

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. form	Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (12 pages)	11/09/1995	P6/b(6)
002. memo	Sincavage, Michael R. to Quinn, John M. re: Tax Check Report - Sidney David Drell [26 U.S.C. 6103] (1 page)	11/29/1995	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
003. memo	Sincavage, Michael R. to Quinn, John M. re: Tax Check Report - Sidney David Drell [26 U.S.C. 6103] [duplicate of 002] (1 page)	11/29/1995	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
004. form	Acknowledgment and Consent Regarding Intent to Nominate or Appoint [partial] (1 page)	11/09/1995	P6/b(6)
005. form	Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (15 pages)	11/09/1995	P6/b(6)
006. form	Personal Data Statement Questionnaire (3 pages)	11/09/1995	P6/b(6)
007. form	Questionnaire for National Security Positions (14 pages)	11/09/1995	P6/b(6)
008. form	Office of Counsel to the President Interview of Proposed Presidential Sub-Cabinet Appointee (8 pages)	01/24/1996	P6/b(6)
009. memo	Sincavage to Kennedy, William H. re: Tax Check Report [26 U.S.C. 6103] (1 page)	06/10/1993	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
010. form	Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (11 pages)	04/29/1993	P6/b(6)
011. form	[Taxpayer Authorization for Disclosure of Return Information] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
012. notice	[State of California Notice of Tax Change] (1 page)	05/22/1992	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's Office

OA/Box Number: CF 1488

FOLDER TITLE:

[Appointees] Drell, Sidney [1]

2006-1012-F
eh673

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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013. memo	Sincavage to Kennedy, William H. re: Tax Check Report [26 U.S.C. 6103] [duplicate of 009] (1 page)	06/10/1993	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
014. memo	Sincavage to Kennedy, William H. re: Tax Check Report [26 U.S.C. 6103] [duplicate of 009] (1 page)	06/10/1993	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
015. memo	W. Gregg Burgess to Kathleen Whalen and Marvin Krislov (3 pages)	01/30/1995	P5
016. memo	Jana Blair to Marvin Krislov (3 pages)	01/24/1996	P5
017. report	Sidney Drell (3 pages)	01/17/1996	P5
018. report	Sidney Drell (1 page)	03/30/1993	P5

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2/2/96

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHLEEN WHALEN
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

MARVIN KRISLOV
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. Gregg Burgess *WMB*
DATE: January 30, 1995
CANDIDATE: Dr. Sidney David Drell
POSITION: Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
CONCLUSION: Assuming other background checks do not suggest a contrary conclusion, this nomination may proceed.

This memorandum is based on my review of the attached file, which contains the following:

XX SF 278 or SF 450;
XX SF 86;
XX WH PDS;
XX IRS Memorandum;
XX Vetting Report.

Process of Review

I have reviewed Dr. Drell's SF 450 as submitted and other relevant information from the file with Frank Fountain, General Counsel and Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). We have discussed all of the necessary corrections to the SF 450 and I have been assured that they will be made as indicated on the copy within the file. Mr. Fountain and I agree that Dr. Drell's SF 450 disclosures present no insurmountable conflicts of interest with his proposed reappointment as Member of the PFIAB.

Conflicts Discussion

1. Background on the PFIAB

The PFIAB was established by the President to assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, and of counterintelligence and other intelligence activities; to continually review the performance of

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all agencies of the Federal Government that are engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or the execution of intelligence policy; and to assess the adequacy of management, personnel and organization in the intelligence agencies.

The PFIAB shall consist of not more than 16 members, who shall serve at the pleasure of the President and shall be appointed by the President from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside the Government who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience and independence. Members of the PFIAB shall serve without compensation, but may receive transportation expenses and per diem allowance as authorized by law.

2. Employment of Harold William Drell

Dr. Drell has been a Member of the PFIAB since 1993 and is a professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University, where he has been employed since 1963. He also performs consulting/advisory functions for the JASON division of MITRE Corp. (a group of academic scientists) and the University of California's President's Council on the National Laboratories.

3. Financial Interests

Listed assets on Part I of the SF 450 include a personal checking account, money market accounts, mutual funds which qualify as excepted investment funds (EIF's), stock interests of publicly traded corporations, U.S. Treasury notes, and a vested interest in TIAA-CREF (also an EIF). Mr. Fountain and I agree that none of these assets presents any conflict of interest with Dr. Drell's proposed reappointment as Member of the PFIAB, which may not be handled by usual avenues of resolution.

He has entered "none" on Part II of the SF 450. No other information in the file contradicts this representation.

4. Outside Positions

Included on Part III of Dr. Drell's SF 450 are the following outside positions:

- Consultant for the JASON Division of MITRE Corp.;
- Professor and Deputy Director for the Stanford Linear Acceleration Center of Stanford University;
- Adjunct Professor for Carnegie Mellon University's Department of Engineering and Public Policy (position no longer held);
- Chairman of the University of California President's Council on the National Laboratories;

- Member of the Council on Foreign Relations;
- Member of the Board of Governors of the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, Israel;
- Board Member of "Annual Reviews, Inc.";
- Advisor to the Ploughshares Fund; and
- Board Member of the International Science Foundation.

5. Agreements or Arrangements

On Part IV of the SF 450, Dr. Drell has entered "none." No other information contained in the file contradicts this representation.

6. Ethics Agreement

It is the opinion of Mr. Fountain and I that none of Dr. Drell's interests nor his outside affiliations should pose a problem to his reappointment, since any problems can be handled by the usual avenues for resolution of conflicts of interest.

Other Potentially Relevant Information

The public records search on Dr. Drell revealed a few articles of interest relating to his expressed views on testing of nuclear weapons, advocating our nation's role in a European accelerator project, and his reluctance to be appointed to a Federal Government advisory committee regarding priorities for high-energy research. Details on these issues are included in the file.

In my opinion, there are no other items contained in the file that may be of potential interest.

* * * * *

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January 24, 1996

**MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN KRISLOV
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT**

FROM: Jana L. Blaik *JB*
Office of Counsel to the President

SUBJECT: Interview with Sidney Drell (PA) Presidential Foreign
Advisory Board

Dr. Drell, age 69, has been employed as a Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University since 1963. Dr. Drell has been a Member of the Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1993. He is up for reappointment. His interview on Wednesday, January 24, 1995, revealed the following information:

INTERVIEW

Taxes Dr. Drell's tax check was in the file and revealed no issues. Moreover, Dr. Drell disclosed a tax error on his 1991 state tax return which has long since been resolved and was disclosed in paperwork for his initial appointment in 1993. Dr. Drell stated that with the exception of the his 1991 tax matter there had been no tax problems or issues.

Domestic Help Dr. Drell stated that he and his wife use a gardening service and a housecleaning service. He stated that the companies furnish the supplies and bill him monthly. He said that the services pay the workers and he pays the service. He said the service pays the workers' wages, social security and taxes.

Conflicts of Interest Dr. Drell stated that he would divest himself of any interests which presented a conflict. He noted that most items should have already been addressed in his initial appointment.

Boards of Directors Dr. Drell noted that he is a Trustee for the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, he is on the Board of Governors for Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel, and he serves on the Boards of Directors for Annual Reviews, Inc., and the Arms Control Association. He explained that most of these positions were pro bono but that he did receive an honorarium for some of the positions. He stated that he would step down from any of these post which presented a problem.

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PUBLIC RECORD ISSUES

The public record research on Dr. Drell revealed the following issues:

On the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

On September 2, 1995, the NATIONAL JOURNAL reported that Senator Dole was troubled by the President's decision to ban testing on nuclear weapons. The article recognized Dr. Drell as the chairman of the group that released the report that supported the President's decision. Dr. Drell was quoted as stating that Dole's comment was at odds with scientific and technological conclusions.

In response to this article Dr. Drell stated that his statements were correct. He said that he did the study and briefed the Secretary of Energy and others about the results and he was proud that the study was the basis of the President's decision.

An August 23, 1995, article in the HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS reported that Dr. Drell had submitted a report in 1990, supporting that tests were necessary and that he had testified in supported this position until 1992. The article noted that Dr. Drell had only recently released a report reaching the opposite conclusion.

In response to the Heritage article, Dr. Drell stated that the 1990 report was misrepresented by the article and that it was an attempt to discredit him. He said that his report stated that testing was necessary to improve the safety of nuclear weapons but that continued testing was a decision that would be considered when trying to get a non-proliferation treaty in force.

Criticized for Advocation U.S. Role in European Collider

A 1994 article noted that Dr. Drell, as chairman of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel, was criticized for advocating U.S. participation in a European accelerator project.

Dr. Drell said that he did support participation in the project and that he told the Department of Energy exactly what he thought about the project and the role of the U.S.

