

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                                                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION<br><b>COPY</b> |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|
| 001. fax                 | Faxed communication from Javier M. Guzman to Percy Bates. Re: Davis and United States v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, CA 56-1662-A (3 pages)                  | 05/14/1999 | P5 6111                    |
| 002. fax                 | Faxed communication from Franz R. Marshall to Charles L. Patin and Michael C. Garrard. Re: Davis and United States v. East Baton Rouge Parrish School Board. (5 pages) | 06/10/1999 | P5 6112                    |
| 003. fax                 | White House Counsel to the Office of the AAG. (2 pages)                                                                                                                | 06/10/1999 | P5 6113                    |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
Domestic Policy Council  
Bethany Little  
OA/Box Number: 18526

### FOLDER TITLE:

Gore Conference

Adam Bergfeld  
2006-0226-F  
ab865

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

6111

COPY

Educational Opportunities Section  
P.O. Box 63958  
Washington, DC 20035-5958

JG:FRM:JMG  
DJ 144-100-32M-2

May 14, 1999

Percy Bates, Ph.D.  
Director, Programs for Educational Opportunity  
School of Education  
University of Michigan  
1005 School of Education Building  
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1259

William M. Gordon, Ph.D.  
148 Greenmount Blvd.  
Dayton, OH 45419

Re: Davis and United States v. East Baton Rouge Parish  
School Board, CA 56-1662-A (M.D. La.)

Dear Drs. Gordon and Bates:

Thank you for providing us a copy of your May 4, 1999 report recommending the addition of a fourth grade to the Children's Charter School. The report is helpful and we appreciate your input on the issue. However, since you have forwarded the report to all the parties and the Court, we would like to correct one point made in the report regarding the United States' position on the proposed expansion of the Children's Charter School.

The report describes our February 5, 1999 letter to Messrs. Patin and Garrard as indicating that we "would not agree to an expansion of the charter schools beyond their present configuration." Therefore, you state that this matter needs to be brought to the attention of the Court before any decision is made concerning the addition of a fourth grade class. We do not believe that our February 5<sup>th</sup> letter states that we would not agree to any expansion. In any event, that is not our position. It is our view, however, that in light of the requirements of the Court's orders that this matter should be brought to the Court's attention, before any changes are made, even if we do not oppose the changes.

Percy Bates, Ph.D.  
William Gordon, Ph.D.  
May 14, 1999  
Page 2

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The report states support for the proposal to add a fourth grade to Children's Charter because it will allow the present third graders in the 78 student school to remain there "in an articulated elementary program." Indeed, it does not appear that adding the fourth grade to allow present third graders at the school to continue their education there presents a major issue.

The February 5<sup>th</sup> letter cited by the report informs the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board that we would not oppose a motion to continue operating these small charter schools, including Children's Charter, upon the Board's agreement to certain rather basic and straightforward conditions, including: providing specific information about the charter schools' enrollment; reporting on the effect, if any, the charter schools have on any other schools in the Parish; and providing assurance that the operation of the charter schools would not impede the Board's ability to comply with the terms of the recent consent decrees, including its financial obligation under those decrees. We also asked for agreement (assuming the Court approved the proposed motion) that Court approval would be sought for any further expansion of the schools or any change in location. The Board has not yet responded to this letter nor provided the requested information and assurances.

Upon receiving the requested information, we will promptly respond and work with all the parties to attempt to resolve this issue amicably. However, as stated above, ultimately the matter must be submitted to the Court for approval. Hopefully, we can do this expeditiously in the form of an agreement of all the parties. But even in that case, we will need to present the Court some evidence to consider. The information and assurances requested in our prior correspondence to the Board would be a step in that direction.


Finally, the report raises the possibility of further expansion of the current elementary charters in the 2000-01 school year. While we are unaware at this point of any such proposal, your report raises a valid point. It is not only difficult to consider in piecemeal fashion any potential impact of the charter schools on the remedy in this case, it is also unfair to the students and parents concerned. We anticipate meeting with the parties in the near future to address the long range concern expressed in your report.

