

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Marcia G. Norman to William C. Danvers, re: First Draft of memo (2 pages)	02/16/1996	P1/b(1)
002. email	Richard Clarke to Rand Beers, et al., re: Priorities (2 pages)	04/11/1996	P1/b(1)
003. email	Judith Miscik to Jane Baker, et al., re: Revised (shortened) Brown Report Memo (6 pages)	04/18/1996	P5
004. email	Marcia Norman to Richard Wilhelm, re: Brown Memos (7 pages)	04/23/1996	P5
005. email	Ardenia Hawkins to William Davis, re: concurrences, please (4 pages)	07/03/1996	P5 2031
006. email	Richard Clarke to James Eisenhower, re: PC Meeting (2 pages)	07/11/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Non-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Aspin Brown Commission])
 OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/16/1996 - 07/11/1996]

Kara Ellis
 2006-1023-F
 ke793

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

COPY

M S M a i l



DATE-TIME 03 July 96 11:53
FROM Hawkins, Ardenia R.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davis, William K.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

_thanks,

From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Burrell, Christina L.; Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: FW: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 03, 1996 08:39 AM

[[PECKHAM.DOC : 2824 in PECKHAM.DOC]]

Sorry, but I can't remember whether we have received concurrence from you.
If possible can we get your clearance by noon today?

From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: Kreczko, Alan J.; Danvers, William C.; Leary, William H.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Beers, Rand R
Subject: concurrences, please [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, June 24, 1996 05:46 PM

Please review/comment on the attached and respond to @INTEL by noon
tomorrow,
June 25. thanks, Dee


ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 24 June 96 17:40
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME PECKHAM.DOC

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Memo for TL

from beers

subject: Peckham Request for Access to PDD 35



Gardner Peckham, Foreign Policy Advisor to Speaker Gingrich, has requested the opportunity to read PDD 35 on Intelligence Priorities

(Tab A). The request originally arose during the Speaker's visit to

CIA last December when Deutch raised the subject with Gingrich. Deutch assured Peckham that he could read the document and then told

his Congressional Affairs office to take care of it.

Fortunately,

through Mike Andricos' involvement, the issue was referred to the NSC

as the agency responsible for providing access to such documents.

As a matter of course, the NSC does not allow access to PDDs other

than routine PDDs (such as PDD 2 on NSC organization which was released publicly) or unclassified PDDs. We and previous Administrations have, however, released PDDs upon the written request

by the Leadership or the Chairman or ranking minority member of a committee or subcommittee with appropriate jurisdiction.

Decisions

to grant access are made on a case by case basis. Access has been

granted only for the personal review of Members of Congress and senior committee staff.

Documents are then provided for review in the presence of an NSC staff member. Copies are not allowed, but notes may be taken.

Any

notes taken must be reviewed for classification by the NSC and returned by classified document receipt to the originator after appropriate classification.

As a matter of law, the President is constitutionally empowered to

assert an absolute executive privilege to protect information the production or disclosure of which could adversely affect the Nation's


security. In addition, the President can assert a qualified privilege with respect to deliberative presidential communications or

simply communications that he intends to be confidential.

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Information covered by a qualified privilege may be withheld unless outweighed by a legitimate legislative need for the documents.

It is difficult to assert a State secrets privilege for PDD-35 when most of its contents have been discussed publicly, including by the President during his speech at CIA last summer. The President, however, might still assert a qualified privilege on the grounds that PDD-35 is a confidential communication to his advisors. Because the document in question is post decisional and the contents known, this is primarily a question of principle.



The arguments against disclosure:

☐ Legislative need for access to the document is limited. Its contents are essentially public. Access will yield little substantive benefit. The Speaker's interest was sparked simply by a remark by John Deutch during his visit to CIA.

☐ Providing the document will be cited as the basis for other requests for PDD-35 or other Presidential directives and will increase pressure on us to comply.

The arguments for disclosure:


☐ PDD-35 is a document written to convey our intelligence priorities. It has been briefed to relevant members of Congress, to the Aspin-Brown Commission and others. Its substance has been the basis for public discussion regarding the workings of the Intelligence Community. It has generated no controversy. Hiding the specific document from the Speaker's Foreign Policy Advisor gains no benefit and suggests that we have something to hide.

