

PERPETRATORS
VICTIMS
BYSTANDERS

THE JEWISH
CATASTROPHE
1933-1945

RAUL HILBERG



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always do so rapidly, and when he announced it to someone, it was not necessarily self-explanatory. Yet these internal pronouncements were guidelines and inspirations, and meaning could be drawn even from his incomplete thoughts. Because Hitler stood above the bureaucracy, he was not the author—and seldom the editor—of laws or directives he signed. The administrative apparatus was in fact the source of a continuous flow of ideas and initiatives. Many major actions were taken without his express consent, and sometimes they were not reported to him. On occasion, he would have to arbitrate between contending potentates or factions. In these respects, Hitler was like all rulers in a complex society, but he never relinquished the prerogative to intervene, either to veto an action or, portentously, to bring it about. Finally, it must be said that Hitler could not have killed the Jews with his two hands and that he could not have accomplished anything without the men who staffed the far-flung organizational machine that carried out specialized functions of every kind. Yet to these men the extraordinary assault upon Jewry would have been inconceivable without him. He was, as they said repeatedly, indispensable.

All the characteristics of Hitler's decision making may be observed in the anti-Jewish operations between 1933 and 1945. His first intervention came about during the drafting of a law two months after he had become chancellor. In the highly charged atmosphere of these first months, the Nazi party organized a boycott of Jewish stores and Jewish judges were dragged out of courts. The ministries, working on a law about the civil service, considered the dismissal of non-Christian judges and prosecutors. At this point Hitler demanded the removal of all Jewish civil servants.²¹ The aged Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, still president of Germany, protested to Hitler against the strong-arm methods employed by the party against Jewish judges who were disabled veterans of the First World War, and Hitler promised exemptions of several categories, including combat veterans.²² On the other hand, the law was overarching enough to cover all "non-Aryans," that is to say any person, regardless of religion, who had at least *one* Jewish grandparent. Hitler also signed a number of corollary laws at that time to disbar Jewish lawyers and to dismiss patent agents and tax advisers.²³

The civil service law substitutes, and the consequences troubled the German physicist. Planck mentioned ammonia by the fixation just before the Germany from the new manufacture of explosives. Germany would have he was not against Jewish Communism. When F. valuable Jews as well Hitler replied that a Jew make distinctions between going to proceed against removal of Jews needed. Hitler said no, pointed and became vehement.

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The civil service law covered professionals in universities and institutes, and the consequent loss of highly qualified Jewish physicists and chemists troubled the German academic establishment. In 1933, the German physicist Max Planck talked to Hitler about this problem. Planck mentioned Fritz Haber, the Jew who had synthesized ammonia by the fixation of nitrogen from the air. This feat, accomplished just before the outbreak of the First World War, had freed Germany from the need to import natural Chilean nitrates for the manufacture of explosives. Without this discovery, Planck explained, Germany would have lost the war at the outset. Hitler answered that he was not against Jews per se but against Jews as the supporters of Communism. When Planck tried to argue that, after all, there were valuable Jews as well as those who did not amount to anything, Hitler replied that a Jew was a Jew, that the Jews themselves did not make distinctions between one Jew and another, and now he was going to proceed against all of them. When Planck argued that the removal of Jews needed in science was tantamount to self-mutilation, Hitler said no, pointed to himself as a man of steel, slapped his knee, and became vehement.²⁴

More than two years passed before Hitler ignited the anti-Jewish process again. By the beginning of 1935, the Jewish condition in Germany had stabilized and Jewish life was almost quiescent. Jewish civil servants, teachers, lawyers, artists, writers, and other professionals were losing their positions, and Jewish business establishments were the targets of takeover attempts by German firms, but there was still an economic base for most self-employed individuals and private employees. The emigration of the Jews was slackening and Jews still had not ceased to be Germans. Hitler, about to address the party rally in Nuremberg, wanted a change. He ordered the rapid drafting of a law depriving Jews of citizenship, and another law prohibiting the conclusion of marriages between Jews and non-Jews. The citizenship law was largely symbolic, inasmuch as the Jews still needed German passports to emigrate. The intermarriage prohibition was not going to affect mixed couples who had already sealed their union in a wedding ceremony, but the use of the word *Jew* in the text forced the Interior Ministry to define the term. Henceforth, Jews were persons with at least *two* Jewish grandparents, and if they

levying of a heavy "fine" in the form of a property tax on the Jews. The tax was to be collected by the state, rather than the party, as Goebbels had wished. Even more significantly, Hitler was concerned enough about the possibility of renewed violence to veto a proposal to mark the Jews with a star at that time.²⁸

The goal of mass emigration, which was pursued and intensified in 1938 and 1939, was feasible only for Germany and newly annexed Austria. It was no longer realistic, after the outbreak of war, for occupied western Poland, which held a much larger Jewish community. A major resettlement scheme, involving the movement of all the European Jews to the French island colony of Madagascar, was briefly considered by the Foreign Office and other agencies after the fall of France, but this plan could not materialize while Britain was still at war with Germany. Thus the two-year period after the beginning of the Second World War marks a period of uncertainty in the course of which additional measures, including ghettoization in Poland, were taken against the Jews in German-dominated Europe, but with only a nebulous conception of the ultimate purpose of these increasingly stringent steps. The ghettos in particular were unsightly and uneconomical devices. These high-density districts in poor sections of Polish cities and towns were packed with unemployed, starving, and disease-ridden Jews, and the German creators of this system considered it temporary from the start. Momentum was therefore joined with tension, as pressure developed for clarification of a truly "final" solution of the Jewish question.

