

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. cable</del>	<del>POTUS to Francois Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)</del>	<del>10/05/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
001b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Reply to President Mitterand's Letter on Peacekeeping in Rwanda [partial] (1 page)	10/02/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
<del>001c. letter</del>	<del>POTUS to Francois Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (1 page)</del>	<del>10/05/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
<del>001d. letter</del>	<del>Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
<del>001e. memo</del>	<del>Richard Clarke &amp; Jennifer Ward to Anthony Lake; re: Draft Message from the President to Francois Mitterand on Rwanda Peacekeeping (1 page)</del>	<del>10/02/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDSD 5/18/2015
002a. memo	re: New Reports [partial] (1 page)	10/06/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) RDS 5/18/2015
002b. report	re: Assessment - Rwanda's Regional Relations & Relevance [partial] (2 pages)	10/06/1993	P3/b(3)
<del>002c. chart</del>	<del>re: UN Peacekeeping Missions (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
<del>003. memo</del>	<del>From Susan Rice; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)</del>	<del>10/02/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1), P5</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004. report	re: Assessment - Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda [partial] (4 pages)	09/30/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) RDS 5/18/2015
005a. memo	Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation [partial] (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 502

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, 1993 [1]

2006-0218-F

jp865

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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005b. letter	Francis Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005e. letter	POTUS to Francis Mitterand; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005d. cable	U.S. Mission, New York to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: Rwanda & Criteria for New UN Peacekeeping Operations (4 pages)	09/28/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
006. memo	Arlene Bender to Susan Rice; re: Backgrounder - UN Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda (13 pages)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
007. memo	Susan Rice & Nick Rasmussen to Samuel Berger; re: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues [partial] (1 page)	09/20/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
008. letter	Francis Mitterand to POTUS; re: Rwandan Crisis (in French) (1 page)	09/28/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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RUSANDA

September 22, 1993

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

DECL: OADR

TO: NSC - Susan Rice  
FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render  
SUBJECT: Backgrounder: UN Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda

ISSUE: To what extent should the U.S. support deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in order to assist implementation of the August 4 peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front.

I. ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

The Peace Accord and the NIF. On August 4, 1993, after over one year of negotiations, the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed a final peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, putting a formal end to nearly three years of war. The agreement provides that a Neutral International Force (NIF) will ensure implementation of the peace accords, and both sides have requested that the UN provide this force. The parties expect the NIF to create the necessary climate of security for creation of a coalition government in Kigali and to oversee disengagement of troops, disarmament, and force integration, and demobilization.

The Humanitarian Costs. The war, which had its roots in ethnic conflict between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi groups, displaced approximately one million people, about one-seventh of the country's population, and produced thousands of military and civilian casualties. Humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone has already reached \$100 million, with the U.S. government having committed to provide over \$34 million. Although the majority of the displaced have begun to return to their homes, approximately 350,000 cannot return until the RPF gives up the territory it holds and enters into encampments as part of the process of force integration.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

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By VZ NARA, Date 8/4/2023

2010-0639-M-1 (1.14)

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The Transition Government. The peace accord provides for a coalition government which will oversee a 22-month transition period ending in multiparty democratic national elections. The government was supposed to come into being on September 10. However, the deadline could not be met, given the non-deployment of the NIF, which is expected to provide the necessary climate of security to allow the RPF to come to Kigali to join the government.

The Military Picture. The GOR has roughly 30,000 troops and the RPF has approximately 20,000. The two sides remain in defensive positions on either side of a Demilitarized Zone in the northern part of the country, and an effective ceasefire has been in place since March. The ceasefire is monitored by the OAU's 130-man Neutral Military Observers Group ("NMOG"), currently composed of 30 Senegalese, 25 Congolese, 60 Tunisians and representatives from the GOR and RPF. In June, the UN Security Council approved an 81-person observer mission to monitor the Rwanda/Uganda border for cross-border arms shipments. The French have 300 troops deployed in the Kigali area to protect the expatriate community. Under the peace accords, RPF officials can bring a security force of up to 600 lightly armed troops to Kigali, but the officials and their security force will not enter the capital until the NIF has been deployed and the French have withdrawn their troops.

## II. THE RWANDAN REQUEST FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Both the GOR and RPF have requested deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to help implement the peace accord. They consider the matter to be of the utmost urgency and recently sent a joint delegation to the UN and Washington seeking support for deployment of a NIF. The delegation emphasized the urgent need to put the broad-based transitional government in place and begin the power-sharing process that is at the core of the political solution to the conflict. The Rwandans consider the current political situation fragile and have warned that delay threatens the peace process because:

- o the parties' mutual goodwill might be undermined if the new government is not put in place quickly.

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- o the 50,000 soldiers dug into their positions could become restless unless there is movement on implementing the accords.
- o the delay could be politically manipulated, possibly imperiling the democratization process.

In addition to the political pressures for deployment of a NIF, the delegation outlined the principal humanitarian justifications for rapid deployment of a nif:

- o The NIF will provide security which will allow hundreds of thousands of displaced to return home..
- o Without the NIF, the displaced will be without shelter during the rainy season, which begins this month. this would increase their misery and could endanger their health..
- o The displaced must return to their farms before the end of the current planting season, or famine may ensue.
- o The repatriation of Rwandan refugees (which number at least 500,000) can only occur after a NIF has been deployed.

### III. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL

#### 1. The Basic Four-Phase Plan

The UN sent a reconnaissance team to Rwanda in August to evaluate the need for a peacekeeping force in Rwanda. Based on the team's findings, the Secretary General issued a report, dated September 24, recommending phased deployment of a force of (on average) 1600 personnel over 25 months. The proposed operation, to be known as "UNAMIR" (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) would start small, increase to a peak of approximately 2500 for a period of four months, and then decrease in subsequent phases.. The UN has not yet released a projected cost for this operation, although it is expected to cost from \$XXX to \$XXX. The operation would include the following four phases:

Phase 1 - Preparatory (first three months): Headquarters advance team and other advance contingents arrive, followed by deployment of one battalion to Kigali to assure security so that the transitional government can form; UN border force and portions of the NMOG placed under UNAMIR command.

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Phase 2 - Transition Government Set Up (next three months): Transitional government begins working; additional battalion deployed to DMZ by end of Phase 2; Spartan assembly points established in DMZ. Border force and NMOG fully integrated into UNAMIR mission.

Phase 3: demobilization/force integration (next seven to nine months): Mission oversees integration of two forces, demobilization. When integration completed, second battalion withdraws from DMZ.

Phase 4: electoral process (10 Months): Termination of border force; DMZ abolished.

## 2. Force Size and Duration of Deployment.

The force will be comprised (at different times) of two light battalions (800 troops), 320 military observers (including the 81 UN border monitors and the 115 non-Rwandan NMOG observers), 60 civilian police monitors, elements for logistics, engineering, medical, and civilian support staff. The peak size will be 2,548 for a period of four months. At the low point, the force size will be 800. The average size, in "man-years", would be about 1,600 per year.

First Battalion for Security in Kigali. The NIF would establish Kigali as a weapons-secure zone. Military units in the zone would be required to store their weapons and ammunition in designated areas. A light infantry battalion of four companies would be deployed to secure a 10-km radius around Kigali for the entry of the RPF. One company will secure the airport, one company will secure the RPF compound, one company will secure government offices such as the ministries, parliament, etc., and one company will be held in reserve, ready to deploy quickly into the DMZ in case of trouble. Although the Arusha accords call for a 22-month transition, the Secretary General's report recommends that the duration of the mission be extended to 25 months, to allow for set-up time.

Second Battalion for Troop Assembly and Demobilization. A second battalion would monitor the DMZ and oversee demobilization and force integration. The UN would establish nine assembly points per side within the DMZ, which would be enlarged. The UN will also establish one cantonment site per side, where heavy weapons will be placed. Once the assembly

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and cantonment sites are set up, and the transitional government is functioning, the UN will establish with the government a date for demobilization. The demobilization date will be a maximum of seven days. On that date, soldiers will move from their current positions directly to the assembly points within the DMZ, where they will spend one month. From there they will either be demobilized, or sent for two months of training in one of four "integrated training centers" where they will be trained to enter the new, 13,000 man, combined army. An integrated police force of 6,000 will also be established, with one assembly point and one cantonment site per side, as well as one integrated training center.

Observers and Support Personnel: Observers would be deployed in five sectors: Kigali, the DMZ, GOR force positions, RPF force positions, and the UN border monitor zone. In essence, the observers would monitor the activities within their sector and verify that the operations in that sector were proceeding as planned and both sides were respecting the process. The mission would also include an engineering company of 200 to perform demining tasks and support the mission's operational needs, a logistics company of 200, 50 medical personnel, and a 40-person helicopter unit. A small civilian police unit of 60 would also be deployed to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially.

### 3. Mandate

UNAMIR would not have any peace enforcement duties. The force would not fight, but would be strong enough to overwhelm a challenge in a localized situation, such as from armed bandits. UNAMIR would not contain an electoral component, or electoral observers. Any UN assistance to the electoral process will be provided through UNDP technical assistance channels.

### 4. The Rwandan Position

The joint GOR/RPF delegation has endorsed the UN proposal in general terms, although they believe that the deployment timetable should be accelerated so that the transition government can come into being as soon as possible. (The UN report envisions formation of the new government at the end of the year.)

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5. The French Proposal and Draft UN Resolution

Prior to the release of the UN report, the French proposed a force of approximately 1,000 peacekeepers for Rwanda, with 500-600 to be deployed in Kigali and the remainder elsewhere in the country. The French insist on UN troops in Kigali, and they must be deployed all at once. The purpose of the Kigali unit is to allow the French to withdraw and the RPF to come to Kigali so that the broad-based transitional government can get underway. The French see the rapid deployment of a UN contingent to Kigali as the key to the success of the peacekeeping mission. They said they are willing to be flexible on other issues, such as total force size and the use of OAU NMOG forces and phased deployment outside the capital. The estimated cost of this force would be \$50 million over a year, assuming immediate deployment of the full force of 1,000. A phased deployment along the lines of the UN proposal would reduce the cost to some extent.

This earlier proposal is similar to force proposed by the Secretary General, although more modest in size. The French have now proposed a draft UN resolution authorizing a peacekeeping in Rwanda "in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General".

IV. THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR A UN PKO IN RWANDA

1. Deployment of a UN NIF Would Advance Key U.S. Interests.

The U.S. has both political and humanitarian interests in Rwanda. Politically, the U.S. seeks to promote the fundamental foreign policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization. Deployment of a NIF will create the necessary climate of security and confidence to allow the multiparty coalition government to form and thus begin the transition to multiparty democratic elections. Without a NIF, the GOR will not ask the French to withdraw their troops, the RPF will not join the government, and the transition to democracy cannot begin.

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The U.S. also has a strong interest in ending the humanitarian crisis that the conflict engendered. Several hundred thousand Rwandans remain displaced and cannot return to their homes until the RPF vacates its stronghold in the North and enters encampments as part of the demobilization process. However, the RPF will not move to assembly points and begin demobilization until a NIF has been deployed. Thus, until peacekeepers arrive, the displaced will remain in their camps and will require continued massive humanitarian assistance, with the U.S. the principal humanitarian aid donor.

Without a NIF, the parties face a political and military stalemate that cannot last indefinitely. The current interim government, which does not include the RPF, is merely a caretaker, without the power or the mandate to pursue the transition to full democracy or to address the country's post-war problems of reconstruction, demobilization, and return of refugees. Although the two military forces have respected the ceasefire for six months, they cannot remain in defensive positions indefinitely, no matter how strong their political will to make peace. Unless peacekeepers are deployed to enable the transition to begin, the peace process may ultimately unravel, leading to renewed fighting and continued massive humanitarian aid.

2. The U.S. Has Already Invested a Great Deal in Rwanda.

The U.S. was instrumental in persuading the two sides to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. We initiated the dialogue between the GOR and the RPF, and our government sent active observers to the year-long peace talks in Arusha, and we provided \$1 million to the OAU to assist it in fielding the NMOG ceasefire monitors. We have pushed publicly for democratization throughout the region. The two sides have taken up the challenge, and after long and arduous negotiations, have reached a peace agreement that includes a detailed blueprint for transition to multiparty democracy through free elections. They have asked the international community to make this transition possible by deploying troops to keep the peace during the transition and force integration process. If the U.S. decides now to oppose deployment of UN peacekeepers, we could be seen as blocking the peace process and preventing the transition to democracy. This could affect our credibility throughout the region.

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3. A Rwandan Peacekeeping Operation Is a Potential Winner.

Despite longstanding ethnic resentments, the Rwandan Government and the RPF showed real willingness to compromise during their year-long negotiations. The two sides, and the Rwandan people, are war-weary and want peace. A political settlement has already been negotiated. The two sides have been meeting regularly at all levels since the signing of the peace accord and, as a sign of their commitment to the peace process, they sent a joint delegation to the UN and Security Council member capitals to push for rapid deployment of a NIF so that the transitional government can get underway. President Habyarimana held a conciliatory meeting in the DMZ with RPF Chariman Kanyarengwe on September 13 and plans to visit the U.S. in early October to press for support for a UN peacekeeping mission. All the two sides need now is deployment of international peacekeepers to provide a confidence building measure to proceed with implementation of the peace accords. These circumstances significantly increase the likelihood of success of a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.

Unlike in other recent operations, the peacekeeping force in Rwanda is not likely to face serious danger or resistance. Both sides, as well as the general population, want the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force so that the peace process can proceed. As a cultural matter, Rwandans have a great deal of respect for Westerners and are unlikely to support hostile actions against a UN force. The experience of the OAU's NMOG is also instructive. In the twelve months that the OAU troops have been deployed in Rwanda, they have never come under attack or suffered a casualty.

4. Deployment of an NIF Is Cost Effective In the Long Run.

The international community has already provided \$100 million in humanitarian aid to the displaced this year alone, with the U.S. having already pledged or committed to provide \$35 million. These displaced cannot return until the RPF evacuates the area it holds and relative security is restored to the Northern portions of the country. Deployment of a NIF would allow the RPF to move into assembly points and would bring the necessary security required for return of the displaced. This would mitigate the need for humanitarian assistance. Once the displaced have all returned, humanitarian aid would no longer be necessary, saving tens of millions of dollars in assistance and essentially offsetting the peacekeeping costs incurred by the U.S. and the international community.

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5. Support for a NIF in Rwanda Could Bolster French Support for U.S. Foreign Policy Goals Elsewhere in Africa

The French strongly support a NIF in Rwanda and they are pushing the U.S. and the UN to support rapid deployment. They have a strong interest in seeing a NIF deployed because it will allow their 300 troops to pull out without endangering the French or expatriate community or threatening the stability of Rwanda. If the U.S. blocks a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, it could damage prospects for cooperation with Paris on a whole range of key African issues.

6. The Proposed NIF Meets Most of the Criteria of PRD-13

As demonstrated in the attached Joint State-OSD Memorandum, dated July 26, 1993, the proposed NIF meets most of the criteria of PRD-13, which sets forth the conditions under which the U.S. will support a peacekeeping operation.

- o The presence of several hundred thousand war-displaced presents a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action.
- o Renewed fighting would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and could destabilize the region, which is rife with ethnic rivalries.
- o The international community has addressed the Rwandan problem on a multilateral basis, through wide participation in the peace talks and deployment of an OAU ceasefire monitoring force and UN Rwanda/Uganda border force.
- o The NIF is a classic peacekeeping operation: both sides have requested the force, a ceasefire has held for 6 months, and the NIF is merely needed to provide confidence and keep the parties apart during the transition.
- o The objectives of the mission are clear: help assure security to allow the formation of the broad-based transitional government, oversee force integration and demobilization, and monitor security through the end of the 22-month transition period.

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- o The Secretary General's proposal contains a detailed timetable with well-defined phases and a clear termination point for the mission: then end of the transition period, which culminates in multiparty democratic national elections.

The last criterion, available resources and forces, has not yet been established (see below). However, in proposing a phased deployment, the Secretary General has shown his sensitivity to cost concerns. His Report attempts to identify the minimum credible peacekeeping force, without jeopardizing the success of the operation. If the operation is paid for by increasing our UN arrears, savings in humanitarian aid could be viewed as an offset.

#### V. THE CONCERNS ABOUT A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA

##### 1. The U.S. and UN Lack the Necessary Funding Resources

Both the U.S. and UN peacekeeping budgets are running large deficits, and the U.S. has been unable to identify sufficient resources to pay its share of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, which could cost from \$50 million per year (for the French option) to \$XXX (for the UN proposal). Assuming an assessed UN operation, the U.S. would be responsible for funding 30 percent of the operation's cost, or roughly \$15 million for the French option and as much as \$XXX for the UN option. Our only option would be to add these costs to our arrears.

We might try to fund the operation in whole or in part through voluntary contributions. However, the French have stated that they do not favor voluntary contributions. As a matter of principle, the French contend that peacekeeping is a responsibility of the entire international community and, as such, should be financed through the normal UN assessment process. As a practical matter, the French have indicated that certain internal budgetary rules make voluntary contributions difficult. The Belgians, who have a special interest in Rwanda as the former colonial rulers, have indicated a willingness to assist financially and might contribute to a voluntary fund, but it is unlikely that they or any other country would step forward and contribute enough to finance the operation entirely

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through voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, State AF has identified \$1.8 million in reprogrammed ESF that could be used as a contribution, but this money is vulnerable to the current Congressionally-mandated rescission and, in any event, it would only cover a fraction of the operation's total cost.

