



Drugs

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

January 22, 1999

Dear Mr. Reed *Bruce*

The attached charts summarize drug policy successes and challenges. Over the last three years we have made substantial headway on a number of critical fronts, including educating children and reducing the supply of cocaine.

Despite progress in both demand and supply reduction, we face major hurdles -- particularly in reducing the addicted population that consumes two-thirds of the drugs brought into our country each year, commits the most crime, and generates the majority of health-related problems. We are confident that a balanced strategy which relies on prevention, treatment, law enforcement, and supply reduction can dramatically cut the social consequences of drug abuse.

We look forward to providing a copy of the *1999 National Drug Control Strategy* in February and supporting your efforts to reduce drug abuse in America.

Sincerely yours,

Janet Crist
Chief of Staff

Mr. Bruce Reed
Assistant to the President for
Domestic Policy and Director
of the Domestic Policy Counsel
The White House
Washington, DC 20503

THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY PROGRESS REPORT

Educating Children, Preventing Drug Use -- The National Youth Media Campaign

- Campaign's aggressive goal was to reach 90% of target audiences 4 times per week, currently the Campaign is reaching 94% of target audience 7 times a week.
- Help calls to the Clearinghouse for anti-drug information are up 300% since the campaign's initiation.
- We see over 766,000 hits/month on the campaign's Internet sites; before the Campaign we averaged 33,000 hits/month.
- Media match of federal expenditures exceeds 100% -- more than dollar-for-dollar.

Securing America's Borders -- the Southwest Border

- The 2,000 mile border with Mexico is the world's busiest border; this open exchange greatly benefits both nations (1997, US merchandise exports to Mexico equal \$71.4 billion).
- The Southwest border remains the primary entry point for drugs into the United States; recent federal efforts have produced only marginal gains.
- Improving anti-drug efforts at the border is vital to both reducing the availability of drugs in America and safeguarding our economic and political relationship with Mexico.

Closing the Treatment Gap -- Insurance Parity for Substance Abuse

- For *de minimus* (0.2%) increase in the average insurance premium we can immediately make progress toward providing access to treatment to 4.1 million people up from 1.7 million.
- Initiative will pay for itself. For example, savings in incarceration costs: potentially up to 2.4 million addicted criminals will go into treatment and out of drugs/crime cycle at a possible savings of \$260,000 per person.

Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime -- Prisons and Drugs

- Prisoners who get treatment have 73% lower recidivism rate.
- Treatment is more cost effective than the average \$125,000 -- 5 year prison term.
- Efforts to break cycle of drugs and crime will pay for themselves through reductions in prison costs, social costs associated with drugs and crime (over \$110 billion per year), and through the money no longer wasted on purchase of drugs (over \$57 billion per year).

Reducing the Population of Chronically Addicted

- One-quarter of all drug users (the chronically addicted), use upwards of two-thirds of all the illegal drugs consumed in America. This addict population also drives drug-related crime rates.
- Expanding their access to treatment programs (to include methadone and LAAM) will help addicts become drug-free, reduce crime, and substantially reduce America's demand for drugs.


Breaking the Sources of Supply -- Andean Ridge

- From 1994 to 1998, Peruvian coca cultivation down 56% from 108,600 hectares to 51,000 hectares.
- From 1994 to 1998, Bolivian coca cultivation down 28% from 48,100 hectares to 38,000 hectares.

Providing the Resources and Programs to Make a Difference -- Budget and Performance Measures


- Since 1995, the Administration's counter-drug budget has increased from \$13.2 billion to \$17.8 billion in 1999. We have invested an almost 40% increase in drug prevention and a 17% increase in drug treatment.
- The Administration's Performance Measures of Effectiveness System will provide greater accountability in our anti-drug programs, and ensure that the rate of current drug use drops below 3% -- which would be the lowest level in modern-day history.

Youth attitudes determine youth marijuana use. The case of 12th graders.




Source: 1998 Monitoring the Future Study.

Drug related murders continue to decline.
Murders related to narcotic drug laws.




Cocaine Production in Peru and Bolivia has Declined Dramatically
 1995 to 1998



ONDCP: The Administration's Anti-Drug Policy is Working

Youth drug use has decreased.
Past month use of any illicit drug.




Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign
Exceeding Expectations

- Reach and Frequency:
 - ▶ GOAL -- 90% target audience 4/ a week
 - ▶ STATUS -- 95% target audience 7/ a week
- Calls to ONDCP for information --
 - ▶ Up 300% since campaign initiation
- Internet
 - ▶ Hits per month on campaign sites up over 2000 %

Source: ONDCP 1999

Federal Counterdrug Spending
 Has Increased.

Fiscal Year 1993 -1999




- Almost 40% Increase in Prevention
- 17% Increase in Treatment

Source: OMB, 1999

Aggressive anti-social behavior is clearly linked to marijuana use


Percentage of those ages 12 to 17 who reported aggressive behavior in past 6 months, by number of days marijuana was used in the past year



Source: NIMHDA Household Survey Data, 1994-1996

The Health Impact of Drug Abuse: 4.1 Million Addicts Getting Older and Sicker


Cocaine and heroin hospital emergency room mentions, 1978-1996



Source: NIMH Drug Abuse Warning Network


But We Still Have a Challenge.

The social costs of drug and alcohol abuse are increasing.



Source: NIDA, 1998

1.8 Million Americans are incarcerated: an all-time high.



Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

Personal

December 11, 1998

The Honorable Bruce N. Reed
Assistant to the President for
Domestic Policy
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Reed:

Bruce

Drug policy is a cornerstone of domestic policy. Drug abuse is a public health problem linked to our efforts to empower communities, foster a workforce that will grow the economy, curb youth violence, and preserve families. Congress recently enacted for FY 1999 a historic national drug control budget which totals \$17.8 billion. As part of its preliminary decisions on the FY 2000 budget, OMB proposes drug control funding of \$16.7 billion, \$1.1 billion below FY 1999. This funding level would be the first reduction in the drug control budget since ONDCP was established in 1989. Given the importance of drug policy to the President's domestic agenda for health and crime issues, additional resources are especially important in FY 2000 to ensure that drug control programs will succeed. Request your support for a stronger drug control budget, as final funding levels are debated over the next two weeks. ONDCP has identified priority initiatives totaling \$1 billion, as highlighted below.

For the most vital demand reduction initiatives, ONDCP has appealed for additional FY 2000 funding of **\$535 million**. These resources are needed to continue and expand drug prevention programs and provide additional treatment services nationwide. This funding consists of the following:

- **Prevention Programs - \$127 million.** This request includes \$101 million for Department of Education grant programs, \$10 million for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) for the Strengthening Families Initiative, \$10 million to expand ONDCP's Drug-Free Communities grant program, and \$6 million for youth prevention research at the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA).
- **Treatment Programs - \$408 million.** Additional resources are requested for the Department of Health and Human Services for treatment grant programs and drug research.
- **SAMHSA Grants - \$349 million.** This funding includes an additional \$249 million in drug-related funding for the Substance Abuse Block Grant (\$350 million in drug and non-drug funding), as well as \$100 million for Treatment Capacity Expansion grants. ONDCP proposes to use \$10 million of the Treatment Capacity Expansion program to support grants that will expand the availability of methadone.


- **NIDA -- \$59 million.** This request includes \$50 million for the Clinical Trials Network initiative which will develop a network of community-based programs to conduct large-scale trials of new treatments for drug use. Also requested is \$9 million for medications research, including efforts to increase the effectiveness of methadone while reducing the side effects.

For priority supply reduction programs, ONDCP has appealed for additional FY 2000 funding of **\$473 million**. These resources will provide drug treatment in prisons, help secure our borders, add operational funding for emergency resources Congress provided in FY 1999, fund important international programs, and implement an improved drug intelligence architecture. This funding consists of the following:

- **Prisons & Drugs -- \$107 million.** This includes \$85 million for Justice's Break-the-Cycle initiative which provides funding to local governments for drug testing and treatment for individuals in the criminal justice system. In addition, \$22 million is requested for other Department of Justice drug treatment programs in prisons.
- **Southwest Border -- \$99 million.** Additional resources totaling \$59 million are requested for the Customs Service for technology-based non-intrusive inspection systems at ports-of-entry. Also, \$40 million in drug-related funding (\$270 million drugs and non-drugs) is needed for the Border Patrol to hire an additional 1,000 agents, along with associated support staff and equipment.
- **Emergency Supplemental Follow-on Funding -- \$148 million.** In FY 1999, Congress provided emergency supplemental drug funding of \$870 million. For FY 2000, drug control agencies need follow-on funding to continue activities initiated by the emergency resources. This additional funding consists of \$62 million for the Coast Guard, \$35 million for Customs, \$20 million for the National Guard, \$19 million for State, \$10 million for Defense, and \$2 million for DEA.
- **Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement -- \$68 million.** This additional funding includes \$46 million for Andean Coca Reduction efforts, \$12 million for programs focusing on heroin, \$7 million for Mexico, and \$3 million for the Caribbean.
- **Interdiction/Caribbean -- \$41 million.** This request supports drug law enforcement activities in the Caribbean region, including new funding of \$19 million for the Customs Service and \$22 million to enhance the Coast Guard's Campaign Steel Web.
- **Intelligence Architecture -- \$10 million.** ONDCP lead a White House Task Force which developed a comprehensive proposal to improve the architecture of federal drug intelligence programs. To begin implementing changes recommended by the task force, \$10 million is requested in FY 2000.

Over the past few years, the Administration has made great progress toward reducing drug use and its consequences in America. With sustained attention, additional progress is assured. Understand that you have principal input on how some discretionary funding will be allocated. Meeting the country's demand reduction needs is an essential component of the President's domestic programs. Look forward to your leadership and support.

Best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Barry R. McCaffrey". The signature is stylized and written over a horizontal line.

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

November 3, 1998

Mr. Bruce N. Reed
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Reed:

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is pleased to announce that the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has awarded \$2 million for research grants and \$500,000 as supplements to existing grants in areas of interest to ONDCP's National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. Through a Memorandum of Understanding with ONDCP, NIDA is administering the communications research grant program in support of the Media Campaign.

The research grants program was developed to attract noted researchers in the communications field to conduct research projects to inform the national campaign with respect to communications objectives, media strategies, audience targeting, and evaluation designs. Through a competitive award process that adhered to National Institutes of Health procedures, NIDA selected 5 grantees from a pool of 20 eligible applicants and provided supplemental funding to 5 existing grantees.

The grantees, representing the most highly respected communications research institutions, include the following:

- Michael Slater, Colorado State University, will test the effects of the media campaign on community readiness and community action.
- Philip Palmgreen, University of Kentucky, will examine the effectiveness of the campaign in persuading African American and white sensation seeking youth in 5th through 9th grades not to use marijuana and inhalants.
- James Derzon, Vanderbilt University (TN), will use meta-analytic techniques to examine the effectiveness of media interventions in reducing drug use.
- William Crano, Claremont Graduate University (CA), will develop theory-based strategies to foster the development of anti-drug communications tailored to the psychology of white and Latino youth.
- Martin Fishbein, Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania, will test the theory of reasoned action and media priming theory in the laboratory and in the field among African American and white youth ages 12 to 18.

- Gilbert Botvin, Cornell University Medical Center, will add questions on the media campaign to an existing self-report study to assess the impact of the campaign among 5,000 multi-ethnic, inner-city New York youth.
- Brian Flay, University of Illinois at Chicago, will collect additional data over 4 years among 1,200 inner-city African American youth on their exposure to the campaign and other drug interventions.
- Douglas Longshore, RAND Corporation (CA), will supplement an existing data collection effort among a primarily rural, white population of 6,000 youth in South Dakota with questions on the impact of the campaign and the additive effects of the Project Alert Plus prevention curriculum.
- Carol Metzler and Tony Biglan, Oregon Research Institute, will examine the impact of the campaign among 330 at-risk families who are involved in an ongoing study.
- Marvin Eisen, The Urban Institute (DC), will supplement an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Lions-Quest Skills for Adolescence life skills education program by adding media exposure questions.

We appreciate your interest in this critically important effort to reduce drug use among American youth.

Respectfully,



Janet Crist
Chief of Staff



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

September 8, 1998

Mr. Bruce N. Reed
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Reed:

The purpose of this letter is to update you on ONDCP's views of the challenges facing our drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and our ideas for improving coordination among the twenty-three federal agencies involved in drug-control operations there. The enclosed *White Paper* and *Concept for Analysis* outline the general problem and offer specific suggestions for consideration by the President's Drug Policy Council. We intend to present a coordinated set of recommendations for President Clinton's consideration this fall.

The drug-control challenges we face along the Southwest Border, though severe, are not insurmountable. About 60 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. does so across this border, yet seizures in the border region are declining. Total 1998 cocaine seizures are projected to be less than half of the annual average seized between 1991 and 1996 and account for just a fifth of the cocaine crossing the border. Heroin seizures have declined by about a third since 1996. Over the past several years, the general trend has been one of fewer seizures of all drugs except marijuana. Our visits last month to San Diego and El Paso reinforced our belief that immediate action must be taken to address the following issues:

- **Drug smugglers coordinate their efforts.** Anecdotal evidence and seizure data in El Paso reveals that when met with resistance smugglers simply shift their methods and routes at the ports of entry (POEs) and between the POEs.
- **One agency's success will inadvertently and directly impact other agencies.** Border officials stated that an increase in inspection efforts at a POE, for example, often resulted in greater challenges for Border Patrol personnel between POEs.
- **The lack of communication and information sharing is a serious problem.** If a Border Patrol officer needs immediate assistance from a member of US Customs, he would have to radio his communications center which would then contact US Customs communications by telephone. US Customs communications would then radio their personnel to assist the Border Patrol officer. This time consuming process puts agents at risk.
- **Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, National Guard, and other government personnel often use outdated technology.** In many instances, line personnel have been using obsolescent equipment for years, one explanation of the insufficient results.

The enclosed White Paper contains specific recommendations to attain the following objectives:

- **Ensure the rule of law along the entire border.** Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.
- **Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times.** We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture
- **Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds upon our strengths.** No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies in a coordinated fashion can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.
- **Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.** We need to designate a federal officer who will be responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border. We must also establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at each POE (e.g., Customs) and for each sector between POEs (e.g., Border Patrol).
- **Harness counter-drug technology.** We must develop and deploy advanced technologies that increase detection rates of drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- **Work cooperatively with Mexico.** We must work in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

The fourth goal of the President's *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* is to "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontier from the drug threat." Over the past five years, the Administration has invested heavily in anti-drug programs to secure the two-thousand mile border with Mexico. As a result, Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent while the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled. We have not, however, significantly curtailed the flow of drugs across the border. We owe it to the President and to the American people to address this problem. We look forward to working closely with you and the other members of the President's Drug Policy Council in the coming weeks to develop specific recommendations for the President's consideration.

Sincerely,



Janet Crist
Chief of Staff



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

September 3, 1998

Concept for Analysis

Organizing Counter-Drug Efforts Along the Southwest Border

I. **Long-standing problem.** Since the 1980s, a number of analyses and reports have identified the need to improve our Southwest Border counter-drug efforts through the following actions:

- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control challenge;
- Need for closer coordination among Border Patrol, Customs, INS, and other agencies to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry (POEs) along the borders;
- Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort;
- Need for improved human intelligence;
- Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies;
- Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels;
- Need to combine foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.

II. Imperatives for improving counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border.

A. **General Trends.** Three major trends have complicated efforts to stop drug trafficking across the Southwest Border:

1. **Incompatible communications systems.** Operational units must be able to communicate with higher headquarters, with other units and with sources of information. Too many of our systems are either operating in isolation or are dependent upon jerry-rigged solutions.
2. **Lack of timely intelligence in the right hands.** Separate agencies collecting intelligence often do not share information that may be relevant for another agency. At the same time, agencies are sometimes unable to internally disseminate intelligence within their own organization in time to stop a shipment. Information must be made available to all involved law enforcement agencies in time to stop shipments of drugs.

3. **Lack of efficient non-intrusive inspection technology to screen cross-border traffic and detect drugs.** Currently there are only three truck scanners in place along the border. Traffickers quickly adjust to the construction of such devices, and shift drugs elsewhere. We must develop, test and field technology that can detect drugs while not hindering legitimate commerce.

B. Southwest Border drug interdiction failure. Our efforts to date have not yielded the benefits we had hoped for with the exception of marijuana, though early 1998 seizure data are showing improvements:

- In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million of the 3.54 million commercial trucks and railcars that crossed into the US from Mexico. In just 6 incidents, cocaine was found within the commercial cargo contained by these trucks and railcars.
- Cocaine seizures declined steadily between 1994 and 1997.
- Heroin seizures are down from 1996's record level.
- Methamphetamine seizures in 1997 were 36 percent lower than in 1996.
- Cocaine seizures as a result of investigations in 1997 were about one eighth of what they were in 1994.
- Cocaine seizures between POEs (not including traffic checkpoints) declined by 90 percent between 1995 and 1997.
- Despite resource enhancements at the Southwest border in recent years, approximately 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States through Mexico still crosses the border undetected.

These interdiction trends indicate a challenge posed by drug traffickers that is not being adequately met by our drug control system.

III. The Response. For the last three years, the many federal agencies involved in law enforcement, commerce and transportation along our border have been engaged in a process to determine how we can best fulfill these anti-drug imperatives. The Attorney General and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and Transportation, and the leadership of the DEA, the Border Patrol, Customs, and the INS have been integral to this effort. Our common response is to create a Southwest Border Counter-Drug White Paper for approval by the President during the fall of 1998.

- A. The Southwest Border counter-drug principles.** Three core U.S. principles guide all our efforts:
1. **Maintain deference to the U.S. Constitution.** Maintain the proper balance of federalism. Maintain respect for civil liberties and rights. No U.S. militarization of the border.

2. **Respect Mexican sovereignty.**
3. **Maintain the benefits of NAFTA trade and the enormously increased flow of commerce between our nations.**

B. The Southwest Border counter-drug objectives. There are six counter-drug objectives to be achieved:

1. **Ensure the rule of law along the entire border.** Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.
2. **Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times:** We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture. Build over time a high technology Customs Service and a 20,000+ person Border Patrol, with 500+ miles of fencing, anti-intrusion sensors and supporting infrastructure.
3. **Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds on our strengths.** No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies, can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.
4. **Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.**
 - a. **Establish a Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinator.**
 - One federal officer responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border.
 - Presidential appointee; 4 year term; Senate confirmed.
 - Small staff -- Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinating Authority (drawn from existing capabilities).
 - Located on the Border (El Paso: geographic center; already EPIC hub for intelligence, Operation Alliance and JTF-6 for military support).
 - Authority to review and integrate Southwest Border drug policy, procedures, budget and resource levels, construction and control of infrastructure, and intelligence.
 - Authority to request redeployment of counter-drug interdiction resources from federal officials.

b. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at POEs (leadership- Customs).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures, and intelligence at their assigned POE.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities at their POE.

c. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators for each sector between POEs (leadership- Border Patrol).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures and intelligence along their assigned sector.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities within their sector.

d. Train border counter-drug law enforcement agents, officers and officials. Joint training will integrate and coordinate counter-drug efforts.

5. Harness counter-drug technology.

- a. Develop and deploy advanced technologies that will increase the probability of detecting drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- b. Increase the number of counter-drug technology-assisted inspections.
- c. Intercept illegal drug money, weapons, and precursor chemicals.

