

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Robert Ford and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME April 1, 1999, 6:45 - 6:49 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello Gerry. (U)

Mr. Adams: Good morning. (U)

The President: Look, I talked to Tony and Bertie, and they understand where you are and why, and what they say must be right. I'm sure there's no way this document is not going to leak. (U)

Mr. Adams: I told them that when they give it out. (U)

The President: What they're saying is they think this document can be the basis for agreement but they know the parties need time to reflect on it and suggest reconvening a week from Tuesday. Otherwise it'll look kind of crazy if it just leaks out there. (U)

Mr. Adams: I think all of that's dead on. What we can't have them say is they think we're going to agree to it. (U)

The President: No, no, I think they can say they don't know what you'll say. (U)

Mr. Adams: Mr. President, we told them when they gave out the document it'll end up in the public arena. There is no bad feelings -- they're doing their job and we understand. We

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 4/1/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

actually said we couldn't deliver but then they gave us all sorts of trouble. I am trying to manage that and I think it's going to be a public issue. At this point I don't think the government can do anything except put it out there as the basis for agreement. All of that's okay? (S)

The President: Yes. (S)

Mr. Adams: And they are talking about reconvening bilaterals in a week from Tuesday. (S)

The President: Okay. Yeah, I got it. Well, all right, I think if they can publish and say it could be the basis for an agreement and give all the parties time to reflect. (S)

Mr. Adams: We were against adjournment and we told the Government. We told them that we would have to reflect our disappointment. It is more acceptable to them, but they should be saying they'll adjourn for a period of reflection and then we'll resume intense discussion on such-and-such a date. (S)

The President: I got it. (S)

Mr. Adams: You happy enough? (S)

The President: Yes, I think this will work. (S)

Mr. Adams: Okay, goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with First Minister Designate Trimble
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
First Minister Designate Trimble

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Frank
Jarosinski

DATE, TIME June 30, 1999 - 11:06 - 11:13 p.m. EDT
PLACE: Air Force One

The President: David, can you hear me? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes, I can. (U)

The President: Well, I am glad you have resumed your good sleeping habits. (U)

First Minister Trimble: I didn't hear you clearly. (U)

The President: I said you are pulling another all nighter? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. It is so late at night, but we are about to break here and come back later in the morning after a bit of rest. (U)

The President: Well, I've been briefed by Tony Blair on the state of play. As I understand it, Adams has said that they would publicly commit to decommission on DeChastelain's schedule, which means a finish by the time described by the Good Friday agreement and start by the end of the year. But they want to condition that on going into the government now because they want to rely exclusively on the sequence in the Good Friday Accord; and you say your guys want proof that they are serious, that you want to put them in the shadow government now, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

achieve devolution only when they start decommissioning. Is that where we are? (X)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. (X)

The President: And that you now have tabled two possible alternatives, or you got those and will present them in the morning. (X)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. I will work up some alternatives along those lines and will leave a few outline ideas here tonight. But, we are going to have to get people around when their minds are reasonably clear, so they can work through the details, some of which may involve quick decisions. But I want to do that in the morning. This whole thing comes down to sequencing, and in a way, each side is sure the other will do it, which is our concern. The time interval is important, otherwise we didn't think we could survive politically. (X)

The President: Yes. For one thing, I don't know if you saw my BBC interview, but I said I hope your people would stay with you if you made a fair agreement. (X)

First Minister Trimble: We don't intend to walk away from it. (X)

The President: No one will be able to understand if it falls apart on sequencing. But as you go home tonight, you guys can wake me up in the middle of the night if you can think of anything I can do or say that will either help you with your own people by showing the United States will give you the high ground by completely disavowing the other side, if they don't keep their word, or if you can think of anything I can do to persuade Sinn Fein to come closer to you. I will do that. I know what position you are in. (X)

First Minister Trimble: I very much appreciate that. If there is a way, I will come back to you. (X)

The President: Let me say one other thing. I spent a year, the better part of it -- when was the Good Friday Accord adopted -- more than a year, a lot of time trying to persuade Gerry Adams. You were right about sequencing because all you wanted was to get him to show good faith, and I failed. And I failed, not because of him, so much as because the IRA wants to be seen as to be decommissioning because the people they represent overwhelmingly voted for the Good Friday Accord. They don't

want to be seen as surrendering to you. They want to surrender to the world or Irish Catholics who voted for the Accord. I understand that. I think personally, they should do more. I appreciate Trimble's political position and difficulties you face. But I can tell you, I have worked harder than you know to persuade them that the initial going-in position you had was a right and reasonable position. And I have failed. On the other hand, I don't think they want you to be deposed. (S)

First Minister Trimble: That is right. (S)

The President: I think he wants you to prevail as a leader and he wants this to work. So, if there is anything you can think of that I can do to put the United States in your corner, as most of your people think I have been too close to them, or something I can give to him to have him come closer to you, you can wake me in the middle of the night. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I will try not to disturb your sleep, but I thank you very much for this call. (S)

The President: I really admire you, David, and I just want to help if I can. (S)

First Minister Trimble: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Okay, goodnight. Get some sleep. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Frank
Jaraosinski

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 30, 1999, 11:31 - 11:52 p.m. EDT
Air Force One

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Gerry? (U)

Mr. Adams: How are you? (U)

The President: I am glad to see you decided to go back to sleeping twelve hours a day. Do you guys ever go to bed? You know, my daughter wrote a paper on you at Stanford. Did someone tell you that? (U)

Mr. Adams: No, I didn't know that. Was it good? (U)

The President: Yes, it was good, but the professor said it was too favorable. However, they said it was supposed to be an academic exercise and should have been more balanced. (U)

Mr. Adams: Ask her to send me a copy, if you would. (U)

The President: Okay, I will. It was just a short essay, not a term paper, like an eight-page paper. She called me and I sent her some stuff, and they gave her a little grief. The professor said while her father is certainly authoritative, he is not really an academic source; you need to be a little more

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

balanced. So I drummed up some articles, finding one mildly critical of you; it was really fun. (U)