Hitler made a number of critical decisions in his foreign policy between 1939 and 1941. He started a war, planned campaigns, and in 1940 instituted preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union. In the realm of domestic affairs, he signed a directive in September 1939 for the killing of patients afflicted with hopeless mental diseases.²⁹ This piece of paper, with which the euthanasia program was inaugurated, did not spell out the word *mental*. It was, however, the product of arguments put forward by some physicians and party stalwarts to the effect that mental institutions were places in which people suffered for a long time without the possibility of a change for a better life. The asylums were costly to maintain, and the painless administration of some lethal agent to those of the inmates who

NON-GERMAN GOVERNMENTS

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWS was European-wide. In a large area holding about 2 million Jews, a multiplicity of measures were taken by non-German authorities. Four countries that engaged in such action had joined Germany for the sake of conquest: Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Two were satellite states that had been created by Germany: Slovakia and Croatia. Three others were occupied countries, which had fought against Germany, but in which collaborating governments or agencies were prepared to contribute anti-Jewish decrees or at least significant administrative assistance: Norway, France, and the Netherlands.

What Germany wanted from its allies was a cloning of the anti-Jewish regulations developed in Germany itself. It was hoped that steps would be implemented by friendly states in a proper order to make the Jews "ripe" for deportation. The sequence was to begin with a definition of the term *Jew* in accordance with the principle of descent; it was to continue with the expulsion of the Jews from any vital role in the economy; and it was to go on with devices for identification and concentration, notably the marking of the Jews with a star. Finally, help was welcomed in the form of roundups, rolling stock for transport, and payment to defray the costs of the

deportations. To assure the accomplishment of these goals, the German Foreign Office and Adolf Eichmann's specialists in the field stood by with appropriate "advice."

Not everything worked out in the hoped for manner. Some countries wrote definitions of the concept of "Jew" which contained subtle deviations from the German formulation. Thus Italy exempted children of converts and Bulgaria spared all converts married to Bulgarians. Hungary and Slovakia changed definitions in response to tightening or relaxing German pressure. Romania dispensed with a single controlling definition altogether, preferring to specify a circle of victims in each decree.

Almost all of Germany's allies were avid expropriators. In societies that valued farmland and forests, as in the case of Romania and Hungary, Jewish agricultural properties, however few, were targeted immediately for takeover. The acquisition of Jewish industrial and commercial enterprises mattered in Slovakia, which wanted a stronger ethnic Slovak presence in these sectors. In Romania, where most industrial and many commercial holdings were foreign, similar considerations propelled the attempt to create a purely Romanian economic base. Both Slovakia and Romania, however, lacked capital and expertise. In Slovakia, some former Jewish owners remained as managers to operate their old firms under Slovak strawmen, and in Romania some Jewish companies simply remained in business.

The ouster of Jewish professionals and skilled laborers was pursued as a means of rewarding non-Jewish aspirants. Here too there were limits. In Hungary, Jewish physicians were still essential, and in Romania, gentile beginners stood as "doubles" next to Jewish craftsmen to learn a trade. Policies were quite different, of course, with respect to unskilled or unemployed Jews. France, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary drafted these people into labor companies, which were housed in camps and deployed in many outdoor projects. The Hungarian Jewish companies, which were the most numerous, were given such tasks as mining copper in Yugoslavia and clearing mine fields on the Eastern Front.

Concentration measures were sometimes adopted for pragmatic reasons. The housing shortage spurred the expulsion of thousands of Jewish families from the Slovak capital of Bratislava and the Bulgar-

ian capital of Sofia. Romanians to claim The Romanian city ghetto. In unoccupied signed by French au

The Germans placed yellow identifying stars on the practice of collaboration from uniform. Croatia emblem at once. Slovakia (later) that many workers wear it. Hungary had companies, until the Rumania mandated a plan. Romania introduced voided the measure. but not its French collaboration star.

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In Slovakia and Croatia Croatia killed almost half of the population in concentration camps, it reserved families, individuals and connections. Hungary annexed regions in the Soviet German-occupied USSR. Jewry as a whole was not a Zionist France was of foreign Jews but was reality. Bulgaria and Rom

ian capital of Sofia. In Romania, there was a law allowing ethnic Romanians to claim Jewish apartments anywhere in the country. The Romanian city of Cernauti (Chernovtsy) had a long-lasting ghetto. In unoccupied France, impoverished foreign Jews were assigned by French authorities to "forced residence" in small towns.

The Germans placed particular emphasis on the introduction of a yellow identifying star that the Jews were to affix to their clothes, but the practice of collaborating governments in this undertaking was far from uniform. Croatia, which was created in 1941, imposed the emblem at once. Slovakia instituted the star with a proviso (removed later) that many working Jews and their families would not have to wear it. Hungary had no external identification, outside the labor companies, until the Germans occupied the country in 1944. Bulgaria mandated a plastic yellow button and then halted its production. Romania introduced a star in some provinces and subsequently voided the measure. In France, the German military government, but not its French collaborators, decreed the yellow patch. Italy had no star.

A crucial difference between German and non-German agencies surfaced in the course of deportations. Within Germany and territories occupied by Germany, the Jews were to be rooted out completely. Exceptions were made only for those living in mixed marriages and deferments were granted mainly to irreplaceable laborers. Non-German governments were much less compulsive in this regard, and they made distinctions in a more compromising manner.