6. Work cooperatively with Mexico. We are committed to working in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

*Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along
the United States Southwest Border*



**AN ONDCP
WHITE PAPER**

September 3, 1998



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

WHITE PAPER

September 3, 1998

**SUBJECT: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the United States
Southwest Border**

I. GENERAL.

a. **Purpose.** This White Paper is intended to present ideas for improving the coordination of activities of federal drug-control program agencies along the Southwest Border (SWB). It sets the stage for the implementation of follow-on actions that are designed to make it increasingly difficult for illegal drugs to flow through Mexico to the United States. The intent is to decrease the incidence of illegal drug use throughout the United States. Although the Southwest Border is where most of the drugs cross into the United States, their ultimate destination is the heartland of America, the cities, suburbs, and rural communities across the country where the drugs are retailed in local markets. By curtailing the flow across the SWB, we in fact decrease the prevalence of drugs throughout the United States and greatly reduce the corruption and violence that threaten communities on both sides of the border. The purpose of this White Paper is to:

- (1) Outline drug-control problems along the SWB.
- (2) Provide recommended coordinated responses to drug-control problems for interagency approval.
- (3) Propose a time-line for implementation of these drug-control recommendations.

b. **Objectives.** Drug-control objectives along the Southwest Border include:

(1) **Near-Term.**

- (a) Develop a recommended Southwest Border drug-control strategy for presentation to the President's Drug Policy Council and POTUS by fall 1998.
- (b) Gain interagency approval for development of an effective, coordinated response to drug-control challenges along the SWB.
- (c) Begin implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.

(2) **Mid Term.**

- (a) Implement 1st generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection mechanisms at all 24 POEs for the U.S. Customs Service.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (b) **Build a 10,000 person Border Patrol** with 200 miles of Southwest Border fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.
 - (c) **Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States** across the Southwest Border by 10 percent by the year 2002.
 - (d) **Continue accelerated implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**
- (3) **Long Term.**
- (a) **Field multiple system 2nd generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection mechanisms** at all 24 POEs.
 - (b) **Complete an integrated C3I structure** for the SWB.
 - (c) **Build a 20,000 person Border Patrol** with 500 miles of Southwest Border fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.
 - (d) **Complete a maritime surveillance system** for the Gulf and Pacific flank zones.
 - (e) **Complete implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**
 - (f) **Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States** across the Southwest Border by 80 percent by the year 2007.
- c. **Efficiency in Southwest Border Federal drug-control efforts.** The Southwest Border concept must eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlap of effort among Federal drug-control program agencies.
- d. **U.S. - Mexico relations.** The Southwest Border concept must improve existing cooperative U.S. - Mexican efforts (such as the High Level Contact Group and the Bi-National Task Force) if we are to improve our bilateral ability to significantly curtail the flow of drugs across the SWB.
- e. **Expanded legal commerce.** The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has created an unprecedented expansion of commerce between the United States and Mexico. Effective use of non-intrusive technologies within the framework of an efficient inspection regime can both stop drugs and facilitate legitimate trade.

2. THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE.

a. The Environment:

(1) **The Southwest Border is the major entry route for illegal drugs.** Approximately 50 percent of the cocaine on our streets and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine sold in the United States come across the SWB. These drugs enter by all modes of conveyance for eventual distribution throughout the United States. They come through ports of entry by car, truck, train, and pedestrian border-crossers. They come across the open desert in armed pack trains as well as on the backs of human "mules." They are tossed over border fences from urban locale to urban locale, then speeded away surreptitiously by foot and vehicle. Planes and boats find gaps in U.S./Mexican coverage and position drugs close to the Southwest Border for eventual transfer to the United States. Small boats in the Gulf of Mexico and the eastern Pacific also seek to outflank U.S. interdiction efforts and deliver drugs directly to the United States. Finally, traffickers will seek to exploit incidences of corruption in U.S. local, state and Federal border agencies to route illegal drugs and other contraband between our two nations. However, it is a tribute to the vast majority of U.S. Federal, state, and local officials dedicated to the anti-drug effort that their service is overwhelmingly characterized by dedication, integrity, courage and respect for human rights.

(2) **Challenges posed by SWB.** Drug traffickers exploit extensive legitimate commerce and traffic at the busiest border in the world. During 1996, 254 million people, seventy-five million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through thirty-nine crossings and twenty-four ports of entry (POEs). Indeed, most of the more than one-hundred billion dollars of trade that makes Mexico our 2d-largest trading partner crosses the SWB. Illegal drugs comprise but a tiny fraction of this commerce but cause a disproportionate amount of damage to both countries.

In addition to those people who lawfully cross the border, countless other people cross the border illegally, many carrying unlawful drugs or other contraband. Traffickers exploit the border's length (3,326 kilometers), remoteness, ruggedness, and diversity. The diverse terrain includes: urban sprawl that straddles both sides of the international border; hostile, remote, and vast deserts; easily passable terrain (like the Rio Grande); vulnerable air space; and exploitable maritime. Multiple jurisdictions on both sides of the international border exacerbated by the presence of four major urban complexes further complicate organized, coherent efforts to control the border. The centuries-old tradition of smuggling and illegal migration feeds this region's porosity to illegal drugs.

(3) **The Southwest Border is more an area of confluence than a line of demarcation.** The political boundary between two sovereign and democratic nations need not be a barrier to open, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relations between two peoples. The Southwest Border holds every opportunity for a rich and prosperous confluence

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

of two energetic and symbiotic cultures. Both Mexico and the United States can draw from the other to better both of our ways of life.

The essential principle – which must be shared on both sides -- is the rule of law. Both peoples insist on it; both peoples deserve it. Furthermore, since the majority of law derives from national choice – as opposed to international agreement – we must preserve due respect for the sovereignty of nations. A sovereign nation must determine and control under what conditions people and goods may enter into the territory under its authority.

The border between the United States and Mexico is unique. Our two nations share core values that include love of country, strength of family, respect for the law, and a willingness to work hard in order to procure a decent and dignified livelihood. There is no room within our shared values for the corruption and ruin that comes with the illegal drug trade.

b. Evolution of the Drug Problem. Drug traffickers, along with smugglers in general, have long seen the Southwest Border as a natural entry point to the United States because of the relative ease with which the movement of contraband from nation to nation can occur.

(1) Cocaine. When the cocaine epidemic surged in the 1970s, the preferred route for trafficking cocaine was from Colombia through the western Caribbean. Traffickers used to fly twin-engine civil aviation aircraft from Colombia to small islands in the Bahamas and then airdrop drugs into either Florida or our coastal waters for subsequent pick-up by fast boats. Their success was predicated on the “big sky” or “big ocean” theory and on our inadequate detection and monitoring capabilities. In response to this challenge, United States drug-control program agencies developed extensive detection and monitoring capabilities to sort legitimate air and maritime traffic from illicit drug traffic. As our interdiction organizations and strategies became more effective, drug traffickers changed their routes and modes of transportation in response. Mexico and the Southwest Border became the principal route for cocaine.

Land conveyances, including tractor-trailers, cars, recreation vehicles, and trains, crossing at Southwest Border ports of entry are the primary means used to smuggle cocaine into the United States from Mexico. Cocaine is also carried across the U.S. - Mexican border by foot, by backpackers and by animal caravans. Transnational trafficking organizations employ high-technology equipment including night-vision goggles and radios with scramblers, as well as military hardware such as assault rifles, and bulletproof vests. These criminal groups also use scouts with radios and scanners tuned to police frequencies to monitor drug law enforcement activities along the border.

Cocaine trafficking organizations operating from Colombia employ groups based in Mexico to smuggle a significant proportion of the cocaine supplied by the drug mafias across the SWB. These groups are typically made up of polydrug traffickers

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

with extensive experience in smuggling drugs across the SWB. Frequently, the groups receive a percentage (up to 50 percent) of the cocaine shipments in exchange for their services. This has enabled them to become wholesale sources of supply for cocaine available in many western and mid-western U.S. cities such as Chicago, Denver, and Detroit.

- (2) **Heroin.** Since the late 1970s, heroin produced in Mexico has been readily available in the United States, primarily in the West. Heroin trafficking in Mexico is controlled by transnational heroin trafficking groups operating between Mexico and the United States. These organizations control the cultivation, production, smuggling, and distribution of the drug. Heroin produced in Mexico - either in black tar, or brown powder form - is the predominant type of heroin available in the western half of the United States.

Most of the heroin produced in Mexico is destined for the U.S. market. Black tar and brown heroin are produced by traffickers operating from Mexico and sold by transnational networks operating within both nations. These trafficking organizations have been involved in smuggling heroin, cocaine, and marijuana for decades. In addition, these transnational organizations take full advantage of well-established, extended networks to distribute heroin throughout the western United States. These criminal groups also control distribution at the wholesale level. They are not generally involved in street sales that often are managed by local distribution groups.

- (3) **Methamphetamine.** Over the past few years, international organized crime groups have revolutionized the production and distribution of methamphetamine by operating large-scale laboratories in Mexico and the United States capable of producing unprecedented high-purity quantities of the drug. These organizations have saturated the western and mid-west U.S. market with methamphetamine. The amount of methamphetamine seized in transit from Mexico to the United States increased dramatically beginning in 1993. In 1993 and 1994, 306 and 692 kilograms, respectively, were seized in the United States along the border. During 1995, 653 kilograms were seized. By comparison, only 6.5 kilograms were seized in 1992.

The major methamphetamine trafficking organizations operating in Mexico and the United States regularly demonstrate their flexibility and adaptability, modifying smuggling routes and methods as needed to ship drugs into the United States. The primary points of entry into the United States for methamphetamine produced in Mexico are San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California. The most common method of transporting methamphetamine across the border is via passenger vehicle.

- (4) **Marijuana.** Marijuana from Mexico (either grown in Mexico or transshipped through Mexico from other source countries such as Colombia) accounts for a significant proportion of the marijuana available in the United States. Most of the marijuana smuggled into the United States across the Southwest Border is concealed in vehicles - often in false compartments - or hidden in shipments of legitimate agricultural products. Marijuana is also smuggled across the border by horse, raft,

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

backpack, and sporadically by private aircraft. Shipments of 50 kilograms or less are smuggled by pedestrians who enter the United States at border checkpoints, and backpackers alone or in "mule" trains who cross the border at more remote locations.

Larger shipments, ranging up to multi-thousand kilogram amounts, usually are smuggled in tractor-trailers or rail cars.

- c. **The evolution of Federal involvement along the Border – The Challenge.** The history of the Southwest Border reflects the history of the United States. At first, undefined and remote, the boundary of the United States gradually took form as our people pushed out, established contact with neighboring cultures, created communities and looked to their government for protection under the law. International competition, conflict, and agreement evolved definitions of sovereign relations. Commercial enterprises sought to leverage their potential by reaching across national divides. Amid this evolution of legitimate international relationships intruded the unsanctioned and corrosive illegal trade in goods and services – contraband, illegal immigrants, guns, and drugs – and the habits of violence and human degradation that come with them.

While the individual policy formulation, resource allocation and operational activities of all federal drug-control program agencies are supportive of the goals and objectives of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*, there is no central organizing concept for federal interdiction and intelligence efforts along the SWB. For the drug control program in particular, the current, fragmented organizational structure has been debilitating. It underlies the absence of shared accountability for the results of drug control efforts. In fact, the lack of accountability is the key weakness in the overall system. It is clearer at the Southwest Border because of the confluence of illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and trade issues. Nonetheless, the issue of accountability has been of central concern for years to the Congress, executive branch policy makers, and indeed, most of the people involved in the drug law enforcement effort and the general public. Counter-drug activities are rarely coordinated except for the very broad policy guidance of the *National Drug Control Strategy* or the very narrow case-centered criminal investigative activities. There are insufficient coordination mechanisms for translating strategic objectives into integrated, prioritized operational and investigative activities.

Some Observations:

- (1) Over the years, the federal government committed its energies and developed the processes for dealing with the needs and realities of the border region. In keeping with the laws of the United States and the dictates of national sovereignty, these individual agencies – the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and many others – applied their organizational resources to meet their assigned missions at the Southwest Border in particular and throughout the United States. The uniqueness of agency missions and their evolutionary development as new problems emerged and old problems were overcome created separate objectives and traditions among the many agencies. These individual bureaucracies came to be imbued with their own

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

sense of purpose. Where missions overlapped among different federal agencies, individual prerogatives and jurisdictions were jealously guarded. Although proximity and necessity drove some degree of cooperation, the more natural inclination for the many federal actors at the Southwest Border was to be wary of others institutions whose evolutionary development, central ethos, and stated purpose was different from one's own.

- (2) It is not surprising that interagency planning, intelligence sharing, budget coordination, and operational integration at the border is less than ideal. Organizations that have evolved in different ways and along separate paths over the decades do not readily come together with their separate organizational imperatives to support each other's specific counter-drug roles. While all of them are committed to slowing the flow of illegal drugs, they are unwilling to yield their own budgetary and manpower prerogatives to the others in order to do so. The result is a mix of redundancy, overlap, competition, and gaps in coverage; leading to needless inefficiency in stopping drugs at the border. This is unacceptable. We must bring together all of the Federal agencies involved in the efforts to counter drugs into a single, committed mission to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across the border.
- (3) The importance of coordinated anti-drug operations has long been recognized at the national level. In just the past thirty years there have been numerous efforts to improve counter-drug coordination and effectiveness and eliminate duplication of effort. In 1968, for example, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was formed. The BNDD merged the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (under the Department of the Treasury) and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). This action resulted in the Department of Justice gaining primary responsibility for drug investigations. More recent attempts to streamline federal drug-control efforts included: the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (1971), the formation of a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (1971); a Strategy Council on Drug Abuse (1972); establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration (Reorganization Plan No. 2, 1973); the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (1976), Drug Abuse Policy Office (1977/82); formation of a National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (1983); a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (1984); and the establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (1988).
- (4) Border control functions have also been subject to attempted reorganization and rationalization. Since 1930, there have been a number of efforts that included broad scale border management reorganization proposals. Improved coordination, however, has proved elusive. Presently, there are five principal departments concerned with drug control-related issues in the Southwest Border region: Treasury (drug interdiction, anti-money laundering and anti-firearms trafficking); Justice (drug and immigration enforcement, prosecutions); Transportation (drug interdiction); State (counter-drug cooperation with Mexico); and Defense (counter-drug support). Drug intelligence is currently provided by individual departments, as well as by organizations such as Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

Committee (CNC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). In addition, ONDCP oversees the Southwest Border HIDTA which encompasses the entire 2,000 mile border one to two counties deep. The HIDTA is divided into five regional counter-drug partnerships of federal, state and local enforcement agencies.

- (5) With the exception of DEA, the counter-drug mission for federal agencies is secondary to other core missions. Coordinating activities among departments and agencies will require overcoming or transcending individual agency line authority requirements and prerogatives. This is always a challenge since no individual bureaucracy willingly or wittingly allows its resources to come under the forced coordination of another organization that is outside that bureaucracy's span of control
- (6) There is much to be proud of. There have been substantial reinforcement of federal drug-control efforts along the SWB. During the past six years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the SWB. For example: Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93; the number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90; the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90; DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest Border has increased 53 percent since FY91; and the number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest Border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.
- (7) Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be integrated into the five basic border control functions as well as other functions of federal agencies:
 - (a) Inspecting people and goods at ports of entry for illegal drugs and other criminal activity.
 - (b) Patrolling between ports to prevent illegal drug entry and other illegal activity.
 - (c) Collecting and disseminating drug and other criminal information on activities likely to affect the border.
 - (d) Enhancing drug-control partnership between the U.S. and Mexico, and
 - (e) Facilitating commerce and transportation incident to legitimate trade.

The two principal border control and management agencies, Customs (Treasury) and INS (Justice) should undoubtedly remain the principal federal enforcement agencies along the SWB. Any effort to better coordinate Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must include a shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Above all, we need integrated, mutually supporting efforts that create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The following must be addressed:

d. **The Drug-Control Imperatives:**

(1) The need for a system to allocate resources against the perceived threat.

Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily available integrated overview of Federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. We need a system that anticipates trends, projects actions by drug-trafficking organizations, and that allocates resources accordingly. This is true not only at the tactical level (i.e., within individual POEs) but also across the entire border.

(2) The need for greater drug-control effectiveness.

Although we have been introducing additional inspection resources at the border over the past several years, we have not reliably increased our ability to screen trucks. In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million of the 3.54 million commercial trucks and railcars that crossed into the US from Mexico. In just 6 incidents, cocaine was found within the commercial cargo contained by these trucks and railcars. The challenge is to develop the indicators that will lead to a higher probability of contraband discovery per vehicle checked. The greater the confidence we have in selecting the appropriate vehicles for inspection, the more effective we can be in starving the drug trade, while at the same time speeding legal commerce to market. Our current drug interdiction efforts are relatively ineffective in reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. Recent statistics on the amounts of illegal drugs seized at the border seem to show that we are becoming increasingly ineffective. The inspection process should be less reliant on human resources. Instead, we need to invest in intelligence-driven processes which employ emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches.

(3) The need for better drug-control coordination.

Twenty-three separate federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the SWB. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. Regional offices of different federal agencies do not always have matching areas of responsibility. Too often, Federal organizational schema do not take into account state and local jurisdictions. As a stop-gap measure Federal agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an *ad hoc* measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established.

(4) The need for drug-control synchronization.

As Federal drug-control agencies reinforce their efforts, they must consider the effects of their actions on Federal, state, and local agencies. Too much or too little emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort without corresponding adjustments elsewhere detracts from overall effectiveness. For example, increasing the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

can overwhelm the latter.

- (5) **The need for more drug-control inspection capability.** Even as commerce and movement between the United States and Mexico has rapidly expanded in recent years, the Federal ability to properly screen all movement has not increased commensurately. Federal resources do not have to increase in proportion to the number of movements. Federal technical capabilities, however, must stay abreast of the requirement to prevent drugs from being hidden among increasing cross-border traffic.
- (6) **The need to work drug control across federal, state and local lines.** Our constitution and our legal traditions ensure the doctrine of federalism. Both state and local officials have a strong voice in how drug control efforts will be applied within their boundaries. Federal agencies must respect state and local laws and procedures. Federal agencies can also act as a catalyst to promote unity of effort among state and local efforts.
- (7) **The need for good U.S. - Mexico drug-control bilateral relations.** The United States has been blessed with peaceful relations with its two contiguous neighbors throughout the majority of its history. Seldom have nations lived in such harmony along such an expansive border. But the relations between sovereign nations cannot be taken for granted. Only through dignified and proper relations that evince respect for sovereignty can we hope to preserve the beneficial contacts that have long endured. The great common ground we have with Mexico in regard to the illegal drug trade is the recognition that neither country can tolerate wanton violation of the rule of law. Neither society can tolerate the ruin and destruction that the drug trade brings. We must build on this mutual recognition and forge relationships that allow us to develop common purpose in reducing the demand for drugs and foiling criminal traffickers.
- (8) **The need to confront drug corruption.** America is well-served by its dedicated law enforcement officers. Selfless service, physical courage, devotion to duty and integrity mark the record of their service. However, a society that spends more than fifty billion dollars on illegal drugs produces corruption on both sides of the border. Individual corruption is always a possibility. Left unchecked, it can lead to systemic corruption. It is necessary on both sides of the border to create a system of checks and balances to guard against corruption. The men and women of U.S. law enforcement who work so diligently to uphold the law deserve such supporting anti-corruption mechanisms. So do the people they serve.
- (9) **The need to integrate related drug-control issues:**
 - (a) **International Trade.** We are a trading nation. The importance of free trade across our borders cannot be overestimated. We must stop drugs. However, we must continue to facilitate the free exchange of goods which forms the underlying basis of our economy.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(b) Immigration. Any effort to better coordinate federal counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border will simultaneously affect federal immigration-control efforts. Presently, the Border Patrol estimates that 18 percent of its activities have a drug nexus. Drug-trafficking organizations capitalize on the illegal flow of people to camouflage and transport drugs. Any effective drug-control regime must also stop the uncontrolled movement of people moving money, drugs and weapons across the Southwest Border in both directions.