Percy Bates, Ph.D.  
William Gordon, Ph.D.  
May 14, 1999  
Page 3

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Again, we thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

  
Javier M. Guzman  
Trial Attorney

cc: Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Robert Williams, Esq.  
John Pierre, Esq.



## U.S. Department of Justice

6112

## Civil Rights Division

**COPY**

*Educational Opportunities Section  
P.O. Box 65958  
Washington, DC 20035-5958*

JG:FRM:JMG  
144-100-32M-2

June 10, 1999

Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
Kean, Miller, Hawthorne,  
D'Armond, McCowan & Jarman, LLP  
P.O. Box 3513  
Baton Rouge, LA 70821

Re: Davis and United States v. East Baton Rouge Parish  
School Board, CA 56-1662-A (M.D. La.)

Dear Messrs. Patin and Garrard:

This letter is intended to summarize our discussions at the June 3, 1999 meeting, to set out our position on some of the matters discussed, and to share with you our suggestions of steps that may be helpful.

1. The Board's proposal of a new desegregation plan.

School system officials presented a new concept for furthering desegregation in the school system. This concept would be based on increasing majority-to-minority ("M-to-M") transfers from predominantly black schools in the western part of the parish to predominantly white schools in the eastern part of the parish which would be provided with additional space, either through additional temporary buildings ("t-buildings") or permanent construction ("quads"), to accommodate in part the expected M-to-M transfers; relocating magnet programs from predominantly black schools in the western part of the parish to schools in the central part of the parish to increase the likelihood of attracting white students; and enhancing predominantly black schools in the western part of the parish. This concept was to be presented to the Board at its June 4<sup>th</sup> meeting to determine whether it should be further developed.

Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
June 7, 1999  
Page 2

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While we are willing to consider reasonable proposals from the Board for furthering desegregation, we are not sure that adopting a new plan at this time makes the most sense given that the Board has not yet complied with the 1996 Consent Decree and is scheduled to shortly begin implementing the modified tax plan approved by the Court earlier this year. In fact, we are not sure that the premise for developing a new plan -- that the current plan is not working -- is a fair assessment of the current plan rather than a statement regarding implementation efforts. For instance, it cannot be said with any certainty that the magnet programs, in their present locations, will not further desegregation because the Board has failed to properly implement and support many of the magnet programs. We would therefore be reluctant to agree to any new desegregation plan without a clear commitment from the Defendants that the necessary resources, financial and otherwise, will be committed to ensure success.

Additionally, we are concerned that the proposal to create additional space at the predominantly white schools in the eastern part of the parish to accommodate the expected increase in M-to-M transfers, which may simply result in larger one-race white schools absent the implementation of enrollment limitations at those schools (particularly since Board representatives stated at the meeting that this additional space would also be used to accommodate incoming white students). What are the projections regarding increased M-to-M transfers and upon what are they based? We are also concerned about school system officials' discouragement of black M-to-M transfers to predominantly white Wedgwood Elementary School (for which the Board has requested 7-8 additional temporary buildings) while additional white students are accepted. Further, we are concerned about the Superintendent's statement during the June 4<sup>th</sup> Board meeting that he supported further development of the new desegregation plan only insofar as there would be no attendance zone changes. Such changes should be considered where necessary to achieve the greatest degree of desegregation practicable, especially in light of the school system's overcrowding and t-building situations.

**2. Over-enrollment, temporary buildings and new classroom construction.**

The Board has proposed relocating t-buildings to accommodate students and academic programs. As you know, the Board has been under a continuing court-ordered obligation since 1981 to reduce the number of t-buildings in the school system so that racially identifiable schools are not enlarged. We are therefore unwilling to agree to any proposal that fails to reduce the number of temporary buildings in the absence of safeguards (e.g.,

Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
June 7, 1999  
Page 3

**COPY**

enrollment limitations, adjusted attendance zone lines) that would prevent increased racially identifiable enrollments.