In Slovakia and Croatia, some Jews were privileged. Even though Croatia killed almost half of its Jewish population in its own annihilation camps, it resembled Slovakia in exempting old established families, individuals needed in the economy, or people with various connections. Hungary ousted non-Hungarian Jews from newly annexed regions in the summer of 1941, delivering the victims to the German-occupied USSR, where they were killed, but Hungarian Jewry as a whole was not deported until the spring of 1944. Collaborationist France was often ready to intern or hand over stateless and foreign Jews but was reluctant to surrender Jews of French nationality. Bulgaria and Romania drew the line territorially. The Bulgar-

ian government gave up the Jews of the freshly acquired regions in Macedonia, Thrace, and Pirot but resisted deportations from Old Bulgaria. Romania, which had lost Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in 1940 and had recovered them in 1941, promptly expelled the Jews from these provinces. A year later, the Romanian government declined a German request to deport the Jews of Old Romania to Poland.

The unevenness of action in Germany's periphery was not an accident. Nowhere was the determination to implement the final solution so deep rooted as in Germany; nowhere was the issue so fundamental. Most of Germany's neighbors, whether allied or conquered nations, continually balanced a variety of considerations in their decision making. The result was a spectrum of reactions, from non-cooperation, to some forms of participation, to heavy involvement that nevertheless fell short in one aspect or another of reaching the German standard.

Two countries were unapproachable at any time. They were Finland, a German ally against the Soviet Union, and Denmark, wholly occupied by Germany, but with its prewar government still in place. Their small Jewish populations survived, in Finland, without a German foray, and in Denmark, after a largely abortive German attempt to act singlehandedly in a seizure operation.

Norway and the Netherlands had offered resistance to German invasions, and after they were overwhelmed, each was placed under a Reichskommissar. A Norwegian government in exile waited in London for an Allied victory, but in the meantime a puppet government under Vidkun Quisling in Norway pledged itself to support Germany. Although there were very few Jews in Norway, almost half of these few were rounded up for deportation with the help of old as well as newly established Norwegian police.¹

Indigenous authority in the Netherlands was the product of a more complex situation. The Dutch cabinet had fled to London, but it had left behind the senior civil servants to run the country on a stable day by day basis under German rule. The principal functionaries in the Netherlands were four Secretaries General, one of them, Karl Johannes Frederiks, in charge of internal affairs, that is to say, general administration. The Dutch bureaucracy refrained from issuing any

regulations against the Jews. The Dutch government, however, did have a Jewish policy, notably the registration of Jews. When on September 15, 1941, the German government issued a directive in this matter to the Dutch law enforcement authorities, the SS and Police, the Dutch government, notwithstanding the Dutch law enforcement authorities whom the Germans considered as a directive in this matter, did not issue a directive in this matter to the Province. The commission of the Province from arresting any Jew was not a secret. The Secretary General of the Province, however, was evident to the German government, the disregard of a law, and the behavior.²

Notwithstanding this, the Dutch government, under German pressure, did not issue regulations against the Jews less than a year after the war was injected into the operation. The police chief of the city of Amsterdam, who had a Jewish record, who had been in the army of the East Indies, was ordered to be self-confident and to be self-confident force. He also sought to be self-confident. Leader Hanns Rauter, with the telephone and correspondence, was a German feature. Amsterdam, most of whose members were of the Dutch army, and was in the summer of 1942, Tulp was the chief of Jewish affairs. Finally, only one of his officers reported, had acted with the German government, found at home in the general administration.

Not all Dutch police were self-confident. The arrest of his family in Amsterdam

regulations against the substantial Jewish community. All such measures were therefore exclusively German. The Reichskommissar, however, did have Dutch assistance in the implementation of German policy, notably in the issuance of identification cards and in registrations. When Jews were prohibited by a German ordinance of September 15, 1941, from changing their residence without permission, the SS and Police wanted any violators to be apprehended by the Dutch law enforcement machinery. The Mayor of Zutphen, whom the Germans considered to be pro-Jewish, thereupon sought a directive in this matter from the Dutch commissar of Gelderland Province. The commissar replied that Dutch police were to abstain from arresting any Jews who were not guilty of a punishable act, and Secretary General Frederiks agreed with this opinion. It was evident to the Germans that in the eyes of the Dutch administration, the disregard of a German anti-Jewish decree was not criminal behavior.²

Notwithstanding this display of Dutch rectitude in the face of German pressure, Dutch police participated in the large-scale round-ups of Jews less than a year later.³ The Amsterdam police were injected into the operation at the end of August 1942. The Dutch police chief of the city was Sybren Tulp, a man with no prior anti-Jewish record, who had been an infantry officer in the Dutch colonial army of the East Indies. Tulp was popular with his men. He wanted them to be self-confident and he strove to shape them into a model force. He also sought the goodwill of the Higher SS and Police Leader Hanns Rauter, with whom he maintained regular contact by telephone and correspondence. Tulp's police took on more and more German features. Amsterdam had a newly formed police battalion, most of whose members had been drawn from demobilized soldiers of the Dutch army, and who were quartered in barracks. During the summer of 1942, Tulp expanded his headquarters, forming a bureau of Jewish affairs. Finally he led his men in the seizure of the Jews. Only one of his officers refused duty. The mobile battalion, Tulp reported, had acted with great dedication, looking for any Jews not found at home in the general neighborhood.⁴

Not all Dutch police were so arduous. A Jewish survivor recalls the arrest of his family in Apeldoorn on October 2, 1942. A member

of the German army's Field Police, accompanied by two Dutch policemen, appeared in the apartment. He ordered the family to prepare itself and left with one of the two Dutchmen. The Dutch policeman who was left alone with the Jews pleaded with them not to flee. Explaining that he was acting under orders, he said that he would be held accountable for their disappearance. The Jewish victims complied.⁵

The Dutch police would take the Jews to a concentration point, from which they would be sent to a railway station to board a train to a transit camp. In this shuttle, the Dutch railways, less visible than police in the streets, apparently cooperated with the Germans as a matter of course.⁶