(c) Arms trafficking. The illegal drug trade also generates a demand for weapons in both Mexico and the United States. The demand for illegal weapons in Mexico is essentially satisfied through the illegal exportation of weapons from the United States and other nations. Federal drug-control efforts must also address this problem and appropriately support Government of Mexico efforts to stem the illegal flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico.

(d) Money laundering. One of the most pernicious effects of drug trafficking is the way in which money laundering distorts the economy of affected areas. Federal drug control efforts must deny traffickers the profits of their trade to both deter trafficking as well as to safeguard legitimate business.

3. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES. The growing seriousness of the drug-trafficking problem across the Southwest Border has already elicited a vigorous federal response. In recent years, federal drug interdiction capabilities have improved. U.S.-Mexican cooperation has also increased as both nations have underscored their commitment to the rule of law and the security of our respective citizens. These efforts and improvements, however, have been insufficient. We must do more to stem the flow of illegal drugs. The following drug-control principles, objectives and actions are proposed as a preliminary guide to action:

a. DRUG-CONTROL PRINCIPLES

(1) Sovereignty. We demand respect for our national sovereignty. We will not tolerate transgressions of illegal goods and activities across our borders. We acknowledge that Mexico demands and is entitled to this same respect. We, therefore, must pledge our commitment to the sovereign rights of both of our nations. Both the U.S. and Mexico have the obligation to act unilaterally within their own sovereign air, land, and sea space to protect their citizens from drug-related crime. At the same time, both nations must cooperate closely to ensure that drug trafficking organizations do not exploit sovereignty issues on either side of the border to avoid prosecution. Close coordination between national, regional, and local authorities on both sides of the border can ensure consensual and cooperative anti-drug ventures and allow both Mexican and U.S. officials to effectively target and prosecute drug-trafficking organizations whose activities straddle the SWB.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(2) Constitutionality. While the illegal drug trade poses a serious threat to our people and our society, we will only respond to it in strict adherence to the principles and values inherent in our constitutional traditions. Four U.S. states comprise our border with Mexico, as do scores of counties and local governments. Each of them is entitled to their rights reserved to them by the constitutions. Our response to the illegal drug trade will always respect:

(a) States' rights. Local law enforcement remains a state and local function. Drug traffickers that violate local laws or commit offenses against communities should be prosecuted visibly so that it is clear that justice has been carried out.

(b) Federal authority. Securing the border and controlling movement of people, goods, and services across it is essentially a federal responsibility. The federal government has an obligation to effectively secure the SWB.

(c) Due process. Every individual must be accorded his or her full constitutional rights. Foreign citizens apprehended in the United States must be treated in accordance with pertinent U.S. migration laws and their government(s) must be promptly notified of the status of their citizens who come into contact with law enforcement agencies.

(d) No U.S. militarization. Militarization of the border is an inappropriate response to the drug trafficking problem at the SWB. Preventing the violation of domestic U.S. laws is a function that must be performed by federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies. The U.S. Armed Forces are already providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest Border region. This support function is appropriate and should continue. However, the federal government must ensure that its law-enforcement agencies are equal to the task at hand and that the U.S. military is never assigned domestic police functions. Military operations along the border in direct prosecution of law enforcement activities is an inappropriate use of our military forces.

(3) Free trade. The greatest potential for mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Mexico lies in free trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement has brought increased prosperity to peoples of both nations. Whatever steps we take to slow the flow of drugs across the Southwest Border cannot be allowed to slow the flow of legitimate commerce.

b. DRUG-CONTROL OBJECTIVES:

(1) Ensure the rule of law along the entire border. We reject the lawlessness that comes with the illegal drug trade. We have common ground with Mexico to unite our efforts against illegal drug traffickers. No sovereign nation can cede control over any portion of its territory to criminal organizations. Nor can any community be left unprotected and subject to the influence of drug-trafficking organizations. Federal agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce the drug-control efforts of state and

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

local law-enforcement agencies anywhere along the Southwest Border to assure that the rule of law is not compromised.

(2) Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times. Illegal cross-border traffic inexorably follows the path of least resistance and highest pay-off -- the crossing sites and modes where interdiction is least likely and the highest volume of contraband can get through. Uncontested space along the border is automatically ceded to those who wish to violate our laws and regulations. "Space" must take on a new dimension to involve not only areas of air, land, and sea constituting an international border. The critical area in question also includes interior space created by humans, motor vehicles, aircraft, ships, and containers that cross a border and can be used to carry merchandise and other forms of commerce. No stretch of the Southwest Border can be left uncontested; every dimension must be considered. No cross-border shipment or movement should be immune from scrutiny or inspection. All illegal entries should be subject to detection and interruption. Ports of entry must be made more efficient; intervening spaces must be secured.

(3) Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds upon our strengths. No single entity by itself can solve the multi-faceted drug trafficking problem. Solutions can only result from coordinated efforts between Mexican authorities and U.S. Federal, state, and local agencies. Reducing drug trafficking is a sub-set of a larger federal obligation -- the requirement to control our sovereign border. We must ensure that scarce Federal resources are allocated in an efficient and timely manner to ensure a less porous, drug-free border. Each federal agency possesses unique strengths that should be optimized and used in complementary ways. In addition, while we cannot and will not tolerate a militarized border, we must consider the capabilities offered by the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. military can aid the federal effort to reduce illegal drug trafficking by: supporting surveillance, intelligence monitoring along remote stretches of the border; providing mobility and quick reaction; providing language interpretation support and intelligence sharing and analysis; providing training to domestic law enforcement agencies. The same is true for state and local agencies. Each must use existing assets in a coordinated and coherent manner.

(4) Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success. Defense of the border cannot begin and end at the border itself. All cross-border movements have three elements: a point or origin, a crossing point, and an intended destination. An effective counter-drug border control regime should be able to influence the movement of contraband drugs, precursor chemicals, illegal weapons, human couriers and illegal funds throughout this "spectrum." Legal movements can be inspected throughout this process rather than solely at the border. Illegal drug movements also should be subject to interdiction in either country before, during, or after transit. Action against drug traffickers should be taken when and where it is most advantageous. Any Southwest Border counter-drug strategy must be executed in concert with a domestic law enforcement threat assessment. As the Department of Justice, for example, progresses with its national plan for disruption and dismantlement of drug distribution organizations,

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

we must be careful to integrate their efforts into the overall Southwest Border plan.

(5) Harness counter-drug technology. Technology heightens the probability of successful interdiction of contraband. Integrated with the entire network of systems to secure our citizens from illegal drugs, technology can: improve intelligence and information sharing; lessen the vulnerability of remote areas; penetrate otherwise unobserved space; sense, detect, and track specific substances; and supplement human resources committed to interdiction efforts. In concert with the entire counter-drug strategy, technological investments must be long-term, designed to thwart drug traffickers' efforts to defeat them, and sensitive to new trends in the two-sided struggle to stem the flow of illegal drugs across our border.

(6) Work cooperatively with Mexico. The Governments of the United States and Mexico have recognized that international drug trafficking and related crimes extend beyond national boundaries and exceed the capacity of any nation to face them in isolation. At their meeting in May 1997, the Presidents of the United States and Mexico established a commitment to cooperate more closely to combat the problem of drugs and associated crimes. This commitment was formalized in the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs signed during the Presidents' meeting. The Declaration established principles under which bilateral cooperation will be carried out, and specific areas in which cooperation will be strengthened. The Declaration includes key areas of collaboration pertaining to the Southwest border drug control efforts. The United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control drafted a binational strategy designed to achieve the objectives identified in the Declaration of Alliance. This strategy will be a key pillar for a coordinated border control strategy.

c. DRUG-CONTROL ACTIONS:

(1) Establish a drug-control coordinating authority. A *U.S. Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinating Authority* will allow us to integrate efforts, complement individual inspection and interdiction operations, focus resources, provide timely and accurate intelligence, and reinforce threatened areas. Such an organization must be vested with appropriate authorities that allow it to coordinate the employment of assets belonging to all federal drug-control program agencies. A Presidentially appointed *Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator* must be the accountable federal official. This coordinating entity would operate from a base in El Paso (the present base of Operation Alliance, the Southwest Border HIDTA, JTF - 6 and EPIC). This Federal coordinator would work with all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and coordinate with appropriate Mexican authorities.

(2) Create a shared appreciation of the drug-control challenge. The many federal, state, and local agencies must have a shared bond among them that transcend their natural inclinations to compete and jealously guard their institutional prerogatives. The commitment against the illegal drug trade is not enough in itself to accomplish that. A key step would be a common educational experience that brings disparate Federal Southwest Border agents together to share techniques and procedures to counter illegal

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

drugs. This common training experience would enable them to develop a common culture and appreciate the fact that no one agency can be successful in the struggle against drugs without the integrated efforts of all the others. The success of HIDTA is a good example of a program which capitalizes on a shared appreciation of a common mission. Such an common training experience will also focus all individual law enforcement officers on a single-mission environment that will promote coordination and cooperation.

- (3) Calculate and minimize drug-control risk.** Although we intend to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across our border, we cannot disrupt the enormously beneficial cross border economic trade that generates such wealth in both nations. Risk is inherent in any counter-drug border control regime that does not seek to inspect every movement. Risk can be minimized by focusing resources on movements deemed more likely to be concealing illegal drugs and by developing systems of inspection conducive to moving a high volume of traffic while pinpointing probable illegal drug activity. The risk of drug contraband penetrating our borders will always be present. We need to manage this problem and increase the likelihood that we will intercept enough of it to discourage drug traffickers and force them away from the Southwest Border where drug violence and corruption causes such dismay on both sides of the border.
- (4) Develop a supporting drug control intelligence structure.** Counter-drug intelligence must support border control efforts in both countries by allowing appropriate agencies to identify and track suspect movements. Knowing what to look for as well as where and when can simplify the tasks of those charged with establishing an exclusionary counter-drug regime. Surveillance can offset a lack of physical presence. Sensors can help detect and track the presence of illegal human movement and of contraband. Information and intelligence, properly protected, must be shared in a timely and accurate manner so that those acting against the traffic in illegal drugs can move safely and efficiently.
- (5) Focus on drug criminal organizations.** Much illegal drug trafficking across the Southwest Border is conducted by sophisticated criminal organizations that pose threats to local and state authorities because of their wealth and propensity for violence. These organizations are not constrained by sovereignty considerations as they move illegal drugs, weapons, precursor chemicals and money between Mexico and the United States. In fact, they seek to exploit jurisdictional lines, be they national, state, or local. These drug criminal organizations must be broken up. Our counter-drug organizational efforts must similarly cross national federal, state, and local lines with greater operational flexibility than the criminal organizations we face.
- (6) Facilitate legal traffic; block illegal traffic.** An effective border control policy must facilitate appropriate interaction and constrain illegal drug transactions. Any system designed to stop illegal drug movement across a border, whether consisting of contraband or persons, must be designed so that penalties exacted on legal traffic are minimized. There must be a balance between the imperative of facilitating legal cross-border transactions and the requirement to regulate it in order to stop drugs, raise revenue, protect public health, and uphold laws. There is no reason why stringent drug-control inspection regimes should interfere in any serious way or impede properly cleared

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

commercial or private movement or transactions.

(7) **Build on existing drug control initiatives.** Ongoing initiatives such as the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Operation Alliance, and JTF-6 provide a foundation for the future. These initiatives have evolved over the years from lessons learned from both successes and failures. We need to build on what works and find continued ways to improve our operations against drugs.

(8) **Maintain integrity of law enforcement investigations.** Nothing in this document should be taken to construe any usurpation of delineated Department of Justice or Department of Treasury authority in the conduct of criminal investigations nor should it be taken to amend the discretionary powers of agency supervisors and leadership as they relate to investigations of criminal behavior.

4. PROPOSED DRUG-CONTROL STEPS.

a. **General.** This approach will ensure that our drug-control efforts along the SWB:

(1) **Conform to the *National Drug Control Strategy*.** The *National Drug Control Strategy* summarizes national drug-control goals and objectives. All federal drug-control efforts, to include those along the SWB, must be supportive of Goal 4 of the *Strategy*, "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat" and its supporting objectives.

(2) **Integrate drug control efforts.** As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest Border area, we must ensure the build-up is feasible to execute and coordinated. In particular, we must ensure that:

(a) Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

(b) Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat.

(c) Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

(3) **Match drug control resources with threats.** We must:

(a) Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.

(b) Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest Border intelligence and coordination headquarters.

(c) Create an intelligence system through the five Southwest Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (d) Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
 - (4) **Drug control efforts are long term.** There is no short-term solution to the drug trafficking problem along the SWB. The federal response must recognize that there must be a permanent capability to deter traffickers from transporting illegal drugs across any portion of the border to include its maritime flanks or air space.
 - (5) **Drug control efforts must be continuously adjusted over time.** The illegal drug threat is a continuously evolving one. Trafficking organizations will respond to federal drug-control efforts by shifting modes and conveyances. The growth of rail traffic, for example, allows traffickers new routes as long as effective screening/inspection techniques are not developed. Federal drug control efforts must anticipate changes in legal commerce as well as those of drug traffickers. Success in one section will cause shifts in trafficking patterns elsewhere. The federal drug control effort must be seen in its entirety in order to make appropriate adjustments over time.
- b. **The Southwest Border organizing plan to confront drug smuggling across the border must:**

- (1) **Address drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border in context.** All of the United States' borders, seaports, and airports are vulnerable to the drug threat. Even if we were to be successful in preventing drug trafficking activities along the SWB, trafficking organizations would shift to other entry points as they have in the past. Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, major international airports in cities such as Chicago and Orlando, seaports along the Atlantic Seaboard, in the Gulf of Mexico, and on our Pacific coast have experienced problems with drug trafficking. The U.S. - Canadian border is increasingly being targeted by traffickers. Successes in better coordinating the federal response to the drug trafficking threat along the Southwest Border must also be applied to other vulnerable regions within the "arrival zone."

Federal drug control efforts at the Southwest Border must also consider that U.S., Mexican and other trafficking organizations do not just move drugs across the SWB. They also distribute them throughout the United States, often seeking to hide among migrant populations. Information and intelligence derived by federal drug-control program agencies must be shared promptly with state and local authorities in the heartland of America. If necessary, federal law enforcement agencies must deploy resources to address the activities of transnational trafficking organizations far from our borders.

- (2) **Establish a Southwest Border Counter-drug Coordinating Authority (SWBCCA).** Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be properly coordinated. An SWBCCA can fulfill this function and can also coordinate drug control efforts with state and local authorities and Mexican governmental institutions. We must:

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (a) Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border to one federal official (a Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator). This individual would:
- (i) Be nominated from a list prepared by the Attorney General, Treasury Secretary, and Director, ONDCP.
 - (ii) Be appointed by the President for a four-year term and confirmed by the Senate.
 - (iii) Be required to submit to the Congress a coordinated annual report on federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border as an annex to the *National Drug Control Strategy*. This report should address: budget, manpower, technology, construction, intelligence and operations of counter-drug agencies along the SWB.
 - (iv) Have coordinating authority assigned to:
 - Establish in coordination with ONDCP drug-control objectives and priorities for all federal drug-control program agencies along the SWB.
 - In coordination with ONDCP recommend to heads of Southwest Border Federal drug-control program agencies changes to the organization, allocation of personnel, management, and budget of federal departments and agencies engaged in drug enforcement along the SWB.
 - Certify in coordination with ONDCP the adequacy of agency and department drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and recommend required corrective actions.
- (b) Provide the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator an organizational capability to assess the effectiveness of federal drug-control program agencies and coordinate promising or successful initiatives
- (c) Designate a Federal Customs official at each Port of Entry and a Border Patrol official along all sectors of the Southwest Border to coordinate all counter-drug interdiction efforts within their areas of responsibility. All federal drug-control program agencies would benefit from the leadership of a single accountable coordinating official in each specific area and across the entire border. This Federal coordinator would have coordinating authority over the drug-control activities of all Federal agencies within his or her area and would also be expected to coordinate with state and local counterparts as well as corresponding Mexican authorities. These Federal coordinating officials will respond to guidance from the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(3) Incorporate specific recommendations for federal agencies. (Note: To be developed by each federal drug-control program agency with responsibilities along the SWB.)

(a) Department of the Treasury.

(i) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

(ii) Customs Service.

(b) Department of State.

(c) Department of Commerce.

(d) Department of Defense.

(i) The National Guard.

(ii) Active Duty Military Forces.

(e) Department of Transportation.

-Coast Guard.

(f) Department of Justice.

(i) Drug Enforcement Administration.

(ii) Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(iii) Immigration and Naturalization Service.

-The Border Patrol.

(iv) U.S. Attorneys' Offices.

(g) Department of the Interior.

(i) Bureau of Land Management.

(ii) National Park Service.

(iii) Bureau of Indian Affairs.

(h) Department of Agriculture.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

-U.S. Forest Service.

(i) Intelligence Community.

(i) CNC

(ii) DIA

(iii) EPIC

(iv) NDIC

(v) NSA

(4) Use existing interagency structures.

(a) **HIDTA.** The five Southwest Border HDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:

(i) Ensuring the five HDTAs help coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

(ii) Increasing coordination among the border HDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).

(iii) Improve coordination among HDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.

(b) **Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF).** *Discussion to be developed by DOJ.*

(c) **El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).** *Discussion to be developed by EPIC.*

(d) **Joint Task Force Six.** *Discussion to be developed by JTF-Six.*

(e) **United States Interdiction Coordinator.** *Discussion to be developed byUSIC.*

(f) **Joint Interagency Task Forces.** *Discussion to be developed byJIATFs East, South and West.*

(5) **Develop an integrated intelligence structure that supports policy decisions and operations.** Southwest Border operations are hobbled by the existing national counter-drug intelligence architecture which does not effectively and efficiently serve the needs of policy makers or investigators and operators. There is no national

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

counter-drug intelligence requirements process that effectively directs law enforcement and foreign intelligence assets against common objectives. Case information at the state and local level is not systematically exploited for its potential usefulness to other investigations and operations. This information is not integrated with Federal information and analyzed to discern possible operational and strategic patterns.

Intelligence must form the basis for an integrated, campaign planning effort as well as support for coordinated, multi-agency investigative and operational activities. An improved organizational structure on the Southwest border must be enabled by a cogent *national counter-drug intelligence system* that meets the needs of (1) federal, state and local officers and (2) policy-makers, planners and resource allocators.

- (6) **Harness technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, weapons and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is inadequate. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics, border roads and fencing to canalize cross-border illegal drug trafficking. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- (a) Every suspect truck and train that crosses the border into the United States could be subjected to as many as three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - (b) The physical and/or electronic transfer of drug monies and weapons out of the United States can be detected.
 - (c) Fencing, sensors, lighting and remote night vision TV digital devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - (d) Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- (7) **Build required infrastructure.** Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized four years ago. In 1996, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:

- (a) Develop a strategic five-year Southwest Border plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - (b) Assign the U.S. Border Patrol complete responsibility for planning, budgeting, building, and maintaining roads, barriers and sensors along the Southwest Border.
- (8) **Nurture U.S. - Mexico relations.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the SWB. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI and DEA training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions might include:
- (a) Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - (b) Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest Border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- (9) **Involve the private sector.** The scope of this drug-control challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- (a) Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - (b) Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.

