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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-14

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Sudan (U)

U.S. relations with Sudan have fallen to an all-time low. The reasons are fairly clear. The NIF-dominated military regime, having overthrown an ineffectual but democratically elected government, has embarked on a policy of Islamization that has resulted in large-scale human rights violations, interference with international relief efforts, support for terrorism, and attempts to spread militant Islam throughout the region and beyond. (S)

Alarming reports of mass starvation, the obvious suffering of the non-Islamic, non-Arab southerners, the unjustified execution of two USG employees, all add urgency to the need for a fundamental review of our policy toward Sudan and examination of options on how to deal with this country. (S)

This policy review should be completed by March 24. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues: (S)

Part I: Assessment

- What are U.S. interests in Sudan? (S)
- Does the behavior of the Khartoum regime, at home and abroad, constitute a threat to U.S. national security that would justify making Sudan a higher priority in terms both of declared policy and of action? (S)
- What is the current and potential scope of the humanitarian emergency in Sudan? (S)

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- What is the terrorist threat from Sudan? (S)
- What is the potential for regional instability as a consequence of Sudanese activities and of the famine and fighting in the South? How do Sudan's neighbors judge the threat from Sudan, and what are they doing to counter it? (S)
- Is there any potential for indigenous opposition to the regime outside the South? (S)
- What are the likely short and medium term results of the rebellion in the South, and the Government's efforts to extinguish it? (S)
- What are the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the war in the south? Are the parties willing and capable of meaningful negotiations? Would they require outside assistance (mediation) and who are the likely candidates for such a role? (S)
- Is public international pressure against the regime effective? Counterproductive? (S)
- What is the impact of Operation Restore Hope on Sudanese outlook and intentions? (S)
- What influence does the U.S. have over Sudanese government behavior? (S)

Part II: Options for Policy

- What are our options for enhancing the delivery of humanitarian relief to people in need in Sudan? (S)
- What level of aid should the U.S. provide, through what organizations and with what conditions? (S)
- What diplomatic course of action should we pursue vis-a-vis Sudan? (S)
- What role, if any can the UN play in all areas -- humanitarian, human rights, and conflict resolution? Would a UN-sponsored safe haven zone in the South be effective and achievable? (S)
- What are our options in the economic area? What can we do with the IFIs, if anything, to influence Sudan in a positive direction? (S)
- Are there additional courses of action that we should consider employing? (S)
- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify an implications for broader U.S. African policy,

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any applicable legislative constraints, and budgetary implications. (C)

- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (C)

Part III: Tasking

- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (C)



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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