When France approached defeat in 1940, a new government was formed, which asked for an armistice. Under the terms of this agreement, the northern part of the country, including Paris, and the entire Atlantic coast became a German-occupied area. The interior to the Mediterranean was unoccupied until November 1942. The French government had its capital in the small town of Vichy within the free zone. Its laws, decrees, and directives were also applicable in occupied territory, but there the German military administration could issue its own ordinances, preempting or overriding French enactments. Vichy remained independent in unoccupied France, where it was permitted to maintain a small army, and at the beginning it still controlled the French colonies. Yet in the French population on both sides of the demarcation line, there were feelings of humiliation, a sense of bewilderment over the sudden debacle, and the sheer pain caused by the burdens of the lost war. For these reasons, the Vichy regime emphasized old pride reflected primarily in the person of the aged Marshal Philippe Pétain; a new competence as represented in a corps of able leaders; and the necessity of facing reality in the form of an articulated policy of collaboration with Germany.

A comparison between Pétain and his German contemporary von Hindenburg is almost inescapable. Both men had triumphed in defensive battles during the First World War, Pétain at Verdun in 1916, Hindenburg against the Russians in 1914. Both had urged their governments to surrender, Hindenburg as Commander of the German

army in 1918, Pétain of state in their eighth year. Pétain was more than a symbol, in anti-Jewish deportation of Jews incorporated the com

The new professional hierarchies. The army attempted to become leader of the 1920s. At the start of its Jewish officers and wholly "French."⁷ Moreover, only a few had joined Robert Paxton has shown of the officers at home occasions, the military French empire. A British 1940, and a British in 1941. In the Syrian battle side, and when the French of the fighting to go home but 5,668 of the 37,730 mennel who opted for de-allegiance to Vichy: "C

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army in 1918, Pétain as Vice Premier in 1940. Both served as heads of state in their eighties with full lucidity of mind. Pétain, however, was more than a symbolic ruler. He acquiesced, even though reluctantly, in anti-Jewish measures, and opposed, albeit indirectly, the deportation of Jews of French nationality. With these attitudes he incorporated the compromises of his regime.

The new professionalism was stressed in the military and civilian hierarchies. The armistice army weeded out older officers and attempted to become leaner like the 100,000-man German Reichswehr of the 1920s. At the same time, it dismissed, with a few exceptions, its Jewish officers and non-commissioned officers in order to be wholly "French."⁷ Many Frenchmen were still prisoners of war, but only a few had joined General Charles de Gaulle in London. As Robert Paxton has shown, the Vichy army had retained the loyalty of the officers at home and in the overseas possessions. On several occasions, the military fought against British onslaughts against the French empire. A British naval attack was beaten back at Dakar in 1940, and a British invasion of Syria was resisted for a month in 1941. In the Syrian battle, there were thousands of casualties on each side, and when the French defenders were given a choice at the end of the fighting to go home or join de Gaulle's Free French forces, all but 5,668 of the 37,736 officers and men returned to France. A colonel who opted for de Gaulle was told by a major who kept his allegiance to Vichy: "Go to the Jews, then; they will pay you well."⁸

Within the civilian branches of the Vichy regime, there was an infusion of technocrats and careerists who, like Tulp in the Netherlands, thought of themselves as innovators. Several of these entrants were graduates of elite schools. One was François Lehideux, educated at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques and a veteran of the Renault concern, who as Secrétaire d'Etat of Industrial Production signed a number of anti-Jewish decrees in the economic sphere. Another was Jean Bichelonne, trained at the Polytechnique, who succeeded Lehideux and was also concerned with takeovers and liquidations of Jewish enterprises. Still another, Pierre Pucheu, was a product of the Ecole Normale Supérieure with experience in heavy industry who, as Minister of the Interior, signed a host of anti-Jewish measures leading to segregation and internments. Pucheu had been a

member of the extremist right-wing Parti Populaire Français before the war, but his colleague, Justice Minister Joseph Barthélemy, another signer of decrees, had come into the office from the University of Paris, where he had been a respected professor of law. The chief of the Vichy government's police, René Bousquet, was a former prefect, and at the time of the deportations in 1942, he was only thirty-three.⁹

The Vichy regime had not only new men, but also a new agency: a Commissariat of Jewish Affairs. This office was headed by Xavier Vallat, a nationalist and militant Catholic, whose principal achievement was the creation of a Jewish council that would have to take orders from him. Vallat, however, was sufficiently hostile to Germany to be replaced by Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, who was more exclusively anti-Jewish. Son of a physician and a seventeen-year-old soldier of the First World War as well as an officer in the second, Darquier had studied and abandoned chemistry. During the 1930s he acquired his principal credentials by heading the Rassemblement anti-Juif de France. As Vallat's successor, Darquier dealt with property transfers and a host of other activities, but he was not always at the center of the action.

One man who played a pivotal role in the Vichy regime and who became the principal advocate of the policy of collaboration was Pierre Laval. Neither a modernizer nor an ideologist, Laval was a pragmatic politician. Born in a peasant family and trained as a lawyer, he was a man of high visibility long before the German invasion. Twice a premier in the 1930s and for a short period a foreign minister, he was co-author with Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare of a plan to appease Italy's appetite for Ethiopia by offering Benito Mussolini a few of Ethiopia's provinces. War seemed to him folly, and toward Britain and the Soviet Union, France's potential allies in a conflict with Germany and Italy, he harbored distrust. When France fell, he joined Pétain's cabinet but then lost his post in a palace coup. He returned as premier in March 1942, at a time when the deportation of the Jews of the occupied zone was imminent. Laval threw in his lot and that of France with Germany. Predicating his policy on a German victory, he was willing to make deals with the Germans. Thus he sought the release of French prisoners of war

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in exchange for an increase in the number of French laborers going to the Reich, and in the summer of 1942, he agreed to deport twenty thousand stateless Jews from the unoccupied zone as a concession to German demands. Among the victims were several thousand children who had not been expected by the SS and Police. In a gesture of largesse, Laval declared that the children did not interest him.¹⁰

Germany's southeastern allies, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, were primarily interested in territory. All three had been territorial losers, and each was compensated under German patronage. As they drew nearer to Germany, they also commenced anti-Jewish activities.

