


ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE  
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

1944-1946

*by Ziemke*  
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General was training officers "to assume the duties of Military Governor or civilian advisors to Military Governors." He asked for a complete explanation and lists of all the personnel, military and civilian, undergoing such training. The matter, he said, was something which should have been taken up with him in the first instance. Governing civilian territory was predominantly a civilian task and required "absolutely first class men."<sup>37</sup>

In a few sentences the President's memo converted an interdepartmental squabble into a monumental misunderstanding and a dire threat to the principle of unity of command. Obviously he had assumed that the Army was attempting to train a species of proconsuls at Charlottesville and he was convinced that such posts should go to high-powered civilians and not to the military at all. The Army doctrine that made the theater commander the military governor at least until hostilities ended not only was apparently unknown to him but could not even be fitted into his concept of military government. The President, like the public, was thinking in terms of domestic government; he considered civil administration, no matter where it was conducted, a civilian responsibility and was totally unimpressed by the argument of military necessity.

Stimson dictated two letters explaining the War Department concept, particularly the need to have military operations and civil administration under a single authority in the war zone. Neither letter was sent. Most likely Stimson wanted to avoid, if he could, precipitating a decision that could in one stroke force the Army out of military government and create in-

calculable command problems for the future. Instead, he made an oral report at the cabinet meeting of 6 November, in which he described the objectives of the school at Charlottesville and disclaimed any Army desire to control occupied areas after the war ended. He let this report stand as the answer to the President's question.<sup>38</sup>

In November, attacks came from all directions. Within the War Department the questions raised a year earlier were brought forth again. Was the training worthwhile when the times and places of future occupations were unknown? Should the Army create a large pool of officers for whom it had no assignments?<sup>39</sup> Early in the month the criticisms from outside centered on the alleged second-rate quality of the faculty at Charlottesville and on the content of the courses.<sup>40</sup> Later the charges became more diversified, and Gullion surmised that several civilian departments were becoming jealous of each other, although they were still somewhat united in their attack on the Army. The new attacks concentrated mostly on Gullion's supposed personal ambition, on the political composition of the Charlottesville faculty and students, and on the caliber of the students. Gullion, a Democrat, was accused of having packed the school with anti-New Dealers and Republicans. Toward the end of the month, the President sent Ambassador William C. Bullitt and Jonathan Daniels to Charlottesville to investigate separately the quality of the students, the courses, and the plans

<sup>37</sup> Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, p. 24.

<sup>38</sup> Memo, Gullion for CofS, sub: Training of Civil Affairs Officers, 13 Sep 43, in PMG, MG Div, decimal file 353.

<sup>40</sup> Memo, PMG for Sec War, sub: School of Military Government, 9 Nov 42, in PMG, MG Div, classified decimal file 333.

<sup>39</sup> Memo, President for the Secretary of War, 29 Oct 42, in PMG, MG Div, classified decimal file 333.

advantages: it was better situated within the military chain of command, at least theoretically, than it had been in the Mediterranean where, with the rest of civil affairs, it was completely separate; and it could assume from the outset that the tenor of Eisenhower's December directive for Italy would also apply in northern Europe. In January, Professor Geoffrey Webb, Slade Professor of Fine Arts at Cambridge University, became the semiofficial MFA&A adviser to the Supreme Commander pending his confirmation as civilian adviser and subsequent appointment as lieutenant colonel and section chief. The MFA&A functions that he proposed were to protect monuments and art work from avoidable loss or damage, prevent their deterioration after combat, and collect evidence on German looting or desecration. The civil affairs instructions for OVERLORD, issued in February, confirmed these duties and added requirements for protecting Allied governments from false claims and Allied troops from slanderous accusations. To execute its missions, MFA&A was to have four officers attached to each army, one at army headquarters and three with the frontline troops. The chief would further maintain a pool of eight officers at SHAEF. Since experience had demonstrated that without some weight of rank MFA&A officers were helpless, the chief was to be a lieutenant colonel and the other officers majors. To avoid immobility, which had long beset MFA&A in the Mediterranean, the section would have three jeeps and a truck of its own.<sup>11</sup>

Compared with the setup in the Mediterranean, the MFA&A organization proposed for SHAEF appeared almost ideal.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

As such, unfortunately, it was also to prove unattainable even within the elaborate SHAEF structure. Military organizations do not easily assimilate highly specialized, autonomous functions; consequently, for MFA&A within the military chain, the question was still not what was desirable but rather what was feasible. This situation was true both in personnel and in organization. The argument that MFA&A officers needed the prestige of rank could not prevail against the Army's reluctance to grant field grade commissions to art specialists with no military experience; therefore, what MFA&A received were captains and lieutenants. While Professor Webb awaited his own confirmation as civilian adviser, which did not come until 1 April, MFA&A led a shadow existence within G-5, SHAEF; and the German and French country units in the Special Staff at Shrinham set up their own MFA&A subsections which, as Webb at one point complained, scarcely seemed aware that a policy-making section existed in G-5.<sup>12</sup> In the 1 May 1944 G-5 reorganization, MFA&A suffered the ultimate indignity: it did not appear in the organization chart at all. The omission was not remedied until nearly a month later when a place was made for it in the Operations Branch.

For a time in April, MFA&A in northwest Europe even seemed about to be reduced to the impotence it had experienced during the early months in Italy. When the Governmental Affairs Branch, Special Staff, recommended issuing a letter and a general order similar to those Eisenhower had put out in Italy in December 1943, G-5 Operations objected on the ground that existing civil affairs instructions pro-

<sup>12</sup> Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, p. 864.

the German final collapse or necessitated by chaotic conditions in Germany after the surrender; a transitional middle phase in which the military command would pass its authority to a control commission; and a final phase in which the occupation would assume permanent form.<sup>16</sup> On this basis the Supreme Commander could assume that he would have a military government mission in Germany before the surrender and for an indeterminate period thereafter.

The Supreme Commander could assume that he had a mission but not much more. Responsibility for launching the occupation would probably be his, but its nature and purposes were almost totally unknown. The second and third phases, as Slash 100 pointed out, depended on political decisions which had not yet been made. This deficiency loomed large as soon as G-5 moved into the planning for the first phase. On 10 February, Smith laid the problem before the CCAC (Combined Civil Affairs Committee). SHAEF, he said, was beginning to plan for military government in Germany, recognizing that its direct concern was only with the first phase, but such SHAEF decisions could affect the whole occupation machinery. Therefore, the first phase policies ought to be attuned from the start to those of the other two phases. To accomplish this, SHAEF needed political and economic guidelines.<sup>17</sup>

Smith did not know it, but he had asked the impossible. There was no agency that could give him what he wanted nor would there be one for the duration of SHAEF's

existence. The first impulse in the CCAC was to put Smith off with an assurance that the major policy decisions could be expected from the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in due time.<sup>18</sup> To do so, however, would have amounted to CCAC's abdicating its function as the source of combined civil affairs policy as far as Germany was concerned. Furthermore, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had independently arrived at an estimate of the way the occupation would be imposed on Germany that coincided with the SHAEF view derived from Slash 100; consequently, as far as the U.S. staff was concerned, Smith's request was highly pertinent.<sup>19</sup> The JCS, therefore, agreed that SHAEF would most likely have to establish military government in Germany and maintain it for what "could be considerable length of time" after the capitulation. Hilldring sent this information to Smith on 22 February.<sup>20</sup>

However, as Supreme Commander, Eisenhower was under the CCS not the JCS, and his instructions would have to come through the CCS in order to be valid. In the CCAC, the British members proposed, not unexpectedly but nevertheless disquietingly for the Americans, that the questions Smith had raised be referred to the CCAC(L), which could secure opinions directly from the EAC.<sup>21</sup> Thereafter, for both the British and the Americans the issue became one of supplying an adequate answer to Smith without prejudicing either Washington's or London's claim to be the fountainhead of occupation policy. In a meeting on 9 March, Hilldring advanced

<sup>16</sup> Memo, CCAC, Director to Civil Affairs Division, sub: Problems of Occupation of Germany, 27 Feb 44, in ASW 370.8.

<sup>17</sup> Cable, SHAEF to CCAC, sub: The Administrative System of Germany and Some Problems of Occupation, 10 Feb 44, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 7-A.

<sup>18</sup> CCAC 69, Proposed Cable, CCS to SCAEF [no date], in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 7-A.

<sup>19</sup> Ltr, JCS to Sec of State, JCS 623, Appendix B, 18 Dec 43, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 1-A.

<sup>20</sup> JCS 723, Administration of MG in Germany—Occupation Period, 22 Feb 44, in SHAEF G-5, 30.

<sup>21</sup> History of the CAD, bk. VI, p. 18.

the thought that the EAC, as a negotiating body for the governments, would not be much help as a source for informal judgments and advice; he stated that the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was already well along in drafting basic directives for Germany which ought soon to be expanded into detailed directives. Four days later the British representatives suggested issuing an interim directive to take effect before the EAC completed its work, the details being left to the CCAC(L).<sup>22</sup>

In a meeting on 19 March, McCloy asserted that the military could not wait for the EAC to act. A military directive would have to be prepared beforehand and the necessity for it would have to be made clear to the British and Soviet governments. Hill-dring added that, as a matter of fact, the CAD had completed a draft of a basic directive which it would submit for British approval and for expansion in detail by the CCAC(L). Alarmed at the broad hint in McCloy's remarks that the Americans were ready to ignore the EAC entirely, the British conceded that since the Russians probably had their own prepared directives for fringe areas such as Estonia and East Prussia, the Americans and British could probably do the same, "having in mind the recommendations being put forward by the U.S. and U.K. representatives on the EAC."<sup>23</sup> Having reached an agreement, which as usual was open to disparate interpretation, the CCAC finally sent a reply to Smith telling him a directive for Germany was being prepared.<sup>24</sup>

Another six weeks passed before the directive reached Eisenhower by special air

courier on 28 April as "CCS 551," because it first had to be transmitted to London for British review and approval. At British insistence the scope was limited specifically to the period before the German defeat or surrender to avoid infringing on the competence of the London-based EAC. In the meantime, working parties in the CCAC had prepared supplementary political, financial, and economic and relief guides.

The basic directive was Eisenhower's charter to establish military government in whatever parts of Germany his forces occupied. As Supreme Commander he would have the supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority which he could delegate as necessary to his subordinate commanders. Military government administration, however, would be identical throughout the occupied parts of Germany.<sup>25</sup>

A political guide, sent with the directive, stated that military government was to be "firm . . . at the same time just and humane with regard to the civilian population as far as consistent with strict military requirements." The purposes were to be to assist continuing military operations, to destroy nazism and fascism, to maintain law and order, and to restore normal conditions in the population as soon as possible.<sup>26</sup>

Financial and economic and relief guides reached SHAEF on 31 May. The first provided for tight control of German banking and currency and for the introduction of Allied military marks as occupation currency. The Allied military marks were to be used in Germany by the U.S., British, and Soviet forces, each country redeeming

<sup>22</sup> Analysis Sheet, SHAEF G-5, Hist Sec, sub: Directive for MG in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 6 May 44, in SHAEF G-5, 1-A.

<sup>23</sup> CCAC 69/5 [CCS 551], Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 28 Apr 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-44), sec. 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>25</sup> Min, CCAC 26th Meeting, 16 Mar 44, in SHAEF G-5, 3-A.

<sup>26</sup> Cable, Gov 15 (CCAC 69/2), 19 Mar 44, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 7-A.

them in its national currency for its own troops. The Germans would continue to use the Reichsmark and would only be able to exchange Allied military marks for Reichsmarks.

The U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing in Washington had made plates for the Allied military marks earlier in the year and had begun printing for all three governments when the Soviet Union demanded it be given duplicate plates from which to do its own printing. The Soviet government had explained, with almost disarming candor, that it wanted to do its own printing to be sure of having a constant supply of marks available. Neither the Americans nor the British had openly raised the obvious objection to putting duplicate plates in Soviet hands, namely, the lack of control over the amounts printed; but the British had argued against relinquishing the plates on the ground that the whole issue might be discredited because of the unlikelihood of the Russians' being able to produce identical notes even from duplicate plates, which in fact proved fortunately true. For both the British and the Americans, however, the real dilemma was whether or not they wanted to see a separate Soviet occupation currency introduced into Germany, a move which the Russians threatened to make if they were not given the plates. To avoid such a development and its implications for projected Allied unity in the occupation, the duplicate plates had been made and sent.<sup>27</sup>

The economic and relief guide combined two marginally related subjects in one paper. The economic part gave Eisenhower full control over German industrial produc-

tion which he was instructed to use to orient German industry toward helping the war against Japan, to convert industry not needed against Japan to peacetime production, to make goods available for restitution and reparations, and to integrate the German economy into the European and world economies. With regard to relief, the guide specified that critical German shortages were to be alleviated only to the minimum extent necessary to prevent disease and unrest. Excess German food and other commodities were to be used for relief in liberated countries.<sup>28</sup> After he received the guide, Eisenhower pointed out that it assumed a surplus in Germany but made no provision in the event the assumption proved wrong. The CCAC then revised the guide and empowered him to plan for relief in Germany on the same scale as in liberated countries, except that if supplies proved inadequate, Germany as the enemy country would receive the lesser share.<sup>29</sup>

Although the directive and the guides categorically disclaimed any purpose beyond providing Eisenhower with a basis for conducting military government in areas he might occupy before the surrender, they were obviously conceived as being readily convertible to final policy statements. They were firm, even severe, on specifics but on the whole remarkably moderate. Although the elimination of nazism and of the German ability to make war were assumed, the mission would be to restore normal conditions and to recreate a peaceable Germany. The authors had learned Colonel Hunt's lessons well, but The Hunt Report

<sup>27</sup> Min, CCAC, 27th Meeting (1 Apr 44) and 28th Meeting (13 Apr 44), 1 and 15 Apr 44, in SHAEF G-5, 3-A.

<sup>28</sup> CCAC 69/8, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 31 May 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-44), sec. 15.

<sup>29</sup> (1) Memo, Dir, CAD, sub: Civilian Relief in Germany, 19 Jul 44, in SHAEF G-5, 3-A; (2) Cable, CCS to SHAEF, 19 Aug 44, in CCS 383.21 (2-22-44), sec. 2.

"Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance." With their informal approval, the directive went to the JCS as JCS 1067.<sup>24</sup> It was the product of a tumultuous month. Allied troops were inside Germany and might soon occupy the whole country. Eisenhower had no directive, and whether or not he would have a military government mission was far from certain. At Quebec the President and Prime Minister had put their okays on the economic features of the Morgenthau Plan. Whether the leadership in occupation planning, even during the military phase, would remain with the War Department was questionable. Under pressure from the White House, U.S. official opinion on Germany had hardened to a degree that would for months to come dismay and baffle many who saw the results but not the darker alternatives.

