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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 16, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT ARISTIDE OF HAITI

The Oval Office

5:00 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I'd like to make a brief statement and then invite President Aristide to make a statement. And then we'll answer questions.

It's been a great honor for all of us to have President Aristide and members of his government and the Ambassador from Haiti to the United States here in the Oval Office today. And we wanted to have the opportunity to speak to the American people and to the people of Haiti from the Oval Office to emphasize how important it is to me personally and to the United States to restore democracy in Haiti and to restore President Aristide as the elected leader of that country.

To those who have blocked the restoration of democracy, I want to make it clear in the strongest possible terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal government in Haiti, and that we want to step up dramatically the pace of negotiations to restore President Aristide under conditions of national reconciliation and mutual respect for human rights with a program of genuine economic progress.

The Secretary of State has named an experienced diplomat, Mr. Lawrence Pezzullo, who is here now, to be his special representative in Haiti, to work with the Caputo mission through the United Nations and the Organization of American States to push forward with a rapid settlement of these issues. I would urge the de facto government of Haiti and the military officials in that country and police officials to support this process. Any opposition, any delay will only result in stronger measures taken by the United States, and more difficulty and hardship for the people of Haiti, who have been the innocent sufferers in this whole sad saga.

I look forward to working with President Aristide. I look forward to the success of Mr. Pezzullo. And I want to make it clear that the United States is committed strongly to a much more aggressive effort to restore Mr. Aristide to his presidency and to, over the long run, work with the people of Haiti to restore conditions of economic prosperity.

I am prepared to commit the United States to its fair portion of a five-year, multinational \$1 billion effort to rebuild the Haitian economy. And we are going to begin on this project in earnest now.

I'd like to now invite President Aristide to make whatever remarks he would like to make, and then open the floor for your questions.

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: Mr. President Clinton, we are delighted to be here with you, with the Vice President, Secretary of State, Ambassador Pezzullo. We want to thank you on behalf of the Haitian people for your support. We want to thank you for what you just said. That went directly to the heart of the Haitian people working peacefully for the restoration of democracy.

I grasp this opportunity to thank the American people for their solidarity, because with our American brothers and sisters, these 18 months we realize how beautiful it is to work in a nonviolent way for the restoration of democracy. The Haitian people today hear your voice and, on behalf of them, I can say, in the past, we wanted to be with you -- we are with you; in the future, we will be with you and you will be welcome in Haiti when I will be there after the restoration of democracy.

We have a lot of people suffering these 18 months. And today I'm sure they are happy because they realize finally the day for the restoration of democracy will come and since today they can continue to build, but in a strongest way that democracy, always in a nonviolent way. The refugees can feel happy. Those who are in Guantanamo can feel happy. Those who are in Haiti working peacefully for that democracy can feel happy because the U.S., because of the U.S., because of the OAS.

Thanks once again for that and you are welcome to our land.

Q Mr. President, in the past few days, President Aristide has called for a date certain for his return. He's called for a tougher sanctions, a tougher enforcement of the embargo, a naval blockade, and for some action to relieve the suffering of those in Guantanamo. Are you prepared to take any of those steps?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me respond, if I might, to each in turn. And let me start with the middle suggestion -- the question of whether United States would take tougher action on the embargo. I wouldn't rule that out, but I think you shouldn't underestimate the impact of this diplomatic initiative, sending Mr. Pezzullo to Haiti, making the statements we're making today, sending a clear and unambiguous signal we're sending.

And I might note that just a few moments ago the person we had approved for refugee status who had been held illegally by the Haitian de facto government was released to come to the United States as a refugee.

I think that the message we're sending out there is clear. So I think what we would like to do is to give Mr. Pezzullo a chance to go to Haiti, communicate strongly and directly to the appropriate people there what our position is and where we're going before we take actions, which at least in the short run will make life even more difficult for the Haitians. I wouldn't rule them out, but I think we ought to have it in an appropriate sequence of events.

As to the question of a date certain, I certainly think that we ought to return President Aristide in the near future. But I think that the date for the conclusion of the negotiations ought to come out of Mr. Caputo and his mission. And I think we ought to, in fairness, let him do that. It is a very grave thing for the United States alone to be setting a date certain in an endeavor that involves the United Nations and the Organization of the American States. So I think a date may well come out of the efforts of the Caputo mission, but we don't feel at this time it is the wisest thing for the long-term interests of President Aristide or Haiti for us to set the date on our own.

With regard to the refugees in Guantanamo, I'm going to do the following things: First of all, I'm going to send someone from our White House staff to Guantanamo to review the situation personally. Secondly, I'm going to take up the legal and human conditions of the refugees with the Attorney General, who has jurisdiction in these areas, now that we have a new Attorney General confirmed. I wanted to wait and have the opportunity to discuss that with her.

And then we will review the whole question and see whether or not there's anything else we should do. I expect all this would be done in the near future. I don't expect to take a good deal of time on this.

Q President Aristide, is that satisfactory to you?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: Totally.

Q Can we expect or can any Haitian in Cap Haitian or elsewhere expect the early return, constitutional return of the constitutional President of Haiti?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: Every Haitian should be extremely happy about what has happened today. I think that all Haitians can look with joy at the cooperation of myself and President Clinton, working hand in hand for all Haitians looking forward to peace, to nonviolence, to economic development. I think everyone can feel great contentment and happy anticipation.

Q Is there going to be real celebration of the Constitution, the anniversary of the Constitution of Haiti?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: Yes, with the help of President Clinton, all Haitians can feel comfortable and happy about celebrating March 29th as an anniversary for peace and respect of the law, the Constitution as a basis for the law and for its respect for all Haitians.

Q Mr. Clinton, would it be acceptable to you if the coup leaders left without being punished?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it would be acceptable to me to restore President Aristide to power in Haiti under conditions which were safe for him and for all Haitians. He has spoken in the past about what his policies would be in that regard, and I presume that a lot of the details of this would be the subject of negotiations. And those are negotiations of which I do not believe I should engage, although I would say that I was very impressed with what President Aristide said today about the need for national reconciliation. And perhaps you'd want him to make a comment.

Q Mr. President, you could criticized --

THE PRESIDENT: Give him a chance to answer, please.

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: In Haiti we don't have an institution giving justice to people, but unfortunately selling that justice. After 200 years, we realize we still have an army of 7,000 military and 40 percent of the national budget. So I used to ask the Haitians, do not go to any kind of violence or retaliation or vengeance. I will continue to do the same, because what we need is nonviolent reality, not violent.

That's why I'm not saying we want to see the coup leaders in jail and then to feel happy because we punished them. I'm saying, asking to all the Haitians to not go to vengeance, to wait for justice instead of doing justice for themselves out of -- we can work peacefully to remove the coup leaders from the army, and that way, to free the army and let justice be done; not then to feel happy because we put them in jail, not; happy because we can that way make the balance in a country where we don't have yet institutions who give justice.

I would add this point: We want reconciliation. We want justice. We want peace. That's why, through this process by a dialogue, we can reach that level where, finally, the Haitians will feel so happy to not go to vengeance

and to not see the symbol of the coup in the same place, with the same weapons, doing the same repression. That's the way we are trying to go.

(Repeated in French and then translated.)

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: There is no institution in Haiti which is in a position or able to give justice in Haiti at the present time. Justice is sold, and that has been the case for the last 200 years. We in Haiti are opting now for nonviolence, for peace for all -- for all the people of Haiti. Therefore, we must free the army from those who are responsible for the coup, asking at the same time all Haitians not to engage in vengeance, but rather to devote themselves to justice and to feel happy in the knowledge that justice will be done.

It is in that sense that we have asked for the departure of the coup leaders, that they no longer be the heads of the army -- not necessarily that they either be in jail or have to leave the country, but that a solution be found via dialogue which will lead to a truly balanced situation so that all can work together in this nonviolent context which will bring about a feeling of deepest joy in the hearts of all Haitians.

Q Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: I know we have to go. Let me just reaffirm two points -- and I'm glad you said it the second time because that's exactly what came out of our meetings. That sort of attitude on the part of President Aristide is the very thing that should enable us to resolve this in a peaceful way. If the people of Haiti can live in peace and security, subsequent to an agreement, and begin once again to work for their own prosperity instead of living in ever-deepening misery, then I think that we will be well on the road to alleviating literally centuries of oppression in that beautiful country that has been so misgoverned for so long.

And I applaud his statement. It is in that spirit that I undertake this initiative. And I want to close by reaffirming the determination of the United States to restore democracy and President Aristide as soon as possible.

Thank you very much.

Q Thank you.

END5:20 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 6, 1993

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT ARISTIDE AND PRIME MINISTER MALVAL OF HAITI

The Oval Office

6:45 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to make a statement first. I want to welcome President Aristide back to the White House and also welcome Prime Minister Malval here for the first time, and the other people associated with the effort to bring democracy back to Haiti.

I want to reaffirm the support of the United States for the democratic impulses of Haiti and for the return of President Aristide. I'd also like to compliment Prime Minister Malval on his announcement today of his intention to remain on after December 15th as acting Prime Minister and to try to revitalize and broaden the talks in Haiti within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement. The United States will support this Haitian initiative and seek the support of the U.N. and the OAS. We have no reason to believe that they will not also be supportive, and so we are looking forward to discussing that. They just got here and we're going to have discussion about that.

Q Besides the sanctions, what steps are you willing to take to help restore democracy to Haiti.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let's wait until we have a meeting here. We're going to have a discussion about all those things, and there will be more to say about that.

Q How about North Korea then, Mr. President? Did you come to any decision in your meeting today?

THE PRESIDENT: We worked through the problem, and at the end of the meeting I authorized our folks to go back to the South Koreans and our allies, and I expect to have a talk with President Kim in the next -- sometime in the next 24 hours. We'll talk a little more about it then. I want to talk to them before I say more.

END6:47 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 25, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Vice President Gore met with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti today to discuss the situation in Haiti. The Vice President reiterated to President Aristide the President's and Administration's unwavering commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and to President Aristide's return to his country. The Vice President also reaffirmed our and the international community's commitment to provide assistance to President Aristide and the constitutional government in their difficult task of reconciling the Haitian people and rebuilding the country's economy.

The Vice President and President Aristide reviewed our diplomatic approach, which combines the maintenance and enforcement of strong sanctions with promotion of a political process involving all legitimate Haitian political elements.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 3, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT UPON DEPARTURE

The South Lawn

10:15 A.M. EDT

Q Mr. President, are you going to send military advisors to Haiti? What is our Haiti policy, and are you thinking about military action or advisors, or trainers, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Right now, what we're doing is to put in place a stiffer sanctions policy, consistent with what President Aristide has been asking for some months now. And we want to have a better enforcement of the sanctions we have as well as the stiffer sanctions. And I don't think it's useful to rule out any option, and I'm not ruling out any option.

But to use a phrase the Vice President made famous in 1992, "It's time for them to go." I mean, the military leaders of Haiti have abused their authority. They have begun to clearly kill more innocent civilians -- people not even directly involved in the political life of the country.

I think the United States and the world is outraged by it. And we've tried other initiatives and they have not worked. We have done our best to work through this, and the things we have done have not worked, so we're now doing this sanctions regime, as recommended by President Aristide and others, but we're not ruling out anything.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END10:17 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 8, 1994

HAITI

Summary

At the conclusion of a comprehensive review of United States policy toward Haiti, the President announced on May 8 several new steps to bring about the restoration of democracy and return of Haiti's democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide while addressing humanitarian concerns which worsening repression in Haiti has intensified.

The major new steps the President announced were:

The appointment of William Gray, the distinguished President of the United Negro College Fund and former Chairman of the House Budget Committee, as the new Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Haiti to focus and invigorate our diplomacy.

Changes in our procedures for returning boat migrants to Haiti to ensure that all who claim refugee status are given a hearing while still discouraging massive and dangerous departures by sea.

New emphasis on using comprehensive sanctions and improved sanctions enforcement to make Haiti's military leaders relinquish power. The UN Security Council approved May 6 a new resolution intensifying the sanctions.)

Augmentation of humanitarian assistance for Haiti's poor and support for the earliest arrival in Haiti of more UN and OAS human rights monitors.

Intensified consultations at the United Nations on preparing the UN military and police mission for deployment to Haiti once the military leaders have relinguished power.

Background

Resolving the crisis in Haiti has been a continuing policy priority of the President and this Administration. Our objective has been to restore democracy and to make possible the return to Haiti of President Aristide. The urgency of the situation has grown as the intransigence and depredations of Haiti's military leaders have worsened.

The President is working to advance the several U.S. national interests at stake:

• DEMOCRACY: Haiti is one of only two countries in this hemisphere where the people are deprived of their right to democracy. Democracy underpins our efforts to build freedom and prosperity in this hemisphere through such initiatives as NAFTA and the December Summit of the

Americas in Miami.

- HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: The Haitian people are suffering worsening privation and brutality at the hands of the military. Unless soon halted these abuses could drive large numbers of Haitians to risk the perils of the sea to try to reach our shores. The first step in giving Haitians hope in their own land is for the military leaders to leave and democracy to be restored. This will allow the international community to work with Haiti to address the root causes of migration.
- PROTECTION OF AMERICANS OVERSEAS: As many as 10,000 Americans live and work in Haiti. Their safety is threatened by deepening military abuses and the insecurity that creates.

The President and his senior advisers have reviewed our policy toward Haiti during the last six weeks. This review was prompted by the rejection by the Haitian military leadership of every initiative to achieve a political settlement of the crisis and by their visibly worsening human rights abuses. As a result of this review the President has directed important changes in our policy to increase the pressure on Haiti's military leaders while addressing the humanitarian repercussions of their misrule.

VIGOROUS DIPLOMACY: The appointment of William Gray as the President's and Secretary of State's Special Adviser on Haiti will inject new vision and determination into our efforts. The President will rely on Mr. Gray as a central figure in our Haiti policy. As Mr. Gray leads that effort, Ambassador Albright will be working closely with the Secretary General and her colleagues to ensure that the UN brings all its resources to bear. Ambassador Babbitt will do likewise at the OAS, and Ambassador Swing will direct our efforts within Haiti in support of the new policy.

NEW MIGRANT PROCESSING PROCEDURES: In the context of our broader Haitian policy review we also reviewed our migration policy. We currently process Haitians for refugee claims only within Haiti, and we interdict and return all those who seek to migrate by boat without processing. Haitians who are returned by our interdiction effort are permitted to apply for refugee status within Haiti. Those who claim political persecution on questionnaires completed while they are being returned to Portau -Prince are encouraged to apply at our in-country refugee center. Since the inception of in-country refugee processing in 1992 we have accorded refugee status to nearly 3,000 Haitians. We have increased the refugee intake from Haiti through incountry processing ten-fold compared to the last Administration.

The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission has documented a substantial increase in killings and other brutal abuses in recent months. During the month of April alone it noted nearly 50 executions and suspicious deaths, including 11 separate murders during April 23-24 alone. It has reliably reported significant increases in kidnappings and forced disappearances, rapes, attacks on children and other abuses. In Gonaives and other parts of Haiti, military sweeps have led to dozens of deaths. Under these circumstances, the President has concluded that it is inappropriate to return all Haitian boat migrants without first affording them the opportunity to make claims to refugee status and protection. While our in-country processing provides a crucial route to refuge for many Haitians, it may no longer be adequate.

Therefore, the President has modified our procedures for processing Haitian boat migrants. Our Coast Guard will continue to interdict all Haitian migrants at sea but we will no longer return them to Haiti without first interviewing them to determine which are bona fide political refugees. Processing will involve a standard refugee interview similar to that currently performed by our three refugee processing centers in Haiti. It will be carried out either in third countries or aboard appropriate ships. Those who qualify as political refugees will be resettled outside Haiti. Other countries will be approached to join us in accepting Haitian political refugees. Those not qualifying for refugee status will be returned promptly to Haiti.

The new procedures will not come into effect until after our new processing facilities outside Haiti are in place. That will be some weeks from now. Until that time, which will be announced publicly, we will continue to return all interdicted boat migrants to Haiti without processing. We will be unable to process boat migrants for possible refugee status adequately and fairly before then and we must discourage departures in unseaworthy vessels with the attendant risk of death at sea.

INTENSIFIED SANCTIONS: The UN Security Council on May 7 unanimously approved a strong resolution intensifying sanctions. The resolution immediately made effective worldwide the targeted entry ban and asset freeze which we have been enforcing since last year against the military and its allies. It also imposed an immediate ban on non-scheduled flights to and from Haiti. Within the next two weeks the world community will bring into force comprehensive trade sanctions against Haiti, excluding only the most essential humanitarian supplies.

On May 7, the President signed an Executive order and Proclamation implementing the first two of those measures. A second Executive order will bring the comprehensive trade sanctions into effect in the next several days.

FULL ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS: Our naval vessels around Haiti will continue to stop ships entering and leaving Haitian waters and divert those carrying prohibited cargo. The President has been in contact with President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic to express his concern about sanctions leakage on their long border with Haiti and our willingness to assist the Dominicans in meeting their international obligation to enforce the sanctions. We are working with the United Nations to facilitate international cooperation with the Dominican Republic. HUMANITARIAN/HUMAN RIGHTS MEASURES: Comprehensive new sanctions and strengthened enforcement will increase the pressure on the Haitian people. To shield the most vulnerable Haitians from the sanctions' worst impact, we will increase as soon as possible our humanitarian feeding and health care programs to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries. We are working to restore the full complement of 250 UN/OAS civilian human rights observers to Haiti.

RECONFIGURING THE UN MISSION IN HAITI: We will be consulting intensively with our partners in New York to prepare the planned UN military and police Mission for Haiti to be able to function effectively and safely once the military leadership has relinquished power. As those consultations proceed and the possibilities for our own participation in the Mission become clearer we will consult extensively with the Congress.

• * *

WILLIAM H. GRAY, III

William Gray has demonstrated a strong and unwavering commitment to public service throughout his career: from his years of service to the 96th-101st Congresses as Representative of the 2nd District of Pennsylvania to his continuing work in the Baptist Church to his current role as President of the United Negro College Fund.

He was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1941. He earned a Bachelors degree from Marshall College, Masters degrees from Drew Theological Seminary and Princeton Theological Seminary and has undertaken postgraduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Temple University and Oxford University. Continuing his interest in education, he worked as an assistant professor at St. Peters College in Jersey City, New Jersey from 1970-74 and has lectured at Jersey City State College, Rutgers University and Montclair State College.

In 1978, he was elected to Congress where he performed with distinction until 1990, serving as House Majority Whip and chairman of the House Budget Committee. He was also a member of the House Appropriations Committee.

An ordained minister in the Baptist Church, Mr. Gray served as assistant minister at the Bright Hope Baptist Church in Philadelphia, where he is currently senior minister, from 1963- 64; and as co-pastor and senior minister of the Union Baptist Church in Montclair, New Jersey, 1966-72.

He and his wife, Andrea Dash, have 3 children: William H. IV, Justin Yates and Andrew Dash.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 8, 1994

STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Rose Garden

3:15 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to speak for a few moments about the crisis in Haiti, the challenge it poses to our national interests, and the new steps I am taking to respond.

Three and one half years ago, in free and fair elections, the people of Haiti chose Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President. Just nine months later, their hopes were dashed when Haiti's military leaders overthrew democracy by force. Since then, the military has murdered innocent civilians, crushed political freedom and plundered Haiti's economy.

From the start of this administration, my goal has been to restore democracy and President Aristide. Last year, we helped the parties to negotiate the Governors Island Accord, a fair and balanced agreement which laid out a road map for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. But late last year, the Haitian military abrogated the agreement, and since then they have rejected every effort to achieve a political settlement.

At the same time, the repression and bloodshed in Haiti have reached alarming new proportions. Supporters of President Aristide, and many other Haitians, are being killed and mutilated. That is why, six weeks ago, I ordered a review of our policy towards Haiti.

As a result of this review, we are taking several steps to increase pressure on Haiti's military while addressing the suffering caused by their brutal misrule. We are stepping up our diplomatic efforts, we are intensifying sanctions, and we are adapting our migration policy.

Let me describe these steps. First, to bring new vigor to our diplomacy, I am pleased to announce that Bill Gray, the President of the United Negro College Fund, former House Majority Whip and Chair of the House Budget Committee, has accepted my invitation to serve as special advisor to me and to the Secretary of State on Haiti. (Applause.)

Bill is here with his wife, on his way to the inauguration of President Mandela in South Africa, and I will ask him to speak in just a few moments. But let me just say that he is a man of vision and determination, of real strength and real creativity. And I appreciate his willingness to accept this difficult and challenging assignment. He will be the point man in our diplomacy, and a central figure in our future policy deliberations.

As part of our diplomatic efforts, we will work with the United Nations to examine the changes in the proposed U.N. military and police mission in Haiti. We want to ensure that once Haiti's military leaders have left, this mission can do its job effectively and safely.

Second, the U.S. is leading the international community in a drive to impose tougher sanctions on Haiti. On Friday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution we had proposed to tighten sanctions on everything but humanitarian supplies; to prevent Haiti's military leaders and their civilians allies from leaving the country; to promote a freeze of their assets worldwide; and to ban nonscheduled flights in and out of Haiti. U.S. naval vessels will continue to enforce these sanctions vigorously.

We are also working with the Dominican Republic to improve sanctions enforcement along that nation's border with Haiti. To shield the most vulnerable Haitians from the worst effects of the sanctions, we will increase both humanitarian aid and the number of U.N. and OAS human rights monitors in Haiti.

While these stronger sanctions will cause more hardships for innocent Haitians, we must be clear: The military leaders bear full responsibility for this action. They can stop the suffering of their people by giving up power, as they themselves agreed to do, and allowing the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide.

Third, I am announcing certain changes in our migration policy towards Haiti. Currently, Haitians seeking refugee status, including those interdicted at sea, are interviewed only in Haiti and not beyond its shores. Our processing centers, which have been dramatically expanded in this administration, are doing a good job under bad circumstances.

In 1993, we processed and approved about 10 times the number of refugee applicants as in 1992. In recent months, however, I have become increasingly concerned that Haiti's declining human rights situation may endanger the safety of those who have valid fears of political persecution, who flee by boat, and who are then returned to Haiti where they are met at the docks by Haitian authorities before they can be referred to in-country processing.

Therefore, I have decided to modify our procedures. We will continue to interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will determine aboard ship or in other countries which ones are bona fide political refugees. Those who are not will still be returned to Haiti, but those who are will be provided refuge. We will also approach other countries to seek their participation in this humanitarian endeavour.

The new procedures will begin once we have the necessary arrangements in place. This will take some weeks. Until then, the Haitians must understand that we will continue to return all boat migrants to Haiti. Even under the new procedures, there will be no advantage for Haitians with fears of persecution to risk their lives at sea if and when they can assert their claims more safely at a processing center in Haiti.

The ultimate solution to this crisis, however, is for the military leaders to keep their own commitment to leave, so that Haiti's people can build a peaceful and prosperous future in their own country.

I am committed to making these new international sanctions work. At the same time, I cannot and should not rule out other options. The United States has clear interests at stake in ending this crisis. We have an interest in bolstering the cause of democracy in the Americas. We have an interest in ensuring the security of our citizens living and working in Haiti. We have an interest in stopping the gross human rights violations and abuses of the military and their accomplices. And we clearly have a humanitarian interest in preventing a massive and dangerous exodus of Haitians by sea.

The steps I have announced today are designed to relieve suffering, redouble pressure and restore democracy. Working with the Haitian people and the world community, we will try to advance our interests and give Haiti an opportunity to build a future of freedom and hope. They voted for it and they deserve the chance to have it. (Applause.)

Mr. Gray.

MR. GRAY: Thank you, Mr. President. I am honored to accept this great and important challenge. I am glad for the opportunity to serve my country and work on resolving one of the greatest challenges we face today. I share the President's determination to help end the suffering of the Haitian people at the hands of their military leaders. I will work towards that end with commitment and with determination.

In accepting this assignment, I want to stress publicly, as I have stressed to you, Mr. President, that I am a private citizen and will remain a private citizen during this work. I have also insisted on serving without pay. My reason for taking on this work is straightforward and very simple. For me, it is an article of faith that when a person is asked by his President to be of service to the nation, he should do so. And today, I respond to that request to serve from my President.

In the months ahead, I look forward to working with you, Mr. President, and your national security team to carry out your policy, promote our nation's interests, and restore freedom and democracy, and above all, hope to the people of Haiti.

Thank you. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, what makes you believe that these sanctions -- these new policies on returning Haitian refugees to Haiti will work this time? Haven't they been tried before and found to be unreliable or to encourage people to --

THE PRESIDENT: Before, when they were tried, the circumstances were somewhat different. First of all, let me answer the question about why we would undertake to change the policy even though there is clearly some logistical challenge involved in doing so.

I ordered the review of this policy six weeks ago when we began first to get intelligence reports and then clear news reports that there was increasing violence against citizens of Haiti who did not agree with the policies of the military regime -- and, indeed, some of them seem to not be political at all -- of people not only being killed but being mutilated. It seems to me reasonable to assume that some of the people who were fleeing by boat are in that group of people who also are fearful of their lives. And the way the boat return has worked so far is that we take the people back, let them off at the dock at Port-au-Prince. They are then -- by and large, they have been free to go to the in-country processing. But they are subject to the authority of the Haitian police at that moment. And I simply think that the risks of that cannot be justified, given the increased level of political violence in the country. Therefore, I think we have to change the policy.

Now, why do I think it will work? First, we've studied what happened before when the policy of inspection of people at sea occurred, and we have determined that two things ought to be done. First, we ought to look for a third-country processing center. And second, if we do it at sea, we ought not to do it on the Coast Guard cutters, which can be quickly overrun in their capacity, but to do it on bigger ships.

We believe if we can -- given a little time to organize this logistically, we can handle it. Also, it will be clear that we are not changing our policy, which is the law of the United States with regard to economic refugees. People who seek to come to the United States for economic reasons only are not eligible for this kind of status.

So we will do these reviews. We think we can do them fairly quickly, in a matter of a few days, and then return those who should be returned and take those who should be taken into the United States.

Ron.

Q Are you in danger, sir, of sending signals that could open the floodgates for Haitian refugees? And how much, if any, did the fast play into your decision-making process?

THE PRESIDENT: First let me answer your first question. I hope that we will not have a flood of refugees, but we are increasing our naval resources to deal with them. We are not changing our policy about who can come and who cannot. That is a matter of American law. We are not able to do that, nor should we do that.

But I don't believe the policy we have now is sustainable, given the level of political violence against innocent civilians in Haiti. We have to try to implement this policy. I believe we can, and I think, as we do it firmly, the Haitian people will see we are not opening the floodgates for indiscriminate refugee migration into the United States, but that we are going to try to find those people who have left because they have a genuine fear.

The review of this policy began before Mr. Robinson's fast, but if you will go back and when I was first asked about it I said that I did not mind his criticism of our policy, it obviously had not worked. I said that from day one. And I respect his conviction and his courage and his conscience. And I was gratified by the comments that he said today. And I'm glad that on this Mother's Day he's going to be having dinner with his wife tonight.

Q Mr. President, on sanctions, your former envoy to Haiti warns that the stricter sanctions will -- could so ruin the situation on the ground in Haiti. I would make it impossible for President Aristide or for anyone Mr. Gray works with to set up there to bring democracy back. What kind of confidence do you have that economic sanctions are going to bring the military leaders out?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the economic sanctions will have to be coupled with a vigorous and aggressive and broadbased diplomatic effort. And we are exploring all alternatives.

As you know, we have been reluctant to impose the more severe sanctions, although President Aristide and many of the Friends of Haiti group -- the French, the Canadians, others who have worked with us on this for a long time, since -- have advocated this course. In my view, we must exhaust all available alternatives as we try to resolve this diplomatically. And I think it is an appropriate thing to do now.

If we are successful in trying to bring back democracy and to restore not only President Aristide, but the concept, the spirit that was in the Governors Island Accord -- that is, a broadbased, functioning representative government that can relate to the business community as well as to the ordinary citizens of Haiti -- then we will have to get ourselves in gear to try to make sure that that economy comes back as quickly as possible. We're trying to do that with South Africa and others. I think we'll be able to do it.

Q? Mr. President, I don't understand why the administration is saying that it does not expect a large influx of Haitian refugees now. Are you saying effectively that you expect the results of the new policy will be the same as the results of the old policy?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm saying -- I think there will be more -- some more people in the sense that we will be reviewing more people simultaneously. That is, we will be reviewing people not only in the in-country processing centers, but we'll be interviewing people either on boats or in a third country. But what I'm saying is that we have not broadened the criteria of eligibility for coming to the United States.

I want to make this very clear. The problem with the present policy is -- the present policy worked in 1993 up through the abrogation of the Governors Island Accord and for sometime thereafter in the sense that we did not have evidence of widespread indiscriminate killing of civilians. And we increased by tenfold, by tenfold, the number of people processed and the number of people approved for refuge in this country for 1993 over 1992.

But when all this killing started, when it became obvious that the military leaders had no earthly intention of honoring Governors Island or anything approaching it, or keeping their commitments, but instead were going to tolerate, organize and abet increased killing in Haiti, it is logical to assume that some of those who get on the boats include not only economic refugees, who are the vast majority of them, but also some who genuinely fear for their lives. The only way we can get those people to the in-country processing is to let them off at the dock in Port-au-Prince where the police have jurisdiction. I do not believe that is a sustainable policy, either practically or morally, given the level of indiscriminate violence.

So there may be some more people who get in because we'll be reviewing even more people. But it would be a great mistake for Haitians who want to come here for economic reasons to just take to the boats, because we are not changing the standard by which we admit people.

Gwen.

Q It seems there are two outstanding problems. One is that Lieutenant General Cedras said this morning he doesn't really have any intention of stepping aside in order to replace -- in order to make room for President Aristide; and that even your supporters on this policy are concerned that there is still no equivalency between what happens with the United States and Cuban immigrants and the United States and Haitian immigrants. How do you address those two things?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are going to have -- we do have an equivalency in terms of people who get here. But we have an obligation to try to let the people who genuinely fear for their lives into this country. We are now going to do that without regard to whether they're processed in country or on boats. Therefore, the legal standard is what it ought to be.

The Cuban situation is unique in the sense that there is an act of Congress which has certain specifics about the Cuban situation which changes our relationship with Cuba to some extent. But this will alleviate the legitimate concern with regard to the Haitians, and I hope will minimize the likelihood that hundreds of people will die at sea innocently.

Q And about Lieutenant General Cedras?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, he's going to say that. That's what he's been saying ever since -- that's what he told us when he abrogated the Governors Island Accord. "I gave my word. I never expect President Aristide to keep his word. President Aristide called my bluff, kept his word, and so I'm going to shaft the agreement." That's what he said on September 30th. So he hasn't changed his mind since then. But we may be able to do better now, and I think the gentleman to my right is a person of extraordinary ability; maybe he can do some things we haven't done yet. We're going to give it our best shot.

Q Mr. President, I am very pleased for your determination today. I have been very uncomfortable because I am a Cuban boat American -- the founding father of my country. They leave -- in the second world war. I have been here since 1959. As the leader of the democratic body, I had to leave when Baptista left. And I have been listening to people in connection with my country. The country of Cuba is dominated by the Cuban communists, and there is legislation that you have to pursue that course.

However, it is a reality that in 1779 and 1781, 1,100 -- Cubans came here and made this country free -- (inaudible.) Now, in this situation I congratulate you --

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks.

One more.

Q How long are you willing to give sanctions to take the desired effect?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I have to let Mr. Gray do a little work before I can answer that question.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END4:34 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 9, 1994

SUSPENSION OF ENTRY OF ALIENS WHOSE ENTRY IS BARRED UNDER UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917 OR WHO FORMULATE, IMPLEMENT, OR BENEFIT FROM POLICIES THAT ARE IMPEDING THE NEGOTIATIONS SEEKING THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN HAITI

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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

In light of the political crisis in Haiti resulting

from the expulsion from Haiti of President Aristide and the constitutional government, United Nations Security Council Resolution 917, and the overriding interest of the United States in the restoration of democracy to Haiti, I have determined that it is in the interests of the United States to restrict the entry to the United States of: (1) all aliens described in paragraph 3 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917; and (2) all other aliens who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that impede the progress of the negotiations designed to restore constitutional government to Haiti and their immediate families.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, by the powers vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that the unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens described in sections 1 and 2 of this proclamation would, except as provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this proclamation, be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I do therefore proclaim that:

Section 1. The immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens described in paragraph 3 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917 is hereby suspended. These aliens are: ((all officers of the Haitian a) military, including the police, and their immediate families; (b) the major participants in the coup d'?tat of 1991 and in the illegal governments since the coup d'?tat, and their immediate families; and

(c) those employed by or acting on behalf of the Haitian military, and their immediate families.

Sec. 2. The immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens who are not covered by section 1, but who nonetheless formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that impede the progress of the negotiations designed to restore constitutional government to Haiti, and their immediate families, is hereby suspended.

Sec. 3. Section 1 shall not apply with respect to any alien otherwise covered by section 1 where the entry of such alien has been approved as prescribed by paragraph 3 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917.

Sec. 4. Section 2 shall not apply with respect to any alien otherwise covered by section 2 where the entry of such alien would not be contrary to the interests of the United States.

Sec. 5. Aliens covered by sections 1 through 4 shall be identified pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State, as authorized in section 8 below.

Sec. 6. Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to derogate from United States Government obligations under applicable international agreements.

Sec. 7. This proclamation shall take effect at 11:59 p.m., eastern daylight time on May 8, 1994, and shall remain in effect until such time as the Secretary of State determines that it is no longer necessary and should be terminated.

Sec. 8. The Secretary of State shall have responsibility to implement this proclamation pursuant to procedures the Secretary may establish.

Sec. 9. Proclamation No. 6569 of June 3, 1993, is hereby revoked.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighteenth.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 9, 1994

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On October 4, 1991, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq.) and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), President Bush exercised his statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12775 on October 4, 1991, declaring a national emergency and blocking Haitian government property.

On October 28, 1991, pursuant to the above authorities, President Bush exercised his statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12779 on October 28, 1991, blocking property of and prohibiting transactions with Haiti.

On June 30, 1993, pursuant to the above authorities, as well as the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended ("UNPA") (22 U.S.C. 287c) I exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12853 on June 30, 1993, to impose additional economic measures with respect to Haiti. This latter action was taken, in part, to ensure that the economic measures taken by the United States with respect to Haiti would conform to United Nations Security Council Resolution 841 (June 16, 1993).

On October 18, 1993, pursuant to the IEEPA and the NEA, I again exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12872 on October 18, 1993, blocking property of various persons with respect to Haiti.

On May 6, 1994, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 917, calling on Member States to take additional measures to tighten the embargo against Haiti. These include, inter alia, a requirement that Member States deny permission for take off, landing or overflight to any aircraft flying to or from Haiti, other than aircraft on regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights. In addition, the Resolution strongly urges, but does not mandate, the freezing of funds and financial resources of officers of the military in Haiti, including police, major participants in the coup d'?tat of 1991, and in illegal governments since the coup d'?tat, those employed by, or acting on behalf of, the military, and immediate family members of the foregoing. Effective at 11:59 p.m. e.d.t., May 8, 1994, I have taken additional steps pursuant to the above statutory authorities to enhance the implementation of this international embargo and to conform to United Nations Security Council Resolution 917.

This new Executive order:

bans arriving and departing flights and overflights stopping or originating in Haiti, except regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights;

blocks the funds and financial resources, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of the individuals specified in Resolution 917, identified above;

prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions of this order; and

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authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to issue regulations implementing the provisions of the Executive order.

The new Executive order is necessary to implement certain

provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917 of May 6, 1994, that are to take effect without delay. Further measures, including a comprehensive trade embargo with certain humanitarian exceptions, are required no later than May 21, 1994. I am considering additional measures to give full effect to these and other provisions of that Resolution. The measures we are imposing and the United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted on May 6, 1994, reflect the determination of the United States, acting in concert with the international community, to end the assault on democracy and human dignity in Haiti.

I am providing this notice to the Congress pursuant to section 204(b) of the IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and section 301 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631). I am enclosing a copy of the Executive order that I have issued.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

May 7, 1994.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 9, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HAITI

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917 of May 6, 1994, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the actions and policies of the de facto regime in Haiti and the national emergency

described and declared in Executive Order No. 12775, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses, which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order, all funds and financial resources of: (a) all officers of the Haitian military, including the police, and their immediate families;

(b) the major participants in the coup d'?tat in Haiti of 1991 and in the illegal governments since the coup d'?tat, and their immediate families; and

(c) those employed by or acting on behalf of the Haitian military, and their immediate families; that are or hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked.

Sec. 2. The following are prohibited, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order, except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, authorizations, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order: (a) the granting of permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly the territory of the United States, if the aircraft, as part of the same flight or as a continuation of that flight, is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Haiti, with the exception of regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights; (b) any transaction by any United States person that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

Sec. 3. The definitions contained in section 3 of Executive Order No. 12779 apply to the terms used in this order.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of

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the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 6.

(a) This order shall take effect at 11:59 p.m., eastern daylight time on May 8, 1994.

(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

May 7, 1994.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 16, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Last Wednesday in Haiti, the military leadership abetted by a rump faction of the Haitian Senate installed a bogus government supposedly led by illegitimate "President" Emile Jonaissant. Jonaissant, fronting for the military leaders, compounded this offense by announcing new "Cabinet" appointments this afternoon. In a courageous speech to the Haitian people this morning, acting Prime Minister Robert Malval called on Haiti's civil servants to refuse cooperation to the bogus authorities. Malval dismissed Jonaissant as a puppet of the military leadership. He renewed his call to General Cedras to retire and permit the restoration of democracy.

We vigorously support Prime Minister Malval's denunciation of this travesty of constitutional process. We associate ourselves fully with his demands that C?dras and the other military leaders stop denying democracy and security to the Haitian people. We will keep tightening the pressure on the military leadership until they step down. Maneuvers such as today's announcement only strengthen our determination to see democracy restored and President Aristide returned to the Presidency to which Haitians overwhelmingly elected him in 1990.

Malval and his Cabinet are the only legitimate constitutional government in Haiti, operating under the authority of President Aristide. Obviously, neither we nor the international community will have any dealings with the Jonaissant cabinet.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

REMARKS BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ON HAITI BILL GRAY

The Briefing Room

12:24 P.M. EDT

MR. GRAY: Thank you, Mr. President.

As the President has indicated, we are announcing two new steps in our efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. First, the President has signed an executive order banning private financial transactions between Haiti and the United States and, through the United States, between Haiti and other countries. Let me note that this ban does not apply to humanitarian activities, including the expanding programs to feed over a million Haitians daily. It also exempts remittances of up to \$50 a month to individual Haitians who depend on such funds.

Second, the President has directed Secretary of Transportation Pena to instruct all United States and Haitian air carriers to cease scheduled services between our two nations. In order to allow those Americans and others who wish to leave Haiti to do so in an orderly fashion, this measure will take effect as of June 25th.

The new measures we are announcing today have been endorsed by the Organization of American States, the Friends of Haiti and President Aristide. Through these actions, we are sending a strong message to Haiti's military leaders that they cannot continue repressing their people and defying world opinion with impunity. Working with our international and Haitian partners, we will act to protect our national interest and hasten the day when Haitian democracy is restored and President Aristide can return to the people who freely elected him as their leader.

At this time I will entertain questions.

Q How effective do you think these new sanctions will be in restoring Aristide to his power?

MR. GRAY: Well, sanctions create an environment where we hope we will be able to have a diplomatic breakthrough. As you know, the sanctions under U.N. Resolution 917 were only imposed about three weeks ago, and they are having a significant effect. These additional sanctions are targeted in such a way to have a maximum effect upon the coup leaders and those who are their supporters. And it is our belief that they will further create that kind of an atmosphere where we can have a diplomatic breakthrough and a solution where the coup leaders step down.

Q How long is it going to be before you expect to see any kind of results from the additional sanctions? How long are you going to give it before you know if it works?

MR. GRAY: Well, we're going to be analyzing and reviewing the situation daily and weekly in Haiti to determine the effectiveness of these sanctions as well as those that are now in place and determining what our next steps should be.

Q Mr. Ambassador, does this mean that the military option, at least for now, is on hold?

MR. GRAY: As the President has said, all options are on the table. We are pursuing a multilateral policy with our allies in the region -- the Organization of American States that just met, and Brazil as well as the Four Friends of Haiti and the United Nations. We will continue to work in a multilateral way to apply the maximum amount of pressure and to use every option available to restore democracy.

Q There are reports today from within the administration that the sanctions already in place are beginning to take their bite. What evidence can you tell us today that the sanctions are beginning to have an effect?

MR. GRAY: Well, I think that we have information that there are some shortages, gasoline prices that had dropped early have now come back up a little bit. And we suspect that those sanctions that were put in place by U.N. Council Resolution 917 on May 21st are beginning to have an impact. These will heighten the impact rather dramatically, and we think that we will, hopefully, see some changes in the behavior of those in Haiti, and perhaps the coup leaders will do what they agreed to do in Governors Island, which was to step down.

Q If I could follow up please. Specifically, some administration officials are talking about the business elite that surround the military leaders in Haiti are beginning to feel the pressure of the sanctions. What kind of intelligence -- what can you tell us, can you share with us today about that aspect of the sanctions?

MR. GRAY: Well, I think there is significant evidence that they are feeling the bite of the present sanctions and that these will also have a significant impact on them. And I think you've seen statements in the news media coming from people in the business elite who have supported the coup leaders in their taking over democracy in Haiti. And we expect that these will have a significant impact, especially upon the business elite who have been supporting the coup leaders.

Q Mr. Gray, the Latin American governments are not in favor of the military intervention, nor seem to be the other friends -- the other three countries. You say all options on the table. Is the U.S. willing to go it alone if need be?

MR. GRAY: Well, first of all, I don't know where you get your information from with regard to Latin American countries and CARICOM countries. I have just been, in the last two weeks, traveling, meeting with all of the leaders of the CARICOM nations, also at the OAS nations and also at the Four Friends. The statement that none of them are interested in the possibility that you just described is not accurate at all.

Secondly, I think that what everyone is concerned about is applying the maximum amount of pressure to seek a diplomatic solution. I think there are mixed views with regard to the timing, as well as the tactics of other possible solutions.

Right now, our policy continues to be that of working with other nations to apply the maximum amount of economic pressure to have a diplomatic breakthrough. But the President has said, and we continue to make clear to our allies in the region, that all options are on the table. And those who would suggest that there has already been a vote or there is a consensus that all options are not on the table is not accurate, from my conversations with leaders throughout the regions.

Q you have figured out some plan whereby the United States, with all of this interfering on behalf of democracy, some plan to keep those poor children in Haiti from starving to death? You see pictures of that all the time.

MR. GRAY: Well, first of all, let me just point out that I'm glad you raised that question -- that certainly the economic sanctions that have only been in place about three and a half weeks did not create those pictures. In fact, it is U.S. policy that has helped to provide humanitarian aid in Haiti for some time. We are providing, right now, over \$70 million of humanitarian aid. Right now we are presently feeding one million Haitians -- that's approximately one out of five.

So those who say sanctions should not be applied because somehow we're going to increase the suffering of children ignore the fact that our aid programs right now -- and have been over the past year -- feeding one out of every five Haitians in that country. We are planning to increase that assistance by another 300,000 who will go on the feeding programs. And we will be looking for an additional expenditure of PL-480 program money and humanitarian aid that will assist those who are suffering.

The suffering of those children is not a suffering caused by United States sanctions or world sanctions. The suffering of those children has been caused by a society that continues to ignore the needs of its majority citizens for the needs of the few. And if you're going to correct that situation, democracy is the first step in bringing about an economic prosperity that affects all of the people in that society. And so American policy is not simply to restore democracy and restore the dually-elected leadership, but we are also providing right now, over \$70 million of humanitarian aid to those who are hungry, those who are suffering. And that is beside the aid that comes from the numerous nongovernmental agencies, humanitarian and missionary groups that are also there providing medicine and health and a variety of other things.

Q Mr. Gray, can you pull apart for us the financial aspects of what you're trying to accomplish? In the past, when the administration has tried to freeze assets, most of the assets have been gone. When you have tried to block the flow of money, it's proved to be very difficult. Who are you going to go after? Do you believe that there is anything to really get at this point? And what about other governments such as France, the Bahamas and Switzerland? Are we going after them as well?

MR. GRAY: Let me begin by starting at the rear of that question and moving backwards. Last Friday in a communique the Friends of Haiti of the United Nations issued a statement supporting this kind of action that President Clinton is taking today. Also last Monday in Brazil, the Organization of American States issued a statement supporting this same kind of action.

It is our expectation that other nations will be doing the same -- those nations where such actions can have an effect. For instance, not every airline in the world flies into Port-au-Prince. There are essentially five that do -- American Airlines, Air France, Canada, the Dominican Republic and the Dutch Airlines. And so, therefore, these actions have to be taken bilaterally by individual nations as opposed to an organization such as the OAS or the United Nations.

We expect that other nations will also join us in this activity with regard to isolating the coup leadership and the supporters in the Haiti situation. What it means is essentially this: When you ban American airlines from flying, that's approximately 65 to 75 percent of all the air traffic to Haiti. Air France, Canada has about another 25 percent, and we expect that they will be reviewing the recommendations that come from the Four Friends as well as the OAS in determining what they will do on this issue.

With regard to financial transactions, we are talking about the prohibition of hundreds of millions of dollars on an annual basis. That includes prohibitions such as carrying amounts of cash into the United States, wire transfers, trade financing such as letters of credit, dollar clearing, and a host of other types of activity. Since the United States dollar is an international currency that is very important in trade, we think it will have a very significant impact.

We expect, again, that other nations, particularly those who, like the Four Friends, as well as the OAS who voted just recently for these recommendations, will also be doing the same thing. So we think it will have a very significant impact. And even though someone may attempt to relocate their resources, after today it will be impossible --

Q Are you going after a new named list of individuals that goes beyond the group of roughly 600 that have been targeted before? Or are you doing it in a more general sense?

MR. GRAY: We are constantly evaluating the list of those who are subject to visa revocation, as well as the freezing of assets. To that list has been added, as you well know, those who are part of the front government that was set up by the coup leaders. And as we find evidence of those who are supporting the coup leadership and its unconstitutional government, their names will be also added.

Q? Mr. Gray, if these sanctions make sense, can you tell us why they were not imposed earlier, why it made sense to wait until now?

MR. GRAY: Well, I think that essentially, one, these restrictions that we're talking about here are restrictions that have to be applied primarily bilaterally. Again, as I said before, there are only five countries that have airlines flying into Port-au- Prince. And so, thus, a U.N. resolution, even though it is broad- based as 917, it leaves the possibility for other nations to take additional actions and restrictions.

We have worked in a multilateral way, and that is why this action is now coming upon the heels of a vote by the OAS and also by the support of the Four Friends. And so, these are really a continuation of U.N. Resolution 917. Prior to that imposition of 917, which was on the 21st, you had voluntary sanctions on arm embargo, or just oil. I think what the world community said was that after the coup leaders failed to live up to their previous agreements, especially the Governors Island Agreement to step down, that stronger steps had to be taken, and we joined the world community in doing that.

Q of the size of the assets that you're talking about? And if people have had a week to consider this, if the OAS has talked about this a week ago, by now certainly a prudent person would have already moved their assets or taken steps to cover it up. How do you counter that?

MR. GRAY: Where would you take your assets and where would you want them to be? What are the international -- what does the international marketplace respect in terms of currency? So, therefore, if you also get other countries to join in, I doubt very seriously you'll find too many places to run with those assets.

And then, also, when you talk about carrying out international transactions, the payment of trade bills and so forth, that payment is usually preferred in certain kinds of currencies, the United States dollar being the foremost. And so, yes, I think someone may have tried to take their assets and move them as a result of hearing what the OAS did on Monday. But eventually, if you're going to do business in the world marketplace, there are certain currencies that are the accepted currencies of the market. The dollar is one of them. So, yes, this will have a very significant impact upon those who are the elite and who have been supporting the coup leadership.

Q Last week, the Haitian government seized \$12 million of U.S. AID funds. What is our response to that? Have we done anything?

MR. GRAY: What have we done? Essentially, they seized about \$12 million of U.S. assets. Those assets were primarily for humanitarian purposes in deposit in order to carry out our feeding programs of the poor, of the children and the needy. And we have decided to continue those programs and to go on without that money at this time.

Q How will this measure on the cut-off of flights affect the OAS-U.N. human rights mission that's in Haiti now? And also, how will it affect the humanitarian aid programs, the workers in the country? Do you anticipate any kind of action --

MR. GRAY: Our conversations that we've had with the humanitarian groups is that this prohibition on airline flights is not going to cause them to leave. Their commitment is based upon a strong commitment to aid the poor, the hungry. There are those groups that do use air charter service to bring in supplies -- medical, as well as humanitarian aid. Those flights have to be cleared through a United Nations procedure. We are working with the United Nations now to come up with an expedited procedure mechanism so that there will not be delays for those who have medical supplies and other supplies -- missionaries, humanitarian groups -- that want to get them in.

And so we're hoping that we'll have an expedited procedure. We have worked already with regard to two requests of groups that have had that problem. But we do not see the banning of commercial airlines as somehow affecting the humanitarian aid programs that will be going on there.

Q But there were some aid programs that depended on commercial airlines, Mr. Gray.

Q If the Haitian military does not agree to these conditions by the time that your term expires, will you see these efforts essentially as a failure?

MR. GRAY: My term expires -- oh, my term expires after 130 days, but let me explain to you what 130 days means. It means the days that I work for President Clinton. And so, every day I'm not working for President Clinton. I still remain as the President of the College Fund and there are days when I am not doing this job. And so, therefore, those who think if you wait until October 1st Bill Gray will be gone, they may be surprised. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Gray, what's the practical effect for those groups which did send in their humanitarian supplies, primarily medical, by commercial airliner? I know of at least two. What are they going to do?

MR. GRAY: Well, we will work with those groups to find a different way for them to get their supplies in. There are charter flights and there are other ways in which we can get those supplies in. But I don't think that we should take the position or imply that these additional restrictions are going to hurt the poor and humanitarian. In fact, what they hurt are those people who are the supporters of the coup who presently can now go and get on an Air France plane, go to Paris, shop and come back, or get on an American Airlines plane and come to New York. I assure you that not too many of the poor children or the poor people of Haiti are flying American Airlines, either economy or business or first class, coming to Miami or New York.

And so, therefore, the emphasis here is seeking to apply pressure to those groups that are supporting the coup leadership. And let me point out that most of the humanitarian aid that is going in, most of the medical aid is not going in by these commercial airline flights. And as I said before, we are willing to work with those groups that have used these flights through air cargo.

But we should also point out that if they can use air cargo, so can those who want to break the embargo use air cargo. So we will work with those humanitarian groups to make sure that there is no loss of humanitarian aid that will be going in to provide help for the poor or the needy.

Q Why do you think that these will work?

Q Mr. Gray, how does this impact people who have families in New York, in Port-au-Prince who wire money into people in to aid them?

MR. GRAY: Well, I'm glad you raised that question because one of the things that is a part of this whole set of financial restrictions is that we are providing for remittances of about \$50 a month, which allows someone who lives in the United States who has some family members and would like to send small amounts to the poor there, up to \$50 a month, they will be able to continue to do so.

And when you're talking about a society where the annual income is around \$350, even though \$50 a month may not sound like a great deal here in America, it is a significant amount. So, therefore, we think that these restrictions have been targeted and fashioned in such a manner that it will provide for the neediest citizens and for those in America -- we have over one million Haitian Americans -- who will be able to provide some help for their families. So, therefore, there is a provision that allows remittances up to \$50.

The question that was asked before -- and I'll conclude on the other question, and that is, why do we think these will work.

We believe that, joining with other nations of the world, we must restore democracy. Whenever the United States can influence a direction for democracy, it has the responsibility to do so, working with its neighbors. We have been working with our neighbors and been working with the nations of the world to bring about a change. We believe that the sanctions under U.N. Resolution 917 plus these heightened sanctions that have been announced today by President Clinton will create that kind of environment where we can have a solution to this crisis.

Sanctions alone don't solve any crisis. They didn't solve it alone in South Africa, and they won't solve it anywhere else. But what they can do is they can create an environment where those who are the coup leaders, those who took democracy away from the Haitian people at the point of a gun, can rethink their position and come to their senses. We're hoping that that will happen, that this will create the kind of situation where they will not choose to destroy their country or themselves. And certainly, these kinds of economic restrictions make that choice very clear to the coup leaders and to their supporters.

And that's why we think it is important to try every diplomatic arrow in our quiver so that we can restore democracy. And if we can restore democracy, we will end the huge number of Haitians who are fleeing as refugees, risking their lives. At the same time, we will be able to create an environment of economic hope with the other nations of the world to provide a long-term solution.

I want to make it very clear, the financial transaction prohibition, which is quite different from seizing and freezing assets, is extremely important because it is targeted specifically at those groups who have been the supporters of the coup leaders and of the coup leaders themselves. We think it's a positive step. Again, it is a step that has been supported by the OAS in its recent communique from Brazil and also by the Four Friends of Haiti at the United Nations.

Thank you very, very much.

END 12:45 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On October 4, 1991, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act ("NEA") (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), President Bush exercised his statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12775 of October 4, 1991, declaring a national emergency and blocking Haitian government property.

On October 28, 1991, pursuant to the above authorities, President Bush exercised his statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12779 of October 28, 1991, blocking property of and prohibiting transactions with Haiti.

On June 30, 1993, pursuant to the above authorities, as well as the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended ("UNPA") (22 U.S.C. 287c), I exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12853 of June 30, 1993, to impose additional economic measures with respect to Haiti. This latter action was taken, in part, to ensure that the economic measures taken by the United States with respect to Haiti would fulfill its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 841 of June 16, 1993.

On October 18, 1993, pursuant to the IEEPA and the NEA, I again exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12872 of October 18, 1993, blocking property of various persons with respect to Haiti.

On May 6, 1994, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 917, calling on Member States to take additional measures to tighten the embargo against Haiti. On May 7, 1994, pursuant to the above authorities, I exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12914 of May 7, 1994, to impose additional economic measures with respect to Haiti. On May 21, 1994, pursuant to the above authorities, I exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12917 of May 21, 1994, to impose economic measures required by Resolution 917. These latter actions were taken, in part, to ensure that the economic measures taken by the United States with respect to Haiti would fulfill its obligations under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 917.

On June 10, 1994, pursuant to the above authorities, I exercised my statutory authority to issue Executive Order No. 12920 of June 10, 1994, prohibiting additional transactions with Haiti.

