, and focusing on FFLs and gun purchasers associated with those weapons.

**The Boston Gun Project: deterring violent gang crime.** Participants in the Gun Project researched the Boston youth homicide problem and determined it to be largely gang related. Participating officials agreed to deliver and act on a new enforcement message to these gangs: *violence will not be tolerated in Boston; it will be met with a strong and coordinated interagency response.* Officials delivered this message through formal meetings with gang members, individual police and probation contacts with gang members, meeting with all inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city, and gang outreach workers. Where violence occurs, it is met with a coordinated interagency response, using all possible enforcement tools, from probation supervision to Federal investigation and prosecution.

**Memphis U.S. Attorney's Anti-Violent Crime Task Force.** This task force is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Memphis, spearheaded by U.S. Attorney Veronica Coleman. The group developed comprehensive crime gun tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of all arrestees, especially gang members and juveniles arrested with firearms or for violent offenses. This task force is currently working with ATF to expand local capacity to restore obliterated serial numbers on crime guns.

# ATTACHMENT

5



## The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The following are consistently the fastest "time-to-crime" guns recovered by law enforcement from juveniles and youth in the 17 Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative sites (by manufacturer, caliber, and type):


- Bryco, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- High Standard, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Glock, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Ruger, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Smith & Wesson, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Mossberg, 12 gauge, shotgun
- Intratec, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Bryco, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .25 caliber, semiautomatic pistol

**Note:** More than 50% of the total number of each of these types of recovered crime guns moved from their first retail sale to their recovery by law enforcement from a juvenile or youth in under three years. The firearms pictured are typical of models falling under the type of firearm listed above. Trafficking investigations aimed at the sources of these firearms have the highest probability of success.

**Note:** "Time-to-Crime" is that period of time (measured in days) between a firearm's acquisition from a retail market and law enforcement's recovery of that firearm during use, or suspected use, in a crime. A short time-to-crime usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and when several short time-to-crime traces involve the same individual/FFL, this can be an indication of illegal trafficking activity.


# Firearm and Non-Firearm Juvenile Homicides

Juvenile Offenders (ages 10-17)




# Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

## Crime Gun Recoveries by Age Group



Based on recoveries in 13 of 17 communities. The following sites were excluded: Atlanta, Inglewood, Jersey City, and St. Louis. These sites include too few cases in one or more age categories to be used in an age-based comparison.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative  
Crime Guns Recovered in 17 Communities  
**Semi-automatic Handguns as a  
Percentage of All Crime Gun Recoveries**



Crime - Guns

## Memorandum

**DATE:** November 15, 1996

**TO:** Rahm Emanuel  
Bruce Reed

**FROM:** Bob Walker, Legislative Director

**RE:** Possible New Gun Initiatives

In preparation for our meeting next week, I have prepared the following menu of possible new initiatives. Offered in no particular order, they range from the important, but relatively ambitious, to the relatively unimportant, but non-controversial. If you would like any further information on any of these options, let me know. My direct line is (202) 289-5773.

***Limit Retail Handgun Purchases to One Per Month*** -- A modest little proposal, this measure would drastically slow the flow of guns into the black market by preventing gun runners (and their straw purchasers) from making multiple purchases. Four years ago, Virginia was a major supplier of guns to cities up and down the East Coast. Seeking to change its reputation as the top gun running state in the country, Virginia passed a law limiting retail handgun purchases to one per month. A study by our Center to Prevent Handgun Violence found that the law, after two years, had drastically reduced the number of guns being traced back to Virginia from crime scenes in the Northeast. Responding to law enforcement concerns about multiple purchases, Maryland earlier this year passed a similar law. Both laws have worked with a minimum of inconvenience to gun owners; buyers wishing--for whatever reasons--to make multiple handgun purchases may seek permission from the State Police.