5. MILESTONES.

Aug 98	Further development of Southwest Border concept. IAWG meetings / Office visits SWB Trips (3-5 Aug, 24 - 26 Aug).
Sep 98	Interagency circulation of concept/recommendations.
Nov 98	Submission of SWB concept by PDPC to POTUS/VPOTUS; Interagency development of supporting federal budget.
Dec 98	Begin SWB implementation plan study
Jan 99	State of the Union Address: Announcement of SWB concept/ implementation plan.
Feb 99	Publication of <i>National Drug Control Strategy</i>;
Jun 99	ONDCP legislative plan implemented.
Oct 99	Begin SWB Concept implementation

- 6. CONCLUSION:** The flow of drugs across the Southwest Border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and there are growing threats to border region residents. The obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, but they are not insurmountable. Our substantial investments along the Southwest Border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing drug-control organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must.

The Southwest Border is the principal avenue for illegal drug trade into our country. We must anticipate that the greater our success at the Southwest border, the more drug traffickers will attempt to penetrate elsewhere. Therefore, we must see Southwest border organization efforts as but one step in the process to safeguard all our borders from illegal drugs. We should learn from our successes and failures, applying these lessons to future efforts to stem the flow of transnational illegal drugs into our country. Federal, state, and local authorities in the Gulf Coast, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, Northeastern and Northwestern United States, and in the Great Lakes region are facing similar organizational and coordination challenges as they seek to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In the end, we must stop drugs every where they threaten to enter the United States. But since the Southwest border is at the moment the most porous part of the nation's borders, it is there that we must mount an immediate, determined, and coordinated effort to stop the flow of drugs. We can do this. We must do this. And, at the same time, we must anticipate where further efforts will be needed to close the entire border from the destructive flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

The Burkhalter Report of 1988

The Vice President's Task Force on Border Control reported to then Vice President Bush in 1988 the following problems:

- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control challenge.
- Need for closer coordination between the Border Patrol, and Customs to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry along the borders.
- Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort.
- Need for improved human intelligence.
- Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies
- Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels.
- Combining foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.

Bruce, Tom.
FYI. I take it from
Chuck that the AG
was unimpressed.



Eyes Only

Elena

**OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500
August 18, 1998**

Sout-

**THE DIRECTOR
MEMO FOR THE HONORABLE JANET RENO
ATTORNEY GENERAL**

SUBJECT: ONDCP Southwest Border White Paper

The attached draft white paper, *Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border*, summarizes ONDCP's ideas for improving the coordination of activities of federal drug control program agencies along the Southwest border. It takes into account your own viewpoints as well as those of other members of the President's Drug Policy Council on this complicated issue.

We are tabling these ideas within the interagency for discussion and expansion and look forward to incorporating the Department of Justice's further comments. We believe that our collective ideas for decreasing the flow of illegal drugs across the Southwest border must be presented to the President this fall. They must also be contained in the annual report we submit to the Congress in February on the nation's drug problem and the federal response.

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director

Per our conversation -- on refining
concept.

WHITE PAPER
August 19, 1998

SUBJECT: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

1. GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This White Paper is intended to present ideas for improving the coordination of activities of federal drug-control program agencies along the Southwest border (SWB). It sets the stage for the implementation of follow-on actions that are designed to make it increasingly difficult for illegal drugs to flow through Mexico to the United States. The intent is to decrease the incidence of illegal drug use throughout the United States. Although the Southwest Border is where most of the drugs cross into the United States, their ultimate destination is the heartland of America, the cities, suburbs, and rural communities across the country where the drugs are retailed in local markets. By curtailing the flow across the SWB, we in fact decrease the prevalence of drugs throughout the United States and greatly reduce the corruption and violence that threaten communities on both sides of the border. In order to set out the parameters of what our actions must be, this White Paper will:

- (1) Outline drug-control challenges along the SWB.
- (2) Provide recommended responses to this challenge for interagency consideration.
- (3) Propose a time-line for consideration and implementation of these recommendations

b. Objectives. Drug-control objectives along the Southwest Border include:

(1) Near-Term.

- (a) Develop a recommended strategy for presentation to the President's Drug Policy Council and POTUS by fall 1998.
- (b) Continue interagency development of an effective, coordinated response to drug-control challenges along the SWB.
- (c) Begin implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.

(2) Mid Term.

- (a) Implement 1st generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection technology at all 24 POEs for the U.S. Customs Service.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (b) Build a 10,000 person Border Patrol with 200 miles of fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.**
 - (c) Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States across the Southwest Border by 10 percent by the year 2002.**
 - (d) Continue accelerated implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**
- (1) Long Term.**
- (a) Field multiple system 2nd generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection technology at all 24 POEs.**
 - (b) Complete an integrated C3I structure for the SWB.**
 - (c) Build a 20,000 person Border Patrol with 500 miles of fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.**
 - (d) Complete a maritime surveillance system for the Gulf and Pacific flank zones.**
 - (e) Complete implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**
 - (f) Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States across the Southwest Border by 80 percent* by the year 2007.**
- c. Achieve greater overall efficiency in federal drug-control efforts. Eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort among federal drug-control program agencies.**
- (1) Improve U.S. - Mexico relations. We must improve existing cooperative U.S. - Mexican efforts (such as the High Level Contact Group and the Bi-National Task Force) if we are to improve our bilateral ability to significantly curtail the flow of drugs across the SWB.**
 - (2) Reduce obstacles to legal commerce. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has created an unprecedented expansion of commerce between the United States and Mexico. Effective use of non-intrusive technologies within the framework of an efficient inspection regime can both stop drugs and facilitate legitimate trade.**

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border /

2. THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE.

a. The Environment:

(1) **The Southwest Border is the major entry route for illegal drugs.** More than half of the cocaine on our streets and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine sold in the United States come across the SWB. These drugs enter by all modes of conveyance for eventual distribution throughout the United States. They come through ports of entry by car, truck, train, and secreted on pedestrian border-crossers. They come across the open desert in armed pack trains as well as on the backs of human "mules." They are tossed over border fences from urban locale to urban locale, then speeded away surreptitiously by foot and vehicle. Planes and boats find gaps in U.S./Mexican coverage and position drugs close to the Southwest Border for eventual transfer to the United States. Small boats in the Gulf of Mexico and the eastern Pacific also seek to outflank U.S. interdiction efforts and deliver drugs directly to the United States. Finally, traffickers will seek to exploit incidences of corruption in U.S. local, state and Federal border agencies to route illegal drugs and other contraband between our two nations. However, it is a tribute to the vast majority of U.S. Federal, state, and local officials dedicated to the anti-drug effort that their service is characterized by dedication, integrity, courage and respect for human rights.

(2) **Challenges posed by SWB.** Drug traffickers exploit extensive legitimate commerce and traffic at the busiest border in the world. During 1996, 254 million people, seventy-five million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through thirty-nine crossings and twenty-four ports of entry (POEs). Indeed, most of the more than one-hundred billion dollars of trade that makes Mexico our 2d-largest trading partner crosses the SWB. Illegal drugs comprise but a tiny fraction of this commerce but cause a disproportionate amount of damage to both countries.

In addition to those people who lawfully cross the border, countless other people cross the border illegally, many carrying unlawful drugs or other contraband. Traffickers exploit the border's length (3,326 kilometers), remoteness, ruggedness, and diversity. The diverse terrain includes: urban sprawl that straddles both sides of the international border, hostile, remote, and vast deserts, easily passable terrain (like the Rio Grande), vulnerable air-space, and exploitable flanks offer a range of opportunities for drug traffickers and complex challenges to those that would thwart them. Multiple jurisdictions on both sides of the international border exacerbated by the presence of four major urban complexes further complicate organized, coherent efforts to control the border. The centuries-old tradition of smuggling and illegal

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

migration feeds this region's porosity to illegal drugs.

(3) The Southwest Border is more an area of confluence than a line of demarcation.

The political boundary between two sovereign and democratic nations need not be a barrier to open, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relations between two peoples. The Southwest Border holds every opportunity for a rich and prosperous confluence of two energetic and symbiotic cultures. Both Mexico and the United States can draw from the other to better both of our ways of life.

The essential principle – shared on both sides -- is the rule of law. Both peoples insist on it; both peoples deserve it. Furthermore, since the majority of law derives from national choice – as opposed to international agreement – we must preserve due respect for the sovereignty of nations. A sovereign nation must determine and control who and what under what conditions and at what times and places may enter into the territory under its authority. Any transgression to the contrary undermines the authority of the state, weakens the ties between nations, and damages the well-being of two mutually supportive cultures.

The border between the United States and Mexico is unique. Our two nations share core values that include the love of country, strength of family, respect for the law, and a willingness to work hard in order to procure a decent and dignified livelihood. There is no room within their shared values for the corruption and ruin that comes with the illegal drug trade.

b. Evolution of the Drug Problem. Drug traffickers, along with smugglers in general, have long seen the Southwest Border as a natural entry point to the United States because of the relative ease with which the movement of contraband from nation to nation can occur.

- (1) Cocaine.** When the cocaine epidemic surged in the 1970s, the preferred route for trafficking cocaine was from Colombia through the western Caribbean. Traffickers used to fly twin-engine civil aviation aircraft from Colombia to small islands in the Bahamas and then air drop drugs into either Florida or our coastal waters for subsequent pick-up by fast boats. Their success was predicated on the "big sky" or "big ocean" theory and on our inadequate detection and monitoring capabilities. In response to this challenge, United States drug-control program agencies developed extensive detection and monitoring capabilities to sort legitimate air and maritime traffic from illicit drug traffic. As our interdiction organizations and strategies became more effective, drug traffickers changed their routes and modes of transportation in response. Mexico and the Southwest Border became the principal route for cocaine.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

Land conveyances, including tractor-trailers, cars, recreation vehicles, and trains, crossing at Southwest Border ports of entry are the primary means used to smuggle cocaine into the United States from Mexico. Cocaine is also carried across the U.S. - Mexican border by foot, by both backpackers and animal caravans. To aid smuggling ventures, transnational trafficking organizations employ high-technology equipment including night-vision goggles and radios with scramblers, as well as military hardware such as assault rifles, and bulletproof vests. These groups also use scouts with radios and scanners tuned to police frequencies to monitor drug law enforcement activities along the border.

Cocaine trafficking organizations operating from Colombia employ groups based in Mexico to smuggle a significant proportion of the cocaine supplied by the drug mafias across the SWB. These groups are typically made up of polydrug traffickers with extensive experience in smuggling drugs across the SWB. Frequently, the groups receive a percentage (up to 50 percent) of the cocaine shipments in exchange for their services. This has enabled them to become wholesale sources of supply for cocaine available in many western and mid-western U.S. cities such as Chicago, Denver, and Detroit. While the trade appears to be shifting to the Caribbean and South Florida in recent years, the flexibility of the drug trade means that cocaine trafficking will continue to be a threat to the SWB.

- (2) **Heroin.** Since the late 1970s, heroin produced in Mexico has been readily available in the United States, primarily in the West. Heroin trafficking in Mexico is controlled by transnational heroin trafficking groups operating between Mexico and the United States. These organizations control the cultivation, production, smuggling, and distribution of the drug. Heroin produced in Mexico - either in black tar, or brown powder form - is the predominant type of heroin available in the western half of the United States.

Most of the heroin produced in Mexico is destined for the U.S. market. Black tar and brown heroin are produced by traffickers operating from Mexico and sold by transnational networks operating within both nations. These trafficking organizations have been involved in smuggling heroin, cocaine, and marijuana for decades. In addition, these transnational organizations take full advantage of well-established, extended networks to distribute heroin throughout the western United States. These criminal groups also control distribution at the wholesale level. They are not generally involved in street sales that often are managed by local distribution groups.

- (3) **Methamphetamine.** Over the past few years, international organized crime groups have revolutionized the production and distribution of methamphetamine by operating large-scale laboratories in Mexico and the United States capable of producing unprecedented high-purity quantities of the drug. These organizations have saturated

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

the western and mid-west U.S. market with methamphetamine. The amount of methamphetamine seized in transit from Mexico to the United States increased dramatically beginning in 1993. In 1993 and 1994, 306 and 692 kilograms, respectively, were seized in the United States along the border. During 1995, 653 kilograms were seized. By comparison, only 6.5 kilograms were seized in 1992.

The major methamphetamine trafficking organizations operating in Mexico and the United States regularly demonstrate their flexibility and adaptability, modifying smuggling routes and methods as needed to ship drugs into the United States. The primary points of entry into the United States for methamphetamine produced in Mexico are San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California. The most common method of transporting methamphetamine across the border is via passenger vehicle.

- (4) **Marijuana.** Marijuana from Mexico (either grown in Mexico or transshipped through Mexico from other source countries such as Colombia) accounts for a significant proportion of the marijuana available in the United States. Most of the marijuana smuggled into the United States across the Southwest Border is concealed in vehicles - often in false compartments - or hidden in shipments of legitimate agricultural products. Marijuana is also smuggled across the border by horse, raft, backpack, and sporadically by private aircraft. Shipments of 50 kilograms or less are smuggled by pedestrians who enter the United States at border checkpoints, and backpackers alone or in "mule" trains who cross the border at more remote locations. Larger shipments, ranging up to multi-thousand kilogram amounts, usually are smuggled in tractor-trailers.

- c. **The evolution of Federal Involvement Along the Border – The Challenge.** The history of the Southwest border reflects the history of the United States. At first, undefined and remote, the boundary of the United States gradually took form as our people pushed out, established contact with neighboring cultures, created ordered communities and looked to their government for protection under the law. International competition, conflict, and agreement evolved into definitions of sovereign relations; commercial enterprises sought to leverage their potential by reaching across national divides. Amid this evolution of legitimate international relationships intrudes the unsanctioned and corrosive illegal trade in goods and services – contraband, illegal immigrants, guns, and drugs – and the habits of violence and human degradation that come with them.

While the individual policy formulation, resource allocation and operational activities of all federal drug-control program agencies are supportive of the goals and objectives of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*, there is no central organizing concept for federal interdiction and intelligence efforts along the SWB. For the drug control program in particular, the current, fragmented organizational structure

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

has been debilitating. It underlies the absence of shared accountability for the results of drug control efforts. In fact, the lack of accountability is the key weakness in the overall system. It is clearer at the Southwest Border because of the confluence of illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and trade issues. Nonetheless, the issue of accountability has been of central concern for years to the Congress, executive branch policy makers, and indeed, most of the people involved in the drug law enforcement effort and the general public. Counter-drug activities are rarely coordinated except for the very broad policy guidance of the *National Drug Control Strategy* or the very narrow case-centered investigative activities. There are insufficient mechanisms for translating strategic objectives into integrated, prioritized operational and investigative activities.

Some Observations:

(1) Over the years, the federal government committed its energies and developed the processes for dealing with the needs and realities of the border region. In keeping with the laws of the United States and the dictates of national sovereignty, these individual agencies – the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and many others – applied their organizational resources to meet their assigned missions at the Southwest Border in particular and throughout the United States. The uniqueness of agency missions and their evolutionary development as new problems emerged and old problems were overcome created separate objectives and traditions among the many agencies. These individual bureaucracies came to be imbued with their own sense of purpose. Where missions overlapped among different federal agencies, individual prerogatives and jurisdictions were jealously guarded. Although proximity and necessity drove some degree of cooperation, the more natural inclination for the many federal actors at the Southwest Border was to be wary of others institutions whose evolutionary development, central ethos, and stated purpose was different from one's own.

(2) It is, therefore, not surprising that interagency planning, intelligence sharing, budget coordination, and operational integration at the border is less than ideal. Organizations that have evolved in different ways and along separate paths over the decades do not readily come together with their separate organizational imperatives to support each other's specific role. While all of them are committed to slowing the flow of illegal drugs, they are unwilling to yield their own budgetary and manpower prerogatives to the others in order to do so. The result is a mix of redundancy, overlap, competition, and gaps in coverage; leading to needless inefficiency in stopping drugs at the border. This is unacceptable. We must bring together all of the agencies involved in the efforts to counter drugs into a single, committed mission to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across the border.

CLOSE HOLD – DO NOT DUPLICATE
DRAFT WORKING PAPER: FOR INTERNAL ONDCP COORDINATION /COMMENT

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(3) The importance of coordinated anti-drug operations has long been recognized at the national level. In just the past thirty years there have been numerous efforts to improve counter-drug coordination and effectiveness and eliminate duplication of effort. In 1968, for example, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was formed. The BNDD merged the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (under the Department of the Treasury) and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). This action resulted in the Department of Justice gaining primary responsibility for drug investigations. More recent attempts to streamline federal drug-control efforts included: the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (1971), the formation of a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (1971); a Strategy Council on Drug Abuse (1972); establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration (Reorganization Plan No. 2, 1973); the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (1976), Drug Abuse Policy Office (1977/82); formation of a National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (1983); a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (1984); and the establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (1988).

(4) Border control functions have also been subject to attempted reorganization and rationalization. Since 1930, there have been a number of efforts that included broad scale border management reorganization proposals. Improved coordination, however, has proved elusive. Presently, there are five principal departments concerned with drug control-related issues in the Southwest Border region: Treasury (drug interdiction, anti-money laundering and anti-firearms trafficking); Justice (drug and immigration enforcement, prosecutions); Transportation (drug interdiction); State (counter-drug cooperation with Mexico); and Defense (counter-drug support). Drug intelligence is currently provided by individual departments, as well as by organizations such as Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Committee (CNC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). In addition, ONDCP oversees the Southwest Border HIDTA which encompasses the entire 2,000 mile border one to two counties deep. The HIDTA is divided into five regional counter-drug partnerships of federal, state and local enforcement agencies.

(5) With the exception of DEA, the counter-drug mission for federal agencies is secondary to other core missions. Coordinating activities among departments and agencies will require overcoming or transcending individual agency line authority requirements and prerogatives. This is always a challenge since no individual bureaucracy willingly or wittingly allows its resources to come under the forced coordination of another organization that is outside that bureaucracy's span of control.

(6) However, there is much to be proud of. There have been substantial reinforcement of federal drug-control efforts along the SWB. During the past six years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the SWB. For example: Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

FY93; the number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90; the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90; DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest Border has increased 53 percent since FY91; and the number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest Border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

(7) Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be integrated into the five basic border control functions as well as other functions of federal agencies:

- (a) **inspecting people and goods at ports of entry,**
- (b) **patrolling between ports to prevent illegal entry,**
- (c) **collecting and disseminating information on activities likely to affect the border,**
- (d) **enhancing partnership between the U.S. and Mexico, and**
- (e) **facilitating commerce and transportation incident to legitimate trade.**

The two principal border control and management agencies, Customs (Treasury) and INS (Justice) will undoubtedly remain the principal federal enforcement agencies along the SWB. Any effort to better coordinate federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must include a shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Above all, we need integrated, mutually supporting efforts that create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The following must be addressed:

d. The Imperatives:

(1) The need for a system to allocate resources against the perceived threat.

Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. We need a system that anticipates trends, projects actions by drug-trafficking organizations, and that allocates resources accordingly. This is true not only at the tactical level (i.e. within individual POEs) but also across the entire border.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (2) **The need for greater effectiveness.** Although we have been introducing additional inspection resources at the border over the past several years, they have not reliably increased our ability to screen trucks. In 1996, about 900,000 (about a quarter of the total) U.S.-bound trucks were subjected to drug control inspections. Cocaine was found in just sixteen. The challenge is to develop the indicators that will lead to a higher probability of contraband discovery per vehicle checked. The greater the confidence we have in selecting the appropriate vehicles for inspection, the more effective we can be in starving the drug trade, while at the same time speeding legal commerce to market. Our current interdiction efforts are relatively ineffective in reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. Recent statistics on the amounts of illegal drugs seized at the border seem to show that we are becoming increasingly ineffective. The inspections process should be less reliant on human resources. Instead, we need to invest in intelligence-driven processes which employ emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches.
- (3) **The need for better coordination.** At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the SWB. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. Regional offices of different federal agencies do not always have matching areas of responsibility. Too often, federal organizational schema do not take into account state and local jurisdictions. That being said, federal agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established.
- (4) **The need for synchronization.** As federal agencies reinforce their efforts, they must consider the effects of their actions on federal, state, and local agencies. Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort without corresponding adjustments elsewhere detracts from overall effectiveness. For example, increasing the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter.
- (5) **The need for more inspection capability.** Even as commerce and movement between the United States and Mexico has rapidly expanded in recent years, the federal ability to properly screen all movement has not increased commensurately. Federal resources do not have to increase in proportion to the number of movements. Federal technical capabilities, however, must stay abreast of the requirement to prevent drugs from being hidden among increasing cross-border traffic.
- (6) **The need to work across federal, state and local lines.** Our constitution and our legal traditions ensure the doctrine of federalism. Both state and local officials have a

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

strong voice in how drug control efforts will be applied within their boundaries. Federal agencies must respect state and local laws and procedures. Federal agencies can also act as a catalyst to promote unity of effort among state and local efforts.

- (7) **The need for good U.S. - Mexico bi-lateral relations.** America has been blessed with peaceful relations with its two contiguous neighbors throughout the majority of our history. Seldom have nations lived in such harmony along such expansive borders. But the relations between sovereign nations cannot be taken for granted. Only through dignified and proper relations that evince proper respect for sovereignty can we hope to pressure the beneficial contacts that have long endured. The great common ground we have with Mexico in regard to the illegal drug trade is the recognition that neither country can tolerate such wanton violation of the rule of law. Neither society can tolerate the ruin and destruction that the drug trade brings. We must build on these mutual recognitions and forge relationships that allow us to develop common purpose in reducing the demand for drugs and for bringing those that trade in them to justice.
- (8) **The need to thwart corruption.** America is well-served by its dedicated law enforcement officers who have committed themselves to the preservation of its laws. Countless examples of selfless service, physical courage, devotion to duty and integrity mark the record of their service. But it is clear that in a society that spends more than fifty billion dollars on illegal drugs corruption is a reality on both sides of the border. Individual corruption is always a possibility. Left unchecked, it can lead to systemic corruption. It is necessary on both sides of the border to create a system of checks and balances to guard against corruption. The men and women of U.S. law enforcement who work so diligently to uphold the law deserve such supporting anti-corruption mechanisms. So do the people they serve.
- (9) **The need to integrate related issues:**
- (a) **International Trade.** We are a trading nation. The importance of free trade across our borders cannot be overestimated. We must stop drugs, however we must continue to facilitate the free exchange of goods which forms the underlying basis of our economy.
- (b) **Immigration.** Any effort to better coordinate federal counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border will simultaneously affect federal immigration-control efforts. Presently, the Border Patrol estimates that 18 percent of its activities have a drug nexus. Drug-trafficking organizations capitalize on the illegal flow of people to camouflage and transport drugs. Any effective drug-control regime must also stop the uncontrolled movement of people moving money, drugs and weapons across the Southwest Border in both directions.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(c) **Arms trafficking.** The illegal drug trade also generates a demand for weapons in both Mexico and the United States. The demand for illegal weapons in Mexico is essentially satisfied through the illegal exportation of weapons from the United States. The domestic sources of weapons satisfies the U.S. demand. Federal drug-control efforts must also address this related problem and appropriately support Government of Mexico efforts to stem the illegal flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico.

(d) **Money laundering.** One of the most pernicious effects of drug trafficking is the way in which money laundering distorts the economy of affected areas. Federal drug control efforts must deny traffickers the proceeds from their trade to both deter trafficking as well as preserve legitimate business.

3. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES. The growing seriousness of the drug-trafficking problem across the Southwest Border has already elicited a vigorous federal response. In recent years, federal drug interdiction capabilities have improved. U.S.-Mexican cooperation has also increased as both nations have underscored their commitment to the rule of law and the security of our respective citizens. These efforts and improvements, however, have been insufficient. We must do more to stem the flow of illegal drugs. The following principles, tenants and actions are proposed as a preliminary guide to action:

a. PRINCIPLES

(1) **Sovereignty.** We demand respect for our national sovereignty. We will not tolerate transgressions of illegal goods and activities across our borders. We acknowledge that Mexico demands and is entitled to this same respect. We, therefore, pledge our commitment to the sovereign rights of both of our nations. Both the U.S. and Mexico have the obligation to act unilaterally within their own sovereign air, land, and sea space to protect their citizens from drug-related crime. At the same time, both nations must cooperate closely to ensure that drug trafficking organizations do not exploit sovereignty issues on either side of the border to avoid prosecution. Close coordination between national, regional, and local authorities on both sides of the border can ensure consensual and cooperative anti-drug ventures and allow both Mexican and U.S. officials to effectively target and prosecute drug-trafficking organizations whose activities straddle the SWB.

(2) **Constitutionality.** While the illegal drug trade poses a serious threat to our people and our society, we will only respond to it in strict adherence to the principles and values inherent in our constitutional traditions. Four states comprise our border with Mexico, as do scores of counties and local governments. Each of them is entitled to their rights

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

reserved to them by the constitutions. Our response to the illegal drug trade will always respect:

(a) **States' rights.** Local law enforcement remains a state and local function. Drug traffickers that violate local laws or commit offenses against communities should be prosecuted visibly so that it is clear that justice has been carried out.

(b) **Federal authority.** Securing the border and controlling movement of personnel, goods, and services across it is essentially a federal responsibility. The federal government has an obligation to effectively secure the SWB.

(c) **Due process.** Every individual must be accorded his or her full constitutional rights. Foreign citizens apprehended in the United States must be treated in accordance with pertinent U.S. migration laws and their government(s) must be promptly notified of the status of their citizens who come into contact with law enforcement agencies.

(d) **No militarization.** Militarization of the border is an inappropriate response to the drug trafficking problem at the SWB. Preventing the violation of domestic U.S. laws is a function that must be performed by federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies. The U.S. Armed Forces are already providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest Border region. This support function is appropriate and should continue. However, the federal government must ensure that its law-enforcement agencies are equal to the task at hand and that the U.S. military is never assigned domestic police functions. Military operations along the border in direct prosecution of law enforcement activities is an inappropriate use of our military forces.

(3) **Free trade.** The greatest potential for mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Mexico lies in free trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement has brought increased prosperity to peoples of both nations. Whatever steps we take to slow the flow of drugs across the Southwest Border cannot be allowed to slow the flow of legitimate commerce.

b. OBJECTIVES:

(1) **Ensure the rule of law.** We are a nation of laws. We reject the lawlessness that comes with the illegal drug trade. We believe that democratic heritage is shared by our neighbors south of the SWB. We have common ground, therefore, for uniting our efforts against illegal drug traffickers. No sovereign nation can cede control over any portion of its territory to criminal organizations. Nor can any community be left unprotected and subject to the influence of drug-trafficking organizations. Federal agencies must be

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce the efforts of state and local law-enforcement agencies anywhere along the Southwest Border to assure that the rule of law is not compromised.

- (2) **Act in a coherent, coordinated manner.** No single entity by itself can solve the multi-faceted drug trafficking problem. Any solution will result from coordinated efforts between Mexican authorities and U.S. federal, state, and local agencies. Reducing drug trafficking is a sub-set of a larger federal obligation – the requirement to control our sovereign border. We must ensure that scarce federal resources are allocated in an efficient and timely manner to ensure a less porous, drug-free border.
- (3) **Employ each agency to the utmost.** Each federal agency possesses unique strengths that should be optimized and used in complementary ways. In addition, while we cannot and will not tolerate a militarized border, we must consider the capabilities offered by the armed forces of both nations. The military can aid the federal effort to reduce illegal drug trafficking by: supporting surveillance, monitoring or patrolling activities along remote stretches of the border; providing mobility and quick reaction; providing interpretation support and intelligence sharing and analysis; providing training to domestic law enforcement agencies. The same is true for state and local agencies. Each must use existing assets in a coordinated and coherent manner.
- (4) **Organize in depth.** Defense of the border cannot begin and end at the border itself. All cross-border movements have three elements: a point or origin, a crossing point, and an intended destination. An effective counter-drug border control regime should be able to influence all movements contraband drugs, precursor chemicals, illegal weapons, human couriers and illegal funds throughout this “spectrum.” Legal movements can be inspected throughout this process rather than solely at the border. Illegal drug movements also should be subject to interdiction in either country before, during, or after transit. Action against drug traffickers should be taken when and where it is most advantageous. Any Southwest Border counter-drug strategy must be executed in concert with a domestic law enforcement threat assessment. As the Department of Justice, for example, progresses with its national plan for disruption and dismantlement of drug distribution organizations, we must be careful to integrate their efforts into the overall approach we take.
- (5) **Partnership with Mexico.** The Governments of the United States and Mexico have recognized that the international drug trafficking and related crimes extend beyond national boundaries and exceed the capacity of any nation to face them in isolation. At their meeting in May 1997, the Presidents of the United States and Mexico established a commitment to cooperate more closely to combat the problem of drugs and associated crimes. This commitment was formalized in the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs signed during the Presidents' meeting. The Declaration established principles under which bilateral cooperation will be carried out, and specific

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

areas in which cooperation will be strengthened were identified. The Declaration includes areas of key collaboration pertaining to the Southwest border drug control efforts. The United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control drafted a binational strategy designed to achieve the objectives identified in the Declaration of Alliance. This strategy will be a key pillar for a coordinated border control strategy.

- (6) **Harness counter-drug technology.** Technology heightens the probability of successful interdiction of contraband. Integrated with the entire network of systems to secure our citizens from illegal drugs, technology can improve intelligence and information sharing; lessen the vulnerability of remote areas; penetrate otherwise unobserved space; sense, detect, and track specific substances; and supplement human resources committed to interdiction efforts. In concert with the entire counter-drug strategy, technological investments must be long-term, designed to thwart drug traffickers' efforts to defeat them, and sensitive to new trends in the two-sided struggle to stem the flow of illegal drugs across our border.
- (7) **Control all of the border.** Illegal cross-border traffic inexorably follows the path of least resistance and highest pay-off -- the crossing sites and modes where interdiction is least likely and the highest volume of contraband can get through. Uncontested space along the border is automatically ceded to those who wish to violate our laws and regulations. "Space" must take on a new dimension to involve not only areas of air, land, and sea constituting an international border. The critical area in question also includes interior space created by humans, motor vehicles, aircraft, ships, and containers that cross a border and can be used to carry merchandise and other forms of commerce. No stretch of the Southwest Border can be left uncontested; every dimension must be considered. No cross-border shipment or movement should be immune from scrutiny or inspection. All illegal entries should be subject to detection and interruption. Ports of entry must be made more efficient; intervening spaces must be secured.

c. ACTIONS:

- (1) **Establish a drug defense coordinating authority.** A *U.S. Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinating Authority* will allow us to integrate efforts, complement individual inspection and interdiction operations, focus resources, provide timely and accurate intelligence, and reinforce threatened areas. Such an organization must be vested with appropriate authorities that allow it to coordinate the employment of assets belonging to all federal drug-control program agencies. A presidentially appointed *Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator* must be the accountable federal official. This coordinating entity would operate from a base in El Paso (the present base of Operation Alliance, the Southwest Border HIDTA, JTF - 6 and EPIC). This Federal coordinator would work with all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and coordinate with appropriate Mexican authorities.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (2) Create a shared appreciation of the challenge.** The many federal, state, and local agencies must have a shared bond among them that transcend their natural inclinations to compete and jealously guard their institutional prerogatives. The commitment against the illegal drug trade is not enough in itself to accomplish that. A key step would be a common educational experience that brings disparate Federal Southwest Border agents together to share techniques and procedures to counter illegal drugs. This common training experience would enable them to develop a common culture and appreciate the fact that no one agency can be successful in the struggle against drugs without the integrated efforts of all the others. The success of HIDTA is a good example of a program which capitalizes on a shared appreciation of a common mission. Such an common training experience will also focus all individual law enforcement officers on a single-mission environment that will promote coordination and cooperation.
- (3) Calculate and minimize risk.** Although we intend to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across our border, we cannot disrupt the enormously beneficial cross border economic trade that generates such wealth in both nations. Risk is inherent in any counter-drug border control regime that does not seek to inspect every movement. Risk can be minimized by focusing resources on movements deemed more likely to be concealing illegal drugs and by developing systems of inspection conducive to moving a high volume of traffic while pinpointing probable illegal drug activity. The risk of drug contraband penetrating our borders will always be present. We need to manage this problem and increase the likelihood that we will intercept enough of it to discourage drug traffickers and force them away from the Southwest Border where drug violence and corruption causes such dismay on both-sides of the border.
- (4) Develop a supporting drug control intelligence structure.** Counter-drug intelligence must support border control efforts in both countries by allowing appropriate agencies to identify and track suspect movements. Knowing what to look for as well as where and when can simplify the tasks of those charged with establishing an exclusionary counter-drug regime. Surveillance can offset a lack of physical presence. Sensors can help detect and track the presence of illegal human movement and of contraband. Information and intelligence, properly protected, must be shared in a timely and accurate manner so that those acting against the traffic in illegal drugs can move safely and efficiently.
- (5) Focus on drug criminal organizations.** Much illegal drug trafficking across the Southwest Border is conducted by sophisticated criminal organizations that pose threats to local and state authorities because of their wealth and propensity for violence. These organizations are not constrained by sovereignty considerations as they move illegal drugs, weapons, precursor chemicals and money between Mexico and the United States. In fact, they seek to exploit jurisdictional lines, be they national, state, or local. These

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

drug criminal organizations must be broken up. Our counter-drug organizational efforts must similarly cross national federal, state, and local lines with greater operational flexibility than the criminal organizations we face.

- (6) **Facilitate legal traffic; block illegal traffic.** An effective border control policy must facilitate appropriate interaction and constrain illegal drug transactions. Any system designed to stop illegal drug movement across a border, whether consisting of contraband or persons, must be designed in such a way that penalties exacted on legal traffic are minimized. There must be a balance between the imperative of facilitating legal cross-border transactions and the requirement to regulate it in order to stop drugs, raise revenue, protect public health, and uphold laws. There is no reason why stringent drug-control inspection regimes should interfere in any serious way or impede properly cleared commercial or private movement or transactions.
- (7) **Build on existing drug control initiatives.** Ongoing initiatives such as the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Operation Alliance, and JTF-Six provide a foundation for the future. These initiatives have evolved over the years from lessons learned from both successes and failures. We need to build on what works and find continued ways to improve our operations against drugs.
- (8) **Maintain integrity of investigations.** Nothing in this document should be taken to construe any usurpation of delineated authority in the conduct of investigations nor should it be taken to amend the discretionary powers of agency supervisors and leadership as they relate to investigations.

4. PROPOSED STEPS.

a. **General.** This approach will ensure that our efforts along the SWB:

- (1) **Conform to the *National Drug Control Strategy*.** The *National Drug Control Strategy* summarizes national drug-control goals and objectives. All federal drug-control efforts, to include those along the SWB, must be supportive of Goal 4 of the *Strategy*, "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat" and its supporting objectives.
- (2) **Integrated drug control efforts.** As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest Border area, we must ensure the build-up is feasible to execute and coordinated. In particular, we must ensure that:
 - (a) Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.
 - (b) Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(c) Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

(3) Match drug control resources with threats. We must:

(a) Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.

(b) Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest Border intelligence and coordination headquarters.

(c) Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.

(d) Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.

(4) Drug control efforts are long term. There is no short-term solution to the drug trafficking problem along the SWB. The federal response must recognize that there must be a permanent capability to deter traffickers from transporting illegal drugs across any portion of the border to include its maritime flanks or air space.

(5) Drug control efforts must be continuously adjusted over time. The illegal drug threat is a continuously evolving one. Trafficking organizations will respond to federal drug-control efforts by shifting modes and conveyances. The growth of rail traffic, for example, allows traffickers new routes as long as effective screening/inspection techniques are not developed. Federal drug control efforts must anticipate changes in legal commerce as well as those of drug traffickers. Success in one section will cause shifts in trafficking patterns elsewhere. The federal drug control effort must be seen in its entirety in order to make appropriate adjustments over time.

b. The Southwest Border organizing plan to confront drug smuggling across the border.

(1) Address drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border in context. All of the United States' borders, sea ports, and airports are vulnerable to the drug threat. Even if we were to be successful in preventing drug trafficking activities along the SWB, trafficking organizations would shift to other entry points as they have in the past. Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, major international airports in cities such as Chicago and Orlando, seaports along the Atlantic Seaboard, in the Gulf of Mexico, and on our Pacific coast have experienced problems with drug trafficking.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

The U.S. - Canadian border is increasingly being targeted by traffickers. Successes in better coordinating the federal response to the drug trafficking threat along the Southwest Border must also be applied to other vulnerable regions within the so-called "arrival zone.

Federal drug control efforts at the Southwest Border must also consider that U.S. and Mexican trafficking organizations do not just move drugs across the SWB. They also distribute them throughout the United States, often seeking to hide among migrant populations. Information and intelligence derived by federal drug-control program agencies must be shared promptly with state and local authorities in the heartland of America. If necessary, federal law enforcement agencies must deploy resources to address the activities of transnational trafficking organizations far from our borders.

(2) Establish a Southwest Border Counter-drug Coordinating Authority (SWBCCA). Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be properly coordinated. An SWBCCA can fulfill this function and can also coordinate drug control efforts with state and local authorities and Mexican governmental institutions. We must:

- (a)** Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border to one federal official (a Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator). This individual would:
 - (i)** Be selected by the President from a list prepared by the Attorney General, Treasury Secretary, and Director, ONDCP.
 - (ii)** Be appointed by the President for a three-year term and confirmed by the Senate.
 - (iii)** Be required to submit to the Congress a coordinated annual report on federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border as an annex to *the National Drug Control Strategy*. This report should address: budget, manpower, technology, construction, intelligence and operations of counter-drug agencies along the SWB.
 - (iv)** Have the following delegated coordinating authorities assigned by Director ONDCP, under existing law to:
 - Establish drug-control objectives and priorities for all federal drug-control program agencies along the SWB.
 - Recommend to heads of Southwest Border Federal drug-control program

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

agencies changes to the organization, allocation of personnel, management, and budget of federal departments and agencies engaged in drug enforcement along the SWB.

- Certify adequacy of agency and department drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and recommend required corrective actions.
 - (b) Provide the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator an organizational capability to assess the effectiveness of federal drug-control program agencies and coordinate promising or successful initiatives
 - (c) Designate a Federal Customs official at each port of entry and a Border Patrol official along all sectors of the Southwest Border to coordinated all counter-drug interdiction efforts across, at and behind the border. All federal drug-control program agencies should capitalize on the leadership of a single accountable coordinating official. This Federal coordinator would have coordinating authority over the drug-control activities of other federal agencies and would also be expected to coordinate with state and local counterparts as well as Mexican authorities. These Federal coordinating officials will respond to guidance from the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator.
- (3) Incorporate specific recommendations for federal agencies. (*Note: To be developed by each federal drug-control program agency with responsibilities along the SWB.*)
- (a) Department of the Treasury.
 - (i) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
 - (ii) Customs Service
 - (b) Department of State.
 - (c) Department of Commerce.
 - (d) Department of Defense.
 - (i) The National Guard.
 - (ii) Active Duty Military Forces.
 - (e) Department of Transportation.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

-Coast Guard.