We expressed the same concerns with respect to constructing quads at racially identifiable schools. Moreover, as we have stated many times to the Board, enlarging one-race schools, either by permanent construction or temporary buildings, is inconsistent with the orders in this case. We understand that the Board is now willing to reconsider the schools that were designated in the original tax plan to receive quads. We look forward to having the opportunity to consider such proposals when they are forwarded to us.

Finally, the Board also indicated that it would like to postpone compliance with the 1996 Consent Decree obligations to reduce temporary buildings and over-enrollment at certain schools, pending further development of a new desegregation plan. We stated that we cannot agree to a suspension of the Board's obligations when we do not know whether a new plan will be developed, what that plan will entail, and whether the Board will approve such a plan. At any rate, the Board has had three years to remedy these issues and has failed to do so.

### 3. Expansion of existing charter schools.

The plaintiff parties were presented with a joint motion for expansion of the existing charter schools. We requested that the Board provide, as indicated in my February 5, 1999 letter setting forth the conditions under which we would not oppose a motion for expansion, the enrollment for each school by race and an affidavit from the appropriate official that the reduction in funds from the operation of these schools (for all grades) will not impede the Board's ability to comply with the financial obligations set forth in the 1996 Consent Decree or any other applicable Court order. School system officials indicated that they would consider providing this additional information, and that the Board intended to file its motion with the Court. We also informed the Board, as suggested by Board President Moser, that if it is considering approving the addition of a fifth grade to the charter schools, the issue should be addressed now rather than next summer.

Insofar as the Board intends to file its motion with the Court, it may be that the Court would find it helpful to have additional information to provide a more complete picture about the charter schools you propose to expand. In addition, providing the suggested information may in the long run save time. This information might include:

Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
June 7, 1999  
Page 4

**COPY**

- a. A map disclosing the location of the charter schools as well as nearby EBR schools of similar grade levels.
- b. The current and proposed grade levels to be served for each charter school, and the proposed enrollment limitations.
- c. Any special program or theme for each charter school.
- d. The admissions process of each school, indicating whether admissions are open, have any targeted attendance area, and an explanation of the enrollment process.
- e. The recruitment process for each charter school, including a description of any recruiting activities by the district or charter school targeted to attract other race students.
- f. If available, a GIS map or other map disclosing the racial composition of the area surrounding and nearby the charter schools.
- g. The current racial composition of each charter school with respect to not only student enrollment, but also faculty and staff.
- h. To assess the impact of the charter school on other schools, for each charter school for each student at the school; the student's race, the school the student would have attended in EBR if he/she did not attend the charter school, and the racial composition of that school.
- i. The district's budget for the coming school year and an indication of any line item for charter schools.


As we explained in our meeting with you, and in prior correspondence, particularly our letter of May 14<sup>th</sup>, 1999 to Drs. Gordon and Bates, based on the information we have at this time, we do not anticipate opposing the expansion of currently existing schools to allow students to continue in the program beyond the

Charles L. Patin, Esq.  
Michael C. Garrard, Esq.  
June 7, 1999  
Page 5

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third grade. However, we need, additional basic information about the charter schools, and the assurances we requested, in order to be clear about the impact of these programs on the district's ability to meet its obligations under the Court's prior orders. Please do not hesitate to contact me or Javier Guzman if you would like to discuss these matters further.

Sincerely,



Franz B. Marshall  
Senior Trial Attorney

cc: Robert L. Williams, Esq.  
John Pierre, Esq.  
Dennis Parker, Esq.