Bulgaria's losses had occurred as a result of the Second Balkan War and the First World War. By spring 1941, Bulgaria controlled more land than it had ever had in the twentieth century. Yet the Bulgarian government was hesitant to be fully at Germany's disposal. Bulgarian troops did not fight on the Eastern Front and the Jews of Old Bulgaria were not deported. Anti-Jewish action was not omitted completely and something did happen to the Jews. The driving force in this campaign was Alexander Belev, the Commissar for Jewish Affairs. A prewar ultra nationalist, Belev was appointed to the newly formed commissariat by Interior Minister Peter Grabovski in August 1942. A number of steps had already been taken against the Jews by that time, and Belev was to preside over the deportations. His path, however, was at least partially blocked. Foreign Minister Ivan Popov and Gabrovski himself became sensitive to internal counter-pressures and to the evolving changes in Germany's fortunes. Belev's success was therefore limited to the deportation of somewhat more than eleven thousand Jews from the newly annexed areas of Macedonia and Thrace.¹¹

Romania's losses had occurred in the course of a few months in 1940. Territory had to be ceded to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the USSR. In 1941, Romania reacquired its eastern provinces from the Soviet Union and occupied a portion of Ukraine. Unlike Bulgaria, however, Romania had to commit its army in bitter fighting for these gains.

At the beginning of September 1940, immediately following the trauma of the three amputations, Romania acquired a dictator, Gen-

eral Ion Antonescu. A veteran of the First World War, when Romania had fought against Austria-Hungary and Germany, Antonescu was a Chief of Staff of the Romanian army in the 1930s. Openly right wing, he allied himself with the Iron Guard, a mystical religious-nationalist movement that was hostile not only to Romania's neighbors but to the three quarters of a million Jews who lived within Romania's pre-1940 boundaries. As one of the Iron Guard's intellectual spokesmen, Mircea Eliade, wrote in 1936: "[W]e are waiting for a nationalist Romania, frenzied and chauvinistic, armed and vigorous, pitiless and vengeful."¹²

The Iron Guard held several portfolios in Antonescu's initial cabinet, but in January 1941 it launched a revolt, in the process of which it also slaughtered Jews in and around Bucharest. The uprising failed, as Germany decided to trust Antonescu. Within months the frenzy came at the hands of Antonescu's army and gendarmerie.

A few days after Romania's entry into the war, violence engulfed the Jewish community of the city of Iasi, leaving several thousand dead. When Bukovina and Bessarabia were retaken, Antonescu ordered the expulsion of the Jews in these regions across the Dnestr River. This time the deaths were in the tens of thousands. After a Romanian general with his staff were killed in an explosion at their headquarters in the captured Soviet city of Odessa, Antonescu ordered a reprisal in the ratio of one to one hundred. The ensuing massacre of Jews was the largest in Europe. More mass dying of the expellees and more mass shootings of Soviet Jews followed in the wake of these events.

In the meantime, the Romanian bureaucracy imposed decree after decree on the Jewish population of Old Romania. A commissariat was established under a former newspaper correspondent of the Nazi party's *Völkischer Beobachter*, Radu Lecca. It is Lecca who was to hand over the remaining Romanian Jews to the Germans for deportation to Poland. At this point, however, the Romanian destruction process was frozen.

Antonescu was a man who had always had contacts with Jews and who never stopped arguing and talking with them. In an open letter to a Jewish leader, he attempted to justify the uprooting of Bukovinian and Bessarabian Jewry by claiming that during the one-year So-

viet rule and in the context of the Soviet Union. No man delegation and all the Jewish star. After the war, it was possible to German demands. The war forbade any German kidnapping during occupation. The war was itself.¹³

Compared to Romania, its long-time leader was... His rank stemmed from... Austro-Hungarian navy. Horthy came to power when a Hungarian Communist dissolved under the impact of the communists were hunted by coalition anti-Semite of the old school. He was approaching him with... played in Hungary's economic recovery. The country's material fortune was in the hands of the communists. He did want to raise the standard of living in the rural areas inhabited by Hungarians. The country rapidly enlarged itself by the acquisition of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. These were made possible by German demands to be paid. Hungary and Hungarian measures were not up to German standards, however. The communists stopped short of fighting for the economic reconstruction of the country. In March 1944, the German army deported 450,000 Jews who were smarting under the German occupation and neutral governments. He stopped them. A few days later he was killed with an extremist. By then it was no longer feasible.¹⁴

viet rule and in the course of the Soviet retreat, they had been loyal to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he subsequently received a two-man delegation and allowed himself to be convinced not to introduce the Jewish star. After the summer of 1942, he was no longer accessible to German demands for deportations, and in 1943 he explicitly forbade any German killing of Jews in Soviet areas under Romanian occupation. The war was being lost, and Romania's frenzy had spent itself.¹³