This new Executive order:

prohibits payment or transfer of funds or other assets to Haiti from or through the United States or to or through the United States from Haiti, with exceptions for activities of the United States Government, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or foreign diplomatic missions, certain payments related to humanitarian assistance in Haiti, limited family remittances, funds for travel-related expenses, and payments incidental to exempt shipments of food, medicine, medical supplies, and informational materials;

prohibits the sale, supply, or exportation by United States persons or from the United States, or using U.S.-registered vessels or aircraft, of any goods, technology, or services to Haiti or in connection with Haitian businesses, or activities by United States persons or in the United States that promote such sale, supply, or exportation, except for the sale, supply, or exportation of informational materials, certain foodstuffs, and medicines and medical supplies;

prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions of this order; and

authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to issue regulations implementing the provisions of the Executive order.

The new Executive order is necessary to tighten the embargo

against Haiti with the goal of the restoration of democracy in that nation and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under the framework of the Governors Island Agreement.

I am providing this notice to the Congress pursuant to section 204(b) of the IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)) and section 301 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1631). I am enclosing a copy of the Executive order that I have issued.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 10, 1994.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

SUBJECT: Scheduled Air Service Ban

In furtherance of the international effort to remove the de facto regime in Haiti and to restore the democratically elected Aristide government, I have taken certain steps in the Executive order that I issued today.

In addition, I have determined that it is in the essential foreign policy interests of the United States that additional action beyond that in Executive Order No. 12914 of May 7, 1994, be taken regarding transportation by air to Haiti. I have determined that, with respect to regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights of U.S. and Haitian air carriers, and except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, authorizations, or licenses that may be issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation with the Departments of State and Transportation, the following is prohibited: the granting of permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly the territory of the United States, if the aircraft, as part of the same flight or as a continuation of that flight, is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Haiti.

The Department of Transportation should take appropriate action to implement this decision. That action should be effective as of 11:59 p.m., eastern daylight time on June 24, 1994, and these measures should remain in effect until further notification.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12920

PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HAITI

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the actions and policies of the de facto regime in Haiti and the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order No. 12775, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order: (a) Any payment or transfer of funds or other financial or investment assets or credits to Haiti from or through the United States, or to or through the United States from Haiti, except for:

(i) payments and transfers for the conduct of activities in Haiti of the United States Government, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or foreign diplomatic missions;

(ii) payments and transfers between the United States and Haiti for the conduct of activities in Haiti of nongovernmental organizations engaged in the provision in Haiti of essential humanitarian assistance as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury;

(iii) payments and transfers from a United States person to any close relative of the remitter or of the remitter's spouse who is resident in Haiti, provided that such payments do not exceed \$50 per month to any one household, and that neither the de facto regime in Haiti nor any person designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a blocked individual or entity of Haiti is a beneficiary of the remittance;

(iv) reasonable amounts of funds carried by travelers to or from Haiti to cover their travel-related expense; and

(v) payments and transfers incidental to shipments to Haiti of food, medicine, medical supplies, and informational materials exempt from the export prohibitions of this order;

(b) The sale, supply, or exportation by United States persons or

from the United States, or using U.S.-registered vessels or aircraft, of any goods, technology, or services, regardless of origin, to Haiti, or for the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from Haiti, or any activity by United States persons or in the United States that promotes such sale, supply, or exportation, other than the sale, supply, or exportation of:

(i) informational materials, such as books and other publications, needed for the free flow of information; or

(ii) medicines and medical supplies, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, and rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil, corn, corn flour, milk, and edible tallow, provided that neither the de facto regime in Haiti nor any person designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a blocked individual or entity of Haiti is a direct or indirect party to the transaction; or

(iii) donations of food, medicine, and medical supplies intended to relieve human suffering; and

(c) Any transaction by United States persons that evades or avoids,

or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order, the definitions contained in section 3 of Executive Order No. 12779 apply to the terms used in this order.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 5.

(a) This order shall take effect at 11:59 a.m., eastern daylight time on June 10, 1994.

(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 10, 1994.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PROHIBITING CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HAITI

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the actions and policies of the de facto regime in Haiti and the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order No. 12775, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The following are prohibited, except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the effective date of this order: (a) Any payment or transfer of funds or other financial or investment assets or credits to Haiti from or through the United States, or to or through the United States from Haiti, except for:

(i) payments and transfers for the conduct of activities in Haiti of the United States Government, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or foreign diplomatic missions;

(ii) payments and transfers between the United States and Haiti for the conduct of activities in Haiti of nongovernmental organizations engaged in the provision in Haiti of essential humanitarian assistance as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury;

(iii) payments and transfers from a United States person to any close relative of the remitter or of the remitter's spouse who is resident in Haiti, provided that such payments do not exceed \$50 per month to any one household, and that neither the de facto regime in Haiti nor any person designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a blocked individual or entity of Haiti is a beneficiary of the remittance;

(iv) reasonable amounts of funds carried by travelers to or from Haiti to cover their travel-related expense; and

(v) payments and transfers incidental to shipments to Haiti of food, medicine, medical supplies, and informational materials exempt from the export prohibitions of this order;

(b) The sale, supply, or exportation by United States

persons or from the United States, or using U.S.-registered vessels or aircraft, of any goods, technology, or services, regardless of origin, to Haiti, or for the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from Haiti, or any activity by United States persons or in the United States that promotes such sale, supply, or exportation, other than the sale, supply, or exportation of:

(i) informational materials, such as books and other publications, needed for the free flow of information; or

(ii) medicines and medical supplies, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, and rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil, corn, corn flour, milk, and edible tallow, provided that neither the de facto regime in Haiti nor any person designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a blocked individual or entity of Haiti is a direct or indirect party to the transaction; or

(iii) donations of food, medicine, and medical supplies intended to relieve human suffering; and

(c) Any transaction by United States persons that evades or

avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order, the definitions contained in section 3 of Executive Order No. 12779 apply to the terms used in this order.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 5.

(a) This order shall take effect at 11:59 a.m., eastern daylight time on June 10, 1994.

(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 10, 1994.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 22, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12922

BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN HAITIAN NATIONALS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the actions and policies of the de facto regime in Haiti and the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order No. 12775, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, all property and interests in property of:

(a) any Haitian national resident in Haiti; or

(b) any other person subject to the blocking provisions of Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, or 12914 and Haitian citizens who are members of the immediate family of any such person, as identified by the Secretary of the Treasury;

that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked. This section shall not apply to property of nongovernmental organizations engaged in the provision of essential humanitarian assistance in Haiti or in the conduct of refugee and migration operations in Haiti, as identified by the Secretary of the Treasury. Payments and transfers previously authorized by Executive Order No. 12920 of June 10, 1994, may continue to be made in a manner directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Sec. 2. Any transaction by a United States person that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) The term "Haitian national" means a citizen of Haiti or an entity organized under the laws of Haiti.

(b) The definitions contained in section 3 of Executive Order No. 12779 apply to the terms used in this order.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 6.

(a) This order shall take effect at 10:09 p.m., eastern daylight time on June 21, 1994.

(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 21, 1994.



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 22, 1994

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

June 22, 1994

The Briefing Room

3:45 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose of this briefing is to fill in as best we can the details of what the particular measure that was announced earlier does and answer your questions as to the consequence. My colleagues here are experts in this. There is one other person who damn well better get here from OFAC. But we're going to go ahead without him.

Q Couldn't you make the announcement again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I will start from the top. This is actually from her announcement. Do you really want me to read it? Okay.

It says: "As part of the Clinton administration's commitment to restore democracy to Haiti, the President has imposed additional financial sanctions to block assets of all Haitian nationals residing in Haiti. The order also reconfirms prior blockings of named persons who have participated in or supported the illegal regime in Haiti."

Is this a comfortable speed, if you're taking it down? Okay.

"And extends to all Haitian family members of already blocked individuals wherever resident. Blocked assets include assets in the United States or subject to U.S. jurisdiction, such as deposits in foreign banks of U.S. banks."

This new executive order is effective immediately. It does not affect property of the United States government, the United Nations, the Organization of American States or foreign diplomatic missions in Haiti. It is also inapplicable to nongovernmental organizations providing essential humanitarian assistance or conducting refugee and migration operations in Haiti.

Q How many people are affected compared to the previous number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm reverting back to lecture hall techniques here and am watching as the pens go down, and then I'll continue and finish this, and then I'll take your answers.

This executive order is intended to target propertied Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the suffering of the Haitian people. We will continue to work closely with nongovernmental groups to minimize the impact of the new sanctions on their operations in Haiti.

This executive order does not affect financing for continued shipments of basic foodstuffs and medical supplies to Haiti, as well as transactions that are associated with such shipments, consistent with previous executive orders and U.N. sanctions.

The new sanctions the President has imposed will amplify our message to the Haitian military leadership and those who have supported them, that we are determined to bring about the return of democracy and President Aristide to Haiti.

Coupled with previous actions, the freeze executed today by President Clinton will make it unmistakably clear to the Haitian elite that it will not escape the consequences of continued rule by the illegitimate de facto regime.

We urge those elites this now and to join in the restoration of democracy to Haiti.

Actually, I have a sets of Qs and As here, which are rather well structured. So, if you like --

Q Did you write your own questions? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course. Of course. Listen, this is an exercise best conducted alone anyway, so -- (laughter) --

Q Is this a new way of --

Q Could we ask how many people are affected, though? This is really --

Q And then, is that one of your Qs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, you can. It's there, but we can go out of turn if you like. Alright. Hang on. Has my colleague gotten here yet? No? Okay, alright.

The total number of persons who might be affected by this we cannot know. (Laughter.) Wait, just a minute. You have to hear the subordinate clause before you have to decide whether the giggle factor is involved. First of all, we assume that the Haitian poor are not likely to have assets in the control of U.S. banks or subject to this freeze. So, wherever they are, this freeze gets to the wealthy, however many of them there are. I don't think that's laughable, especially if you discover that your property is frozen in Miami, or wherever.

Now, in addition, in order to ensure immediate application against these wealthy elites, more than 250 individuals were specified as being covered by the order in implementing instructions that accompanied the order as distributed to U.S. banks. So this executive order catches any Haitian citizen who has assets within the grip of the United States government. But, in addition, there was a list of 250 named persons to whom this executive order has been explicitly applied.

Q Could you characterize those people?

Q What kind of people? Generically, who are these 250 people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see my colleague is here. How is it you managed to run three blocks and not look warm?

The list was prepared for this purpose. I think that we can characterize who was selected to go on it without necessarily providing the names. I don't know if there's a problem about giving the names. Do you think so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The names have been supplied to the U.S. financial institutions to ensure that in addition to every other covered individual, any Haitian national resident of Haiti -- but these people in particular are, in fact, specifically blocked by banks, and so they have the names so they can immediately take action on these individuals.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the logical question here is, can we provide the list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. When could you provide the list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Later today.

Q You said there were 250 names on the first list, and I thought there were 600.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a new list. This is a list that was associated with the executive order that just went into effect.

Q Is it the feeling -- if I can press that question, is it the feeling that this second request covers a larger group of people than the first -- 600 in the first, are you trying to pick up folks who you missed, are you trying to hit a larger category of folks trying to stop? Obviously, there was a -- rush to switch accounts out of U.S. banks, and a first order was implemented. We're trying to get a sense of whether the horse has left the barn, of whether you're catching a small group of people who theoretically fell through the cracks, or whether you acted to get a broad group after the rush to switch assets prompted by the initial order.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This order is more sweeping and decisive.

Q But does it cover a larger group of people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm -- that was dot, dot, dot. As to who got caught, one must listen to who is screaming in the next couple

of days. I expect that we will hear from their attorneys in due course.

Remember, we are not aiming necessarily for vast numbers of persons. What we're aiming for are persons who happen to have assets that are within the grasp of this order. And as I said before, there is no way for us to know, conclusively, how extensive that number of persons might be.

On the other hand, the list of 250 people that was provided in association with this order was carefully devised to be as close to a smart bomb financially as we could get.

Q What indication do you have that you're not simply putting a freeze on a bunch of empty accounts, that there are, in fact, assets there that have not been shifted out somewhere else where you can't get ahold of them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, you would never have that information, but it's broader than just accounts, it's property and interest and property in the United States subject to U.S. jurisdiction and foreign branches of U.S. banks. Moreover, it would prohibit financial transactions as well by the black minority.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd ask you to give a little more detail about the composition of the second list. That is, in terms of whether or not it is restricted to persons supporting the regime, or represents a broader category of persons.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's a broad cross-section of those individuals who, in addition to the standard laid out in the executive order, all Haitian nationals resident in Haiti includes specifically these people by name to ensure, in fact, that financial institutions have caught these people in the net as well. It was a list devised in consultation with those specifically acknowledged of these individuals and names.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Please correct me if I'm wrong; I could be. But this applies not merely to those who are known to be directly in political support of the regime, but to those who are essentially deemed to have profited through their associations and transactions with them. So it is a wider circle of persons, and a broader standard for who shall be affected.

Q Understanding that you don't have a total number of people that this is going to affect, you have an approximate idea. Do you also have an approximate idea of how much money this entails? Millions and millions? A few hundred thousand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no way to have an estimate because those numbers are not kept anywhere in the system. The point about this measure is that it severs the ability of wealthy Haitians to hold property and assets in the United States of America, a place where people like to hold property and assets. It is a very severe message to them about the future. So I will say quite bluntly that if you think that you have to know how many dollars are involved in order to assess the punch this carries, you are not quite catching the way in which the message is phrased.

It is telling a community of people who are accustomed to regarding the United States as a backyard that it isn't.

Q But the question about whether it could be empty accounts I don't think has really been adequately answered. Is there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it can't be, as I said before.

Q So there's a chance, though, that some of that money could have been put in accounts --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, always a chance.

Q And could you also just explain for those of us who don't always look into this in great detail, generally who those people are? I mean, could it range from factory owners to drug dealers, or who are we talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure the drug dealers have that on their business cards.

Q Are they entrepreneurs? Who are these people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They will be a crosssection, and when you get the list, you'll have a chance to have a look at that yourself. But it will be a cross-section of the Haitian elite.

Q Will countries in the Caribbean be following suit? Have you all been talking to other countries down there who might also be able to freeze assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have an earlier executive order, which has stopped dollar transfers out of Haiti. And we are still talking to banks in the region and elsewhere to try to secure their voluntary cooperation with that standard. Of course, at the time that that earlier measure went into effect, the United States accounted for a little bit over 80 percent of the volume by dollar of what was going through there. So, in effect, we had the lion's share; it gave us our leverage; and we used it. But, of course, we would like for others to back us up.

The U.N. sanction that we have does not make that kind of approach mandatory for other banks, though it urges them to consider it. So we are out talking to them about that.

I have not even thought through myself yet or talked to my colleagues about whether this particular measure can be replicated elsewhere or whether it's advisable to try. I think it's sufficient at this point to say what I've said already, which is, it denies the United States as a place of investment to the Haitian elite and costs them what they have invested here. That is a very stern message.

Q Would you explain the legal language that it freezes the assets of Haitian nationals residing in Haiti, and then the families of the 250 named individual wherever they reside? Why not simply freeze the assets of the Haitian nationals wherever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you froze the assets of Haitians wherever, you would get a class of persons who essentially are expatriate, who have severed their living ties with Haiti, who live elsewhere, work elsewhere, and who don't deserve to be sucked into this.

The President of Haiti is here for the purpose of continuing his struggle to be returned to the pursuit of his constitutional obligations.

Q Can people named in the list move and reclaim control of their assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you want to amplify?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Once the assets are blocked, they're blocked within the United States. If they fit under the executive order, the standard is any resident, any Haitian national resident in Haiti, their assets are blocked and are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. That is in the United States, in the foreign branch of a U.S. bank, or doing business with a U.S. person would be prohibited because of the blocking order. But once it's blocked, it cannot be removed without a license.

Q So let me understand this. These people have had their assets frozen until, theoretically, Aristide is returned to power and you drop this sanction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're frozen until the President nullifies the executive order.

Q There is nothing they can do to regain control of their assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely nothing.

Q They cannot pledge allegiance to Aristide? They cannot disavow any association with the military government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When the President of the United States is ready, they can regain control over their assets, period. Excuse me. That's many, many questions, and there's one person behind you who has had quite a few.

Q Accepting the fact that you can't put a dollar figure on this, could you tell us how you can gauge the scope as large enough to really make it bite? What is the scope of it so that these folks -- you talked in terms of future investment, but what about the property that's here now, and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All property that is here now is frozen.

Q I hear that. But what's the scope of that property? Why -- if you don't know how much it's worth, how can you tell us it's large enough to make them feel the pain?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't we just find out?

Q What are some of the anticipated next steps, further actions, other sanctions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm here to discuss sanctions. And typically, you will see me nameless, faceless and odorless -- maybe odorless -- when the government announces what it is doing. I can't speculate in advance what we might do next.

There are some things that I would like to say about our efforts to make sure that these sanctions do not interfere with humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti. I'll return to your questions, but it is an important message to get out, if you would care to carry it. (Laughter.)

I'm not sure what's amusing about it, but let me go ahead --

Q I'll tell you, if you'd like to know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q You are among the more patronizing officials in this briefing room, I think. Maybe we could have an exchange of information without being treated

like three-year-olds. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize -- really, I didn't know I was. Truly. Can we start all over again?

Q That would be nice.

Q Not with Dee Dee's statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. No, not with Dee Dee's statement. Let me just answer the question. The key point that I wanted to make in connection with this is that the freeze specifically exempts nongovernmental organizations providing essential humanitarian assistance or conducting refugee operations in Haiti. We are continuing to work closely with these organizations to ensure that the impact of expanded sanctions on their operations is minimized. The freeze also exempts food and medical shipments to Haiti as well as transactions associated with those shipments.

Mort Halperin has been working closely and so has Mark Schneider, has been working closely with the NGOs as these sanctions take effect in order to explain to them in detail what they are and to talk them through the administrative procedures that have to be set up so that they can continue to function, better fulfilling a very vital function, feeding an increasingly large number of people in Haiti. And we are making every effort to be sure in designing these orders and in executing them that we continue to support their operation.

Q Can I ask a fundamental question here? What's the legal or constitutional basis for this kind of action? Are we entitled at any time, or is the President at any time he chooses to freeze or seize the assets of someone who supports a government we don't like?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think my colleague can answer that best.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which is the authority delegated to the President to take action --

Q When was this law passed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 1977 -- it's been used in Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Serbia, Panama, Haiti.

Q I assume this couldn't be used against American citizens in any instance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a very complex legal question that we could sit and debate. The point here is that this is any foreign national -- any Haitian national resident in Haiti. That's a much larger question. It doesn't really relate to what we're doing here.

Q But also the rubric is that it's under U.N. Security Council resolution, too, as well as the Act of 1977.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because of the incorporate by reference of earlier executive orders that were indeed part of the U.N. participation act that was included and cited in the preamble, however, this action was taken unilaterally within the United States and is not part of a larger U.N. activity.

Q What happens with a Haitian national resident in Haiti who's covered by this, who shifts legal residence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If he can demonstrate that for a period of time prior to imposition of the executive order for a continuing period, then he can go forward to the bank or the holder of the assets and make a case that indeed he would not qualify if for that period of time he was indeed not a resident.

Q What I'm trying to figure out is if someone looks at this order that comes out, someone who -- official, whatever, and says, all right, I've upped stakes, I move out, ship my legal residence to another country wherever it is, establish whatever may be -- another citizenship, which can certainly be done. Can they be avoided that way? I'm just trying to find out how --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, if the assets were blocked underneath the standard I've just mentioned, they will remain blocked.

Q So under -- if I may ask yet another question, under the '77 law, any foreign national who places assets in the United States leaves himself open for this kind of thing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These kinds of executive orders are not issued lightly; it's in extraordinary circumstance. It took us a long time to get to this point. There are very few examples of instances where we have done something like this. Any foreign person who invests in the United States in good faith can expect his investment to be honored. This is, I think everyone would agree, a fairly unique set of circumstances.

Q Unless his government does something we don't like, even if he is innocent of involvement in that government.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are lots of governments that do things we disagree with. One has to get to a fairly intense threshold before something like this can happen.

Q Why is this happening at this particular point? Is it an indication that nothing seems to be working and you must try one more time? Or has there been some progress, as Dee Dee indicated, but I wasn't quite clear on exactly what kind of progress we're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the second question, I have to beg off because I don't know exactly what she said. As to why it is happening in this fashion, essentially the hope is that at lower levels of the sanctions, people who are running Haiti would get the message that they need to get out of the way of constitutional authority. Since that hasn't happened, we have moved to a sanction at a higher level of intensity. And you can't tell for sure whether they will get that message, but the intent of the sanction is to be a more powerful message than before.

Q Is there any appeals process here for Haitians who are affected? And, second of all, does this include all assets, such as automobiles, mutual funds? Is it all-inclusive?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the second question, yes, everything. The first question, there's a technical answer and then there's the answer which my colleague gave you, which is the political answer.

The technical answer is, anyone can always petition, send a letter, request to have a license; so the mechanism is there. The question then would be, should we do it?

Q So the operating assumption is that every Haitian with assets in the United States for the moment is a supporter of the military regime.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This applies not to every Haitian in the universe, but to --

Q I didn't say that. Is every Haitian with assets in the United States -- your operating assumption initially is that their support is of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. Let's qualify what we're talking about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The standard is resident in Haiti -- Haitian national resident in Haiti. If they have assets in the United States and they're resident in Haiti, they're blocked. If they have refugee status, if they've been out of Haiti for a period of time --

Q My question was, your operating assumption is that every Haitian living in Haiti with assets in the United States is assumed to be a supporter of the Cedras regime.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is assumed either to be a supporter or to be in a relationship to that regime which enables them to profit from it. Okay? I think that's right. I'll be right with you, I'm just checking. Isn't that right? Okay.

Q In your theory, are there any remaining sanctions you could take against the military or anything left now in terms of economic sanctions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question. I am not sure, as I stand here before you, that there would be any left. But in any event, in terms of direct sanctions to freeze property, we have basically done it with this sanction. There are other possible sanctions, measures, but not in this family, not in this group.

Q I think that's what the question is -- whether there are more things you can do -- whatever.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, there are other possibilities, but as I said before, I'll come before you to talk about them if there's a decision made to carry them out. I can't speculate about them in advance.

Q How much is the expected impact, or hoped-for impact of these sanctions diminished by the possibility or likelihood that a lot of the money that these -- the people that you're targeting here has is not in the United States, but in places like the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, which I gather are outside the ambit of these--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can't know. All I can tell you is that by their nature, these sanctions are blunt, they're not scientific. So you take a step of this sort and it's empirical. We --

Q What is your knowledge of the disposition of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not know the disposition of assets in places like the Caymans. And so there is no way that I can provide a --

Q Do you have any sense or estimate of whether these people have tied their money up here, or there, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Is that correct?

Q Just flat don't know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you like to qualify that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct. However, it would apply to deposits in U.S. banks which have branches in those locations or any branch around the world. If there was a bank in Paris or a bank in the Cayman Islands, that would apply. We will, however, be getting reports over a period of time as to the amount.

Q I'd like to ask you about the commercial airline instructions. I understand American Airlines stops flying in two days.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And how effective have you been with other countries in getting them to stop -- France, Canada?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't checked as of this morning about the French. But everybody else who had flights going in and out has voluntarily decided to go along with that, and we're hopeful that the French will go along, too.

Q I'm a little confused about the effect --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me just a second. This was her first --

Q confirm reports that the U.S. is considering buying off the military leaders, paying them off to leave the country.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't confirm, deny, or even comment about those reports.

Q Didn't earlier executive orders restrict the asset movement of family members of the 600 or so named evil doers with -- is this new order filling a loophole about family members of those earlier named people, or were they named -- family members not named originally as being on the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those earlier orders established a series of standards by which factional information would be applied as to the degree of obstructing the implementation of the Governors Island Accords, contributing to the climate of violence, obstructing the implementation of the U.N. resolutions, and so forth.

Several weeks ago there was a transfer prohibition from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or through the United States to Haiti. This goes still one step further and blocks all assets to a Haitian national resident of Haiti. So it's a progressive step. The 650 are still in place. Any Haitian national resident of Haiti is in place, and these names now meet the standard Haitian national resident in Haiti.

Q Was there anything before about every Haitian national in Haiti, or is that new?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's new. That's new today.

Q to include the main people and that's new.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That 250 name is inclusive of the names who might meet the standard. It is a portion of those names who might meet the standard, but who are likely to have accounts.

Q They weren't on the first list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of them may have been. There may be some overlap, but substantially, no.

Q the last time the United States invoked this, and with whom against whom?

Q Iraq.

Q Yugoslavia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was not done against Iraq. Vietnam in 1975; it was done in the north in 1963.

Q I'm sorry -- what was done in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Blocking of individual private assets.

Q Not since then?

Q I thought you said this was done under a '77 law.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Those actions were taken on an earlier statute that has similar authority but has not been used since the new law was passed, but was grandfathered in. That was called Trading With The Enemy Act.

MR. MITCHELL: Could we just take one more question. If you have some detailed questions, we can do this afterwards.

Q In a political context, this is a policy, it's a broadly-framed order. And I think one of the questions we have been touching on around the borders is, don't you run the risk of alienating a substantial part of the middle class population in Haiti, those people who are not supporters, don't you run the risk that they will be clearly not on our side at some point down the road, because we've been taking a significant bite out of their assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To this point, and has been possible for such persons, to find a relationship with the people who are running Haiti that is a workable and presumably comforable enough for them. The purpose of this order is to focus their attention on the fact that that relationship now leads to conditions that aren't workable and aren't comfortable, so that hopefully they will come off the fence and become a source of pressure for the restoration of constitutional rule in Haiti.

I can take two more, if that's okay with you.

Q I'd like to ask you how effective has been the original order for the 600. I mean, has it really turned the screws on the military?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not only does it block individual accounts, it prohibits transactions, so the blocking order locks in place what is there and prohibits contacts with the United States. For those names, 650 people heretofore, financial contacts with the United States, were also prohibited.

Q I wanted to follow up on what he was saying. Why is it appropriate for the United States to say that you must take sides? It is not appropriate for you to not take sides in this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's up to these persons to decide for themselves what they want to do. But unless they become a force for restoration of constitutional government in Haiti, democracy is not going to be able to live there. I think it's legitimate for the President to use his legal authority to underscore that point.

Now, of course, if they still wish to remain on the fence, so to speak, that's a choice that only they can make. But a choice that we can make is whether to allow them to do so and still enjoy their ability to operate financially in the United States.

Q But what we were saying is if you don't take sides, we will punish you. Why is that appropriate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One could say that what we are trying to do here is to bring an end to the suffering of the largest part of the Haitian people, which we think is a process that begins when constitutional government is restored and given a chance to exercise the promise it had before it was kicked out by the de facto regime.

Q I wanted to ask you, you've been using -- you and Dee Dee used the words wealthy elite. Is there a cutoff among -- let's say a Haitian who is wealthy or elite has managed to save \$10,000 and has some in the United States and resides in Haiti, will he be affected? Is there a cutoff quantity that divides the wealthy and elite from normal amount?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The order applies to all Haitian nationals resident in Haiti.

Q Regardless of the amount.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q But what is the population of Haiti -- about 4 million? Six million.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I think we're done. The lady in the second row, whom I offended, can we talk and make peace on the side?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END4:20 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 22, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER

BLOCKING PROPERTY OF CERTAIN HAITIAN NATIONALS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the actions and policies of the de facto regime in Haiti and the national emergency described and declared in Executive Order No. 12775, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order, all property and interests in property of:

(a) any Haitian national resident in Haiti; or

(b) any other person subject to the blocking provisions of Executive Order Nos. 12775, 12779, 12853, 12872, or 12914 and Haitian citizens who are members of the immediate family of any such person, as identified by the Secretary of the Treasury;

that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked. This section shall not apply to property of nongovernmental organizations engaged in the provision of essential humanitarian assistance in Haiti or in the conduct of refugee and migration operations in Haiti, as identified by the Secretary of the Treasury. Payments and transfers previously authorized by Executive Order No. 12920 of June 10, 1994, may continue to be made in a manner directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Sec. 2. Any transaction by a United States person that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) The term "Haitian national" means a citizen of Haiti or an entity organized under the laws of Haiti.

(b) The definitions contained in section 3 of Executive Order No. 12779 apply to the terms used in this order.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order, including suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 6.

(a) This order shall take effect at 10:09 p.m., eastern daylight time on June 21, 1994.

(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 21, 1994.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 22, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

As part of the Clinton Administration's commitment to restore democracy to Haiti, the President has imposed additional financial sanctions to block assets of all Haitian nationals residing in Haiti. The order also reconfirms prior blockings of named individuals who have participated in or supported the illegal regime in Haiti and extends to all Haitian family members of already blocked individuals, wherever resident.

Blocked assets include assets in the U.S. or subject to U.S. jurisdiction, such as deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks. This new Executive Order is effective immediately. It does not affect property of the United States Government, the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the foreign diplomatic missions in Haiti. It is also inapplicable to nongovernmental organizations providing essential humanitarian assistance or conducting refugee and migration operations in Haiti.

This Executive Order is intended to target propertied Haitians who have supported the de facto regime and prolonged the suffering of the Haitian people.

We will continue to work closely with non-governmental groups to minimize the impact of the new sanctions on their operations in Haiti. This Executive Order does not affect financing for continued shipments of basic food stuffs and medical supplies to Haiti, as well as transactions associated with such shipments, consistent with previous Executive Orders and UN sanctions.

The new sanctions the President has imposed will amplify our message to the Haitian military leadership and those who have supported them that we are determined to bring about the return of democracy and President Aristide to Haiti. Coupled with previous actions, the freeze executed today by President Clinton will make it unmistakably clear to the Haitian elite that it will not escape the consequences of continued rule by the illegitimate de facto regime. We urge those elites to recognize this now and to join in the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 29, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT ON HAITI WILLIAM GRAY

The Briefing Room

4:20 P.M. EDT

Q Mr. Gray, can you explain why 30 percent -- we were told today that the number of Haitians being granted asylum from the Comfort, the level is about 30 percent, which is a large increase percentage-wise over the five or six percent that we had been told was the average on land. Is there something occurring that would account for a larger size of permissions because of the boat process?

MR. GRAY: Well, actually, if you look at the numbers of both the boat processing as well as the in-country processing during the same rough period of time when the ships were in operation, it is very similar; it varies between 20 and 30 percent.

I think clearly what we are seeing is a continuing deterioration of the human rights situation in Haiti. That is why the President, on May 8, announced the change of policy. And I think the outflows that we are seeing now represent a continuing deterioration of that human rights situation. As you all know and has been covered by the press, there have been hundreds of killings in Haiti. And surely, we believe, that the reason for these outflows is connected to that deteriorating situation in human rights. And when you look both at in-country as well as shipboard during the same period, you see very significant changes.

Q Could I follow up, please, and ask you why it was five percent a few months ago that were granted asylum and now it's 30 percent? The question goes to what changed that more are eligible for asylum.

MR. GRAY: Well, what we've done is we've changed our whole processing procedure. Before it was in-country alone, and secondly, now we have a partnership with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees that is looking very carefully at each individual refugee request in light of those deteriorating situations. So, again, I go back to the fact that we have seen a decline in the situation in Haiti; that was the reason for the change in policy. We're not surprised by what we see because that was why the policy was changed.

Q How does that explain, though, the increase in the acceptances? I can understand how it would account for an increase in the number of applications, but how does it explain the fact that the ratio of acceptance seems to have gone up so sharply?

MR. GRAY: Well, without getting into specific detail as the interviewers go through the process, obviously if people and families are being killed, if sisters, wives being raped, the number of people who would, therefore, qualify for asylum would, therefore, significantly increase. So, therefore, if you have an increase in human rights violations it is logical that you will also have probably an increase in the number of people who can justify their claims for asylum.

And we must remember, the President made it very clear: we changed the policy because of the deteriorating human rights situation. That situation has not improved. It has continued to decline. And so the fundamental cause of the refugee problem remains the lack of democracy in Haiti. And our policy is designed to deal fundamentally with reversing that in Haiti. And until we address that problem, we will continue to see the effect, which is the refugee situation.

Q Mr. Gray, is Aristide driving -- beyond his natural interest, is he driving the U.S. policy? Is he making policy and making us dance to his tune?

MR. GRAY: No, the President of the United States is the maker of U.S. foreign policy.

Q But he seems to oppose everything we do and harden up the policy, and we seem to go along.

MR. GRAY: Well, I'm not sure that that is the case. In fact, I would seriously question that. I'm sure that as you well know, governments and governmental leaders always have a right to criticize other government and governmental leaders in things that they disagree. You can see that on international scene all the time.

Q But he prevails.

MR. GRAY: He does not determine U.S. foreign policy at all. I think -- I have not read the transcript, I have not seen it, but I am told he made some very favorable remarks about U.S. foreign policy this week at the National Press Club.

Governmental leaders will have differences of opinion. But I assure you that the President of the United States makes the U.S. foreign policy.

Q Mr. Gray, a two part question -- first, do you know if the heavy outflows of refugees in the past few days is a spike that you can tap down, or is going to be a continuing problem?

MR. GRAY: Well, we're going to have to look at the situation on a daily basis. Clearly, we are having a huge surge at this time. Whether or not it is a spike, something that is temporary that will drop off, or whether it is a wave that will be very consistent is yet to be determined. However, we are prepared to deal with whatever develops with regard to the refugee situation. And that is why we have not only the ships in place, but that is also why we have Guantanamo available to be utilized for a situation like this. And that is why we have already in place an agreement and we expect to open very shortly a land processing center in the Turks and Caicos Island. And that is why we are also in discussions with several other countries about land-based centers throughout the region.

And so this is not something that is surprising. We've been watching the deteriorating human rights situation and we are prepared to deal with it.

Q The second part, if I might -- the processing at sea was set up to deal with some of the human rights problems in Haiti, but now with this massive outflux of refugees being drawn out into the open sea, where they run risks, and the fact that you have to deal with them no in various locations, in much larger numbers than expected, haven't you just exchanged one problem for another?

MR. GRAY: No, that is not correct. Again, we don't use the word unexpected. We use the word expected. The President said in May we were changing our policy because of the human rights situation. We expected that if that human rights situation continued to decline that there would be an increase in refugees. Why? Because the fundamental cause of the refugee problem is in Port-auPrince. It is Cedras. It is the coup leaders. It is those who stole democracy. And as long as they're in place, and as long as they refuse to step down, as long as they seek to tighten their grip by the use of violence, then you can expect this to happen.

We have expected it. And that is why we have the ships in place. That is why we have Guantanamo as a backup. That is why, just a few weeks ago, I went to the Turks and Caicos Island and signed an agreement to build a processing center there. And that is why we're in the process of talking with several other nations to put together other land-processing centers.

So we have been prepared. We understand what is going on. But, again, I would draw you to the fundamental problem --the fundamental problem is a lack of democracy. And what we're seeing in terms of the refugees is effect not cause. And what we've got to do is keep our policy focused on dealing with the root cause of the problem, which is bringing democracy.

Q It seems apparent from news reports that those who do apply for land-based processing in Haiti are often persecuted by government forces. And U.S. policy, of course, is to say, do it there; don't risk your lives by fleeing in boats. Yet we've only made it easier for them to be processed if they do flee on boats. By some accounts, they're fleeing in even ricketier boats than before because they know that the chances are that they'll get picked up and processed. We seem to be saying one thing and doing another.

MR. GRAY: No, what we're saying is that, one, we think that it is safer to go to the in-country processing centers rather than take your chances in rickety boats that could be swamped, people drown, before our Coast Guard cutters get there. So we continue to say, go to the in-country processing centers. It is safer. And if you look at the rates that have going on there, you will find that a lot of people have been going there, and we have been providing refugee asylum status.

And so, again, we would simply say to you that we have been trying to take out as quickly as possible those who have been granted asylum through the in-country process. But it continues to be the safest possibility, rather than getting in a rickety boat, going out 10, 12, 15, 30 miles and hoping that some Coast Guard cutter will come. So our message remains the same. Our message is, go to the in-country processing center. But because we understand the deterioration of human rights that is going on in that country, we have been prepared to take those who have felt the need to run the risk of their lives through these rickety boats. So, thus, our policy is designed to deal with both. However, we continue to say, go to the in-country processing centers.

Q What about persecution for those who do go? By all accounts there has been some.

MR. GRAY: We have some evidence that people have been detained upon going back, but they have usually been released. We have some evidence, and we've seen some in the news media, of some people who have been subject to some persecution after going through the land processing system. And we've tried to make corrections in that system so that a person who is approved can be immediately removed. And we are working right now to remove all of those incountry who have been granted asylum.

We're also working as a part of this policy -- if you go back and look at the policy since May 8th, this policy has been one that has sought to do several things: One, to provide a fair processing operation for refugee and asylum seekers. But at the same time, it has been designed to be prepared for any contingency while also bringing to play a multilateral approach recognizing that the refugee problem is not simply a United States problem.

And that is why we've gotten the United Nations High Commission on Refugees involved. That is why we've got Turks and Caicos started to put in place a center. That is why we went to the Jamaica government, and they courageously have stepped forward and provided their harbor in order to begin the processing system there. And so there has been a consistent goal in this policy. And that policy has understood that as human rights deteriorate in the country, you may have a surge, and, yes, you may even have a wave if human rights continues to deteriorate. But we are prepared for it, and we're going to continue to be prepared for it.

Q How do you deal with the wave, though, when it gets up -- what if it gets up to 10,000, 11,000, 12,000 refugees back at Guantanamo Bay, like George Bush had? You don't want that on your hands, I take it.

MR. GRAY: Well, as I said before, Guantanamo is now open as a backup to the ships because of this surge. We don't know if it is a wave yet. We've only had three days. Secondly, we hope next week to open Turks and Caicos. And we're also in the process of negotiation and conversations with several other countries. So if you look at all of those steps that we're taking, I don't think we'll reach that kind of situation that you just described.

Q You have mentioned the human rights situation, but as the President himself yesterday said that the tougher sanctions probably explain in part this big increase in the refugees. Would you agree with that?

MR. GRAY: No, I would not necessarily agree with that. I do believe that sometimes sanctions do cause fear, anxiety in a population. But let's not get into the game of blaming sanctions for the cause of poverty in Haiti or the deterioration of conditions that are driving people out.

Haiti has a per capita income, as you know, of \$350. These sanctions that have been in place less than five weeks didn't do that. Stories about children suffering an starving, that didn't occur because of five weeks of United Nations sanctions or the targeted sanctions that we imposed. There are no hungry children seeking to get on American Airlines or Air Canada to fly coach or first-class to go to New York or Miami. There are no starving peasants who are worried about their transfer of assets at Citibank or at Chase Manhattan. There are no people in -- who are worried about their estates in Florida or Texas or their penthouses in New York.

And so, therefore, to suggest that these sanctions are somehow creating the impoverishment of that country and driving people out avoids the historical reality and the fact that what is the cause of the refugee situation is primarily the lack of democracy, the coup leadership, its brutality, the declining human rights.

Yes -- do sanctions hurt? Yes, they do. They do have an effect -- a negative effect. But dictatorships kill. And those who say that we should not follow this policy are usually are those who say, let's walk away and leave the dictatorship in place. I think the community of nations, the United Nations, the Organization of American States in an unprecedented manner have said collectively that this is the correct policy to pursue. And that's why even on the targeted sanctions that we have put in place since May 21st, we've been joined by Canada. We've been joined by the Netherlands. We've been joined by Panamanian Airlines. And we're hoping that Air France and others will join in doing that.

So I think we've got to be very, very clear. And at the same time that we're putting these tough sanctions on that are targeted toward the wealthy, those who need visas, for instance, we are also offsetting the suffering of the poor by feeding nearly one out of every five Haitians today and providing \$2.2 million of medical supplies and aid to those in need of healing.

So to suggest that somehow the prime result of these economic sanctions of five weeks is the impoverishment of Haiti, ignores the fact that it is the military dictatorship that continues to take away opportunity. We all know, as looking back to the 1970s and the 1980s and the Western Hemisphere, whenever we have restored democracy, whenever we've restored free marketplace, you have seen the end of refugees. And we have seen that movement in this hemisphere for the last two decades. And now, in one place, there remains in this island, Haiti, a lack of democracy, and that is why the nations of Latin America, Central America, our neighbor to the north Canada and the United Nations have joined overwhelmingly in supporting what we are doing and have implemented similar actions themselves.

Q Sir, I'm interested in the increase in repression and human rights abuses that you cite which seems conveniently to coincide with the President's decision on refugees and not necessarily to gibe with what we've been hearing for the past year and a half. I wonder if you have hard numbers to support this, and whether you have hard numbers to support the approval rate for refugees applying in-country being the same as those on shipboard?

MR. GRAY: First of all, the numbers speak for themselves if you talk to the human rights organizations. Many of you have covered them. Many of you have shown on television bodies lying out in the street on the way to the airport, where everyone had to go around them, and left there purposely to demonstrate the ability to inspire fear. I saw a series of reports this weekend on several major news outlets of women who are being raped sytematically in front of their children because they don't support the coup, or because they were believed to have supported President Aristide.

So we don't need to document that. It has been recorded by you in the media; it is being recorded by the human rights organizations, and including the international human rights representative there on the spot, whom I met with in Brazil, who clearly has put forth that there are increased human rights violations.

And so those are not numbers that interestingly coincide with the change of policy. We changed our policy because of those numbers and because of what was happening in-country. And that is why we changed the policy.

With regard to the acceptance rates, if you would like to contact we'll be glad to put you in touch with the appropriate member of our staff to discuss numbers. And what I said -- but I will say it again -- I said, during roughly the same period, since the boats have been in place, that in-country as well as the acceptance rates in terms of the shipboard processing have been roughly about the same, and has varied between 20 and 30 percent.

Q Do you have any indication at all that the military rulers in Haiti are any closer to stepping down now than they were before the new policy of sanctions and so forth had started?

MR. GRAY: Yes. I think we are seeing our policies taking hold and having effect. Some of you have already documented, but let me go through some of the things that we are seeing.

One, I'm told by our people that the price of gas that everyone saw was low several weeks ago is beginning to climb again. We are beginning to see greater efforts on the part of the Dominican Republic to seal its borders. And with the help of the U.N. technical team, we've also seen members of that society, some parliamentarians, as well as the brother of Michelle Francois, call for the coup leaders to step down. And we're also beginning to pick up signs of unrest within the military itself, and certainly among the business support groups of the coup leadership.

Those are things that have happened in the last few days, and we think that we're beginning to have a serious impact, and, hopefully, these policies will help the coup leadership and their supporters to come to their senses and make a choice. And the choice is very clear -- they can continue to pursue the policies that they are pursuing, holding on to power illegally, abusing human rights, and in so doing, run the risk of destroying their country, the institutions that they are sworn to protect; or, they can step down.

And I can assure you that the President is very strong in his resolve and so are the other nations of the Western Hemisphere, the OAS and the United Nations in pursuing these policies and making sure that they do step down.

Q But to follow up, sir, is there any direct evidence that these guys are closer to stepping down?

MR. GRAY: I think I've cited at least four or five things that show that there are breaks that are taking place. There are divisions that are taking place. And those things were not there a month ago. Other than that, I'm not prepared to comment on anything other than those things.

Q Are there any limits to your ability to process refugees? In other words, can you, in Guantanamo Bay and the all the other places you cited, handle as many as could come?

MR. GRAY: I believe that we're in a position and we are prepared to deal with the problems that we face at this time. I cannot conjecture on what will happen next week or next month if the situation in human rights declines further and large numbers come out, we will have to deal with that. But I will say that we have been prepared to deal with a surge or a spike or a wave, and that's why we've got the Turks and Caicos Island, that's why we've got Guantanamo, and we will be prepared to deal with any contingency.

But, again, I think our course has been to remain on the source of the problem. And the source of the problem is not the refugees. The source of the problem are the coup leaders who continue to oppress their people and continue to hold power against the will of the majority of their people who voted overwhelmingly in free and full election for leadership, and also against the rule of the entire international community. That is the fundamental cause.

Our policies will stay focused on changing that cause. And yes, we will be prepared to deal with the refugee situation in a multilateral way as we're doing with Jamaica, Turks and Caicos, and some other countries that will be joining us, and, above all, with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees which is helping in the processing and also helping in the resettlement.

Q these people that are fleeing their country like to come to the United States. Are you going to warehouse these people, then, at Guantanamo waiting for the change in leadership in Haiti? Or will they actually be allowed to come to the United States?

MR. GRAY: Well, first of all, let me just simply say that part of the process that we are working with the United Nations High Commission is proving resettlement opportunities for those who are screened in, not simply the United States, but in other countries as well. And therefore, it is our hope that this effort that we are working on in dealing with the refugee situation will become completely multilateral in the sense that it is not simply a United States issue, but it is really an issue of the Western hemisphere. And because the United Nations has gotten into it, it is clearly a condition that affects the entire world.

And so, therefore, we must address the refugee side, the effect side just as we're trying to address the core problem -- the lack of democracy -- with the same multilateral approach. And so, therefore, it is our expectation that as we go forward, we will be looking for other resettlement possibilities, and we will be prepared to deal with any contingency whether that involves a safe haven or not. And it will depend upon our day-to-day and week-toweek evaluation.

Thank you.

END4:48 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 5, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton spoke separately by phone today with President Guillermo Endara of Panama, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica and Prime Minister Lester Bird of Antigua and Barbuda to thank them for their willingness to host safe havens for Haitian refugees in each of their countries.

During the conversations, the President told each of the three leaders that by providing safety for those Haitians in need of protection, their governments would play a critical role in addressing the humanitarian implications of the crisis in Haiti.

In coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are now six governments in the region which have agreed to provide various forms of assistance to Haitian asylum-seekers. They include the United States, Jamaica, the Turks and Caicos, Panama, Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda.

The President today also invited Ernesto Perez Balladares, the President-elect of Panama, to meet with him on July 20 in Washington. President-elect Perez Balladares has accepted the President's invitation. This meeting will give President Clinton and President Balladares an opportunity to review U.S.-Panamanian cooperation across the range of areas of mutual interest including providing safe haven to Haitians in need of protection and restoring democracy to Haiti.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 5, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING BY WILLIAM GRAY, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT ON HAITI

The Briefing Room

12:04 P.M. EDT

MR. GRAY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The flow of boat migrants from Haiti highlights the continued political repression in that country. The United States, along with several other regional nations and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, are determined to provide protection to those Haitians who are at risk of persecution.

Toward that end, the United States has established an in-country refugee processing system in Haiti. It is one of only four such programs that we operate worldwide. Three thousand Haitians have entered the United States through this program since February of 1993. Those Haitians who apply in Haiti and are given refugee status will continue to be admitted to the United States.

The United States remains concerned that migration by boat places Haitians at risk of loss of life. The boats are often unseaworthy and are usually overcrowded. This morning's report of a loss of over 100 boat people at sea confirms the risk of boat departures. There are large numbers of Haitian asylum seekers who may be in need of protection. To provide for those large numbers, the United States, acting with other regional nations and the UNHCR will establish safe havens in several Caribbean area states.

The first of these safe havens will be established in Panama, initially at U.S. Defense Department facilities and later at a new camp run by UNHCR and the government of Panama. Those Haitian asylum seekers in need of protection will be allowed to stay. We pledge our continued vigorous efforts to ensure that those political conditions improve in the near future.

Thus, Haitians who are determined to be refugees at our three in-country refugees processing sites in Haiti will continue to be brought to the United States. Boat people will continue to be rescued at sea by the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy. Those boat people who are in need of protection will be given the opportunity to obtain it in safe haven camps, initially in Panama later in other Caribbean nations.

We remain committed to the early end of the source of the persecution in Haiti and the return of democracy there and the restoration of President Aristide. I will take questions.

Q Mr. Gray, you're saying, in effect, that people who go to the boats will not be able to enter the United States, even if they deserve asylum, that they will go to these safe haven countries and remain there.

MR. GRAY: Yes.

Q That only those who go in-country to processing centers and deserve refugee status will have the option of getting to the United States.

MR. GRAY: That is correct. What we are providing is a safe haven, safety from persecution and from the fear of persecution to all. Those who take to the boats will be offered safe haven in camps in Panama. Those who go to in-country processing sites will be offered the potential for resettlement after the processing in the United States.

We believe that this is a system that is a continuation of what the President announced May 8th of a fair procedure, a procedure that was responding to the continuing deterioration of human rights. And we believe that the overwhelming flow that we are seeing in the last week is created by the continued repression that is occurring in Haiti. And therefore we are prepared to respond to that by offering safety and safe haven for all.

And thus what you see is again an evolution to meet the crisis. It is multilateral. We are joined in it with Panama. And we also have agreement in principle with two other Caribbean nations -- Dominica and Antigua.

Q Why the distinction in the way they're treated?

Q For those who have a well-founded fear of persecution, has Panama agreed to in effect an open-ended commitment to allow these people to stay on its territory indefinitely until the situation in Haiti is resolved?

MR. GRAY: The agreement that we have with Panama is for them to provide safe haven for those who have a well-founded fear of persecution, political refugees, asylum seekers. And that commitment is for a six-month period as we continue our policy of applying economic and diplomatic pressure.

Q What happens to the refugee processing centers on the Comfort and the Turks and Caicos? And are the standards different for measuring those who have a fear of persecution as opposed to those who you would let into the United States? Is it going to be easier for them to get this safe haven status?

MR. GRAY: As you know, the Turks and Caicos processing center is expected to be open next week and functioning. We have the shipboard processing in place, and that will continue. We are in the process of negotiations with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees to determine just that issue, which is the process and criteria as we move forward into this new phase of providing safety and protection for people who are fleeing from persecution.

Q So those ships would be processing people, but not into the United States anymore.

MR. GRAY: Well, the ships -- those who are picked up by ship will be given safe haven in Panama. So therefore, those who would go to the processing centers at TCI or at Jamaica on shipboard will be being processed for safe haven in Panama. The fundamental point here that we want to make is, one, that we urge people as a result of seeing what happened yesterday with the loss of life, that leaving by ship is not safe. However, we're prepared to respond. Clearly, the shipboard processing with these kinds of flows requires that we will also use TCI, because if this continues, and it appears that this may be a wave rather than a surge. But I think the fundamental issue here is that the United States government, working with its allies in the region -- Panama, with agreements in principles, with two other nations, and already the TCI facility -- we are prepared to deal with the continuing deterioration that is driving people out of Haiti.

Q What happens to the people that go to Panama? Some are probably applying for political asylum; the others may be economic refugees. Will you make a difference who will stay in Panama? And is there a number, because as the numbers keep growing of refugees at high seas, how many people will Panama take in?

MR. GRAY: Our understanding with regard to the safe haven is that we will have a processing that will continue, that will determine those who are in need of political asylum. And they are the ones that will go to Panama. All of those who come from boats, they will go to Panama, and we will have a processing system that will provide for the selection and the identification of those who are at political risk and will find that safe haven in Panama.

Q Mr. Gray, the Pentagon has announced that it is sending four ships into -- four amphibious ships into the area off of Haiti. Has this sudden influx of refugees pushed the U.S. to the point that it is sending a message, that it will attack or put troops ashore in Haiti to deal with the situation? Why are these moving in there? Can you give us some --

MR. GRAY: That development has nothing to do with the refugees at all -- it has to do with the obligation of the President of the United States to protect American lives. As you know, there are thousands of Americans that are still in Haiti. As we see the continuing deterioration and the repression that is going on, the President has a responsibility to be prepared for any contingency and for the protection of American lives.

Q more troops in there than are needed just to extricate Americans there. Is there a message, veiled or otherwise, to the Haitians to move forward on the refugee question, to get the military leaders out, or else --

MR. GRAY: There's only one message that we are sending. That message, through diplomatic channels, as well as our sanctions, is that the coup leaders must step down. With regard to the issue that you raise, the message that we are sending there is that America is prepared to protect American lives, as the American President must be prepared to do so. Secondly, the message that we're sending with regard to these new agreements, this multilateral approach to solving the refugee crisis, is that we are prepared to provide safe haven, safety. The United States will act with compassion. We will pick up those at sea. However, they will be taken to Panama. And we are urging them to stay at home and use the in-country processing, which is the only place that will have the resettlement possibility of the United States.

We do not want to see people drowned at sea, as has been reported already. And thus, we believe that we have an evolution of our policy that meets the wave that is coming out, works multilaterally with our neighbors in the region, who are stepping up to assist in this policy and yet, at the same time, offer fairness and sanctuary.

Q Mr. Gray, back to the Panama situation, is there a limit of 10,000 there, as the Panamanians are saying?

MR. GRAY: Yes, there is a limit in the agreement that we worked out of 10,000.

Q Can you tell me if the other two countries involved also have limits, so we get an idea of how much safe haven capability the United States --

MR. GRAY: We have not worked out in detail those agreements in principle, which were achieved yesterday. The details are currently being worked out and I'm not at liberty to say exactly what size each of those will be.

Q Can you cite precedents for the time schedule for the return of people who are granted asylum and then placed under guard? As I understand the United Nations HCR is going to provide guards for these camps, and then a time schedule return for them. That doesn't sound like our usual asylum program. Are there precedents for that kind of thing? And what are you going to do if they're not ready in six months?

MR. GRAY: Well, first of all, the safe haven program that we're establishing with Panama and other countries in the region do meet international standards. Otherwise, you would not have had the partnership formed with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees several weeks ago. They are involved right now in the processing and looking at the standards on shipboard, as well as what we're doing everywhere.

So number one, those who are concerned about standards, we have the highest standards, working with the United Nations Commission on Refugees. These standards are international and they will be an advocation, both in Panama, as well as in TCI and other countries, where we will establish safe havens.

Q I didn't ask about standards, sir, I asked about the precedent for granting asylum based on a time certain return to the country from which they had a well founded fear of --

MR. GRAY: We are providing safe havens. These are safe havens that are being provided. That is done in international circumstances and it has been done by the United Nations High Commissioner. Safe havens are temporary until a crisis is ended, and then people can be repatriated to their home

country. And so that is exactly why, in my statement, these are safe havens.

Q I'm still confused as to who is going to be processed then. I mean, you say that the processing facilities in Jamaica and the Turks and Caicos will go on line. Who is going to be processed -- the people who are already in the system, because it sounds to me like what you're saying is the people who go to Panama will remain there, have their needs taken care of, but will not be processed for U.S. asylum? Is that correct?