6113

enrollment is 1200; 650 students would attend in just the first year. DOJ has also expressed some concern about the drain of funds since the district claims it cannot fulfill its responsibilities under the decree because of lack of funds. **COPY**

At these meetings, we have repeatedly indicated that we do not oppose charter schools. But we have expressed concerns about circumstances where the creation and operation of charter schools may have a negative effect on the desegregation process and/or impede the school board's ability to fulfill its obligations under the extant desegregation plan and applicable federal law. Here, we have requested that the charter school representatives commit to refraining from taking any action that might negatively affect the fragile level of desegregation attained in this system. To this end, we have requested that the charter school administrators agree to not enroll black students attending predominantly white schools or white students attending predominantly black schools. The charter school board representatives (Mr. McCollister) have denied this request out of hand. Additionally, we have asked the local school board to indicate to us that the allocation of funding for operation of the charter school would not impede the local board's abilities to fulfill its responsibilities under the 1996 and 1999 consent decrees. The local school board has not responded to this request.

The charter school group sought to intervene and DOJ opposed the intervention in the lawsuit by the charter school group on the grounds that their interests are adequately represented by the school board. On March 24, 1999, the court denied the motion in part because "Children's Charter concedes that its interests are 'virtually identical' with that of the School Board." 3/24/99 Order at page 4.

DOJ has now been informed that the district intends to withdraw its motion so that it will purportedly no longer represent the charter school's interests, and that the charter school has asked Mr. Bolick to represent it in future proceedings.

Currently, three other charter schools operate in the district, one of which is operated by the proponents of the proposed Children's Charter. DOJ has not objected to these schools. They are relatively small. However, DOJ has expressed concern to the local school board about proposed expansion of these schools, because of the potential effect on desegregation, including the impact of any loss of funds. We have recently been informed that the school board will be forwarding to us a letter requesting our position regarding the proposed expansion of these schools. We will respond to the letter when we receive it.

St. Helena Parish, Louisiana

This is a case in which the Legal Defense Fund is a party and AAAG Lee is recused.

St. Helena Parish is a small school district of approximately 1200 students of whom 91% are African-American. The school district is one of the poorest in the state. On February 26, 1998, the local school board rejected the charter school developer's application but was

overruled by the State Board. DOJ has not opposed the charter but has asked the State Board for information regarding its impact on desegregation and the likely racial composition of the school. DOJ has not been supplied all of the information that it requested by letter in March, 1999.

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Many years ago, when the district was ordered to desegregate, the white students who resided in the district enrolled in the public or private schools in the neighboring Parish. Now, most of the white students who reside in the Parish attend private schools. St. Helena's Superintendent informs us that the private school is experiencing financial problems and has notified parents that it will be raising tuition. According to the Superintendent, the parents are looking for an alternative to the private school and do not wish to enroll their children in the predominantly African-American St. Helena Parish system. The proposed charter would be located in a rural section of a predominantly white residential area. Transportation would not be provided. The State Board is providing DOJ with information.

#### Monroe, Louisiana

In August, 1997, the local school board rejected the charter school application. However, the State Board overruled the local board. The local board sought DOJ's assistance. Thereafter, the district filed a motion for a restraining order seeking to enjoin the operation of the charter school. Conferences were held with the court in July, 1998. DOJ requested that before the court approved the charter, there should be an evaluation of whether the charter adversely impacts desegregation in the city school system. A hearing followed in October, 1998, during which it appeared that the board and the charter school proponents could agree on the parameters of the operation of the charter. DOJ supported continuing the hearing until the agreement could be worked out. The court, continued the hearing and permitted the charter to open for the time being. Nothing has happened since.

#### Georgetown, South Carolina

In discussions with Board counsel, DOJ explained that its position was not in conflict with South Carolina state law. First, Section 59-40-50 of the South Carolina Charter School Act states that a charter school must adhere to the same civil rights requirements as are applied to other schools operating in the same school district. Second, in Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm. and the State of South Carolina, No. 97-CP-07-794, Order at 13-14 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas Feb. 21, 1998), the Court of Common Pleas reversed the South Carolina Board of Education's decision approving the application of the Lighthouse Charter School Committee. The Court held that the Committee had failed to prove that the charter school could adhere to the Beaufort County Board of Education's voluntary compliance agreement with the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights.

