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
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21022 (60)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DC 20506

CHRON FILE

September 20, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

FROM: SUSAN RICE/NICK RASMUSSEN

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on African Peacekeeping Issues

The Peacekeeping Core Group met September 9 to discuss proposed operations in Rwanda and Liberia. It was clear from that meeting that there are issues that warrant Deputies' attention. As a next step, we suggest that you convene a DC meeting possibly as soon as this week, to consider the proposed Rwanda operation. We would also use the meeting to tie up a few loose ends relating to Liberia. Global Affairs will draft a paper for the DC on the Rwanda operation.

Rwanda

A UN resolution is likely to be voted on within the next couple of weeks. The USG has never addressed at a senior level the question of whether or not we should support a Rwanda operation or whether such an operation is consistent with the guidelines set out in PRD-13. This issue may fuel concern on the Hill that we can't say no. It's yet another operation that we cannot pay for. On the other hand, we must consider the implications of failing to support the Rwanda peace plan, which the U.S. helped broker.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(b), E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Liberia

Though the Deputies agreed some weeks ago to support in principle a UN observer mission in Liberia, they left a key issue unresolved: the question of participation by U.S. military observers. Since the last DC, the UN has informally requested 15-20 U.S. military observers. Deputies should decide how to answer that request. In addition, there is the question of placing U.S. logisticians on the ground. One of the key prerequisites for the participation of the potential new ECOMOG contributors is that the U.S. provide sustaining logistical support in Liberia for the duration of the operation. This would

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require U.S. military personnel to facilitate operations in Monrovia, at Roberts Field, and at two major ports.

You should also be aware that Jennifer Ward, with support from Global Affairs is working closely with State and Defense to resolve a number of related Liberia issues before a UNSC vote. A EUCOM assessment team has just returned from Liberia. Their report, plus a State-drafted Progress Report, will address all of these issues, including:

- Level of Support for ECOMOG Forces: Although we have expressed a willingness in principle to help ECOMOG stand up and sustain 4 additional battalions, there are unanswered questions about specific requirements. Lift, equipment, personnel costs, ongoing logistical support.
- Costs: We need a better handle on what the entire spectrum of our involvement could cost. At present, we have no sense of total cost. Presumably, there will be a need also to fund demobilization and resettlement of the combatants, as well as an election process and humanitarian support.
- Timeframe: Is the 7 month period for elections overly ambitious? Should we push for an extension of the UN mandate?
- Humanitarian Requirements: We need to get OFDA's view of the humanitarian assistance requirements needed to make a peacekeeping operation viable, as well as post-PKO requirements.
- ECOMOG Viability: There are concerns about the availability of sufficient African troops to augment ECOMOG. The OAU has not taken steps to accelerate recruitment. There are no countries committed to participate at this stage and deployment could take several months. There is also some concern that Nigeria may reduce its participation in peacekeeping, including in Liberia.
- The French Problem: We need to manage effectively the French attempt to link Liberia and Rwanda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to convene a meeting of the Deputies in the near future as soon as papers have been prepared to discuss Rwanda and tie up loose ends related to Liberia.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Sep-1993 16:55 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Nicholas J. Rasmussen
(RASMUSSEN)

SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

Mr. Lake/Mr. Berger --

Susan Rice asked that I bring to your attention the fact that the Security Council appears to be moving very quickly toward a vote on a resolution establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Informal consultations have already begun on the SYG's report (released Monday).

In keeping with our desire to proceed more deliberately before voting yea or nay on new UN operations, State is asking USUN to slow the process so that we can take a close look at the SYG's report, as well as at the cost analysis (still pending) from the UN budget people. Nonetheless, we will probably need to have a USG position by the beginning of next week.

We recommend that a Deputies Committee meeting be scheduled on Thursday or Friday to consider the issue. A number of issues should be discussed by Deputies, including funding of the U.S. share of an operation, French attempts to link the operation with a Liberia PKO, and how the operation stacks up against the PRD-13 criteria. State/AF is providing us with input which we will turn into a DC discussion paper. We can have a paper ready by mid-week. If a DC can be scheduled, we will coordinate the paper and agenda with Jennifer Ward. Alternatively, we can prepare a decision memorandum for Mr. Lake.

Distribution:

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FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Sep-1993 14:31 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Jennifer C. Ward
(WARD)

SUBJECT: Rwanda

Sandy:

Assuming that we can get the paperwork sped up, would you be willing to add Rwanda to the agenda for the Thursday Deputies Meeting on Sudan? Dick and I agree that we need to make a decision quickly. I got a call from Ambassador Albright's office noting that it would be unlikely that we could hold the UNSC off much longer, and that a decision sooner rather than later was preferable.

Please advise. Thanks.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX_MAIL@OEBO
RICE@A1@OEBO
RAGLE@A1@OEBO

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

<DIST>

SIT: RAGLE RICE VAX

<PREC>

PRIORITY

<CLAS>

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NFO RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0090

UEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

UEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

UFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1466

<SUBJ>

RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

(see para 5 onward)

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004735

STATE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S DELEGATION

STATE FOR AF-MOOSE, IO-BENNET, EUR-OXMAN,

LSO IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, L/UNA, L/AF

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

.0.12356: DECL:OADR

AGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

OBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO

EF: A) USUN 4653, B) USUN 4690, C) USUN 4720

~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE, SEE

ARA 4.

SUMMARY: FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE WITH THE

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SECRETARY TOMORROW THE QUESTION OF A UN PKO IN RWANDA. THE FRENCH PLAN TO CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30 ON THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. FOLLOWING IN PARAS 5 THROUGH 11 IS AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA (REFTELS) IN RELATION TO THE PRD-13 CRITERIA CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION, AND TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SEPTEMBER 27 SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN OUR ANALYSIS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PROPOSED PKO FOR RWANDA MEETS THE DRAFT CRITERIA SUBJECT TO FINAL SUBMISSION OF A FINANCIAL STATEMENT WHICH IS EXPECTED IMMINENTLY. END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE WARNED USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER THAT FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF A NEW UN PKO (REFTELS) WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SEPTEMBER 29. THE FRENCH WANT TO CONSIDER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL B) TUESDAY, REFINE THE TEXT WEDNESDAY, PUT IT INTO ITS FINAL DRAFT VERSION WEDNESDAY NIGHT, AND VOTE THURSDAY. MERIMEE WANTS TO CONCLUDE THIS MATTER DURING SEPTEMBER, SO AS TO AVOID THE DELAYS THAT ARE INEVITABLE WHEN A NEW PERSON ASSUMES THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENCY ON THE FIRST OF OCTOBER. THE FRENCH KNOW THEY HAVE AT LEAST TEN POSITIVE VOTES (ONE MORE THAN NEEDED TO PASS A RESOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A VETO). THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE RWANDA OPERATION MEETS THE CRITERIA SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA. MERIMEE POINTED OUT THAT THE FRENCH COOPERATED ON THE RECENT LIBERIA AND HAITI RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING NEW PKO'S. USUN HAS NEVER INDICATED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE A LINKAGE.

COMMENT: IF WE TAKE THE STEP OF VETOING THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, THEREBY FORCING THE FRENCH TO MAINTAIN THEIR BATTALION IN KIGALI, WE CAN ALMOST CERTAINLY WRITE OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF FRENCH TROOPS REMAINING IN SOMALIA. END COMMENT.

. THE ONLY WAY WE COULD STOP THE RWANDA PKO IS BY THREATENING TO VETO A RESOLUTION THURSDAY. WE MUST, THEREFORE, RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO EITHER VOTE YES, BSTAIN, OR VETO BY 10 AM THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL HAVE THE MOST EFFECT ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE TEXT IF RECEIVED BY OOB WEDNESDAY. IF INSTRUCTED TO VETO, USUN WILL REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) FROM THE DEPARTMENT.

. DURING THE PROCESS OF DEFINING USG FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE VOTING ON NEW UN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, SIX FACTORS HAVE EMERGED AS PART OF THE LATEST PRD-13 DRAFT. TO AID THE USG REVIEW PROCESS, WE WILL APPLY THESE STANDARDS TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION FOR RWANDA.

. IS THERE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? YES. INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION OCCURRED WHEN PF TROOPS INVADED RWANDA FROM UGANDAN TERRITORY IN 1990. ALSO, ALMOST 1 MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS AND

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REFUGEES FLED THEIR FARMS DURING THE FIGHTING, CONSTITUTING A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER REQUIRING URGENT ACTION, COUPLED WITH VIOLENCE.

7. IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS? YES. AT LEAST TEN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS HAVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE PKO PROPOSED BY THE SYG. THE OAU AND THE OBSERVERS TO THE PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA ALSO FAVOR THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH CALLED FOR IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

8. ARE THERE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE MISSION FITS ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT? YES. THIS WOULD BE A CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING OPERATION OPERATING UNDER CHAPTER VI WHERE THE CEASEFIRE,

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WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5, J3

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

PAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA AND CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PKO
DEMOLIBILIZATION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WOULD BE MONITORED BY THE UN. NO PEACE ENFORCEMENT POWERS WOULD BE INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH THE FORCE WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF ACTING IN SELF-DEFENSE IF NEEDED BE. THE OPERATION HAS A CLEAR 22-25 MONTH PERIOD FOR EXECUTION, WITH PRECISE MILEPOSTS ON THE WAY, AT THE END OF WHICH TIME THE MANDATE AND MISSION EXPIRES. THIS IS ONE OF THE BETTER-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED PKO'S WE HAVE SEEN.

9. FOR CHAPTER VI PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IS A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE AND HAVE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CONSENTED BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES TO DEPLOY THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION. YES. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN HOLDING WELL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA IN WHICH THE REQUESTED THAT A PEACEKEEPING MISSION BE EMPLOYED AS PART OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS TO PEACEFUL ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY.

10. ARE THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AVAILABLE, INCLUDING (A) FORCES (REGIONAL OR UN) APPROPRIATE TO THE MISSION? YES. THE UN HAS INFORMALLY CONTACTED SEVERAL RANCOPHONE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PRELIMINARILY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING THE TWO BATTALIONS RECOMMENDED FOR THE RWANDA PKO. THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WILL VARY BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 700 AND 2,500 DEPENDING ON THE NEEDS AT ANY GIVEN TIME IN ORDER TO SAVE ON COSTS. (B) MANDATE: THE MANDATE WOULD BE TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT, CONTRIBUTING TO THE DISENGAGEMENT, DEMOLIBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION

PHASE, WHILE PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SECURITY. SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE MANDATE, AS SPELLED OUT IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WOULD BE TO: A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI, B) SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEFINING OF DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES, C) OVERSEE THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS, D) CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING EFFORTS RELATED TO THE OPERATION, IN PARTICULAR BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS, E) EXAMINE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DETERMINE THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE, F) OVERSEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, G) SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE. (C) FINANCE: THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND THE COUNCIL WILL NOT ACT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED. THE COUNCIL HAS ACTED, HOWEVER, AS IN THE CASE OF HAITI, IMMEDIATELY ON PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT.

11. FINALLY, CAN AN END-POINT TO UN INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED? YES. THE INSTALLATION OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION AND ELECTORAL PROCESS (APPROXIMATELY 22-25 MONTHS AFTER ADOPTION OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION).

ALBRIGHT

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SECTION: 02 OF 02

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7451

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE/JENNIFER WARD

FROM: NICK RASMUSSEN *NR*

SUBJECT: Rwanda Peacekeeping Operation

\$200 million
\$60 million
US over
2 years

If approved, a UN peacekeeping operation for Rwanda stands a good chance of being a success. Both parties to the conflict want UN involvement and believe it is necessary for continued progress in implementing the Arusha peace accord (which we helped broker). The ceasefire has held for several months; its durability attests to a strong desire on both sides for a political solution. OAU and UN observers have been in country for several months and have not been harmed or threatened in any way.

The PRD-13 Factors. There are satisfactory answers to a number of the PRD factors that we have developed to guide our decisions on support for new UN operations.

- o There is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis. USUN reports that at least 10 UNSC members will vote in favor of a resolution.
- o There are clear objectives and a clear understanding that this a peacekeeping, not peace enforcement mission.
- o A ceasefire is in place; both parties want the UN to come in.
- o An end point to UN involvement has been identified. When an integrated armed force is created and elections produce a new government, the UN will leave. The UN estimates this will take ~~22-25~~ months.

Looking at some of the other guidelines, however, the picture is less favorable:

- o It is not clear that there are means available to support this mission. There is consensus that the OAU is overburdened and cannot take on the mission. While some UN member states have indicated that they are willing to consider stepping forward, we are a long way from having firm troop commitments. We can also assume that this operation would add to our UN arrearages.

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- o The first guideline, that there be a threat to international peace and security, is met, but just barely. The most compelling rationale for UN involvement is to bring an end to a conflict which has displaced almost 1 million people, not to halt aggression.

Demobilization: Ambitious and Expensive. Beyond the PRD guidelines, we have some concerns which center around the UN's concept of operations. In the early stages of the mission, the UN would do what we know it can do successfully -- oversee a ceasefire so that a transitional government can take office in a climate of security. Later, however, the mission would be responsible for organizing demobilization of the two armed forces so that an integrated, national army could be created.

Demobilization of two large armed forces (30,000 on one side, 20,000 on the other) is a complex and ambitious undertaking, made much more so by the UN's relative inexperience with disarmament. If there is any point at which this operation could break down, this would be it.

A demobilization component to the mission has significant cost implications as well. At its peak, the number of UN peacekeepers will climb to almost 2600. Though the UN has not yet provided cost estimates, we expect that it will be quite expensive. There have already been several attempts to scale down the size of the proposed operation, but given the ambitious mandate, this has not been possible.

Next Steps. If we are inclined to support this mission in the Security Council, we should nonetheless take the time to make sure our concerns about mission scope and costs are given a fair hearing and to scrub the text of the resolution. Given the President's clear statement on Monday, Security Council members and Boutros-Ghali should expect no less. Even if we end up supporting the mission in its current form, we will have established that we will exercise our right to scrutinize an operation in advance of a decision, regardless of time pressures from other members.

We understand that Secretary Christopher informed French PM Juppe in New York today that we want to delay the Security Council vote scheduled for Thursday. Ambassador Albright is following up through UN channels. State has also begun putting together comments on the draft resolution offered by the French. Most of the changes will involve being more precise about the mandate and end points. We will have their input early on Thursday.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d) We have developed a preliminary draft of a response.

We believe that State will support a Rwanda resolution (USUN has already weighed in favor -- see Tab C). OSD and JCS would have to be convinced, but their concerns appear seem more tied up in the process (a hurried vote without good information) than with the substance. If we can slow the process down and demonstrate to them that we are faithfully applying the PRD guidelines, they will likely support a yes vote.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to schedule this week either a Deputies meeting or conference call involving State, DOD and NSC to develop a USG position on a Rwanda resolution.

Approve _____

Disapprove 

Attachments

Tab A Mitterrand's Letter
Tab B Draft Letter of Response
Tab C USUN Cable

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DRAFT

Dear Francois:

Thank you for writing to share with me your views on the situation in Rwanda. I agree with you that the international community needs to support the Arusha accords so that our efforts to bring peace to Rwanda are not compromised.

To that end, the U.S. is considering supporting a resolution establishing a UN force in Rwanda, provided~~of course~~ that our concerns about the mission's mandate and cost are resolved in a satisfactory manner. As I made clear in my remarks to the ~~UNGA~~ last week, I think it is imperative that we consider all aspects of an operation before we move to a final vote. I greatly appreciate your government's willingness to accept a short delay in the Council's final vote on this matter so that we can address the issues that concern the U.S.

I understand that deployment of a UN force will permit France to withdraw its forces from Rwanda. I hope you ~~can tell the UN~~ that the creation of a UN force in Rwanda can permit some French forces to remain in Somalia beyond the end of the year. As you know, I think it is vital that the Secretary-General's efforts in Somalia receive the continuing strong support of the

*your own
to comment*

DRAFT

international community. Let me close by thanking you for your help in ensuring that cooperation between France and the U.S. on peackeeping matters around the world remains strong.

With Best Wishes,

CLINTON **DRAFT** PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Oct-1993 13:17 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

Sandy--

I have sent up to you a revised version of the President's letter to Mitterand taking into account the concerns that I understand you expressed to Dick.

I am assuming that we still plan to support the Rwanda mission, despite a rumor that Frank Wisner was reconsidering after looking more closely at the latest French resolution. Please let us know if our position has changed.

Late yesterday afternoon we had a working level interagency videoconference to try to respond to widespread concerns about the military concept of operations for the Rwanda mission and to reach consensus on a U.S. position on the draft resolution. While much common ground was found on the outline of the resolution, you should know that JCS and to a somewhat lesser extent OSD have very serious concerns about the mission as currently conceived.

In particular, they believe that since the mission is a traditional CH. VI in a supposedly completely permissive environment, the operation should be conducted by unarmed military observers (or at most very lightly armed observers) rather than the planned 2 infantry battalions. As the mission now stands, they "non-concur", and remain adamantly opposed for this reason.

State supports the 2 infantry battalions. I tend to agree with JCS that there is considerable dissonance between the concept of operations and the supposed permissive environment. We ought to be able to achieve the same goals with observers if the parties truly want peace. However, it will be difficult to move the French, the UN and the Rwandan parties in the short time we have before a vote. JCS and/or OSD may raise this at your level.