MR. GRAY: Those who are picked up on the sea -- and we urge people not to take to the sea because of the potential loss of life, as we have seen graphically demonstrated. However, because of our concern, we are prepared to pick those up who are at sea. They will be processed to seek, to learn, whether or not, just as we have been doing over the last few weeks, there is a real and credible fear with regard to political persecution. Those who are found to have such a fear, those who are granted asylum, that asylum will be granted at the refugee camp in Panama; and later as we bring on board other safe havens, they will be granted status there.

Q So the people who will be remaining in the safe haven will be people -- rather than repatriate people, they will remain in the safe haven --

MR. GRAY: What we have said is those who have been defined as political refugees will be put in a safe haven until the crisis has ended.

Q will be repatriated from now on until the crisis is settled?

MR. GRAY: I'm saying to you that through the processing, which we have in place of those who are not political refugees, will be returned. Those who are refugees will be given safe haven that are picked up on the sea in Panama.

Q Does that mean that no one will go from Panama to the United States for --

MR. GRAY: That is exactly right. That is exactly right. Safe haven means a safe place to stay throughout the crisis. So those who take to the boats will be picked up, processed. Political refugees will be taken to Panama for safe haven. They will not have resettlement possibilities in the United States. Those who take to the boats will not have resettlement possibilities in the United States. What will be offered is safe haven.

Q As a further disincentive for people to take to the boats, would it be any harder to obtain refugee status if you take to the boats? And second of all, what happens after six months to the people who are in these safe havens if this crisis that has taken months and months to resolve is not resolved in six months, are they going to forced to be --

MR. GRAY: Well, we are, first of all, hoping that our efforts in terms of sanctions and diplomatically will find a resolution and the coup leadership will come to its senses and step down. If not, we will be prepared to work with countries to seek further safe havens for those who may need them.

Q is there a difference between political asylum and safe haven?

MR. GRAY: Yes. If you include by that definition, political asylum means permanent resettlement. That is that someone would be taken someplace and permanently resettled. What we are offering for asylum seekers who take to the boats, which we urge that they not do because of the threat to the loss of life, is that we will provide for them a safe haven for those asylum seekers as opposed to permanent resettlement.

Q But not political asylum.

MR. GRAY: No, it will be a safe haven in terms of it will not be resettlement. It will be political asylum in the sense that they will be safe from the continuing repression and the escalating violation of human rights. So in terms of a definition of political asylum means, I can get away from the fiery furnace of repression, yes, you will get that in Panama. Will it be a permanent resettlement? No. At the end of the crisis when democracy is returned, you will be returned.

Q How much will this cost? Who's paying it? And does this come out of a compassion on the part of Panama and the other nations, or are we footing the bills?

MR. GRAY: Well, those details have not been finalized, but we are getting support, which also includes some financial support, from those who are cooperating. A large portion of this will be borne by the United States government, because it is our Coast Guard cutters, our Navy ships that are doing the picking up. Of course, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is contributing their personnel and people, as well as nongovernmental organizations, who are sending people to be a part of a processing. So it is a shared responsibility. We are very confident that as this process continues, you will see the same increase in terms of international support that you have seen since May 8th. And we expect other nations to join us in dealing with this hemispheric problem. It is not a problem of the United States alone. It is not a problem of one state in the United States, but it is a hemispheric problem, which has implications for the entire region. And that is why we are successful in getting other nations to join us in solving this refugee crisis.

Q Mr. Gray, you link the sending of four more ships to waters off Haiti to an obligation of the President to protect America lives. Is there an increased threat to Americans or to other foreigners in Haiti?

MR. GRAY: Well, obviously when you see the deterioration that is taking place inside of Haiti, the kinds of examples that many of you in the media have covered, we believe that there is an increasing deterioration, and that potentially poses a threat to the safety of Americans. On June 15th in Port-au-Prince a labor activist was beaten and fatally shot in front of her three young children. On June 21st one employee of the government was severely beaten, another imprisoned for unwittingly violating a new decree of the de facto government that the Haitian flag not be lowered until so-called international oppression of Haiti ends. On June 25th, or 24th, an explosion in the front of the house of a local representative of a labor organization killed two young girls. On June 30th last week, the bodies of five men appeared on the streets of Port-au-Prince, all shot with their hands tied behind their backs.

The President has a responsibility to be prepared to protect American lives. And clearly, when you look at this kind of deteriorating situation, we must be prepared to do that.

Q Mr. Gray, is this a pretext, though, for an invasion? I mean, why do you need 2,000 men off the coast, four ships? Is this part of the contingency plan for an invasion to get --

MR. GRAY: There is no pretext other than the responsibility of an American President to protect American lives and have sufficient available resources to do that adequately.

Q congressional testimony, you were specifically asked, is a military invasion imminent, and at that time you said no. What is your response to the question now? Is a military invasion imminent, given what you said, that the U.S. is prepared to deal with the continuing crisis that is driving the Haitians out?

Q And how do you define imminent?

MR. GRAY: My response is that there is no military invasion imminent. However, the military option is on the table. Imminent is defined as something that is going to happen in a few days. That is not the case.

However, we are looking at that situation as it deteriorates. The President has made it very clear and I have made it very clear, as his spokesperson, that the military option is on the table.

Q Do you have support from the UNHCR and from President Aristide for the new policy of setting up these safe haven holding areas?

MR. GRAY: We do have the support of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. President Aristide has not been available for me to have a conversation with him. I expect to have it with him this afternoon. I would be very surprised if he was not supportive of this, since he has been calling, for some time, for safe havens; and he has told people not to flee, as he calls it, the house on fire.

What we are doing here is we are doing two things. One, through our policies, sanctions, diplomacy, working with other nations, we're trying to put out the fire, but at the same time, we are trying with compassion to handle those who are fleeing the house.

So I would be very surprised if President Aristide had any such criticism.

Q When you were last here, you gave some signs -- you mentioned some signs of dissension within the Haitian military and also suggestions that the coup leaders were succumbing to the sanctions pressure. Have you seen more evidence of dissension? Have you seen things -- more pressure on the coup leaders to step down?

MR. GRAY: Well, I think that besides those signs that I mentioned to you, I think it was last week, there is additional information that people are dissatisfied with the way things are going as a result of the coup leaders' intransigence and refusal to step down.

Let me just expand on that by simply saying when one looks at what is happening, one has to understand that the address of problem is in Port-au-Prince and lies with the coup leadership, where the entire international community has condemned them for refusal to living up to their agreements to step down; after years of negotiation, and now, with the escalating human rights violations, that international community, of which we are a part and which we are working together with, has said very clearly that that is the center of the problem. And our policies are working with those nations, designed to try to bring about a result, where they step down and democracy is returned.

Yesterday I spent time in Barbados with the CARICOM leadership and to listen to the prime ministers of the CARICOM nations and to brief them on where we were. And I can say very confidently that those leaders of CARICOM feel very, very strongly that we must stay the course, that we must have resolve, and that we must be determined to make sure that the coup leadership steps down and democracy will prevail. And that is ultimately our message.

And I think what we have done to meet this wave of refugees that are coming out is we have said, as the American government, that we're going to act with compassion; we're going to act with fairness; we're going to act with our neighbors in the region to provide safety for those who are fleeing; and at the same time, we are going to continue with our efforts.

Q What evidence do you have that the lives of U.S. citizens are in danger --

MR. GRAY: In any situation where there is a deterioration of human rights and where there is the kind of diplomatic struggle that is going on over whether democracy will be the order of the day or whether tyranny and murder will be the order of the day, at any time there could be a threat to the thousands of Americans who are there, including our embassy employees.

For a government and an administration not to be prepared for that contingency would really be the height of irresponsibility. We are going to be prepared for any contingency, whether it is the refugees or whether it is working with our neighbors in the region, the evolution of this diplomatic and sanctions policy.

And so thus, as we look at the deterioration, which is the fundamental driving force of these refugees coming out, we believe that we have to be ready to protect those citizens. That is not a pretext. That is just a statement of responsibility that a government has to its people around the world. And this administration and President Clinton is determined to provide that kind of protection to all American citizens.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END12:30 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Naples, Italy)

> BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL

July 8, 1994

The Briefing Room

7:50 P.M. (L)

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I thought it might be most efficient. You all seemed kind of interested after the press conference, and I thought if you want to take just a few minutes if you have any more questions and, specifically, the question you were all asking me about whether we -- let me say first I would like to be an AMERICAN OFFICIAL.

Q How about a senior American official? It sounds much better for our editors.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Senior American Official. We have been checking with Washington and have, so far, found no evidence of abusive behavior by any American official in Panama is the answer to your question. But we don't want to get into a -- argument with the Panamanian government and it is up to them to explain their decision.

Q What was Endara's conversation with the President like only few days ago? Was there any hint --

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: He was very friendly and the President expressed his appreciation for their agreement to allow us to use Panama for a safe haven.

Q How did you phrase the request to him? What was the context of it? Was it brought up as a favor or in the atmosphere of duty, how was he approached?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I'd say that it was as much their volunteering to do this as our initially going to --

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I'm trying to remember. You'd have to get that in Washington.

Q So it was their idea?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Almost. As I said it was as much their volunteering as our -- initially -- and, again, you would have to -- we've been on the flight but we were informed that they were offering this and the President called in effect to -- (inaudible.)

Q Who told you that they were offering?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I think our embassy made the initial --

Q Do you agree with other senior officials that the only reason for this was that there was just too much backlash within Panama?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Let me go deeper on background here, okay, if I may.

Q How deeper?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: It's just to say -- I just don't want an American official with the President characterizing their views, okay.

But, absolutely, was our impression. Our impression is that Endara did encounter a very, very strong domestic backlash and took this decision.

Q Can you tell us any more about what form that took?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Again, on deep background so you're not quoting American officials?

Q Yes.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I think the problem was this. The main backlash took place within his own party and, therefore, he was very worried about losing control of the issue in the Parliament. And was then concerned that the incoming government, opposing party, would use it simply to embarrass him -- (inaudible.)

Q What is your feel for what is happening within Haiti in terms of the junior officers and any instability among the leaders?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: -- (inaudible.)

Q But is there foment there?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: There are signs of ferment within the armed forces. Nothing so tangible as to be able to give you --

Q The President said to Ruth, "I think the conduct of the --

Q What was the end of that? Nothing so tangible as to?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: As to say that anything's about to happen.

Q "I think the conduct of the military leaders will have more than anything else to do with what options are considered when and their conduct is not been good." Is he shortening the time frame with the press of refugees?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: What are you saying is another way of saying that the responsibility for what is happening is the responsibility of the military in Port au Prince.

Q But the question is what is happening? In other words, we've all been talking among ourselves and we're not clear on exactly sort of how bellicose or not to read this statement. When you take their responsibility for what options are considered and they're behavior has not been good, the syllogism would go --

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: For your guidance I would say that that is more a strong statement of the general point that it is their responsibility than saying -- I would not take that in terms of a timetable exactly.

Q But given the fact that you now aren't going to try to expand Gitmo and you don't have that much capacity elsewhere on line --

Q You're starting to get it, that's going to be tricky.

Q And Turks and Caicos some people said was a little shaky also.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: That's not a good rumor.

Q That's not what you're hearing?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is there a point where the refugee flow creates the pressure for military action?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Certainly the refugee flow makes the problem a lot more difficult but the President outlines today a lot of American interests that are stake including the refugee -- (inaudible.)

Q That adds up to a lot of reasons to go in.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: That's also a lot of reasons to keep pushing on the sanctions. I think there are signs that the sanctions are having an effect.

I think you all are looking for some sort of datecertain on all of this and that's not where we are.

Q You're telling us that the decision that the Panamanians took and the outflow of refugees has not made military action more likely and has not accelerated the timetable --

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: What Bill said is that it makes the situation -- I've forgotten the exact words he used -- they were similar to what I just said that it makes the situation more difficult. But that is not the only interest at stake here.

Q I thought he said intervention more likely, but my mind is so mushy.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: (Inaudible.)

Q That's not the only interest at stake, you mean stemming the flow of refugees?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: The refugees is an interest, the situation within Haiti.

Q But those things even reinforce?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: No, that's true. But the sanctions -- there are also increasing signs that the sanctions are working.

Q How? Give me a sign, a good sign?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: As we were saying, increasing signs of ferment within the military, increasing signs of division among the military, the refugee -- (inaudible.)

Q Can you tell us who spoke to Endara? The Vice President did.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: The Vice President spoke to him yesterday.

Q And who from the National Security Council spoke with him?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Earlier Eric Schwartz had gone together with Jim Dobbins.

Brit, I'm not hiding something here, I'm telling you where we are.

Q Just one other question. Is there anything tangible that you expect to do as far as withdrawing aid and not recommending aid for Panama or anything like that in response to this?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: We're in the process of talking to them.

Q What do you mean?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Still engaged in talking to them about the whole issue.

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Are they going to be punished?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: And I'm not giving you an answer.

Q But you're -- (inaudible) -- considering it?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: No. What I'm saying is that we are still engaged with them on this issue.

Q You're holding out hope you can patch this together and actually get them to change their minds?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: That's going farther but let's see where we come out.

Q Can you state it assertively so we know where it does stand?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I don't want to say that we think we can turn the whole decision around but we are continuing to discuss the issue of safe haven with them and let's see where it comes out.

Q Endara did not sound last night as if that was in any way a possibility.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I wouldn't hold out a lot of --

Q So, they just say screw you and we say okay?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: You didn't hear me say that.

Q We set this guy up.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: We were very, very disappointed in what they did.

Q That's right. Bad boy.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I'm not going to -- if you can hear I'm not going to talk to you about --

Q What do they get from us a year?

Q Eleven million dollars.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I think it's less than that.

Q It was \$11 million in 1994 according to our researchers.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: I got \$6 million.

Q What was your figure?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: About \$6 million in economic assistance.

Q assistance?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q What's in the budget for next year?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: You should check with Washington if you want that.

Q Endara said that the Americans suddenly started talking about multiple sites. Is he right on that? Endara said that you were initially talking about one site, an island, and suddenly the Americans started again talking about several sites.

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: From the start we were talking about both bases and island.

Q Are you going back and forth on that?

SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL: There was not a shift in that, no.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END8:00 P.M. (L)

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 13, 1994

Statement by the Press Secretary

The President will address the nation live from the Oval Office 9:00pm Thursday September 15, 1994 concerning United States' policy towards Haiti.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 14, 1994

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT ΒY WIRE REPORTERS

The Oval Office

4:45 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: I asked you in here today because I want to talk a little about Haiti. As you know, I am going to address the country tomorrow night, and I will have more to say then.

But I wanted to emphasize the interests of the United States and the values of the United States that are at stake in this situation and to just remind you and through you, the American people, of what the United States has done here for the last three years.

Let me begin by saying that the report of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, John Shattuck, yesterday highlights the interest we have there that has gotten so much worse. This is plainly the most brutal, the most violent regime anywhere in our hemisphere. They have perpetrated a reign of terror in Haiti and it is getting worse.

I just had a long meeting with John Shattuck, and he left me, just for example, these pictures -- illustrative of what is going on there that you may want to look at of people who have been killed. This man killed in the slums, in Port au Prince, disemboweled in the --. This man, a distinguished supporter of the elected president dragged out of church and murdered. This woman horribly disfigured. And we have examples now of the slaughter of orphans, the killing of a priest, in small towns, killing people and dismembering them and then having -- burying them and leaving parts of their bodies to stick out to terrify people.

We have clear examples of widespread use of political rape -- that is, rape against wives and daughters to intimidate people, children included. We now know there have been over 3,000 -- well over 3,000 political murders since the military coup occurred.

So the human rights violations and the situation there right on our backdoor is very, very significant.

The second point I'd like to make is that the United States clearly has an interest in preventing another massive outflow of refugees, which are plainly going to flow from this if the international community does not act to put an end to it. We already have over 14,000 Haitian refugees at Guantanamo, many thousands of others have come --

Q How many --

THE PRESIDENT: Over 14,000. Many thousands of others had come to the shores of the United States, or attempted to, as you know. We're going to have a massive immigration problem that we will have to pay for with thousands of dislocated people.

The third thing I want to emphasize is a point that has been made repeatedly to me by leaders in the region, in the Caribbean and has been echoed by the person who was in charge of Latin American policy under the previous administration. And that is that we have a decided interest in seeing democracy succeed in Haiti. We have now 33 of the 35 countries in the Caribbean, Central America and South America are democratic governments. Cuba is not and has not been for a very long time. But Haiti is the only one where there was an election and then a military coup negated it. Ninety percent of the people in Haiti voted; 67 percent of the people voted for President Aristide.

As the leaders in the region, particularly in the Caribbean have pointed out to me repeatedly in my conversations with them, democracy is not a done deal all over this region. And if this is allowed to stand after all this brutality, all this evidence of violations of international law and human conscience, then democracies elsewhere will be more fragile. That is important to us, not only because of security concerns. We look toward the 21st century, and we know what our problems are going to be. We know we're going to have problems with small-scale weapons of mass destruction. We know we're going to have problems with terrorism. And we know that democracies are far less likely to tolerate that sort of thing than dictatorships are.

Furthermore, we know that an enormous percentage of our economic growth and prosperity is tied to the growth of democracy in an open trading system south of our borders. And we have to keep it going. So those three things -- human rights, immigration, democracy -- are very important.

I'd like to mention just one other thing that is equally important, and that is that the reliability of the United States and the United Nations once we say we're going to do something. And let me go through the chronology here. You will remember, first of all, when this coup occurred, President Bush said that this was a serious threat to our national security interests. Secretary of State Baker said that the coup could not be allowed to stand.

We worked hard on a nonviolent solution, on a peaceful solution to this with the United Nations called the Governors Island Accord, which was signed in the United States. It was an agreement, in effect, all the parties made with the United States and the United Nations. On the day it was supposed to be carried out, the military leaders broke their word to the United States and to the United Nations.

We then went back and pursued sanctions and the tightening of sanctions. We did everything we could to avoid any kind of confrontation of force. And what has happened? The sanctions have made the Haitians poorer. They have not undermined the resolved of the dictators to keep milking the country dry in perpetrating their reign of terror. They have instead led to continued terrorism, the expulsion of the U.N. human rights monitors, the refusal of the dictators to see the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. All that has happened.

Meanwhile, the Security Council Resolution 940 has approved all necessary measures to restore democracy, and has called for a two-phase process -one in which the leaders would be removed and their would be an immediate beginning of retraining the police force and a period in -- multinational force would attempt to stabilize the situation there, restore President Aristide and establish a security force that is reliable.

And then within a matter of a few months, the mission would be turned over to the United Nations itself to stay until the presidential election in '95 and the inauguration of a new president in '96. The multinational force mission, in other words, that the United States is called upon to spearhead is a limited one.

The international community is exhausted. Not very long ago -- I mean, their patience is exhausted. The Secretary General of the U.N. himself said, the time for diplomacy had finished.

Now, just in the last few weeks, we have had more than 20 countries say that they would participate with us in the first stages of this, in the multinational force, in retraining the police force, operating as police monitors, trying to maintain security while we normalize the situation there. More countries are willing to come into the U.N. mission to stay for a longer period of time, until the election is held and a new president is installed.

The United States has an interest, it seems to me, in the post-Cold War world in not letting dictators break their word to the United States and to the United Nations, especially in our backyard. We have supported other countries taking the lead in other areas of the world where their interests are directly at stake. The Europeans overwhelmingly, principally aided by the Canadians, have been in Bosnia. The Russians sent a force into Georgia at the request of the government of Georgia, but willing to abide by United Nations standards.

Here is a case where the entire world community has spoken on a matter in our backyard involving horrible human rights violations, the threat of serious immigration dislocation in the United States, the destabilization of democracy in our hemisphere when it's going along so well, and the total fracturing of the ability of the world community to conduct business in the post-Cold War era. Those are the things that are at stake here. And it seems to me that we have literally exhausted every available alternative. And the time has come for those people to get out of there.

Now, there is still -- they can still leave. They do not have to push this to a confrontation. But our interests are clear; the support is astonishing. We have countries all over the world on every continent willing to come to be a part of this because they are appalled by what's going on.

But the flipside of this is that the United States must not be in a position to walk away from a situation like this in our backyard, while we expect others to lead the way in their backyard as long as the United Nations has approved of an operation. And yet, people are coming from all over the world to be a part of this, to rebuild Haiti because they understand the significance of it.

That is my case. There is no point in going any further with the present policy. The time has come for them to go, one way or the other.

Q Why give them the pass, Mr. President, if they're responsible for such horrific deeds as this, to allow them at this stage free passage out of Haiti?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I happen to have two answers to that. First of all, we are interested in bringing an end to the violence; violence may tend to beget violence. And secondly, President Aristide, himself, supports this.

Keep in mind, President Aristide has been willing all along to follow the spirit and the letter of the Governors Island Agreement. In the Governors Island Agreement the military leaders and the police leaders were promised safe exit. And yes, this is horrible, but the most important thing we can do is to quickly create a spirit of reconciliation and to try to move to a point where we can do that.

Now, if they don't leave, of course, then they are vulnerable to being handed over to the authorities and being held accountable for whatever their role was, their respective roles were, in the kinds of things that have occurred. But anyway, those are my two answers.

Q Mr. President, are you going to fix a deadline by which they must leave or the United States is going to take action? How imminent is something?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'll have a little more to say about that tomorrow night. But I don't want to talk about any specific date. All I can tell you is that the time is at hand. They need to leave; and they're going to leave one way or the other.

Q Does that mean you are going to give a deadline?

THE PRESIDENT: That means that it wouldn't be responsible for me to discuss that question at this moment.

Q Is it a matter of days or weeks?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to get into the time --

Q Are you going to -- is this an ultimatum? You've said they must go, they have to go, they have -- and so forth. All of these words amount to, in fact, that you have made a decision to invade Haiti.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that decision is up to them. My decision is that it's time for them to go. We have tried every other option. We now have an enormous array of international support for a problem that is on our doorstep.

Q But you don't have any support in this country.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, it's interesting. When we had the -- let me just remind you about the -- let me say first of all what's important.

I am concerned about that, and I am sorry that the polls are the way they are. But my job as the President is to take the information that I have and the facts that I know and do what I believe is best for our national security interests. And I believe it is best -- in fact, I think it is very important, for the reasons I have stated, for us to resolve this matter and to do it now. That is what I believe.

And I hope that I can persuade the American people that I am right. But I was -- but my job in this case, where I have access to a lot of facts and evidence, is to make that decision and to go forward.

I also would remind you that these polls come and go. There was a poll at the height of the immigration crisis which said by 51 percent to 17 percent, the people of America would support our going in there to restore democracy if it were part of a United Nations effort. And clearly, when the immigration crisis abated, it abated because -- not simply because we established safe havens outside the United States, it abated because it was part of a process that the Haitian people thought was going to lead to a resolution of this crisis.

If we walk away from this, and these things keep happening, you're going to see another explosion of immigration, I am convinced, with far, far more people than the 14,000 that are at Guantanamo today that the American taxpayers are supporting, that are in a terrible situation. And we will have to see -- it's going to be a very difficult situation.

Q So you'll move even if you don't have Congress or the American people behind you because you think that they will rally once you have made them?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I think my job -- look, I have taken on a lot of tough fights since I have been here. And I believe that the country is going to be better off because of them. And in a matter like this, I believe that if the American people knew everything that I knew on this -- and I think as they know more, I think more of them will agree with me. But regardless, this is what I believe is the right thing to do. I realize it is unpopular; I know it is unpopular. I know the timing is unpopular; I know the whole thing is unpopular. But I believe it is the right thing. I have been working on this hard since the day I took office. Indeed, I began to work on it before I took office. I was trying to continue the policy not only that I thought was right, but that my predecessor said was right. He said it was a serious threat to our security.

We were very reasonable. We went through that whole Governors Island thing. We agreed, because they wanted it, to lightly arm our soldiers and the French and the Canadians, the other that were part of Governors Island. And then we showed up to implement the Governors Island Agreement. And because we were lightly armed, because we had agreed to do that, and because we had agreed to come on conditions of mutual willingness, they broke the deal while we were literally on the point of landing -- the United Nations.

We did not invade them then; we did not resort to violence then. Instead, we went back and got a consensus of the international community. We took the -- we dealt with the refugee crisis; we ended the policy of direct return of refugees; and we went to the sanctions, and we did everything we could. And all of our efforts resulted in more of this, more of this. And it is wrong for us to permit more of this when the United Nations authorized us 50 days ago to act -- 50 days ago they authorized us. I have tried for 50 more days. And when we got support from countries -- we will talk about it some more tomorrow -- but we have an amazing array of countries who believe this is right.

I think when the American people know the facts of this, they will be supportive. And as I said, no decision has been made to use force. That decision is in the hands of the people in Haiti; they can still leave. But they've got to go.

Q Is there any signal from Port au Prince saying that General Cedras could leave?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Is there any signal coming out of Port au Prince saying that he could leave?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what's going to happen there.

Q Have you had any signals?

Q Before the Persian Gulf War, President Bush sent Secretary Baker for one final, last meeting, an emissary, with Tariq Aziz and said, this is it, you've got to go within, I think, he prescribed some kind of deadline. Are you -- some of your supporters say that you should make one last stab at this -- send an emissary. Is that something -- do you endorse that idea?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to say anymore today about all of that. I just want to say I think I have shown already extreme good faith and forbearance in the face of dictators who broke their word to America, broke their word to the United Nations, permitted gross brutalization of their own people, and are exercising a destabilizing force in our region when we need to be supportive of democracy. I have shown forbearance.

We will deal with those questions -- that question and questions like it -- in an appropriate fashion. And they I hope will make the right decision.

Q Well, are you sending President Carter, by any chance, who seems to be a world peacemaker? I mean, giving him a chance to meet with Cedras?

THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing to meet about, unless they are leaving. If they are leaving and they want to discuss things, well, that's a different issue.

But the time has come for them to go. I am not interested in sending anybody down there to try to talk them into doing something that they plainly will not be talked into doing in a reasonable, fair, humane way.

They broke their word on Governors Island. I was prepared, fully committed, to see that the amnesty provision was honored, that they and the people they were associated with were protected. I had no intention of supporting any international aid to Haiti if the Governors Island agreement was not honored. We still are committed to a spirit of reconciliation and to putting an end to this. I know that there will be pressures for other kinds of violence when the change occurs. People don't suffer this kind of thing and not want to retaliate. We are committed to -- the international community is, the U.N. is, all these countries that are willing to go in are committed to trying to put an end to this.

Q Even at the price of American lives?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope there won't be a loss of American lives. But the United States went into not only Desert Storm, but went in -- in our hemisphere, where we have a special interest -- went into both Panama and Grenada in a conflict without United Nations support, without United Nations -- an outright request, and certainly without 20 other countries supporting an endeavor.

I think that, therefore, our interests are clear and certainly as compelling here as they were there.

Q Have there been any signals at all, any feelers from --

THE PRESIDENT: -- you've seen enough from the films to know that we have been doing preparations. And we will do everything we can under all circumstances always to minimize any risk to American lives.

Q Have there been any signals at all, any feelers from Cedras and the others, that at long last they're ready to go?

THE PRESIDENT: All I can tell you is that the issue as we stand tonight is how I have presented it to you. And I'll have more to say tomorrow night.

Q What about a congressional vote? If that happens, if there is a congressional vote and it goes against you, would you ignore that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we've had -- first of all, I'm not convinced that that's going to happen, but secondly, we have had seven debates about it. The 1994 appropriations bill actually provided -- if you will remember -- provided a procedure by which the United States could move, along with the U.N., and file a detailed report about what was going on.

I do want to emphasize this, because I think this is a legitimate concern of Congress and the American people: What is our mission? If we lead this multinational force, what is our mission? Our mission is to get the dictators out, bring the police monitors in from these other countries to help maintain the peace; begin to retrain a Haitian police force to be responsible, supportive of democracy and to prevent violence, not participate in it; restore the elected president; and turn the mission over to the U.N. as quickly as we can. Then there would be a U.N. mission in which the United States would participate but at a much reduced level, which would stay there until election occurs next year and the new president is inaugurated in early '96.

In other words, we have very limited objectives. We are not trying to win military conquest. We have no interest in that at all. And we are not responsible in any way, shape or form for rebuilding Haiti. This is not a nation building operation; it is not a traditional peacekeeping operation. Our responsibility would be limited to removing the dictators, bringing in the police monitors from other countries, retraining the police force, restoring the president, turning it over to the U.N.

The nation-building, so-called nation building, would have to be done by the international aid institutions. You should know, by the way, because one of the questions that will be asked is, how do we know that we'll be on a more positive path. There was a meeting in Paris a few days ago. There was a commitment to give over \$1 billion in aid to Haiti when democracy is restored, when the dictators leave -- if conditions of reconciliation exist.

Q If force has to be used, how many troops would be involved and how long would they have to --

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to discuss the details of that. It would not be responsible. I'll have some more to say about it tomorrow night.

Q Your exit strategy?

- PRESIDENT: Absolutely.
- Q I was going to say that --

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, a disciplined and clear one there is. That's what I'm trying to say. This is, there is -- first of all, the whole U.N. mission will be over when the next presidential election is held in '95 -- that's when the U.N. mission is over. The U.S.'s responsibility as head of a multinational force would be over in a couple of months, as soon as we could do those things I said -- remove the dictators, retrain the police, maintain -- let the police monitors maintain order, restore the president, turn it over to the U.N. It could be done in a matter of a couple of months.

You know, it is very important that it be limited. The nation-building must be done by the international financial institutions. They have a plan to -- that I think will work.

Q Mr. President, a purely domestic issue, as you probably know, Bud Selig has announced that the baseball season is over with no World Series. Do you think the anti-trust exemption should be removed from baseball at this point because of the situation?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to give you a definite answer, but it's something that I think ought to be looked at. The reason I don't want to give you a definite answer is that I have not had a chance to study that issue in detail or to get any kind of advice from the Justice Department. But I think that if for the first time in history we're not going to have a World Series, and if we have ended what could have been the best baseball season in 50 years -- I might say, you know, we tried. We had the Federal Mediation Service in there. The Secretary of Labor worked very hard; the White House worked very hard. We did everything we could. If this has just turned into another business in America, then that's an issue, it seems to me, that has to be examined. But I cannot give a definitive answer at this moment for the simple reason that I have not had adequate time to study it or get a recommendation from the Attorney General, so I should not do that. But I don't see how we can avoid a serious examination of it in light of what has happened now to the American people.

Q You sound very angry.

PRESIDENT: Well, I believe that the United States -- I think there's no question, about what you said, about the whole issue about the public support -but that's because immigration has gotten off the front page and the nature of the U.N. commitment got off the front page. And I understand that, and I'm sympathetic -- and we were doing a lot of other things in America, you know, a lot of things at home. But, you know, we asked for this report from the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. He gave it to me. Just in the last few days we had The New York Times story on the orphans being killed. It's just getting worse, and I am -- I am very angry.

Those people gave their word to the United States and the United Nations at Governors Island. And we gave our word to them. We kept our word to them; they broke their word to us; they went about committing this kind of atrocity. And I have bent over backwards -- I have used sanctions and everything else. I have also not had the United States be the Lone Ranger. We had the U.N. come in here. The United Nations has asked us to move, and we have all these other countries. And it is -- this is, senseless and it needs to stop.

END5:14 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 15, 1994

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions to restore the civilian government in Haiti. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty any units, and any individual members not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order is effective immediately and shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 15, 1994.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 15, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

9:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, tonight I want to speak with you about why the United States is leading the international effort to restore democratic government in Haiti. Haiti's dictators, led by General Raoul Cedras, control the most violent regime in our hemisphere. For three years, they have rejected every peaceful solution that the international community has proposed. They have broken an agreement that they made to give up power. They have brutalized their people and destroyed their economy, and for three years we and other nations have worked exhaustively to find a diplomatic solution, only to have the dictators reject each one.

Now the United States must protect our interests -- to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to us.

Earlier today, I ordered Secretary of Defense Perry to call up the military reserve personnel necessary to support United States troops in any action we might undertake in Haiti. I have also ordered two aircraft carriers, U.S.S. Eisenhower and the U.S.S. America into the region.

I issued these orders after giving full consideration to what is at stake. The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear: Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power.

I want the American people to understand the background of the situation in Haiti, how what has happened there affects our national security interests, and why I believe we must act now. Nearly 200 years ago, the Haitian people rose up out of slavery and declared their independence. Unfortunately, the promise of liberty was quickly snuffed out. And ever since, Haiti has known more suffering and repression than freedom. In our time, as democracy has spread throughout our hemisphere, Haiti has been left behind.

Then, just four years ago, the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since their independence. They elected a parliament and a new president, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest who received almost 70 percent of the vote. But eight months later, Haitian dreams of democracy became a nightmare of bloodshed.

General Raoul Cedras led a military coup that overthrew President Aristide, the man who had appointed Cedras to leave the army. Resistors were beaten and murdered. The dictators launched a horrible intimidation campaign of rape, torture and mutilation. People starved; children died; thousands of Haitians fled their country, heading to the United States across dangerous seas. At that time, President Bush declared the situation posed, and I quote, "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States."

Cedras and his armed thugs have conducted a reign of terror. Executing children. Raping women. Killing priests. As the dictators have grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown ever more brutal. Recent news reports have documented the slaying of Haitian orphans by the nation's deadly police thugs. The dictators are said to suspect the children of harboring sympathy toward President Aristide for no other reason than he ran an orphanage in his days as a parish priest. The children fled the orphanages for the streets. Now they can't even sleep there because they're so afraid. As one young boy told a visitor, "I do not care if the police kill me because it only brings an end to my suffering."

International observers uncovered a terrifying pattern of soldiers and policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents. Young girls, 13 years old, 16 years old. People slain and mutilated with body parts left as warnings to terrify others. Children forced to watch as their mothers' faces are slashed with machetes.

A year ago, the dictators assassinated the Minister of Justice. Just last month, they gunned down Father Jean-Marie Vincent, a peasant leader and close friend of Father Aristide. Vincent was executed on the doorstep of his home, a monastery. He refused to give up his ministry. And for that, he was murdered.

Let me be clear: General Cedras and his accomplices alone are responsible for this suffering and terrible human tragedy. It is their actions that have isolated Haiti.

Neither the international community nor the United States has sought a confrontation. For nearly three years we've worked hard on diplomatic efforts. The United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community, the six Central American presidents all have sought a peaceful end to this crisis. We have tried everything -- persuasion and negotiation, mediation and condemnation. Emissaries were dispatched to Port au Prince and were turned away.

The United Nations labored for months to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties. Then last year, General Cedras himself came here to the United States and signed an agreement on Governors Island in New York in which he pledged to give up power, along with the other dictators.

But when the day came for the plan to take effect, the dictators refused to leave, and instead increased the brutality they are using to cling to power. Even then, the nations of the world continued to seek a peaceful solution while strengthening the embargo we had imposed. We sent massive amounts of humanitarian aid -- food for a million Haitians and medicine to try to help the ordinary Haitian people as the dictators continued to loot the economy. Then this summer, they threw out the international observers who had blown the whistle on the regime's human rights atrocities.

In response to that action, in July the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to remove the Haitian dictators from power and restore democratic government. Still, we continue to seek a peaceful solution, but the dictators would not even meet with the United Nations special envoy. In the face of this continued defiance and with atrocities rising, the United States has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations.

More than 20 countries from around the globe, including almost all the Caribbean Community and nations from as far away as Poland, which has so recently won its own freedom, Israel and Jordan, which have been struggling for decades to preserve their own security, and Bangladesh, a country working for its own economic problems, have joined nations like Belgium and Great Britain. They have all agreed to join us because they think this problem in our neighborhood is important to their future interests and their security.

I know that the United States cannot -- indeed, we should not -- be the world's policemen. And I know that this is a time with the Cold War over that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to our shore, it affects our national interests. And we have a responsibility to act.

Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking their lives to escape the reign of terror. As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already expended almost \$200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo, and the prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period of time loom ahead unless we act.

Three hundred thousand more Haitians, five percent of their entire population, are in hiding in their own country. If we don't act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders.

No American should be surprised at the recent tide of migrants seeking refuge from on our shores comes from Haiti and from Cuba. After all, they're the only nations left in the Western Hemisphere where democratic government is denied, the only countries where dictators have managed to hold back the wave of democracy and progress that has swept over our entire region, and that our own government has so actively promoted and supported for years.

Today, 33 of the 35 countries in the Americas have democratically-elected leaders. And Haiti is the only nation in our hemisphere where the people actually elected their own government and chose democracy, only to have tyrants steal it away.

There's no question that the Haitian people want to embrace democracy; we know it because they went to the ballot box and told the world. History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's security and prosperity. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region. They're more likely to create free markets and economic opportunity, and to become strong, reliable trading partners. And they're more likely to provide their own people with the opportunities that will encourage them to stay in their nation, and to build their own futures.

Restoring Haiti's democratic government will help lead to more stability and prosperity in our region, just as our actions in Panama and Grenada did. Beyond the human rights violations, the immigration problems, the importance of democracy, the United States also has strong interest in not letting dictators -- especially in our own region -- break their word to the United States and the United Nations.

In the post-Cold War world, we will assure the security and prosperity of the United States with our military strength, our economic power, our constant efforts to promote peace and growth. But when our national security interests are threatened, we will use diplomacy when possible and force when necessary.

In Haiti, we have a case in which the right is clear, in which the country in question is nearby, in which our own interests are plain, in which the mission is achievable and limited, and in which the nations of the world stand with us. We must act.

Our mission in Haiti, as it was in Panama and Grenada, will be limited and specific. Our plan to remove the dictators will follow two phases. First, it will remove dictators from power and restore Haiti's legitimate, democratically-elected government. We will train a civilian-controlled Haitian security force that will protect the people rather than repress them. During this period, police monitors from all around the world will work with the authorities to maximize basic security and civil order and minimize retribution.

The Haitian people should know that we come in peace. And you, the American people, should know that our soldiers will not be involved in rebuilding Haiti or its economy. The international community, working together, must provide that economic, humanitarian and technical assistance necessary to help the Haitians rebuild.

When this first phase is completed, the vast majority of our troops will come home -- in months, not years. I want our troops and their families to know that we'll bring them home just as soon as we possibly can.

Then, in the second phase, a much smaller U.S. force will join forces from other members of the United Nations. And their mission will leave Haiti after elections are held next year and a new Haitian takes office in early 1996.

Tonight, I can announce that President Aristide has pledged to step down when his term ends, in accordance with the constitution he has sworn to uphold. He has committed himself to promote reconciliation among all Haitians, and to set an historic example by peacefully transferring power to a duly-elected successor. He knows, as we know, that when you start a democracy, the most important election is the second election.

President Aristide has told me that he will consider his mission fulfilled not when he regains office, but when he leaves office to the next democratically-elected president of Haiti. He has pledged to honor the Haitian voters who put their faith in the ballot box.

In closing, let me say that I know the American people are rightfully concerned whenever our soldiers are put at risk. Our volunteer military is the world's finest, and its leaders have worked hard to minimize risks to all our forces. But the risks are there, and we must be prepared for that.

I assure you that no president makes decisions like this one without deep thought and prayer. But it's my job as President and Commander-In-Chief to take those actions that I believe will best protect our national security interests.

Let me say again, the nations of the world have tried every possible way to restore Haiti's democratic government peacefully. The dictators have

rejected every possible solution. The terror, the desperation, and the instability will not end until they leave. Once again, I urge them to do so. They can still move now and reduce the chaos and disorder, increase the security, stability and the safety in which this transfer back to democracy can occur.

But if they do not leave now, the international community will act to honor our commitments; to give democracy a chance, not to guarantee it; to remove stubborn and cruel dictators, not to impose a future.

I know many people believe that we shouldn't help the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedoms, that the Haitians should accept the violence and repression as their fate. But remember: the same was said of a people who, more than 200 years ago, took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they were a stubborn bunch, a people who fought for their freedoms and appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their cause. And their cries were answered, and a new nation was born -- a nation that, ever since, has believed that the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none.

May God bless the people of the United States and the cause of freedom. Good night.

END9:20 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 15, 1994

SELECTED REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY PRESIDENT WILLIAM

JEFFERSON CLINTON ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

"The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear: Your time is up. Leave now or we will force you from power."

"We have exhausted diplomacy. Now the United States must protect its interests:

to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders and preserve stability in our hemisphere; and to promote democracy and uphold the reliability of our commitment around the world." ***

"Cedras and his armed thugs have conducted a reign of terror. Executing children. Raping women. Killing priests. As the dictators have grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown ever more brutal.

Recent news reports have documented the slaying of Haitian orphans by the nation's deadly secret police. The dictators are said to suspect the children of harboring sympathy toward President Aristide, for no other reason than because he ran an orphanage in his days as a parish priest. The children fled the orphanages for the streets. Now they cannot even sleep there because they are so afraid. As one young boy told a visitor: "I do not care if the [secret police] kill me because it only brings an end to my suffering.

International observers uncovered a terrifying pattern of soldiers and policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents. Young girls -- 13, 16 years old. People slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify others. Children forced to watch as their mothers faces are slashed with machetes.

A year ago the dictators assassinated the Minister of Justice. And just last month, they gunned down Father Jean-Marie Vincent, a peasant leader and close friend of Father Aristide. Vincent was executed on the doorstep of his home, a monastery. He refused to give up his ministry. And for that he was murdered."

"Let me be clear: General Cedras and his accomplices alone are responsible for the suffering and terrible human tragedy. It is their actions that have isolated Haiti -- and driven the people deeper into poverty and despair.

The United States has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the U.N. More than twenty countries from around the globe -- from as far away as Poland, Israel and Jordan and Bangladesh -- have agreed to join us.

I know that the United States cannot and should not be the world's policeman. But we have a responsibility to respond when inhumanity offends our values. And we have a particular interest in stopping brutality when it occurs so close to our shores. Thousands of Haitians have already escaped to the United States, risking their lives to flee the reign of terror.

As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already spent \$177 million to support them and maintain the economic embargo -- and the taxpayers will have to spend \$14 million each month unless we act.

Three hundred thousand more Haitians -- 5 percent of the population -- are in hiding. If we do not act, they will be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face a mass exodus of refugees and a constant threat to stability in our region and control of our borders."

"Tonight, I can announce that President Aristide has pledged to step down when his term ends, in accordance with the constitution he has sworn to uphold. He has committed himself to promote reconciliation among all Haitians, and to set an historic example by peacefully transferring power to a duly elected successor. He knows, as we know, that when you start a democracy the most important election is the second election. President Aristide has told me that he will consider his mission fulfilled not when he regains office, but when he leaves it to the next democratically elected President of Haiti. He has pledged to honor the Haitian voters who put their faith in the ballot box. " # # #

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 16, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING BY SANDY BERGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND WILLIAM GRAY, SPECIAL ENVOY TO HAITI

The Briefing Room

3:36 P.M. EDT

DEPUTY ASSISTANT BERGER: Good afternoon. The President this morning met with his senior foreign policy advisors and military leaders, General Shalikashvili and Admiral Miller, who briefed him on the final preparations that are ongoing in connection with Haiti. There was a broad discussion of that.

As you know, the President has just come from a meeting at which the 24 nations that have joined the multinational coalition were represented. They will be present during this multinational phase in some 2,000 numbers during this period.

I'd like to ask Bill Gray to just give you a flavor of the meeting that took place with the leaders from around the world.

MR. GRAY: Thank you, Sandy. There were 24 nations represented, with several prime ministers. You've had an opportunity to talk with at least two of them, as well as deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers, as well as ambassadors, representing those who have already committed to be a part of a multinational coalition. We expect that that number will increase.

I think the mood was a mood of commitment, solidarity, all agreeing that the multinational force would be utilized if the coup leaders do not step down, and are ready to go forward, and participate in a joint effort.

Also, President Aristide addressed the group and responded to President Clinton's address last night, where he made it very clear that he was thankful for the actions and the support of the international community, Resolution 940. He laid out his vision for a new Haiti in terms of education, health care and prosperity; reached out to the military, calling for no revenge, no retribution, to use his words, and that they are the "sons of the land," if I remember the quote exactly; and then closed his presentation by making it very clear that he did believe in democracy to the point that, despite what has happened, that the real test of a democracy was relinquishing power and that, in compliance with the Haitian constitution, he wanted to demonstrate what a real democrat ought to do, and that is to oversee new elections in 1995, as well as parliamentary elections this year; and said very clearly that he would not be a candidate and could not be a candidate.

The reception of President Aristide's words was a very strong one among the members of the coalition and the representatives who were there. And I think there was, overall, a general mood of solidarity among the coalition members.

Q Mr. Gray, there are reports that -- in fact, Secretary of Defense William Perry just said -- that the U.S. is engaged in a last-ditch effort to resolve this peacefully, and is meeting through intermediaries or an intermediary with Lieutenant General Cedras and his allies. What is going on? And is there any hope that this last-ditch effort will succeed?

MR. BERGER: We have made it clear from the beginning that if the military leaders wanted to discuss with us the circumstances of their departure before the introduction of a multinational force, we would be prepared to do that. But beyond that -- and that message has been conveyed to them, both very publicly yesterday by the President and privately. But beyond that, there are no negotiations.

Q Privately today?

MR. BERGER: Throughout this period, that message has been conveyed to them very clearly that they -- this multinational force is coming, that the time for negotiating the fundamentals here has passed, but that if they care to discuss with us the circumstances of their departure, we are prepared to discuss that.

Q But -- is that today. Is that private message being carried today? You haven't answered that question. Maybe you won't but could you tell us, yet whether ---

MR. BERGER: That has been the continuing posture that we've taken throughout this entire situation.

Q Have you seen any flexibility or any division among the three to indicate that one or another of them might be willing to leave?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think clearly the reality of the arrival of the multinational force is one that is increasingly apparent to the leadership of Haiti and to the people of Haiti. But ultimately we will judge them by what they do.

Q Mr. Berger, any other countries sending intermediaries besides the United States?

MR. BERGER: I can't comment or even know about what other contacts General Cedras and others may have with others.

Q Mr. Gray, what is your sense of whether there is a possibility to avoid an actual military invasion?

MR. GRAY: My sense is, is that if the coup leaders, General Cedras, Biamby and Francois step down, that will avoid it. That is what the President said last night, and they know what that message means. And I think it is very clear that it is imminent, that the multinational force will be coming to Haiti. And the President made that very clear, and they know what that means. And so, it is up to them to act, and as Mr. Berger has pointed out, we have always said for the last month or two, that they can contact our ambassador and discuss the modalities and the technicalities of a departure.

Q Have they?

MR. GRAY: And I would simply say to you that they need to do that, and they need to do it immediately.

Q Can we assume, sir, that the Ambassador is the vehicle through whom such messages or communiques are being conducted, that he's the man now?

MR. BERGER: We have a very, very capable ambassador in Port-au-Prince, Bill Swing, very seasoned and experienced man. We have a great deal of confidence in him.

Q That's not quite an answer to the question. May we assume that he is the point person?

MR. BERGER: If the coup leaders would like to have a discussion of the circumstances under which they can leave, Ambassador Swing is perfectly capable of doing that.

Q Mr. Berger, there are already reports of proAristide forces are exacting their revenge on their enemies. With all that's been written about the possible instability of Aristide, how can you assure the public that we can trust him to be careful with his democracy and with his government if he gets back in?

MR. BERGER: Let me express one cautionary note that I suspect you'll hear us express often in the coming days. There's going to be lots of rumors floating around. Many of you have a good deal of experience with these situations, and I would caution you not to accept every rumor as something that is in reality happening.

As to the larger point of your question, I think President Aristide expressed today what he has been expressing very consistently to the Haitian people over the past several months through broadcasts into Haiti that we have facilitated. And that is the message of reconciliation, a message of trying to

bring the country together, of urging people, supporters of his, as well as those who have been hostile to not act through violence. That is something I think he understands extremely well, that it is not in his interest or in the interest of Haiti for there to be now a period of recrimination.

I would add one final thought. There is amassed a very substantial international economic effort that is prepared to move into Haiti when conditions permit. Obviously, that depends on there being a relatively secure environment there, and I think President Aristide understands that the rebuilding of this country by the international community is very much dependent on an atmosphere of relative stability.

Q Mr. Berger, after an invasion, how much time will pass before Reverend Aristide was brought back to Haiti? How much time would pass before the troops from all 44 of these countries would actually set foot there?

MR. BERGER: With respect to the first, I think it's President Aristide's intention to come back relatively soon.

Q What does that mean?

MR. BERGER: Perhaps in the first two or three weeks. But obviously that depends to some degree on the conditions on the ground.

With respect to the sequencing of the arrival of these 24 countries, it varies. I think certainly in the beginning, this will be overwhelmingly American in the first few days. But these countries will be arriving -- particularly as we stand up an interim Haitian police force, many of these countries will provide police monitors and others so that we can operate in Haiti with a Haitian police force as rapidly as possible.

So over the period of the first week and weeks, you will see nation after nation joining.

Q If I can follow, how many of these countries are being reimbursed for their costs?

MR. BERGER: They're -- in some cases, we are undertaking their transportation costs, but you'd have to go to the Pentagon to get a more specific answer.

Q Nothing beyond that?

MR. BERGER: I would refer you to the Pentagon for arrangements.

Q May I follow on those countries, too --specifically on Israel and Jordan -- either of you gentlemen -- what role are they going to play? How many people do you expect from Israel, how many from Jordan? And will any of these countries really assume a membership role?

MR. BERGER: Well, Israel, I know, particularly is going to provide police monitors, and I think in the number or range of 50 to 100, roughly. I think that that is also what the Jordanians intend to provide as well.

MS. MYERS: Sandy's got to go, so let's have one more question.

Q Have you reached a status of forces agreement with President Aristide?

MR. BERGER: I believe we either have, or will, in the next day. The last details are being worked out. There's no problem --

Q And what's your expectation of votes on the Hill next week on this question?

MR. BERGER: I wouldn't want to predict. I think our view is, the President has this authority to proceed, the President's made a judgment that it is in the national interest to do so, that this is an operation that is analogous to others in which presidents have not sought or obtained prior congressional approval, and that is our posturing.

Q Mr. Gray, are you satisfied, sir, that Mr. Aristide has overcome or is not still seized with the strong anti-American and anti-capitalist passions that he has in the past expressed?

MR. GRAY: I can only speak from my experience of the last four months in dealing with President Aristide. I have not experienced any of the things that you have just described. Secondly I must refer to the speech that he gave today, where he described democracy as the ability to transfer power, living within the constitution, and here is a person whose term has been altered by three years; but yet says he will abide by democracy in the constitution and not run again and not seek an extension. I think that is a very clear signal of what democracy is all about, and a very powerful example.

Q Has he expressed to you any commitment to market economics?

MR GRAY: He has expressed an interest and a commitment in the speech today. If you read the speech today, he talked about the market and the marketplace and growing and the economy. I think President Aristide understands the dynamics of the marketplace and the market economies and that the way to grow is to have individual freedom, free markets -- and that's what democracy has produced. I think he is clearly aware that in this hemisphere, as well as throughout the world village, other forms of economic and political organizations have been in deep despair -- and in trouble -and many of them have fallen under there own weight. And in today's presentation to the prime ministers he did talk about just those subjects. Thank you.

END3:50 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

September 16, 1994

The Briefing Room

5:42 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will now have a background session. Thank you.

Q Explain what the framework is.

Q When are they going, and did Cedras request it?

Q Could you explain what the framework is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As soon as we are on background and we have reasons for it. We will, okay?

Q? When are they going, and did Cedras request it, and when were they asked?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me make a few points on background, if I may now, about this.

Q Why did Mr. Berger say only two hours ago that no such thing was contemplated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. First, please, please. Let me first say that this is practically a real-time event. These arrangements, this agreement was just reached. We have been saying for some days now, first of all, that we are prepared to discuss with the de facto Haitian leadership the means of their leaving, and that President Clinton wished to pursue every possible alternative that would allow them to leave without bloodshed. And this discussion is in that context. No policy, nothing has changed since the President's statement last night.

Let me emphasize that -- and I'll come back to discuss the last few days' events which will show that. Nothing in this changes, either the urgency of the situation or the timetable of our military preparations. As I said -- and let me emphasize it again -- our purpose is discussions only of the means of their departure.

Finally, the details of their trip are still being discussed. They have not been worked out. I would anticipate that they would be going down within 24 hours. We have not yet established when or precisely with whom they will be meeting, but we do expect it will be with the leadership.

Q What makes you think that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q What makes you think they'll be received?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have been told that they will be received -- by the Haitian leadership.

Q Did Cedras request it? Was this meeting requested by the opponents of the -- by the military regime?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Former President Carter has been in touch for some time with General Cedras, and this emerged out of those discussions. President Clinton has spoken with Senator Nunn, with Colin Powell and with former President Carter, at least twice each, over the last day or two pursuing this. Again, we have said for some days now that we were prepared to enter into discussions with the de facto leadership about the means of their departure. And I think I can say that a number of avenues were pursued, and this is the avenue that we will now be pursuing.

Q Does this indicate -- is there some indication from the leadership down there that they are at this point looking to make some sort of deal to get out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be wrong to assume, I think, that they are hereby saying that. But there can be no doubt that they understand what our policy is. And our policy, as enunciated by the President a number of times now, is that we are prepared to discuss the means of their departure. And that is all that we are prepared to discuss.

Q Did President Carter indicate it could be a fruitful discussion with Cedras and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, we hope that it will be a fruitful discussion. The discussions need to take place before anybody can know that.

Q But did President Carter indicate to you that it could be fruitful if he went down there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have to assume when you enter into any discussion that it could be fruitful. I think at this stage to be either optimistic or pessimistic would be wrong. You simply pursue the option and see what happens.

Q You wouldn't invade while they're there, would you?

Q Has there been any communication from Cedras to Carter about this mission since the President's speech? Or was this in the works before the President went on the air last night? In other words, is there any way that we should interpret this as a Cedras response, an openness or willingness to see Carter --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we can't know that.

Q When did you know that he'd be willing to receive you?

Q Exactly. When did you know that Cedras was willing to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, as I said, just this afternoon. This is --

Q Just this -- so there was communication since the President's speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Oh, yes.

Q There was never communication --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, again, let me emphasize that that is why we have come to you very quickly after working this through -- and this was put together this afternoon.

Q? When was the prospect of Mr. Carter and the others going proposed to Cedras?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's been a possibility for a couple of days now, I would say.

Q So it's fair to say it's been before him for a couple days, you've been awaiting an answer and you got it today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there have been, I think, a couple of conversations between President Carter and either Cedras or other members of the leadership over the last couple of days.

