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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

Reemployment Assistance For
Engineers, Scientists, And Technicians
Unemployed Because Of Aerospace And
Defense Cutbacks

B-133182

Department of Labor

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate

This is our report on the Department of Labor's program of reemployment assistance for engineers, scientists, and technicians unemployed because of aerospace and defense cutbacks.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and to the Secretary of Labor.

James B. Stacks

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

ES	employment service
EST	engineers, scientists, and technicians
HRD	Department of Human Resources Development
MDTA	Manpower Development and Training Act
NRE	National Registry for Engineers
OJT	on-the-job training
RMA	Regional Manpower Administrator
TMR	technology mobilization and reemployment

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR
ENGINEERS, SCIENTISTS, AND
TECHNICIANS UNEMPLOYED BECAUSE
OF AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE CUTBACKS
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D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO examined the Department of Labor's program to reemploy engineers, scientists, and technicians laid off by the aerospace and defense industries to determine how much assistance it provided and whether improvements could be made.

Background

The Technology Mobilization and Reemployment program was authorized by the President on April 2, 1971, when an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 engineers, scientists, and technicians were unemployed. The Department estimated that it would provide financial assistance to about 30,000 persons to help them find employment and that about 40,000 overall would be placed in 2 years. The Department allocated \$42 million of Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) funds for the program--\$40 million for retraining, job search, and relocation grants and \$2 million for skill conversion studies. (See p. 5.)

The program was to provide assistance in four ways:

1. Job promotion and development including referrals to jobs developed by State employment service agencies.

2. Grants not to exceed \$500, to enable applicants to explore job opportunities outside their home areas.
3. Grants not to exceed \$1,200, to enable applicants to move their household goods, in the event they obtained employment outside their home areas.
4. Special training when there is a strong prospect that such training will lead to a permanent job with a specific employer. The employer is reimbursed up to \$2,700 for the cost of an employee's nonproductive time.

GAO reviewed the program, administered by State employment security offices, in Los Angeles and Van Nuys, California; Seattle; Denver; and New Orleans. (See p. 6.)

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This program was reasonably successful. However, in terms of assisting applicants in finding jobs and of providing financial assistance to participants, the program fell short of the estimated goals.

Obviously, program administrators faced a difficult challenge. The average unemployed professional

was 35 to 54 years old, had 11 to 20 years highly specialized experience, and had been earning an annual salary of \$10,000 to \$15,000.

Experience under the program and of private employment agencies indicated that such individuals were not easily reemployed. (See p. 12.)

The Department reported that, of 50,000 applicants registered in the program as of March 31, 1973, about 30,000 had been assisted in obtaining jobs. The 30,000 figure is believed to be overstated. (See p. 15.)

As of that date, the Department reported that 10,365 persons, or 35 percent of the goal, received financial assistance totaling \$7.6 million. (See p. 14.)

Principal factors contributing to a greater number of those applying not being assisted included:

- Job development activities were concentrated in areas where job openings were scarce and nationwide job development tools which provide additional employment opportunities were not used adequately. (See pp. 15 and 17.)
- Program officials did not determine why individuals on job search grants failed to obtain employment and did not make additional efforts to fill job openings for which the grants were made. (See p. 20.)
- Lack of posttraining placement assistance and insufficient job development activities necessary for identifying areas where training could have resulted in suitable employment. (See p. 22.)

--Inadequate monitoring of the program by the Department and various deficiencies which, in the absence of monitoring, remained uncorrected. (See p. 25.)

One aspect of the program which appeared to be successful was the series of studies called skill conversion studies. These identified industries and public service areas that have significant potential for new job creation for former aerospace and defense workers in the immediate or near future.

Under a contract stemming from one of these studies, 329 persons had enrolled in courses to retrain workers and, as of January 12, 1973, 302 had obtained employment, most of them in training-related jobs. (See p. 27.)

The program, as a special effort, was scheduled to end March 31, 1973, but was extended to June 30. Some activities were continued in specific areas where high unemployment and pending layoffs were expected.

Decisions on whether these activities will be further financed have been held in abeyance pending completion of a Department evaluation. Regardless of whether the program continues, the need which brought the program into being--unemployed engineers, scientists, and technicians--continues, although somewhat diminished. (See p. 28.)

The experience of the program provides knowledge on the relative merits of the assistant methods used. This knowledge can be useful in determining future approaches to alleviating unemployment problems of any highly skilled group.

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

If program-type activities are carried out in some form, the Department of Labor should instruct local employment service offices to

- increase their use of existing nationwide job development tools;
- initiate followup efforts to determine the reasons why individuals on job search grants did not receive offers of employment, so that additional efforts could be made to fill the opening;
- provide posttraining placement assistance; and
- conduct in-depth job development activities necessary for identifying areas where institutional training could result in meaningful employment for program applicants.

From lessons learned from the program, Labor should develop a plan it could implement quickly, in the event of future occurrences of the nature experienced by ESTs. This plan should provide for

- performing and using skill conversion studies which would be given a high priority and

- implementing a monitoring system automatically with the implementation of the program. (See p. 29.)

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The Department agreed with these findings and said that, if the program were to continue, it would adopt GAO's recommendations. The Department, however, expressed the desire for a more permanent program and for a somewhat expanded departmental role in the program than GAO's recommendations would accomplish. (See p. 30.)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Senate has passed Senate bill 1559, The Job Training and Community Services Act to 1973, which contains authority for State and local government program sponsors to operate programs to help unemployed engineers, scientists, and technicians. The House of Representatives is considering similar legislation.

Information on how this program was implemented and GAO views on how programs of this nature can be improved should be of assistance to the Congress in its deliberations of problems dealing with unemployment of a highly trained segment of the Nation's work force.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Technology Mobilization and Reemployment (TMR) program is a Department of Labor program designed to provide assistance to unemployed engineers, scientists, and technicians (ESTs) from aerospace and defense industries. Labor estimated that between 75,000 and 100,000 persons were in this category at the program's inception. The National Society of Professional Engineers in March 1972 estimated 92,000 persons. The President authorized the program on April 2, 1971, and Labor allocated \$42 million in Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) funds for 2 years. Labor set aside \$2 million of the \$42 million for studies called skill conversion studies, to identify those industries where potential job openings might be created for ESTs.

The program, as a special effort, was scheduled to end March 31, 1973, but was extended to June 30, 1973. Labor said that, because of high unemployment in a few specific areas and some pending layoffs, EST unit staffs would continue to provide job development and referral activity until September 30, 1973. Labor is evaluating the program but its report has not yet been issued; a decision on whether financial assistance will be made available for TMR-program-type activities will be based on the recommendations in the report.

Labor's Regional Manpower Administrators (RMAs) administered the program through State employment security agencies of the Federal-State employment security program. The existing employment security program includes the (1) employment service (ES), a nationwide network of public employment offices, and (2) unemployment insurance.

Locally a separate unit within the ES offices called "EST job development units" carried out the program. The units were established in areas Labor designated as having a high concentration of unemployed ESTs. States not having an EST unit were authorized one additional ES employee to serve, at the State ES headquarters level, as the EST State Specialist responsible for administering the program. In 50 of the largest cities, displaced professionals were hired by State employment security agencies as job development

consultants to help find job openings for the unemployed ESTs.

Assistance to those eligible to participate in the program is provided by the EST units and State specialists in four ways.

1. Job promotion and development, including referrals to jobs ES agencies developed.
2. Job search grants, not to exceed \$500, to enable applicants to explore job opportunities outside their home areas.
3. Relocation grants, not to exceed \$1,200, to enable applicants to move their household goods, in the event they obtain employment outside their home areas.
4. Institutional training and/or on-the-job training (OJT) where there is a strong prospect that such training will lead to a permanent job with a specific employer. The employer is reimbursed up to \$2,700 for the cost of an employee's nonproductive time.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review included an evaluation of the extent to which the TMR program assisted unemployed ESTs and an examination of how the program was carried out by Labor and selected State employment security agencies. Information for our review was obtained from:

- Headquarters, Manpower Administration, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
- Regional Manpower Administrators' offices in San Francisco, Seattle, and Dallas.
- ES offices in Los Angeles and Van Nuys, California; Denver; New Orleans; and Seattle.
- The National Registry for Engineers (NRE), Sacramento.

We examined Labor and State policies, procedures, documentation, and reports relating to program activities and interviewed Labor, State, and local ES officials administering

the program. We also interviewed an official of a private employment agency involved in placements in various professions, including engineering and science, to determine the agency's experience in placing unemployed ESTs.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE

TECHNOLOGY MOBILIZATION AND REEMPLOYMENT PROGRAM--

AN EFFORT TO CONSERVE A VALUABLE NATIONAL ASSET

For about 25 years aerospace was one of America's leading industries. This field attracted thousands of the country's best minds, and employment in aerospace became the goal of many others selecting careers.

The aerospace industry was a prime factor in Federal efforts to develop sophisticated defense and space capabilities and in efforts by the private sector to develop bigger and better commercial transportation capability.

Beginning in 1968 national priorities changed:

- Industry's biggest customer, the Department of Defense, cut its spending.
- The National Aeronautics and Space Administration reduced space efforts.
- The decision to forego development of the supersonic transport was made.
- Further cutbacks were tied to the Nation's disengagement in Vietnam.

As the general economic slump caused the industry's other major customer--the airlines--to limit contracting for new equipment, a national news publication reported widespread fears about the future of the aerospace industry. Aerospace sales fell and, although the industry remained the Nation's largest manufacturing employer, it was forced into an austerity program and had to reduce the number of employees substantially. For the first time in recent history, aerospace workers were without jobs and found their expensive talent unsalable.

PROGRAM INITIATED BY
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT CANCELLATION

In the aftermath of the congressional cancellation of the supersonic transport, the White House launched the \$42 million TMR program to help unemployed aerospace ESTs find new jobs.

The program was launched in 14 areas selected on the basis of their having either 1,000 or more unemployed ESTs or 500 such persons in a city with at least a 6-percent unemployment rate; expansion to 5 additional areas followed. The funds were divided into four categories: \$5 million for job search grants; \$10 million for relocation grants; \$25 million for training and retraining on the job; and \$2 million for skill conversion studies. Originally Labor estimated that the \$40 million allocated to the first 3 categories could help as many as 10,000 persons in each category for a total of 30,000 persons.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS

The purpose of the first two types of grants was to provide assistance to individuals to explore job opportunities outside their home area or who needed help in terms of relocation costs to accept job offers outside their areas.

If the individual could convince his local ES office that the opening was a good prospect, the program would pay up to \$500 for him to travel to the new job interview and up to \$1,200 in moving expenses if he got the position and the new employer did not normally pay moving costs.

Whether a participant was placed locally or through the use of the financial assistance grants, if some retraining for the new job was necessary, the new employer was reimbursed up to \$2,700 for the employee's nonproductive time.

JOB DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

The program design contemplated that both unemployed persons participating in the program and the EST units would carry out extensive job development activities and recognized that in some cases the participant would require additional training to get the job. The job development aspect of the

program was not particularly successful because it was directed mainly to employers in the high unemployment areas served by the EST units.

One of the tools available to the EST units to locate suitable jobs outside the local area was the job bank system, operated by the State employment agencies. By use of computers, the job banks collect, process, distribute, and control announcements of job openings by employers in each of the 38 participating metropolitan areas.

Job orders are received by a centralized order-taking unit, generally as a result of a telephone request from an employer, and assembled into a book containing all current openings placed with the ES agency. The book is updated daily to reflect changes in the status of job orders and is distributed to all State agency offices and to offices of certain other agencies which place persons in jobs in the area served by the job bank. Referrals of applicants to jobs are controlled from a central point, to insure that applicants are not sent in greater numbers than the employer requested or referred to jobs already filled. In July 1971 Labor established a procedure whereby sections of job bank books dealing with professional, technical, and managerial occupational categories would be provided weekly by each job bank to each EST unit.

To further aid former aerospace and defense workers, Labor, in cooperation with the California State Department of Human Resources Development (HRD), and the National Society of Professional Engineers established on November 1, 1970, a computerized applicant-job opportunity register in Sacramento, to make employee referrals nationwide from this centralized data base.

Labor and the Department of Housing and Urban Development jointly sponsored a separate \$1.3 million pilot project conducted by the League of Cities - Conference of Mayors, Inc., to employ displaced persons in middle-level management jobs available in 34 cities. The project covered the period May 1, 1971, to April 30, 1972, and the final report showed that, of the 571 participants in the program, 297 had been employed. The Emergency Employment Act of 1971, which was expected to assist in the employment of a large portion of project participants, subsidized 95 of the 297 jobs.

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Workshops offer counseling, new careers, guidance in preparing personal resumes and developing job-interview techniques, and information on job opportunities and assistance programs. State employment agencies assist in conducting these free workshops.

SKILL CONVERSION STUDY

Although the TMR program was designed primarily to retrain ESTs for existing jobs or to provide some financial assistance to enable them to obtain existing jobs, the program also included a skill conversion study to identify new opportunities for employment and to explore the problems of converting current available skills to new occupations. EST research groups were to do systems design and engineering work on problems in such fields as agriculture, paper, lumber, city government, fire protection, crime protection, and water pollution. The skill conversion study which cost about \$2 million represented the major effort to identify new occupational opportunities.

FACTORS ADVERSELY IMPACTING ON PROGRAM OPERATIONS

Many roadblocks were encountered in getting unemployed ESTs back to work. One of the most significant barriers was the problem of salary adjustment. Aerospace work has traditionally paid well. Consequently, many of those initially laid off delayed job searching, hoping they would be restored to their jobs. They resisted moving into related fields at lower pay.

Labor data showed that the typical program participant was 35 to 54 years old, had 11 to 20 years of experience in a highly specialized area, and had been earning an annual salary of \$10,000 to \$15,000. Early data showed that most professionals placed in new jobs had to take a salary cut averaging about \$2,500 annually.