Reluctance to Appointment to and Advisory Board

The March 20, 1994, NEW YORK TIMES reported that Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary requested that Dr. Drell be appointed to an advisory committee but that he was reluctant and had claimed that the Federal Government had given too little heed to the advice of physicists.

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Dr. Drell noted that he was reluctant about being appointed to the board but that it was because the budget was too low. He said that it would have been too difficult to do high-energy research with such a low budget. He said that at one point the budget was lower than when he accepted the appointment and he almost left. When asked about the article quote, he stated that he was not familiar with the article and could not remember making the quoted statement.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on my interview with the candidate and the information provided thus far, I recommend that this nomination proceed.

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SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member (PA)
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Dr. Sidney Drell has been employed as a Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University since 1963. A physicist and arms control specialist, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to the executive and legislative branches of government on national security and defense technical issues since 1960. He has been a Member of the Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1993.¹

Dr. Drell has written extensively on his research achievements in theoretical physics and nuclear arms control.²

On the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

The NATIONAL JOURNAL reported on September 2, 1995 that President Clinton had announced on August 11, 1995, that the United States would support a "zero threshold" test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, Senator Robert Dole declared that he was "deeply troubled" by the President's decision because the "credibility, safety and security of our nuclear deterrent [would] be fundamentally affected for years to come." Dr. Drell was chairman of a study team under the

¹ Dr. Drell received an A.B. from Princeton University in 1946. He received a M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

Dr. Drell has been a consultant for the JASON Division of the MITRE Corporation since 1960. He has also provided consulting services for the Central Intelligence Agency since 1976 and for Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory since 1967. Throughout his career, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to numerous other divisions of the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as other educational institutions including, but not limited to, Chairman of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the House Armed Services Committee and the Technology Review Panel of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and Consultant to the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Dr. Drell currently chairs the U.S. President's Council on the National Laboratories.

² Due to the limited nature of this public record vet and current staffing limitations, Dr. Drell's writings were not reviewed.

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JASON group that had released a report in July 1995 that supported the President's call for a zero-yield comprehensive test ban. Dr. Drell reportedly stated that Senator Dole's comment was "obviously at odds with the scientific and technological conclusions" reached by the JASON group.

On August 23, 1995, the HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS published an article regarding the test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, President Clinton's decision to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban was based on "misperceptions about nuclear testing." Specifically, the article stated that, although the Administration asserted that "nuclear tests are not needed to maintain a stockpile of reliable, safe, and effective nuclear weapons [t]ests are needed." The article cited a report submitted to the House Armed Services Committee in 1990 by a non-partisan panel of scientists chaired by Dr. Drell which found that the tests were needed. According to the article, Dr. Drell testified in support of the assessment contained in the 1990 report as recently as 1992. The article noted however, that the JASON group, also chaired by Dr. Drell, released a report on August 4, 1995, which reached the opposite conclusion.

Supports Building Laser at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

A September 3, 1994 article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES reported on the political battles over a proposal to build a multibillion dollar laser known as the National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The project was reportedly criticized as undermining the moratorium on nuclear testing and as a "pork barrel project that will further pollute the environment around Livermore." Proponents reportedly argued that the facility was "vital to maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." In discussing the new laser, Dr. Drell reportedly stated, "It is an important area to be pursuing. It is good physics, and it is very good people doing it." Many opponents of the laser argued that supporting the laser was contrary to the United States agreement to a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Criticized for Advocating U.S. Role in European Collider

An article in the March 14, 1994 edition of INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Dr. Drell, as chairman of a subpanel of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP), was criticized by some colleagues who claimed that he was advocating that U.S. participation in a European accelerator project, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) be given greater emphasis than domestic research projects. Dr. Drell reportedly denied that he was ranking Europe's LHC ahead of support for

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U.S. accelerator programs and that the LHC could just have well been listed second instead of first on the report his subpanel submitted.

On March 14, 1994, an article regarding the same issue in SUPERCONDUCTOR WEEK reported that the harsh response to Dr. Drell's report was "no doubt fueled by physicists whose own base programs were being cut back."

Reluctance to Appointment to an Advisory Board

On March 20, 1994, the NEW YORK TIMES reported that Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary had requested that Dr. Drell be appointed to an advisory committee made up of young physicists who were to make detailed recommendations to the Government on new priorities for high-energy research, taking into account the absence of the Superconducting Supercollider, but noted that Mrs. O'Leary said that Dr. Drell had been reluctant to take on the advisory project claiming that "the Federal Government had given too little heed to previous advice from working physicists."

Aside from the above, a limited review of the available public record revealed no information that might bear negatively on Dr. Drell's candidacy, generate controversy, or disqualify him from continuing to serve as a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

January 17, 1996

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SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member of the
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Sidney D. Drell, a physicist and arms control specialist, has been an advisor to the executive and legislative branches of government on national security and defense technical issues since 1960. He currently is Professor and Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, at Stanford University.

This review of the public record is limited to the files of the Foreign Agents Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, as well as the lobbyist registration files of the U.S. House and U.S. Senate. No further review of the public record was made. Sidney D. Drell has not registered as a lobbyist for any foreign or domestic clients.

March 30, 1993

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001. form	Personal Data Statement Questionnaire (3 pages)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
002. form	Retirement Account Statement (9 pages)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
003. form	Notice of Tax Change (1 page)	05/22/1992	P6/b(6)
004. form	Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security). (19 pages)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
005. form	Acknowledgement and Consent Regarding Intent to Nominate or Appoint [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
006. form	Standard Form 86 [Authorization for Release of Information] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
007. form	Additional Data for Single Scope Background Investigations and Other Background Investigations (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
008. form	Personal Data Statement Questionnaire [duplicate of 001] (3 pages)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
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010. form	Acknowledgement and Consent Regarding Intent to Nominate or Appoint [duplicate of 005] [partial] (1 page)	04/27/1993	P6/b(6)
011. form	Additional Data for Single Scope Background Investigations and Other Background Investigations [duplicate of 007] (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
012. form	Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security) [page 6 only] (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)

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Counsel's Office

OA/Box Number: CF 1488

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[Appointees] Drell, Sidney [2]

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013. report	Interview Completion Form (partial) (1 page)	05/06/1993	P3/b(3), P5
014. report	Dr. Sidney Drell (3 pages)	01/20/1999	P5
015. report	Sidney D. Drell (3 pages)	01/17/1996	P5

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OFFICE OF COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

Interview Completion Form

NAME OF CANDIDATE: *Sidney Drell*

TELEPHONE: *(w) 415-726-2664*

DEPARTMENT/POSITION: *Member, President
Foreign Intelligence Advising Board*

CANDIDATE'S COUNSEL:

ACTION:

☒ Interview Completed; No Follow-Up Required

☐ Follow-Up Required:

I. Domestic Help

II. Financial

III. Other

☐ HOLD UP NOMINATION

PERSONS CONSULTED:

Gary

ATTORNEY IN CHARGE:

Gary Ginsberg

DATE OF INTERVIEW:

5/6/73

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DR. SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member (PA)
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Dr. Drell has been a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) since 1993. He is Professor Emeritus at Stanford University's Linear Accelerator Center (Center); before his retirement in 1998, Dr. Drell was a Deputy Director at the Center.¹

Supporter of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On September 26, 1996, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE identified Dr. Drell as a supporter of the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing. Dr. Drell, on the signing of the treaty by the United States and other major powers, was quoted as stating, "It is a major achievement after 40 years of effort. This is an important step in the direction of uniting the world in an effort to contain the nuclear danger."

In a transcript of a June 10, 1998, broadcast of *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, Dr. Drell declared that the Senate should "[d]efinitely" ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty (treaty). Dr. Drell was quoted as stating, "On national security grounds, . . . on technical grounds I believe [the treaty is] in our interest." He, too, was quoted as saying, ". . . I think when you balance the risks and the benefits, getting the added power into our ability to verify activities around the world, which we will with the comprehensive test ban, [and] accepting the judgment of many, including the [nuclear] lab directors, that [nuclear] testing is not necessary, we should go with [the treaty] The goal of the game is to try and restrain proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, making them [less] available to terrorists." Finally, Dr. Drell was quoted, "If the United States is to be a leader in preserving this important [non-proliferation regime] and try and restrain [proliferation], we must ratify the treaty to be sitting at the table as a leader."

On August 10, 1998, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Dr. Drell was very much interested in nuclear non-proliferation. According to the article, Dr. Drell said that the treaty would help guarantee nuclear nonproliferation in the future. He was quoted as stating, "If we truly believe in non-proliferation, then we must have a corresponding treaty that ensures no tests are taking place." Dr. Drell noted that the world's four other declared nuclear powers had already signed the treaty, and he reportedly asserted that "[f]ailure by the Senate to ratify the treaty would put the United States at a disadvantage" in the future. Dr. Drell was quoted as stating, "If we want to influence international [nonproliferation]

¹ This is an update of an earlier public record vet dated January 17, 1996. For additional issues and biographical information, please see the attached.