Look, I know you need to get some sleep, but I wanted to say a couple of things. All of this you know, of course, but it took me a long time to understand your position on this sequencing issue and why the IRA would consider it wrong to have to do decommissioning for Sinn Fein to get in the government. I think I understand it now and how they feel. I think it's important that your people know when you decommission that it's not surrendering to Unionism but to the people who voted for the Good Friday Accord. We all work for people we represent. I got that. (E)

On the other hand, no one will understand, no one in the world or in Northern Ireland, if this comes apart over sequencing. You and I know what the problem is. As I understand it, you offered to support the process to be developed by DeChastelain which would have decommissioning completed by the date of the Good Friday Accord and would start before the end of the year -- if the rest of the Accord is implemented and Sinn Fein went into Executive. Is that accurate? (E)

Mr. Adams: Yes. (E)

The President: As I understand it, the real problem for Trimble is -- I talked to him -- that he would like to take that, but right now he is virtually certain if he did, he would be deposed. So we've got to figure out how to move forward; we don't want that to happen, we've got to figure some way out. I think it would be good for you to get some sleep. I think tomorrow he will table a couple of ideas. Based on my understanding, I don't think you can accept either one of them, but hope that in saying "no," and if that is what you have to do, you figure out how to keep pushing the ball forward. And if there is anything I can do to be helpful to you, or him, when you get up and start working, even though it will be the middle of the night for me, I don't mind waking up. If there is anything within my legal powers to do, I will do it. I don't want to do it now. I think you need to think it through. (E)

Mr. Adams: First of all, I want to thank you for your call and for your interest, which I know is very genuine, very emotional, and real. Secondly, what we put to these people is what Martin McGuinness discussed with Jim Steinberg in the White House on May 5. We took that and gave it to Tony and Bertie. (E)

We actually got a deal done on the 14th of May and an agreement in my presence. The British Prime Minister gave it to us and Trimble walked away. We came back to the idea and, we put it to them today, it was in the general ball park you outlined, but further they rejected it. They said "No." (C)

David Trimble sent his negotiating team home without telling anyone an hour-and-a-half ago and adjourned the talks. He will come back tomorrow and put together a proposal which we can't accept. My concern at the moment is not David Trimble. My concern is Tony Blair. He's been very solid in terms of all this but what Trimble needed today was to be told by the British Prime Minister very vigorously that he had to do this. I asked to talk to his team; they refused to let us do it and their team won't go to their people. (C)

This is my position which Martin worked with Jim and which we have outlined to the Unionists and everybody else involved. They are going to cause us terrible trouble with the Republicans because they will be out in the news in a day or two. Some say Republican activists will not be able to understand how we did so and not get anything in return. I think the problems are quite worsened as a result of these past couple of nights of negotiations. This is the best they are going to get. I just don't know what we can do, to tell the truth. (C)

The President: Let me ask you this. I want to mention two key thoughts, and this is something you don't need to answer but sleep on it. One is, I think if Blair is going to do any good with them, he has to get out of the negotiating session and and go see Trimble's party leaders. (C)

Mr. Adams: I agree. (C)

<u>The President:</u>	EO 13526 1.4d
-----------------------	---------------

Mr. Adams: You are absolutely right. (C)

The President: That is option one, or some variation of it. Option two, and I know where this is going, tomorrow, when Trimble puts something on the table that changes sequencing in ways you can't accept, because you won't accept going into a shadow executive until first decommissioning occurs. Blair will ask if there is something he can do for you along these lines in a way of a guarantee; maybe even an act of parliament, which he can pass in no time because of his massive majority, which takes

the decision away from the Unionists in a sense that Sinn Fein no longer agrees to put its faith in the hands of the Unionists. (G)

The thing I was impressed by in your last offer was your willingness to be far more explicit than in the past in terms of decommissioning. You may not be able to take what Tony wants to do, which is to say, "Can you do these things if I take the decision away from the Unionists by an act of parliament?" I understand the difficulty with that, but I ask you to think whether there is something else he can do by act of parliament. (G)

Mr. Adams: The Good Friday Accord guarantees us, and other parties with mandates, the right to participate. You're talking about ordinary citizens who pay taxes, who have been denied their rights, their entitlements, and the Unionists got away with this for the last twelve months despite the governments are saying there is no preconditions. The only thing that is going to move the Unionists is by your first option. That is a very good option. I just don't know of any guarantee. (G)

The President: All I'm saying is I'm afraid that Tony beating up on Trimble is not enough because I talked to some of those guys and I know what their positions are and I think they are crazy enough to take him down. I know it's crazy on their part and they would be discredited by the world. Here is what I thought I could do. I said to the BBC interviewer last week that it seems to me that if Blair can figure out some way to put some heat on the guys behind Trimble, threatening him every step of the way, and I make more explicit the fact that if all this could be done along the lines you talk about and for some reason the IRA walks away from your commitment, then they could bring the government down and I would support them in doing so. (G)

Mr. Adams: I think all that is useful. (G)

The President: I know you and Trimble have both met and consciously avoided mixing this Drumcree business into the talks but I can't help but wonder, given some of the concessions by the marchers, if there is something you can do to help them with that and whatever. If you did, he might be willing to take more risk himself. In the end, Gerry, no matter what Tony does or what I say, Trimble, to get a deal, is going to have to take some risks. You are going to take a world of crap. We can't immunize him from all that risk. You can be neutralized, but he can be deposed. I got to figure out if something can be done

that he could hold up as a flag, of his bona fides. I know you don't want to mix but... (C)

Mr. Adams: We actually have experience in that situation. The one thing I was very struck by was what you said no one should ever be persecuted by religion or ethnic background, and I think that is where this is in terms of that. I don't have that much influence with the people there but we can continue to try. I will continue wherever I can to make things easier. The problem is David Trimble has brought in the same people who voted against the Good Friday agreement and oppose it publicly are the ones we are negotiating with; David Trimble tolerates them. To me, that crystallizes the problem. Either he stands up to those people -- whatever way he does is a very important element. We have stuck our necks out far enough now to hang ourselves. I will reflect on what you said. I appreciate your attention and the fact that you are very much up to speed, as usual. (C)

The President: Okay, I'm going to call Tony back and then leave you guys to sleep. (C)