Additionally, the reluctance of individuals to take positions necessitating a geographic move was surprising to labor and to others involved in trying to place the unemployed aerospace workers. Both labor officials and the private employment agency we talked with generally pictured

aerospace workers as a mobile work force following job opportunities from one area to another as major job prospects opened and closed.

According to a private employment agency, about 50 percent of the unemployed ESTs registering with the agency would not relocate. This agency, which at the time of our discussion had about 1,000 ESTs registered and about 800 related openings, said that it had a 10- to 20-percent placement rate for ESTs.

Other problems, Labor identified and discussed in its publication dealing with manpower activities, included employer suspicions that displaced aerospace professionals would not permanently commit themselves to a new professional career and would go back to aerospace work at the first opportunity. Also some employers were reluctant to hire middle-aged and older persons. Additionally, the Nation in 1968-72 was in a fairly severe economic slump that affected the labor market as a whole. Employment opportunities were limited and large numbers of the unemployed labor force were seeking work. As was the case in most other manpower programs, the TMR program was, for the most part, not a job creation program; therefore, during depressed economic periods, placements became more difficult.

SIMILAR PROGRAMS IN FUTURE--
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Although the program may not have fully achieved its goals, there are lessons to be learned that could help similar programs in the future.

There might have been better opportunities for a program participant to obtain a job, particularly those willing to relocate, if local EST units had made better use of nationwide job development tools, such as the job bank books provided by the various job banks throughout the country or NRE, rather than concentrating job development activities in areas where job openings were already scarce.

A followup procedure to determine why individuals on job search grants did not obtain jobs or why other individuals were not referred to the unfilled job openings would have provided valuable data to use as a basis for program changes to improve this aspect of the program.

Additionally, during periods when the economy is in a slump, consideration could be given to some type of temporary job creation activity, such as a public employment program. If the economy is fairly strong and if only one segment of it is affected by a decline, then a program, such as TMR, might prove more successful.

CHAPTER 3

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS FALL SHORT

OF ESTIMATED GOALS

Our review indicated that the TMR program was reasonably successful, but program accomplishments fell short of initial estimates. Program managers were more concerned with attempting to develop jobs in localized and often depressed labor market areas than with attempting to find job opportunities in other labor market areas. Labor did not evaluate placement efforts to determine reasons for failures and did not provide sufficient placement assistance to those persons who had been involved in the retraining aspects of the program.

Between 75,000 and 100,000 ESTs were unemployed at the inception of the TMR program, according to a Labor estimate.

Labor estimated that about 40,000 ESTs would be placed during the 2-year program period, either through placement services or through financial assistance grants discussed below. Labor reported, as of March 31, 1973, that, of the 50,424 registered applicants, 29,855, or approximately 75 percent of the program goal, were assisted in obtaining jobs.

When the program was initiated, Labor estimated that, in addition to placement services available to all ESTs in the program, it would provide financial assistance to about 30,000 program participants. Labor provided \$40 million for the financial assistance--retraining, job search, and relocation grants--aspects of the program. The following table compares Labor's estimated program activities with actual activities as reported in Labor's March 31, 1973, report on this program.

Type of assistance	Persons served			Amount		
	2-year goal	Actual	Percent of goal	2-year goal	Actual	Percent of goal
				(million)		
Job search grants	10,000	4,594	46	5.5	\$ 877,081	18
Relocation grants	10,000	1,819	18	10	1,106,884	11
Retraining	10,000	5,952	40	25	5,583,126	22
Total	30,000	10,365	35	\$40	\$7,567,091	19

As shown above, the estimated goals for financial assistance to ESTs were far from met.

Our review showed that the numbers reported as being assisted by the program were overstated. To qualify as a placement by Labor's definition, the employment service must have made prior arrangements with the employer for the referral of, or have referred, an individual who had not been specifically designated by an employer and have verified from a reliable source (preferably the employer) that the individual had started to work. We found that, in many instances, placements were claimed for persons not meeting these criteria. Placements were also claimed for persons who had never registered in the program. Assistance in finding jobs was often claimed when no evidence existed that the program had provided any assistance. Due to these inaccuracies, the actual number of persons assisted by the program is difficult to ascertain.

FACTORS ADVERSELY AFFECTING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROGRAM GOALS

According to Labor reports the TMR program assisted in placing 29,855 of the 50,424 registered applicants; the number assisted represents about 75 percent of the estimated total of 40,000 that Labor believed it could help. Analysis of the reports showed, however, that, in the three grant categories, only 35 percent of the estimated goal of 30,000 had been helped. Some factors which mitigated against helping a larger number of ESTs were

- concentrating job development activities in areas where job openings were scarce, and not adequately using nationwide job development tools which provide additional opportunities for obtaining jobs, which would have permitted greater use of job search grants and possibly job relocation grants, both of which appeared under-utilized;
- a lack of followup to determine why participants on job search grants did not obtain employment, and a lack of additional efforts to fill the job openings for which the grant was made;

--the lack of posttraining placement assistance, combined with insufficient job development activities necessary for identifying areas where institutional training could have resulted in meaningful employment for participants;

--inadequate monitoring of the program by Labor, and various deficiencies which, in the absence of monitoring, remained uncorrected.

Job development activities

The three EST units included in our review directed their job development activities, with little success, mainly to employers in the high-unemployment areas served by the units. They were making only limited efforts to identify employment opportunities in other areas of the country.

For example, from September 1971 to January 1972, the Los Angeles EST unit contacted approximately 180 employers in Los Angeles County and, as a result, identified an estimated 316 job openings for which the unit referred 1,025 participants. Only 26 were placed because, according to local EST officials:

1. Other EST units and volunteer organizations in the area were referring participants to the same jobs.
2. Many of the jobs were not really available, because employers were more interested in developing a list of candidates for future jobs than they were in hiring at that time.

At the Van Nuys, California, EST unit, where an intensive advertising campaign involving radio coverage and mailers to employers was undertaken to develop jobs, only 42 positions were listed at the time of our visit. At the same time, about 1,100 job-seeking participants were enrolled in the TMR program at the Van Nuys unit.

In a random sample of 118 program participants we selected at 5 EST units, the records showed that 50 had not been referred to a job because no job openings were available for them. At the time of our test, the 50 participants had been in the program for an average of about 8 months.

As an alternative to local job development efforts, the TMR program provided for job development outside the local areas through the use of job bank books containing listings of job openings throughout the Nation; NRE; and job search and relocation grants. However, ESTs either were not using or were improperly using these means of identifying job opportunities outside the local high-unemployment areas.

Job bank book utilization

In July 1971 Labor established procedures to enable the EST units to use job bank books from various parts of the Nation to locate employment opportunities outside the local areas. Of the three units included in our review, only one used the job bank books, but it had little success.

At the end of each week, all job banks transmit to EST units an excerpt from their book consisting of all job orders in the professional, technical, and managerial occupational categories. The units were supposed to use the books to identify suitable job opportunities for their program participants and, if identified, the units were to contact the job banks to request permission to contact the employers directly. The job banks could grant or deny permission, depending on the number of referrals previously made to the prospective employer. If permission was granted, the unit was to call the employer to arrange for an interview.

These procedures, established for the program, differed from the normal Labor-established procedure of referring an applicant from one area to another--sending clearance papers to the job bank which would then notify the prospective employer--in that they allowed for direct contact with the employer by the EST unit.

A Seattle job bank specialist told us that, for the States for which he had information, only 6 States, involving 23 job banks, granted permission to contact employers directly when attempting to refer program participants to listed jobs. In 25 other States, involving 34 job banks, the EST units were required to send clearance papers to the job banks, and the job banks would contact the employers. According to the director of the Seattle EST unit, the chances of placing a participant through job bank books could be

greatly enhanced if the employer could be contacted directly to explain participants' qualifications and program benefits.

We tested the Seattle EST unit attempts to place participants through job banks for 2 months in 1972 and found the results were inconclusive as to whether direct contacts would be more beneficial. Some 246 referrals were made, but no placements resulted. Of these referrals, 56 were made through direct contact and 190 were made through the traditional clearance system.

The policy of the States that did not allow direct contact was in conflict with the Department's procedures, established for the TMR program, that allowed for direct contact of employers by units. Labor headquarters officials, when advised of the States' actions, stated that they had no control over States in this regard, because each State may develop its own procedures within the context of Labor's guidelines.

Directors of the Los Angeles and the Van Nuys EST units told us that the job bank books were not generally used, because staffing of the units was insufficient to pursue the listed job openings.

The New Orleans Job Bank allowed other States' EST units to contact employers directly but requested that the clearance paperwork be forwarded concurrently. Despite the direct contact procedure, we found little or no referral activity for 85 job openings for ESTs listed in the job bank book as of October 1972 for the New Orleans area, even though the book was sent to units throughout the country. Of 50 randomly sampled orders, which had been in the book for an average 5 weeks, 43 showed no referral activity and 7 showed only 1 to 3 referrals. During a 6-week period ended November 1972, the job bank office received only two calls from an out-of-state EST unit requesting permission to refer participants to local area jobs. Louisiana ES officials said that the low activity reported may not be representative because some States contact employers direct and the Louisiana ES would have no record of referrals resulting from such direct contacts.

Data provided by the New Orleans ES office indicated that some EST units did not make more use of the job bank books because they referred participants to nonlocal

employers via the traditional clearance system, which requires lengthy processing of paperwork between the States. During 1971 and 1972, however, only 57 participants from 11 States were referred to the New Orleans area under this system. Our review further disclosed that EST units in 4 States and Washington, D.C., had not referred any participants to the New Orleans area since the start of the TMR program even though those 5 EST units had approximately 2,900 participants in the program.

Utilization of National Registry for Engineers

The TMR program handbook of instructions requires EST units to submit information to NRE on program participants and engineering-related job orders which had not been filled locally. The EST units, however, generally were not doing this.

An NRE report dated May 26, 1973, showed that NRE had 9,013 engineers registered at that date and had 973 job orders on file. NRE had made 49,453 referrals but placement data was not available because NRE had no system to obtain this data.

A random sample of 118 participants registered with 3 EST units showed that only 41 had applications submitted to NRE. Also, only a small percentage of job listings received by the various EST units we visited had been listed with NRE.

The directors of the three EST units said they provided program participants with NRE applications during orientation. The TMR program director in Seattle said that applicants were told that they must register with NRE, but the TMR unit has no control over, or any way to ascertain, whether applicants register. According to the directors of the two California TMR units, they believed they were satisfying the TMR program handbook requirements by providing the applicants with NRE applications; these directors stated that they had no way of forcing applicants to register. The directors stated that their policy on job openings was to obtain employers' permission to send the listing to NRE but that they did not have sufficient staff to contact each employer.

Utilization of
job search and relocation grants

Labor anticipated that 10,000 participants would receive job search grants and that 10,000 would receive relocation grants during the 2-year program. As of March 1973, 4,594 participants had received job search grants and 1,819 had received relocation grants. Of 138 job search grants included in our sample, 42 resulted in placements. As previously discussed, had the EST units pursued job openings outside their local areas, we believe more participants would have requested job search grants which in turn would have resulted in additional placements. Increased use of job search grants, which averaged about \$700 and for which substantial additional funds were available, would also have resulted in the awarding of additional relocation grants for those participants who obtained employment in other locales.

Followup of unsuccessful job searches

Written reports required by the TMR program handbook on the outcome of job search grants either were not being obtained from program participants or did not contain information as to why job offers were not obtained. This information would be useful in further attempts to fill the job openings for which the grants were made. Also, the EST units were not following up to ascertain whether participants obtained jobs and therefore were not taking advantage of opportunities for referring other participants to those jobs that remained available.

One EST unit director stated that he was not obtaining the reports because he could not require the participants to submit reports. Two other units claimed they did not have sufficient staff to follow up on the reports they did obtain.

In commenting on this report (see app. I), the Department, although not disagreeing that followup should be carried out, said that followup on most cases would not have significantly affected the placement rate because most contacts had been made by the individual through a friend or directly with the employer, and the job would often be tailored to the individual.

Training assistance

Labor originally estimated that 10,000 participants would receive retraining assistance at a cost of \$25 million. As of March 1973 only 3,952 participants had received retraining at a cost of \$5.6 million. We believe additional OJT could have been provided if the EST units and EST State Specialists had pursued OJT development activities in accordance with program guidelines. It also appears that more participants could have been placed in jobs if posttraining placement assistance had been provided after participants completed their institutional training.

Training activities under the program were geared to immediate employment prospects, with OJT considered the best type of training for obtaining employment. However, where the State agency, the employer, and the program participant determined that preparation for a job could better be accomplished through institutional training, a referral to an approved institution could be made.

Program guidelines state that development of OJT opportunities was to be undertaken by the State ES agencies and EST units using NRE. Occupations for which OJT was considered appropriate had to pay an annual salary of at least \$8,000 for engineers and scientists and \$6,000 for technicians. In making referrals to OJT opportunities, priority was to be given to occupations in which program participants had previous experience or training.

OJT contracts

The TMR program handbook states that State ES agencies, EST units, and EST State Specialists were to develop OJT opportunities for program participants. The Los Angeles unit and the Louisiana State Specialist were not taking advantage of all OJT opportunities available.

At Los Angeles, where OJT contracts had been executed covering 70 individuals as of July 1972, a professional section independent of the unit maintained a file of about 440 job openings for professionals in the fields of business, engineering, science, and medicine. According to the director of the EST unit and the manager of the Professional Section, they did not have any plans for developing OJT contracts

with those employers listed because they did not have sufficient staff to develop the contracts.

In Louisiana, OJT contracts covering 11 individuals had been awarded from inception of the program through October 1972. A New Orleans TMR program consultant said he limited his OJT activities to firms in engineering and scientific industries that had jobs which would use the training of ESTs registered in the program. He said that, as he understood it, the OJT objective was to place participants in occupations which would use the professional training of the participant. Consequently, opportunities for placing participants in OJT contracts in other occupations were not sought.