The only apparent feasible way to finance the operation would be through an assessed operation, with the U.S. assessment added to our arrears. A voluntary fund could also be established, which would allow the UN to accept supplemental contributions from those countries with a special interest in Rwanda (e.g., Belgium, and possibly the French, if they can be persuaded to accept the principle of at least partial voluntary funding). Voluntary contributions would lower the overall cost of the assessed operation, thereby reducing the overall increase in U.S. arrears.

## 2. Adequate Troop Commitments May Be Difficult to Assemble.

With the number of peacekeeping missions on the rise, the UN and the international community are stretched very thin and it is becoming more and more difficult to identify countries willing to contribute troops to new peacekeeping operations. Although UN officials have informally contacted various countries to determine whether they would be inclined to participate in a mission in Rwanda (e.g., Canada, Belgium, Senegal, Morocco, Togo), there is still work to be done before all the necessary troops are identified.

That said, it should be noted that the Belgians have recently indicated that they may contribute 300 troops, and they also plan to assist in training the integrated Rwandan police force. The Egyptians have said they could supply a battalion (provided it was under UN command), and the 200 or so NMOG and UN border monitors can be fairly easily incorporated into the proposed UN NIF. Although the Canadians are stretched thin in this area, they have expressed a willingness to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping mission and other countries could be expected to come forward once a Security Council resolution authorizing a NIF has been adopted. There is no plan to offer U.S. troops to a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, and we have informally indicated as much to the Rwandans on several occasions.

  
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3. The Mission of the NIF May Be Too Broad  
and May Spill Over Into Peace Enforcement

There is some concern that the UN force will be required to act as a police force and provide security in Kigali and throughout Rwanda. Indeed, one of the principal mission's of the NIF will be to create a climate of security in Kigali so that the RPF will willingly come to the capital and the broad-based transitional government can be established. This may go beyond the mandate of traditional peacekeeping and could put the UN in the difficult position of enforcing the peace.

If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or resources to respond adequately. However, unlike in other conflicts where peacekeepers have been requested, the Rwandans have negotiated and agreed on a very detailed, specific, and comprehensive peace agreement. Because the parties have already considered the key areas of possible dispute and addressed them in the accords after lengthy negotiations, they are more likely to respect the terms of the peace agreement.

In addition, the UN report tries to make clear that the NIF would not enforce security; rather, it would "assist in ensuring security" through overseeing the movement of troops and weapons and monitoring the local enforcement of the law. If fighting were to break out, the Rwandans themselves have said that the UN force would not be expected to intervene, but instead could withdraw.

4. The OAU or Other Regional Bodies Should Have a Larger Role.

With the UN and U.S. stretched to the limit on peacekeeping, it might be preferable to shift all or part of the peacekeeping job in Rwanda to the OAU or some other regional organization. This would relieve the UN (and derivatively, the U.S.) of the substantial financial burden and would have the added benefit of developing the peacekeeping capabilities of regional organizations, a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy.

Unfortunately, there is little likelihood that the OAU or some group other than the UN could mount a credible peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. The Secretary General of the

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OAU has already indicated that the OAU lacks the resources to expand the NMOG or to mount a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and the OAU has made it clear that it wishes to turn the job over to the UN as soon as possible. In addition, the GOR has been unimpressed with the performance of the NMOG and considers the NMOG to be pro-RPF. As a result, the Rwandan Government insists on a UN force and will not ask the French forces to leave if only OAU troops are on the ground. As long as the French forces stay, the RPF will not come to Kigali, the transitional government cannot form, and the peace implementation process would probably never get off the ground.

5. Accommodating the French May Not Be Appropriate or Effective

It may not be good policy to support a NIF in Rwanda just to accommodate the French. The proposed peacekeeping operation in Rwanda should be examined on its own merits, without regard to the desires or interests of the French or any other countries. Given budgetary constraints, we should try to ensure that the French show some flexibility in their position, for instance by agreeing to make voluntary contributions to any peacekeeping mission, above and beyond their modest UN peacekeeping assessment. Finally, even if we support a NIF in Rwanda, there is no guarantee that the French will be cooperative in other areas where they would not otherwise have been supportive of the U.S. position.

Drafted:AF/C:KAiston  
SECC 3070, 09/27/93, X73139

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	re: Aide-memoire de la Mission Conjointe Gouvernement rwandais-Front Patriotique Rwandais au sujet de la creation et du deploiement d'une Force Internationale Neutre au Rwanda (in French) (4 pages)	09/16/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002a. memo	Arlene Render to Mr. Moose; re: Your Meeting with Joint Rwandan Government-RPF Delegation [partial] (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002b. note	re: Anastase Gasana [partial] (1 page)	09/22/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002c. report	re: U.S. Government Report. (1 page)	05/11/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Prudence Bushnell to Richard Clarke et al; re: Peacekeeping in Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part Per E.O. 13526	08/04/1993	P3/b(3) RDS 5/18/2015
003b. memo	Anthony Marley & Kevin Aiston to Prudence Bushnell; re: Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda (9 pages)	07/26/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
004a. fax cover sheet	Kevin Aiston to Jennifer Ward et al; re: Rwanda PRD-13 [partial] (1 page)	07/28/1993	P3/b(3)
004b. memo	re: Joint State OSD Memorandum Concerning Peacekeeping in Rwanda & Criteria of PRD-13 (5 pages)	07/26/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004c. memo	Prudence Bushnell to Anthony Marley & Kevin Aiston; re: Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda (9 pages)	07/26/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/2015
005a. memo	Anthony Marley to Prudence Bushnell; re: Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda (8 pages)	07/16/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/2015
005b. annex	re: Criteria of PRD-13 (4 pages)	07/16/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, 1993 [2]

2006-0218-F

jp866

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. talking points	re: Peacekeeping Core Group Meeting (3 pages)	07/07/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
007. memo	Edward Brynn to Douglas Bennett; re: UN/OAU (Organization for African Unity) Peacekeeping Initiatives (3 pages)	05/27/1993	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/2015
008. memo	William Itoh to Marc Grossman; re: South Africa (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
009a. cable	Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. to American Embassy, Paris; re: Response to President Mitterand's January 15 Letter on Rwandan Displaced Persons (1 page)	03/09/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
009b. letter	Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)	01/15/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
009c. letter	Francois Mitterand to POTUS; re: Situation in Rwanda (in French) (2 pages)	01/15/1993	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Rwanda Crisis—Back from Kigali (For Now) (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. memo	re: Rwanda Crisis—Focus on Goma (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Recognition of New Government of Rwanda (2 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
003. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Rwanda Refugee Crisis—U.S. Mobilizes (2 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004a. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Rwanda Crisis—Back from Kigali (For Now) (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/15
004b. memo	re: Rwanda Crisis—Focus on Goma (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005a. letter	J.B. Bolger to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005b. letter	Prime Minister of Denmark to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (2 pages)	08/06/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005c. letter	Tomiiichi Murayama to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (2 pages)	08/03/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005d. letter	Felipe Gonzalez Marquez to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (1 page)	08/04/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005e. letter	Gyula Horn to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (1 page)	08/15/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [1]

2006-0218-F

jp867

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/2024
002. memo	Marc Grossman to William Itoh; re: Rwanda Refugee Crisis—U.S. Mobilizes (2 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1) 5/18/2015
003. memo	Anthony Lake & Alexis Herman to POTUS; re: Foreign Affairs Issues with Congressional Black Caucus (3 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
004a. memo	Marc Grossman to William Itoh; re: Operation Support Hope in High Gear (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004b. report	re: Rwanda—High Level Visits Highlight Crisis (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005. list	re: White House Meeting on Rwanda (2 pages)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
006a. note	Kristie Kenney to Nancy Soderberg; re: Rwanda Recognition (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
006b. memo	Rick Inderfurth to William Itoh; re: USUN Reactions to Recognition of Rwanda (2 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
006c. paper	re: Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (2 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/2024
006d. memo	Marc Grossman to William Itoh; re: Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (2 pages)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1), P5 SOL 5/18/15
007. email	From Alan Kreczko; re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/28/1994	P6/b(6)
008. memo	For Executive Secretart, NSC; re: Recognition of New Government of Rwanda (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [2]

2006-0218-F

jp880

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009: memo	Donald Steinberg to Anthony Lake; re: Diplomatic Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (3 pages)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1), P5 V2/1/2024

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OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

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2006-0218-F

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Recognition of the New Government in Rwanda

Issue A

What should be our diplomatic relationship with the new RPF-led government in Rwanda?

Option 1:

Given our continuing concerns about the nature of the RPF-led government, we could hold off on full recognition for the time being, both to use the carrot of recognition to encourage greater inclusiveness and an absence of mass retribution, and to learn more about reports of unacceptable activities of RPF operatives, including summary executions. At the same time, we could also launch an aggressive effort to enhance the visibility of our relations with the government of Rwanda through high-level visits (e.g., A/S Moose, CODEL Payne, who plan to travel to Goma/Kigali this coming weekend), increased cooperation on relief efforts, the use of Kigali airport as a hub for relief flights and perhaps a letter from Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. This would add to the sense of stability and security in Rwanda and could facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. In particular, we should give high visibility to our contacts with the Rwandan government's Hutu President and Prime Minister.

In these contacts, we should welcome the progress so far in working toward national reconciliation, but continue to stress that full diplomatic recognition will be tied to our judgment on the Government's movement on the following issues:

- Continued efforts to enhance its ethnic base, such as reaching out to members of the former governing Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords;
- Fostering rule of law, respect for human rights and exercise of restraint on the issue of retribution;
- Establishment through words and actions of the security and stability necessary to attract refugees back to Rwanda.

We should work with the United Nations (perhaps through a U.N. Security Council Resolution or Presidential statement) and other key players to communicate this same message of encouragement and a call for continued movement.

Option 2:

We could move to immediately recognize the current Rwandan government in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the possible entry of U.S. military personnel in Kigali and/or elsewhere in Rwanda. This option would be taken in response to the previous moves to include moderate Hutus in the government (including as President and Prime Minister), positive statements regarding the need to respect the rule of law and limit retribution, and efforts to create

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7010-0639-11-2 (1.31)

72 8/28/2023

(7010-0639-11-2 (1.43))

a safe and secure environment for the return of refugee. This action could be announced during Assistant Secretary Moose's trip to Kigali. Assistant Secretary Moose would carry a letter from the President or Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. We would coordinate this action with other nations.

At the same time, we would announce that we are continuing our efforts to encourage the Rwandan government to take the three steps outlined above with respect to broadening its political and ethnic base; respecting the rule of law and limiting retribution; and giving full meaning to its call for a safe environment for the return of the refugees.

#### Issue B

How would we respond to a move by the new RPF-led government for the seat at the United Nations?

##### Option 1:

Whether or not we move now to recognize the RPF-led government, we could support the seating of that government at the U.N. General Assembly and on the Security Council. This participation would facilitate humanitarian relief efforts in the country through greater contact between the government, the UNHCR and other U.N. bodies. The President pledged two weeks ago to work to unseat the representation of the current interim government, which no longer controls any territory within Rwanda and has clearly been involved in genocidal killings. U.N. recognition would also afford the government additional credibility, and may encourage the creation of the conditions needed to provide assurances for the return of the refugees from Zaire. Close ties with the international community will be essential to ensure that the new government abides by international standards on human rights.

##### Option 2:

We could opt for the "empty seat" approach. This would give the United Nations some continued pressure with the new government to adopt good policies on the issues noted above.



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6072

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

7/30/94

July 28, 1994

94 JUL 28 08:08

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE  
ALEXIS HERMAN

SUBJECT:

Foreign Affairs Issues with the Congressional Black Caucus

Background

In his meeting with you on Tuesday, Congressman Donald Payne referred to inadequate responses by the Administration to CBC concerns on foreign affairs issues, especially with regard to Rwanda. He also expressed concerns regarding comments by Ambassador Albright with respect to the United Nations peacekeeping facilities and about delays in our sending APC's to the UN for use in Rwanda. His comments reflect a general frustration at lack of coordination with the White House. To remedy the problem, we have worked out a process for ongoing communications and procedures that we believe will alleviate the major concern of the CBC members and will provide a process to ensure close consultation on follow up to the issues that arose from the White House Conference on Africa and other issues of concern to them. Tony will begin meeting once a month with the CBC to discuss foreign affairs issues. Since the White House Conference on Africa, we have also undertaken internally to meet once a week at the staff level with CBC staff to address foreign affairs issues.

Ambassador Albright

With respect to Ambassador Albright, Congressman Payne took offense at her comments on a MacNeil Lehrer broadcast in which she noted the problems we face on international peacekeeping efforts. He said that she had "demeaned" the Secretary General by stating that calling on the UN peacekeeping office was tantamount to dialing 911 and getting a busy signal or no answer at all. We were first alerted to Congressman Payne's concerns in mid-June and informed Ambassador Albright of them. She contacted Payne directly. In addition, we explained to his top aides that her comments had been misinterpreted. Ambassador Albright was expressing her concern that the international community was overstressing the capacity of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. She was calling for all the friends of the United Nations to work together to enhance its capacity. We stressed that Ambassador Albright has been a strong and consistent supporter of the United Nations. We have alerted her again to the concerns expressed to you by Congressman Payne, and she spoke with him again on Tuesday.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2023

2010-0639-M-1 (1.45)

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



CBC Letters

In terms of responding to letters, the first contact we received from the Congressional Black Caucus on Rwanda was on May 4 in a letter from Chairman Kweisi Mfume and Congressman Payne. This letter called for our logistical and financial support for an international peacekeeping effort in Rwanda under the United Nations. Neither this letter, nor the ones described below, requested meetings with you or the White House staff. There remains confusion over whether Payne made an oral request. On June 9, you sent a reply to the May 4 letter which the CBC staff says they never received (copy at Tab B). The response describes our efforts to see such a UN peacekeeping force deployed, including our support for a UN Security Council Resolution to authorize 5,500 troops for Rwanda and efforts to facilitate their deployment; our sponsorship of an arms embargo on Rwanda; our humanitarian assistance efforts, which at that time had reached a commitment of more than \$50 million; our commitment to send 50 APC's to the United Nations; and other diplomatic actions.

On June 16, Congressmen Mfume and Payne again wrote to you regarding Rwanda, calling for the deployment of armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR, criticizing our UN Ambassador for comments she made regarding the United Nations, questioning our use of terminology to refer to the killings in Rwanda and complaining about the absence of consultation on the White House Conference on Africa. We received the letter on June 19 and contacted the Congressmen and their staffs by phone to discuss their concerns. We discussed our actions on Rwanda, including support of the UN peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian relief efforts. We noted that our armored personnel carriers were already arriving in Entebbe. The letter also prompted a series of long discussions concerning the White House Conference, resulting in an agreement to work together more closely with the Caucus, including a meeting with the CBC Foreign Affairs Task Force the first week of August.

On July 20, Congressmen Mfume and Payne wrote again, praising the humanitarian response of the Administration to the refugee crisis in Zaire and calling for immediate new assistance, including engineers and medical staff, as well as diplomatic efforts with the government of Zaire to disarm the forces of the Rwandan Army units which had crossed the border into Zaire. A draft response to these last two letters is attached for your signature.

APC's

Regarding the armored personnel carriers, there has been criticism that we delayed sending them to the UN because of bureaucratic difficulties. In truth, we could have moved faster in the first two weeks but once the White House made the issue a priority, we moved the APC's within about ten days. There were then bureaucratic problems with the UN, causing additional delays. The UN first indicated an interest in the APC's on May 19; June 3, the NSC weighed in to move things faster; the U.S.-UN contract was signed June 14 (the June 3-14 period involved normal contracting procedures and identification of available supplies); the APC's were shipped to Uganda between June 19 and 30; the UN took control of them on June 30 and has been moving them to Rwanda as needed. There was an initial delay by the UN in moving them to Rwanda



because of the lack of UN troops to receive them and because of the UN requirement to repaint them UN white to avoid any confusion between military and humanitarian equipment.

Attachments

Tab A	Responses to Congressmen Mfume and Payne
Tab B	June 9 Letter
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

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Recognition of the New Government in Rwanda

Issue A

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Option 1:

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We should work with the United Nations (perhaps through a U.N. Security Council Resolution or Presidential statement) and other key players to communicate this same message of encouragement and a call for continued movement.

Option 2:

We could move to immediately recognize the current Rwandan government in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the possible entry of U.S. military personnel in Kigali and/or elsewhere in Rwanda. This option would be taken in response to the previous moves to include moderate Hutus in the government (including as President and Prime Minister), positive statements regarding the need to respect the rule of law and limit retribution, and efforts to create

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a safe and secure environment for the return of refugee. This action could be announced during Assistant Secretary Moose's trip to Kigali. Assistant Secretary Moose would carry a letter from the President or Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. We would coordinate this action with other nations.

At the same time, we would announce that we are continuing our efforts to encourage the Rwandan government to take the three steps outlined above with respect to broadening its political and ethnic base; respecting the rule of law and limiting retribution; and giving full meaning to its call for a safe environment for the return of the refugees.

### Issue B

How would we respond to a move by the new RPF-led government for the seat at the United Nations?

#### Option 1:

Whether or not we move now to recognize the RPF-led government, we could support the seating of that government at the U.N. General Assembly and on the Security Council. This participation would facilitate humanitarian relief efforts in the country through greater contact between the government, the UNHCR and other U.N. bodies. The President pledged two weeks ago to work to unseat the representation of the current interim government, which no longer controls any territory within Rwanda and has clearly been involved in genocidal killings. U.N. recognition would also afford the government additional credibility, and may encourage the creation of the conditions needed to provide assurances for the return of the refugees from Zaire.

