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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Polish President Lech Walesa

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Ambassador Nicholas Rey
Elaine Shocas, Chief of Staff to Amb.
Albright
Daniel Fried, NSC Director for CEE
Jamie Rubin, Director of Communications for
Ambassador Albright

Polish

President Lech Walesa
Ambassador Jerzy Kozminski
Mieczyslaw Wachowski, Chef de Cabinet to
President Walesa
Andrzej Zakrzewski, Political Advisor to
President Walesa
Andrzej Ananicz, Foreign Policy Staff
Advisor to President Walesa
Maciej Kozlowski, Americas Department
Director, MFA

DATE, TIME 16:30-17:15, October 22, 1994
AND PLACE: Walesa's Suite - Hyatt, Buffalo, New York

President Walesa opened the meeting by expressing pleasure at being in the U.S. and at seeing Amb. Albright. He was pleased as well by the passage of the Brown-Simon Amendment (inter alia making the Visegrad Four states and other CEE's potentially eligible for lethal EDA). It was clear that Polish problems were meeting with greater understanding in the U.S. The U.S. was the only power that could help construct a post-Cold War political order in Europe; this placed tremendous responsibility on the U.S. but Poland was confident the U.S. would do the right thing; Poland had full confidence in the Clinton Administration.

Amb. Albright responded by welcoming Walesa to the U.S. His confidence in the U.S. was not misplaced; Poland was very important to the U.S. The security of Poland remained, as she had said in January, of direct and material importance to the U.S. She wished to thank Poland for contributing to the international coalition on Haiti. The operation was going well

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and Poland's contribution was important both in its own right and to bilateral relations.

Albright said she wanted to raise a matter that had been troubling her. She had taken a trip to the NIS recently to discern what Russia was doing in the "near abroad." Her purposes and views had somehow been badly misinterpreted in Poland and among the Polish-American community. In visits to Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, she had focused on ethnic issues that were serious on their own merits but were made even more serious by being exploited by nationalists in Russia. Moldova and the situation in Transdnistria were examples. She had made statements urging withdrawal of the 14th Army that had earned her a denunciation by General Lebed. She had made the point that the emerging NIS had to be independent and strong and she repeated that theme in Moscow. Yet Poland and Polish-Americans and somehow gained a very different impression of her views.

Walesa interrupted that as a politician he understood perfectly well what Amb. Albright had tried to do in her NIS trip. She had wanted to deliver a firm message and had. In Moscow, she had wanted to balance her tone and "pat the bear" a bit. This was a sound approach and he appreciated it; the reaction in Poland had been a bit overblown.

Albright responded that Walesa grasped her motives well.

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Albright said she appreciated Walesa's analysis. The U.S. and Poland had come a long way together since her trip to Warsaw with General Shalikashvili in January. The U.S. and its friends and allies were putting more and more flesh on the framework of the Partnership for Peace. PFP's first exercises had taken place in Poland. In Warsaw last July, President Clinton had expressed the U.S. position by declaring that NATO's expansion was not a question of whether but when and how. (Wachowski interjected that the GOP was well aware of President Clinton's statement and its importance.)

Albright continued that it was important to continue the momentum toward NATO expansion and noted Walesa's metaphor that the process was like a bicycle: to keep it upright it simply had to move forward, whatever the speed. Albright could assure Walesa that NATO's expansion would take place country by country, rather than by way of large groups, and that Poland had itself assembled many of the elements we looked for in new members. However, while countries outside NATO could not veto NATO's expansion, the sixteen in NATO could. As President Clinton had promised, the U.S. now was talking to its Allies about expansion. Some wanted to go slow. The U.S. did not; it was moving ahead with an active program. She would pass to President Clinton Walesa's views about timing.

Albright raised U.S. concerns about Ukraine, saying that the U.S. was concerned not to isolate that country. She had read Zbigniew Brzezinski's articles about how a NATO expanded to the Visegrad Four countries could develop a robust relationship with Russia. That was interesting but where did it leave Ukraine?

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Albright emphasized that the U.S. appreciated Poland's importance as the largest and a leading state of the region and confirmed that the U.S. foresaw that Poland would be among the first of NATO's new members; she had not said that Poland's entry into NATO would have to follow Hungary's and the Czech Republic's.

Albright turned to U.S.-Russian relations after the Yeltsin visit. This had gone well and it was clear that President Clinton and Yeltsin enjoyed good personal rapport. Still, recent developments with Iraq had revealed interesting aspects of the relationship and Russian foreign policy. Some in Russia wanted to press Russia's world role to a level equal to that of the U.S. In some cases, the two nations would agree; in others, they would not. Albright emphasized that she had had received firm instructions that even if Russia were to veto the UNSC Resolution in Iraq, the U.S. would press ahead. She had made that clear to the Russians and in the end they voted with the United States. The lesson was that when the U.S. was firmly committed to a course of action, Russia knew it and responded accordingly.

Albright continued that the U.S. was concerned about Russia. Still, it was important not to treat Russia as an outlaw lest it become one. There were good people in Russia -- real reformers -- whom we should support. Still, the U.S. would be vigilant.

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As the meeting closed, Albright handed Walesa President Clinton's letter.