☐ The President can waive the privilege with respect to one PDD without necessarily waiving it with respect to others, especially in a case like this where the substance has been released publicly.

☐ We have a good story to tell. We have set real priorities for the Intelligence Community for the first time. We have modified our process based on a critique by the Aspin-Brown Commission by

COPY

creating the Consumers Committee (a renamed DC) and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (a renamed PC). We are in the midst of our first annual review of priorities demonstrating that this is a dynamic process. That represents more systematic attention to priorities for the Intelligence Community than by any previous Administration.



Concurrences by: Alan Kreczko, William Leary and Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION :

That we seek White House Counsel concurrence to show Peckham the document under existing procedures.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report (4 pages)	04/22/1996	P5 Dup of 002b
002a. memo	R. Rand Beers and Jamie Miscik to Anthony Lake, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report (1 page)	04/14/1996	P5
002b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report (4 pages)	ca. 04/1996	P5 4145
002c. memo	John Deutch to the President, re: Intelligence Community Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission and Recommendations for an Administration Initiative (6 pages)	04/05/1996	P5 4146
002d. list	Informal Summary of Individual Brown Proposals (6 pages)	ca. 04/1996	P5
002e. talking points	Talking Points (1 page)	ca. 04/1996	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Global Affairs - Eisenhower
OA/Box Number: 750

FOLDER TITLE:

Brown Commission

Kara Ellis
2006-1023-F
ke1453

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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
4/23/96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 22, 1996

96 APR 22 P4:27

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report

Purpose: To determine the Administration's response to the Aspin-Brown Report and to approve a broader Administration intelligence initiative.

Background: You met with Harold Brown on March 1 to receive his Report on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). You asked John Deutch to prepare the Administration response.


John's response is at Tab A. He adopts most of the major Brown recommendations but modifies several to strengthen them or to recognize work completed during or after the report was prepared. He also recommends a major personnel initiative, which goes beyond the Aspin-Brown recommendations. We can accomplish most of the proposals by agency or Presidential directive. Some will require legislation. John's key recommendations are recapped below with NSC staff modifications where appropriate. John concurs in this approach.

Establish a Committee on Foreign Intelligence: A Principals Committee chaired by the National Security Advisor, including State, Defense, Justice, the DCI and JCS to meet semi-annually on intelligence issues and long-term priorities. (Executive Order/PDD)

Establish a Consumers Committee: A Deputies Committee chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, with the above agencies and representatives of key IC producers and consumers, meeting monthly on customer requirements and product quality. (Executive Order/PDD)

Establish a Global Crime Committee: John originally proposed a State-Justice co-chair, but he and I now agree that we should retain the PDD-42 structure which you approved on October 21, 1995, which coincides with Brown's recommendation. This involves

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



NSC-chaired principals and deputies committees and preserves the delicate balance between Justice and Treasury. (No additional action necessary, already established by PDD-42)

Global Crime Spokesperson: John's memo to you recommends that you designate the Attorney General as the principal Executive Branch spokesperson on global crime. The Secretary of State disagrees and would prefer to be designated co-spokesperson or have none designated. In deference to Chris, John now withdraws his recommendation and agrees to having no designated spokesperson. I concur. (Executive Order/PDD)


Intelligence Relationship with Law Enforcement: The existing CIA-Justice co-chaired Intelligence and Law Enforcement Policy Board would resolve the knotty issues which Brown raised. (In process)

Increase the Number of DCI Deputies: Upgrade the Executive Directors for CIA and Intelligence Community Affairs to confirmation positions as DCI Deputies in addition to the existing Principal Deputy. Brown recommended only a Principal Deputy for the Intelligence Community portfolio and a second Deputy for CIA. I agree with John. We need both positions upgraded; otherwise the Principal Deputy will be constantly shifting roles between Acting DCI and line manager for IC affairs. (Legislation)

John also wishes to create an Associate Director for International Support for issues concerning diplomacy and international cooperation. (Agency Directive)

DCI Consultation or Concurrence in IC Appointments: This issue represents the only major disagreement within the Intelligence Community. Brown proposed DCI **concurrence** in the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to you on the Directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Central Imagery Office (CIO) or its successor, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); and **consultation** in the appointments of the DOD Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (INR) and the FBI Assistant Director for National Security (NS). John believes he should have **concurrence authority for all the appointments**, but all other agency heads disagree. (The one exception is that Bill Perry agrees to DCI concurrence on the NIMA appointment.) Consequently he recommended the status quo to keep the peace.

I believe, however, that John's original instinct is correct. All these positions are part of your national Intelligence Community. If it is to be a national community, then the DCI needs an integral role in creating the team. If we wish to



emphasize John's role as the Director of Central Intelligence rather than simply the head of CIA, then John needs a stronger relationship with the entire community. Should you choose this course of action, I will need to confer with Bill, Chris, Janet and Louis Freeh before any announcement, since we will need their full support. (Executive Order/Legislation)

Rightsizing the Workforce: Brown recommended a one-time "rightsizing" of intelligence agencies if any desire to cut their workforce by ten percent. John feels the Brown proposal is too inflexible, focusing only on a large one-time reduction and not the broader skill mix problem. He and DOD prefer a flexible authority for selective downsizing.

The above authorities would be coupled with a major IC personnel reform: recruitment, training, rotational assignments and easier personnel movement between agencies. The associated legislation and agency directives are nearing completion. John sees this as his most significant recommendation, recognizing the legislative elements are unlikely this year. (Legislation and Agency Directives)

Military Intelligence: Transfer DIA's clandestine recruitment of human sources to CIA, with the details still to be completed. (Secretary of Defense and DCI action)


Budget Disclosure: Make public the total appropriation for intelligence. No more than the bottom line figure should be disclosed. (Legislation)


The DCI's memo does not address two major Brown proposals.

Dual-hatting the DOD Directors of NSA and NIMA as Associate Directors of Central Intelligence: John believes his concurrence in appointing these two Directors is more important. There are also serious problems in placing individuals in two separate chains of command. (No action)

Instituting a two-year fixed term for the proposed Deputy for CIA, renewable up to three times: Brown intended to provide continuity in CIA leadership and to suggest the possibility of a career CIA incumbent, as with the JCS Chairman. Without ruling out career appointments, John believes that a new President and a new DCI should be able to choose a new team. I agree. (No action)

Other topics were also studied by Brown. (A summary of the IC response to the entire Report is at Tab B.) They include improving intelligence analysis, creating a better budget analysis capability and establishing clear guidelines for





reporting information to senior officials. These matters will be implemented at lower levels within the Intelligence Community.

Following your approval of the above program, we will prepare a Presidential announcement and the appropriate documents for your signature. We will then complete the necessary legislative proposals and submit them to the Hill. John will ensure that those actions to be carried out within the Intelligence Community are completed. In addition, John and others in the Intelligence Community will be called to testify on the Hill on the Aspin-Brown Report and other Congressional proposals on intelligence legislation. This Administration position will form the basis of our response.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the above response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report and our broader Administration intelligence initiative.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments


Tab A Memo from John Deutch

Tab B Summary of the IC Response to the Brown Report



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 April 199



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission and Recommendations for an Administration Initiative

At your instruction, I have considered the Aspin-Brown Commission report on "The Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community," and I am proposing in this memorandum a suggested Administration course of action. What follows is based closely on the advice of a working group composed of Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council representatives for this purpose and my close consultation with the Departments of State and Justice on how best to proceed.

In general, there is considerable support for the Commission's findings and recommendations although, in most instances, the Intelligence Community suggests modified versions of the implementing actions. I have discussed these differences with Harold Brown, who does not view them as central and (even though he would choose the Commission's version in some cases) supports the conclusions presented below.


I propose that you take initiatives, based on the Aspin-Brown report, to strengthen US intelligence during the next decade. The initiatives include both legislative changes and changes which can be accomplished by executive order. I outline below the principal elements of this initiative.

There are two important reasons for undertaking this initiative now. First, it responds to many, but not all, of the sensible recommendations of the Aspin-Brown Commission that we all agree will strengthen the efficiency and focus of the Intelligence Community. Second, an Administration position likely will influence greatly the course of, or stop the progress on much more dramatic, reorganization legislation under preparation by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. For example, the House Committee proposes to establish a new agency for all technical intelligence collection, a new technology development office, and a new agency for clandestine human collection. We all agree these proposals do not address current needs and indeed would not improve performance of the Intelligence Community in the near term.

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Here are the principal elements of the proposed initiative:




Need for improved policy guidance:

1. Establish a Committee on Foreign Intelligence, as recommended by the Commission, chaired by the National Security Advisor, including the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of Defense and State (The Commission had recommended the Deputy Secretaries of these departments.), the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to meet semi-annually to discuss key intelligence issues and long-term priorities. (by executive order)
2. Establish a Consumers Committee, as recommended by the Commission, that would take over the responsibilities currently performed by the PDD-35 interagency working group. The Consumers Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor, would include deputies of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence members plus representatives of other principal intelligence producers and consumers, and would meet monthly to provide guidance to the Intelligence Community on customer requirements and product quality. (by executive order)

Need for a coordinated response to global crime:

3. Principal Spokesperson. We agree with the Commission recommendation that the Attorney General should be the principal spokesman on law enforcement issues and global criminal matters. (by Presidential designation)
4. Establish a Global Crime Committee, as recommended by the Commission, co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State and Deputy Attorney General (not the National Security Advisor, as the Commission suggested), who share the formal responsibility and control the resources directed at this problem, reporting to the National Security Council on needs, priorities, and activities in the areas of international crime, counter narcotics, and international terrorism. (by executive order)
5. Intelligence Relationship with Law Enforcement. The already existing Intelligence and Law Enforcement Policy Board, co-chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Attorney General, would be responsible for considering the changes in the relationship between the law enforcement and intelligence communities proposed by the Aspin-Brown Commission. Much progress has already been made. (no additional action)

Organizational Arrangement of the Intelligence Community:



6. Increase the number of DCI Deputies. I believe that better structure than the Commission's suggestion of deputies in place of one is to maintain the current structure with a single principal deputy and to create two additional deputies, one fulfilling the duties now performed by the Executive Director of the CIA and the other those now performed by the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs. Both would be Presidential appointees and require Senate confirmation. This meets the Commission's recommendation to elevate the status of both positions. (by legislation)

At the same time, I propose to establish an Associate Director for International Support. This position would address the Aspin-Brown Commission's wise recommendation that the Intelligence Community pay closer attention to a range of diplomatic support and other international cooperation matters. This position would be a senior point of contact for the Department of State parallel to the position of Associate Director for Military Support which Vice Admiral Denny Blair currently fills for liaison with the Pentagon. (by DCI directive)

7. DCI Consultation or Concurrence in appointments of Intelligence Community. In order to strengthen DCI authorities, the Commission recommended that the DCI concur in the Secretary of Defense's appointment of the Directors of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Central Imagery Office (or a successor National Imagery and Mapping Agency). The Commission recommends that the DCI be consulted in the appointment of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and the Assistant Director of the FBI for National Security.

This is the only issue where disagreement exists.

I believe that the DCI should concur in the appointments of all these senior intelligence officers. Not surprisingly, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI offer arguments, many cogent, against broadening the DCI's authority over appointments.

I believe that the best way to proceed is not to go through a lengthy and acrimonious process to reach an Administration position on this matter. The net result is that the status quo likely will remain unchanged. My colleagues will be satisfied with this outcome. (no action)

8. Rightsizing the Intelligence Community Workforce. All knowledgeable observers agree that one of the principal challenges for the Intelligence Community is to downsize the workforce and at the same time change and improve the skill mix. The Commission made a tactical judgment that the best chance for obtaining special personnel authority for the Intelligence Community was to seek one-time authority to downsize the civilian work force.


DOD and CIA believe, alternatively, that the Administration should initiate comprehensive Intelligence Community personnel reform combining continuing authority for selective downsizing as well as new opportunities for career development. This is a preferred option from the point of view of what is needed for the long term. We are well along in drafting such comprehensive personnel reform legislation.

Because the chances of passage of such authority this year are remote, we should also submit a request for waiver of the 2% reduction in annuities for early retirements at NSA only. This legislation already has OMB approval. (by legislation)

9. Military Intelligence The Commission makes a number of recommendations for changes in the management of military intelligence. Of most importance is the proposal that DOD's clandestine recruitment of human sources, now carried out by the Defense Humint Service, be transferred to CIA. I believe this recommendation should be accepted. I continue to work with the Secretary of Defense to craft a final proposal. (Secretary of Defense and DCI action)

Another Commission suggestion was the reassignment of the J-2 from DIA to the Joint Staff. The DOD suggests - and I agree - that this be accomplished by a Memorandum of Agreement, which has already been executed. (by Memorandum of Agreement)

10. Space Reconnaissance and Management of Technical Collection - The Commission endorses the continued existence of the National Reconnaissance Office and suggests a comprehensive review of the technological health of the National Security Agency. Most importantly, the Commission endorses the proposal made by Bill Perry, John Shalikashvili, and myself to establish a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to establish a single agency in the DOD to provide, more efficiently, timely imagery products to both national level and military commanders. We propose to include enabling legislation for NIMA (now in the final drafting phase) in the Administration package. (by legislation)



11. Resource Management - The Commission makes a number of recommendations concerning the level of resources for intelligence and for a new budgeting system along the lines of intelligence disciplines. In this area, the Intelligence Community and DOD during the past year have been making progress on a system of programming, planning, budgeting and execution that takes into account the Commission's concerns and additional factors. This system will improve resource allocation and trade-off decisions by intelligence users and we believe it is more useful than "discipline based" budget execution. Nonetheless, the views of the Commission will influence on-going efforts to improve the program-planning-budgeting process of the Intelligence Community. (no action)
12. Budget Disclosure - The Commission recommends the public disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes. While we believe that this figure would not in itself cause harm, we believe that no more than the bottom line should be disclosed. Accordingly, we suggest that the Congress, not the President, make public the total appropriation for intelligence at the time the appropriations conference report is approved in the Congress. (by legislation)

These recommendations cover the central conclusions of the Aspin-Brown Commission. Other topics are also covered in the report, e.g. international cooperation, improving intelligence analysis. These matters deserve and will receive attention from appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

Our proposal is to submit Administration legislation to the Congress that covers:

Intelligence Community organization (DCI deputies);


Personnel Reform;


Establishment of NIMA; and

Budget Disclosure.

We suggest issuance of an executive order or other Presidential directive to establish the NSC level Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Global Crime, and the Intelligence Consumer (PDD-35) Committee, and to designate the Attorney General as principal spokesperson on global criminal matters. These actions are an appropriate response to the Aspin-Brown Commission and an aggressive legislative agenda for this shortened legislative year. The remainder of our recommendations can be implemented at a lower level.

I urge you to announce these proposals publicly and direct their expeditious implementation.




John Deutch

cc: The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Director, Office of Management & Budget
Chief of Staff to the President
National Security Advisor
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	Todd Stern to the President (1 page)	04/23/1996	P5 4177
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to the President, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission (4 pages)	04/22/1996	P5 Duplicate ke 1453.001
001c. memo	John Deutch to the President, re: Intelligence Community Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission and Recommendations for an Administration Initiative (6 pages)	04/05/1996	P5 Duplicate ke 1453.002c
001d. list	Informal Summary of Individual Brown Proposals (6 pages)	ca. 04/1996	P5
001e. memo	R. Rand Beers and Jami Miscik to Anthony Lake, re: Response to the Aspin-Brown Commission Report (1 page)	04/14/1996	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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Roles & Missions Commission (Aspin) - Alan Kreczko, NSC Staff [1]

Kara Ellis
2006-1023-F
ke1456

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4/23/96

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1996



MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached memo from Tony Lake seeks your approval of an Administration response to the Aspin-Brown Report on Role and Capabilities in the Intelligence Community. The response is based on John Deutch's views, modified in some cases by NSC. Tony is seeking your approval ASAP this morning because Deutch is planning to hold a press conference at 1:30 pm today in the OEOB to announce Administration's response.

The memo reviews a dozen Aspin-Brown recommendations. In all but one, the NSC recommendation is concurred upon within the Intelligence Community.

The one area of disagreement concerns whether the DCI should have concurrence or just consultation authority on certain Intelligence Community appointments. Brown proposed DCI concurrence in the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for Directors of NSA, NRO, NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency); but only consultation in appointments of DOD Director of DIA; State Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research; and FBI Assistant Director for National Security. Deutch believes he should have concurrence authority for all of these. Other agency heads disagree, but Tony agrees with Deutch -- saying that if we are creating a national community, the DCI needs an integral role in creating the team.

Todd Stern