Mr. Adams: My sense at the moment is that we are at a very precarious situation and my concern is that Tony must be very assertive with these guys. (C)

The President: Just because of your position alone, I don't think we've got an exit strategy short of an agreement. We have got to protect everybody concerned until we hammer through it. If you walk away with nothing, you might have to modify your position to come back the way he did. Two weeks ago, he would have taken this deal in a bird dog's minute. (C)

EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] so we have to figure out a way to somehow give him some more elbowroom. Whatever you can work on Drumcree, wave in his face and say, "screw you." You think about it. I will call Blair and Ahern back and, if you need me, wake me up. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

6

Mr. Adams: Okay. Thanks again. (U)

The President: Thanks, Gerry. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheramie and Jim Smith

DATE, TIME July 1, 1999, 8:08 - 8:13 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Jack Kent Cooke Stadium,

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. How are you doing?
(U)

The President: Bertie, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Not too bad at all. Thanks for all your time over the last few days. I know you have been in tough talks with these difficult people. (U)

The President: What about this latest proposal Tony talked about? Have you run it by Sinn Fein? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Yes. I was talking to them as of half an hour ago. I think the difficulty is the 12th of August will not work for them with July and August being the marching season. They will not be able to sell that to their units but they have committed themselves now to decommission. They need to strengthen their position a little. The statements Tony and I put out tomorrow should be as strong as possible in what we can say, but I don't think there is any possibility they will say they will do something by the 12th. (U)

The President: What about moving the whole thing back some?
(U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

Prime Minister Ahern: Yes, I think if we can get some leeway and move it back a bit. (Ø)

The President: They need it. Trimble said he can't stand more than six weeks with no first act. What if you put up the government in the middle of August? That would give them until the first of October to decommission. Do you think that framework might work? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the framework will work but if we put up the 15th of August it might jeopardize selling it to their guys. (Ø)

The President: Tony wanted me to call Trimble and push the generic idea tonight but I didn't want to talk to him until I talked to you first and I can't talk to Gerry until you have put this to him. Are you going to talk to him about it tomorrow? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I will talk to Gerry the first thing in the morning. (Ø)

The President: I really should not call him until tomorrow. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: The question with Sinn Fein is, now they have it clear in their minds and are going to convince the IRA to do an act of decommissioning before Christmas. The real question is how quickly they will do that. I think from their point of view as soon as they nominate someone to the Chastelein Commission the better. That is not as quick as mid-August. At the same time, we don't want to put a new date that creates frustration and creates a new deadline. We have to get something agreed that automatically happens provided they have decommissioning. Gerry Adams is worried about getting ahead of the IRA because there would be more problems than it is worth. I think John Hume feels, I've spoken to him, that Sinn Fein has not got that far in its statements. They could push themselves a bit further. It is the old story. How far can you push them? If they could give us another sentence that would give it credibility. They really have to give us something. I think you could give them another sentence to make it that much firmer. (Ø)

The President: That it is really going to work. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: Exactly. Otherwise we get into a difficult marching season again. Did you talk to Trimble? (S)

The President: Yes, but I have not talked to him yet on this. Maybe I should wait until morning to talk to him and Gerry in closer proximity. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: That would be wise. We will meet at 8 o'clock in Belfast to finalize the words. So maybe as soon as we got that done we should get that sent to your people right away. (S)

The President: 8 o'clock a.m.? (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: 8 o'clock our time. (S)

The President: I will have my guys wake me at 2 o'clock our time. I would like to call them both at the same time. (sound of cheering in background) Do you know where I am? I am at the World Cup Women's Soccer Game and we just scored a goal to tie Germany. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: You go and enjoy it, Bill. (U)

The President: OK. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: God Bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Miles Murphy,
Michael Manning and James Smith

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 12:04 - 12:11 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hey, Bertie. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: How do you do? Tony will be joining us in a few minutes; he's still with David and his colleagues. (U)

The President: How are things at the zoo? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: I'll fill you in. I think we're fairly far along in getting somewhere, but we're not there yet. It's never easy in Northern Ireland. But just to fill you in briefly, I think we've practically agreed that the IRA will nominate someone on the 15th of July. That would set up the executive. The devolution order would be laid before the British Parliament on the 16th of July and take effect on the 18th of July and the difficulty is to allow a period where Sinn Fein nominates an IRA person to start working on decommissioning with General de Chastelain and the other people. What will happen is that the person nominated by the IRA will start discussions in the period after that, talking about actual decommissioning to start within a specified time, and the decommissioning body will make progress reports in September and December. We hope to start decommissioning in September. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The President: But you wouldn't have a Sinn Fein commitment by a certain time? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: If we achieve that, it will certainly be good, President. (Ø)

The President: What do you think they will say? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think it's looking good at this stage. We've got a little bit of work to do and we need all the help we can get. (Ø)

The President: Is it time for me to call now? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the problems will be in this order. Trimble will be very worried because some of his guys will definitely get wobbly again. We need to pump as much confidence in him and put as much steel behind him as possible. This is the time where the governments, the two traditions in Northern Ireland work today together in the devolution we've worked for all these years and thought we had in the Good Friday Agreement but couldn't get it. And secondly, give us the decommissioning of the paramilitaries in a reasonable time. Third, the fail-safe clause, where the governments undertake that if any difficulties arise in regard to decommissioning, based on the report by the decommissioning body, or arising from devolution, we will automatically initiate an immediate review and suspend the institution. That is, if anybody starts messing we just stop the whole bloody lot. (Ø)

The President: That ought to at least convince Trimble that Sinn Fein will be blamed if the thing goes down. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think we need to have Sinn Fein and the unionists not go bumping each other, but say this is the completion of the historic breakthrough of the Good Friday Agreement, that the two Northern Ireland traditions will work together. This has to be solved. The two need to feel confidence, to see the bigger picture because if we get this through, Bill, this procedure nominating on the 15th of July, that's just a fortnight. The devolution order would be laid before Parliament in 2 weeks. If it gets through, it will be tremendous. These guys have to have the steel to go for it in the next hour or so, as we try to finalize this. I am holding Sinn Fein's hand and Tony is holding the unionists'. I think in terms of where the unionists are, it is more difficult and shaky for Trimble. Tony is doing a great job helping them through it.