I think we ought to talk to the French and the UN in New York to address these issues, preferably before a vote, if JCS insists.

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger

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(BERGER)

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Message Format:

Message Status: READ


Date Modified: 02-Oct-1993 13:04

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-Oct-1993 14:34 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: RWANDA

Sandy--

It seems that State and DOD/JCS have managed to come to agreement on instructions to USUN to support the Rwanda resolution. In short, JCS walked back from the cliff and agreed to more open-ended language about the composition of the force (armed battalions vs. unarmed military observers) in exchange for absolute clarity that this is meant to be a traditional (pacific) Chapter VI operation.

This is a good compromise. We are looking forward to rapidly clearing the x-hatched instruction cable.

I have tried to track down the message from the President to Mitterrand. As far as we can tell, the package went to the President on Saturday evening, but has not yet been signed out. Kathy Millison is checking further for us.

Susan

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 04-Oct-1993 13:42

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 016991

VMS Filename: OASSHARE42:ZUWVKU2TF.WPL

A1 Folder: OCT93

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 04-Oct-1993 13:42

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Nov-1993 12:57 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: Meeting With Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, Tues. at 6:30 pm

Memorandum

November 9, 1993

To: Samuel Berger

Through: Richard Clarke

Fr: Eric Schwartz

Concurrences by: Jane Holl, Jennifer Ward, Larry Rossin

Subject: Meeting this evening with Mrs. Sadako Ogata of UNHCR

We expect Mrs. Ogata will raise UNHCR activities in Bosnia, the situation in Haiti and, possibly, the situation in Burundi.

In addition to discussing these issues with her, you will want to congratulate her on her recent reelection to a five year term and express strong U.S. support for her leadership at UNHCR.

I. BOSNIA

Background: Mrs. Ogata's visit comes at an increasingly difficult time for agency operations in Bosnia. Security conditions continue to deteriorate for humanitarian relief workers

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

POINTS TO MAKE/QUESTIONS TO RAISE:

- UNHCR in Bosnia: Express appreciation for continued UNHCR efforts in the region.
- Winterization Plans: What is Mrs. Ogata view of preparations and coordination between agencies?
- EC Initiative to Encourage Parties to Guarantee Supply Routes: How does Mrs. Ogata assess the prospects for this initiative?
- Tuzla: Reports indicate serious shortages in the Tuzla area. What are Mrs. Ogata's views on the opening of Tuzla airport and under what scenario does she think this might be

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

accomplished?

[Note: UNHCR continues to believe the opening of the airport is vital. Before the airport were opened, Bosnian forces would probably have to abandon many of the buildings at the airport, which they have thus far refused to do. State suggests that the Europeans could handle the technical aspects of opening the airport.] EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Other issues that might come up:

□

- UNHCR APPEAL FOR BOSNIA: we are now preparing a response, which should be ready within the next seven days.
- PERMITTING UNHCR TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN SERBIA: The refugee population in Serbia is distressed, and the Serbs are using this publicly as claimed evidence of discriminatory treatment of refugees. UNHCR urges aid to these populations, as well as to other vulnerable groups in Serbia. We have not taken a formal position, though Warren Zimmerman at State supports a carefully monitored and controlled aid program. Jane and I agree with Warren.

II. HAITI -- ISSUES MRS. OGATA MAY RAISE

Background: As you know, UNHCR opposes direct return. With other countries supporting the embargo with their own ships, the question of their policies on return may arise. As a result, the UNHCR Americas Directorate has requested a technical meeting in Geneva to discuss the treatment of Haitian boat people by ships of countries enforcing the embargo.] EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

If raised, you may want to point out that --

- Based on our own experience, we are very doubtful that a UNHCR meeting will come up with viable third country options.
- We continue to monitor the situation in Haiti and see no signs of a imminent exodus of large numbers.
- Our three refugee processing centers are operating in Haiti and U.S. officials continue to meet returning Haitians to assist those who wish to apply for refugee status.

III. BURUNDI

Background: As you know, elements of the Burundi military recently launched an attempted coup d'etat against the democratically-elected government of President Ndadaye, resulting in the death of the President and several members of his Cabinet, as well as inter-ethnic violence primarily in the countryside. We have no estimates of the number killed. Some 650,000 new

refugees have fled to neighboring states, primarily Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. As a result of this crisis, UNHCR has depleted its emergency fund and has now borrowed \$5 million from the UN's Central Emergency Revolving Fund. UNHCR has made an appeal for \$17 million to meet the needs of the refugees over the next three months. State R/P is preparing an ERMA (Africa) drawdown proposal for the President for \$20 million, of which \$4.25 million would go to the UNHCR for Burundian refugees.

POINTS TO MAKE:

- We want to be as helpful as possible in this humanitarian crisis and encourage UNHCR's efforts as well as those of the ICRC and WFP;
-
- AID's Office of Disaster Assistance has already approved contributions of \$50,000 as a result of our Ambassadors' having declared disasters in Rwanda and Burundi;
- We are working on a drawdown of monies from the President's emergency fund to provide substantial funding for your appeal.

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
CC: Lawrence G. Rossin	(ROSSIN)
CC: Barbro A. Owens-Kirkpatrick	(OWENS)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
CC: Jane E. Holl	(HOLL)
CC: Jenonne R. Walker	(WALKER)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas	(CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz	(SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman	(NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup	(STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh	(DARRAGH)
CC: Nicholas J. Rasmussen	(RASMUSSEN)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 09-Nov-1993 12:56

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 020044
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE53:ZUYFIIYZY.WPL
A1 Folder: NOV93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 09-Nov-1993 12:56
Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Upcoming Issues in UNSC

OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail

INFORMATION:

The Security Council is expected within the next week to renew routinely a number of peacekeeping mandates:

Cyprus

The UNSC will vote this week another 6 month renewal of UNFICYP. The last renewal came in the summer as the Canadians were leaving and after the Russians initially vetoed the resolution for procedural reasons. Today, the Argentines have replaced the Canadians, and the Russians seem satisfied on the issue. The U.S. and allies have also succeeded in getting Greece and Cyprus to pick up over 50% of the cost of the operation, thus reducing the U.S. share to roughly \$7 million/pa.

This week's vote should be an easy, pro forma extension. The draft resolution is a good one, stating that the status quo is unacceptable and calls for a thorough review of the future role of the UN in Cyprus in February.

Angola

The UNSC will vote by the 15th to extend UNAVEM's mandate at current strength for 3 months. As Jennifer has informed you, the U.S tabled a draft resolution that has been considered by the P-5. USUN is trying to ensure that it remains balanced to put appropriate political pressure on both sides.

Liberia

We are at the 3 month stage when the UNSC must decide to continue the mission in Liberia for the duration of its seven month mandate. This is very similar to the procedural issue we faced last week on Haiti. Again, this continuation can be achieved without any formal resolution, only a letter from UNSC Pres. to SYG or a statement. Not expected to be a big deal.

Rwanda

There are 2 Rwanda missions-- 80 border monitors looking for arms traffic on the Rwanda/Uganda border and a larger

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peacekeeping force in Kigali. The upcoming renewal (required by the 22nd) will give the Ugandan border mission its second 6-month mandate. Happily, the two missions, while formally separate for political reasons, are well-integrated in terms of command. Better yet, after Dec. 22 they will have a single budget, allowing us to capture all possible economies of scale.

ACTION:

South Africa: How to authorize and fund the anticipated UN election monitoring mission.

Normally, straight election monitoring (w/o peacekeepers) is a UNGA activity paid for on the regular budget, for which US pays 25%. But according to USUN, the South African parties, the Frontline States and many others want the UNSC to mandate the South Africa mission, because the UNGA can't move quickly and doesn't carry the same political weight.

The problem is that if the UNSC mandates it, the UNGA (which controls the UN purse strings) is likely to insist that it be paid for on the peacekeeping budget (we pay 31.7%). Funding non-peacekeeping on the Peacekeeping budget would set a terrible precedent.

ISSUE: If you agree, Jennifer and I will ask State to draft a cable to USUN, instructing them to submit quickly a strategy for speedy UN action on South Africa paid for on the regular budget. We propose to give them a relatively short time frame in which to implement that strategy.

If USUN fails, I think we will need a DC in early Jan. to decide whether the U.S. wants to work through the UNGA, which may be opposed by the parties and slow down deployment, or; whether we want to pay for this on the peacekeeping budget, which could raise serious questions on the Hill and would set a dangerous precedent.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

CC: Randy R. Beers (BEERS)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward (WARD)
CC: Jane E. Holl (HOLL)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 13-Dec-1993 21:09
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 023167
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE17:ZUZN VH3T6.WPL
A1 Folder: DEC93
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 13-Dec-1993 22:01
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Dec-1993 17:22 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

FROM: Susan E. Rice (RICE)

SUBJECT: You need this!

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 16-Dec-1993 17:21

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 023581

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE25:ZUZQOU6GD.WPL

A1 Folder: DEC93

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 16-Dec-1993 17:21

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

S

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Dec-1993 22:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice (RICE)

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OMNIBUS PEACEKEEPING E-Mail

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PER E.O. 13526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
FOR: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
FOR: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
FOR: James W. Reed	(REED)
FOR: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
CC: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
CC: Jennifer C. Ward	(WARD)
CC: Jane E. Holl	(HOLL)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III	(WILSON)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 10:24 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Eric P. Schwartz
(SCHWARTZ)

SUBJECT: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA OF RWANDA

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

I reported to you yesterday that Monique Mujawamariya, the Rwandan human rights activist who met the President, appeared to have been killed. I characterized the report as unconfirmed.

(The report was based on the fact that Monique had been talking by phone with a friend in the U.S. when soldiers who were killing her neighbors approached her home. The phone went dead and further attempts to reach Monique were unsuccessful, with men answering the phone and hanging up. (There is a Washington Post account of these events on today's Op Ed page.))

Thankfully, Monique appears not to have been killed. She apparently fled her home and hid in the bush. She is now back at her home and our Embassy if trying to figure out how we might help in getting her to a safe place.

THIS NEW INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS OR
DISCUSSED PUBLICLY AT THIS POINT.

Our Embassy's Task Force in Kigali believes strongly that Monique's chances of survival will be increased if she is believed to be dead, as Rwandan soldiers continue to look for her.

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake	(LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger	(BERGER)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Nancy Soderberg	(SODERBERG)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CC: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed (REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
CC: Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
CC: Richard L. Canas (CANAS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey (LINDSEY)
CC: Rand R. Beers (BEERS)
CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)
CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 08-Apr-1994 10:21
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035415
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE42:ZVDZEV30F.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 10:21
Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 15:29 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: *** FOR 4:00 MEETING IN PENTAGON

DOD is looking at three options:

1. Permissive evacuation: The ambassador thinks he can get a safe conduct/laissez passe to drive the Amcits out of the country. (This strikes DOD as the easy way out but frankly scares me.)
2. Belgian Forced Entry: The Belgians would be flown in by the US to a staging area (Bujumbura) and would then be choppered in to Kigali. DOD opposes the use of US helos.
3. US NEO: George Joulwan has begun planning. The Marine carrier has been moved from Somalia to Mombasa (a long way from Rwanda). The US Special Forces Group in Germany has an African specialist unit that could be flown in quickly (8 hour flight). JCS thinks that this force is "too small" and is worried about doing an operation at the end of such a long tether.

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Distribution:

FOR: W. Anthony K. Lake (LAKE)
FOR: Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
CC: Records (RECORDS)


Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 08-Apr-1994 15:20
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035491
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE26:ZVDZM4MG3.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ

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UNIVERSITY LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 15:20
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1994 17:23 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Neal S. Wolin
(WOLIN)

SUBJECT: thanks

Spence,

Just wanted to thank you and your team for a great job in putting together the material for Messrs. Lake and Berger for their 4pm meeting on Rwanda in the tank. An excellent example, I think, of the Sit Rm giving those guys first rate support.

Neal

Distribution:

FOR: William H. Spencer	(SPENCER@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: James W. Reed	(REED)
CC: Ralph H. Sigler	(SIGLER@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 08-Apr-1994 17:13
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035521
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE16:ZVDZOP8EA.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 08-Apr-1994 17:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/14/14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-Apr-1994 12:45 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: DECISION MAY BE REQUIRED

TO: TL/SRB

FM: RAC

RE: RWANDA

The UN is planning to pull out the UN peacekeeping force, according to USUN.

The UN may rpt may ask for US airlift to get the force out fast.

Meanwhile, the French are beginning to pull their force out and the Belgians are continuing to insert troops.

If the UN asks for help getting out, USAF transports standing by in Kenya could be available.

ACTION REQUESTED:

Do you have any guidance for us on how we should respond to a UN request?

Distribution:

FOR: Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
FOR: MacArthur DeShazer (DESHAZER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
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CC: Records (RECORDS)
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CC: Eric P. Schwartz (SCHWARTZ)

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PER E.O. 13526**

CC: Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)
CC: Susan E. Rice (RICE)
CC: Marcia G. Norman (NORMAN)
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup (STALCUP)
CC: Sean J. Darragh (DARRAGH)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 035670
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE44:ZVECI88L0.WPL
A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 11-Apr-1994 12:41
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1994 09:25 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: THURSDAY MORNING NOTES FOR SANDY BERGER FROM GLOBAL

Sandy,

Good Morning from your friends in Global Issues>

Could you get back to us today on the following:

1. RWANDA: Can we add a short discussion on the agenda for Friday's DC on Somalia?
2. HAITI: Can I circulate at the 3:00 meeting Watson is holding something like the paper on peacekeeping we sent you yesterday afternoon?
3. CUBA: Please react to the draft policy cover paper for the Cuba contingency planning DC.
4. COUNTER-TERRORISM: Please try to resolve the PDD with Talbott today in view of the Congressional report required to be sent up next Monday.
5. EXCESS F-16s: Could you ask Deutch and Talbott about this at the lunch today. We have supplied you with paper.

Thanx.

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 28-Apr-1994 09:20

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 037998

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE13:ZVETDGJDI.WPL

A1 Folder: APR94

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 28-Apr-1994 09:20

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1994 12:48 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Allison M. Wright
(WRIGHT)

SUBJECT: SOMALIA DC

I understand that Mr. Berger's office has approved Rwanda as an additional subject at tomorrow's DC on Somalia. Please let me know if the participating agencies should be told in advance of receiving the paper or if updating the paper will be sufficient.

Thanks very much!

Distribution:

FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
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CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
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Date Modified: 28-Apr-1994 12:39
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M1 NARA, Date 12/12/14

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Deputies Committee Discussion Paper

RWANDA

Background

The UN reports that in excess of 100,000 Rwandans have been killed. Fighting between the government and rebel forces continues. Militia led massacres are also continuing, urged on by radio stations calling for more killing.

UNAMIR has drawndown to 270 troops and is attempting to arrange for the safety of Rwandans under its protection at the Kigali Amahoro stadium.

About 500,000 in-country refugees have fled to the border areas with Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. They are being prevented from crossing the borders and are in need of humanitarian assistance.

The White House issued a statement last Friday, mentioning specific military leaders who human rights groups believe have been implicated in the slaughters (tab 1).

Objectives

The IWG has identified six short-term policy objectives:

1. to stop the on-going massacres as quickly as possible through contacts with GOR and RPF leaders and demarches for similar representations with neighboring states, France, Belgium, and others.
2. to support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a cease fire.
3. to encourage Tanzanian and other attempts to resume negotiations under the Arusha Framework.
4. to seek to prevent the violence from spreading outside Rwanda through contacts with neighboring states.
5. to push in the UN to launch an immediate expanded humanitarian assistance effort.
6. to prevent a similar round of slaughter and disorder in Burundi by closely monitoring the situation there and staying in touch with the various elements in the country to dissuade.

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Issues for Discussion

The Deputies should provide direction to the IWG on the degree of activism that they wish to encourage on further international steps aimed at addressing the slaughter and assisting refugees.

A new UNSC resolution is being co-drafted by the Czechs and Argentines. Among the possible elements in the resolution could be a genocide investigation, a call for UNHCR and border countries to engage in cross border assistance to the trapped in country refugees, limited protection for the refugees, and an arms embargo. In the new UNSCR debate, should the US support:

1. Genocide investigation: language that calls for an international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention?
2. In Country Protection of Refugees: language that authorizes the use of UNAMIR military or civilian police to protect in-country refugee camps receiving UNHCR or ICRC relief?
3. Arms embargo: language banning arms exports to Rwanda and would, *inter alia*, sanction the on going Ugandan aid to the rebels?
- In addition to the UNSCR, are there additional actions that should be explored aimed at stopping the killing, or punishing those who may have planned it, or at least be seen to be pressuring the Rwandan government to have it punish them.
4. Counter-propaganda: should the US engage in additional propaganda activities to get a message into Rwanda to counter the radio stations that are urging killing?
5. Pressure to Punish Organizers of Killing: should the US work with other nations to explore directed sanctions (no admission on travel status, assets seizures, etc.) aimed at those who may have engineered the slaughter? and/or diplomatic sanctions (down grading relations, termination of non-emergency assistance) against Rwanda until those responsible are tried?

