

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Tyrer to John Podesta and Dawn Smalls re: no subject (partial) (2 pages)	07/08/1999	P5, b(6) 6365

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System
WHO ([General Wesley Clark])
OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/29/1999 - 07/18/1999]

2006-0325-F
ds359

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Robert.Tyrer@osd.pentagon.mil@INET@LNGTWY (Robert.Tyrer@osd.pentagon.mil@I

CREATION DATE/TIME: 8-JUL-1999 23:11:56.00

SUBJECT: - no subject (01JDC7VDQF4Y002SFK) -

TO: John Podesta@eop (John Podesta@eop [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Dawn L. Smalls@eop (Dawn L. Smalls@eop [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Thursday - Copenhagen

John:

Sandy Berger may or may not have mentioned this to you, but I wanted to make sure you are up to speed.

The issue of Wes Clark's replacement is upon us, and the Secretary will recommend Joe Ralston to the President. This has been informally discussed in recent days between Cohen and Sandy. Joe had been planning to retire, but we prevailed upon him to accept a nomination if the President agrees with our recommendation. I think you have had enough exposure to Joe to see his sterling qualities - we feel he would be the strongest choice for CINCEUR/SACEUR.

This idea raises a couple of sensitive points, and I wanted to outline them for you to get your thoughts.

1. Though there has been one Air Force officer in the position, it has otherwise been held by the Army. When we receive the President's go ahead, we will need to work with Caldera and Shinseki to make sure the Army grousing is kept to a minimum. The air war has shown us that having an Air Force background is relevant and, more importantly, Joe is a sufficiently "joint" officer that I believe he can break this paradigm with ease. While the Army has several solid officers it could nominate for the slot, none are remotely in Joe's league.

2. Wes's term was due to end this month and we extended him for up to a year. Given the timing of Joe's departure as Vice Chairman (statutorily set at March 1, 2000), we would probably need to have the handover from Wes to Joe take place in May, 2000, which will be a month or two earlier than Wes had been planning on. I do not foresee this as a problem with Wes but given his ties to the President I wanted you to be aware of it.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND-TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Janet Abrams to Robert Johnson et al., re WHF Legacy (3 pages)	08/06/1999	P6/b(6)
002. email	Gaynor McCown to Patricia Davies et al., re WHF Legacy (3 pages)	08/11/1999	P6/b(6)
003. email	Patricia Davis to Janet B. Abrams et al., re WHF Legacy (3 pages)	08/11/1999	P6/b(6)
004. email	Patricia Davis to Janet B. Abrams et al., re WHF Legacy (3 pages)	08/11/1999	P6/b(6)
005. email	Patricia Davis to Robert Johnson et al., re WHF Legacy (2 pages)	08/11/1999	P6/b(6)
006. email	Bruce Lindsey to Maria Echaveste re: release march (1 page)	08/30/1999	P5

6366

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System
WHO ([General Wesley Clark])
OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/01/1999 - 09/13/1999]

2006-0325-F
wr10684

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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6366

RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Bruce R. Lindsey (CN=Bruce R. Lindsey/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 30-AUG-1999 17:11:24.00

SUBJECT: Re: Guiliani in Release March

TO: Maria Echaveste (CN=Maria Echaveste/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Yes, I am currently planning to go to New Zealand. Jeff has been forwarding the press on the Puerto Rican prisoners to me. If we are lucky, the prisoners will turn down our offer. The President indicated to former President Carter that he was inclined to stop the bombing on Vieques, but that was before General Clark made his comment that it would affect readiness.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Miriam Sapiro to Antony Blinken re: FW: NATO SYG Robertson meeting with SRB (4 pages)	04/03/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	James Baker to Hoyt Yee re: ICTY memo for SRB (2 pages)	04/03/2000	P1/b(1)
003. email	James Baker to Hoyt Yee et al. re: NATO SYG Robertson meeting with SRB (3 pages)	04/03/2000	P1/b(1)
004. email	Hoyt Yee to Roderick vonLipsey re: ICTY memo for SRB (4 pages)	04/04/2000	P1/b(1)
005. email	James Baker to Hoyt Yee re: ICTY memo for SRB (6 pages)	04/04/2000	P1/b(1)
006. email	Hoyt Yee to Roderick vonLipsey re: ICTY memo for SRB (6 pages)	04/05/2000	P1/b(1)
007. email	James Baker to Charles Allen re: Assessment (6 pages)	04/19/2000	P5 <i>6368</i>
008. email	Thomas Greenwood to Gregory Schulte re: Kasich (2 pages)	08/09/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange - Record (Sept 97 - Jan 01) ([Gen Clark])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/03/2000-08/09/2000]

2006-0325-F

bm408

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Exchange Mail

6368

DATE-TIME 04/19/2000 2:30:33 PM
FROM Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: ICTY/NATO Assessment - ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Sent: Monday,
February 14, 2000 10:18 AM
To: @APNSA
Cc: Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI);
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE); Blinken, Antony J. (EUR); Malinowski,
Tomasz P. (SPCHW); @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; Leavy, David C.
(PRESS);
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Subject: ICTY/NATO Assessment - ABC Lunch
[UNCLASSIFIED]

DELIBERATIVE/PRIVILEGED

Sandy:

You asked
for a firm letter that rejects the ICTY's assessment of NATO air
operations. The attached letter does so. The letter has not been
shared with our counterparts or Principals.

The letter includes
four building blocks: (1) A clear statement that NATO assiduously
observed the law of armed conflict, no more so than in the area of
collateral casualties -- this should give the ICTY a basis to stand
down in much the manner that Louise Arbour stated that in the
absence
of evidence she was satisfied with an assurance from NATO ; (2)
notation
that the Tribunal's competence and a state's duty to assist the Tribunal
extends (only) to serious violations of international humanitarian
law; (3) appreciation that just motive is not license for indiscriminate

operational conduct, but there is no factual basis to proceed with an assessment; and (4) recognition of the irony that NATO now finds itself the subject of an ICTY assessment having stopped crimes against hundreds of thousands of civilians and the effect this may have on the willingness of states to stop such crimes in the future.

Principals
will want to consider and agree on:

1. The Tone of the Letter

The letter accurately portrays U.S. views, but it is a strong letter with additional rhetoric, which risks provoking the ICTY, at the same time that it seeks to give the ICTY a basis to "conclude" its "assessment." We recommend that you ask the Secretary of State for her view on the tone of the letter -- in terms of the likelihood it will provide the ICTY the necessary "out" to end its assessment. Too strong a letter might force the ICTY to hold its ground and we may find ourselves in a stalemate. Eric and I are also cautious about overstating (or perhaps even making explicit) the last point in the letter: An ICTY that loses perspective will deter future efforts to end humanitarian crisis, but we should avoid letting this concern sound like a threat. In short, we are recommending a letter with the same content and building blocks identified above, but with less rhetoric.

2. Whether to offer a briefing

Clearly,
our first goal is to reject the premise of the ICTY's inquiry. However, to the extent our second objective is an immediate conclusion of the ICTY's assessment, Principals should consider whether the letter should also offer a staff level briefing, while making it clear we are not going to answer interrogatories. Again, the goal would be to offer the ICTY just enough engagement to facilitate a decision on their part not to proceed. (Military staff are reviewing public statements as well as the recent Defense report to see if we might not be responsive by answering the mail using open source documents.

I would not count on this.) A more realistic alternative, if Principals are inclined to this approach, is a general briefing by a mid-level official who was not himself in the chain of operational decision, which would raise concerns about witness statements. The EUCOM JAG

Vince Fagialli (sp.) would be a candidate.

3. Who signs the

letter

One option is Gen. Clark, on behalf of Robertson. Clark is best situated to address the questions and more importantly to provide the ICTY an authoritative statement that NATO did not intentionally target civilians and sought to minimize collateral casualties to the fullest extent feasible both in the cockpit as well as in NATO capitals. A Clark letter would also surely be reflective of U.S. views; we cannot be as sure that Robertson would respond in the same

manner (particularly since he appears to have encouraged this line of questions in the first instance.) On the other hand, there are some legal advantages to having the response come back from someone

who was not in the decisional chain of command, i.e., a potential witness (although my non-lawyer instinct is not to let legal tactics drive a fundamentally policy response.) To be clear, we do not have interagency views on this point.

