

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email attachment	Confidential Kosovo Communications Strategy. (3 pages)	[none]	P5
002. email attachment	Confidential Kosovo Communications Strategy. (3 pages)	[none]	P5
003. email attachment	Confidential Kosovo Communications Strategy. (3 pages)	[none]	P5
004. email attachment	Confidential Kosovo Communications Strategy. (3 pages)	[none]	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System [Email]
WHO ([Metzl])
OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/30/1998 - 10/15/1998]

Adam Bergfeld
2006-0214-F
ab651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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KOSOVO COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

As our diplomacy intensifies and the possibility of military intervention in Kosovo grows, our communications strategy should focus on laying the groundwork of domestic and international public support essential to any action we undertake. (Should the decision be made to use force, additional steps would need to be taken to solidify this support, including a speech by the President to the nation and a more prominent role for DoD and the JCS in our public outreach efforts.)

The objective of our public outreach campaign in advance of any new diplomatic or military initiative is fivefold:

- Raise public awareness of the crisis;
- Define U.S. interests and policy objectives in Kosovo;
- Demonstrate our preference for a political solution;
- Secure international support; and
- Project a credible threat of force and clarify the aims of military intervention

To achieve these objectives, we propose the Administration take the following actions:

The President

SBTP on NATO/UN Mandate - If we succeed in convincing our NATO allies that military intervention does not require a UN resolution, we should release a public statement by the President affirming NATO's mandate to intervene militarily if necessary. Conversely, if the UN passes a resolution implicitly or explicitly authorizing the use of force, a public statement by the President highlighting the resolution would add credibility to our threat.

Cabinet Secretaries and Senior Administration Officials

High Visibility Speech - As the likelihood of military intervention grows, either SRB or MKA should deliver a major address aimed at a broad audience to define our national security interests in Kosovo, highlight the humanitarian emergency, enunciate the objectives of any potential use of force, and frame the crisis in the larger context of our overall European security strategy.

Sperling Breakfast (October 1) - SRB should amplify Administration's case for possible military intervention in Kosovo at this weekly gathering of influential columnists and reporters hosted by Budge Sperling, longtime editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Shattuck Op-ed on Humanitarian Crisis - An op-ed A/S Shattuck on his recent mission to Kosovo will underscore human rights violations committed by Serb authorities to date and warn of the worsening humanitarian crisis. We should also seek every

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opportunity to televise images of the suffering Serb authorities have inflicted upon Kosovars to build public appreciation for the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis.

"Diplomatic Dispatches" by Ambassador Chris Hill - Periodic public reports from our chief mediator in Kosovo on the status of talks will demonstrate our commitment to a peaceful resolution of the crisis while affirming that our diplomacy is backed by force. Diplomatic reporting will also provide the public with insight on the complicated task we face, including the security impediments to delivering humanitarian aid to internally displaced people. NSC Planning will work in conjunction with Amb. Hill's public affairs officers to coordinate and disseminate regular dispatches.

Outreach to Editorial Boards and Key Columnists - In conjunction with the MKA/SRB speech, we should arrange for a briefing for key columnists and pundits at the White House. Senior Administration officials should also brief editorial boards and key reporters in both the domestic and foreign media. We will engage Public Affairs Officers at our overseas posts to carry our message internationally.

Foreign Press Center Briefing and USIA Global Exchanges - Senior Administration officials and NSC staff should also brief foreign correspondents at the FPC and appear on USIA Global Exchange programs to build international support for U.S. policy in the region.

Outreach to Albanian-Americans - A/S Gelbard should periodically brief Albanian-American leaders on developments in Kosovo. Regular outreach will strengthen the Administration's relationship with this vocal community, which will be important to demonstrate our diplomatic efforts as well as for validation of any future action. Supportive members of this community should also be enlisted for appearances as surrogates on USIA and other international media.

NSC Staff

Validation Strategy - Well-respected military leaders past and present (Powell, Shalikashvili), Congressional leaders from both parties (Dole, Nunn), and recognizable foreign statesmen (Blair, Kohl) should be encouraged to vocalize their support for our policies early and often through both spoken and written word.

Background Briefings with Schulte - We will aggressively promote briefings by NSC SrDir Schulte to reporters covering Kosovo to begin building the case for intervention, encourage more nuanced reporting, and develop open lines of communication.

"Scholar's Briefing" for White House Press Corps - Although normally reserved for Presidential trips, this highly-successful device could be utilized to provide interested

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reporters with basic information on the nature of the conflict, the historic animosities involved, and the broader implications of the crisis.

International Public Information IWG - The IPI group will take the lead in developing international strategies for building public support abroad for our position. Liaison with NATO's office of Public Affairs will be crucial to this effort.

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001. email	Jamie Metzl to Roseanne Hill; re: USIA Television Program (partial) [50 USC 403 (g), Section 6] (1 page)	10/23/1998	P3/b(3)
002. email	Valerie Guarnieri to Eric Schwartz; re: More Press? (2 pages)	10/23/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Valerie Guarnieri to Jamie Metzl; re: More Press? (2 pages)	10/23/1998	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Jamie Metzl to Eric Schwartz; re: Proposal for Improving IPI Coordination (2 pages)	10/22/1998	P5
005. email	Jamie Metzl to Donald Bandler et al; re: IPI Kosovo (5 pages)	10/26/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	Jamie Metzl to Roseanne Hill; re: WashfaX (11 pages)	10/26/1998	P1/b(1)
007a. email	James Baker to Jamie Metzl & Eric Schwartz; re: Mark Nathanson (1 page)	10/26/1998	P5
007b. email	Jamie Metzl to Eric Schwartz; re: Mark Nathanson (partial) (1 page)	10/26/1998	P6/b(6)
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009b. email	Jamie Metzl to Eric Schwartz; re: Mark Nathanson (partial) (1 page)	10/26/1998	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jamie Metzl])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/23/1998 - 10/27/1998]

