

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	M. Kay Joshi to Crispell et al; re: Crosshatches Due (2 pages)	08/22/1994	P1/b(1)
002. email	From M. Kay Joshi; re: Crosshatches Due Today (1 page)	08/23/1994	P1/b(1)
003. email	From M. Brooke Darby; re: Update (2 pages)	08/31/1994	P1/b(1)
004. email	From Susan Rice; re: Crosshatches (1 page)	09/01/1994	P1/b(1)
005. email	From Richard Clarke; re: Crosshatches (1 page)	09/01/1994	P1/b(1)
006. email	From MacArthur DeShazer; re: Ghana Paper for Mrs. Gore (4 pages)	09/02/1994	P1/b(1)
007. email	From Wilma Hall; re: Schedule & Calendar (partial) (1 page)	09/03/1994	P6/b(6)
008. email	From Susan Rice; re: Rwanda (2 pages)	09/08/1994	P1/b(1)
009. email	From Susan Rice; re: Rwanda War Crimes (1 page)	09/08/1994	P1/b(1)
010. email	From Tara Sonenshine; re: Lippman (2 pages)	09/09/1994	P5
011. email	From Allison Wright; re: Foreign Policy Team Meeting Memo (2 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
012. email	From Murphy; re: Situation Room Morning Summary (2 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
A1-Non-Record (Apr 94-Sept 94) ([Rwanda & Soderberg])
OA/Box Number: 580000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/22/1994 - 09/22/1994]

Jimie Purvis

2006-0238-F

jp1344

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Sep-1994 13:11 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NONRECORD

(NONRECORD@A1@OEOb)

FROM:

sonensht

(sonensht@NSCSTF@OEOb@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT:

[UNCLASSIFIED] Lippman

Message Creation Date was at 9-SEP-1994 00:53:00

Tom Lippman of the Post will be seeing you at 4:30. He will want to talk about (3 subjects: Rwanda, Haiti and Cuba.

RWANDA--

I talked at length with Don Steinberg. He expects Lippman to advance an argument along the following lines: The US ignored warning signs of trouble, we were spooked by Somalia, we got scared off by the costs of an enhanced peacekeeping mission and decided it wasn't worth it. In the end, we deserve part of the blame for who lost Rwanda not to mention the fact that Rwanda shows that we are resistant to having US peacekeepers deployed.

Arguments to refute Lippman.

1. If anything, this is a case where our experiences in Somalia did NOT prevent us from doing the right thing. If we were truly spooked by Somalia, we would have turned away entirely instead of committing 4000 American troops and spending \$500 million to give the people of Rwanda humanitarian help and a breathing space. We put Somalia behind us and moved into Rwanda in full force. We could have easily argued that we have no vital interests, no refugee flow to the US, no issue of terrorism or drugs, no major de-stabilization in the region...and that this is a Franco-Belgian problem. We took a different path..
2. If you look at the (4) packages that we agreed to sign on to doing: water, the Goma airport, Entebbe hub, and food/supply distribution--we have done all 4 beyond the call of duty. There is now more water than even needed, the Goma airport is running well, Entebbe still has 600 US troops, and food and supplies are getting in.
3. Let's look back at how we responded to danger signs--not ignored them. We sent in Oct of 1993 2500 UN peacekeepers to the region.
4. If Tom says that we pushed for the UN to withdraw its peacekeepers after the plane was shot down in April, the response should be that it was inappropriate to leave a lightly armed force that had been sent in to monitor the Arusha accords, to handle the chaos. Other countries were also pulling out.

6. On the decision NOT to provide US peacekeepers and the notion that PRD 25 was designed to limit peacekeeping, with Rwanda fast-becoming the litmus test of that unwillingness---I leave that to you!

***You might suggest that Tom talk with Don Steinberg for more detail on chronology, etc.

Additional Header Information Follows

```

Date Created: 09-Sep-1994 00:53
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 022226
VMS Filename: OA$SHARA9:ZVJXIUILV.TXT
Al Folder: READ
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 09-Sep-1994 00:53
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

```