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20546

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506,

Summary of Conclusions of
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 29, 1994
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 am - 12:00 pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Somalia and Rwanda (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office

Leon Fuerth
James Carman

USUN

Rick Inderfurth
Michael Sheehan

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
James Dobbins
Richard Bogosian

JCS

William Owens
Frank Bowman

DOD

Frank Wisner
Thomas Longstreth

AID

Richard McCall
Gary Bombardier

CIA

Douglas MaEachin
(b)(3)

The White House
Sandy Berger

NSC

Richard Clarke
Don Steinberg
Sean Darragh

Summary of Conclusions

The Deputies Committee decided that:

SOMALIA:

1. Consideration of Terminating UNOSOM: The US should not take the lead in threatening termination of UNOSOM, but should make clear to the Somalis that donor and troop contributors may well decide to terminate operations soon because of the continued violence and failure to achieve a political solution. (S)

-- Donors/Troop Contributors: State, AID, and DOD should consult with the donors and major troop contributors about their views on continuing the operation. We should urge them to make the risk of termination clear to the Somalis. (S)

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2

-- Special Envoy: State should consult with the UN (specifically the acting SRSG) and regional states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda) to determine whether and when a trip to the region by special US Envoy Bob Oakley would be helpful in reducing factional fighting and promoting a political settlement. If there is a consensus that such a trip should occur, then Amb. Oakley should be asked to head a team to the region. {S}

-- Mandate Review Guidance: When the UNSC considers the UNOSOM mandate extension, USUN will support a 30 or 45 day extension only. It will support Council action to insure that there is a review toward the end of that period of the possibility of terminating or significantly reducing the mandate and UN presence, unless factional fighting has been reduced and there has been significant progress toward a political settlement. {S}

2. Protection of USLO: The current US Marine Fleet Area Security Team (FAST) is scheduled to depart Mogadishu on June 30. Senior State and Defense officials should consult immediately about State's plans for security of USLO after that date. If the departments have not reached consensus, the issue will be reviewed by the DC no later than 15 May. {S}

3. Contingency Evacuation of UNOSOM: JCS and CINCENT should evaluate the UN plan for permissive and emergency evacuation. They should determine to what degree the UN is planning to rely upon the US, what US capabilities would be required, and what would be necessary to have those capabilities available in a timely manner. The Deputies decided to defer consideration of the proposal to consult with Congress on this contingency pending review of the JCS evaluation. {S}

4. UNOSOM Personnel: Agencies will report immediately on candidates to fill positions on the UNOSOM staff: Development Office (AID), Judicial section (State/INM and Justice), political office (State), and Demining/Disarmament/and Demobilization (OSD and ACDA). {S}

RWANDA:

State will prepare a draft action plan for review Monday, 2 May. It will be as vigorous a program as is feasible and include approaches to the UNSYG, the OAU leadership, concerned European states, and regional leaders. Among the ideas that we will solicit reaction to will be an OAU authorized peacekeeping force for Rwanda, a preventive diplomacy/deterrent force in Burundi, an arms embargo, a human rights/genocide investigation, and a UN protective operation for Rwandan refugees. {S}

The Deputies will review the plan and the status of the issue at a telconference early in the week. (U)

USUN will support Security Council action to endorse an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and assistance (including UNHCR) for the refugees. {S}

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Apr-1994 16:36 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: FOR SANDY'S APPROVAL: DRAFT DC SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

format: DC Summary

Subject: Somalia and Rwanda

The Deputies Committee decided that:


1. Consideration of Terminating UNOSOM: The US should not be seen as taking the lead to threaten termination of UNOSOM, but should make clear to the Somalis that donor and troop contributors may well decide to terminate operations soon because of the continued violence and failure to achieve a political solution.

Donors/Troop Contributors: State, AID, and DOD should consult with the donors and major troop contributors about their views on continuing the operation. We should urge them to make the risk of termination clear to the Somalis.

Special Envoy: State should consult with the UN (specifically the acting SRSG) and regional states (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda) to determine whether and when a trip to the region by a special US envoy would be helpful in reducing factional fighting and promoting a political settlement. If there is a consensus that such a trip should occur, then Amb. Oakley or some other envoy should head a team to the region.

Mandate Review Guidance: When the UNSC considers the UNOSOM mandate extension, USUN will support a 30 or 45 day extension only. It will support Council action to insure that there is a review toward the end of that period of the possibility of terminating or significantly reducing the mandate and UN presence, unless factional fighting has stopped and there has been significant progress toward a political settlement.

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□

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RWANDA


State will prepare a draft action plan for review Monday 3 May. It will be a vigorous program and include approaches to the UNSYG, the OAU leadership, concerned European states, and regional leaders. Among the ideas that we will solicit reaction to will be an OAU authorized peacekeeping force for Rwanda, a preventive diplomacy/deterrent force in Burundi, an arms embargo, a human rights/genocide investigation, and a UN protective operation for Rwandan refugees.

The Deputies will review the plan and the status of the issue at a teleconference early in the week.

USUN will support Security Council action to endorse an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and assistance (including UNHCR) for the refugees.

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Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Apr-1994 10:58 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
Mary C. Emery (EMERY)

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)


SUBJECT: SATURDAY NOTES FOR SANDY FROM GLOBAL

1. Somalia/Rwanda: We e-mailed you the draft summary and conclusions of the DC on Friday. We would like approval to send them out Saturday if possible.
2. Haiti: Alec Watson held a LARGE and somewhat wandering meeting on peacekeeping on Thursday and agreed to draft a paper. There was some confusion on the fundamental assumption operating: was this a force inserted before or after a political agreement? We said we assumed it was part of such an agreement. Could you please react to our paper to you on this subject, so that we can have some guidance for these meetings?
3. Cuba: State promises the Contingency Paper on Monday, following which you promised the AG a Deputies Committee. You have our draft overview paper for that DC. Is it the sort of thing you had in mind?
4. Counter-terrorism PDD: We have put a hold on the 1 May report to Congress, pending resolution of the PDD. If that hold lasts more than a few days, it will begin to attract attention.
5. Peacekeeping: As I know Jeremy has been urging, we need to have the Presidential meeting/event with the Defense authorizers and appropriators soon.
6. Terrorism: On the subject of the recent Principals Committee, we now have the materials from CIA to send the package to the President. You will have it on Monday. I am informed that State has joined the consensus, but you may want to double check that with Strobe.

CC: Records

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Deletable Flag: Y
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A1 Folder: APR94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 30-Apr-1994 10:50
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-May-1994 18:31 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Additional Actions on Rwanda

Tony/Sandy:

I hope we can meet with Dick early on Monday to review where we are and where we're going with respect to Rwanda. In particular, we need to review our potential support for OAU and regional efforts if/when they act to protect refugees on both sides of the border or take more aggressive action to end the massacre. In addition to the new instructions (State 114636) to the USUN on actions to pursue with respect to a resolution on Rwanda (based on Dick's suggestions), the following actions are being taken:

- The President's message yesterday is being pumped into Rwanda through VOA, BBC, Radio France and Radio Belge. We've already received indications that it is being heard, if not heeded, by the government and RPF leadership. It also received very heavy press play in the United States.
- We are continuing to work with the regional leaders, especially Presidents Mwinyi of Tanzania and Museveni of Uganda, to shore up their efforts at resolving the crisis. New talks are scheduled for Tuesday in Arusha, although it is uncertain whether the RPF (this time) will show up. Our Ambassador to Tanzania, Peter De Vos, will attend and help facilitate the discussions.
- AS John Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson will leave tomorrow (Monday) night to travel to the region, including Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania to shore up the regional leaders' efforts to achieve peace and protect refugees in Rwanda. The UN Commission for Human Rights is sending a team to the region to investigate the current abuses.
- Senior USG officials have been contacting Government and RPF leaders on a daily basis to urge a ceasefire and renewal of negotiations. For example, DAS Bushnell talked with General Bizimungo (RGF) and General Kagame (RPF) today to relate the President's message from yesterday. She also told the RPF that there are reports the RPF is impeding the flow of refugees to Tanzania, which he strongly denied.
- State is assembling a revised package of \$15 million in emergency relief assistance for the region. A team of refugee officials from our Embassy in Tanzania is going to the border with Rwanda to assess the current situation and make recommendations for new assistance.

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Date Created: 01-May-1994 18:30

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
Date Modified: 01-May-1994 18:30

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Read-Receipt Requested: NO

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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 10:04 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Kofi Annan Briefing Memo

May 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Kofi Annan, Tuesday, May 3, 1994, at 12:15 pm.

Kofi Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, is in Washington for meetings with Members of Congress, including a hearing yesterday before the Senate Africa Subcommittee on peacekeeping in Africa. Annan is likely to wish to cover a range of issues with you including: Bosnia, Rwanda, and possibly Somalia, the status of our PDD and peacekeeping funding.

Update on Peacekeeping Reform at the UN

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which Annan heads, has made significant progress in the past year in improving its capacity to manage peace operations. In addition to a substantial reorganization and increase in its staff, DPKO now has a 24-hour situation room and a stand-by forces planning team. The latter is the result of a year-long project to solicit voluntary, but non-binding commitments of troops, equipment, and services from member states. This effort has yielded pledges of over 50,000 troops, which should improve the UN's force planning and rapid deployment capabilities measurably.

Consistent with the PDD, the U.S. has not made any such pledges, but once the PDD is signed we will offer the UN information on potentially available U.S. forces or capabilities. We will, of course, make no commitments to provide such forces when they are requested.

Suggested Talking Points

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Bosnia

-- I appreciate the Secretary-General's expressed concern about criticism of U.S. policy by UNPROFOR officials. These statements have not been helpful to our shared goal of improved coordination between the UN and NATO.

□ -- This public sniping has to stop. What can we do, in your view to improve UN-NATO relations both on the ground and in the press?

-- We are very concerned that the Serbs continue to violate the Gorazde and Sarajevo exclusion zones. EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Rwanda

-- We are very concerned about the grave situation in Rwanda. We are hopeful that African nations will respond favorably to the SYG's request for troops. What is your expectation? What role do you think peacekeepers could usefully play? How many do you expect are needed?

-- If adequate troops are available, we will do what we can to make voluntary contributions to deploy and sustain them. We do not think it would be wise, however, to fund a non-UN mission through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.

-- We are also planning to make available \$15 million to support the refugee and emergency relief effort and have dispatched Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck to the region to try to reinvigorate the peace process.

Somalia

-- We have threatened to discontinue support for UNOSOM II if the parties fail to make substantial political progress. We are considering how to respond if this threat does not bring results.

-- Do you think, if the UNSC threatens to withdraw the force and donors threaten to cut assistance, this will yield any useful result? Do you think there is any collective will to carry out such a threat?

-- How confident are you that the major troops contributors will stay beyond May/June? If they are not likely to stay, wouldn't it be preferable for the UN to be seen to withdraw because the parties have failed to cooperate rather than because the UN mission crumbled?

Haiti

-- Do you have any sense of what role a reconfigured, more robust UNMIH might play, in the event that sanctions soften the military regime? Do you think there would be any appetite in the UN for a peace enforcement mission in Haiti?

Georgia

□ -- The Russians are pressing for the immediate dispatch of a UN mission to Georgia. This seems premature given the failure of the parties to reach any form of settlement. Do you see any role for UN peacekeepers at this stage? What role might the UN play if the Russians decide to go in unilaterally with a CIS force?

Peacekeeping Funding

(FYI: A NSC/State/OMB team travelled to the UN last week to try to obtain additional information on the UN's cash flow picture for presentation to Congress. Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met with House and Senate appropriators. While the general mood was more or less cooperative and understanding of the severity of the problem, staff expressed serious doubt that Congress will be able to act before the August recess (when the cash flow crisis is likely to become severe) and concern that the House Republicans will try to extract additional conditions or hold up the supplemental over UN reform.

Another thing that was clear from these meetings is the importance of scheduling a Presidential meeting with the Defense authorizers/appropriators immediately. Many are feeling left out and increasingly angry.)

-- Thank you for your help in providing financial information to our team that visited the UN last week. We are working hard with Congress to try to find a solution to the funding problem. The President is personally committed to this effort.

-- We are hoping to be able to have some funds to the UN in August, but this will be difficult given the complexity of the appropriations process this year.

-- One thing is clear: It is absolutely crucial that we obtain an effective inspector general. Otherwise, we will never be able to pay off our debts in full. What do you think we can do to press our case more effectively both with the SYG and the membership?

Containing UN Peacekeeping Costs

-- We appreciate the efforts the UN has made to try to reduce the costs of on-going peacekeeping operations.

-- We would like to work with your staff in a low-key and quiet ways to try to identify additional, readily implementable cost-savings measures.

-- We would like to send a small team to New York to work with DPKO in the same cooperative spirit that our logistics teams did last Fall. How do you view this proposal?

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker

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Deletable Flag: Y
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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-May-1994 10:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 10:04 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Kofi Annan Briefing Memo

May 3, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: SUSAN E. RICE

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
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Suggested Talking Points



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

Rwanda

-- We are very concerned about the grave situation in Rwanda. We are hopeful that African nations will respond favorably to the SYG's request for troops. What is your expectation? What role do you think peacekeepers could usefully play? How many do you expect are needed?

-- If adequate troops are available, we will do what we can to make voluntary contributions to deploy and sustain them. We do not think it would be wise, however, to fund a non-UN mission through UN assessments. This would set a bad precedent.

-- We are also planning to make available \$15 million to support the refugee and emergency relief effort and have dispatched Ambassador Rawson and John Shattuck to the region to try to reinvigorate the peace process.

Somalia

-- We have threatened to discontinue support for UNOSOM II if the parties fail to make substantial political progress. We are considering how to respond if this threat does not bring results.


-- Do you think, if the UNSC threatens to withdraw the force and donors threaten to cut assistance, this will yield any useful result? Do you think there is any collective will to carry out such a threat?

-- How confident are you that the major troops contributors will stay beyond May/June? If they are not likely to stay, wouldn't it be preferable for the UN to be seen to withdraw because the parties have failed to cooperate rather than because the UN mission crumbled?

Haiti

-- Do you have any sense of what role a reconfigured, more robust UNMIH might play, in the event that sanctions soften the military regime? Do you think there would be any appetite in the UN for a peace enforcement mission in Haiti?

Georgia



-- The Russians are pressing for the immediate dispatch of a UN mission to Georgia. This seems premature given the failure of the parties to reach any form of settlement. Do you see any role for UN peacekeepers at this stage? What role might the UN play if the Russians decide to go in unilaterally with a CIS force?

Peacekeeping Funding

(FYI: A NSC/State/OMB team travelled to the UN last week to try to obtain additional information on the UN's cash flow picture for presentation to Congress. Yesterday, and OMB-NSC team met with House and Senate appropriators. While the general mood was more or less cooperative and understanding of the severity of the problem, staff expressed serious doubt that Congress will be able to act before the August recess (when the cash flow crisis is likely to become severe) and concern that the House Republicans will try to extract additional conditions or hold up the supplemental over UN reform.

Another thing that was clear from these meetings is the importance of scheduling a Presidential meeting with the Defense authorizers/appropriators immediately. Many are feeling left out and increasingly angry.)

-- Thank you for your help in providing financial information to our team that visited the UN last week. We are working hard with Congress to try to find a solution to the funding problem. The President is personally committed to this effort.

-- We are hoping to be able to have some funds to the UN in August, but this will be difficult given the complexity of the appropriations process this year.

-- One thing is clear: It is absolutely crucial that we obtain an effective inspector general. Otherwise, we will never be able to pay off our debts in full. What do you think we can do to press our case more effectively both with the SYG and the membership?

Containing UN Peacekeeping Costs

-- We appreciate the efforts the UN has made to try to reduce the costs of on-going peacekeeping operations.

-- We would like to work with your staff in a low-key and quiet ways to try to identify additional, readily implementable cost-savings measures.

-- We would like to send a small team to New York to work with DPKO in the same cooperative spirit that our logistics teams did last Fall. How do you view this proposal?

Concurrences by: Jenonne Walker


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Additional Header Information Follows

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DOCNUM: 038578
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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-May-1994 10:04
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-May-1994 11:06 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wanda D. Lindsey
(LINDSEY)

SUBJECT: FYI: FROM DICK CLARKE

~~SECRET~~

May 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP MEMBERS

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE

SUBJECT: Summary and Conclusions of 2 May 94
Meeting

GEORGIA

1. State (NIS) will engage in a variety of diplomatic contacts with the Russians and Georgians this week to probe further the reasons for the May 10th "deadline" for a decision on peacekeeping.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

3. State (IO) will prepare an analysis of the varying levels of UNSC action that might be taken with regard to a CIS peacekeeping force (e.g. acknowledgement, endorsement) and what "price" or conditions might be sought of the CIS in return (e.g. reporting, monitoring, mandate). The paper should be available to members of the Core Group by 6 May.

RWANDA

1. USUN will circulate to other concerned delegations the elements of a new resolution based on the guidance that was agreed on by the interagency community on April 30, with a view to approval of such a resolution later this week.

2. State will examine what funding authorities are available for US support to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations (Voluntary PKO account; FAA sections 506A, 522; ERMA).

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

NSC will seek a White House announcement of \$15 million in emergency refugee assistance.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

4. State (AF) will host a daily (M-F) video conference on Rwanda at noon, until further notice.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET2~~

GENERAL

There was agreement that USAID should be routinely invited to all future meetings of the Core Group.