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policy in the future, then the treaty must be ratified [by the Senate]."

Controversy over Dr. Drell's Support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On June 2, 1998, Dr. Drell wrote an opinion piece in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the NEW YORK TIMES. More precisely, Dr. Drell wrote in favor of Senate ratification of the treaty and, apparently, in response to statements by Senator Trent Lott against the treaty. Senator Lott had argued that "the nuclear spiral in Asia demonstrates the irrelevance of U.S. action" on the treaty and branded the treaty "unverifiable and ineffectual." Dr. Drell was plainly of a different opinion than Senator Lott, determining that "the treaty's international monitoring system, when used in combination with our own intelligence resources, provides the means to verify the test ban effectively. Further, he argued that "a quick vote in the Senate approving the treaty is an essential response to the South Asian nuclear gambit." Dr. Drell noted that the treaty "calls for the [nuclear testing] monitoring system to be beefed up" and that the treaty "would allow us to request a short-notice, on-site inspection if we had any evidence suggesting that a nuclear weapons test might have occurred." Dr. Drell contended that "[t]he test ban treaty -- which has already been signed by 149 nations and ratified by our nuclear allies, Britain and France -- provides the legal framework for a long-term solution to the problem of nuclear testing in India and Pakistan." Additionally, Dr. Drell argued that "Senate ratification would strengthen our hand in pushing India and Pakistan toward a responsible course, and it would help dissuade other states from going down the dangerous road of developing nuclear weapons." Dr. Drell, in conclusion, offered that "[Senate] [i]naction will not help to deter further nuclear tests or reduce nuclear dangers. Rather than pointing to India's and Pakistan's tests as an excuse for inaction, the Senate should be approving the treaty without delay."

In a June 3, 1998, opinion piece in the NEW YORK TIMES, it was claimed by a former CIA Soviet policy analyst that Dr. Drell "exaggerate[d] the success of Central Intelligence Agency monitoring against Russian nuclear tests and misse[d] the political significance of the agency's intelligence failure regarding Indian nuclear testing" in his above commentary.

In a June 12, 1998, opinion piece in the NEW YORK TIMES, Senator Trent Lott maintained that Dr. Drell's "arguments in favor of Senate action on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty do not stand up to reality." Senator Lott argued that the Treaty "adds nothing to global security." He continued, "Some arms control theologians may think that Senate action on the treaty would have affected the decisions of India and Pakistan to conduct multiple nuclear weapons tests last month. Serious people should not." Senator Lott finished, "Treaty advocates should expend their energy on supporting de-escalation of the nuclear arms race in Asia, not in lobbying for an unverifiable treaty overtaken by events."

Opponent of "Star Wars" Program

On July 31, 1998, the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE reported that "[d]uring the 1980s, the outspoken [Dr.] Drell was a leading opponent of President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative." Dr. Drell reportedly argued that President Reagan's "Star Wars"

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program "would destabilize efforts to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and its Cold War antagonist, the former Soviet Union." According to the article, Dr. Drell, during the "Star Wars" debate, "consulted with Mikhail Gorbachev on the former Soviet leader's unprecedented plan unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet missiles."

Advocate of Controversial Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program

In January 1996, the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS described Dr. Drell as a "nuclear warhead and testing insider." The article stated that "[l]ike most other boosters of stock pile stewardship, [Dr.] Drell ignores why the replacement warhead [from the 'colossal B53 gravity bomb' to the 'smaller B61 bombs'] is being pursued. The actual purpose is not, as the Study Group asserts, for the [T]hird World. The new B61 . . . would be a . . . late-arriving, earth penetrating weapon intended to burrow after Russian military commanders and leaders in their underground bunkers." According to the article, the "wasteful and pernicious truth" about the replacement was that "nuclear warfighting [was] alive and well."

On May 5, 1998, the SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN reported that Dr. Drell is "a fierce advocate of the Energy Department's controversial stockpile stewardship program. More than an advocate, [Dr.] Drell is generally considered a principal founder of the effort to maintain the nation's aging nuclear arsenal." According to the article, "[t]he arms control community, while not exactly embracing [nuclear weapons] stewardship, is tolerating it in order to have [the treaty]." The article said as well that "[a]nti-nuclear activists, however, warn that stewardship is primarily a weapons development program that will ultimately render the [treaty] moot." Dr. Drell was quoted as saying, "The anti-nuclear crowd goes off the rails when they say you can improve the arsenal (with stewardship) and that the program is a subterfuge. I just totally, technically, disagree."

Aside from the above, a limited review of the available public record revealed no information that might bear negatively on Dr. Drell's candidacy, generate controversy, or disqualify him from serving as a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

January 20, 1999

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SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member (PA)
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Dr. Sidney Drell has been employed as a Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University since 1963. A physicist and arms control specialist, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to the executive and legislative branches of government on national security and defense technical issues since 1960. He has been a Member of the Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1993.¹

Dr. Drell has written extensively on his research achievements in theoretical physics and nuclear arms control.²

On the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

The NATIONAL JOURNAL reported on September 2, 1995 that President Clinton had announced on August 11, 1995, that the United States would support a "zero threshold" test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, Senator Robert Dole declared that he was "deeply troubled" by the President's decision because the "credibility, safety and security of our nuclear deterrent [would] be fundamentally affected for years to come." Dr. Drell was chairman of a study team under the

¹ Dr. Drell received an A.B. from Princeton University in 1946. He received a M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

Dr. Drell has been a consultant for the JASON Division of the MITRE Corporation since 1960. He has also provided consulting services for the Central Intelligence Agency since 1976 and for Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory since 1967. Throughout his career, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to numerous other divisions of the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as other educational institutions including, but not limited to, Chairman of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the House Armed Services Committee and the Technology Review Panel of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and Consultant to the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Dr. Drell currently chairs the U.S. President's Council on the National Laboratories.

² Due to the limited nature of this public record vet and current staffing limitations, Dr. Drell's writings were not reviewed.

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JASON group that had released a report in July 1995 that supported the President's call for a zero-yield comprehensive test ban. Dr. Drell reportedly stated that Senator Dole's comment was "obviously at odds with the scientific and technological conclusions" reached by the JASON group.

On August 23, 1995, the HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS published an article regarding the test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, President Clinton's decision to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban was based on "misperceptions about nuclear testing." Specifically, the article stated that, although the Administration asserted that "nuclear tests are not needed to maintain a stockpile of reliable, safe, and effective nuclear weapons [t]ests are needed." The article cited a report submitted to the House Armed Services Committee in 1990 by a non-partisan panel of scientists chaired by Dr. Drell which found that the tests were needed. According to the article, Dr. Drell testified in support of the assessment contained in the 1990 report as recently as 1992. The article noted however, that the JASON group, also chaired by Dr. Drell, released a report on August 4, 1995, which reached the opposite conclusion.

Supports Building Laser at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

A September 3, 1994 article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES reported on the political battles over a proposal to build a multibillion dollar laser known as the National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The project was reportedly criticized as undermining the moratorium on nuclear testing and as a "pork barrel project that will further pollute the environment around Livermore." Proponents reportedly argued that the facility was "vital to maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." In discussing the new laser, Dr. Drell reportedly stated, "It is an important area to be pursuing. It is good physics, and it is very good people doing it." Many opponents of the laser argued that supporting the laser was contrary to the United States agreement to a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Criticized for Advocating U.S. Role in European Collider

An article in the March 14, 1994 edition of INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Dr. Drell, as chairman of a subpanel of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP), was criticized by some colleagues who claimed that he was advocating that U.S. participation in a European accelerator project, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) be given greater emphasis than domestic research projects. Dr. Drell reportedly denied that he was ranking Europe's LHC ahead of support for

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U.S. accelerator programs and that the LHC could just have well been listed second instead of first on the report his subpanel submitted.

On March 14, 1994, an article regarding the same issue in SUPERCONDUCTOR WEEK reported that the harsh response to Dr. Drell's report was "no doubt fueled by physicists whose own base programs were being cut back."

Reluctance to Appointment to an Advisory Board

On March 20, 1994, the NEW YORK TIMES reported that Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary had requested that Dr. Drell be appointed to an advisory committee made up of young physicists who were to make detailed recommendations to the Government on new priorities for high-energy research, taking into account the absence of the Superconducting Supercollider, but noted that Mrs. O'Leary said that Dr. Drell had been reluctant to take on the advisory project claiming that "the Federal Government had given too little heed to previous advice from working physicists."

