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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 21, 1994

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC- 30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Nuclear Arms
Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties
(S)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and directs the implementation of U.S. nuclear posture and policy on nuclear arms control beyond the START I and START II Treaties.
(S)

Background

Nuclear posture. In October, 1993, the Secretary of Defense tasked a comprehensive review of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. This review examined strategic and non-strategic forces; safety, security and use control; infrastructure; command, control, communications and intelligence and operations; and threat reduction and counterproliferation. The conclusions of this review were briefed to me on September 16, 1994. (C)

Arms control. On May 21, 1993, Presidential Review Directive (PRD)-34 tasked a comprehensive examination of U.S. policy on

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nuclear arms control beyond the START I and START II Treaties, focusing on four areas:

- Whether to seek further negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear forces;
- Whether to seek to restructure Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces at current or reduced levels;
- Whether to seek operational and or confidence building measures relating to strategic nuclear forces;
- Whether to change U.S. policy regarding the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. (S)

The Review was conducted by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Arms Control and was reviewed by the Deputies Committee on September 9, 1994. (S)

U.S. Nuclear Posture

Role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. Consistent with the July, 1994 National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) and the recommendations of the NPR, the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. (U)

U.S. nuclear declaratory policy. The U.S. will continue to observe the U.S. nuclear declaratory policy that has been in place since 1978 and make no changes beyond those previously authorized (i.e., to reach agreement among the P-5 on a common formula regarding negative security assurances and incorporate it into a U.N. Security Council resolution). (S)

Strategic nuclear forces. I approve the Nuclear Posture Review's (NPR) recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. This force will maintain flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further, and will include:

- SSBNs: 14 SSBNs, all with D-5 missiles, located at two bases (Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington);
- Bombers: 20 B-2s, a non-nuclear role for the B-1s, and 66 B-52s.

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-- ICBMs: Maintain two or three wings of Minuteman ICBMs (500/450 or 350/300 missiles). (S)

Non-strategic nuclear forces. I approve the NPR's recommended non-strategic nuclear force posture. Under this force, the U.S. will maintain USAF dual capable aircraft (DCA) at current strength in CONUS and Europe. I also approve the NPR's recommendations to eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability but to maintain the capability to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs. (S)

Safety, security and use control. The U.S. will (a) equip all U.S. nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices or PAL by 1997, (b) upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers and (c) increase warhead safety without nuclear testing (B-53 replacement, W-62 retirement). (S)

Infrastructure. I approve the NPR's recommendations to sustain the ballistic missile industrial base by Minuteman III sustainment and D-5 production and to sustain the reentry vehicle and guidance system industrial base. The DOD will work with the DOE to ensure effective implementation of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-15 (November 3, 1993), "U.S. Policy on Stockpile Stewardship Under an Extended Moratorium and a Comprehensive Test Ban." (S)

Command, control, communications and intelligence and operations. The DOD will continue to make adjustments to post-Cold War alert and operational requirements and will continue to support programs for assured NCA survivability and continuity. These programs will include:

E.O. 13526, 1.4(a), E.O. 13526, 1.4(f)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(a), E.O. 13526, 1.4(f)

Threat reduction and proliferation. The DOD will continue to support Nunn-Lugar programs to reduce the danger of unauthorized or accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from and within the Former Soviet Union. The DOD will also support the counterproliferation initiative to provide conventional responses to use of WMD in regional conflict. (S)

U.S. Policy on Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties

During the first year and a half of the Administration, our focus has appropriately been on delivering on the promise of START I and II. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-3 (March 24,

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1993), "U.S. Policy on the Ratification and Implementation of START I and START II and the Denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan," clearly states that ratification and implementation of START I and II are priority objectives of U.S. foreign, security and non-proliferation policy and that acceleration of START I and II is in the U.S. interest. (S)

The Administration has been successful in achieving many of the goals and objectives set out in PDD-3. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified START I and Belarus and Kazakhstan have acceded to the NPT. All three states have concluded agreements relating to the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons to Russia, and the implementation of these accords is underway. While the Ukrainian Rada has yet to ratify the NPT (thus blocking the entry into force of START I and ratification of START II), we are working diligently with the Ukrainian government to try and bring this about by the Fall. (S)

Goals for the September, 1994 U.S. - Russia Summit. As recommended by the Deputies Committee, the U.S. should focus the security segment of the upcoming U.S. - Russia summit on (a) trying to reach agreement on new initiatives to improve the security and safeguarding of nuclear warheads and fissile materials and (b) encouraging the Russians to take reciprocal steps in response to the unilateral changes and downsizing the U.S. will make in its nuclear posture as a result of the NPR. (S)

Further steps. Also as recommended by the Deputies Committee, the U.S. should agree with Russia at the Summit to continue our dialogue on "further steps" to adapt the strategic nuclear forces of both sides to the changed international security environment and the U.S. Russian strategic partnership. These "further steps" would include (a) the possibility, at some future date, that both countries will make a joint political commitment not to exceed the low-end of the START II accountable weapons ceiling (i.e., 3,000 weapons) and (b) the possibility, after ratification of the START II Treaty, of further reductions of, and limitations on, strategic nuclear forces. After the Summit, the IWG will continue to study and analyze options for further reductions pursuant to the approaches outlined in (a) and (b) above, taking into account military geostrategic and arms control considerations, with the aim of making recommendations to me later this year. (S)

Implementation

The NSC staff will coordinate the taskings identified in this PDD. (C)

William S. Clinton

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