

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Eric Schwartz to Robert Malley re: gv (4 pages)	01/13/1997	P5
002. email	Robert Malley to Eileen Biernacki et al re: Golden Venture (4 pages)	01/15/1997	P5
003. email	Robert Malley to Kelly Letts re: package (5 pages)	01/16/1997	P5
004. email	Alan Kreczko to Gordon Bendick (4 pages)	01/21/1997	P5
005. email	Robert Malley to Eric Schwartz re: INS (4 pages)	01/30/1997	P5
006. email	Robert Malley to Fulton Armstrong re: FW: INS Exercise (5 pages)	02/03/1997	P5
007. email	Robert Malley to William Danvers and Alan Kreczko re: Golden Venture (4 pages)	02/11/1997	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail - Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) ([Immigration and Naturalization])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/06/1997 - 02/20/1997]

Dana Simmons
2011-1044-F
ds362

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 January 97 18:43
FROM Malley, Robert
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT INS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schwartz, Eric P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[INS.DOC : 4674 in INS.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 30 January 97 18:42
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME INS.DOC

January 28, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM STEINBERG

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ/JIM DOBBINS

FROM: ROB MALLEY/FULTON ARMSTRONG

SUBJECT: Proposed INS Exercise in South Florida

Background

In 1994, Governor Chiles asked the federal government to undertake a thorough review of its plans for dealing with a potential mass migration from the Caribbean and, in particular, to enhance U.S. readiness by holding a series of simulation exercises. The Governor's request grew out of his serious concern with federal management of the Mariel and 1994 Cuban migration crisis. In

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response, and pursuant to the Attorney General's direction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has organized a series of planning and mock exercises since 1995. INS has scheduled the largest such exercise for February 25-27 in South Florida. It would involve roughly 100 representatives from various U.S. agencies and will be conducted in conjunction with the State of Florida.

Note: Similar exercises have been held on the Southwest border.

Assumptions and Plans for the Exercise

The INS exercises are premised on current U.S. policy: (1) to seek to intercept illegal migrants; (2) to initiate refugee processing; (3) to repatriate non-refugees to their country of origin; (4) if the magnitude of the crisis were to overwhelm the processing capacity of the Coast Guard and the INS, to transfer migrants to safe-havens; and (5) in the event some migrants were to evade interception or were brought to the U.S. because of lack of space at the safe-haven, to detain them and place them in exclusion proceedings.

The February exercise is designed to focus on two of these aspects.

First, it will test the INS' ability to expand shipboard refugee processing in the event of a massive increase in the number of migrants. Twenty-five asylum officers will conduct mock interviews on board Coast Guard vessels. Second, it will test the inter-agency's plans to deal with vast numbers of migrants who reach our shores.

This portion will require the participation of roughly 100 representatives from various U.S. agencies who will run through the different stages of onshore processing in coordination with state officials, including expanding our detention capacity nationwide and transporting the migrants to various detention centers.

Governor Chiles strongly believes that the exercise ought to take place, both to bolster USG preparedness and, with memories of Mariel

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and 1994 still vivid, to demonstrate to South Floridians that in the future the federal government would be ready to respond.

Risks and Proposals to Manage Them

While the exercise is not designed to be nationality-specific, it inevitably will be perceived as directed at Cubans. This presents particular risks given the sensitivity of the Cuban migration issue on the island and in the United States.

☐ Sending the wrong message to Cubans: The focus of the exercise on the detention of migrants who reach the United States could be interpreted as signaling either an end to the interdiction/repatriation policy announced in 1995 or our expectation of an imminent mass migration. These perceptions, in turn, could potentially increase migration pressures on the island. The risk should be minimized by an effort to downplay coverage of the exercise and to reiterate the basic and ongoing elements of our policy both in Miami and on Radio Marti. (As a result of State and NSC/staff expressions of concern about the visibility of the exercise, the Attorney General has agreed not to participate.)

☐ Sending the wrong message to the Cuban-American community: The exercise is scheduled to take place a day after the one-year commemoration of the Cuban shutdown during which members of the Cuban-American community are expected to organize a flotilla. The coincidence of the two events raises two concerns: First, holding an exercise predicated on the detention of Cuban migrants could be viewed as insensitive; second, Coast Guard assets might be needed to deal with the flotilla and therefore would be unavailable for the exercise. You should know that State (Tarnoff) originally sought such a change but ultimately chose not to press the issue when informed that a move would require significant adjustments by the Justice Department.

☐ Sending the wrong message to Cuba: The government of Cuba could react negatively to an exercise premised on a mass migration, especially given that it has made every effort to date to prevent such an occurrence. State agrees that USINT would need to brief the GOC ahead of time and inform it that the exercise was neither Cuba-directed, nor based on the expectation of an imminent crisis.

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OPTIONS

1. Maintain current plans: The exercise would proceed as scheduled on February 25. Media, members of Congress, and members of Florida's various communities would be briefed in advance on its purpose.
2. Change the date: We would request that INS move the date so as not to coincide with the one-year commemoration of the shutdown.
3. Cancel or scale back the exercise.