Aside from the above, a limited review of the available public record revealed no information that might bear negatively on Dr. Drell's candidacy, generate controversy, or disqualify him from continuing to serve as a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

January 17, 1996

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Marusin , Thomas to Nolan, Beth re: Tax Check Report [26 U.S.C. 6103] (1 page)	11/16/1999	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
002. form	Questionnaire for National Security Positions (21 pages)	03/12/1999	P6/b(6)
003. form	Disclosure Authorization Form [partial] (1 page)	03/12/1999	P6/b(6)
004. form	Disclosure Authorization Form [originally dated 11/14/1998] [partial] (1 page)	03/12/1999	P6/b(6)
005. memo	Marusin , Thomas to Nolan, Beth re: Tax Check Report [26 U.S.C. 6103] [duplicate of 001] (1 page)	11/16/1999	P3/b(3), P6/b(6)
006. form	Tax Check Waiver [Authorizing Disclosure of Return Information] (2 pages)	11/15/1999	P6/b(6)
007. form	Personal Data Statement Questionnaire (4 pages)	11/14/1998	P6/b(6)
008. memo	Ott, Dana B. to Winston, Lisa re: Results of Interview with Sidney D. Drell, Candidate for President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) (2 pages)	01/25/1999	P6/b(6)
009. form	Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report (3 pages)	11/14/1998	P6/b(6)
010. form	Acknowledgment and Consent Regarding Intent to Nominate or Appointment [partial] (1 page)	11/14/1998	P6/b(6)
011. form	Office of Counsel to the President Interview of Proposed Presidential Sub-Cabinet Appointee (11 pages)	01/25/1999	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's Office
Jane Schaffner
OA/Box Number: CF 1636

FOLDER TITLE:

Drell, Sidney

2006-1012-F
eh672

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. memo	Frank Fountain to Charles Ruff (2 pages)	03/25/1999	P5
013. report	Dr. Sidney Drell Candidate for Member of the PFIAB (19 pages)	n.d.	P5
014. report	Dr. Sidney Drell (3 pages)	01/20/1999	P5
015. report	Sidney D. Drell (3 pages)	01/17/1996	P5
016. report	Sidney D. Drell (1 page)	03/30/1993	P5
017. report	Search results (2 pages)	05/04/1999	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel's Office
Jane Schaffner
OA/Box Number: CF 1636

FOLDER TITLE:

Drell, Sidney

2006-1012-F
ch672

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Personnel Information - Treat Accordingly

DR. SIDNEY D. DRELL

Candidate for Member

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PA)

The investigation into security problems at Lawrence Livermore Lab ("LLL") is ongoing. This memo contains articles through June 30, 1999.¹

Dr. Drell's Connection to the University of California:

A December 1992 article in TECH TRANSFER REPORT stated that under a new contract between the Department of Energy ("DOE") and the University of California ("UC"), a high-level advisory panel would be formed "to counsel the university on lab management and help determine UC-directed research at the facilities." According to the article, the advisory group would be called the University of California President's Council on the National Laboratories and would have 22 members selected from academic and research institutions, private industry and government. Furthermore, Dr. Drell was selected as chairman of the panel.

A February 1, 1996 article in FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY REPORT quoted Dr. Drell as stating:

I find it ironic that it will take real effort by the university leadership starting at the very top to convince many in Washington, in both the executive and congressional branches of government, that what the UC is doing is a great national service by accepting this management burden. Some still need convincing that UC is not simply an absentee landlord collecting a management fee.

The article also stated the "three national laboratories operated by the University of California are producing 'excellent to outstanding' science and technology, and DOE should extend automatically the contracts of all [of] them, according to Sidney Drell, the chairman of a panel that advises UC President Richard Atkinson on the labs."

¹ The memo is based on the following searches in NEXIS/NEWS/ALLNWS:

1. (Lawrence /1 Livermore) /80 spy! or steal! or chin! or espionage! or leak! and date > 1998
2. Lawrence /1 Livermore and date > June 16, 1998
3. Sidney /3 Drell and (Los /1 Alamos) or Chin! or (Lawrence /1 Livermore)
4. Sidney /3 Drell and date > June 16, 1999
5. Sidney /3 Drell and (university /2 california)
6. Livermore and (Richard pre/3 Zare) or AFFYMAX

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A January 30, 1997 article published in the FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY REPORT reported that Dr. Drell, in his annual report on the labs to the UC Regents, stated that all three UC labs are "healthy, . . . managed well, and their achievements in science, technology and engineering are a credit to [UC]."

According to a March 19, 1999 article in the SACRAMENTO BEE, Dr. Drell still was heading the UC advisory panel.

According to an April 23, 1999 article in the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Dr. Drell wrote a letter to the president of UC in March 1999, stating "[t]he laboratory community cannot be isolated or subjected to excessive secrecy, or it will suffer stagnation and long-term damage."

University of California's Role in Managing LLL:

The University of California has managed LLL, Los Alamos, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory since they were opened in the 1940s and 1950s through contracts with the federal government.

A May 26, 1999 article in the UNIVERSITY WIRE discussed UC's role in managing LLL, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Berkeley labs. The article quoted Ward Connerly, a UC Regent, as stating "[a]ny federal contractor has a responsibility to do its part in maintaining security. . . . The security responsibilities lie primarily on the people on-site. UC has a responsibility to maintain adequate security."

However, a May 21, 1999 article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES quotes Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante as stating "[t]he university was told that the federal government was handling security." The article also states that the Lt. Gov. was disturbed by news reports "scapegoating the university, implying that the university has not done its job."

A May 26, 1999 UNIVERSITY WIRE article quotes Rick Malaspina, the manager of public affairs for the UC laboratories, as stating that "[t]he DOE sets policy and guidance for security and counterintelligence. The labs are responsible for implementing those policies." The article also reported that Mr. Malaspina "denied any wrongdoing on the part of the UC management, saying that the university has successfully implemented DOE policies."

According to an April 23, 1999 article in the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, the UC's contract with the federal government "gives the university explicit responsibility for safeguarding classified information." Furthermore, the article stated that "despite promises to improve security, GAO officials have said

that the University of California and the labs have made insufficient progress."

According to a May 26, 1999 article in the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), whose district includes LLL, said it "was inappropriate to blame UC, which is not in charge of security, for the lapses." The article quotes her as saying "[t]here's not been any questions about" the day-to-day management of the labs."

A June 7, 1999 article in INSIGHT ON THE NEWS stated that:

[t]he problems during the Reagan-Bush administrations, DOE security analysts say, stemmed from a decades-old culture of academic elitism that has prevailed in the prestigious research labs, such as Los Alamos and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, both managed by the University of California. Some research scientists have tended to regard the sharing of science with all humanity as a nobler goal than protecting national security, and others are quite open about their concern that the United States has become the lone superpower.

An April 23, 1999 article in the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION stated that "[t]o date, the Energy Department has taken the brunt of public criticism over the alleged leaks [from the weapons labs], which have not been conclusively traced to Los Alamos. But as the contractor that runs the labs, the University of California is not without critics." The article then reported that:

[a]n official of the General Accounting Office . . . last week cited security shortcomings in support of its long-standing proposal that the Energy Department end the university's monopoly on running the labs and seek competitive bids for the contract In 1992, the GAO called for open bidding because of problems in university procurement practices for the labs; the agency also warned, in reports released in 1989 and 1997, of inadequate lab security.

According to a June 22, 1999 article in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, the Energy Department has begun wholesale polygraphing of nuclear weapon scientists and other sensitive employees. The article reported that in the fall of 1998, UC, which is the direct employer of many of the scientists, wrote to Secretary Richardson that "it would object to using polygraph testing 'broadly as a managerial tool' rather than 'in a limited and more focused manner to investigate serious espionage situations.'"

Cox Report:

On May 25, 1999, the declassified portion of the Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China ("Cox Report") was made public. According to a May 26, 1999 NEW YORK TIMES article, the report found that in the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on the US W-70 warhead from LLL.² Furthermore, according to the NYT article, the report found that:

[t]he PRC acquired this and other classified U.S. nuclear weapons information as the result of a 20-year intelligence collection program to develop modern thermonuclear weapons, continuing to this very day, that includes espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories.

The Select committee has found that the primary focus of this long-term, ongoing PRC intelligence collection effort has been on the following national weapons laboratories: Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, Sandia.

The NYT article also quoted the Cox Report as finding that:

[d]espite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national nuclear laboratories does not meet even minimal standards.

More specifically, the Select Committee has concluded that the successful penetration of our national laboratories by the PRC began as early as the late 1970s; the PRC has penetrated the laboratories throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and our laboratories almost certainly remain penetrated by the PRC today.

Counterintelligence programs at the national weapons laboratories today fail to meet even minimal standards. Repeated efforts since the early 1980s have failed to solve the counterintelligence deficiencies at the national laboratories. While one of the laboratories has adopted

² The W-70 warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon or as an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb).

better counterintelligence practices than the others, all remain inadequate.³

In addition, according to a June 1, 1999 article in HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING & COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, the Cox Report stated that:

[t]he Select Committee is concerned that no procedures are in place that would either prevent or detect the movement of classified information, including classified nuclear-weapons design information or computer codes, to unclassified sections of computer systems at U.S. national weapons laboratories.