Compared to Romania, Hungary was more stable and controlled. Its long-time leader was the Prince Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy. His rank stemmed from his service as Commander in Chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy. Hungary, which is landlocked, had no navy. Horthy came to prominence in the turmoil of 1919 and 1920, when a Hungarian Communist government under Béla Kun, a Jew, dissolved under the impact of a Romanian invasion, and Communists were hunted by counter-revolutionary forces. A self-proclaimed anti-Semite of the old school, Horthy could stare down any upstarts approaching him with extreme ideas. He knew the role that Jews played in Hungary's economy, and he was not about to surrender the country's material fortunes to incompetent, self-seeking opportunists. He did want to raise the Hungarian flag in neighboring territories inhabited by Hungarians, and in pursuance of this aim, Hungary rapidly enlarged itself between 1938 and 1941 at the expense of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. All of these acquisitions were made possible by Germany and soon enough the price for them was to be paid. Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union, and Hungarian measures were instituted against the Jews. By German standards, however, both of these efforts were limited. Hungary stopped short of fighting all out, and beyond the broad sweep of its economic constriction of the Jews, it refused to deport them. In March 1944, the Germans occupied Hungary and from May to July deported 450,000 Jews with matchless efficiency. Horthy, who was smarting under the German intervention, heard the protests of Allied and neutral governments. Before the deportations reached Budapest, he stopped them. A few months later, the Germans replaced him with an extremist. By then the transport of Jews to Auschwitz was no longer feasible.¹⁴

Laval, Antonescu, and Horthy were not political extremists and there was comparatively little room in their governments for such people. Too many of the revolutionaries on the ideological Right lacked the credibility of traditional leadership. The movements of the ultraists were either imitations of Nazism or were assumed to be Germany's tools. Only in Slovakia and Croatia did extremists monopolize governmental power from the start, but these countries were German products. Germany needed the nationalists of the Hlinka party in Slovakia and the Ustasha movement in Croatia, and to these groups in turn Germany presented the only chance of survival. Hence they aligned themselves with Germany fully, contributing soldiers to the campaign against the USSR and moving against their Jews. Croatia struck out at its Jewish inhabitants with heavy shootings, while Slovakia was the pliant satellite falling into step with Germany's expectations. The only independence they manifested in Jewish affairs was in their protection of favored Jews.

After three years of war, the situation gradually changed in all of Germany's domains. In France during November 1942, Italy in September 1943, Slovakia in August 1944, and Hungary during the following November, German forces intervened physically to prevent a further deterioration of Germany's position. The indigenous bureaucracies still functioned, still collaborated, but they were no longer relied on as before. To round up the remaining Jews, the Germans were increasingly dependent on ultra parties and their motley crews of helpers.

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factors shaped a characteristic reaction pattern, and even characteristic changes in this pattern, during the course of Jewry's destruction.

In the lineup of nations, one must begin with Germany itself. Here the difference between perpetrators and bystanders was least pronounced; in fact it was not supposed to exist. The proposition was spelled out most clearly by Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the German Security Police, at a conference chaired by Hermann Göring in November 1938. Göring suggested that ghettos would have to be created for Jews in all German cities, but Heydrich disagreed, stating in no uncertain terms that he preferred control of the Jews through the watchful eyes of the whole population.¹ That principle of universal supervision was clearly based on the unarticulated presumption that an army of ordinary German men and women was perpetually ready to report anything suspicious in the Jewish community:

The isolation of the Jews in Germany was accomplished relatively early. Before the compulsory middle names Israel and Sara were decreed, and long before the mandatory star was instituted, Jews were already stigmatized and sometimes shunned. In November 1934, a German attorney named Coblenzer, who lived in Bochum, wrote a letter to the Justice Ministry, complaining that because of his family name, which he did not wish to change, he was suspected of being Jewish and was losing business to the point of approaching poverty. A rumor that one was a Jew, he said, was equivalent to financial ruin. He was a full Aryan with four years and four months at the front in the First World War. In addition, he was in possession of the Iron Cross First Class. Yet he was helpless, and so were, he estimated, one tenth of all German businessmen in a similar predicament in his city.²

Whereas many Germans walked away from the Jews, they were eager enough to acquire some Jewish property. After transports of Jews began to move out of Leipzig to the "east," 118 suitcases, a backpack, and a handbag were left behind with all their contents. The representative of the Finance Ministry in the area handed over these personal belongings to an auctioneer, who listed all the items, their former Jewish owners, estimated yields, names of German purchasers, and realized prices. Virtually everything was sold.³ All over Germany, tens of thousands of Jewish apartments were taken over

furniture from Jewish homes in disgraced German offices and private objects were distributed to the centers where they had been c many questions.

Relatively few Jews were able are scant, but a very high percentage found refuge or help in Germany by reason of a mixed marriage, descent or converts to Christianity made after the war in Vienna.⁴ A detailed study of Mönchengladbach, the period before the dark later, more dangerous time. They include a Jewish couple who died with two children who changed the number of Jews who pretended to papers. The later phase, which included a half-Jew considered Jewish and wife in a mixed marriage, a Jewish marriage who—although safe—short, either the Jews were left depended largely on German relations. Germany was the country in which launched. There was no cleavage and the perpetrators, who could difficult to revolt against establishments were more likely to revolt again difficult, as well as doubly dangerous had been put into place and the truth in Germany was almost alone.

No country in Europe was like a copy. The closest resemblance to involvement must be sought in the may discern some important differences. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania decades of independence were ended

furniture from Jewish homes in Germany and the Western countries graced German offices and private German residences; and smaller objects were distributed to the needy, sometimes from the killing centers where they had been collected. The recipients did not ask many questions.