Close ties with the international community will be essential to ensure that the new government abides by international standards on human rights. We must be aware that whether we formally recognize the new government or not, our support for its admission to the UN will be viewed by the international community as a *de facto* act of recognition, whose personnel have

Option 2: We could opt for the "empty seat" approach. This would give the United Nations some continued pressure with the new government to adopt good policies on the issues noted above.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6165

July 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON STEINBERG *ms*

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Recognition of New Government in Rwanda

Purpose

To determine what should be our diplomatic relationship with the new RPF-led government in Rwanda, including our position with regard to its participation in the United Nations.

Background

Since our action in derecognizing the interim government in Rwanda, we have recognized no government in Rwanda. We have taken several actions that can be interpreted as de facto recognition of the current RPF-led government, including signing a Memorandum of Understanding for the entry of U.S. planes and a letter to the new Prime Minister from Acting Secretary of State Tarnoff. The current RPF-led government has a fairly strong claim to recognition. It came to power through military means, but did so by defeating the forces of a government that fostered genocidal killings. It is in firm control of the country militarily -- albeit with more than half its population either out of the country or in a French safe zone -- and is establishing political control. While the power base of its government is still vested in the minority Tutsi ethnic group and the RPF, it has reached out to name moderate Hutus as President and Prime Minister and has included non-RPF supporters to about half the ministerial positions.

In the short run, our principal goal in Rwanda is to encourage the 2 million Rwandan refugees in camps in neighboring countries and an equal number of displaced persons in the French secure zone to return to their homes. UNHCR has made a determination that Rwanda is now safe for the return of refugees and is officially urging refugees to return. Raising the level of our relationship with the RPF government will help this effort by enhancing the government's credibility. Several relief agencies have said that they will not begin in-country programs until there is a U.S. diplomatic presence. Even the presence of Ambassador David Rawson, who returned to Kigali on Sunday in the capacity of a special envoy rather than ambassador, has helped facilitate the use of the Kigali airport to provide relief to the refugees in Zaire.

However, there are three principal concerns with immediate recognition. First, despite good statements of the new government on the question of retribution, there are reports that some in the RPF are engaged in revenge activities like summary executions, especially of regional leaders associated with the previous government. The French are saying that the new government plans to bring charges against as many as 40,000 Hutus suspected of participating in the massacres.

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Second, whereas the RPF has taken some steps to make the new government representative, it can do more. The Hutu President and Prime Ministers are widely perceived as frontmen for a Tutsi-led government under RPF control. The government should be willing to embrace some members of the former Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords. Given the fluidity of the situation and our leverage at this point, we can help avoid sowing the seeds for another ethnic crisis and new warfare later.

Finally, immediate recognition might jeopardize the neutrality of our relief efforts among the Hutus in Zaire. Whereas recognition might have benefit in persuading Hutus that the situation in Rwanda was stable, it would also make extremist Hutus in Zaire target us as the "enemy" (coming on top of our de-recognition of the interim government), and threaten the security and neutrality of our military personnel there.

It is unclear how much we can obtain in terms of movement on these issues with the carrot of recognition. Our leverage will be enhanced if we can work with other nations. We have been in contact with other NATO nations to coordinate strategy. In general, other nations are moving to enhance ties with the government through high-level visits to Kigali. In many cases (e.g., France, Zaire), the question of recognition does not arise, since they recognize nations, not governments.

Regarding seating a RPF-led delegation at the U.N., a state can be credentialled to the UNGA and Security Council without U.S. diplomatic recognition. U.N. recognition would also afford the government additional credibility, and may encourage the creation of the conditions needed to provide assurances for the return of the refugees from Zaire. Close ties with the international community will be essential to ensure that the new government abides by international standards on human rights. The U.S. has not opposed credentialling in at least 20 years. Our policy has been to favor an inclusive U.N. and to avoid politicizing the credentials process. Failure to permit a Rwandan delegation that controls the country to take its seat might jeopardize U.N. relief efforts there. On the other hand, Rwanda is scheduled to become Security Council President in September, a position for which it may not be prepared.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

#### Option 1:

We should delay recognition for the time being, using the carrot of recognition to encourage greater inclusiveness and an absence of mass retribution, and to learn more about reports of unacceptable activities of RPF operatives, including summary executions. At the same time, we should enhance the visibility of our relations with the government of Rwanda through high-level visits and increased cooperation on relief efforts. This would add to the sense of stability and security in Rwanda and could facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. We should welcome progress so far in working toward national reconciliation, but stress that full diplomatic recognition will be tied to our judgment on the Government's movement on the following issues:

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- Continued efforts to enhance its ethnic base, such as reaching out to members of the former governing Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords;
- Fostering rule of law, respect for human rights and restraint on the issue of retribution;
- Creation through words and actions of the security and stability necessary to attract refugees back to Rwanda.

We should work with the U.N. and other nations to coordinate the message of encouragement and a call for continued movement. (Position favored by NSC, State, USUN, CIA)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Option 2:

We should move to immediately recognize the current Rwandan government to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the possible entry of U.S. military personnel in Kigali and/or elsewhere in Rwanda. This action would be taken in response to the previous moves to include moderate Hutus in the government, statements regarding the need to respect the rule of law and limit retribution, and efforts to create a safe environment for the return of refugees. This action would be announced during Assistant Secretary Moose's upcoming trip to Kigali. We would coordinate this action with other nations. At the same time, we would announce that we are continuing our efforts to encourage the Rwandan government to take the three steps outlined in option 1 above. (Position favored by Defense, JCS)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SEATING AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Option 1

We should support the seating of the new RPF-led government in the UNGA and Security Council. We should seek to urge Rwanda to waive its Security Council presidential turn for practical matters. (Position favored by all agencies; JCS states that support for its admission to the U.N. will be taken by the international community as a de facto act of recognition)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Option 2:

We should opt for the "empty seat" approach.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrence by: Susan Rice *R*



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Operation Support Hope in High Gear (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. report	re: Rwanda High Level Visits Highlight Crisis (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002. email	From Alan Kreezko; re: Rwanda War Powers (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
003a. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Rwanda Crisis Fast Forward (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003b. report	re: Rwanda Crisis Back to Kigali [partial] (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
004a. memo	William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004b. paper	re: Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (2 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
005. memo	Donald Steiberg to Anthony Lake; re: Recognition of New Government in Rwanda (3 pages)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
006. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Foreign Affairs Issues with Congressional Black Caucus (2 pages)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
007. email	Donald Steinberg to Legislative Affairs; re: Delegation to Rwanda & Region (partial) (1 page)	07/25/1994	P6/b(6)
008. letter	Jean-Luc Dehaene (Prime Minister of Belgium) to POTUS; re: Rwandan Refugee Crisis (1 page)	07/26/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
009. email	From MacArthur DeShazer; re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/23/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F

jp881

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. email	Don Steinberg to Anthony Lake & Sandy Berger; re: Diplomatic Moves (2 pages)	07/24/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
011a. letter	Peter Tarnoff to Faustin Twagiramungu (Prime Minister of Rwanda); re: Rwandan Crisis (2 pages)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011b. cable	re: Delivery of Diplomatic Note to Zaire Government Regarding American Military Personnel (Incomplete) (1 page)	07/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011c. letter	Faustin Twagiramungu to American Ambassador; re: Status of American Military Personnel (1 page)	07/27/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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The Rwanda Crisis: Back to Kigali

The humanitarian situation in eastern Zaire continues to be critical and the most pressing needs remain potable water and ground transport. Eight U.S. water purification units have arrived in Goma, along with a U.S. technical team. UNHCR estimates that 1.5 million refugees remain in eastern Zaire, although 15,000 - 20,000 have reportedly left Goma for Rwanda.

The military's plan to expand the U.S. humanitarian operation beyond Goma and Entebbe has received wide coverage in the press. A military team is now in Kigali to assess airport capacity and security. If the team recommends and receives approval for use of Kigali, the U.S. will likely deploy military personnel to Rwanda to create a logistical air base for humanitarian relief efforts in the region. We can expect 500 - 1,000 U.S. troops into Kigali within 48 hours of the final decision to deploy; within two weeks as many as 4,000 U.S. military personnel may operate from Kigali. This operation should be purely logistical and humanitarian. We do not want to see "mission creep," in which the military decides to fan out into the countryside to deliver aid within Rwanda or somehow takes on the general security role that has been assigned to UNAMIR. U.S. troops should be used to support UNHCR; we should not be in the lead. The U.S. humanitarian operation from Kigali could act as a magnet for voluntary repatriation of refugees, a goal consistent with UNHCR's policy.

We are dealing with the RPF-led government in Kigali to address operational needs. We do not need to announce "recognition" of the government to deploy troops in Rwanda. The government has said that it would like the U.S. to turn Kigali into the logistical base of the humanitarian operation, and in an exchange of notes between Ambassador Rawson and Prime Minister Twagiramungu, the new government agreed to treat U.S. military personnel deployed to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes on the same basis as administrative and technical staff at the Embassy. The Embassy should be operational by July 30 with a skeleton staff.

The deployment of UNAMIR II remains incomplete. Defense and State have been asked to marry up likely contributors with equipment needs and press Western countries to follow our adopt-a-battalion approach. The strategy calls for the Deputy Secretary to call heads of government to urge prompt action. There are about 600 UNAMIR troops now deployed in Rwanda, including 206 additional Ghanaians which the U.S. helped equip. The rest of the U.S.-sponsored Ghanaian troops could arrive next week. Although DoD has been unable to meet all their mission-essential equipment needs, the UN is working to fill the gaps. 800 Ethiopian troops are ready for deployment by July 29, and the British will announce July 28 that they will offer three teams, including mechanical engineers, heavy engineering and field ambulance units.

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Recognition of the New Government in Rwanda

Issue A

What should be our diplomatic relationship with the new RPF-led government in Rwanda?

Option 1:

Given our continuing concerns about the nature of the RPF-led government, we could hold off on full recognition for the time being, both to use the carrot of recognition to encourage greater inclusiveness and an absence of mass retribution, and to learn more about reports of unacceptable activities of RPF operatives, including summary executions. At the same time, we could also launch an aggressive effort to enhance the visibility of our relations with the government of Rwanda through high-level visits (e.g., A/S Moose, CODEL Payne, who plan to travel to Goma/Kigali this coming weekend), increased cooperation on relief efforts, the use of Kigali airport as a hub for relief flights and perhaps a letter from Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. This would add to the sense of stability and security in Rwanda and could facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. In particular, we should give high visibility to our contacts with the Rwandan government's Hutu President and Prime Minister.

In these contacts, we should welcome the progress so far in working toward national reconciliation, but continue to stress that full diplomatic recognition will be tied to our judgment on the Government's movement on the following issues:

- Continued efforts to enhance its ethnic base, such as reaching out to members of the former governing Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords;
- Fostering rule of law, respect for human rights and exercise of restraint on the issue of retribution;
- Establishment through words and actions of the security and stability necessary to attract refugees back to Rwanda.

We should work with the United Nations (perhaps through a U.N. Security Council Resolution or Presidential statement) and other key players to communicate this same message of encouragement and a call for continued movement.

Option 2:

We could move to immediately recognize the current Rwandan government in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the possible entry of U.S. military personnel in Kigali and/or elsewhere in Rwanda. This option would be taken in response to the previous moves to include moderate Hutus in the government (including as President and Prime Minister), positive statements regarding the need to respect the rule of law and limit retribution, and efforts to create

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a safe and secure environment for the return of refugee. This action could be announced during Assistant Secretary Moose's trip to Kigali. Assistant Secretary Moose would carry a letter from the President or Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. We would coordinate this action with other nations.

At the same time, we would announce that we are continuing our efforts to encourage the Rwandan government to take the three steps outlined above with respect to broadening its political and ethnic base; respecting the rule of law and limiting retribution; and giving full meaning to its call for a safe environment for the return of the refugees.

#### Issue B

How would we respond to a move by the new RPF-led government for the seat at the United Nations?

##### Option 1:

Whether or not we move now to recognize the RPF-led government, we could support the seating of that government at the U.N. General Assembly and on the Security Council. This participation would facilitate humanitarian relief efforts in the country through greater contact between the government, the UNHCR and other U.N. bodies. The President pledged two weeks ago to work to unseat the representation of the current interim government, which no longer controls any territory within Rwanda and has clearly been involved in genocidal killings. U.N. recognition would also afford the government additional credibility, and may encourage the creation of the conditions needed to provide assurances for the return of the refugees from Zaire. Close ties with the international community will be essential to ensure that the new government abides by international standards on human rights.

##### Option 2:

We could opt for the "empty seat" approach. This would give the United Nations some continued pressure with the new government to adopt good policies on the issues noted above.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

6046 redo

July 27, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

DON STEINBERG *DS*

SUBJECT:

Recognition of New Government in Rwanda

Issue

What should be our diplomatic relationship with the new RPF-led government in Rwanda?

Discussion

When we acted three weeks ago to cease recognition of the interim government in Rwanda, we put ourselves in the unique position of recognizing the country of Rwanda but not any government. On traditional grounds, the current RPF-led government has a moderate claim to recognition. It came to power through military means, but did so by defeating the forces of a government internationally recognized as having fostered genocidal killings. It is in firm control of the country militarily -- albeit with more than half its population either out of the country or in the French safe zone -- and is moving rapidly to establish its political control. While the power base of its government is still vested strongly in the minority Tutsi ethnic group and the RPF, it has reached out to name moderate Hutus as President and Prime Minister and has named non-RPF supporters to about half the government ministerial positions.

In the short run, our principal goal in Rwanda is to encourage the return of the 2 million Rwandan refugees from the camps in Zaire, Tanzania and other neighboring countries, and the return of internally displaced persons from the French secure zone to their homes. UNHCR has made a determination that Rwanda is now safe for the return of refugees and is officially urging refugees to return. Raising the level of our relationship with the RPF government will help this effort by enhancing the government's credibility. Several relief agencies have said that they are reluctant to proceed with in-country programs until there is an American diplomatic presence. Being able to re-open our Embassy would increase our capacity to assist reconstruction efforts within Rwanda and facilitate our support for UNAMIR deployment. Even the presence of Ambassador David Rawson, who returned to Kigali on Sunday in the capacity of a special envoy rather than ambassador, has helped facilitate the use of the Kigali airport to provide relief to the refugees in Zaire. The issue of recognition is closely linked to the question of U.S. and international efforts to encourage return of Rwandan refugees: for example, JCS believes that recognition would be necessary to facilitate the relief effort within Rwanda itself, including the use of U.S. military; State legal affairs believes we can proceed with these efforts without formal diplomatic relations.

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However, there are three principal concerns with immediate recognition. First, despite good statements of the new government on the question of retribution, there are sketchy reports that some in the RPF are engaged in revenge activities like summary executions, especially of regional leaders associated with the previous government. We need more information on this issue before moving to full recognition and diplomatic relations.

Second, whereas the RPF has taken some steps to make the new government more representative, including the naming of Hutus as President and Prime Minister, it has to do more to meet the Arusha Accord standards for real powersharing. These two leaders are widely perceived as being Hutu frontmen for a Tutsi-led government under the control of RPF military commander (and vice-president) Paul Kagame. We should look for signs that the President and Prime Minister are actually wielding power and that the government is willing to embrace some members of the former governing Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords. Given the fluidity of the situation and our leverage at this point, we can help avoid sowing the seeds for another ethnic crisis and new warfare later.

Finally, immediate recognition might jeopardize the neutrality of our relief efforts among the Hutus in Zaire. Whereas recognition might have benefit in persuading Hutus that the situation in Rwanda was stable, it would also make extremist Hutus in Zaire target us as the "enemy" (coming on top of our de-recognition of the interim government), and threaten the security and neutrality of our military personnel there.

It is unclear how much we can obtain in movement on these issues with the carrot of recognition. Certainly, our leverage will be enhanced if we can work in concert with those of other nations. We have been in contact with other NATO nations to coordinate a strategy. In general, other nations are moving to expand their ties with the new government through high-level visits to Kigali, such as that of the British Minister of Development, the French Minister of Health and others. In many cases (e.g., France, Zaire), the question of recognition per se does not arise, since they recognize nations, not governments.

#### Possible Next Steps

Led by Global Affairs, we are in the process of working out recommendations on U.S. and international efforts to support the return of Rwandan refugees, for consideration at a Deputies Committee meeting tomorrow. Given the close link between return efforts and diplomatic recognition questions, Dick Clarke proposes that a comprehensive policy involving both questions be addressed at the DC level. I agree. The following are considerations that would be folded into that review.

Given the continuing concerns about the nature of the RPF-led government, we should hold off on full recognition for the time being, both to use the carrot of recognition to encourage greater inclusiveness and an absence of mass retribution, and to learn more about the activities of RPF operatives. However, we should also launch an aggressive effort to enhance the visibility of our relations with the government of Rwanda through high-level visits (e.g., Secretary Perry, USAID

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Administrator Atwood, A/S Moose and the Payne Codel, who all would like to travel to Goma/Kigali this coming weekend), increased cooperation on relief efforts, the use of Kigali airport as a hub for relief flights and perhaps a letter from Secretary Christopher to President Bizimungu. In particular, we should give high visibility to our contacts with the Rwandan government's Hutu President and Prime Minister.

In these contacts, we should welcome the progress so far in working toward national reconciliation, but continue to stress that full diplomatic recognition will be tied to:

- Continued movement by the Government toward enhancing its broad base, such as reaching out to members of the former governing Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords;
- Fostering rule of law, respect for human rights and exercise of restraint on the issue of retribution;
- Encouragement through words and actions the security and stability necessary to attract refugees back to Rwanda.