The two parties need to have a feeling that something is in this and they really should have a go. I think it will be very helpful if you could call and have a word with them. (S)

The President: I'll call right now. What's the timetable for this? (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: This is the new order. I'm not just dumping on the government for Northern Ireland...traditions...selling it and selling it hard, not just bumping on the other side, Bill. If it shapes up like this, this will be good. I am reluctant to call it yet. (S)

The President: No, I'm happy to call. I got up this morning ready to call, and they said it wasn't time yet. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: If you want, Tony has obviously got the latest, he's still in with the unionists. If you want, we could get back to your people in the next 15 to 20 minutes and tell them now is the time to move. (S)

The President: Right. Give us a call when you're ready for me to call Trimble. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the call to Gerry could be made now, and we could get a message back to you when it is good to call David.

The President: Bertie, the President of Korea is coming in here for 2 or 3 hours, so I will call Gerry now, and the quicker I can call Trimble, the better. It'll be hard to walk out of the meeting. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: What I'll do is check with Tony; he's still with him. As soon as he comes out, I will call straight away. (S)

The President: Okay, man. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Michael Manning, Roger Merletti, Miles Murphy, Joel Schrader, Matt Sibley, James Smith and Amy Swarm

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 12:17 - 12:19 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Gerry? (U)

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: How are we doing? (C)

Mr. Adams: I think we are getting there. (C)

The President: I do, too. The last deal sounds pretty good to me. We have to convince Trimble he should take it. (C)

Mr. Adams: I think he will go for it. (C)

The President: Is there anything to do to make sure they don't try to depose him over it? (C)

Mr. Adams: They will try to do that anyway. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b

[redacted] We need to get this done in the shortest period possibly required and make sure someone is helping him. [redacted] I'm sure Tony will do it. He just needs help getting over that period. [redacted]
[redacted] We will help ease him over it. We'll be as magnanimous as possible. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 6/8/09

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

The President: We don't want anyone claiming victory. (C)

Mr. Adams: No. I already said that to people here. It isn't a matter of getting him to do it. It's just a matter of getting it done. I want to galvanize the positive elements within the Unionists. I think he is going to do it. I'll bet you a dollar he goes for it. (C)

The President: That is a dollar I would love to pay off. (C)

Mr. Adams: Okay. We will be in there. It sounds silly and I couldn't say to him, like I can to you, but we'll make sure he's okay. (C)

The President: Okay. I will get on it. Tony is still with him and as soon as he gets out I'm going to call him. (C)

Mr. Adams: I look forward to taking your money. (C)

The President: Okay. Goodbye. (U)

Mr. Adams: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland First Minister
David Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Trimble

Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
Miles Murphy, Robin Rickard and James
Smith

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 5:40 - 5:44 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: David? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. (U)

The President: How are you keeping? Are you still standing?
(U)

First Minister Trimble: Still standing. Could be worse but it
will be better. (U)

The President: Look, I wanted first of all to thank you and
second, to say I tried to issue a helpful statement. Thirdly,
to ask what can I do to help? Personally, if they screw us on
this, I will support kicking them out and stand up publicly and
say that you are not to blame and they are. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Right. The only problem is I can't
muster enough steam to get it in. Whether we will get in over
the course of the next week or ten days I don't know. I'm
trying to give enough space for people. When I first put the
suggestion to the session of the party, only a couple showed a
favorable response and some were against. Most of the others
were of differing viewpoints. Key members from whom I needed

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

support were unhappy. Maybe we can work something in the next week or two to change aspects of this scheme. (S)

The President: Let me ask you, if you think it will help for me to call any of them personally. I will do that. (S)

First Minister Trimble: John Taylor is on our side as is Maginnis; and Reg Empey if we leave him alone for a couple of days. I made a serious mistake in organizing. I thought if I brought Jeffrey Donaldson onto my team we could smother some of the opposition. I am afraid it backfired on me. I need to get Jeffrey away for awhile to get things better. (S)

The President: Yes. You think about it and if you think I can help in any way. If you want me to send somebody over, I will. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I very much appreciate this, Mr. President. I really do. I don't know how we will work it out in the next week or two. If there's any chance I will. (S)

The President: I know you will. You're a good man, David. You've made decommissioning real. This decision would really not have happened if it was not for you. It will work now, I think. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I hope so. They have changed their position. If only I can get my people to see that and take advantage of it. (S)

The President: There's no doubt they changed their position. I honestly believe, based on my conversations with Adams in the last week, that he knows without you that this is a dead dog. You have to come out looking like the leader you are. Once he gets his ducks in a row, he will bust his ass to make it work. I've already told him this is it. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I went out of my way in comments to throw a line out to them. We now hope that works. (S)

The President: All right. Let me know if there is anything we can do. (S)

First Minister Trimble: Once again, I really appreciate your support and encouragement. You may find me calling again next week. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

The President: Thanks. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Thanks. Cheers. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland First Minister
Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
First Minister David Trimble

Notetakers: Matthew Sibley, Sean Tarver and
Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME July 5, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, David. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Well, the march went pretty well yesterday. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes, it did. I'm very glad that it
went off as well as it did. I hope it doesn't leave them too
big a problem. It is a credit to the Portadown Orangemen that
they did well. They are hoping that Tony Blair will reciprocate
it. I'm not sure if he can. (U)

The President: What can I do for you? (U)

First Minister Trimble: There are two things that would be a
great help to me. One which I think you are already doing and
that is to talk to Gerry Adams about a statement from the IRA
about decommissioning. The other thing is the so called "fail
safe" mechanism. It is fairer to exclude Sinn Fein from the
executive, but the problem continues to be John Hume. Seamus
Mallon is trying to persuade him. If John Hume could move, that
would help greatly. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/8/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President: So I'll call John and get back to Gerry about the other thing. I'll get back to you in a day or so. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with SDLP Leader John Hume (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Hume

Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
George Chastain and Joel Ehrenreich

DATE, TIME July 5, 1999, 6:50 - 6:57 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, John. (U)

Mr. Hume: Hello, how are you doing, Mr. President? (U)

The President: Well, I'm alright. How are you? (U)