Relatively few Jews were able to hide in Germany. The statistics are scant, but a very high percentage of those few thousand who found refuge or help in German families were relatives of the rescuers by reason of a mixed marriage, or they were of partial German descent or converts to Christianity. Such are the findings of a survey made after the war in Vienna.⁴ A similar result was obtained in a detailed study of Mönchengladbach and its vicinity. In this investigation, the period before the deportations was separated from the later, more dangerous time. The case histories for the first phase include a Jewish couple who dyed their hair blond, a Jewish woman with two children who changed hiding places frequently, and a number of Jews who pretended to be bombed-out Germans without papers. The later phase, which encompassed more individuals, included a half-Jew considered Jewish by official definition, a husband and wife in a mixed marriage, a Jewish woman in a privileged mixed marriage who—although safe—feared deportation, and so on.⁵ In short, either the Jews were left to their own ingenuity or they depended largely on German relatives, if they had any.

Germany was the country in which the destruction process was launched. There was no cleavage between the German in the street and the perpetrators, who could be found in every agency. It was difficult to revolt against established order in a society where people were more likely to revolt against revolution, and it was doubly difficult, as well as doubly dangerous, to do so once all the decrees had been put into place and the trains had begun to roll. The helper in Germany was almost alone.

No country in Europe was like Germany. Not one was a carbon copy. The closest resemblance to the Reich in the near-totality of involvement must be sought in the Baltic region. And even there one may discern some important differences.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were anti-Communist. Their two decades of independence were ended by the entry of Soviet forces in

Hilliard

"All the News
That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

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NEW YORK, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1945

PRESIDENT ORDERS EISENHOWER TO END NEW ABUSE OF JEWS

He Acts on Harrison Report,
Which Likens Our Treatment
to That of the Nazis

MAKES PLEA TO ATTLEE

Urges Opening of Palestine—
Conditions for Displaced in
Reich Called Shocking

The text of the report on displaced persons, Page 38.

By BERTRAM D. HULEN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29—President Truman has directed General Eisenhower to clean up alleged shocking conditions in the treatment of displaced Jews in Germany outside the Russian zone and in Austria. He acted on the basis of a report made by Earl G. Harrison, American representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, after an inspection.

The report declared that displaced Jews were held behind barbed wire in camps guarded by our men, camps in which frequently conditions were unsanitary and the food poor and insufficient, with our military more concerned with other matters.

Some of the displaced Jews were sick and without adequate medicine, the report stated, and many had to wear prison garb or, to their chagrin, German SS uniforms. All were wondering, it was added, if they had been liberated after all and were despairing of help while worrying about the fate of relatives.

Formal Appeal to Attlee

The President appealed formally to Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain to open the doors of Palestine to 100,000 displaced Jews of Germany and Austria who want to be evacuated there.

Mr. Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and former Immigration Commissioner, submitted his report at a personal conference with President Truman in August. The

President wrote to General Eisenhower Aug. 31. In the communication he cited the following paragraph from Mr. Harrison's report:

"As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our own military guard instead of SS troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy."

The report, while praising "some" of our Army officers in Germany for their handling of the Jews, for the most part severely arraigned the way they were dealing with the problem.

President Truman declared in his letter to General Eisenhower that policies promulgated by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, "are not being carried out by some of your subordinate officers."

Policy Declared Violated

The announced policy of giving the "liberated" prisoners preference in billeting among the German civilian population had not been followed on "a wide scale," he asserted.

"We must intensify our efforts," he wrote, "to get these people out of camps and into decent houses until they can be repatriated or evacuated."

He also asked General Eisenhower to carry out a suggestion of Mr. Harrison for more extensive field visitations by the Army and adequate inspections so that conditions could be promptly and effectively corrected.

"We must make clear to the German people that we thoroughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution," he stated. "We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this than by the manner in which we ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany."

General Eisenhower had replied, the White House said, that he was investigating the conditions and would report to the President.

The President had not yet heard from Mr. Attlee on the Palestine question, the White House added, and the President's letter to Mr.

Attlee was not given out pending a reply.

Mr. Harrison reported that the conditions affecting the displaced Jews as he observed them were such that unless remedies were applied there was danger of trouble.

They were held in many cases, he said, behind barbed wire camps formerly used by the Germans for their prisoners, including the notorious Berger Belsen camp. Nearly all had lost hope, he stated.

The Germans in rural areas, whom the Jews look out upon from the camps, were better fed, better clothed and better housed

than the "liberated" Jews, the report declared.

Unless proper remedial action was taken and promptly, Mr. Harrison warned, "substantial unofficial and unauthorized movements of people must be expected and these will require considerable force to prevent." It could not be overemphasized, he cautioned, that "many of these people are now desperate."

Mr. Harrison urged the opening of Palestine to the displaced Jews, most of whom are Polish, Baltic, Hungarian or Rumanian, in addition to German and Austrian. He declared that the issue of Palestine "must be faced" and voiced hope that we could persuade Britain to make a "reasonable extension or modification" of her White Paper of 1939 which permitted Jewish immigration into Palestine on a limited basis.

There was no acceptable or even decent solution for the future of many European Jews other than Palestine, he contended, adding that his position was "purely humanitarian" and taken with "no reference to ideological or political considerations."

He also urged that the United States admit a "reasonable" number of these Jews under our existing immigration law. Some wanted to come here and others to go to England, the Dominions and South Africa, he added, explaining that the number desiring to enter the United States was not large.

Mr. Harrison urged that "those who have suffered most and longest" receive "first and not last attention" now that the mass repatriation had been so largely completed. Evacuation from Germany, he said, should be "the emphasized theme" and the Jews so wishing should be permitted to return to their own countries without further delay.

Referring to the expiration of immigration certificates for Palestine in August, he stated:

"It is nothing short of calamitous to contemplate that the gates

The New York Times, September 30, 1945, front page story of the Harrison report, and Truman's orders to Eisenhower, REPRINTED BY PERMISSION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

of Palestine should soon be closed."