A May 26, 1999 article in the SACRAMENTO BEE reports that LLL "is not the primary focus of the [Cox] committee's report. The lab, however, does play a recurring role in the narrative on nuclear spies, dual loyalties and flawed security." The article states the Cox Report found the following about LLL:

China acquired information about four nuclear warheads designed at the top-secret lab. In addition . . . a contract scientist at the lab admitted giving the Chinese crucial information about lasers and anti-submarine warfare, and the lab's high-performance computers were squarely in the espionage crosshairs.

The SACRAMENTO BEE article also states that the Cox Report found that Peter Lee, a Taiwan-born naturalized US citizen who worked at LLL for about 17 years, "admitted giving China research from Lawrence Livermore about detecting submarines under water." More specifically, according to the article, Lee "admitted that in May 1997, he gave a lecture in Beijing in which he sketched out the physics involved in the joint U.S.-British research [on detecting submarines]."

Furthermore, the SACRAMENTO BEE article reports the Cox Report found that "China tried tapping Lawrence Livermore through numerous visits made by scientists" and "when Lawrence Livermore scientists have visited China . . . Chinese officials have peppered them with technical questions, 'sometimes after a banquet at which substantial amounts of alcohol have been consumed.'"

On May 25, 1999, the Cox Committee held a briefing on its report (CNNFN). During the briefing, Norm Dicks (D-WA) stated that DOE's new counterintelligence director (Ed Curran) "concluded

³ The article does not identify which lab was found to have adopted better counterintelligence practices.

that two past attempts to improve counterintelligence capability at the labs faltered because counterintelligence directors were not given direct access to the Secretary of Energy, and because lab directors in many cases ignored the demand for change and thwarted the suggested improvements." Congressman Dicks then stated that it was "essential" "that the labs become more responsible and accountable."

At the end of the briefing someone asked: "[g]iven the damage that was done to the nuclear weapons knowledge base, the fact that these labs were managed by the University of California, should the University of California be allowed to continue managing Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore?" Congressman Dicks responded:

[w]ell, one of the things that we recommended is that we take a look at how these laboratories are managed and look at whether there is a better way to do this. Now I'm not prepared here today to make any definitive recommendation myself. I think that this is a serious matter. I know that the President has ordered the PIFFIAL (ph) to look into these matters. And I think Congress needs to have good oversight, good hearings, look at the structure and see if changes need to be made in how we protect these secrets. And currently, the system didn't work. We need a new system, I believe.⁴

Rudman Report:

According to a June 17, 1999 article in the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board released a report (the "Rudman Report") on June 16, 1999. "criticiz[ing] the U.S. Department of Energy and lab managers for a 'half-hearted, grudging accommodation' and 'smug disregard' of security. It suggests holding UC responsible for future security problems by docking a portion of the \$25 million the university gets every year for managing three labs for the department."

On June 22, 1999, Secretary Richardson and former Senator Rudman testified before a joint session of four senate

⁴ A May 31, 1999 article in AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE reported that while Energy Secretary Richardson has acknowledged that "some very serious security lapses" occurred at the national labs in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, he believes there is no significant ongoing Chinese spying at the labs. According to the article, Representative Cox stands by the findings of the Cox Report that espionage is ongoing, warning that "[t]his is an espionage effort that has accelerated over the last several years."

committees (FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS). Senator Rudman testified that the Rudman Report found:

[r]ecent cases of foreign scientists visiting labs without proper background checks or monitoring; classified computer systems and networks with innumerable vulnerabilities; top-level bureaucrats who could not tell us to whom they were accountable . . . ; instances where secure areas were left unsecure for years; and finally, thousands of employees being granted security clearances without good and sufficient reason.

During the hearing, Senator Warner (R-VA) asked Senator Rudman about UC's responsibility for the problems with the weapons laboratories. Senator Rudman responded:

[w]ell, of course, the responsibility for counterintelligence is a federal responsibility. The responsibility for security is a shared responsibility between the federal government and its contractor. Our report applies equally to them as it does to the DOE bureaucracy in terms of we thought a poor job of discharging their responsibilities and in some cases resisting efforts that - honest efforts by the department

Senator Warner and Senator Rudman then had the following colloquy:

Senator Warner: "They [UC] were a part of the resistance also in your judgment?"

Senator Rudman: "No question about it."

Senator Warner: "Should they be continued in that role, then?"

Senator Rudman: "Well, I will leave that up to the Secretary. That's going to be a tough call"

Senator Warner then asked Secretary Richardson about UC's performance, to which the Secretary responded:

On the University of California, Senator, let me just say that these are universities we have a lot - that do a lot of nonprofit managing of the board. Overall, the University of California right now is doing a good job in managing the labs. They're part of the change in culture that I've mandated to better do security at the labs. They're doing a lot better.

Now in terms of the future contract, I make that decision, and I have a policy of as much as possible competing every contract. I think that's better for the taxpayer. It'll be the same in the future when we deal with the University of California.

Now, I haven't made that decision yet whether we compete or not. But a lot of the performance relating to security is also our contractors. But right now, Senator, the University of California with the changes that we're making, the upgrades, they are cooperating. They are working with us. And I want to state that on the record.

During the hearing, Senator Lieberman stated:

[y]ou point out in your report, Senator Rudman, it's hard to get a clear definition of culture at the labs, but everybody agrees it's distinct, it's pervasive and it has an effect on the problem we're talking about.

And you used some pretty harsh language to describe the attitude there, the bureaucratic culture: "cynicism," "disregard for authority," "cavalier attitude towards security," "bureaucratic insolence."

In response to these and other statements by Senator Lieberman, Secretary Richardson responded:

[l]ab officials are cooperating. They've recognized the problem.

Lab employees - yes, in the past, the labs resisted many of these counterintelligence reforms. But one of the problems is Secretaries did not give policy direction to the labs. .

Some of these reforms they haven't liked, but that doesn't mean they're not implementing them. They operate on academic/scientific freedom, but I can tell you that they're cooperating. We have counterintelligence operations at each of the labs. . . .

On June 22, 1999, Senator Rudman and Secretary Richardson also testified before the House Commerce Committee. As reported in a June 23, 1999 article in the WASHINGTON POST, several representatives "asked Richardson why, after the allegations of Chinese spying emerged last year, he did not immediately cancel the University of California's contract to manage the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories." For example,

during the hearing, Representative Dingell (D-MI) and Senator Rudman had the following exchange:

Rep. Dingell:

Senator, the laboratory directors at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore labs are employees of the University of California, not the Department of Energy. The lab directors have day-to-day responsibility for security of computers, physical security and other types of security. The government basically employs University of California as a contractor, to manage employees and lab facilities. You talked in your report of the culture of the defense laboratories, regarding it as arrogant, fractious, saturated with cynicism and disregard for authority. You stated that to this day the laboratories are fighting security changes. Shouldn't we fire a contractor who behaves this way and -

Senator Rudman: ". . . I think that the Secretary ought to look real hard at every contractor that deals with DOE. . . . These people do very good work . . . but it seems to me that they not only have to do good science, but they have to do good security."

Representative Dingell then said: "Mr. Secretary, why don't we fire these contractors if they behave the way the Senator and his commission say? Why do we keep people on who are a security risk and who are arrogant, haughty, and resist change?"

Later in the hearing, Representative Barton (R-TX) stated:

[T]he Rudman Report states - and I quote again - "The Department of Energy and the weapons laboratories have a deeply rooted culture of low regard for and at time hostility to security issues which have continuously frustrated the efforts of internal and external critics." . . . It doesn't say this in the report, but staff has indicated to members of the committee that since we have been attempting to correct some of these problems, that same elitism and arrogance and cynicism apparently is still in the laboratories. . . . But if I were the Secretary of Energy and if I were the new czar that's sitting out there behind the Secretary, I would immediately take whatever steps were necessary to terminate the contract of the University of California. Period. I would do that. I think they're the root of the problem.

During the hearing, Secretary Richardson, in response to questions by Representative Burr, stated:

Congressman, I don't want you to blame the University of California for the security problems. You should blame Department of Energy personnel. You should blame Los Alamos. It's a collective blame. To set up the University of California as straw man I don't think makes sense.

Representative Burr then said: "[s]o your statement would be then it's the Department of Energy's responsibility, it is not the University of California." Secretary Richardson responded:

[i]f the Department of Energy contracts the University of California, it should be a collective responsibility. It's not just one or the other. The University of California needs to do better on security. That is painfully evident. I'm not taking that out. I'm also saying to you - which maybe you're having difficulty accepting - is that we have made dramatic progress on security and counterintelligence with the labs, with the University of California.