Q We've been told by every person in this administration for three days that we would have no discussions with Cedras until he said he was willing to discuss leaving, one -- and that's the only thing we would talk about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I just said --

Q Now, one, why does it take a delegation of this level to talk about getting on a plane and going, why should we not assume these talks will go into further things, and why do we not think that the President has not just blinked?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad you asked me that, actually. Let me repeat what I just said, because it is deadly serious: No timetable has changed. The urgency of the situation has not changed. Administration officials and President Aristide today said that this is a question of days. So it is flatly and absolutely the case that this does not alter the timetable in the slightest. Okay? No, it does not.

Q You're not going to invade while Jimmy Carter and Colin Powell and Sam Nunn are still in negotiations with the Haitian leaders.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our military preparations are continuing on exactly the same timetable that they were before.

Q Well, you wouldn't go in while they're there, would you? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a very --this is a very urgent situation and they will conduct very urgent discussions.

Q When do you expect them to be back?

Q Did you answer the question of why you do not -- why it takes a three-person major delegation to negotiate the modalities of departure, since we've been told all along, this is a simple thing; all they have to do is get on a plane and leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually the way in which they would depart is not a simple thing. There are a lot of issues involved in the manner of their departure, which I would prefer not to go into, because we need to discuss it with them. And, clearly, this delegation offers them the means that they preferred to carry out these discussions. And I think we should welcome that.

Q When will they be back? When will the delegation return?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you a date for that, but I can tell you, again, that this is an urgent situation.

Q You have explained why Jimmy Carter is part of the group. Can you tell us how Colin Powell and Sam Nunn came to be the others who are included?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you the exact sequence of it, but there were a series of conversations among the President, President Carter, Senator Nunn, and General Powell. And General Powell and Senator Nunn and President Carter had been discussing this among themselves as well over the last 48 hours or so.

Q Did they indicate that these were people who were acceptable to meet with them in particular? In other words, were these singled out by Cedras and the other leaders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q Were these three names -- well, were Sam Nunn and Colin Powell -- you said that there had been discussions between Cedras and Carter, but not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Cedras had been in touch with Carter, and then Nunn and Powell were names that were suggested to the Haitians.

Q By Cedras --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, to the Haitians.

Q Would they be carrying a different message?

Q Who recommended Nunn and Powell?

Q Yes, can you clarify? Did the President personally choose them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was, I think, worked through jointly by the President and President Carter. But let me emphasize that the President has discussed Haiti and other issues many times, both with Senator Nunn and with General Powell.

Q Could you clarify also why a representative from the NSC is going and a member of the Joint Staff? And also, will they be flying in a U.S. military plane? Or how are they getting down there? Are they leaving Washington?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I anticipate they will be flying on a government aircraft. And we thought it was important that there be American officials with them who can assist in discussing what could be a number of details that would require their presence.

Q Do you see this as forward movement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I do. Of course. And let me explain that one more time, okay? Because it is very important that you understand this.

Our policy, throughout, has been that they must leave. We have always said that we were prepared to discuss with them the manner of their leaving. It is the responsibility of the President, in fact, to pursue every possible alternative that could produce a solution in which they leave without bloodshed. This presents such an opportunity, and it would be irresponsible not to pursue it.

This does not alter by one minute or one second the timetable of our military preparations, our preparedness to act, or the urgency of the situation in general. The President said last night that their time is up, and I am saying to you that their is time up. We are discussing how to resolve this without bloodshed.

Q You said that it would be wrong to assume that they have agreed at this point to leave. This suggests that having assembled this powerful armada, having called up the reserves, we are letting them dictate the terms of their departure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're not. We're going down to discuss their departure. We have always said that what matters is their departure, not the manner of the departure. Review our statements. We have never said anything otherwise. And this offer is an opportunity, again, to achieve their departure without bloodshed. It is inconceivable to me that anyone would argue that refusing to seek a way to gain their departure in an urgent situation --

Q You cannot say that they've signified a readiness to go, can you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They understand very well what our policy is.

Q Have you set a time limit on these talks? In other words, if these talks drag on and you don't get signals, will you cut them off and proceed with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These talks will not drag on.

Q Have you set a time limit? What is your understanding with President Carter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Carter understands very clearly that these talks will not drag on, and they must be completed before, obviously, we launch a military operation.

Q What do envision the time period. A week? A day?

Q Would you give them months to depart?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Andrea, my quandary is that I cannot give you a deadline for the talks without getting into military issues.

Q Would you give them a deadline --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As much as I like to share, that is not something that I can share here. Helen, please.

Q Can we assume --

Q Dee Dee, we have a lot of questions. Why can't we stay for a minute?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll stay for a minute. It's okay. I'm having fun, they're having fun with this --

Q I have two things: First of all, you said it would be premature to say they have, by this, agreed to go, but have they given any solid indication that their departure will, in fact, be on their agenda from what they want to talk about. And the second thing is, do any of these three gentlemen -- all of them or two of them, or any one of them support the administrations policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We -- they are all very clearly prepared to conduct these discussions within the context of the Administration's policy.

Q But do they support it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And --

Q Have they told you whether or not they do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is relevant here is what they will say to the Haitian leaders, and that we have gone over with them and they are very well satisfied.

Q You don't think there is any possibility of mixed messages being sent by people who don't necessarily support your policy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We have discussed what they will be discussing.

Q On the other question, is there any assurance from the Haitian side that their departure is on the agenda that they contemplate for these talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they know very well what our policy is.

Q Will Nunn and Powell be bringing more of a sort of military-type message, something to the effect of look at what's arrayed against you? They're two military-oriented people.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they will, I'm sure, point out the situation in which the de facto --

Q Is President Carter --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they all will. I know they will.

Q The end result --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The military message is on the screens every evening. In the back.

Q Senator Nunn had suggested that there should be some new way that Cedras could leave. He should leave. Then there should be Parliamentary elections and after that then Mr. Aristide should return. Is it -- could that sort of thing be on the table at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We are discussing in an urgent situation the manner of their departure.

Q Can I also ask you -- was this President Carter's volunteer effort, or did the President think of this to ask the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, the -- President Carter had been in touch with General Cedras, informed the President of that and

then has emerged from it.

Q When did Presidents Carter and Clinton first talk about this mission? And how did they come to decide on Nunn and Powell as --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say over the last 48 hours.

Q Can you be more precise about that? When did this first emerge as a strong possibility? The day before yesterday? Wednesday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Time passes so quickly when you're having as much fun as I've had over the last 72 hours. All I can tell you -- I'm sorry, I'd have to sit down and look at it. I'd say over the last two or three days.

Q We don't quite understand exactly how this happened.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I just said over the last two or three days.

Q Carter calls Clinton and says, hey, I've been talking to Cedras and I'm trying to get him to leave and I'll be in touch. And three days later, three hours later, he's calls back and says --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, as I said -- two things that are relevant here -- one, that President Clinton has had at least a couple of conversations over the last 24 to 36 hours with Carter, with Nunn and with Powell. I've had three or four conversations with President Carter, also.

I should add -- the President, throughout this, has been consulting with Secretary Christopher, Perry, General Shali, et cetera. Meanwhile, we are discussing other possible channels of communication with the leadership in Haiti. This is the one which has been established, and we are very happy about it because we think that these three Americans can very strongly present the view that they should depart, but that we are prepared to discuss with them the manner of their departure; because the issue is their removal from power, as we have said repeatedly.

Q Did Cedras really give the green light for this discussion? It wouldn't happen unless he had said, come come to Port au Prince, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course. He's agreed. He agreed, though --

Q He is the one who said please come.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, today. Today, to Carter.

Q Is the delegation authorized to offer any U.S. funds as part of some kind of golden parachute to them? Is there any authorization of U.S. funds to assist them in getting settled elsewhere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they -- there will be a number of details discussed, but I would not anticipate that that would be a major issue. Our impression is that they have funds available.

Q Did the consultations with Shali and Christopher and yourself constitute government permission for these talks with Cedras, or was he acting as a private citizen on his own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean Carter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His conversations -- oh, I see what you mean -- his conversations --

Q At what point was it authorized and not perhaps a private negotiation?

Q Give him a break. Say the President called him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Today. Today. No, that's not true, no.

Q So he's been acting as a private citizen up until today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's been, yes, talking about the issue with Cedras and informing us of those discussions as a private citizen.

Q And does that keep him in the clear as far as outside private negotiation, Logan Act type stuff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, he was not negotiating with them, he was talking to them.

Q Violating the Logan Act?

Q? Would it be fair, then, to describe this mission as Jimmy Carter's idea and not President Clinton's?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It would not be fair to describe it that way. Okay, I'm almost going to behave myself here. It would not be fair to describe it that way because, as I said, we have said repeatedly that we were prepared to enter into discussions with them the manner of their leaving, right? And we have, as I said, explored a number of possibilities for those discussions, and Carter informed us -- President Carter informed us of his contacts with Cedras, and we have pursued it with him and brought it to a conclusion.

And again, I emphasize with President Carter is Senator Nunn, our Senator Nunn and General Powell.

Q And you can assure us that the results of these discussions will not produce some new way of holding elections later, Cedras leaving four months from now, da, da -- any kind of sixteen different variations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes. I can assure you of that.

Q The only result of these discussions is they'll be gone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is our policy, and it has not changed one bit.

Q Do you have a specific third country in mind for them to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are details that I don't wish to discuss here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 6:01 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 16, 1994

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

The Roosevelt Room

11:27 A.M. EDT

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I want to welcome all of you and thank for coming this morning. As the Secretary of State I've tried to focus in various ways on long-term security structures for the United States to try to adapt our security structures for the next century. I think how we handle this particular endeavor will have a great deal to do with our security in the future and our ability to put together coalitions in the future.

We can in this endeavor, I think, improve our capacity to maintain democracy in this hemisphere and to try to ensure stability in this hemisphere. The results over the last several days on that front are, I think, very impressive. We're now up to 24 nations in the multinational coalition; more than 2,000 troops will be available in the first phase of the multinational coalition. And these numbers are building, by the time action is taken, if it needs to be taken, I think you will see substantial numbers.

The support from the Caribbean community itself is very impressive. Virtually every nation in the Caribbean is contributing in one way or the other. In addition, the support that we're getting from Europe is impressive to us, and the support we're getting from around the world for this endeavor is impressive. As you know, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom -- beyond Europe -- Israel, Jordan, Bangladesh, are all contributing to this multinational coalition. I think that's a reflection of the fact the international community recognizes the importance of this endeavor, which was certainly reflected in the U.N. Resolution 940.

We go forward, here, I think, based upon a very strong showing by the international community of concern about this particular problem.

After President Clinton's speech last night, I think you're going to find support for this growing not only among the American people, but on Capitol Hill as well. I don't see us in a confrontation with Capitol Hill. We're continuing to follow a very heavy briefing schedule, following up on the more than 75 briefings we've had with Capitol Hill this year. And as I say, I think that if the President concludes that we do have to intervene, I think you will find very strong support from Capitol Hill for what the President is doing.

When you hear from my colleagues, I think you'll conclude that this has been a very well planned operation from the military standpoint. I've never seen one with this thorough, this complete planning, this much training, these many exercises. My colleague can give you much more detail about it, but I believe you will find, after you hear from my colleagues, that this has been a very well planned operation, both from the standpoint of assembling the coalition, as well as from the military side.

That's all I'll say because I think they want to get to the substantives issues.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've just come from a meeting with the President, senior foreign policy, national security advisers, reviewed the status of military planning and military preparedness as well as the political military activities that will be taken parallel to the political activities, the status of the coalition.

I would say the President approaches this with a sober sense of the seriousness of this, but at the same time, a deep conviction that it is the right thing for the United States to do. The President set forth last night what, I think, he believes and what we believe was a strong rationale, one that seems to have caused, at least, many Americans to think carefully about why we are doing this -- that is, to restore democratic government, to stop the brazen human rights abuses in our front doorstep and to honor a commitment that has been made now by two administrations.

I would say one final thing and that is that this is an issue that the President, as you know, has been deeply engaged in from the very beginning, starting really in the transition when we not only reviewed refugee policy, but working very closely with the Bush administration, the outgoing Bush administration launched the U.N.-OAS negotiated initiative under Dante Caputo.

We pursued that initiative. The President pressed very hard for nine months, reached an agreement. The military leaders agreed to step down. That agreement, as we know, was abrogated in October. I say this in the context, as I go on, of making the point here that I believe the President feels very strongly that he has exhausted every other alternative, short of the one that we are now considering, that is force.

Even after the Governors Island agreement broke down in July. We spent another seven months trying to negotiate the transfer of authority from Cedras and company back to constitutional government, through Prime Minister Malval, through various parliamentary leaders who emerged in Haiti. We desperately were looking for a Haitian solution.

It became increasing clear in April that there simply was not a critical mass in Haiti that was capable of effectuating the peaceful transfer of power back to constitutional rule. At that point the President ordered a review of our policy. And that led to both some changes in our refugee policy, as you know, but also then an effort through very stiff economic sanctions to force the military leaders to step down.

Those sanctions have been steadily escalated over the past six months. We've now gone to the United Nations. The United Nations has expressed the will of the international community that democracy and a democratic government should be restored. And I think the President feels very strongly that we have walked the extra mile; we have exhausted every opportunity to solve this by peaceful means. And if the military leaders do not step down imminently, then the coalition will proceed with its action.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President last night laid out the rationale for his conviction that this operation serves the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. And you've heard that point underscored by these officials just now.

Another important dimension of this, of course, is that we are pursuing an objective that is in our national security interest as part of an international coalition that we have assembled. And you will, of course, be seeing more evidence of that during the course of the day. Let me just very briefly review for you how it is going to work, and how we are confident that it is going to work well.

It's very important to understand that while the initials U.N. appear only in the third phase of the operation, the entire operation is authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, which established that member states could use all necessary means -- meaning force in this case.

The three phases are the following -- one, intervention; two, transition; and three, UNMIH -- UNMIH standing for United Nations Mission In Haiti. Stages one and two -- intervention and transition -- are part of what is called the multinational force; and that is the group of 24 plus the United States that will be meeting here later. And as our colleague mentioned, others are joining that.

The first phase, or intervention, will be relatively brief; and the objective is to establish basic security. And that means, essentially, suppressing if necessary, deterring certainly will be necessary, what might be called combat resistance of any kind. And my colleague will be speaking more to this in just a moment.

The second phase transition prepares the way for the entry of the United Nations mission. And one of the principal purposes there will be to put in place an interim police force which will be manned entirely by Haitians -- approximately 3,000 -- and will be supervised by international monitors -- approximately 500, virtually all from non-U.S. participants in the coalition. I can't give you an exact time on how long that will last, but we should be thinking in terms of probably a couple of months.

Once the key participants -- in the first instance, of course, the United States and its political and military leaders, but working closely with the other participating states and with the Secretary General of the United Nations to determine that basic civic order has been established, there will be a handoff from the multinational force which, of course, is very much numerically and otherwise dominated by the United States, to the United Nations mission in Haiti. It will number about 6,000, and less than half of those will be American personnel. And not all of those will be military.

The UNMIH will have as its principal task the protection of the international presence in Haiti, the protection of the legitimate government, which by then will have been restored, and also, working with the government of Haiti to set up a long-term permanent police force and military. And the timetable there, as the President underscored last night, will be for UNMIH to leave by February 1996, when President Aristide's successor will be inaugurated.

The last point I would make is that while much attention, of course, is being given quite properly to the military preparations and parallel with that to the political preparations, we regard economics as a key part of the mission. And it has been a key part of planning this. The U.S. agency for International Development has taken the lead and has prepared a very elaborate and, we think, a promising plan for putting Haiti back on its feet and working very closely with the international community and the international financial institutions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This afternoon, President Aristide will be addressing a group of the multinational coalition leaders who will be here. And I will just give you what, I think, he will be saying. Essentially he will be thanking the international community for their efforts, thank the President of the United States for his understanding of what is going on in Haiti in terms of the human rights situation, and also spelling out briefly his vision for democracy and what it will mean in terms of education, health care and the economy. And there will be a very strong statement, I believe, where he will be reaching out for reconciliation, especially to the Haitian military, calling for all to work together to build a new Haiti.

And there will be a statement from him which will reinforce his beliefs in constitutional democracy, in that he is going to govern within that by having elections this fall -- the parliamentary elections -- and also a presidential election next year under the constitution, where as you know, he cannot be a candidate, and that he supports very strongly the concept that a test of a democracy is not the first election but the second election when you pass the power on.

And so I think you will see a strong response from the Aristide government to the President's statement and to what the multinational coalition is about to do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to just make three very brief points.

The first is I believe that in contrast to any other intervention, you have a situation here with an integrated political diplomatic effort, which my colleague has described; military plan, which is as detailed and thorough as any I've ever seen, which my colleague described; and an economic reconstruction point, which my colleague alluded to. That's unique in my awareness of prior interventions that have involved the United States.

Secondly, I'm glad that my colleague talked about the phasing of the initial insertion of the multinational force and then UNMIH. I want to stress that we have careful milestones for an exit strategy. And at every stage of the game we are going to reduce, as is possible with respect to the establishment of civil order and the return to legitimate government, the number of U.S. troops that are there. So we are very conscious of working on an orderly and --basis to reduce the troops as rapidly as possible.

The final point I would like to make is that we're going in there with a large number of troops, what I would regard, and Bill Perry certainly regards, as overwhelming force, so as to assure, minimize, the number of casualties that we may have and that may be caused in the populace. And we believe that the early insertion of a large force will actually make peace come more quickly, reduce the possibilities -- of course, nobody can guarantee any minimum numbers of casualties, and that the large initial numbers of forces will help make this transition more rapid and make the exit more sooner.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: The force that my colleague just mentioned is a trained, joint force. It will have multinational flavor, but there are some unique aspects of it that you've seen unfolding. And that's why I took time out from operations down south to accept the invitation to just say a few words this morning.

What you're seeing unfold is a joint force package, a joint task force that has been tailored for the mission that we see at hand. We have been watching the Haiti situation -- myself personally for nearly four years -- as a ship commander and now as the, last two years -- (inaudible).

We've had the requirements to maintain a contingency plan for Haiti, and we have done so while we've been maintaining peacetime presence, contingency operations in other parts of the world. With Resolution 940 on the 1st of August and the spotlight coming closer, we adapted that force that you see in assembly even more so it will be able to carry out effectively any of missions that we're given.

It's not only me that's very comfortable with this plan. It's every force commander that has a command role in the joint task force and with the component commanders that train the Armed Forces here in the United States. I'm speaking of Mike Loh, ACC, of Denny Reimer, the forces command commander, Hank Mauz, the Atlantic Fleet, and Bill Johnson's the Marine Corps -- (inaudible). We've been working together as a team to work to make sure that it was an effective and trained force that will be employed.

We reported to the Secretary of Defense and to Shali on Monday, not only myself but the other commanders did, about the preparedness and the readiness of the force. The Secretary of Defense came down again on Wednesday. We even went out to the Eisenhower, where we saw the unique combination of 10th Mountain troops on a naval aircraft carrier. It is the right force for this mission.

While it is not familiar to all about operating Army forces from naval ships, this isn't the first time that we've done it. We've done it in training, in previous joint task force training evolutions. And it is not an experiment. It is not. It is a trained and ready capability, one that the commanders are confident in.

Since I laid out a -- (inaudible) -- approach last October to assembling our capability, and I called it adaptive joint force packaging -- the label's not important -- but what is important is taking from the entire kit of capability this nation has, putting together the trained and ready portion of it needed to execute the mission at hand. That's what you're going to see unfold in this operation.

Q How do you go about minimizing the civilian casualties in Haiti with an overwhelming force like that -- beyond just being an overwhelming force?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: We have set the conditions so that upon entry, a minimum advance -- (fires) -- will be made. It's a tough, unique environment; and we're asking a lot of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines that are participating. It will be tactically dynamic, and it will unfold very, very rapidly. But we're confident that with the forces chosen, that it's the best force that the nation has to ensure quick success with minimizing the casualties on the Haitian side and, of course, underlined on the U.S. side.

Q Could you tell us what you call the "careful milestones" are for drawing down American forces over the weeks and months?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that there are three of them; my colleague alluded to them.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The first is to disarm the farph. The second is to make sure that we establish civilian order. The third is the transfer of different aspects of both the normal, functioning government there to the legitimate government of Father Aristide. And, now, each of those can be decomposed into specific steps that have to be taken in different regions of the country, and that will be done as rapidly as possible. And as that comes down, and as civil order is established, the force commander will remove the forces as rapidly as possible.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I just add one thing to what my colleague has said? And that is to distinguish here between -- even in the initial phase between police function, which will continue to be conducted by Haitians, and what my colleague has described as basic civil order, that is, avoiding large-scale disturbances or other major problems. But the -- from early on in this operation, there will be a reconstituted interim Haitian police force with, as my colleague indicated, 500 or more international monitors who will be traveling with them to assure that they are performing in a fair way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The point I want to make is though that there's an explicit set of steps which we're following and get people out as quickly as possible.

Q And what is the troop level? What are the troop levels at each step?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean, we have to look at -- each step -- start of about 14,000 to 18,000. It will come down as rapidly as they can, as my colleague mentioned, to a UNMIH level force of 6,000 which are U.S., where U.S. will be less than half.

Q Following up with your comments, if there is a problem with looting, mob action, Haitian against Haitian, are you saying that that will be handled by the Haitian police force and not by the U.S. military?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The principal police function will be handled by a Haitian police force with outside monitors. And what the U.S. mission will be charged with doing is essentially trying to maintain basic civil order against large-scale problems.

Q You said that there's going to be -- there were going to be parliamentary elections this fall? When do you -- what conditions do you expect to be existent in Haiti when you have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said President Aristide would probably announce in his speech this afternoon that he will push for elections this fall. The parliamentary elections are scheduled for this fall, and he has indicated that he is going to try to go forward with those elections -- invite the international community to observe them.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that you do not expect a confrontation with Congress. Does that mean that you're willing to go to Congress for a vote before you go in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it means that we're going continue our extensive briefing of the Congress. I think this is a situation in which -- as the support for this policy grows, you'll see it grow on Capitol Hill as well.

I find that we have a good deal in common with them on a number of issues, as I have briefed them and as I have talked to them about it. I don't want to project a sense of confrontation with them. I want to project a sense of consultation with them on this issue as we go through this difficult period --

Q Are you trying to give some specific -- does the War Powers Act click in, or is there going to be a vote next week of some sort, and are you trying to structure the vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If American troops are put in a situation of imminent danger, of course we have obligations under the War Powers Act. Without conceding the applicability of that act, we will do as we've done in the past, and that is file a report that's consistent with the Act. As we go through this period, as I say, we'll try to be in close touch with Congress at every stage. We are not trying to -- not trying to -- at this point to try to find some mechanism for a vote in Congress. But, as I say, we'll be working very closely with the Congress --

Q On that same point, I was struck that neither the President nor you all in your opening statements really addressed this question of Congress's role in the thing. The argument is made that this President, because of his opposition to the Vietnam war and his nonparticipation in that war, has a particular moral responsibility to involve the Congress in a decision to put American troops in harm's way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say from my standpoint, this President, like his predecessor, have a particular responsibility to protect the constitutional prerogative and then duty of the President to act as Commander-In-Chief and be able to send American forces into action when they are needed to secure America's interests. He spelled out America's security interests last night -- the same ones that President Bush had talked about in 1991. And I think that's his principal responsibility in this situation.

I just want to say again as I've said before, that the size and scale of this operation is very similar to that in Panama and Grenada, when the President did not seek prior authorization. And I think it's appropriate for the President to exercise his authority as Commander-In-Chief in the situation, but to comply with the authorities in Congress that are effective as we move through the situation if he decides that intervention is necessary.

Q Is that, then your criterion -- the size -- for instance, you would argue that in the Persian Gulf War, that Congress should have been involved, but in a smaller operation, Congress should not be involved ahead of time. Is that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's certainly one of the factors in weighing the situation. There were half a million troops involved there, and they had been deployed for some time in a region distant from the United States. That was a major factor involved. The differences in the branches on the situation, as everybody in this room knows, is historic and traditional. The President has been vindicating his own power and authority, going back to through two centuries of our existence. Very rarely has he sought prior authorization from Congress. Much more frequently has he taken the action in advance when he felt it was necessary in American interests.

Q Can I just get back to the mission for a second. A senior administration official said that the first phase is going to be relatively brief. What do you mean by that? And when will Mr. Aristide be brought back? What's your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my colleague, of course, has been working very closely with President Aristide. President Aristide has indicated on a couple of occasions that he intends to come back in about 10 days. I would not myself want to define what relatively brief means because I think we obviously need to leave ourselves flexibility to respond to the situation defined on the ground.

But perhaps my colleague wants to give you a ballpark guess.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Sounds good.

Q What do you expect? What do you expect? I mean, you're going in with this overwhelming force. Do you go in with guns blazing? Do you go in and wait for somebody to shoot at you?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: No --

Q What do you expect to happen in the opening phases of this?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: We have, as military planners, at being practitioners, sat around many tables answering those questions. This is a unique environment. It is a unique environment. So what we've done is put together a capabilities package that we can flow in quickly. And I think that's going to be an important aspect of the military side of the operations in the first days.

We're able to flow in a large number of troops to calm the city, because I think that's important, and be able to deal with the FAHD, deal with the attaches, paramilitary, you pick the label. There won't be any situation that all of us that have watched things, we're familiar with, with regard to the Harlan County, in which there were some attaches trying to, you know, chew back the force that was there. This isn't that way.

Q What about the possibility of hostage-taking? There are Americans there now.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: We have factored that into the plan. As you know, we've had a noncombatant evacuation capability down south now on a continual basis for a couple of months. But before we had that, we had contingency plans to do that from CONUS. And now we have contingency plans to work that possibility should it arise. And I'm comfortable with what we have on the scene.

Q I just want a clarification. The return of President Aristide in 10 days, is that 10 days from right now or 10 from days from the beginning of any operation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: D-Day.

Q What is the policy of the United States government toward appointments made by President Aristide? Do we attempt to influence him or do we -- as has been quoted by certain unnamed administration officials, say that that is the business of President Aristide?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The policy is the same policy -- (inaudible) -- democratically elected governments. And that is that, those governments make those appointments.

Q And we don't try to influence them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would act the same way with this democratic government as we would do with other democratic governments.

Q How much resistance do you expect initially? How big a concern is guerilla or sniping in the following days and weeks? And did I understand the plan is not to go after Cedras or Francois, but allow them to go off into the countryside if they so desire?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Starting with the last first -- the mission does not have any names in it that we are supposed to go into Port au Prince or Haiti and find, okay, number one. Working up the list with regard to guerrilla activity or snipers -- there may be some that go to the outlying areas, but the force that we're going to have in Haiti will be a force not only in Port au Prince, there will be capability outside of Port au Prince that will be able to deal with that, should that come up. An urban environment, snipers -- tough, tough environment. We're going to have to deal with that threat not only on day one, day 10, day 40. It's a tough environment, so we have to be concerned with that. The best thing that we've done is establish an effective ROE and carefully trained the troops.

What force do we expect? Intel estimates are all over the board, but we don't expect an organized resistance as we come in. We don't expect to have a military defense posture as most of the defense mechanisms that countries have. They just don't have the organizational network, nor the military hardware. There's numbers -- there's numbers and there's the sporadic activity by the paramilitary that we have to guard against.

Q Would you give us the phasing of this Haitian force that is going to be taking over things? There are some that are being trained now, I gather, in Puerto Rico or Guantanamo. And are they going to be the basis of the new force? And how do you expect to recruit new people? And how do fast do you expect it to grow so that you can turn over the major security and responsibility to the Haitians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ultimately, we believe that on an interim basis there will be several thousand Haitian police. They will be partly recruited from the five, screened and vetted in terms of those who have known records of human rights abuse. There are also people being recruited in Guantanamo who will come back as trainees -- again, with monitors. We would expect over a relatively short period of time that there would be several thousand Haitian police that would be on the street.

Q We've talked almost exclusively about the possibility of an invasion here, but there must be other alternative plans underway to try to get this to a conclusion before we have to send troops in. Could you tell us if there are these efforts made to try to get Cedras and his friends to leave, whether to try to get some of them to go, and where there's even a possibility that we're trying to foment a coup in Haiti behind the scenes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President last night --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said you were great. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I was saying -- (Laughter.) The President last night looked right at General Cedras in this marvelous way in that they're communicating across television and said, you should go, and if you don't go, we'll remove you. Cedras and company know what they have to do.

If there are some arrangements they'd like help with, I've said and others have said that we'll be glad to assist them with arrangements, but I think the message has been conveyed to them in a very strong way. And last night by the President in most direct terms he said, this is not inevitable, but it's imminent. And so I think they know that time is running out on them, and they have the choices as to whether to stay there and perhaps be turned over to the legitimate government of Haiti or to leave -- said they should.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I just -- my colleague has to leave for another meeting if there is any last question for him before he

leaves. Otherwise, we will dismiss him.

Q Do we have a cost estimate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's impossible to give a good estimate of the cost before you know the extent, how long it is. But if I had to once again give figures, say something about it as best we can, and we look at it now as about half a billion.

Q But that doesn't include the aid package?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does not include the aid package. It's a very, very rough estimate, I want to tell you. You cannot tell anything from -- at this stage.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But if I can just amplify on the aid side, and that is the \$550 million that were pledged in year one and the roughly \$1 billion that have been pledged is largely, overwhelmingly international -- international financial institutions and other non-U.S. money.

We already have the aid program active in Haiti and is feeding a million people and providing health care for 2 million people. Presumably we will be able to convert that into a program that is doing something that is more permanent.

Q What's your best guess as to what these guys are going to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it really appropriate to guess what's in somebody else's mind. We'll just keep on making the case to them that they ought to leave, and you know, if they're rational about it, Tim, if one was in their place, you'd think they'd recognize the advisability of making the choice of leaving under circumstances where they have a future. But it's very hard to predict what they will do.

I'm rather hesitant to be in a situation of being more confident than the President was about Congress, but since I said it, I'll say it again. I think if we have to intervene, based upon my conversations with people in Congress over the last several days and weeks, I think we'll have support that's considerably stronger than it is now. I think the case is being made to them, and I think that there will be stronger support from the Congress --

Q Post intervention? Post intervention?

Q Can I add one more question to -- before we -- (Laughter) -- which is normally the case. Force is not popular in American history at all.

Q Your colleague said that we weren't going to have any people in the Haitian police force with known records of human rights abuses. Does that mean that the U.S. government is screening the appointments by President Aristide for the police? Is that what you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be a vetting process that takes place cooperatively between our military and representatives of President Aristide's government.

Q I take it from what the President said that he is not doing any phoning on the Hill? Who is? I mean, who is doing the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has spoken to many senators and congressmen over the past months and certainly over the last weeks and days --

Q But I mean in this current period.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In addition, everybody at this table, except for my colleague, certainly has been in close contact with the Hill, as well as my colleagues. There has been extensive contact with my colleagues and others from the White House.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Just a point to piggy-back on what my colleague said about being more than military mission initially. We have had very, very close joint interagency cooperation in putting this force package together. We are working with all the other agencies; in fact, I think this will probably be the first time that representatives from other agencies will be on the command ship. I have invited them to be part of the command ship that -- and then the command headquarters that will move in and we have already got acceptances from some of the agencies; and I think that's awful important to show how this has been conceived and how it's going to be executed as a joint, not only military, but multiagency as well as multinational operation.

And you will see unfold in Mount Whitney, the command ship that is down there, the most modern and the most capable command and control mechanisms that we've ever had.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- My colleagues have done a marvelous job in planning this exercise. I want to emphasize one element of what he said. And that is that I think my colleague very carefully define the mission here of our military people. The mission of our military people is to remove the current regime to enable the elected regime to resume, to resume power, to stand up as interim police and to build a security -- help train a security force that is responsive to civilian control.

When that mission is done, my colleague's people's mission is done, the economic efforts that will be going on will be going on will be conducted by the international financial institutions, by the international community, by our own AID. But that is not -- our military mission is not tied to the long-term success of the economy of Haiti, or the long-term success of those efforts.

MR. GEARAN: We're going to have to start to wrap up.

Q Okay, one question. You say the mission is not to go out and get Cedras and company. What if you find them there and you do confront them? What will you do with them? Would you hand them over to Mr. Aristide? What are the plans on this, if this should occur?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Do you think that we'll find him in his home, as we --

Q No, I don't know. But, you know, there is a possibility --

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Everybody's got to be somewhere, right?

Q But what's the --

Q It's not a very big island.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: He'll be detained. He will be detained.

Q And then, who would he be --

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Then he'll be detained and then the authorities of the legitimate government of Haiti will have to handle his disposition.

Q Would you presume there would be some kind of summary judgment passed at that particular point, or we would wash our hands and leave it at that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They would be turned over to the judicial processes of the legitimate government of Haiti. So we'd be --

Q With a theme of reconciliation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's very important, and I think it's important to go back -- obviously this will be evaluated based on what happens. But to go back over what President Aristide has been saying over the last six months in a series of speeches to the Haitian people, of what he will say this afternoon, and what is very much in his self-interest. And that is to build a new Haiti.

It is not in his interest to continue division. There is an enormous opportunity, the international financial agencies and the international community have said, we are prepared to come into Haiti and help lift this country out of poverty. But that is not going to happen, of course, if the environment in that country is not conducive to it. So there are both his own words and his own, I think, interests to go by in believing that he has a strong interest in reconciliation. And a statement that the President made last night, i.e., that he will not serve beyond the end of next year, will not seek reelection, I think, is some evidence of that.

Q Can we say anything at all yet about an ultimatum for a deadline? A deadline --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I were listening to that speech last night, I would think there was an ultimatum there.

Q Yeah, but I mean you don't have any specific date is what I'm talking about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not going to talk about specific dates.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:20 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 17, 1994

RADIO ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

10:06 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. The night before last, I spoke with you about why America's interests compel us to help restore democratic government in Haiti.

For three years, the United Nations, the Caribbean community and the Organization of American States have pursued every diplomatic avenue possible. But the dictators rejected all of our efforts, and their reign of terror -- a campaign of murder, rape and mutilation -- gets worse with every passing day. Now we must act.

Our reasons are clear -- to stop the horrific atrocities that threaten thousands of men, women and children in Haiti here in our own neighborhood; to affirm our determination that we keep our commitments and we expect others to keep their commitments to us; to avert the flow of thousands of more refugees and to secure our borders; and to preserve the stability of democracy in our hemisphere.

Today I'd like to speak with you about the steps we are now taking to ensure that these brutal dictators leave and leave now. The preparations of the extraordinary international coalition we have assembled are proceeding without delay. Even as I speak with you, our armed forces, in coordination with personnel from 24 other nations from all around the world, are poised to end the reign of terror that has plagued Haiti since the military coup three years ago. I have great pride and confidence in our troops. Our leaders have prepared their mission very, very carefully; and our forces are clearly the finest in the world.

At the same time, it is the responsibility of any American president to pursue every possible alternative to the use of force in order to avoid bloodshed and the loss of American lives. That is why this morning, at my request, President Carter; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell; and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn left for Haiti. Their mission is to make one last best effort to provide a peaceful, orderly transfer of power, to minimize the loss of life, and to maximize the chances of security for all Haitians, and, of course, for our own troops in the coalition force.

On Thursday night, I stated that the Cedras regime's time is up. Their time is up. The remaining question is not whether they will leave, but how they will leave. They can go peacefully and increase the chances for a peaceful future and a more stable future for Haiti in the near term not only for all those whose democracy they stole, but for themselves as well. They can do that, or they will be removed by force.

Yesterday, leader's of the international coalition gathered at the White House. They come not only from our hemisphere and from our neighborhood here in the Caribbean, but also from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East; from countries as diverse as Israel and Poland, Belgium and Bangladesh; countries with problems of their own -- economic problems, political problems, even security problems. But each and every one of them believes it's important enough for them to come here to participate, to stand united with us in insisting that the dictators who terrorize Haiti must be removed, and that the democratically-elected government must be returned to power now.

As Prime Minister Owen Arthur of Barbados stated so eloquently yesterday, "the Haitian people have wished for democracy, they have suffered for it, they have voted for it, and now they are dying for it."

The goals of the international coalition are clear and limited. Once the military regime is removed from power, the coalition will help the democratic government establish basic security. It will begin the process of placing the Haitian police under civilian control and monitor them to help ensure that they respect human rights. Then, in months, not years, the coalition will pass the baton on to the United Nations. The U.N. mission in Haiti will take over and continue to professionalize Haiti's police and military. It will leave Haiti no later than 18 months from now -- after elections are held and a new government takes office.

Over time, the coalition countries, as well as the international financial institutions will provide Haiti with economic, humanitarian and technical assistance that the country needs to stay on the democratic track, to put people back to work and to begin the work of progress. They can get assistance from other countries, but we all know that in the end the job of rebuilding Haiti belongs to the Haitian people.

Yesterday, at the White House, President Aristide took a long step toward that job of rebuilding, in the spirit of reconciliation. He put it very well when he said, we say and we will be saying again and again, no to vengeance and no to retaliation; let us embrace peace. President Aristide also reiterated his pledge to transfer power peacefully to a duly elected successor. He said that in the formative years of any democracy, the most important election is not the first one, but the second. That's a sentiment that should become a staple of civics books in our country and throughout the world.

My fellow Americans, at this very hour, we are taking important steps in the journey back to democracy in Haiti. We still hope to end this journey peacefully. But let me say one last time, the cause is right, the mission is achievable and limited, and we will succeed. The dictators must leave.

Thank you for listening.

END10:12 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 18, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING ΒY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI

The Briefing Room

9:52 P.M. EDT

MS. MYERS: I think we'll hear now from Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He will make a brief opening statement, and then Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will also be available, along with Secretary Christopher, to take your questions.

So, Secretary Christopher.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good evening. Perhaps I'll say first that Tony Lake is off on other duties, otherwise he would be here with General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry and myself.

We've been saying since the beginning of our administration that the goals of our Haiti policy were to restore democracy to Haiti and to return President Aristide. Today we have taken very long and important steps toward achieving both of those goals.

As I look back on this situation, it seems to me that a critical time occurred when the illegal government forced out of Haiti the U.N. monitors. That resulted in the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, which provides, basically, the context for what's happened today. All that's been done here, I think, is, in effect, a way to carry out U.N. Security Council Resolution 940. And what's been done here is to, I think, achieve the goals set forth in that resolution and achieve the goals of the policy that we have been trying to carry out during the entire time we've been in office.

There is certainly challenging times ahead for us in implementing this policy. There will be first the obligation to secure the environment in Haiti. And our troops will be going in tomorrow, as you know, from what the President has said. We expect that President Aristide will be returned to power in an appropriate way in the very near future. And then, over time, we look forward to the transition to the United Nations mission within a matter of months. But we have, I think, the structure and the basis for moving ahead to achieve the goals of our policy in Haiti.

And, of course, the best news of the day is that we're going to do this in a permissive environment with less risk to American lives, less risk to our troops than would have been achieved without these goals.

As I look back over the course of the day, I want to pay great tribute to the negotiating team that we had in Haiti -- with President Carter, with General Powell, and with Senator Nunn. We had, I think, the perfect combination to make it clear to the leaders of Haiti that not only this administration, but those outside this administration in leading positions in American life were strongly convinced that the illegal government must leave.

I also want to pay tribute to the United Nations and the coalition of 25 governments that were prepared to join us, and will join us in this endeavor. I think these were all factors that conjoined together to convince the de factos that the time had come for them definitely to go.

This is clearly power in the service of diplomacy in one of the most convincing ways that I can recall. As the day went on, we, of course, we were in very close touch with the -- our representatives, the President's negotiators in Haiti. We had an open line to the negotiating areas all during the course of the day. The President talked not only with former President Carter, but to General Powell and Senator Nunn during the course of the day.

I would say that the sticking point for us was to insist on there being a definite date on which the de factos would leave, and without that, the President was unwilling to go forward. And when that was achieved, as the day wore on and as it became apparent to the de factos that they were going to be taken out in other ways, we were able to get an agreement to the departure on that date, which I think is the critical element of this agreement. We hope that they may be forced to leave before then because of the passage of the amnesty law. But we do have an outside date, and that is critical.

I do want to step aside now, because in many ways I'm sure you'll be much more interested in talking about the military aspects of this than the diplomatic aspects; although as I say, this is one instance where power has served diplomacy in an absolutely classic way.

Secretary Perry.

Q Mr. Secretary, where will they go and how much money will they take with them?

SECRETARY PERRY: We'll come back to the questions in just a minute.

I just want to add one thing to what the Secretary said. I was on board the Wasp last night, off the shores of Haiti, talking with the more than 1,000 troops who are on board there. I can tell you, they were cocked, primed and ready to go. But they knew and I knew that a forced entry was not without risks -- there would be some casualties not only to our troops, but to the Haitians as well. And so we all hoped we could avoid that kind of a forced entry. And that is what this negotiation has achieved, so we've strongly supported it.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Pardon me. On the question you asked now, we don't know where they will go. But as I said earlier today, I can't imagine that they would want to stay in Haiti with several thousand American troops there, with Aristide returned to power; but when they leave, they will not take any American money with them.

Q Mr. Secretary, their departure from the country, though, is not an explicit part of this agreement. How can you be certain that they will go? And could you address widespread reports earlier today that President Carter was insisting on staying long after this White House wanted him to leave?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, with respect to the first part of your question, Andrea, just repeat what I said -- I think for all practical purposes, they are certain to leave. I doubt that they'll want to stay there when President Aristide is returned to power. I doubt they'll want to stay there with many thousand American troops and then later on, U.N. troops.

We had long discussions, of course, on the telephone with the President's representatives there. They've all come back together. It was a negotiating team of extraordinary unity and effectiveness. And they worked together and they're leaving together.

Q But did President Carter want to stick it out long after the President felt that they should be returning, that they were not going to reach an agreement? Was there a disagreement on whether or not the negotiations should continue?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: There was no disagreement on whether negotiations should continue. I must say that, knowing what we knew about the military plans, we were concerned that they be able to leave Haiti tonight. And it was only in those terms that that discussion took place.

Q On that score, would you actually have invaded while they were still in Haiti?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: That's why we were so anxious to get them out.

Q But would you have actually permitted this to --

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: No, we would have ensured that they left Haiti before the invasion began.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, please, who is covered by the amnesty that the Haitian Parliament is expected to pass? Is it just General Cedras and General Biamby, or does it include other military officers? And if they're not covered, how do you expect them to want to cooperate?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, of course, that will be up to the Haitian Parliament. But the plan is that there would be a broad amnesty for all the members of the military. That's one thing that General Cedras has insisted on. But it was because of our concern that that might take some time, or that that amnesty might not be enacted promptly, although perhaps it will be, that we insisted on an outside date.

Q Can I ask General Shalikashvili a question? General, just to clarify this point on the start of the military operation. When did you -- were you told to begin the operation tonight? And was that connected to the negotiations? Was the part of the strategy to convince Cedras to accept the terms that were acceptable to President Clinton? Or was this operation always scheduled to begin Sunday evening?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: This operation was scheduled to begin Sunday evening for a number of days now, yes.

Q And do you believe that when General Cedras learned about it, that's when he blinked? And how did he learn about precisely, because there's some confusion whether he was told by General Powell or that the troops at Ft. Bragg were getting ready to begin this invasion, or whether he learned it independently through the news media?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I am absolutely convinced that it was being aware of the preparations of such an overwhelming force that caused him to blink. It is my understanding that he received that information through a third party. I don't know who it is. But not General Powell.

Q Secretary Christopher, you, Secretary Perry, the President, his spokespeople all last week and through yesterday and this morning were insistent that there were be no negotiations, that this team was going down there only to discuss how they would get out of the country. Now there are at least some conditions attached to their departure. When was the decision made to expand the negotiations into negotiations and why?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I think it's fair to say that the negotiations were all related to departure arrangements and the timing of departure arrangements. I think it's entirely fair to say that the discussions were all within the context of the President's instructions to the delegation that what we're talking about was departure and departure arrangements.

Q Mr. Secretary, by leaving the military leaders in there for several days or weeks, does that not increase the risk of them running either organized or guerrilla activities against our troops that are going to be there tomorrow, starting tomorrow?

GENERAL PERRY: The risk of paramilitary or guerrilla activity has always been there, no matter how we went in. We believe that risk is minimized by the agreement of the leaders of the Haitian military to cooperate with the entry. That --

Q These are the same leaders though, sir, who promised last year to step down. How can we trust them this time?

GENERAL PERRY: We are not -- our entry plans are not based on trust. We are going in with a very large and a very wellarmed military force. Our protection will be in our arms, not in trust.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: -- in answer to that -- last October 15th when they were scheduled to leave, there were no American troops there. This year I expect there will be about 15,000, give or take a few thousand troops there. And I think that's a fairly good guarantee that they'll carry out their understanding.

Q Secretary Christopher, who will be held to account for the massive human rights violations that the President said justified this massive U.S. military buildup and planned invasion?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: I think that there would be a strong spirit of reconciliation in Haiti. President Aristide himself has emphasized that. He has said that he preferred that Cedras and Biamby leave the country. And I think that's really the answer to the question now whether or not under internal law of Haiti there would be some prosecutions for human rights violations will really depend upon the Haitian laws. There's a sound constitution there. There's a sound legal structure. And I think the important thing is to be able to implement that legal structure.

Q But you said there would be a broad amnesty, is not correct?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, the legislature will be considering -- the parliament will be considering a broad general amnesty, which, as you know, President Aristide promulgated an amnesty, and this would be a follow-up on that. But I want to emphasize again that because we did not want to be held subject or conditional to the passage of that amnesty, that we insisted on an outside date for departure.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it for departure or resignation, sir -- the October 15th date -- is that for departure or resignation?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: You're right to correct -- it is departure from their office and resignation from their office.

Q And having said that, when you said earlier that the sticking point on your side was to -- you had to insist on a definite day by which de factos would leave, we've always thought you were talking about leaving the country. You're saying now that you were not talking about that?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, we've always said that the key factor was to relinquish power. We've also said we thought they should leave the country. And I say again that I think that in practical terms they will leave the country.

Q There's 27 days, if I'm counting correctly, between now and October 15th. That will take a long time -- does it take that long to get the assembly to vote on this? Was that a condition that was placed by the military?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, you know, parliamentary bodies do take some time. We hope they'll do it more rapidly. Some of the Aristide supporters, as you know, have been here in the United States and out of the country. We'll try to facilitate their return to the country so that parliament will be able to act swiftly. But we want to have an outside limit on --

Q May I have a follow-up, sir? Does that mean that the assembly will be composed of the Aristide faction and the faction that is there now?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, the two houses of the parliament, and I don't want to pose as a precise expert on that, will be formed in the way that they presently are. As you know, a number of the Aristide -- the Aristide supporters have left the country and are -- many of them are in Florida.

Q Can you and General Shali have told us as much as you can about how the troops will come ashore? Will it be comparable to the invasion plan, with the Marines perhaps taking the north shore and the army going in Port au Prince? What can you share with us?

SECRETARY PERRY: There's important similarities and important differences. The most important differences are that we're not having to make a forced entry, we will not have to do it in the middle of the night, and we will not have to do it in the middle of the night, and we will not have to use our paratrooping forces to do it. So you subtract that from it and what's left is a very similar force.

Shali, would you like to add more to that?

Q And what time, sir, do you think the first troops will come ashore, if you can tell us?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I can tell you that General Shelton, the commander of those troops, is expected to be there in the morning. He's expected to meet with General Cedras to inform him how it is that we propose to bring the other forces in; and after those discussions, then to order the movement of those forces.

My expectation is that those forces will begin arriving sometime tomorrow afternoon. But I really need to leave it up to General Shelton, who has the authority to work out the specific details.

Q Can I follow up on that? Secretary Perry, can you tell us, with our troops in place but the dictatorship still in office, who's going to be running the country? Where is the dividing line as to who has authority over what?

SECRETARY PERRY: As long as the de facto government is still in charge, they will be in charge of the police. The new police force will come in with the new government, although we hope to begin some of the preparation and vetting for that during this interim period. The military force -- the U.S. military force --will be there to provide a fundamental security role; first of all, and most importantly, to ensure that the provisions of this agreement are carried out.

Q Well, is there a provision to give primacy to one or the other of the forces in case of a dispute?

SECRETARY PERRY: The primacy will be with the U.S. military forces.

Q Excuse me, Secretary Perry, if they refuse to leave on October 15th, will the military be arresting them?

SECRETARY PERRY: I don't want to write out a formula for what will happen then. We would be confronted then with a situation like we were confronted yesterday, with the difference being that we would have 15,000 troops already on the ground. So whatever our problems in enforcing our will at that stage will be greatly facilitated by the fact that we have our troops on the ground.

Q And do we think there's any threat from Francois, who apparently is in hiding and is not a signatory to this agreement?

SECRETARY PERRY: I would see if either Shali or Secretary Christopher would want to add to that. But I don't believe that's a significant threat, myself.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any more information about Francois?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I think that his position is sufficiently eroded in Haiti that the military leaders, either the current ones or those who replaced them, will be able to issue orders to him that will be quite effective.

Q I'm intrigued that you think that only because the planes were in the air did the coup leaders blink. You mean that they thought two aircraft carriers and the whole off-shore surrounded with an armada was a bluff? I mean, didn't that disturb them at all? It had no impact until you started the invasion?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Isn't it interesting what psychological moment finally causes somebody to decide?

Q You mean that's the only time they capitulated and went for the agreement?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: That's the way the facts look, Helen.

Q Well, speaking of psychological, Secretary Christopher, can you talk about the psychological -- there seems to be some face-saving that had to go on here. It seems to me that the administration had to blink on the departure-from-country date in order to get this agreement, because these guys were worried about losing face, being forced out of the country in a written agreement. Is that what you had to do in order to get this agreement? You decided it wasn't worth spilling American blood in order to get them to agree to leave on a certain date?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, we, as I said at the beginning, we achieved the goals of our policy. If we could do that and minimize the risk to American troops, that seemed a very prudent thing to do, and we did it.

END 10:14 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 18, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

9:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, I want to announce that the military leaders of Haiti have agreed to step down from power. The dictators have recognized that it is in their best interest and in the best interest of the Haitian people to relinquish power peacefully, rather than to face imminent action by the forces of the multinational coalition we are leading.

Our objective over the last three years has been to make sure that the military dictators leave power and that the democratically-elected government is returned. This agreement guarantees both those objectives. It minimizes the risks for American forces and the forces of the 24 nations of the international coalition. And the agreement maximizes the orderly transfer of power to Haiti's democratically-elected government.

This is a good agreement for the United States and for Haiti. The military leaders will leave. The United States and coalition forces will arrive beginning tomorrow. And they'll do so in conditions that are less dangerous, although still not without risk. It will be much easier to preserve human rights. And there is a real chance of a more orderly and less violent transfer of power.

And to the supporters of President Aristide, he will be returned. I ask that all Haitians remember what President Aristide said just a couple of days ago: no vengeance, no violence, no retribution. This is a time for peace. That is what the United States is going, along with our coalition partners, to work for.

As all of you know, at my request, President Carter, General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn went to Haiti to facilitate the dictators' departure just yesterday. I have been in constant contact with them for the last two days. They have worked tirelessly, almost around the clock. And I want to thank them for undertaking this crucial mission on behalf of all of Americans.

Just as important, I want also to thank the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. It was their presence and their preparations that played a pivotal part in this agreement.

Under the agreement, the dictators have agreed to leave power as soon as the Haitian parliament passes an amnesty law, as called for by the Governors Island Agreement, but in any event, no later than October 15th. They've agreed to immediate introduction of troops from the international coalition, beginning, as I said, as early as tomorrow. They have also pledged to cooperate fully with the coalition troops during the peaceful transition of power -something we have wanted very much.

I have directed United States forces to begin deployment into Haiti as a part of the U.N. coalition. And General Shelton, our Commander, will be there tomorrow. The presence of the 15,000-member multinational force will guarantee that the dictators carry out the terms of the agreement. It is clear from our discussions with the delegation that this agreement only came because of the credible and imminent threat of the multinational force. In fact, it was signed after Haiti received evidence that paratroopers from our 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had begun to load up to begin the invasion, which I had ordered to start this evening. Indeed, at the time the agreement was reached, 61 American planes were already in the air.

Because of this agreement, the United States and other coalition troops going to Haiti will now be able to go under much more favorable conditions than they would have faced had the generals not decided to leave power.

But let me emphasize that this mission still has its risks, and we must be prepared for them. Haiti is still a troubled country, and there remain possibilities of violence directed at American troops. But this agreement minimizes those risks and maximizes our chance to protect the human rights of all Haitians, both those who support President Aristide and those who oppose him; and to create an environment in which President Aristide can return, as he said, without violence, without vengeance, without retribution.

Under the terms of United Nations Security Resolution 940, an international coalition from 25 nations will soon go into Haiti to begin the task of restoring democratic government. President Aristide will return to Haiti when the dictators depart.

On Thursday night I told you that the United States must act here to protect our interest, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders and preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere, to uphold the reliability of commitments we make to others and the commitments others make to us. This agreement furthers all these goals.

From the beginning I have said that the Haitian dictators must go; tonight I can tell you that they will go. And to our troops tonight who are headed to Haiti under less risky conditions, I am confident you will carry out your mission as you already have, effectively and professionally. We depend upon you to do well tomorrow as you have done so very well today; and in the weeks and days before, when you planned this exercise, prepared for it and then began to carry it out.

To all of you I say, thank you, your nation is proud of you.

Good night, and God bless America.

END9:35 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 19, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT BREAKFAST WITH FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER, GENERAL COLIN POWELL, SENATOR SAM NUNN AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

State Dining Room

10:21 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me -- before we sit for breakfast, let me just make a couple of points very briefly. First of all, our deepest thanks as a nation should go to President Carter, General Powell and Senator Nunn. They have had about four hours' sleep in the last two or three nights. They have worked very hard, and they have, I think, made a major contribution toward helping us find a peaceful solution to the problem in Haiti.

I also want to say to you, I think that a significant measure of credit goes to the United States military forces for their preparation, their readiness, and their imminence. And finally, let me say that we have, this morning, the first peaceful introduction of our forces there to begin to carry out the mandate of the United Nations.

So it has been, so far, a good day, thanks in no small measure to the extraordinary labors of this delegation. I know that you join me in thanking them for all they've done. (Applause.)

We're going to have a press conference in just a minute, so there's no point in having two. (Laughter.) Thank you.

END10:25 A.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 20, 1995

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

The Briefing Room

2:08 P.M. EDT

MS. MYERS: As you know, the following briefing will be ON BACKGROUND. You can describe the briefer as a senior administration official. So, Mr. Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've heard earlier in the day from General Shalikashvili in terms of the deployments. They're going well. Our forces continue to be deployed around the country, are meeting no resistance, and we're very pleased about that.