Jimmie Purvis
2006-0214-F
ip1460

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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010. email	Jamie Metzl to Roseanne Hill; re: FLOTUS Memo (partial) [50 USC 403 (g), Section 6] (1 page)	10/27/1998	P3/b(3)
011a. email	Eric Schwartz to James Baker; re: Mark Nathanson (1 page)	10/27/1998	P1/b(1)
011b. email	James Baker to Jamie Metzl & Eric Schwartz; re: Mark Nathanson (1 page)	10/26/1998	P5
011c. email	Jamie Metzl to Eric Schwartz; re: Mark Nathanson (partial) (1 page)	10/26/1998	P6/b(6)

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 OA/Box Number: 620000

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[10/23/1998 - 10/27/1998]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/26/98 10:00:58 AM
FROM Metzl, Jamie F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Metzl proposal [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schwartz, Eric P.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Eric,
Here is an electronic copy of the memo I sent you last week.
Thanks.
Jamie

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

IPI Position 102198.doc

October 22, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR ERIC SCHWARTZ

FROM: JAMIE METZL

SUBJECT: Proposal for Improving IPI Coordination

As you know, the IPI PDD will establish an office at State to coordinate interagency IPI efforts. Given State's track record for dealing with these issues, I am concerned that there may not be the necessary institutional support at State to make the IPI initiative as meaningful as it can be. One particular concern is that as the de facto IPI coordinator, I may have a difficult time plugging into the policy process at a high enough level to maximize the impact of interagency IPI efforts.

Our Kosovo activities have demonstrated how effective IPI can be when it is well coordinated and more fully plugged into the policy process. It has also shown

that the NSC will have a significant equity in IPI activities during future crises.

I would propose that IPI efforts could be made more effective, and NSC could maintain its equity in IPI by double-hatting me in my new position at State. In addition to my State title, I might also be made a Special Assistant to the President for International Public Information. This would allow me to plug IPI into NSC policy coordination, to better leverage NSC equities to make interagency coordination more effective, and to more easily report to NSC structures. I would not need to count against an NSC slot or maintain an office in the OEOB.

The minimal requirements to make this happen would be:

1. Designation as Special Assistant to the President or other appropriate status;
2. A badge of any color to get me in the door;
3. An e-mail account and access to a computer (perhaps one of the floater computers in 379);
4. Minimal secretarial support.

I ask that you please consider this proposal, and look forward to discussing it with you further.

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/26/98 7:58:44 PM
FROM Baker, James E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Metzl, Jamie F.
Schwartz, Eric P.

CARBON_COPY Davies, Glyn T.

TEXT_BODY

Jamie Metzl's e-mail and Eric's response are inappropriate. Sandy has repeatedly advised the staff that decisions about who we meet with, to whom we speak, and which policies and decisions we recommend should be based on national security merit alone. Jamie's e-mail could be read to suggest that he has weighed other factors in deciding whether to meet with Mr. Nathanson.

I have asked Jo to arrange a time tomorrow for you to review with me Sandy's "appropriate contacts" guidance of June 1997. Until that time, and until we discuss the foreign policy predicate for a meeting with Mr. Nathanson, I request that you not arrange the lunch referred to below. Thank you.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Highsmith, Newell L.
Sent: Monday, October
26, 1998 7:14 PM
To: Baker, James E.
Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson
[UNCLASSIFIED]

-----Original Message-----
From: Schwartz,
Eric P.
Sent: Monday, October 26, 1998 4:29 PM
To: Metzl, Jamie
F.
Cc: Highsmith, Newell L.
Subject: RE: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/26/98 7:59:05 PM
FROM Baker, James E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker, James E.
Sent: Monday,
October 26, 1998 7:59 PM
To: Metzl, Jamie F.; Schwartz, Eric P.
Cc: Davies,
Glyn T.
Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Jamie

Metzl's e-mail and Eric's response are inappropriate. Sandy has repeatedly advised the staff that decisions about who we meet with, to whom we speak, and which policies and decisions we recommend should be based on national security merit alone. Jamie's e-mail could be read to suggest that he has weighed other factors in deciding whether to meet with Mr. Nathanson.

I have asked Jo to arrange a time tomorrow for you to review with me Sandy's "appropriate contacts" guidance of June 1997. Until that time, and until we discuss the foreign policy predicate for a meeting with Mr. Nathanson, I request that you not arrange the lunch referred to below. Thank you.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Highsmith, Newell L.
Sent: Monday, October
26, 1998 7:14 PM

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/26/98 8:01:32 PM
FROM Davies, Glyn T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Let me know if I can assist in this. Tx.

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To: Metzl, Jamie
F.; Schwartz, Eric P.
Cc: Davies, Glyn T.
Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson
[UNCLASSIFIED]
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Newell L.
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To: Baker, James
E.
Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]

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Message-----

From: Baker, James E.

Sent: Monday, October 26, 1998

7:59 PM

To: Metzl, Jamie F.; Schwartz, Eric P.

Cc: Davies, Glyn

T.

Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

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From: Highsmith, Newell L.

Sent: Monday, October

26, 1998 7:14 PM

To: Baker, James E.

Subject: FW: Mark Nathanson
[UNCLASSIFIED]

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz,

Eric P.

Sent: Monday, October 26, 1998 4:29 PM

To: Metzl, Jamie

F.

Cc: Highsmith, Newell L.

Subject: RE: Mark Nathanson [UNCLASSIFIED]

Let's

find him, and have him in for lunch this week.