The New Orleans TMR consultant's understanding of OJT differed significantly from that of the Los Angeles and Van Nuys units where, as long as the occupation paid at least the minimum annual salary, it was considered eligible for OJT funds by these units.

A sample of 112 participants that had received OJT contracts from the Seattle, Los Angeles, and Van Nuys EST units indicated that OJT was a relatively successful means of finding employment for participants. Of 60 participants that had completed training, 38 were still employed, 15 were no longer employed, and the status of 7 could not be determined.

Institutional training

The TMR program handbook points out that, in those cases where OJT is not adequate to prepare an individual for employment, the State agency may determine that preparation for a specific job can be better accomplished through academic instruction. In these instances the State agency can refer the individual to an approved institution, through an institutional training project established specifically for the TMR program in that State. The project must be established in accordance with the normal requirements for such projects set forth in the MDTA handbook.

EST units did not provide needed placement assistance for those participants completing institutional training, nor did they conduct job development surveys necessary for identifying those areas where training would result in meaningful employment for participants. The failure of the

EST units to provide posttraining placement assistance, combined with insufficient job development activities, limited the opportunity for increasing the number of participants that could have been placed as a result of institutional training.

Participants enrolled in institutional training by the Los Angeles and Van Nuys EST units were not provided with posttraining placement assistance. Under the MDTA program, from which funds were allocated for institutional training, local ES offices were expected to maintain contact with participants after completion of training and to provide such services as counseling and placement.

At two of the three EST units visited, participants were no longer considered unemployed upon their enrollment in institutional training, and their employment applications were deactivated. Procedures for reactivating the applications upon completion of the training were not established, and only those participants that contacted the units after training were provided additional placement assistance.

To determine the extent of placement assistance provided to participants who had completed training, we looked into the current status of 20 participants who had completed training which qualified them to teach high school mathematics. Two of them were employed as mathematics teachers, eight were employed in nonteaching occupations, eight were unemployed, and the status of two could not be determined.

We contacted one of the largest school districts in Los Angeles County and were told that it had 25 openings for mathematics teachers. When we advised an official of the Van Nuys unit of the openings, he said his office was not aware of them because of insufficient staff to develop jobs and lack of agreement between the EST unit and other public agencies for listing job openings. In our opinion, deactivating participants when they enroll in training, combined with insufficient job development efforts, seriously limits the opportunity for participants to find employment after training.

We reviewed a randomly selected sample of 110 participants who had received grants for training and noted that 42 were employed in training-related occupations, 19 were

employed in nonrelated occupations, 24 were unemployed, 19 were still in training, and the status of 6 could not be determined. Because records were incomplete, we were unable to determine whether the 42 participants employed in training-related occupations found employment as a result of post-training placement assistance.

Corrective action taken to
stop training for occupation
with surplus manpower

At the Van Nuys EST unit, we noted that program participants were being sought for institutional training in the field of computer programming for business applications, a skill which was not in demand in the area. As of October 1972, 9 participants had been accepted into the program and there were 10 additional openings. Local ES office files showed that 33 qualified computer programmers, with experience in business applications, were already seeking employment.

We advised the State program coordinator of the lack of openings in that field. Subsequently, the Van Nuys and Los Angeles EST units, on the basis of instructions from the State, stopped referring participants to the training program.

Program monitoring by Labor

RMAs were responsible for monitoring of the TMR program, but the administrators for the areas included in our review had not established an adequate monitoring system.

According to a Labor headquarters official, a nationwide system for the program was not established because it would be only a 2-year program. Instead, RMAs were given responsibility for monitoring the program within their respective regions. No monitoring guidelines were issued, and the extent of monitoring activities varied from region to region.

Our review included 3 of the 10 Labor regional offices. Officials from the RMA offices responsible for the States of California and Washington said a system for monitoring the action of ES agencies in implementing the TMR program had not been established. Although onsite monitoring of the

program was performed initially, this was replaced by in-house review of the TMR program reports. An official of the RMA office in Dallas, whose region includes Louisiana, said his office did not monitor the program because he considered this the responsibility of Labor's national office.

Labor said that the TMR program monitoring by both the National Office and the regional staffs was very limited and that lack of sufficient staff, all along the line, probably was a contributing factor. Labor said also that, although no formal monitoring plan was formulated, personnel in the EST units repeatedly called either the regions or the National Office when problems arose.

Adverse effects of
inadequate monitoring

Some program officials cited insufficient staffing as a reason units were not carrying out certain responsibilities, such as not using nationwide job development tools and not following up unsuccessful job search grants. Also units and ES offices were not accurately reporting program accomplishments. We believe that adequate monitoring of the program and guidance to the EST units and ES offices would have highlighted the problems being encountered and would have brought them to the attention of Labor headquarters where corrective actions could have been formulated.

CHAPTER 4

SKILL CONVERSION STUDY

One aspect of the TMR program which appeared to be particularly productive was the Skill Conversion Study made by the National Society of Professional Engineers under contract with Labor. The study was to develop information on the potential for, and the means of, converting professional skills from one occupational area to another.

Research teams--in each of the 14 cities initially designated by Labor as having a high concentration of unemployed ESTs--began the study in July 1971 and ended it in March 1972. Each team was assigned two or more industries; public service areas; or special problems for study, such as health care, transportation, solid waste, food products and services, and criminal justice; and each submitted reports on results of their studies.

The study was conducted in three phases.

1. Background data was developed on the individual industrial field selected for study.
2. Each study team made an evaluation of the potential for jobs in the industrial fields being studied.
3. Data collected by the various study teams was consolidated and evaluated, and recommendations for future actions were proposed.

The industries and public service areas, listed below, were identified as having significant potential for new job creation for former aerospace and defense workers in the immediate or near future. Also shown are the estimated new jobs that could possibly be created.

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Projected employment opportunities</u>	
	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973-75</u>
Food products and services	950	8,950
Health care	250	5,800
Transportation	1,750	5,650
Wood products	900	3,400
Power resources	600	7,000
Pollution control	1,600	5,000
Security-criminal justice	300	2,500
Banking and finance	360	2,750
Solid waste	90	1,500
Educational technology	-	3,000
Occupational safety	200	1,500
Other--Oceanography, public service, petroleum-chemical	<u>210</u>	<u>750</u>
Total	<u>7,210</u>	<u>47,800</u>

Over 100,000 additional employment opportunities in the fields of transportation, pollution control, solid waste, and public service were also identified. These additional opportunities were dependent on the Federal Government's lifting its hiring freeze, releasing impounded funds, and passing pending new legislation. The reports also suggested education and training programs to convert the skills of former aerospace and/or defense workers to occupations in the new industries and recommended pilot programs to test the feasibility of converting the skills.

To implement the recommendations of the report, Labor awarded another contract of the National Society of Professional Engineers to retrain former aerospace and/or defense workers. Under this contract, courses to retrain workers for 11 of the above industries were held, and 329 persons had enrolled in the courses. The results of the training have been impressive--of 329 enrollees, 302 had obtained employment as of January 12, 1973, most of them in the occupation for which they were trained.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

About 50,000 unemployed ESTs applied for assistance, including financial assistance, from the TMR program. The program was successful to the extent that about 30,000--and this figure may be inflated--were helped in their efforts to find work. The accomplishments in the areas of job search, relocation, and retraining grants were disappointing however, since only 35 percent of the goal was reached and only about 19 percent of the financial aid was disbursed. Factors contributing to a greater number of applicants' not being assisted included insufficient job development and placement assistance, failure to provide followup efforts to insure that participants completing training were given additional assistance as needed, and inadequate program monitoring.

The TMR program, as a special effort, was terminated on March 31, 1973, although program activities continued under local ES office administration until June 30, 1973. Labor is evaluating the TMR program but its report has not yet been issued. A decision on whether financial assistance will be made available for TMR-program-type activities will be made on the basis of recommendations contained in the report. Regardless of who administers the program or whether the program continues, the need which brought the program into being--substantial numbers of unemployed ESTs--continues although somewhat diminished, and the Nation is still confronted with the problem of employing the talents of these individuals.

The TMR program tried to provide reemployment assistance. At the time the program came into being, Labor estimated the number of unemployed ESTs at 75,000 to 100,000. The National Society of Professional Engineers estimated the number at 92,000 in March 1972, approximately 1 year after the TMR program was initiated.

Our review indicated that the TMR program had been successful to a point. However, the challenge faced by program administrators to assist these professionals was a difficult one; these individuals were not easily reemployed. One of the problems which worked against greater program success was the reluctance of former aerospace employees to abandon the hope of a resurgence of the industry and its well-paying jobs

or to move from the areas where major aerospace firms are located, while nonaerospace employers were cautious about hiring former aerospace employees fearing they would not commit themselves to a new career.

During the life of the program, the economy was depressed and large numbers of employees from many industries were seeking new employment, increasing the problems of successfully implementing a special program for former employees of a single industry. A TMR-type program would have a greater chance of success if only one industry, such as aerospace, was impacted and other industries either remained stable or expanded.

The need to reemploy these professionals continues, and the experience of the program provides knowledge on the relative merits of the assistance methods used in the program. This knowledge can be useful in developing approaches to alleviating future problems of unemployed, highly skilled persons in similar circumstances.

The skill conversion study was one of the more successful activities undertaken to assist ESTs in starting new careers, and Labor should consider that concept in similar undertakings. Such a study, however, should be considered at the earliest possible time, once a problem industry has been identified, and a high priority should be placed on completing and using study results.

If this program is continued under some form, the following actions should be taken.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

We recommend that the Secretary instruct local ES offices, in the event that TMR program activities are continued, to

- increase their use of existing nationwide job development tools;
- initiate followup efforts to determine the reasons why individuals on job search grants did not receive offers of employment, so that additional efforts could be made to fill the opening;

- provide posttraining placement assistance in accordance with MDTA guidelines; and
- conduct in-depth job development activities necessary for identifying areas where institutional training could result in meaningful employment for program applicants.

From lessons learned from the TMR program, Labor should develop a plan it could quickly implement, in the event of future occurrences of the nature experienced by ESTs. The plan should provide for:

1. Performing and using skill conversion studies which would be given a high priority.
2. Implementing a monitoring system automatically with the implementation of the program.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Labor stated that, after a final evaluation of the TMR program, it would decide what future action to take and that, if the program continued, it would adopt our recommendations.

Labor added that:

"* * * we believe that skill conversion studies should be an ongoing function of the Department in order to better utilize the nation's skills. Not only are engineers, scientists and technicians a surplus commodity, but so are language specialists and a variety of teachers with special expertise. In the absence of job creation efforts like the Public Employment Program, alternative means of integrating skilled professionals into the work force are a necessity.

"We believe that the recommendations of the report to the Secretary of Labor should stress the desirability of developing a more effective permanent program or mechanism, rather than simply instructing local offices to improve job development and followup techniques. We have seen that nationwide job development tools were not extensively utilized, and that job development efforts

were restricted to depressed local labor markets with little potential for assimilating the displaced ESTs. This suggests a federal role is necessary in such activity, and the role need not be contrary to decentralization under manpower revenue sharing. Only a national effort can focus on broader concerns that affect the nation's labor force and cross regional boundaries."

(See apps. I and II.)

GAO evaluation

Labor's comments envision a somewhat more expanded departmental role than would be present with the implementation of our recommendations.

The recommendations in this report were developed to show the improvements which, we believe, could be made in program activities within the administrative framework in which the program originally operated.

We see no conflict between our recommendations, which envisioned Labor's continuing the program on somewhat of an ad hoc basis, and Labor's comments. We believe adoption of our programmatic recommendations would enhance program performance irrespective of how Labor carried out the program. Our work, however, showed that a stronger Federal role, particularly in the monitoring area, would have enhanced program effectiveness.

MISSING

PAGE (S)

APPENDIX I

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR MANPOWER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20210



SEP 11 1973

Mr. George D. Peck
Assistant Director
United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Peck:

Thank you for your letter of August 17, 1973, to Secretary Brennan and the draft of the General Accounting Office Report on the Technology Mobilization and Reemployment Program (TMRP).

We too believe that TMRP was moderately successful in returning many engineers, scientists, and technicians (EST's) to gainful employment and that perhaps approaches were overlooked that could have led to additional employment. However, we do feel that a creditable job was done in the local offices of the various State agencies in dealing with the problem of unemployed EST's considering the number of applicants as compared to the ES staff involved. Since this was a short term program, two years, and could be considered as experimental in nature, initial staffing was based on estimated figures but revised when the workload was known.

All EST Units were urged to utilize the Job Bank system as well as long distance phone calls to increase the potential for placements outside their immediate areas. As was pointed out, we found that EST's were not as mobile as we had anticipated and there was a reluctance on their part to relocate, especially out of California and Florida.

We feel that if California had chosen to participate in the 50 City Consultant Program their job development efforts could have been increased. However, none of the States were forced to participate in any phase of the program and Oregon did not participate in the TMRP at all.

APPENDIX I

Concerning the followup of job search applicants it should be pointed out that most of the time the contacts were made by the individual through a friend or his own contact and the job, many times would be tailored to him. We do not believe that the placement rate would be significantly affected by the followup and the time and effort would negate the results.

Monitoring was done on a very limited basis both by the National Office and the regional staffs. No formal monitoring plan was formulated and perhaps for this reason the EST Units felt that there was minimal supervision. The personnel in these Units, through their long distance tie lines, repeatedly called either the regions or National Office for guidance when problems arose. The lack of sufficient staff, all along the line, probably was a contributing factor to the limited amount of monitoring of TMRP.

[See GAO note.]


GAO note: Deleted material concerned statements in the report draft which were revised in this report in accordance with data supplied by Labor.