Additional Distribution:
State/NIS - Amb. Collins
State/AF - Asst Sec Moose

~~SECRET~~

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FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
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CC: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)

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Date Created: 03-May-1994 11:04
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 038593
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A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-May-1994 11:04
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-May-1994 08:48 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Donald K. Steinberg
(STEINBERG)

SUBJECT: Points on Rwanda for Luncheon

Rwanda

Background

The situation in Rwanda continues to deteriorate, with reliable reports of at least 200,000 deaths and displacement of at least half a million people in largely communal violence. The situation combines ethnic civil war and hardline Hutus killing Tutsis and "sympathetic" Hutus behind Government lines. Fighting has reached a tentative stalemate, although it continues to rage. The Government (RGF) is calling for UN or OAU intervention, while the RPF distrusts the UN (and especially its representative Booh-Booh) and believes a ceasefire would only allow the RGF to continue massacres in territory it controls. The mass flows of refugees towards Tanzania and other border areas continue: there are at least 250,000 in empty fields on the Tanzanian border. Humanitarian relief is moving into the region slowly, and there is real fear of famine and disease.

Peace talks in Arusha and elsewhere, which we asked President Mwinyi to host, have not gotten off the ground as RPF and Government forces refuse to meet. Our ambassadors in Tanzania and Uganda are deeply involved in these efforts.

Meanwhile, the situation in Burundi remains strangely calm but tense. A coup attempt was nipped in the bud last week, but the largely Tutsi government is having problems in disarming Hutu militia, who fear a potential massacre if they are left unarmed. Renewed widespread communal violence is clearly a strong possibility.

Our Response

We have identified five key goals for the international effort in Rwanda: stop the on-going massacres, achieve an RPF/RGF ceasefire, resume negotiations under the Arusha Framework, prevent the violence from spreading to neighboring states (especially Burundi) and ensure humanitarian assistance.

Among the steps we've taken are Presidential statements radioed into Rwanda, \$15 million in emergency humanitarian relief, sending A/S Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson to the region, urging Presidents Mwinyi and Museveni to continue to broker peace and direct conversations with the RPF and Rwandan Government forces.

At the UN, we are pushing for an arms embargo; asking the UN to

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PER E.O. 13526

work with the OAU to protect refugees on both sides of the borders, backed by external support; and urging the Human Rights Commissioner to go to the region (including Rwanda) to investigate the massacres.

USUN is pursuing this initiative, but raises the key question: what degree of financial, logistical and/or material support are we prepared to provide for UN or OAU actions. This questions hinges, of course, on what kind of mission we are talking about. Boutros Ghali has called on the international community to assemble a force to act in the region, although it is unclear what he is proposing. In his meeting with Sandy yesterday, Kofi Annan thought in the absence of Western intervention, the only practical way to take "robust" action would be to use African troops, Belgian/French assets and U.S. airlift.

The OAU continues to talk about an emergency foreign ministers meeting to discuss its role in Rwandan peacekeeping, but it remains unscheduled. Boutros Ghali and Annan continue to press for a full-blown Chapter VII peace-enforcement mission. There is, however, a considerable gap between these proposals and the actual financial and manpower resources that countries are likely to make available.

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Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 04-May-1994 08:48
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:58 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Suggested Talking Points for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

Sandy,

Attached are suggested talking points for the Vice President's meeting with Boutros-Ghali et al. on Rwanda.

They have been informally cleared by JCS, State and OSD. Don Steinberg concurs as well.

Once you and your counterparts have cleared/commented, I will forward formally to the Vice President's office.

I will also provide the Vice President's office with a chart being prepared by State that summarizes the FY 94 resources that may still be available to support voluntary contributions to a potential Rwanda mission.

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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 06-May-1994 21:58
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:49 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg (STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke (CLARKER)
Randy R. Beers (BEERS)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Revised TPs for VP's Meeting on Rwanda

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a force could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi government and, preferably, the assent of the Rwandan parties.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for any additional contributions of equipment or services.


-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.



Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 11:46 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Updated Talking Points on Rwanda

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et. al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands prompt international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of refugees on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone with an international force to provide security to populations in the southern portion of Rwanda, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

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It would, however, need the active support of the Burundi and/or Tanzanian government and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

□

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would endeavor to help by providing financial resources, equipment and lift as well as humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would pay more than 30% of the cost and seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

E.O. 13526, 1.4(d)

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, no country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done by air.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim, particularly without the participation of a major military power.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 16:18 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Ernest J. Wilson III (WILSON)

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: rwanda talking points

Ernie--

Rwanda points FYI. Have a great trip (and bring me back an ANC election or inauguaral T-shirt)!!

Susan

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows
-----Date Created: 07-May-1994 16:17
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 039294
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE13:ZVFCNARRL.WPL
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Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 07-May-1994 16:17
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
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Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 15:54 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Susan E. Rice
(RICE)

SUBJECT: Final Draft Rwanda Talking Points

Attached are final draft talking points on Rwanda for possible use by the Vice President.

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PER E.O. 13526

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They have the full support of Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger as well as NSC staff, State, JCS, USUN. OSD has cleared at the DAS level and we expect senior level concurrence shortly.

OMB recommends against the Vice President meeting with Boutros-Ghali and Salim Salim on this subject, because OMB opposes any peacekeeping effort inside Rwanda and believes further consideration should be given to alternative options.

However, if the meeting does take place and there is discussion of options for providing security to persons inside Rwanda, OMB would not object to the final version of the talking points as drafted.

Distribution:

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□

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-May-1994 15:26 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FROM: Susan E. Rice	
(RICE)	
SUBJECT: Final Rwanda Talking Points	

CC: Records (RECORDS)

Suggested Talking Points for Vice President's Meeting
with Boutros-Ghali, Salim Salim et al. on Rwanda

-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.

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-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas with you further, as well as with representatives of concerned African states and our colleagues in the Security Council.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement the arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.

It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.

In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.

We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.

-- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial

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resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.

-- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

[IF ASKED what direct support U.S. could provide:

If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.]

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

EO 13526 1.4d

This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.

It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.

Thus far, it is unclear that any country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.

Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.

It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.

Finally, the chances of success appear slim.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as result of this tragic conflict.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-May-1994 09:29 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Richard A. Clarke
(CLARKER)

SUBJECT: SATURDAY MORNING NOTES FOR SRB

1. Jamacia: You should meet with the Jamaican ambassador today and hand him the President's letter. State is trying to arrange.

2. PM Major: We need POTUS to make the call, even if its from the airplane over Indianapolis.

3. Rwanda: We delayed a vote in the UNSC on a new PKO, but they will want to vote on Monday. Two big problems: a) the consensus in the UNSC is for a Somalia-styled operation, not the limited one we favor; and b) we now by law need to tell the Congress five days in advance of such a vote or invoke a Presidential waiver. We're doing two things:

--sending a team to the UN Monday to brief our concept again and elaborate the problems with theirs; and

--OMB and OSD have asked for a DC meeting, pursuant to PDD-25. We've penciled in an SVTS at 4:30 Monday for 30 minutes, but that may be too late in the day.

4. Drugs: The lawyers group that we needed to have prior to any decision or DC met on Friday. Opinion was firm from all agencies that both US and international law prohibited shoot downs and there were no exceptions. Thus, I think our only choice is to ask Peru and Colombia to agree not to use our info for shootdowns. I'll try to sell that. If I can't, you should call Strobe. This one will not benefit from a DC.

Distribution:

FOR: Samuel R. Berger (BERGER)
FOR: Mary C. Emery (EMERY)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)
FOR: Kristen K. Cicio (CICIO)
FOR: Katherine M. Veit (VEIT)
FOR: William H. Itoh (ITOH)
FOR: Kristie A. Kenney (KENNEY)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
FOR: James W. Reed (REED)
FOR: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
FOR: Ardenia R. Hawkins (HAWKINS)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CC: Records

(RECORDS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 14-May-1994 09:21

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 040332

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARE3:ZVEJDK0P9.WPL

A1 Folder: MAY94

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 14-May-1994 09:21

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-May-1994 13:10 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Allison M. Wright
(WRIGHT)

SUBJECT: DC Meeting via SVTS

Per Mr. Berger's office there will (probably) be a DC Meeting to be held via SVTS tonight on Rwanda UNSC vote from 7:00 - 8:00. Attendance is principal plus on and is as follows:

OVP
STATE
DOD
CIA
JCS
USUN
OMB

Any changes or questions please let me know.

Thanks very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Randy R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Susan E. Rice	(RICE)
CC: Records	(RECORDS)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
CC: MacArthur DeShazer	(DESHAZER)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTFIELD)
CC: Kyle D. Bakke	(BAKKE)
CC: Kenneth Baldwin	(BALDWIN@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: Roy Hamilton	(HAMILTON@WHSR@CCGATE@VAXA)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
CC: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
CC: Ardenia R. Hawkins	(HAWKINS)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Kristen K. Cicio	(CICIO)
CC: Katherine M. Veit	(VEIT)
CC: William H. Itoh	(ITOH)
CC: Kristie A. Kenney	(KENNEY)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/14

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CC: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
CC: James W. Reed (REED)
CC: Neal S. Wolin (WOLIN)
CC: Ardenia R. Hawkins (HAWKINS)

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 16-May-1994 13:01
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 040436
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA28:ZVFLIST1N.WPL
A1 Folder: MAY94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
□
Date Modified: 16-May-1994 13:01
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jul-1994 13:01 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS (RECORDS@A1@OE0B)
FROM: Hilliard, Brenda I. (hilliarb@NSCSTF@OE0B@MSGATE@VAXB)
SUBJECT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: RE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Message Creation Date was at 20-JUL-1994 00:46:00

I'll be happy to contact their offices. Thanks.

From: Kenney, Kristie A.
To: Hilliard, Brenda I.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Reed, James W.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Wednesday, July 20, 1994 11:00 AM

Brenda:

would you please invite the following to the foreign policy team meeting on Friday with the President (Mr. Lake has approved).

President
vice President
Acting SecState
Acting SecDef
Ambassdador Albright
Secretary Bentsen
Leon Panetta
Anthony Lake
Bob Rubin
Alice Rivlin
General Shali
Director Woolsey
Samuel Berger
Pat Griffin
Leon Fuerth
Lloyd Cutler
Brian Atwood
David Gergen
George Stephanopolous
Mark Gearan
Dee Dee Myers
Nancy Soderberg
Ricki Seidman (to join for third agenda item)
Bill Gray

You may wish to tell these folks that the agenda is:

Rwanda (trip report by Atwood)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By AM NARA, Date 12/2/14

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Haiti (discussion by Lake/Albright/Gray)
Middle East (diplomatic update by Talbott, next week's white House events by Lake/Seidman)

(I will let the ExecSecs at each "presenters" agency know of their role but you often get asked by other attendees so I thought you might like to have the agenda ready to tell them..)

Thanks, Kristie

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 20-Jul-1994 00:46
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 047006
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA19:ZVHYILL8R.TXT
A1 Folder: JUL94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 20-Jul-1994 00:46
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jul-1994 14:32 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NONRECORD

(NONRECORD@A1@OEBO)

FROM: kenneyk
(kenneyk@NSCSTF@OEBO@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :CONFIDENTIAL: RE: :CONFIDENTIAL: RE: :C

Message Creation Date was at 20-JUL-1994 14:28:00

Brenda: that's fine. Whoever is acting secstate should come and be prepared to update on Secretary's Christopher's mission to the middle east.

From: Hilliard, Brenda I.
To: 'Kenney, Kristie A.'
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: :CONFIDENTIAL: RE: :CONFIDENTIAL:
Date: Wednesday, July 20, 1994 02:20 PM

Kristie -

Wanted to let you know that Talbott will be out of U.S. Friday morning (in case State Exec Sec didn't mention it when you contacted them). I assume Tarnoff (who will be the Acting) will be the one presenting the Middle East Diplomatic update, right? I haven't invited him yet, in case someone else has been designated to give the update. Thanks.

From: Kenney, Kristie A.
To: Hilliard, Brenda I.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Reed, James W.; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: :CONFIDENTIAL:
Date: Wednesday, July 20, 1994 11:00 AM

Brenda:

would you please invite the following to the foreign policy team meeting on Friday with the President (Mr. Lake has approved).

President
vice President
Acting SecState
Acting SecDef
Ambassador Albright
Secretary Bentsen
Leon Panetta
Anthony Lake
Bob Rubin
Alice Rivlin

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By AN NARA, Date 12/12/14

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General Shali
Director Woolsey
Samuel Berger
Pat Griffin
Leon Fuerth
Lloyd Cutler
Brian Atwood
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
Mark Gearan
Dee Dee Myers
Nancy Soderberg
Ricki Seidman (to join for third agenda item)
Bill Gray

You may wish to tell these folks that the agenda is:

Rwanda (trip report by Atwood)
Haiti (discussion by Lake/Albright/Gray)
Middle East (diplomatic update by Talbott, next week's white House events by Lake/Seidman)

(I will let the ExecSecs at each "presenters" agency know of their role but you often get asked by other attendees so I thought you might like to have the agenda ready to tell them..)

Thanks, Kristie

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 20-Jul-1994 14:28
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 016578
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA19:ZVHYKRM8H.TXT
A1 Folder: READ
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 20-Jul-1994 14:28
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jul-1994 09:48 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NONRECORD

(NONRECORD@A1@OE0B)

FROM:

hallw

(hallw@NSCSTF@OE0B@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT:

:CONFIDENTIAL→

Message Creation Date was at 28-JUL-1994 09:36:00

Dick,

Mr. Lake wants to have a RWANDA Meeting for one hour tomorrow (Friday) at 4:30 pm and starting Monday, August 1st every Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 10:30 am for one hour.

I would appreciate some clarification on participants so that Allison and I know who the "preferred" participant should be for this meeting. Could you give ALTERNATE name that should be invited when one of these are unavailable to attend?

I was told that yesterday's participants were (please correct if not right):

DOD: DepSecDef John Deutch
JCS: Gen Gerald Bates
OVP: Leon Fuerth
STATE: Tim Wirth
AID: Brian Atwood
NSC: Dick Clarke and Randy Beers
CofS: Leon Panetta

Should JCS Rep be Gen Jack Sheehan when he is available?

Who should be PRINCIPAL participant for State ?? Tim Wirth ??

SHOULD ANYONE ELSE BE INVITED? (I am assuming Sandy Berger will also attend)

Sorry to bother you with such detail but we want to be certain you get the participants you need at the meeting. . . THANKS !

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/04

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 28-Jul-1994 09:36

Deletable Flag: Y

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DOCNUM: 017614
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA11:ZVIGE04RQ.TXT
A1 Folder: READ
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 28-Jul-1994 09:36
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Jul-1994 07:47 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NONRECORD

(NONRECORD@A1@OEOB)

FROM: kenneyk
(kenneyk@NSCSTF@OEOB@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :UNCLASSIFIED: RE: Ltr to Byrd:CONFIDENTIAL

Message Creation Date was at 29-JUL-1994 07:31:00

Kay: thanks for taking the time to sort this out. I appreciate your professionalism even at the end of a very long day! Kristie

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: Clarke, Richard A.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Kenney, Kristie A.; Lindsey, Wanda D.; Millison, Cathy L.; Wright, Allison M.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: Ltr to Byrd:CONFIDENTIAL
Date: Thursday, July 28, 1994 11:09 PM

Dick:

Per your instructions, package 6159 -- presidential letter to Senator Byrd on Rwanda -- went in Mr. Lake's book for him in the morning. While proofreading it, I had a couple of questions. I just want to make sure that the memo is correct. Mr. Berger took a look at it when he passed by and he wasn't sure either.

In the first paragraph, it mentions a discussion YESTERDAY. When did the discussion take place? If on July 27 (the memo by you was written on the 28th), the President will get the memo on July 29 and we cannot use yesterday. If the discussion was on July 28, then you already took into account the difference in time.

In the fifth paragraph, the letter mentions the UN holding a donor coordination meeting in Geneva TODAY. The today that is mentioned -- is it today as in July 28 (which by the time the President gets the letter to read will be yesterday) or is it today as in July 29?

I hope this isn't too confusing, but after a hard day for all, I just wanted to be sure all grounds were covered since the memo did not go to anyone in this office before going to Mr. Lake.

Please let someone know the answer as soon as possible in the morning.

Thanks.

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E.O. 13526White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/04

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Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 29-Jul-1994 07:31
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 017794
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA13:ZVIHB4GMG.TXT
A1 Folder: READ
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 29-Jul-1994 07:31
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Jul-1994 09:18 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS (RECORDS@A1@OEBO)

FROM: Wolin, Neal S. (wolinn@NSCSTF@OEBO@MSGATE@VAXB)

SUBJECT: :UNCLASSIFIED: FW: Ltr to Byrd.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Message Creation Date was at 29-JUL-1994 09:08:00

good work, Kay. thanks.

From: Joshi, M. Kay
To: Clarke, Richard A.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Kenney, Kristie A.; Lindsey, Wanda D.; Millison, Cathy L.; Wright, Allison M.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: Ltr to Byrd.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Thursday, July 28, 1994 11:09 PM

Dick:

Per your instructions, package 6159 -- presidential letter to Senator Byrd on Rwanda -- went in Mr. Lake's book for him in the morning. While proofreading it, I had a couple of questions. I just want to make sure that the memo is correct. Mr. Berger took a look at it when he passed by and he wasn't sure either.