(f) Department of Justice.

(i) Drug Enforcement Administration.

(ii) Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(iii) Immigration and Naturalization Service.

-The Border Patrol.

(iv) U.S. Attorneys' Offices.

(g) Department of the Interior.

(i) Bureau of Land Management.

(ii) National Park Service.

(iii) Bureau of Indian Affairs.

(h) Department of Agriculture.

-U.S. Forest Service.

(i) Intelligence Community.

(i) CNC

(ii) DIA

(iii) EPIC

(iv) NDIC

(v) NSA

(4) Use existing interagency structures.

(a) HIDTA. The five Southwest Border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:

- (i) Ensuring the five HDTAs help coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.
 - (ii) Increasing coordination among the border HDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - (iii) Improve coordination among HDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- (b) **Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF).** *Discussion to be developed by DOJ.*
 - (c) **El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).** *Discussion to be developed by EPIC.*
 - (d) **Joint Task Force Six.** *Discussion to be developed by JTF-Six.*
 - (e) **United States Interdiction Coordinator.** *Discussion to be developed by USIC.*
 - (f) **Joint Interagency Task Forces.** *Discussion to be developed by JIATFs East, South and West.*
- (5) **Develop an integrated intelligence structure that supports policy decisions and operations.** Southwest Border operations are hobbled by the existing national counter-drug intelligence architecture which does not effectively and efficiently serve the needs of policy makers or investigators and operators. There is no national counter-drug intelligence requirements process that effectively directs law enforcement and foreign intelligence assets against common objectives. Case information at the state and local level is not systematically exploited for its potential usefulness to other investigations and operations. This information is not integrated with Federal information and analyzed to discern possible operational and strategic patterns.

Intelligence must form the basis for an integrated, campaign planning effort as well as support for coordinated, multi-agency investigative and operational activities. An improved organizational structure on the Southwest border must be enabled by a cogent *national counter-drug intelligence system* that meets the needs of (1) federal, state and local officers and (2) policy-makers, planners and resource allocators.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

(6) **Harness technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics, border roads and fencing. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:

(a) Every suspect truck and train that crosses the border into the United States could be subjected to as many as three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.

(b) The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.

(c) Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.

(d) Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.

(7) **Build required infrastructure.** Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized four years ago. In 1996, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:

(a) Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.

(b) Assign the U.S. Border Patrol complete responsibility for planning, budgeting, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- (8) **Nurture U.S. - Mexico relations.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the SWB. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions might include:
- (a) Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - (b) Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest Border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- (9) **Involve the private sector.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- (a) Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - (b) Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- (10) **Develop a Southwest Border Law Enforcement Interagency Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.** Each federal drug-control program agency has a unique culture and history which are a source of continuing strength and influence its organization and procedures. Many of our federal officers have not had sufficient interagency experience to appreciate these institutional differences or to understand the mutually-supportive roles other drug-control program agencies bring to bear. While this White Paper has argued forcefully against militarization, it is appropriate to consider that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act was the result of a recognition that our Armed Forces' efficiency was impaired by lack of coordination and unity of purpose. The legislatively mandated integration of the services under unified commands has had a positive effect on military operations in both peace and war.

An interagency educational/training academy can help newly assigned agents and officers better understand federal drug control priorities along the SWB, appreciate the setting for their individual functions, and facilitate better operational coordination throughout the period of assignment. Such an academy could also develop courses appropriate for senior level officials from all federal drug-control program agencies, state and local law enforcement agencies, and Mexican officials. The academy

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

should be operated by the Southwest Border Coordinating Authority. It will help assure that assigned federal officials are highly skilled and well-disciplined and that they embrace the highest standards of integrity, professionalism, and devotion to duty.

5. MILESTONES.

- Aug 98** Further development of Southwest Border concept. IAWG meetings / Office visits (August/ September) SWB Trips (3-5 Aug, 24 - 26 Aug).
- Sep 98** PDPC to develop concept/recommendations (Sep 22d?).
- Oct 98** Interagency development of supporting federal budget.
- Feb 99** ONDCP implementation plan study.
- Jun 99** ONDCP legislative plan implemented.

- 6. CONCLUSION:** The flow of drugs across the Southwest Border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest Border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must.

The Southwest Border is but one avenue for illegal drug trade into our country. We must anticipate that the greater our success at this particular border, the more drug traffickers will attempt to penetrate elsewhere. Therefore, we must see Southwest Border organization efforts as but one step in the journey to seal all our borders from illegal drugs. We should learn from our successes and failures, applying these lessons to future efforts to stem the flow of transnational illegal drugs into our country. Federal, state, and local authorities in the Northeastern United States and in the Great Lakes region are facing similar organizational and coordination challenges as they seek to work with Canadian counterparts to stop the flow of illegal drugs from Canada into the United States.

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

**APPENDIX A:
THE PROBLEM**

General Trends

Four major trends have complicated efforts to stop drug trafficking across the Southwest Border:

- **Incompatible communications systems.** Operational units must be able to communicate with higher headquarters, with other units and with sources of information. Too many of our systems are either operating in isolation or are dependent upon jerry-rigged solutions, such as Coast Guard deck officers calling for information on private cellular telephones.
- **Lack of intelligence in the right hands.** Separate agencies collecting intelligence often do not share information that may be relevant for another agency with that agency. At the same time, agencies are sometimes unable to disseminate intelligence within their own organization in time to stop a shipment. Information must be pooled and made available to all who need it in time to stop shipments of drugs.
- **Lack of efficient technology to screen cross-border traffic and detect drugs.** Currently there are only three truck scanners in place along the SWB. Traffickers quickly adjust to the construction of such devices, and shift drugs elsewhere. We must develop, test and field technology that can detect drugs while not hindering legitimate commerce.
- **Mixed history of U.S. - Mexico relations.** The record of relations between the border partner nations has in the past been stained by various affronts to national sovereignty, mixed histories of dealing with corruption, and a less-than-optimal degree of cooperation. Our challenge is to assist our ally in solving its problem while working in a cooperative manner to solve our common drug problem and at the same time addressing concerns of Mexico.

The Burkhalter Report of 1988

The Vice President's Task Force on Border Control reported to then Vice President Bush in 1988 the following problems:

- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control

WHITE PAPER: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the Southwest Border

challenge.

- Need for closer coordination between the Border Patrol, and Customs to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry along the borders.
- Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort.
- Need for improved human intelligence.
- Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies
- Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels.
- Combining foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.

Seizure Data

Our efforts to date have not yielded the benefits we had hoped for. Last year we inspected 900,000 of the 3.7 million trucks which crossed into the U.S. from Mexico. Cocaine was found in just 16 trucks.

Seizures throughout the Southwest region have declined precipitously in recent years.

- Cocaine seizures at POEs in 1997 were about half of what they were in 1996.
- Cocaine seizures as a result of investigations in 1997 were about one-quarter of what they were in 1995.
- Cocaine seizures at checkpoints and traffic stops in 1997 were less than half of what they were in 1995.

This pattern of declining seizures is consistent for all categories of seizures. Such a broad trend indicates a challenge posed by drug traffickers that is not being met by law enforcement personnel.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1998

DRUG MEDIA CAMPAIGN LAUNCH

DATE: July 9, 1998
LOCATION: Sidney J. Marcus Auditorium
World Congress Center
MEET & GREET: 9:45 am - 10:00 am
EVENT TIME: 10:15 am - 11:25 am
FROM: Bruce Reed

I. PURPOSE

To launch the largest ever national media campaign to target youth drug use and educate young people and their parents on the dangers of drugs.

II. BACKGROUND

At this event, you will launch the national expansion of the historic youth anti-drug media campaign -- which is already underway in 12 pilot cities. This is the largest publicly funded anti-drug campaign, with a total proposed budget of \$1 billion over five years and a dollar-for-dollar match from each media outlet airing the ads. Using the full power of the mass media to change youth attitudes toward drugs, the campaign will ensure that when teens and adults turn on the television, listen to the radio, or surf the Internet, they will get the message that drugs are dangerous, wrong, and can kill you. Children are exposed to many media messages that normalize drugs. The campaign will utilize modern media and technology to give alternative messages that will compete with these influences.

By changing attitudes, youth drug use can be reduced. Studies of drug use rates over the last thirty years show that when young people disapprove of drugs and consider them dangerous, youth use rates decline. Furthermore, we now know that if a child can reach the age of 21 without using drugs, he or she will probably never use them.

Specifically, you will announce the following:

- A television "roadblock" that will air Thursday evening -- where every network will show the same counter-drug ad at 9:00 PM (EST). This ad will reach an estimated 85 percent of American television viewers. The roadblock will be

supplemented by print ads in the nation's top 100 newspapers and radio ads in the top 100 media markets.

- Local media buys to target specific drug problems in certain regions of the country. All new ads will provide the campaign clearinghouse number (800-288-7800) that will be staffed 24 hours a day and provide information on drug prevention. The campaign's new interactive website for parents and youth (www.projectknow.com.) will also be unveiled at the event.
- The anti-drug media campaign is more than just ads. It is coupled with public-private partnerships that will generate a wide range of coordinated anti-drug activities with schools, civic organizations, community anti-drug coalitions, and others. It also challenges media outlets to match the campaign's efforts -- on a dollar for dollar basis -- with related pro-bono ads or programming time for youth drug prevention.

You will be addressing audience of 600: including; 300 students ages 11-15 throughout Georgia; parents; local anti-drug advocates; community activists; and Members of Congress. In addition, the event will be carried live to over 150 satellite event sites around the country.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Event Participants:

General McCaffrey

Speaker Newt Gingrich

Senator Max Cleland

Governor Zell Miller

Mayor Bill Campbell

James Miller, 17 year-old from Portland, Oregon. James co-chairs the Regional Drug Initiative and speaks to kids about staying drug free. He is committed to not using drugs because of the pain caused by his mother's addiction when he was young.

Kim Willis, 8th grader from Erie, Pennsylvania. She is very active in her school's anti-drug coalition Kids Interacting Drug-Free Coalition (KIDco). She serves as the KIDco leader for her class and represents her Region in the Statewide organization.

Seated on stage:

Attorney General Reno

Secretary Shalala

Jim Burke, President of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Press.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- **YOU** will be announced onto the stage accompanied by General McCaffrey, Attorney General Reno, Secretary Shalala, Mayor Bill Campbell, Senator Max Cleland, Governor Zell Miller, Speaker Gingrich, Jim Burke, James Wilson, and Kim Willis.
- Senator Cleland will make remarks and introduce Mayor Campbell.
- Mayor Campbell will make remarks and introduce Speaker Gingrich.
- Speaker Gingrich make remarks and introduce Governor Miller.
- Governor Miller will make remarks and introduce James Miller.
- James Miller will make remarks and introduce General McCaffrey.
- General McCaffrey will make remarks and unveil the Campaign Ads. He will then introduce Kim Willis.
- Kim Willis will make remarks and introduce **YOU**.
- **YOU** will make remarks, work a ropeline, and then depart.

VI. REMARKS

Remarks Provided by Speechwriting.

MEET AND GREET PARTICIPANTS

Lisa Reisberg, Director of Public Education, American Academy of Pediatrics
Wallace Snyder, President/CEO, American Advertising Federation
Betty Shelling, Regional Director, Zeta Phi Beta Sorority, Inc.
Preston Padden, President, ABC TV Network
James Burke, Chairman, Partnership for a Drug Free America
Richard Bonnette, President/CEO, Partnership for a Drug Free America
Nelson Cooney, President, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America
Leon PoVey, President, National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors
Jill A. Bartholomew, National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, ONDCP
Hank and Mrs. Aaron, former baseball player
James Kelly, CEO, United Postal Service
Dwayne Ackerman, CEO Bell South
Dan Amos, CEO, AFLAC
Ruth Wooden, President, The Advertising Council
Dennis Windscheffel, Prevention Through Service Civic Alliance
Jim Ervin, Executive Vice President, Lions Club
Thomas Dortch, National President, 100 Black Men
Chief Beverly Harvard, Atlanta Police Department
Michael Hightower, Fulton County Commissioner and Former NACO President
Chief Justice Robert Benham
Bobby Moody, President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
Alan M. Levitt, Director, National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, ONDCP
Dante Washington, ONDCP
Nancy Olson, ONDCP

Taking the President's Anti-Drug Media Campaign Nationwide July 9, 1998

Today in Atlanta, the President launches the national expansion of the Anti-Drug Media Campaign he first proposed in last year's drug strategy and budget. The kick-off of the 5-year, \$2 billion Anti-Drug Media Campaign will be linked by satellite to over 150 sites around the country.

The Largest Targeted Effort Ever to Teach Youth About Drugs

The President's Anti-Drug Media Campaign is designed to use the full power of the mass media to change youth attitudes toward drugs. It is designed to let teens know -- when they turn on the television, listen to the radio, or surf the 'Net -- that drugs are dangerous, wrong and can kill you. Activities planned for today's nationwide launch include:

- A television "roadblock" that will air this evening -- where every network will show the same counter-drug ad at 9:00p.m. (EST). This ad will reach an estimated 85 percent of American television viewers. The roadblock will be supplemented by print ads in the nation's top 100 newspapers and radio ads in the top 100 media markets.
- Local media buys to target specific drug problems in certain regions of the country. All new ads will provide the campaign clearinghouse number (800-288-7800), which will be staffed 24 hours a day and provide information on drug prevention. The campaign's new interactive website for parents and youth (www.projectknow.com.) will also be unveiled.
- In January 1998, the campaign began in 12 pilot cities (Atlanta, Baltimore, Boise, Denver, Hartford, Houston, Milwaukee, Portland (OR), San Diego, Sioux City, Tucson, and Washington, D.C.). Since ads started to run in these pilot cities, anti-drug awareness has increased and requests for anti-drug publications increased by more than 300 percent.

More Than an Ad Campaign

- The anti-drug media campaign is more than just ads. It is coupled with public-private partnerships that will generate a wide range of coordinated anti-drug activities with schools, civic organizations, community anti-drug coalitions, and others. It also challenges media outlets to match the campaign's efforts -- on a dollar for dollar basis -- with related pro-bono ads or programming time for youth drug prevention.

A Record of Accomplishment

- The President has consistently proposed the largest, most ambitious anti-drug budgets ever -- and more than \$17 billion for FY 99. His 1998 National Drug Control Strategy is a comprehensive ten-year plan designed to cut drug use and its availability in half. Among other initiatives, the Strategy continues the anti-drug media campaign, improves and expands the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, shields our borders with 1,000 new Border Patrol officers and advanced drug detection technologies, strengthens law enforcement with new DEA agents to crack down on heroin and methamphetamine traffickers, and cuts crime by testing and treating crime-committing addicts.

*Put
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briefing!*

*10-
CB/LN/EL/CH/MC/MC
FR: EMMBETH*

Drugs

**Republican Press Secretary Briefing:
April 30th Drug Free America Event & Republican Women's Leadership Forum
April 24**

Drug Free America Event

Pete Jeffries (Dennis Hastert's office)

- Monday, 3pm briefing: more legislative info, schedule, social security presentation
- 3 points of attack (see blue sheet) to be used on all press releases
- 8-week campaign: late April through early July — to highlight concepts that build the blocks to a drug-free America
 - May 3-9: "Drug-Free Schools and Campuses Week"
 - Rob Portman - introduce a resolution on the floor for drug-free schools
 - resolution/bill on medical marijuana
 - higher education on the floor may be in jeopardy — can highlight provision in Solomon bill on drug-free student loans
 - "Free Needles/Needle Giveaways"
 - Democrats say individuals turn in 1 needle and get 1 clean needle; really, they turn in 1 needle and get 40-50 clean needles — the Administration is putting needles and syringes into kids' systems
 - Needle/syringe makes good prop for media events/forums/etc.
 - Some statistics that will be highlighted:
 - 70% of drugs in the U.S. crossed the S.W. border
 - under Clinton's "watch": 14,000 Americans (mostly kids) die every year of drug abuse, including drug-related crime, etc. the number increases to over 20,000
 - A "drugs in America" brief will be reissued
- Thursday, 2 pm, West side
 - trying to get 100 Republican members
 - other attendees: gold medal goalie of women's hockey team; mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota; Speaker Gingrich (keynote); task force members
 - invited Democrats - "damage control" - try to get some Democrats to "buy into it"
 - trying to get a ticking clock — each tick=1 kid dying of drug abuse
 - members will sign pledge committing themselves to the drug war
 - encourage any local anti-drug coalitions, family groups, etc. to attend
 - Event designed as local press hit

Republican Women Leaders Forum

Cara Kimberman (sp7), Speaker's Office & Michael Levy, RNC

- 600 women from 41 states (elected officials, business women, etc.)
- packets/press releases faxed to Republican offices with list of attendees from your state/district
- will include Trent Lott, Elizabeth Dole, etc.
- Agenda: political outreach (training, how to set up a PAC, etc.) + issue-driven (drugs and crime, education, small business, etc.)
- will be covered by C-SPAN, FOX; maybe Good Morning America
- press releases: put out general press releases; more specific on campaign letterhead
- play up female candidates

SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA

Mission Statement & Legislative Strategy

On March 24, House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) established the Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America to design a World War II-style victory plan to save America's children from illegal drugs. Chaired by Congressman J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and co-chaired by Congressmen Rob Portman (R-OH) and Bill McCollum (R-FL), the 32-member Task Force is responsible for helping to raise public awareness about America's drug crisis and advancing a comprehensive legislative strategy to achieve a Drug-Free America by 2002.

The Congressional battleplan to win the War on Drugs will be waged on three major fronts:

- ◆ **DETECTING DEMAND**—Prevention starts at home. We must eliminate the demand for illegal drugs in our neighborhoods through *effective education and prevention programs* to keep kids and young adults from experimenting with illegal drugs altogether, and *proven treatment programs* to help those stay off drugs once they seek assistance.
Possible Legislation includes: *Drug-Free Schools, Drug-Free Workplaces & Drug-Free Prisons*
- ◆ **STOPPING SUPPLY**—Controlling our borders is crucial. We must stop the overwhelming supply of illegal drugs by *eradicating* plants that ultimately produce illegal drugs where they're grown, *interdicting* illegal drugs by land, air and sea, *intercepting* illegal drugs at our borders before they're smuggled into the U.S., and, *eliminating sophisticated trafficking networks* which move illegal drugs throughout the U.S. and onto our street corners.
Possible Legislation includes: *Drug-Free Borders & Drug-Free Hemispheres*
- ◆ **INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY**—Federal, state, and local agencies must be empowered to win the War on Drugs and held accountable for their actions. Precious resources must be maximized to achieve required results. For instance, *hard targets* should be imposed on the nation's Drug Czar's office so the White House, Congress, and American people can all *measure the success or failure* of specific initiatives and public policies. *American businesses also must be empowered and held accountable* for stopping the multi-billion dollar illegal drug trade.
Possible Legislation includes: *Drug Czar Reauthorization & Drug-Free Money (Saunders)*

The Congressional battleplan—highlighted with a specific focus of the week between late April and early July—will be a real War on Drugs. It's not a war of words, but a war of action. The Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America will combine national leadership with community activism to ultimately declare victory in the War on Drugs by 2002. It requires action and demands results; however, these are the necessary steps to begin developing local solutions to the national problem—America's drug crisis.

