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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1997

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Antipersonnel Landmines (APL): Additional
Guidance on U.S. Policy (U)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) supplements U.S. policy on antipersonnel landmines (APL) established in PDD/NSC-48. (U)

I. NEGOTIATING VENUE

On May 16, 1996, I announced that the United States would aggressively pursue a worldwide agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel landmines (APL), with a view to completing that negotiation as soon as possible. Since that announcement, the United States has conducted extensive consultations with many countries regarding their views on the best forum in which to pursue such an agreement. While keenly aware of the magnitude of the challenges we will face, I have decided that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) offers the most practical alternative for achieving the U.S. goal of a worldwide APL ban. (U)

- **CD Negotiating Mandate for a Comprehensive Ban.** During the next CD session in January 1997, the United States will begin work with our Allies, friends and other nations to achieve consensus on creating an Ad Hoc Committee with a broad mandate.

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authorizing negotiations on a comprehensive APL ban, consistent with the May 16 policy announcement. (U)

- **Interim Steps in the CD.** The United States will remain open to agreement on meaningful interim measures in the CD that could constitute steps on the road toward a comprehensive ban, including a ban on export and transfer of APL and a cap on APL stockpiles. In order to give impetus to such measures, we will announce our intent to observe unilaterally a permanent ban on APL exports and transfers and a cap on our APL stockpile level (see below) and will call on others in the CD to do the same. If enough other countries demonstrate a willingness to join us, we will pursue an interim multilateral agreement in the CD. In any case, we will continue to vigorously pursue, in parallel, a comprehensive ban. (C)
- **"Ottawa" Process.** Recognizing the strong views of many governments, as well as NGO support for the "Ottawa" process, we will not seek to dissuade countries who want to participate in both the CD negotiations and the "Ottawa" process from doing so or seek to dissuade non-CD members from joining the "Ottawa" process. While making clear we cannot subscribe to Ottawa's near-term timetable for a total ban and that we believe broader participation is needed from the outset in order to secure a ban that includes more than "like-minded" states, we will speak positively of the "Ottawa" process as a way to provide momentum to the overall effort to ban APL. (C)
- **Possible Alternative to CD.** If an acceptable CD negotiating mandate is not established within a reasonable timeframe or if little progress has been made on interim steps in the CD, the United States will review its decision to determine whether an alternative or additional forum should be sought. To this end, the United States will review progress on this issue at a senior level, immediately following the end of the CD's second session (late June). Under this review, we would consider, for example, working with the Canadians with the objective of shaping the "Ottawa" process in a way that would allow us to attend and sign a ban on the export and transfer of APL and a cap APL stockpiles at current levels (i.e., consistent with sections II and III below). This approach does not preclude us from attending the planned pre-Ottawa conference meetings, beginning in February in Vienna. (C)
- **Diplomatic Gameplan.** To begin developing support for our approach immediately, in particular for a CD negotiating mandate, State will prepare a gameplan, in accordance with PDD/NSC-48. Efforts to develop support for a CD negotiating mandate should commence upon announcement of our venue decision. (C)

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II. EXPORT AND TRANSFER BAN

The United States will extend its moratorium on export and transfer of APL to a permanent ban. (U)

- "Export and transfer" means the selling, giving or receiving of either title or control over the APL to or by another state or entity. (U)
- "Control" over APL means a degree of physical control or direct or indirect supervision of the APL that is sufficient to ensure that the APL are not moved or used without the direction of the originating state and that the originating state can fulfill its responsibility for compliance with international legal standards governing their use and possession. (U)
- Export and transfer of APL components and technology, as they would be defined under the Leahy export moratorium law, will also be prohibited. Assistance in making APL detectable will not be considered a transfer of APL components or technology. (U)
- Receipt of very small quantities of APL for use in improving countermine and humanitarian demining capabilities are excepted. (U)
- This policy does not preclude use of APL by personnel in a coalition or as part of a combination of forces, in the collective self-defense of U.S. and Allied forces, as long as the APL remain under U.S. title and the direct or indirect supervision of a U.S. commander, as described above. Thus, for example, use of APL by coalition personnel could be permitted as long as a U.S. commander retains direct or indirect supervision of the APL, regardless of which country were to lead the coalition. (U)
- This policy does not preclude the transfer from one country to another of territory containing emplaced APL. (U)

III. STOCKPILE CAP

The United States will cap its APL stockpile at its current level. (U)

- "Stockpile" includes all APL in the U.S. inventory, except those already emplaced. (U)

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- Replenishment of the stockpile, in the event it is drawn down for any reason, is permitted, as long as the stockpile does not exceed its current level. (U)
- This policy does not preclude the Department of Defense from modifying the mix of APL types within the declared stockpile ceiling, to adequately provide for current and future operational requirements until a global ban takes effect or alternatives are developed. (U)

William S. Clinton

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