Mr. Hume: Oh, I'm surviving. (U)

The President: Well, I think we got a pretty good proposal if we can get them to take it. I've been talking to Trimble and Adams. Trimble is having a bit of a hard go with Maginnis and with Empey and others who are being critical of the proposal. He thinks they can still get blamed if the government comes down and the IRA doesn't comply. I know Seamus Mallon has a piece in the paper tomorrow, which will help bring the Unionists on board for the Blair-Ahern proposal -- you know what it says -- it doesn't say outright that Sinn Fein should be expelled but gets pretty close. I have told Trimble in private and said publicly if the IRA doesn't live up to its obligations, I would support Sinn Fein being excluded. The United States would say -- it's not their fault, it's your fault and not the Unionists'. Similarly, if anybody else doesn't comply. We have to help Trimble a little. You've been working on this for 30 years now. I believe Gerry is ready to take the final steps. (✓)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/8/09 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPIED

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013 - 0472 - M
8/6/15 KBH

Mr. Hume: I don't think it's easy if he's being seen as being under public pressure. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (S)

Mr. Hume: I think it's better done quietly than with public pressure. (S)

The President: I do agree. (S)

Mr. Hume: What I've been saying today on the radio and TV is there is no way my party would sit in government with any party if they were engaged in violence. I'm convinced from my experience that Sinn Fein is committed to the peace process. Therefore, the international commission is going to report, so what we should all do is suspend judgment until we all hear the report and then make our judgment having heard that report. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. How are we going to deal with Trimble's problem to sell it? (S)

Mr. Hume: The time of the year is the major part of the problem. It's marching season for his people. Every year the tensions are very high for this time of the year. By the second half of July, when we move beyond that, tensions will fall, and it should be easier for him then than now. Do you know what I mean? (S)

The President: Yes, absolutely. And we had a pretty good day for that yesterday. (S)

Mr. Hume: Yes. It was pretty welcome that they behaved very responsibly. (S)

The President: You know, John, he doesn't have to lose very many people before he can't go on. (S)

Mr. Hume: Yes, I know, but the overwhelming majority of people voted for it. In addition, last week we had special messages from organizations representing the business community, trade unions, community groups and youth groups all telling us to keep the agreement on the road. There is very big public support for the agreement. This can be resolved and will be resolved in the coming weeks, but I don't think we should be putting anybody under pressure. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. Is there anything else you think I can do to help Trimble? (S)

Mr. Hume: I think one of the things you could do is make very clear from your point of view that as soon as a new administration is in place, that's when the goodwill of the international world will become evident. That's when the economic development and investment and marketing will transform our economy and society. The sooner the two communities start working together to set up the institutions, the better. There needs to be a clear understanding of the agreement that totally respects both identities, therefore no section of the community is under threat. (S)

The President: Okay, well, I'll just keep plugging along. I understand what you are saying. I really worry about the hard guys on Trimble's side taking him out. If we lose him, we're in trouble. (S)

Mr. Hume: I know that. Listen, thanks again for your interest and support. (S)

The President: If you want to talk anymore, I'm as close as the phone. (S)

Mr. Hume: Okay, thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
James Smith and Dick Norland

DATE, TIME: January 31, 2000, 2:55-3:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Gerry. (U)

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm alright. I just wanted to call and talk to you one more time before this comes down. I know how hard you've worked on this decommissioning issue, but we've been in touch with the Irish and British governments and I've talked to most of Sinn Fein's friends in Congress the last few days, and no one I talked to believes what the IRA is prepared to say to de Chastelain about arms and explosives and then to say he can't say that publicly will prevent this whole thing from going down. The institutions will be suspended and I don't know how the hell we'll ever get them up again. Then it will be even more difficult; the IRA will look like they're crying uncle, instead of squeezing out the last ounce of good will, especially since Blair is prepared to go forward with implementing the Patten Report. We're just in a terrible situation. I don't know if there's anything you can do to get a clear commitment on a timetable. I am very worried about this. I think de Chastelain will have no choice, and Trimble is gone if the institutions are not suspended. If they are suspended, we will all do our best to keep them alive, but it does not help the IRA at all. (S)

Mr. Adams: It will work backward. (S)

The President: It will be even harder for them. Right now, they're in an admirable political situation, saying, "we made everyone fork over before we did." We can get by without an act if there's a clear commitment and timetable, but without that, I

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 02/04/10

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472- M
8/6/15 KBH

think de Chastelain is going to issue his report, institutions will be suspended and the IRA -- I agree with you, it will work backward. Otherwise, Trimble is going to fall. They are going to get him. No one I know thinks he will survive. No one will say, "investments are coming in, we just hope the IRA does right down the road." They just won't do it. (S)

Mr. Adams: I think that there are -- first of all, I agree with you on the seriousness of the situation. Have you seen the words? (S)

The President: It says something like they will consider putting arms beyond use -- (S)

Mr. Adams: Yes, it also says IRA guns are silent and there is no threat to the peace process by the IRA. (S)

The President: But they won't even let him make that one public. (S)

Mr. Adams: I think David Trimble, if he receives a positive report from de Chastelain and he notes the British government accepts that as positive, then he clearly has the political will to go back. (S)

The President: But the problem is, their view is they've done what they're supposed to do and, hell, this could take place in 2010. (S)

Mr. Adams: Well, okay. I mean -- (S)

The President: Look, we can buy a few days here because the British and Irish are both committed to do the best they can, even if the institutions are suspended. The problem is, the language would seem less conditional if there were any reference to a timetable. I know the IRA view is they gave first because they gave the principle of consent, but everybody else's view of this is all the other parts of the Good Friday Accord and even the Patten Report is being implemented and that was difficult for the unionists -- and difficult is a mild word -- and old Trimble is still hanging on, but there is no clear timetable. If the language were public and there was a timetable referenced, it would seem less conditional, but without a timetable this language seems very conditional indeed. I don't think there's any chance of getting a positive report out of this. (S)

Mr. Adams: Okay, I am going to talk to Tony and also go have a meeting with Peter Mandelson. I don't think it is going to be possible, in fact I know it won't be possible. We tried to get a definitive timetable. What we got was intent on modalities and