MEDIA ADVISORY

CONGRESS TO UNVEIL DRUG-FREE AMERICA STRATEGY WAR ON DRUGS "DEPLOYMENT CEREMONY" OUTSIDE CAPITOL

WHO:

*Members of Congress, Including
House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and
his 32-Member Task Force for a Drug-Free America;
Local Drug Crusaders & Olympic Athletes; as well as,
School Groups, Grassroots Organizations and Anti-Drug Coalitions*

WHAT:

*A Public Rally to Renew the National Commitment
to Win the War on Drugs by 2002 and
Deploy the Congressional Agenda for a Drug-Free America*

WHEN:

*Thursday, April 30, 1998
2:00 p.m. EDT*

WHERE:

West Side Plaza of the U.S. Capitol

SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA
Communication Ideas to Emphasize & Incorporate

War will be waged on three major fronts by:

- Detering Demand
- Stopping Supply
- Increasing Accountability

A real War on Drugs

Not a war of words, but a war of action

Call to Arms

Modern-day Plague

Controlling our borders

Zero Tolerance

National leadership combined with
 community activism

Crisis in our schools

Our children are at risk

Moms & dads, teachers & preachers
 working together

Local solutions to the national problem

Requires action, demands results

We must send a clear and unequivocal
 message to parents, teachers and the
 peddlers of poison

Prevention starts at home

Front Lines

Drugs are not an American value

Epidemic

Crisis

Scourge

Poison

Principle

Goal

Consistent

Focus

Insist

Commitment

Partnership

Mobilize

Deployment

Battleplan

Attack

Fight

Command

Engage

Conquer

Declare Victory

Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America

Chairman J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL)

Chief Deputy Majority Whip's Office, H-104, U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC 20515

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 1998
CONTACT: PETE JEFFRIES at 202-225-3976

456-3530

HOUSE LEADERS INTRODUCE NEEDLE BAN-PLUS **"LOCKS THE CABINET" FROM SHIFTING FUNDS FOR NEEDLES**

WASHINGTON—Upholding their commitment to keep taxpayer dollars from needle giveaways for drug addicts, House leaders have introduced a *Needle Ban-Plus Bill* so there are no "mixed messages" about America's drug crisis.

The legislation, introduced by Congressmen Roger Wicker (R-MS), J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Bob Barr (R-GA) and Tom DeLay (R-TX), is intended to prevent any federal money from "directly or indirectly" funding free needles for intravenous drug users. Today's action follows the Clinton administration's announcement that supports needle-exchange programs (NEPs).

Wicker is a member of the Speaker's Task Force for a Drug-Free America: "Allowing federal tax dollars to be spent on needle exchange would undermine the efforts of anti-drug groups across the nation who preach a consistent, 'no-use' message to children regarding illegal drugs. Our legislation will prevent the Clinton administration from releasing federal funds for this risky program."

Lawmakers say the White House's position leaves the door open for future federal funding of needle giveaways to drug addicts. They also fear programs currently receiving federal money for unrelated projects may shift taxpayer dollars from one account to actually pay for a needle campaign from another. As drafted, the *Needle Ban-Plus Bill* states decisively: no federal funds "may be expended, directly or indirectly, to carry out any program of distributing sterile needles or syringes."

Hastert serves as Chairman of the Drug-Free America Task Force: "We're imposing a lock on the cabinet so not a dime of taxpayer money goes toward spreading drug use and incidents of HIV in our society. Our *Needle Ban-Plus* ensures that the Clinton administration won't be able to hand out drug paraphernalia with taxpayer money through the front door or even give a wink and a nod to their friends to do it through the back door. Our message is simple: drugs are deadly, and we won't fund it."

Barr is also a member of the Drug-Free America Task Force: "It's an outrage that the President is putting instruments of death in the hands of drug users, addicts and children. One must also question the judgement of a President who ignores the advice of his top policy adviser on drugs, Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey. Gen. McCaffrey has said he's opposed to needle giveaways because they send a poor message to the nation's children, and I agree. Does the administration want to fight the War on Drugs, or does it want to assist drug users?"

As Majority Whip, DeLay is the third most ranking Republican in the House Leadership: "We can't afford to let the President throw in the towel when it comes to the War on Drugs. By condoning free needles for drug addicts, the President's signing off on illegal drug use. This bill makes it clear that the federal government will not condone illegal drug use."

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<http://www.nytimes.com/yr/morday/oped/23curt.html>**Op-Ed****The New York Times**

April 22, 1998

Clean but Not Safe

By JAMES L. CURTIS

Donna Shalata, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, wanted it both ways this week. She announced that Federal money would not be used for programs that distribute clean needles to addicts. But she offered only a halfhearted defense of that decision, even stating that while the Clinton Administration would not finance such programs, it supported them in theory.

Ms. Shalata should have defended the Administration's decision vigorously. Instead, she chose to placate AIDS activists, who insist that giving free needles to addicts is a cheap and easy way to prevent H.I.V. infection.

This is simplistic nonsense that stands common sense on its head. For the past 10 years, as a black psychiatrist specializing in addiction, I have warned about the dangers of needle-exchange policies, which hurt not only individual addicts but also poor and minority communities.

There is no evidence that such programs work. Take a look at the way many of them are conducted in the United States. An addict is enrolled anonymously, without being given an H.I.V. test to determine whether he or she is already infected. The addict is given a coded identification card exempting him or her from arrest for carrying drug paraphernalia. There is no strict accounting of how many needles are given out or returned.

How can such an effort prove it is preventing the spread of H.I.V. if the participants are anonymous and if they aren't tested for the virus before and after entering the program?

Studies in Montreal and Vancouver did systematically test participants in needle-exchange programs. And the studies found that those addicts who took part in such exchanges were two to three times more likely to become infected with H.I.V. than those who did not participate. They also found that almost half the addicts frequently shared needles with others anyway.

This was unwelcome news to the AIDS establishment. For almost two years, the Montreal study was not reported in scientific journals.

After the study finally appeared last year in a medical journal, two of the researchers, Julie Brubeau and Martin T. Schechter, said that their results had

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PAGE. 07

APR 24 '98 15:11

been misinterpreted. The results, they said, needed to be seen in the context of H.I.V. rates in other inner-city neighborhoods. They even suggested that maybe the number of needles given out in Vancouver should be raised to 10 million from 2 million.

Needle-exchange programs are reckless experiments. Clearly there is more than a minimal risk of contracting the virus. And addicts already infected with H.I.V., or infected while in the program, are not given antiretroviral medications, which we know combat the virus in its earliest stages.

Needle exchanges also affect poor communities adversely. For instance, the Lower East Side Needle Reduction Center is one of New York City's largest needle-exchange programs. According to tenant groups I have talked to, the center, since it began in 1992, has become a magnet not only for addicts but for dealers as well. Used needles, syringes and crack vials litter the sidewalk. Tenants who live next door to the center complain that the police don't arrest addicts who hang out near it, even though they are openly buying drugs and injecting them.

The indisputable fact is that needle exchanges merely help addicts continue to use drugs. It's not unlike giving an alcoholic a clean Scotch tumbler to prevent meningitis. Drug addicts suffer from a serious disease requiring comprehensive treatment, sometimes under compulsion. Ultimately, that's the best way to reduce H.I.V. infection among this group. What addicts don't need is the lure of free needles.

James L. Curtis is a professor of psychiatry at Columbia University's medical school and the director of psychiatry at Harlem Hospital.

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April 22, 1998

COMMUNITY Clean Needles May Be Bad Medicine

By DAVID MURRAY

The Clinton administration on Monday endorsed the practice of giving clean needles to drug addicts in order to prevent transmission of the AIDS virus. "A meticulous scientific review has now proven that needle-exchange programs can reduce the transmission of HIV and save lives without losing ground on the battle against illegal drugs," Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala announced.

The administration is not unanimous, however; the drug czar, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who opposes needle exchange, was out of the country Monday. Who's right? As recently as a month ago, HHS had resisted needle-exchange programs. "We have not yet concluded that needle exchange programs do not encourage drug use," spokeswoman Melissa Skolfield told the Washington Post March 17. By Monday the department had reached that conclusion, though the scientific evidence that needle exchanges don't encourage drug use is as weak today as it was a month ago.

In fact, the evidence is far from clear that needle-exchange programs protect against HIV infection. Most studies have had serious methodological limitations, and new studies in Montreal and Vancouver have revealed a troubling pattern: In general, the better the study design, the less convincing the evidence that clean-needle giveaways protect against HIV.

The Montreal study, the most sophisticated yet, found that those who attended needle-exchange programs had a substantially higher risk of HIV infection than intravenous drug addicts who did not. In a much-discussed New York Times op-ed article two weeks ago, Julie Bruneau and Martin T. Schechter, authors of the Montreal and Vancouver studies respectively, explained the higher risk this way: "Because these programs are in inner-city neighborhoods, they serve users who are at greatest risk of infection. Those who didn't accept free needles . . . were less likely to engage in the riskiest activities."

Dr. Bruneau is apparently rejecting her own research. For her study had statistical controls to correct for precisely this factor. In the American Journal of Epidemiology, Dr. Bruneau wrote: "These findings cannot be explained solely on the basis of the concentration around needle-exchange programs of a higher risk intravenous drug user population with a greater baseline HIV prevalence."

Even more troubling, Dr. Bruneau reported that addicts who were initially HIV-negative were more likely to become positive after



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[Asia](#)

[Europe](#)

[The Americas](#)

[Economy](#)

[Earnings Focus](#)

[Politics & Policy](#)

[Weather](#)

[Editorial Page](#)

[Leisure & Arts](#)

[Voices](#)

[Table of Contents](#)

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initially HIV-negative were more likely to become positive after participation in the needle exchange. Dr. Bruneau speculated that needle-exchange programs "may have facilitated formation of new sharing networks, with the programs becoming the gathering places for isolated [addicts]."

Janet Lapey of Drug Watch International says needle-exchange programs often become "buyer's clubs" for addicts, attracting not only scattered users but opportunistic dealers. Not everyone agrees. Dr. Schechter says that when he asked his study's heroin users, they reported meeting elsewhere. But a delegation from Gen. McCaffrey's office returned from Vancouver in early April with some startling news: Although more than 2.5 million clean needles were given out last year, the death rate from illegal drugs has skyrocketed. "Vancouver is literally swamped with drugs," the delegation concluded. "With an at-risk population, without access to drug treatment, needle exchange appears to be nothing more than a facilitator for drug use."

The problem for science is that no study has used the most effective method for settling such issues—a randomized control trial. Moreover, needle-exchange programs are usually embedded in complex programs of outreach, education and treatment, which themselves affect HIV risk. A 1996 study showed that through outreach and education alone, HIV incidence in Chicago-area intravenous drug users was reduced 71% in the absence of a needle exchange.

Peter Lurie of the University of Michigan argues that "to defer public health action on those grounds [awaiting better research] is to surrender the science of epidemiology to thoughtless empiricism and to endanger the lives of thousands of intravenous drug users." But Dr. Lurie's reasoning appears circular. Only someone already convinced that needle-exchange programs are effective at preventing HIV can claim that addicts are jeopardized by further testing.

And drug use carries risks besides HIV infection. A recent article in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* warned that the arrival of a new drug from Mexico called "black-tar heroin," cut with dirt and shoe polish, is spreading "wound botulism." This potent toxin leads to paralysis and agonizing death, even when injected by a clean needle.

Thus, dispensing needles to the addicted could produce a public health tragedy if this policy does indeed place them at greater risk for HIV or enhances the legitimacy of hard drug use. Simply put, the administration's case is not proven.


Mr. Murray is director of research for the Statistical Assessment Service, a nonprofit group in Washington.

[Return to top of page](#)

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Washington, DC 20503



Drug Strategy

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

TO: *Rahm Emanuel*

FAX: *202-6423*

DATE: 2/17/98

FROM: Janet Crist *JC* Chief of Staff

FAX NUMBER: 202/395-6708

OFFICE NO: 202/395-6732

COMMENTS:

We're delighted that the President's Strategy is getting good media attention. Attached are:

1. The *National Drug Control Strategy: A National Consensus*.
2. The Associated Press Article of February 17.
3. The Strategy Highlights.
4. Key Drug-Policy Trends.

We think our Strategy is a responsible and realistic document which lays out a comprehensive plan of action which will achieve our common objective.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

THE 1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:
A NATIONAL CONSENSUS

NEWT GINGRICH'S PROPOSAL

- Work with NGOs to increase anti-drug coalitions.
- Give parents and children information to talk to each other about drug abuse.
- Provide market incentives for businesses to implement drug-free workplace.
- Build a system to keep our schools drug-free.
- Work with PDFA to ensure powerful anti-drug messages are presented to children.
- Set up a national clearinghouse for information on drugs for all parents.

THE 1998 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

- Expands the number of anti-drug coalitions by 10,000 beyond the 4000 already existing (pp 31-33).
- Gets information on drugs to parents and children through a \$195 M media campaign: expands parenting, mentoring and media literacy skills (pp. 30-32).
- Provides the incentives and know-how for 22 million small businesses to initiate drug-free workplaces (pp. 40-42).
- Adds 1300 drug coordinators to 6500 schools nationwide: affirms commitment to Safe and Drug-Free Schools programs(pp. 31-33).
- PDFA and ONDCP worked together on media campaign from inception, utilizing state of the art marketing (pp 30-32).
- ONDCP clearinghouse (1-800-666-3332) is up and running: web site is listed on the back cover of the *Strategy* (www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov). These services will expand.

We agree that these are all good ideas. That's why the *National Drug Control Strategy* was developed with input from thousands of informed and committed professionals (medical, international and domestic policy, legal, educational, community, law enforcement, care givers, spiritual leaders, youth mentors and parents) to ensure the best mix of programs to achieve a drug-free America.

Breaking News

FROM A.P.

The New York Times
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REVIEWS

February 17, 1998

Drug Czar: Gingrich 'Irresponsible'

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Filed at 1:31 a.m. EST

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The White House drug policy chief says House Speaker Newt Gingrich is playing party politics in the war on drugs. The speaker's office counters that lives could be lost because the Clinton administration lacks a strong anti-drug plan.

Barry R. McCaffrey, head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, reproached Gingrich as "irresponsible" for declaring that the administration's long-term plan to reduce illegal drug use was dead on arrival in Congress.

"I'm sympathetic to partisan wrangling and know that Newt Gingrich is looking for issues for the midterm election, but that's not what I signed up to do. I'm afraid he's going to do a disservice to a comprehensive strategy," McCaffrey said in an interview Monday.

"I think the American people deserve better than a hasty, partisan response from Newt Gingrich," McCaffrey said.

Gingrich's press secretary, Christina Martin, responded that "there's nothing hasty or political about Speaker Gingrich's deep disappointment that the Clinton administration cannot put together a serious strategy for saving America's teens in a more timely and effective manner. ...

"The speaker worries that the slower, more ineffective America's drug plan is, the more young lives lost and damaged. It doesn't have to be this way," she said.

The jousting over drug policy began Saturday when President Clinton, in his weekly radio address, outlined his plan to reduce the number of Americans using drugs by half over the next decade. The administration has budgeted \$17.1 billion for next year to expand prevention programs, hire more border patrol agents, drug agents and police, and treat more prisoners.

Gingrich, in response, derided that strategy as a "hodgepodge of half-steps and half-truths" and a "definition of failure." He said he would try to pass a resolution in the House asking Clinton to withdraw his plan as inadequate.

Gingrich asked why it would take a decade to reduce drug use when the Civil War was won and slavery abolished in only four, and said Republicans would push through their own anti-drug agenda. It includes community anti-drug coalitions, market incentives to help companies fight drug use and a national clearinghouse for drug information.

Last year Gingrich led efforts to win House passage of a bill that would have required the drug office to virtually end drug use in America by 2001.

"This strikes me as this brilliant man Newt Gingrich conducting drug policy by what I would have termed in my last life as "ready, fire, aim," said McCaffrey, a retired Army general.

He said the administration, with the help of Republicans, already had implemented into law many ideas pushed by Gingrich and when Gingrich rejects out-of-hand the administration's proposals, "my immediate reaction is that this is irresponsible."

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998
A Ten-Year Plan
Highlights

The National Drug Control Strategy's Five Goals

- Goal 1: Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence.
Goal 3: Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use.
Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

A Ten-Year Strategy to Reduce Drug Use and its Consequences by Half

- First-ever, comprehensive ten-year plan to reduce drug use and its consequences by one half.
- This ten-year plan is backed by: a five-year budget; and performance measures to improve accountability and efficacy.
- Supported by the largest counter-drug budget ever presented: \$17 billion.
- Dynamic and comprehensive: focuses on results not programs; each element supports all the other initiatives.

Protecting America's Kids

- *Strategy's* first goal is educate kids to enable them to reject drugs.
- Current studies show youth drug use rates have leveled off, and in some cases are in decline.
- This *Strategy* builds on programs that work and launches new initiatives:
 - ✓ *National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign* -- which will "go national" in June.
 - ✓ *Drug Free Communities Act* -- building and strengthening 14,000 community-based anti-drug coalitions across the nation.
 - ✓ *High Hopes Initiative* -- \$140 million to expand mentoring for disadvantaged children in grades six through twelve.
 - ✓ *School Drug Prevention Coordinators Initiative* -- providing prevention professionals to 6,500 schools nationwide.
 - ✓ *President's Youth Tobacco Initiative* -- stopping gateway behaviors to drug use.
 - ✓ *Youth Drug Research* -- expanding understanding of youth drug use and addiction.
- Largest percentage budget increases -- 15% or \$256 million -- for youth programs.

Strengthening Our Borders

- Launches a \$105 million *Port and Border Security Initiative*.
- Puts 1,000 new Border Patrol agents, and increasing barriers along the Southwest border.
- Deploys new, advanced technologies, such as X-rays and remote video surveillance, along the Southwest border -- including \$41 million for nonintrusive inspection technologies.
- Strengthens oversight over federal Southwest border drug control efforts.

Strengthening Law Enforcement

- Focuses on community policing by full implementation of the COPs Program.
- Launches a new DEA counter-heroin initiative.
- Launches an expanded anti-methamphetamine initiative: \$24.5 million including 100 new DEA agents.

Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime

- Provides \$85 million in funding and other support to help state and local governments implement drug testing, treatment, and graduated sanctions for drug offenders.

Reducing the Supply of Drugs and Enhancing Multinational Cooperation

- In 1997, Andean cocaine production dropped by as much as 100 tons over the prior year.
- The *Strategy* adds \$75.4 million in Department of Defense support to US, Andean, Caribbean and Mexican interdiction efforts.
- Provides \$45 million to support Andean nation counter-drug efforts, including interdiction, crop replacement, and support to law enforcement.
- Continues to build multinational cooperation against drugs, focusing on US-Mexico bilateral efforts, the Caribbean Initiative, and the upcoming Santiago Summit and UN Special Session.

Closing the Treatment Gap

- The number of people who require drug treatment but who are not in treatment -- the "gap" -- is estimated at 1.7 million.
- Provides \$200 million in Substance Abuse Block Grants to states to close the gap, increasing the total funding to \$1.5 billion.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

KEY DRUG-POLICY TRENDS

- **Illegal drug use rates are 50 percent lower than 1979's historic high levels.** Drug use levels have remained steady since 1990. Six percent of the household population aged twelve and over are current users of illegal drugs, down from 1979's level of 13 percent. Sixty-one million Americans who once used illegal drugs have now rejected them.
- **Illegal drug use has begun to level off among youth but remains unacceptably high.** Both the University of Michigan's *Monitoring the Future* survey and the *National Household Survey of Drug Abuse* reported that the six-year trend of increased drug use among 12-17 year olds has leveled off. However, this good news is tempered by the fact that today's drug-use rates among youth, while well below the 1979 peak of 16.3 percent, are substantially higher than the 1992 low of 5.3 percent.
- **The spread of methamphetamine is being checked.** The Drug Use Forecasting system found that methamphetamine use decline substantially among arrestees between 1995 and 1996.
- **Drug courts are expanding.** The nation's first drug court opened in 1989. In 1997, approximately 20,000 defendants appeared before the active 215 drug courts. ONDCP and DOJ supported the establishment of a national drug Court Institute.
- **Hemispheric anti-cocaine strategy is working.** Illicit coca cultivation decreased in Peru by 40 percent in the past two years. Coca cultivation in Bolivia stabilized.
- **Coast Guard seizures reached record levels in 1997.** In 1997, approximately 430 metric tons of cocaine passed through the transit zone toward the United States. An estimated 32 percent of this amount was seized; eighty-four metric tons in the transit zone and fifty-four metric tons in the arrival zone.
- **Bilateral drug-control strategy signed with Mexico.** President Zedillo has identified drug trafficking as the principal threat to Mexico's national security.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BRUCE REED *BR*
CHUCK RUPPE *CR*

RE: Attached ONDCP Memorandum on the Southwest Border Region

Attached is a memorandum that General McCaffrey sent to you outlining recommendations on how to improve the Administration's drug interdiction efforts along the Southwest border. Although we share the General's concerns, we do not support his recommendations at this time and do not believe this issue should be tasked to the Drug Policy Council for resolution.