Concurrence by: [Enter names of concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ [Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 February 97 09:24
FROM Malley, Robert
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: INS Exercise [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Armstrong, Fulton T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

From: Malley, Robert
To: Dobbins, James F.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Subject: INS Exercise [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, January 30, 1997 07:20 PM

[[INS.DOC : 2362 in INS.DOC]]

Please pass to Jim

Jim,

Attached is a draft memo to Steinberg. I will try to get DPC's and Suzanna's views on Friday.

Thanks

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

30 January 97 19:18

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

INS.DOC

January 28, 1997

ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR JIM STEINBERG
THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ/JIM DOBBINS
FROM: ROB MALLEY/FULTON ARMSTRONG
SUBJECT: Proposed INS Exercise in South Florida

Background

In 1994, Governor Chiles asked the federal government to undertake a thorough review of its plans for dealing with a potential mass migration from the Caribbean and, in particular, to enhance U.S. readiness by holding a series of simulation exercises. The Governor's request grew out of his serious concern with federal management of the Mariel and 1994 Cuban migration crises. In response, the Attorney General directed the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to organize a series of planning and mock exercises since 1995. INS has scheduled the largest such exercise for February 25-27 in South Florida. It would involve roughly 100 representatives from various U.S. agencies and will be conducted in conjunction with Florida.

Note: Similar exercises have been held on the Southwest border.

Assumptions and Plans for the Exercise

The INS exercises are premised on current U.S. policy: (1) to seek to intercept illegal migrants; (2) to initiate refugee processing; (3) to repatriate non-refugees to their country of origin; (4) if the magnitude of the crisis were to overwhelm the processing capacity of the Coast Guard and the INS, to transfer migrants to safe-havens; and (5) in the event some migrants were to evade interception or were brought to the U.S. because of lack of space at the safe-haven, to detain them and place them in exclusion proceedings.

The February exercise is designed to focus on two of these

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aspects.

First, it will test the INS' ability to expand shipboard refugee processing in the event of a massive increase in the number of migrants. Twenty-five asylum officers will conduct mock interviews on board Coast Guard vessels. Second, it will test the inter-agency's plans to deal with vast numbers of migrants who reach our shores.

This portion will entail the participation of roughly 100 representatives from various U.S. agencies who will run through the different stages of onshore processing in coordination with state officials, including expanding our detention capacity nationwide and transporting the migrants to various detention centers.

Risks and Proposals to Manage Them

While the exercise is not designed to be nationality-specific, it inevitably will be perceived as directed at Cubans. This presents particular risks given the sensitivity of the Cuban migration issue both on the island and in the United States.

☐ Sending the wrong message to Cubans: The focus of the exercise on the detention of migrants who reach the United States could be interpreted as signaling either an end to the interdiction/repatriation policy announced in 1995 or our expectation of an imminent mass migration. These perceptions, in turn, could increase migration pressures on the island. The risk should be minimized by an effort to downplay media coverage of the exercise and to reiterate the basic and ongoing elements of our policy both in Miami and on Radio Marti. (As a result of State and NSC/staff expressions of concern about the exercise's visibility, the Attorney General has agreed not to participate.)

☐ Sending the wrong message to the Cuban-American community: The exercise is scheduled to take place a day after the one-year commemoration of the Cuban shutdown, at which time members of the Cuban-American community could well organize a flotilla. The coincidence of the events raises two concerns: First, holding an exercise predicated on the detention of Cuban migrants could be viewed as insensitive; second, Coast Guard assets might be needed to deal with the flotilla and therefore could be unavailable for

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the exercise. You should know that State (Tarnoff) originally to change the date but ultimately chose not to press the issue when informed that it would require significant adjustments by DOJ/INS.

We have asked Coast Guard to provide us with their views as well.

☐ Sending the wrong message to Cuba: The government of Cuba could react negatively to an exercise premised on a mass migration, especially given that it has made every effort to date to prevent such an occurrence. State agrees that USINT would need to brief the GOC ahead of time and inform it that the exercise was neither Cuba-directed, nor based on the expectation of an imminent crisis.

Our Views

Governor Chiles strongly believes that the exercise ought to take place as planned, both to bolster USG preparedness and, with memories

of Mariel and 1994 still vivid, to demonstrate to South Floridians

that the federal government is ready to respond to future crises.

We

are inclined to defer to his judgment and allow INS to proceed with

the exercise. While there are risks, they are manageable if we downplay the exercise and accompany it with a strong message that

(1)

our current policy of interception/repatriation remains in effect,

and (2) this is part of an ongoing training effort and does not signal our expectation of a mass migration.

Although feasible, changing the timing of the exercise would be difficult given the number of people involved -- both from the agencies and from the State of Florida. Unless Coast Guard communicates its preference for a change based on its concerns about a

flotilla, our recommendation is to maintain the date.

State agrees with these recommendations.

OPTIONS

1. Maintain current plans.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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2. Change the date.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. Scale back the exercise.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. Cancel the exercise.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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