On December 1, 1998, the parents in the Pleasant Hill area voted by a 2 to 1 margin against converting the three public schools into charter schools.

A charter school currently operates in the district. DOJ does not object to that charter.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                              | DATE       | RESTRICTION<br><b>COPY</b> |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|
| 001. draft               | Presidential Speech [preparation for the Democratic Convention 2000] (2 pages)                             | n.d.       | Personal Misfile           |
| 002. draft               | Presidential Speech [preparation for the Democratic Convention 2000] (2 pages)                             | n.d.       | Personal Misfile           |
| 003. draft               | Presidential William J. Clinton Democratic Convention Speech Los Angeles, CA (1 page)                      | 08/05/2000 | Personal Misfile           |
| 004a. memo               | Memorandum for the President from Samuel Berger. Subject: Speech to Jewish Community Celebration. (1 page) | n.d.       | P5 6114                    |
| 004b. draft              | President William Jefferson Clinton Remarks to National Democratic Institute Luncheon. (2 pages)           | n.d.       | Personal Misfile           |
| 004c. draft              | President William Jefferson Clinton Remarks to National Democratic Institute Luncheon (11 pages)           | n.d.       | Personal Misfile           |
| 004d. draft              | Points on Middle East Peace Process for Jewish Community Celebration Remarks (2 pages)                     | n.d.       | P5 6115                    |
| 004e. draft              | Talking Points for Jewish Community Celebration Remarks. (12 pages)                                        | 08/13/2000 | P5 6116                    |
| 004f. draft              | President William J. Clinton Remarks at the Democratic National Convention Los Angeles, CA (15 pages)      | 08/14/2000 | Personal Misfile           |
| 004g. draft              | President William J. Clinton Remarks at the Democratic National Convention Los Angeles, CA (15 pages)      | 08/14/2000 | Personal Misfile           |
| 004h. draft              | President William J. Clinton Remarks at the Democratic National Convention Los Angeles, CA (15 pages)      | 08/13/2000 | Personal Misfile           |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
Speechwriting  
Josh Gottheimer  
OA/Box Number: 18993

### FOLDER TITLE:

Democratic Convention 2000 [6]

Adam Bergfeld  
2006-0226-F  
ab869

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Speech to Jewish Community Celebration - A Few  
Cautions

1. I would continue to stay away from specifics about Israeli compromises at Camp David. That will make Barak's life more difficult -- and remember, at least half the people in this audience think Barak went too far.
2. Although it is tempting with this crowd, I would continue, as you have done, to downplay criticism of Arafat or the other Arab countries. We are at a critical time. Arafat is making some moves in the right direction. And the Palestinians and Arabs generally are very apprehensive that our domestic politics are driving us toward an Israeli tilt.
3. I would avoid too much discussion of Barak's political timetable. The more Barak's opponents believe he is about to reengage, the more likely they will call a special session of the Knesset. (The latest ploy under consideration by Likud is to convene a session that would prohibit Barak from coming to the United States during their recess.)
4. On the embassy, I would repeat what you have said: that it has always been your personal view that it should be moved to West Jerusalem, but that you have not taken such action because you did not want to disrupt the peace process. This continues to be uppermost in your thinking, but you are reviewing the matter and will make a decision by the end of the year.
5. On the unilateral declaration (and the Nadler amendment to cut off aid to the Palestinians if there is a declaration): I would repeat we oppose unilateral actions that would undermine the peace process. You've made clear to Chairman Arafat that you hope he will not take such an action, and that if he does, we would have to review all aspects of our relationship.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff  
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President William Jefferson Clinton  
 Points on Middle East Peace Process  
 For Jewish Community Celebration Remarks