4. Process

With guidance from Principals on content and tone of a letter, we would recommend circulating a draft to agencies up through staff to Principals. We would send the draft to Gen. Clark and Sandy Vershbow for clearance as well. With letter in hand, Tony, Chris, Gen. Clark and Sandy V. would then work within NATO for concurrence on our response.

Concurrence: Eric Schwartz; Chris Hill, Tony Blinken, Tom Malinowski

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT ICTYletter.doc

Dear:

You asked about NATO's conduct of the air campaign during Operation Allied Force. NATO's objective was to end the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to prevent a wider conflict by striking military targets, including command and control mechanisms, military and paramilitary forces, and the infrastructure that supported Serbia's activities in Kosovo. In doing so, NATO fully followed the laws of armed conflict in training, targeting and operational decisions.

In no area of operational decision was more effort taken than in minimizing the possibility of collateral casualties and damage to civilians and civilian objects. In no case, did NATO intentionally target civilians or civilian property. Each target was carefully assessed to determine whether it was a valid military object or whether it was being used for military purposes. I know of no example in the history of human warfare in which a combatant, in this case an entire alliance, more assiduously observed the law of armed conflict and the protections it affords to noncombatants.

While understanding that collateral casualties would occur in time of armed conflict, NATO and all its members were nonetheless dismayed by even the small numbers of civilians killed or injured as they reversed Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing - and they publicly acknowledged their responsibility for those collateral casualties they did inadvertently cause. NATO regrets more the acts of the Milosevic regime bent on cleansing Kosovo of its nearly two million Albanians.

The Tribunal's competence covers the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the laws of customs of war (such as the wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages), genocide, and crimes against humanity. The obligation of states to cooperate with the ICTY also extends to serious violations of international humanitarian law. There have been no such allegations, let alone evidence, of serious violations of international humanitarian law by NATO. Entertaining spurious allegations demeans the importance of the ICTY's work.

Therefore, it is with great dismay that NATO ironically now finds itself the subject of an ICTY "assessment" regarding actions it took to stop crimes against

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hundreds of thousands of civilians in Kosovo. NATO accepts and indeed supports ICTY territorial jurisdiction over events in Kosovo. Moreover, there is no question that a just motive is not license to violate international humanitarian law. However, in the absence of evidence, there is no basis to proceed with an assessment of NATO air operations. Spurious allegations are not evidence. In those few incidents where weapons missed their intended military objective, NATO carefully and clearly reported the event and, consistent with its duty to provide for the safety of the pilots who were risking their lives to protect civilians in Kosovo, publicly indicated why the event occurred.

This is in sharp contrast to the conduct of Serbia's military and paramilitary forces, for which Slobodan Milosevic now stands indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. They used tactics specifically designed to inflict suffering and death on as many civilians as they could reach - in effect, their war aim was to commit war crimes. This was a conflict between an armed force that intentionally caused harm to innocent people and an alliance that took extraordinary measures to avoid such harm. Any war crimes tribunal that loses sight of that distinction will not be worthy of its name.

The ICTY should not permit its good offices to be used to detract from its investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law. It would be tragic if such a use of the ICTY process were to dissuade states from acting in the future to prevent the kinds of widespread and systemic crimes committed in Kosovo by the Milosevic regime. After all, the ICTY should deter atrocities, not deter those who seek to end them.

I trust this responds to your questions.

2

DRAFT/DELIBERATIVE

DRAFT/DELIBERATIVE 2/11 1530 g:ICTYletter

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Roderick von Lipsey to M. Kay Joshi et al. re: Conference with CINC's (10 pages)	09/10/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Roderick von Lipsey to Antony Blinken et al. re: POTUS Meeting with CINC's (10 pages)	09/11/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Roderick von Lipsey to Elaine Wasserman re: Item 1 of 3 (5 pages)	09/11/1998	P1/b(1)
004. email	Roderick von Lipsey to L. June Bartlett et al. re: Package 6034 (11 pages)	09/11/1998	P1/b(1)
005. email	Roderick von Lipsey to Steven Andreasen et al. re: CINC's Conference (24 pages)	11/03/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	Charles Allen to James Baker re: Skaggs on Kosovo (2 pages)	11/12/1998	P5 6369
007. email	Miriam Sapriro to Susan Braden and Stephen Flanagan re: Target Date (4 pages)	12/07/1998	P1/b(1), P5
008. email	Gregory Schulte to Susan Braden re: Target Date (4 pages)	12/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Wesley Clark])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/10/1998-12/08/1998]