6/22/99

During the hearing, Representative Klink and Senator Rudman had the following exchange:

Rep. Klink:

Senator Rudman, I don't want you to get angry with me with this question, but it's something that needs to be asked and I've been struggling with it myself. Please don't be insulted. One of the things that has bothered me about the panel that you put together to look at these enormous security problems that surfaced at the weapons labs was that you appointed Dr. Sidney Drell, who I don't know, from the University of California, who has the responsibility of those same laboratories. Now, he may be a wonderful person, he may be an honorable person. But the question is: are we not putting somebody in charge of the investigation who is going to be asked to rat out his employer to the President of the United States? That's a very uncomfortable position to ask Dr. Drell to be in. Can you explain that thought process to us?

Senator Rudman:

Yeah, I thought it was, and that's why I told Sid Drell that I thought this service was so important to this country that I'd like him to resign from his position at the University of California before going on to this panel. He did so.

Rep. Klink: So you didn't see any problems at all with -

Senator Rudman:

Dr. Drell is a man of such unquestioned integrity. But even with that, we felt that staying on the UC advisory board would have a terrible appearance. And so we just said "Sid, we need you on this panel." I had a limited group to pick from. The PFIAB is only about 14 people. He is a world-renowned expert and could answer questions that no one else could. And he decided, after many years, that he would resign.

A June 29, 1999 opinion piece in the PRESS JOURNAL criticized the Rudman Report and the Cox Report for not putting enough blame on UC, arguing both reports "shied away from identifying the source of most of the problems: feeble, ineffective management by the University of California. The column then stated that:

Rudman's silence on the issue is particularly noteworthy given that one of the report's principal authors - Sidney Drell - recently stepped down as the chairman of the University of California President's Council on the National Laboratories. As chairman, Drell was a full-time cheerleader for the university's management of the labs.

not
full-time

The column went on to say:

[w]hen we asked Rudman about the hole in his report, he said his group's mandate had limited them to looking at security and counterintelligence operations, and not lab management generally. A White House spokesman declined to comment on the omission.

The column also quoted Representative Bart Stupak (D-MI) as saying "The question I have is: Why didn't Rudman go all the way? Why didn't he say, 'Let's take the bull by the horns,' say 'Let's cancel the contract [with UC] and send the message that we really mean business this time?'"

A June 26, 1999 article in the NATIONAL JOURNAL also raised the issue of Dr. Drell's relationship with the labs. After stating "[a]nd Drell's closeness to the labs?," the article quotes Senator Rudman as stating "[h]e had a great history there, which was wonderful. We had somebody inside." The article then stated "Drell himself said of the skeptics raising questions: 'They

have a right to, (but) we talked to a lot of DOE headquarters people, (and) we were absolutely evenhanded.'" .

GAO Reports:

According to a May 31, 1999 article in INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, GAO "investigators have been warning about porous security at DOE facilities for nearly two decades." The article reported that GAO has released at least 31 major reports on nuclear-security problems at the department since 1980 including "Safeguards and Security at DOE's Weapons Facilities are Still not Adequate" (1982); "Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories" (1988); "Accountability for Livermore's Secret Classified Documents is Inadequate" (1991); and "DOE Needs to Improve Controls over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories" (1997). The article stated GAO warned that:

controls were lax over foreign visitors to DOE facilities; that equipment, nuclear materials and thousands of pages of sensitive documents were disappearing; that physical security of nuclear facilities was laughable; and that security clearances of DOE personnel or contractors were incomplete and backlogged.

A May 28, 1999 article in the DAILY NEWS (NEW YORK) stated that in 1989, the GAO "reported that foreign intelligence agents posing as visiting scientists had gained access to" LLL.

On May 20, 1999, Representative James Sensenbrenner, in an opening statement during a Committee of Science hearing on security at DOE, announced that the GAO had found that "DOE's security problems stem from the Department's failure to hold its contractors accountable for meeting their important responsibilities and its program managers accountable for making sure contractors do their jobs." (FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY).

According to an April 21, 1999 article in the CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, a GAO official appeared before the House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and released a report which showed, among other findings, that:

Background checks were performed for fewer than 10 percent of visitors [to the weapons labs] from 'sensitive' countries, including China, Iran and Iraq.

In February 1991, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California was unable to find about 12,000 classified documents. The laboratory located 2,000 documents, but did

not conduct an assessment of the potential that the documents missing might compromise national security.

Furthermore, according to a FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE report, the GAO employee testified that the GAO has:

[f]ound that DOE has often agreed to take corrective action but the implementation has not been successful and the problems reoccur. In our view, there are two overall systemic causes for this situation. First, DOE managers and contractors have shown a lack of attention and/or priority to security matters. Second, and probably most importantly, there is a serious lack of accountability at DOE.

The employee also testified that:

[t]he FBI, which examined DOE's counterintelligence activities in 1997, noted that there is a gap between authority and responsibility, particularly when national interests compete with specialized interests of the academic or corporate management that operate the laboratories.

An April 11, 1999 article in the FRESNO BEE reported that the Energy Department agreed to let three Russian scientists visit LLL in 1987 as long as they were kept out of the lab's highly classified "Q" areas. The article then stated that the GAO found "a significant portion of this meeting [with the Russians] did occur in the "Q" area." The article also noted that a 1991 GAO report found a "troubling 30% vacancy rate in the lab's security division."

A March 14, 1999 LOS ANGELES TIMES article stated that a GAO report found that security at the three labs was so sloppy until the fall of 1998, that "foreign visitors, including suspected spies, often were allowed 24-hour, unescorted access to areas where sensitive and classified information was stored." It also stated that between 1994 and 1996, LLL only gave background security checks to 185 of its 474 Chinese visitors.

General Security Problems at LLL:

A June 30, 1999 article in the WASHINGTON POST, reported that an internal DOE investigation "uncovered critical weaknesses in computer security, protection of nuclear materials and reaction capability of the guard force" at LLL. Among other findings, the investigation "showed that foreign nationals residing in sensitive countries abroad and doing non-weapons work for

Livermore have had remote dial-up access to the nuclear laboratory's main, unclassified computer."

A May 19, 1999 article in USA TODAY reported that DOE's:

fiercely autonomous plants and labs have resisted dictates on all sorts of security issues. Many of those facilities, which employ thousands of people, have built strong ties to local congressional delegations, insulating their budgets and building political clout so they have little need to heed agency directives.

The article also stated that "security officials at DOE headquarters battle constantly with site managers." For example, according to the article, in 1997:

[s]ite managers helped bury a report by the department's Office of Safeguards and Security, which cited vulnerabilities at several key facilities. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory outside San Francisco took hits

The report decried a steep decline in security spending at DOE facilities. It noted that guard forces had dwindled 42% from 1992 through 1996, alarm systems needed replacement, employee background check programs were backlogged and computers were increasingly susceptible to outside penetration.

Heavy complaints from site managers spurred DOE officials to commission a follow-up assessment with heavy participation by site managers, who painted a far brighter picture of the agency's security.

The follow-up review "leaves the reader with the important misimpression that safeguards and security at the Department of Energy is either satisfactory or will be soon," Edward McCallum, chief of the DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security, wrote in an official response. "Neither is correct."

On April 28, 1999, Sharyl Attkisson conducted an interview of two unidentified LLL scientists ("S") which was broadcast on the CBS EVENING NEWS. The interview included the following exchanges:

S: "Certainly in the last half of the 1990s, there's been a significant change in the working atmosphere."

Attkisson: "A loosening of security?"

S: "A general loosening, yes."

Later in the interview, Attkisson reported that the scientists had told her that "in the early '90s, workers without a "Q" clearance [the highest security clearance] began getting access to buildings where classified work is done." And still today, the only security keeping non-"Q"-cleared workers away from sensitive areas is often no more than a keep-out sign."

Attkisson also reported that:

when scientists need to discuss classified material, there's often no special security check, just an honor system. Workers who don't belong are supposed to leave the room. It's a system that presumes all the employees are honest and requires them to self-patrol classified areas.

Attkisson later stated: "[b]ut the biggest threat may lie in the ability of hundreds of "Q" clearance workers simply to carry out reams of secret documents."

In response to this statement, one S stated: "[i]t would be straightforward for such a person to smuggle documents, classified documents outside of Livermore Laboratory and get them into the hands of foreign agents by fax or U - or US mail, even. One can pack up a briefcase and just walk out."

Attkisson then explained "[t]hat's because "Q" clearance scientists or anyone using their badge and ID number can get in and out of classified areas without ever encountering a guard."

At the end of the interview, Attkisson announced that "[s]ecurity and intelligence sources at the labs in the Energy Department confirm each of the scientists' accounts."

According to an April 8, 1999 article in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, one security flaw of LLL's computers "is that secret information about nuclear weapons can be copied from the sensitive computers onto a computer disk and then sent as electronic mail among the thousands of e-mails that leave the laboratory through separate, unclassified computer systems."