APPENDIX I

If TMRP were to continue we would incorporate the recommendations of the General Accounting Office Report. Following a final evaluation of the TMRP a decision will be reached on what future action will be taken.

Thank you for the opportunity to review your report.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM H. KOLBERG
Assistant Secretary for Manpower

Enclosures

APPENDIX II

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20210



OCT 2 1973

Mr. George D. Peck
Assistant Director
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Peck:

This letter supplements the September 11 response of Assistant Secretary for Manpower William H. Kolberg to your letter of August 17, 1973, and the draft of the General Accounting Office Report on the Technology Mobilization and Reemployment Program (TMRP).

We wish to support Mr. Kolberg's comments on the draft report and to add the following views regarding the potential value of this program to similar future efforts.

The draft report states the opinion that the TMRP was reasonably successful, although estimated goals were not met for a variety of reasons. We share that view, while recognizing that in some localities -- in Seattle, for instance -- the program is considered to have done exceptionally well. Seattle was one of the hardest-hit areas in the country for aerospace unemployment, and yet at least two-thirds of those who registered with the EST unit there were assisted in finding employment and/or provided financial assistance.

The TMRP, in our judgment, proved most successful in terms of the lesson it provided for determining future approaches to assisting large groups of displaced workers; namely, that an effective nationwide system should be in place to handle any occurrence of worker displacement in any segment of the economy, and with a minimum of delay.

In line with this, we believe that skill conversion studies should be an ongoing function of the Department in order to better utilize the nation's skills. Not only are engineers, scientists and technicians a surplus commodity, but so are language specialists and a variety of teachers with special expertise. In the absence

of job creation efforts like the Public Employment Program, alternative means of integrating skilled professionals into the work force are a necessity.

We believe that the recommendations of the report to the Secretary of Labor should stress the desirability of developing a more effective permanent program or mechanism, rather than simply instructing local offices to improve job development and followup techniques. We have seen that nationwide job development tools were not extensively utilized, and that job development efforts were restricted to depressed local labor markets with little potential for assimilating the displaced ESTs. This suggests a federal role is necessary in such activity, and the role need not be contrary to decentralization under manpower revenue sharing. Only a national effort can focus on broader concerns that affect the nation's labor force and cross regional boundaries.

Sincerely,

Fred G. Clark

FRED G. CLARK
Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Management

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

APPENDIX III

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
 THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
 RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
 TECHNOLOGY MOBILIZATION AND REEMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
SECRETARY OF LABOR:		
Peter J. Brennan	Feb. 1973	Present
James D. Hodgson	July 1970	Feb. 1973
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR MANPOWER:		
William Kolberg	April 1973	Present
Paul J. Fasser, Jr, (acting)	Jan. 1973	Apr. 1973
Malcolm R. Lovell	July 1970	Jan. 1973
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATOR:		
Vacant	Apr. 1973	Present
Paul J. Fasser, Jr.	Oct. 1970	Apr. 1973

END

U.S. GPO

~~4-10-02~~



REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

74-0452

**Rehabilitating Inmates
Of Federal Prisons:
Special Programs Help,
But Not Enough**

B-133223

Bureau of Prisons
Department of Justice

**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

NOV. 6 1973

701761



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-133223

41
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate

This is our report on the limited success of the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, in meeting rehabilitation objectives established to prepare Federal offenders to re-enter society.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and to the Attorney General.

Thomas B. Staats

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

BOP	Bureau of Prisons
FPI	Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated
GAO	General Accounting Office

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

REHABILITATING INMATES
OF FEDERAL PRISONS:
SPECIAL PROGRAMS HELP,
BUT NOT ENOUGH
Bureau of Prisons
Department of Justice 37
B-133223

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO made this review to evaluate the Federal Bureau of Prisons' success in meeting objectives set to prepare Federal offenders to reenter society.

Causes of criminality

Various correctional authorities have noted that the causes of criminality are uncertain. Frequently cited is the belief that most offenders are not equipped to function in society because they cannot adequately read or write, possess undesirable character traits, and/or have no marketable skill. Because the family and society have already failed to correct these problems, it is not easy for the prisons to correct them. However, because of the controlled conditions, imprisonment is probably the best, and perhaps often the only, chance for rehabilitating offenders.

Bureau objectives

The Bureau's objectives are to

- maintain custody and care of Federal offenders and
- prepare them to reenter society.

In preparing inmates to reenter society, the Bureau's major objective is to provide each offender an opportunity to acquire

- a sixth-grade reading level,
- high school equivalency for offenders with average intelligence,
- treatment for undesirable character traits, and
- a marketable skill.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Bureau has made progress in developing educational, vocational, and related programs for rehabilitating Federal offenders, but in relation to the total problem, this progress has been limited.

Case histories of 169 inmates released from 5 Federal institutions during July 1971 showed the inmates had a total of 342 needs for sixth-grade reading level, high school equivalency, character trait treatment, or marketable skills when they entered prison. Only 116 or 34 percent of these needs had been fulfilled or treated during their imprisonment. Although this

indicates the Bureau of Prisons has achieved some success, more inmates need rehabilitation services. (See p. 11.)

GAO found that:

- Available rehabilitation programs were not fully used because inmates were not motivated to improve themselves.
- Shortages of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social case-workers prevented treatment for some inmates needing help.
- Inmates had only limited opportunities to learn marketable skills.
- Vocational programs were limited by availability of Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated (FPI), funding.
- Sufficient emphasis was not placed on preparing inmates for jobs.

Program participation

Many inmates needing rehabilitative services did not participate in available programs because they lacked motivation. Rewards within the prisons generally are based on inmate performance on jobs in institutional maintenance and operation or prison industries.

Only 2 percent of monetary awards given to inmates during fiscal year 1972 were for involvement in educational and vocational training programs. No money was awarded to inmates participating in programs treating undesirable character traits. (See pp. 11 and 15.)

The funding for such awards has been limited by statute. As the

effects of a current project are assessed, the Bureau expects legislation to be requested providing for a broader and more flexible incentive system. (See p. 16.)

Efforts to treat undesirable character traits

Counseling and related character trait programs are important aspects of rehabilitation. Bureau institutions use various methods designed to alter an inmate's attitudes, self-concept, and values.

The case histories of 169 inmates indicated that only about 30 percent needing treatment participated in character trait programs. The Bureau attributes the low participation to a shortage of qualified staff and to inmates' lack of motivation. (See pp. 11, 12, and 18.)

The Bureau is taking steps to maximize available resources in identifying and providing needed inmate programs by

- using specialized centers for treating severe mental disorders,
- increasing the number of caseworkers, and
- training its correctional officers in counseling. (See pp. 18 and 21.)

Job skills

Prison industries had not been fully effective in training inmates in marketable skills; little progress had been made in implementing formal on-the-job training in maintenance and operation of institutions; and institutions did not have sufficient vocational courses.

Of 169 inmates, 91 had no marketable skill when they entered prison, 51 had no job skill when released from prison, and 40 were considered to have obtained a marketable skill. (See p. 25.)

The Bureau should make greater use of prison industries and maintenance assignments for training inmates in marketable skills.

Vocational training programs are funded from FPI profits. Funding for vocational training had occasionally been reduced because of low profits. (See p. 30.)

Job placement services

Various studies have indicated jobs offering self-respect and financial support will deter many former inmates from returning to criminal activity. But many inmates are released without jobs and are unaware of available placement assistance. Content as well as frequency of employment counseling before release differed significantly among institutions. The Bureau had not evaluated furloughs as a pre-release placement tool. (See pp. 34 and 35.)

Information on program needs and progress

The Bureau has not had a centralized management information system to provide current information on

--the number of inmates at each institution needing rehabilitation and

--the progress made in meeting objectives.

The Bureau is currently implementing a computerized system to provide information on rehabilitation needs and the extent that these needs are being met. (See p. 39.)

Information on the success and activities of former inmates provides a basis for determining how useful the programs are and for identifying needed revisions. The Bureau faces difficulties in tracing an individual's activities after release.

Of the inmates released in fiscal years 1971 and 1972, 62 percent were released without supervision and were no longer accountable to the criminal justice system. (See p. 40.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

3 The Attorney General should direct the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to:

714
4 --Work with FPI to develop and operate a plan to increase opportunities for inmates to acquire marketable skills.

--Make sure that institutions establish on-the-job training and apprenticeship programs in maintenance and operations functions.

--Work harder to assist inmates in preparing to obtain a job before release.

--Evaluate the use of furloughs to assist inmates in obtaining

employment before release and to insure consistent use among similar institutions.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The Department of Justice generally agreed with these recommendations and noted the report calls attention to weaknesses and deficiencies in Federal prisons which the Bureau is attempting to correct as additional resources are made available. (See app. I.)

Justice noted that the availability of vocational training should not be subject to change in market demand for Federal prison system products and indicated action was being taken to correct the problem of reduced FPI profits. (See p. 32.) If this action fails to meet the needs for inmate vocational training programs, the Bureau should

consider obtaining appropriated funding for vocational training.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE CONGRESS

Progress has been made toward achieving rehabilitation objectives; further actions by the Department could result in greater progress. Some existing conditions, however, make it uncertain whether the objectives will be fully achieved. The Congress should find this report useful in its continuing evaluation of the inmate rehabilitation program in Federal prisons.

Correctional administrators and authorities are reexamining concepts and practices and are considering new and/or alternative approaches. The Congress may be asked to consider significant changes in present concepts and provisions for the custody, care, and treatment of prisoners in Federal penitentiaries.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The need for improvements in rehabilitating criminal offenders has been noted in studies on recidivism,¹ emphasized by commissions investigating inmate disturbances, and highlighted by the 1969 Presidential directive to the Attorney General to improve the Nation's correctional systems.

The causes of criminality are uncertain. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has pointed out that the social and economic deprivation and the lack of opportunity of many offenders do not fully explain their criminal behavior since many non-offenders have similar backgrounds.

Various studies have mentioned many factors, including the criminal justice system, as contributing to the failure to rehabilitate offenders. Frequently cited is the belief that most offenders are not equipped to function in society because they cannot adequately read or write, have no marketable skills, and/or possess undesirable character traits (personalities, values, and attitudes). Because the family and society have already failed to correct these problems, it is not easy for the prisons to correct them. However, because of the controlled conditions, imprisonment is probably the best and perhaps the only chance for rehabilitating offenders.

BOP operates 45 penal facilities and contracts with State and local authorities to protect society through the custody, care, and treatment of Federal law offenders committed by the courts to the supervision of the Attorney General. Its major goals are to

- maintain custody and care of Federal offenders and
- prepare them for reentering society.

¹We could not locate any generally accepted statistics on recidivism. Such statistics vary depending on the criterion used to determine recidivism, e.g., arrests or convictions. However, a recent report prepared by the House Select Committee on Crime provides a perspective on the extent of the problem. The report cited a Federal Bureau of Investigation finding that about two-thirds of offenders released from prison are rearrested within 4 years.

In preparing inmates to return to society, BOP's major objective is to provide each offender an opportunity to acquire

- a sixth-grade reading level,
- high school equivalency for offenders with average intelligence,
- treatment of undesirable character traits, and
- marketable skill.

In fiscal year 1972, BOP had about 6,400 employees. During the same year 15,100 offenders were committed to Federal prisons and 12,700 were released. Confinement averaged about 19 months. According to BOP, about 95 percent of the inmates will eventually be released. The average inmate population during the year was 21,300, and BOP expects an increase of 750 a year through the 1970s.

The inmates' ages ranged from 13 to 83, and averaged 31 years. Their intelligence quotients averaged 104. BOP officials estimated that of the inmates:

- 15 percent read below the sixth-grade level.
- 90 percent have not completed high school.
- 88 percent have undesirable character traits.
- 65 percent have no marketable skill.

In 1969 the President directed the Attorney General to take several steps to improve the Federal prison system and have it serve as a model for State and local reforms in order to improve the Nation's correctional systems. (See app. II.) BOP then developed a long-range master plan in which it estimated the number and characteristics of future Federal prisoners and outlined strategies for meeting these inmates' needs. Principal objectives of the long-range plan include:

- Providing enough inmate supervision to protect the community from lepredation, insure maximum safety for inmates and staff, and carry out the judgments of the U.S. courts.
- Increasing the alternatives for those offenders who do not require traditional institutional confinement.

--Implementing experimental programs as demonstration models.

--Increasing significantly the number of offenders attaining success after release.

Although BOP personnel recognize that many problems exist and much remains to be done, they believe that considerable progress has been made. Current programs and activities are considered significant improvements over previous ones. BOP cited increased staff training, emphasis on programs and facilities for youthful offenders, efforts to reduce overcrowding, expansion of prerelease assistance through greater use of community treatment centers, and attempts to obtain post-release data on ex-offenders as a method of evaluating institutional programs.

ASSIGNING AND CLASSIFYING INMATES

BOP determines the type of penal institution to which a convicted offender is to be assigned on the basis of sex, age, and offense; degree of custody considered prudent; court recommendations; and length of sentence. It then commits the offender to that type of institution nearest his hometown.

During an inmate's first few weeks at an institution, he undergoes orientation and is given a physical examination and needed medical care. He is interviewed and tested for basic intelligence, educational achievement, occupational aptitude, and personality to help determine his academic, vocational, and social needs. The results of these tests and interviews are incorporated into a classification study. An institutional classification team, usually consisting of an inmate's caseworker, a correctional counselor, and other institutional staff, then develops a program for the inmate, including suggested rehabilitation. The program, however, is tailored to the institution's available work assignments, educational and vocational training programs, or staff resources.

BOP categorizes inmates as I, II, or III priority on the basis of:

--Likelihood of change (as determined by the classification team).

--Age.

--Number of prior commitments.

--Nature and length of sentence.

Category I inmates, generally considered more receptive to change, are often young and are usually first-time offenders. On the other hand, category III inmates are usually older, have committed more than one offense, and are considered less likely to change their lifestyles.

FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED

An act to provide for diversified employment for Federal prisoners and for training and schooling them in trades and occupations was approved on May 27, 1930. It required that the Attorney General establish industries that provide inmates with a maximum opportunity to learn skills which will enable them to earn a living upon release.


Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), a wholly owned Government corporation established in 1934, functions within the Department of Justice. FPI's operating policies are prescribed by a 6-man board of directors appointed by the President. The Director, BOP, serves as the Commissioner of Industries and the acting executive officer of FPI. Certain BOP functions, such as the vocational training program, are financed from FPI's profits.

FUNDING

BOP's appropriations and congressional authorizations of FPI funds for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 and the amounts requested for fiscal year 1974 are shown below.

<u>Appropriation and authorization</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	1974 (<u>note 2</u>)
	—————(millions)—————		
Salaries and expenses	\$104.8	\$115.4	\$129.0
Buildings and facilities	59.8	42.6	14.8
Support of prisoners	14.5	17.0	22.4
FPI funds authorized by the Congress for vocational training	<u>5.6</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total	<u>\$184.7</u>	<u>\$179.9</u>	<u>\$171.8</u>

^aEstimated.



BOP Photo

**OLDEST ACTIVE FEDERAL PRISON-PENITENTIARY AT
McNEIL ISLAND, WASHINGTON (opened Jan. 1865).**

CHAPTER 2

NEED FOR MORE INMATES TO PARTICIPATE

IN REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

Penologists generally agree that an effective inmate rehabilitation program combining job training, job placement, and treatment/counseling for undesirable character traits can significantly reduce the number of persons re-committed to penal institutions. BOP has made considerable progress in developing educational, vocational, and related programs for rehabilitating Federal offenders. However, in relation to the total problem, BOP has had limited success in meeting established rehabilitation objectives directed toward preparing Federal offenders to reenter society.

Case histories of 169 inmates released from 5 institutions in July 1971¹ showed that they had a total of 342 needs when they entered prison, of which only 116 or 34 percent had been fulfilled or treated during confinement, as shown below.

	<u>Number of inmates with needs</u>	<u>Needs fulfilled or treated</u>	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Sixth-grade reading level	22	4	18
High school equivalency	87	29	33
Treatment for undesirable character traits	142	43	30
Marketable skills	<u>91</u>	<u>40</u>	44
Total	<u>342</u>	<u>116</u>	34

Although this indicates that BOP has achieved some success in satisfying identified needs, more inmates need rehabilitation services.

Many inmates having rehabilitative needs did not participate in programs to help meet those needs. BOP officials attributed the low participation primarily to a lack

¹As of July 1972, 79 of the 169 inmates had been rearrested.

of motivation and are developing a better incentive system to stimulate greater participation in rehabilitation programs.

PROGRAMS

BOP institutions offer classes in adult basic education, high school equivalency and college-level education, and such special classes as English for Spanish-speaking people. Inmates may also enroll at their own expense in correspondence courses of their choice. Some inmates attend schools in the community during the day and return to the institution at night under BOP's study release program.

The institutions use treatment methods--such as transactional analysis, reality therapy, and behavior modification techniques--designed to alter an inmate's attitudes, self-concepts, and values. Generally, institutions provide psychotherapy (conducted by psychiatrists or psychologists) and group counseling (conducted by case-workers or other trained staff members). Inmates may participate in such groups as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. There are opportunities for greater inmate participation in some programs; however, present resources cannot meet all needs. (See ch. 3.)


All institutions provide selected job skill training. Inmates may participate in vocational training courses and/or be assigned to jobs involving the maintenance and operation of the institutions or to jobs in FPI. (See ch. 4.)

LACK OF EFFECTIVE REWARD SYSTEM

In September 1967 BOP contracted with the Sterling Institute of Washington, Inc., to study training activities in Federal institutions. Sterling reported that many inmates interviewed preferred the money they could earn by working in prison industries (FPI jobs) to the less tangible rewards of taking and completing training courses. Sterling reported an almost negative relationship between the means of earning money and the attainment of educational and training goals. Sterling concluded that a system of incentives tied to specific, measurable goals is needed and that, ideally, sentences should be stated in terms of achievement of prescribed treatment goals.




**KEY PUNCH TRAINING, TERMINAL ISLAND
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION**



**ENGLISH CLASS, TERMINAL ISLAND
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION**

BOP Photos



**BUILDING A TEACHING MACHINE--ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY,
McNEIL ISLAND PENITENTIARY**

BOP Photo

In its 1968 report on a study of education and training programs at BOP institutions in Milan, Michigan, and Terre Haute, Indiana, the Battelle Memorial Institute cited the following examples of the lack of an effective reward system for inmates.

"One inmate operates a loom in the textile mill and earns \$50 and three days of 'good time' [sentence reduction for good behavior] each month; another provides maintenance service for the mill and earns nothing. One man works as a clerk in the Education and Training Division and earns meritorious pay; another serves as an instructor or tutor and earns nothing. The inmate and staff alike feel that there are many inequities in the institutional reward system for inmates. When 'good time' and money are viewed as such precious rewards even the slightest of inequities is viewed as unfair."

The institute concluded that a more equitable reward system was obviously needed.

Rewards are based almost entirely on performance on prison industry jobs. Assignments to such jobs are voluntary, and wages range from 21 cents to 51 cents an hour. Only about one-fourth of the inmates work in FPI, and some industries have a waiting list for assignment. All non-industry assignments pay no wages, although inmates may earn meritorious service awards on some assignments.

BOP awards inmates up to \$50 a month for exceptionally meritorious or outstanding service. Most of these awards, which are generally much less than FPI wages, are granted for performance on jobs involving the maintenance and operation of the institutions. During fiscal year 1972, only 2 percent of the monetary awards were given to inmates participating in educational or vocational training programs and no monetary awards were paid to inmates participating in programs treating undesirable character traits.

BOP conducted a pilot study in 1971 to determine the feasibility of paying inmates \$10 to \$25 a month in \$5 increments for institutional maintenance and operations work. The study showed that paying wages to the inmates reduced their absenteeism and improved job stability.

Inmates not committed to life imprisonment may earn good time for obeying institution rules. In addition, inmates who work in FPI or at the prison camps and inmates who perform exceptionally meritorious service generally receive extra good time. Inmates who participate in other rehabilitation programs do not receive extra good time.

Some institution officials stated that the reward system is inequitable. For example, one official said the meritorious service award and extra good time system is inequitable because certain inmates' efforts often go unrewarded. Another official responsible for maintaining mechanical equipment at one institution stated that inmates who have considerable potential to learn crafts transfer to FPI because of the wages.

BOP officials told us that the traditional incentives of extra good time and pay are less effective than they might be because the law requires that they be awarded only for "outstanding services in institutional operations" and not for self-improvement. They stated that both the extent of and available funding for such awards were too limited. BOP, however, is conducting a demonstration project at one youth institution where inmates are rewarded for accomplishing assigned tasks. We were told that, as BOP assesses the effects of this project, it will request legislation providing for a broader and more flexible incentive system.

The Department of Justice commented that one of the greatest challenges facing the manager of a corrections program is encouraging offenders to enter rehabilitation programs. The Department noted that BOP is implementing a decentralized form of institutional operations called functional unit management which should increase participation in rehabilitation programs by expanding the inmate's role in selecting treatment activities. (See app. I.)

CONCLUSION

Many inmates are not participating in rehabilitation programs primarily because they lack motivation. The current monetary and reduced-time rewards do not motivate inmates to participate in all phases of rehabilitation.

We are not making any recommendations in view of BOP's efforts to develop a broader and more flexible incentive system and to insure a better tie-in between rewards and achievements of specific rehabilitative programs.

CHAPTER 3

EFFORTS TO TREAT

UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS

Changing an inmate's attitudes and values is one of the most important objectives of rehabilitation. BOP institutions use various treatment methods designed to accomplish this objective.

Case files of 169 inmates released in July 1971 showed that institution officials had identified 142, or 84 percent, of the inmates as needing treatment for undesirable character traits. Only 43 (30 percent) participated in such programs.

A comparison of the number of persons needing treatment and the number receiving it follows.

	<u>Needed treatment</u>	<u>Partic- ipated</u>
Alcohol abuse	37	17
Drug abuse	50	15
Attitude problems (note a)	116	39

^a BOP considers an inmate to have an attitude problem when he needs treatment in self-control, standards and values, interpersonal relationships, and/or aspirations.

Key institutional personnel told us that insufficient staffing made it difficult to identify needs and provide treatment. BOP is therefore transferring certain inmates to specialized centers for treatment and is training correctional officers in counseling. BOP has also recruited intensively in recent years to increase its staff of mental health employees and caseworkers.

LACK OF INMATE PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMS

Some case histories of inmates not participating in needed rehabilitation programs follow.

Inmate Alex

Alex, 23 years old, was committed to a Federal young adult institution in 1970 for transporting a stolen automobile across State lines. He had an extensive prior juvenile crime record, including a commitment to a State institution for approximately 29 months. Alex admitted to prison officials that he had been using narcotics and dangerous drugs since he was 16.

Alex did not participate in any programs to alleviate the causes of drug addiction. He was paroled after 15 months, and his probation officer informed us that Alex began using narcotics immediately upon release. Eleven months after release, Alex was recommitted to a Federal correctional institution for armed robbery.

Inmate Bill

Bill, 21 years old, was committed to a Federal young adult institution in 1970 for transporting a stolen automobile across State lines. While a juvenile, he had been jailed four times for such offenses as automobile theft, petty larceny, chronic runaway, and attempted rape.

Examinations at three mental health facilities revealed that Bill was not mentally ill but was suffering from a sociopathic personality disturbance warranting major efforts toward building desirable character traits. Group counseling was recommended as treatment. The institution in which Bill was incarcerated, however, had no group counseling.

Bill was released in July 1971 after serving 16 months. Since release he has been fired from two jobs and has quit another. He has not been involved in any known criminal activity; however, his parole officer told us that he has a very volatile personality and that at times his actions are unpredictable.

Inmate Chuck

Chuck, 31 years old, was committed in 1966 to a Federal penitentiary for smuggling heroin into the United States from Mexico. His prior criminal record included two other commitments for narcotics violations.

Chuck has been a heroin addict since he was 15. He was to be transferred to a hospital for treatment of his addiction provided he "responded positively" during the first 18 months of his sentence. He did not respond positively; he received several misconduct reports for sniffing intoxicants and thus was not transferred. In July 1971 he was released after 4-1/2 years of imprisonment. Four months later he was convicted of car theft.

Inmate Doug

Doug, 37 years old, was committed to a Federal institution for interstate transportation of forged securities. He had an extensive arrest record which included three prior commitments.

Doug had a high school education and over 12 years experience as a machinist. His problem was related to excessive use of alcohol and, consequently, the classification team recommended that he attend Alcoholics Anonymous.

Doug was released after 10 months. During that time he did not attend Alcoholics Anonymous or receive any formal counseling or psychotherapy. Three months after his release he was arrested for receiving stolen property.

INSUFFICIENT STAFF TO HANDLE CASELOAD AND CORRECTIVE EFFORTS BEING TAKEN

BOP officials advised us that the number of psychologists and caseworkers is too small in relation to the number of inmates needing treatment but that steps are being taken to provide more counseling and psychotherapy.

One warden said that most inmates needed psychological treatment but that the lack of resources and qualified personnel usually precluded such treatment. Another official at the same institution told us that because of staff limitations the institution has no records showing inmates needing treatment and cannot provide counseling on a scheduled basis. (See ch. 6 for a discussion of BOP's inmate information system.)

We compared the size of professional psychological and caseworker staffs at the five institutions reviewed with the

staffing criteria established by the American Correctional Association.¹ According to the association, a prison should have at least one psychiatrist and three psychologists for 600 inmates and one caseworker for 30 to 150 inmates depending on the type of inmate, the rate of turnover, and the institution's mission. As of June 29, 1972, the five institutions had 6 fewer psychiatrists and 18 fewer psychologists than recommended.

Institution (population)	Psychiatrists		Psychologists	
	Ac- tual	Staffing criteria	Ac- tual	Staffing criteria
Lompoc (1,400)	1	2	3	6
Milan (600)	-	1	1	3
Terminal Island (900)	2	1	2	3
Leavenworth (2,200)	-	3	1	9
McNeil Island (1,200)	-	2	2	6
Total	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>27</u>

The number of inmates per caseworker at the 5 institutions ranged from 51 at Terminal Island women's facility to 270 at Leavenworth and averaged 1 caseworker for 159 inmates. Caseworkers at all five institutions told us that they do not have enough time to provide inmates with needed services. For example, the staff at one institution identified about 50 percent of the inmates as needing individual counseling, but a caseworker said that only a few inmates were being helped.

Efforts to provide more counseling and psychotherapy

BOP is attempting to expand counseling and psychotherapy opportunities for inmates by transferring those with severe mental disorders to specialized centers, by increasing the

¹The American Correctional Association is composed of persons engaged in correctional work or interested in furthering the objectives of the association, which include improving penal institutions throughout the country. Membership includes the present Director and two former Directors of BOP and various State correctional officials.

number of caseworkers, and by training its correctional officers in counseling.

Mental health services for BOP inmates are augmented by the BOP Springfield Medical Center in Missouri, which treats inmates having severe mental disorders. BOP is constructing the Federal Center for Correctional Research at Butner, North Carolina, to provide similar services. The institute will also conduct behavioral research of violent and dangerous offenders. The chief psychiatrist at one institution advised us that about 10 percent of its inmates are psychotic.


During fiscal year 1972, the National Institute of Mental Health transferred its Clinical Research Center in Fort Worth, Texas, to BOP. The projected population, according to BOP, will include geriatric cases, drug addicts, alcoholics, and psychiatric cases.