~~SECRET~~

3

on a timetable determined by political developments as opposed to a calendar timetable. It is going to cause trouble within the IRA, no matter what people think, trouble within the IRA and its leadership. The worst possible scenario was failing to get the IRA to move, because the IRA's position was that not under any circumstances will they decommission, and now they are saying they will consider decommissioning, putting weapons beyond use, which is the exact wording of the legislation, which is a total change from their previously stated position. Whatever has been created in terms of public expectation of the IRA, the fact is this is a unilateral deadline set by the unionists. But that is not the way to try and make this work. There is perhaps some room to maneuver in terms of de Chastelain including some of the statement in his report, if that helps, if there are problems in not being able to publicize or publicly comment on this. I think there is a possibility, but only in the context that it would help stabilize the situation. We won't get it; we tried over the weekend to get a definitive timetable. For all that is said about the Patten Report, the reality is it is all promises. We've seen no legislation from the British. Demilitarization has not happened; there has been remilitarization. Two children -- two teenagers -- were killed in my constituency some years ago, a young girl and boy, killed by British soldiers. They were joyriding and they were killed. The soldiers perjured themselves. Today all the charges were dropped. All of this is playing into what was done. The guns are silent. I don't believe for a moment that Tony Blair for one moment disagrees with my analysis of how this can be done. I think he accepts it. The problem is in the unionists who are dictating this, not in the Irish government by itself or in the British government. I think it is in the way this issue has been used to choke the process. (S)

The President: I agree with all that but look, the problem is the whole Good Friday Accord and the elections are all premised on all the pieces falling into place at the same time. [Break]...of the Accord that set up the timetable for decommissioning. All the voting proceeded under the assumption it would happen. Now, the unionists have absorbed the fact that it will not all unfold as the accord predicted, but still there is this process and it has to have some integrity to it. The IRA may not care, but all the Americans who have normally been so supportive of you will basically say the same thing, that they didn't come across. As a practical matter, I think that's what is going to happen. The real problem was Trimble got those guys to go a lot further than I thought he could. He's eaten a lot more than the IRA has, he's eaten his words four or five times, and then he just found a way to get out of it and survive. I just don't think he can do that now. If you can work a deal with Mandelson, you need to go see him. We need to buy a day or two.

~~SECRET~~

If you can get something specific on the Patten Report, maybe you can use that. Details of how it's going to be implemented and when. Maybe you can synchronize that with the IRA commitment. Maybe they'll be willing to do that. (S)

Mr. Adams: The big problem for the IRA is that the decommissioning issue will be dictated by political circumstances that exist, not a timetable which they never signed up to. (S)

The President: But if that's the issue, what if you worked out with Mandelson and Blair a timetable on the Patten Report and agreed to get the IRA to say, "If they do this and this, we'll do the following things." (S)

Mr. Adams: It wouldn't work in that context. The big problem for the IRA is the unarmed police service. We can probably get unionists to buy it, but for the republicans, it is still a partitionist service. Our whole intent was to get the IRA out of the game, on the sidelines, so other people could take more pragmatic positions. So the big thing is to keep the IRA sidelined and spectating in all this. So I am going to see Mandelson, because we have to make the best effort to make sure this situation is rescued. I would mislead you if you left with the impression that something could be done on Patten which could help on this, but I'll go and see Mandelson now. (S)

The President: Let me ask you: if they want the timetable to be dictated by political circumstances, why can't there be some statement that if such and such occurs, we will do something? (S)

Mr. Adams: That's what the statement says. Let me just read it to you. "The IRA wants a permanent peace in Ireland. IRA guns are silent. We have contributed in a real and meaningful way to the search for a durable peace, but for that goal to be reached, steps taken need to be sustained. British forces and loyalist militias must be removed. The challenge is to remove the cause of conflict. In this context, and in the context of the full implementation of the Good Friday Accord, the leadership of the IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use. For our part, we are committed to enhancing our engagements with the IICD to resolve the conflict and deliver a durable peace. There is no threat to peace by the IRA." That language is going to cause trouble within republican ranks. (S)

The President: But that's buying trouble without the benefits. The point of view of the other guys is, "After all they've said, they've backed off." This will be read by skeptics as, you know, "We might never do this, even though this was part of the deal, even though parts of the plan precedent to the act of

~~SECRET~~

5

decommissioning have occurred." This goes back to my thinking in the beginning. I still think the easiest thing to have done to buy you the most and hamper you the least was a symbolic act.

(S)

Mr. Adams: I agree with you completely, but we tried and failed. The problem is Trimble said things and then backed off. He shouldn't have said them in the first place and we got him off of them. (S)

The President: The fact remains, if he goes, we are sunk. (S)

Mr. Adams: There's no reason for him to go. (S)

The President: It's not up to us if they depose him. That's the problem, no matter what the right or wrong. It may not matter to the IRA, but based on what I've heard my view is everyone will try for a soft landing if these institutions are suspended, but at least as of yesterday, when I spoke to a bunch of our Irish congressmen who have been so supportive of you and still are, their universal view is they need more. You go to Mandelson and see if you can work it out. We've got to buy a couple of days. I don't think this is going to fly. The institutions will be suspended and if we plead with him to hang on, I think the chances he will be deposed are about 90 percent. (S)

Mr. Adams: Let me go see Mandelson and get back to Jim Steinberg. Sorry to keep you waiting; I wasn't near a landline. (S)

The President: Thanks. Good luck. Goodbye. (U)

Mr. Adams: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair

Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Michael Manning,
Robert Williams, Matthew Sibley, Don Gentile,
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 10, 2000, 5:45 - 6:02 p.m. EDT
Army-Navy Country Club

Prime Minister Blair: Hi Bill. (U)

The President: Hey Tony. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: We've hit a snag. (C)

The President: Yes, we sure have. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

This is as much to get your thoughts and advice, Bill. I'm sorry for troubling you. This is the situation. When Trimble last went to his Ulster Unionist Council, they passed a resolution that said they couldn't go back into the Executive again unless he retained the name of the RUC in some way. [redacted]

The President: Yes, I saw it. I even got a copy of the resolution. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [redacted]

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/11/10

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, what I think, what I'm concerned about and what the SDLP is also concerned about is that the unionists will call it RUC and the Catholics won't join it. I think the SDLP is worried there won't be any Catholics to join because the unionists will use this to refer to themselves as RUC. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [REDACTED]

The President: Let me tell you what bothers me about your difficulties. I worry that if you put this legislation through like this and Sinn Fein withdraws their offer, we are worse off than if we're in a stalemate and we just hold the IRA to their offer. Ever since the last impasse, I thought the unionists had the complete high ground. Now it looks to me like the IRA and Sinn Fein have the high ground, especially if the SDLP sticks with them rhetorically. If you can't get this done, the question is, what do you want to give up right now? I'm very worried about it. We can try again, but we've been working on Sinn Fein all day and we haven't gotten any further than you. Now they want to change the Patten report, that's their perspective. I know what the counter-arguments are; it's a lousy deal either way. Either way, I feel so badly for you. The only thing that bothers me is the SDLP. No matter what the undertaking is, the unionists would continue to refer to it in that way in every non-official channel possible and that would keep the Catholics from joining. The practical problem is they're two hardheaded sides

pouring old grudges into little words. We can talk to them again, but I have next to no hope they'll change and if they don't, what's confronting you is what you're better off giving up. I'd really be worried if these IRA guys withdraw their offer before we put it on the table. Would you want something else, a tit for tat deal? Any way, can you buy yourself another 24 hours to keep working on this? (S)

Prime Minister Blair:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I'll keep thinking about it some more to come up with anything else. I really have only been pondering it for about 30 minutes because I thought it would get worked out. Our guys pounded Sinn Fein today. (S)

Prime Minister Blair: They feel they're in a very strong position. (S)

The President: Yes, they finally got the high ground back. I know the Irish community here was so relieved when the IRA said that they would commit themselves to put arms beyond use; before that, the Irish here were in the uncomfortable position of finding themselves disillusioned with Sinn Fein. Now they feel they kind of came across and took a huge step forward. I am sympathetic to Trimble's position, but I don't know what to do right now. I sure worry about taking the risk the IRA will take the offer off the table and I don't know what I would do if I were you. (S)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: That's why you try to buy a little time. Do you think there is any chance if Trimble and Adams met, they could work this out? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I will try to buy time. I just thought I would fill you in on the situation. (C)

The President: Do you think that if Trimble and Adams met, they could work it out? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: It's possible, and may be worth getting them to do that.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: That's why I wondered. The problem is if they had a meeting and it leaked, then everyone would try to spin the crap out of it if there was no resolution. It's the sort of thing that might work if they looked at each other face to face, assuming no practical impact and assuming you can work it out with the Catholics to not refuse to join, or even have Hume there. They've been at loggerheads for so long and come so far. It would be truly heartbreaking, since they made this big move on decommissioning. Maybe you could find a way out of it, if they sat down and talked, maybe they could work this out. I don't know if this is true, I'm just thinking. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: It's worth trying. To be honest, anything's worth trying. (C)

The President: Do you think you ought to ask to see if they were willing? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I do. (C)

The President: Do you think it would be better or worse if Hume were there? (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: Yeah, I know. If he has this language, he can say I'm deciding the requirement has been satisfied, and we are going to stand up the government. If the language is not in there, then he has to actually call them all back together and get another vote. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: Exactly. (C)

The President: Well, let me talk to our guys about this and think about whether you want to ask them to get together and have anybody there, or just the two of them alone in a room talking. I think they both realize they have come a long way and they both have unruly elements in their coalitions. It would be a travesty to let this slip away now, and they might be able to find an answer among themselves that we haven't thought of. They know their needs better than we think we know their needs. (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I can't believe there's not a legal way or undertaking capable of eliminating that problem. (C)

The President: Let me ask you this -- the unionists, when they passed this resolution, what did they have in mind? They basically didn't want to erase the role the RUC history played, and pretend that Northern Ireland was independent and not a part of Great Britain? (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: I wonder if there's some way for Burnside to work out some sort of statement that would be sufficiently reassuring to Sinn Fein, so they would be absolutely sure the Catholics would be comfortable joining this force. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: That's a possibility. (C)

The President: If they're not just worried about the words, but the practical impact, there might be some way for people that supported this to help. That's another thing I think that works on them. One of the things I learned about Adams and McGuinness, they were very worried that their requirements would cause Trimble to fall. If you can get some of these guys who caused these problems to help solve it by some sort of statement or

something, maybe even something else that could be adopted that Trimble, given the support of these guys, could take to his people, that might also work. There's a theology of the words, which you may not ever be able to solve, and the practical impact of them, which you might be able to solve, or at least some basis on which Trimble could talk to Adams and work this out. My instinct is this seems to be the real last straw and a situation where Adams might claim that Trimble is trying to change the importance of the Patten report. Maybe that's the answer. Maybe the sponsors of this resolution could do something that would support Trimble and reassure Adams. That and having them meet together are the only ideas I've got right now. I've had a hundred conversations with Gerry Adams and I could have another one, but based on what my guys say, I think I'd be better off calling him and urging him to meet personally with Trimble and urging the same thing on Trimble. There are two things there. There is psychology and theology, where Sinn Fein and the IRA think they have the high ground and then there is the practical, and I think, understandable fear that no matter how you slice this, the people who've been the dominant party will find a way to use this to make it very uncomfortable for the Catholics to be a part of this institution, which will undermine all the grief you've taken for letting people out of prison. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I think there may be something in that.
(C)

The President: You want to think about it and I'll have my people be in touch with your guys? I know it's late for you, but it's early here and I will be up late, so I can start early in the morning, if you want. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: That's very helpful; there may be something in that. (C)

The President: Talk to your folks and have them get back to us and if you want me to make calls at the crack of dawn, I will be happy to do that. Get some rest. The worst thing we can do is having everybody where they can't think anymore. It's not so late for me and I've got a lot of work to do, and I'll be happy to do that, so I can make the early morning call. Let me know.
(C)

Prime Minister Blair: I'll let you know. (C)

The President: Goodbye, Tony. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ulster Unionist Party Leader
David Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Trimble

Notetakers: Amy Swarm, Sean Tarver, and
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME May 27, 2000, 11:57-11:59 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Trimble: Hello. (U)

The President: Well, congratulations. (U)

Mr. Trimble: I'm not sure. It was too close for comfort. (U)

The President: I followed the debates all week, and you were
brilliant. (U)

Mr. Trimble: It is kind of unfortunate other people were
incensing their delegates, and there was more than a little bit
of dubious practices going on. There were some discrepancies in
the voting figures, and I have to see if we can't give ourselves
a bigger margin next time. (U)

The President: Good. I'll go back to the others on the CBMs.
(U)

Mr. Trimble: Good. I need a success story quickly. (U)

The President: I will go to work on it. But you were brilliant.
I followed you on BBC and UTV. They may have to give you a
second Nobel Peace Prize. (U)

Mr. Trimble: It was quite a weekend. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/30/10

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
3/6/15 KBH

CONFIDENTIAL

2

The President: The weird thing about politics is that sometimes you have to take more grief from your friends than your enemies.
(S)

Mr. Trimble: Yes. Well, it's good of you to call. (U)

The President: Okay. Thanks, friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Amy Swarm, and
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME: May 27, 2000, 12:20-12:24 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Adams: Hi, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Gerry, it's been a good day. (U)

Mr. Adams: Good day, surely. Thanks for all your help. (U)

The President: Glad we could do it. I'm really pleased. I hated to see Trimble have to go back to all his crazies, but it came out okay. (U)

Mr. Adams: It continues to be frustrating and messy. David Trimble's line about "house-training" Sinn Fein doesn't help. I can live with it, but it will upset the republican constituency. (U)

The President: I saw all that, but we've just got to get the government up and calm everybody down. (U)

Mr. Adams: You're right about that. I have also been working on Downing Street to claw back the emasculation of the Patten report. I actually had to talk to Number 10 on Thursday night because we almost lost the confidence-building measure on this issue -- the IRA were very close to issuing a statement. Any kind of formal meeting and we would have lost it. They are very clear. (U)

The President: I don't think this whole letter thing amounted to anything. I think we will be all right. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 05/30/10

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

Mr. Adams: Okay. (S)

The President: I wanted to talk to everyone. The main thing is to get the government up and keep moving forward on the Patten Report and on CBMs. I think Trimble was just traumatized by having to deal with all those people. Sometimes in politics our friends are our biggest problem. (S)

Mr. Adams: I said so publicly here, but once again we are at this point because of your unique understanding. I have been saying to people: let's make sure we get as much progress as we can while you are in the White House. It is no accident that this has happened during your Presidency. Thanks again. (S)

The President: Yes. We've got almost eight months, so we can do it. (S)

Mr. Adams: We'll need you every day. (S)

The President: Have you given your commencement speech yet? (U)

Mr. Adams: No, I will be giving it tomorrow morning. Thanks again. (U)

The President. Okay. Good bye. Thanks for all your help. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Ahern of Ireland
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Amy Swarm

DATE, TIME May 27, 2000, 12:45-12:49 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hey, Bertie. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: How are you, Bill? (U)

The President: Congratulations. It was a good day. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: It was a good day in Northern Ireland.
(U)

The President: Back on St. Patrick's Day, I was a little
worried, but I feel good now. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Trimble worked hard. He had to rally
troops. But it was a good win, because people are with him.
Public opinion was 80 to 20 with him. We now have to get the
Executive up and make as much progress as we can. We need the
republicans and the IRA to make quick gestures, but the key issue
is the Patten issue. Seamus Mallon has come out strongly in
favor of serious amendments. If we don't get into position soon
where they are recommending Catholics to the RUC, then.... It
brings us forward from where we were. (U)

The President: We just got to get the government back up and get
those CBMs done too. That will change everything. The unionists
will completely change their mood when that happens[*gap*]. (U)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/30/10

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBM

Prime Minister Ahern: I think that has to happen quickly. The pressure will be back on Trimble. If out of this he gets a quick move on the CBMs, that will mean a lot. (S)

The President: Good. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: It is a good move. I don't know if anyone mentioned it, but Mallon is worried about Patten and RUC, but if we hold our nerve, we should be okay. (S)

The President: I'll call Mallon. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: Cheer him up. He is going to see Tony Blair tomorrow, but just to get his confidence up. How is everything with you? Campaigning? (S)

The President: Hillary is doing well. I think she is going to win that race. We've got two big issues this week -- China and [gap] trying to pass the World AIDS initiative. I'm feeling kind of good. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: And Mbeki is over with you? (S)

The President: Yes, he was here. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Give my regards to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will. She was doing great against Giuliani and now we have to do a different race. Al had a good week. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: That's great. Thanks for the call and all your work and interest. You [gap] been out and we do appreciate it. (U)

The President: Okay. Keep in touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland Assembly Deputy
First Minister Seamus Mallon (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Seamus Mallon

Notetakers: Amy Swarm, Sean Tarver, and
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME May 27, 2000, 1:20-1:21 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: Seamus, how are you? (U)

Mr. Mallon: Very well. (U)

The President: I'm doing fine. I'm just glad the government is going back up and this is really important and a good sign. I think it has been a tough time for you. I talked to Tony Blair today, and he assured me that they are going to go ahead and implement the Patten report. I think we need to get on with work. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Yes. We will have to make sure he implements it in full. (U)

The President: I think he will. There are difficulties for him, but I think he is intent on doing it. Get the institutions back up and then get the IRA to do the CBMs as promised. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Patten is the key factor now. (U)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

Mr. Mallon: I am seeing him tomorrow...seeing Blair tomorrow and I will be giving him a strong message on it. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/30/10

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

The President: Good. I will do what I can. I had a good talk with him today. I told him you guys are worried about him weakening it more, but he understands and I am hopeful, and just wanted to say congratulations to you today and whatever I can do to help, I will certainly do it. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thank you, Mr. President. We hope to see you here soon. If you can make it, you will be very welcome, and bring the golf clubs with you. (U)

The President: I will do it. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thank you for everything you have done and we look forward to seeing you soon. (U)

The President: Thanks, friend. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thanks, Bill. We'll be seeing you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --