

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to the President, re: Meeting with Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili (3 pages)	07/30/1997	P5 4150
001b. memo	Draft memo from Samuel Berger to the President, re: Meeting with Secretary Cohen and General Shlikashvili (3 pages)	ca. 07/1997	P5 Dup 001a

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy - Bell
OA/Box Number: 3587

FOLDER TITLE:

Khobar Towers, July - September 1997

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke1735

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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7-30-97

5198

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1997

MEETING WITH


SECRETARY COHEN & GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI

DATE: July 31, 1997

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 12:15 - 12:45 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER



I. PURPOSE

To receive a briefing from Secretary Cohen regarding his review of the Khobar Towers bombing investigations.

II. BACKGROUND

Secretary Cohen has completed his review of the Khobar Towers bombing and has concluded that the chain of command failed to proactively support the local commander in protecting his forces. In addition, he faults Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, who commanded the 4404th Wing in Saudi Arabia, for neglecting to seek assistance and to adequately protect his unit - a core responsibility of any military commander. Bill (who has carefully reviewed the record) will not bring charges against Schwalier but will recommend that you remove him from the 1995 Major General list.

General Schwalier focused his force protection efforts on preventing a terrorist penetration into the compound. He assumed that a stand-off bomb would not exceed the size of the one used in the November 1995 attack against the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) in Riyadh. In Bill's judgment this was inadequate. Strategic intelligence alerted our forces to the probability of a terrorist attack and indicated Khobar Towers was among the targets of highest interest. In addition, approximately 4,000 pounds of TNT had been smuggled into Saudi Arabia since the OPM/SANG attack (a stand-off explosion of approximately 220 pounds of TNT). Schwalier undertook over 130 separate protection enhancements (ranging from increasing the guard force and strengthening fences, to ensuring food and water supplies

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could not be poisoned); nonetheless, there were prudent additional efforts that could and should have been pursued, including installation of an alarm system in the building. General Fogleman believes Schwalier is not culpable for the Khobar failure, as the Air Force and Central Command did not adequately support the mission. Fogleman's view that the Khobar tragedy was an unavoidable "act of war" led, in part, to his decision to retire early.

Bill's decision has been long anticipated by the bombing victims' families, congressional members and Pentagon watchers who anticipated General Fogleman's retirement decision. Many in the Air Force will disagree with Bill's decision to single out Schwalier; however, the overall decision will probably be well received within the other Services, the media and on the Hill.

The divergent views amongst the military services may reflect cultural differences regarding both command accountability and force protection approaches. For example, some have stated that a senior Army or Marine officer would have viewed defensive tasks differently than an Air Force commander.

Some will question why Bill does not fault Central Command and the CINC, General Peay, for failing to adequately support Schwalier and for neglecting to properly organize and equip the mission in Saudi Arabia. You might seek Bill's views regarding the CINC's role in adequately structuring the long-term SOUTHERN WATCH mission. (It was established in 1992 for a short-term operation to enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq).

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary Cohen
 General Shalikashvili
 Erskine Bowles
 Samuel Berger
 Leon Fuerth
 Donald Kerrick




IV. PRESS PLAN

WH Photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Secretary Cohen's staff requested an easel for Cohen to place photographs on.



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001b memo	Draft memo from Samuel Berger to the President, re: Meeting with Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili (3 pages)	07/31/1997	P5 4152

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[Khobar]
OA/Box Number: 1633

FOLDER TITLE:

9705198

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke1736

RESTRICTION CODES

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
July 30, 1997

MEETING WITHSECRETARY COHEN & GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI

DATE: July 31, 1997

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 12:15 - 12:45 p.m.


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II. BACKGROUND

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could not be poisoned); nonetheless, there were prudent additional efforts that could and should have been pursued, including installation of an alarm system in the building. General Fogleman believes Schwalier is not culpable for the Khobar failure, as the Air Force and Central Command did not adequately support the mission. Fogleman's view that the Khobar tragedy was an unavoidable "act of war" led, in part, to his decision to retire early.

Bill's decision has been long anticipated by the bombing victims' families, congressional members and Pentagon watchers who anticipated General Fogleman's retirement decision. Many in the Air Force will disagree with Bill's decision to single out Schwalier; however, the overall decision will probably be well received within the other Services, the media and on the Hill.

The divergent views amongst the military services may reflect cultural differences regarding both command accountability and force protection approaches. For example, some have stated that a senior Army or Marine officer would have viewed defensive tasks differently than an Air Force commander.

Some will question why Bill does not fault Central Command and the CINC, General Peay, for failing to adequately support Schwalier and for neglecting to properly organize and equip the mission in Saudi Arabia. You might seek Bill's views regarding the CINC's role in adequately structuring the long-term SOUTHERN WATCH mission. (It was established in 1992 for a short-term operation to enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq).

III. PARTICIPANTS


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Secretary Cohen
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Leon Fuerth
Donald Kerrick

IV. PRESS PLAN

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
V. SEQUENCE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



MEETING WITH
SECRETARY COHEN & GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI

DATE: July 31, 1997

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FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

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
II. BACKGROUND*has concluded that*

Secretary Cohen has completed his review of the Khobar Towers bombing and ~~believes~~ the chain of command failed to proactively support the local commander in protecting his forces. In addition, he faults Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier, who commanded the 4404th Wing in Saudi Arabia, for neglecting to seek assistance and to adequately protect his unit - a core responsibility of any military commander. Cohen will not bring charges against Schwalier but will recommend removing him from the 1995 Major General list.

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including installation of an alarm system in the building *nonetheless,*

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The Downing Report noted failures at different levels in the military chain of command. Of the report's findings, one attributes command failures at Air Force levels above the 4404th Wing Commander; two specifically cite failures on the part of General Schwalier; two single out DoD; and five detail Central Command failures. (Not all failures were of the same magnitude.) General Fogleman believes Schwalier is not culpable for the Khobar failure, as the Air Force and Central Command did not adequately support the mission. Fogleman's view that the Khobar tragedy was an unavoidable "act of war" led, in part, to his decision to retire early.


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The divergent views amongst the military services may reflect cultural differences regarding both command accountability and force protection approaches. For example, some have stated that a senior Army or Marine officer would have viewed defensive tasks differently than an Air Force commander. You might ask Cohen if we are truly maximizing the functional strengths and benefits of "joint Service approaches" (such as force protection) when establishing operations such as SOUTHERN WATCH.

Bill's *well* *Bill*
Some may question why Cohen does not fault Central Command and the CINC, General Peay, for failing to adequately support Schwalier and for neglecting to properly organize and equip the mission in Saudi Arabia. You might seek Cohen's views regarding the CINC's role in adequately structuring the long-term SOUTHERN WATCH mission. (It was established in 1992 for a short-term operation to enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq).

Other Potential Questions:

- How will his decision feed into a climate where many in the military already view it as a "zero defect" climate?
- How will this decision be viewed in the Air Force, coming so soon after General Fogleman's retirement announcement?



III. PARTICIPANTS

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The Vice President
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