Elements of the multinational force are preparing in Puerto Rico for deployment, which will take place in the not-toodistant future.

Q Like what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't have a specific date.

Q Weeks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think less than weeks, but I don't have a specific date.

We, I think, are very pleased that we have seen in this first 24-hour period the kind of permissive entry of an American-led multinational coalition into Haiti, which will enable us to achieve the objectives that we've had all along; which is the stepping down of power of the military leaders, the restoration of President Aristide, and the peaceful transition of power in Haiti. So we're pleased with the way things are going today.

Q How about any of your deployments to President Aristide? What can you tell us about his obvious dissatisfaction with this, and what impact that has on any sort of success for the political operations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we've had a number of conversations with President Aristide, obviously over the months, but certainly over the past several days. Today Bill Gray has talked to him; Tony Lake and General Sheehan are going to meet with him tonight. General Sheehan will give him a briefing on the military aspects of the deployment of the multinational force.

What President Aristide said today was -- reaffirmed, certainly, his commitment to the fundamental principles that we share, which is a peaceful transition, nonviolent transition of power. I think it is not hard to understand that he would have some difficulty with elements of the agreement reached over the weekend, particularly the fact that it was reached with a government that he, nor we recognize. And I think he obviously also anticipated going back to Haiti a bit sooner. But I think, as the days go on, as we continue to work together with him, I believe and suspect that he will continue to share our view that this will achieve the fundamental objective here, which is the resignation of the military leadership and the restoration of President Aristide. That's the goal we have in common --

Q Why hasn't the President talked to him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q Why hasn't the President ---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President did talk to him, I believe after the agreement was signed with -- Sunday.

Q Sunday night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And I suspect that he will talk to him again.

Q Can you tell us one positive thing President Aristide has told you, meaning the administration, since the signing of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we have a common goal, and I don't think that there's any distance between us with respect to what -- the objective here. The objective is for the military leadership to step down, and for him to be restored to power.

In our judgment, waiting 25 more days for that to happen, in exchange for getting a permissive entry of American troops into the country and other of the multinational troops, is not a large price to pay for a very big gain. But I think, as I say, as we continue to talk with him over the coming days, I think he will see that as well.

Q On Sunday night a senior administration official told a number of reporters that in terms of the departure of Mr. Cedras and Mr. Biamby, that they made it clear to Carter, Powell and Nunn, that they didn't want it spelled out that they viewed it as a humiliation. But this senior official indicated to us that, practically speaking, it was expected that they would leave. Yesterday, another senior government official told a number of us that "it wasn't discussed at all". Which was it? Was the issue of their departure not from power, but from Haiti ever discussed, and what was said about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I was not in the meeting, so I cannot --

Q But certainly you were getting briefed, weren't you, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot tell you what was discussed in the meetings. They did not agree to leave Haiti. They did agree to leave power. And that was our fundamental objective. We believe they should leave Haiti and we will continue to hold to that position.

Q Are you telling us that the White House never bothered to inquire the President's negotiators asked if these people would be willing to leave Haiti?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the bottom line for us, in these negotiations, was getting them to agree to leave power.

Q That's not the answer to -- that's not question I'm asking you. I'm asking you: Did the White House every inquire whether or not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think President Carter and -- knew very well our position with respect to what we believed would be the better outcome here. And in the course of the briefings that he received, he clearly knew, understood that our position was, and that they should leave

Haiti.

I think in the context, though, of a very compressed negotiation in which time was short and the stakes were high, I think the fact that he achieved the basic objective, which is the commitment of these leaders to step down on a date-certain, is what we needed to achieve.

Q I don't mean to monopolize, but I'm just trying to get an answer to this question. Did you ever ask him whether or not he had tried to get any commitment they would leave the country, or was it just something that wasn't on your radar screen at that time? You didn't seem to have an interest in whether he did anything but step down from power?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's my understanding that the subject was discussed between President Carter and --

Q Carter says he didn't. Carter says he opposed it.

Q He said never.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the issue was -- my understanding was the issue was discussed. It was discussed in the conversation. It was not an objective that was achieved. But I think from our perspective, the fundamental and most important objective -- what we got on Sunday was a date-certain for their leaving, our ability to permissively put 15,000 multinational forces in the country so that we could enforce that date, and return President Aristide.

Q It appears that you gave a great deal more than you would have in, say, the Governors Island accords that followed, which is what the President mentioned yesterday. The Governors Island Accords contemplated amnesty and perhaps only for certain civil offenses through the date of their departure a year ago, and said nothing, of course, of the prospect about everything that has happened since. You're guaranteeing amnesty apparently for everything that's happened since the effective date of the Governors Island Accords?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not guaranteeing amnesty. What the agreement says is that they will, that they will leave when there is an amnesty law passed or October 15th, whichever is first. Now --

Q Yes, but that's amnesty for everything. That's amnesty for everything.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that will be for the Haitian parliament to try to work out. And there's always been controversy over the nature of amnesty. If you read Governors Island, Governors Island is about as ambiguous as you can get with respect to what kind of amnesty is contemplated. I mean, it just says the word, "amnesty." It doesn't say political; it doesn't say general.

Q But I thought we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me finish. What was critical here was we will encourage all of the parties to work for an amnesty law that is mutually acceptable. If such a law is not achievable by October 15th, the agreement provides for their departure. That, the agreement doesn't say that we will guarantee an amnesty law; that's for the Haitian parliament and for the Haitian people to determine.

Q Will the military impose their departure on October 15th if the amnesty law has not been passed? The Foreign Minister of Haiti today was indicating that they may not abide by it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that -- with respect to that -- that the agreement is very clear. They will depart power -- leave power -- upon the enactment of an amnesty law, or October 15th, whichever is earlier. That could not be clearer. That was explicit, and that was what the last three house of these negotiations were about; President Clinton's insistence that there be a date-certain in this agreement, so that we could not have a position that -- a departure that depended upon some event over which many people could affect the outcome.

Q Given their track record on keeping promises, would the military be prepared -- is it part of their orders -- to impose the departure of Cedras and company from power if they are not out by the 15th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The presence of the multinational force in Haiti, is in, part to guarantee compliance with the agreement.

Q They would then.

Q Two questions raised by President Carter this morning. The first is on the lifting of the economic embargo against Haiti. He says that he offered an assurance the president -- the acting President Jonassaint and the Haitian people, endorsed by President Clinton, that it would be lifted even -- it would be lifted before Aristide came back to power, as soon as the U.N. took action. And he assured them, based on the commitment he received from President Clinton, that that would be done before Aristide came back to power.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No. The -- what the agreement says is that economic language is a little bit unclear, but again, remember the context. I think somebody, Sam Nunn or somebody said the other day, this was not 12 lawyers in a room for 75 days with -- refining language. But the language on this says that the economic sanctions will be eliminated in accordance with 940, that 940 established criteria, including - before which all of the sanctions cannot be removed, including the departure of the military leadership. So this is a matter that we will discuss with the U.N. There are U.N. sanctions; there are unilateral sanctions; there are OAS sanctions.

I think there is not a sentiment in the United Nations at this point for lifting the U.N. sanctions. We will act -- we will look at these matters in a way that will enable our mission -- enable our soldiers to conduct their mission in terms of what they need and what steps will best effectuate the peaceful transition of power.

Q So is it the Clinton administration's position that the economic embargo should be lifted as soon as possible, even before Aristide returns?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a number of economic sanctions. There are at least three different categories of sanctions -- there are U.N. sanctions under 917; there are OAS sanctions; there are unilateral U.S. sanctions.

Certainly, with respect to the U.N. sanctions, which is essentially the oil and commercial embargo, there are certain criteria for their lifting. And the -- as I say, the agreement specifically says that they must be lifted in accordance with U.N. Security Council 940. So we would have to do that in conjunction with the U.N. and in accordance with those criteria, one of which for lifting all the sanctions is --

Q What about the frozen assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- is the resignation of the military leaders. With respect to specific matters and our own sanctions, we will look at those individually in the context of what our troops need to do their mission and what will best accomplish a peaceful transition.

Q Well, in terms of those assets -- the frozen assets in the United States -- were any assurances given to any of the Haitian leaders about the disposition of the frozen assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not as far as I'm aware of.

Q Is there any reason, any security reason that you can think of that if they comply with the agreement and step down by the 15th that you would not unfreeze their assets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not -- first of all, I'm aware of no commitments that were made to them with respect to that. And it's not a matter that we addressed.

Q To what do you attribute the amazing calm and the acquiescence of the people and the troops? Did Cedras somehow pass the word, you know, that we're going to go along? And do you know of any relationship --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think so far, so far the military leaders have obviously directed their forces to cooperate fully with the introduction of the multinational force. General Shelton had a good meeting yesterday with Cedras about the circumstances under which we would enter. And I suspect that there is -- that presence itself has some dissuasive kind of influence in terms of life in the country.

Q What is the message --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To Ruth and then --

Q There were at least two incidents today when Haitian military forces, I understand, fired on or went into the crowd and beat Aristide supporters. What's your reaction to that? And does the U.S. military have a role to play in addressing that kind of violence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as we've said all along, it is not our role to conduct the basic police function in Haiti; however, we would hope, as quickly as possible, to bring the human rights monitors back into Haiti. We would hope as quickly as possible to bring police monitors into Haiti so that we can have some presence with the FAHD as it conducts its affairs. And, ultimately, we would hope to be in a position to retrain and professionalize that force.

But in the -- the basic answer to your question is that it is not our mission there to undertake the police function. We want to bring in the human rights monitors and the police monitors to try to end those kinds of --

Q So, then, until then, we stand by, and are you troubled by these developments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our forces, if there were a threat to basic civic order in Haiti, our forces would try to address that. But that is different than individual incidents or specific individual police cases.

Q Are you troubled by this development?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we're going to have a period over the next two or three weeks in which we're going to have to develop the basis on which we work with the FAHD. I hope it can be cooperatively, and I hope it can be in a peaceful fashion, and we will push in that direction.

Q What specific message are Mr. Gray and Mr. Lake going to take to President Aristide tonight? What can they tell him to persuade him that his reaction to this agreement in which he has a vested personal interest -- I mean, his life may be at stake. How are they going to persuade him that he's wrong, that this is, in fact, a good deal for him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there are some reassurances that we can provide, for example, that we have not and will not and do not recognize the Jonassaint government as a U.S. government. But more importantly, I think, is to simply focus on the big picture here and what will happen in 25 days. You know, it's been three years since President Aristide was ousted from power, and it's now 25 days to a point in which he can be returned, that this agreement, aspects of which he might be uncomfortable with, change the basic objective that he has sought for all this time, and that is removal of power of the military leaders and his restoration.

Q Does it bother the administration that the Aristide letter seems to be particularly lacking in any expression of gratitude to the American people and U.S. military forces for what it's doing on behalf of his country and his own presidency?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think the statement basically reaffirms that we operate here in a common context; that is, common objectives -- the achievement of Governors Island objectives and U.N. Security Council resolutions.

As I said earlier, I think we can understand why he may have some hesitation about elements of this. But I think as he focuses on what will come from this, what we have achieved here -- and that is the introduction of a multinational force in Haiti, permissively, without bloodshed; the agreed departure of the military leaders when we'll be there in large numbers to make sure that happens; and his return -- I think the details that he may have some problems with will be put in the larger perspective of the objectives that we share.

Q May I follow this question? You didn't really -- with all due respect, sir -- answer Mark's question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought I did.

Q No, you went through the reasons why you thought, in the end, he would come around. President Clinton put his presidency and American military lives on the line to get this guy back into Haiti. And I think Mark's question, if I understood it, was, are you troubled at all by his statement that doesn't even suggest any gratitude there? That's, I think, the question.

Q I yield to my spokesman. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would anybody else like to reinterpret that question?

Q Well, Representative Obey, on that specific point --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was not trying to --I believe that President Aristide appreciates the sacrifice that American soldiers are making. And I think that when some time has gone by when he is able to resolve in his mind some of the details of this, and put it in the larger perspective, I think that he will be supportive of it.

Q What about the parliament -- the Haitian parliament and what the U.S. is doing to facilitate the return of any of the Aristide members who might be in the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are prepared to facilitate that. We are prepared to help them return and provide protection to the parliament and it -- as an institution -- as it acts. But, obviously, that depends upon the willingness and actions of the Haitian parliamentarians to reconvene.

Q To what extent are we responsible for Aristide's safety once he gets back there, and what are you telling him about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that one of our missions is to provide a protection for the constitutional government; and obviously, the safety of President Aristide and his government will be of concern.

Q Did the President reach a decision some time before his negotiators went to Port-au-Prince that it would be preferable to have General Cedras remain in power for some time, rather than to step down immediately as he had demanded?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there was -- in the couple of days before this mission came together there was some thinking about the power vacuum that would be created if they left and we weren't there, so that the notion of a more simultaneous action, I think, became something that we began to think about. It was not our objective when President Carter and General Powell and Senator Nunn went to Port-au-Prince that there would be a deferred departure. They initially came back with -- the military leaders -- with a provision that said that they would leave when an amnesty law was passed. President Clinton said that is not acceptable. That is something that is too easily manipulated. There must be a datecertain. We suggested a date and, ultimately, the 15th was agreed to.

So there was not the intention going in that there would be a full week delay, but I think looking at this in terms of the tradeoff of the four-week delay for the agreement to depart and the permissive entry, I think that it was a clear-cut winner from our perspective.

Q How do you reconcile --

Q But if you were concerned about the power vacuum, why then, did they say only last Thursday night that they should step down now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, it's always been our position that they should step down. I mean, we were prepared, I think, to go in quickly had they stepped down, and there were plans for an almost immediate entry under those circumstances. But I think as we continued to think about it, and as the proposition of their leaving with our arriving became an option, that it at least was acceptable to us because it would avoid that kind of power vacuum.

Q How do you reconcile the President's description of these men as dictators, murderers, human rights abusers --

Q Thugs.

Q Thugs -- thanks -- and President Carter's description of them as honorable patriots who were concerned about their people, their army and departing in honor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there's no question that we have a different perspective on that issue, from a somewhat different perspective than President Carter.

I think, ultimately, they must be held responsible for - - they must be responsible for what's happened in the country for the last three years. They will be --

Q They're not being held responsible. Amnesty, money, you know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They will be out of there. They will step down. That is the critical element here. They will be out of power, Aristide will be in power, and it will be effectuated -- there's a much greater chance it will be effectuated peacefully under what has happened over the last two or three days than ever before.

Q But you haven't changed your view of these people because Carter has persuaded you that they're really good guys?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I would not say that.

Q Haiti's ambassador to the U.S. has just come out, after talking with President Aristide, and said that President Aristide is uneasy because the disarming of the FAHD has not begun. Earlier, a representative of the Haitian government here told me that the Pentagon had, in fact, shown him -- President Aristide -- an order that would have required the FAHD to have started to have been disarmed within 24 to 48 hours after the arrival of U.S. troops. Some of the members of the FAHD were to have been screened and put into a police force. We got indications from General Shali earlier that this is on a much slower track. What is the story here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't forget here that the scenario under which we are going in is different than the scenario that we anticipated. We anticipated a scenario in which we would be going in forcefully, at some cost -- we would be then, essentially, forcefully removing the leaders from power, and there would be a new commander-in-chief that would be named by President Aristide, who we would begin to work with immediately in the process of working and retraining the FAHD.

We now have, built into this, a transition period of now a little more than three weeks in which we will try to achieve those same objectives. But, obviously, during this three-week period, we will have to do it working in different ways.

Q One question about President Carter. He said last night that he told the Haitian military leaders that he was ashamed of his country's policies. I'm wondering if you can comment on that and comment on an appearance of somebody who is negotiating on behalf of the U.S. government and is saying things like that about U.S. policy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the wonderful thing is that, working from differing perspectives, we achieved a terrific result. (Laughter.)

Q Good spin.

Q Can you let him finish?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I obviously don't share that view of our policy. I think -- let's go back to basics here. We committed ourselves three years ago to restore democracy to Haiti, and during that period there has been negotiations and every other effort made to try to achieve that.

The sanctions have been imposed as a result of the acts of the Haitian leaders, not as a result of something we wanted to do, or something that we thrilled in doing.

Haiti is -- was a desperately poor country before the economic sanctions were imposed. There were many malnourished and underfed people before the sanctions were imposed. We, during this period have been feeding a million people a day. We have been providing health care for two million people a day. We have been providing, I believe, a humane refugee policy. And, I think under the circumstances, we -- as a policy that has been very admirable in its purpose and I believe is going to be successful in its outcome.

Q Does it make sense to subcontract U.S. policy from somebody who is so fundamentally in disagreement with you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Clinton never subcontracted foreign policy for a second. The fact is that we had always believed in the end game there would be some kind of emissary to the military leaders. This emerged over Thursday and Friday through conversations that President Carter and President Clinton had and President Carter had with President Cedras. And it became the vehicle that we believed would work in terms of the willingness of Cedras and Biamby to meet with them. But let me be clear, from someone who was sitting next to -- through that day on Sunday with the President who was making the final decision here, and it was President Clinton.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END2:40 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 20, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI

The Briefing Room

11:00 A.M. EDT

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Good morning. Thank you very much for letting me come by -- (laughter) -- talk to all of you.

Q You're welcome any time, sir.

Q We wouldn't have missed it.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: You and your colleagues have been doing such a super job reporting on this operation since it began to unfold yesterday. But I thought it might be useful if I came.

Q We're not used to people being nice to us.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Well, I meant it; I meant it very much.

Q Are you feeling okay, sir? (Laughter.)

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: But I thought what I would do is use just two kind of simple cartoon charts to put it in perspective what it is we tried to accomplish, and how we ended up at the end of the day, and do the same thing for today -- what our goals are for today, what you ought to be seeing unfolding there, and what we think it ought to look like a the end of the day, and that might be helpful, I hope.

I don't know if you can all see that. I want to tell you that, up here in the upper righthand corner of the chart were the objectives we had set ourselves for yesterday. First and foremost, to establish contact with General Cedras before anything else happened, and that was very important to us because we needed to set that -- to relate that cooperative relationship straight from the beginning.

Your colleagues have already reported on that meeting that took place at around 10:00 a.m. The spirit was, in fact, cooperative. We informed him what we were going to do for the remainder of the day. He, in turn, told us that he thought that wherever we would go, there would be no difficulties. If there were some places that we would run into where we might encounter difficulties, he would try to let us know beforehand so we wouldn't be surprised by it. It was that kind of a relationship that existed.

The other thing that we wanted to do for the rest of the day was to establish American presence the two key notes, really, in Port-au-Prince: the international airfield and at the port. The reason that is important, the airport, particularly, that should we have started to run into any trouble in the afternoon or during the night, it was important that we had -- that we were at the airport because it is through that airport that we would have brought in further reinforcements. And the port is, of course, terribly important to ensure that our follow-on forces and our sustainment stocks would have uninterrupted access to Port-au-Prince.

So, by the end of the night, we had our presence from the established at the international airfield. We felt secure that we would not be dislodged. The same at the port, and we had at the close of the day just a few people short of 2,500 people on the ground.

Now, what is it that we are planning to do today? Again, our objectives for the day are sort of here. First of all, I think it was time to establish our presence in the next largest town in Haiti, in Cap-Haitien. Starting at around 8:00 a.m. this morning, Marines went ashore. Some 1,800 Marines went ashore in Cap-Haitien. They were met by the police up there. Again, that same sort of cooperative spirit existed, and they report absolutely no problems up there.

We are -- yesterday we brought to RO-ROs -- roll-on, roll-off ships into the port. They started unloading yesterday. They should continue and complete the unloading today. On one of those ships, we have the Bradley fighting vehicles, the armored vehicles that we think are absolutely essential to have on the ground for any kind of a reaction force that we might need so they would have that armored protection as they go help someone out in trouble And that's firmly established today.

Another RO-RO ship will be brought in, so by the end of the day we should have completed unloading at least one and continue unloading two more with our sustainment stocks.

Also, our folks will go to Camp d'Application where the heavy weapons company is located to coordinate sort of confidencebuilding measures. We think it's important that we establish our presence at that location as well. And so, we will be establishing those contacts today, and either later today or sometime tomorrow, we'll bring additional forces into that camp, which, as you know, is the camp where they keep most of their heavy weapons, all of the B- 150 armored vehicles, the air defense weapons, the Howitzers. And so, I think it is important that we be there with them at that location.

Q And what will we do? Will we just stand there with them? Or will we take charge of those weapons?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I will tell you an interesting -- what they were doing yesterday was play volleyball. (Laughter.) We are going -- we think it would be useful if we could use that camp for one of our headquarters to operate out of.

Q We will then have effective control of those weapons, will we, sir?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: We will be able to see what it is they are doing with those weapons.

Q? Can you tell us anything about General Shelton's first meeting with General Cedras? Was Cedras -- you said he was cooperative. Did he seem nervous meeting with General Cedras, was Cedras -- you said he was cooperative. Did he seem nervous, reluctant? Did he say that he would be there every day for you, or is -- how do --

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I cannot characterize, since I haven't been here, and I'd ask you to ask General Shelton. My reports from that meeting were that he was cooperative, that there was no indication at all of either walking away from the agreement or characterizing it somehow different than General Powell had characterized it to me in the discussions. So, although this is only the first day, there was no indication that there was some kind of a disconnect between what our team reported the relationship would be, and how General Cedras acted.

Now, as far as seeing him every day, General Cedras established a coordination committee, headed by a colonel, Haitian colonel, and this is where the minute-by-minute coordination is ongoing. I think, again, the information I have is that General Shelton will be meeting with General Cedras again tomorrow.

Q General Shalikashvili, could you update us on what the pro-Aristide elements in Haiti are now up to, because we have a statement from President Aristide which is silent on the entire agreement; does not endorse it or oppose it. But his advisors say he's deeply concerned, that it has many flaws and that it may not achieve its objectives. What can you tell us about all of this?

And how much of a concern for the military is there that there could be problems between the pro-Aristide and the antiAristide forces in Haiti?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: As far as what the pro-Aristide folks are doing on the ground, which I think was the first part of your question, the only experience we have had so far, that there's been some kind of a demonstration at the port -- there was one yesterday -- by pro-Aristide folks, certainly supportive of us. It was broken up -- sometimes maybe a little harshly by the Haitian police and the military -- but that's the only kind of demonstration we've run into.

Now, as far as the agreement is concerned, I am absolutely convinced that an agreement that allowed us to now be in Haiti this morning, already up into the tune of over 4,000 -- by the time the night ends, over 6,000 -- without a single shot fired up until now, without a single American having been wounded or died, or without a single Haitian being wounded and died, must be pretty good.

Now, the issue is that we can -- there's always room to argue about the finer points of it. But we must not lose sight of the strategic importance of this agreement, that it has allowed us to be there in those numbers now. I am very hopeful that we can continue this cooperative process with Cedras until he leaves. He will leave on the 15th. He will leave power on the 15th as the agreement says, of that I have absolutely no doubt. And so what we're talking about is this period between now and the 15th of October.

Q From a point of stability -- from a point of stability, do you think that if General Cedras remains in the country that the same kind of stability you're talking about can be guaranteed when President Aristide returns? And will -- are you worried about a possible breakdown between two sides over there possibly endengaring U.S. treeps on the ground?

there, possibly endangering U.S. troops on the ground?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Yes, I am worried about it. I've been, from the very beginning of this operation, very much concerned about getting our military men and women caught up in this Haitian-on-Haitian violence, that murky sort of a threat out there that's always there. And I will tell you that nothing that we have seen so far removes my concern about that, because these are sort of explosive situations that can come up at any given moment, and our soldiers have to be prepared for it physically and mentally, and we have to have given them the rules of engagement to handle themselves in these kinds of situations.

Q General, just to follow up, would you like to see General Cedras depart, then, and think it would be best if he left the country?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I think that's what this whole exercise is about, the departure of --

Q From the country, we're talking about. We're talking about from the country. Because if he stays, there are lots of people who worry that he may end up rallying his troops around.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I think we have always said that he must relinquish power, and as a practical matter, we think he's leave the country, but I cannot get into that.

Q General Shali, a question about Camp d'Application --

Q General, to that extent, isn't there some concern that the statement from President Aristide, which is certainly not at all supportive of this agreement, might undercut efforts to keep things quiet between pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide forces, and further endanger U.S. troops? Wouldn't it be more helpful if President Aristide could bless this agreement?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I certainly won't presume to speak for President Aristide. I hope that we can be -- before many more hours go by, we can go meet with him and brief him on what has happened so far and what our plans are for the days ahead to make him fully aware and feel more comfortable about how this is progressing.

Q Do you have a plan to see him today?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I have a plan for our folks to go over there and meet with him today. If I can break away after this, I will certainly be delighted to meet with him.

Q Are these military people?

Q General on Camp d'Application, Aristide supporters apparently felt that they had a deal with the Pentagon to disarm the Haitian military. You say that you have just observed what is being done with the heavy weapons there.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I'm sorry, who said that we --

Q Some of Aristide's supporters believe that was a deal with the Pentagon to disarm the Haitian military. And you say you just monitor what is being done with the weapons there. Is there a deal to -- what will be done with the armaments of the Haitian military?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I'm not sure what which deal you are talking about. Is it between us and FAHD?

Q Apparently in discussions prior to events over the weekend, there was an understanding where Aristide's supporters claim there was an understanding that the Haitian military would be disarmed. Apparently, that is not the case. Is that correct?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: No. I believe that within the context of removing weapons from the streets, we are going to not only deal with the question of buy-back of weapons -- which we want to institute almost immediately -- have follow-on discussions with General Cedras on recalling those weapons that he issued to the -- to those militia folks -- some 15,000, 20,000, 30,000 -- how many of them there are.

There are paramilitary groups that have weapons that we -- those need to be taken off the streets. And then the question of the disarming of the FAHD was discussed previously in the context of our original plan of going in, in opposition to the FAHD and immediately disarming it. I think that is an issue that we are going to have to discuss now in the next few days, so that as we go closer to the 15 October date, we, in fact, feel comfortable that only those people who are supportive of the democratic government there have weapons.

Q General, do you --

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: So, I feel comfortable that we are on track on all this.

Q What are you going to do about it?

Q Are you comfortable with the circumstance where the United States forces will be apparently sharing the job of keeping order with the Haitian police and military? Is that how that's supposed to go?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Not at all. The task of keeping law and order in Haiti is the responsibility of the Haitian police force and the Haitian military. We are not in the business of doing the day-to-day law and order. For that matter, the resolving or quelling any demonstrations, unless these demonstrations or this level of violence becomes so great that it threatens the overall stability and the security of our multinational forces; and then we will intercede.

Q What would occur, for example, sir, if the effort to recall weapons was not entirely successful? There are still weapons out there; you see them there on the streets. What do we do then? Do we ask the Haitian police to confiscate the weapons? Do we do so? What?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: It's always been our intention from the very beginning that we would put the onus of collecting those weapons onto the Haitian police. That is still -- those are the discussions we're going to have with Cedras, that that goes on. We never intended to go on house-to-house hunts for those weapons. So I think what I'm telling you is, it's not a change of the way it was envisioned.

What I think is the difference is that now where some of those things were going to happen on a day when we made a forced entry, now that we did not make a forced entry, but we have the agreement that President Carter and Senator Nunn and Colin Powell were able to bring back, we now have a more extended period of time during which to effect some of those things. Certainly, the buy-back program can start today. The disarming of certain factions will probably take a little longer.

Q both military factions to be very respectful of each other. Are you personally surprised at how much General Cedras and the Haitian military police are cooperating with you? Personally, are you surprised?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I am very gratified by it. But I think that as our presence there builds up, I'm not surprised. I think that what we're doing is that we're doing this in the spirit of being firm, of making sure that we inform him what we are going to do. We're not negotiating those issues. General Cedras understands that, has been helpful.

And I think to the degree that we can maintain that spirit and not pick at it so it falls apart, the more we're going to be saving ourselves trouble in the days ahead. Because I think it's important that, as we march on with this process, that we can do that in this kind of a spirit instead of look to see where we can start friction between ourselves.

Q Do we have an agreement to disarm the paramilitary troops?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: We have neither tried to gain such an agreement up to now, but it is something that we're going to start discussing with General Cedras -- first with his folks today and then with General Cedras tomorrow, certainly.

Q So, as far as your military mission is concerned, do you now believe that it is preferable that General Cedras remain in power and that his army remain intact, at least for now, than that he has stepped down immediately, as the President initially demanded?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: It was never quite that either or. It was, stay and then we have to fight, I mean, stay there and have to fight, or reach an agreement so we can negotiate these issues. So you have to put it in a context that for him to have been gone today, we most probably would have taken casualties; they certainly would have taken casualties. The fact that he has stayed for this very short interim period has prevented those casualties.

And if we do it right and if we try not to create friction, but rather try to maintain that cooperative spirit, I think that's one of our better guarantees to keep casualties low. But I must tell you, this is the first day of an awful lot of days. This uncertainty, this break-out of hostilities, of Haitian-on-Haitian violence can come at any time. So we all and the nation needs to understand that we can be taking casualties at any moment, and we need to be prepared for it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END11:18 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Minneapolis, Minnesota)

For Immediate Release

September 24, 1994

RADIO ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION

> Ritz-Carlton Hotel Chicago, Illinois

9:06 A.M. CDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. This week I'm in Chicago, where my radio address is carried live each week by radio station WMAQ.

One week ago, America stood ready to use force if necessary to help restore the democratically-elected government in Haiti. American power martialed in pursuit of our national interest enabled American diplomacy to succeed. Haiti's military leaders agreed to leave power no later than October 15th. And our troops entered Haiti peacefully and without bloodshed, leading an international coalition of 28 nations that will work to bring greater security to the people and restore to power Haiti's democratically-elected government.

Today, I am pleased to report on the progress of our mission. The U.S. contribution to the international coalition will soon be at full strength -- some 14,000 American servicemen and women. Our troops include nearly 1,000 military police, who are working to help ensure that the Haitian police act with restraint toward the Haitian people. Police monitors from our coalition partners, Argentina, Jordan and Bolivia, are expected to arrive next week. And the United Nations human rights observers expelled from Haiti two months ago will soon return.

We've also have begun programs to confiscate heavy weapons controlled by the Haitian military and to buy back light weapons from the militia and civilians.

Our presence, in short, is helping to restore civil order in a country wracked by violence and instability. Perhaps the best evidence of our success is that 200 to 300 Haitian refugees who we sheltered at our base in Guantanamo will go home on Monday. And we expect more to follow soon.

This remains a difficult undertaking -- as with all military operations -- and as I speak to you, Secretary of Defense Perry and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are traveling to Haiti to review our progress on the ground. I am proud of our troops and their commanders there. They deserve our thanks, our prayers, and our praise.

Our success in Haiti to date shows what the international community, with American leadership, can achieve in helping countries in their struggle to build democracy. Our mission, however, is limited. We must remember, as I plan to tell the United Nations General Assembly on Monday, that it is up to the people in those countries ultimately to ensure their own freedom. This is the great challenge and opportunity of democracy.

That's also one of the lessons I hope Americans will learn as Russian President Boris Yeltsin and South African President Nelson Mandela visit our country in the next two weeks. Their visits will be occasions to reflect on the remarkable democratic transformations of Russia and South Africa -- which the United States has done a great deal to promote.

America should be proud of our leadership in helping to build open societies around the world. By supporting democracy and promoting economic growth, we are actively helping others, but we're helping ourselves at the same time.

Despite this, some people in our country question the importance of American engagement in the post-Cold War world. They say we should hide behind the walls of protectionism and isolationism. But they're wrong.

That's why early next week I'll submit to Congress legislation to implement the GATT world trade agreement -- the largest trade agreement in history. By cutting tariffs around the world, GATT will mean a \$36-billion tax cut for Americans over the coming 10 years. It will also generate between 300,000 and 700,000 permanent new jobs in those years, and, in time, many, many more for our children. And most of all, it will mean that we are facing this moment of decision with the confidence we need to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world -- tearing down walls that separate nations instead of hiding behind them.

As we've learned again this week, when we approach our responsibilities around the world with the same sense of purpose, we can, indeed, accomplish great goals.

Thanks for listening.

END9:11 A.M. CDT
View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (New York, New York)

For Immediate Release September 25, 1994

Statement by the President

We regret any loss of life in connection with our mission in Haiti, but it must be clear that U.S. forces are prepared to respond to hostile action against them and will do so. We will continue to work with Haitian military authorities for a peaceful transition.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 6, 1994

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

The Roosevelt Room

3:40 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not exactly the roundtable, intimate setting that all of us anticipated. But let each of us in the beginning spend a few minutes trying to bring you up to date on where things are in Haiti, and then answer questions you might have.

This is historical material, "frozen in time." The web site is no longer updated and links to external web sites and some internal pages will not work.

The President just got back from Norfolk, where he's had a full briefing from U.S. -- from a teleconference he had with General Shelton and others in Haiti on the situation. He was very impressed by what he heard.

Generally, the situation -- let me just quickly go through a couple of the elements of the situation and the others will take up other aspects of it.

On the security side, the situation is generally calm. Clearly, our presence has altered the balance of power. We have, by virtue of both weapons buyback and asserting control over FAD'H weapons and going after weapons caches that we're familiar with, have recovered over 4,000 weapons in the country. There obviously are considerably more than that, but that is 4,000 weapons that are no longer on the street.

The general security environment in the last several days has been relatively calm; there has not been widespread looting or violence. All major food storage facilities now, all of the AID food storage facilities are now under the protection of U.S. quick reaction forces.

There are, as of today, 447 police monitors in Haiti who will travel with, are traveling with Haitian military and security forces. There will be 800 police monitors there by -- before the end of October. This is in addition to 300 translators who will operate as facilitators between the police monitors and the Haitian police.

Ray Kelly, who was a former chief of police of the New York police department, is in Haiti working with these police monitors, and will begin the process of professionalizing the Haitian police forces once Aristide returns.

My colleague will have more to say about other elements of the multinational force that are present.

In terms of President Aristide, he has been extremely cooperative with us in every aspect, and in fact, there is now a transition office in Port-au-Prince consisting of his former defense minister and others who are working with Ambassador Swing and General Shelton.

On the political side, of course, Francois is out. The radio and TV -- state radio and TV are now in the hands of legitimate government. Parliament is meeting again today on the amnesty law. We can talk more about that if you would like. And the City Hall is back in the hands of the elected mayor of Port-au-Prince, Evans Paul, who probably is the second most popular political figure in Haiti after President Aristide.

On the sanctions side, as you know, we've lifted all of the unilateral -- or in the process of lifting all of the unilateral sanctions except those that are targeted specifically on the 600 individuals who are most associated with the military regime. And we are using authority we have under the U.N. resolutions to expand the humanitarian, fuel, and other supplies that are coming into the country. So that we now, for example, have the lights on in CapHaitien for the first time in a long time, and the lights in Port-auPrince -- the electricity has been restored, so that instead of lights being on three hours a day they're now on, I guess, 12 to 18 hours a day. And there is beginning to be some visible signs that life is improving.

On the economic side, we have, as you know, organized a donors group that has committed \$550 million for the first year of economic recovery. One of the things that they're doing during this transition period is clearing the arrears that Haiti has, about \$86 million, so that there will be less of a time line between the time that Aristide returns and the time that the international financial institutions will be able to go back into the country.

Finally, on the humanitarian side, we've intensified in this interim period the humanitarian programs. We're now feeding over a million people a day. When schools open next week we will be feeding 1.3 million. That is obviously easier now that --logistically, now that the sanctions are lifted and we are able to bring food into the country more easily.

Finally, on the migrants at Guantanamo, as of today about 2,000 have returned voluntarily to Haiti. That process will continue. There are about 14,000 Haitians that are still in Guantanamo.

As the last thing, I would say the thing that impressed those folks who were in Norfolk most today was the report from the field level commanders of the response of the Haitian people to what we're doing. This is something that we've read about and see on television, but I'm told that the President was hearing the younger officers speak to the kind of reception that they're getting from the country, it reinforces and validates in no small measure what we're doing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just say that, with only a little over a week to go before the 15th of October, there's obviously been a further intensification of contact between our government and President Aristide and his colleagues. Ambassador Swing is conducting a more or less permanent open house in Port-auPrince. He's got members of the private sector, parliamentarians, political figures coming to see him; he's going out to see them.

And here in Washington, a number of officials of our government are meeting on a fairly regular basis with President Aristide in preparation for his return. You can imagine what the principal topics of conversation are -- obviously, the amnesty law, the police law, provisions for his return, economic reconstruction program.

When I say intensification, there's been a lot of contact going back, of course, many, many months. Tony Lake has seen him on a number of occasions; Secretary Christopher -- Secretary Christopher will be seeing him again in the next day or so. Bill Gray is still involved, available particularly when it comes to dealing with President Aristide.

The new special envoy of the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Brahimi, is now very much engaged in this process. The gentleman has taken over from Dante Caputo. He met with several of us earlier in the week up in New York. He's in Washington today and tomorrow meeting both with the Aristide party and members of our government.

My colleague suggested I would talk a little bit about the deployment of the multinational force. I think it would probably be better to fold that into what my other colleagues have to say. The long and short of it is the CARICOM battalion is in place in Haiti. The Bangledeshis will be arriving in a day or two, and if anybody is interested in the details on when the others will actually be coming, I have a list here and can give you more on that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My view is that this is a unusual operation that I've known about in 30 years -- the political and diplomatic part, military part and the economic recovery part are well integrated, well-thought-through. I want to say a few words about the military part, and my colleague may want to add some additional comments.

First of all, we think that the execution here has been extraordinary. It has involved a joint use of force -- very unusual. You have army helicopters taken off over the decks of an aircraft carrier, but in an integrated operation, changing the plan at the last moment. The troops have entered into Haiti, have taken over the two large cities first -- Cap-Haitien and Port-de-Paix -- without any fatality from combat. We are extremely pleased -- all the military commanders and civilians in the department -- with the military operation up until now.

A not-well-known fact is the dispersement which is occurring from the two main towns. Here's a map which just gives you a sense of how the special forces units which are concerned with the civil-military quarter throughout the country are going into the small towns, everywhere; are being met, as my colleague pointed out, very, very warmly by the population, being able to bring some medical assistance, some civil affairs assistance to all parts of the country.

In general, there has been vastly less violence than we feared. And while there's always the possibility for more, we are extremely pleased with what the presence of U.S. forces has done to deter violence throughout the country. We're not just talking about the big towns, but everywhere.

I would like to make one point about the policy on civil order, which is discussed endlessly, but it's really quite simple, it has not changed -- is that U.S. troops are going to become involved in maintaining public order, provided in the judgment of the commander on the scene that, A, they have the capability of doing so, and B, it does not place those U.S. troops at unreasonable risk.

I would also note that we are doing very well with our program on reducing arms throughout the country. As my colleague has mentioned, we're never going to get rid of them all -- the heavy weapons of the FAD'H have been completed seized. Almost all of the FAD'H arsenals have been reviewed to remove from them armaments which do not belong in a reasonable police force. We are beginning to go after the caches of the paramilitary cadres, the FRAPH. And as you know, individuals -- if they show any hostile intent when they are carrying weapons on the street, and again, in the judgment of the individual U.S. commander, they have the capability to do so if they show hostile intent, they will be dealt with and they will be dealt with immediately.

There presently are about 19,500 troops on the island. The CARICOM battalion, I believe, is responsible now for the safety of the port, Cap-Haitien, which means there will be U.S. battalion that will be free to be able to come home. There are 194 police monitors who are present and who are beginning to work with the remaining FAD'H public order units to make sure that they provide the correct kind of police view over the island.

In general, we are extremely pleased with the operation up until now, and believe that it's of great value to -- it shows the best of U.S. military forces.

Do you want to add anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think you covered it all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The bottom line from our perspective is that we are on track as well, if not better, than we anticipated we would be in this stage in terms of this mission.

QCan I ask about the police training -- can you explain a little bit about how that would work and timetables for having different increments and recruitment and so on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Police training is phased off -- Ray Kelly is down there now; he's actually gone into a couple of the police stations, as only he can do, he held a muster, NYPD style. He said, okay, fall in, count heads; you guys are showing up to work tomorrow morning and here are the rules. And he dropped off international police monitors with them and said, okay, I'll be back tomorrow morning; I want these guys fed and looked after; if they aren't you're going to have to deal with me. So Ray Kelly has convince them that there's a good deal in this for them.

We have Haitians that we've trained at Guantanamo. The first group should be coming over in the next couple of days, and they'll become the interim police force as we go through this process. So we'll start that at Cap-Haitien this weekend. We don't need many people up there. The original police company is about 288; you can do this with about 100 police. So it's a combination of --the police that Kelly's guys are going to vet out and this kind of volunteer organization we're bringing out of Haiti.

We're going to replicate that in the sectors of Port-au-Prince incrementally over time. And then, once Aristide names the new police chief, we'll get serious about vetting out the FAD'H and going from there.

Q The FAD'H are asking Ray Kelly to do it for the reporters as well. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I can add just one thing to what he said, in terms of the folks coming from Guantanamo, they will be basically trainees. They will not have weapons, they will be accompanied by other police there and by the police monitors. They'll continue to receive training, but at this stage they will be particularly doing neighborhood watch, traffic control, other things that are less intrusive until they've had more training.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just add one thing, too. You will note that General Sheehan has called this an interim police force. There's a lot of very understandable confusion about the differentiation between the two missions -- the multinational force, which is the current phase, and the United Nations mission that will be coming in early next year, we expect. It's the United Nations mission that will have the responsibility of both bifurcating what is now a combined police and military force into a smaller professional army and an appropriate civilian police force. What we're doing now is an interim force to provide security.

QWill you describe how President Aristide will return and whether American troops are going to protect him, and if so, for how long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How he will return is something we are beginning to discuss with him, and obviously, his judgments here will be the critical ones in terms of the logistics of returning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The protection is that he has his own security that's worked with the State Department protective service. We will provide what I call general support. If he leaves the city, we will provide helicopter service for him. We will provide checkpoint security throughout the city. But over the longterm, clearly the responsibility is going to rest with the Haitian military and the Haitian police force. But as my colleague said, that is a function that is going to take a couple of months to get completely in place.

Q So Americans won't be bodyguards?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q I'm wondering if we can talk a little bit about the transformation of Mr. Constant this week from the head of FRAPH to someone who is there giving a speech endorsing Mr. Aristide's return. That's perplexed a lot of folks, and as you know, tomorrow in The Nation, there's going to be an article that there are CIA links to FRAPH and to this individual. I would just like to get the government's assessment to why he turned around so quickly and neatly and react to that upcoming story.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say a few things. First of all, the United States government had no role whatsoever in organizing, funding, encouraging, operating FRAPH.

Q Is this just during the Clinton administration we're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as I know, prior to that. Constant came to us. He obviously saw the shift of powers that I spoke to you -- that I mentioned before. We obviously facilitated his having a press conference.

QWhen did he come to you, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Shortly before the press conference.

Q In other words, earlier this week?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that's correct -- two days ago. But this was something he that he did -- we did not initiate, he initiated.

QCould you talk about the extent to which you think FRAPH has been or is being dismantled, and the extent to which he maybe just is going underground?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I say a word about -- clearing your throat -- (laughter) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you should FRAPH is really more than one organization. There's a centralized FRAPH and attached to it is a whole set of paramilitary throughout the country, not centrally controlled; other paramilitary organizations that have to be considered as well. And so your question really asks how are we going to address all of these groups.

And I think that -- I tried to suggest that we are ready, as you saw during last week, going after the FRAPH facilities and seeing whether they have contraband there, seeing -- I think we did seven of them, what was it, last Thursday. And some of them we found a lot of weapons and contraband, and others we didn't. And that's the way we are seizing them.

One of the FRAPH deputies I think has also left country, of the organized FRAPH. And around that are these attaches and paramilitary units which contain a lot of potential for violence and a lot of weapons where you just can't find them and go after them in an organized way. It's a much more difficult task than going after the FAD'H, and that's not so easy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is one other point I wanted to make in the beginning. In reviewing the progress that we've made and our general satisfaction with where things are, that should not suggest that we don't still consider this to be a difficult mission and one that still carries risks. And that is something that we are aware of every hour of every day.

Q The revelations about FRAPH and also the reports that Aristide had been in a mental institution, which was later discredited, you get the impression that there is a CIA involvement that does not want Aristide to return and to succeed. How do you dispel this cloud that seems to hang over this whole operation that deals with a sort of undercurrent that certain people in the government are not happy with Aristide and would rather someone else be in power?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, with respect to the revelations, as I said to you, as I said a moment ago, that is not true. The allegation that the government organized or funded or ran FRAPH is not true.

But let me answer your broader question. I think this has been an operation since the President decided that we were heading down this course in which there has been a greater degree of cooperation among the various branches of the government, including the intelligence community, than any that I have ever seen before. So I think once the direction has been clear, everyone has been --has put their shoulder to the wheel and has helped to make this a success.

And with respect to President Aristide, we've judged him based upon our own contacts with him over now two-and-a-half years. And in all of those contacts, he has been a man who is, I think, a man of high principle and knows his own mind, and is about to restored to his elected position, which indicates his strength of purpose.

Q What still stands in the way of a formal agreement between the United States and President Aristide about the role that U.S. forces will play in his country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not very much.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I understand, it's supposed to be signed this afternoon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been some --

QWhat was the hitch, what were the obstacles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was just a question of going through -- part of it was just understanding of what you mean. When you have a culture -- it's like the Governors Island Accord -- it took a period of time for people to understand what the words mean. It was just a slow, bureaucratic process. Anytime you hire a lawyer, it's going to take time. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is on background. (Laughter.)

Q What happens to Jonassaint?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would expect Jonassaint to leave office -- leave the office he doesn't legitimately hold -- on or before October 15th. And the other ministers -- there is a government. Aristide does have most of the ministers in place. Rene Prosper yesterday offered the amnesty proposal. We would expect by October 15th or soon thereafter those ministers to be back in their offices. And President Aristide will appoint a new prime minister, as he's indicated.

Q Are you getting cooperation from Cedras and Biamby -- any indication that they may give you some problems at the last moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they have given us cooperation; more importantly, I think they've learned to take guidance and instruction from General Shelton. I think that's worked very well. It's not so much cooperation anymore as they know what's expected of them by the U.S. military there, and I don't think we expect there to be any trouble. As time has gone on, Cedras has certainly lost the control that he had over the FAD'H in the country, and that's got its good parts and its bad parts. He no longer has military control. On the other hand, we don't have another structure to put in his place. But generally speaking, that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was just going to say, I think a variant of the same answer really applies to your question about Constant. I don't think his transformation is as puzzling as a lot of people have found it. I don't think it has anything to do with his biography or, for that matter, his character. It's a direct response to a new reality.

Q Are you going as far as to say that the capacity for organized, centrally-controlled resistance --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the capacity, I would say, for organized, centrally-controlled resistance is over. The capacity for violence, organized in smaller groups which can create a lot of terror and trouble in the country, is certainly still present.

Q The fact that Francois just went over to the Dominican Republic and that may be the haven for the others, is there some concern that they could just be regrouping, especially against a backdrop of a Congress which is very anxious to get American troops out of Haiti?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- my impression is that President Ballaguer has made it clear and the Dominican government has made it clear that they do not want to see the Dominican Republic used as a staging ground for actions against the legitimate government of Haiti. That's obviously something that we would view as an adverse development. Francois has a house in the Dominican Republic -- not surprising that that's where he would go. But I think we will work closely with the Dominican government to assure that that's where he remains and it is not used as a base of operations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By the way, speaking personally as well as on background, I would place a small bet that at least one of the other two, maybe both, will leave. And I'd also place a small bet that they won't end up in the Dominican Republic. For whatever it's worth. I don't think that you would see a gathering of a threesome there.

Q Which one of the two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I won't go beyond that. I'm just saying that I wouldn't assume from Francois's decision to join his brother in the Dominican Republic, that that's where the other two will go.

Q Has the trio been offered immunity from prosecution, either by us or by Haiti?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q On the amnesty question, how much concern is there -- American honor and good faith -- what steps are being taken to ensure that those things aren't compromised in the way this plays out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the amnesty question?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what the Carter, Powell, Nunnagreement provided was that Cedras, Biamby and Francois would leave upon the enactment of a general amnesty or October 15th, whichever is earlier. So that if there is not an amnesty by October 15th, they're still obligated to leave; we still expect them to leave; and we still believe they will leave. In fact, they will leave, period.

Now, we have an interest in an amnesty law, as does President Aristide. We think that would be useful in terms of the reconciliation process that is going forward. President Aristide has introduced -- his government has introduced an amnesty bill yesterday; it's being referred to a committee. There are differences about the scope of amnesty. This has been an issue really preexisting Governors Island, from Governors Island until now -- what is the scope of an amnesty; what does it cover. We don't think it's appropriate for the United States government to try to write a Haitian amnesty bill. We will try to keep this process moving, try to help bring the parties together to achieve an amnesty, but ultimately, obviously, they've got to define what the terms of that amnesty is.

Q And as you've brokered the deal don't you have an interest in the way it plays out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, could I maybe address that? I think it's too early certainly to prejudge that there won't be an amnesty. God knows it's too early to predict what kind of an amnesty there will be. But during that -- fairly memorable for us, I suspect for some of you Sunday, when President Carter and General Powell and Senator Nunn were down there, and there was a lot of back-and-forth between them and President Clinton, the one issue on which President Clinton was most adamant was that the proposed document to be signed include a date certain. And the reason was anticipating precisely the kind of wrangle that may or not

now develop. It was President Clinton's view that, okay, we'll give the parties -- never mind who might show what kind of faith -- x amount of time in order to work out an amnesty, but not forever. And that's why he insisted that the October 15th date be added.

And basically what it says, you have until October 15th to work out an amnesty. And if that makes it easier for the --particularly Cedras and Biamby to acquiesce in a peaceful, nonviolent, nonlethal introduction of American forces, fine. But only until October 15th.

Q Could I follow that? In a larger sense, the amnesty issue, looking down the road, is a question of how far Aristide's new government pursues justice as opposed to mercy. Given that the United States forces are securing order on the ground, why shouldn't Aristide go ahead and attempt to pursue every violator of human rights over the last three years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought your question was going to take just the opposite.

Q Why, in other words, are you urging a broader amnesty rather than --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are not urging --we're not trying to define the nature of a Haitian political and constitutional argument that is daunting, even if you were an expert at Haitian constitutional law. That is, what authority the President has under Article 147; what authority the parliament has to create an amnesty. We're not saying this is the kind of amnesty or that is the kind of amnesty. What we are urging all of the parties to do, and what seems to be happening is to make a serious effort to adopt an amnesty law that they an agree on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I just add a word, having some sense -- as, certainly, my colleague does as well -- about President Aristide's thinking. He is, we're convinced, serious about wanting a broad-based government. And he also is serious about wanting a political environment that is peaceful. And he is looking for a balance between, on the one hand, an amnesty that is so narrow that it leaves out there a critical mass of people who are afraid for their lives and, therefore, constitute a threat to public order; and on the other hand, an amnesty that is so broad that it outrages the mass of Haitian people who have suffered terribly at the hands of this regime.

Now, he has found a kind of rhetorical balance in that respect -- and those of you who listened to his speech in the U.N. the other day probably heard it -- where he says no to vengeance, no to retribution, yes to reconciliation, but no to impunity and yes to justice. Now, how he's going to translate those yeses and nos into an amnesty law -- I don't think he's probably worked out entirely, but he is, I know, in close consultation with his supporters in the Parliament.

There's a lot of experience elsewhere in the hemisphere on this subject -- in Chile, Argentina, Salvador -- and I know that President Aristide has been getting and listening to a lot of advice from other countries who had been through similar traumas and have had to face that problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say one last thing on the amnesty. The law that Aristide submitted yesterday through his government to the Parliament does expand considerably the authority that the President would have under an old 1860 Haitian law to confer amnesty. So I think that signifies the fact that he sees this in more expansive terms than the narrowest possible terms one could imagine.

Q You've got nine days -- they've got nine days to accomplish this. I'm just curious what your best guess is about the odds that that will happen over the next nine days -- a law with this emotion attached to it can actually be done in that amount of time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought GATT would be passed before -- (laughter).

I have to honestly -- I don't think anybody can say. I think they are making -- I think there is a serious effort to find a consensus at this point, as of Wednesday.

Q Are you worried that Congress is considering a time limit when to pull out? Is that worrisome to you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're on record until we're blue in the face making the argument to the Congress that a time limit has real dangers associated with it and could complicate, if not endanger, the mission of our forces there. We continue to consult closely with the Congress.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're very encouraged by the fact that in the Senate there is a compromise sense of the Congress resolution which is does contain any date certain. It's not something -- there are a lot of other things in the Congress resolution that we disagree with, but I think it does reflect a bipartisan view in the Senate at this stage that it is inadvisable, notwithstanding our intention of drawing our force down over the next several months, that it is inadvisable to put a calendar on General Shelton's head.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's significant that -- I believe that all the senators who went -- last weekend -- down, came back opposed to a date certain. It's also worth keeping in mind that one of the reasons we made the progress we had and are now absolutely certain that we're going to succeed in restoring President Aristide is because General Cedras and General Biamby were faced with a date certain. We don't want to put General Shelton in that position.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to say anything more about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the point that my colleagues made are accurate, but the point that I would make to people and that I have made to the people who have asked me the question is that from the squad leaders' perspective, the kid that's on the ground, we own the tactical advantage for two reasons: One, when the policemen up at Cap-Haitien last weekend decided to threaten the Marines and the Haitians died in the firefight, that has a significant psychological advantage, especially on Cedras and the rest of the leadership. They didn't expect that to happen.

And number two, when you're talking about these special forces teams that have gone out to the countryside, you're talking about 12 kids, very, very talented people, but they fly in, drive into a particular town, and their simple presence is a psychological advantage because the FAD'H clearly knows that's either the front end of a big piece or the beginning of reconciliation and progress.

In the case of, for example, -- when we went in there the other day, it was 12 people that went in there. And they flew in by helicopter, landed in the town, said, okay, we're here. Chief of Police, fall in. Get your cops over here; get your army guys over here; let's go look at the jail. That's where they found the 40 people stuffed in one cell. And a Sergeant First-Class told the chief -- the police guy there -- I'll be back this afternoon; I want the place cleaned up; I want these people looked after; I want them taken care of -- get it done. And the guy said, yes, sir.

He then mustered the attorney general equivalent and called the Red Cross and said, get over here and get involved in this thing; I'll be back. He then went and called back and said, I want this guy reassigned. And they packed him up and shipped him back to Port-au-Prince.