He quoted Hugh Dalton to show that the British Labor party had stood for a liberal policy on this question.

Those displaced Jews not able to leave the country, Mr. Harrison declared, should be gotten out of the camps and the ill placed in tuberculosis sanitarium or in rest homes. Others should be billeted with the Germans while those who wished to be in camps should be placed in separate ones.

"There seems little justification," he asserted, "for the continuance of barbed-wire fences, armed guards and prohibition against leaving the camp except by passes."

He recommended that as quickly as possible the operations of such camps as remain be turned over to the UNRRA.

Since military authorities must necessarily continue to participate in the program, he urged that there be a review of military personnel selected for camp commandant positions with the aim of obtaining sympathetic officers.

Pending the creation of this setup, he suggested that there be more extensive field visitations.

The Combined Displaced Persons Executive, Mr. Harrison said, had generally followed nationality lines, feeling that to treat the Jews separately would make for intolerance and trouble on the part of others. He called this an "unrealistic approach."

Their former barbaric persecution, he pointed out, had made the Jews a separate group with greater needs.

Because of preoccupation with the mass repatriations and with various difficulties, Mr. Harrison reported, the military authorities had shown considerable resistance to the entrance of voluntary agencies on the scene. In a few places "fearless and uncompromising" military officers had requisitioned whole villages for Jews or required them to be billeted by the Germans, but "at many places" our officers had manifested "the utmost reluctance or indisposition, if not timidity, about inconveniencing the German population."

These officers contend, the report stated, that their job is to get the communities going again while the displaced persons constitute a

sulted, it was added, in a burgo-meister easily persuading a town major to give shabby places with improper facilities to Jews while saving better accommodations for returning German civilians.

"This tendency," Mr. Harrison reported, "reflects itself in other ways, namely, in the employment of German civilians in the offices of Military Government officers when equally qualified personnel could easily be found among the displaced persons whose repatriation is not imminent.

"Actually there have been situations where displaced persons, especially Jews, have found it difficult to obtain audiences with Military Government authorities because, ironically, they have been obliged to go through German employes who have not facilitated matters."

There had been some general improvement in conditions, Mr. Harrison reported, but there had been relatively little done beyond the planning stage.

Many of the Jews, the report said, had no opportunity, except surreptitiously, to communicate with the outside world.

The diet was principally bread and coffee, the report stated, and there are many pathetic malnutrition cases.

Mr. Harrison estimated there would be more than 1,000,000 displaced persons in Germany and Austria this winter, in many instances housed in buildings unfit for cold weather.

The text of Truman's letter to Eisenhower.

"All the News
That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

NEWS MODEL, PAGE 27, THIS SECTION

VOL. XCIV, No. 3288

NEW YORK, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1945

REPORT IS SENT TO EISENHOWER

President Stresses Responsibility to Refugees and Policies of Potsdam and SHAEF

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22—The text of President Truman's letter to General Eisenhower on the report of Earl G. Harrison on displaced persons in Germany and Austria was as follows:

Aug. 31, 1945.

"My Dear General Eisenhower:
I have received and considered the report of Mr. Earl G. Harrison, our representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, upon his mission to inquire into the condition and needs of displaced persons in Germany who may be stateless or non-repatriable, particularly Jews. I am sending you a copy of that report. I have also had a long conference with him on the same subject-matter.

"While Mr. Harrison makes due allowance for the fact that during the early days of liberation the huge task of mass repatriation required main attention, he reports conditions which now exist and which require prompt remedy. These conditions, I know, are not in conformity with policies promulgated by SHAEF, now combined displaced persons executive.

But they are what actually exists in the field. In other words, the policies are not being carried out by some of your subordinate officers.

"For example, Military Government officers have been authorized, and even directed, to requisition billeting facilities from the German population for the benefit of displaced persons. Yet, from this report, this has not been done on any wide scale. Apparently it is being taken for granted that all displaced persons, irrespective of their former persecution or the likelihood at their repatriation or resettlement, will be delayed, must remain in camps—many of which are overcrowded and heavily guarded. Some of these camps are the very ones where these people were herded together, starved, tortured and made to witness the death of their fellow-inmates and friends and relatives. The announced policy has been to give such persons preference over the German civilian population in housing. But the practice seems to be quite another thing.

"We must intensify our efforts to get these people out of camps and into decent houses until they can be repatriated or evacuated. These houses should be requisitioned from the German civilian population. That is one way to implement the Potsdam policy that the German people cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.

"We quote this paragraph with particular reference to the Jews among the displaced persons:

"As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them. They are

in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead of S.S. troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following, or at least condoning, Nazi policy.

"You will find in the report other illustrations of what I mean.

"I hope you will adopt the suggestion that a more extensive plan of field visitation by appropriate Army group headquarters be instituted, so that the humane policies which have been enunciated are not permitted to be ignored in the field. Most of the conditions now existing in displaced persons camps would quickly be remedied if through inspection tours they came to your attention or to the attention of your supervisory officers.

"I know you will agree with me that we have a particular responsibility toward these victims of persecution and tyranny who are in our zone. We must make clear to the German people that we thoroughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution. We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this than by the manner in which we ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany.

"I hope you will report to me as soon as possible the steps you have been able to take to clean up the conditions mentioned in the report.

"I am communicating directly with the British Government in an effort to have the doors of Palestine opened to such of these displaced persons as wish to go there.

"Very sincerely yours,

"HARRY S. TRUMAN."

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR
MAY 10 1945
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
WAR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEDICATION

To the survivors and their memories;
To Zalman Grinberg and Edward Herman,
who did much for many;
And to those American soldiers who kept hope
alive.

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*Surviving the Americans: The
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After Liberation*

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
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