
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full or released in part.

Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.

Subject: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
DTG: 201823Z AUG 98
MSGTO: AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
SSN: 2763
TOR: 980821150149 M3432489

~~SECRET~~ STATE 152763

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/20/28
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ASEC
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG

1. ~~(S)~~ CLASSIFIED BY UNDER SECRETARY THOMAS R. PICKERING FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
2. ~~(S)~~ AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT JIANG.
3. ~~(S)~~ BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT JIANG,

FIRST, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CONDOLENCES FOLLOWING THE BOMBINGS IN EAST AFRICA.

TODAY I AUTHORIZED OUR MILITARY FORCES TO STRIKE AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN. I AM WRITING, IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR WORK TOGETHER AND OUR CONTINUING CLOSE CONTACTS, TO TELL YOU HOW I REACHED THIS IMPORTANT DECISION.

THE FACILITIES ATTACKED TODAY IN BOTH COUNTRIES ARE BEING USED BY THE USAMA BIN LADIN NETWORK TO TRAIN AND EQUIP TERRORISTS FOR WORLD WIDE OPERATIONS. WE HAVE SOLID EVIDENCE FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT THIS GROUP WAS MOST RECENTLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA. EXERCISING OUR RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, WE CARRIED OUT STRIKES AGAINST TRAINING AND BASE CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND A FACILITY BEING USED TO PRODUCE VX NERVE GAS.

WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE WAS HELD TO A MINIMUM. ALL STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM USING THEIR TERRITORY TO COMMIT ACTS OF TERRORISM. STATES WHICH FAIL TO UPHOLD THAT OBLIGATION MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT FAILURE.

THE HARD TRUTH IS THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT WITH THE FORCES OF TERRORISM, A CONFLICT WHICH WAS THRUST UPON US, AND ONE WHICH WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO BRING TO A HALT.

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2009-1291-M
7/21/15 KBH

I URGE YOU TO JOIN US IN TAKING A STRONG PUBLIC STAND AGAINST TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS. AS A FIRST STEP WE ASK THAT YOU EXAMINE CAREFULLY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WHICH I HAVE ASKED OUR EMBASSY TO PRESENT TO YOU BEFORE YOU DECIDE YOUR OWN POSITION. IF YOU DO SO, I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL JOIN US IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE IN TAKING ACTIONS TO DEFEAT TERRORISM AND TO SPEAK OUT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY AGAINST THOSE WHO PERPETUATE IT. WE ALSO ASK YOU TO RATIFY ALL ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERROR TREATIES.

OUR SOLIDARITY ON THESE ISSUES IS THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST THOSE PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT WOULD LAUNCH TERROR ATTACKS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND INTERESTS.

AS WE DISCUSSED DURING MY VISIT TO CHINA THIS SUMMER, THIS IS ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH WE CAN REACH A GENUINE DEGREE OF OPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND TO HAVING YOUR SUPPORT.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

4. END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Boris, wanted a chance to talk to you directly during this momentous period. Know the pressures must be enormous and that much is at stake for Russia. Pleased that Vice President had good conversation with Chernomyrdin about this on Sunday.
- Strobe is coming to Moscow this week. Hope you can find time to meet with him. He will have my latest thinking. I am sure that meeting with him will help both you and me prepare for next week.
- Wanted to hear your thoughts about the cabinet change and what we can expect to see over the coming week.

Economic Crisis

- A few weeks ago, Boris, you told me the future of Russian reform could be at stake, and that may be truer now than ever.
- Know you're aware of the stakes and how important it is to move promptly and convincingly to address immediate financial crisis. Even a day or two of uncertainty could be dangerous.
- I am sending one of my top economics experts before the meeting; important that our teams work together and that you and I have a frank discussion about economics next week.

Osama bin Ladin

- I heard your comments about our airstrikes last week against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. Wanted to reassure you that I acted because the evidence was overwhelming that more American lives were at stake. I hope you know me well enough to trust me on this.
- At times we have to act based on what we know is right and discuss it later. You and I have worked together on the problem of terrorism and share a common view of the threat to our people. I simply could not stand by when Americans were under attack.

Pause for Yeltsin response

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Reason: 1.5b,d

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- Boris, I want to be able to say publicly that we discussed the air strikes and that you understand why I had to act quickly. We need to get this issue behind us or the press will try to cast it as a point of conflict at the summit.

Summit Preparations

- Especially important right now to show world that this relationship produces concrete results.
- We have made progress on two important new initiatives: sharing early warning data on ballistic missile launches and disposing of excess plutonium for nuclear weapons. Let's make sure these agreements are finalized.
- Also wanted to raise several issues that you and I can turn into symbols of cooperation, rather than points of conflict. Strobe will be able to go into detail.

Iran

- We've worked on Iran and have a chance to demonstrate we've made real progress.
- Your people are working on investigations of Russian entities that have been cooperating with Iran's missile program. If results from investigations were announced before I get to Moscow, would set the right tone for our meeting.

Iraq

- Saddam is defying the MOU he agreed to with Kofi Annan. If we are going to sustain the credibility of the Security Council, we need to get him to reverse course and do it now.
- If that message came directly from you - and we reinforce it in our public remarks after the meetings - it could show Saddam we have a united front.

Kosovo

- Have a chance to make a difference in Kosovo that could save thousands of lives. Humanitarian situation is precarious. Milosevic feels like he can attack the Kosovars with impunity, ignoring the commitments he made to you in Moscow.

- Winter is coming. There are 200,000 displaced people. Now is the time for us to send a clear signal that he cannot use indiscriminate force against civilians. Strobe will talk about how we might do this.

If raised - need larger international bailout?

- Think this would be wrong message to send. Investors looking now for Russian actions to stabilize economy. Talk of bailout could backfire and send signal that situation is desperate.

If raised - go together to Duma?

- Need to reassess this in light of changes in government. Seeing both of us together may only anger your opponents in Duma and complicate matters. Let's approach this cautiously.

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ABCD

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

5930
Rice
J. J. J.

- Boris, wanted a chance to talk to you directly during this momentous period. Know the pressures must be enormous and that much is at stake for Russia. Pleased that Vice President had good conversation with Chernomyrdin about this on Sunday.
- Strobe is coming to Moscow this week. Hope you can find time to meet with him. He will have my latest thinking.
- Wanted to hear your thoughts about the cabinet change and what we can expect to see over the coming week.

Economic Crisis

- A few weeks ago, Boris, you told me the future of Russian reform could be at stake, and that may be truer now than ever.
- Know that you're aware of the stakes. I hope you and I can have a frank discussion about economics next week.

U Osama bin Ladin

- I heard your comments about our airstrikes last week against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. Wanted to reassure you that I acted because the evidence was overwhelming that more American lives were at stake.
- At times we have to act based on what we know is right and discuss it later. I simply could not be idle. I hope you know me well enough to trust me on this.

Pause for Yeltsin response

- Boris, I want to be able to say publicly that we discussed the air strikes and that you understand why I had to act quickly. We need to get this issue behind us or the press will try to cast it as a point of conflict at the summit.
- Many critics who want to seize on every difference between us as an excuse to block our cooperation. We cannot let this overshadow our meeting. Especially important right now to show world that this relationship produces concrete results.

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- In that spirit, wanted to raise several issues that you and I can turn into symbols of cooperation, rather than points of conflict. Strobe will be able to go into detail.

Iraq

- First is Iraq. Saddam is defying international community despite the efforts of Primakov and Kofi Annan. We have to get him to reverse course and do it now.
- If that message came directly from you - and we reinforce it in our public remarks after the meetings - it could show Saddam we have a united front.

Iran

- We've worked on Iran and have a chance to demonstrate we've made real progress.
- Your people are working on investigations of Russian entities that have been cooperating with Iran's missile program. If results from investigations were announced before I get to Moscow, would set the right tone for our meeting.

Kosovo

- Have a chance to make a difference in Kosovo that could save thousands of lives. Humanitarian situation is precarious. Milosevic feels like he can attack the Kosovars with impunity, ignoring the commitments he made to you in Moscow.
- Now is the time for us to send a clear signal that the attacks must stop. Strobe will talk about how we might do this.

If raised - need larger international bailout?

- Think this would be wrong message to send. Investors looking now for Russian actions to stabilize economy. Talk of bailout could backfire and send signal that situation is desperate.

If raised - go together to Duma?

- Need to reassess this in light of changes in government. Seeing both of us together may only anger your opponents in Duma and complicate matters. Let's approach this cautiously.

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6153

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader,
Liz Rogers, Cindy Lawrence and Lawrence
Butler

DATE, TIME August 8, 1998, 10:57-11:20 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. (U)

President Chirac: I wanted to say that we have been traumatized by the two attacks against Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and I wanted to tell you how sorry I am and offer all my friendship on this occasion. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I appreciate that and all the assistance you offered. I think your embassy in Dar es Salaam was damaged as well. (U)

President Chirac: Yes, a little bit. I don't know who these people are. Do you have any idea? (S)

The President: Only suspicions. We have our bomb team there now. I have been amazed at what they can find from tiny pieces about how the bombs were put together and sometimes that offers clues. We have our suspicions, but we still don't know. (S)

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
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President Chirac: You don't know still? (S)

The President: I think we will find out. (S)

President Chirac: I was very, very sorry and I wrote it to you. But I tell you how sorry I was, and I feel it from the bottom of my heart about the people who were killed from the United States and those two countries. (U)

The President: Thank you. Jacques, first of all, I want to apologize for disturbing your vacation. I hear you are in Mauritius. I called to talk to you about Kosovo. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, do you mind going through an interpreter? As you know, my English is not so good. (U)

The President: Let's go through an interpreter. I called to talk to you about Kosovo because I am very concerned that we are getting close to another humanitarian disaster and am worried that we are on the verge of another Bosnia. The war in Bosnia could not have ended in 1995 without your leadership and determination. (S)

Here is what I believe has happened. I think Milosevic has decided to go for a military victory. But in addition to fighting the armed resistance, he is also cleaning out civilians from their homes and villages and innocent civilians are being hurt because he believes, after talking to Primakov, that there is not a chance of a NATO military response because he thinks they will act only with a UN resolution and Russia will block that. (S)

EO 13526 1.4d

I think it would be better with a Security Council resolution. But here is what I think is the problem and why I think we need to make it clear that NATO could act without a Security Council resolution if necessary and let them go ahead with the planning they have begun and in identifying forces that could be brought into play to stop a military offensive in Kosovo. Here is what I believe: if we try to get a UN resolution, we will put Yeltsin in the worst of all positions because if they block it, many people in the world will criticize Russia, and Russia needs friends now because the government is in a bad position and the economy is hanging by a thread. If they back it and let it go through, I think Yeltsin will be in terrible trouble at home with the nationalists in the Duma. In principle, I would like a resolution too, but as a practical matter we may have to keep

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our options open and argue that we can do this if necessary because of the previous actions of Milosevic. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, I perfectly understand that and there is no need for interpretation, but I would like to speak French.

EO 13526 1.4b

The President: Well, you know Milosevic believes he'll never have to face NATO. That is why there are 200,000 people driven from their homes. All the past evidence suggests that only when he is under pressure will he negotiate. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] my impression is that he would get killed in the Duma if he voted for this. (S)

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President Chirac:

EO 13526 1.4b

The President: I agree, if we can. (€)

President Chirac:

The President: Here is what I think. I think that first of all, we are clearly better off if we can get it. My problem is I think if we wait to the point where a clear humanitarian disaster is on us this winter, we may be too late to prevent a mass outpouring of refugees and there will be a hell of a lot more people killed by then. (€)

President Chirac:

The President: I understand your situation, but what bothers me is that by then Milosevic may have won his military victory by massive ethnic cleansing. (€)

President Chirac:

The President: What I want to do is avoid the stick, but if he thinks we've got it, he may go back to negotiations. It is the possibility of NATO action without Russian approval that is a

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deterrent. Is that what you are you saying, that we can leave it unstated? I would like the planning to go forward. (C)

President Chirac: Absolutely. (C)

The President: Then we need to tell Yeltsin we do not want this to come to pass. We don't want to have to ask for a UN resolution. It will give him more incentive to try to settle this thing. (C)

President Chirac: Yes. (C)

The President: Believe me he does not want us to ask for a resolution. If there is a resolution, Yeltsin will be weakened at home no matter what he does. (C)

President Chirac:

EO 13526 1.4b

The President: He said he would prefer the UN, but he didn't want to put Yeltsin into an impossible position, and in a position where it looks like Russia has a veto over anything NATO wants to do. I think we want to avoid this. Kohl said he wanted to talk to you again and have Sandy Berger meet with Bitterlich and check around and talk again in a couple of days. (C)

President Chirac:

The President: I agree with that. (C)

President Chirac: At the same time, bring all possible pressure to bear in order to find a solution through the Contact Group, which should remain united.

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EO 13526 1.4b

The President: If that is your position, I think it is important that our public position is that we should try to be silent on the matter and not make a big issue out of the UN mandate one way or the other. Otherwise we will look totally hypocritical. There is a disaster and then a veto and then we have to act. I think we have to keep the public position that we hope we won't have to act, we believe there ought to be a UN resolution, but not close the door. (€)

President Chirac: Yes, I agree completely with you. Don't close the door. No polemics on that. (€)

The President: On the other hand, we will be quiet too. We won't say of course we don't need it. We will say it would be a good thing to have it. (€)

President Chirac: That is good. Please say all my best regards and affection to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will. (U)

President Chirac: Thank you very much, Bill. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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9-28-98

5961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1998

98 SEP 28 PM 12:30

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter from Chinese President Jiang Zemin on
Afghanistan/Sudan Military Actions*copied
Berger
NSC WW Desk**COS*

Jiang Zemin, in his reply to your letter explaining our rationale for taking military action against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, reiterated Chinese condemnation of the terrorist attacks against our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, called for enhanced international cooperation against terrorism, and said unilateral action should be avoided.

The most interesting element in Jiang's letter is a call for "increased consultation and cooperation" between China and the United States against terrorism. We have been urging China to increase counterterrorism cooperative efforts for the last year without much response. We are following up on this hint by Jiang that China may be ready to take up our suggestion.

Attachments

Tab A August 26 Letter from Jiang Zemin

Tab B Your August 20 Letter to Jiang Zemin

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1291-M

7/21/15 KBH

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)

Declassify On: 9/10/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter from Chinese President Jiang Zemin on
Afghanistan/Sudan military Actions

Jiang Zemin, in his reply to your letter explaining our rationale for taking military action against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, reiterated Chinese condemnation of the terrorist attacks against our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, called for enhanced international cooperation against terrorism, and said unilateral action should be avoided ~~as far as possible~~ (attachment at Tab A).

The most interesting element in Jiang's letter is a call for "increased consultation and cooperation" between China and the United States against terrorism. We have been urging China to increase counterterrorism cooperative efforts for the last year without much response. We are following up on this hint by Jiang that China may be ready to take up our suggestion.

Attachment **S**

Tab A August 26 Letter from Jiang Zemin

Tab B Your August 20 Letter to Jiang Zemin

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2009-1291-M
7/21/15 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: ~~Kenneth Lieberthal~~
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 9/10/2008

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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