The reason they had that advantage is clearly because the Haitians knew that if they didn't do it, it was going to be bad news for them. And so, you have that advantage psychologically in tactical mobility. But if you have a date out there that says it's 30 days, it's 60 days, it's 90 days -- this is a society that lives in intimidation. Five, 10, 15 of these jerks are going to drift off into the countryside with their weapons and in 60 or 90 days later they're back because they're going to say, well, the Americans are going to be gone. If they don't know that you're not going to leave in 60 or 90 days, you are going through what we call behavior modification. So they are going to behave because they don't know what's transpiring. So I think that if they knew that we are going to be gone in two months or something like that, that young Sergeant FirstClass would not be going into a town with the psychological advantage that he owns right now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say one last thing on this point. There will be an international presence in Haiti under U.N. Security Council 940 until February of 1996. We want that to be very much a seamless process. We will hand over this operation to a U.N. mission; at that point where we can represent the Security Council; the Security Council accepts the proposition there is a secure environment.

The dates that are out there are dates for the front-end of this thing, not for the whole thing. And, again, from a Haitian perspective there will be an international presence. It will be coming down on the military side and going up on the international, economic and other kind of side substantially next year. But, there will be an international presence through most of next year. And I think it's important that they not -- that we not emphasize a particular point in which that transition takes place.

Q Does the U.S. have any track record in professionalizing these forces in foreign countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. In fact, there is a tap which is a Justice Department agency working with the State Department that has done this in Panama and Salvador and other places. In fact, there is more than a record than I was aware of.

Q Is the aim to disarm all the paramilitary forces there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think my colleague explained the plan here in terms of the paramilitary's --there has been an order that has gone out from the FAD'H, as I understand it, for the paramilitaries to reclaim the weapons they were issued. Therefore, the permits -- the licenses by which those weapons were in people's hands -- no longer pertain to the extent therefore that they are in caches that we can identify or they are in visible situations where we have the capacity to obtain them, we will do so. We are not engaged in person-to-person, house-to-house searches for weapons, nor will we be.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. That's essentially correct. Most of the information -- it's all based on intelligence. There is a large segment of the population that continually wants to lead the rest of their lives in peace. And so what's happening is we are getting a lot of what we call basic (inaudible). And so after four or five people, say, there is a building down the street that has xnumber of weapons -- and for example, we got a mortar the other day because somebody told us where

it was. So, based on intelligence from four of five different sources, we will go after a particular house. But as my colleague says, we are not going to go through the Citi Soleil or Carrefour or one of those kinds of places looking for weapons.

QI believe, sir, that you said that you were feeding 1.3 million people. There were stories today showing -- Haitians were eating the troops garbage. Is there any plans to improve upon that situation, or will it stay virtually the same?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- let me make sure I was accurate about the numbers I used. I think we're feeding today a million people. When schools open next week, we will be feeding 1.3 million.

Let's step back a second. Haiti is a desperately poor country. It is the poorest country in the hemisphere. It is one of the poorest countries in the world. It was before Aristide was dislodged. After three years of sanctions, the situation, obviously, is even worse. So I think we've got to look at it in the proper context. Our humanitarian operation now will be able to ramp up. We are not operating -- the humanitarian operation before was operating, in some ways at the tolerance of the military leadership. If they wanted to jerk us around and not let an oil shipment into -- non-NGOs, we lost a week or two weeks. Those roadblocks are now away. We are able to increase the humanitarian operation significantly. More importantly, we need to get beyond the relief operation to the beginning of an economic recovery and reconstruction program which we hope the international -- we expect the international to begin soon after Aristide comes back.

Q There may not be -- (inaudible) -- date certain. But there is a date certain. As the moral authority of these forces are going to -- (inaudible) -- over time, and we've seen Lebanon, Somalia, wherever - - that the danger is Mission Creep, as we move from maintaining order, which we're very good at, to nation-building, which we are abysmal at, is there a sense that there is a time that we've just got to get these troops out of there and get somebody else on the ground to pick up those duties?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me be really clear about this. The mission of our troops in Haiti is not nation-building. I want to distinguish very clearly between what American and other forces are doing in Haiti and what the international community with Haiti hopefully will do with our involvement over the years on the economic side. Our mission is to ensure the transfer of power, to help to establish a secure environment in which that government can work, and then to professionalize the police and military and then to get out. That is not contingent upon an increase in the standard of living of Haitians. It is not contingent upon running water in every house. It is not contingent upon Jeffersonian democracy taking hold in Haiti.

However, parallel to what we are doing, there will be a significant infusion of international economic assistance -- \$500 million in year one, which is probably about the capacity of the country to absorb, which hopefully will have the effect of infusing that country with more economic vitality.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you want to energize your briefers, just use the phrases Mission Creep and nation-building in the same question. (Laughter.) You'll really see us kind of get up off of our chairs.

But, the way we look at it -- we are trying to give the Haitian people a chance to go back to the business of nation-building themselves. There has been an awful lot of commentary, and God knows we've discussed it a lot among ourselves, over the parallel effort of democracy-building and how much democracy was there, can there be, and so forth and so on. And we feel that what happened back in December 1990, when 90 percent of Haitian people went to the polls and nearly 70 percent of them voted for Aristide, that was democracy in a very fundamental way. And it was an important part of nationbuilding. And it was interrupted. It was taken away from them in September 1991. And our mission is very simple. It's to give them back what they lost in September 1991, and we think that is going to happen nine days from now.

Q-- the role of United States is one thing. The role of the United States military is quite different. That is, there has to come into time very soon at hand where the handoff is from the military having a major role to the State Department, whoever, having the major role, and the military taking a subsidiary position --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand what's going to happen --our staunch resistance to a legislatively imposed date certain does not mean that we have anything less than a high degree of confidence that we are going to be able to hand-off to the United Nations mission, which is going to total 6,000 people. Remember, we've got nearly 20,000 there now -- total 6,000 people, of whom no more than half, probably a little less than half, will be Americans. And of those 3,000 quite a few of them will not be military. So we have that hand-off very much in mind and it's in quite foreseeable future.

QGoing back to the FRAPH, you said that the U.S. is not funding it -- or never did fund it. But isn't it fair to say that there were assets in the FRAPH on the U.S. payroll?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's the practice of this government --

Q That's why we have background briefings --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know, but background or not background, not to comment on who was or wasn't assets of intelligence

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END4:30 P.M. EDT

community.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 10, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Tonight I want to speak with you about the actions we are taking to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf in the face of Saddam Hussein's provocative actions. But first, let me take just a minute to report to you on today's events in Haiti.

Three weeks ago today our troops entered Haiti. They went there to keep America's and the world community's commitment to restore the democratically-elected government to power by October 15th. Today, Lt. General Cedras and Brigadier General Biamby, the two remaining coup leaders, have resigned. They have said they will leave Haiti shortly. I am pleased to announce that President Aristide will return home to resume his rightful place this Saturday, October 15th.

I want to express again my pride in what our men and women in uniform have done in Haiti, and how well they have measured up to their difficult mission. In just three weeks the level of violence is down, the Parliament is back, refugees are returning from Guantanamo. And now the military leaders are leaving.

But I also want to caution again, the job in Haiti remains difficult and dangerous. We still have a lot of work ahead of us. But our troops are keeping America's commitment to restore democracy. They are performing their mission very, very well with firmness and fairness, and all Americans are proud of them.

The strength of America's foreign policy stands on the steadfastness of our commitments. The United States and the international community have given their word that Iraq must respect the borders of its neighbors. And tonight, as in Haiti, American troops with our coalition partners are the guarantors of that commitment, the power behind our diplomacy.

Three and a half years ago, the men and women of our armed forces, under the strong leadership of President Bush, General Powell and General Schwarzkopf fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to protect our interests in that vital region. Today we remain committed to defending the integrity of that nation and to protecting the stability of the Gulf region.

Saddam Hussein has shown the world before, with his acts of aggression and his weapons of mass destruction, that he cannot be trusted. Iraq's troop movements and threatening statements in recent days are more proof of this. In 1990, Saddam Hussein assembled a force on the border of Kuwait and then invaded. Last week, he moved another force toward the same border. Because of what happened in 1990, this provocation requires a strong response from the United States and the international community.

Over the weekend, I ordered the George Washington carrier battle group, cruise missile ships, a marine expeditionary brigade and an army mechanized task force to the Gulf. And today, I have ordered the additional deployment of more than 350 Air Force aircraft to the region. We will not allow Saddam Hussein to defy the will of the United States and the international community.

Iraq announced today that it will pull back its troops from the Kuwait border. But we're interested in facts, not promises; in deeds, not words, and we have not yet seen evidence that Iraq's troops are, in fact, pulling back. We'll be watching very closely to see that they do so.

Our policy is clear: We will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or to intimidate the United Nations as it ensures that Iraq never again possesses weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the sanctions will be maintained until Iraq complies with all relevant U.N. resolutions. That is the answer to Iraq's sanctions problems -- full compliance, not reckless provocation.

I'm very proud of our troops who tonight are the backbone of our commitment to Kuwait's freedom and the security of the Gulf. I'm also proud of the planners and the commanders who are getting them there so very quickly, and in such force. They all are proof that we are maintaining and must continue to maintain the readiness and strength of the finest military in the world.

That is what we owe to the men and women of America who are putting their lives on the line today to make the world a safer place. And it is what we owe to the proud families who stand with them. They are protecting our security as we work for a post-Cold War world of democracy and prosperity.

Within the last two weeks, America hosted two champions of post-Cold War democracy. South African President Nelson Mandela came to thank the United States for our support of South Africa's remarkable democratic revolution, and to seek a partnership for the future. And Russian President Boris Yeltsin came to further the partnership between our two nations so well expressed by the fact that now Russian and U.S. missiles are no longer pointed at each other's people, and we are working to reduce the nuclear threat even more.

In short, we are making progress in building a world of greater security, peace and democracy. But our work is not done. There are difficulties and dangers ahead, as we see in Iraq and in Haiti. But we can meet these challenges and keep our commitments. Our objectives are clear. Our forces are strong and our cause is right.

Thank you and God bless America.

END8:12 P.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 14, 1994

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE BILL GRAY, AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER

The Briefing Room

2:10 P.M. EDT

MR. GRAY: Let me begin by simply saying that today was the farewell ceremony of President Aristide coming to the White House to thank President Clinton. In a private meeting, it was a very warm and joyous feeling that the journey is just about complete. President Aristide thanked President Clinton and the American people profusely, and especially the American military that is doing such a fantastic job down in Haiti.

The President shared with President Aristide the fact that in the audience would be the wives and children of many of our military personnel, and that is why, during his presentation today, President Aristide took time out to especially thank the spouses of those men and women serving in Haiti for their service, and especially the children.

I think clearly the mood that I sense from President Aristide was one of joy, one that -- a sense of great responsibility that will be facing him as he goes back to meet the challenges of reconciliation and building democracy in Haiti. President Aristide has said on several occasions this week to us that he is really looking forward to the return and to the moment of stepping again on Haitian soil. But he is well aware of the great challenges that he will face and is looking forward to working with the CARICOM community, the OAS, as well as the United States in making sure that over the next few months of his administration that there would be democracy, there would be opportunity, and there would be reconciliation.

Let me turn now to Mr. Sandy Berger.

MR. BERGER: Thank you, Bill. And thank you for the enormous contribution that you have made to the achievement that we are on the verge of seeing tomorrow.

I just got off the phone a moment ago with Vicki Huddleston, who is our intrepid DCM in Port-au-Prince, and I asked her what the mood was in the city. And she said it is like there are thousands of Haitians cleaning up as if there is a great big wedding tomorrow. It's a joyous mood. They are obviously very happy about the imminent return of President Aristide and the formal restoration of democratic government.

Let me just tell you a few words about what will happen tomorrow. There will be, tomorrow morning, three planes taking off from Andrews -- two U.S. Air Force planes, one additional plane that the Haitian government has chartered. Leading the presidential delegation will be Secretary of State Christopher. The Vice Chair will be Bill Gray. There will be a number of congressional participants in the delegation. The leadership has designated Senator Dodd and Congressman Rangel to lead the congressional component of the delegation. There will also be private individuals. We will have a list available later today. There will also be a larger Haitian delegation, partly traveling on the Air Force planes and on the Haitian charter plane, making the trip to Port-au-Prince.

The arrival will be shortly be noon. The party will be helicoptered to the palace, where President Aristide will address the Haitian people. There then will be a lunch. Secretary Christopher will have some separate meetings with individuals in the Haitian government and others who will be attending. And we will be returning the delegation tomorrow night.

Q Who's putting on the lunch?

MR. BERGER: The Haitian government.

Q What time do you depart?

MR. BERGER: I think the idea is that wheels will be up around 6:30 a.m. tomorrow. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'll open up the questions to either Bill or I.

Q To both of you, I guess, Randall Robinson has criticized some of the things that have been provided for Cedras, Biamby and Francois, particularly the rental agreement on the personal homes. Your response, Ambassador Gray?

MR. GRAY: Well, I think that the rental agreements are not anything that are objectionable. They're at fair market rent. In light of what's going to be going on over the next few months in Haiti, certainly the United States government will be needing additional space, and to pay fair market rent for additional space is not a negative.

I think really what we've got to do is keep the focus on what has been achieved here. And what has been achieved here is exactly the goals and the objectives of those who raise the question about rental of housing, the removal of the coup leadership, the restoration of democracy, the ending of human rights abuse and the ending of refugee outflows. That has been the goal of the policy. It has been achieved.

And I think that the issue of renting several houses which can be utilized at a fair market value is not an issue at all that should mar the joy that is going to take place tomorrow when President Aristide returns and when the people of Haiti see democracy restored.

MR. BERGER: If I could just add one other thing to that because there have been completely erroneous reports about \$80 million freed up for Cedras and Biamby in connection with their departure. Those reports are just wrong. The \$80 million, I think, referenced is the amount of money that was unfrozen on October 6 when we did away with the general asset freeze. Most of that money is money that was the money of large business families in Haiti. None of that money was Cedras or Biamby money.

There are some targeted sanctions that will be ended tomorrow as all sanctions are lifted. They are in the amount of several hundred thousand dollars. But there again, the only thing that we're aware of that involves Cedras and Biamby is a \$1,000 check that apparently has been held up. So that it is simply incorrect to say that there were assets unfrozen for the Cedrases and Biambys in connection with their departures.

Q Where do you think their money is?

Q Well, where does this money go? Who gets the \$80 million?

MR. BERGER: The \$80 million was money that was part of the general asset and transaction freeze that applied to --

Q Goes to people still in Haiti?

MR. BERGER: Correct. It's the large business families in Haiti and part of reconciliation is --

Q So it's --

MR. BERGER: If I could just finish -- part of reconciliation is saying let's get on with rebuilding Haiti and let's not continue having sanctions.

Q Where do you think Cedras's and Biamby's money is?

MR. BERGER: I have no idea. I don't know whether --

Q Are you saying none of it is theirs?

MR. BERGER: That's correct.

Q Except for \$1,000 dollars, right?

MR. BERGER: The only thing we're aware of in checking our records is a \$1,000 check.

Q And then the several hundred thousand that you mentioned is --

MR. BERGER: There are two different pots here, so to speak. There is the \$80 million that were unfrozen back on October 6 in connection with general lifting of the unilateral sanctions. And those sanctions included certain asset and transaction freezes. There was a second, smaller amount that involved 600 -- generally members of the Haitian military, by name. Their assets in the United States were frozen. Those will be lifted, as always anticipated, and as discussed with President Aristide, when President Aristide returns. But as I said, even in that target amount, the only thing that we have identified that has any connection with Cedras and Biambi is \$1,000.

Q How big is that pot, the second pot?

MR. BERGER: Hundreds of thousands of dollars. I don't know the precise amount.

Q And that \$1,000 check belong to whom? Cedras --

MR. BERGER: Mrs. Cedras. Apparently, it was a transaction that was blocked because her name was on the list when the freeze took place.

Q What about Francois -- his money?

MR. BERGER: Not as far as I know. Francois, the same applies.

Q Can you tell us who this check was to or what it was for?

MR. BERGER: No. I'm sorry, I don't know.

Q Can you give us any better timetable of the withdrawal of U.S. troops? Can you tell us about whether or not you feel they are still in danger and what the justification is to Americans for keeping them down there with Aristide going back?

MR. BERGER: Let me go it first, and then, Bill, you can add.

Our mission now is to maintain a secure environment for the period in which President Aristide returns, to help that government get on its feet through our security presence, and to begin the process of retraining and professionalizing the Haitian police and the Haitian military. We expect that job to be completed in a matter of months. At that point, the mission will be turned over to the U.N. The entire size of that mission will be no greater than 6,000, of which the United States military and civilian presence would be in the range of 3,000.

Q Is there still a danger to U.S. troops?

MR. BERGER: I think we have to be very, very realistic about this. There continues to be risks involved in this mission and there continue to be dangers, as President Clinton has said every time he's spoken to this issue. But we believe every effort is being made to assure the security of our forces and that they are performing brilliantly. And all you have to do is travel behind an American humvee down the streets of Port-au-Prince and see the Haitians waving at our folks, our men and women, and the smiles back to realize the kind of rapport that's developed.

MR. GRAY: I think that Mr. Berger has hit the major points. I think the only thing I'd like to emphasize is that there is a transition point. The exact date of that transition point we can't give to you at this moment, but we know there is going to be hand-off by the multinational force that is currently there, over to the UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti, of which we will only be a part. They, in turn, along with a newly constituted civilian law enforcement authority, will have responsibility. And that is going to happen.

That has been a part of the plan. The United Nations has already agreed to it and we are working toward that end. And so I think it's very clear -- and it has been for some time in this policy -- that United States troops in large numbers in a multinational force would not be there indefinitely. But we will stay long enough to make sure that there is a secure environment and the UNMIH can come in, in an orderly transition and take over its responsibilities.

Q Mr. Gray. These apartments that the government is renting from Cedras, what is the U.S. government going to use them for?

MR. BERGER: Our intention is to sublease these three houses, and I'm told that will not be difficult to do.

Q I thought we needed them because we needed extra space.

MR. BERGER: There are international agencies coming into Haiti. There is a premium at this point on housing.

And let me just put this in context. It seems to me in the context of facilitating the departure of General Cedras and General Biamby and their families so that President Aristide could return to an environment which was more unified and had less elements of friction, the notion of our paying fair market rental for three houses for a year, which we'll, I'm sure, sublease, it seems to me is a minor blip.

Q just a minor blip and what's the rent, the total rent?

MR. BERGER: It's \$5,000 for the three houses.

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Q A month?

MR. BERGER: For the year -- \$5,000 a month for the year.

Q Each house?

MR. BERGER: That's the total for the three houses.

Q All three?

MR. BERGER: Yes. And I am told that they are worth -- that is a conservative estimate of their rental value.

Q Can you tell us whether, in fact ---

MR. GRAY: Let me just make another point to this, beside the point that Mr. Berger made, in terms of this in relationship to facilitating the coup leaders leaving and producing an environment that is more conducive for reconciliation. President Aristide has supported the departure of the coup leaders and wants to have this kind of an atmosphere as well. And so I would urge us to keep in perspective these houses, which will be easily rentable, in light of the new activities that will be taking place in Port-auPrince as well as new activities over the year. So this is not, and it should not even end up being a cost factor for the American taxpayer. But the fact of the matter is and the focus ought to be on the fact that this facilitates an environment where you can really have reconciliation and that becomes the critical issue here.

Q Can you tell us if the U.S. today is on the verge of paroling Cubans at Guantanamo who are over or under a certain age into the United States?

MR. BERGER: We're going to focus on Haiti. I think there will be some statement later with respect to Cuba.

Q Is that correct, though?

MR. BERGER: I'd rather not get into it.

Q Mr. Berger, there are some new reports today that link Cedras to Colombian drug cartels. Can you confirm that? And was there any immunity at all given to them for any criminal warrants that are out on any of them?

MR. BERGER: The answer to your second question is absolutely not. The answer to your first question, with respect to any kind of judicial proceedings, I would refer you to the Justice Department. And I don't the answer to that.

Q Sandy, while you have you there, could you update us on the deployment of the Iraqi troops near Nasiriyah?

MR. BERGER: No, we're going to -- let's confine this briefing to Haiti.

Q Has President Aristide told you when he plans to name a Prime Minister? And do you have any concern that if he doesn't do that immediately you're going to have less stability rather than more?

MR. BERGER: Well, there is an Acting Prime Minister, Prime Minister Malval, a very capable man who has already convened his government and has, I believe, had one Cabinet meeting already. And so there is a figure there as Acting Prime Minister. When President Aristide returns, he'll determine how he wants to proceed.

Q But he hasn't told you when he plans to do that?

MR. BERGER: No.

Q Sandy, what protection will U.S. forces now provide to any Haitians who feel jeopardized by Aristide's return?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think the general guidelines that we have operated on continue to pertain. Our basic mission there is to maintain a secure environment, essential civic order. If we see violent incidents and we're in a situation in which Americans -- the American commander on the scene believes that we have the capability to stop those incidents without endangering needlessly American soldiers, we will do so.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END2:26 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 14, 1994

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT ARISTIDE OF HAITI

Outside West Wing Lobby

10:20 A.M. EDT

PRESIDENT: President Aristide, distinguished Haitian guests; to the distinguished members of Congress who are here -- Senator Dodd, Congressman Rangel, Congressman Conyers, Congressman Oberstar, Congressman Combest -- to the members of the United States military and their families who are here; to the friends of Haiti and the process of peace and reconciliation:

Three years ago, the international community, led by the United States, set out to restore Haiti's democratically-elected government. Today, on the eve of President Aristide's return to his beloved nation, we mark the end of one stage of the long and difficult journey and the beginning of a new era of hope for the people of Haiti.

Halfway around the world, America's armed forces are also bringing a message of hope and confidence to the people of Kuwait. Our troops have responded rapidly to the threat from Iraq, and I have ordered that the deployment of personnel and equipment to the area continue. Let there be no mistake: The United States will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors.

In Haiti, the men and women of our armed forces have protected our national interests and advanced the democratic values we Americans hold so dear. We've helped to curb the violence that threatened tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our own borders, to bring democratically-elected government to the 34th of our hemisphere's 35 nations, to uphold the reliability of our own commitments and the commitments others make to us. In so doing, we have helped to give the people of Haiti a chance to remake the democracy they earned, they deserve, and they so plainly wish. President Aristide's return to Haiti is a victory for freedom throughout the world.

More than three years have passed since a bloody coup stole the Haitian people's first elected government. But the road back to democracy, as we all know, has been strewn with obstacles and dangers. Despite exhaustive efforts -- diplomatic condemnation, economic sanctions, United Nations resolutions -- the brutality of the military regime and its hired guns increased day by day. Haiti sank deeper into poverty and chaos. Only the combination of the imminent American-led invasion and the skillful diplomacy by President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn brought this terrible chapter in Haitian history to a close. General Powell is here today, and on behalf of the American people sir, I thank you for your mission and for what you did. (Applause.) Thank you.

Just one month later, today, the generals have stepped down from power and left Haiti. The Haitian people have begun to move from fear to freedom. American troops and those of our coalition partners are restoring basic security and civil order. They have helped more than 3,700 refugees to go home from Guantanamo. (Applause.) The Haitian Parliament has once again has opened its doors. The Mayor of Port-au-Prince is back in office, and the lights are on in more ways than one. (Applause.)

In a few short weeks, these things have paved the way for President Aristide's return. Haiti's voyage back to reclaim its democratically-elected government is surely a cause for celebration. But the days and weeks ahead will be full of arduous work and they will not be free of danger.

Now, more than ever, I urge the Haitian people to come together in a spirit of reconciliation and peace -- the spirit so eloquently advanced by President Aristide himself. As he has said, there should be no vengeance, no violence, no retribution. This is a time for peace. That is what the United States and

its coalition partners are working for, and I am certain that that spirit will continue to prevail when the multinational force turns its responsibilities over to the United Nations.

President Aristide's return to Port-au-Prince sets the stage for the Haitian people to take control of their future. The task is large to strengthen and young and fragile democracy; to build a new economy based on opportunity, small enterprise and steady development. The international community has pledged to do all it can to help, starting with a one-year, \$550-million reconstruction and recovery program, to fund humanitarian relief, provide economic assistance, support the institutions that must become a permanent foundation for Haitian democracy.

To help launch the economic recovery more immediately, I am pleased to announce that today I will sign an executive order lifting all economic sanctions against Haiti after President Aristide returns. (Applause.) Now that the coup leaders have departed, democracy is being restored, the sanctions have clearly served their purpose, by lifting banking, trade and travel restrictions, we can help to give back to the Haitian people the opportunities they need to grow and to prosper and to preserve their freedom.

Ultimately, the task of rebuilding Haiti belongs to the people of Haiti themselves. Theirs will be a long and hard road. Each and every citizen must make a contribution. It will take a lot of patience, but it will be a joyous effort if it is done in the right spirit and if the rest of us do our part to help.

The progress will begin with reconciliation, as the President has said. He will go home in that spirit, vowing to oppose all who seek revenge and retribution. Tomorrow, when he resumes his duties, as he has said, it will be just the beginning. But what a beginning it is.

President Aristide has also vowed to step down at the end of his term, leaving his office to the next democratically elected president. In one of the most insightful comments about democratic government I have ever heard, he has said that when you start a democracy the most important election is the second one. This is the kind of insight that will serve Haiti so well in the years ahead.

Let me conclude by expressing my gratitude to all those who have done their part to give Haiti a second chance, something we need more for not only countries, but people in this old world. I thank the 30 countries whose troops are in Haiti as part of the multinational coalition, and all the nations who joined our multilateral efforts in the Caribbean Community, the Organization of American States, and United Nations. Your efforts have made our hemisphere safer, and sent a message of resolve around the world.

I thank the men and women of our armed forces who have answered the call and performed a difficult job with skill, devotion and humanity. You are the steel and the sword of America's diplomacy. Thanks to your efforts the world knows that we will stand for democracy, honor our commitments, and expect others to honor theirs.

I thank especially the families of our service members here at home -- those who make such great sacrifices. Some of them, including the children, are here today, and I would like to ask them to stand and be recognized. The families of the service people serving in Haiti. (Applause.)

And finally, to the American people, I say that, although we are not, we cannot, and we should not be the policemen of the world, we have proved once again that American will stand up for others when the cause is clear, the mission is achievable and our interests are at stake. The American people have done the right thing in Haiti. They have stood for what is best about America. And because of the support of the American people, democracy will be stronger tomorrow than it is today all around the world. (Applause.)

Finally, to President Aristide and the people of Haiti, for three years you have kept faith against all odds that one day a government of the people would be restored to your native land. Tomorrow will be that day. You have survived decades of violence, terror, poverty with dignity, pride and hope. Now you and your people will have the opportunity to make democracy work for yourselves; to let all the children we are tired of seeing in turmoil on our newscasts become a part of that vast mass of humanity in free societies seeking their God-given potential. I say to you, bonne chance, ayete toma. Good luck and long live Haiti. (Applause.)

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: President Clinton, distinguished guests, distinguished members of the Congress of the United States, distinguished members of the United States military, dear friends, and sisters and brothers: It is a pleasure for me to spend part of my last day in Washington here at the White House in the company of many of you who have been instrumental in the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

President Clinton, once again, the people of Haiti thank you for the leadership that you have demonstrated. You just said, bonne chance, ayete toma;

and we say, thank you so much. (Applause.)

To the United States Congress; to the innumerable men and women of goodwill and courage throughout the United States who committed themselves to the restoration of democracy in Haiti; to General Powell; to our dear brothers and sisters here who worked so much for that restoration -- there are so many I don't want to recognize the others to not leave some of them aside -- so to all of you, I express my sincere and everlasting thanks.

In the spirit of peace and reconciliation, we are witnessing a renewal of ties that link our nation. With the participation of the international community, we are paving the way for democracy in Haiti. This democracy will bring peace for all, reconciliation among all, respect and justice for every single citizen.

Tomorrow when we return home to Haiti, this will be our message to the nation: no to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation. (Applause.) Moving this way through this reconciliation, as President Clinton just said, in Haiti we will be moving from misery to poverty with dignity.

I thank each and every soldier in Haiti today who is working for democracy. I thank your families, some of whom are gathered here with us, for the support that strengthens you. A couple of weeks ago I was very moved when I could see you and thank your sons working in Haiti, helping us, providing security to the nation to uphold democracy. As you know, having here fellow countrymen, I will ask them to join me to express our sincere thanks to you, families of those American soldiers right now working side by side with us in Haiti. Thank you. (Applause.)

Tomorrow, when I will address the nation, I will express my love for the kids not only in Haiti, but throughout the world. Allow me now to tell the kids, the children of those soldiers that I love them.

You have seen the cooperation of the Haitian people and have witnessed their wholehearted embrace of the same democratic principles held dear by this country. It is this commitment to peace that will guide us towards true reconciliation.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is embedded in the growing global opposition in this post-Cold War world that democracy is indeed the cornerstone upon which much that is essential for the progress of men depends, whether in Haiti or elsewhere. The great joy that democracy will bring is a joy to be shared by the world. It is a demonstration of the possible; a sign that united we can achieve peace.

Tomorrow the people of Haiti will know that with them stands an international community committed to this lasting peace. Our hope for Haiti is our hope for the world -- democracy, peace and reconciliation.

President Clinton, I know one day I will have the honor to welcome you to this Haiti. The same way here you and the people of the United States could help me feel at home here in your land, one day we will be so happy to make you feel at home to this Haiti toma. (Applause.)

And there, as a musician, I will find the right way to sing with all the people of Haiti for President Clinton -- no to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation. Thank you. (Applause.)

END10:37 A.M. EDT

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 15, 1994

RADIO ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION

The Roosevelt Room

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I want to begin by expressing my profound shock and abhorrence at the death of Corporal Nachshon Waxman as a result of his kidnapping by Hamas terrorists.

On behalf of the American people, Hillary and I want to convey our deepest sympathy to the Waxman family and to the people of Israel at this dark moment. Nachshon Waxman was a son of Israel, but he was also a son of America.

Terrorists must know that these acts will not defeat the process that is bringing peace to Israel and her Arab neighbors. In the face of such cowardly and evil actions, I know it's hard to go forward, but we owe it to all those who have paid such a heavy price to persist and finally to prevail in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

Our efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East are part of an overall strategy to enhance American security and broaden American opportunities in the post-Cold War world -- by promoting democracy, increasing trade, and reducing the threat of terror, chaos and weapons of mass destruction.

We're making progress on all fronts. The United States and Russian missiles are no longer targeted at each other. We're expanding trade through NAFTA, the GATT world trade agreement, a new agreement with Japan. This means more jobs for Americans and less tensions with other countries. And we have to be encouraged by the recent successes of democracy, our peace efforts in the Middle East in North Ireland, and of course in South Africa.

Today I want to talk with you about Haiti and Iraq. In Haiti this week we've helped to restore the democratic government of President Aristide after three years of brutal military rule. In the Persian Gulf, our resolve in the face of Iraq's provocative actions is preserving security in that vital region.

Even as I speak with you this morning, Haiti's first democratically-elected President is flying home to resume his rightful place at the helm of his country. President Aristide's return marks the end of one leg of a long and difficult journey and the start of a new era of hope for that Haitian people.

They've come a long way since a military coup toppled the democratic government in 1991. For three years the international community, led by the United States, tried diplomacy and economic sanctions to force the brutal military regime from power. They were unwilling to yield. Four weeks ago, faced with an imminent United States-led invasion authorized by the United Nations, the military regime finally agreed to peacefully give up power. Since then our troops, together with those of our coalition partners, have done a remarkable job in moving Haiti from fear to freedom.

President Aristide returns today to a more stable, less violent nation. The parliament is once again open for business. And in the best sign that democracy is taking hold, thousands of refugees are returning from Guantanamo. But let me say, dangers still remain. We know that. Still, thanks to the men and women of our Armed Forces and the brilliant work they have done in Haiti, democracy is back on track.

Now, the difficult job of rebuilding Haiti must begin. Countries from around the world have pledged to do their part, starting with a \$550 million recovery and reconstruction program. In the end, though, only the Haitian people can do the job of rebuilding their country.

It will be a clearly difficult task. But the people of Haiti have survived decades of violence and terror and poverty with dignity, pride and hope. And now they have an opportunity to make democracy work for themselves and to reach their God-given potential.

Our troops have helped to give them the chance to do so, just as they are also giving the people of Kuwait the confidence that they can live in peace. It was less than four years ago that the men and women of Operation Desert Storm drove Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. This time we are determined not to let Iraq violate its neighbors' borders or to create new instability in the Gulf region. That is why in the face of Iraq's threatening troop movements on the Kuwaiti border last week, I ordered our troops, ships and attack aircraft to the Gulf. Our policy is clear -- we will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors or to intimidate the United Nations as it ensures that Iraq never again possesses weapons of mass destruction.

Much of the force that Iraq sent to the border has retreated. But significant elements still remain within striking distance of Kuwait. We're watching this situation very carefully and continuing with the deployment of our own forces. They will remain in the area and on alert until we are absolutely satisfied that Iraq no longer poses threats to Kuwait.

At the same time, we're working to ensure that Iraq does not threaten its neighbors or the United Nations weapons inspectors in the future. We're seeking support in the U.N. Security Council for a strong resolution that would prevent renewed provocations by Iraq.

I share the pride of every American in the men and women of our Armed Forces. In both the Western Hemisphere and on the edge of the Persian Gulf, they have answered the call of duty; they have performed difficult tasks with great skill and devotion. They have shown again that the American military remains the finest in the world. And thanks to their effort, the world now knows again that the United States will honor its commitments, just as we expect others to honor the commitments they make to us.

Thanks for listening.

View Header

WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 16, 1994

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT WELCOME HOME CEREMONY FOR THE HAITI DELEGATION

West Wing Lobby Entrance

12:10 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Secretary Christopher, Mr. Gray, distinguished members of Congress and members of the delegation who went to Haiti. Let me welcome you back to the United States from your historic trip. We are here today to continue this remarkable celebration of freedom over fear that all of you witnessed yesterday in Port-au-Prince, and here to look ahead to the hard work the people of Haiti now have to do in order to rebuild their nation.

But, first, let me say a few words about the situation this morning in Persian Gulf. I was pleased that the United Nations Security Council yesterday passed a very strong resolution and unanimously condemned the recent provocative actions by Iraq near its border with Kuwait. The Security Council resolution makes clear that the international community will not allow Iraq to threaten its neighbors, or to intimidate the United Nations as it ensures that Iraq does not again possess weapons of mass destruction.

The message is clear: Iraq must complete its withdrawal. It must not threaten its neighbors in the future. It must comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions. The troops, ships and attack aircraft I have ordered to the Gulf area will continue to remain there until the crisis passes. As our troops in the Gulf are helping to enforce the will of the international community, our young men and women in uniform in Haiti are doing so as well; and as all of you saw yesterday, they're doing so in a brilliant fashion.

When we sent our Armed Forces to Haiti just four weeks ago, their mission was to pave the way for President Aristide's return. Yesterday, that mission was completed, as the President returned home in joyous atmosphere that we all watched so happily from here. Now, Haiti is a nation where violence is down and the parliament is back, a nation where men and women freely chosen by the Haitian people are once again leading their country, where a long night of fear is giving way to a new day of promise.

A few moments ago I was briefed by Secretary Christopher and Bill Gray on yesterday's events. I asked a lot of questions about what happened and what would happen in the future. But let me just say yesterday I was moved, as I know all of you were -- even more moved being there on the ground - by the incredible sight of President Aristide addressing the people from the Presidential Palace, in saying again and again: "No to violence. No to retribution. Yes to peace. Yes to reconciliation."

We know there is a long road ahead, that dangers still remain. Now that the democratic government has been restored it must be nourished, and the country must be rebuilt. Many nations around the world are already pledging to do their part, starting with a \$550-million reconstruction and recovery fund to provide humanitarian relief, development assistance, and support for democratic institutions. The United States will work with these countries, with the international financial institutions, with private organizations, all together, over the next several months to make sure this work succeeds.

In the end, of course, only the people of Haiti can rebuild their country. They have waited a long time for the chance to do so. Now, thanks to the efforts of the men and women of our Armed Forces, those of our coalition partners and the supporters of freedom, they are being given the chance to do it.

Several of you have commented on the freshly-painted signs you noticed in Port-au-Prince. I understand that the most popular one had three words:

"Thank you, America."

So let me conclude by saying a few thank-yous. Thank you to all of you who worked so long and hard to help to put Haiti back on the track to democracy. As he ends his mission, let me say a special word of thanks to Bill Gray who, at a critical time, brought energy, focus, credibility and great skill to this task. Thank you, sir. (Applause.)

Thank you to the men and women of our Armed Forces, and their families -- from General Shelton to every last enlisted man and woman who are there -- all of them are the power behind our diplomacy. (Applause.) Thank you to the nations from our hemisphere who have worked with us and those beyond our hemisphere who have worked with us on this project. Thank you to the people of our country who, time and again, have been willing to stand up for others because it is the right thing to do.

And, finally, thank you to President Aristide and the freedom-loving people of Haiti who never gave into despair and who, today, stand in the warm, bright sunshine of freedom. Thank you all. Thank you. (Applause.)

END12:15 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 28, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON US POLICY IN HAITI

Today I have signed into law S.J. Res. 229, "Regarding United States policy toward Haiti."

In signing this joint resolution, it is important to clarify the interpretation of a provision related to the President's authority and responsibility as Commander in Chief.

Section 2 of the resolution calls, inter alia, for a detailed description of "the general rules of engagement under which operations of the United States Armed Forces are conducted in and around Haiti." I interpret this language as seeking only information about the rules of engagement that I may supply consistent with my constitutional responsibilities, and not information of a sensitive operational nature.

Let me take this opportunity to associate myself unreservedly with the joint resolution's commendation of the professional excellence and dedicated patriotism with which the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces are performing their mission in Haiti.

The combination of determined diplomacy and military resolve achieved, just 1 month ago, an agreement that permitted the peaceful deployment of U.S. and multinational forces to Haiti pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. And on October 15, culminating 3 years of international efforts led by the United States, Haiti's democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, stood on the steps of the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince and addressed tens of thousands of his countrymen and women in an atmosphere of joy, reconciliation, and rebuilding.

That historic achievement capped a breathtaking month of democratic restoration and the beginnings of Haiti's economic recovery, all made possible by the dedicated efforts of our service men and women in Haiti. The Haitian people no longer live in fear; they now have hope. The coup leaders are gone from Haiti and the thugs are no longer in control. Haiti's parliament is open. It has enacted an amnesty law and is busy laying the legislative groundwork for stronger democratic institutions. The Mayor of Port-au-Prince has been restored to office after 3 years of internal exile, the legitimate Prime Minister and Cabinet have reclaimed their offices, and the state media are back at the service of the people. The lights are on again in Cap-Haitian after 2 years of darkness as electrical service is expanded throughout the country. With the lifting of all U.S. and international sanctions upon President Aristide's return to Haiti, commercial fuel and food shipments and airline service have resumed.

The full restoration of democracy opens a period of hope for the Haitian people. Only they can reconcile their country. As the international community supports them with a major program of economic assistance, our military personnel participating in the multinational force will maintain the climate of basic security in which those goals can be achieved. Through police monitors and trainers, the multinational force will lay the groundwork for the transition of the Haitian army to a professional defense force and for the creation of a civilian police force.

We expect that within months, the bulk of our military personnel will leave Haiti. The multinational coalition will transfer responsibility to the United Nations Mission in Haiti in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 940. Our forces' accomplishments in the last month have been superb. I am confident they will maintain their outstanding record and leave a Haiti poised to consolidate its hard-won democracy, create a brighter future for all its people, and become a factor for stability in the region and hemisphere.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

October 25, 1994.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 1, 1994

STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY ON LAKE VISIT TO HAITI

Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will visit Haiti Wednesday and Thursday, Nov. 2-3. Mr. Lake and his party, including officials from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, will meet with President Aristide and a broad range of Haitian and U.S. officials, as well as visit with U.S. troops.

The purpose of the visit is to discuss Haiti's return to democracy and cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Haiti to restore a secure environment, including the training of police and the transition from the U.S.-led multinational force to the U.N. Mission in Haiti, and to revitalize the Haitian economy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release February 2, 1995

PRESS STATEMENT

Vice President Gore met today in his West Wing Office with Haitian Prime Minister Smarck Michel. The Vice President congratulated the Prime Minister, President Aristide and the Haitian people on the progress which has been made since the restoration of democracy.

Among the subjects they discussed were the Haitian economic revitalization program and the importance of the forthcoming elections and political stability to attracting substantial private investment to Haiti.

The Vice President assured Prime Minister Michel that the United States will remain committed to Haiti after the transition from the U.S. led Multi-National Force (MNF) to the United Nations Mission Haiti (UNMIH), set to occur in about two months.

Prime Minister Michel is visiting Washington en route home from an International Donor's Group Meeting in Paris. He is meeting with other senior Administration officials while in Washington.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 3, 1995

TEXT OF A LETTER ON HAITI FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO CONGRESS

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

- 1. In December 1990, the Haitian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President by an overwhelming margin in a free and fair election. The United States praised Haiti's success in peacefully implementing its democratic constitutional system and provided significant political and economic support to the new government. The Haitian military abruptly interrupted the consolidation of Haiti's new democracy when, in September 1991, it illegally and violently ousted President Aristide from office and drove him into exile.
- 2. The United States, on its own and with the Organization of American States (OAS), immediately imposed sanctions against the illegal regime. Upon the recommendation of the legitimate government of President Aristide and of the OAS, the United Nations Security Council imposed incrementally a universal embargo on Haiti, beginning June 16, 1993, with trade restrictions on certain strategic commodities. The United States actively supported the efforts of the OAS and the United Nations to restore democracy to Haiti and to bring about President Aristide's return by facilitating negotiations between the Haitian parties. The United States and the international community also offered material assistance within the context of an eventual negotiated settlement of the Haitian crisis to support the return to democracy, build constitutional structures, and foster economic well-being.

The continued defiance of the will of the international community by the illegal regime led to an intensification of bilateral and multilateral economic sanctions against Haiti in May 1994. The U.N. Security Council on May 6 adopted Resolution 917, imposing comprehensive trade sanctions and other measures on Haiti. This was followed by a succession of unilateral U.S. sanctions designed to isolate the illegal regime. To augment embargo enforcement, the United States and other countries entered into a cooperative endeavor with the Dominican Republic to monitor that country's enforcement of sanctions along its land border and in its coastal waters.

Defying coordinated international efforts, the illegal military regime in Haiti remained intransigent for some time. Internal repression continued to worsen, exemplified by the expulsion in July 1994 of the U.N./O.A.S.-sponsored International Civilian Mission (ICM) human rights observers. Responding to the threat to peace and security in the region, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 940 on July 31, 1994, authorizing the formation of a multinational force to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership and the return of legitimate authorities including President Aristide.

In the succeeding weeks, the international community under U.S. leadership assembled a multinational coalition force to carry out this mandate. At my request, former President Carter, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell went to Haiti on September 16 to meet with the de facto Haitian leadership. The threat of imminent military intervention combined with determined diplomacy achieved agreement in Port- au-Prince on September 18 for the de facto leaders to relinquish power by October 15. United States forces in the vanguard of the multinational coalition force drawn from 26 countries began a peaceful deployment in Haiti on September 19 and the military leaders have since relinquished power.

In a spirit of reconciliation and reconstruction, on September 25 President Aristide called for the immediate easing of sanctions so that the work of rebuilding could begin. In response to this request, on September 26 in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, I announced my intention to suspend all unilateral sanctions against Haiti except those that affected the military leaders and their immediate supporters and families. On September 29, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 944 terminating U.N. -imposed sanctions as of the day after President Aristide returned to Haiti.

On October 15, President Aristide returned to Haiti to assume his official responsibilities. Effective October 16, 1994, by Executive Order No. 12932 (59 Fed. Reg. 52403, October 14, 1994), I terminated the national emergency declared on October 4, 1991, in Executive Order No. 12775, along with all sanctions with respect to Haiti imposed in that Executive order, subsequent Executive orders, and the Department of the Treasury regulations to deal with that emergency. This termination does not affect compliance and enforcement actions involving prior transactions or violations of the sanctions.

3. This report is submitted to the Congress pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) and 1703(c). It is not a report on all U.S. activities with respect to Haiti, but discusses only those Administration actions and expenses since my last report (October 13, 1994) that are directly related to the national emergency with respect to Haiti declared in Executive Order No. 12775, as implemented pursuant to that order and Executive Orders Nos. 12779, 12853, 12872, 12914, 12917, 12920, and 12922.

4. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (FAC) amended the Haitian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 580 (the "HTR") on December 27, 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 66476, December 27, 1994), to add section 580.524, indicating the termination of sanctions pursuant to Executive Order No. 12932, effective October 16, 1994. The effect of this amendment is to authorize all transactions previously prohibited by subpart B of the HTR or by the previously stated Executive orders. Reports due under general or specific license must still be filed with FAC covering activities up until the effective date of this termination. Enforcement actions with respect to past violations of the sanctions are not affected by the termination of sanctions. A copy of the FAC amendment is attached.

5. The total expenses incurred by the Federal Government during the period of the national emergency with respect to Haiti from October 4, 1991, through October 15, 1994, that are directly attributable to the authorities conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with respect to Haiti are estimated to be approximately \$6.2 million, most of which represent wage and salary costs for Federal personnel. This estimate has been revised downward substantially from the sum of estimates previously reported in order to eliminate certain previously reported costs incurred with respect to Haiti, but not directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the declaration of the terminated national emergency with respect to Haiti.

Thus, with the termination of sanctions, this is the last periodic report that will be submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) and also constitutes the last semiannual report and final report on Administration expenditures required pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(c).

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 3, 1995.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 2, 1995

PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO HAITI

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott will lead a Presidential Business Development Mission to Haiti March 7-8 in conjunction with the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce. Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, more than 20 business executives, and Members of Congress will meet their Haitian counterparts and officials of the Haitian government.

The Mission caps U.S. efforts thus far to promote the recovery of the Haitian economy and provides a starting point for continuing progress in this area. Members of the Mission will participate in the inaugural session of the recently-organized U.S.-Haitian Business Development Council which seeks to promote ties between the U.S. and Haitian business communities. Individual U.S. business participants will discuss ongoing and future business opportunities with Haitian business leaders.

This Mission takes place against a background of political and economic developments since October 1994 which have set the stage for economic progress. The U.S.-led Multinational Force has established conditions in Haiti which have allowed the beginnings of economic recovery.

The Haitian government has moved to implement the program of economic liberalization which it discussed at the August 1994 Paris meeting of the Consultative Group. This liberalization of its economy will provide a freer, more competitive atmosphere for business development. Haitian government actions to lower tariffs, sign the Uruguay Round, reach an understanding with the IMF on economic policy goals and consider moves toward privatization of state enterprises provide grounds for confidence in the future course of the Haitian economy.

The international community has provided substantial economic assistance to Haiti already and pledges made at the January meeting of the Consultative Group totaling approximately \$1 billion are an indication of continuing positive interest in participating in Haiti's development.

Signs of progress have become visible in Haiti in the past several months as markets have reopened, agricultural exports have begun to increase and the assembly sector has shown signs of growth. The Business Development Mission will seek to build on this progress and intensify efforts to promote economic growth. Mission participants include, among others, representatives from tourism, energy, communications, agriculture and the assembly sector -- key areas in Haiti's future economic development.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 8, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton to Visit Haiti

At the invitation of President Aristide, President Clinton will travel to Haiti on March 31st. He will meet with and thank American and coalition forces, who will be turning over the peacekeeping operation to a UN mission on that day. The President will meet with President Aristide and his government to review the economic, security and political progress that has been achieved under Operation Uphold Democracy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 9, 1995

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

March 8, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Attached, pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 103-423, is the fifth monthly report on the situation in Haiti.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1995

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

March 21, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

On September 21, 1994, I reported to the Congress that on September 19, 1994, U.S. forces under the command of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, were introduced into Haitian territory following an agreement successfully concluded by former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) provided for by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940 of July 31, 1994. I am providing this update of events in Haiti (Operation "Uphold Democracy") consistent with the War Powers Resolution to ensure that the Congress is kept fully informed regarding events in Haiti.

At their peak last September and into October, U.S. forces assigned to the MNF in Haiti numbered just over 20,000. Approximately 2,000 non-U.S. personnel from 27 nations also participated in the initial stages of the MNF. Over the last 6 months, U.S. forces gradually have been reduced, consistent with the establishment of a secure and stable environment called for by UNSCR 940, such that they currently number just under 5,300. Non-U.S. forces -- both MNF and International Police Monitors (IPM) -- currently number approximately 2,800. When the transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) authorized by UNSCR 975 of January 30, 1995, is complete on March 31, 1995, approximately 2,500 U.S. forces will remain in Haiti as the U.S. contribution to UNMIH's force structure. Following transition to UNMIH, non-U.S. forces will total approximately 3,500, for a total force of approximately 6,000. In addition, a U.N. civilian police monitor component of UNMIH will number approximately 900.

In January, the United Nations Security Council determined that a secure and stable environment had been established in Haiti, based upon assessments from the MNF Commander and the U.N. Secretary General, and recommendations from the MNF Member States. As to the duration of the deployment, it is anticipated that the entire U.N. security mission, including U.S. forces, will withdraw from Haiti not later than February 1996. Presidential elections are scheduled for November 1995 and the inauguration will be held February 7, 1996.

Overall, Haiti has remained calm and relatively incident-free since the deployment of U.S. and MNF forces. The level of political violence has decreased substantially since the departure of the de facto government. There is normal activity in the streets, and in stark contrast to when MNF forces first arrived, people are able to go outside at night due to a more secure environment. The number of weapons in Haiti also has been significantly reduced. Early in its deployment, the MNF took control of heavy and crew-served weapons belonging to the FAd'H (The Haitian Armed Forces). The MNF is also administering a weapons buy-back, seizure, and reduction program that has thus far yielded over 33,000 weapons, including hand grenades.

Thus far, there have been only five incidents involving attacks on or gunfire by U.S. forces. On September 24, 1994, a U.S. Marine Corps squad exchanged gunfire with members of the FAd'H at the police headquarters in Cap Haitien. One Marine was wounded, and ten Haitians were killed. On October 2, an unidentified individual fired shots over a wall in Les Cayes, wounding an American soldier. On October 14, a member of the FAd'H was wounded by U.S. Special Forces when he burst from his barricaded room and ran towards a U.S. soldier during a confrontation in Belladere. On December 26, U.S. forces came under fire during a demonstration by disgruntled former members of the FAd'H outside FAd'H General Headquarters. After receiving fire, the MNF fired on the Headquarters resulting in several Haitian, but no U.S. casualties. Finally, on January 12, 1995, a two-man Special Forces team was fired on at a toll booth south of Gonaives. One U.S. soldier was killed and another injured in the incident. The Haitian

gunman was also killed.

I have taken the measures described above to further the national security interests of the United States. I have ordered the continued deployment of U.S. forces to the MNF pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.

I remain committed to consulting closely with the Congress, and I will continue to keep the Congress fully informed regarding this important deployment of our forces.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 27, 1995

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS

March 27, 1995

The Briefing Room

3:26 P.M. EST

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: In typical Pentagon fashion, I've built some charts here, maybe help describe where were are in a little bit more detail. And then my colleague has got some remarks, and then we'll take your questions.

If there's one chart that sort of maybe sort of depicts this all in one fell swoop, it's probably this one. And let me just talk to you about it briefly. This is 20 September back here when we intervened in the country. And as you recall, that number got as high as 21,000 for a very brief time under the command of 18th Airborne Corps, Lt. General Hugh Shelton.

I've listed at 20 September, and the numbers here, 10th Mountain Division -- that's really a misnomer. In addition to the 10th Mountain Division, there was an aviation task force, a logistics task force, a medical task force, a signal task force, et cetera. But about 15-3 army special operating forces -- 1,400; and the special SPMAGTF, the Marine battalion plus, initially offshore at Cap-Haitien eventually came ashore in that part of the country.

We quickly came down from that on the 25th of October. General Shelton handed off to Major General Dave Mead, the 10th Mountain Division, who assumed responsibility for everything in- country. And then in January on the 14th, General Mead handed off to General Fisher, who has continued the effort since that period.

Now the other part of this story, of course, is the bottom part, initially, almost entirely a U.S. effort. And over time, as we'll show you on some succeeding charts, coalition forces -- and I'll list those for you -- subsequently entered into this effort and have continued to expand over time. And when we reached the 31st, the magic number is 6,000, 2,500 of which are U.S., and 3,500 of which are other forces. And, again, we'll list those on a succeeding chart.

Now, if you look at the left side of this chart first, the multinational force, which is what we went in as, went in with this mission -- for those of you in the back, depending on how old you are -- establish a safe and secure environment, restore legitimate government, protect Haitian leaders, and assist in the provision of humanitarian relief. I suspect this is tough to see from over on this side.

The concept was to establish a presence throughout the country to focus on security, stability and civil military operations; to professionalize the army of Haiti; and, initially, really two things -- professionalize the army and establish an interim police force. Those two really came together very quickly over the last five months.

And the army, as most of you know, the army in Haiti as it existed before the 19th of September no longer exists. Many of those army members, through a process of vetting to determine whether or not they were human rights abusers, have become a part of the interim police force. And they are functioning throughout the country of Haiti. And then the transition to United Nations Operations.

Now, if you look at a snapshot on the 30th of January, this was now -- was the 25th Infantry Division, numbers as shown, and our Special Operating Forces. Principally, our Special Forces A- Teams -- about 800-plus, scattered throughout the country, and then, as many of you know and have done enormous good work in terms of interface with both humanitarian agencies, our governmental agencies, and the Haitian institutions -- the mayors, the local towns -- focusing the effort in providing security and stability throughout the country.

And then as of that date, these were the coalition forces already in-country. As you can see, a large contingent from Bangladesh. This is a multination contingent out of the Caribbean and the others as shown there, for a total of 1,600. And this item down here, international police monitors, are basically policemen from all over the world who came together to support this effort principally to provide sort of a backup to the interim police force, not just in Port-au-Prince, but throughout the country, to sort of supervise, make sure they take a look at things like human rights, making sure that interim police were functioning within reasonable bounds in terms of the way they function, and also to provide sort of moral support and physical support to the interim police force throughout the country.

If you fast forward to the 31st of March to the UNMIH, to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, this will be their mission: sustain a stable and secure environment; protect international people in key installations; create and train a Haitian police force -- that my colleague talked about briefly; and assist the legitimate constitutional authority, assist the government of Haiti. Really, the focus shifting from first General Shelton, then General Mead, then General Fisher, being sort of in charge of everything, to a U.N. mission focusing on supporting the government of Haiti and all of the institutions that it must bring up and get functioning adequately through time.