**COPY**

- Journey of peace already taken is remarkable: From era of bloody wars – 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 – region has entered era of engagement and peace-building.
- In just the last seven years: The signing of the Declaration of Principles on the South Lawn, which reflected the direct engagement of the parties themselves in Oslo. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim agreement. A treaty leading to genuine peace between Israel and Jordan. The rallying of the world's leaders, including the leaders of the Arab world, in Sharm-el-Sheik to condemn terrorist attacks against Israel. The Hebron and Wye accords, which put the implementation of the interim agreement back on track.
- In these years, both sides have recognized that there is but one thing inevitable in the relationship between them: Israelis and Palestinians are bound to live side by side. Yet throughout the process, the ultimate question of how they would live side by side has been continually deferred. Everyone knew it would be too hard to deal with at the outset. But the reality is, the conflict will not be truly over until it is dealt with.
- That is the context in which we approached Camp David.
- The parties had been working diligently between themselves for months, but ultimately the core issues could only be tackled and decided by the two leaders – and only in a setting in which they could think privately, protected from competing pressures and constant scrutiny. And so, we agreed to bring them together in Maryland.
- In the peace process, the closer you get to the summit, the steeper the path. So I was perfectly aware we might not succeed. But not to try was to guarantee failure. I decided it was necessary to try.
- I don't want to sugar coat what happened. We wanted an agreement. We didn't achieve one. That is a disappointment.
- But I believed when the talks were over, and I see even more clearly now, that we made significant progress at Camp David. One Palestinian negotiator said these were revolutionary talks. That is true. We cracked open a sealed container, took out a set of problems that had been festering for 52 years, and put them on the table. The parties talked about them.
- These are issues they had never confronted before in an official setting: How do you define the Palestinian state and its borders? What happens to refugees from 1948 – both Palestinian and Jewish? How do you protect Israel's security if it withdraws from the West Bank? How do you resolve the difficult issues of Jerusalem?

- Because I do not believe the process is over, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss the specifics. That can only make difficult problems more difficult.
- But I will say this about where we stand now.
- First, every one affected by the peace process – Israelis, Palestinians, the nations of the region, and friends and allies of both sides, are faced with a choice. We are at a crossroads. Down one path, I believe, lies confrontation and a conflict which would lead to more bloodshed and tears, with no ultimate winners. Down the other path is an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
- Everyone must understand that by definition, agreement means compromise. No one gets 100%. And a durable agreement cannot have winners and losers, only winners and winners. This is the choice PM Barak and others in Israel face. It is the choice for Chairman Arafat and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. It is the choice for other Arab countries.
- Needless to say, because agreement requires compromise, the choice is painful, agonizing, even existential. But there is really only one choice that can fulfill both sides' aspirations.
- If this opportunity is not seized, if the parties allow themselves to drift into conflict, the core issues won't change or become easier to solve. Another group of leaders will come back to face the same set of choices, the same set of facts. But only after more bloodshed and tears, more grievances to redress, more bitterness to overcome.
- I don't want to mislead you. Reaching agreement still is very difficult. But I believe it is possible. I believe the parties want it to happen. But both must be prepared to take tough choices.
- Both sides want the United States to continue to help, and we will. The nature and form of our role will depend on what they do and want us to do. I will do whatever will help us achieve this goal. But the decisions are theirs to make. We cannot must not impose our ideas on them.
- What we will do is continue to stand by Israel, as we have during the last seven and a half years of my presidency, and the last 52 years of our relationship. We will help Israel maintain its strength. And we will minimize the courageous risks it is taking for peace.

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Final 08/13/00 4am  
Malinowski/ Gottheimer

President William J. Clinton  
Talking Points for Jewish Community Celebration  
Remarks  
Los Angeles, CA  
August 13, 2000

- Ack: First Lady. Secs. Glickman, Cuomo, Riley, Tiny

**COPY**

Wuliger (AIPAC). Joel Tauber (UJC). Todd Morgan  
(LA Federation). Bill Dockser (NJDC).

- Thank you for all the support you've given me over the years.
- This is an historic election. First election of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, and the first time a Jewish American has been on the ticket for Vice President of the United States.
- I've known Joe Lieberman for 30 years. I supported him in his first race for public office in 1970.