***Limit Private Sales of Handguns to One Per Month*** -- The Brady law effectively regulates sales by licensed dealers. But while federal law requires anyone who is in the business of selling guns to obtain a federal license, many dealers circumvent that requirement by selling guns from their "private collection" at well-attended gun shows. In some states, Florida most notably, gun show sales by unlicensed gun dealers are a major source of guns for criminals and professional gun traffickers. Some jurisdictions, worried about this gun trafficking, have banned private sales at gun shows. That, however, may not be necessary. A federal law prohibiting non-licensees from selling more than one handgun per month, would effectively shut down this illicit trade, without imposing any substantial burden on the law-abiding gun owner. Individuals wishing to dispose of more than one handgun per month could either sell their handguns to a licensed dealer or obtain a special permit from the local police.

How?

***Extend the Brady Law to Cover Private Sales*** -- The Brady Law has done a great job of preventing criminals from buying a handgun at a gun store, but it does nothing to regulate private or secondary sales. Some states, Maryland for example, have passed laws requiring that private sales or transfers must be conducted through a gun store so that the waiting period and background checks requirements can be met. Such a measure, if adopted as part of the national instant check system, would go a long way toward shutting down the illegal gun market.

***Extend the Brady Law to Cover Pawn Shop Redemptions*** -- In implementing the Brady Law in 1994, ATF issued regulations treating a pawn shop redemption as a "transfer" for purposes of the Brady law. As a result, individuals wishing to get their gun out of hock were subjected to a waiting period and a background check. A number of states, such as Nevada, reported a large number of denials for pawnshop redemptions (i.e. a lot of convicted felons routinely hocked their illegally possessed guns for cash). But, at the urging of the pawn shop industry, Jack Brooks added an amendment to the 1994 crime bill that exempted pawn shop redemptions from the Brady bill. Subsequent research by HCI indicates that the exemption lowers the number of Brady denials by up to 15 percent.

***Child Access Prevention (CAP) Law*** -- Thirteen states have adopted laws requiring adults to keep handguns locked up and inaccessible to young children. When Florida passed the first such law in 1989, it was called a "child accident prevention" law, but since then the emphasis has shifted to *access* prevention, reflecting the growing concern that children are not just playing with their parent's gun, they're taking it to school. A national CAP law could be coupled with a requirement that all new handguns be sold with a CAP warning.

***Trigger-Lock Requirement*** -- There are several different kinds of devices intended to prevent unauthorized users from being able to fire a handgun. The most common is a simple, inexpensive "trigger lock," a padlock which is specifically designed to secure a gun. There are, however, a number of new technologies--some being developed under government contract at Sandia Labs in New Mexico--which "personalize" a gun, rendering it unusable by an unauthorized user. Federal law could be changed to require that a licensed federal dealer may not sell a firearm without a trigger-lock or some other approved device which allows the user to protect against the unauthorized use of the gun.

***"Cop-Killer" Bullets Ban*** -- Legislation is still needed to prevent future "cop-killer" bullets from coming on the market. While Congress has authorized a limited study of this issue, we really need to establish a standard performance test for all new handgun bullets to determine whether they have armor-piercing capabilities.

***Require Pistol Manufacturers to Include a Magazine Safety*** -- The manufacture of handguns in this country is virtually unregulated. In the absence of any safety requirements, many pistol manufacturers fail to include a magazine safety on some or all of their guns. As a result, several children are killed every year when a child picks up a pistol, takes the magazine out, and pulls the trigger, not realizing that there is a bullet in the chamber.

*Crime -  
Gun Ideas*

# Gun Producers' Use of a Safety Device Is Called Erratic

By BARRY MEIER

It is an accident that safety experts say does not have to happen: A person picks up a semiautomatic pistol, takes out the magazine containing the cartridges and, thinking the weapon is empty, squeezes the trigger and shoots himself or someone else.

When a semiautomatic's magazine is removed, a round can remain in the chamber, ready to be fired, and dozens of lawsuits say adults and children have died or been seriously injured as a result.

Gun producers have long known of the danger, and some responded by building into their guns an inexpensive mechanism known as a magazine safety. But the fact that many gun makers have chosen not to use simple devices like magazine safeties and gun locks is now a focus of a growing wave of lawsuits in which cities are accusing the industry of making guns needlessly dangerous.

A look at how gun makers have chosen to use, or not use, the magazine safety provides a glimpse into an industry driven by unique marketing forces. In the absence of government safety regulation, different companies set their own standards, and producers have not sought independent answers about safety issues or been able to reach consensus.

For decades, the nation's biggest gun maker, Smith & Wesson, has incorporated a magazine safety, a mechanism made of a few springs and a lever that can cost from 9 cents to \$2, in virtually every semiautomatic pistol it sold to the public. Other companies have never used one.

Beretta, a subsidiary of Beretta Holding S.P.A. in Italy, uses the device in a few models but not others. Some manufacturers offer it as an option to law enforcement but not to the public. One manufacturer stamps a warning about the firing danger onto a pistol. Another puts a caution sticker on the magazine. Others say nothing on the gun.

Gun makers have a simple response to the safety lawsuits: People know that guns are dangerous, gun owners need training, and they need to keep weapons away from children. Faced with the prospect of Federal regulation, firearm makers recently began to distribute locks for guns, but both the industry and groups like the National Rifle Association oppose mandatory requirements.

"We leave it up to each individual company to manufacture what they think is the safest, highest quality product as they see fit and leave it to the consumer to buy the gun that best fits their needs," said Andrew Kelley, a spokesman for Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, a trade group in Newtown, Conn.

For every gun maker who cites safety as a reason for using the magazine device, another contends it could make a gun less reliable. Other consumer industries form internal task forces to resolve such debates, or refer them to independent technical groups, such as Underwriters Laboratories Inc., which have set standards for products from children's pajamas to hair dryers.

But while the gun industry's trade group has set technical standards for ammunition, it has not researched the value of the magazine safety and similar devices, Mr. Kelley said.

There is little question that some accidental shooting deaths can be prevented if gun owners handle and store their weapons more safely. And such deaths have fallen steadily over the last two decades.

Still, in 1996, the most recent year for which Federal data are available, 1,134 people were killed in such incidents, 135 of them children under 14.

The shootings occur for various reasons. Many involve hunting. Others happen when a gun is dropped. But a 1991 study by the General Accounting Office, an investigative arm of Congress, found that nearly a fourth occurred because the person who picked up a gun thought it was unloaded.

No single device — and gun makers can choose from many — can eliminate such shootings. But the gun industry's inconsistent approach to safety involves producers of inexpensive and costly guns alike.

For expensive pistols, the marketing chain often starts with military or police agencies. Gun makers can use their success in that arena to sell the same weapon to consumers.

"Whatever gun the cop carries, the civilian aspires to carry," said Joseph Cartabona, director of handguns for Colt's Manufacturing, a subsidiary of New Colt Holding Corporation in West Hartford, Conn.

Many law-enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, do not want a magazine safety. Their reasoning: that being able to fire the bullet remaining in the chamber could save the life of an officer who changes his magazine or accidentally releases it in a gunfight.

But some firearm experts who have looked for such cases say they have found few. Instead, experts like Massad Ayoob, a police captain who is director of the Lethal Force Institute, a training academy in Concord, N.H., say they have found more instances where officers with magazine safeties avoided being shot with their own guns by ejecting the magazine during a struggle.

"It acts as a kind of kill button," preventing the gun from being fired, Captain Ayoob said.

From 1988 to 1997, 62 police officers nationwide were killed with their own weapons, according to the F.B.I.

Beretta and Sig Arms, a subsidiary of Sig Holding in Switzerland, do not normally put the safety in their pistols but will if law-enforcement agencies want it. Neither company gives the public that option.

"There has been no commercial call for it or request for it," said Wesley Lang, the vice president of marketing for Sig Arms, based in Exeter, N.H.

Whatever the merits of the device for police work, guns stripped of safety features for military or police use are then sold to consumers, who often lack training. Such guns include semiautomatics made by Glock Inc., which are used by half of the country's police departments.

Glock pistols, designed in the early 1980's for the Austrian military, have also been a big hit with consumers, who now account for half of all sales. The Glock has several safety features but lacks both a magazine safety and a manual safety, the lever found on many pistols that must be pushed for the gun to fire.

Such mechanical factors combined with poor training may be behind many accidental deaths and injuries involving Glock pistols. In the last decade, about 60 accidental shooting lawsuits have been filed against Glock, of Smyrna, Ga., according to Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, an advocacy group in Washington, and the company says it is facing about 20 such suits, 40 percent of which involve consumers.

Glock denies any blame for the incidents and it has won all nine cases that have gone to trial, said the company's general counsel, Paul Jannuzzo. But it has settled others.

"The gun is the best tool of its kind available, be it for a policeman or a civilian," Mr. Jannuzzo said. "It strikes the proper balance between safety and usability."

Only a few lawsuits charging that an accidental shooting resulted from the lack of a magazine safety have gone to trial, and gun makers have

won them. Several more are pending, including one involving the 1996 death of Ross Mathieu, a 12-year-old boy, in Massachusetts shot by a friend who thought a pistol without its magazine was empty.

But in the last three decades, gun makers have quietly settled dozens of such cases, say plaintiffs' lawyers and expert witnesses who have testified for them. Stanton O. Berg, a firearms consultant in Minneapolis, said he had been involved in about 30 suits involving the lack of a magazine safety, nearly all of which were settled.

Another firearms expert, Lama Martin, the president of Forensic Ballistics Inc., a consulting firm in Bel Air, Md., said he had been involved in about six cases that were settled. He said that any gun sold to the public should have at least three devices: a manual safety, a magazine safety and a safety to prevent the gun from firing if it is dropped.

"The average civilian has received no training," Mr. Martin said. "He needs all the help he can get."

The settlements have not prompted the industry to use magazine safeties. Jeffrey K. Reh, general counsel of Beretta U.S.A. in Accokeek, Md., which has settled two of those cases, said the magazine safety has pros and cons.

Mr. Reh said the safety can prevent someone from accidentally firing a gun that they think is unloaded because the magazine is removed. But deadly accidents have happened with guns that have the safety, he said, when someone inserted an empty magazine in the pistol. That disengages the safety and allows the remaining bullet to be fired.

He also said that a homeowner needing a gun in a hurry for self-defense might not be able to use it if the gun had a safety and he fumbled with a magazine.

"It is what we call a neutral feature," Mr. Reh said.

That does not explain why some Beretta guns sold to the public have magazine safeties and others do not. Mr. Reh said none of the guns made by Beretta in the United States have magazine safeties, but they are included in Berettas made by Fabbrica D'Armi Pietro Beretta, an Italian sister company.

Mr. Reh said he did not know why the Italian company used the device, but he said the reason might stem from a 1968 Federal law aimed at cheap handguns known as "Saturday night specials," most of which came from abroad at the time.

The 1968 law, the Federal Gun Control Act, imposed a test based on safety features on imported handguns. But the test did not apply to guns made in the United States, and domestic producers quickly moved in to make inexpensive guns that did not meet the import test.

In recent years some gun makers have moved to make weapons less dangerous. But within the industry, currents can flow in several directions.

For decades, virtually every Smith & Wesson pistol sold to the public had a magazine safety because the company believed it could help prevent accidental shootings, said Kenneth Jorgensen, a spokesman for the gun maker. But several years ago, faced with the popularity of the Glock, Smith & Wesson started selling a competing line of inexpensive pistols known as its "Sigma" series.

The new pistol, like the Glock, does not have a magazine safety. Instead, it bears this warning stamped on the side: "CAUTION: Capable of firing with the magazine removed."

*The New York Times*  
FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1999

# Court Told of Draft Indictment That Included the First Lady

By STEVE BARNES

LITTLE ROCK, Ark., Mar. 18 — Hillary Rodham Clinton was named in an indictment drafted by a top aide to Kenneth W. Starr, the independent counsel, but the document was never presented to a grand jury and no charges were brought against the First Lady, the aide testified in Federal District Court here today.

The disclosure came from the deputy independent counsel, W. Hickman Ewing, who was subpoenaed as the first witness for the defense in the contempt-of-court trial of Susan H. McDougal, a former business partner of the Clintons.