2006-0325-F

kh711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DATE-TIME 11/12/98 10:41:47 AM
FROM Allen, Charles A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Skaggs on Kosovo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.

CARBON_COPY Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

TEXT_BODY Jamie, I have the folder on this item. Mike Hurley gave it to me late last week for an input. I'll work with Mike on the latest policy material he wants in the letter, to go along with your input.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Baker, James E.
Sent: Wednesday, November 11,
1998 3:23 PM
To: Rudman, Mara E.; @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs
Cc: @LEGAL
- Legal Advisor
Subject: Skaggs on Kosovo [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mara/Nick:

This is what I would propose for the legal section of the response to Skaggs et al on Kosovo. I defer to Bosnia on how much of the policy stuff to insert after the 2d and 3d paras. on constitutional authority. If we are to respond specifically on the legal challenge, I recommend that Sandy, and not the President sign the letter. (I am confident Chuck Ruff would agree.) The President should not be put in a position of defining the scope of his authority to act, since any future context may be different from that at issue. Moreover,

the question is now a hypothetical one, and it strikes me as unPresidential for the President to engage with Members on whether he could have done something.

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If you concur, I will quickly run this letter
by Chuck Ruff.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT KosovoSkaggs.doc

Dear Representative Campbell:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. I share your concern about the continuing violence and human suffering, as well as the risks Milosevic's policies pose to regional stability. However, we do not agree on the scope of the President's constitutional authority to authorize use of force.

This Administration, like previous administrations, takes the view that the President has broad authority, as Commander-in-Chief and under his authority to conduct foreign relations, to authorize the use of force in the national interest. There is ample constitutional precedent for the type of action contemplated in October, including air operations in Bosnia in 1995 that involved over 2300 U.S. sorties, and the deployment of ground forces to Somalia to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Previous administrations have taken the position that military actions of greater scope could be conducted without congressional authorization.

Nor were the actions contemplated "offensive" in nature. Our objective was, and remains, prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe, a negotiated and peaceful settlement, and prevention of a regional conflict. NATO's willingness to threaten the use of force did just that. The threat of force was instrumental in

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001.	[All Declassified] (0 page)	n.d.	#Error
002. note	To Nancy (1 page)	ca. 9/1994	P5 6371
003. memo	Margie Sullivan to Nancy Soderberg re: Lieutenant General Wesley Clark (1 page)	09/15/1994	P5 6372
004. draft	To President Clinton from Deputy Secretary of Defense (3 pages)	ca. 9/1994	P5 6373

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Wesley Clark])
OA/Box Number: 212

FOLDER TITLE:

9407198

2006-0325-F

kh754

RESTRICTION CODES

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Nancy,

As you know, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili have very strong feelings about how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration.

As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would like the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted me to show you the entire packet -- not to confuse you -- but to give you additional background information.

Tab #1 is a proposed letter from Deutch to the President defending Clark. John has no intention of signing this -- he just wants you to see it.

Tab #2 is a long response to Hoyer and DeConcini detailing the events surrounding Clark's meeting with Mladic.

Because John and Shali care so much about the handling of this matter, if you or Tony have problems or are going to make changes to the proposed response, could you please let me know.

Thanks.



THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



6372

September 15, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR, NSC

FROM: Margie Sullivan

SUBJECT: Lieutenant General Wesley Clark

As you know, John Deutch and General Shalikashvili have very strong feelings about how they want General Wes Clark to be defended by the Administration.

As John mentioned, the JCS prepared the attached packet. Deutch and Perry would like the White House to go with the brief response to Hoyer and DeConcini signed by the President (not Deutch) which is Tab #3. In spite of John's strong preference, he wanted me to show you the entire packet -- not to confuse you -- but to give you additional background information.

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Thanks.

Attachment



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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

Press reports and a letter to you from Senator DeConcini and Representative Hoyer regarding Lieutenant General Wesley Clark's recent meeting with General Ratko Miladic in Banja Luka have expressed concern that the event damaged both General Clark's credibility and United States foreign policy towards the Bosnian Serbs. The congressmen recommend you "take necessary and appropriate action" against General Clark.

Our inquiry into this matter convinces me that no such action is necessary. General Clark acted reasonably and honorably in a difficult situation--a situation that evolved as a result of an unfortunate sequence of events beyond his knowledge or control. In the interest of fairness and in defense of your Administration's foreign policy objectives, I offer the following facts and attach a proposed reply to the congressmen.

The primary purpose of General Clark's trip to Europe from August 20 to 27 was to participate in US-Russian joint staff talks in Moscow. It also provided him an opportunity on his way back to Washington to observe first-hand Operations Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, and Provide Promise. As the newly-arrived senior US military planner for these UN efforts to achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was entirely appropriate that he visit both the NATO headquarters in Naples and the UN headquarters in Sarajevo. General Clark believed this side trip would also provide helpful insight for a Bosnia options paper the NSC had tasked him to write. The State Department accordingly granted him country clearance into both Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Immediately after his arrival in Sarajevo on 26 August, and upon the recommendations of both the US Ambassador and Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, General Clark met successively with General Delic, commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces; Generals Roso and Muslimovic, commander and deputy commander of the federation forces; and Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Early the next day, General Clark toured the Bosnian Muslim front lines in Sarajevo and had discussions with Bosnian Muslim field commanders.

During General Clark's first day in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Rose also proposed that they travel to Banja Luka to visit General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commander. He suggested the visit would give General Clark a broader perspective and a more complete appreciation of the obstacles to peace.

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As General Clark's staff prepared to travel to Banja Luka, the US Defense Attache and two members of the Joint Task Force confirmed to the general's special assistant that all necessary steps had been taken to clear and coordinate the trip. Assuming that the defense attache had consulted the embassy, the special assistant understood his confirmation to mean the trip had also been approved by the State Department. In fact, the US Charge d'Affaires had disapproved such a visit prior to General Clark's arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Importantly, however, this fact was never communicated to General Clark or his staff.

*does state
agree with
this?*

On 27 August, General Clark, his staff, and General Rose traveled by helicopter to Banja Luka to meet General Mladic. During their meeting, General Clark clearly and forcefully expressed United States concerns about the Bosnian Serbs' lack of cooperation in the peace process, and pressed Mladic to make a significant overture of peace such as to demilitarize Sarajevo or one of the other safe zones. Mladic continued to hold firm that the Serbs would only support an immediate ceasefire in current positions and the initiation of negotiations.

When the meeting ended, Generals Clark and Mladic and their staffs departed the room into an awaiting press ambush. General Mladic presented General Clark his field cap as a gesture of goodwill. General Clark reciprocated and the two were then photographed. General Clark then gave the press a professional account of his Bosnia-Herzegovina trip and stressed that he was in Banja Luka on a fact-finding mission and nothing more.

At lunch just before his departure, General Clark again pressed General Mladic to offer a tangible gesture of peace. At that point, Mladic presented General Clark his personal weapon as an expression of his desire to end the fighting. The only personal gifts offered to General Clark were Mladic's hat and a bottle of brandy. In keeping with common and accepted practice, General Clark accepted the pistol and gifts. All three items have been turned in to the Department for appropriate disposition.

Understandably upset by what they perceived to be his blatant disregard for their advice, State Department officials immediately denounced General Clark's visit. Unfortunately, their anger fueled the already-considerable press hyperbole. General Clark was in fact a victim of communication failure and a skillful Bosnian Serb manipulation of the media.

The facts as General Clark saw them during his visit to Sarajevo convinced him that meeting General Mladic was the right thing to do. After establishing what actually happened, it is the Department's and my position that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. While General Clark and I agree that the meeting would not have taken place had the State Department's concerns been communicated to him, we do not concur in the senators' view that meeting General Mladic was so obviously a bad idea that common sense alone should have prevented it. As the senior military planner for US participation in Bosnia operations, General Clark was tasked by the NSC to write a Bosnia options paper and may someday be asked to develop a strategy for the employment of United States forces in the Balkans. To the extent this visit enhanced his understanding of Mladic's motives, personality, and military thinking, General Clark and our Nation have been well served.

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My confidence in General Wesley Clark's intelligence, competence, and integrity remains unshaken. I hope you will join me in expressing support for this fine officer.

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001c. letter	Address (Partial) (1 page)	ca. 1999	P6/b(6)
001d. letter	Address (Partial) (1 page)	ca. 1999	P6/b(6)
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Ambassador Swanee Hunt

8-4-99

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5915

July 30, 1999

President Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

'99 AUG 4 AM 11:30

Dear Mr. President,

The International Herald Tribune (front page, above the fold) and Boston Globe have, very sadly, carried several stories of your administration publicly slapping General Wes Clark, following his successful leadership of the Kosovo campaign. I am, of course, not privy to the inside story, and I have not been in touch with Wes, but, after the indescribable effort he spent getting action where others wanted only to delay, I am so, so sorry that this is how he is being repaid, according to the press. The timing appears to allow only an interpretation that this is a punitive act.

I believe you can turn this around, and I respectfully ask that you make amends for this public disgracing of one of your most courageous advocates. Wes Clark should serve out his full term as NATO commander. He has been a robust champion for you in winning the war in Kosovo, and he has earned the respect of our NATO allies. I have been told (perhaps incorrectly) that Wes' desire to send in ground troops conflicted with your NSC leadership's opinion, and that is why he is now being punished. If that is the case, let's remember that as many as 200,000 Kosovar Albanians may have died as we bombed and rebombed and rebombed targets rather than sending in troops. Maybe only bombing was the best approach. Maybe it wasn't. But clearly there was strong reason to take the position Wes did. (Again, my information is not from Wes, but from a high-ranking former military leader who is plugged into the network.)

The unfortunate and possibly unintended consequence of the Pentagon leaking the news of General Clark's premature relinquishing of his position has had the effect of not only publicly tarnishing his reputation, but more importantly severely diminishing his effectiveness for the next 9 months. From what I read, he now appears to retain his command without the support of key players in the Pentagon, and, most important without your backing. As a direct result, he will be unable to speak convincingly for us or for NATO.

Recently a former senior commander in the NATO structure (different from the one I mentioned above) gave me his explanation of why our US military did such a miserable job vis a vis war criminals in Bosnia (leading, I believe to the Kosovo conflict). He heard that "Washington" had told the top US commander in Bosnia that if there was one

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
"mistake," his career was over. Perhaps that's why our military allowed the situation to simply fester, which has resulted in Dayton not being fulfilled. (By the way, this is not simply allegation. I had first-hand knowledge of our first US commander in Sarajevo declaring "If Mladic walks into a cafe where I'm sitting, we're just going to walk out the back door.")

How on earth can a military leader face a Milosovic with that sort of apprehension about his career? Should he look at the enemy in front of him, or over his shoulder? Wes leaned forward, and thank God he did. He should not be punished now by those who disagreed. History will show he was one of the only right-thinking military leaders in this whole Balkan mess. If he is now disgraced, that lesson will become precedent in future military situations.

Forgive me if I am completely off target in this. Perhaps this is naive, but I'm assuming you were not informed of the full implications of this rotation decision. Nor is the military bureaucracy a field I know; I'm simply telling you how the papers are interpreting this latest announcement. As you well know, their interpretation is as close to reality as the public will get. My military friends have told me the excuses coming from the Pentagon about how this is a normal rotation issue are disingenuous. The precedent is for terms of four, five, even eight years for the SACEURs, ever since Eisenhower. The Pentagon's false explanations are a discredit to that institution.

You have displayed exceptional leadership in this recent conflict. Please don't let a passionate advocate for your values and vision of a multi-cultural world, in which tyrants are courageously confronted, be publicly demeaned because of internal disagreements within your administration. Your leadership is needed now.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Swanee", with a large, sweeping loop at the end.

Swanee

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