According to an April 14, 1999 article in the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Lawrence Livermore received a "red" or "unsatisfactory" grade for the handling of secret computer activities. Out of the 12 energy facilities evaluated, only LLL got a red rating according to the article.⁵

⁵ The article did not make clear who issued the rating. However, it appeared to have been the Department of Energy.

An April 5, 1999 article in INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS stated that since 1975, Congress has mandated that DOE issue security evaluations of its facilities. For FY 1997 and FY 1998, DOE gave LLL (and two other labs) "marginal ratings". According to the article, the other facilities which were evaluated received "satisfactory" ratings. (The lowest possible rating is "unsatisfactory.") The article stated that the DOE report did credit LLL "for improving its physical security."

A March 29, 1999 article in INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Representative Thomas Bliley (R-VA) wrote a letter to Secretary Richardson on March 24, 1999, discussing how "DOE officials have known about security problems at the labs since November 1996, when . . . former Deputy Secretary Charles Curtis ordered heightened security measures at the laboratories. 'But his orders were largely ignored by the laboratory directors and others at DOE headquarters.'"

A March 16, 1999 article in NEWSDAY reported that "a senior administration official acknowledged":

federal agencies charged with nuclear security, including the CIA, the FBI and the Energy Department . . . have been unable to stop the espionage because the "free-spirited scientific types" who design the bombs have historically balked at security steps that limit open academic exchanges with foreign counterparts.

The article then reported that Los Alamos and LLL "are operated by the University of California at Berkeley, which critics say has been lax in enforcing counterintelligence measures already on the books." Furthermore, according to the article, "a climate of openness and scientific freedom continued [at the labs] even after the disclosure in 1990 that China had stolen secrets to build a neutron bomb . . . from Lawrence Livermore in the mid-1980s."

According to a May 6, 1999 article in the FRESNO BEE, the director of LLL, Dr. C. Bruce Tarter, "defended his lab's security measures" in a hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, "while cautioning that computer breakthroughs can frustrate the most strident protections." The article quotes Dr. Tarter as testifying that "[c]yber-security . . . is probably the most complicated area. It changes every month, and all of us have been somewhat overwhelmed by how to cope with that." According to the article, Dr. Tarter told the senators that the "anti-spy program [at LLL] started getting strengthened in the 1980s, after allegations grew that a Lawrence Livermore researcher passed along neutron bomb secrets to the

Chinese." However, according to the article, nothing Dr. Tarter (or the two other nuclear lab directors who testified) said "seemed to soothe angry senators." The article quotes Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), chairman of the committee, as stating "[h]eads ought to roll, but I'm not sure whose."

Later in the hearing, in response to a question by Senator Murkowski, Dr. Tarter admitted that someone at LLL with clearance to have access to classified information could put "certain kinds of magnetic media" on a floppy disk and then put it on his own computer or take it home with him. (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE).

Praise of LLL:

In a May 26, 1999 interview on CNN & COMPANY, Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), who represents the district in which LLL is located, stated that LLL "is known to have the best counter-intelligence efforts throughout the labs in the United States."

A May 23, 1999 article in the CHATTANOOGA TIMES AND FREE PRESS states that in 1996, Los Alamos spent \$1000,000 per Russian or Chinese visitor to monitor for possible espionage. It then reports that LLL had half as many visitors but spent more than five times that amount to monitor possible espionage.

According to a transcript of a May 5, 1999 hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE), Senator Domenici (R-NM) stated: "Dr. Tarter [director of LLL], your laboratory went through an episode of significant espionage before this case [the recent problem at Los Alamos] started. As a result . . . you did certain things that caused some people to say, even in my presence talking about what's going on, well, Lawrence Livermore has done it a little bit different - they're doing this or this."⁶

During the hearing, Senator Bingaman asked Dr. Tarter the following question: "It sounds, Dr. Tarter, as though you believe you have adopted best practices there at Livermore. Or because you indicated that for some period now you've had a former FBI agent in charge of your security effort. And did I pick that up correctly?" Dr. Tarter responded: "[o]n the physical security, I think we're all quite confident. On the counterintelligence, we had an earlier program. On cyber-security, I think we're all in the learning and adapting and evolving mode."

⁶ Based on the context of this statement, it appears to be a compliment about some of LLL's security efforts.

According to an April 21, 1999 article in the FRESNO BEE, while there has been much criticism of security at LLL, there also has been some praise of its security efforts. For example, the article quotes Notra Trulock, an Energy Department intelligence official who has criticized lab security in general, as stating: "[i]f every laboratory had the counterintelligence program that Lawrence Livermore has, we would not be having this discussion." The article also quotes Edward Curran, the Energy Department's counterintelligence chief, as testifying before a House panel that he "would like to see what we have in Livermore, or what we're doing in Livermore, imitated in other laboratories. We're very, very pleased with the Livermore operation." Curran also noted that LLL's counterintelligence chief is "very competent" and that its director is "very, very supportive" of counterintelligence efforts.

In an April 15, 1999 interview on the FOX NEWS NETWORK, Joseph Cirincione stated:⁷

[h]ere's what the analysts agree on from the various intelligence agencies, that there were lax security procedures in place at some of the laboratories, not all. For example, in today's testimony at the House Armed Services Committee, everyone agreed that if the procedures that Lawrence Livermore Lab follows, for example, had been in place everywhere, we wouldn't be having this conversation [about espionage].

An April 11, 1999 article in the FRESNO BEE quotes an LLL spokesman as saying "our counterintelligence program to some extent has been used as a model for others."

Drell (Misc.):

According to a March 10, 1995 article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, the Clinton Administration canceled a high-level meeting at which an agreement with Russia establishing a broad scientific exchange program was to be renewed.⁸ The article quotes Dr. Drell as stating that if the agreement with Russia lapses, "[i]t would be a loss. There is a lot of good cooperation going on."

An April 9, 1992 article in the SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE quoted Dr. Drell as stating "[w]e (the American Physical Society) made great effort to see that our colleagues around the world got all the papers and journals we produced. Sakharov [a Russian scientist] told me many times how important the information was because it

⁷ Mr. Cirincione appears to work for a think tank or public policy organization.

⁸ The meeting was canceled in reaction to Russia's deal to build nuclear reactors for Iran.

made them feel less isolated. They knew they were part of an international community."

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DR. SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member (PA)
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Dr. Drell has been a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) since 1993. He is Professor Emeritus at Stanford University's Linear Accelerator Center (Center); before his retirement in 1998, Dr. Drell was a Deputy Director at the Center.¹

Supporter of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On September 26, 1996, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE identified Dr. Drell as a supporter of the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing. Dr. Drell, on the signing of the treaty by the United States and other major powers, was quoted as stating, "It is a major achievement after 40 years of effort. This is an important step in the direction of uniting the world in an effort to contain the nuclear danger."

In a transcript of a June 10, 1998, broadcast of *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, Dr. Drell declared that the Senate should "[d]efinitely" ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty (treaty). Dr. Drell was quoted as stating, "On national security grounds, . . . on technical grounds I believe [the treaty is] in our interest." He, too, was quoted as saying, ". . . I think when you balance the risks and the benefits, getting the added power into our ability to verify activities around the world, which we will with the comprehensive test ban, [and] accepting the judgment of many, including the [nuclear] lab directors, that [nuclear] testing is not necessary, we should go with [the treaty] The goal of the game is to try and restrain proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world, making them [less] available to terrorists." Finally, Dr. Drell was quoted, "If the United States is to be a leader in preserving this important [non-proliferation regime] and try and restrain [proliferation], we must ratify the treaty to be sitting at the table as a leader."

On August 10, 1998, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Dr. Drell was very much interested in nuclear non-proliferation. According to the article, Dr. Drell said that the treaty would help guarantee nuclear nonproliferation in the future. He was quoted as stating, "If we truly believe in non-proliferation, then we must have a corresponding treaty that ensures no tests are taking place." Dr. Drell noted that the world's four other declared nuclear powers had already signed the treaty, and he reportedly asserted that "[f]ailure by the Senate to ratify the treaty would put the United States at a disadvantage" in the future. Dr. Drell was quoted as stating, "If we want to influence international [nonproliferation]

¹ This is an update of an earlier public record vet dated January 17, 1996. For additional issues and biographical information, please see the attached.

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policy in the future, then the treaty must be ratified [by the Senate].”

Controversy over Dr. Drell's Support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On June 2, 1998, Dr. Drell wrote an opinion piece in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the NEW YORK TIMES. More precisely, Dr. Drell wrote in favor of Senate ratification of the treaty and, apparently, in response to statements by Senator Trent Lott against the treaty. Senator Lott had argued that “the nuclear spiral in Asia demonstrates the irrelevance of U.S. action” on the treaty and branded the treaty “unverifiable and ineffectual.” Dr. Drell was plainly of a different opinion than Senator Lott, determining that “the treaty’s international monitoring system, when used in combination with our own intelligence resources, provides the means to verify the test ban effectively. Further, he argued that “a quick vote in the Senate approving the treaty is an essential response to the South Asian nuclear gambit.” Dr. Drell noted that the treaty “calls for the [nuclear testing] monitoring system to be beefed up” and that the treaty “would allow us to request a short-notice, on-site inspection if we had any evidence suggesting that a nuclear weapons test might have occurred.” Dr. Drell contended that “[t]he test ban treaty -- which has already been signed by 149 nations and ratified by our nuclear allies, Britain and France -- provides the legal framework for a long-term solution to the problem of nuclear testing in India and Pakistan.” Additionally, Dr. Drell argued that “Senate ratification would strengthen our hand in pushing India and Pakistan toward a responsible course, and it would help dissuade other states from going down the dangerous road of developing nuclear weapons.” Dr. Drell, in conclusion, offered that “[Senate] [i]naction will not help to deter further nuclear tests or reduce nuclear dangers. Rather than pointing to India’s and Pakistan’s tests as an excuse for inaction, the Senate should be approving the treaty without delay.”

In a June 3, 1998, opinion piece in the NEW YORK TIMES, it was claimed by a former CIA Soviet policy analyst that Dr. Drell “exaggerate[d] the success of Central Intelligence Agency monitoring against Russian nuclear tests and misse[d] the political significance of the agency’s intelligence failure regarding Indian nuclear testing” in his above commentary.

In a June 12, 1998, opinion piece in the NEW YORK TIMES, Senator Trent Lott maintained that Dr. Drell’s “arguments in favor of Senate action on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty do not stand up to reality.” Senator Lott argued that the Treaty “adds nothing to global security.” He continued, “Some arms control theologians may think that Senate action on the treaty would have affected the decisions of India and Pakistan to conduct multiple nuclear weapons tests last month. Serious people should not.” Senator Lott finished, “Treaty advocates should expend their energy on supporting de-escalation of the nuclear arms race in Asia, not in lobbying for an unverifiable treaty overtaken by events.”

Opponent of “Star Wars” Program

On July 31, 1998, the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE reported that “[d]uring the 1980s, the outspoken [Dr.] Drell was a leading opponent of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.” Dr. Drell reportedly argued that President Reagan’s “Star Wars”

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program "would destabilize efforts to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and its Cold War antagonist, the former Soviet Union." According to the article, Dr. Drell, during the "Star Wars" debate, "consulted with Mikhail Gorbachev on the former Soviet leader's unprecedented plan unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet missiles."

Advocate of Controversial Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program

In January 1996, the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS described Dr. Drell as a "nuclear warhead and testing insider." The article stated that "[l]ike most other boosters of stock pile stewardship, [Dr.] Drell ignores why the replacement warhead [from the 'colossal B53 gravity bomb' to the 'smaller B61 bombs'] is being pursued. The actual purpose is not, as the Study Group asserts, for the [T]hird World. The new B61 . . . would be a . . . late-arriving, earth penetrating weapon intended to burrow after Russian military commanders and leaders in their underground bunkers." According to the article, the "wasteful and pernicious truth" about the replacement was that "nuclear warfighting [was] alive and well."

On May 5, 1998, the SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN reported that Dr. Drell is "a fierce advocate of the Energy Department's controversial stockpile stewardship program. More than an advocate, [Dr.] Drell is generally considered a principal founder of the effort to maintain the nation's aging nuclear arsenal." According to the article, "[t]he arms control community, while not exactly embracing [nuclear weapons] stewardship, is tolerating it in order to have [the treaty]." The article said as well that "[a]nti-nuclear activists, however, warn that stewardship is primarily a weapons development program that will ultimately render the [treaty] moot." Dr. Drell was quoted as saying, "The anti-nuclear crowd goes off the rails when they say you can improve the arsenal (with stewardship) and that the program is a subterfuge. I just totally, technically, disagree."

Aside from the above, a limited review of the available public record revealed no information that might bear negatively on Dr. Drell's candidacy, generate controversy, or disqualify him from serving as a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

January 20, 1999

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SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member (PA)
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Dr. Sidney Drell has been employed as a Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University since 1963. A physicist and arms control specialist, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to the executive and legislative branches of government on national security and defense technical issues since 1960. He has been a Member of the Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1993.¹

Dr. Drell has written extensively on his research achievements in theoretical physics and nuclear arms control.²

On the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

The NATIONAL JOURNAL reported on September 2, 1995 that President Clinton had announced on August 11, 1995, that the United States would support a "zero threshold" test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, Senator Robert Dole declared that he was "deeply troubled" by the President's decision because the "credibility, safety and security of our nuclear deterrent [would] be fundamentally affected for years to come." Dr. Drell was chairman of a study team under the

¹ Dr. Drell received an A.B. from Princeton University in 1946. He received a M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

Dr. Drell has been a consultant for the JASON Division of the MITRE Corporation since 1960. He has also provided consulting services for the Central Intelligence Agency since 1976 and for Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory since 1967. Throughout his career, Dr. Drell has been an advisor to numerous other divisions of the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as other educational institutions including, but not limited to, Chairman of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the House Armed Services Committee and the Technology Review Panel of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and Consultant to the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Dr. Drell currently chairs the U.S. President's Council on the National Laboratories.

² Due to the limited nature of this public record vet and current staffing limitations, Dr. Drell's writings were not reviewed.

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JASON group that had released a report in July 1995 that supported the President's call for a zero-yield comprehensive test ban. Dr. Drell reportedly stated that Senator Dole's comment was "obviously at odds with the scientific and technological conclusions" reached by the JASON group.

On August 23, 1995, the HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS published an article regarding the test ban on nuclear weapons. According to the article, President Clinton's decision to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban was based on "misperceptions about nuclear testing." Specifically, the article stated that, although the Administration asserted that "nuclear tests are not needed to maintain a stockpile of reliable, safe, and effective nuclear weapons [t]ests are needed." The article cited a report submitted to the House Armed Services Committee in 1990 by a non-partisan panel of scientists chaired by Dr. Drell which found that the tests were needed. According to the article, Dr. Drell testified in support of the assessment contained in the 1990 report as recently as 1992. The article noted however, that the JASON group, also chaired by Dr. Drell, released a report on August 4, 1995, which reached the opposite conclusion.

Supports Building Laser at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

A September 3, 1994 article in the LOS ANGELES TIMES reported on the political battles over a proposal to build a multibillion dollar laser known as the National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The project was reportedly criticized as undermining the moratorium on nuclear testing and as a "pork barrel project that will further pollute the environment around Livermore." Proponents reportedly argued that the facility was "vital to maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." In discussing the new laser, Dr. Drell reportedly stated, "It is an important area to be pursuing. It is good physics, and it is very good people doing it." Many opponents of the laser argued that supporting the laser was contrary to the United States agreement to a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Criticized for Advocating U.S. Role in European Collider

An article in the March 14, 1994 edition of INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS reported that Dr. Drell, as chairman of a subpanel of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP), was criticized by some colleagues who claimed that he was advocating that U.S. participation in a European accelerator project, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) be given greater emphasis than domestic research projects. Dr. Drell reportedly denied that he was ranking Europe's LHC ahead of support for

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U.S. accelerator programs and that the LHC could just have well been listed second instead of first on the report his subpanel submitted.

On March 14, 1994, an article regarding the same issue in SUPERCONDUCTOR WEEK reported that the harsh response to Dr. Drell's report was "no doubt fueled by physicists whose own base programs were being cut back."

Reluctance to Appointment to an Advisory Board

On March 20, 1994, the NEW YORK TIMES reported that Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary had requested that Dr. Drell be appointed to an advisory committee made up of young physicists who were to make detailed recommendations to the Government on new priorities for high-energy research, taking into account the absence of the Superconducting Supercollider, but noted that Mrs. O'Leary said that Dr. Drell had been reluctant to take on the advisory project claiming that "the Federal Government had given too little heed to previous advice from working physicists."

Aside from the above, a limited review of the available public record revealed no information that might bear negatively on Dr. Drell's candidacy, generate controversy, or disqualify him from continuing to serve as a Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

January 17, 1996

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SIDNEY D. DRELL
Candidate for Member of the
Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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Sidney D. Drell, a physicist and arms control specialist, has been an advisor to the executive and legislative branches of government on national security and defense technical issues since 1960. He currently is Professor and Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, at Stanford University.

This review of the public record is limited to the files of the Foreign Agents Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, as well as the lobbyist registration files of the U.S. House and U.S. Senate. No further review of the public record was made. Sidney D. Drell has not registered as a lobbyist for any foreign or domestic clients.

March 30, 1993

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