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In the fifth paragraph, the letter mentions the UN holding a donor coordination meeting in Geneva TODAY. The today that is mentioned -- is it today as in July 28 (which by the time the President gets the letter to read will be yesterday) or is it today as in July 29?

I hope this isn't too confusing, but after a hard day for all, I just wanted to be sure all grounds were covered since the memo did not go to anyone in this office before going to Mr. Lake.

Please let someone know the answer as soon as possible in the morning.

Thanks.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MS NARA, Date 12/12/04

Additional Header Information Follows

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Date Created: 29-Jul-1994 09:08
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 047897
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA25:ZVIHDAHE4.TXT
A1 Folder: JUL94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 29-Jul-1994 09:08
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Aug-1994 16:04 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wolin, Neal S. (wolin@NSCSTF@OE0B@MSGATE@VAXB)
SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ CPL lunch -- 4 August

Message Creation Date was at 3-AUG-1994 15:48:00

Below is a tentative agenda for tomorrow's C-P-L lunch. Where indicated, please provide me, by no later than 9.30 am Thursday, a short background paper (via e-mail) for Tony's use.

Lake:

- o DoD Readiness Report follow-up -- will ask Sec Perry what steps are being taken to follow-up on the Meyer report. (Bob Bell please provide background as appropriate.)
- o Coordination of U.S. Antiterrorism Programs -- will discuss with particular reference to Iran and Hezbollah. (Dick Clarke/Randy Beers/Sean Darragh, George Tenet, and Martin Indyk please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Sensitive Program -- (George Tenet has provided background.)
- o Military Assistance for Cambodia -- following on Stanley's trip to Phnom Penh. (Stanley Roth please provide appropriate background.)
- o Sensitive Counternarcotics Narcotics Program -- will raise status of program after August 7. (Sean Darragh please provide background.)

Christopher:

- o Bosnia Update -- will raise a possible visit to Izetbegovic and follow-up on Contact Group "consequences" (Sandy Vershbow/Don Kerrick please provide background as appropriate.)
- o Rwanda Update -- will discuss follow-up to Perry trip, Rwanda supplemental (Randy Beers, Don Steinberg and Bill Danvers please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Haiti -- will ask who has responsibility for funding support costs for countries contributing to UNMIH (Randy Beers and Larry Rossin please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Peacekeeping Funds -- will compare notes on where we stand on the Hill on peacekeeping and UN funds issues. (Susan Rice and Bill Danvers please coordinate on appropriate background.)

Perry:

- o FAST Marines -- will raise dissatisfaction with State's continuing

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refusal to bring this issue to closure. (Randy Beers/Sean Darragh please provide appropriate background.)

o Possible POW/MIA Trip to Vietnam -- will consult on the advisability of sending another high level team to work on getting more out of the Vietnamese. (Stan Roth please provide background.)

Thanks.

Distribution:

FOR: Robert C. FauverFOR: Sandra J. KristoffFOR: Robert D. KyleFOR: Daniel B. Ponema

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 03-Aug-1994 15:48

Deletable Flag: Y

DOCNUM: 048325

VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA14:ZVIMMYOI4.TXT

A1 Folder: AUG94

Message Format:

Message Status: READ

Date Modified: 03-Aug-1994 15:48

Forward Flag: YES

Read-Receipt Requested: NO

Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO

Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Aug-1994 21:26 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RECORDS (RECORDS@A1@OEBO)
FROM: Wolin, Neal S. (wolinn@NSCSTF@OEBO@MSGATE@VAXB)
SUBJECT: :CONFIDENTIAL: RE: :~~SECRET~~: CPL lunch --

Message Creation Date was at 3-AUG-1994 21:06:00

Thanks.

From: Bell, Robert G.
To: Wolin, Neal S.
Subject: RE: :~~SECRET~~: CPL lunch -- 4 August
Date: Wednesday, August 03, 1994 06:04 PM

We're sending over hard-copy a read ahead for my item.

From: Wolin, Neal S.
To: Rossin at A1; Beers, Rand R; Beyrle, John R.; Danvers, William C.;
Darragh, Sean J.; Fried, Daniel; Kerrick, Donald L.; Rice, Susan E.;
Suettlinger, Robert L.; @SENIORS - Senior Directors
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Kenney, Kristie A.; Reed, James W.; Sens, Andrew D.;
Soderberg, Nancy E.; Itoh, William H.
Subject: :~~SECRET~~: CPL lunch -- 4 August
Date: Wednesday, August 03, 1994 3:48PM

Below is a tentative agenda for tomorrow's C-P-L lunch. Where indicated, please provide me, by no later than 9.30 am Thursday, a short background paper (via e-mail) for Tony's use.

Lake:

- o DoD Readiness Report follow-up -- will ask Sec Perry what steps are being taken to follow-up on the Meyer report. (Bob Bell please provide background as appropriate.)
- o Coordination of U.S. Antiterrorism Programs -- will discuss with particular reference to Iran and Hezbollah. (Dick Clarke/Randy Beers/Sean Darragh, George Tenet, and Martin Indyk please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Sensitive Program -- (George Tenet has provided background.)
- o Military Assistance for Cambodia -- following on Stanley's trip to Phnom Penh. (Stanley Roth please provide appropriate background.)
- o Sensitive Counternarcotics Narcotics Program -- will raise status of program after August 7. (Sean Darragh please provide background.)

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Christopher:

- o Bosnia Update -- will raise a possible visit to Izetbegovic and follow-up on Contact Group "consequences" (Sandy Vershbow/Don Kerrick please provide background as appropriate.)
- o Rwanda Update -- will discuss follow-up to Perry trip, Rwanda supplemental (Randy Beers, Don Steinberg and Bill Danvers please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Haiti -- will ask who has responsibility for funding support costs for countries contributing to UNMIH (Randy Beers and Larry Rossin please coordinate on appropriate background.)
- o Peacekeeping Funds -- will compare notes on where we stand on the Hill on peacekeeping and UN funds issues. (Susan Rice and Bill Danvers please coordinate on appropriate background.)

Perry:

- o FAST Marines -- will raise dissatisfaction with State's continuing refusal to bring this issue to closure. (Randy Beers/Sean Darragh please provide appropriate background.)
- o Possible POW/MIA Trip to Vietnam -- will consult on the advisability of sending another high level team to work on getting more out of the Vietnamese. (Stan Roth please provide background.)

Thanks.

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 03-Aug-1994 21:06
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 048369
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA21:ZVIMUMJDL.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 03-Aug-1994 21:06
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions

Ad Hoc Group on Rwandan Relief Operations

DATE: August 5, 1994

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 9:45 am - 11:00 am

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Ad Hoc Group on Rwandan Relief Operations. ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Timothy Wirth
Edward Brynn

AID

Brian Atwood

DOD

Ted Warner

The White House

Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg

CIA

Charles Snyder

NSC

Don Steinberg
Eric Schwartz
Susan Rice

JCS

LTG John Sheehan

Summary of Conclusions

The Ad Hoc Group agreed on the following:

1. Water Requirement: In view of conflicting estimates of requirements, USAID will provide the Ad Hoc Group with an assessment of water needs in Zaire and options for meeting the needs. USAID will consult with JCS and will distribute a paper on this issue no later than 12 noon, Monday, August 8. (U)
2. Length of U.S. Humanitarian Involvement: While we would like to hand off as much of the humanitarian effort to private relief organizations as possible, we will not at this point announce any target date for an end to U.S. involvement in view of the uncertainty of the situation in Rwanda. ~~(S)~~
3. Organization of the Relief Effort and Repatriation:
 - State will continue to encourage the UN to establish an organized structure for decision-making on humanitarian relief. USUN will urge the UN Secretary General to ensure that he has a representative on the ground to facilitate

~~SECRET~~

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Declassify on: 04DR **PER E.O. 13526**

coordination, which should include coordination with NGOs.
(U)

-- State will prepare an action plan on repatriation issues that will be cleared interagency and available no later than OOB, Tuesday, August 9. The paper should be coordinated with JCS and include recommendations on implementation of Phase 2 of the relief operation. The paper should be informed by discussions with UNHCR and contain benchmarks to use in determining how actively we should encourage repatriation.

~~(C)~~

4. Additional Needs: USAID will report on critical gaps in the relief effort, with a focus on anticipating problems (such as an outbreak of dysentery) in the weeks to come. USAID will provide options for meeting such needs. The report should be available no later than COB Monday. (U)

5. RPF Efforts to Create a Safe Environment in Rwanda: State will continue to urge the RPF to discourage acts of retribution and reprisal. State will instruct Ambassador Rawson to urge the RPF to develop radio messages to this effect. ~~(C)~~

6. RPF and UNAMIR: Ambassador Rawson will seek to reaffirm RPF agreements to 1) permit Francophone contingents in French units to operate as UNAMIR II units, 2) avoid an RPF presence in the safe area and 3) undertake joint patrols with UNAMIR elsewhere in Rwanda. ~~(S)~~

7. Moroccans: The Vice President will call King Hassan to encourage him to deploy troops to Zaire to help maintain security. NSC staff will prepare materials for this phone call.

~~(C)~~

8. Burundi: State, in coordination with OSD/JCS, will implement the "Burundi Strategy," including finding facilitators (and, in particular, outside monitors) who will attempt to identify common ground and will thus help to isolate extremists, replacing French troops in southwest Rwanda with expedited deployment of UNAMIR, continuing high-level visits (and public statements accompanying them) to demonstrate strong U.S. support for Burundi's fragile democracy and remind Burundians that the international community is watching, supporting a refugee conference of regional leaders for Bujumbura, and establishing Bujumbura airport as a transit and staging point that would be used by the U.S. military in the humanitarian effort. Such relief would be directed to Rwandan refugees in Bukavu, Zaire, southwest Rwanda and northern Burundi. State will be prepared to report on progress on these fronts at the Ad Hoc meeting on August 9. ~~(C)~~

9. Meetings Next Week: The Ad Hoc Group will meet on Tuesday and Thursday of next week. ~~(C)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-Aug-1994 10:41 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jonathan H. Spalter (SPALTER)
Natalie S. Wozniak (WOZNAK)

FROM: Calvin A. Mitchell
(MITCHELLC)

SUBJECT: august 8 guidance

FOREIGN POLICY TALKING POINTS
(as of August 8, 10:00 A.M.)

FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CUBA

HAITI

BOSNIA

RWANDA

MIDDLE EAST

TERRORISM

DISCO BOMBING

NIGERIA

NORTH KOREA

TRADE

NIS

CIA

FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In the end, what matters is what we are getting done. This is the measure of leadership. And in the last few weeks, we have helped Israel and Jordan achieve an historic breakthrough; helped

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Russia and Estonia reach agreement allowing the withdrawal of Russian troops; led in the implementation of a tough resolution on Haiti at the Security Council; and carried out a humanitarian operation in Rwanda that should make all Americans proud.

But let me take a moment to put this in the context of my three, fundamental strategic goals:

Our first goal in the post-Cold War world has been meeting security challenges. We have succeeded:

Prepared a strategy for our armed forces to fight two major regional conflicts at one.

Elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

By the end of this month, no more Russian troops in Central and Eastern Europe for the first time since World War II.

Partnership for Peace.

Persistent efforts to ensure that the Korean peninsula is nonnuclear.

Historic progress in the Middle East.

Pursued and convicted terrorists; will not let them stop peace.

Our second goal has been to promote free markets and bring our international economic policies in line with our domestic goals. Our accomplishments include:

Vast new credibility by lowering our deficit at home. NAFTA, which will create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S.

GATT, which we are working with Congress to pass this year.

First summit meeting of APEC, to launch new economic initiatives on Pacific rim.

Lifting of export controls promotion of expanded American trade, investments.

Our third goal has been to promote democracy, from Russia to South Africa to Chile.

Assisted states, such as Russia and Ukraine, in return for progress toward market reforms.

Leading the international community in efforts to restore democracy to Haiti.

Will be hosting the Summit of the Americas, first gathering in 30 years of the democratic nations of our hemisphere.

Cuba

New Developments

All appears quiet following statements by Castro following riots on Friday in Havana that if the US fails to adopt measures to stop the encouragement of illegal departures from Cuba, he would allow open immigration. State issued a statement on Friday evening condemning his comments.

Sandy Berger chaired an interagency meeting on Saturday and Monday evening at the White House to discuss contingency plans in

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light of possible massive outflows.

There are no signs of any boats from Cuba detected today.

Key Themes

- The overriding US objective in Cuba is a peaceful transition to democracy.
- In Cuba, we seek to promote a peaceful democratic transition through a two-track policy, embodied in the Cuban Democracy Act, of isolating the Castro regime while reaching out to the Cuban people with humanitarian aid.
- We believe that the economic embargo continues to serve as important leverage in our efforts to promote democratic political change in Cuba.
- Our embargo policy will remain in place until Cuba adopts internal democratic reforms, most importantly free and fair elections under international observation, and respects human rights.
- In the meantime, we are encouraging increased people-to-people exchange, including enhanced telecommunications, humanitarian aid through non-governmental organizations and a freer flow of ideas.

Points

- We are deeply concerned about recent statements by Fidel Castro.
- We will not permit Fidel Castro to dictate our immigration policy or to create a replay of the Mariel boat lift, a cynical move on the part of Castro in 1980.
- We urge the Cuban government to consider all the implications of such incitement. We also urge the citizens of Cuba and their relatives in the US to remain calm and not to participate in this ploy of the Cuban Government.
- We call on the Cuban Government to refrain from the use of force against its own people.

□

HAITI

Background

The UN Security Council voted on July 31 -- 12 to 0 with two abstentions -- to allow necessary means to implement the Governor's Island Accord.

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By a vote of 100-0 on August 3, the Senate approved an amendment by Senator Dole to the effect that the UN resolution does not constitute authorization for deployment of US armed forces under Article I of the Constitution or the War Powers Act.

Coast Guard rescued 88 Haitians on Friday; none over the weekend.

In reports on purported discussions at a Principal's Meeting on August 2, the New York Times said top officials were divided on whether to set a deadline for an invasion, and the Washington Post said the officials concluded that an invasion should not occur before mid-September.

In other stories: the Washington Post reported that some 500 Haitians who have been cleared for travel to the United States as refugees are stranded in Haiti, and that Argentina had abandoned plans to provide troops for an invasion; and the New York Times reported the US has abandoned efforts to use safe havens beyond Guantanamo in light of reduced numbers of migrants.

Human Rights Violations

- On April 18, soldiers opened fire on slum-dwellers in a pro-Aristide area of Gonaives (GO-NIGH-EEV), killing as many as 30.
- On May 23, a dozen gunmen hunted down and brutally killed four Aristide supporters in Cite Soleil (SEE-TAY SO-LAY), and on May 27.
- On June 30, the bodies of five men appeared on the streets of Port-au-Prince, all shot with their hands tied behind their backs.
- And on August 1, armed men arrived at our refugee processing center in Port-au-Prince, held several refugee applicants on the ground and beat them, took away three applicants.
- And just last month, our Embassy in Haiti located new graves of a dozen young men who had been shot and hastily buried under suspicious circumstances.



Key Points

- The U.N. vote says clearly that the international community will no longer tolerate the reign of terror -- political killings, rape, mutilation -- being perpetrated on the people of Haiti by the military leaders who have seized power.
- The U.N. resolution gives the international community all the tools it needs to restore democracy, including the use of force. That option is on the table.
- There is no deadline but time is running out for the military leaders to step down voluntarily.

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Points

(If asked whether you will seek prior Congressional UNSC Resolution approval:)

-- We will be consulting closely with the Congress as we move forward on Haiti.

(If asked why the Latin American countries oppose the UNSC resolution authorizing use of force to resolve the Haitian crisis:)

-- The UNSC resolution set a precedent -- for the first time ever the Security Council authorized Chapter 7 peacekeeping action in the Western Hemisphere.

-- In the Security Council vote, Argentina supported the resolution while Brazil abstained. The Caribbean countries and several Central American states have now stated their support.

-- Concern among other states regarding the principle of nonintervention is misplaced. The multinational military action authorized by this resolution would, in fact, restore the sovereignty and protect the interests of the Haitian people currently oppressed by the illegitimate military rulers.

-- The second concern many expressed was that other measures -- sanctions and negotiations -- have not yet been exhausted.

-- We agree that the international community must continue to work to make sanctions fully effective. That is the central focus of my efforts in Haiti at this time. On negotiations, I believe that military intransigence over the last 18 months has demonstrated that this avenue has indeed been exhausted.

□

(If asked whether we have abandoned the safe havens):

-- The story is not true. We have reached agreement with three countries and are now considering which alternatives to pursue in terms of cost, capacity and prompt availability.

(If asked why Haitians are stranded in Haiti):

-- We have made all the necessary arrangements to charter flights out of Haiti for refugees and we await approval from the de facto authorities, which has not yet been forthcoming.

-- This issue is of serious concern to us and must be resolved speedily.

-- The authorities should know that it is in their interest to permit such flights for approved refugees and they would be well advised not to interfere with flight arrangements.

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(If asked if Argentina has abandoned plans to provide troops for an invasion):

-- The story is not correct. We have received assurances from the Argentine government that it continues to actively consider participation.

(If asked about the reports on the Principal's Meeting):

-- I do not think it wise to discuss confidential deliberations on national security matters in public.

(If asked about reports of President Carter travelling to Haiti):

-- I do not know of any plan for former President Carter to travel to Haiti.

□

BOSNIA

Background

In response to increasing violations of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb target on August 5. After a US A-10 destroyed an anti-tank weapon, the Bosnian Serbs said they would return weapons taken from a UN collection site in their latest violation of the exclusion zone.

The Contact Group ministers agreed in their meeting in Geneva on July 30 to tighten sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and to strengthen the safe area regime once planning has been completed to protect UNPROFOR troops.

Serbia announced on August 4 that it was breaking all political and economic ties with the Bosnian Serbs. Only trade in food, clothing and medical supplies would be allowed.

We are consulting with the Contact Group on a Security Council resolution on new sanctions.

Key Points

-- The NATO air attack demonstrated the firm resolve of the United States and the international community.

-- Once again, I call upon the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace proposal put forward by the Contact Group.

-- If they continue to reject the proposal, the Contact Group, with the full support of the United States, will continue to pursue tightened enforcement of sanctions against Bosnian Serb territory and final planning for strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones.

-- As the Contact Group has also stated clearly, if the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the proposal, a decision by the UN

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to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable.

Points

- I have said before that there would be consequences if the Bosnian Serbs rejected our proposal. So I welcome the Contact Group's action.
- Our effort to achieve a negotiated settlement is continuing to move ahead.
- We are consulting at the United Nations on a new resolution to extend sanctions and tighten enforcement of existing sanctions.

□

- We are not prepared to allow the current situation -- in which the victim is penalized unfairly and denied the right to defend himself -- to continue without some remedy.

□

RWANDA

Background

US troops are deployed at Kigali and the airport is now 24-hour operational.

We have sent a Report to Congress on the deployment of troops to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

The press is reporting that the new government in Rwanda wants to push ahead with war crimes trials, possibly without the UN; that returning Hutus are being killed; and that Hutu soldiers in Goma are rearming, looting and warning their kin against returning.

Key Points

- All Americans have been deeply moved by the plight of the Rwandan refugees. We have responded swiftly and massively to what could be the worst humanitarian disaster in a generation.
- We believe we are turning the corner. Roads that were lined with dead bodies a few days ago are now filled with people carrying water.
- The United States has provided the bulk of the aid for this crisis, more than any other country. Americans are a generous people. They should feel proud of what their country and the men and women of their armed services are doing.

Points

- Since we began on July 21, we have delivered over 4300 tons of equipment, food, water, and medicine.
- So far, the United States has provided some 40 percent of

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all aid for Rwanda, far more than any other country. If Congress approves, we will be providing close to half a billion dollars in aid.

- The US is currently producing about 360,000 gallons of safe water a day and when combined with the work of others, we are producing almost 900,000 gallons of safe water a day with a goal of increasing output further.
- We have conducted over 300 flights of U.S. military aircraft delivering aid since July 21.
- We have turned Goma and Kigali into 24-hour-a-day airports and are delivering around-the-clock.
- We are also moving supplies in by sea.

□

- But more needs to be done. This cannot be the job of the US Government alone. Individual American citizens and American corporations must also get involved.

Troops to Kigali

- When we moved into Entebbe and Goma, we realized that we could not get enough water, food, medicine, equipment and people in quickly using those two airports no matter how efficient we were. Kigali is closer and bigger than Goma.
- The mission continues to be humanitarian assistance. Our troops will not be involved in peacekeeping. They will, however, be equipped for self-defense.
- If over the next week or so the UN and private agencies expand their operations at Kigali and if the security remains stable, then we will look at expanding US operations there.
- The decision on this second phase has not been made and will not be made until we can evaluate what happens in the first phase.
- We do not know how long the mission will last, but we are committed to staying until the immediate crisis ends.
- (If asked about War Powers:) We have provided a Report to Congress on the deployment of U.S. forces to Rwanda consistent with the War Powers Resolution.
- (If asked about reports that US troops could be in Rwanda for a year or more:) Secretary Perry was misquoted on that. He was talking about how long the overall humanitarian mission might last, not how long US troops would remain.
- (If pressed, we suggest you resist laying down a precise time frame for the US troop commitment. In briefing the press, Shali put it at "weeks, probably months.") I can't put a specific time on how long our military personnel will be in Rwanda. We have not yet made a decision on the second phase of this operation and we can't do that until we can

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evaluate the first phase at Kigali.

Recognition

- I have decided to recognize the Rwandan government. I based my decision on:

Our conversations with the acting government that they will broaden their base, respect human rights, and support national reconciliation, and

The fact that they control the country and will cooperate in the relief effort.

War Crimes Trials

- We agree that the world should act swiftly on those responsible for genocidal killings in Rwanda. And we've sponsored efforts by the UN Security Council and Human Rights Commission to set up the right mechanisms.
- We urge the new government in Rwanda to work with the international community to assure that the process supports justice, not revenge.

MILITARY READINESS

Background

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili appeared before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on August 4. They testified that unless Congress takes quick action on the emergency supplemental request for \$270 million for Rwanda operations and \$800 million for Haiti-related operations, the US military will be forced to curtail routine training and acquisition activities.

These could include aircraft flying operations, ship training exercises, procurement of spare parts and equipment, removal of equipment from Europe associated with the US drawdown, and release of temporary civilian employees. Perry emphasized that he would attempt to avoid measures that would impair long term readiness or undercut the Armed Forces' ability to respond to an immediate crisis.

Points

- I am very concerned about this budgetary situation. And I definitely want to avoid having to implement the cost saving measures Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili outlined.
- I urge the Congress to take quick action on the supplemental and the reprogramming request.
- I should emphasize, however, that any effect on military readiness would be limited since at the start of the new fiscal year we would have the funds to restore any cuts in training, repair and maintenance.

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MIDDLE EAST

Background

The Senate/House Conference on Appropriations approved \$99 million in debt forgiveness for Jordan. This will buy down some \$190-200 million of Jordan's \$700 million debt to the USG. The Conference also approved language that would allow us to provide Jordan with spare parts and ammunition from excess defense stocks.

Secretary Christopher is on a trip to the Middle East.

Key Points

- I am proud of the historic steps we have taken to promote peace in the Middle East.
- The path of peace led once again through the White House, when Israel and Jordan ended their state of belligerency and declared that their mutual goal is a peace treaty.
- But we still have work before us. Secretary Christopher is again in the region soon to work for a breakthrough on Syria.

JORDAN: DEBT FORGIVENESS

- I am pleased that Congress is moving to appropriate \$99 million in debt forgiveness for Jordan. This will enable us to write off more than \$190 million of Jordan's \$700 million debt. I am grateful to Congress for moving so quickly to support King Hussein's decision to end the war with Israel.
- I am committed to working with Congress to write off all Jordan's debt as it proceeds forward to a peace treaty with Israel.
- As Middle Eastern leaders take risks for peace, it's important that we support them in ways that will bring home the benefits of peace to their people.

JORDAN: ARAB BOYCOTT

- Jordan and Israel have ended their conflict. They have agreed in the Washington Declaration to prepare for bilateral cooperation including the abolition of all economic boycotts. This agreement clearly demonstrates that the boycott has become a thing of the past.

JORDAN: MOHAMMED ABEQUA CASE

- We do not have an extradition treaty with Jordan but

□

King Hussein has agreed to help resolve this problem. The sister of the victim is now in Jordan and we hope that it will all work out.

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SYRIA: PEACE PROCESS

- I am committed to achieving a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When King Hussein and Prime Minister were here for their meeting, I spoke with President Asad to reaffirm my dedication to working for a breakthrough on the Syrian negotiating track.
- We are convinced that the parties are determined to pursue the possibility of peace and I am hopeful that a breakthrough with Syria can take place this year.

PEACEKEEPING ROLE FOR U.S. FORCES ON THE GOLAN

- We have stated our willingness to participate in security arrangements as agreed by the parties in a peace treaty. But they have not yet requested such participation. We will consult fully with the Congress before any such commitment of U.S. forces is made.

□

TERRORISM

Key Points

- I condemn the outrageous actions in London, Argentina and Panama, and I convey my condolences to the victims and their families.
- My administration is committed to dealing with terrorism aggressively.
- From the start of my Administration, we have acted quickly to bring terrorists to justice, and we are working with our friends and allies throughout the world to prevent future attacks.

Points

- Moments after taking office, I was faced with the World Trade Center bombing. We moved aggressively to apprehend those involved and those who fled overseas.
- We successfully foiled a second terrorist operation in New York before the terrorists had a chance to strike.
- We also targeted increased resources against those who posed a foreign terrorist threat in the United States.
- I established new procedures to tighten border security and prevent terrorists from entering the United States. They include name checks for visa issuance, checking for fraud at foreign airports, and reviews at points of entry into the United States.
- The Administration has also broken new ground by engaging Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Many of these countries served as havens for terrorists. Now they have become

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partners in the worldwide campaign against terrorism.

-- We are also working closely with our G-7 partners, allies and other governments on the recent bombing attacks.

Recent Bombings

-- As I have said repeatedly, I will not let the enemies of peace in the Middle East or elsewhere derail the peace process.

-- We have dispatched a team of experts to Buenos Aires and Panama to help in the investigations.

-- We are also sharing intelligence with the British.

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-- And we are taking specific action, which I will not detail, to ward off threats to Israeli interests in the United States.

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DISCO BOMBING

Background

The Washington Post reported that German officials claimed the United States had delayed for a year in turning over information crucial to the extradition of a prime suspect in the 1986 bombing of a disco in Berlin in which two U.S. soldiers were killed. The report said the suspect had been released by the Lebanese.

Points

-- The report is incorrect.

-- The United States provided the German government with all the information we have available on the bombing.

-- We have solid reports that the suspect is not free but is in Lebanese custody.

-- We remain absolutely committed to seeing justice done in this case.

□

NIGERIA

Background

Jesse Jackson has completed his mission to Nigeria on your behalf to convey to the government of General Abacha your concerns over the absence of movement toward civilian democracy. He met with Abacha for two hours and called for concrete action. Abacha insisted that the United States does not understand internal Nigerian politics.

Jackson then met with Chief Abiola, the detained leader of some

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opposition forces. Jackson received good press reports during his trip despite criticism by some leading Nigerian democracy advocates that Jackson's association with the previous military government made him an inappropriate emissary.

Meanwhile, the political situation in Nigeria continues to deteriorate, with widespread strikes, riots and growing ethnic and regional tensions.

Key Points

- I call on the military leaders of Nigeria to restore civilian democracy and release those who have been arrested or detained, including Chief Abiola.
- At my request, Reverend Jackson traveled to Nigeria to deliver a strong message to the country's military leaders. He had an excellent and constructive trip.
- It is offensive that the Nigerian government denied visas to members of Congress -- Don Payne, Bill Jefferson and Lucien Blackwell of the Congressional Black Caucus -- who wanted to show that Americans speak with one voice on the need for democratic change in Nigeria. We have registered our deepest concern to the Nigerian government.
- The government of Nigeria must not think that they can stifle the voices calling for democracy by keeping them in prison or forbidding them to enter the country .
- We urge the Nigerian leaders to release and respect the results of the June 12 elections.

NORTH KOREA

Background

We resumed talks with the North Koreans on the nuclear issue in Geneva on August 5.

Kim Jong Il appears to have succeeded his father without serious challenge.

The Washington Post reported that other countries are resisting taking North Korea's spent nuclear reactor fuel. The story is inaccurate. A number of countries are receptive but negotiations could be hurt by public discussion.

A North Korean defector to South Korea claims North Korea has five nuclear devices. Most discount his credibility, including the IAEA.

Key Points

- Our policy remains unchanged. We seek a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. That means North Korea must agree as part of an overall settlement to give up its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way and account for its past nuclear activities.

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- This overall settlement would also end North Korea's isolation from the international community.
- The talks began on Friday. They lasted eight hours and were businesslike and useful. They'll resume on Monday.
- Our security commitments to South Korea and Japan are unshakable.

Points

- If they address our concerns, we are prepared to address their concerns about security assurances and shifting to a light-water nuclear program in the context of an overall settlement.
- The North-South summit has been delayed but not canceled and the two sides need to work out the details.
- (IF ASKED about North Korea's spent fuel) Ambassador Gallucci had a productive round of discussions in Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. It is wrong to say that they all have refused to take spent fuel rods. The fact is that we are continuing discussions on this and other aspects of the North Korean issue. But I don't want to get into the details of the negotiations.

□

Defector

- The South Korean cabinet has declared that the defector's claim was based on hearsay and he had no evidence to support it.
- The IAEA has found his claims implausible.

□

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Key Points

- I have often pointed out that we cannot be strong abroad unless we are economically strong at home. And if we can't compete in the global economy, we'll pay for it at home.
- That is why I am pleased we were able to settle our differences on wheat with Canada. It is another step on the road to free trade with our largest trading partner.
- Though we prefer to negotiate our differences with Japan, we will use our trade laws to ensure free and fair trade.

Overall

- Let's be clear: This has been the biggest year-and-a-half in international trade in two decades.
- We negotiated the NAFTA side agreements and secured approval of the NAFTA by Congress.
- We completed the seven-year Uruguay Round GATT negotiations

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and initiated the Framework talks for working out our economic differences with Japan.

-- We've engaged the fastest growing economies of the world in APEC. And we've reformed the export control system and freed-up billions of dollars of U.S. exports from unnecessary and expensive export licensing requirements.

Canadian Wheat

-- The agreement limits Canadian grain imports for one year, addressing the immediate problem.

-- Longer term, we will establish a Joint Commission to examine each country's marketing and support systems.

-- We agreed that there would be no additional restrictions inconsistent with NAFTA or GATT.

Japan

-- The identification of Japan under Title VII for its government procurement practices does not mark the beginning of a trade war. We have a deep economic relationship with Japan, but we have certain differences. We would prefer to resolve those differences by negotiation, if possible. If we can't, we will use our trade laws to ensure free and fair trade.

-- The identification of Japan under Title VII starts a 60-day negotiating period to resolve the issue of Japan's discrimination against foreign producers in its government procurement of telecommunications and medical technology products and services. If we are unable to reach an agreement during the next 60 days, sanctions will go into effect.

Uruguay Round

-- After seven years of negotiations, we completed the Uruguay Round and are now working with Congress to pass this agreement in time to implement it this year. As we have seen with NAFTA, we don't want to wait on the jobs that exports create.

-- This agreement is good for America and for the global economy. When fully implemented it will add \$100-\$200 billion to the U.S. economy each year and create hundreds of thousands of new well-paying jobs.

-- We are working with the Congress on the implementing details, and we are making good progress. The Senate Finance Committee has agreed on a funding package (comprised largely of spending cuts) and we are continuing to work out the other details.

-- On fast-track authority, we are working with Congress to ensure that the U.S. can continue to open markets for U.S. exports.

- I know there are some outstanding differences, but I think we can work out a bill that recognizes the link between trade on one hand, and labor and the environment on the other, without opening the door to hidden protectionism.
- On sovereignty, this agreement for the first time will force our trading partners to live up to their obligations. It will not, however, force us to change our laws or regulations. Only Congress can do that. We are free to maintain the level of health, safety and environmental protection we think is appropriate.

□

NIS

ESTONIA-RUSSIA

Background

Estonia and Russia have reached agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops by August 31.

Key Points

- The agreement by Russia to withdraw its troops from Estonia is historic. It means that on August 31 Russian troops will have completely withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe for the first time since World War II.
- When I met Presidents Meri and Yeltsin in Europe last month, I encouraged them both to meet to try to settle their differences. I congratulate both men for their vision and statesmanship.
- This is a real contribution to regional stability in the Baltics and Europe, and opens the door to a new era of normal relations between Russia and the Baltic states.

G-7 and Russia

- Important steps were taken in Naples to promote stronger integration of Russia and Ukraine with the West.
- Yeltsin is now a full partner in the G-8 political dialogue. Russian participation strengthens reformers in Moscow, lends additional weight to common foreign policy positions.
- The U.S. led the effort to get the G-7 engaged in promoting economic reform in Ukraine. The G-7 committed to over \$4 billion in conditional IMF/WB loans for Ukraine. G-7 states also pledged expanded export credits on a bilateral basis.

New Leaders in Ukraine and Belarus

- Our top priority is continued adherence to the denuclearization program in both countries.
- We have no indication that either new regime will back away from their nuclear commitments and obligations.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Joshi, M. Kay

From: Schwartz, Eric P.
To: Joshi, M. Kay
Cc: Steinberg, Donald K.; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
Subject: YOUR REQUEST ON THE RWANDA MEETING
Date: Tuesday, August 09, 1994 5:43PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR KAY JOSHI

Kay:

I've made the fix in the paragraph on the Rwanda summary of conclusions. For your convenience, I've put them in boldface, but I understand that the boldface might not reproduce in e mail. If not, you can read through the paragraph and see the changes yourself. There are changes in two sentences.

8. Burundi: State, in coordination with OSD/JCS, will implement the "Burundi Strategy", including finding facilitators (and, in particular, outside monitors) who will attempt to identify common ground and will thus help to isolate extremists, replacing French troops in southwest Rwanda with expedited deployment of UNAMIR, continuing high-level visits (and public statements accompanying them) to demonstrate strong US support for Burundi's fragile democracy and remind Burundians that the international community is watching, supporting a refugee conference of regional leaders for Bujumbura, and establishing Bujumbura airport as a transit and staging point that would be used by the U.S. military in the humanitarian relief effort. Such relief would be directed to Rwandan refugees in Bukavu, Zaire, southwest Rwanda and northern Burundi. State will be prepared to report on progress on these fronts at the Ad Hoc meeting on August 9. ~~(G)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

coordination, which should include coordination with NGOs.
(U)

-- State will prepare an action plan on repatriation issues that will be cleared interagency and available no later than OOB, Tuesday, August 9. The paper should be coordinated with JCS and include recommendations on implementation of Phase 2 of the relief operation. The paper should be informed by discussions with UNHCR and contain benchmarks to use in determining how actively we should encourage repatriation.

~~(c)~~

4. Additional Needs: USAID will report on critical gaps in the relief effort, with a focus on anticipating problems (such as an outbreak of dysentery) in the weeks to come. USAID will provide options for meeting such needs. The report should be available no later than COB Monday. (U)

5. RPF Efforts to Create a Safe Environment in Rwanda: State will continue to urge the RPF to discourage acts of retribution and reprisal. State will instruct Ambassador Rawson to urge the RPF to develop radio messages to this effect. ~~(c)~~

6. RPF and UNAMIR: Ambassador Rawson will seek to reaffirm RPF agreements to 1) permit Francophone contingents in French units to operate as UNAMIR II units, 2) avoid an RPF presence in the safe area and 3) undertake joint patrols with UNAMIR elsewhere in Rwanda. ~~(S)~~

7. Moroccans: The Vice President will call King Hassan to encourage him to deploy troops to Zaire to help maintain security. NSC staff will prepare materials for this phone call.

~~(c)~~

8. Burundi: State, in coordination with OSD/JCS, will implement the "Burundi Strategy," including finding facilitators (and, in particular, outside monitors) who will attempt to identify common ground and will thus help to isolate extremists, replacing French troops in southwest Rwanda with expedited deployment of UNAMIR, continuing high-level visits (and public statements accompanying them) to demonstrate strong U.S. support for Burundi's fragile democracy and remind Burundians that the international community is watching, supporting a refugee conference of regional leaders for Bujumbura, and establishing a U.S. military presence at the Bujumbura Airport to help in getting relief to Rwandan refugees in Bukavu, Zaire, southwest Rwanda and northern Burundi. State should be prepared to report on progress on these fronts at the Ad Hoc meeting on August 9. ~~(c)~~

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will

25 August 1994

Zaire-Rwanda: Moving FAR Units North to Bunia 3.5c

1. What is the status of the Former Rwandan Army (FAR) in eastern Zaire? We believe that there are some 10,000-12,000 soldiers of the FAR in eastern Zaire who retain their personal weapons. About 10,000 are near Goma in battalion size camps; they have retained military discipline, train each morning, and respond to senior command and control. While most of the FAR's heavy equipment was seized when they crossed the border last month, they continue to control a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun and a few truck mounted mortars. Most of the 7,000-8,000 FAR troops near Bukavu do not appear to have retained their weapons and they are reportedly less disciplined, more disorganized, and less loyal to their officers than their comrades near Goma. EO 13526 3.5c

2. Can the FAR be persuaded to move? Most of the armed FAR troops in Goma probably are committed to remaining an organized force near the Rwandan border in order to more easily resume hostilities against the new Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government. They reportedly have received four months of salary in advance, are receiving (partly through theft of relief assistance) adequate food, water, and medical supplies, and live in military-style tents. FAR units near Bukavu probably would also resist moving, but many soldiers in this area are reportedly selling their weapons to buy food, suggesting that some might be willing to move to new camps that offered better living conditions. 3.5c

3. What is President Mobutu's view? EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c Mobutu has publicly stated that he will prevent the FAR from resuming hostilities, but we have no specific evidence that he is actively pursuing such an objective. Mobutu has long-standing political and military ties to the former Hutu regime. 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

EO 13526 3.5c

4. Can Mobutu's military forces forcibly move the FAR? Probably not. Even if Mobutu openly supported such a policy, there are only about 2,500 Zairian troops--perhaps as many as 1,000 from Mobutu's Special Presidential Division (DSP)--in Kivu. Zairian troops are deployed primarily in Goma and Bukavu and rarely travel to FAR camps located outside of town. These troops are ill-disciplined, poorly trained and led, and receive little logistical support; Zairian troops are likely responsible for at least half of all security incidents near Goma. Zairian troops would almost be certainly reluctant to forcibly attempt to redeploy the FAR, fearing--correctly in our view--that they would be outmanned, outgunned, and outclassed. The FAR senior leadership does spend considerable time in Goma and Bukavu, however, and Zairian forces would likely stand a better chance of detaining individual officers. 3.5c

5. Would moving the FAR to Bunia significantly undermine its capabilities to renew hostilities? Yes. Bunia is over 400 km north of Goma on the Ugandan border, sharply limiting their ability to conduct operations in Rwanda. The roads in the area are very poor--especially during the current rainy season--and the town's airport probably cannot handle sizable transport aircraft. There are few Hutus among the indigenous population, denying the FAR a natural base of support. 3.5c

6. What are the implications for Zaire? Putting the FAR in Bunia would probably have little immediate impact on Zaire's political dynamics. Kinshasa would likely demand that international relief agencies provide for FAR troop welfare in order to minimize their threat to the local community. Mobutu has scattered thousands of ill-disciplined, disloyal regular Army soldiers throughout Zaire's interior with no obvious means of logistic support. Although these troops occasionally engage in violent looting to survive, the unrest is usually contained to the individual town and has had no political impact. 3.5c

7. The deployment, however, could potentially complicate Zaire's relations with Uganda, which have often been tense. The border area has long hosted numerous armed groups that engage in cross-border unrest. The FAR, which views Uganda as an enemy for supporting the RPF, could try to destabilize President Museveni as well as looking for opportunities to launch attacks against Rwanda. Under such circumstances, Uganda might retaliate with cross border attacks or support to anti-Zairian groups. 3.5c

*

26 August 1994

Human Rights Abuses by the Rwandan Patriotic Front

Reports from a range of sources says that forces loyal to the Rwandan Patriotic Front are killing ethnic Hutus, seizing property, and committing other abuses throughout Rwanda. These reports appear plausible to us. They reflect both conscious policy by the RPF, which dominates the new regime in Kigali, and serious problems of discipline and command-and-control among RPF troops. We estimate that at most several thousand Hutus have been killed by RPF troops and supporters--far short of the genocide perpetrated by the ousted Hutu regime against ethnic Tutsis. Nonetheless, whatever the motivation, the abuses are aggravating the regional refugee crisis by driving more Hutus out of Rwanda and by bolstering radical Hutu leaders' claims that, because returnees face slaughter at the RPF's hands, they should remain outside the country's borders. 3.5c

Evidence of Policies Encouraging Abuses

-- Continued flight of refugees into Tanzania--some 40,000 have left this month--suggests a systematic RPF crackdown on the Hutu population of Kibungo Prefecture, which the Front has controlled for four months. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c Hutu
refugees' descriptions of harsh RPF measures; Tanzanian authorities have been pulling 20 to 30 bodies each week from the Kagera River on the border. Since mid-May we have received a steady stream of similar reports of RPF brutality

EO 13526 1.4c

We believe this behavior represents scorched-earth tactics by the RPF in response to an ongoing armed threat from Hutu elements in Kibungo. EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

-- We believe that similar crackdowns--meant to encourage Tutsis' return as well as to punish Hutus--have taken place elsewhere in Rwanda. EO 13526 1.4c relief
agencies were not allowed into the eastern portions of Butare and Gitarama Prefectures during most of July--a period when EO 13526 1.4c destruction or seizure of Hutu property in the towns of Butare and Gitarama. This suggests the RPF wanted no outside witnesses of a violent rooting out of suspected enemies. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

In Kigali, according to press reports, Tutsi exiles returning from Uganda say the RPF has given them houses and businesses seized from Hutus. We view this as evidence that the Front is actively working to tilt the capital's ethnic balance in its favor. 3.5c

- The above actions would be consistent with the RPF's practice during the civil war of not letting civilian or humanitarian concerns keep it from obtaining military objectives. The RPF's remorseless shelling of Hutu positions in Kigali between May and July inflicted heavy collateral losses, including barrages that damaged Red Cross hospitals and UN facilities. Similarly, an RPF mortar attack on fleeing Hutu troops in Goma, Zaire, in mid-July set off a deadly panicked stampede among civilian refugees in the target zone. 3.5c
- RPF leaders have created an atmosphere conducive to abuses with public pronouncements on the need for "justice" on a massive scale against the authors of the anti-Tutsi genocide. Some have spoken of the need to arrest, try, and punish up to 40,000 mass murderers, and the RPF has circulated lists with hundreds of names of suspected ringleaders. 3.5c

Evidence of Uncontrollable Armed Groups

- EO 13526 1.4c the Rwandan Patriotic Army's control over its troops has shrunk as its strength has swollen past 25,000 from an early April level of 10,000. EO 13526 1.4c RPF troops went on a spree of rapine and summary executions after they captured Kigali on 4 July. The RPF regime's announcement this week of the execution of two soldiers for atrocities and the arrest of 60 others indicates that it is aware indiscipline is a problem. Prime Minister Twagiramungu--not an RPF member--says that the military's discipline has evaporated and that Defense Minister Kagame may have lost control of the force.
- EO 13526 1.4c the RPF has armed returning Tutsi refugees and given military training to nearly every able-bodied Tutsi to defend against Hutu raids. These vigilante groups have killed Hutus who have fallen under suspicion due to their education, purported political beliefs, or coveted possessions. 3.5c
- Outside of "hot" zones such as Kibungo, we believe these vigilantes and undisciplined, vengeful soldiers--operating on their own--have been responsible for the atrocities. This was almost certainly the case in the murder of the Catholic Archbishop of Kigali and other clergymen in early June. It probably has also been true of reported massacres of Hutu villagers along the edge of the former French security zone in southwestern Rwanda and apparent killings of some returning refugees in Gisenyi Prefecture. 3.5c

-- The RPF may lack the muscle and the political will to rein in freelance Tutsi killers. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] the dispersal of RPF troops across Rwanda has greatly diluted the command-and-control exercised by commanders. At the same time, as long as the regime feels under threat of attack, it is likely to be reluctant to rein in--much less punish--its enthusiastic supporters among the vigilante bands and newly recruited troops. [redacted] 3.5c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Aug-1994 00:47 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: (grayw@NSCSTF@OE0B@MSGATE@WHSR)
SUBJECT: STUFF -- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~:

Message Creation Date was at 0 00:00:00

Good morning!

Not much out there this evening. SRB's schedule says Nancy will do the Rwanda meeting on Tuesday. I've left copies of the package with Nancy and Dee.

And, that covers it.

Adios!

Additional Header Information Follows

Date Created: 30-Aug-1994 00:47
Deletable Flag: Y
DOCNUM: 049930
VMS Filename: OA\$SHARA4:ZVJN14KUN.TXT
A1 Folder: AUG94
Message Format:
Message Status: READ
Date Modified: 30-Aug-1994 00:47
Forward Flag: YES
Read-Receipt Requested: NO
Delivery-Receipt Requested: NO
Message Priority: FIRST_CLASS

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/14

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 October 94 01:49
FROM Gray, Wendy
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: STUFF ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Wright, Allison M.
CARBON_COPY Itoh, William H.
Reed, James W.
Sens, Andrew D.

TEXT_BODY Good morning!

We received a fax from State this evening requesting Secretary Christopher, Thomas Donilon, Dennis Ross, Robert Pelletreau, Michael McCurry, Liz Lineberry and Robert Bradtke be allowed to travel on the President's plane during the up coming Middle East trip.

Ken Brill was under the impression we would be sending him an agenda for the Forn Policy Mtg -- He knew the subjects and I confirmed with Will that we would NOT be sending him a copy of the paper itself

Todd Stearns was concerned about the Bosnia portion of the Forn Policy Paper -- says it contains conflicting info. He will stop by in the AM.

We are missing four papers for Lake/Berger on Wednesday:

Rwanda Mtg -- Susan Rice
Alice Rivlin - Dick Clarke
DCI/DDCi - George Tenet
Hans Blix - Dan Poneman

I think that covers it.

Adios!

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 1/26/06

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 02 November 94 09:13
FROM Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: How I spent my day in New York ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Emery, Mary C.
Wolin, Neal S.
CARBON_COPY Atkin, Timothy J.
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Darragh, Sean J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Rice, Susan E.
Richardson, Craig
Rossin, Larry
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Simon, Steven N.

TEXT_BODY

FOR BERGER

Readout of meetings with Kofi Annan et al on Tuesday.

1. On Haiti: Kofi can't get BBG to focus on the Schroeder appointment while BBG is travelling. He will return around 11 November. Suggest we recommend to JCS getting Schroeder over here as a TDY advisor to Shali.

They are thinking of a hand over date in early February. USACOM is also recommending that date to Shali.

They like the idea of an all day conference on the US/UN transition, which we would host on or about the 14th.

2. On Somalia: They are pleased with the work being done by the three US planners. The Council should pass the withdrawal resolution this week. They NEED a decision soon on the US role in the withdrawal.

3. On Rwanda: I'll submit a detailed report to Tony. Bottom line: they will propose several options to the Council, while we and they together recruit someone to send a highly capable battalion plus into the Zaire area

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 November 94 15:14
FROM Wolin, Neal S.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Readiness Issue for Press Conference ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 12/12/14

also to go in the fax-to-TL pile. thx.

From: Bell, Robert G.
To: Berger, Samuel
CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Subject: Readiness Issue for Press Conference [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, November 22, 1994 03:06 PM

To recap:

1. Late in FY 1994 several unanticipated contingencies (Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.) arose which required immediate funding.
2. In August, Secretary Perry urged Congress to enact supplemental appropriations at once to pay for these military operations and warned that unless Congress acted immediately, training would have to be cancelled to free up O&M funds to pay for the contingencies.
3. In his testimony, Perry itemized exactly which units would have their readiness impaired if the training were cancelled. He SPECIFICALLY named the three active Army divisions that have now been classified "C-3" for readiness (1st Division, 4th Division and 2nd Armored).
4. Congress did NOT enact a supplemental at once. Instead, it went on its Labor Day recess and did not enact the supplemental until early October. By then, the training had been cancelled and the damage to readiness done.
5. Now, with the supplemental bill and the FY 1995 defense authorization and appropriations act signed into law, we HAVE THE FUNDS to reschedule the training and RESTORE the readiness. (Perry estimates a "get well" date of January-March of next year.
6. One of the reasons we will have the money to do this is because we

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fought for an INCREASE in defense spending in FY 1995 compared to the enacted FY 1994 level of ONE PERCENT (not adjusted for inflation). Specifically, we increased the Defense topline (in Budget Authority) for FY 1995 by \$2.4 billion and added \$11.4 billion back to the defense spending plan across the FYDP.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 November 94 18:15
FROM Veit, Katherine M.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Subject: RE: PC Meeting ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Cicio, Kristen K.
Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY Baker, Jane E.
Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Itoh, William H.
Joshi, M. Kay
Reed, James W.
Sens, Andrew D.

TEXT_BODY

Okay per Sandy Berger. thx.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: Cicio, Kristen K.; Veit, Katherine M.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: PC Meeting ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Friday, November 25, 1994 04:56 PM

Kris/Kathy:

Can you run this by Mr. Berger and let me know. Thanks.

From: Rice, Susan E.
To: Millison, Cathy L.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @AFRICA - African Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: PC Meeting ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Friday, November 25, 1994 04:42 PM

I think you should add OMB at least for the Rwanda/Angola discussion. Our understanding is that on Rwanda, we'll have a substantive discussion of issues and Angola will be a situation update. Please advise if that is not your understanding.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NM NARA, Date 12/12/11

CC: /R, Record at A1; Cicio, Kristen K.; Hall, Wilma G.; Veit, Katherine M.;
@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @AFRICA

African Affairs

Subject: PC Meeting ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Date: Friday, November 25, 1994 04:29 PM

I have just been notified by Mr. Lake's office that there will be a Principals Committee Meeting on Monday, November 28, 3:30 - 5:00 pm in the Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The main topic of discussion will be Bosnia. We are also letting the agencies know that Peacekeeping for Angola/Rwanda is a tentative item for the agenda.

The following agencies are being invited:

OVP
STATE
DOD
JCS
CIA
USUN

Any questions, let me know.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21395

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Separate
Meeting*

November 26, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE
FROM: SUSAN E. RICE/TIM ATKIN
SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting On
Rwanda and Angola, November 28, 4:30-5:00 pm.

In this brief meeting, you will cover three subjects: Rwanda, Angola, and the congressional consultations strategy that will accompany the Administration's policy decisions on Angola and Rwanda. Rwanda will be the most complex of the three subjects discussed and is the only one requiring an early decision.