Mr. Ewing was not asked what charges he had specified in the draft indictment he drew up against Mrs. Clinton, but he suggested that he considered her responses to questions put to her under oath as less than forthcoming.

Mr. Ewing, who is in charge of the Arkansas phase of the Whitewater inquiry headed by Mr. Starr, testified that he wrote the indictment in late 1996 after becoming persuaded that Mrs. Clinton had not been truthful in discussions with Mr. Starr's staff. The independent counsel has been investigating the Clintons' involvement in a complex series of loans and land deals that collectively have come to be known as Whitewater.

Ms. McDougal and her late former husband, James B. McDougal, were partners of the Clintons in the Whitewater venture. Mr. McDougal died last year in a Federal prison, and Ms. McDougal has twice refused to answer questions from a grand jury about their financial dealings. By calling a Starr prosecutor, she was attempting to show that she was pressured to falsely implicate the Clintons, an assertion the prosecutors have insisted is bogus.

That Mr. Starr's office had drafted the indictment against Mrs. Clinton

has been known for months, but details were never disclosed.

"The D.I.C. illegally leaked this information a long time ago," David B. Kendall, the Clintons' lawyer, said in a statement today after Mr. Ewing's testimony. "The mere fact that this prosecutor's office drafted a frivolous indictment three years ago has no significance whatsoever, except as a possible violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995."

"She was in conflict with other interviews that we had already done," Mr. Ewing said of Mrs. Clinton's answers to questions from prosecutors in two meetings, including an April 1995 session at the White House. Mr. Ewing said the conflicting information came from interviews with some of Mrs. Clinton's former partners at the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock.

Mr. Ewing testified that based on what he knew at that point he had questions about what Mrs. Clinton was saying.

"You had doubts?" asked Mark J. Geragos, Ms. McDougal's lawyer.

"That is correct," Mr. Ewing responded. "The same was true of the President," he continued, referring to an interview with Mr. Clinton conducted by prosecutors the same day.

"Did you tell people you thought she was lying?" Mr. Geragos asked.

"I don't know if I used the 'L' word, but I certainly expressed internally that I had some problems with some of the answers of the President and the First Lady," Mr. Ewing said.

"Did you have a draft indictment?" Mr. Geragos asked.

"I can't say positively," Mr. Ewing said, but Mr. Geragos persisted until Mr. Ewing added, "I would say yes, but qualify that."

Mr. Ewing said it was not unusual for prosecutors to circulate proposed indictments, whether or not a charge was ever brought. "You're always



Associated Press

W. Hickman Ewing, a Starr deputy, testified yesterday.

thinking about what possible crime could it be," he said.

Asked if he had ever graded Mrs. Clinton's testimony, Mr. Ewing recalled that he had, in a reference to one of Mrs. Clinton's interviews with the independent counsel's staff. He said he had given her an "F" because "she had used the words 'I don't recall' about 50 times."

No charges have been brought against the Clintons in the Whitewater investigation. Ms. McDougal is charged with blocking the inquiry by refusing to testify to a grand jury about Whitewater-related matters despite a judge's order to do so and a grant of limited immunity.

Mr. Ewing insisted today that Mr. Starr's team was interested only in obtaining the truth, even as he acknowledged that the Clintons were potential targets of their inquiry.

"We wanted any information she had, including the Clintons," Mr. Ewing affirmed, referring to Ms. McDougal. "It was our duty to investigate whether the Clintons did anything illegal."

# Judges Turn Back Challenge To a Federal Inquiry of Starr

By DAVID JOHNSTON

WASHINGTON, March 18 — A Federal appeals court today dismissed an effort by a private legal group to halt the Justice Department's inquiry into possible misconduct by the independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr.

The special three-judge panel that selects independent counsels rejected a challenge from the Landmark Legal Foundation, a conservative law group based in Virginia that sought to block the inquiry on the grounds that the department lacked the authority to discipline independent counsels.

It was uncertain today what impact, if any, the court's ruling would have on the department's inquiry. Before the foundation sought to intervene, Attorney General Janet Reno and Mr. Starr had agreed to negotiate a framework for the inquiry into his operations.