Few documents as important as JCS 1067 have been written under such intense and diverse influences of the moment; nevertheless, if not enlightened, the document was what it was intended to be, a proper military directive giving the theater commander workable instructions on which to base detailed planning. At the same time, it was not, as its authors were no doubt well aware, an adequate program for administering a conquered nation. The directive disavowed any intention of stating policy beyond that of a "short term and military character, in order not to prejudice whatever ultimate policies may later be de-

termined upon."<sup>25</sup> Its object was to establish a "stern, all-powerful military administration of a conquered country, based on its unconditional surrender, impressing the Germans with their military defeat and the futility of any further aggression."<sup>26</sup> In language it was redolent of the Treasury philosophy. In substance it was an expansion of five points, none originating with the Morgenthau Plan, on which the War-State-Treasury meeting of 2 September and subsequently the Cabinet Committee had agreed unanimously. They were: dissolution of the Nazi party; demilitarization; controls over communications, press, propaganda, and education; reparation for those countries wanting it; and decentralization of the German governmental structure (without a decision either way on partitioning the country). A sixth point—aimed at permanently reducing the German standard of living to the subsistence level, eliminating the German economic power position in Europe, and converting the German economy "in such a manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production"—had been considered and dropped. It had been acceptable to Morgenthau as a lightly camouflaged entering wedge for his plan and had been vehemently rejected by Stimson for the same reason. On the matter of relief, the directive restated the disease and unrest formula and discouraged importation of relief supplies, but did not prohibit them.

The economic section of the directive prohibited "steps looking toward the

<sup>24</sup> JCS 1067, Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat), 24 Sep 44, in OPD, ABC 387.

<sup>25</sup> Department of State, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, in "Foreign Relations of the United States" (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 143.

<sup>26</sup> [Unsigned paper] German Occupation Policy, Oct 44, in ASW, 370.8.

a boner," and he seemed "staggered" to learn that a passage about agriculturalization and pastoralization was in the agreement he had initialed with Churchill at Quebec.<sup>31</sup>

In early October, JCS 1067 suddenly became a valuable document—to the President temporarily as evidence, should he need it, that it and not the Morgenthau Plan was the approved U.S. policy for Germany—to the War Department for many months to come as the only statement on Germany it was going to get. Having denied accepting the Morgenthau Plan, the President soon also professed complete lack of interest in postwar planning for Germany. To the Secretary of State he wrote, "it is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe speed in such matters is not an essential. . . . I dislike making plans for a country which we do not yet occupy."<sup>32</sup>

#### *A Program for Germany?*

JCS 1067 was a U.S. document. As such, although it was sent to Eisenhower, SHAEF could not put it into force until it was approved and transmitted through the CCS. After the uproar over the Morgenthau Plan, the War Department more than ever wanted it approved—and without changes—because the likelihood of agreement within the government on any other document or revision was extremely slight. The hope was that the President's influence would be enough to quell British resistance to policy originating in Washing-

<sup>31</sup> (1) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 580. (2) Department of State, *Malta and Yalta*, in "Foreign Relations," p. 155.

<sup>32</sup> Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, p. 358.

ton and now, in the instance of JCS 1067, exclusively made there. Hopkins, when he took the paper to the President, had asked him to "write a note . . . and ask the Prime Minister to have his nitpickers lay off the documents."<sup>33</sup> But in October the British put forward in the CCAC a draft directive of their own. It differed from JCS 1067 in a number of respects, most painfully for the War Department planners in that it could be taken as an expression of long-term policy—just then the most highly explosive subject in Washington.<sup>34</sup>

That the British directive and JCS 1067 would die in the CCS from lack of action by either side soon became clear; thus the War and State Departments attempted to salvage their one viable piece of policy guidance by submitting it for tripartite adoption in the EAC. Pending this event, which was not to be expected soon, the CAD sent JCS 1067 to the U.S. Group Control Council to be used in planning for the postsurrender period.<sup>35</sup> As Supreme Commander, Eisenhower would have to continue under the presurrender directive, CCS 551. Wickersham, on his return from a trip to Washington in November, reported, "The feeling at home is that SHAEF, in the pre-defeat period, should follow Document 1067 as closely as possible"; but how Eisenhower as combined commander was to impose a strictly U.S. policy on the British contingent in SHAEF was not explained.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Unsigned memo dated 29 Sep 44, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 4-B.

<sup>34</sup> Memo [no source], sub: The British Draft Directive for Germany, 1 Nov 44, in ASW, 370.8.

<sup>35</sup> Memo for Record, H. L. S. [Stimson], 19 Dec 44, and Memo for Record, H. L. S., sub: Financial Directive, JCS 1067 [no date], in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 4-B.

<sup>36</sup> US Gp CC, Min of Meeting of Staff Conference Held 20 Nov 44, in SHAEF G-5, 31.04.

to assume an extension of the CCS presurrender policy into the postsurrender period. Consequently, in its ECLIPSE planning, SHAEF G-5 took on the following additional objectives from the SHAEF presurrender directive of 9 November: care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons; apprehension of war criminals; establishment of property and financial controls; elimination of nazism and militarism; and preservation of a suitable civil administration to accomplish all the objectives.<sup>21</sup>

In writing the outline plan, SHAEF predicted that German resistance to ECLIPSE would be low. The Germans, the planners expected, would know they had been overwhelmingly defeated and would be too physically and spiritually exhausted to continue the struggle. Some sabotage might be attempted and some of the Nazi leaders might attempt a dramatic last stand, perhaps in the Bavarian Alps, though it was most unlikely.<sup>22</sup> Instinct regarding the Germans was better in November 1944 than it would be a half year later. (See below, p. 255.)

#### *The Carpet and Static Plans*

Whether military government went into Germany after a surrender, as TALISMAN assumed, or, as ECLIPSE supposed, in the wake of the last battle, its first mission would be to seize governmental control in all areas occupied by SHAEF forces. In this respect the planning for military government in Germany had differed from the planning for civil affairs in liberated coun-

tries. Under RANKIN the concept of pinpointing—the assignment of specific detachments to specified localities—had been introduced for Germany. In liberated territory, detachments would be assigned where they were needed; in Germany they would be assigned to assert Allied control. RANKIN, however, said nothing about how detachments would get to their pinpoint assignments. The war remedied this omission. By the end of summer 1944, the armies were either at or approaching the German border and would most likely sweep across Germany in the deployment they then had, whether the Germans surrendered or not. For military government the effect would be like unrolling a carpet: control would be extended across Germany from the border eastward as the armies advanced, the pinpointed detachments taking up their stations as the locations were uncovered.

The carpet made its appearance in the 1,186 South Plan Amended, which ECAD issued on 13 September 1944 and which thereafter went by the more convenient name Carpet Plan.<sup>23</sup> Two ECAR's, the 2d and 3d, with 213 detachments and 1,428 functional military government officers were to provide the carpet. The area to be covered, at first the U.S. zone plus the Rhineland from the zone boundary north to Duesseldorf, was later increased in the ECLIPSE planning to include the whole southern third of the British zone. The carpet was a thin one. I detachments (four officers and six enlisted men) were assigned areas with populations up to 100,000. To provide coverage for the northward extension, four companies of detachments pinpointed for southern and eastern Bavaria had to be transferred north and given tem-

<sup>21</sup> SHAEF G-5, ECLIPSE Memo No. 13, Digest of Military Government Considerations for Germany, 13 Dec 44, in SHAEF G-5, 115.25A, Jacket 3.

<sup>22</sup> SHAEF (44) 34, Operation ECLIPSE, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 Nov 44, in SHAEF G-5, 115.25A, Jacket 3.

<sup>23</sup> ECAD G-3, Organizational Development per G-3 Records [no date], USFET CAD 322.



U.S. OFFICER SWEARS IN A BUEGERMEISTER AND FIVE POLICEMEN

tainted by nazism. "Busy" was the word that described these detachments best—busy with getting local government running again and with streams of Germans reporting to be registered, wanting favors, wanting passes, or reporting rapes and looting, confident that the omnipotent military government would be able to ferret out the guilty from among thousands of soldiers.<sup>25</sup> For the civilians, living and eating and staying out of jail all depended on a military government officer's signature on their registration cards and on any passes they

might need to be out during the curfew hours or to travel beyond the three-mile limit. One detachment commander claimed to have signed his name 540,000 times in less than a month.<sup>26</sup>

Since, in an opposed advance, predicting when specific localities would be reached was impossible, the armies sent out spearhead detachments in the first wave—I detachments whose pinpoint assignments were east of the Rhine. Their job was to move with the divisions in the front, stopping only long enough to post the procla-

<sup>25</sup> Hist Rpt, Ninth Army G-5, 1-31 Mar 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.14, Jacket 6.

<sup>26</sup> SHAEF G-5, DP Br, sub: Report of Visit by Col. Gary, 27 Mar 45, in SHAEF G-5, 2748/4.

MILITARY INSTRUCTION



A SPEARHEAD DETACHMENT AT WORK

mations and ordinances, issue circulation and curfew orders, and remove the most obvious Nazis. They sometimes appointed an acting *Buergermeister* who would then frequently have to be left to struggle with the new rules on his own until the next unit came along and, as often as not, dismissed him for incompetence.

One spearhead detachment was I11D2, commanded by Capt. Lloyd La Prade and pinpointed for *Landkreis* Friedburg north of Frankfurt. In the first week of March, I11D2 crossed the Roer River behind First Army. On the 9th, the detachment took over Bruehl outside Cologne, appointed a

*Buergermeister*, received orders on the same day to double back to Euskirchen, and on the way was diverted to Linz am Rhein in the Remagen bridgehead. Sunday morning, 11 March, the detachment ran the "hot corner" at Remagen and crossed the bridge safely, becoming the first detachment across the Rhine. La Prade set up his headquarters in the town hall at Linz, which happened to be a mile upstream from the bridge and directly in line with it. The German planes on bombing runs came in low overhead, and on the second day one dropped its bombs short, wounding one officer and an enlisted man. On the

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29th, having counted 200 bombing sorties and evacuated some thousands of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons to the west side of the river, I11D2 turned Linz over to its assigned detachment and headed south to join Third Army, which was then closing in on Frankfurt. Four days later, after helping to quell riots among political prisoners at Diez and Butzbach near Frankfurt, the detachment moved to its station at Friedburg.<sup>27</sup>

In the big cities the pinpoint detachments moved in immediately, sometimes before the fighting ended. First Army began clearing Cologne, the largest city in the Rhineland, on 6 March, and Detachment E1H2 arrived on the 9th. At the last minute before the Americans came, the Nazi *Gauleitung* had sent criers through the streets directing the women and children and men over sixty to cross over to the east side of the Rhine; but, except for party big shots who left wearing *Wehrmacht* greatcoats over their party uniforms, few followed the directions because they would have had to go on foot with only the possessions they could carry in their hands. Some, women and children in particular, had left earlier either to escape the bombing or avoid the occupation. First estimates put the number who stayed at 100,000 to 150,000, but for weeks there was no way of telling how many were living in cellars or hiding in the outskirts. The most significant change in comparison with communities occupied earlier was a great increase in *Wehrmacht* deserters, *Volkssturm* men, and policemen who had stayed behind in civilian clothes. According to a strong rumor, a hundred *Gestapo* agents, called "*die raechende Schar*" (the avenging band), had also stayed, to kill anyone

who collaborated. If the rumor was true, the agents must have put caution before vengeance, because they were never heard from.

The first Americans into Cologne pronounced their welcome "terrific." They had not seen anything like it in Germany. The days were bright and sunny. Beerhalls and restaurants offered free beer and wine; people on the streets looked at the troops as if they were heroes; and to those who could understand German and to the many who could not the civilians said, "*Endlich seid Ihr gekommen. Seit Jahren haben wir auf Euch gewartet.*" (At last, you have come. We have waited years for you.) When the weather became dreary two or three days later, the mood appeared to fade, and the Americans decided upon reflection that the joy had been "patently false" anyway.<sup>28</sup>

Finding the city a wreck and over 70 percent destroyed was no longer a surprise, but the cellar life that had sprung up under the constant threat of air raids continued to astonish the Americans. The average citizen seemed to find spending his life underground entirely normal. A typical cellar contained bedding, a stove, a cabinet, and some decorations to give the place a homey touch. In the cellars, the inhabitants had even developed a brisk trade and social life. Many were hesitant about coming up into the daylight and facing the new risks of the occupation, but most were out in a few days scavenging among the ruins. The military government officers observed, as they had elsewhere, that the first reaction seemed to be to regard all unguarded property as free for the taking.

For E1H2 and its commander, Lt. Col.

<sup>27</sup>Hist Rpt, Det G-34, LK Friedburg, 17 Sep 44-31 Jul 45, in OMGUS 8-2/5.

<sup>28</sup>SHAEF, ACofS G-5, G-5 Weekly Journal of Information No. 6, 28 Mar 45, in SHAEF, G-5, 17.16, Jacket 8.



IN THE WAKE OF BATTLE a German woman surveys the wreckage of her property.

R. L. Hyles, the big problem was to rebuild the city administration under 12th Army Group's recent and rigid directive against employing Nazis and without letting a clique like the one in Aachen emerge. The detachment had to do more of the work of running the city, handpicking the officials at all levels, not only at the top, and supervising those who did qualify since, if they were up to the new standard of political purity, the chances were their other qualifications were weak. Hyles' prize appointee was Dr. Konrad Adenauer, who had been *Oberbuergermeister* of Cologne

from 1915 to 1933 when the Nazis forced him out. He had been in jail for several months after the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler and, after his release, was prohibited from returning to Cologne. To wait out what was left of the war, Adenauer had settled in Rhoendorf on the right bank of the Rhine five miles downstream from the Remagen bridge. In his seventieth year, he had done poorly at choosing a refuge from the war but brilliantly in setting the stage for a late political career. When the bridgehead front passed Rhoendorf, military government brought him to Co-

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logne and reinstalled him as *Oberbuergermeister*, in secret for the first two months because his three sons were in the Wehrmacht.<sup>29</sup>


Cologne demonstrated on an ominously large scale something that had been observed earlier at Aachen: the helplessness and hopelessness of a city cut off from its lifelines to the outside. The city administration, German and American, could do practically nothing about getting the railroads, the power grid, or the food distribution system functioning again. Fortunately, the breakdowns in these services antedated the occupation, and the civilians had adjusted to them. The cellars contained stocks of food and coal, and the city had seventy-five wood-burning trucks. Electricity came in sporadically over the German grid. When it was on, the civilians could tune in their radios and hear the German stations across the Rhine broadcasting that the new chief of police in Cologne was a "cocky Jew," that the Americans were forcing women to bury the dead dug out of the rubble, and that hundreds of Negroes were standing guard over German civilians and forcing them to clean up the streets.<sup>30</sup> The detachment believed that the population benefited by being able at last to compare the Nazi propaganda with reality.