The concept is to maintain the sort of focus on stability; to support a free elections process scheduled for early June, already underway; and support the transition to the new government as provided by that election and the presidential election late this year; and then, finally that mandate for the U.N. ends in February of next year and the forces within this United Nations mission then redeploying.

You can see conventional forces -- I've sort of lumped this together -- conventional forces just under 2,000 and the special forces still 550, still operating out in the countryside. I'll show a slide that sort of graphically depicts that. And then these coalition forces that are providing companies and battalions -- 100 people, up to 800 people in some cases -- listed here. And then the international police monitors now referred to as the civilian police or civpol under the supervision of a Royal Canadian Mounted Policeman, and a total of 900, actually more than we had there before. Same mission -- sort of backup for the interim police force and, as we began to graduate people from the police academy for the new police force, providing both supervision, moral support and physical support.

And, finally, just to give you a concept of what this United Nations Mission in Haiti looks like in the country, I would highlight a couple of things. The little triangles here are where we will have our Special Forces A-Teams throughout the country. So we're still maintaining that presence, and they are linked in both with Port-au-Prince and with the other part of this that's expanding which is these contingents from the other nations which are in fact based throughout the country. And you can see the names listed there. The stars are sort of battalion hubs, and the little, red circles are company locations.

But, again, the effort under General Kinzer is to push this force out into the countryside so that they provide more of this presence along with our Special Forces A-Teams as we go forward through the next year.

Let me touch briefly on command and control relationships. Major General Joe Kinzer, two-star general, is both the commander of all U.N. forces, as well the commander of all U.N. forces as well as the commander of all U.S. forces in Haiti. Under the U.S. side of that, his chain of command runs through General Jack Sheehan in the Atlantic Command. On the U.N. side, his chain runs through Mr. Brahimi, the Secretary General's Special Representative in Haiti, who is there full-time. And so all the U.S. forces will be under the direct command of a U.S. officer for the full duration of this mission.

I think with that as some background, I would turn it over for some comments from my colleague and then be happy to take your questions.

Q Could I just ask first, please -- there were a lot of problems in the beginning when the U.S. troops first went in with the rules of engagement. Is there any difference with the rules of engagement here? Do they vary from country to country?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Let me touch on that. I guess I would agree to you that at 9:00 a.m. in the morning on the 19th there was a question on rules of engagement because we had built them for an invasion. And in fact, we intervened without an invasion. So there was a tweaking of the rules of engagement to ensure that they matched the situation that we had on the ground.

So if you accept the premise that from about the 21st of September on, the rules of engagement were correct for the situation that our forces found themselves, I would say to you that the ROE for the U.N. mission is -- and we've spent a lot of time; in fact, General Shali has spent a great deal of time, as well as Secretary Perry on this particular issue -- they both believe, and we believe, that the ROE are absolutely adequate to do what is required to both maintain the security of the force and accomplish the mission in Haiti. I didn't list them, but I would say to you that if you look at that set of rules of engagement we have for UNMIH, they will allow the commander to do what he needs to do in the event he encounters problems.

Q How many U.S. forces are there right now, today?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: About 6,000, just over 6,000.

Q The two charts don't really agree, the first one and the second one. The first one showed more than -- well over 6,000 on March 31st, then kind of tapering off.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: That's correct. If you'll put that chart back up here, maybe I can -- I'm confusing myself.

Q The second chart made it look like as of the 31st it went down to 6,000 total.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: No, that's -- you are correct, that there are about -- well, let's look at here on the chart so we don't have to conjecture. Okay, remember it's 2,500 U.S. when we get to UNMIH. The net difference is between 2,500 and about this total here. So we're at -- just over 5,000 soldiers. The rest will come down in the next two weeks.

Q You mean right now there are 5,000 U.S. --

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: That's right. And they are scheduled to redeploy. And the reason we've held is during this transition we wanted to make sure we had adequate force there so that it was sort of seamless in terms of --

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Could I just add one thing here. One of the ideas here of a seamless transition in a sense is that there will be essentially -- the force the day right before the transition to UNMIH will look very much like the force right after UNMIH. So there will be roughly 6,000 right before, roughly 6,000 right after.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Being from the State Department, I needless to say, don't have slides. But let me just run through a few facts. There are going to be two elections this year in Haiti. Legislative and local elections on June 4th, and presidential elections on -- in November. Organizing the June elections is going to be a substantial undertaking -- 3,000 polling places, more than 1,000 candidates for different local and national offices. The process has begun. The registration of voters began on Sunday in a number of localities through the country. And that will continue, and registration at all localities will begin by next week. Registration of candidates is to begin on the 30th of this month, the day before the President goes. So Haiti is going into an electoral period.

Let me just briefly go over the economic situation. Haiti has been promised \$1.2 billion in international assistance roughly over 18 months, of which the United States will contribute about 25 percent. This is the best example of, from the American standpoint, of international burden-sharing in the history of the Western Hemisphere.

Forty -- as my colleague said, economic activity is resuming, albeit slowly in Haiti. About 40 firms have reopened their doors with employment perhaps of 10,000 to 12,000. The employment in the formal private sector in Haiti was about 50,000 in the late '80s. And that's a target which we would hope to reach over the next year or two as we encourage further investment, both from within Haiti and foreign investment.

The U.S. program is \$200 million in aid this year, this fiscal year, of which slightly less than a quarter is going for basic humanitarian assistance -sorry -- slightly more than a quarter for basic humanitarian assistance, slightly less than a quarter for assistance to governance, that includes money to support the elections which are going to be held, money to support the creation of a new police force, and assistance to other administrative and governmental reform. And a little less than half is basic economic recovery -- balance of payments assistance, the payoff -- a participation, international program to pay off Haiti's arrears to the international financial institutions, which in turn has allowed them to come up with something like half of that \$1.2 billion that's been -- that's been committed.

Under the leadership of the Department of Commerce, the United States has engaged in a major effort to promote trade and investment in Haiti. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott led a trade and -- a presidential trade and investment mission to Haiti several weeks ago, which had about 28 American corporations along with senior officials and congressional delegations.

This was the kickoff of a campaign which will include five other sectoral missions in which the United States government will bring down American investors and American corporations interested in doing business in Haiti in sectors including the agribusiness, the assembly sector, telecommunications sector, the energy sector and the arts and crafts sector.

So that's just some basic background on our efforts in the economic and electoral area.

Q Sir, did I understand you to say that we would be using American troops to conduct local elections down there?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: No, what I said was the -- I'm not sure -- I didn't address the issue of troops in the elections.

Q You said we were going have an election -- you said we had so many troops there.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I didn't mention any troops. Sorry. I mean, the role of the U.N. Mission will be to create a secure environment in which elections take place. But I didn't address the question.

Q Will you be using U.S. troops to supervise and advise and control elections -- local elections down there?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: No.

Q What are you going to do --

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Can I -- move this around a little bit.

Q What kinds of themes will the President be sounding in his speeches that he makes there in the different settings?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: There will be two-and-a-half speeches. One will be to the troops in which I think it's fair to expect that he will express deep gratitude to the United States for the job that they have done, which has really been truly an extraordinary job. From the very beginning when the 11th hour they changed their mission on the way from one fundamental mission to another to the skill with which they have related and dealt with the Haitian people through this period to the point where they are a very welcome presence in the country, not something that was anticipated, given Haitian history, they have performed very well, magnificently so.

Theme number one, I think, clearly is to thank the troops. Number two, I think in his talk to the Haitian people, the President will acknowledge the extraordinary courage and determination that they have demonstrated through a brutal period. They fought very hard for restoration of their democracy, not just President Aristide, but the Haitian people have endured an enormous amount. And I think the President will pay tribute to that. He will also talk about the hard work that lies ahead in making democracy take root, where it does not have a deep and long tradition in doing the hard work of building an economy that has been really plundered by its leaders over many, many generations.

And so I think he will express to the Haitians the hope that they will stay the course and continue to build the progress that they are making. He'll talk, obviously, about the importance of the elections and the need to continue the process of democratization that was truncated at the time of the coup and restored in September.

There will be brief remarks by the President at the transition ceremony, and I'm sure at that point he'll talk about the fact that we remain committed to this operation through its UNMIH phase.

Q One of the criticisms of the operation so far has been that our forces did not disarm the paramilitary -- and that they're just lying low, waiting for us to leave as of February '96, and then it all starts again. Why did we not go after the paramilitary to disarm, and how do you assess the danger that poses?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Let me answer it, and then I'll ask General Bates perhaps to fill in behind me. From the very beginning, our mission there was to create a secure environment so that the government could be restored, but it was not to be the front-line police operation in Haiti. That is something that we felt from the very beginning had to be a Haitian function.

We have done a lot of disarmament. Thirty thousand weapons have been retrieved from Haitians over this period. There has been -- when we've known of weapons caches, we've gone after them. There have been roadblocks and seizures on a random basis. I think we've absorbed a lot of the weaponry that's in the country, but there was a decision from the very beginning that we were not going to go house to house looking for weapons in Haiti; that was not part of our function.

With respect to opposition, I think with the conversion with the reconstitution of the security forces in Haiti, from the old FAHD, which was quite a repressive institution, to a new much more trained Haitian police force, that undercuts to no small degree the institutional base for a lot of these paramilitary groups that really adhered to the army. And while I am sure there are opponents of the current government that remain in Haiti, we have not seen, so far, organized opposition.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I think the only thing I could add to that is that from the start, and continuing under UNMIH, we are with every intelligence apparatus we have at our disposal, focusing on this issue of are there additional weapons caches, and are there organizations that are maneuvering to have an effect on the society.

So we stay concerned about it, but I'd just reinforce what my colleague said in terms of the number of caches we've picked up. And the fact that there at this state not any reasonable intelligence would suggest that there are organizations out there with large amounts of weapons sort of waiting in the wings to have an effect.

Q Who is part of the President's delegation? Did you extend invitations to Carter, Powell and Nunn?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I don't believe that President Carter or Senator Nunn or General Powell are coming with us, but there is a congressional group, congressional delegation. There will be other Americans traveling -- Bill Gray, for example, I know is going with us. It's not a large delegation. Basically, the President's going to be transiting from Florida, so he'll already be down there with you all. And we'll take one plane down from here.

Q Were those three invited?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: At present, I don't know the answer to that. The President has talked to them over this period about Haiti, and they were just there quite recently. President Carter -- all three of them have reported back to the President on their observations from their recent trip.

Q Can you be a little clearer in terms of where there is a change in the rules of engagement between the coalition of UNMIH? I ask that question because, as you know, there's been some criticism the last couple of days that the coalition forces aren't intervening to stop the wave of crime that's going on in Port-Au- Prince.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'll ask my colleague to answer that. But we have never seen the function of either the multinational force or the United Nations mission as the Haitian police -- that is, as the first line of police, in terms of crime and in the streets, so to speak. And what we've seen in the last few weeks, from our observation, from the reporting of our embassy down there and others, appears to simply be economic kind of petty crimes and thievery, and then violence arising from that, and not of a political nature.

Q Wait a minute. But isn't that a problem, though? I mean, that's what led before. I mean, it's not political in nature, but if enough people get enough desperate, it could become political in nature and could topple Aristide again.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Let me just say I've gone down twice to Haiti to participate and share the U.S. delegation in meetings with President Aristide and with Mr. Brahimi and General Kinzer representing the U.N. to talk about the transition. And we've talked on both of these occasions in mid-March and in mid-February about the rules of engagement, and more broadly, the function not only of the military, but of the civilian police component of the U.N. mission.

And the U.N. has made clear that it intends to carry forward all of the activities that are currently being undertaken by U.S. military forces, by MNF military forces and by the civilian police, and that this will include, as necessary, the use of force, not just in protecting the troops and in protecting the U.N. personnel, but in maintaining a secure and stable environment and assisting the government of Haiti in that respect. And the police and military will be permitted to use force to protect their mission, as well as themselves. And this would include intervening when necessary; when large-scale criminality or disorder threatened the stability of the environment, or to protect individuals, including Haitians, who are themselves being threatened as a result of criminality.

Q Very simply, will this U.N. force be making criminal arrests? Will they serve as a police force? There are estimates that it may take 12 to 18 months for the Haitian police force to be adequately trained and manned to take over that responsibility.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: The U.N. force will continue to detain individuals as the MNF has, and turn them over in due course to the Haitian authorities. Neither the MNF, nor UNMIH make formal arrests. They do detain people and then turn them over the Haitian authorities who keep them in custody. And that will continue.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: And I would also ad, this again, is a -- you've got to see this as an evolving situation. We will -- there is the interim police that's on the street now. They will eventually be replaced, 350 or so a month, by the new Haitian police that are going through a very rigorous training program. At the same time, we are trying to deal with a justice system in Haiti that has been devastated. And we have people down there now who are working with justices of the peace -- training them. We've had some efforts now with about 200 or 500 justices of the peace. I mean, we are -- this is a construction project as we move along. Both, obviously, the security -- Haitian security forces and the Haitian judicial system will steadily improve.

Q Do you have a contingency force and a stay-behind, or is it going to be offshore? What are the preparations for contingency operations?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: There is no -- correct me if I'm wrong -- there's no dedicated quick reaction force or anything of that nature.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Let me just say one more thing about that, and that is, that in the UNMIH force structure itself, is in fact, a quick reaction force. And it's made up of two light infantry companies, capable of moving by helicopter, and two light calvary troops, which are armored Humvee-mounted, principally for operations in Port-au-Prince, but also that can be moved by CH-47 anywhere in the country. That force is being exercised and will be exercised by General Kinzer, specifically, to ensure it's ready to go. So in Haiti, there is, in fact, a QRF. But my colleague is exactly correct, as far as offshore or something, a dedicated QRF -- there is none because we don't see a need for one.

Q Those units are U.S. units?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: That's right. The four units in the QRF are U.S.

Q What is the status of the former leaders in Haiti and what role, if any, do you expect them to play in the election process?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: Haven't heard much from them.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END3:53 P.M. EST

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 27, 1995

PRESS BRIEFING ΒY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER

3:08 P.M. EST

MR. BERGER: Thank you, Mike. As Mike indicated, the President will be traveling on Friday to Haiti. Let me talk to you briefly this afternoon about the trip and about the status of the situation in Haiti itself.

First, I'd like to put the present moment in a bit of context, then talk a bit about the President's day on Friday in Haiti. And third, talk about where we see the situation in Haiti both from a security, from an economic and from a political democracy-building standpoint five months into the mission.

Let me begin with brief context. Five months after the U.S.-led coalition was sent to Haiti, I think it's fair to say that our mission there is succeeding. A brutal military dictatorship is gone and a democratically-elected government has been restored. Haiti today is a nation where people are building roads to get to market rather than boats to escape terror. That is not to say that there are still not daunting challenges in Haiti -- plenty of uncertainties in the road ahead. But the fact is that Haitians today are rebuilding their new democracy and their shattered economy with pride and with hope.

There are three basic purposes for the President's trip on Friday. First is to express the deep gratitude of the American people to the U.S. troops who have served in Haiti over these last five months -- who are serving there today. They have done a truly magnificent job over this period. And the President wants to express the deep gratitude of the American people for the skill with which they have functioned during this period.

Second, he will meet with President Aristide and his government to congratulate them on the strides that they have made on restoring democracy and promoting reconciliation in that country.

And third, the President will be attending a transition ceremony in the afternoon whereby the U.S.-led coalition under General Fisher, will give way to the U.N. coalition under General Joe Kinzer. This has been an extraordinarily smooth transition between the U.S.-led coalition and the U.N. coalition that will assume authority on March 31st. It has gone as we have planned and hope for. And the President wanted to be there for that.

Of course, there still will be an American military presence during this phase of the 6,000 U.N. UNMI peacekeepers in Haiti -- about 2,500 will be Americans.

The itinerary of the day: The President will leave from Florida. He will go, fly to Port au Prince rather early. He will address the troops, including American troops, including some of those who are soon to depart. He will then give an address to the Haitian people from the steps of the National Palace. He will meet with President Aristide and members of the Haitian government and other Haitian leaders. He will participate in the transition ceremony that I mentioned. He will meet with the provisional Electoral Council that is responsible for holding the elections in June. And then he will meet with the embassy staff before departing late the same day back to Arkansas.

Now, let me just spend perhaps two minutes giving you an overview of what we see, both the situation in Haiti today and the challenges that remain. First, a word on the security side. Haiti today has generally been restored to a secure and stable environment. That fact has been attested to by our commanders there, as well as the United Nations Security Council in making the transition to the U.N. presence.

Political violence that was pervasive just five or six months ago has largely disappeared. There still is crime and street violence in Port-Au-Prince in Haiti, although at a level probably less than most other cities around the world and the United States. Roughly 30,000 weapons have been confiscated or purchased back. An interim police of 3,400 has been trained and is functioning under the supervision of about 800 international monitors. They will eventually be replaced by a new Haitian police that is currently being trained at a Haitian police academy at a rate of about 350 a month -- very impressive program. These have been very competitive to become part of the new Haitian police, and they will begin to come on stream and actually be patrolling in the spring and summer.

On the economic side, I think we have to bear in mind that Haiti is and has been a desperately poor country. It is the poorest country in the hemisphere. Per capita income of roughly \$260. Its economy shrank 30 percent since the '90 coup. And so the situation President Aristide went back to was one that was barely functioning. But there has been progress.

There is a serious relief effort that is now ongoing -- the international community, and is feeding with the United States participation of a million people a day, providing health care or medical services for two million a day. There's been an immunization program since President Aristide returned, which has immunized about 90 percent of the children in Port-Au-Prince, and soon will be throughout the country.

The government has established an economic plan based on a free-market system. They've signed an agreement with the IMF. They've eliminated their arrears to the IMF. The international community in January in Paris pledged \$1.2 billion to Haitian economic recovery over the next 18 months. That money is beginning to flow, and it's obviously going to be slow in the beginning, but there is a serious international commitment there.

In terms of the private sector, our Department of Commerce and OPIC have been spearheading an effort to try to get the private sector back into Haiti. OPIC has signed a \$100-million facility with the Bank of Boston to provide some lending to assembly companies to go back in to Haiti. About 40 companies have returned. We hope eventually 200 will go back. That sector provided about 50,000 jobs before the military coup and before the sanctions.

And, finally, there is a serious privatization program that has been undertaken by the Haitian government, focusing initially on the electrical infrastructure, the electricity company, on the telecommunications sector, and on the infrastructure of the ports, et cetera.

Finally, a snapshot of where we are in terms of the political situation and democracy. The legislature, after President Aristide returned, reconvened. It functioned quite effectively. It passed an amnesty law; it passed a police law. Its term expired in January. The legislature is now not sitting. Elections have been called for June 4th, and a provisional Electoral Council has been established to hold elections basically not only for most of the legislature, but also roughly 2,000 local and municipal office holders. That is a daunting challenge for a country that has had only a few elections in its history.

We're talking about something like 2,500 registration sites, 9,000 polling places -- all of these things need to be done between now and early June. USAID has committed \$11 million to help in that program. That will be elections under U.N. supervision with OAS monitors coming to the country to help supervise the election.

Let me just conclude and take a few questions. With this thought -- as we move here on Friday from one phase to another, I think we are very cleareyed about the obstacles that lie ahead for Haiti. Haiti's turbulent history cannot be easily escaped. Political institutions are fragile, about as fragile as its electrical generators.

But I think this all needs to be seen in the context of the progress over the last five months. Perhaps the best perspective is provided by President Aristide himself, who has said on many occasions that the Haitians are moving along a path that leads from misery to poverty with dignity. And that has been the process that we have been assisting over this period, and will continue over the next phase.

Q There have been reports that as the election process nears, there has been an increase in homicides. Can you also say how much this operation has cost the U.S. so far?

MR. BERGER: With respect to the question about whether there's been an increase in homicides, there was a few weeks ago a spike of some violence during a two- or three-day period. Upon investigation, it appears that most of these incidents, if not all of them, have been situations involving common criminals and not political crimes. Obviously, there is still criminal activity and some violence in the country, and it's obviously a subject of concern until the Haitian police force and judicial system is really functioning really well.

With respect to the cost -- the cost of this since September has been roughly \$900 million. I should note that we spent \$400 million last year on Haiti

during a period in which we were seeking to restore democracy. There is, in FY'95, roughly \$200 million of economic assistance as part of that \$900 million.

Q Does that include the cost of the U.S. military -- the \$900 million?

MR. BERGER: Yes.

Q The New York Times today talked about the President and the business code of ethics. Some of the unions in the United States have been rather upset about American companies doing business in Haiti and now workers were paid per hour and lack of bathroom facilities. Are you trying to work with the American companies to get more humane --

MR. BERGER: We've worked very closely with the AFL-CIO and the labor movement. They have been very involved in Haiti, in Haiti democracy from the very beginning, for years. They have a very active presence there and we obviously want to see as the private sector is restored, we want to see that done in a way that is respectful of the rights of Haitian workers.

Q Sandy, what's the status of U.S. cooperation with the extradition request for Mr. Constant?

MR. BERGER: I'm not sure for certain where that stands. You know, Constant has left Haiti, but I'm not sure of the status.

Q Is he not in the United States?

MR. BERGER: I know he was at the United States at one time, but I don't know where he is at this point.

Q I understand we give \$33 million a year to the AFL- CIO to carry on these projects overseas -- what we call for democracy. Why do we give the money to them to spend? Why don't we spend it ourselves if we're going to spend it?

MR. BERGER: Well, this is a little bit off the Haiti track, but there is, of course, the National Endowment of --

Q I'm talking about the general --

MR. BERGER: I understand. There has been a program supported by the --

Q Haiti is included.

MR. BERGER: That's correct. There has been a program, supported on a bipartisan basis, the National Endowment of Democracy -- actually created under the Reagan administration, if I recall correctly -- originally an idea of President Reagan -- that has funded both through Chamber of Commerce on the one hand and through the American labor movement on the other hand, the support of democratic institutions abroad. That's been something we support. Haiti is one of many places in which that functions.

Q Sandy, can we get one comment on peacekeeping?

MR. BERGER: Yes. By the way, we are going, in a moment, go on background and have a little more detailed briefing.

Q Well, just on the record, could you just put this in a broader context? We've gone in and out of Rwanda very quickly and cleanly. Here we've gotten in and out of Haiti relatively quickly and cleanly. Somalia, obviously, was a very different case. Can you comment on the development of U.S. ability to do these sorts of operations in a U.N. context?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think, you know, Haiti is a situation that we have been -- we planned for very, very carefully. I think from the very beginning, the President was very clear about the objectives -- the purpose of the American military presence was to return the democratic government, establish a safe and secure environment and then turn this over to a U.N.-led force of which we will still participate to maintain that secure environment. Clear exit strategy, that is, we will -- the peacekeepers will be gone in February '96, after the Presidential election. And I think, with clear goals and with a lot of planning, a lot of work so far, we're on track.

Q So do you think that all of this is worth spending \$1,300 million on?

MR. BERGER: Thirteen hundred million?

Q Well, you said \$900 million.

MR. BERGER: Nine hundred million was the total figure.

Q There was \$400 million last year. Now, do you think it's worth it?

MR. BERGER: I think it is absolutely --

Q Have we gotten our money's worth?

MR. BERGER: Yes.

Q How so? By what, specifically?

MR. BERGER: I believe that today, had we not taken this action, we would have had an enormous Haitian migrant problem that would have cost us dearly. We would have seen on our doorstep the continued brutality of a regime that killed 3,000 people. For us to stand by and tolerate that, over time, would, I think, have diminished the United States.

America has kept the word of two American Presidents to help restore democracy in Haiti. And I believe the vitality and strength that Haiti will bring to the region and to our commitments, are well worth it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END3:36 P.M. EST

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

For Immediate Release

March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON AND PRESIDENT JEAN BERTRAND ARISTIDE IN WELCOMING CEREMONIES

> National Palace Port-au-Prince, Haiti

11:16 A.M. EST

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: (Speaks in Creole.) Mr. President Welcome, President Clinton. Welcome, President Clinton. Members of the U.S. Congress, members of the U.S. administration, friends of Haiti, a warm hello to all of you.

(Speaks in Creole.) If democracy were a river, the principle of one man, one vote would be its bridge. If economic development were a seed, it would only germinate in soil rich in democratic principles and values.

Greetings to all of you who have done so much for the restoration of democracy to Haitian soil. Special greetings to the delegation traveling with President Clinton. We are happy to see so many familiar faces. We hope that you, our friends in the U.S. Congress, all of Haiti's friends here today, carry back the joy and the spirit of democracy that is in the hearts of our citizens.

I salute the close to 20,000 U.S. troops who helped restore democracy to our country. Thanks to the nonviolent resistance of the Haitian people and to you, on September 19th Haiti moved from death to life. The water of violence was transformed to the wine of peace. Since our first meeting with General Shalikashvili in Washington, through many visits with General Sheehan, to our close collaboration with General Fisher here in Haiti, we have found ready partners willing to work with us to uphold democracy.

We thank all the men and women of the United States military serving in the multinational force, their families and the American people for their support for this successful operation.

In 1776, a famous American, Thomas Payne, published the template entitled, Common Sense, which galvanized the 13 colonies in their struggle for liberation. Years later, when Payne wrote the constitution for the state of Pennsylvania, he reaffirmed his commitment to liberty by insisting on universal suffrage. During this same time, during this same period, across the Caribbean Sea, Toussaint Louverture, the pride of Haiti, drafted the constitution which paved the way for the liberation of the world's first independent black nation.

Both nations honor their forefathers. In the life of this great historic figure, Haitians and Americans will, together, always remember the contributions made by Operation Uphold Democracy to Haiti under the leadership of President Clinton. (Applause.)

They are ready for you. They are ready for you.

THE PRESIDENT: President Aristide, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished guests, and citizens of a free and democratic Haiti: Bon jou. (Applause.)

I am deeply honored by President Aristide's invitation to speak with you today. In the many months we have known each other I have learned firsthand of President Aristide's tremendous courage. His strength in the face of great challenge reflects the unbreakable will of the Haitian people. We respect him as the President you elected freely and fairly, and for his leadership of all Haitians since his return. (Applause.)

Today, we come together as friends. (Applause.) Today, once again, we give life to the ideals of democracy, justice and freedom. Today, we celebrate the restoration of democracy to your country. (Applause.) Never -- never again must it be stolen away. (Applause.)

For centuries, the Haitian people have known little more than blood and terror. You have been robbed of opportunity and deprived of basic rights. Your children have grown up with too much violence. From Cite Soleil to the smallest village in the farthest corner of your land -- (applause) -- you have sacrificed much in your quest for liberty. Now you stand on the brink of a new and more hopeful time. Now you have a chance to make real the dreams of those who liberated your nation nearly 200 years ago. (Applause.)

The tasks ahead will not be easy. Democracy does not flow naturally like the rivers, and prosperity does not spring full grown from the earth. Justice does not bloom overnight. To achieve them, you must work hard, you must have patience, you must move forward together, with tolerance, openness and cooperation. I believe you can do it, for, as President Aristide has said, your challenge is great, but your will to succeed is greater. (Applause.)

Your democracy will be maintained and strengthened by free elections, and respect for the rights and obligations enshrined in your constitution. Your government, the United Nations and the United States will do all we can to guarantee free, fair, and secure elections, first in June and then in December. (Applause.) We know from experience that when elections are free, fair and secure, you will participate. That is what democracy requires of you, and we know you will do it. (Applause.)

Your nation has been stripped bare of many of its natural resources. But the most important of these resources -- you, the people -- have survived with dignity and hope. As the Proverb says, "les poua fe viv." (Hope makes life.) (Applause.)

Now you have a chance to come together to make the rice fields come alive and harvest the corn and millet; to build the schools and clinics that promise a better future for your children. We, your neighbors, your allies, and your friends, will support your efforts to create jobs, to attract investment from beyond your borders, and to rebuild and repair your injured land. (Applause.)

In a few months, the program will begin to pave the 1,000 kilometers of your roads. And later this year I will send the American Peace Corps here to help to organize the planting of millions of trees. (Applause.) As the roads are built and the trees are planted, thousands of you will have jobs. (Applause.) As you begin this work, I urge your countrymen and women who fled the terror to return and to help you to rebuild your land and theirs. (Applause.)

Economic progress will demand much patience. But we will stand with you as you tackle the hard and sometimes painful work ahead. "Men ampil chay pa lou." (With many hands the burden is not heavy.) (Applause.)

There will be times of great frustration as you build your democracy and move toward prosperity. But today, Haiti has more friends than ever before. (Applause.) And so once again, I urge each and every citizen of this nation to come together in this spirit of unity that President Aristide has so eloquently promoted. I can do no better than to repeat his words: Say no to vengeance, no to revenge, yes to reconciliation. (Applause.)

Justice will not always be swift, will not always seem fair, but the rule of law must prevail. The police and the courts must quickly get stronger. Citizens must not take the law into their own hands. Each of you must choose, as most of you have already chosen, to build up, not tear down. I congratulate you for the patience you have already shown.

History records that two centuries ago on the eve of your independence, and during my nation's Revolutionary War, more than 500 of your ancestors came from Haiti to my country and died in the fight to bring the United States to life. (Applause.) More than 200 years later, the United States is proud to have helped to give you a second chance to build your democracy and bring life to the dreams of your liberators.

I have been told that, throughout your land, our soldiers, our diplomats, and our volunteers have been greeted by hand-painted signs with three simple words. These words go right to their hearts and to mine. They are: Thank you, America. Now, it is my turn to say, Merci a Haiti. (Applause.) Thank you for the warmth of your welcome, and your support for all who have joined hands with you. Thank you for embracing peace, for denying despair, for holding on to hope. Because of your courage, because of your determination, freedom can triumph over fear.

Today, we stand in the warm, bright light of liberty, and together, we can say: Kembe fem, pa lage. Kembe fem, pa lage. (Stand firm, don't give up.) (Applause.) Merci, and thank you. (Applause.)



View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

(Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

For Immediate Release March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY U.N. AMBASSADOR MADELEINE ALBRIGHT AND AID ADMINISTRATOR BRIAN ATWOOD TO THE POOL

> National Palace Port-au-Prince, Haiti

1:00 P.M. EST

MR. MCCURRY: And now, it is my great pleasure to produce America's Ambassador to the international community of the United Nations. The Honorable Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Madeleine? It's a pleasure to welcome you here today, and several of our friends have questions.

Would you like to --

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: Let me start by saying that this has been an amazing day of gratitude, which really began with the President's gratitude to the American forces that have been here and have done such a magnificent job in making sure that we reach this very important phase.

Second, there clearly is great gratitude from President Aristide and the Haitian people for what the American forces have done as part of this multinational force. And this day, we think, in fact, does mark a transition from the period that began with President Aristide's return to Haiti, the initial phases here of beginning to put together a political, economic and judicial program. And in addition to being a day of celebration, it's clearly a day of looking forward and of dealing with the issues that now face Haiti and discussing how that progress can continue.

Q broach the subject in the bilateral of Tuesday's assassination, and can you tell us some context of that conversation?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: Well, what happened was that there was a photo op where questions had been raised about that issue, and after that, the President commended President Aristide for having asked the FBI to come and investigate it, and President Aristide reconfirmed the fact that he wanted this investigation to go forward. And there was a general discussion about the necessity of creating kind of an all-inclusive judicial system which would be able to not only arrest people, but investigate crimes, and also, then, have a judicial system which could deal with those that had, in fact, been a part -- been indicated or alleged to have committed a crime. That is part of this whole of how to establish a rule of law.

And so both Presidents talked about the necessity of kind of having this full package. They talked about the importance of getting a well-trained police, and also about the need of having courts and judicial training along with a well- trained police, and among the things that AID is helping with is in this training of police -- primarily, this judicial system of trying to get more judges and that kind of thing.

Q There are allegations that a member of his government was involved in the assassination. Even in the private talks, there was no concern raised by our President?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: -- that we -- clearly, there is -- this is in the middle of an FBI investigation, and I think that you would all agree that it would be totally inappropriate for me to discuss anything further about this. You're probably going to be asking me more questions, but let me just say that I am not going to speak on this, because we're in the middle of an FBI investigation.

And I think what's important here is exactly what President Clinton said, is that President Aristide made a decision very quickly to bring the FBI in, and that is a very important sign of his commitment to deal with this issue.

Q Do you know where the Interior Minister is today?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: I have no idea.

Q Is the President confident that President Aristide was not involved in any way in this plot? He was not aware of it, he had no knowledge?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: I said I am not -- I am not -- this is in the middle of an investigation and I'm not going to comment on it. Let me talk a little bit about --

Q Excuse me. But, without being specific, can you say whether or not the conversations on that matter went any farther than the President's talk about in public?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: They were discussing the whole problem of having this kind of an event take place, and the necessity, generally, to deal with how to investigate a variety of crimes, and I'm not going to go beyond that.

Let me say that what I think is very important here is to see the phases of what has happened. We started out here with 20,000 troops that were able to come into this country and return President Aristide to his rightful place as President. Over the months, we have all seen how that has worked, and the multinational force, ceasing operation today is to be turned over to the United Nations, where there will be 6,000 troops, of which 2,500 will be American and they will form the core of this. It shows America's commitment to the continuation of democracy in Haiti, and the importance of rebuilding the infrastructure here.

Second, the third phase of this will come next March, when there will be 4,000 police, Haitian police, that will be able to take over. That is the security aspect of the issue.

Q When you were talking about the courts, did you mean that, let's say the FBI did find that this Interior Minister was involved, would there not be a proper court to try him in right now?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that this is the issue, that they have a court system, they have a constitution, and I think the issue is not so much for that alleged crime, but I think it's more a matter of the fact that they are concerned in discussions that I've had where people are arrested for crimes of various kinds, and there is not -- the judicial system is not large enough to be able to deal with that.

Let me, if you don't mind -- we also -- we talked about the whole issue of economic phases here, and that was a major part of what the Presidents talked about, and a sign that they were really looking forward. They talked about the need for jobs, they talked about the need for building infrastructure, the need for energy here, and the hope that there would be additional American investment that would come to Haiti, and the hope, in fact, that President Aristide might come to the United States to talk about investment in Haiti, and the necessity to get on with it. Because I think that they are concerned that the people have had a great deal of patience.

And, finally, there was the whole political context of the need to get on with the elections and to get a proper political climate here. So we have talked about it, and the Presidents did, in terms of all the work that needed to be done.

And let me say for myself, personally, as I sat on that stage and watched the faces of the people who were so intent on listening to the two Presidents, all I could think about is that those very same people, those same faces might have been on boats, drowning, or trying to find a place to be, had it not been for the actions of the United States, the American military forces and President Clinton and President Aristide.

Q Isn't Aristide likely to come to the United States soon, and --

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: I don't know. Well, we did not talk about that, specifically, but clearly, the relationship between Haiti and the United States will continue to be very, very strong and, clearly, there will be visits back and forth of a variety of officials.

Q From your observation a moment ago, it sounds like you're speaking in favor of more peacekeeping and nation-building operations involving the U.S. and other U.N. nations.

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: No. I'm saying that, here, there has been a major success of having -- that we worked out a system which I think is an example of how things could be done, which is a two-phase system where there is a multinational force that goes in and deals with some of the first phases of restoration of democracy here, and then, in fact, in a very seamless way, can turn it over to the United Nations.

I think that what you will all note here is that the amount of work that has already gone into the preparation for the United Nations mission and the cooperation between the military forces that have been here, some of whom will stay, and how it will work in a seamless way when UNME takes over.

Q Why is it not too early to say that this is a success, what with political assassinations and the nation still an economic basket case?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: I think that the issue here is that there are major successes. You have a president that was elected by two-thirds of his people back. You have people that are clearly in the better economic phase than they were before. You have to compare the violence of the last few days to the violence that existed here before. Nobody condones death and violence. But I think you have to keep this in context.

Let me also say this job is not finished. Nobody thinks the job is finished. But I do think that we can all --we, the United States and especially the Haitian people -- and President Aristide can take great credit for what has happened here, and President Clinton today expressed his great pride in the

American military and also in the cooperation of the U.S. and the Haitian people.

Q Would the U.S. appreciate to get more nations involved -- European nations, for example, more than the Netherlands --

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: Well, I think, you know, the more, the better. Because I think the issue here is that the United Nations, as it gathers forces for its peace-keeping operations does, in fact, very much like to have multinational forces.

Q Ambassador Albright, there's been a real increase in crime here in Haiti in the last few weeks. Do you think the United Nations will have the mandate and the will to combat this crime?

AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT: I think the United Nations knows its mandate; it is to sustain the secure and stable environment, and as we've constructed this mandate, we believe that it is able to do the job.

Thank you.

MR. MCCURRY: Let me -- we're going to do one other thing. The President, after the transition ceremony, is going to meet with members of the electoral council, and I've got Brian Atwood, who is the Administrator of AID, who will kind of talk to you about some of the things the President's going to raise in that meeting, and we'll just do that real briefly, and that will serve as a readout for that meeting --

Brian? Come up.

Q How long was the meeting with Aristide?

DIRECTOR ATWOOD: It ran just over 20 minutes. It went a little longer and then --

Q Twenty minutes?

DIRECTOR ATWOOD: Twenty minutes, one-on-one, and then Boutros-Ghali joined the meeting after that.

Q A longer session with Boutros-Ghali?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: No, it was just a photo.

MR. MCCURRY: That was about 15 minutes. I think you all know Brian Atwood, who is the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who has been doing a lot of work down here. Brian is going to tell you a little bit about what some of the concerns the President will raise when he meets with the electoral council this afternoon, and also -- if you're interested, some of the work that AID has been doing in preparation for the June 4th parliamentary elections.

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: Let me just say that some of you may know that I used to do elections for a living. I used to work for the National Democratic Institute. And we were here in 1987 when the election went very bad. We are this time taking every precaution, as are the Haitians. They have an electoral council that is going to be using the most modern safeguards that can be mounted. The United Nations is here to advise them. The United States government is providing \$11.6 million for all of the ballots and the other safeguards that are necessary to run a free and fair election. There will be something like 400 monitors from both the OAS and the United Nations that will be monitoring this, and of course, the UNME force will be here as well.

So I think what the President will be anxious to hear from the Chairman of the Election Council is, what is the state of their preparations at this point, what additional assistance can we give them. As I indicated before, we're going to take every precaution. The election is June 4th, by the way. They then have to prepare for presidential elections later in the year, November 25, I believe. That's in '95.

There will also be, possibly, a runoff, there will be a runoff in June, June 26th, I believe. So those are the kinds of issues I think they'll raise.

Q Are there going to be members of other political parties at this meeting, opposition leaders at this meeting with the --

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: Let me just say, there are 70 political parties in this country. We have been urging the Election Council, and they have agreed that they should have weekly meetings with these political parties. We would like to see them actually enter into an agreement on a code of conduct for this election; that would be, obviously, very helpful.

There will be representatives of political parties, I believe, at this meeting. Is that correct, Larry?

U.S. AID OFFICIAL: No, not this afternoon. There are too many -- too many political parties to have to choose seven -- there's not enough room for seven -- eight representatives.

Q Who is going to be in this meeting, then?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: This will be the electoral council, the CEP. That's right.

Q The electoral council, not any opposition leaders or members?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: No.

Q Does he see them later, then, or not?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: I don't think that we were able to work that out this time.

Q Was it because there were too many, or --

AMBASSADOR ATWOOK: well, that's always part of the problem when you have 70 political parties. The question is, how do you select those that should meet with the President and how many representatives and that sort of thing. I guess we weren't able to work that out.

Q Was there a request by Aristide that the President not meet with any opposition leaders?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: No, absolutely not. No. President Aristide, of course, is staying out of politics. He's the President of the country. He's trying to stay above it all and we're certainly supportive of that posture.

Q I thought that was on our schedule, though?

ADMNISTRATOR ATWOOD: I think we tried to work it out. I don't think it was worked out. This has been a very compressed schedule, so we weren't able to work that one out.

Q So he's just seeing representatives from Aristide's party?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: The electoral council is made up of individuals that were selected both by the parliament and by President Aristide, and I think there are some private sector representatives as well. So it's an even distribution. They're not just Aristide's party.

Q Are you concerned that the rising cost of living and unemployment could cause instability for the elections?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: Well, we're concerned with the economic development of the country. And when we had meetings this morning, we emphasized the importance of continuing to make progress on the privatization front, continuing to try to find employment and jobs. They, in this country, cannot really afford a hiatus in moving forward on economic development. They can't just sit back and wait because there's an election campaign going on, and I think the Haitian government very much understood that and supported that.

I've been in a lot of developing countries, obviously, in this job and in my previous experience. There has been a remarkable amount of progress made here. Things always, I suppose, are frustrating for Americans because we're so impatient, but I think there's been a remarkable amount of progress in passing laws that are needed to create the right kind of economic policy structure.

Q How delicate is this system? How easily could it come apart?

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: I'm not going to tell you it isn't delicate; it's fragile. This is a rather classic transition here, and we're talking about a country that has lost 30 percent of its gross national product in the last three years. And we're trying, obvioulsy, just in initial stages, to restore that, to restore the jobs that were lost and the like. And we're doing a lot of humanitarian assistance, still. We're still feeding a lot of people, almost a million people.

I think that it is a fragile situation, but I also think that tremendous progress has been made, and each day that goes by, we create, I think, irreversible change, and this visit, I think, symbolizes the success we've had to date, and certainly launches us to work harder for the future.

Q what his personal ambitions are for the time after the elections -- presidential elections. President Aristide's ambitions.

ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD: President Aristide is primarily concerned with making sure that the democracy that will be experienced during a political campaign is matched by the progress in economic development. He is primarily concerned with jobs for his people and wants to create the right environment so that investment will come back into Haiti. That's his primary concern.

Thank you very much.

END1:18 P.M. EST

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADDRESS TO U.S. SOLDIERS IN HAITI

Warrior Base Port-au-Prince, Haiti

9:28 a.m. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Q: Go, Razorbacks!

THE PRESIDENT: Who said, "Go, Razorbacks?" (Applause.) We should have had a longer promotion ceremony up here. (Laughter.)

General Fisher asked me to take roll call. Are the 2nd Brigade Warriors here? (Applause.) The 65th Engineer Staffers? (Applause.) The 1st of the 21st Gimlet? (Applause.) The DISCOM Lightening Supporters? (Applause.) The 1st of the 25th Aviation Bandits? (Applause.) Special Forces Green Berets? Per person, they deserve applause. (Laughter.) What about the 3rd Squadron and 2nd ACR -- (Applause.) Are all the Light Fighters present and accounted for? (Applause.)

I've been told that your lungs are as strong as your hearts and your hands.

Did I leave out anybody? Would you like to be heard? (Applause.)

Q: Semper Fi!

THE PRESIDENT: Good for you. (Laughter.)

Every one of you who has take past in Operation Uphold Democracy on behalf of the American people, I am here to say, thank you. Thank you for serving your nation. Thank you for being democracy's warriors. Thank you for helping to bring back the promise of liberty to this long troubled land. You should be very proud of what you have done. (Applause.)

We gave you a tough and demanding mission which some said could not be done. And you proved them wrong. Look what you have accomplished. Seven months ago, a brutal military regime ruled Haiti, beating and torturing and murdering its citizens. Now the Haitian people are moving from a dark night of fear to a new day of freedom. You and all those who have served since last September helped to make that happen.

Seven months ago, thousands of migrants were streaming out of Haiti. Now tens of thousands of Haitians have come home -- home to start to build a better life for themselves and their fellow countrymen and women. You helped to make that happen.

Seven months ago, the world wondered whether the United States could summon the will to protect democracy in this hemisphere. Now the world knows once again that the United States will honor its commitment and stand up for freedom. And you helped to make that happen. For all this, you should be very, very proud.

We gave our word and the men and women of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, and the Coast Guard -- you kept our word. You have succeeded because you're the best trained, best prepared, best equipped fighting force in the world. Your reputation landed in Haiti before you did. And I am convinced that is one of the reasons that so much was done with so little bloodshed. The moment the military leaders learned that you were on the way, they got out of the way. (Applause.)

Since you've been here you've been asked to do it all, and you have. You've taken thousands of guns off the street. You've helped to train a new Haitian police force. You've prepared roads and bridges. You've brought food and medicine to the farthest reaches of our country -- to this country. And, of course, you have literally turned the lights back on in dozens of towns. (Applause.)

You not only answered the call of duty, time and again you have gone beyond it. And that is what heroism is all about. Each of you in your own way has become a hero in Haiti. I'd like to mention a few of you whose stories I have learned about.

Sergeant 1st Class Steven Lamb, whose platoon conducted over 140 patrols, often under hazardous conditions. On one mission the platoon came across a mob using steel pipes to beat a man whose hands were tied behind his back. They dispersed the crowd freed their man, treated his injuries. By stopping violence, confiscating weapons and diffusing problems before they got out of control, the platoon helped to give hundreds of Haitians a new sense of confidence and security. Thank you, Sgt. Lamb. (Applause.)

I met Sergeant 1st Class Michelle Howard of the Army. Many men and women under her command were overseas for the first time. Their morale was a little low without any mail from home, so she wrote the families of every single soldier in her platoon and told them to sound off in writing more often. Then the letters, postcards and packages came in by the dozens. And now Sgt. Howard is called by the troops, Mother Teresa with a 9-millimeter. (Applause.) Well, thank you Mother Teresa -- and thank you, Sergeant Howard.

I met First Sergeant Jose Garcia Apponte, and he and dozens of volunteers from all the service branches, on their free time and with no pay, started the School of Hope to teach Haitians English. Already the school has graduated more than 300 students. And now they'll return to their communities to share what they have learned. Thank you, Sergeant Garcia Apponte. (Applause.)

I met Private 1st Class John Firneno, a medic from the 32 ACR. (Applause.) He was on patrol about midnight last month when he came upon a young Haitian woman about to give birth. Now that requires courage. (Laughter.) As his comrades flustered around him with flashlights, he helped to deliver an eight-pound baby boy. Well, he didn't get a medical degree, but the boy now bears his name. Thank you, Private Firneno. (Applause.)

I want to thank the special forces who fanned out across the country and helped our local leaders learn the basics of government of, by, and for the people -- good things like keeping the streets safe and holding town meetings -- and even some of the not so good things like collecting taxes.

Through these and dozens of other acts, big and small, you have defended democracy and made it stronger here. You have shown the Haitians what it means to be a soldier in a free society, working for the people, not against them. And when you go home, you must know that you have inspired a new generation of Haitians, supported by the United Nations mission, to carry on the never-ending struggle for freedom.

I know that for those of you who are preparing to leave, your loved ones are ready to welcome you home. (Applause.) General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, recently visited in Hawaii with the families of the 25th Infantry Division soldiers. On my behalf, he thanked them for their sacrifice and the extraordinary support they have given to you. They and all of our military families have been heroes, too. And our country is in their debt, as well.

I'd also like to thank the soldiers from other countries who have been our partners in this remarkable endeavor. I know some of them are represented to my right here. Some of them have shared this encampment with you and some of them are in other places. I got to thinking about what a small world it can be when we are united for democracy and freedom.

Some of you may know that the First Lady is about to visit two of the countries represented here -- Bangladesh and Napal. Americans there, the First Lady and my daughter and others -- Bangladeshis and Nepalese here -- all standing for freedom across the world, led by the United States, led by you. You should be very proud. (Applause.)

Even though, my fellow Americans, Haiti is democratic, free and more secure than ever before, we know there is long hard work ahead. And we know that some of you will have a hand in it as part of the United Nations mission. In the end of course, we all know the Haitian people themselves must rebuild their country and realize their dreams, just as we must in the United States. But now, because of you, they have a chance to do so, just as we do in the United States.

The hand-painted signs see all over Haiti say it all: "Thank you America." Today, America says thank you to the men and women of our Armed Forces who helped to give Haiti a second chance.

Whether you serve in an active unit, the Reserves or the National Guard, we ask you to bear many burdens. We ask you to travel far from home. We ask you to stand in the face of danger. We ask you to be away from your families and your friends for a very long time. We ask you to protect your country and to defend democracy and freedom. We ask all these things. And time and again, you have risen to the challenge. Today, because of you, the Haitian people know why we call the United States, "Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave." (Applause.)

You have allowed freedom to triumph over fear here. You have helped to remind the world that democracy is still on the march, even though it still has enemies. And you have stood up for a principle upon which our country was founded, that liberty is everyone's birthright.

Thank you, each and every one of you, and God bless America. (Applause.)

END 9:30 a.m. EST

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

For Immediate Release

March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR SWING TO THE POOL

> Warrior Base Port-au-Prince, Haiti

9:52 A.M. EST

Q Mr. President, why don't you join us for a question or two?

THE PRESIDENT: The Ambassador will do fine. Thank you.

Q Mr. Ambassador, is there any truth to these allegations about the Interior Minister may have been involved in this plot to kill this woman?

AMBASSADOR SWING: What I want to emphasize is that the -- President Aristide asked for help and we're sending a very large contingent of FBI here. We're determined to work with them and find out the facts. -- investigation on the FBI --

Q make sure that this democratic experiment works?

AMBASSADOR SWING: I do. We obviously face enormous challenges -- building a new justice system and a police system -- But they've gotten off to a very good start. He's preaching basically for reconciliation. He's moving toward elections. We're training the police -- and more importantly, the international community support remains very solid. We've got 37 nations in the U.N. force, so, yes, I feel good about --

Q Haitian military police force, can they go after these assassinations, these murders -- are these political? Are they just random robberies? What is going on?

AMBASSADOR SWING: It's very hard to tell at this point. I'll give you a personal perspective on it. Most of the crime in the recent days has been of an economic nature. This does not appear to be of that sort, it would appear to be -- have some kind of a political motive. We don't know what yet.

In a transitional society such as Haiti is, the people often use high-profile assassinations in order to advance an agenda, for instance, to derail a process. So we're looking at it very much from that angle. As you know, it's being investigated now with our own FBI agents, so we'll see.

Q Do you know this Interior Minister personally?

AMBASSADOR SWING: I do not know him personally, no.

Q Is he known as someone who is responsible --

AMBASSADOR SWING: I wouldn't want to characterize him. I do not know him. He's a former military man and he was recently appointed. But as I say, we're in the middle of an investigation now. We'll know more later about the assassination.

Q When do you think the investigation will be over with?

AMBASSADOR SWING: Well, we've just begun it, as you know. We had, at one point, a large pool; we've got more than a dozen people here now. They'll stay as long as necessary to complete the various aspects of the forensics and all the rest, and following up all the leads we can get.

Q Should the multinational coalition have done more to disarm the populace?

AMBASSADOR SWING: I think they've done a very good job of doing -- they're not here to disarm the populace because under the constitution the populace has the right to have a gun for personal protection. What they have done is collected about 30,000 weapons through about two or three means. One is the cash for guns program, about 13,000. And we've got about 17,000 just going after caches based on intelligence reports that we get. We'll continue to do street sweeps at night, roadblocks, and I think the U.N. plans to do that.

But the real key is, even if you pick up all the guns, you've got to have a justice system that works. And we're trying to help them --

Q Is that the key to ending political violence in Haiti?

AMBASSADOR SWING: It's one of the keys. The other is to have an electoral process that works. And the other is to get people jobs so they don't commit crime.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what does the U.S. government know about the possible involvement of the Interior Minister?

AMBASSADOR SWING: I don't want to get into discussion of the actual case under investigation. So if you don't mind, I'd rather not go into that kind of detail now.

Thanks.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

END

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT ARISTIDE IN PHOTO OP

The National Palace Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Q: President Aristide, was your Interior Minister involved in the Tuesday assassination?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: No.

Q: Have these allegations cast a damper over the President's visit?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: No.

Q: Have you asked the FBI to look into the possibility that he might have been involved in the Bertin death?

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: We welcome help from the international community, from the United States in helping us finding proof of this violence for months -- for days. And together we'll be working.

Q: Mr. President, are you satisfied the Interior Minister was not involved?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: President Aristide asked the FBI to help investigate this. They are doing an investigation. I think we should applaud this quick and decisive action and let the investigation proceed, and not presume its results.

This is a day of celebration, and nothing can cast a cloud on it. It's a day of mission accomplished for the United States; a day of celebration for Haiti and for the United Nations force. And a day for looking ahead for the work still to be done.

Q: How did you like your reception, Mr. President?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I liked it a lot. It was very nice. It was great.

Q: Must be a little bit tired -- all the handshaking.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: It was quite wonderful.

Q: -- was your idea?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: No, but I liked it, though.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 31, 1995

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT JEAN BERTRAND ARISTIDE

IN WELCOMING CEREMONIES

National Palace Port-au-Prince, Haiti

11:16 a.m. EST

PRESIDENT ARISTIDE: (Speaks in Creole.) Mr. President welcome, President Clinton. Welcome, President Clinton. Members of the U.S. Congress, members of the U.S. administration, friends of Haiti, a warm hello to all of you.

(Speaks in Creole.) If democracy were a river, the principle of one man, one vote would be its bridge. If economic development were a seed, it would only germinate in soil rich in democratic principles and values.

Greetings to all of you who have done so much for the restoration of democracy to Haitian soil. Special greetings to the delegation traveling with President Clinton. We are happy to see so many familiar faces. We hope that you, our friends in the U.S. Congress, all of Haiti's friends here today, carry back the joy and the spirit of democracy that is in the hearts of our citizens.

I salute the close of 20,000 U.S. troops who helped restore democracy to our country. Thanks to the nonviolent resistance of the Haitian people and to you, on Sept. 19, Haiti moved from death to life. The water of violence was transformed to the wine of peace. Since our first meeting with Gen. Shalikashvili in Washington, through many visits with Gen. Sheehan, to our close collaboration with Gen. Fisher here in Haiti, we have found ready partners willing to work with us to uphold democracy.

We thank all the men and women of the United States military serving in the multinational force, their families and the American people for their support for this successful operation.

In 1776, a famous American, Thomas Payne, published the template entitled, Common Sense, which galvanized the 13 colonies in their struggle for liberation. Years later, when Payne wrote the constitution for the state of Pennsylvania, he reaffirmed his commitment to liberty by insisting on universal suffrage. During this same time, during this same period, across the Caribbean Sea, Toussaint Louverture, the pride of Haiti, drafted the constitution which paved the way for the liberation of the world's first independent black nation.

Both nations honor their forefathers. In the life of this great historic figure, Haitians and Americans will, together always remember the contributions made by Operation Uphold Democracy to Haiti under the leadership of President Clinton. (Applause.)

They are ready for you. They are ready for you.

THE PRESIDENT: President Aristide, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished guests and citizens of a free and democratic Haiti: Bon jour. (Applause.)