The judicial panel's primary role is to select the independent counsel and define the scope of the inquiry after the Attorney General decides an inquiry is required under the law.

In its decision, the panel acknowledged the limited scope of its own authority under the law. The panel's unsigned opinion said, "We have no jurisdiction."

Nonetheless, the panel said the foundation could not show how it had suffered any "concrete and actual or imminent injury" because of the Justice Department's investigation.

The investigation will focus on whether Mr. Starr's prosecutors improperly coerced witnesses like Monica S. Lewinsky or withheld information from the department's lawyers about possible conflicts of interest at the outset of the Lewinsky inquiry in January 1998.

The court's decision was one of two events today involving Mr. Starr and the entangling legal issues his

investigation has engendered.

Although Congress has only just begun deliberations over whether to renew the law that provides for the appointment of independent prosecutors, some Democratic senators tried to insure that whatever happens, Mr. Starr would be out of business by the end of the year.

Senator Robert G. Torricelli of New Jersey and a handful of other Democrats tried and failed to have the Senate vote to shut down Mr.

*A court says it has no authority over investigation of the independent counsel.*

Starr's operations by Dec. 31 and to have any outstanding investigations turned over to the Justice Department to complete.

The motion was criticized even by some Democrats and was defeated by a voice vote so resounding that Senator Torricelli did not even make the customary request for a roll-call vote.

The brief consideration of Mr. Torricelli's amendment today was a foretaste of the looming debate over whether to renew the independent counsel law, which is set to expire on June 30.

It is expected that Congress will allow the law to lapse. If that happens, however, any pending investigations like that of Mr. Starr's would continue until declared finished by the independent counsels themselves, who would by then be relics of a defunct law.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON SENATE VOTE ON GUN CONTROL

The South Portico

8:45 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. It is now clear that the tragedy at Littleton has helped to create a broad national consensus that we must act together to protect our children from violence, including taking efforts to keep guns away from children and away from criminals. The question is whether Congress will write that national consensus into law, or block it. Thus far, the Senate has not fully lived up to its responsibility.

I am very pleased that on Wednesday a bipartisan majority in the Senate passed two important measures I proposed two weeks ago. First they agreed to ban the import of high-capacity ammunition clips that are used to evade the 1994 ban on assault weapons. Second, they agreed to ban juvenile possession of semi-automatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, weapons used -- designed only for mayhem. There's no good reason for a child to own an AK-47 or a 15-round ammo clip.

I applaud the Senate for taking these two steps. However, on Wednesday, a narrow majority squandered an important opportunity to close the gun show loophole through which tens of thousands of guns are sold each year without background checks. Yesterday I called on the Senate to reconsider that vote. It makes no sense to let criminals continue to use legitimate gun shows as a convenience store for their weapons.

Today the Senate will vote again on a measure purporting to address this issue. However, the new Senate Republican bill is still riddled with high-caliber loopholes. It won't stop criminals from buying guns at gun shows. At the same time, it will open up a new pawn shop loophole that lets convicted felons get guns at a local pawn shop. That's actually worse than current law.

I simply can't believe the Senate will make the same mistake twice. So once again, I ask them to reject this phony proposal and to pass real legislation that requires the background checks necessary to prevent criminals from buying guns at gun shows which they cannot buy at gun stores.

This should be a moment for national unity. I was so pleased today to receive a letter from the major gun manufacturers reiterating their support for our efforts to pass real, enforceable, mandatory background checks at gun shows. They recognize that law-abiding citizens don't need a gun show loophole -- only criminals do.

For six years, we have made strong, steady progress against crime by elevating results over ideology. Today we have a chance to put aside partisanship, political divisions, and draw

MORE

special interest power that has dominated our politics on this issue for too long. For the sake of our children, I hope the Senate changes its mind and does the right thing.

Thank you.


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8:50 A.M. EDT

SPECIAL REPORT

# Newsweek

## AMERICA UNDER THE GUN



**WHAT MUST  
BE DONE  
PROTECTING  
YOUR KIDS**

BY [Illegible Name]  
[Illegible text]