

tomorrow. I
think it's of cardinal importance and that is what our presidents will
discuss
tomorrow. I would like to make clear that Russia-US relations are
moving
forward. Thank you.

[good byes]

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT memcon -- vp-stepashin call 6-14-99.doc
DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT
SERGEY VADIMOVICH STEPASHIN

LOCATION: RESIDENCE

NOTE TAKER: RICHARD BRODY

INTERPRETER: ?

DATE/TIME: 14 JUNE 0740/0816 EDT

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Sergey, thank you for taking my call at
such short notice
and I wanted to express appreciation for our very good conversation
on Saturday.
I know you're chairing a Security Council meeting today. So I
appreciate your
taking the call. Based on our conversation Saturday, I believe we are
able to
discuss even the most sensitive topics frankly and productively. And
President
Clinton is looking forward to seeing you in Cologne. Our Presidents
had a
constructive call yesterday. Their discussion laid a useful foundation
for how
we move forward on cooperation in Kosovo. Our countries must be
seen as working
together, not at cross purposes. Otherwise our success in bringing
peace to
Kosovo will falter and the conflict will quickly re-ignite, with our
forces in
the middle. I wanted to review the four issues that President Clinton
will wish
to discuss later today when he speaks to President Yeltsin. First, they

agreed
that Generals Jackson and Zvarzin would meet today in Pristina and
find a way to
resolve the situation at the airport. This meeting is important for
substantive
reasons and because the problem at the airport raises further questions
about
Russia's credibility and its commitment to work cooperatively on
implementing the
peace agreement in Kosovo. Despite what we asked for yesterday, the
problem at
airport still isn't fixed. Zvarzin said he was not there to work things
out,
only to listen. But he insisted on Russian control of the airport. That
won't
do. Both the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari agreement and the UNSCR call
for unity of
command. This is serious. It will cast a negative tone over all we've
done on
Kosovo; it could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace
to break
down. We must instruct our people to fix this today. If we can't get
this
resolved, it will be impossible to go on to address the other issues. I
can go
on if you wish, but I can pause for you to respond if you'd like to.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Good morning again. I'm glad to
hear you. I'm happy
we have the regular possibility to talk to each other. I'm convinced it's
the
correct method of communication. Besides, it's useful to remove
misunderstandings
while their happening to prevent them becoming something more
serious. During
our last conversation and again now you underlined the importance of
mutual
confidence between Russia and the US. In Moscow we ascribe
particular importance
to this issue. Without trust and confidence we could not attain what
we've
managed to attain between our two countries and this is the way to
work in the
future as well. About Kosovo, within the first stage of the settlement
we should
come to the framework of the Russian presence at the Slatina airport
which is
situated near Pristina. And I would like to say that that stage should be
in the
international presence and I would like to underline the international

presence
in Kosovo. On instructions from the President of Russia, General
Zvarzin is
negotiating with General Jackson and in doing so we proceed from the
following:
the support group of the Russian peacemaking force remains in the
Slatina
airport. And as I understand General Jackson has nothing against this.
And then
as a matter of principle comes what you have now set forth to me as a
question .
The cooperation of the group with the commanders of the
peacemaking force is done
in accordance with the Bosnia formula. And for that purpose at the
earliest
stage the package of understanding would be put together and the
mechanism for
ensuring cooperation would be also put together. And as I know
British liaison
officers work in the Slatina airport already now. And the parts of the
contingent which are lacking now can be brought over there in
accordance with the
schedule that has to be approved by General Jackson and we would
like to
underline this. Within the next 2 or 3 days in the scope of track 2
several
issues of principle should be come forth. And they should apply to the

deployment of the Russian peacemaking contingent in the scope and
in the
framework of the international security presence and the international
security
force. And agreements pertaining to that should be reached at the level
of the
Ministers of Defense and foreign affairs and reported to the
presidents.
Minister Ivanov already informed Madeleine Albright about that
during the last
night. And I would like to reiterate that position. And it is of great
importance to have the meeting of ministers of defense held tomorrow
or the day
after and Minister of Defense Sergeyev is prepared to welcome
Secretary Cohen in
Moscow. If you would agree with that let us say that this is an
agreement and we
will report to the President. There is one new issue which causes great
concern
among us and which can upset the settlement in Kosovo. What I mean
is the
appearance of armed guerillas of the so-called KLA and they make

their appearance
in the areas where KFOR has already located. And there are already
people killed
and would there which is quite inadmissible and this is in violation of
the
UNSCR. And we all of us have to take urgent measures in order to
demilitarize
the units of the KLA. And Minister Ivanov informed Madame
Albright about that
and she assured him that the appropriate work is being done and we
do count on
the contribution from the American side. Thank you. I'm now
prepared to hear
the other points you wanted to make.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: First, about your proposal for Secretary
Cohen to come to
Moscow. I'm not prepared to answer now. But I will consult with
Secretary Cohen
on the state of his dialogue and they will be in further communication
on w ere
and when a meeting might take place. I quite understand the depths of
your
concern on the need to disarm the KLA. We share this concern and
are working
very hard to make sure that does happen. The danger you refer to
simply
underscores the importance to both of our countries to working out
unity of
command and arrangements for the US and Russia and the rest of the
international
force. If Russia is there by itself not on terms that have been agreed to
then
that could increase the chances that the conflict could restart and that
your
forces and ours could be caught in middle. That's a situation that is a
real
cause for concern and a reason to resolve this. Let me go on to the
point I
raised first. I'll pause for the interpreter. Now on the very first point, it
is true that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that General Jackson
and
Zvarzin would meet and find a way to resolve the situation at the
airport. But
let me repeat that when Zvarzin came to the meeting he said he was
not there to
work things out, not there to resolve the issue, but was instructed only
to
listen. So there is no agreement on how to handle this situation at

airport. I repeat this is a serious matter. Second, Minister Ivanov told Strobe yesterday that your military people had agreed to fold the Russian contingent in Kosovo into KFOR on an interim basis under Bosnia-type arrangements to be reached with General Jackson, the British KFOR commander. We now need instructions from our Presidents to the relevant military people to implement this agreement. To avoid a security vacuum or problems on the ground, we must act quickly. What must happen to make sure that this is done to get instructions from our Presidents to the relevant military people to implement the agreements?

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: Well I accept the formula to which you referred, namely that the militaries should receive the appropriate instructions. And before the conversation between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton we shall inform him about what you have said and about the need to have appropriate instructions so the military could come up with their scheme for solving the matter which should be reported to the commander in chief. And as I understand the military have come up with further plans to that effect. And after that after the appropriate instructions are given the second meeting would actually be in order, the one I referred to between the ministers of defense should be held tomorrow or the day after in order to ensure that that proper instructions are approved and transmitted into reality. And in this way we could overcome the security vacuum that you referred to. Now I would like again to affirm the fact to which Mr. Ivanov said we are prepared and should work on the basis of the Bosnia formula and indeed this intention of ours remains in force, meaning the first stage.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I agree with your suggestions about the need for a work plan for long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I would propose that our defense ministers meet Wednesday in Helsinki. They would

be joined later
by our Foreign Ministers and could work to advance an agreement as
far as
possible before Cologne. We support this idea, and our President will
confirm
that our side is ready.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: AI, I agree that it's a very good
formula. And I shall
report this accordingly to the president. Today that would be referred
to in the
conversation between the presidents. Of course I can not now speak
on behalf of
the President, but I can tell you that the appropriate report will be
prepared
and position worked out. I do support the position you suggested and
will
examine it and we will examine it at the Security Council meeting.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Thank you. The other point I wanted to
make was that we
agreed on Saturday that it was very important that no additional
Russian forces
enter Kosovo absent mutual agreement. Let me underscore the
continuing
importance of this issue. We also believe that sending Russian forces
to Serbia
would be a provocative move.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I agree with you and this would of
course be maintained
and this is the position of our president that this agreement should be
kept in
force. And the last thing AI, this is an issue which is outside the
framework
of Kosovo. You know I'm going to be in Cologne the first two days.
And I would
very much like if you could ask your assistant Mr. Fuerth to come
over there
where I intend to stay on the 18th and 19th and get in touch with my
personal
assistant, Mr. Engelsberg, to discuss details of our forthcoming
meeting that
will take place in July.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: I'd be happy to do so. I think that's an
excellent
suggestion. Let me close by saying thank you Sergey for an excellent
conversation. President Yeltsin yesterday proposed a meeting between
the two

Presidents. They will of course meet next Sunday in Cologne, and President Clinton is looking forward to this. But as you know it is critically important to get these issues resolved in the next few days to ensure that this meeting is a success.

PRIME MINISTER STEPASHIN: I absolutely agree with your formula and I am prepared for that .

VICE PRESIDENT GORE: Have a very good have a good day and good luck in your Security Council meeting. And I look forward to talking with you again soon.
Good bye.

[good byes]

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memcon on vp-primakov call on kosovo march 18 1999.doc
MEMCON: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN VICE
PRESIDENT GORE
PRIME MINISTER PRIMAKOV
MARCH 18, 1999

* AG: I appreciate your taking my call on such short notice. I am looking forward to your visit to Washington and to the upcoming session of the Commission.

* YP: I also looking forward to seeing you - impatiently

* AG: We've been preparing well for the meeting. It will have big meaning for our relations. President Clinton and I believe it is essential that we use the visit to secure maximum progress on issues like promoting Russia's economic