I am deeply honored by President Aristide's invitation to speak with you today. In the many months we have known each other I have learned firsthand of President Aristide's tremendous courage. His strength in the face of great challenge reflects the unbreakable will of the Haitian people. We respect him as the President you elected freely and fairly and for his leadership of all Haitians since his return. (Applause.)

Today, we come together as friends. (Applause.) Today, once again, we give life to the ideals of democracy, justice and freedom. Today, we celebrate the restoration of democracy to your country. (Applause.) Never -- never again must it be stolen away. (Applause.)

For centuries, the Haitian people have known little more than blood and terror. You have been robbed of opportunity and deprived of basic rights. Your children have grown up with too much violence. From Cite Soleil to the smallest village in the farthest corner of you land -- (applause) -- you have sacrificed much in your quest for liberty. Now you stand on the brink of a new and more hopeful time. Now you have a chance to make real the dreams of those who liberated your nation nearly 200 years ago. (Applause.)

The tasks ahead will not be easy. Democracy does not flow naturally like the rivers, and prosperity does not spring full grown from the earth. Justice does not bloom overnight. To achieve them, you must work hard, you must have patience, you must move forward together, with tolerance, openness and cooperation. I believe you can do it, for as President Aristide has said, your challenge is great, but your will to succeed is greater. (Applause.)

Your democracy will be maintained and strengthened by free elections, and respect for the rights and obligations enshrined in your constitution. Your government, the United Nations and the United States will do all we can to guarantee free, fair and secure elections, first in June and then in December. (Applause.) We know from experience that when elections are free, fair and secure, you will participate. That is what democracy requires of you, and we know you will do it. (Applause.)

Your nation has been stripped bare of many of its natural resources. But the most important of these resources -- you, the people -- have survived with dignity and hope. As the Proverb says, "lespwa fe viv." (Applause.)

Now you have a chance to come together to make the rice fields come alive and harvest the corn and millet; to build the schools and clinics that promise a better future for your children. We, your neighbors, your allies, and your friends, will support your efforts to create jobs, to attract investment from beyond your borders, and to rebuild and repair your injured land. (Applause.)

In a few months, the program will begin to pave the 1,000 kilometers of your roads. And later this year I will send the American Peace Corps here to help to organize the planting of millions of trees. (Applause.) As the roads are built and the trees are planted, thousands of you will have jobs. (Applause.) As you begin this work, I urge your countrymen and women who fled the terror to return and to help you to rebuild your land and theirs. (Applause.)

Economic progress will demand much patience. But we will stand with you as you tackle the hard and sometimes painful work ahead. "Main anpil chaj pa lou." (Applause.)

There will be times of great frustration as you build your democracy and move toward prosperity. But today, Haiti has more friends than ever before. (Applause.) And so once again, I urge each and every citizen of this nation to come together in this spirit of unity that President Aristide has so eloquently promoted. I can do no better than to repeat his words. Say no to vengeance, no to revenge, yes to reconciliation. (Applause.) ...take the law into their own hands. Each of you must choose, as most of you have already chosen, to build up, not to tear down. I congratulate you for the patience you have already shown.

History records that two centuries ago on the eve of your independence and during my nation's Revolutionary War, more than 500 of your ancestors came from Haiti to my country and died in the fight to bring the United States to life. (Applause.) More than 200 years later, the United States is proud to have helped to give you a second chance to build your democracy and bring life to the dreams of your liberators.

I have been told that, throughout your land, our soldiers, our diplomats, and our volunteers have been greeted by hand-painted signs with three simple words. These words go right to their hearts and to mine. They are: Thank you, America. Now, it is my turn to say, Merci a Haiti. (Applause.) Thank you for the warmth of your welcome, and your support for all who have joined hands with you. Thank you for embracing peace, for denying despair, for holding on to hope. Because of your courage, because of your determination, freedom can triumph over fear.

Today, we stand in the warm, bright light of liberty, and together we can say: Kimbe fem, pa laque. Kimbe fem, pa lague. (Applause.) Merci and thank you. (Applause.)



For Immediate Release April 10, 1995

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

April 10, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Attached, pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 103-423, is the sixth monthly report on the situation in Haiti.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 23, 1995

FACT SHEET ON HAITIAN ELECTIONS

The holding of national elections on June 25 represents a milestone in the joint efforts of the Haitian people, the United States, and the international community to restore democracy to Haiti. Nine months after the U.S.-led coalition was sent to Haiti, the country will freely choose its representatives in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and at the local level. Approximately 3.4 million Haitians have registered to vote out of a total eligible population of roughly 4 million. Over 10,000 candidates belonging to more than 60 parties will be running for 2,200 public offices. Local debates are being held and candidates have been able to present their views to the electorate.

The elections represent, first and foremost, a success for the Haitian people. The task of building a new democracy was and remains theirs. But the United States has been an active partner in this endeavor:

On the security side, President Clinton's decision to send an international force to remove a brutal military dictatorship was the first step in Haiti's march towards democracy. The goal of the U.S.-led coalition was to establish a safe and secure environment, a pre-requisite for a peaceful, democratic life. That mission was accomplished, as attested by the United Nations Security Council decision to transition to a UN Coalition last March. Tens of thousands of weapons have been confiscated or purchased back. Together with its Haitian and international allies, the United States also helped train an interim police force. Today, the 6,000 UNMIH peacekeepers and the Haitian police force are ensuring that the electoral campaign and the elections can take place without the large-scale political violence to which Haiti had become accustomed.

On the political side, the Administration has taken steps to build confidence in the democratic process and promote a national dialogue both among the political parties and between the parties and the Electoral Council. This culminated with last month's Presidential Mission to Haiti on elections and democracy, which was led by US AID Administrator Brian Atwood.

On the technical and financial side, the Administration has strongly supported Haiti's electoral process. The United States is providing \$6.9 million to the Government of Haiti to help organize the elections. In addition, U.S. governmental grants have made it possible for non-governmental organizations such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems to train political party pollwatchers and pollworkers, organize candidate forums, procure ballots and registration cards, and promote voter education.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 23, 1995

White House Statement on Presidential Delegation to Observe Haitian

Election

On June 23, a Presidential Delegation headed by Brian Atwood, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, will depart for a three day mission to Haiti to observe and report on the elections scheduled for Sunday, June 25 to choose representatives for the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and local officials.

The establishment of a lasting democracy in Haiti has been one of the Clinton Administration's key foreign policy goals since President Aristide's return to Haiti last October. The President believes that the holding of national elections represents a milestone in the partnership between the Haitian people, the United States and the international community to restore a strong and viable democracy to Haiti.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

(San Francisco, California)

For Immediate Release June 25, 1995

PRESS BRIEFING BY ANTHONY LAKE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT

Aboard Air Force One En Route to San Francisco, California

5:30 P.M. PDT

MR. LAKE: On Haiti, let me just give you a readout that we've gotten so far. And all of this --

Q Are you on the record?

MR. LAKE: Yes, I'm now on the record. And all of this is preliminary. The polls are just closing about now, aren't they? Yes, I would think so.

First of all, there have been some isolated incidents of violence, but only a very few, and no reports of casualties thus far. Secondly, there have been reports of some logistical problems with regard to getting ballots to the polling places on time, et cetera. But our embassy has not reported any immediately visible political patterns in those logistical problems. I think it is not surprising -- and we're not making any final judgments yet on the elections. We have to hear from our observers and others. I think it's not -- I would say, however, that it's not surprising that there would be logistical problems when you're speaking about getting out some 14 million ballots, and when you're dealing with some 11,000 candidates in an election in a country which was so recently in the grip of endemic violence.

In fact, I would argue that we really ought to be, besides looking at the trees here, looking at the forest, and seeing how -- what an extraordinary act it is to have conducted elections in Haiti on time when a year ago, if a Haitian expressed freely a political view, he or she risked having his or her face cut. And today millions of Haitians express those political views in safety.

So I think -- well, I could have made a lot of money if a month or two ago I had bet people on whether or not the elections would take place today and in circumstances of relative calm. But I did not do so only because gambling is illegal. (Laughter.)

Q (inaudible)

Q Is there a U.S. monitoring delegation there, Tony?

MR. LAKE: -- except off the record on baseball.

Q Is there a U.S. monitoring delegation there?

MR. LAKE: Yes, yes.

Q Who heads that?

MR. LAKE: Brian Atwood, AID.

Q What about the --

MR. LAKE: (inaudible) -- tonight.

Q Would the U.S. military -- the, actually U.N. military, but primarily U.S. soldiers, what role are they playing in terms of any monitoring?

MR. LAKE: Well, they have been out very actively, both in the cities and in the countryside to make sure that there were conditions of security. And apparently, very effectively so, working with the new Haitian police forces.

Q Can you say at this point that they were free and fair elections?

MR. LAKE: No, I cannot. We should not rush to a judgment here, not because I I'm implying that they were not free and fair, but we simply want -- the observers should do their work, and we should do all this in an orderly fashion.

Q I mean, have you had any indications that there may not have been totally free and fair --

MR. LAKE: What we have so far are indications of logistical problems. And as I said, the embassy has not reported any political patterns in those logistical patterns. But we'll have to -- and problems -- but we'll have to see and wait for the report of the observers.

Q What kind of a turnout have you got?

MR. LAKE: We have reports -- and again, this is early -- of a moderate turnout in the cities, and we don't know yet in the countryside.

Q What sort of logistical problems -- what's an example? What are you talking about?

MR. LAKE: Oh, the ballots not being available in time as the voters were waiting in lines, for example.

Q -- main problem? Is that the main -- the most frequently --

MR. LAKE: The main logistical problem, I was saying, one example was ballots not being ready in time as the voters were standing in line.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Polling places not opening on time, ballots not getting there on time, running out of ballots.

Q Is there a reason you know why there was only a moderate turnout in Haiti? Is there anything you can put that on?

MR. LAKE: No -- (inaudible)

Q Going back -- just one last thing --

MR. LAKE: -- get the implication of your remark, there's no sign that there was -- that violence deterred people from voting ---

Q -- worry of it or anything --

END

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 6, 1996

PRESS BRIEFING ΒY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL BERGER

The Briefing Room

1:05 P.M. EST

MR. JOHNSON: Good afternoon and welcome to the White House briefing room. To start off today's briefing, we are going to have the Deputy National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, to brief you on tomorrow's visit by a presidential delegation led by Madeleine Albright for the inauguration of President Preval in Haiti.

MR. BERGER: Good morning -- afternoon, I guess. Let me say a few words at the outset about the significance of the events tomorrow -- the inauguration of President Preval to be the new President of Haiti. And as David indicated, a delegation led by Ambassador Albright will represent the United States at that ceremony.

Tomorrow represents an historic day for Haiti, and a day in which I believe Americans can take some pride in what we've accomplished over the past 18 months. Tomorrow there will be the first peaceful transition of power from one democratically elected president of Haiti to another in Haiti's history. That establishes the basis for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, as the President indicated back in September of 1994 when we began the action in Haiti.

President Preval has asked the U.N. to extend the U.N. mission for another, roughly, six months. That will be discussed at the U.N. during the month of February and we hope that will be approved, something perhaps at the 1500 to 2000 level. The United States will not participate in that phase of the security operation. U.S. combat forces will be departing -- in fact, they already are beginning to depart and will be departed from Haiti by mid-March. Some remaining support forces will be gone by early April. At that point there will be a -- hopefully, if the U.N. mandate is extended -- a 1500-to-2000 U.N. presence, largely Canadians and Pakistanis.

We intend to have a vigorous ongoing policy with respect to Haiti. We would hope that there would be a small military liaison office there, as we have in most countries in Latin America -- perhaps 50 or so; occasional exercises, civic action programs by the military -- obviously, a very vigorous AID and economic program; continued heavy diplomatic involvement, as well as our efforts in helping to continue to train and upgrade the Haitian police. But we will not be part of the security force.

Now, the second point I want to make is that an enormous amount has been accomplished since September, 1994 -- September 19, 1994, to be precise -- when 23,000 American soldiers began to land in Haiti. The de facto regime that had ruled Haiti brutally since 1991 departed peacefully. The Haitian military, much feared, was disbanded and demobilized, also peacefully.

There have been a series of elections in Haiti for local and parliamentary and now presidential elections that have been conducted, largely peacefully. There is a new legislature that is operating with a good degree of vigor and independence. There is a 5,000-person Haitian national police force that has been trained with the help of American and Canadian and other outside assistance that is operating. We have trained during this period about 400 justices of peace through Haiti to help begin to improve their judicial system.

And the economy, which remains very, very poor, is showing signs of some revitalization, it grew about five percent last year. The assembly sector has restored about 12,000 of the, I think, roughly, 35,000 jobs that existed there before the coup and before the period during the coup.

And, finally, I would say that the level of political violence in Haiti, which involved perhaps 3,000, 4,000 political murders during the period of the coup leaders from 1990 to 1994 has been dramatically reduced. We estimate that perhaps since the American involvement there, there may have been roughly 20 or so killings that can be attributable to perhaps some political motive.

Now, let me say finally that I think we need to recognize that enormous challenges remain for Haiti. It is the poorest country in the hemisphere, it is one of the poorest countries in the world. It does not have a deep and long tradition of democracy, it has weak governmental institutions, but it is moving along the path towards democracy and towards recovery.

I think the final thing I would say is that all along over the last two years, the doomsayers with respect to Haiti have been wrong. They predicted widespread violence after the American intervention, widespread opposition to the American intervention; that did not materialize. They suggested that Aristide was not a Democrat and would seek vengeance and not reconciliation; in fact, President Aristide not only spoke continually of reconciliation, but practiced it as well. They indicated all along that Aristide, of course, would never step down for power, would never peacefully turn over his power to another democratically-elected regime, which, of course, he's done.

So at each step of the way, I think Haiti has defied the conventional wisdom, it has moved along the path towards democracy, and we hope that we will be part of that enterprise for years to come.

Let me try to answer your questions.

Q Is President Carter going to be a part of this delegation since he was so instrumental in bringing about this peace?

MR. BERGER: I don't believe President Carter will be at the inauguration, but there will be an American delegation, including members of Congress and others.

Q Why would the U.S. support an extension of the mandate, the U.N. mandate, at the same time refuse to keep its troops there? Isn't there a contradiction here?

MR. BERGER: No, the President indicated very clearly in September of 1994 when we introduced the American force that we would be there through the election of a new president and the inauguration of a new president. That is happening tomorrow, and consistent with that commitment to the American people, the remaining American forces will be withdrawn.

Just to give you a perspective here, we were initially at 23,000. We drew down very quickly. In March of 1995, we were only about 2,500, which is what we are at now. Nonetheless, the Preval government, the new government has asked for there to be some continued transition, continued U.N. presence as the Haitian national police in particular gains in maturity, gains in experience, the Canadians, the Paks and others have indicated they're prepared to do that, and I think we welcome that.

Q When does the U.S. intend to return the thousands of pages of documents that the Haitians -- say are quite incriminatory toward the U.S.?

MR. BERGER: At the time of the intervention, there were a number of documents and other things that were taken at that time. We very much would like to return all of that material to Haiti, to the government of Haiti, and have indicated to them that that's our intention.

There are some procedures we would like to work out with the government with respect to some of the documents -- some, for example, that may have names of American citizens in Haiti that we would like to make sure receive adequate protection. We have not yet been able to work out all of those procedures with the government of Haiti. We will continue, after the transition with the new government, to discuss that with them. But our hope and expectation is to return the documents subject to adequate procedures.

Q What will President Aristide be doing now and what is his influence on the government at this point?

MR. BERGER: Well, President Aristide has indicated that he intends to remain active in Haitian affairs. His commitment to his people is manifest and deep and abiding. He has some ideas with respect to literacy programs and other private activities that he's talked about engaging in. I expect, certainly

he is a figure of great respect in Haiti and he will be a not-so-senior statesman.

But I also anticipate that President Preval will function as the real president of Haiti and that President Aristide will play a role as a private citizen.

Q So you do not believe that he'll be the power behind the throne when --

MR. BERGER: No, I don't think so. And, again, I think this may be another one of these conventional expectations that President Aristide once again defies, that he will somehow seek to be the president while not being the president. He and President Preval have been close through the years. President Preval was a prime minister in his earlier government, before the coup. I suspect that he will be an advisor, but I also expect that President Preval and his government will be the authorities that operate and run the government in Haiti.

Q You mentioned that the U.S. would be part of what you called the enterprise in Haiti for some time. Given the economic conditions, the ecological environmental degradation there, what's it going to take to keep the situation from deteriorating again to the point where the people start coming into the United States again and create the same political problems that led to this intervention?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think there has to be steady economic progress for there to be an enduring transformation in Haiti. Obviously, the most important thing that can happen is the higher level of foreign investment in Haiti. I think as this transition takes place peacefully, as we have now a new democratically elected government, I think that the environment in which business can operate in Haiti, I think they will have a greater confidence that we're through this period and there will be greater levels of investment.

There obviously is also still a role for international financial institutions and for bilateral economic assistance. We would hope that we could continue to assist Haiti, both through the international financial institutions and our own bilateral programs so that this growth that has begun to resume last year continues.

Q What is the current aid level, and how do you -- do you anticipate it will go higher or --

MR. BERGER: In FY '95 the level was about \$162 million -- excuse me, it was about a total of \$235 million, that was '95. In '96, the planned total is \$115 million but, as you know, budget expenditures for FY '96 are a little irregular due to the nature of our budget battles. And so I'm not sure whether it will spend out at that level. And it is important that we continue to maintain the support in Congress for a continued level of assistance for Haiti. I think it's extremely important that we work with Haiti now to consolidate this extraordinary transformation that has taken place.

We no longer have a situation of mass brutality in Haiti, we no longer have a situation of thousands of people in boats heading for the United States. We have a democratic government, and I think we have an obligation to try to assist it.

Q Do you have any reasons to believe that Preval's policy and attitude will be different from Aristide's with regard to the economy? Aristide refused to implement this program of economic -- which led Congress, in fact, freeze part of U.S. aid -- do you think that Preval will have a different policy, or will he keep the same direction?

MR. BERGER: Well, he has indicated that he wants to work with the international community, he wants to work with the World Bank and other institutions to try to maintain their engagement and involvement in Haiti, and I believe he will do that.

Q Aristide said the same thing -- blocked the policy, so --

MR. BERGER: President Aristide had a good deal on his plate over the last year and a half, and I think a lot of progress was made. Not everything was done during this period, but I think there's been a steady trend line here, and we would expect President Preval to continue the process of economic development.

Q If the economic policies do not change -- what do you think the impact will be with Congress? Do you think he will still keep his freeze on U.S. aid, or how are you going to work with that?

MR. BERGER: We hope to continue to work with the new government of Haiti to encourage them to adopt economic policies that are both -- that are principally in the interest of the Haitian people, both in the short term -- that is in terms of the dire kind of situation that exists in parts of Haiti and in





View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 15, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

On Monday March 18, 1996, the President will travel to Fort Polk, Louisiana, to visit American troops who participated in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Representatives from major units that participated in this operation will attend a joint awards ceremony honoring all U.S. military units who served in Haiti. The President will also see several family members of those soldiers currently serving in Bosnia.

Fort Polk is home to the Joint Readiness Training Center and the Army's Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. Units from the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment served in Haiti as part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The last U.S. combat forces return from Haiti on March 15, although some support forces will remain.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 21, 1996

FACT SHEET ON HAITI

THE ROAD FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP and the perseverance of the Haitian people has helped restore democracy to Haiti and provided concrete hope for a better future. The inauguration of Rene Preval as Haiti's new President on February 7, succeeding President Jean Bertrand Aristide, represented the first peaceful transfer of power from one democratically-elected President to another in Haiti's almost 200-year history. The United States is proud to have helped return democracy to Haiti and given it a chance to take hold.

America's decisive action helped to:

- Restore the legitimate, democratically-elected government of Haiti.
- Dramatically improve the human rights situation in Haiti.
- Reverse the economic decline of the coup years.
- Eliminate the flood of Haitian migrants seeking economic and political sanctuary on our shores.
- Conduct free and fair local, parliamentary and presidential elections.

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S promise to the American people regarding Haiti is being realized:

When President Clinton ordered over 23,000 U.S. troops to Haiti on September 19, 1994 to lead the multinational Operation "Restore Democracy", he stated the mission would be limited in scope and duration.

On March 31, 1995, the U.S.-led Multinational Force was transitioned (or was reduced) to the 6000-man United Nations Mission in Haiti(UNMIH), 2500 of whom were Americans. The 2500 U.S. soldiers began their redeployment from Haiti in December, 1995. U.S. operational participation in UNMIH ended when the original UN mandate expired on February 29, 1996. The bulk of U.S. UNMIH troops now have returned to their home stations in the United States. The President just visited Fort Polk, Louisiana where he greeted returning forces. The remainder will be home by mid-April.

U.S. troops and their civilian and international military counterparts have given the people of Haiti the chance to restore their democracy and work toward a more secure and prosperous future. Specifically, they have:

Confiscated or bought-back more than 30,000 firearms and individual explosive devices;

Maintained a secure and stable environment as the brutal FAd'H (Haiti's former military) was disbanded;

Provided security, technical expertise and logistical support for democratic elections nationwide; and

Supported the development of the new, civilian police force to assume security and law enforcement

responsibilities throughout Haiti.

Today, as U.S. military participation in UNMIH comes to a close, the Government of Canada has stepped forward to take charge of the mission under United Nations auspices. This new, smaller UNMIH military component will remain in Haiti for an additional four months, until the end of June.

President Preval and the democratically-elected Haitian Parliament have affirmed his commitment: to sustain and extend the development of a professional and uncorrupted police and security establishment; to intensify judicial reforms; and to put into place sound economic development plans that will benefit the Haitian people and attract foreign and domestic investment as well as assistance from the international donor community.

Under the leadership of President Preval and his government, the Haitian people now face the challenges of building a better future for themselves and their country. The United States is proud to have played an important role in enabling the Haitian people to face these challenges, and will continue its support for Haiti's restored democracy and critical economic growth.

THEN AND NOW

Haiti has made remarkable progress since the U.S.-led Multinational Force deployed to Hispaniola in September 1994. The difference between then and now is dramatic:

BEFORE September 1994, Haiti was ruled by a brutal, corrupt military regime which preyed upon its own people.

NOW, the peaceful, democratic transfer of power on February 7 from President Aristide to his elected successor, Rene Preval, was an historic event that will further cement Haiti's place among the community of democratic nations. Since the September 1994 arrival of the Multinational Force, Haiti has conducted three rounds of national elections -- for local governments, for Parliament, and for President.

BEFORE, Haiti's military dictators ruled through terror. Rape, torture and murder were routine instruments of governance. NOW, the Haitian people have a government committed to respecting basic human rights, and is developing the kind of law enforcement and judicial structures necessary to ensure the Rule of Law prevails. The Haitian military has been disbanded and the feared paramilitary organizations such as FRAPH have been eliminated. With U.S. help, a new, civilian police force is being trained and deployed to protect and serve the Haitian people, rather than to exploit and abuse them.

BEFORE, thousands of refugees risked their lives at sea to get to the United States in an effort to escape Haiti's oppression.

NOW, the flow of migrants from Haiti has decreased dramatically. The serious crisis prompted by massive waves of Haitian refugees has been eliminated.

BEFORE, the Haitian economy was in decline. In the last year alone of the dictatorship, GDP declined 11 percent, inflation rose to 40 percent, and public sector deficit skyrocketed to 6 percent of GDP.

NOW, Haiti's economy is slowly recovering from the coup years. In the first twelve months after the restoration of Haiti's democratically-elected government, the economy expanded by over 5 percent. Inflation has been cut almost in half. Export assembly operations, which were completely closed down in September 1994, came back to life and now employ over 12,000 people.

A CHRONOLOGY OF SUCCESS December 16, 1990: Jean Bertrand Aristide is elected President of Haiti in a free election.

September 29-30, 1991: A coup topples the Aristide government and installs a brutal military regime.

October 1, 1991 to September 18, 1994: Thousands of people are killed by or with the complicity of the coup government.

September 19,1994: The American-led Multinational Force (MNF) launched Operation ?Restore Democracy? in Haiti.

October 15, 1994: President Aristide returns to Haiti accompanied by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.S. Congressional leaders and other foreign dignitaries for welcoming ceremonies in Port-au-Prince. Aristide calls for reconciliation among all Haitians.

October 21, 1994: The Haitian Senate passes a bill outlawing paramilitary groups.

November 30, 1994: The MNF reports it has collected 14,943 weapons; 1,720 Haitians had graduated from the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) police training courses; 8,670 U.S. troops remain in Haiti.

December, 1994: The Haitian Government takes several important steps to reform key institutions, including the appointment of a new supreme court, and the separation and reorganization of police and army units.

December 21, 1994: The Government of Haiti announces the appointment of the last of nine members of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which opens the way for Haiti to begin the election process for legislative, municipal and local elections.

January 4, 1995: MNF Commander, General Meade, declares that a secure and stable environment exists in Haiti, one of the requirements necessary to transition from the MNF to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

January 17, 1995: President Aristide officially dismisses the remainder of the Haitian army. U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry pronounces Haiti secure and stable for turnover to the UNMIH forces, which will replace the MNF by March 31, 1995.

January 30, 1995: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 975 to transfer the Haitian peacekeeping mission from the MNF to UNMIH effective March 31, 1995.

January 31, 1995: In Paris, the World Bank and international agencies from 20 countries pledge \$1.2 billion dollars in assistance for Haiti's economic recovery.

March 31, 1995: President Clinton and other dignitaries attend ceremonies in Port-au-Prince transferring operations from the MNF to UNMIH. Major General Joseph W. Kinzer, USA, assumes command of all U.S. and UN forces in Haiti.

June 4, 1995: President Aristide and Secretary of State Christopher address the first 357 graduates of the Haitian National Police training program and announce that the program to train new police will be doubled in order to field over 5,000 police officers by March 1996.

June 5, 1995: The Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly begins its session in Port-au-Prince, demonstrating regional support for democracy in Haiti.

June 25, 1995: Haiti holds first round of national elections for which more than 3.5 Haitians registered to vote for some 10,000 candidates to fill over 2,000 local and national offices.

August 13, 1995: Haiti holds make-up elections in 21 towns including Port-au-Prince. Voter turnout isn't high, but procedural complications have declined since the June 25 round.

September 17, 1995: UNMIH forces provide security and logistical support to the conduct of run-off elections throughout Haiti. 68 Parliamentary races are contested, 60 for the Chamber of Deputies and 8 for the Senate. Elections are violence-free and improved administratively, though voter turnout is low.

October 15, 1995: To commemorate the first anniversary of President Aristide's return to Haiti, Vice President Gore attends ceremonies in Port-au-Prince and visits UNMIH troops.

December 12, 1995: The last class of Haitian National Police candidates to receive training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri graduates 758 members.

December 17, 1995: Haiti holds its Presidential election. Rene Preval is elected to succeed President Aristide.

February 7, 1996: Rene Preval inaugurated as the new President of Haiti, the first peaceful transfer of power from one civilian leader to another in Haiti's 192-year history.

March, 1996: The UN Security Council votes to extend the UNMIH mandate in Haiti for four months under Canadian military command and control. UN Special Representative Lakdhar Brahimi is replaced by Enrique Ter Horst of Venezuela. U.S. Major General Kinzer changes military command to Canadian Brigadier General Daigle and U.S. forces terminate operational missions as part of UNMIH.

March 18, 1996: President Clinton travels to Fort Polk, Louisiana to welcome U.S. troops home from Haiti and present military awards to representative service members.

March 19-21, 1996: President Preval and delegation travel to Washington for an official working visit and meet with President Clinton at the White House.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 21, 1996

PRESS BRIEFING BY SAMUEL BERGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The Briefing Room

1:50 P.M. EST

MR. MCCURRY: The Deputy National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, who has been attending the meetings President Clinton has had today with President Rene Preval of Haiti, is here to advise you further on the status of those deliberations. They were warm and productive, I am sure. Or can I be so sure?

MR. BERGER: Thank you, Mike. Let me just say a few words briefly at the outset and then respond to any questions you might have. President Clinton met today for roughly two-and-a-half hours for a working meeting and lunch with President Preval of Haiti. It's the first meeting the President has had since the democratic transition of power in Haiti in February from President Aristide to President Preval, the first democratic transition of power in the 200-year history of Haiti. So, truly, an historic moment.

I must say I was very impressed by President Preval. He is clearly someone who is very bright, very focused in a practical way on both his immediate goals and his long-term goals for his people, very strong. And the meetings with the President and President Preval were very productive. Needless to say, I was also impressed by President Clinton, as well.

Q Was he very bright, very focused? (Laughter.)

MR. BERGER: The President thanked -- President Preval thanked the American people and President Clinton for the role that we played in the restoration of democracy to Haiti, expressed a gratitude on behalf of the Haitian people.

In turn, the President expressed his admiration for what the Haitian people have accomplished over the last 18 months --restoration of democracy; a series of peaceful elections producing a parliament and representatives around the country; dismantlement of the FAHD which was, of course, hated and feared in the country; the creation of a Haitian national police indigenous and trained by international police academy; and generally an environment of much greater hope and security.

The focus of the discussions were largely on the economy. President Preval said essentially he had campaigned on the theme, It's the Economy, Stupid. And most of the discussion was on what needed to be done now as we transitioned from the security issues to the very, very challenging economic issues.

While there has been progress in Haiti -- inflation is down from about 50 percent to about 17 percent, there is actually real growth in the economy last year of about 5 percent, first time since before the coup in 1991 -- there are enormous economic challenges facing Haiti with an unemployment rate of roughly 70 percent, an infrastructure that has been decimated by the plundering of the past several years and the neglect and problems with the provision of basic services.

President Preval indicated very strongly that he believed that the Haitian economy needed to undertake structural reform, that he believed very firmly that they needed to proceed ahead with privatization, they would move very rapidly with respect to the first parastatal, the cement and flour sectors that he was interested in resuming and accelerating negotiations with the international financial institutions so that an agreement could be reached fairly promptly for assistance from the international community. And he, obviously, as he undertakes these very difficult adjustments within his own economy, is looking to the international community to remain engaged and to remain active in Haiti.

For our part, the President has requested \$100 million in FY '97 for assistance for Haiti, economic assistance, and we will be working very closely with the Congress in order to obtain that assistance. President Preval will have several meetings and has had on the Hill while he is here.

Let me say a word on the security side. Of course, as you all know, American forces are largely gone from Haiti. The last American combat forces will be gone by April 15th on schedule, in the timetable that the President laid out for the American people when we engaged in this operation -- mission accomplished for our military.

The UNMI, itself, the U.N. mission has been extended for four more months with Canadian leadership. There are 5,000, as I said, Haitian police that have been trained, and they are well-trained, but still quite inexperienced. President Preval indicated he now needed to focus essentially on supervisory personnel. He has placed new people in charge of the Haitian police, who I think most people believe are very strong and solid at the top.

But he indicated that the problems that they now face were less political in nature in terms of security than simply an environment of economic deprivation which creates incidents and creates problems and frustrations that erupt from time to time. He needs and was -- hopes that the international community will still remain involved in training, in providing some equipment, minimal equipment to the police so that they can continue to progress as a Haitian police force -- something that Haiti has not really had as opposed to a Haitian military strong-arm presence.

Let me just conclude by saying I think there was a strong convergence of views between President Clinton and President Preval. Haiti has traveled an enormous distance with U.S. support over the past 18 months. The challenge now shifts to, in some ways, even more difficult economic issues of trying to assure that the benefits of democracy flow to the Haitian people and are seen by the Haitian people. And, finally, President Clinton made very clear that we wanted to continue and we intended to continue to be Haiti's partner as we move ahead -- no longer with the American military in the lead, but their partner in trying to help them build their economy and solidify their democracy.

Q Did the question of the confiscated documents come up -- documents confiscated by the U.S. military a year ago? President Preval indicated this morning that Haiti really wants those documents back.

MR. BERGER: It did not come up in the meetings with President Clinton and President Preval, but we are taking steps to return those documents.

Q You announced three months ago that those documents would be returned. What is the explanation for that not having been carried out?

MR. BERGER: Well, a very large amount -- number of these documents are ready to be handed over right away. With respect to the others, there are some assurances that we are seeking with respect to assuring that they will be used in an appropriate way. But I think those will be worked out very soon.

Q What kind were they, and why were they picked up?

MR. BERGER: Well, as I said, this issue did not come up in the meetings between President Clinton and President Preval. These were -- back at the time when the American intervention took place, and when the military went into, for example, these FRAPH headquarters, they seized guns, they seized boxes, you know, they seized, I think in the normal course of things, things that were there, some of which included documents which, as I say, we want to get back to them.

Q Will you be redacting those documents or giving them back intact?

MR. BERGER: I think there is some intent to protect some -- names of Americans, but to provide some mechanism by which -- if there was some law enforcement reason why the Haitians needed those names, they could have them.

Q Do you want the names to be deleted or you want guarantees from Preval that the names won't be used in a way that you don't like?

MR. BERGER: We want to provide some protection in terms of those names. But as I say, this is not, after two-and-a-half hours, an issue that was even raised by President Preval.

Q Was the issue of Haiti's recognizing Cuba an issue that came up during this meeting?

MR. BERGER: No.

Q The President didn't express his concern about that?

MR. BERGER: No, this was a meeting focused on the future of Haiti. We have invested an enormous amount in trying to bring Haiti back to democracy -- 23,000 Americans were deployed to Haiti in September of 1994, as you know. Haiti has gone through an enormous transition. There's an enormous set of challenges ahead, big challenges, that have to do with whether or not the Haitian economy can be restored; whether private investment will go back to Haiti; whether there will be an environment of investor confidence; whether Haiti will move forward with privatization, as President Preval indicated; whether there will be continued support for the Haitian police. And those are the things that matter to the lives of Haitians and should, I think, matter to us as well.

Q Did the President expand on Strobe Talbott's raising the issue of investigating the political killings in Haiti?

MR. BERGER: As you know, the Haitian government has established a special investigative unit to conduct investigations of political killings that have taken place. There was some brief discussion of that. President Preval reported on that. He clearly seems committed to assuring that that unit proceed and do so in a fair and just way. And we have in the past indicated that we're prepared to provide some technical assistance if they desire.

Q Based on that, is the President or is this administration in a position to certify to Congress that earnest investigations are underway in Haiti, so that money that is being held back from Haiti would go forward?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think the way -- I think that judgment needs to be made in April, and I think it probably would be unwise to make it either from me, from this podium, or before April.

Q I'm not up on this. Which international financial institutions is Haiti talking to? The World Bank --

MR. BERGER: It's the IMF, the World Bank, and the International Development Bank. And there is a -- kind of an interrelated cluster of agreements that need to be signed in order for a fairly significant amount of international aid to flow. Those have been delayed during the political season in Haiti, during the elections, during the transition.

President Preval made it very clear that he seeks to resume those negotiations promptly, to complete them promptly, and that he believes, himself, that privatization, modernization, structural reform of the Haitian economy is what the Haitians need. So I think those negotiations hopefully should go rather well.

Q Is the \$1.6 billion that Mike was referring to, is this the package of -- how big is the package of --

MR. BERGER: That's roughly -- I don't have the exact number of what it is.

Q You said, International Development Bank. Do you mean the Inter-American Development Bank?

MR. BERGER: Excuse me, Inter-American Development Bank. Thank you very much.

Q Is there an idea that privatization will go ahead as previously planned, or is he looking for a different kind of --

MR. BERGER: Well, he indicated that there have been a quest for bids to privatize two sectors: the cement sector and the flour sector. That he would move ahead with those two sectors rather soon. And that he would then be looking at other sectors down the road. At the same time, there was some -- obviously, that kind of structural reform has its economic consequences, and President Preval hopes that the international community will be of assistance to him as he seeks to help those people who may be dislocated by that economic change.

Q And the service industries? I mean --

MR. BERGER: We didn't get into an industry-by-industry discussion. I think what was important here was his very clear, very clear intent, very clear understanding that this was what was necessary for Haiti and for the Haitian people.

Q On the documents in question, is the U.S.'s only concern protecting the names of Americans who may have had contacts with the military; or is there another concern here, as well, about how -- you know, what the government would do in terms of their own --

MR. BERGER: The concerns have been, A, Americans and B, assuring that the documents and any names in those documents would be handled in a judicious way, and now there's a new government -- I think we'll resolve this problem very quickly.

Let's remember there's been a political transition here, there's been two elections. President Preval has been forming his government, parliament has been established. He simply has been in office for two or three weeks, so there really hasn't been an interlocutor here to deal with.

I have a very clear sense, after the last two-and-a-half hours, that Haiti has a very dynamic president, very clear in his focus, and someone who will be a very good partner for the United States to work with together.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:04 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE

March 21, 1996

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I am providing you my fourth report on the continuing deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti, most of whom have served as part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). I am providing this update of events in Haiti, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, to ensure that the Congress is kept fully informed regarding U.S. support for the successful efforts of UNMIH to assist the Government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment, protecting international personnel and key installations, establishing the conditions for holding elections, and professionalizing its security forces.

As you know, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 975, UNMIH was authorized to assume responsibility for the U.S.-led Multinational Force for peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Through the presence of UNMIH and its support to the United Nations-Organization of American States International Civilian Mission, a tremendous improvement in the observance of basic human rights in Haiti has been achieved. Over 5,000 Haitian police have received professional training and continued to be observed by and receive guidance from UNMIH international civilian police monitors. Haiti's Presidential election on December 17, 1995, led to the first-ever transition from one democratically elected President to another on February 7, 1996.

In Resolution 1048 of February 29, 1996, the U.N. Security Council extended UNMIH's mandate for a period of 4 months and authorized a decrease in the troop level of UNMIH to no more than 1,200. Beginning in January of this year, there has been a phased reduction in the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to UNMIH. At present, 309 U.S. personnel remain a part of UNMIH, primarily providing logistical, aviation, psychological operations, engineering, staff, and medical support. These forces are equipped for combat. By April 15 we expect to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from UNMIH.

In addition to U.S. personnel assigned to UNMIH, U.S. military personnel are assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti as part of the FAIRWINDS exercise. Over the past 6 months, the Support Group has demonstrated the capabilities of U.S. military engineers to deploy overseas in an austere environment and has also provided training opportunities for military engineering, support, medical, and civic affairs personnel. Through this exercise, substantial humanitarian and civic assistance has been provided to the Haitian people. This assistance has included the repair and restoration of nine schools and one hospital and the drilling of wells in order to provide potable water to two remote communities. Currently, the Support Group consists of 184 military personnel, who are under U.S. command and follow U.S. rules of engagement.

There have been no serious security incidents or civil disturbances involving attacks on or gunfire by U.S. forces since my last report.

I have taken the measures described above in order to further important U.S. foreign policy goals and interests, including the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights in Haiti. I have ordered the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, and in accordance with various statutory authorities.

I remain committed to consulting closely with the Congress on our foreign policy, and I will continue to keep the Congress fully informed about significant deployments of our Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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WILLIAM J. CLINTON

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 30, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Haiti

President Clinton today welcomed passage by the Haitian Parliament of two key pieces of economic reform legislation, calling the accomplishment "a tribute to President Preval's leadership and a key step on the road to economic growth and recovery."

The Haitian Senate on September 25 passed a comprehensive civil service reform bill and on September 26 passed a modernization bill which authorized the government to restructure inefficient state enterprises and bring in the private sector. Both these bills had been approved previously by the Haitian Chamber of Deputies, and will go now to President Preval for signature. The President cited the extended Parliamentary debate over this legislation as evidence that democracy is taking root in Haiti, and hailed the final approval as "an important step in Haiti?s long journey from dictatorship to democracy."

In passing these two bills, the Haitian Parliament cleared the way for a multi-donor economic recovery program that totals over \$170 million, including assistance from the EU, Canada, and others, and loans from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank.

During their March 21 meeting in the Oval Office, the President told President Preval that the United States would join in supporting this international effort if the government of Haiti met the reform conditions of the IMF. Haiti has now done so. Accordingly, the U.S. government is disbursing the first \$4.6 million of a \$19.6 million budget package in support of the IMF program. We are working with Congress to release the remaining \$15 million.

Little more than two years ago, Haitians were taking to boats by the thousands. Today, with the support of the United States and many of our allies, Haitians are laboring to build a democracy and reform their economy. For the United States, this assistance is a prudent investment in the democratic stability of a nearby neighbor and the economic development of a region on our doorstep.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 10, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

12:22 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Today I want to have Bill Gray, our Special Advisor on Haiti, announce two new steps that are necessary to intensify the pressure on that country's military leaders: a ban on commercial air traffic and sanctions on financial transactions.

As Bill Gray will explain, these steps represent an important new stage in our efforts to restore democracy and return President Aristide to Haiti. The message is simple -- democracy must be restored; the coup must not endure.

In the past month, we have taken steps to advance the interests of the Haitian people and the United States. Our national interests -- to help democracy thrive in this hemisphere, and to protect the lives of thousands of Americans who live and work in Haiti -- require us to strengthen these efforts.

Under our leadership, comprehensive United Nations trade sanctions have gone into force. To enforce these sanctions, we are moving to assist the Dominican Republic to seal its shared border with Haiti. The Dominican Republic has agreed to welcome a multilateral sanctions monitoring team to help the Dominicans seal their border.

We've deployed U.S. naval patrol boats to the area to stop smugglers, and have begun detaining ships suspected of violating the sanctions. We've also made important strides in dealing with the difficult issue of Haitians who leave that country by sea. A facility to interview Haitians who have been interdicted will soon open in Jamaica. And one month from now, we will open a second interview facility on the Turk and Caicos Islands. I want to thank the governments of those countries and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for their collaboration in this effort.

I want to be clear about this issue. I continue to urge all Haitians to avoid risking their lives in treacherous boat voyages. Anyone who fears persecution should apply for refugee status at our facilities within Haiti. Since our administration began, those offices have arranged resettlement for some 3,000 Haitian political refugees; far, far more than was the case prior to that time. They stand ready to review further cases and represent the safest and fastest way for Haitians to seek refuge.

Now I'd like to ask Bill Gray, who stepped into this very difficult role and has used great skill to make real progress, to explain these new steps which we're announcing today.

END 12:24 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 23, 1997

FACT SHEET

Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Haitians

Today, the President directed the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to defer for one year the deportation of Haitians who were paroled into the United States or applied for asylum prior to December 31, 1995. This action will protect these Haitians against deportation for one year while the Administration works with Congress to provide them long-term legislative relief.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that there are approximately 40,000 Haitians who may benefit from the President's action. This group includes Haitians who were paroled into the United States from Guantanamo Bay Naval Base after the overthrow of President Aristide in 1991, Haitians who arrived in the United States through other means and were later paroled, and Haitians who applied for asylum prior to December 31, 1995. Haitians who have committed serious crimes or whose removal the Secretary of State or the Attorney General determines to be in the interest of the United States would be ineligible for this relief.

The President has determined that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to grant DED to this group of Haitians. Specifically, he believes that this action will help contribute to Haiti's efforts to build a stable and lasting democracy. This, in turn, will help to prevent future outflows of undocumented Haitian migrants. He also strongly believes that Haitians should receive the same treatment we sought for Central Americans, in light of the similarity of their circumstances.

President Bush granted DED three times: first in 1990 to Chinese who where in the United States at the time of the events at Tiananmen Square; then in 1991 to certain Kuwaiti residents evacuated from the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War; and finally in 1992 to Salvadorans who had previously registered for Temporary Protected Status (TPS)-- a form of relief provided to them because of the civil war in their country. In 1993, President Clinton extended for 18 months the grant of DED to Salvadorans.

The Department of Justice and INS will implement the President's directive. Questions about implementation should be referred to them.

When Congress returns, the Administration intends to work closely with interested Members on both sides of the aisle to provide permanent legislative relief for this group of Haitians.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 23, 1997

December 23, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Measures Regarding Certain Haitians in the United States

Over the past several decades, many Haitians have been forced to flee their country because of human rights abuses and civil strife and have sought the protection of the United States. A significant number of these Haitians were brought into the United States from Guantanamo Bay Naval Base by President Bush following the overthrow of President Aristide in 1991. Other Haitians arrived here through other means and were paroled or applied for asylum. Many of these Haitians continue to be without legal status in the United States.

Pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, I have determined that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to defer for 1 year the deportation of any Haitian national who was paroled into the United States before December 31, 1995, or who filed for asylum before December 31, 1995, and who has been continuously present in the United States since that date.

Accordingly, I now direct you to take the necessary steps to implement for these Haitians:

- 1. deferral of enforced departure from the United States for 1 year from the date of this memorandum; and
- 2. authorization for employment for 1 year from the date of this memorandum.

This directive shall not apply to any Haitian national: (1) who has been convicted of an aggravated felony; (2) who is found to be a persecutor of others within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42); (3) whose removal you determine is in the interest of the United States; (4) whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States; (5) who voluntarily returned or returns to Haiti or his or her country of last habitual residence outside the United States; (6) who was deported, excluded, or removed prior to the date of this memorandum; or (7) who is subject to extradition.

These measures shall be taken as of the date of this memorandum.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 23, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Haitians

Today, I have directed the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to defer for one year the deportation of Haitians who were paroled into the United States or applied for asylum prior to December 31, 1995. This action implements the commitment I made to address the situation of Haitians when I signed immigration legislation last month offering relief to Central Americans and others. It will shield these Haitians from deportation while we work with Congress to provide them long-term legislative relief.

Haitians deserve the same treatment we sought for Central Americans. Like Central Americans, Haitians for many years were forced to seek the protection of the United States because of oppression, human rights abuses and civil strife at home. Many of them have established strong ties and made significant contributions to our communities. And, while we have been encouraged by Haiti's progress following the restoration of democratic government in 1994, the situation there remains fragile. Staying the deportation of these Haitians and obtaining for them permanent legislative relief will help support a stable and democratic Haiti - which, in turn, is the best safeguard against a renewed flow of Haitian migrants to the United States.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release September 30, 1998

VICE PRESIDENT GORE HIGHLIGHTS U.S. ASSISTANCE TO HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN RESPONSE TO HURRICANE GEORGES

Washington, DC -- Vice President Gore today highlighted Administration efforts to help the victims of Hurricane Georges in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The federal government will deploy three C-130 aircrafts, departing from New York today, to provide supplies to hurricane victims.

"While nothing can erase the pain this devastating hurricane has caused so many families in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, this assistance will help them begin to rebuild their lives," Vice President Gore said. "I want to assure these families that the federal government will stand by to offer as much assistance as needed to get these communities back on their feet."

The federal assistance includes:

Three C-130 aircrafts to bring humanitarian relief to the victims of Hurricane Georges in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

A U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Andrew M. Cuomo, and Peace Corps Director Mark Gearan are in the Dominican Republic and Haiti to survey relief efforts and announce additional recovery efforts.

100,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at \$10 million donated by the Agriculture Department to the Dominican government. Authorized under the President's Food Aid Initiative, the proceeds of these sales will be used for reconstruction and development projects.

In addition to directing the Defense Department assistance, the

Vice President also coordinated with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to facilitate the transportation of these relief supplies.

View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release August 6, 1999

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit for your immediate consideration and enactment the "Central American and Haitian Parity Act of 1999." Also transmitted is a section-by-section analysis. This legislative proposal, which would amend the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), is part of my Administration's comprehensive effort to support the process of democratization and stabilization now underway in Central America and Haiti and to ensure equitable treatment for migrants from these countries. The proposed bill would allow qualified nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti an opportunity to become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Consequently, under this bill, eligible nationals of these countries would receive treatment equivalent to that granted to the Nicaraguans and Cubans under NACARA.

Like Nicaraguans and Cubans, many Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Haitians fled human rights abuses or unstable political and economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet these latter groups received lesser treatment than that granted to Nicaraguans and Cubans by NACARA. The United States has a strong foreign policy interest in providing the same treatment to these similarly situated people. Moreover, the countries from which these migrants have come are young and fragile democracies in which the United States has played and will continue to play a very important role. The return of these migrants to these countries would place significant demands on their economic and political systems. By offering legal status to a number of nationals of these countries with long-standing ties in the United States, we can advance our commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Passage of the "Central American and Haitian Party Act of 1999" will evidence our commitment to fair and even-handed treatment of nationals from these countries and to the strengthening of democracy and economic stability among important neighbors. I urge the prompt and favorable consideration of this legislative proposal by the Congress.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 5, 1999.

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View Header

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Little Rock, Arkansas)

For Immediate Release

August 6, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton Announces Legislation to Provide Parity for Central American and Haitian Migrants

Yesterday President Clinton transmitted to the Congress legislation that amends and expands the 1997 "Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act" (NACARA) and the "Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998" (HRIFA). The President's bill aims to ensure that migrants from Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti all receive similar treatment under U.S. immigration law.

This bill would right the imbalances left by NACARA by offering the same protection to all Central Americans who have fled violence, human rights abuses and unrest. Under the legislation, those migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have resided continuously in the United States since December 1, 1995, and do not have disqualifying characteristics such as certain criminal convictions -- the same requirements applicable to Nicaraguans and Cubans under NACARA -- would be eligible to become lawful permanent residents. It would provide similar treatment to Haitians who sought the protection of the United States in the early 1990s, following the overthrow of a democratically elected regime.

The enactment of this legislation would contribute to stability and development in these young and fragile democracies. While these countries have made important strides in recent years, they suffer from significant unemployment and underemployment. Repatriation of the nationals of these countries who have longstanding ties to the United States would only add to the economic and political challenges facing these governments. The United States has invested substantial resources in establishing peace and democracy in these societies, and this legislation will help carry out that important commitment.

"I am pleased that Representatives Luis Gutierrez and Christopher Smith introduced this legislation last night with broad bipartisan support," the President said. "I commend their leadership on this issue and the support of Representatives Carrie Meek, Benjamin Gilman and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen who joined with others as original co-sponsors of this important legislation."

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

For Immediate Release August 6, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

In 1997, Congress passed a law that, though well intentioned, resulted in different treatment among groups of Central Americans seeking refuge from persecution.

I am pleased that yesterday our administration submitted to Congress legislation that will result in fairer, more just treatment for Central Americans and Haitians who have come to this country seeking protection from harm. Our legislation will right the imbalances of the 1997 "Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act" so that our laws recognize not what type of regime punished a person, but what that person has suffered. Specifically, our bill would ensure that migrants from Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti all receive similar treatment under U.S. immigration law.

America is too great a country not to support this bold move for fairness. I call on Congress to act on our legislation and achieve equity in our nation's immigration laws.

I also want to thank Representatives Christopher Smith, Luis Gutierrez, Carrie Meek, and Benjamin Gilman and the many other members of Congress who cosponsored this bill.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary (Kansas City, Missouri)

For Immediate Release August 16, 1999

August 16, 1999

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 561(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999 (FOAA), as enacted in Public Law 105-277, I hereby report to the Congress that the central Government of Haiti: (1) has achieved a transparent settlement of the contested April 1997 elections, and (2) has made concrete progress on the constitution of a credible and competent provisional electoral council that is acceptable to a broad spectrum of political parties and civic groups in Haiti. Section 561(b) states that funds appropriated by the FOAA and made available to support elections in Haiti shall not be restricted if I report to the Congress that the central Government of Haiti has met the two aforementioned criteria.

The first criterion in section 561(b) of the FOAA, a transparent settlement of the contested April 1997 elections, was cumulatively met by a public declaration by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) on June 11 and the promulgation of the Electoral Law, which was published in the national gazette Le Moniteur July 19, and republished with corrections July 22. Taken together, these two acts establish that 19 Senate seats will be run in the legislative and local elections projected for late 1999. Included in this number are the two still-contested Senate seats from April 1997. Article 63 of the Electoral Law specifically states "the number of Senators to be elected in the upcoming elections shall be determined by the CEP." This authority is also provided in Article 16. Article 130 states that the elections are to fill Senate seats vacant by "fact or law."

Pursuant to its authority to determine which seats will be competed, the CEP declared publicly on June 11 that it "has decided to call elections to fill all Senate positions currently vacant, whether de facto or de jure, without distinction." In a number of subsequent public statements, as well as in private assurances to the Embassy and others in the international community, CEP officials explicitly and unanimously reiterated that because there are presently eight sitting Senators and the Constitution calls for a Senate of 27 Senators, a total of 19 Senate seats will be competed, including the two still-contested positions.

The second criterion, concrete progress on constituting a competent, credible, and broadly acceptable CEP, was achieved March 16 when President Preval announced that nine-member body's composition after consultations with the five-party Espace de Concertation. Since that time, the CEP has performed in a competent, even-handed, and credible manner and has been deemed acceptable even by parties and movements who stand in staunch opposition to the government.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 7, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

There have been queries about a letter President Clinton wrote to President-elect Jean Bertrand Aristide of the Republic of Haiti. On December 1, 2000, President Clinton wrote President-elect Aristide to express his hopes and concerns with regard to the evolution of democracy in Haiti as President-elect Aristide prepares to return to office. President Clinton underscored his personal commitment to a better future for Haiti and better relations between our two countries, stressing the importance of building an inclusive society dedicated to the goals of justice and the rule of law.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 28, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Last week, Special Envoy Tony Lake led a delegation to Port-au-Prince to meet with President Preval, President-elect Aristide and Haitian opposition leaders. During a series of meetings, President-elect Aristide committed to rectify the problems associated with the May 21 elections, create a credible electoral council, enhance counter-drug cooperation, professionalize the police force and judiciary, strengthen democratic institutions and protect human rights, install a broad-based government, initiate a new dialogue with the international financial institutions, and negotiate a new agreement for the repatriation of illegal migrants. He has written to the President confirming his commitment to these significant steps. Their implementation can mark a new beginning for Haiti's democratic future.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 18, 2001

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

January 17, 2001

Pursuant to section 559(b) of Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2000, I hereby transmit to you a report concerning the status of Haiti's progress.

The report contains eight subsections, which provide information required by section 559(b) of the Act, to the extent that such information is available. These subsections address:

- Governmental Institutions Envisioned in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.
- Privatization of Haiti's Major Public Entities.
- Efforts to Re-sign the Lapsed Bilateral Repatriation Agreement, and Cooperation in Halting Illegal Migration.
- Investigations and Prosecution of Extrajudicial and Political Killings, and Cooperation With the United States In Such Investigation.
- Removal and Maintenance of Separation of Human Rights Violators from Haitian Public Security Entities or Units.
- Ratification of the 1997 Maritime Counter-Narcotics Agreement.
- Development of Haiti's Domestic Capacity to Conduct Free, Fair, Democratic, and Administratively Sound Elections.
- Demonstrated Commitment of Haiti's Minister of Justice to the Professionalism of the Judiciary, and Progress Toward Judicial Branch Independence.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON