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## **Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review**

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Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (c) and (d) of E.O. 13526.

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## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/8/99 1:31:13 PM  
FROM Clarke, Richard A.  
CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(c)(d)  
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/08/1999  
DECLASSIFYON 06/08/2009  
SUBJECT RE: PAKISTAN AND UBL [~~TOP SECRET~~]  
TO Riedel, Bruce O.  
Sutphen, Mona K.  
CARBON\_COPY Sutphen, Mona K.

## TEXT\_BODY

[007a]

Bruce and I are in complete accord on this. - rac

-----Original

Message-----

From: Riedel, Bruce O.

Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999

1:32 PM

To: Sutphen, Mona K.

Cc: Sutphen, Mona K.; Riedel, Bruce

O.; Clarke, Richard A.

Subject: PAKISTAN AND UBL [~~TOP SECRET~~]

MONA--PLS

PASS TO SRB

SANDY YOU ASKED DICK AND I FOR VIEWS ON HOW TO  
PROCEEDWITH UBL. WE AGREE THE CORE OF THE UBL/TALIBAN ISSUE  
IS HOW TO PRESSPAKISTAN TO TAKE ACTION TO FORCE TALIBAN TO ACT ON  
UBL. STATE STRATEGY

EO 13526 1.4d

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7/16/15 KBH

EO 13526 1.4d

THE PAKISTAN PROBLEM IS NOW GREATLY COMPLICATED  
BECAUSE OF THE KASHMIR ISSUE.

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/2/99 10:53:49 AM  
FROM Benjamin, Daniel (TNT)  
CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(c)(d)  
DATECLASSIFIEDON 12/02/1999  
DECLASSIFYON 12/02/2009  
SUBJECT UBL Small Group [~~TOP SECRET~~]  
TO Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)

CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY Mona--

[010a]

The second document is the paper SRB asked for from Dick for tomorrow's small group. The two flanking memos are grist for a future PC. They are 1) the memo Bruce did at SRB's request on the big picture in Afghanistan/Pakistan and 2) a discussion paper that was tasked in the CSG and coordinated among the agencies. The papers are somewhat complementary in that the first is longer term, the second shorter term.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 8717srb\_\_\_\_.doc

November 30, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: BRUCE RIEDEL

SUBJECT: Taliban -- Next Steps

[010b]

You asked for my views on a Taliban strategy post-sanctions imposition. The

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confluence of sanctions, the winter lull in the civil war and the coup in

Pakistan may offer us a window of opportunity to achieve our objectives in

Afghanistan. A major U.S. diplomatic effort to seek (1) an end to the war, (2) a

new government in Kabul and (3) Afghan compliance with the UN resolutions will be

required. Its chances for success are a long shot but in my judgement worth the

effort especially as we have few other options to achieve our goals.

Afghanistan has become a cancer in Asia, exporting terror and drugs.

It is also

remarkably invulnerable to outside influence. It has virtually no modern economy

and has been so ravaged by two decades of war that there is nothing worth

bombing. Normal economic or military pressures will not succeed. It is time to

try a comprehensive approach.

The Opportunity: The UN sanctions have gotten the Taliban's attention.

Combined with a wheat shortage and a cold start to winter there is some grumbling

in Afghanistan about Taliban's decision not to comply with UNSCR 1267. This is

not regime threatening, however, and will not compel compliance.

More worrisome

for the Taliban leadership was the failure of their 1999 offensives against the

Northern Alliance which have left them vulnerable to counter attacks this spring

when the weather improves. Again the Taliban is not in any danger of losing the

war but they could see some of their 1998 gains lost. Most alarming for Mullah

Omar and his lieutenants is the regime change in Pakistan. Pakistani support

(food, oil, advisors, recruits, etc.) remains the single most essential outside

leverage over Taliban. The Afghan policy of the Musharraf government remains

unclear. At least some in Islamabad

EO 13526 1.4d

have

indicated they want to move away from close alliance with the Taliban.

This opportunity will not be open-ended. Sanctions' impact will be

stronger  
now than later as the Afghans adapt. Once spring comes the war will  
resume in  
earnest. Musharraf will  
develop an Afghan approach soon and the default position will be the  
status quo.

U.S. Diplomatic Offensive: We should consider launching a major  
diplomatic  
effort to secure both compliance with the UNSCRs (i.e. an end to  
Taliban support  
for terrorism in general and UBL in particular) and an end to the civil  
war.  
Indeed the two issues are inextricably linked. Mullah Omar supports  
Mujahedin  
like UBL because of their role in fighting the Russians and now the  
Northern  
Alliance, and in securing popular support for the regime in the war.  
Only a  
settlement that seeks to resolve the larger Afghan picture will succeed  
in  
resolving the sub-problem of Taliban's role in terrorism.

What we should offer is a package deal which includes a negotiated  
end of the war  
through the creation of a Taliban dominated unity government. All  
factions would  
be represented but the Taliban would have the upper hand, a reflection  
of their  
superior position and control of 80% of the country.

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

To sell such a deal to the Afghan parties and their outside supporters will require a full court press with a great number of countries. This should be a U.S.-led effort and will replace the now moribund 6+2 effort the UN led for the last several years.

Pakistan is the most important actor. We should run our ideas past them first

Iran is also a critical player as the Northern Alliance chief supporter. Tehran

Russia and Iran are partners

in  
supporting the Northern Alliance.

EO 13526 1 4d

Saudi Arabia and the UAE can be critical

China can also be a help

Finally we need to bring the Indians on board as well

The Afghan diaspora,

should be mobilized to bring its talents to bear on reconstruction.

A major public diplomacy campaign will also be essential. We should kick off our effort with a major speech by you on our policy toward Afghanistan in this Administration. This would review our many efforts to get a peace process moving including Bill Richardson's trip in 1997, our support for the UN 6+2 effort and our considerable aid to Afghan NGOs (we are Afghanistan's largest aid donor in the '90s). We would then propose the way forward to end the war and try to appeal directly to the Afghan people. We would make clear we have no quarrel with their brand of Islam but do have an interest in ending support for terror.



This effort will encounter some domestic criticism from human rights advocates who want us to have no dealings with the Taliban. Our best response to their concerns is that the most immediate human rights help we can give the Afghan people is to end the war. We can also still press our concerns about women's rights with a new government. But we should have no illusions -- in my view, pressing the human rights issue aggressively during these negotiations will doom them to failure.

If this effort fails we will still have all other options to explore. If fact we will be better placed to seek additional sanctions against Taliban if we have tried to resolve the war and they rejected our effort.

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2

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~ LIMITED ACCESS 8717~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 11/30/09

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT SRB UBL Small Group.doc  
~~TOP SECRET DELEND A~~

UBL Review 3 December 1999

There are two broad areas of concern. The first is the regional context - our policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. You may want to hold a full PC on this issue. Attached is discussion paper that has been coordinated with the agencies and could be the basis of a PC. To tee that up, you may want to discuss briefly

[010 c]

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the outstanding issues in the small group.

The second area is UBL himself -- what he is up to, what is the state of our intelligence, what operations are under way.

The Region:

1. US Policy on Taliban: Given the Taliban's refusal to comply with the UNSC call for an end to terrorist support and their attitude in the attempted peace talks, should we review our policy of neutrality in the afghan conflict? Do we want to state our support for non-Taliban alternatives?

2. How do we maximize the sanctions?

EO 13526 1.4d

Bin Ladin:

1. What is he up to? Where has he been? Is there any reality to the talk of his leaving Afghanistan? What role has al Qida played in Chechnya? What do you expect him to do next?

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

2

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT Taliban Discussion Paper.doc

Discussion Paper: Next Steps on Bin Ladin,  
the Taliban and Pakistan

[010 d] Background: The passage of UNSCR 1267 and the November 14 imposition of sanctions appear to have shaken the Taliban leadership. In the weeks since the vote, they have sought to intensify their talks with us

EO 13526 1.4d

They also tried two different stratagems for dealing with Bin Ladin. The first was to declare that Bin Ladin had asked the Taliban leadership for permission to leave Afghanistan and for assistance in securing safe passage. This effort appears to have fizzled out, possibly because we made clear that such an outcome was not in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and would not get the Taliban off the hook. The Taliban may have tried this ploy as the first step in a ruse they have attempted before: Declaring that Bin Ladin had departed when he had not. In retrospect, it is not clear that Bin Ladin ever offered to leave. If he did not, he may be rattled by the Taliban's public discussion of the matter.

The Taliban's other maneuver has been to float what they consider different 'offers' to us, including the idea of convening a religious council, or ulema, to decide Bin Ladin's fate - specifically whether he should be expelled to a country

that can try him under Sharia law. The members of the ulema would likely come from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and a third country. The Taliban has also spoken about putting Bin Ladin under house arrest in Afghanistan, where he would be monitored by an organization such as the OIC.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

Discussion:

UNSCR Sanctions: Ensure Implentation/Increase the Pressure?

It will take some time for sanctions to bite. The UNSC has to set up a sanctions committee, and we are working to ensure its effectiveness

While time is passing, we should underscore to the Taliban that the current sanctions are not our only - or last - shot. UNSCR 1267 holds out the promise of further action, and we should let the Taliban know that we will consider additional sanctions, including further travel restrictions and/or a trade embargo

EO 13526 1.4d

However we proceed, we need to ensure that the Taliban recognize that they can get out of the box they are in. Some among them may believe that handing over Bin Ladin will not lead to sanctions relief. We need to convince them that their choices will indeed make a difference. We should also continue to emphasize that sanctions were unanimously voted by the Security Council -- that they express the will of the international community, not just the US -- and that this effort is directed against Bin Ladin and not the Afghan people or Islam.

Engaging the Taliban: Should We Persist or Enlist the UN? Although the Taliban's intentions are not clear, we have heard from some contacts that they want to send a team here to discuss sanctions and other issues. We have repeatedly said that we would welcome such a discussion but have not received a definitive response.

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EO 13526 1.4d

Intelligence

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d



EO 13526 1.4d

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Classified by: Daniel Benjamin

Reason: 1.5 (c) (d), x1

Declassify On: exempt