

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Kenneth Jarrett to Kenneth Jarrett re: U.S. - Singapore Free Trade Agreement (2 pages)	11/14/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Todd Dennett to Richard Saunders re: Singapore (2 pages)	11/17/2000	P5 6390
003. email	Judson Bruns to Michael Hammer et al re: Draft Chili Package (2 pages)	11/22/2000	P5 6391

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records

NSC Emails

Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Singapore...])

OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/14/2000 - 12/21/2000]

2009-0013-F

kh999

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

0390

DATE-TIME 11/22/2000 5:48:14 PM
FROM Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Draft Chile Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)

CARBON_COPY Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
Hanley, Timothy P. (INTERAM/INTERN)
Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
Mattingly, Amanda C. (INTERAM/Intern)
Merletti, Roger D. (INTERAM)
Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
Wallace, Joanna B. (INTERAM)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Baer, Elliott H. (NEC)
Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON)
Efros, Laura L. (NEC)
Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
Kalil, Thomas A. (NEC)
Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)
Rosen, Daniel H. (NEC)
Samans, Richard (INTECON)
Tseng, David C. (NEC)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY First installment. SRB memo to come. Please make better! Thanks,
Jay

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUSmemoChileFTA.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING

SUBJECT: Call to Chilean President Lagos to Offer to Begin Negotiations on a
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement

Purpose

Offer the Chileans the option of entering negotiations with a view toward concluding a Free trade Agreement as soon as possible.

Background

In the wake of the announcement that the United States and Singapore would enter negotiations toward a free trade agreement, your advisors concur that you should make a similar offer to Chilean President Lagos. The announcement with Singapore took the Chileans aback, aggravating the bilateral relationship. If President Lagos takes you up on the offer to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement, we believe that we can make substantial progress, and perhaps even conclude an agreement by the end of the Administration. There are difficult hurdles to overcome, but our negotiators will confront these challenges anyway under the FTAA negotiations. We believe that substantial progress on a Chile FTA will provide momentum to the FTAA negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call President Lagos using the attached talking points.

Attachment
Tab I Draft talking points

2

7217

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DATE-TIME 11/17/2000 10:27:12 AM
FROM Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Singapore FTA [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT singapore FTA.doc

November 17, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: LEON FUERTH & DAVID BEIER

SUBJECT: President Announces Free Trade Agreement with Singapore

Summary:

While in Brunei, the President committed the United States to enter into free trade negotiations with Singapore, with a goal of completing an agreement by year's end. This announcement was not anticipated. The decision to enter into this agreement was not the product of any interagency process and we were not consulted in advance. In fact, we learned of the agreement after the fact through press accounts. Other parts of the government - and even many White House entities - were similarly surprised.

Background:

As you will recall there has been pending for a time the promise of reaching a Free Trade Agreement with Chile. This idea has been pending for the last 7 plus years. During the last year, the idea of including other countries, including Singapore, Australia and New Zealand (creating a P-5 trade agreement) surfaced. That idea never securing a consensus within the government. We expressed serious reservations about the idea of a P 5 trade agreement.

Evidently Ambassador Barshevsky believed that a FTA with Singapore was as good idea, so she has quietly pursued this idea. We have learned after the fact that Sandy Berger was opposed to the idea and that Gene Sperling supported it. Gene Sperling was supposed to run an interagency process, but failed to do so. During the preparations for the APEC meeting Charlene continued to push for a FTA with Singapore. This agreement was apparently finalized during a golf game between the President and the Prime Minister of Singapore on the margins of the APEC meeting.

Problems:

The idea of a U.S./Singapore FTA agreement causes several problems. First, it was the product of no strategic thinking, consultation or planning. Second, it substantially complicates and negatively effects our relationships with the Chileans who honestly think they are next in line. Third, because this agreement requires Congressional approval this agreement seeks to bind a future President to the strategic, and geopolitical view of an outgoing Administration.

In addition, this agreement purports to seek as its goal the U.S./Jordan Free Trade Agreement as the model for dealing with labor and the environment. We explicitly have told the West Wing and USTR that we did not want to be bound to us the Jordan agreement as the template. Moreover, unlike the Jordan agreement there appear to have been far fewer consultations with organized labor and the Hill about this agreement that was the case with Jordan. In short, this agreement could cause a new President political problems on trade at the risk of his own trade agenda or vision.

Conclusions:

At this point, there is little that can or should be done to publicly repudiate this action. On the other hand, pursuit of this agreement by year's end ought to be discouraged. In the event that an agreement is reached a future President ought to carefully consider whether to submit or pursue it with the Congress.

1

2