

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Madeleine Albright to POTUS; re: Your Trip to Moscow, September 1-2, 1998 (3 pages)	08/15/1998	P1/b(1), P5
002. email	Donald Bandler to William Courtney; re: Managing Russia Issues in the Weeks Ahead (2 pages)	01/29/1998	P1/b(1), P5
003. memo	Lawrence H. Summers to POTUS; re: Core Themes for Ongoing United States Engagement with Russia (2 pages)	09/09/1999	P5 1290

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2191

FOLDER TITLE:

Russia

Jimmie Purvis
2006-0471-F
jp1600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

To: MALINOWSKI
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LEAVY

→ Tom, David et al

@ FYI.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

9 September, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

FROM: Lawrence H. Summers

SUBJECT: Core Themes for Ongoing United States Engagement with Russia

You asked me to forward to you my thoughts on the core themes of our public and private engagement with Russia in the coming months.

Clearly, as Strobe's recent memo to you highlighted, we must continue to stand by the principle upon which your Russian policy has rested since 1993. The United States has an enormous strategic stake in a peaceful democratic transition in Russia and we must seize every realistic opportunity to make a difference – even as we recognize the enormity of the obstacles in Russia's path and the limits on our capacity to help.

It will, however, be critical going forward that we not appear insensitive to the pain that Russians have suffered or to the policy implications of the developments of the past year.


SEP 16 18:40

- Russia is not making economic policy progress and, in a climate of intense pre-election maneuvering, the government is not credibly committed to a reformist agenda.
- Longstanding problems of corruption and abusive concentration of economic power seem to be getting worse not better.
- Largely as a result of these factors, market-oriented reform, for the moment, lacks a solid constituency in Russia – and United States domestic support for helping Russia has eroded.

Our hard-headedness needs to be reflected in our public discussion of Russia as well as in the substantive direction of our policy of engagement. We should not promise too much for the future nor claim too much for the past.

Key points to make publicly:

- Russia is today a very different country than it was a decade ago, in ways of profound importance to the national security of the United States.
- To be sure, there are many respects in which Russia's transition has not proceeded as either we or the Russian people would have hoped. But disappointment cannot give way to



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disengagement. Events in Europe earlier in this century teach a powerful lesson about the consequences of isolating fallen great powers in periods of internal turmoil.

- We have an enormous stake in Russia's becoming a stable market democracy, and we will continue to support that outcome in every way feasible. But Russia will shape its own destiny. We cannot want change more than the Russians themselves do.
- Recent events have once again underlined why conditionality of international support needs always to be applied vigorously to ensure that money flowing into a country does not flow right back out again – and that the net result of our efforts is not just a higher level of official debt.
- This has informed our support for a rescheduling of Russia's bilateral debt that is limited both in scope and duration. It is also reflected in the terms of the recent IMF program, which safeguards IMF resources by providing funds in the form of Special Drawing Rights, paid into an account in the United States, which can be used only to repay Russian obligations to the Fund. The program also requires Russia to provide an adequate accounting of various practices at the central bank as well as the July 1998 IMF disbursement.
- Bilateral and multilateral support for Russia in the future will be shaped by the same kind of realism.

Key elements of policy going forward:

- Setting the realistic aspiration of maintaining a minimum level of stability in Russia.
- Conditioning further IMF tranches on there being effective safeguards that lending will not be misappropriated, a satisfactory accounting of relevant central bank activities, and genuine broad-based implementation of reforms, not just commitments.
- With respect to future bilateral and multilateral efforts in Russia:
 - Condemning corruption and actively supporting measures that reduce its influence in Russia and potential impact on the United States.
 - Supporting steps that will encourage the development of democratic institutions and a functioning rule of law.
 - Finding nontraditional routes for our engagement that focus more directly on those leaders and parts of the country that are most receptive to positive economic and political change – the young especially.