First, the Treasury and Justice Departments have strong reservations about ONDCP's recommendations. In fact, less than a month ago, we met with Secretary Rubin, Attorney General Reno, and General McCaffrey to discuss coordination of border-related issues. At that time, General McCaffrey was preparing to send a report to Congress on the Southwest border that made the same recommendations as the attached memorandum. Secretary Rubin and the Attorney General expressed their opposition to sending this report to Congress, and General McCaffrey agreed to hold it. Rubin and Reno -- who oversee the enforcement agencies that carry out the drug, crime, trade and immigration laws along the border -- have concerns that assigning a single, federal official at each point of entry to coordinate drug interdiction will negatively affect or conflict with our immigration and trade policies.

Second, several other border-related issues are currently being discussed in the White House and among the agencies, and will need to be resolved over the next few months. Most notably, the Commission on Immigration Reform recently released its final report recommending that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) be disbanded and its responsibilities -- including border enforcement -- parceled out to various agencies. In the wake of this report, Members of Congress have introduced INS reform plans and included appropriations language requiring the Administration to submit similar plans by early next year.

Because of all the above, we proposed at our recent meeting with Secretary Rubin, the Attorney General, and General McCaffrey that a White House-led working group consider all border-related proposals and the issues of drug and crime enforcement, immigration, and trade that they raise. We have met internally and concluded that the White House group will be led by DPC; include Counsel's Office, OMB, NSC and NPR; and will closely coordinate with all the affected agencies to ensure that their issues are fully considered. Although we recognize ONDCP's specific mandate to oversee the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas and coordinate certain counterdrug technologies and intelligence -- and support these issues being discussed by

the Drug Policy Council -- border issues that go beyond the reach of drug policy would be more appropriately handled by the process we have outlined. At OMB's request, we expect to have some initial recommendations before the budget process is concluded. We recommend that you support this process for coordinating border-related issues.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

'97 OCT 9 10:48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

1. PURPOSE. The purposes of this memorandum are to: (a) summarize Office of National Drug Control Policy observations made during the recent ONDCP-led trip to the Southwest border; (b) report on the status of counter-drug efforts in this region; and (c) suggest interagency consideration of how federal drug control efforts along the border can be improved.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- a. From August 24, 1997-August 29, 1997, ONDCP led a delegation of federal officials on a fact-finding trip along the U.S. Southwest border. Our purpose was to review federal drug control program agency efforts to stop drug trafficking and stem drug-related violence and corruption. We also met with state and local officials in each of the border states to hear their perspectives of the drug threat. Finally, we discussed cooperative drug control efforts with Mexican officials in four major Mexican border cities (Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Tijuana).
- b. Establishing adequate control of our Southwest border is an increasingly important U.S. national security interest. As U.S.-Mexico trade continues to grow -- it has increased 122 percent since 1990 (going from \$59B to almost \$130B in 1996) -- so do the opportunities for drug trafficking. This 2,000-mile border is one of the most open and busiest in the world. Last year, 254 million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through 39 crossings and 24 ports of entries (POEs). We estimate that more than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines also enter the U.S. across this border. The enormous profits associated with this drug trade and the propensity of U.S. and Mexican criminal drug trafficking organizations to use violence and bribes to further their operations foster both corruption and lawlessness. A manifestation of this problem is the wave of murders in the Mexican border town of Ciudad Juarez following the recent death of Mexican trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
- c. Over the past four years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the Southwest border. Some examples:
 - Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.

October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
- The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

This federal attention is making a difference. For example, violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas. Federal drug seizures have also increased; USBP FY96 marijuana seizures were up 50 percent over FY94's 50,000 pounds.

d. Despite these successes, much remains to be done. For example, added inspection resources have not increased our ability to adequately screen trucks. Last year about 900,000 (about a quarter of the total) U.S.-bound trucks were subjected to drug control inspections. Cocaine was found in just sixteen. Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. We need to shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Based on our observations during this trip, ONDCP suggests the following measures will help improve federal drug control capabilities along the Southwest border:

- Improve accountability.
- Expand cooperation with Mexico.
- Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.
- Develop a system that matches resources with threats.
- Integrate technology.
- Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.
- Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.
- Encourage private sector support of our efforts.
- Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.
- Continue DOD's support role.

3. DISCUSSION

a. **Improve accountability.** At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the Southwest border. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. That being said, federal

October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

- Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official.
 - Designate an "in-charge" federal official at each POE.
- b. Expand cooperation with Mexico.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the Southwest border. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions include:
- Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- c. Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.** Current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials conducting drug control operations do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence or information. Intelligence is not adequately shared among Federal and state agencies. NDIC and EPIC roles are not supportive of operating elements. Our intelligence and information systems must:
- Bring together all federal, state and local intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts.
 - Create a seamless intelligence operation covering the entire 2000-mile border and contiguous waters.
 - Encourage law enforcement officials at all levels to conduct intelligence-driven/information-based operations.
 - Encourage appropriate, strictly protected sharing of information with vetted counterpart Mexican organizations.
- d. Develop a system that matches resources with threats.** Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.
 - Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest border intelligence and coordination headquarters.
 - Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.
 - Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
- e. Integrate counter-drug technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.
 - Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- f. Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.** Although degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:
- Ensuring the five HIDTAs coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - Establish strictly-protected coordination between HIDTAs and counterpart Mexican authorities.
 - Improve coordination between HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- g. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.** In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing federal control of a strip of land sixty feet wide along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. His intent was to assure the federal ability to secure the border. There was no follow-through on his proclamation. We must address serious infrastructure shortfalls in order to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons -- in particular drugs and drug traffickers -- into the United States. Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:
- Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - Assign one federal agency responsibility for planning, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.
- h. Encourage private sector support of our efforts.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- i. Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.** Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort detracts from overall effectiveness. Increasing, for example, the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter. As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest border area, we must ensure the build-up is steady across the board. In particular, we must ensure that:
- Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

October 7, 1997


SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

j. **Continue DoD's support role.** The U.S. Armed Forces are providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border region. This support should continue. However, all Title 10 (active components) and Title 32 (Guard and Reserves) support missions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure assigned missions are compatible with unit and individual capabilities. We should also consider making appropriate investments in those areas where our troops are being employed as a result of federal drug control program agency shortfalls.

4. **CONCLUSIONS.** The flow of drugs across the Southwest border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must. The ten initiatives outlined in this report might usefully orient the already extensive federal anti-drug effort in the region. ONDCP will table them with your Drug Policy Council over the coming months. Our intent is to provide you a fully-coordinated and supportable plan of action in the spring.

V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy

Drug

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
JOHN HILLEY *John Hilley*
BRUCE REED *Match*
CHARLES RUFF

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Maxine Waters Regarding
Programs to Combat Drug Use

Purpose

To reply to a letter from Representative Waters.

Background

Maxine Waters wrote you with two general requests (Tab II). She is outraged at the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenders, and she wants a timely and exhaustive answer to the allegations that CIA and DEA were involved with the Contras in bringing drugs into the United States. Your response lays out your policy on reviewing the sentencing guidelines. It also states that the CIA and Justice IG reports will be completed by the end of September. We have left unanswered her request for you to mention these topics at an earlier press conference, but we will provide copies of your response to General McCaffrey, AG Reno and George Tenet to make them aware of the importance you attach to these issues. CIA, Justice and ONDCP have all coordinated on this response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Representative Maxine Waters
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Maxine:

Thank you for writing to share your views about the effect of drug trafficking on the African American community. I, too, am deeply concerned about the crack addiction, distribution and associated violence that continue to plague many American communities.

At the same time, I fully understand your concern about the substantial disparity between sentences for crack- and powder cocaine-related offenses. I commend the U.S. Sentencing Commission for moving forward with recommendations to Congress to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine penalties. These recommendations, released on April 29 of this year, will be given serious consideration by my Administration. I have assigned Director McCaffrey and Attorney General Reno to review the Commission's recommendations and to report back to me with 60 days after their release.

With respect to allegations that CIA and DEA were involved with the Contras in bringing drugs into the United States, I remain committed to getting to the bottom of this story. America and the black community deserve no less. We expect both the CIA and Justice reports to be thorough and completed by the end of September. We will then brief the relevant committees and undertake to make both reports public to the extent possible.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence Agency and General McCaffrey to indicate how strongly I feel about both these issues.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Maxine Waters
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0535

cc: Attorney General Reno
Acting, Director of Central Intelligence Tenet
General McCaffrey (ONDCP)

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0535

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February 24, 1997

1484

William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have been working with the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Barry McCaffrey and Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Frank Raines on programs to combat drug use in our society. The eradication of drugs is the number one priority of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) for this term of Congress. The CBC will be unveiling its program to deal with the drug program in the very near future.

I have worked well with ONDCP and am delighted with the overall tone and thrust of this year's drug strategy, especially the proposed increases in drug treatment, prevention, and education. We believe that these emphases are crucial components of a successful long-term program of drug abuse reduction.

In addition, there are two other issues which are of primary concern to Members of the Congressional Black Caucus and their constituents. Our community is outraged by the disparity in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine. We have been inundated with letters from prisoners, their families, and other concerned citizens who have seen extremely lengthy prison terms applied to small- and first-time offenders for crack-related offenses. It is impossible for us to discuss the problem of drugs in our communities without addressing this concern.

To that end, would it be possible for you, at your press conference tomorrow, to give recognition to this issue? It would be useful if you described your awareness that this issue is of great concern to many Americans, and pursuant to Congressional directive and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's charge, that the disparity question will be reviewed again this year.

Second, the startling revelations of alleged Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and Drug Enforcement Agency complicity in the drug trade with the Nicaraguan Contra in the 1980s have shocked much of America. This is an issue that has created more debate and discussion among African-Americans in particular than any public policy issue in recent times.
President Clinton

As you know, both the Justice Department and C.I.A. Inspectors General (I.G.) are in the process of conducting investigations into these allegations. I would like to know whether you could, again, during your press conference tomorrow, acknowledge these investigations. Although to date, no firm conclusions have been drawn from either the Justice Department or C.I.A.'s I.G. of U.S. government wrongdoing, your mention of the investigations and the significance of their timely, thorough, and exhaustive completion would show many Americans we are serious about getting real answers to these questions once and for all.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter. I look forward to working with you in the future.

Sincerely,



MAXINE WATERS

Jerry Jones 56625

The college needs commitment on sentencing

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Maxine:

Thank you for writing to share your views about the effect of drug trafficking on the African American community. I, too, am deeply concerned about the crack addiction, distribution and associated violence that continue to plague many American communities.

At the same time, I fully understand your concern about the substantial disparity between sentences for crack- and powder cocaine-related offenses. ~~I believe that the sentencing structure should reflect the fact that all crack starts as powder. My Administration strongly endorses the Sentencing Commission's planned review of this issue and looks forward to receiving its recommendations. Meanwhile, I have instructed the Attorney General to develop enforcement strategies that target equally those who distribute crack and those who sell powder with the knowledge that it will be converted into crack. We must go after drug traffickers at every level of their networks in order to make America's streets neighborhoods and communities safer.~~

With respect to allegations that CIA and DEA were involved with the Contras in bringing drugs into the United States, I remain committed to getting to the bottom of this story. We expect both the CIA and Justice reports to be thorough and completed by the end of September. We will then brief the relevant committees and undertake to make both reports public to the extent possible.

I commend the U.S. Sentencing Commission for moving forward with recommendations to Congress to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine penalties. These recommendations, released on April 29 of this year, will be given serious consideration in my Administration. I have asked Director →

I am sending copies of this letter to the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence and General McCaffrey to stress my strong views on both these issues.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Maxine Waters
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0535

cc: Attorney General Reno
Acting Director of Central
Intelligence Tenet
General McCaffrey (ONDCP)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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The Honorable Maxine Waters
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0535

cc: Attorney General Reno
Acting Director of Central
Intelligence Tenet
General McCaffrey (ONDCP)

FY 97 DRUG CONTROL BUDGET

Drugs

PREVENTION

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program (DoEd)

- Pres Request: \$540m (state grants & national programs)
 - House: \$440.978m (\$99.022m cut)
 - Senate: no action due to Sen stalemate on Labor/HHS Approps bill re domestic spending (Lott/Hatfield)
- Conference: probable CR; no bill until election

President's Crime Prevention Council

- Pres Request: \$1.8 m
- House: \$0
- Senate: \$0

TREATMENT

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA - HHS)

- Pres Request: \$1,284.620b
 - House: \$1,100.925b (\$183.695m cut)
 - Senate: no action due to stalemate
- Conference: probable CR; no bill until election

INTERNATIONAL DRUG BUDGET

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL - State)

- Pres Request: \$193m
 - House: \$150m (\$43m cut)
 - Senate: \$193m
- Senate action result of Coverdell (R-GA) Amendment on Sen Floor
Committee mark: \$160m
- Conference: will probably split the difference 150-193m

INTERDICTION

U.S. Coast Guard (DoTransportation)

- Pres Request: \$345.919m
 - House: \$339.5m (\$6.419m cut)
 - Senate: \$345.3m (\$2.619m cut)
- Conference: will probably split the difference (339.5-345.3m)

\$250m Counternarcotics Request

- FY 96 Supplemental DoD Reprogramming Denied in 4/96 CR
 - FY 97 4/96 CR (P.L. 104-134): "Conferees express their intent to fund these additional requirements in the fiscal year 1997 appropriations process."
 - DoD request: \$132m reprogramming
 - House/Senate: \$119m
- Other:
- Operations Gateway: \$ 28m
 - Marijuana Eradication: 2m

EFFECT OF HOUSE-PROPOSED RESCISSIONS TO EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Drugs

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities State Grants


	1995 Allotment	Proposed Rescission	Percent Change
TOTAL APPROPRIATION	\$456,962,000	\$456,962,000	-100%
ALABAMA	7,506,839	7,506,839	-100%
ALASKA	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
ARIZONA	6,487,092	6,487,092	-100%
ARKANSAS	4,492,073	4,492,073	-100%
CALIFORNIA	49,770,887	49,770,887	-100%
COLORADO	5,182,413	5,182,413	-100%
CONNECTICUT	4,128,214	4,128,214	-100%
DELAWARE	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
FLORIDA	19,007,117	19,007,117	-100%
GEORGIA	11,106,766	11,106,766	-100%
HAWAII	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
IDAHO	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
ILLINOIS	19,656,819	19,656,819	-100%
INDIANA	8,156,638	8,156,638	-100%
IOWA	4,067,495	4,067,495	-100%
KANSAS	3,811,681	3,811,681	-100%
KENTUCKY	7,172,209	7,172,209	-100%
LOUISIANA	10,110,318	10,110,318	-100%
MAINE	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
MARYLAND	6,638,325	6,638,325	-100%
MASSACHUSETTS	8,240,235	8,240,235	-100%
MICHIGAN	17,680,559	17,680,559	-100%
MINNESOTA	6,652,727	6,652,727	-100%
MISSISSIPPI	6,468,360	6,468,360	-100%
MISSOURI	8,166,309	8,166,309	-100%
MONTANA	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
NEBRASKA	2,427,794	2,427,794	-100%
NEVADA	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
NEW HAMPSHIRE	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
NEW JERSEY	10,870,039	10,870,039	-100%
NEW MEXICO	3,436,610	3,436,610	-100%
NEW YORK	33,823,401	33,823,401	-100%
NORTH CAROLINA	9,522,373	9,522,373	-100%
NORTH DAKOTA	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
OHIO	18,676,767	18,676,767	-100%
OKLAHOMA	5,526,746	5,526,746	-100%
OREGON	4,588,094	4,588,094	-100%
PENNSYLVANIA	18,997,290	18,997,290	-100%
RHODE ISLAND	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
SOUTH CAROLINA	5,961,448	5,961,448	-100%
SOUTH DAKOTA	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
TENNESSEE	8,012,502	8,012,502	-100%
TEXAS	35,376,892	35,376,892	-100%
UTAH	3,201,044	3,201,044	-100%
VERMONT	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
VIRGINIA	8,335,477	8,335,477	-100%
WASHINGTON	7,499,718	7,499,718	-100%
WEST VIRGINIA	3,586,658	3,586,658	-100%
WISCONSIN	8,240,236	8,240,236	-100%
WYOMING	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
D.C.	2,229,544	2,229,544	-100%
PUERTO RICO	12,109,055	12,109,055	-100%

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BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE

1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy

Office of National Drug Control Policy

September 1993

Drugs

December 21, 1993

NOTE TO CAROL RASCO
BRUCE REED
GENE SPERLING
SKILA HARRIS

FROM: JOSE

SUBJECT: DRUG TREATMENT FUNDING

As senior staff works to finalize options for the President's budget, I thought this chart would help put the issue of drug treatment funds in perspective. It shows that the Bush budgets -- on average -- requested an increase of about \$125 million per year for increased drug treatment efforts. If, as I understand, one of the options going to the President includes a \$150 million increase for SAMHSA (not tied to the crime bill monies) -- that's great. We'll still be criticized by some folks who think we've promised much more, but it's defensible. More importantly, it should get some of the drug treatment folks who aren't being helpful with health care reform to have a little more faith in us.

But here's another point to ponder: a \$250 million increase to SAMHSA would allow us to say we've put forward the biggest treatment increase ever in a drug strategy. With health care starting to phase-in in FY 96, no increases would be anticipated thereafter, and we could essentially take the credit for this historical increase for the next three years.

Needless to say, increases/decreases along the lines of the Bush numbers -- or increase tied solely to the crime bill fund -- will continue to fuel the fires of criticism in the press and in the demand reduction community.

BUDGET REQUESTS FOR TREATMENT
(Requested Increase, \$ Budget Authority)

(\$ IN MILLIONS)	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995		
						HHS Request	OMB Recomm.	ONDCP Recomm.
Block	n/a	+90.0	+0.0	+10.4	+0.0	-44.4	+0.0	+0.0
CEP (TISE/Hard Core)	+0.0	+0.0	+99.0	+77.0	+73.6	-10.0	+100.0	+500.0
Total SAMSHA Treatment **	+221.1	+74.0	+69.2	+143.0	+93.0	-43.9	+40.0	+715.0
Additional People Treated (FEDERAL)	126,912	40,233	25,191	45,091	21,894	(9,166)	5,000	126,000

* The CEP program was first proposed as part of the FY 1992 President's Budget request in order to target treatment to those areas of greatest need. ONDCP is proposing the Treatment Infrastructure Services Expansion (TISE) Program for FY 1995.

** For FY 1990, the breakout for the President's request of the Block grant, as well as other discretionary programs is unavailable.