By 1982 BOP plans to reduce the caseworker-inmate ratio to an average of 1 to 42 throughout the Federal prison system. The following table compares, by type of institution, the caseworker-inmate ratio for fiscal year 1972 and BOP's goals for fiscal year 1973.

<u>Type of institution</u>	<u>Caseworker-inmate ratio</u>	
	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Long-term adult	1:200	1:175
Short-term adult	1:125	1:125
Young adult	1: 75	1: 65
Youth	1: 75	1: 65

In January 1970 BOP began a program to train all correctional officers in counseling and to assign some officers to counseling as a primary duty. Approximately 900 officers have been trained in counseling, and BOP hopes to have trained all officers by January 1974. This program is to give correctional officers who come in contact with inmates more frequently than any other staff personnel the basic tools for meaningfully assisting inmates.

As of October 1972, 215 correctional officers had been promoted to correctional counselors who assist caseworkers and counsel inmates. A BOP official told us that all of the



**MODEL FOR THE NEW FEDERAL CENTER FOR CORRECTIONAL RESEARCH
AT BUTNER, NORTH CAROLINA.**

BOP Photo

officers promoted to correctional counselors have undergone counseling training and have demonstrated a genuine willingness to assist inmates.

BOP told us that, in connection with its philosophy that the total environment (including all staff) is crucial to the rehabilitation process, all employees must now receive counseling training.

CONCLUSION

Correctional authorities have recognized that counseling and related programs for treating undesirable character traits are important aspects of rehabilitation. BOP is taking steps to maximize available resources in identifying needs and providing necessary treatment. We are not making any recommendations in view of BOP's efforts to increase the number of inmates receiving treatment.

CHAPTER 4

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN TRAINING INMATES

IN MARKETABLE SKILLS

Recognizing that employment is important to keep ex-inmates from returning to crime, BOP established a goal to provide inmates lacking marketable skills the opportunity to acquire skills enabling them to earn a minimum of \$3 an hour. Many inmates, however, are not provided this opportunity and leave Federal prisons with no marketable skill.

Case histories of 169 inmates released in July 1971 showed that 91 had no marketable skills when they entered prison. 51 of these had no marketable skills when released, and 40 attained marketable skills while in prison.

Inmates may learn marketable skills through (1) work experience in FPI or institution maintenance and operation functions and (2) vocational training courses. But BOP has not set up FPI and operation and maintenance activities to meet this objective and has not identified or requested the additional resources required. As a result, FPI has not been fully effective in training inmates in marketable skills, little progress has been made in implementing formal on-the-job training in the maintenance and operation functions, and institutions do not have sufficient vocational training courses.

EMPLOYMENT IN PRISON INDUSTRIES

During fiscal year 1972, FPI conducted 51 industrial operations at 20 institutions and employed about 5,000 inmates. The legislation authorizing the creation of FPI requires the Attorney General to establish industries that provide inmates with a maximum opportunity to learn marketable skills. The legislation also provided that all sales must be made to Federal agencies and that FPI must not constrain or compete with private industry to the extent that an entire industry is affected adversely.

Most prison industries, such as furniture manufacturing and reconditioning, canvas goods manufacturing, and shoe

manufacturing, use many inmates and little automation. Although providing some skilled training, these industries, by their nature, have a large percentage of unskilled jobs. This is illustrated by a furniture manufacturing and reconditioning industry at one institution which employed 68 inmates. On the basis of Department of Labor standards, we determined that 24 inmates were assigned to jobs such as upholstering, which provided skilled training, whereas 44 inmates were assigned to jobs such as assembling and hand sanding, which provided little or no skilled training.


Management firms have told FPI that many inmates employed in its industries were not learning marketable skills because of limited training. Industries identified as not providing appropriate training were canvas goods manufacturing, shoe manufacturing, textiles, and furniture manufacturing and reconditioning. Sixty-one percent of the inmates employed by FPI at June 30, 1972, were working in these industries.

At the time of our review, neither BOP nor FPI had developed a plan for insuring that inmates were afforded opportunities to learn marketable skills. FPI has not classified its industries by their potential for equipping inmates with marketable skills and has no systematic method for rotating inmates from nonskilled to skilled training jobs within industries or for rotating inmates from nonskilled training jobs in industries to vocational training programs. BOP and FPI officials told us that the institutions are not required to assess the training potential of the industries or to report success in providing inmates with marketable skills.

BOP and FPI have recognized the need to increase FPI's training capability. Some industrial shops have been closed because of their low skill-training potential. According to BOP, a market analysis being conducted by a newly created FPI division will identify new industries that can provide training in skills which can be used in private industry. Other recent actions include (1) obtaining an agreement with the Department of Agriculture to train inmates at Leavenworth in computer programming and (2) developing industrial programs which will provide for repairing and maintaining General Services Administration automobiles.



**ATTACHING BRUSH HANDLES, FPI BRUSH
INDUSTRY- LEAVENWORTH PENITENTIARY**



**FOLDING MACHINE OPERATOR, FPI PRINT
PLANT- LOMPOC CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION**

BOP. Photos



BOP Photo

**WHEEL CHOCKS FOR AIRCRAFT DRYING IN SPRAY ROOM-FPI FURNITURE
INDUSTRY, McNEIL ISLAND PENITENTIARY**

FPI and BOP officials told us, however, that many FPI industries are primarily work programs and not training programs. Some inmates are incarcerated for many years, and industries keep them busy, enable them to develop good work habits, and enable them to earn money to help support their families while in prison and to help them upon release.

Limitations on prison industry operations

In establishing and operating prison industries, FPI must consider various legislative restrictions, including those pertaining to sales to non-Government agencies and

competition with private industry. Though we did not consider the effect of such limitations on FPI's efforts to provide employment and job skill training for Federal inmates, some correctional authorities have suggested that similar restrictions on State correctional agencies be eliminated.

Restrictions on prison industry operations was one of several correctional areas considered by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals¹ in its recent effort to develop uniform State and local criminal justice system standards that, according to the Commission, looked toward new dimensions and directions of growth unhampered by past practices that are no longer relevant or acceptable. In its preliminary report prepared for Federal, State, and local authorities, the Commission noted that such restrictions seriously hamper efforts to provide offenders with employment opportunities. The Commission suggested that each State with industrial programs operated by or for correctional agencies should amend by 1975 its statutory authorization for these programs so that they do not prohibit, among other things, the sale of products of prison industries on the open market, the employment of offenders by private enterprise at full market wages and comparable working conditions, and the payment of full market wages to offenders working in State-operated prison industries.

TRAINING THROUGH PRISON MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION FUNCTIONS

BOP recognized that institutional maintenance and operation functions provide opportunities for training inmates in marketable skills. In July 1969 it directed the institutions to determine the on-the-job training potential in their maintenance and operations shops. As a result, BOP's Education Branch identified 21 occupations, such as barber, plumber, carpenter, and operating room technician, that had such potential. Twenty-one BOP institutions were

¹The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, comprising over 100 correctional authorities, worked for about 1 year to develop working-papers for presentation at the National Conference on Criminal Justice held in January 1973. Both the Commission and the conference received funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice.

each assigned a different occupation for program development. As of June 1972, 3 years later, 13 of the 21 institutions had submitted program outlines to BOP headquarters for approval. BOP had approved 10 outlines but had not distributed them to all institutions.

In August 1971, BOP also directed its institutions to contact State and local apprenticeship officials and Department of Labor regional representatives concerning requirements for apprentice training in maintenance and operations. As of June 1972, 12 institutions had made such contacts. Only two institutions had established apprenticeship programs, one of which was established in 1968. Six other institutions were considered by BOP officials to be in the "negotiating" stage with respect to obtaining fully approved and recognized apprenticeship programs.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
LIMITED BY FPI FUNDING

Vocational training courses at each institution are funded from FPI profits. Such funding is subject to fiscal limitations imposed by the Congress. The number of vocational training courses varied considerably among institutions. One institution with about 1,400 inmates had seven programs and trained 445 inmates during fiscal year 1972. Another institution with about 2,200 inmates had 1 program and trained only 21 inmates. Most inmates in this institution are older, long-term offenders and BOP's policy is to allocate its limited resources to shorter-term and younger offenders.

During the last 2 fiscal years, because of reduced profits, FPI has not provided as many funds for vocational training as requested by BOP or authorized by the Congress.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Requested by BOP</u>	<u>Authorized by the Congress</u>	<u>Provided by FPI</u>
	(millions)		
1971	\$4.4	\$4.2	\$3.5
1972	5.7	5.6	4.7

BOP officials informed us that new programs were curtailed, and planned contracts for inmate training by private industry were reduced about 90 percent due to insufficient funding.

INMATE VOCATIONAL TRAINING



SMALL ENGINE REPAIR



WELDING



AUTOMOTIVE MECHANICS

GAO Photos

CONCLUSIONS

Many inmates are leaving Federal institutions without adequate training in marketable skills. We recognize that FPI must provide some jobs which keep inmates busy and that FPI by law cannot compete with private industry to any great extent. We believe, however, that FPI can improve its effectiveness by evaluating its industries to determine the extent of job skill training provided and whether it should eliminate certain industries and establish others which offer more skilled training. A systematic method for rotating inmates from nonskilled training to skilled training or to vocational training programs is needed.

Prison maintenance and operation functions and apprenticeship programs offer additional opportunities for training in marketable skills; however, BOP has not fully exploited these opportunities by developing appropriate training programs.

At some institutions, inmates are not afforded the opportunity to participate in vocational training programs because programs have been limited by the lack of FPI funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

We recommend that BOP

- work with FPI to develop and implement a plan that will increase the opportunities for inmates to acquire a marketable skill and
- increase management emphasis to insure that institutions establish on-the-job training and apprenticeship programs in maintenance and operation functions.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the recommendations. It noted that the availability of vocational training should not be subject to the changes in market demand for FPI products and indicated that the recently created FPI Industrial Programs Division was acting to correct the recent problem of reduced FPI profits and

the problem of industry job skill development. The new division is conducting a market analysis to develop more appropriate products and, according to the Department, will analyze all present industries in terms of training value and will seek to replace those which do not meet established criteria.

If this action fails to meet the needs for inmate vocational training programs, BOP should consider obtaining appropriated funding for vocational training. To the extent they become available, FPI funds could be used to reimburse appropriated funds.

CHAPTER 5

NEED FOR IMPROVED PRERELEASE

JOB PLACEMENT SERVICES

Although many factors affect an individual's success after release from confinement, BOP and other correctional authorities recognize that jobs offering self-respect and financial support will deter many former inmates from committing more crimes. Learning a marketable skill is important in obtaining such a job and so are job placement services.

BOP stated that it can:

- Prepare the inmate to obtain a job through prerelease employment counseling.
- Grant furloughs to permit inmates to look for jobs.
- Authorize work release and transfer inmates in pre-release status to community residential centers for guidance and help in employment, as well as in other areas of adjustment in the community.
- Assign community program officers to assist in job placement of nonresidents.

We examined the employment counseling and furlough programs at the institutions and the assistance provided by community program officers and found that many inmates were released without jobs and were unaware of available placement assistance. For example, case histories of 85 inmates, released in July 1971 and still under supervision 1 year later, showed that 57 had no jobs when released. We interviewed 153 inmates released in July 1972; 85 did not have jobs upon release. Of the 68 inmates with jobs, only 9 had obtained employment through BOP assistance programs.

BOP personnel told us that a committee of wardens and central office staff was being organized to deal with the problem of release readiness and to find ways to more systematically and effectively meet employment and related needs, such as clothing and funds available upon release.

PRERELEASE EMPLOYMENT COUNSELING

The prerelease employment counseling program consists of a series of lectures, seminars, and group sessions to improve inmates' abilities to obtain and hold jobs. Two of the 5 institutions had programs of 12 and 16 sessions, 1 had a limited program the associate warden described as weak, and 2 had no programs. Participation in the programs was voluntary. In contrast, officials at two State prisons told us that prerelease employment counseling was considered so important that attendance at prerelease employment sessions was mandatory.

Although BOP officials also considered prerelease guidance an important rehabilitation service, BOP has not required its institutions to conduct meaningful employment counseling programs. They advised us that guidelines are being developed for such programs.

FURLOUGHS

A furlough authorizes an inmate to leave an institution unescorted for a specified period. It may be granted to an inmate within 6 months before his release to enable him to meet with prospective employers, enroll in school, or arrange for a postrelease residence.

BOP policy provides that (1) institutions with young adults, short-term adults, and females should make liberal use of furloughs and (2) institutions with intermediate and long-term adults should respectively make conservative and limited use of furloughs. At the time of our review, however, BOP had not evaluated the institutions' use or the potential of furloughs for increasing inmate placements prior to release.

During fiscal year 1972, the 5 institutions granted furloughs to 263 male inmates to seek employment. The number of furloughs to seek employment and the ratio of furloughs to inmates released differed significantly among institutions.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Furloughs</u>	<u>Inmates released</u>	<u>Ratio of furloughs to releases</u>
Young adult:			
Lompoc	2	449	1:225
Milan	177	324	1:2
Short-term adult:			
Lompoc Camp	49	242	1:5
Intermediate-term adult:			
Terminal Island	13	682	1:52
Long-term adult:			
Leavenworth	8	419	1:52
McNeil Island	1	144	1:144
McNeil Island Camp	<u>13</u>	<u>182</u>	1:14
Total	<u>263</u>	<u>2,442</u>	

Under BOP policy the institutions at Lompoc and Milan are authorized to liberally use furloughs. Yet actual use differed significantly. The warden at Lompoc told us that he had granted few furloughs to inmates because of potential adverse public reaction to criminal activity by inmates on furloughs. He makes liberal use of furloughs for Lompoc Camp inmates because the more trustworthy inmates are assigned there.

Lompoc had no records showing how many of the 51 furloughs resulted in jobs. Of the remaining 212 inmates granted furloughs by the other institutions, 30 percent (63) claimed to have found jobs. Information on total BOP use of furloughs was not available.

JOB PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE

BOP's community program officers are responsible for knowing about labor market conditions in their areas, maintaining close liaison with State employment offices, and placing former inmates in jobs. The officers also inspect local jails that provide short-term confinement of Federal prisoners. As of July 1972, BOP had 33 community program officers in 26 cities.

Generally, the community program officers do not attempt to place inmates in jobs before they are released. Their services are geared primarily to the former inmate although they may periodically visit nearby institutions and participate in employment counseling programs.

Of 153 inmates released in July 1972 from the five institutions, 130 told us they did not know that job placement services were offered by community program officers. Further, we followed up on 60 inmates released on parole during fiscal year 1972 in the Los Angeles area; 43 had no jobs when released. Only 16 of the 43 contacted the community program officers.

CONCLUSIONS

Most penal authorities agree that the firm promise of a job awaiting an inmate on his release will contribute to reestablishing community ties and provide an economic base for reentering society.

BOP has not sufficiently emphasized preparing inmates to obtain jobs. The content as well as the frequency of prerelease employment counseling significantly differed among the institutions visited.

In accordance with BOP policy, some inmates have been granted furloughs, but the extent to which furloughs have been granted varied considerably. Although some inmates granted furloughs reported success in obtaining employment, BOP had not evaluated furloughs as a prerelease placement tool. Community program officers have not actively participated with institutions or inmates in finding inmates employment before they are released.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

We recommend that BOP intensify programs for assisting inmates in preparing for and obtaining employment before they are released.

Such programs should include:

- Comprehensive employment counseling for all inmates several months before they are released.

--Greater emphasis by community program officers and other Government-financed placement services on placing inmates in jobs before they are released.

BOP should also evaluate the use of furloughs to assist inmates in obtaining employment before release and to insure consistent use among similar institutions.

AGENCY COMMENTS

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the recommendations. It noted that BOP is taking steps to increase the use of furloughs as an employment placement tool.

CHAPTER 6

IMPROVED BASIS FOR DETERMINING

PROGRAM NEEDS, PROGRESS, AND SUCCESS

To effectively manage the Federal prison system's inmate rehabilitation activities, a comprehensive, accurate, and timely information system is necessary as a basis for planning, evaluating, and changing rehabilitation programs. BOP has taken steps to improve its ability to determine program needs and progress and to measure program success by obtaining data on postrelease activities of ex-offenders.

INMATE INFORMATION SYSTEM

BOP officials at both headquarters and institutions told us that available information systems have not provided timely data on the total number of inmates at each institution needing rehabilitation treatment or on the progress made in meeting the inmates' needs. Without such information, BOP has been hampered in determining the amount and kinds of resources required to adequately meet the educational, psychological, and employment needs of inmates.

In 1970 BOP began to develop a computerized inmate information system which will provide, among other things, information on identified rehabilitative needs of the inmates and the extent to which such needs have been and/or are being met through institution programs. In addition to the amount of time required to enter records for all inmates in the Federal penal institutions, some problems, such as determining the most appropriate data and reporting specifications and insuring the reliability of input data from the institutions, have delayed full implementation of the system. BOP officials expect data on all inmates in the Federal prison system to be available in October 1973. The information now being produced lists inmates who have not been assigned to needed programs.

The Department of Justice agreed that a comprehensive, accurate, and timely information system is critical to effective management. It said that BOP's information system has improved and will continue to improve management's ability to monitor the delivery of services.

POSTRELEASE DATA

Information on former inmates' success or lack of success in obtaining employment or furthering their education, the type jobs they obtain, and their adjustment to re-entry into the community provides a basis for evaluating rehabilitation programs and for identifying needed revisions.

BOP faces difficulties in tracing a person's activities after release from prison. Individuals who have served their full sentences and have been released without parole supervision are not required to provide any data to Federal authorities. The U.S. Probation Office, which supervises parolees, generally has information on their activities. Such information is available only while the individuals are under supervision, which ranges from a few days to several years.

BOP told us that the collection of information on former inmates through cooperation with the U.S. Probation Office is only a partial solution to the problem of obtaining postrelease data. Sixty-two percent of the inmates released in fiscal years 1971 and 1972 were released without supervision and are not accountable to the criminal justice system. In view of this lack of accountability, BOP continues to seek methods for obtaining postrelease data and recently arranged to obtain data on released offenders from the National Crime Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A computer terminal linking BOP with the center was activated in February 1973 and will be used by BOP to obtain partial postrelease data for selected persons. (BOP now can ascertain who has been rearrested since January 1970.) BOP personnel stated, however, that Federal Bureau of Investigation arrest data in its present form must be used judiciously. According to BOP, studies have shown that less than one-third of those rearrested receive an additional sentence--the criterion for postrelease failure used by most studies--and that frequently the disposition of arrestees is unknown.

CONCLUSION

BOP is currently implementing an information system which will provide, among other data, centralized information on each inmate's identified rehabilitation needs and progress. Efforts are also being made to obtain sufficient

data on postrelease activities as a basis for program evaluations. Such data is necessary to determine the progress made in meeting rehabilitation needs and to identify needed program revisions.

CHAPTER 7

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review was directed toward BOP's efforts to prepare inmates for release and to increase their chances for success after release through educational, vocational, and related rehabilitative activities. We examined Federal prison legislation; pertinent BOP policies, procedures, correspondence; and documentation; and published literature related to inmate rehabilitation.

We interviewed BOP and State prison officials who administer rehabilitation programs and officials of the U.S. Board of Parole, U.S. Probation Offices, Department of Labor, and State employment agencies about various aspects of inmate rehabilitation. We analyzed inmates' case histories, interviewed inmates, and followed up on the post-release activities of 169 inmates released in July 1971. We also interviewed 153 inmates released in July 1972 to obtain data on their reactions to BOP rehabilitation programs.

We made our review at five institutions. (See app. III.) Though the results of any review of inmate case histories and rehabilitation progress could vary depending upon the institution selected for examination, the matters presented in this report are representative of the rehabilitation problems facing BOP.



Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

July 2, 1973

Mr. Daniel F. Stanton
Assistant Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Stanton:

This letter is in response to your request for comments on the draft report titled "Limited Success in Rehabilitating Federal Criminal Offenders."

Generally, we are in agreement with the report and its recommendations. The report calls attention to many of the weaknesses and deficiencies in the Federal Prison System which the Bureau is attempting to correct as additional resources are made available. In addition, the report frequently cites the progress made in response to the general need for upgrading correctional services and more specifically to the President's Thirteen Point Correctional Program shown in Appendix II of the draft report. However, we do believe there is a need to place certain statements contained in the report within the context of the basic mission of the Bureau of Prisons--to protect society by crime reduction--and some of our comments are directed to that point. Other comments are directed to certain points discussed in the report which we believe require additional explanation or clarification.

(39 to 41)

As noted in pages 15-18 of the report, a comprehensive, accurate and timely information system is critically important to effective management. The development by the Bureau since 1970 of an offender-based system which includes diagnostic and demographic information has and will continue to improve management's capability to monitor the delivery of Bureau services. Each institution

GAO note: Page references in this appendix have been changed to correspond to the pages of this report.

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now regularly receives summary reports on inmate needs, planned activities and actual performance levels which are used by local and headquarters managers to assess the organization's success in meeting rehabilitation objectives.

One of the greatest challenges facing the manager of a corrections program is encouraging offenders to avail themselves of rehabilitation programs. Too frequently, past efforts have been based on some fad but with little relevance to the individual offender or ultimate post-release outcome. The report succinctly describes this problem (pages 21-23) and indicates (112 to 161) the statutory constraints on developing a more adequate and flexible reward system. Even within present constraints, however, implementation of "functional unit management," which is discussed later in our comments, will increase program participation by expanding the inmate's role in selecting various treatment activities.

(18 to 24)

Pages 25-31 of the report appropriately point out recent efforts to change criminal behavior and explain the Bureau's philosophy of utilizing a range of skill levels (counsellors, caseworkers, psychologists and psychiatrists), rather than simply relying on intermittent psychotherapy in response to crises. Since fiscal year 1971, mental health employees have increased 83 percent, from 35 to 64, and since fiscal year 1969, caseworkers increased by 40 percent, from 169 to 224. Intensive recruiting made these increases possible in the face of a national manpower shortage in mental health.

A parallel action by the Bureau, not mentioned in the report, is a decentralized form of institutional operations called "functional unit management." First attempted on a pilot basis at the Kennedy Youth Center and the Fort Worth Correctional Institution, the concept relates organizational structure to specific rehabilitation needs or objectives (e.g., drug abuse, a treatment typology, etc.), rather than arbitrary functional departments (e.g., education, custody, classification

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and parole, etc.). This arrangement has several advantages: it affords a closer integration of various skills (social work, counseling, custodial, mental health, etc.); service delivery is located closer to the client; decisions are made by an interdisciplinary team which has continuous contact with an assigned group and is more familiar with an individual's unique problems; and improved inmate-staff relations make it possible to involve residents more completely in planning their own treatment program.

If a marketable skill is considered an important element in preventing a return to crime, the availability of vocational training should not be subject to the vagaries of market demand for products manufactured by Federal Prison Industries, Inc. Even though reduced profits have had a slightly dampening effect on training expenditures, a comparison of 1971 and 1972 on page 37 (30) of the report reveals a substantial single year expenditure increase of \$1.3 million, or only \$100,000 below the increase of \$1.4 million authorized by Congress. When viewed in a broader time frame, the 1970-72 expenditure increase totals \$2.1 million. The ultimate effect of reduced profits on training is a recent problem and corrective actions are detailed below. Historically, the primary reason for creating correctional industries was to eliminate the widespread idleness common during that period and prevent the consequent mental and physical deterioration.

While there is general agreement on many of the points raised by the report, we believe an evaluation of an organization's effectiveness should be placed in historical perspective and with reference to its overall mission. Some examples will illustrate how the report fails to do that.

As implied by the report title, "Limited Success in Rehabilitating Federal Criminal Offenders", the review was limited to one of the Bureau's three major goals--rehabilitation. The overall mission of protecting society by reducing crime also involves the goals of custody and care. By limiting its scope and without sufficient qualification, we believe the report at times draws incorrect conclusions. Illustratively, on (30) page 37: "Another institution with a population of 2,200 inmates had one program and trained only 21 inmates during the same period" (Fiscal 1972). Presumably, Leavenworth Penitentiary is the institution. The report

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should note that Leavenworth's population is almost entirely long-term adults with extensive criminal careers for whom the most important goal is custody during a substantial portion of their sentences. Many of these inmates already have marketable skills, so a second goal is to provide a level of care which will prevent the potentially adverse effects of long-term incarceration. Since initiation of the RAPS classification system [7 and 8] described on pages 11-12, the Bureau's explicit policy has been to assign lower priority to the type of offender characterized by Leavenworth's population--older, recidivists with long sentences--and to concentrate limited resources on the younger inmate with fewer instances of prior criminal behavior.

Also, by concentrating on prerelease employment counseling, furloughs and employment placement officers, the study excluded a major avenue of locating post-release jobs--employment placement provided by community treatment centers. In the case of furlough [35 and 36] utilization covered by the study (pages 42-43), it should be noted that the Bureau has supported proposed legislation which would greatly increase the flexibility of applying this tool to prerelease employment placement. Constraints naturally limit the scope of any program review, but the report did not explore completely the employment placement aspects of the one Bureau program chosen for examination. A caveat should be added that not all releasees need placement assistance, because they are white collar, organized crime, immigration or similar offenders.

A somewhat misleading historical perspective is [39] illustrated by comparing a conclusion on page 15 with an observation of the following page: "BOP does not have a centralized informational system to provide data for determining the number and variety of rehabilitation programs required * * * nor the progress made in meeting [39] program objectives." This is followed on page 16 by a recognition that, "* * * in 1970 (the Bureau) began to develop * * * a system which will provide * * * information on identified rehabilitative needs of the inmates and the extent to which such needs have been and/or are being met through institutional programs." By rearranging the

sequence of paragraphs and adding appropriate qualifiers, the overall tone of this section would change. Similarly, the report correctly indicates (page 30) that the Bureau [22] has "a program to train all correctional officers in counseling," but page 25 refers to "training of some [12] correctional officers as counselors." Placed in the proper framework, we believe these and similar statements would tend to be less subject to misinterpretation and not detract from other important points raised in the report.

[25 to 28]

The draft properly highlights the fact (pages 33-35) that many industries currently operating within Federal institutions do not provide the kinds of jobs in which inmates can learn marketable skills. Even ignoring aspects of employment unrelated to skills development--family support, work habits, avoiding idleness--the fact remains that a certain proportion of the offender population can only perform relatively unskilled tasks. For example, using the Programming Aptitude Test as a screening device, approximately 50 inmates from a population of 2,200 were found suitable for computer programming training at Leavenworth. Thus, while highly technical service industries offer excellent prospects for post-release employment, few inmates can benefit. Recognizing this problem, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., recently created an Industrial Programs Division. One of its principal functions is to analyze all present industries in terms of training value and to actively seek replacements for those which do not meet established criteria.

The intent of this memorandum is not to detail each item which needs clarification. Rather, we have highlighted areas of general agreement regarding the major issues and have offered some examples of how the order of presentation of material or the failure to relate observations to a larger, more relevant context might be misleading to someone unfamiliar with the objectives of the correctional system.

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We appreciate the opportunity given us to comment on the draft report. Should you have any further questions please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,



Glen E. Pommeroy
Acting Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

WHITE HOUSE

SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S

13-POINT CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM

In abbreviated form, the thirteen points of President Nixon's directive to the Attorney General of November 13, 1969, are as follows:

1. Develop a ten-year plan for reforming our correctional activities.
2. Explore the feasibility of pooling the limited resources of several governmental units in order to set up specialized regional treatment facilities.
3. Give special emphasis to programs for juvenile offenders.
4. Expedite the design and construction of a Federal psychiatric study and treatment facility for mentally disturbed and violent offenders.
5. Develop recommendations for revising the federal laws relating to the handling of the mentally incompetent charged with a federal crime, serving a sentence for a federal crime or found not guilty solely because of a mental condition.
6. Expedite the planning and construction of federal demonstration centers for urban areas which would provide comprehensive, community-oriented facilities replacing the traditional jails.
7. Expand the federal program of technical assistance in corrections to state and local governments.
8. Provide new vocational, education and employment opportunities for persons on probation, in prison and on parole, enlisting the cooperation of private agencies.

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9. Expand training programs for correctional personnel at the federal, state and local level.
10. Study the feasibility of making the federal correctional system more effective through closer coordination of existing programs.
11. Expand the use of "half-way house" Community Treatment Centers to include offenders on probation and parole, and assist in the development of similar programs at state and local levels.
12. Institute a comprehensive program of research, experimentation and evaluation of correctional methods.
13. Coordinate and consolidate correctional programs among Federal agencies.

APPENDIX III

SELECTED DATA ON BOP INSTITUTIONS REVIEWED

JULY 1972

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Number of staff</u>	<u>Inmates</u>		
				<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Terminal Island, California	Intermediate-term adult institution with men and women facilities	273	Number	765	154
			Median age	36	29
			Average sentence (months)	43	62
Lompoc, California	Young adult institution and short-term adult camp	318		<u>Institution</u>	<u>Camp</u>
			Number	1,054	320
			Median age	23	33
			Average sentence (months)	67	45
Milan, Michigan	Young adult institution	232	Number	579	
			Median age	23	
			Average sentence (months)	70	
McNeil Island, Washington	Long-term adult penitentiary and camp	325		<u>Penitentiary</u>	<u>Camp</u>
			Number	905	258
			Median age	36	39
			Average sentence (months)	131	81
Leavenworth, Kansas	Long-term adult penitentiary	452	Number	2,162	
			Median age	38	
			Average sentence (months)	141	

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

SELECTED DATA ON INMATES RELEASED IN
JULY 1971 INCLUDED IN GAO STUDY

Age	Intelligence quotient (IQ)	Highest grade completed	Prior commit- ments	Time served current commit- ment (months)	Status at cur- rent commitment	
					6th-grade reading level	High school
Lompoc:						
23	114	10	3	44	Yes	No
24	119	11	3	51	Yes	Yes
21	99	8	2	13	Yes	No
24	111	9	-	12	Yes	Yes
20	101	10	1	16	No	No
24	116	10	1	13	Yes	Yes
24	128	15	-	16	Yes	Yes
21	112	10	-	12	Yes	No
23	79	9	1	12	No	No
20	107	9	4	15	No	No
20	103	7	1	26	No	No
26	109	12	-	11	Yes	Yes
21	120	9	3	20	Yes	Yes
24	105	10	1	9	Unknown	No
25	107	9	1	13	Yes	No
22	114	7	1	15	Yes	No
22	114	9	4	13	Yes	No
22	120	12	1	19	Yes	Yes
29	103	9	3	35	Yes	No
26	109	8	4	14	Yes	No
24	110	10	3	24	Yes	No
27	119	8	-	21	No	No
20	106	12	2	4	Yes	No
21	118	12	2	27	Yes	Yes
24	96	7	3	24	No	No
22	107	12	-	5	Yes	Yes
21	104	10	3	26	Yes	No
25	114	12	-	19	Yes	Yes
21	97	11	1	19	Yes	No
23	109	11	1	48	Yes	No
21	106	10	-	25	Yes	No
25	125	14	-	3	Yes	Yes
29	96	10	6	21	Yes	Yes
24	112	13	-	3	Yes	Yes

<u>Status at current commitment</u>		<u>Status when released</u>			<u>Job when released</u>	<u>Arrested after 7-71 (note c)</u>
<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Character trait problems</u>	<u>Minimum education (note a)</u>	<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Treated for character problems (note b)</u>		
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

<u>Age</u>	Intelli- gence quotient (IQ)	<u>Highest grade completed</u>	<u>Prior commit- ments</u>	Time served current commit- ment (months)	<u>Status at cur- rent commitment</u>	
					<u>6th-grade reading level</u>	<u>High school</u>

Lompoc (continued):

28	90	10	2	14	Yes	No
23	122	12	2	21	Yes	Yes
21	107	11	1	20	Yes	No
22	102	11	2	12	Yes	No
30	113	9	4	33	Yes	No
28	104	11	9	27	Yes	No
24	Unknown	12	1	5	Yes	Yes
23	104	11	4	32	Yes	No
25	110	12	-	22	Yes	Yes
27	106	11	-	30	Yes	No
22	104	12	-	20	Yes	Yes

Lompoc Camp:

32	89	8	5	38	No	No
23	110	11	5	31	Yes	No
24	106	14	-	11	Yes	Yes
34	90	12	-	11	Yes	Yes
52	111	12	1	27	Yes	Yes
43	102	9	3	56	Yes	No
28	Unknown	14	-	20	Yes	Yes
45	112	12	-	12	Yes	Yes
32	97	10	4	30	Yes	No
25	115	11	-	10	Yes	No
33	95	12	-	12	Yes	Yes
45	116	12	6	8	Yes	Yes

Milan:

21	98	9	-	9	No	No
24	129	12	-	14	Yes	Yes
27	123	10	-	11	Yes	No
24	114	10	2	10	Yes	No
20	91	12	-	6	Yes	Yes
23	100	10	-	13	No	No
21	100	12	1	14	Yes	Yes
21	99	11	2	15	No	No
24	104	11	-	20	Yes	No

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<u>Status at current commitment</u>		<u>Status when released</u>			<u>Job when released</u>	<u>Arrested after 7-71 (note c)</u>
<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Character-trait problems</u>	<u>Minimum education (note a)</u>	<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Treated for character problems (note b)</u>		
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Unknown	No
No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Unknown	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

Age	Intelligence quotient (IQ)	Highest grade completed	Prior commit- ments	Time served current commit- ment (months)	Status at cur- rent commitment	
					6th-grade reading level	High school
Milan (continued):						
21	104	11	-	12	Yes	No
25	111	15	-	11	Yes	Yes
20	120	8	4	16	Yes	No
20	104	9	2	9	Yes	No
20	110	9	-	21	Yes	No
21	117	10	-	27	Yes	Yes
21	104	11	1	13	Yes	Yes
25	105	10	1	22	Yes	Yes
24	112	12	-	14	Yes	Yes
23	102	11	3	20	No	No
23	94	9	1	13	Yes	No
23	96	8	1	4	Yes	No
25	117	10	2	3	Yes	Yes
26	115	12	3	20	Yes	Yes
24	95	8	1	27	Yes	No
22	93	7	2	25	No	No

Leavenworth Penitentiary:

44	96	9	7	40	Yes	No
54	76	3	24	17	No	No
51	104	6	8	39	No	No
40	109	11	7	16	Yes	No
36	108	10	1	21	Yes	No
57	114	3	12	20	Yes	No
33	103	11	1	44	Yes	No
42	120	10	4	35	Yes	Yes
61	96	9	4	30	Unknown	No
61	Unknown	8	8	28	Yes	No
43	105	12	5	9	Yes	Yes
46	122	12	10	25	Yes	Yes
31	105	10	2	6	Yes	No
33	98	10	2	42	Yes	No
34	106	8	2	16	Yes	No
33	121	11	6	16	Yes	No
50	121	12	1	53	Yes	Yes
30	104	11	2	23	Yes	No
38	110	6	3	47	Yes	No

APPENDIX IV

<u>Status at current commitment</u>		<u>Status when released</u>			<u>Job when released</u>	<u>Arrested after 7-71 (note c)</u>
<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Character trait problems</u>	<u>Minimum education (note a)</u>	<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Treated for character problems (note b)</u>		
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Age	Intelligence quotient (IQ)	Highest grade <u>completed</u>	Prior commit- ments	Time served current commit- ment (months)	Status at cur- rent commitment	
					<u>6th-grade reading level</u>	<u>High school</u>

Leavenworth Penitentiary (continued):

42	122	12	3	42	Yes	Yes
51	96	7	9	24	Yes	No
37	Unknown	10	3	24	Unknown	No
29	112	8	2	57	No	No
36	120	9	4	36	Yes	No

McNeil Island Penitentiary :

49	96	12	4	30	Yes	Yes
32	95	9	6	35	Yes	No
38	113	12	4	16	Yes	Yes
44	123	7	7	54	Yes	Yes
28	Unknown	11	5	26	Yes	No
26	88	11	3	13	Yes	No
44	111	12	2	128	Yes	Yes
29	117	12	3	16	Yes	Yes
26	Unknown	9	5	18	Yes	No
26	95	12	1	30	Yes	Yes
50	125	8	7	31	Yes	No
35	110	12	-	27	Yes	Yes
51	118	7	15	16	Yes	No
32	89	9	1	36	No	No
42	117	9	4	9	Yes	No

McNeil Island Camp:

24	115	12	-	17	Yes	Yes
51	85	8	-	55	No	No
34	Unknown	12	2	37	Yes	Yes
49	123	12	3	28	Yes	Yes
26	119	12	-	27	Yes	Yes
30	116	12	-	19	Yes	Yes

APPENDIX IV

<u>Status at current commitment</u>		<u>Status when released</u>			<u>Job when released</u>	<u>Arrested after 7-71 (note c)</u>
<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Character trait problems</u>	<u>Minimum education (note a)</u>	<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Treated for character problems (note b)</u>		
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Unknown	No	No	No	Deceased
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Deceased
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

<u>age</u>	Intelli- gence quotient (IQ)	<u>Highest grade completed</u>	<u>Prior commit- ments</u>	<u>Time served current commit- ment (months)</u>	<u>Status at cur- rent commitment</u>	
					<u>6th-grade reading level</u>	<u>High school</u>

cNeil Island Camp (continued):

1	122	12	-	12	Yes	Yes
9	Unknown	Unknown	7	10	No	No
1	Unknown	7	2	2	Unknown	No
7	112	4	6	23	Yes	No
9	116	8	6	12	Yes	No
0	125	12	2	23	Yes	Yes
2	93	8	5	8	No	No

erminal Island--Men's Division:

6	117	10	9	24	Yes	No
4	Unknown	11	4	10	No	No
6	132	13	-	4	Yes	Yes
0	Unknown	13	-	21	Yes	Yes
5	92	12	6	19	Yes	Yes
5	102	8	-	9	Unknown	No
0	90	9	1	5	Yes	No
4	95	6	-	36	Yes	No
0	77	11	3	3	Yes	No
1	87	9	5	37	Unknown	No
0	108	10	5	8	Yes	No
9	Unknown	11	-	8	Unknown	Unknown
2	108	6	1	13	Yes	No
1	111	16	-	8	Yes	Yes
8	100	12	1	4	Yes	Yes
9	122	12	-	7	Yes	Yes
7	101	10	2	28	Yes	No
7	Unknown	4	-	12	Unknown	No
0	117	10	2	32	Yes	Yes
2	95	4	-	14	No	No
9	Unknown	11	2	2	Yes	Yes
4	100	5	3	33	No	No

APPENDIX IV

Status at current commitment		Status when released			Job when released	Arrested after 7-71 (note c)
Market-able skill	Character trait problems	Minimum education (note a)	Market-able skill	Treated for character problems (note b)		
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	No	Unknown	Yes	No	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Unknown	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Unknown	Yes
No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Unknown	Yes	No	No	Yes	Unknown	Yes
No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Unknown	Yes	Yes	No	No
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	Unknown	No	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Unknown	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Unknown	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

<u>Age</u>	<u>Intelligence quotient (IQ)</u>	<u>Highest grade completed</u>	<u>Prior commit- ments</u>	<u>Time served current commit- ment (months)</u>	<u>Status at cur- rent commitment</u>	
					<u>6th-grade reading level</u>	<u>High school</u>

Terminal Island--Men's Division (continued):

26	109	9	3	6	Yes	Yes
31	110	11	1	4	Yes	No
32	91	10	-	55	Yes	No

Terminal Island--Women's Division:

24	98	9	1	9	Yes	No
29	83	8	-	11	Yes	No
33	95	10	-	13	Yes	No
26	90	9	1	17	Yes	No
36	116	9	3	12	Yes	No
28	88	8	Unknown	7	Unknown	No
20	104	9	-	9	Yes	No
23	114	9	-	17	Yes	NO
25	112	11	-	9	Yes	No
28	121	16	-	18	Yes	Yes

^aBOP's goal is a sixth-grade reading level for all inmates and a high school equivalency for those with Intelligence Quotients over 89.

^bIncludes psychotherapy, counseling, or participation in voluntary groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous.

^cArrest data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Probation Office covers period through July 1972; 79 of the 169 inmates included in GAO study were arrested after they were released.

APPENDIX IV

<u>Status at current commitment</u>		<u>Status when released</u>			<u>Job when released</u>	<u>Arrested after 7-71 (note c)</u>
<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Character trait problems</u>	<u>Minimum education (note a)</u>	<u>Market-able skill</u>	<u>Treated for character problems (note b)</u>		
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Unknown	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	Unknown	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	No	No	No	Unknown	No
No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Unknown	No
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Unknown	No

APPENDIX V

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
 RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
 ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of office
From To

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:

Elliot L. Richardson	May 1973	Present
Richard G. Kleindienst	June 1972	Apr. 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)	Feb. 1972	June 1972
John N. Mitchell	Jan. 1969	Feb. 1972

DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS:

Norman A. Carlson	Mar. 1970	Present
Myrl E. Alexander	Sept. 1964	Mar. 1970
James V. Bennett	Feb. 1937	Sept. 1964

END