He and his wife, Hadassah, have been good friends to **COPY**

Hillary and me. She's the child of Holocaust survivors, and I know that she and Joe believe in and will fight for One America.

- Joe will also keep working to reach peace in the Middle East.
- Journey of peace already taken is remarkable: From era of bloody wars – 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 – region has entered era of engagement and peace-building.

- In just the last seven years: The signing of the **COPY** Declaration of Principles on the South Lawn, which reflected the direct engagement of the parties themselves in Oslo. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim agreement. A treaty leading to genuine peace between Israel and Jordan. The rallying of the world's leaders, including the leaders of the Arab world, in Sharm-el-Sheik to condemn terrorist attacks against Israel.
- The Hebron and Wye accords, which put the implementation of the interim agreement back on track.
- In these years, both sides have recognized that there is but one thing inevitable in the relationship between

them: Israelis and Palestinians are bound to live **COPY**

by side. Yet throughout the process, the ultimate question of how they would live side by side has been continually deferred. Everyone knew it would be too hard to deal with at the outset. But the reality is, the conflict will not be truly over until it is dealt with.

- That is the context in which we approached Camp David.
- The parties had been working diligently between themselves for months, but ultimately the core issues could only be tackled and decided by the two leaders – and only in a setting in which they could think

privately, protected from competing pressures

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constant scrutiny. And so, we agreed to bring them together in Maryland.

- In the peace process, the closer you get to the summit, the steeper the path. So I was perfectly aware we might not succeed. But not to try was to guarantee failure. I decided it was necessary to try.
- I don't want to sugar coat what happened. We wanted an agreement. We didn't achieve one. That is a disappointment.

- But I believed when the talks were over, and I **COPY** more clearly now, that we made significant progress at Camp David. One Palestinian negotiator said these were revolutionary talks. That is true.
- We cracked open a sealed container, took out a set of problems that had been festering for 52 years, and put them on the table. The parties talked about them.
- These are issues they had never confronted before in an official setting: How do you define the Palestinian state and its borders? What happens to refugees from 1948 – both Palestinian and Jewish? How do you protect Israel's security if it withdraws from the West

Bank? How do you resolve the difficult issues of

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Jerusalem?

- Because I do not believe the process is over, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss the specifics. That can only make difficult problems more difficult.
- But I will say this about where we stand now.
- First, every one affected by the peace process – Israelis, Palestinians, the nations of the region, and friends and allies of both sides, are faced with a choice. We are at a crossroads.

- Down one path, I believe, lies confrontation and **COPY** conflict that would lead to more bloodshed and tears, with no ultimate winners. Down the other path is an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
- Everyone must understand that by definition, agreement means compromise.

No one gets 100% And a durable agreement cannot have winners and losers, only winners and winners. This is the choice PM Barak and others in Israel face. It is the choice for Chairman Arafat and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. It is the choice for other Arab countries.

- Needless to say, because agreement requires compromise, the choice is painful, agonizing, even existential. But there is really only one choice that can fulfill both sides' aspirations.
- If this opportunity is not seized, if the parties allow themselves to drift into conflict, the core issues won't change or become easier to solve. Another group of leaders will come back to face the same set of choices, the same set of facts. But only after more bloodshed and tears, more grievances to redress, more bitterness to overcome.

- I don't want to mislead you. Reaching agreement is

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is very difficult. But I believe it is possible. I believe the parties want it to happen. But both must be prepared to take tough choices.

- Both sides want the United States to continue to help, and we will. The nature and form of our role will depend on what they do and want us to do. I will do whatever will help us achieve this goal. But the decisions are theirs to make. We cannot must not impose our ideas on them.

- What we will do is continue to stand by Israel, as we

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have during the last seven and a half years of my  
presidency, and the last 52 years of our relationship.

We will help Israel maintain its strength. And we will  
minimize the courageous risks it is taking for peace.