We should work with the United Nations (perhaps through a U.N. Security Council Resolution or President statement) and other key players to communicate this same message of encouragement and a call for continued movement

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Issues with the Congressional Black Caucus

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
7010-0639-M-1 (1.61)

Congressman Donald Payne referred this morning to inadequate responses by the Administration to CBC concerns on foreign affairs issues, especially with regard to Rwanda. He also expressed concerns regarding comments by Ambassador Albright with respect to the United Nations peacekeeping facilities. I have contacted Congressman Payne to discuss these concerns. I was already scheduled to meet with the CBC foreign affairs task force during the first week of August to discuss issues related to Africa. We agreed to regularize this contact and meet once a month to discuss all foreign affairs issues. Since the White House Conference on Africa, we have also undertaken internally to meet once a week at the staff level with CBC staff to address foreign affairs issues.

With respect to Ambassador Albright, Congressman Payne took offense at her comments on a MacNeil Lehrer broadcast in which she noted the problems we face on international peacekeeping efforts. He said that she had "demeaned" the Secretary General by stating that calling on the U.N. peacekeeping office was tantamount to dialing 911 and getting a busy signal or no answer at all. We were first alerted to Congressman Payne's concerns in mid-June, and informed Ambassador Albright. She contacted Payne directly. In addition, we explained to his top aides that her comments had been misinterpreted. Ambassador Albright was expressing her concern that the international community was overstressing the capacity of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. She was calling for all the friends of the United Nations to work together to enhance its capacity. We stressed that Ambassador Albright has been a strong and consistent supporter of the United Nations. We have alerted her to the concerns expressed by Congressman Payne, and she will be contacting him directly to dispel his misimpression.

In terms of responding to letters, the first contact we received from the Congressional Black Caucus on Rwanda was on May 4, from Chairman Kweisi Mfume and Congressman Payne. This letter called for our logistical and financial support for an international peacekeeping effort in Rwanda under the United Nations. Neither this letter, nor the ones described below, requested meetings with you or the White House staff. In your response, dated June 9, you described our efforts to see such a U.N. peacekeeping force deployed, including our support for a U.N. Security Council Resolution to authorize 5,500 troops for Rwanda and efforts to facilitate their deployment; our sponsorship of an arms embargo on Rwanda; our humanitarian assistance efforts, which at that time had reached a commitment of more than \$50 million; and other actions.

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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On June 16, Congressmen Mfume and Payne again wrote to you regarding Rwanda, calling for the deployment of armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR, criticizing our U.N. Ambassador for comments she made regarding the United Nations, questioning our use of terminology to refer to the killings in Rwanda and complaining about the absence of consultation on the White House Conference on Africa. We received the letter on June 19 and contacted the Congressmen and their staffs by phone to discuss their concerns. We discussed our actions on Rwanda, including support of the U.N. peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian relief efforts. We noted that our armored personnel carriers were already arriving in Entebbe. (NOTE: The first shipment of five arrived on June 19 and the deployment of all 50 was complete by June 30, at which time the United Nations took possession of them.) The letter also prompted a series of long discussions concerning the White House Conference, resulting in an agreement to work together more closely with the Caucus, including a meeting with the CBC Foreign Affairs Task Force the first week of August.

On July 20, Congressmen Mfume and Payne wrote again, praising the humanitarian response of the Administration to the refugee crisis in Zaire, and calling for immediate new assistance, including engineers and medical staff, as well as diplomatic efforts with the government of Zaire to disarm the forces of the Rwandan Army units which had crossed the border into Zaire. A joint written response to the last two letters is being sent to you separately today.

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**Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants  
**Cc:** @AFRICA - African Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor;  
@LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs  
**Subject:** Diplomatic Moves  
**Date:** Sunday, July 24, 1994 1:34PM

**TO:** Tony/Sandy/Nancy  
**FROM:** Don Steinberg  
**SUBJ:** Diplomatic Moves with Rwanda

I've asked the State Department to prepare a recommendation by COB tomorrow on the terms under which we should move to recognize the new government in Rwanda. My bias is to move quickly to establish regular contact, including a well-publicized, high-level American visit soon (perhaps members of Congress accompanied by George Moose and/or me), but to hold off on recognition for the time being.

There are strong reasons to proceed rapidly to expand diplomatic contact. We can help the new government establish stability through the symbolism of association with the world's most powerful country. Several relief agencies have said that they are reluctant to proceed with in-country programs until there is an American diplomatic presence. Being able to re-open our Embassy would increase our capacity to assist reconstruction efforts within Rwanda and facilitate our support for UNAMIR deployment. The Rwandan government is anxious for contact with us: as you know, President Bizimungu called Moose yesterday, ostensibly to offer use of Rwanda roads to cut the overland travel time between Entebbe and Goma, but more likely just to maintain contact with us.

But I have three principal concerns with immediate recognition. First, it might jeopardize the neutrality of our relief efforts among the Hutus in Zaire. Our immediate goal is to tend to these refugees and to urge their return to Rwanda. Whereas recognition might have some marginal benefit in persuading Hutus that the situation in Rwanda was stable, I fear it might make us the enemy among some extremists in Zaire (coming on top of our de-recognition of the interim government), and threaten the success of this operation as well as the security of our military personnel there.

Second, despite relatively good statements of the new government on the question of retribution, there are reports that some in the RPF are engaged in revenge activities like summary executions and establishment of concentration camps. While I am not establishing a moral equivalency between these actions and the genocide of the Hutu extremists, I think we need more information before we rush to embrace the new government.

Finally, whereas the RPF has taken some steps to make the new government representative, including the naming of Hutus as President and Prime Minister, it can do substantially better. These two leaders are widely perceived as being Hutu frontmen for a Tutsi-led government under the control of RPF military commander (and vice-president) Paul Kagame. We should look for signs that the President and Prime Minister are actually yielding power and that the government is willing to embrace some members of the former Hutu party who were not involved in genocide, as outlined in the Arusha accords. Given the fluidity of the situation and our leverage at this point, we can help avoid sowing the seeds for another ethnic crisis and new warfare later.

If these concerns are even partially met, I think our next step should be have a senior official carry a letter from President Clinton to President Bizimungu offering to begin talks leading toward the establishment of diplomatic relations. In the letter, we should clearly spell out what those conditions are.

On other diplomatic fronts we've discussed: we can be pleased with the role that the new Zaire Prime Minister Kengo has been playing so far in the Rwandan crisis. He has stepped forward on several occasions to act on

behalf of the Zaire government (vice Mobutu), including traveling to Goma to ensure the re-opening of the border for refugees to return to Rwanda. We need to redouble our efforts with the Zaire government to cut off their reported support for the regrouping efforts of the former Rwandan government military forces and its militias.

Our Embassy in Uganda has urged that we consider a letter from President Clinton to President Museveni. I think a letter thanking Museveni for his support for the relief mission in Zaire (including the unfettered access to the Entebbe airport) and urging him to continue to put pressure on the new government in Rwanda would be very useful. We can remind Museveni that in his conversation with the President here on June 21, he said that the only solution for Rwanda is a power-sharing arrangement among all the ethnic groups.



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	<del>Alan Kreezko to MacArthur DeShazer et al; re: Rwanda Officials (1 page)</del>	07/22/1994	P5 DMS 6/6/2014
002a. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to Nancy Soderberg; re: Rwanda Officials (1 page)</del>	07/22/1994	P5 DMS 6/6/2014
002b. email	<del>Alan Kreezko to MacArthur DeShazer et al; re: Rwanda Officials (2 pages)</del>	07/22/1994	P5 DMS 6/6/2014
003. note	<del>Government of Belgium to Anthony Lake; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)</del>	07/22/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004. list	re: White House Meeting on Rwanda (2 pages)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
005. memo	Deputy Secretary of Defense to National Security Advisor; re: Department of Defense Support for Humanitarian Efforts in Rwanda [partial] (2 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/20/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
006. paper	<del>re: Rwanda Relief Efforts (2 pages)</del>	07/21/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
007. paper	<del>re: Possible Measures to Encourage Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees (2 pages)</del>	n.d.	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
008. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to Global Affairs; re: Initiatives to Support Rwandan Reconciliation &amp; Repatriation (2 pages)</del>	07/19/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
009. paper	re: New Measure to Encourage Political Reconciliation in Rwanda (1 page)	07/19/1994	P1/b(1), P5
010. paper	<del>re: Rwanda (2 pages)</del>	07/19/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [4]

2006-0218-F  
jp882

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. map	re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/20/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012a. memo	re: Rwanda [partial] (6 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/18/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012b. annex	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/18/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012c. annex	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/18/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012d. map	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	07/18/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [4]

2006-0218-F

jp882

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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for [unclear] [unclear] 7/21

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## Rwanda - Relief Efforts

### Background

USAID Administrator Brian Atwood traveled at your request to Zaire, Burundi and Kenya on Monday and Tuesday to assess the refugee situation and review humanitarian relief efforts. He also traveled recently (May 26-June 4) to the Horn of Africa to examine disaster conditions that are threatening the lives of nearly twenty million people. Brian has reported that the situation is overwhelming. The 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Goma have completely swamped all relief efforts. The most urgent needs are clean water, medicines and airport logistics to offload and distribute supplies and coordinate air shipments. Mobilization of the international relief efforts for these refugees and the increasing number of refugees and displaced persons elsewhere in the region -- which may number as many as 3-4 million -- is proceeding apace.

Building on our previous support for the refugee crisis (including \$100 million and 100 airlifts since April), one expert team from Defense is already on the ground in Goma and a second will be there within 48 hours. The teams have two functions: to assess possible DOD assistance and to start helping UN and French authorities in areas of our expertise such as flight scheduling, airfield throughput operations, onward movement of supplies, security, communications support and health services. We expect to send additional military personnel to the region as early as this weekend. EUCOM has taken this effort on as a mission -- the model is the Provide Comfort operations to protect a million Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq following Desert Storm.

Beyond the relief efforts, we need to persuade Rwandan refugees -- mostly Hutus in fear of retribution by the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front -- to return to their homes. An important element here is the full deployment of the oft-delayed UNAMIR contingent, which still has only about 1000 of its authorized 5500 peacekeepers deployed. We are redoubling our efforts with the UN to get new countries to contribute troops. Equally important is the internal political situation in Rwanda. We have urged the RPF to declare a cessation of hostilities and invite the refugees to return, both of which they have done. We are urging the formation of a broad-based government; in fact, although the government announced earlier this week includes moderate Hutus as president and prime minister, the government is RPF-dominated.

### Points

- Brian, I appreciate your traveling to Zaire and Burundi earlier this week to assess the situation on the ground. I look forward to hearing your impressions from the trip. From all the reports, the sheer number of refugees in Eastern Zaire and Rwanda is staggering, and the challenge to the international community is overwhelming. I understand the most immediate needs are for clean water, medicines and airlift for food and supplies.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0635-M-1 (1.70)

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- I want to thank all of you for responding rapidly and forcefully to these needs through a coordinated effort of all your different departments. There can be no more important mission than that of responding to this scale of potential human tragedy.
- At the same time, it's clear that we must persuade the Rwandan refugees to return to their homes by assuring the masses of Hutus that they won't face retribution at the hands of the RPF. For this to succeed, we need to redouble our efforts to have UN peacekeepers deployed rapidly and to urge the RPF to pursue a policy of national reconciliation through a broad-based government.
- Could you start, Brian, with some views on the challenges we face in meeting this humanitarian disaster in Eastern Zaire and Rwanda and in the Horn of Africa?

NOTE: You may wish to turn to Defense, JCS and State for their comments on how their Departments are moving to meet the humanitarian crisis and address the need for national reconciliation in Rwanda.

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Possible Measures to Encourage Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees

- Encourage the formation of a four-party **regional mediation body**, consisting of Hutus/Tutsis from Burundi, President Museveni from Uganda, President Mwinyi from Tanzania and Mobutu/Kengo from Zaire, perhaps under OAU or UN auspices. Mwinyi would be the most neutral of choices to head the body. The inclusion of Zairians and Burundi Hutus will reassure Hutus; the inclusion of Museveni and Burundi Tutsis will reassure RPF. This can also be used as a means of getting the Burundians to work together and elevating the status of Prime Minister Kengo.
- Arrange a high-level **phone call to President/Prime Minister** and perhaps others, perhaps from President Clinton. We should hold out the possibility of international acceptance, including U.S. recognition if broad-based nature of government is enhanced, statements of reconciliation are issued and honored, and a permanent cessation of hostilities is announced. Our derecognition of the interim government gives us credibility with the RPF in this regard.
- Send clear messages to refugees in Zaire of safety and security if they repatriate. We can assist a new Rwandan government to establish a **radio transmitter** to broadcast messages of reassurance in local languages, print and distribute fliers, etc. The RPF has requested this assistance. We should focus attention of "lay leaders" among the refugees (e.g., former village leaders).
- Focus **retribution on the leaders of the genocide**, perhaps including the 500 leaders identified by the RPF as ringleaders. An effective international effort centered on these criminals will reassure the RPF that we are taking their concerns seriously, isolate these individuals from the rest of the Hutu community and send a message to the Hutus that the focus is on bringing these criminals to justice, not exacting indiscriminate revenge on Hutu peasants.
- **Redouble efforts to deploy full UNAMIR force.** UNAMIR should focus its attention on providing security in Western regions, with the existing UNAMIR force of about 1000 redeploying toward border with Zaire. If UNAMIR assumes positions now occupied by the RPF, they can set up de facto safety zones covering villages to which Hutus will return.
- Urge the government of Zaire to **disarm and disband military forces of the rump government in Goma and other border sites.** These forces continue to represent a threat to any new government in Rwanda, a potential rabble-rousing influence among the refugees and a real source of instability.
- Urge the new broad-based government in Rwanda to name **moderate Hutus as regional governors in Western Rwanda.** This would create an impression of regional power-sharing. If prominent Hutus can be identified in whom the local community has confidence, this would encourage refugees to return to these areas.
- Arrange high-level and highly visible **U.S. Government visits** to the region.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

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NARA, Date 8/28/2013

2010-0639-M-1 (1.71)

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- **Eliminate Radio Milles Collines** (as well as similar radio now broadcasting towards Burundi). This station continues to broadcast messages of discord, telling Hutus to flee the country and regroup in Zaire, as well as urging Hutus in Burundi to rise up against the Tutsi military there. The radio may be in the French security zone -- we need to have the French to take action or do it ourselves.
- Work with donors to launch **reconstruction programs for Rwanda**, promising a better life for those who return.

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**Cicio, Kristen K.**

**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Cc:** @PRESS - Public Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** Initiatives to Support Rwandan Reconciliation and Repatriation  
**Date:** Tuesday, July 19, 1994 10:39AM

7/19 Don -  
Let me know  
what you think.  
(A)

Tony/Sandy:

Even as we focus on the immediate and humanitarian relief effort (which is occupying about 90 percent of our attention on Rwanda), we need to be looking at measures to address the fundamental issues facing Rwanda as a means of encouraging Hutu refugees to return to their homes and alleviate the humanitarian disaster in the Zaire border regions. We can do this in large part by persuading the RPF to adopt a policy of real national reconciliation, including real powersharing with moderate Hutus in broad-based government; a reasonable policy of retribution for those responsible for atrocities; and a permanent end to hostilities. The following measures are among those we should consider. We are discussing these measures with other agencies — do we need a DC on this?

Don

#### Possible Measures

Encourage the formation of a four-party regional mediation body, consisting of Hutus/Tutsis from Burundi, President Museveni from Uganda, President Mwinyi from Tanzania and Mobutu/Kengo from Zaire, perhaps under OAU or UN auspices. Mwinyi would be the most neutral of choices to head the body. The inclusion of Zairians and Burundi Hutus will reassure Hutus; the inclusion of Museveni and Burundi Tutsis will reassure RPF. This can also be used as a means of getting the Burundians to work together and elevating the status of Prime Minister Kengo.

Arrange a high-level phone call to RPF military commander Kagame and perhaps other RPF leaders, perhaps from President Clinton. We should hold out the possibility of international acceptance, including U.S. recognition and possibly UN Security Council participation if broad-based government is created, statements of reconciliation are issued and honored, and a permanent cessation of hostilities is announced. Our derecognition of the interim government gives us credibility with the RPF in this regard. We can even hold out the carrot of the Security Council Presidency (in September) if the new government comes to power that symbolizes national reconciliation and unity.

Send a clear message to refugees in Zaire of safety and security if they repatriate. We can assist a new Rwandan government to establish a radio transmitter to broadcast messages of reassurance in local languages, print and distribute fliers, etc. The RPF has requested this assistance. We should focus attention of "lay leaders" among the refugees (e.g., former village leaders).

Focus retribution on the leaders of the genocide, perhaps including the 500 leaders identified by the RPF as ringleaders. An effective international effort centered on these criminals will reassure the RPF that we are taking their concerns seriously, isolate these individuals from the rest of the Hutu community and send a message to the Hutus that the focus is on bringing these criminals to justice, not exacting indiscriminate revenge on Hutu peasants.

Redouble efforts to deploy full UNAMIR force. UNAMIR should focus its attention on providing security in Western regions, with the existing UNAMIR force of about 1000 redeploying toward border with Zaire. If UNAMIR assumes positions now occupied by the RPF, they can set up de facto safety zones covering villages to which Hutus will return.

Work with donors, including World Bank, to launch reconstruction programs for Rwanda, promising a better life for those who return.

Urge the government of Zaire to disarm and disband military forces of the rump government in Goma and other border sites. These forces continue to represent a threat to any new government in Rwanda, a potential rabble-rousing influence among the refugees and a real source of instability.

Urge the new broad-based government in Rwanda to name moderate Hutus as regional governors in Western Rwanda. This would create an impression of regional power-sharing. If prominent Hutus can be identified in whom the local community has confidence, this would encourage refugees to return to these areas.

Arrange high-level foreign visits to the region by US government officials (such as A/S Moose, Ambassador Carson, Ambassador Rawson), a US Special Presidential Envoy (e.g., Don McHenry) or an international team of senior officials sanctioned by OAU and/or UN.

Eliminate Radio Milles Collines once and for all. This station continues to broadcast messages of discord, telling Hutus to flee the country and regroup in Zaire, as well as urging Hutus in Burundi to rise up against the Tutsi military there. The radio is apparently in the French security zone -- we need to have the French to take action or do it ourselves.



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Richard Clarke to African Affairs; re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1), P5
002a. memo	Frances Cook to Mr. Tarnoff; re: Rwanda - Transportation Assistance (3 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1), P5
002b. talking points	re: Talking Points on Non-Reimbursable Airlift Support for Operation Turquoise in Rwanda (3 pages)	07/18/1994	P1/b(1), P5
002c. note	re: Names (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
003. email	<del>MacArthur Deshazer to Anthony Lake; re: Item for Meeting (1 page)</del>	07/15/1994	<del>P1/b(1), P5</del> RDS 5/18/2011
004. memo	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Expulsion of Diplomats of Rwandan Interim Government (1 page)</del>	n.d.	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VZ 2/1/2024
005. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to Tony Lake &amp; Sandy Berger; re: Rwanda - Deteriorating Situation (1 page)</del>	07/14/1994	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VZ 2/1/2024
006. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to Anthony Lake; re: Nonrecognition of Rwandan Interim Government (1 page)</del>	07/13/1994	<del>P1/b(1), P5</del> VZ 2/1/24
007. memo	<del>Edward Brynn to The Secretary of State; re: Nonrecognition of Rwandan Interim Government (6 pages)</del>	06/30/1994	<del>P1/b(1), P5</del> RDS 5/18/2011
008. list	re: Rwanda (1 page)	06/30/1994	P6/b(6)
009. report	re: Rwanda [partial] (3 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	06/23/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [5]

2006-0218-F  
ip883

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2013  
2010-0639-M-1 (1,80)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Expulsion of Diplomats of Rwandan Interim Government

We are moving to close the Embassy of Rwanda in Washington and order all its personnel to leave the country within five days. Since the beginning of the crisis in Rwanda, the Embassy has continued to be staffed by representatives of the so-called Interim Government, which has supported genocidal massacres by its followers and military forces. In diplomatic terms, our action means that we are declaring that at present we recognize no government in Rwanda. This action also effectively freezes the assets of the Rwandan government in the U.S. by denying access to the holdings by representatives of the Interim Government. In addition, we are consulting with members of the UN Security Council and others to urge that representatives of the Interim Government not be allowed to continue to occupy Rwanda's seat on the Council. In taking these actions, we reaffirmed our call for an immediate cease-fire in Rwanda and the start of serious discussions leading to creation of a broad-based transition government.

Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate. As the RPF continues its advance westward, up to 300,000 people have streamed across the border into Zaire. If the RPF continues, up to 1 million refugees could enter Zaire. Most are Hutus fearing RPF retribution. Another 100,000+ people a day are seeking refuge in the French secure zone in the southwest Rwanda. New refugee flows are taking place toward Burundi as well. We are deeply concerned both about the humanitarian disaster and about the potential impact on the security situation in Burundi and Zaire -- in sum, we are looking at about 3 million refugees and displaced persons.

We have contacted RPF Commander Paul Kagame to urge him to announce an immediate cease-fire and to halt the RPF advance. We stressed the importance of this action to prevent an even greater humanitarian disaster, one that would make their efforts to govern the country with moderate Hutus in a broad-based government even more difficult. Kagame agreed to announce a cease-fire and a halt by 9 p.m. (their time) tonight. He will also call for the beefing up of UNAMIR and international action against the perpetrators of genocide. A key factor in Kagame's decision on the cease-fire was our derecognition of the Interim Government. We have also been trying to calm down the Tutsi military in Burundi, who fear that a new influx of Hutus from Rwanda will upset the balance there and are thought to be considering "pre-emptive" action.

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PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



**Battenfield, Pat A.**

---

**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Cc:** @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** Rwanda: Deteriorating Situation  
**Date:** Thursday, July 14, 1994 5:00PM

Tony/Sandy:

The humanitarian situation in Rwanda is deteriorating rapidly. As the RPF continues its advance westward, the French tell us that 14,000 people an hour have been streaming across the border into Zaire and 8,000 people an hour have been seeking refuge in the French secure zone in the southwest of the country. New refugee flows are taking place toward Burundi as well. The French are apoplectic. They are concerned both about the humanitarian disaster and about the potential impact on the security situation in Burundi and Zaire. In sum, we are looking at about 3 million refugees and displaced persons now in need of assistance. Most are Hutus fearing RPF retribution. Apparently, the refugees into Zaire have essentially taken over the areas on the west side of the border — Mobutu's forces so far are exercising restraint. There are reports surfacing that the interim government of Hutu extremists is about to leave Rwanda for Zaire as well.

The French are apoplectic. They say that the new flows will make the Tanzanian refugee camps look like a playground. They are already reporting on fights to the death over scraps of food. In addition, they are worried about the potential impact on the security situation in Burundi and Zaire.

We have been in contact with RPF Commander Paul Kagame to strongly urge him to announce an immediate unilateral cease-fire and to halt their advance. We stressed the importance of this action to prevent an even greater humanitarian disaster, one that would make their efforts to govern the country with moderate Hutus in a broad-based government even more difficult. Kagame agreed to announce a cease-fire and a halt by 9 p.m. (their time) tomorrow night. He will also call for the beefing up of UNAMIR and action against the perpetrators of genocide. A key factor in Kagame's decision was our derecognition of the Interim Government. We have also been trying to calm down the Tutsi military in Burundi, who fear that a new influx of Hutus from Rwanda will upset the balance there and are thought to be considering "pre-emptive" action.

We will need to consider how we react to this latest refugee and displaced person flow. Even before this latest flow, State Department had sent over a request for the use of an additional \$20 million from the Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance funds for this crisis. That request is with Global Affairs. I know there are competing demands for those funds, including Haiti and Bosnia, but I cannot imagine a more pressing need for ERMA assistance than this one.

Don

**Battenfield, Pat A.**

---

**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants  
**Cc:** Danvers, William G.; Kreczko, Alan J.; @AFRICA - African Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Subject:** Nonrecognition of Rwandan Interim Government  
**Date:** Wednesday, July 13, 1994 3:34PM

Tony:

A memo went forward last evening to Secretary Christopher recommending that the State Department declare that no government exists in Rwanda and that we no longer treat the Interim Government (IG) as the official government of Rwanda (e.g., allowing its Embassy to function as a normal diplomatic mission.). The declaration of non-recognition would be based on the lack of effective control of the IG over Rwanda, but would clearly make a forceful political and moral statement of our disapproval of the IG for its role in the mass killings which have occurred in Rwanda. Following Secretary Christopher's approval, which we hope comes by COB today, the State Department would clear with us an announcement of non-recognition. The Rwandan Embassy in Washington would be closed, the staff would lose their diplomatic status and their access to funds of the Rwandan government in the United States would be denied.

We strongly believe that this action should take place as soon as possible. It makes a necessary moral and political statement, strengthens the status of moderate Hutus, increases our leverage with the RPF, puts us in a better position to challenge IG representation at the U.N. (which we're now discussing with other UNSC members), and has strong domestic support. We've consulted with the French and Belgians, who have no objection to a policy of non-recognition and do not see adverse impacts on the French peacekeeping operation now underway. The downsides are that it may make the IG more resistant to dialogue, present possible precedents for other similar situations and could rouse the IG to take action against Americans (although there are currently no Americans behind IG lines). We think these factors are outweighed by the benefits of taking the action.

We understand that Secretary Christopher will get to the memo this evening, in which case State will make the announcement tomorrow. Assuming you agree with this action, you may wish to give him a call supporting nonrecognition and urging that he move ahead on this as soon as possible.

Don



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	The Secretary of State & French Foreign Minister Juppe re: France's Rwanda Initiative; Bosnia Peace Process [partial] (1 page)	06/17/1994 Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. telcon	Deputy Secretary of State & French Foreign Minister Chief of Staff de Villepin; re: French Proposal for Intervention in Rwanda [partial] (1 page)	07/16/1994 Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002. talking points	re: Points on Rwanda for Secretary for Telcon with Foreign Minister Juppe [partial] (1 page)	06/17/1994 Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003. memo	<del>Donald Steinberg to Mary Emery &amp; Wilma Hall; re: Movement on Rwanda (1 page)</del>	<del>06/15/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004. memo	MacArthur DeShazer to Mary Emery et al; re: Rwanda Update - Making Progress (2 pages)	06/13/1994	P1/b(1), P5

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [6]

2006-0218-F

jp868

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	<del>King Kigeli V (Rwanda) to POTUS; re: Situation in Rwanda (2 pages)</del>	05/02/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002a. fax cover page	To Lisa Alfred; re: Rwanda (1 page)	06/09/1994	P6/b(6)
002b. letter	To Archbishop Renato Martino; re: Rwanda (2 pages)	04/20/1994	P6/b(6)
002c. note	re: News from Rwanda (1 page)	06/09/1994	P6/b(6)
003. cable	<del>re: Rwanda - Proposed Concept for UN Force (2 pages)</del>	05/14/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004. memo	<del>Donald Steinberg to Kristie Kenney et al; re: Talking Points on Rwanda for POTUS with Pope (2 pages)</del>	06/01/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024

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National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [7]

2006-0218-F

jp884

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-Jun-1994 16:34 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg  
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: TP's on Rwanda for POTUS with Pope

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2020  
2010-0639-M-1 (1.92)

Rwanda

Background

The Vatican's permanent observer at the United Nations, Archbishop Renato Raffaele Martino, has requested on behalf of the Vatican that U.N. peacekeepers ensure the safety of about 38,000 individuals at a large religious complex at Kabagyi, Rwanda, about 30 miles southwest of Kigali. This is an area still controlled by troops of the Government of Rwanda, who seem to be using the refugees as hostages: they are stating that if the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) advances, the Government troops will be forced to pull out and allow extremist Hutu militiamen to enter and massacre the refugees. The Vatican is proposing that the U.N. establish a "safe area" into which no government or RPF troops be allowed.

We fully support this idea, which is an extension of our own proposal to establish safe areas in the southern and western parts of Rwanda, where the maximum number of people are at risk. We are meeting with U.N. officials this afternoon (Wednesday) in New York to discuss the expanded UNAMIR mandate, and are using the occasion to support the Vatican's request, preferably by moving some of the troops already on the ground from Kigali to Kabagyi from Kigali.

Points

- We share your horror over the continuing tragedy in Rwanda, and are deeply concerned over the threat to displaced people at the religious complex in Kabagyi. As you know, my Government strongly supports expanding the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda to protect Rwandans at risk from continuing violence and assist the delivery of humanitarian aid. We are offering financial, material and logistical support for this mission.
- In meetings yesterday (Wednesday) with senior U.N. officials, my Government strongly supported your request that the U.N. immediately establish a safe area at the religious complex in Kabagyi. We are working with the U.N.

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to determine how we can act quickly to ensure the safety of people at that complex. As you know, the U.N. has already sent some military observers to the site to investigate reports of violence.

- The tragedy in Rwanda continues to command my Government's full attention. We have provided more than \$50 million in humanitarian aid to refugees and displaced people, and expect to increase this total. We have supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a cease fire and peace agreement, and proposed the an arms embargo on Rwanda, which the U.N. adopted May 17. We have also supported the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner decision to sent human rights officials to Rwanda to investigate the killings and to insist that those responsible be held accountable for their actions.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. note	Donald Steinberg to Anthony Lake; re: Situation in Rwanda (1 page)	05/27/1994	P5 DMS 10/10/2014
002a. memo	Toby Gati to Mr. Tarnoff; re: Rwanda & Burundi - What Went Wrong? (3 pages)	05/27/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
002b. paper	re: Attempted Conflict Resolution in Rwanda & Burundi - What Went Wrong? (4 pages)	05/27/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
003. memo	Frank Wisner to Deputy Assistant to President for National Security Affairs; re: Rwanda - Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts (1 page)	05/05/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
004. memo	Donald Steinberg to Susan Rice et al; re: Rwanda Talking Points (3 pages)	05/26/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005. memo	Donald Steinberg to Natalie Wozniak et al; re: Press Points on Rwanda (3 pages)	05/26/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
006. memo	Donald Steinberg to Mary Emery et al; re: Additional Actions on Rwanda (2 pages)	05/01/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
007. memo	Donald Steinberg to Natalie Wozniak et al; re: Update for CNN (2 pages)	05/02/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
008. memo	re: Rwanda [partial] (4 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	05/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [8]

2006-0218-F

jp885

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax cover sheet	<del>Tobi Gati to Richard Clarke et al; re: Rwanda Geneva Convention Violations (1 page)</del>	05/20/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. memo	Toby Gati to Moose & Harper; re: Rwanda-Geneva Convention Violations [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	05/16/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002a. memo	<del>Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Discussion Paper for Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda (1 page)</del>	05/16/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002b. report	re: Rwanda Options Paper (9 pages)	05/16/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
003. memo	<del>Anthony Lake to Ricki Seidman; re: Schedule Proposal Statement to People of Rwanda (2 pages)</del>	04/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004. paper	re: South Africa/Rwanda (1 page)	05/12/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
005a. memo	<del>From Leon Fuerth; re: Meeting with UNSG Boutros Ghali, President Mwinyi of Tanzania, &amp; OAU SG Salim Salim (1 page)</del>	05/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Rwanda Discussions [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	05/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005c. paper	re: Background on Rwanda Crisis [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	05/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
006. memo	<del>Frank Wisner to Deputy Assistant to President for National Security Affairs; re: Rwanda Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts (1 page)</del>	09/05/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
007. memo	<del>Neal Wolin to Donald Steinberg &amp; MacArthur DeShazer; re: Rwanda (1 page)</del>	05/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [9]

2006-0218-F

jp869

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	Donald Steinberg to Richard Clarke et al; re: Rwanda Talking Points (2 pages)	05/03/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
009. paper	re: Rwanda/Burundi (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
010. list	re: List of Participants (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011. memo	From Donald Steinberg; re: USG Actions on Rwanda (2 pages)	04/25/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [9]

2006-0218-F  
ip869

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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SOUTH AFRICA/RWANDA

The Vice President said in a meeting in South Africa with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Chairman Salim Salim, and Tanzanian President Mwinyi that the U.S. was prepared, in principle, to provide some support to an international peacekeeping force to create an area of safety for the displaced persons within Rwanda, particularly those on the Burundi border, provided that the mission were considered viable and troops were available. This approach was preferable in our view to a Kigali-centered effort that would involve confronting the ongoing civil war.

Boutros-Ghali did not specifically address the Vice President's proposal. He noted that a UN Peacekeeping mission in Kigali would have to be a Chapter VI operation and would require 5,500 troops to protect the airport, secure enclaves within the city and ensure the supply of humanitarian assistance. The three leaders agreed that the Vice President's proposal represented a possible important interim emergency measure that could save lives but is not alone an ultimate solution. This meeting laid the groundwork for discussions that have continued in New York.

Points to Make

- I remain extremely concerned about the ongoing tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.
- I have serious concerns about the UN's current proposed approach on Rwanda which asks for an expanded UNAMIR force of at least 5,500 troops, with our ambiguous mandate, who would be based in Kigali, the epicenter of the conflict.
- Will be difficult to locate adequate numbers of troops willing to serve under these circumstances.
- The U.S. should support a well-conceived peacekeeping proposal aimed at protecting those displaced persons at greatest risk inside Rwanda. We, of course, have a major funding problem but have to weigh the consequences of exacerbating our funding problems against the tremendous human costs of inaction. I don't believe we can just sit idly by.
- It is important that we ensure time to consult on the Hill before we are required to vote in the Security Council.
- We should urge the UN to explore and refine our alternative and present the Council with a menu of at least two options in a formal report from the Secretary General along with cost estimates before the Security Council votes on changing UNAMIR's mandate.

Questions to Raise

- Will the fighting parties in Rwanda agree to either of these arrangements?

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By VR NARA, Date 8/14/2023



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	MaeArthur DeShazer to Mary Emery et al; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)	04/14/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
002. memo	MaeArthur DeShazer to Neal Wolin; re: U.S. Support for Evacuation of Allies from Rwanda (1 page)	04/13/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003a. memo	Anthony Lake & Ricki Seidman to POTUS; re: Drop By on State Department Task Force on Rwanda This Evening (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003b. report	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	04/11/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
004. memo	Donald Steinberg to Mary Emery et al; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)	04/11/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005a. memo	re: Rwanda - Background to the Crisis [partial] (4 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	04/09/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
005b. annex	re: Rwandan Political Parties [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	04/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005c. map	re: Rwanda (1 page)	04/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005d. report	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	04/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
005e. report	re: Burundi (2 pages)	04/09/1994	P1/b(1)
006. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	04/07/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
007. memo	Marc Grossman to Acting Assistant Secretary Bushnell; re: Working Group Formation to Deal with Situation in Rwanda & Burundi [partial] (1 page)	04/07/1994	b(7)(C)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [10]

2006-0218-F  
jp870

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. note	re: Rwanda (with handwritten notes) (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
009. map	re: Kigali (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
010. memo	Donald Steinberg to Mary Emery et al; re: Reporting on Rwanda (1 page)	04/09/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011. memo	Mare Grossman to William Itoh; re: Department of Defense & Evacuation of Expatriates from Rwanda (1 page)	04/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012. memo	Donald Steinberg to Mary Emery et al; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)	04/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
013a. note	re: Rwanda [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	04/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
013b. photograph	re: Rwanda (1 page)	04/07/1994	P1/b(1)
014. memo	Donald Steinberg to Anthony Lake & Sandy Berger; re: Rwanda Update (1 page)	04/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
015. memo	Donald Steinberg to Susan Rice et al; re: Update on Rwanda (2 pages)	04/07/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
016. memo	From Donald Steinberg; re: Update on Rwanda/Burundi (1 page)	04/07/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994 [10]

2006-0218-F

ip870

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	re: Rwanda - Hutu Army (8 pages)	12/06/1994	P1/b(1), P5
001b. list	re: Rwanda (1 page)	12/06/1994	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	<del>Susan Rice &amp; Timothy Atkin to Anthony Lake; re: Situation in Rwanda &amp; Meeting with Rwandan Officials (3 pages)</del>	<del>12/09/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1), P5</del> RDS 5/18/15
002b. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
002c. talking points	<del>re: Meeting with Vice President Kagame (3 pages)</del>	<del>12/13/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
003. report	re: Rwanda Weekly Report [partial] (2 pages)	12/09/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. report	<del>re: Historical Overview of Rwanda (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004b. report	<del>re: Developments in Rwanda Since April 6, 1994 (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004c. map	<del>re: Refugee Update - Late August (1 page)</del>	<del>08/26/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004d. report	<del>re: Volcanic Activity Along Rwanda Zaire Border (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004e. map	<del>re: Major Volcanoes, Lava Flows, &amp; Refugee Sites (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004f. report	re: Pakistan (1 page)	08/04/1994	P1/b(1)

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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [1]

2006-0218-F

ip871

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004g. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004h. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004i. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	08/04/1994	P1/b(1)
004j. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004k. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	05/20/1994	P1/b(1)
<del>004l. report</del>	<del>re: Burundi Key Facts (1 page)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
004m. report	re: Burundi (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
004n. report	re: Burundi (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
005. report	re: Rwanda (5 pages)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1), P5
<del>006a. letter</del>	<del>Mrs. Agathe Habyarimana to POTUS; re: Immediate Cease Fire in Rwanda (5 pages)</del>	<del>05/19/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015
<del>006b. letter</del>	<del>Mrs. Agathe Habyarimana to POTUS; re: Immediate Cease Fire in Rwanda [Letter in French] (6 pages)</del>	<del>05/19/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> RDS 5/18/2015

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Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [1]

2006-0218-F

jp871

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	<del>William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Meeting (1 page)</del>	11/14/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
001b. list	re: Meeting (2 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	11/14/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 2/24
002. email	<del>Timothy Atkin to Richard Clarke; re: Countries (1 page)</del>	11/18/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
003a. memo	<del>Timothy Atkin to Anthony Lake; re: Briefing Memo (3 pages)</del>	11/07/1994	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 2/1/24
003b. list	<del>re: Topics for Meeting (1 page)</del>	11/08/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
003c. list	re: Conclusions of Meeting (2 pages) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	09/30/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 2/24
004. report	<del>re: Next Steps - Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal (3 pages)</del>	08/12/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
005. email	<del>Timothy Atkin to National Security Advisor; re: Rwanda (1 page)</del>	11/08/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
006. email	<del>Susan Rice to National Security Advisor; re: Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal (1 page)</del>	11/08/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
007. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to National Security Advisor; re: Kagame on Rawson (1 page)</del>	11/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
008. email	<del>Donald Steinberg to National Security Advisor; re: Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal (1 page)</del>	11/07/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
009a. memo	<del>Susan Rice &amp; Timothy Atkin to Anthony Lake; re: Next Steps in Rwanda (1 page)</del>	10/13/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [2]

2006-0218-F

jp872

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. paper	re: Rwanda Next Steps (2 pages)	10/13/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
010. paper	re: U.S. Policy on Rwanda - Proposed Next Steps (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1), P5
011. email	Susan Rice to National Security Advisor; re: Update on Funding for Rwanda (1 page)	10/06/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012. email	Richard Clarke to Wilma Hall; re: Rwanda (1 page)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1), P5 V2/1/24
013. email	Susan Rice to National Security Advisor; re: Bizimungu Meeting (1 page)	10/04/1994	P1/b(1) V2/1/2024
014a. memo	MacArthur Deshazer to Anthony Lake; re: Meeting with Rwandan President (3 pages)	10/03/1994	P1/b(1) VZ2/1/2024
014b. report	re: Rwanda (1 page)	07/22/1994	P1/b(1)
015. email	MacArthur DeShazer to National Security Advisor; re: Possible Bizimungu Meeting (1 page)	10/01/1994	P1/b(1), P5 V2/1/24
016. list	re: Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	09/30/1994 Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ2/24
017a. memo	Timothy Atkin to Anthony Lake; re: Situation in Rwanda [partial] (1 page)	09/30/1994 Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
017b. email	From Donald Steinberg; re: Report of UN Team (1 page)	09/17/1994	P1/b(1) VZ2/1/2024
017c. memo	re: Rwanda (7 pages)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1), P5

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017d. map	re: Rwanda (1 page)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1)

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### FOLDER TITLE:

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. list	re: Meeting (2 pages)	11/14/1994	P3/b(3)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [2]

2006-0218-F

jp872

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions of  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: November 8, 1994  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 6:00 pm - 7:15 pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting  
on Rwanda (S)

## PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Tim Wirth  
George Moose  
Phyllis Oakley  
Douglas Bennet  
Ted McNamara

AID

Dick McCall

OSD

Joseph Nye  
Vincent Kern

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

OMB

Gordon Adams

CIA

(b)(3)

JCS

Wesley Clark

OVP

Leon Fuerth

The White House

Anthony Lake  
Nancy Soderberg

NSC

Richard Clarke  
Don Steinberg  
Susan Rice  
Timothy Atkin

Summary of Conclusions1) Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal

-- State will circulate the staffing plan and agencies will identify appropriate people by the end of next week. (S)

-- State/L will oversee USG efforts to support the rapid establishment of the UN Rwanda tribunal using \$1M start up funds from State/IO and AID. (S)

-- AID will ensure the disbursement of \$600K for GOR's Ministry of Justice by the end of next week. (U)

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2010-0639-M-2 (2.80)

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2) USG Assistance to the GOR

-- AID will begin immediately to provide governance assistance to other key ministries in Rwanda, \$100K to \$200K per ministry. (S)

-- State and AID will develop a plan for continued development assistance, matching project moneys to the following benchmarks: unimpeded access of UNAMIR; unimpeded access of human rights monitors; and, GOR naming a point person on human rights. (S)

3) Reconciliation Efforts

-- State will approach the Carter Center about establishing a dialogue between the GOR and moderate ex-FAR. (S)

4) Security in the Camps

-- State will have the Embassies approach the GOR and GOZ about DPKO's proposed UNAMIR expansion and security efforts to gain their assurances of and support for creating a climate conducive to refugee repatriation. (S)

-- State will coordinate with the UN to identify potential troop donor countries and begin a recruiting effort targeting 2 to 3 battalions of capable troops. (S)

-- State will identify and allocate refugee funds to support UNHCR contracted security efforts in the camps. (S)

5) Evacuation Plan

-- The interagency group will finalize a plan by early next week for the potential evacuation of U.S. personnel and NGOs. (S)



RWANDA

**Battenfield, Pat A.**

---

**From:** Atkin, Timothy J.  
**To:** Clarke, Richard A.  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNAMIR  
**Date:** Friday, November 18, 1994 2:37PM  
**Priority:** High

readout of countries UN has already approached re: expanded UNAMIR support:

Pakistan - offered troops although never approached!

Netherlands - offered police

Sweden - offered police

Canada - will provide "something"

Australia - will provide "something"

Ireland - will provide "something"

Morocco - no answer either way

India - said no support but UN believes with hi level U.S. effort (& Pakistani participation) they would come onboard.

Germany - so far only general talks, no specific Rwanda role. Forsee them supporting Rwanda with a field hospital and logistics (UN doesn't want their troops in their first mission)

RAC: thoughts on this . . . UN doesn't want a piece meal force for this mission, would like one or two countries to take it on. Believes "friends" group should be first group asked, on tuesday at the mtg at State.

SG's report should be out on monday.

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-M-1 (2.36)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 7, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE *RAC*  
DON STEINBERG *JS*  
FROM: TIMOTHY J. ATKIN *N*  
SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda, 8 Nov  
1994, 6:00 PM

Security in the Zairian refugee camps continues to deteriorate and over a dozen NGOs indicated they will depart soon unless substantial action is taken by the international community.

In Rwanda, tension continues to mount between RPF soldiers and UNAMIR troops. Last week Vice President Kagame restricted the movement of APCs after several road barriers were crashed as UNAMIR responded to Australian soldiers who had been surrounded by RPF. Members of the RPF have not been paid for over two months.

Hutu militia have begun incursions into Rwanda and have staged killings disguised as RPF. Ex-FAR troops are conducting training and have indicated attacks against the RPF could begin in December. The threat of renewed civil war could cause further regional instability as the RPF talks about preemptive cross border strikes against the Hutus.

I. Stabilizing the Government of Rwanda

Tribunal Moving Forward: If there is a vote tomorrow, the UN resolution establishing a Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal should pass. If Rwanda introduces an alternative including the death penalty we will support it but it is unlikely to pass. State has identified \$500K in jump start funds of a \$3M target. State is distributing a staffing plan including job descriptions so agencies can identify appropriate personnel.

Reconciliation & USG Assistance: The GOR is in dire straits with no resources to pay troops, reestablish government services or rebuild. GOR pleads its inability to meet the benchmarks discussed between you and President Bizimungu without additional

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support. AID wants to precondition assistance to the GOR. State believes we must be forthcoming with some now and enable GOR to prove genuine in its pledge and place conditions on following assistance.

There is no dialogue between the GOR and Hutus. Many at the UN and State believe the only possible effective dialogue at this point would be between GOR and moderate ex-FAR surrounding army reintegration. Army reintegration is the focus of the possible "Carter initiative" forwarded to you. State believes political dialogue can only follow the establishment of the tribunal and, perhaps, only after some convictions have occurred.

Your Goal: After confirming that State will distribute the Tribunal staffing plan this week, direct the other agencies to respond to State and identify appropriate personnel within one work week. You should try to identify the additional \$2.5M start up funds for the tribunal. After asking AID and State their positions on preconditioning aid to Rwanda, you should push the group to provide some initial aid after the GOR names a point person on human rights while identifying benchmarks and assistance for beyond. You need to get AID to agree they will respond quickly both NOW and when future benchmarks are met. Finally, after asking State to discuss their efforts to identify a "senior coordinator" for Rwanda, you should raise the idea of appointing a special envoy for the region.

## II. Security in the Camps

UNAMIR Expansion: We met with DPKO and agreed in principle on a bubble security concept of 2 battalions which will provide a secure atmosphere for repatriation from the camps in Zaire. Neither we nor the UN thinks we will find a country with capable troops to participate. A high level recruiting effort will be necessary.

UNHCR Security Proposal: We have supported the notion of UNHCR contracting private security firms to train and supervise Zairians and moderate Hutus to police camps. This is the quickest method of improving security and requires no sponsor country in terms of troops but does need donor support. State has indicated it is willing to partially fund this effort.

Tanzanian Camps: We agreed with DPKO that the camps in Tanzania require no further UN troops; however, the international community needs to provide funds and resources to the Tanzanians.

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Your Goal: Find out from DOD the amount of support we are willing to provide to an expanded UNAMIR -- logistical, lift, equipment. You should push State to agree on a list of countries to approach to provide troops for this mission and direct them to develop a recruiting plan, working with USUN, and implement it at the Deputy Secretary level by the end of the week. You should be ready to offer involvement of yourself (phonecalls), the Vice President, and the President (letters) as needed. You should push the group to identify the funds to support the Tanzanian and UNHCR efforts as well as the expanded UN role.

### III. Worst Case Scenario

Evacuation Plans: In light of increasing tensions in the camps and in Rwanda, for NGOs and UNAMIR troops, State has held meetings to discuss USG plans should withdrawal of personnel be desirable or necessary. After the UN troop departure this past spring it will be difficult to flee again but this may be the only safe alternative unless the present GOR is better suited than the last government to stop genocide.

Your Goal: After asking State to review the worst case triggers and potential reactions, you should push the group to agree on what path we will take -- both for NGOs and UN troop withdrawal. In particular, we should know now what, if anything, would be cause for DOD participation.

Concurrences by: Susan Rice

#### Attachment

Tab I Agenda

Tab II Summary of Conclusions, Ad Hoc Meeting 30 Sep 94



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. list	re: Conclusions of Meeting (2 pages)	09/30/1994	P3/b(3)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [2]

2006-0218-F

jp872

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Summary of Conclusions

Meeting on Rwanda

DATE: September 30, 1994  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Meeting on  
Rwanda

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Tim Wirth  
Phyllis Oakley  
Prudence Bushnell

CIA

(b)(3)

AID

Richard McCall  
John Hicks

USUN

Mike Sheehan

JCS

Perry Baltimore

OSD

Sarah Sewell  
Vincent Kern  
Timothy Connolly

OMB

Mark Sandy

NSC

Don Steinberg  
Mac DeShazer  
Susan Rice  
Timothy Atkin

Summary of Conclusions

1). UNAMIR

-- State IO will draft a cable outlining support in principle for an expanded UNAMIR mandate (defining a Chapter VI mission, expanding AOR and troop ceiling). It will also list questions which we would like the UN to address before we would be prepared to vote for an expanded mandate.

-- USUN will coordinate a high level meeting at the UN for Monday or Tuesday (Oct 3 or 4) with Kofi Anan and representatives of DHA, DP and management, to discuss a concept of operations for an expanded UNAMIR, an improved organizational framework for Rwanda operations (i.e. SYSG Khan as overall coordinator), funding concerns and related issues.

-- State will send a demarche to find out a Mali point of contact to expedite troop movement. A demarche will be sent to Zambia to identify the log jam to troop movement.

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**PER E.O. 13526**

2510-0639-M-1 (2.39)

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2  
-- DOD will investigate with USUN the backlog of equipment in Nairobi and the desirability of suggesting a request for U.S. airlift support to expedite its movement.

2) War Crimes Tribunal

-- State will investigate whether or not we can use Sec. 522 drawdown or UNPA authority to fund the tribunal.

-- Working on the assumption that authority will be worked out, State will develop a plan to staff the New Zealand proposal, including job descriptions, and task agencies to identify appropriate personnel.

3) Development Assistance to the GOR

-- By COB Monday, State will decide whether to identify and program the ESF funds needed to clear the GOR arrears.

-- By COB today, State/NSC will identify observable issues for the GOR to indicate its commitment and a timeline for Tony Lake's potential meeting with President Bizimungu on Wednesday. Accomplishment of these items would be used to trigger arrears clearance.

4) Radios

-- The UN has indicated a desire to begin jamming hate radios. OSD will investigate equipment availability to assist.

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**Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Atkin, Timothy J.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Rwanda  
**Date:** Tuesday, November 08, 1994 4:03PM

Tony/Nancy:

U/S Wirth, A/S Moose and A/S Oakley met with NGOs today regarding their proposed departure fm the refugee camps in Zaire. NGOs had 3 main points:

- a. NGOs believe immediate assistance for GOR is CRITICAL. They believe negative reports on GOR have been overplayed and effort is needed to get Rwanda running.
- b. PRIMARY reason for withdrawal is not their security; they find themselves in the unethical position of supporting the old Rwandan regime.
- c. Camps in Zaire are completely controlled by Hutu militia. It is overt to a degree they have never seen (i.e. last weeks murder of 6 Hutus in front of NGO workers). Militia has A LOT of money as well. They support short term police option (contract thru UNHCR) and longer term UNAMIR expansion.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-m-1 (2.41)



**Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Rice, Susan E.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** FW: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Urgent: Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal  
**Date:** Tuesday, November 08, 1994 1:08PM

Tony/Sandy--

Upon your instruction, early this morning we asked State/IO to obtain 7th Floor clearance to the position you endorsed on the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal (i.e. to seek an agreement with the Rwandan delegation whereby we would agree to vote in favor of substitute language on their key positions, if they in turn abstained on the vote on the final resolution).

We have just now received word from the 7th Floor. Talbott apparently delegated responsibility to Wirth on this matter. According to State/IO, Wirth does not agree with the NSC position and favors going with the original instruction (xhatch pending in the NSC), which simply instructs USUN to press forward with a vote today and vote in favor of the resolution. The instruction also contains a strong U.S. explanation of vote (EOV) and instructs USUN to get Rwanda to state its readiness to cooperate with the Tribunal.

We are told Ambassador Albright strongly opposes supporting any substitute amendments and wants simply to vote "yes" today on the existing resolution. Both State and USUN reportedly believe that the Rwandan position is immutable. In addition, USUN is concerned that, by changing our tact now, we will confuse what has been a complicated negotiating process and anger those delegations that have co-sponsored the resolution with us.

We are led to believe that Ambassador Albright plans to vote "yes" today at 3:30 pm.

The ball is effectively in our court. Given Wirth's position, State at this point does not plan to write any revised instructions.

PLEASE ADVISE whether you wish to speak directly with her on this issue or whether you want us to release the crosshatch as written, instructing USUN simply to vote "yes".

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**PER E.O. 13526**  
2010-0639-M-1 (7.42)  
V2 8/28/2023

## **Battenfield, Pat A.**

**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @CROSS - Cross Hatches  
**Cc:** @AFRICA - African Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Subject:** Kagame's Comments on Amb. Rawson (~~CONF~~)  
**Date:** Monday, November 07, 1994 8:25PM

Tony/Nancy:

Rwandan Defense Minister Paul Kagame gave an interview today in Rwanda in which he attacked our Ambassador, David Rawson. He said that Rawson has always been overly-sympathetic to the Hutu oppressors in Rwanda, that this bias shadowed his reporting to Washington in the early part of this year and that because of this, the United States missed the signs that could have helped us avoid a genocide in Rwanda. Kagame said that upon Rawson's return to Washington, his continued involvement in the Rwandan account led the United States to hold off on derecognizing the former Government and to delay labeling what went on in Rwanda as genocide. He said that the current Kigali government has no confidence in Rawson.

Tony, you may recall President Bizimungu's comments to you that the government in Rwanda has little confidence in Rawson.

Steve Greenhouse of the NY Times has been calling around about the story. Working with State, we decided that it would be best to have George Moose go on the record with him.

Attached are the talking points George is using with Greenhouse:

- I have full confidence in Ambassador Rawson, whose performance in Rwanda has been outstanding.
- David Rawson grew up in the region, previously served in Rwanda and is an expert on local political, regional and ethnic issues. His analytical skills and judgment are second to none.
- I was surprised by the purported quote from Mr. Kagame that the Rwandan Government had supposedly expressed displeasure with Ambassador Rawson. If in fact Mr. Kagame holds these views, I'm very sorry to hear that. No one has worked harder than Ambassador Rawson to help Rwanda -- and to help this new government -- to recover from the terrible tragedy that its people have suffered.
- Ambassador Rawson has always placed human rights at the top of his priority list. He was extremely active in pressuring the previous government to respect human rights and implement the Arusha accords. He has pushed for accountability for the atrocities and pressed for the rapid deployment of U.N. peacekeepers and human rights monitors. He has never shied away from calling the slaughter what it was: genocide.
- Ambassador Rawson is neither for nor against the RPF or any other faction. He is working to promote U.S. interest, which is to help all Rwandans achieve peace, stability, respect for human rights and national reconciliation.

2

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VR NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-M 1 (2.43)



**Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @CROSS - Cross Hatches  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** USUN Vote on Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal ~~(CONF)~~  
**Date:** Monday, November 07, 1994 2:58PM

Tony/Nancy:

Per our conversation of Saturday, the question of the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal will likely come to a head at the U.N. tomorrow. The Rwandan government told our Charge and the U.N. legal expert in Kigali over the weekend that there is no give now (and won't be in the future) in their opposition to the current structure of the tribunal. In particular, they cannot accept the absence of a death penalty, a starting date of January 1994 for offenses and the possibility that those convicted of crimes might be imprisoned outside Rwanda. There is no give either on the U.N. side of these issues. On the other hand, the Rwandan government has told our people that they are prepared to work with the Tribunal once it is established.

USUN, our Embassy in Kigali and State Department believe that we should support the resolution to establish the Tribunal now, even over a 'no' vote from the Rwandans. Whereas we should ask USUN to make one last effort to persuade the Rwandans at least to abstain on this vote, Dick Clarke and I agree with this view. If you agree, we will so inform USUN and prepare press guidance on this issue.

Don

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By 12 NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-M-1 (2,44)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Rwanda: Next Steps  
Peacekeeping Core Group  
Discussion Paper**

The Current Situation

**Everybody is Clue-less:** Discussions with the UN reveal that, like the U.S., they have no clear idea as to how to confront the security threat posed by violent elements in the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania or the ex-FAR forces who appear to be preparing to re-start the civil war from bases in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania. The UN intends to make recommendations to the Security Council following the return of a survey team from Zaire. Meanwhile, the clock ticks and the likelihood of renewed civil war increases. **It is quite conceivable that the FAR could resume hostilities in the next several weeks.** It seems probable that the U.S. and UN will continue to spin their wheels, unless we take a firm position on the future role of the UN.

**UNAMIR Incapable:** The UN made plain its view that the current forces deployed in Rwanda as well as the deploying Tunisians and Indians constitute a hodgepodge of under-skilled and ill-equipped contingents who are neither capable, equipped nor willing to assume a more aggressive and complex security role in the refugee camps. The UN concedes that UNAMIR would likely be overrun by the belligerent parties, if the civil war resumes.

**In the event that the civil war resumes, the UN will be faced with the choice of remaining, hunkered down and trying to do what little it can to protect innocent civilians, or withdraw once again.** Withdrawal, although possibly unavoidable, would deal another major blow to the UN's international standing and do nothing to ease the plight of innocent civilians.

The Options

Given the imminent possibility of renewed civil war, the U.S. must quickly decide how best to reduce the chances that the war resumes as well as how to respond if this occurs. There are several options. Key issues are bracketed:

**A. Withdraw UNAMIR**

1. **Now** [Withdrawal would appear unjustified and be highly controversial]
2. **When the Civil War Resumes** [UN perceived as cutting and running again. Civilians left with no protection]

**B. Expand UNAMIR's Mandate, AOR, Force Size to Try to Defuse the Threat in the Camps, Encourage Refugee Repatriation, Reduce the Threat of Civil War.** [What should mandate, AOR and force size be? Should we back Dallaire's concept of operations?]

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2010-0639-M-2 (2,46)

12/28/2023

[2010-0639-M-2 (2,46)]

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- C. **Insert Ad Hoc Coalition of European Forces to "Knock Heads"**, i.e. interpose themselves between the belligerents and use force to *prevent* resumption of the war. [ No country likely to take on this role. Neo-colonialist approach, cuts out UN]
- D. **Do Nothing: Have UNAMIR hunker-down and protect civilians** when the war resumes. [Troop contributors may withdraw unilaterally again when fighting resumes, causing collapse of UNAMIR]
- \*E. **Strengthen the Kigali Government**
  - 1. **Political/Financial Support, i.e. pay off arrears, encourage reconciliation, military integration.** [Government is unreceptive to pressures for change. Financial support from IFIs will flow in slowly. New arrears will accumulate. May be too little too late]
  - 2. **Military Support** [Involves taking sides against the Hutu ex-government. U.S. has no FMF and few other means to provide military assistance to current government. May be bad strategy in long-run, given Hutu majority.]

---

\* Not Mutually Exclusive with Options A-C.

**Steinberg, Donald K.**

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**From:** Clarke, Richard A.  
**To:** Hall, Wilma G.; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @AFRICA - African Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Subject:** URGENT-RWANDA [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
**Date:** Tuesday, October 04, 1994 10:01AM  
**Priority:** High

FOR LAKE

**GOOD IDEA:** The interagency working group on Rwanda agreed last week that you should offer Pres Bis. an offer that he can't refuse: if his government does a list of things we want done in the next 60 days, we will clear their arears and thus make them eligible for a flood of IFI money.

**PROBLEM:** The problem is that State is, of course, in gridlock trying to agree to come up with the \$4.5million to clear the arears. We can spend hundreds of millions in peacekeeping and refugee assistance, but finding a little ESF that will open up a stream of up to \$200million to address the root problems seems too hard.

**PROPOSAL:** You should call Chris this morning and get him to agree to identify the funding IF they comply in 60 days. You should ask him to agree on the following talking points:

—Your government desperately needs funds.

—You can not have access to the international financial institutions until you clear your areas.  
If you could clear them, you could have access to up to \$200 million.

—My government is willing to clear your arears for you if we are satisfied that you are taking the necessary steps to stop the killing, have an international tribunal, and create true reconciliation.

—If you are willing to enter into that kind of understanding, our staffs can develop an aide memoire detailing what your government would undertake to do and when. Following the accomplishment of those undertakings, we would cover your arears.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-M-1 (2.45)



Bill

**Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Rice, Susan E.  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
**Cc:** /N, NonRecord at A1; @AFRICA - African Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Subject:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Urgent- Bizimungu Meeting  
**Date:** Tuesday, October 04, 1994 4:09PM

State has now identified \$2 mill. to help pay down Rwanda's IFI arrears (estimates range from \$4.5 mill. to \$7.2 mill). State will solicit the remainder from other donors, e.g. Belgium and Germany.

Moose is hopeful other countries will put up the balance, and thinks it important this effort be multilateral, if possible.

State has not committed formally to finding the remainder, if other countries fail to come through with the balance quickly. However, it appears State will try to find the remaining funds, if necessary. But, State may require some high level encouragement from the NSC.

\*\*\*You can say to Bizimungu that we are prepared to pay at least \$2 mill. and are working with other countries to find the remainder quickly. Our support, however, is tied to the several conditions (laid out in your briefing memo) as well as to the Rwandan Government's agreement to halt immediately its thinly veiled threats to expell UNHCR.\*\*\*

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**PER E.O. 13526**  
2010-0634-M-1 (2,50)  
VZ 8/28/2023

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8030

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DON STEINBERG *DS*

FROM: MACARTHUR DESHAZER *MD*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President Pasteur Bizimungu of  
Rwanda, 5:30 p.m., October 4, 1994, Grand Hotel

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2010-0639-M-1 (2.57)  
R 8/24/2023

You are scheduled to meet with Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, 5:30 p.m., Tuesday, October 4, at the Grand Hotel in Georgetown, 2350 M Street, N. W., Suite #810. Our proposed talking points are below. A list of participants and Bizimungu's bio are at Tabs I & II, respectively.

BACKGROUND

President Bizimungu's two-day visit to Washington comes amid persistent UNHCR reports that for the first time since mid-July, Rwandan refugees are crossing into Goma from Rwanda, reportedly because of alleged RPA reprisals against the returning Hutu population. Recently, President Bizimungu held a press conference during which he strongly denounced allegations of mass killings committed by the RPA. He has also made statements emphasizing the need for refugee repatriation.

In Paris on September 27, the World Bank held an informal donors meeting on Rwanda and concluded that it wants to assist Rwanda but cannot do so without the payment of Rwandan arrears. The donor community expressed apprehension about committing funds until the new government demonstrates tangible results to support its rhetoric. The Bank has asked the donor community to determine what conditions must be met before the donor community will provide financial assistance.

TALKING POINTS

- First Mr. President, let me welcome you to the United States and express our deep regret over the tremendous loss of life in your country.
- We appreciate the role you have played in national reconciliation and reconstitution of your government.

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- We are proud to have played a role in helping your country through this difficult period and I want you to know that we are committed to working with you to restore stability and prosperity to Rwanda.
- We welcome your recent statements emphasizing the need for refugee repatriation, and we urge you to establish the necessary conditions in Rwanda that will promote and permit the safe voluntary return of the refugees.
- We understand that your government and your country will need assistance to create these conditions, including reestablishing basic government services, judicial and financial systems, infrastructure and other essentials.
- We know that you also have substantial arrears to the World Bank (FYI: over \$4 million now, growing to \$7 million in 1995) and that these arrears have prevented you from benefiting from \$250 million in IFIs' pipeline funding.
- We are looking seriously at assistance in these areas, but we need to see concrete action from your government to foster refugee return and, ultimately, national reconciliation.
- Examples of actions your government should take immediately include:
  - Public reaffirmation of your commitment to the principles of the Arusha Accord, including a promise to broaden the base of the government and integrate ex-FAR soldiers.
  - A constructive response to the UNHCR reports of RPA atrocities, including public statements reassuring the population as opposed to counterproductive statement criticizing UNHCR.
  - Naming a point person in your government on all human rights matters; the official should have full authority to investigate abuses and ensure appropriate action to end them.
  - Meaningful contacts with responsible Hutu leaders in the camps concerning repatriation and reconciliation.
  - Integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan Army, including naming moderate ex-FAR officers to responsible positions in the new Army.

Concurrences by: Robert Fauver, <sup>SR</sup> Richard Clarke  
(copy provided)

Attachments

Tab I List of Participants

Tab II Bio of President Bizimungu



## **Battenfield, Pat A.**

---

**From:** DeShazer, MacArthur  
**To:** @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor  
**Cc:** /R, Record at A1; Battenfield, Pat A.; Steinberg, Donald K.; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs  
**Subject:** Possible Bizimungu Meeting [CONFIDENTIAL]  
**Date:** Saturday, October 01, 1994 4:33PM

Tony:

Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu will arrive in Washington next week for meetings. He has asked for an appropriate level meeting at the White House Wednesday, October 4.

A meeting with Bizimungu would provide us an excellent opportunity to pursue a number issues, including indicating our willingness to look seriously at assistance for their substantial arrears to the World Bank (FYI: over \$4 million now, growing to \$7 million in 1995). The need to see concrete action from his government to foster refugee return and national reconciliation. Examples of actions we could suggest his government make include:

- Public reaffirmation of his commitment to the Arusha accord, including a promise to broaden the base of the government, integrate ex-FAR soldiers, and move ultimately to elections.
- A constructive response to the UNHCR reports of RPF atrocities, including public statements reassuring the population as opposed to counterproductive statements criticizing UNHCR.
- Name a point person within his government on all human rights matters; The official should have full authority to investigate, work with the UN, and see that the government takes appropriate action to end any abuses.
- An end to summary executions.
- Efforts to end large daily outflows of refugees and a reversal of that flow.
- Initiation of meaningful contacts with responsible Hutu leaders in the camps concerning repatriation and reconciliation.
- Real progress in integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan Army, including naming of moderate ex-FAR officers to responsible positions in the new army.

Meet with Tony Lake (?) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Our recommendation/State concurs)

Meet with Don Steinberg-(?) \_\_\_\_\_

We'll prepare a briefing memo in advance of the meeting, depending on your decision.

Mac

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015  
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2023  
2010-0639-M-1 (2.52)

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. list	re: Summary of Conclusions (2 pages)	09/30/1994	P3/b(3)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [2]

2006-0218-F  
jp872

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Summary of Conclusions  
Meeting on Rwanda

DATE: September 30, 1994  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 9:00 - 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Meeting on  
Rwanda

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Tim Wirth  
Phyllis Oakley  
Prudence Bushnell

CIA

(b)(3)

AID

Richard McCall  
John Hicks

USUN

Mike Sheehan

JCS

Perry Baltimore

OSD

Sarah Sewell  
Vincent Kern  
Timothy Connolly

OMB

Mark Sandy

NSC

Don Steinberg  
Mac DeShazer  
Susan Rice  
Timothy Atkin

Summary of Conclusions

1) UNAMIR

-- State IO will draft a cable outlining support in principle for an expanded UNAMIR mandate (defining a Chapter VI mission, expanding AOR and troop ceiling). It will also list questions which we would like the UN to address before we would be prepared to vote for an expanded mandate.

-- USUN will coordinate a high level meeting at the UN for Monday or Tuesday (Oct 3 or 4) with Kofi Anan and representatives of DHA, DP and management, to discuss a concept of operations for an expanded UNAMIR, an improved organizational framework for Rwanda operations (i.e. SYSG Khan as overall coordinator), funding concerns and related issues.

-- State will send a demarche to find out a Mali point of contact to expedite troop movement. A demarche will be sent to Zambia to identify the log jam to troop movement.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0639-A-1 (2,53)

72 8/28/2023

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2

-- DOD will investigate with USUN the backlog of equipment in Nairobi and the desirability of suggesting a request for U.S. airlift support to expedite its movement.

2) War Crimes Tribunal

-- State will investigate whether or not we can use Sec. 522 drawdown or UNPA authority to fund the tribunal.

-- Working on the assumption that authority will be worked out, State will develop a plan to staff the New Zealand proposal, including job descriptions, and task agencies to identify appropriate personnel.

3) Development Assistance to the GOR

-- By COB Monday, State will decide whether to identify and program the ESF funds needed to clear the GOR arrears.

-- By COB today, State/NSC will identify observable issues for the GOR to indicate its commitment and a timeline for Tony Lake's potential meeting with President Bizimungu on Wednesday. Accomplishment of these items would be used to trigger arrears clearance.

4) Radios

-- The UN has indicated a desire to begin jamming hate radios. OSD will investigate equipment availability to assist.

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## **Steinberg, Donald K.**

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**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants  
**Cc:** @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** UN Team Reports Systematic RPF Killings  
**Date:** Saturday, September 17, 1994 5:25PM

Tony/Sandy/Nancy:

We received a briefing today from the U.N. team that spent the last four weeks investigating reports of killings by the new government in Rwanda. The team was headed by Bob Gersony, a long-time AID contractor who has investigated these types of cases for 20 years. His team somehow received permission from the new government to travel throughout the country and interview refugees and displaced persons.

Based on eye-witness evidence and interviews with more than 300 people throughout the country, the team concludes that there have been "systematic killings" by the RPA of about 10,000 Hutus a month since April throughout Rwanda. These include mass killings of entire villages, attacks of displaced persons and returning refugees and pursuit of Hutus hiding in the swamps and hills of Rwanda. The team has concluded that these are not isolated attacks by revenge-seeking individuals or RPA renegades, but part of an organized, ordered exercise directed by the RPA leadership to kill Hutus, depopulate designated regions and keep the refugees from returning.

The geographic distribution of the killings tends to be focused in the south and southeast sectors near Burundi and Tanzania (where UNAMIR has not been present and where up to 25 percent of the original Hutu population remains), but the massacres have occurred everywhere except the French zone and a small area near the Goma region. The team believe that this is part of an effort to ensure that the Tutsis maintain control despite having only 10,000-15,000 troops to patrol the country.

The team provided a detailed description of the interviews they conducted, which they believe were consistent and credible. The most usual pattern of killings was to call together Hutu villagers and returning refugees for a meeting to discuss distribution of food, direct the attendees to small confined areas such as churches, and then massacre them. Other patterns included house-to-house search teams that killed all Hutus they could find, attacks on refugees fleeing on main roads and mass arrests of persons never heard from again.

They reported that the killings seem to have diminished somewhat in August, perhaps simply because there are fewer Hutus to be killed and because Hutus no longer come to the meetings called by the RPA.

The team has already briefed UNHCR and the UN Secretary General's office. Their intention now is to travel to Rwanda this weekend (where they will be joined by Kofi Annan) to discuss their findings to the Rwandan government. They will tell the government that the Secretary General plans to report to the Council as early as Tuesday, at which point the findings will be public information. They will ask the Government to commit to positive steps to halt the killings, so that these can be included in the report to the Council. In addition, they will see whether UNAMIR can be instructed to expand its activities in the regions most affected in the south and southeast, sending small teams of troops into communal capitals. They will also expedite the deployment of the authorized 140 human rights monitor volunteers.

Incidentally, Human Rights Watch issued a report last Thursday that essentially tracks the information which Gersony has provided.

This report obviously raises a number of difficult questions about our repatriation efforts, our relationship with the Rwandan government and how we proceed with the war crimes tribunal. We'll be meeting Monday to further discuss how we react to this situation. If you have some time, it would be good to discuss this situation.



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	09/28/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
<del>002. report</del>	<del>re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page)</del>	<del>09/27/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024</del>
003. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	09/26/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
004a. memo	re: Rwanda (7 pages)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1), P5
004b. map	re: Rwanda (1 page)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1)
<del>005. report</del>	<del>re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/23/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015</del>
<del>006. report</del>	<del>re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi (1 page)</del>	<del>09/22/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015</del>
007. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	09/21/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
008. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page) Released in Part, Per E.O. 13526	09/20/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
<del>009. report</del>	<del>re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi (2 pages)</del>	<del>09/19/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015</del>
010. email	From Donald Steinberg; re: UN Team Reports (1 page)	09/17/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
011a. memo	Timothy Atkin to Anthony Lake; re: Transition of Operation Support Hope in Rwanda (4 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
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### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F

jp873

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Transition of Operation Support Hope in Rwanda (2 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1) VZ 2/1/2024
011c. paper	re: Operation Support Hope Transition (10 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011d. paper	re: Public Outreach Strategy for Rwanda (2 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1), P5 RDS 5/18/15
011e. paper	re: Draft Public Affairs Guidance on Operation Support Hope Withdrawal (3 pages)	09/13/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
011f. paper	re: Security Assessment for Goma Refugee Camps (3 pages)	09/16/1994	P1/b(1) RDS 5/18/2015
012. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page)	09/15/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 2/24

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
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Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F  
jp873

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 27, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - ~~(C)~~ U/S Wirth Meets with Rwandan Vice President Kagame: U/S Wirth met with Vice President Kagame in Rwanda to discuss recent allegations of killings by the RPA and a broad range of issues facing the new Rwandan government. Kagame admitted that individual reprisals, and even locally organized ones, were taking place, but categorically denied that such activities had been authorized by his government. Kagame emphasized the complexity of the problem and his lack of resources to address it. He alleged that outside forces, including the UNHCR, were undermining the GOR's effort to foster national reconciliation. (Kigali 1631)
- - (LOU) Rwandan President Bizimungu in Washington: President Bizimungu will be in Washington on Wednesday, October 5. Bizimungu has requested meetings with the NSC, Deputy Secretary, A/S Moose, and others, time permitting. He is apparently requesting meeting with Congressional leaders on the same day. (Kigali 1632)
- - ~~(S)~~ General Motors Dealership in Kigali: The government of Rwanda has agreed to the establishment of a Rwandan owned and operated General Motors Dealership. The franchise is expected to go to Tribert R. Rujugiro, a long time Rwandan Patriotic Front financier and Tutsi businessman in South Africa. (Yaounde 8922)
- - (U) Operation Support Hope: A total of 376 U.S. forces remain in the region; 299 in Entebbe, 3 in Kigali, 48 in Mombasa, and 26 in Nairobi. (Nairobi 17705)
- - (LOU) UNAMIR Deployments: According to the UN, the initial 312 Tunisian troops expected to deploy on September 28 are now scheduled to deploy by commercial aircraft on October 3. The remaining 600-plus troops will complete deployment by October 16. A Nigerian contingent of 260 troops is to self-deploy on September 30. DOD will provide airlift to the Malians on a date to be scheduled. No deployment date is scheduled for the Zambians, who are still experiencing loadlift problems. India is scheduled to begin its deployment of up to 1,000 troops on September 30. (State 260118)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0639-M-2 (2.41)

VZ 8/28/2013

[2010-0639-M-2 (2.61)]

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page)	09/26/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F  
jp873

### RESTRICTION CODES

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Per E.O. 13526  
2010-0639-M-1 (2.62)  
VZ 8/28/2023

Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Monday, September 26, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Last U.S. Military Flights to Kigali: The last U.S. military flight to Kigali is scheduled for today. The Joint Task Force/Entebbe will close completely on September 27. (Kampala 7783)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell to Southeast Rwanda: During a two day visit to southeast Rwanda, DAS Bushnell pressed the GOR and UN officials about reports of large numbers of refugees still fleeing southeastern Rwanda. Interlocutors offered a variety of explanations for the reports, including both RPA and Interhamwe intimidation. DAS Bushnell and delegation saw nothing specific which would corroborate any of the explanations offered. However, a combination of new departures to Tanzania, new arrivals from Burundi and what appeared to be new recruits from the RPA, suggests that something is preventing refugees from returning home. (Kigali 1612)

- - (U) RPA Activities: The RPA has reported that it continues to search homes throughout Rwanda for arms and ammunition. Persons harboring weapons have been arrested. The relief community is concerned that this policy may cause panic throughout Rwanda. (Nairobi 17539)

- - (U) Refugee Flow into Tanzania: UNHCR estimates that approximately 1,000 people per day continue to cross into Tanzania from Rwanda. (Nairobi 17539)

- - (S) Ex-FAR Gathering in Tanzania: According to reports from the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Forces (TPDF) stationed along the Rwanda/Tanzanian border, ex-FAR are gathering in Tanzania and in northern Rwanda and appear to be preparing to confront the new Rwandan government. Reports indicate the ex-FAR are carrying out a campaign of harassment against Rwandan refugees who are trying to return to Rwanda. E.O. 13526 1.4(c)  
E.O. 13526 1.4(c)

- - (U) UNHCR Reports Ex-FAR in Tanzania: UNHCR has reported that dozens of ex-FAR soldiers have left refugee camps in Zaire and have gone to Ngara, Tanzania. Concern exists that these soldiers may be regrouping to launch a possible guerrilla war. (Nairobi 17539)

† - (LOU) Repatriation Not an Option: According to DART representative Farnsworth and Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator Petrie, refugees in Tanzania do not see repatriation as an option. Highly influenced by the camp leadership structure, refugees are convinced that certain death awaits them should they return to Rwanda. Reports of Tutsis seizing land in the south and northeast Rwanda are reinforcing these fears. (Nairobi 17542)

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F  
jp873

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DECL: OADR

Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Tuesday, September 20, 1994 at 1400 hours

- - (U) Rwanda to Hold Security Council Presidency: The Security Council has decided to allow the Presidency of the Security Council to be held by Rwanda in December 1994. (USUN 3909)

- - (S) [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(c) a real threat exists that RPF soldiers may commit acts of revenge against Hutus if they believe that the new Rwandan government is not paying adequate attention to the issue of apprehending and trying those responsible for war crimes, including genocide. E.O. 13526 3.5(c)  
[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

- - (S) Ex-FAR Agreed in Principle to Move: [REDACTED] E.O. 13526 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED] 1.4(c) the ex-FAR reportedly agreed in principle to be moved from the Zaire-Rwanda border area to the interior of Zaire under the following conditions: none of the new camps would be located more than 100 km from the Goma-Bukavu area, and 4,000 ex-FAR would be allowed to remain in the already-established refugee camps to provide protection to Hutu refugees there.  
[REDACTED] E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

- - (U) Operation Support Hope Troops: The total number of U.S. military personnel in the region as of September 20 is 478; 382 in Entebbe, 3 in Kigali, 92 in Nairobi, and 1 in Mombasa. (Rwanda SVTS 9/20)

- - (C) DAS Bushnell in Burundi: On September 19, DAS Bushnell met with a broad cross-section of government, opposition, and military leaders in Bujumbura. All interlocutors were appreciative and supportive of the role of the OAU in Burundi. Another ten observers set to arrive this week will bring the number to 37 out of the authorized 47. FRODEBU members felt the OAU observers have made a difference, and asked that they be increased to 200. (Bujumbura 3231)

- - (C) Hate Radio Revival: Meeting with DAS Bushnell (see previous item), the interlocutors expressed concern about the revival of the "hate radio" which incited the Hutus to kill Tutsis. The Defense Minister asked about assistance in identifying the location of the radio broadcasting ethnic hate messages. Ambassador Krueger replied that he had been assured that a response would be forthcoming this week. (Bujumbura 3231)

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Per E.O. 13526  
2010-0639-M-1 (2.68)  
VZ 8/28/2023

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## **Battenfield, Pat A.**

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**From:** Steinberg, Donald K.  
**To:** @UP - APNSA Special Assistants  
**Cc:** @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @AFRICA - African Affairs  
**Subject:** UN Team Reports Systematic RPF Killings  
**Date:** Saturday, September 17, 1994 5:25PM

Tony/Sandy/Nancy:

We received a briefing today from the U.N. team that spent the last four weeks investigating reports of killings by the new government in Rwanda. The team was headed by Bob Gersony, a long-time AID contractor who has investigated these types of cases for 20 years. His team somehow received permission from the new government to travel throughout the country and interview refugees and displaced persons.

Based on eye-witness evidence and interviews with more than 300 people throughout the country, the team concludes that there have been "systematic killings" by the RPA of about 10,000 Hutus a month since April throughout Rwanda. These include mass killings of entire villages, attacks of displaced persons and returning refugees and pursuit of Hutus hiding in the swamps and hills of Rwanda. The team has concluded that these are not isolated attacks by revenge-seeking individuals or RPA renegades, but part of an organized, ordered exercise directed by the RPA leadership to kill Hutus, depopulate designated regions and keep the refugees from returning.

The geographic distribution of the killings tends to be focused in the south and southeast sectors near Burundi and Tanzania (where UNAMIR has not been present and where up to 25 percent of the original Hutu population remains), but the massacres have occurred everywhere except the French zone and a small area near the Goma region. The team believe that this is part of an effort to ensure that the Tutsis maintain control despite having only 10,000-15,000 troops to patrol the country.

The team provided a detailed description of the interviews they conducted, which they believe were consistent and credible. The most usual pattern of killings was to call together Hutu villagers and returning refugees for a meeting to discuss distribution of food, direct the attendees to small confined areas such as churches, and then massacre them. Other patterns included house-to-house search teams that killed all Hutus they could find, attacks on refugees fleeing on main roads and mass arrests of persons never heard from again.

They reported that the killings seem to have diminished somewhat in August, perhaps simply because there are fewer Hutus to be killed and because Hutus no longer come to the meetings called by the RPA.

The team has already briefed UNHCR and the UN Secretary General's office. Their intention now is to travel to Rwanda this weekend (where they will be joined by Kofi Annan) to discuss their findings to the Rwandan government. They will tell the government that the Secretary General plans to report to the Council as early as Tuesday, at which point the findings will be public information. They will ask the Government to commit to positive steps to halt the killings, so that these can be included in the report to the Council. In addition, they will see whether UNAMIR can be instructed to expand its activities in the regions most affected in the south and southeast, sending small teams of troops into communal capitals. They will also expedite the deployment of the authorized 140 human rights monitor volunteers.

Incidentally, Human Rights Watch issued a report last Thursday that essentially tracks the information which Gersony has provided.

This report obviously raises a number of difficult questions about our repatriation efforts, our relationship with the Rwandan government and how we proceed with the war crimes tribunal. We'll be meeting Monday to further discuss how we react to this situation. If you have some time, it would be good to discuss this situation.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Transition of Operation Support Hope in Rwanda

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By VL NARA, Date 8/8/23  
2010-0639-11-1 (2.75)Purpose

To approve a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Operation Support Hope in the Rwanda Crisis Area.

Background

U.S. military forces (JTF) began deploying to the Rwanda Crisis Area (RCA) on 22 July to reinforce relief agencies in-place until they could recover and resume effective operations. At the beginning of the humanitarian crisis when no other resources could adequately address the massive logistical needs, JTF operations in support of UNHCR and NGO relief efforts proved invaluable.

We agreed to support four specific UNHCR service packages:

- Package #1 - Airport services in Goma and Bukavu.
- Package #2 - Logistics Base services in Goma.
- Package #7 - Water management in Goma.
- Package #8 - Airhead management in Entebbe and Kigali.

JTF has accomplished service packages #1, #2, and #7. The JTF continues to transfer responsibility for package #8 to the UNHCR and national authorities. Training of local airlift control personnel is being completed to facilitate turnover of this mission. All of package #8 functions will be transferred no later than 28 September.

JTF Support Hope has begun to transition U.S. military operations to UNHCR and NGOs. A successful transition has already occurred in Goma and, upon completion of the services outlined in package #8, can be concluded in Kigali and Entebbe by 30 September.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of StaffCLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHY  
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At a meeting in Geneva on September 13 between General Schroeder and Mrs. Ogata to discuss final details of the transition from JTF, UNHCR requested the following additional support:

- Provision of maintenance and repair parts, for previously provided equipment, for 6 months.
- One U.S. military officer to remain at the Geneva Aircell for Sarajevo Airlift to provide training to Aircell personnel for 6 months.
- Airlift of satellite terminals and ground vehicles.

All of these requests will be met by DOD and do not affect the ability to withdraw U.S. military forces by 30 September. In addition, the U.S. will continue to provide long haul and intra-theater airlift support on a case-by-case basis.

#### Withdrawal Timetable

DOD proposes to withdraw the remaining 674 military personnel from the RCA gradually as outlined below.

Location	15 Sep	24 Sep	28 Sep	30 Sep
Entebbe, Uganda	528	404	343	0
Kigali, Rwanda	5	5	5	0
Mombasa, Kenya	122	0	0	0
Nairobi, Kenya	19	0	0	0
Total	674	409	348	0

The actual number of military personnel is *approximate* and dependent upon the need for personnel to assist UNHCR and NGOs as of the dates specified. The withdrawal will be phased to match UNHCR and NGO capabilities and resources. State/AID have no objection to this plan.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed withdrawal timetable.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	re: Situation in Rwanda/Burundi [partial] (1 page)	09/15/1994	P3/b(3)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Donald Steinberg (African Affairs)  
OA/Box Number: 633

### FOLDER TITLE:

Rwanda, Aug.-Dec. 1994 [3]

2006-0218-F  
jp873

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Rwanda/Burundi Situation Report

Thursday, September 15, 1994 at 0930 hours

- - (C) Security in Burundi: At 10:00 p.m. on September 14, armed bands of civilians attacked military positions near the Panorama Hotel in Bujumbura. Gunfire was exchanged and police say the armed civilians retreated to the hills. On the same night, the house of Francois Ngeze, a prominent opposition hardliner, was attacked with a grenade and sniper fire. Burundi military sources report that gendarmes guarding the house resisted the attack. Ngeze was the figurehead Hutu proposed to head the Committee for Public Safety established immediately after the October coup attempt, and is considered a turncoat by many Hutu. (Bujumbura 3183)
- - (S) Deployment of Three RPA Battalions is Complete: The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) completed deployment of three battalions to the former humanitarian protection zone by September 14, ahead of schedule. The local Hutu population appears to be gaining confidence in the RPA and does not support the Hutu militia activities. (b)(3) [10 USC 424]
- - (U) Bukavu Airport Remains Open: DART reports the Bukavu airport remains open, and there are no indications it will be closed in the near future despite earlier reports that it would be closed for two months for repairs. (Nairobi 16762)
- - (C) Former Rwandan Ambassador to Kenya Seeks Refugee Status: The Rwandan Ambassador to Kenya, Habimana Cyprien, appointed by the former government, has inquired about U.S. refugee status for himself, and his family at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. (Nairobi 16712)
- - (C) Rwandans Flee to Kenya: Embassy Nairobi has received a document from an organization calling itself the Rwandan Community in Kenya. The document alleges that Hutu extremists of the former Rwandan government have taken refuge in Kenya. Embassy Nairobi believes it is likely that the Kenyan government is aware of their presence. The embassy is investigating the possibility that this group, as well as others from the former Rwandan government, is present in Kenya. (Nairobi 16715)
- - (U) Rwandan Refugees in Region: UNHCR reports that the current number of refugees in the region are as follows: 850,000 in Goma, 450,000 in Bukavu, 473,000 in Tanzania, 316,000 in Burundi, 160,000 in Uvira, and 10,000 in Uganda. (OFDA Meeting 9/15).

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0639-41-1 (2.80)

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