Third Army's 10th Armored Division entered Trier on 1 March, and Detachment F2G2 moved in two days later. Lying close to the West Wall, Trier had been under artillery fire and air bombardment for months. The people, except for about

4,000 of the normal 88,000, had either moved east or gone into hiding. Electricity and water were out. When the detachment, under Lt. Col. S. S. Sparks, arrived they found that most life had settled in the Kimmel Caserne (barracks) on the heights above the city, which was beginning to fill up with displaced persons filtering in from the east. In the first week, Sparks appointed Friedrich Breitenbach as civil leader in Trier—avoiding the more dangerous title of *Buergermeister*—and registered the population, which by the time the registration was completed had risen to nearly six thousand. As long as the count did not go above ten thousand, the city promised to be in relatively good shape for the time being. People who stayed had stocked up on food in advance, and although the city was 80 to 90 percent destroyed, the housing was adequate. The big problem, as it would be in most heavily bombed cities, was water. The only reliable sources were three Army chlorination tanks and a trickle still running in an ancient Roman aqueduct. When the detachment discovered it could get a little electricity by tapping the German power grid, it began work on getting the big pumps that served the city water system back in operation. The reservoir and the pumps were in good condition, but troubles soon began to multiply. First the electric lines serving the pumps were dead. The trouble was eventually traced to a switch house that an Army photo group had decided to convert into a baggage room. When the pumps were turned on, the leaks began to show. The geysers in the streets were spectacular, but worse were the breaks deep underground which were hard to locate and repair. Restoring the water system would take months. For a while, what was left of the city seemed likely to burn up before the water was

<sup>29</sup> Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), p. 15-22.

<sup>30</sup> (1) Hist Rpt, First Army, ACofS G-5, 1-31 Mar 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.11, Jacket 9. (2) 5th Information and Historical Service, The Rehabilitation of Cologne, Germany, 16 May 45, in CMH files.



COBLENZ, MARCH 1945. *In the background the forts at Ehrenbreitstein.*

turned on. Careless soldiers and roving displaced persons caused so many fires that the army had to send in the 1240th Fire Fighting Platoon to help the local volunteer fire department. The first day without a fire was 29 March which, Sparks noted in his report, was also the first day the displaced persons had not been allowed to leave the Kemmel Caserne.<sup>31</sup>


The detachments at Cologne and Trier did not have to contend with enemy shell-

fire or counterattacks. At Koblenz, on the Rhine at the mouth of the Mosel, the situation was different. Lt. Col. M. W. Reed took Detachment F3G2 in behind the assault troops on 20 March. He opened his headquarters in a hospital on the bank of the Mosel near where the assault boats landed and moved to the city hall in the afternoon after it was secured. The inhabitants were even less a problem than at Trier. In the first place there were only about 4,000 people in the city, and few ventured out to bring their complaints or requests for passes to the detachment. Ger-

<sup>31</sup> Hist Rpt, Third Army, ACoS G-5, 1-31 Mar 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.10, Jacket 4.



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MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS, COBLENZ

man forts on the heights at Ehrenbreitstein across the Rhine kept nearly the whole city under observation, and anything that moved, even individual persons, drew artillery or sniper fire. At night, from the gun platform of Fort Constantine in the city, the detachment could watch one artillery duel going on downstream between First Army and the Germans around the Remagen bridgehead and another closer at hand upstream between Third Army's artillery and the guns at Ehrenbreitstein. Overhead the tracer and mortar fire, accompanied by the thunder of the American howitzers

firing farther back, made a permanent fireworks display. On the 25th, a German patrol raided downtown Coblenz and sent some civilians and a smaller U.S. patrol running to the city hall for safety.<sup>32</sup>

Before the end of March, 150 detachments were deployed in Germany, almost two-thirds of the total ECAD strength. Ninth and Third Armies had committed all the detachments assigned to them, except for some E detachments. Not all of these detachments would be needed perma-

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

nently in the Rhineland, but all were busy. H and I detachments were holding areas three and four times the size they had been designed for, and an average small town was getting only about four or five days of actual military government in a month. To help the detachments keep order, among the troops and displaced persons as much as among the Germans, the armies converted field artillery battalions to security guard duty and began authorizing them to appoint *Buergermeister*s and post the proclamations and ordinances.<sup>33</sup> The speed of the advance threatened to make ECAD's predicted personnel shortage an imminent reality; and the War Department's temporary overstrength allotment, which reached SHAEF in late February, did not reach ECAD until March. Then the officers and enlisted men still had to be found, trained, and organized into detachments. One modest piece of good luck helped. On 22 February, ECAD opened a school at Romilly Sur Seine to give Air Force and airborne officers two weeks' training in military government liaison. At the end of the first course, nineteen graduates requested transfers into the division, having been advised "without proselytizing or promises" how to go about it. In the second course the school shifted to training both officers assigned to ECAD and ECAD enlisted men nominated for field commissions as second lieutenants under the recent allotment.<sup>34</sup>

Shorthanded or not, military govern-

<sup>33</sup> (1) Hqs, ECAD, sub: Activities of the ECAD, 1-31 Mar 45, 7 May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.12, Jacket 6. (2) Hqs, Ninth Army, Bi-weekly CASUM, 24 Mar 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.14, Jacket 6. (3) Hqs, V Corps, ACoS G-5, to CO, Military Government Security Guards, 196th FA Bn, sub: MG Opns, 15 Mar 45, in V Corps 205-5.5.

<sup>34</sup> Hqs, ECAD, sub: Activities of the ECAD,

ment was propelled onto center stage in March 1945. The war would not wait. Training and practice were over and the real occupation was on. The nation that had almost conquered Europe was being brought as low as any of its victims had been. Germany's long-range future, if it had one, was undecided; the immediate future was in the hands of the G-5's and military government detachments, and even they were unsure of what it was to be. For the moment, what they saw most clearly were the approaching shadows of two relentless companions of war, disease and hunger.

The Germans were not starving, yet. In the cities, reduced populations and cellar stocks combined to make the short-term outlook deceptively bright. Searches in the basements of abandoned dwellings regularly turned up small reserves, mostly potatoes and home-canned vegetables. In Germany flour milling was still a local industry, and the mills usually had some underground grain on hand, which could be extended by setting the extraction rate up to 90 percent. Some places had lopsided surpluses. Alzey, in the fertile Rhine plain, had 5,000 excess tons of potatoes but no meat other than horse meat and not much of that. One thing was certain everywhere: the Germans were better off in March 1945 than they were likely to be again any time soon. The Rhineland, like all western Germany, was a food deficit area. Normally, the half of the Rhineland south of the Mosel imported a half million tons of food every day, equivalent to one fifty-car trainload; but no trains were running, nor was there enough transportation to ensure the movement of local produce. A survey

1-28 Feb 45 and 1-31 Mar 45, 17 Mar 45 and 7 May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.12, Jacket 6.

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MFA&amp;A POSTS ROOM IN WHICH MUSEUM PIECES ARE STORED

burg Castle again in late February and found the furniture and art work scattered about, some thrown into the moat, and the locked rooms broken into and rifled.<sup>44</sup>

Lt. Col. Webb, SHAEF's MFA&A adviser, toured the two British armies and U.S. Ninth Army in March. Pillage and wanton destruction, he concluded, were at least a combined effort, being as prevalent among the British and Canadians as among the Americans. At Juelich, he saw slashed pictures and cases of books from the

Aachen library broken open and their contents strewn about by souvenir hunters. Aware that the prevailing mood was not one of kindness toward Germans or their property, he pointed out that the German collections also contained looted art work which the Allies had pledged to restore to their rightful owners, and these pieces too were threatened. SHAEF G-5 forwarded Webb's report, adding, "It is appreciated that a certain amount of 'toughness' may be desirable in occupied territory and it is not suggested that we should instruct our troops to act in Germany as they have usually in liberated territory; nevertheless, it

<sup>44</sup> Journal, Ninth Army, ACoS G-5, 1-28 Feb 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.14, Jacket 3.

During the winter, the U.S. Group Control Council worked on its Basic Preliminary Plan which, together with its elaborations and supplements, eventually made up a file that General Clay later described as being "beyond the ability of one man to comprehend."<sup>65</sup> SHAEF, in the meantime, completed one "final" G-5 reorganization for Germany at the end of February and another in late April. Together, they did finally end the separation of policy and operations within G-5 and abolished the remnants of the special staff. Henceforth the G-5 functional branches were responsible for policy, planning, and operations.<sup>66</sup> On the other hand, the U.S. side of SHAEF G-5, at least, was now intent on applying the distinction between policy and operations to the U.S. Group Control Council and the future theater G-5.

In March, the U.S. Group Control Council moved to Versailles, leaving a rear echelon in London to maintain contact with the EAC and the British Control Council element. The move brought the American Control Council personnel in contact with events on the Continent—and under closer G-5 scrutiny. One particular weakness G-5 had found in the Basic Preliminary Plan was "some tendency to assume [on the part of the Control Council] power to give orders to the U.S. zonal staff

and subordinate echelons."<sup>67</sup> This tendency was corrected in two directives—one issued on 31 March, the other on 29 April. The first directive limited the U.S. Group Control Council to negotiating in the Control Council and developing policies "consistent with approved U.S. views in conjunction with the joint theater staff."<sup>68</sup> Wickersham managed later, with some effort, to get the words "in conjunction with" changed to "in consultation with."<sup>69</sup> The second directive defined the two staffs' functions as follows:

1. The U.S. Group Control Council will be the U.S. element of the Control Authority.
2. The theater staff will be specifically charged with execution, implementation, and supervision within the zone of approved U.S. and Control Council policies.<sup>70</sup>

In Washington, however, the War Department had, in the President's 23 March directive and the revised JCS 1067, accepted the Control Council's authority as paramount; and Hilldring thereafter concluded that in the long run Eisenhower would clearly have only one staff for military government in Germany, the U.S. Group Control Council.<sup>71</sup>

While the staffs were jockeying for position, one genuinely crucial step toward deciding the future of the occupation was

agree, possibly because whatever drifting the Control Council group was doing was not aimless as far as SHAEF was concerned. In Smith's view, the main purpose of the group for the time being was to "assemble a corps of experts on the civil side." He wanted to hold open the jobs in the executive staff for "outstanding commanders and staff officers here, who are now conducting the war." (1) Cable, Hilldring to Smith, 2 Nov 44, in USFET SGS 334/2. (2) Ltr, Smith to Hilldring, 3 Mar 45, in CAD 014, 7-10-42, sec. II.

<sup>65</sup> Ltr, Clay to Hilldring, 7 May 45, in OMGUS 177-1/3.

<sup>66</sup> General Board, Study No. 32, pp. 52-54.

<sup>67</sup> OMGUS, Control Office, Historical Branch, History of Military Government in Germany, 8 May 45-30 Jun 46, in OMGUS 21-215, ch. VIII, p. 25f.

<sup>68</sup> Hqs, US Gp CC, Planning Directive No. 21, 31 Mar 45, in OMGUS 12-1/5, V60-11/1.

<sup>69</sup> US Gp CC, Staff Meeting of Division Directors, 2 Apr 45, in OMGUS 12-1/5, V60-12/1.

<sup>70</sup> Memo, Hqs, ETOUSA, CofS, for Distribution, sub: Relationship of Dep. Mil. Gov. and U.S. Gp. CC to Theater Staff, 29 Apr 45, in USFET SGS 322/3.

<sup>71</sup> History of the CAD, bk. VI, ch. XII, p. 66.

taken—the appointment of the Deputy Military Governor. After December 1944, the discussion of the appointment, never very enthusiastic on the European side anyway, had faded. Writing to Hilldring in early March, Smith mentioned the need for a deputy but said Wickersham could carry on until one was appointed. He was more concerned at the time with finding a chief for the theater G-5, whose job he described as being “as important or more important” than that of the deputy; he suggested Clay.<sup>72</sup> Hilldring had told Smith a week earlier that the War Department was actively engaged in selecting a deputy but promised only “some official word . . . before long” and did not mention Clay or any other candidates.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, Clay’s appointment as Deputy Military Governor at the end of March, which was a surprise to Clay, equally surprised Eisenhower and Smith when he appeared at SHAEF headquarters on 7 April.<sup>74</sup>

Upon his arrival at SHAEF Forward in Reims, Clay, as he relates in his memoirs, had a title without a job.<sup>75</sup> Military government was all in the hands of G-5, SHAEF, and the welcome Smith gave him was less than warm. But he had ironclad credentials: a presidential send-off arranged by his former chief in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Justice James F. Byrnes; a commitment from the War Department that he would be Eisenhower’s deputy in fact and not be buried somewhere in the general staff; and a promotion

to lieutenant general in the offing. On 18 April ETOUSA created the post of Deputy Military Governor and announced Clay’s assignment to it. A week later he took command of the U.S. Group Control Council.<sup>76</sup> The 29 April directive on the relationship between the U.S. Group Control Council and the theater G-5 appeared still to leave some ambiguity in Clay’s position as Deputy Military Governor: he was to be in direct charge of the U.S. Group Control Council; he would represent the Commanding General, USFET, on the co-ordinating committee of the Control Council when it was established; and he would be “adviser” to the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General USFET, for military government within the U.S. zone in Germany. In this last capacity he would “secure coordination directly through” the theater G-5.<sup>77</sup> But the 29 April directive was less authoritative than Clay’s own definition written on 11 April. In it he proposed to “work directly through the G-5 Divisions with the several command echelons” and as he later told Hilldring claimed as Deputy Military Governor “full charge for the commander in Berlin and in addition . . . staff supervision over G-5 activities within the U.S. zone.”<sup>78</sup>

Not everyone knew yet but the struggle for power was over and General Clay had won.

<sup>72</sup> Ltr, Smith to Hilldring, 3 March 45, in CAD 014, 7-10-42, sec. 11.

<sup>73</sup> Ltr, Hilldring to Smith, 24 Feb 45, in SHAEF SGS 334.

<sup>74</sup> (1) Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 4-7. (2) Summary Sheet, Director, CAD, to OPD, sub: Personnel for U.S. Gp. CC, 28 Mar 45, in OPD 336 (sec. 11-A).

<sup>75</sup> Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 8.

<sup>76</sup> OMGUS, *History of Military Government in Germany*, ch. VIII, p. 25. General Wickersham became Assistant Deputy Military Governor until 26 May when he asked to be relieved from duty for reasons of family health.

<sup>77</sup> Memo, Hqs, ETOUSA, CofS, for Distribution, sub: Relationship of Dep. Mil. Gov. and U.S. Gp. CC to Theater Staff, 29 Apr 45, in USFET SGS 322/3.

<sup>78</sup> (1) Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, p. 934. (2) Ltr, Clay to Hilldring, 7 May 45, in OMGUS 177-1/3.

with hardly even a window broken. It seemed likely to be the only building big enough to house SHAEF (and USFET) left standing in western Germany, and Smith cabled Washington to make sure that Frankfurt, which might be considered for assignment to the French zone, was kept in the U.S. zone.<sup>8</sup> The Germans later suspected that the U.S. Air Force had spared the building deliberately. More likely, the anti-aircraft batteries in the Grueneburg Park and the adjacent Palm Garden had influenced the bomber pilots to pick less hazardous targets.


Advancing north from Frankfurt, Third Army cut into the future Soviet zone when it occupied the western tip of Thuringia. On 4 April, the 90th Infantry Division took Merkers, a few miles inside the border in Thuringia. On the morning of the 6th, two military policemen, Pfc. Clyde Harmon and Pfc. Anthony Kline, enforcing the customary orders against civilian circulation, stopped two women on a road outside Merkers. Since both were French displaced persons and one was pregnant, the MPs decided rather than to arrest them to escort them back into the town. On the way, as they passed the entrance to the Kaiseroda salt mine in Merkers, the women talked about gold that the Germans had stored in the mine—so much gold, they said, that unloading it had taken local civilians and displaced persons who were used as labor seventy-two hours. By noon the story had passed from the MP first sergeant to the chief of staff and on to the division's G-5 officer, Lt. Col. William A. Russell, who in a few hours had the news confirmed by other DPs and by a British sergeant who had been employed in the mine as a pri-

<sup>8</sup> Cable, SHAEF Forward to AGWAR (Hull), 16 Apr 45, in SHAEF G-3, Ops. 387-15.

soner of war and had helped unload the gold. Russell also turned up an assistant director of the National Galleries in Berlin who admitted he was in Merkers to care for paintings stored in the mine. The gold was reportedly the entire reserve of the *Reichsbank* in Berlin, which had moved it to the mine after the bank building was bombed out in February 1945. When Russell learned that the mine had thirty miles of galleries and five entrances, the division, which had already detailed the 712th Tank Battalion to guard the Merkers entrance, had to divert the whole 357th Infantry Regiment to guard the other four.

The next morning, after having steam raised in the boilers overnight to generate electricity for the lifts and ventilators, Russell went down into the mine with a party of division officers, German mine officials, and Signal Corps photographers. Near the entrance to the main passageway they found 550 bags containing a half billion in paper *Reichsmarks*.<sup>9</sup> A steel vault door

<sup>9</sup> The discovery that Germans had possibly removed money recently raised suspicions concerning the uses to which it might be put. Dr. Werner Veick, a *Reichsbank* official who gave himself up to military government in Merkers on 8 April, insisted, however, under intensive questioning, that the money was being taken out for normal circulation because the *Reichsbank's* printing presses had broken down. As Veick explained, he and several other bank employees had loaded 1,000 bags of money in a railroad boxcar on 3 April. The next morning they had decided to unload the car again when they learned that it could not leave Merkers because of a blown bridge. They were about half finished when they heard that the Americans were less than two miles away. The senior official then decided that he was badly needed back in Berlin, locked the vault, and drove off by car while Veick went to get his suitcase. When Veick returned to the mine, the Americans were there. They searched him, asked what he was unloading, looked at the money, and moved on. He and the laborers then finished unloading the money and stacked it in the passage outside the vault.



SOLDIERS ADMIRE MANET PAINTING IN MERKERS MINE

on the entrance to the tunnel said to contain the gold was locked. In the afternoon, after having tried unsuccessfully to open the door, the party left the mine without having seen the treasure.

The next day was Sunday. In the morning, while Colonel Bernstein, Deputy Chief, Financial Branch, G-5, SHAEF, read about the find in the New York *Herald Tribune's* Paris edition, 90th Infantry Division engineers blasted a hole in the vault wall to reveal on the other side a room 75 feet wide and 150 feet deep. The floor was covered with rows of numbered bags, over 7,000 in all, each containing gold bars or

gold coins. Baled paper money was stacked along one wall; and at the back—a mute reminder of nazism's victims—valises were piled filled with gold and silver tooth fillings, eyeglass frames, watch cases, wedding rings, pearls, and precious stones. The gold, between 55 and 81 pounds to the bag, amounted to nearly 250 tons. In paper money, all the European currencies were represented. The largest amounts were 98 million French francs and 2.7 billion *Reichsmarks*. The treasure almost made the 400 tons of art work, the best pieces from the Berlin museums, stacked in the mine's other passages seem like a routine find.

On Sunday afternoon, Bernstein, after checking the newspaper story with Lt. Col. R. Tupper Barrett, Chief, Financial Branch, G-5, 12th Army Group, flew to SHAEF Forward at Rheims where he spent the night, it being too late by then to fly into Germany. At noon on Monday, he arrived at Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army Headquarters with instructions from Eisenhower to check the contents of the mine and arrange to have the treasure taken away. While he was there, orders arrived for him to locate a depository farther back in the SHAEF zone and supervise the moving. Bernstein and Barrett spent Tuesday looking for a site and finally settled on the *Reichsbank* building in Frankfurt. Wednesday, at Merkers, they planned the move and prepared for distinguished visitors by having Germans tune up the mine machinery. The next morning, Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, and Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy took the 1,600-foot ride down into the mine. When they stepped out at the foot of the shaft, the private on guard saluted and, in the underground stillness, was heard by all to mutter, "Jesus Christ!"

The move began at 0900 on Saturday morning, 14 April. In twenty hours, the gold and currency and a few cases of art work were loaded on thirty ten-ton trucks, each with a 10 percent overload. Down in the mine, jeeps with trailers hauled the treasure from the vault to the shaft, where the loaded trailers were put aboard the lifts and brought to the surface. At the vault entrance an officer registered each bag or item on a load slip, and at the truck ramps an officer and an enlisted man checked the load slips and verified that every item that left the vault was loaded on a truck. Finally, the officer recorded the truck number and the names and serial numbers of the

driver, the assistant driver, and the guards assigned to the truck.

The convoy left Merkers on Sunday morning for the 85-mile trip to Frankfurt with an escort of five rifle platoons, two machine gun platoons, ten multiple-mount anti-aircraft vehicles, and Piper cub and fighter air cover. All this protection, however, was not enough to prevent a rumor, which surfaced periodically for years after, that one truckload of gold (or art work) disappeared on the way to Frankfurt. On Sunday afternoon and throughout the night the trucks were unloaded in Frankfurt, each item being checked against the load lists as it came off a truck and again when it was moved into the *Reichsbank* vault. Two infantry companies cordoned off the area during the unloading.<sup>10</sup>

The same procedures, except that a hundred German prisoners of war did the work, were followed in loading the art objects aboard a second truck convoy on Monday, and a similar security guard escorted the trucks to Frankfurt the next day. After the main treasure was removed, the mine was still a grab bag of valuables. Reconnaissance of the other entrances had turned up four hundred tons of German patent office records, *Luftwaffe* material and ammunition, German Army High

<sup>10</sup> The gold remained in the *Reichsbank* vault under Army control until 24 January 1946 when control and responsibility for it passed to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency. The agency was charged with returning the gold on a prorated basis to governments having claims on it and with making a substantial amount (\$25 million in monetary gold, plus all "non-monetary gold" and all so-called heirless funds, according to a subsequent agreement of 14 June 1946) available to "non-repatriable victims of German action." The latter amount went mostly to compensate and resettle Jewish victims of nazism. The Soviet Union was not included in the distribution, since it had relinquished all claims to captured gold in the Potsdam Agreement.

same time on its drive to Magdeburg. The military government carpet had been getting thinner since the beginning of the month because it had been stretched east and north at the same time that the pinpoint locations in the south were being uncovered. When they entered the Soviet zone, the armies ran completely out of trained detachments, and from the zone border west to the Rhine they could not achieve even the planned minimum of one I detachment for every two *Landkreise*. ECAD had begun training its officer overstrength, but the first hundred would not be available until the third week in April, and the last hundred not until late May. The armies resorted to provisional detachments and drew the personnel from their own tactical troops. Ninth Army set up the Ninth Army Military Government Unit, modeled on an ECAD regiment, with 3 companies, 49 detachments, and 900 officers and men. The detachments trained for two weeks. First Army put a thousand officers and men into fifty-two provisional detachments, two more than the total of its regular military government detachments, and assigned one trained ECAD officer to each provisional detachment. Third Army's three corps used antiaircraft, field artillery, and signal troops to put together a dozen detachments apiece, and the army G-5 ran fifty officers through "Charlottesville in three days" in Frankfurt. In all armies, the corps and division G-5 staffs took over detachment functions. The 80th Infantry Division G-5, for instance, in mid-April conducted military government in Erfurt, Weimar, Jena, and Gera.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> (1) After Action Report, First Army, 1-30 Apr 45, in First Army, 101-0.3. (2) Hist Rpt, Hqs, Third Army, ACofS G-5, Apr 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.10. (3) Hqs, Ninth Army, ACofS G-5, Bi-weekly CASUM, 8 May 45, in Ninth Army G-5, 109-5.

A 4th Armored Division tank column heading east past Weimar on 11 April encountered one of the strangest sights of the war. Two PWD observers, 1st Lt. Edward A. Tennenbaum and Egon W. Fleck, a civilian, described what they saw.

[We] turned a corner onto a main highway and saw thousands of ragged, hungry looking men marching in orderly formation, marching east. The men were armed and had leaders at their sides. Some platoons carried rifles. Some platoons had *Panzerfausts* on their shoulders. Some carried hand grenades. They laughed and waved wildly as they walked. Their captains saluted gravely for them. They were of many nationalities, a platoon of French followed by a platoon of Spaniards—platoons of Russians, Poles, Jews, Dutch. Some wore striped convict suits, some ragged U.N. uniforms, some shreds of civilian clothes. These were the inmates of Buchenwald walking to war as tanks roared by at twenty-five miles per hour.<sup>16</sup>

The tank officers ordered the marchers to turn back, and Fleck and Tennenbaum left the column to have a look at the camp. There they found another fantastic scene. Armed inmates stood guard at the main gate, a two-story, wooden structure bearing in large letters across the entrance the motto "*Recht oder Unrecht, mein Vaterland*" (Right or wrong, my Fatherland). Inside, wildly cheering prisoners rushed to shake their hands. Others were busy throwing binoculars manufactured in the camp shops over the barbed wire fence to troops passing by outside. Armed guards in prison clothes patrolled the grounds, and a few words from them were enough to quiet the excited crowds. The Americans noticed at once that the guards looked healthier than the others and later learned why: they were mostly German communists who had sur-

<sup>16</sup> Hqs, 12th AGp, P&PW, sub: Buchenwald, a Preliminary Report, 24 Apr 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.11, Jacket 10.



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*MASS FUNERAL for concentration-camp prisoners murdered by their guards in the last days of the war.*

tance. Military government put some in camps and billeted others with the Sudeten Germans and gave them subsistence from captured German rations.<sup>38</sup> At the Flossenburg concentration camp, ten miles from the Czech border, 186 typhus cases raised the threat of an epidemic, especially from the 16,000 prisoners that the SS guards were marching south, ahead of the front. 26th Division G-5 kept track of the exodus by the trail of bodies and hastily

dug mass graves the prisoner columns left behind.<sup>39</sup>

The Germans were conquered and their property was "liberated." Looting had become something of an art. Soldiers stationed themselves outside military government offices and intercepted civilians bringing in weapons. Tactical units posted their own contraband lists in which they included items as various as automobiles and jewelry, and the military government de-

<sup>38</sup> After Action Report, Hqs, V Corps, ACofS G-5, May 45, in V Corps G-5, 205-5.

<sup>39</sup> Hist Rpt, Third Army, ACofS G-5, Apr 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.11.



GERMANS AND DPs CARRYING LOOT

tachments acquired a new and, for the most part, unwelcome function as tactical commands and individual high-ranking officers requisitioned items of doubtful military usefulness through them. The retreating *Wehrmacht* troops had confiscated many bicycles and automobiles. The U.S. troops took most of the rest.<sup>40</sup> In the last week of April SHAEF stopped accepting *Reichsmark* currency for exchange into

dollars because tremendous amounts dubiously acquired were known to be in the hands of the troops.<sup>41</sup>

Since the U.S. troops, German civilians, and DPs all looted, there was some debate over whose behavior was the most reprehensible. In the DPs defense it was frequently said that they took only food, clothing, and items for their own comfort. The Americans could claim the sanction of military custom. But the Germans stole from each other. On the other hand, the

<sup>40</sup> (1) History of Military Government in Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, pt. I, p. 127. (2) Hist Rpt, Det I4B2, 14 May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.11, Jacket 7. (3) War Diary, Det HIG3, Mar to Jun 45, in OMGUS 413-3/3.

<sup>41</sup> SHAEF, ACofS G-5, Financial Br, Report of Conference Held at SHAEF Forward, 25 Apr 45, in SHAEF G-5, 1.

## CHAPTER XVI

# Germany in Defeat

### *The Carpet*

By V-E Day the military government carpet was laid in dimensions larger than any plan had contemplated. It stretched across the Rhineland and the Ruhr into central Germany to the Elbe and the Mulde Rivers, into western Czechoslovakia to Pilzen, and south into Austria past Linz, Salzburg, and Innsbruck. The carpet was a thin one, 250 ECAD military government detachments and about 200 provisional detachments drawn from the combat troops.<sup>1</sup> Although the movement and the fighting had ended, military government command was still entirely in tactical channels—from division to corps to army to army group. Fifteenth Army controlled the Rhineland. On 11 May, when First Army became non-operational, Ninth Army assumed military government responsibility for the area east of the Rhine and north of the Main River and for the Bremen enclave. Third Army held northern and eastern Bavaria, the western Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, and a dozen *Landkreise* in Austria. Seventh Army straddled half of Bavaria (including Munich, the capital), Wuerttemberg, and Baden. Headquarters, 12th Army Group, took command of Seventh Army on 16 May and therewith became responsible for military government in all U.S.-occupied Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Memo, Hqs, ETOUSA, ACofS G-5, for CofS, sub: Personnel Requirements [no date], in USFET SGS 200.3.

The U.S. Group Control Council, resigned to a delayed entry into Berlin, enjoyed an advancement from the rearward ranks of SHAEF Main, at Versailles, to a spearhead position with SHAEF Forward, in Frankfurt. When SHAEF Forward opened in the I.G. Farben building in Frankfurt after V-E Day, the U.S. Group Control Council set itself up in a Farben plant in nearby Hoechst. Hoechst, a Farben company town, was ideally suited to a military occupation. The houses had been designed for assignment to Farben employees according to rank. Headquarters, ECAD, moved from Troyes to Bad Homburg, ten miles northwest of Frankfurt, and settled into a collection of resort hotels spared from the bombing because they had been used as hospitals during the war.

The E detachments, after their long winter's wait, were in Germany and working, though not yet exercising the regional supervision for which they had been designed. Some detachments, like E1C3 (*Land Wuerttemberg*) and E2C2 (*Land Bremen and the enclave*), had entered their areas in April not far behind the combat troops. Others, like E1F3 (*Land Bavaria*), took up their stations after V-E Day. All had problems, among which inadequate personnel—in numbers and in specialized skills—was the most common. The *Land* detachment commanders learned, as Col. Charles E. Keegan did when he took E1F3 into Munich on 14 May, that the govern-

ments they had come to supervise were practically nonexistent. In Munich, the government buildings were badly damaged; the ministries had either been bombed out or evacuated; the *Reichsstatthalter* (head of government under the Nazis) had reportedly been kidnapped by the SS; and, for the near future at least, the Seventh Army-Third Army boundary cutting through Bavaria was more important than the *Land* political boundaries.<sup>2</sup> Col. Bion C. Welker, commanding E2C2, had a tight, if entirely artificial, area in the Bremen enclave, but he shared it with two major generals, one commanding the 29th Infantry Division, the other the Bremen Port Command.<sup>3</sup>

Military government operations, with few exceptions, were being conducted as they had been during the combat phase, by the local detachments under the supervision of the tactical commands and sometimes in competition with the security troops. Among the exceptions, EIF3, as one of its first acts, appointed a German food and agriculture administrator for Bavaria, thereby recognizing a regional problem though by no means solving it. In two directives affecting the entire U.S.-occupied area, 12th Army Group authorized the reuniforming of the German police and the reopening of lower courts. The police, in old *Wehrmacht* uniforms dyed some color other than field gray, could not be armed but could carry nightsticks. The courts were to make a beginning at clearing up the backlog of ordinary civil and criminal cases accumulated before the surrender, provided judges and lawyers

could be found. At least 80 percent of the members of the legal profession had been Nazis. Twenty-five German courts were operating by the end of May. The opening of the German courts did not affect the jurisdiction of military government courts, which had tried 16,000 cases by V-E Day, 70 percent on curfew and circulation charges.<sup>4</sup>


MFA&A was one of the first military government functions to be centrally coordinated. Because of the shortage of personnel, its functions had not been delegated to lower staffs to the extent others had; moreover, it had become the trustee for a greater quantity of art treasures than had ever been captured by any other army in history. At the time of the surrender, although they did not know it yet, the U.S. armies held the contents of all the major German art repositories except the Hamburg museums and, apparently, nearly all the art work the Nazis had looted in the countries occupied by Germany. The march into the south had uncovered dozens of caches, among them *Einsatzstab* Rosenberg loot at Neuschwanstein, the Rothschild collections at Herrenchiemsee, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop's collection at Gaibach, and, in Austria, mines at Laufen and Alt Aussee—the first mine containing the collections of the Vienna *Kunsthistorischesmuseum*, and the other holding the best of the *Einsatzstab* Rosenberg loot, probably intended originally for the great museum Hitler had planned to build in his hometown, Linz.

In neighboring salt mines at Heilbronn and Kochendorf, Seventh Army made finds that rivaled those of Third Army at Merk-

<sup>2</sup> Wk Rpt, Det EIF3, 21 May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.16, Hist Rpts, 12th AGp, Jacket 14.

<sup>3</sup> Functional History of Military Government, 27 April 1945-30 June 1946, Bremen Enclave, in OMGUS 39-3/5, p. 7f.

<sup>4</sup> (1) Hqs, 12th AGp, Legal Br, to ACoS G-5, sub: Branch Activities, 18 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.16, Jacket 11. (2) General Board, Study No. 85, p. 32.



*GERMANS QUEUE UP for information and advice at a military government detachment headquarters.*

ers. When the MFA&A officer, Lt. James J. Rorimer, went into the mines in late April, he saw, in cavernous galleries 700 feet below the surface where the temperature never varied from 67° Fahrenheit in winter or in summer, thousands of paintings and works of sculpture, millions of books, all the stained glass from the Strassburg Cathedral, the crown jewels and throne of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and, in addition, an I. G. Farben poison gas factory, a Heinkel jet plane factory, locomotives, fireworks, and stores of oil and aluminum.

On into June, depositories came to light almost daily. By the end of the month, the number reported to Headquarters, 12th Army Group, came to 849. The MFA&A job was to locate the caches, identify their contents, check on their condition, and see to their preservation and safekeeping. The 12th Army Group established collecting points at Marburg, Wiesbaden, and Munich; but getting the objects to these points was a massive undertaking. Maj. Louis B. LaFarge estimated that just moving the contents of the Alt Aussee mine to

proletariat of the occupation. The gentry were the "heavy" and "very heavy" workers, railroad workers and miners for instance, who could get up to 2,800 calories. The out-and-out aristocrats were the self-suppliers, that is, the farmers, who did not have to trouble themselves with ration cards. The normal consumer was not starving, but if he subsisted entirely on his ration, which no one really expected him to do, he was very close to it. A typical week's ration issued during May of 1945 consisted of the following: bread, 3 pounds; meat, 4 ounces; butter and fat, 2 ounces; sugar, 7 ounces; macaroni and spaghetti, 5 ounces; potatoes, 6 pounds; some cereal (added to the children's ration), 6 ounces; milk (only for children up to six), 1 quart. The total was less than 1,000 calories per day, and the difference was made up by adding a few ounces of green vegetables "provided trucks can be found to haul them and provided the people can eat rhubarb without sugar."<sup>13</sup>

The 6th and 12th Army Group surveys indicated that there might be enough food in Germany to feed the Germans until the next harvest at the existing ration scales, if the necessity for feeding large numbers of displaced persons and disarmed German troops did not last too long into the summer. The spring planting for 1945 was about 90 percent of normal, but it had been done late and the results were doubtful. Military government had helped. XXIII Corps distributed 10,000 tons of seed potatoes in its area. Fifteenth Army secured 10,000 tons of German and 2,000

tons of imported farm and garden seeds, most of them transported in Army trucks. Military government set up farm machinery and automotive repair shops in the *Landkreise*. The shops could make one usable truck out of two or three wrecks. In the towns and cities, military government worked to protect the food resources of the people and to get the processing plants running again. In Erlangen, the detachment allowed Germans whose houses had been requisitioned as troop billets to have access to their gardens. In Ansbach, the detachment distributed garden seed. By the end of May, mills in Freising were producing 20 tons of flour a day for Munich, and a creamery was processing 50,000 quarts of milk. In June XXIII Corps listed salt, flour, meats, cereals, potatoes, and bread as not to be requisitioned from the Germans for feeding displaced persons. Third Army, by using central repair and strict surveillance, raised the number of vehicles available for civilian transport in its area from 7,500 in May to 25,000 in June.<sup>14</sup>

SHAEF G-5's estimate of the German food situation was, if anything, more pessimistic than that of the army groups. It predicted sporadic starvation in urban areas before the harvest unless food was imported. The most obvious reason for this prediction was that normally the SHAEF area was only 60 to 70 percent self-sufficient. The difference had come from im-

<sup>13</sup> (1) Hqs, 12th AGp, Legal Br, to ACofS G-5; sub: Branch Activities, 18 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.16, Jacket 11. (2) 5th Information and Historical Service, sub: Food and Agriculture, XXIII Corps Area, 14 June 45, in Fifteenth Army, 115-2.

<sup>14</sup> (1) Hqs, 12th AGp, Legal Br, to ACofS G-5, sub: Branch Activities, 18 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.16, Jacket 11. (2) Hist Rpt, 6th AGp, ACofS G-5, May 45, in SHAEF G-5, 5-4. (3) Hist Rpt, Third Army, ACofS G-5, May-Jun 45, in ETOUSA, Admin Hist, Nr. 146. (4) Hist Rpt, Fifteenth Army, ACofS G-5, Apr 45, in SHAEF G-5, 17.25, Jacket 1. (5) Memo, Hqs, XXIII Corps, for CG, Sub-Areas, sub: Feeding of DPs, 26 Jun 45, in XXIII Corps, 223-0.3.

ports and from eastern Germany, now in Soviet hands. The western sections that had produced some surpluses, Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein for instance, were having to feed populations swollen by refugees. The big city populations were often half of normal, but the rural towns and villages had as much as two and a half times the usual number of people. Furthermore, the freeing of the displaced persons had cut the farm labor force in half; the bombing had destroyed processing machinery and impaired the distribution system; and because of the bombing, which had prevented the east-west movement of grain during the past winter, western Germany had begun the year with a food shortage. SHAEF's program was to encourage agriculture to the utmost—one of the few areas in which the Germans would be given Allied encouragement. SHAEF had granted permission to restart the agricultural machinery, fertilizer, and insecticide industries; and 12th Army Group had released 237,000 prisoners of war as farm labor by 1 June and would release over 200,000 more later in the month. Whether the effort would succeed was doubtful.<sup>15</sup> However, the Germans would have to be fed. As General Stearns, ETOUSA G-5, said, "While we can say they brought it on themselves and to hell with them, the fact remains that the Supreme Commander, who will be Military Governor of Germany, will be forced by public opinion at home to take at least minimum steps to prevent starvation."<sup>16</sup> Although the decision was not an easy one—all of Europe was short on

food—SHAEF began importing 650,000 tons of wheat for Germany in June.<sup>17</sup>

Competing with the food shortage for the status of number-one crisis was the state of German coal production. In May, a group of U.S. and British experts, the Potter-Hyndley Mission, surveyed the European coal requirements and concluded, "Unless drastic steps are taken, there will occur in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean next winter a coal famine of such severity as to destroy all semblance of law and order, and thus delay any chance of reasonable stability."<sup>18</sup> This chilling prediction extinguished whatever life was left in the Morgenthau Plan's proposal for closing the German mines; but the outlook for Germany was dark nevertheless. The anticipated coal deficit for northwest Europe excluding Germany in the year from June 1945 to June 1946 was 25 million tons, unless coal could be gotten from Poland, which was highly unlikely, from the United States, which would require four hundred 16,000-ton ships full time and so was impossible, or from Germany. The Potter-Hyndley Mission recommended taking coal from Germany "without any regard for the consequences to Germany." The question was, the mission report conceded, whether German production could be raised to anywhere near 25 million tons. Either way, the Germans would suffer. At the time, production was 30,000 tons a day, 3 percent of normal, and 24,000 of these tons were being used to run the mines. The mines had over 5 million tons on hand but only enough

<sup>15</sup> SHAEF, ACofS G-5, Weekly Journal of Information, No. 15, 16 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-5, 131.11.

<sup>16</sup> Hqs, Com Zone, ETO, Command and General Staff Conference, 4 May 45, in ETOUSA, Admin Hist Collection, Nr. 146.

<sup>17</sup> (1) SHAEF, ACofS G-5, Weekly Journal of Information, No. 15, 16 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-5, 131.11. (2) Hqs, Com Zone, ETO, Command and General Staff Conference, 31 Jul 45, in ETOUSA, Admin Hist Collection, Nr. 146.

<sup>18</sup> Report by the Potter-Hyndley Mission, 7 Jun 45, in USFET SGS 463.3, vol. I.

tachment not to issue any more orders without clearing them first with the tactical commands.<sup>52</sup>

At Ingolstadt, part of the staff of the 9th Infantry Division became involved in a plot with German civilians to overthrow the city government.<sup>53</sup>

### *The Spoils*

One of the earliest lessons of World War II was the potential crucial importance of technology. From the beginning the governments—fortunately the Allies more than the Germans—expected scientific and technical proficiency to influence heavily and perhaps even decide the outcome of the war. A new scientific device or a new industrial process, they believed, could be worth divisions or even armies; and battles, perhaps even the war, could be won or lost in the laboratory or factory. In occupied enemy territory, scientific and technical intelligence might reveal the state of the enemy's advancement in particularly dangerous areas such as atomic fission and might uncover processes or devices that could be converted to Allied use.

During the planning for the invasion SHAEF set up the T (Target) Sub-Division in G-2 to plan for intelligence exploitation of scientific and industrial targets. It was at first composed of five U.S. and three British officers and thirteen enlisted men and women. In February 1945, on the eve of the advance into Germany, SHAEF created the Special Sections Sub-Division to co-ordinate the operations of the T Sub-Division and several other G-2

sections and subdivisions with related missions. T Sub-Division, meanwhile, had acquired a field element, the 6800 T Force, which would reach a 1,700-man strength in April and, with the later addition of the GOLDCUP ministerial control parties, went well over 2,000. During May and June, the force put another 1,000 investigators into the field.

Among its high priority targets the T Force listed synthetic rubber and oil catalysts, new designs in armored equipment, V (rocket) weapons, jet and rocket propelled aircraft, naval equipment, field radios, secret writing chemicals, aero medicine research, gliders, and "scientific and industrial personalities." During the drive into Germany and the first weeks after the surrender, T Force examined some 3,000 planned targets and uncovered 2,000 others. The grand prize target, of course, was the *Mittelwerk*, the V-2 plant at Nordhausen; but to the scientific and technical specialists, documents, patent records, optical devices, high pressure pumps, gear grinders, tire cord twistors, and supersonic wind tunnels were often almost as sensational. When large numbers of German scientists and economic and industrial experts began to be discovered in late April, Special Sections Sub-Division set up the Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section to manage and interrogate them. For its most important charges, the Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section established a detention center, DUSTBIN, first in Paris and later in Kramsberg Castle outside Frankfurt. DUSTBIN was the scientific and industrial-economic counterpart of ASHCAN, and some of its inmates, such as Albert Speer and Hjalmar Schacht, were candidates for both centers.

The top technicians and leaders of the German rocket development program, 450

of whom had been in Bavaria late in the war, were rendered to U.S. custody. In July, they proved Project Paperclip, a group of 350 German scientists and engineers but also included a number of military specialists. What u.s. specialists, aside from those able to contribute to the war against Japan, the most compelling reason for bringing them to the United States at the time to be the reach of Soviet influence. Some had captured rocket research facilities. *Mittelwerk* in the United States had missed out on the development personnel of the V-2 rocket group, Wernher von Braun and Geordie Greiner. They decided for the United States to carry on their work. They held their collection in a camp might have come from the department insisted on being voluntary. In the year, and agreed to work behind in Germany. They brought their families from the conditions, few had families to support the hardships alone; and it was after USFET and a 2,300-candidate list, that OX

<sup>52</sup> (1) Hist Rpt, Eastern Military District, 15 Sep-14 Oct 45, in OMGUS 76-3/10. (2) Annual Report, Det E-236, 1 May 45-30 Jun 46, in OMGUS 77-3/10.

<sup>53</sup> Annual Report, Det E-237, May 45-Jun 46, in OMGUS 77-3/10.

<sup>54</sup> Even so, at least 100 men had been then renamed 1

technical intelligence were redeployed beginning in the late summer, FIAT frequently also became the custodian of the documents and equipment they had collected.

Meanwhile, in June, President Truman had established the Publications Board under the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion and instructed it to review all scientific and technical information developed with government funds during the war with a view toward declassifying and publishing it. In August, after V-J Day, the President also ordered "prompt, public and general dissemination" of scientific and industrial information obtained from the enemy and assigned this responsibility as well to the Publication Board.<sup>59</sup> At first informally and later, in December, by War Department order, FIAT acquired the responsibility for the Publication Board program in Germany and a mission, which was the same one in fact that had been foreseen for it in June, namely, to exploit Germany's scientific and industrial secrets for the benefit of the world. As the military intelligence projects were completed and phased out in late 1945 and early 1946, the volume of civilian investigations increased; FIAT microfilming teams ranged across Germany, and the Frankfurt office screened, edited, and translated reports before shipping them to the United States. By the end of the first year of the occupation, FIAT had processed over 23,000 reports, shipped 108 items of equipment (whole plants sometimes were counted as single items), and collected 53 tons of documents.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> EO 9568, 8 Jun 45, and EO 9604, 28 Aug 45, in *Federal Register*, vol. 10, pp. 9568 and 10960.

<sup>60</sup> With Department of Commerce financial support and personnel, FIAT continued investigations

### *Exit SHAEF*

SHAEF's wartime mission ended on V-E Day. The last residual mission, the redistribution into the zones, was completed on 10 July, and the Supreme Command terminated on the 14th. Headquarters, USFET, under Eisenhower as Theater Commander and Smith as Chief of Staff, had opened in Frankfurt on 1 July; and when its increments from ETOUSA, SHAEF, and 12th Army Group were fully assembled, it was, with 3,885 officers and 10,968 enlisted men, an imposing organization in its own right. USFET commanded only U.S. troops, but its sphere of responsibility extended outside the zone in Germany into England, France, Belgium, Norway, and Austria. Two military government staffs, the U.S. Group Control Council and the theater G-5, would provide the U.S. element of the quadripartite administration for Germany and govern the zone. The 12th Army Group ceased its operations on 25 July, and thereafter USFET also assumed direct command of the occupation forces.

SHAEF had used its authority to bring into being a number of combined agencies which, while they did not constitute a central administration for the western zones, were a more substantial step in this direction than would be made again for several years. The agencies included the Allied Printing and Paper Control Board, the Rhine Navigation Agency, the Resources Allocation Board, the Production Control Agency, the Economic Control Agency, the

until 30 June 1947 and continued microfilming until 30 September of that year. (1) Piram, Background and History of Field Information Agency, Technical, 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46, in EUCOM, T 298-1/2. (2) Memo, Actg Ch, CAD, for Sec War, sub: Termination Date for FIAT, 11 Jun 47, in CAD, 014.

Combined Evidence Collecting Center for War Crimes, the DPX, FIAT, and CROWCASS. The functions of the agencies concerned with economic matters went to the Control Council and to the zonal administrations. The Combined Evidence Collecting Center, CROWCASS, and some other organizations that could not be divided or assigned either to the British or U.S. commands passed temporarily to a Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency. FIAT separated into its British and U.S. components, but the British FIAT stayed in Frankfurt. The two components occupied the same building, at 69 Burgerstrasse, Frankfurt, and later the Director's Building in the I. G. Farben plant at Hoechst, and continued to work closely together.<sup>61</sup>

The Displaced Persons Executive (DPX) was a special case. In the month of July, UNRRA had 2,656 persons in 332 DP teams deployed throughout the western zones. It planned to more than double its personnel, set up a central headquarters for Germany near Frankfurt, and then take over entirely the care and supervision of the displaced persons from the military authorities. For the interim, which was expected to be about three months, the DPX continued as the Combined Displaced Persons Executive (CDPX), operating under the existing SHAEF directives but without authority to make new policy.<sup>62</sup>

Along with SHAEF, the Combined

Chiefs of Staff and Combined Civil Affairs Committee also virtually passed out of the picture as far as Germany was concerned. The USFET channel of command from Washington was IPCOG, the SWNCC, and the JCS. Soon, this changed also. On 16 July at Potsdam, the President assigned "the necessary direction of our activities and negotiations pertaining to the treatment of Germany and Austria" to the War Department and the State Department—State to deal with policy, and War to deal with "the executive and administrative aspects." IPCOG, in which the Treasury Department and Foreign Economic Administration were represented, subsequently ceased to exist.<sup>63</sup>

As a kind of housewarming for the zone, USFET planned and, in forty-eight hours beginning at daybreak on 21 July, executed a check and search operation code-named TALLYHO. The objectives were to check the credentials of all persons in the zone, civilian or military; to search all premises and individuals for prohibited articles, such as firearms and stolen U.S. government property; and to search for evidence of black-marketeering. Staged in secret, to the extent that an operation employing 163,000 troops in the Western Military District alone could be kept a secret, TALLYHO apparently did at least take most Germans by surprise. It raised a fast-traveling wave of rumors: that there had been a jailbreak, that an American officer had been shot, that the Americans were making a last minute search for loot before turning the zone over to the Russians. After

<sup>61</sup> EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Organization and Administration of the European Theater and Its Headquarters, 1947, in CMH file 8-3.1, CA 5.

<sup>62</sup> (1) Cable, SHAEF Main to CG, 12th AGp, 6 Jul 45, in SHAEF G-5, 2772. (2) Cable, USFET to AGWAR, sub: Fifth Report on Status of UNRRA, 20 Jul 45, and Memo, USFET, ACofS G-5, for CofS, sub: Summary of UNRRA/Military DP Programs, 21 Jul 45, in USFET SGS 334.

<sup>63</sup> (1) Memo, Asst Dep CofS, OPD, for Sec JCS, sub: Communications with CINC's, U.S. Forces of Occupation, Germany and Austria, 21 Jul 45, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 4-E. (2) Memo, James F. Byrnes for the President, sub: Termination of IPCOG, 30 Aug 45, in CAD, 014, Jul 45-14 Sep 45.



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## CHAPTER XVIII

# The Occupation Troops

### *Army-Type Occupation*

On V-E Day, Eisenhower had sixty-one U.S. divisions, 1,622,000 men, in Germany, and a total force in Europe numbering 3,077,000.<sup>1</sup> When the shooting ended, the divisions in the field became the occupation troops, charged with maintaining law and order and establishing the Allied military presence in the defeated nation. This was the army-type occupation. A counterpart of the military government carpet, its object was to control the population and stifle resistance by putting troops into every nook and cranny. Divisions were spread out across the countryside, sometimes over great stretches of territory. The 78th Infantry Division, for instance, for a time after V-E day was responsible for an area of 3,600 square miles, almost twice the size of the state of Delaware, and the 70th Infantry Division for 2,500 square miles. Battalions were deployed separately, and the company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent deployment because billets were easy to find and the hauls from the billets to guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long. Frequently single platoons and squads were deployed at substantial distances from their company headquarters.

The occupation troops manned border control stations, maintained checkpoints at

<sup>1</sup> Memo, Hqs, ETOUSA, for Gen Eisenhower, sub: Strength of the U.S. Forces, 30 Apr 45, in USFET SGS 320.3/2.

road junctions and bridges, sent out roving patrols to apprehend curfew and circulation violators, and kept stationary guards at railroad bridges, Army installations, DP camps, jails, telephone exchanges, factories, and banks. In the first months troops were plentiful and almost everything of importance—and some not so important—was guarded.<sup>2</sup> In effect, the combat forces became military government security troops.

The army-type occupation was comprehensive and showed the Germans that they were defeated and their country occupied. This type of occupation was presumably capable of squelching incipient resistance since none was evident. On the other hand, it employed a much larger number of troops than would be available for the permanent occupation and did so at considerable cost in combat potential and discipline. The larger units lost their cohesiveness, and in the platoons and companies discipline weakened. Ironically, the supposed chief beneficiary, military government, concluded after two months' experience that the better plan would have been to form the occupational police battalions General Gullion had asked for and been refused in 1942. The tactical troops thought in terms of military security and therefore often followed different priorities

<sup>2</sup> (1) EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Troop Basis and the Disposition of Forces, 1947, in CMH file 8-3.1, CA 20, p. 3. (2) EUCOM, Hist Div, U.S. Military Government in Germany, Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945, 1950, in CMH file 8-3.1, DF, pp. 79-93.

*Redeployment and Readjustment*

Wartime planning had assumed that a large part of the forces required to defeat Japan would come from Europe after hostilities ended there. In early November 1944, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, had told Eisenhower: "The European Theater of Operations . . . will in fact become a base, the location of resources which we will wish to divert to use in the Pacific. . . . We are going to place immediate demands on you to put your machine in reverse and this at a time when you will have to be laying out your billeting areas, lines of communications, ports, railroads, and other facilities for your job of maintaining order in Germany."<sup>30</sup> Subsequently, with the Battle of the Bulge and the drive into Germany still months ahead, redeployment planning groups had gone to work in the Pentagon and at Headquarters, ETOUSA.

By the third week in March 1945, SHAEF anticipated having to release a million and a half troops for the Pacific and having to send another 600,000 men home for discharge.<sup>31</sup> Concerning the shipment home, General Marshall cabled to Eisenhower:

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the task of readjusting the Army and promptly releasing to civilian life those people who are surplus to the needs of the Japanese war is one that will demand the

most unselfish and conscientious efforts on the part of everyone. I fear that the weight of public opinion in the U.S. will be such that unless the task is handled properly we may be forced to take measures that will interfere with redeployment and result in a prolongation of the Japanese war.

Marshall stipulated that the units to be shipped to the Pacific were to contain only the troops least eligible for discharge, and those being sent home were to be only the most eligible. He remembered, he said, that in World War I the unit shipped out first was often the one most convenient rather than most deserving.<sup>32</sup>

What would determine whether a man stayed in the occupation forces in Germany, went to the Pacific, or went home to be discharged was the Adjusted Service Rating. The rating was calculated individually for every enlisted man in the theater on the basis of one point for each month of service since September 1940, one point for each month of overseas service since September 1940, five points for each decoration or battle star, and twelve points for each child under eighteen up to a maximum of three. Eisenhower informed the commands that they would have to be ready to release the men with high scores "when the bell rings. . . . The fairness and speed," he stated, "with which the redeployment is carried out will be reflected in public support of the Pacific campaign, in the future attitude of the public to the Army, and in the confidence of the returned soldier in the Army command."<sup>33</sup>

The bell rang sooner than anyone in Europe anticipated. ETOUSA had expected to have about a month after the

<sup>30</sup> Ltr, Somervell to Eisenhower, 4 Nov 44, in USFET SGS 370, vol. I.

<sup>31</sup> SHAEF, G-3, Redeployment Brief, 18 Mar 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. I. For a discussion of evolving War Department and JCS redeployment plans in late 1944 and the spring of 1945, see Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy* (Washington: United States Army in World War II, 1968), pp. 539-46, 577-79, and 584-91.

<sup>32</sup> Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. I.

<sup>33</sup> Ltr, Eisenhower to Lt Gen Lewis H. Brereton, 19 Apr 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. I.

surrender to get ready and then eighteen months to complete the shipments. On 8 May, the War Department announced 12 May as R-day, the day full redeployment and readjustment would begin. The Adjusted Service Ratings would have to be calculated by midnight on the 12th, and thereafter they would determine all enlisted assignments (officers were not yet included). On the night of V-E Day the War Department reduced the completion time from eighteen months to twelve and raised the shipping quota for June from 60,000 troops to 240,000. Two days later the department called for 17,500 men eligible for discharge to be shipped by air or water in May and ordered a minimum of 35,000 in June.<sup>34</sup>

The critical score was 85 for enlisted men (44 for enlisted women). Those with 85 or more points on the Adjusted Service Rating were eligible for discharge. Those with fewer points—pending reduction in the score—would serve either in the occupation or be redeployed to the Pacific. For these men and women in particular the War Department released a film entitled "Two Down and One To Go." All movements were to be made by complete units, which necessitated a reshuffling of personnel throughout the theater and the classification of all units into four categories. Category I units were those scheduled to stay in the occupation, Category II units were those to be redeployed to the Pacific, and Category III units were those being reorganized either

for the Pacific or the occupation. Categories I, II, and III would contain no men with point scores of 85 or over. Category IV units would have only men with 85 or more points and would function as vehicles for returning them to the United States. In northeastern France, between Reims and Chalons-sur-Marne and the Aisne River, ETOUSA established an assembly area to accommodate 250,000 men in tent camps. Other camps, capable of housing up to 60,000, were built in staging areas near the embarkation ports of Le Havre, Marseilles, and Antwerp. The camps were named for brands of cigarettes, such as Herbert Tareyton, Wings, Lucky Strike, and Twenty Grand.<sup>35</sup>

For the first two months the shipments out exceeded the original War Department quotas. Nearly 90,000 men were shipped out in May, almost 70,000 of them had high scores.<sup>36</sup> Units went into the assembly areas and on to the staging areas with minimum essential equipment to eliminate the necessity for packing and loading heavy items. Although they were supposed to be traveling light, ETOUSA orders permitted the troops to carry war trophies "to the fullest extent practicable," excepting only explosives and nonmilitary articles removed from enemy dead. The 28th Infantry of 5,000 men embarked with 20,000 souvenir weapons.<sup>37</sup>

No matter how high the rate of departures, however, hundreds of thousands of

<sup>34</sup> (1) Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 45, in USFET SGS 383.3. (2) Memo, USFET, Dep ACofS G-3, for Dep CofS, sub: Redeployment "Ups" and "Downs," 5 Nov 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. V. (3) Memo, ETOUSA, Redeployment Coordinating Group, for Dep CofS, sub: Early Return of U.S. Personnel, 13 May, in USFET SGS 370, vol. I.

<sup>35</sup> (1) Cable, Hqs, ETOUSA, to Distribution, 10 May 45, in USFET SGS 383.3. (2) Hqs, USFET, ACofS G-3, Outline Plan of Functions and Operation of Redeployment Assembly Area, no date, in USFET G-3, 370.

<sup>36</sup> EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Redeployment, 1947, in CMH file 8-3.1, CA 20, pp. 82 and 83.

<sup>37</sup> Cable, Com Zone, to USFET, 13 Jul 45, in USFET SGS 330.11.

outright disgruntlement was less evident; but almost half the men complained that their officers had given them no explanation for the delay in their departures. Most correctly assumed that the cause was a shortage of shipping space but said that they had not been so informed. Shocked to discover that all the effort and expense might go for nothing because of a simple failure to communicate, Eisenhower ordered: "Both officers and enlisted men will be fully informed of the reasons for delay in connection with their return home and no frivolous answers will be given to any inquiry on this subject."<sup>50</sup>

The second atomic bomb was dropped in Japan on 9 August, and the next day Marshall told Eisenhower to be ready, as soon as Japan capitulated, to reverse the redeployment-readjustment priorities. First priority, he said, should go to the men eligible for demobilization, those with 85 points, and plans should also be made for moving out the men with at least 75 points. When Eisenhower asked for a month to clear the pipeline of more than 380,000 low-score men already processed and awaiting shipment, Marshall replied: "The pressure here is terrific. The demands for termination of Selective Service increase daily, a wait of a month before men begin to pour into the U.S. will greatly accentuate our difficulties."<sup>51</sup> On 15 August, the War Department directed Eisenhower to reverse the priorities immediately and prepare to ship out 1,716,000 men by the end of January 1946. Marshall informed Eisenhower

that he could not expect to have any men with scores over 45 left in the theater after 1 April 1946 and therefore should screen out from among the low-score men in the pipeline as many men with less than 45 points as he could.<sup>52</sup>

Since R-day, the decisive element in the long-range planning for the occupation had been the Occupational Troop Basis, the total number of troops to be left in Germany (and Austria) after the redeployment and readjustment were completed. The original Occupational Troop Basis was 404,500, to be reached a year and a half after the surrender. In May, the War Department reduced the time to one year. In August, it reduced the number of troops to 370,000, with a strong indication that the final figure would be substantially lower. The shipping schedule set in August would bring USFET's strength down to this number by the end of January 1946. The low point would be reached in the middle of the first postwar winter, when civil unrest, if it occurred at all, was to be expected in Germany and when the Army would probably still have to care for about a half million DPs and guard many thousands of war prisoners and internees. After USFET pointed out that it would take 100,000 troops just to guard and maintain the \$8 billion (six million tons) of surplus property left in the theater, the War Department in September approved a liquidation force of 337,000 troops, which could be used to postpone the reduction to the Occupational Troop Basis until 1 July 1946. Concerning the efficiency and quality

<sup>50</sup> Memo, Office of the Chief of Staff [U.S. Army] for the Chief of Staff, sub: MPR Section 10, 23 Aug 45, and Memo, Hqs, USFET, G-1, for CofS, 1 Sep 45, in USFET SGS 330.11.

<sup>51</sup> Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 Aug 45; Cable, Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 Aug 45; Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 Aug 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. III.

<sup>52</sup> (1) Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Aug 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. III. (2) USFET, G-3, Weekly Summary of Activities, 31 Aug 45, in USFET SGS 319.11/6, vol. I. (3) Memo, USFET, Dep ACofS G-3, for Dep CofS, sub: Redeployment "Ups" and "Downs," 5 Nov 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. V.

of the troops, however, either in the Liquidation Force or the Occupational Troop Basis, the War Department had nothing to offer. The point score was to be the sole determinant of whether a man went or stayed, and all high-score men would go. Until January some relatively experienced men would be available while awaiting shipping. Thereafter public opinion would determine how many troops of any kind stayed, and Marshall told Smith, "It will be difficult for the Army to explain each case arising without a thorough investigation."<sup>53</sup>

The War Department supplied enough ships to transport over 400,000 men in September and proposed to do the same in October; but in that month it had to return the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Aquilania* (each capable of transporting 20,000 troops a month) to British service and had to loan the British ten Victory ships in order to keep the *Queen Mary*. In November, the troop number again went over 400,000 when Liberty and Victory ships were sent back in ballast from U.S. east coast ports—to the accompaniment of threatened dock workers strikes—and the battleship *Washington*, three heavy cruisers, four light aircraft carriers, and the captured German liners *Europa* and *Vulcania* were pressed into service as troop transports. At the end of December the theater strength was down to 614,000 troops and was 93,000 below the combined total of the Occupational Troop Basis and Liquidation Force.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> (1) Draft, TSFET, ACofS G-3, Redeployment Briefing, 3 Sep 45, in USFET G-3, 370. (2) Cable, Handy to Smith, 30 Aug 45, in EUCOM, Staff Message Control, Jul-Dec 45. (3) Cable, Smith to Marshall, 24 Oct 45, in USFET SGS 400.74. (4) Cable, AGWAR, WARCOS to Smith, 5 Nov 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. IV.

<sup>54</sup> (1) Draft, TSFET, ACofS G-3, Redeployment

When the war was over everyone wanted to go home faster than any feasible schedule could move them and with an intensity that was not going to be diverted by any amount of persuasion. On V-J Day the students at Shrivenham American University stayed away from classes and asked to be sent home. When some who failed the midterm examinations were returned to their units, there was a rash of attempted failures. Shrivenham and Warton both closed at the end of their second term. Biarritz went into a third term with its enrollment down by half.<sup>55</sup> The Riviera Recreational Area had more French civilian employees (7,000) than soldier-guests (5,600) in October. Paris held up well as an attraction, but there the length of stay could be increased in October from forty-eight hours to a full week. USFET Special Services ran a contest for Soldier Shows in which the best show was to be given a three months' tour in the United States and individual performers would receive prizes from Hollywood stars. The contest drew three entries.<sup>56</sup> The loss of the two British liners and a related failure to get all 80-point men out before the end of October brought a plunge in morale in spite of detailed explanations from both the War Department and USFET.<sup>57</sup>

Within three months after V-J Day, the

Briefing, 3 Sep 45, in USFET G-3, 370. (2) Cable, AGWAR, WARCOS to USFET, 23 Oct 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. IV. (3) Memo, Hqs, USFET, Redeployment Co-ordination Gp, for Dep CofS, sub: Monthly Rpt, 1 Dec 45, in USFET SGS 322.

<sup>55</sup> EUCOM, Education and Information, pp. 31, 46, and 78.

<sup>56</sup> EUCOM, Recreation and Welfare, pp. 60, 130, and 132.

<sup>57</sup> Cable, USFET Rear to USFET Main, 17 Oct 45, and Cable, AGWAR, WARCOS to USFET, 23 Oct 45, in USFET SGS 370, vol. IV.

army that had defeated Nazi Germany was no more. In a November 1945 combat efficiency assessment, Smith reported operational understrengths of officers and enlisted men and high percentages of personnel "poorly trained in their duties. . . . A trained, balanced force of infantry armor, and air and supporting combat troops" he continued, "no longer exists. As a result, the forces within this theater are today unable to perform any serious offensive operations. The capability to carry on limited defensive operations is slightly better. Ability to perform . . . occupational duties, to control the German population, and to suppress local uprisings is rated as satisfactory."<sup>58</sup>

#### *Currency Control*

Currency trouble began even before the troops were properly deployed in Germany. In March 1945, First and Ninth Armies' finance officers turned in \$52,875.60 worth of Reichsmarks that they had exchanged into dollars for U.S. troops before the Roer River crossing.<sup>59</sup> Neither the Reichsmarks nor Allied military marks were convertible for the Germans, but both were accepted from U.S. personnel at the rate set for Allied military marks, ten to the dollar. The Reichsmarks were already obviously worth a great deal less. In an attempt to head off a possible flood of Reichsmarks, ETOUSA, on 15 March, limited the dollars an individual could send home to an amount equal to his month's pay. Since dollar conversions of German currency were only made for transmissions to the

United States, the troops would hopefully at least be discouraged from accumulating excessively large amounts of Reichsmarks.<sup>60</sup>

The advance into Germany not only expanded the troops' opportunities for black market dealing in Reichsmarks—with fraternization as an inevitable byproduct—but put the Army in the questionable moral position of converting looted German money into American dollars. Haunted, too, by the nightmare of someday having troops attempting to convert a cache like the one recently uncovered at Merkers, ETOUSA on 19 April stopped exchanging and disbursing Reichsmarks altogether and ordered the post offices and PX's to stop accepting them for purchases.<sup>61</sup> The action was effective, particularly in relieving the Army of the embarrassment of legitimizing illegally acquired and probably worthless money. After V-E Day, however, the theater command apparently assumed that the currency control problem was about to disappear; in early June it began allowing soldiers to convert and send home savings and gambling profits in addition to their month's pay. A perfunctory oath was sufficient to qualify almost any amount as gambling profits.<sup>62</sup>

In the meantime, after the surrender, the value of the Reichsmark on the black market had dropped to 200 to the dollar. For the Germans the Allied military marks were worth about the same since they could only exchange them one-for-one for Reichsmarks; but the American soldier, who sold rations, cigarettes, candy, or any of a mul-

<sup>58</sup> Cable, Smith to Hull, 17 Nov 45, in EUCOM, Staff Message Control, Jul-Dec 45.

<sup>59</sup> Walter Rundell, Jr., *Black Market Money* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 33.

<sup>60</sup> EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Currency Control, 1947, in CMH file 8.3-1, CA 6, p. 10.

<sup>61</sup> Memo, USFET, ACofS G-1, for CofS, sub: Currency Exchange Control, 29 Aug 45, in USFET SGS 123.5.

<sup>62</sup> EUCOM, Currency Control, p. 10.

cil with setting up central German departments for finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. The predominant—possibly exclusive—Soviet concern was with reparations, not from its own zone where it was already collecting on a scale to suit itself but from the western zones. After long, frequently sharp debate, the conference gave the Control Council the second mission of establishing a level of industry for Germany, that is, determining how much of its existing productive capacity the country would need to subsist without being able to threaten the peace again. Any excess would become available for reparations, with 25 percent from the western zones going to the Soviet account.<sup>6</sup>

The Control Council held its second meeting on 10 August in its permanent quarters, the building in which a year earlier the infamous Nazi People's Court had tried the participants in the 20 July plot against Hitler. In the high-ceilinged, newly redecorated sessions chamber where the Nazi judge, Roland Freisler, had handed down his sentences, the military governors, flanked by their deputies, political advisers, and secretaries, took seats around a large oval table. Interpreters sat behind each delegation, and recorders occupied tables in the corners of the room. The resolution activating the control machinery was quickly adopted, and the meeting proceeded in an atmosphere of great personal amiability; but when the responsibilities acquired as a result of the Potsdam Conference came under consideration, the French member, Gen. Pierre Joseph Koenig, announced that he would have to "reserve

his position" with regard to the Potsdam decisions.<sup>7</sup>

The subsequent meetings were conducted, in the words of one observer, with "few dissensions, all things considered," but with "a tone of fatality."<sup>8</sup> France, not having been represented at Potsdam, did not regard itself as bound by the agreements made there; and in the Control Council, General Koenig vetoed the proposed central economic agencies one by one as they came up, eventually including also a proposal to establish a post office department and a law allowing German trade unions to organize nationally. In early October, Gen. Charles de Gaulle told the French press: "France has been invaded three times in a lifetime. I do not want ever to see the establishment of a Reich again."<sup>9</sup> The Russians seemed to want to see the economic agencies created, but when the War and State Departments authorized Clay, in October, to enter into a trizonal arrangement, neither the Russians nor the British would agree.<sup>10</sup> The U.S. representatives returned then for almost another year to the futile task of trying to secure economic unification on quadripartite terms; and the Control Council remained, as Clay predicted it would, a negotiating rather than a governing body, capable of enacting legislation but completely dependent on the separate zonal authorities for enforcement.

While the French attitude alone was enough to cripple the Control Council, it in fact only masked a fundamentally more formidable obstacle to the treatment of Germany as an economic unit, namely, the

<sup>6</sup> B. U. Ratchford and W. D. Ross, *Berlin Reparations Assignment* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), p. 43.

<sup>7</sup> OMGUS, History, ch. III, pp. 14-17.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> OMGUS, Control Office, Hist Br, sub: Civil Administration in Germany, 16 Dec 46, in OMGUS 21-2/5, folder VII-2 ABC.

has greater progress been made toward the declared objectives of the Allied occupation.

As to the future, he warned, "The United States must decide whether we mean to finish the job competently, and provide the tools, the determination and the funds requisite to that purpose, or withdraw."<sup>16</sup> On 28 November, the President released Price's report to the press together with a letter to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy in which he directed them to "give careful consideration to this report, with a view to taking whatever joint action may be indicated."<sup>17</sup>

*"Not a Job for Soldiers"*

At his first meeting with the Army commanders on 21 June 1945, Clay told them that the War Department believed military government was "not a job for soldiers" and should, therefore, be "turned over to the political as soon as practicable."<sup>18</sup> President Truman had said, more than a month before, that he wanted control in Germany shifted to civilian hands as quickly as possible because he believed it was in the American tradition "that the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations."<sup>19</sup> The President said he wanted the transfer made "as soon as the rough and tumble is over in Germany." Apparently he and Eisenhower felt that time was growing short when they met at Eisenhower's head-

quarters in Frankfurt in late July and agreed that Eisenhower should organize the military government in Germany so as to facilitate turning it over to civilian authority "at the earliest moment."<sup>20</sup>

The idea of organizing military government for a changeover to civilian control was of course not a new one. From the beginning the U.S. Group Control Council had been considered more a vehicle for future civilian authority than an element of Army-administered military government. In April 1945, in his first outline for military government organization, Clay proposed also to bring civilians into the theater G-5 so that both it and the U.S. Group Control Council could be "carved out of" the military command when the shift to civilian responsibility occurred.<sup>21</sup> A month later, in the organizational directive for military government, Clay stated, "This organization must become civilian in character as rapidly as consistent with efficient performance so that it may become at the earliest possible date a framework for the administration of political control in Germany by the appropriate U.S. civil agencies."<sup>22</sup> He told the army commanders at the 22 June meeting that he was "infiltrating highly qualified civilians" into the U.S. Group Control Council and the theater G-5; writing to McCloy three days later, he said he understood the creation of a supervisory body for Germany composed of civilians "to be my mission."<sup>23</sup>

Until the war ended in the Pacific, the

<sup>16</sup> Report of Byron Price to the President, 9 Nov 45, in *The Bulletin of the Department of State*, 2 Dec 45, pp. 885-92.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 885.

<sup>18</sup> Min, US Gp CC, Staff Meeting of Division directors, 22 Jun 45, in OMGUS 12-1/5, V60-12/1.

<sup>19</sup> Memo by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, 10 May 45, in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, p. 509.

<sup>20</sup> Ltr, Eisenhower to President Truman, 26 Oct 45, in USFET SGS 114.113.

<sup>21</sup> Memo by Maj Gen Lucius Clay, 11 Apr 45, in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, p. 934.

<sup>22</sup> Hqs, ETOUSA, Organization for Military Government of the U.S. Zone, 13 May 45, in SHAEF G-2, GBI/CI/CS/322.

<sup>23</sup> Ltr, Clay to McCloy, 25 Jun 45, in OMGUS 410-2/3.

numbers of military personnel available for military government assignments made civilianization below the top levels of the U.S. Group Control Council and USFET SGS G-5 an unnecessary luxury. Even in the U.S. Group Control Council, where the number of civilians increased from 83 on 1 May to 326 on 1 September, the relative progress in civilianization was slight since the numbers of officers and enlisted men went from 417 to 1,424 and from 553 to 4,012.<sup>24</sup> In the next two months, however, redeployment altered the proportions rapidly, and the military strength dropped by nearly 2,000 men while the civilians increased to 429. In the first week of September, Clay announced a program to induce officers in particular to convert to civilian status in Germany. On 1 October he initiated a civil service analysis of all military government jobs; and Eisenhower ordered the army commands not to "place any obstacles in the way of these people."<sup>25</sup>

The power struggle between the theater G-5 and the U.S. Group Control Council ended in June on Clay's terms. He and General Adcock, the theater G-5, agreed to integrate their staffs; the staff divisions would be located either in Frankfurt or Berlin depending on where they would be most effective. Adcock became in effect Clay's deputy. Clay indicated to McCloy on 25 June that he contemplated as the next step combining the two staffs into a single office of military government.<sup>26</sup> Since

the merger would remove the top military government echelon from the tactical command channels, it would logically do the same with military government down the line and would constitute a piece of radical surgery on a not entirely willing patient. The USFET and military district G-5's, having no functions that were not duplicated either in the U.S. Group Control Council or the *Land* detachments, would suffer most.

In mid-September, Clay made a choice between two directives: one would have immediately designated the U.S. Group Control Council as the military government authority and removed the G-5's from the chain of command; the other, which Clay approved, cut as deep but not as fast. As of 1 October, the U.S. Group Control Council became the Office of Military Government (U.S.) (OMGUS) and USFET G-5 became the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone). The *Land* detachments became offices of military government for their *Laender*—Third Army G-5 merging with the Bavarian *Land* detachment to form the Office of Military Government, Bavaria—and Seventh Army G-5 became the Office of Military Government (Western District).<sup>27</sup> For USFET and the armies, however, and thus for the tactical concept of military government, the end was in sight. Other directives issued later in September and the first week of October ordered the armies to cease all military government activity after 31 December. USFET G-5, as the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), became the rear echelon of OMGUS upon notice that its functions and personnel would be gradually

<sup>24</sup> OMGUS, History, Office of Military Government for Germany, ch. II, p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> (1) Memo, Hqs, USFET, ACofS G-5, for CofS, sub: Program for Introduction of Classified Civil Service, 6 Sep 45, in USFET SGS 200.3. (2) Diary, Hqs, Seventh Army ACofS G-3, 2 Jun 45-25 Mar 46, 1 Oct 45, in Seventh Army, 107-0.3.0.

<sup>26</sup> Ltr, Clay to McCloy, 25 June 45, in OMGUS 410-2/3.

<sup>27</sup> Memo, Dep Military Governor for CG, USFET, sub: Organization of Military Government, 15 Sep 45, in OMGUS 177-2/3.

on the same terms as the victims of nazism, the cable added, threatened to "raise delicate international questions."<sup>43</sup>

The Jews aroused particular concern, because of their large numbers and because existing U.S. policy granted exceptional treatment to Jews. In the wake of the Harrison report, the War Department had appointed Judge Simon H. Rifkind as USFET adviser on Jewish affairs. On his advice and that of U.S. labor union and Jewish Joint Distributing Committee representatives and in response to newspaper and governmental opinion, USFET was providing the Jews with rations and accommodations that were superior to those accorded the other DPs and had begun a training and rehabilitation program for which it was importing textbooks and instructors by air from Palestine. However, what USFET could do for its original Jewish DP contingent, Smith told Hilldring on 22 November, it did not believe it could do for three or four times as many. He explained:

Six weeks ago . . . our prospects for coping with the Jewish problem seemed very bright. We knew how many indigenous Jews we had. We had, as Rifkind puts it, completed the rescue phase and were embarking on what he called the "domiciliary stage," during which on his recommendation we planned to inaugurate a rather ambitious program of moral and vocational training to equip these people for life in Palestine or elsewhere. . . . This exceeded our directives but because of pressures at home, we thought it ought to be done.

Under the present conditions we are doing the best we can to provide additional shelter and supplies.

In the meantime, you can expect more trouble from the press, since conditions are forcing us back to the rescue phase.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Ltr, Smith to Hilldring, 22 Nov 45, in USFET SGS 383.7/1.

Judge Rifkind, nonetheless, was quite frank about wanting to create a refuge for all European Jews in Germany "to rescue the remnants of a race." He maintained that "Jews would merely be staged in the U.S. zone for movement to Palestine or elsewhere"; but other Jewish representatives, some of whom talked about establishing a permanent Jewish enclave in Bavaria, predicted that the staging period would last three to five years, and Smith doubted whether many Jews except the young would want to go to Palestine at all.<sup>45</sup>

The simplest solution to the problem of the new DP wave—though possibly not practical—was to enforce Military Government Law No. 161, which prohibited civilians from crossing the borders of the U.S. zone without military government permission. In December, USFET proposed to close the border when those who had infiltrated and the Germans expelled from eastern Europe under the Potsdam Agreement raised the zone's population to 16,650,000—or by about a million. But the idea aroused misgivings in Frankfurt and in Washington, as Hilldring indicated when he wrote to Smith:

In general the attitude is that you are right in your position that the U.S. Army now has no obligation to furnish safe haven to any person who is not the victim of Nazi persecution. However, there is also agreement with you that the U.S. Army should not refuse to offer safe haven to persecutees simply because their persecution has been at the hands of other than Nazi oppressors.<sup>46</sup>

Smith said his chief desire was to get the Army "out of being a nursemaid on a gi-

<sup>45</sup> (1) *Ibid.* (2) Cable, USFET to War Dept, 14 Dec 45, and Ltr, Truscott to Smith, 24 Nov 45, in USFET SGS 383.7/1.

<sup>46</sup> Cable, Hilldring to Smith, 7 Dec 45, in USFET SGS 383.7/1.

at the root of soldier attacks on German officials and police. By December, these attacks had grown so alarmingly frequent that Truscott had to issue what the Office of Military Government for Bavaria called "a public plea" for troop co-operation with the U.S.-appointed German officials.<sup>66</sup> Misbehavior was not confined exclusively to the enlisted ranks. In one instance an American officer took an Austrian girl from Linz to Stuttgart, raped her three times, and then transported her to Ulm, where he turned her over to the military police on a charge of having improper papers.<sup>67</sup>

The troop incidents seemed to be associated, on the one hand, with the urge of some soldiers who knew they were soon going to be redeployed and discharged to have a last fling and, on the other hand, with the inexperience and inadequate training of the lowscore men, who were fast becoming the majority in the occupation force. What went unnoticed, or at least unmentioned, was the coincidence of the rise in troop incidents with the hardening of official attitudes toward the Germans that accompanied the Patton affair. One of General Truscott's first acts as Commanding General, Third Army, was to order all his subordinate commanders to schedule frequent instruction periods for their units to counteract the tendency of the soldiers, in his view, to lose sight "of the reasons for which we fought the war" and to become "more and more sympathetic toward the German people."<sup>68</sup> While Truscott was only trying to inculcate in the troops a more

disciplined and aloof attitude toward the German people, some soldiers were bound to feel encouraged to ruffianism particularly when they were drunk. Those who had this tendency also had before them the example of the DPs, for whom public sympathy in the United States secured an almost completely free rein from September to December, which did not begin to tighten again until the early months of 1946 when the Army quietly reinstated controls and put guards back in the camps.

At the year's end trouble arose from another direction. By the time the big redeployment lifts of November and December had reduced the theater strength to 614,000 troops, another 223,000 (enlisted men with 50 points, officers with 70, enlisted WACS with 32, and WAC officers with 37) had become eligible for redeployment and discharge. What this contingent, and the nearly 100,000 who would become eligible after them, were not told—because the information had been classified secret in Washington—was that the freewheeling redeployment was to end on 1 January 1946. The number of troops scheduled to be shipped home for discharge would drop to 47,700 in January (from 303,000 in December and 400,000 in November) and thereafter level off at about 53,500 a month for the next five months. The rates would be somewhat dependent, too, on the inflow of replacements, and as of mid-December, USFET was over 16,000 short on the replacements it had been scheduled to receive in November.<sup>69</sup>

The troops saw no reason why the

<sup>66</sup> (1) *Ibid.* (2) Hist Rpt, Det G-41, Dec 45, in OMGUS 9-1/5.

<sup>67</sup> Hqs, Seventh Army, ACoS G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary, 24 Oct 45, in Seventh Army, Rpt of Opns, Annex No. 2.

<sup>68</sup> Hqs, Third Army, sub: Letter Directive No. 1, 11 Oct 45, in Third Army, Chief of Staff Section, 66-98 (20).

<sup>69</sup> (1) Hqs USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 1, 18 Dec 45, and No. 2, 2 Jan 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF9-05; (2) Memo, Hqs, USFET, Redep Coord Gp, for Dep CofS, sub: Monthly Rpt of Redep Coord Gp, 1 Dec 45, in USFET SGS 322.

monthly redeployment flow could not continue in the hundreds of thousands, and they were given no reason when *Stars and Stripes* announced at the turn of the year that 50-pointers would have at least another three months to serve in the theater. An announcement at the same time that the Army would begin shipping war brides to the United States in January raised a dark suspicion that the women were being given priority over the troops. In Paris, on 7 January, 1,000 50-pointers staged a protest meeting, and two days later 4,000 marched on the USFET headquarters in Frankfurt to take their grievance to McNarney, whom they did not get to see because he was in Berlin attending a Control Council meeting. On the 12th, soldiers in England carried their complaints to Sen. Tom Connally and Sen. Arthur Vandenberg who were then in London. The protests were orderly, and they ended on the 13th when *Stars and Stripes* reported that McNarney had said they "had served their purpose."<sup>70</sup>

These protests, and others that were somewhat less orderly in Manila and other locations in the Pacific, had indeed served their purpose. On 15 January the War Department announced a new demobilization schedule geared to getting all 45-pointers home and discharged by April 1946. To meet the schedule, USFET doubled its shipping quotas for the first four months

<sup>70</sup> (1) Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 3, 8 Jan 46, No. 4, 15 Jan 46, and No. 5, 22 Jan 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF9-0.5. (2) EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Redeployment, pp. 160-65. For detailed accounts of the demobilization crisis worldwide see John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (Washington, 1952), pp. 160-70 and 241-43, or R. Alton Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny' of 1946," *The Journal of American History*, 53:4, Apr 1966, pp. 555-71.

of 1946. In response to an appeal from Eisenhower, who said he had not realized how critical the Army's manpower situation was before he left Europe, McNarney had earlier reduced the Occupation Troop Basis to 300,000.<sup>71</sup> By the first week of February it was clear that the 300,000 figure would only be a point on the scale of USFET's declining troop strength, which would sink to 230,000 by 1 September and 200,000 before the year's end.<sup>72</sup>

The replacements coming to Europe were not only unskilled but, in increasing numbers, untrained. In November and December 1945, 95 percent of USFET's requisitions were for men with technical service specialties. Of those who arrived only 13 percent had such qualifications, and not in any high degree. Beginning in January, replacements were shipped after eight weeks of branch immaterial training, which did not attempt to go beyond qualification with the M1 rifle, personal hygiene and sanitation, and "orientation for occupation duty with emphasis on discipline."<sup>73</sup> In the first week of March, the theater inspector general made inspections in Paris, Metz, and several areas of Germany and reported the following:

Discipline is generally poor and at this time is below desirable standards.

Definite responsibility for maintaining discipline where troops of various arms and services are stationed has not been satisfactorily established.

Incident to the shortage of personnel, the majority of replacements are not receiving

<sup>71</sup> (1) *Ibid.*, p. 165. (2) Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 1, 18 Dec 45, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF-0.5.

<sup>72</sup> Hqs, USFET, to CG's sub: Revision of Theater Logistics Program, 6 Feb 46, in OMGUS 3/35, dec. 320.2.

<sup>73</sup> Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 7, 5 Feb 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF-0.5.

additional disciplinary basic training as expected.

Many young officers command important installations and units. Numbers of these have not had sufficient training to carry out their administrative responsibility. Similarly, there are many untrained noncommissioned officers.<sup>74</sup>

At the same time, military government detachments and the Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, were reporting U.S. troops as the chief source of disturbances in the

<sup>74</sup> Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 12, 12 Mar 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF9-0.5.

zone.<sup>75</sup> In the first week of April, when the theater's weekly intelligence summary showed 101 troop incidents in a four-day period, McNarney ordered that all such cases be reported individually to him with the names of the units involved and the specifics of disciplinary actions taken.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>75</sup> (1) Rpt, Det B-272, 28 Jun 46, in OMGUS 81-2/10. (2) Hist Rpt, Det G-230, Mar 46, in OMGUS 80-2/10. (3) Hist Rpt, Hqs, U.S. Constabulary, Apr 46, Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, in 97-USF8-0.3.

<sup>76</sup> Hqs, USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No. 15, 2 Apr 46, and No. 17, 16 Apr 46, in Hist Div, Hqs, ETO, 97-USF9-0.5.

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and politically foredoomed to failure." The parties, the Bavarian assessment continued, were aware that the ex-Nazis would comprise a formidable voting bloc and, therefore, would, while giving lip service to denazification, manipulate the law to attract the Nazi votes.<sup>23</sup> The CSU was already refusing to nominate a candidate for the *Land* ministry charged with administering the denazification law and at the same time demanding representation on the appeals boards in full proportion to its electoral strength. The regional detachment for Upper Bavaria added that the law was unenforceable because military government could never do more than spot check the millions of cases and because "incorruptible administrators are impossible to find in Germany today." The regional detachment concluded, "The best thing to do is to wash our hands completely of it and tell the Germans that from now on it is up to them whether they denazify."<sup>24</sup>

While the elections and the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism touched off squalls of controversy in Germany, one of the chief reasons for their existence—the projected shift to State Department control of the occupation—was having even rougher going in Washington. On 18 December, Secretary of War Patterson talked about the shift with Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretaries of State James Dunn and Donald Russell. Patterson reviewed the War Department's reasons for wanting the transfer, and the State Department representatives proposed that the responsibility remain with the War Department on a

civilianized basis or that it be lodged with the SWNCC or that it be moved to a new agency—"anywhere," Patterson later declared, "but in the State Department."<sup>25</sup> During the next several weeks both Patterson and Eisenhower attempted to convince Secretary of State Byrnes that the State Department should assume control of civil administration in occupied areas. Other solutions, such as setting up a new agency, Patterson argued, would not work because the State Department would still be responsible for policy, and civilian administration under the War Department would not be "forthright civilianization."<sup>26</sup> But on 21 January Eisenhower cabled to McNarney:

My best efforts and those of Sec. War have been devoted to forcing a decision that State Department assume control of administration of military government in Germany on or before 1 June. So far efforts have been completely unavailing. War Department will continue to press . . . however, am without hope that issue will be settled to our satisfaction in the near future.<sup>27</sup>

On 1 April, the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) closed in Frankfurt. Headquarters, USFET, was therewith divorced from military government, and control would henceforth be exercised exclusively by OMGUS in Berlin; but the next step, appointment of a civilian high commissioner, was in the distant future. At the end of the month the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy endorsed a memorandum on principles and procedures for administration of occupied areas which reaffirmed

<sup>23</sup> Hist Rpt, OMG *Land* Bavaria, 4 May 46, in OMGUS 1-2/5.

<sup>24</sup> Hist Rpt, Det E-205, Apr 46, in OMGUS 1-2/5.

<sup>25</sup> Memo, Secretary of War for Secretary of State, sub: Responsibility for Government of Occupied Enemy Areas, Present Situation, 29 Dec 45, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 4-F.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Cable, ACofS OPD to CG, USFET, 21 Jan 46, in OPD, ABC 387, sec. 4-F.