Rwanda

The discussion paper at Tab II outlines six options for dealing with the serious problem posed by deteriorating security in the refugee camps in Zaire and elsewhere in the region. The options are:

- 1) Two-phased UN mission to establish temporary safe areas inside the Zairian camps (modified "bubble concept");
- 2) Chapter VII UN force to remove forcibly ex-FAR, militia and political leaders from the camps into the interior of Zaire;
- 3) Same as Option 2 conducted by one or more countries forming a multinational, non-UN force;
- 4) Do nothing;
- 5) Provide daylight security to protect humanitarian workers and assure food distribution in the Zairian camps, using peacekeepers or civilian contractors;
- 6) Provide daylight security plus an initial pilot project to test the "bubble concept" described in Option 1 for 30-60 days using 1,000 additional UNAMIR soldiers.

Assessing the Options: In our judgment, Option 1 is likely to be highly complex and costly. The odds of success are slim,

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particularly in the absence of substantive GOR progress towards political reconciliation and establishment of conditions conducive to refugee repatriation. Options 2 and 3 are not viable, because the required capable troops will not be available in any reasonable timeframe. Option 4, doing nothing, has a certain logic, given the international community's inability to address the most urgent problem -- preventing resumption of civil war -- at an acceptable cost. There is, however, hope that concerted international effort could help the Rwandans take control of events and move to peace. Moreover, it is difficult to do nothing in the face of such a compelling human tragedy, the potential for repetition of genocide, and the likelihood that inaction would speed the departure of NGOs.

In our judgment, Option 5 or 6 makes the most sense. They are limited, achievable actions that will make some difference in the camps, while demonstrating the international community's continuing concern about the crisis in the region. These steps would not, however, diminish the potential for renewed civil war. Nor do they address the NGOs' moral dilemma of providing succor to past and possibly future killers, which they cite as a key reason for possibly pulling out.

Specifically, we recommend that you seek agreement to the following:

- The USG will support provision of daylight security in the Zairian camps by civilian contractors, if available, funded by UNHCR. The U.S. would endeavor to make a voluntary contribution to UNHCR for this purpose (using Refugee funds that are available) and encourage other countries to make similar contributions.
- In addition, the USG would agree in principle to support a limited temporary expansion of UNAMIR by 1,000 troops for 30-60 days to pilot the "bubble concept" described in Option 1, under the following conditions:
 - Capable, well-equipped forces are willing and available to take on the mission and have been identified in advance.
 - The additional troops must be part of UNAMIR, not a new UN force.
 - The UN is engaged in consultations with both the GOR and exiled Hutu leadership to begin the process of political reconciliation.

-- The GOR has begun to take concrete steps to establish conditions conducive to refugee repatriation, including:

1. Allowing UNAMIR radio to operate immediately and broadcast conciliatory messages;
2. Creating a process for settlement of land disputes as a matter of high priority;
3. Entering public and genuine discussions with moderate elements of the ex-FAR and former Rwandan government to establish cooperation in the conduct of the tribunal effort and political reconciliation and military integration;
4. Allowing unimpeded access to UNAMIR and human rights monitors.

-- A cost estimate has been provided by the UN and is considered reasonable by USG.

-- Congressional reaction has been tested and there is general acquiescence.

This approach requires that the U.S. be activist in making the option work: by recruiting and perhaps training a capable military unit, by pressuring and possibly rewarding the Kigali Government, and by expending much of the refugee account.

Angola

The ceasefire in Angola appears to be holding, despite isolated skirmishes in outlying areas, involving small arms. Talks on the military accords are proceeding at a reasonable pace in Lusaka. We expect them to conclude next week.

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EO 13526 1.4c

If the ceasefire continues to hold and the military accords are completed, the UN will soon take steps to shore up the ceasefire. SRSG Beye has now decided to deploy the current 76 observers into the field. This should occur shortly. Next, we expect the UN Secretary General to report to the UNSC that conditions are suitable for the deployment of the full complement of police and

observers (476) already authorized by the UNSC. Then, the UNSC will have to vote to authorize the full UN force of approximately 7,000 envisioned in the Lusaka Protocol. This vote could come as soon as December 8, when UNAVEM II's existing mandate expires.

As the Principals decided November 7, the U.S. will support the establishment of UNAVEM III, if a number of conditions are met. Those conditions of significance that remain to be fulfilled are: signing of the military accords, establishment of joint ceasefire monitoring mechanisms, continued maintenance of the ceasefire, free flow of humanitarian assistance, and strong USG efforts to achieve commitment from the GRA and UNITA to help defray the cost of the UN mission. Once the conditions are in place, the U.S. would be prepared to vote for UNAVEM III and support the dispatch of the advance team, HQ and logistics units. The progressive deployment of the bulk of the force would depend on biweekly reports to the UNSC from the SYG that the parties are meeting key benchmarks in the implementation of their accords.

Congressional Consultations

The actions we take in the coming weeks in the Security Council on Angola and Rwanda will be the first relating to new or expanded UN peacekeeping missions since the elections. Funding is a bigger problem than ever: we will be fortunate to get our FY 96 peacekeeping budget request. It will be nearly impossible, if not impossible, to get any supplemental funds for new or existing missions.

Beyond funding, Congressional Republicans have made clear their intention to limit U.S. support for UN peacekeeping. We are already bound by law to inform Congress (whenever possible) before voting for new peacekeeping missions. Beyond this, the Republicans have made clear their desire to require prior Congressional authorization before we vote to commit U.S. funds or troops to new UN missions. The support of Senator Helms and other conservative legislators for UNITA over the years may make it possible to persuade them to support UNAVEM III, although it will not be easy to do so.

While we are unlikely to reach broad agreement on fundamental policy issues, how we approach initial consultations with Congress on Angola and Rwanda is important. The potential for more constructive relations will be enhanced by genuine, substantive consultations that are conducted not only with the intention of explaining and persuading but also of *listening*.

Assuming Council action on Angola on or before December 8, we will need to complete congressional consultations in the next ten days. If the Principals agree to the approach above with respect

to Rwanda, we will not need to consult with Congress on a new or expanded UN mission in Rwanda at this time. We should let them know in advance the conditions under which we would be prepared to support a limited expansion of UNAMIR and, if these conditions eventually pertain, conduct genuine consultations.

You should task NSC/Leg and State/H, working with OSD/Leg., to craft a strategy for consultations by December 2. They should work with their respective peacekeeping and AF counterparts to agree on the substantive elements of our approach to Congress.

Concurrences by: *me* *JK* *fr*
Don Steinberg, Bill Danvers

Attachments

Tab I Agenda

Tab II Discussion Paper

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21394

PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON RWANDA AND ANGOLA

DATE: November 28, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 5:00PM

AGENDA

- I. Introduction NSC
- II. Rwanda Situation Report CIA
- III. Camp Security Options ALL
- IV. Angola Situation Report CIA/State
- V. Summary NSC

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Declassify on 01-01-2040

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Principals Committee
Discussion Paper
Security in Rwandan Refugee Camps

ISSUE FOR DECISION:

What is the United States position on the UN-proposed options for improving security in the Zairian refugee camps and what type of support is the USG willing to provide?

BACKGROUND ON DECISION:

Security in the Camps: Since the massive outflow of Hutus in June and July, relatively few have returned to Rwanda.

Hutus have announced the establishment of a government in exile, begun training and preparations for renewed civil war, and terrorized refugees who indicate a desire to return to Rwanda.

No UN forces are in the camps and, because of radical hard-line Hutus, the camps have become dangerous for relief workers and refugees. Relief organizations have stated that the moral implications of supporting those who were responsible for committing genocide earlier this year, coupled with deteriorating security conditions, may force them to abandon their mission. At least one leading NGO has already shut down operations in the camps.

Conditions in Rwanda: There have been some reports criticizing the GOR for revenge killings of Hutus by Tutsis and lackluster efforts to encourage repatriation. The GOR claims it desires to initiate reconciliation and encourage repatriation but lacks the resources. RPF troops have not been paid for several months. Although the international community has begun efforts to clear Rwanda's IFI arrears and provide support to key ministries, no financial assistance has been provided to date to the GOR.

There have been some efforts by the GOR to make good on their word. Most of the RPA prefects, including at least one civilian hard-liner, have been replaced with civilians supportive of repatriation and sensitive to the need to address Hutu concerns about physical security and the rule of law. The GOR has made efforts to arrest Tutsis who conducted revenge killings and is discussing ways to avoid arbitrary arrest or detention of individuals accused of participating in the genocide.

At the same time the GOR has not: named a point person on human rights; provided UNAMIR unlimited access throughout Rwanda;

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allowed UNAMIR radio to broadcast; initiated significant efforts towards military/political reconciliation and integration; or, established a process to settle land disputes.

OPTIONS:

UN Proposals to Enhance Security in the Refugee Camps: The result of several UN technical missions to the region, the UN Secretary General's recent report on security in the Zairian refugee camps offers three options (1 - 3 below). The UN has provided no cost estimates.

The UNSC will continue discussions of the report this week. It is expected that, rather than authorize any new or expanded mission at this stage, the UNSC will send a letter to the SYG asking him to begin active troop recruitment, provide cost estimates for specific options and refine his concept of operations. This week, the UNSC is also expected to renew and perhaps modify UNAMIR's mandate.

Rwanda will assume Presidency of the UNSC in December, and we will try to minimize Council activity on Rwanda during this period. However, since it is hard to justify delaying any formal Council action on camp security until January, we may need to press the Rwandan Perm Rep. to recuse himself when the Council takes up the SYG's follow-on report in December.

Option One: A Two-phased Operation to Establish Temporary Safe Areas Inside the Zairian Camps (Modified "Bubble Concept"): This would be a robust Chapter VI mission requiring 3,000-5,000 mechanized, well-equipped, well-trained troops for up to 30 months. In Phase I, each battalion would establish temporary safe zones for civilians within the camps, segregating armed military/militia. The UN force would facilitate the return of refugees to Rwanda and provide protection for humanitarian operations. In addition, the UN would support the training by private contractors or UNCIVPOL of Zairian police or untainted Rwandan Gendarmerie to take over camps security in Phase II, once the battalion moves on to the next camp.

Also in Phase II, a single motorized company of UN troops would remain behind with the newly trained local police force until each safe area is closed. A vital prerequisite for success is creation by the Rwandan government of conditions conducive to the safe return of refugees, including access to Hutu-owned land and political reconciliation.

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Option Two: Chapter VII UN Force to remove forcibly former Rwandan government officials, soldiers and militia from the camps into the interior of Zaire: This mission would require 10,000 to 12,000 extremely capable troops able to fight the ex-FAR and militia who would resist separation from the civilian population. The Secretary General argues that moving the ex-FAR and militia is the only way to prevent resumption of the civil war. However, he acknowledges the complexity of the mission and the UN's inability to recruit the necessary troops.

Option Three: Same mission as in Option 2, conducted by one or more countries forming a multinational force blessed but not organized by the UN, as in Haiti or Operation Turquoise: The UN considers this a more viable option than #2, but doubts any country is prepared to take on the mission.

All of the above options are problematic, but the international community remains at a loss to suggest a better plan to reduce the potential for renewed civil war or facilitate repatriation.

- Successful execution of Option 1 would pose a significant challenge even to highly capable forces, which are unlikely to be forthcoming. (Only Pakistan has agreed to provide troops.) Civilian contractors could not be expected to fulfill this mission. Insertion of UN forces to establish safe areas risks igniting open conflict with the Hutu military/militia, who may resist isolation and repatriation of civilians. Moreover, the chances of successfully training "clean", capable local police to assume responsibility for camp security are slim. Most importantly, without genuine political reconciliation inside Rwanda, which seems remote at present, there is considerable risk in trying to return Hutu refugees.

There are also significant questions about the Secretary General's concept of operations. For instance, why are heavily mechanized units required? Are more troops requested than are necessary? Why must the UN establish a separately-mandated mission for Zaire, albeit under UNAMIR operational control and using UNAMIR logistics infrastructure?

If the Principals favor Option 1, they may want to consider the following conditions:

-- reducing the force size to fewer than 3,000 (recognizing this may extend the length of the mission);

-- eliminating the requirement that the forces be "mechanized infantry";

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-- making the forces part of UNAMIR, rather than a new mission;

-- authorizing the expanded force only after we know there are capable nations willing to do it;

-- proceeding with the military "bubble" operation only if, in parallel, the Rwandan Government had established the other part of a comprehensive system -- i.e. appropriate conditions for the return of refugees.

- Options 2 and 3 appear to be virtual non-starters. As the Secretary General's military advisor noted sarcastically last week, it would take "five years" for the UN to recruit and deploy the required forces. It is also unlikely any capable country would volunteer and finance its own forces to undertake the mission.

Alternative Options: There are at least three other options not presented by the Secretary General: 4) do nothing; 5) expand UNAMIR modestly or hire civilian contractors to provide simple daylight security for humanitarian relief workers; or, 6) provide simple daylight security plus initiate a small pilot project to test the feasibility of Option One.

Option Four: Doing nothing: This would likely lead to NGOs pulling out, cause further deterioration of camp security and potentially further destabilize the region, particularly Burundi. Furthermore, the international community may face tremendous criticism for turning its back on innocent civilians a second time.

Option Five: Providing daylight security to protect humanitarian assistance workers and assure food distribution to innocent civilians: Like Option 1 above, providing daylight security alone would not deter resumption of the civil war nor resolve the NGOs moral dilemma of feeding past perpetrators of genocide. Arguably, it heightens the international community's complicity in facilitating Hutu preparations to restart the war. On the other hand, providing daylight security is an achievable, if open-ended mission, which potentially could be fulfilled by civilian contractors hired by UNHCR rather than peacekeepers. If coupled with wet-feeding, an expensive and labor-intensive alternative to providing solid food (which is easily controlled by militia), daylight security could improve conditions in the camps and encourage NGOs remain. Most importantly, it would enable the international community to *do something*, while

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accepting its apparent inability to prevent renewed civil warfare at an acceptable cost.

Option Six: A combination of providing daylight security plus an initial pilot effort to create temporary safe areas inside one or two test camps: This hybrid suffers from all of the impediments discussed above. It would be less ambitious and less costly than option one and would enable the international community to determine the military and political feasibility of encouraging Hutu civilians to repatriate, if given the opportunity. It could also test the GOR's desire to create an atmosphere conducive to repatriation.

The initial pilot could mirror the robust Chapter VI mission described as the "bubble concept" but using only one battalion for a period of 30 to 60 days in a portion of one camp.

Targeting the UN Effort:

The Secretary General's report specifically addresses the need to establish security in the Zairian refugee camps. Intimidation of refugees and interference with NGO efforts are present to some degree in all of the camps in the region. It may be desirable to target any repatriation efforts toward camps in Burundi or Tanzania first rather than the most difficult camps in Zaire. Simultaneously, a daylight security program could be initiated in the camps where NGOs face the most significant troubles.

Conditions on the Government of Rwanda:

It may be desirable to establish benchmarks against which GOR efforts to encourage repatriation can be measured. These benchmarks could include the following and should be met before, or carried out in conjunction with, a UN effort to facilitate refugee return. The GOR should:

- allow UNAMIR radio to operate immediately and broadcast conciliatory messages;
- create a process for settlement of land disputes as a matter of high priority;
- enter public and genuine discussions with moderate elements of the ex-FAR and former Rwandan government to establish cooperation in the conduct of the tribunal effort and political reconciliation and military integration;
- allow unimpeded access to UNAMIR and human rights monitors.

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~~SECRET~~U. S. Support

Recruitment: We have been working with the UN to identify and assist in the recruitment of potential troop contributing countries. UNDPKO does not expect any country to step forward unless the U.S. assists in an aggressive recruitment effort. While high-level involvement in recruiting countries may be successful, it might imply that the U.S. is willing to provide more support than is desirable or possible.

Direct Mission Support: U.S. troop involvement is not being considered. However, the U.S. could continue to provide lift, equipment and other support on a reimbursable basis.

Congressional Issues:

We must consult with Congress immediately on any decision we may take that involves expanding UNAMIR or establishing a new UN peacekeeping mission. We also need to decide whether we would allow a hostile reaction from Congress to change our policy. We lack the funds to pay for any new or expanded mission and need to weigh especially carefully all decisions on new peacekeeping missions. If progress continues in Angola and the Principals decide to endorse options 1, 2 or 6 in Rwanda, we could be asking Congress to go along with two new/expanded and expensive missions. Congressional reaction to a new Rwanda mission is likely to be negative, given the cost, the questionable viability of the mission and doubts about the sub-region's importance to U.S. national security.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 November 94 17:42
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Readiness Issue for Press Conference [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Danvers, William C.
CARBON_COPY Andricos, George M.
Blinken, Anthony J.
Funches, Christina L.

TEXT_BODY

For the Dole/Gingrich Meeting

From: Bell, Robert G.
To: Berger, Samuel
CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Subject: Readiness Issue for Press Conference [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, November 22, 1994 03:06 PM

To recap:

1. Late in FY 1994 several unanticipated contingencies (Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.) arose which required immediate funding.
2. In August, Secretary Perry urged Congress to enact supplemental appropriations at once to pay for these military operations and warned that unless Congress acted immediately, training would have to be cancelled to free up O&M funds to pay for the contingencies.
3. In his testimony, Perry itemized exactly which units would have their readiness impaired if the training were cancelled. He SPECIFICALLY named the three active Army divisions that have now been classified "C-3" for readiness (1st Division, 4th Division and 2nd Armored).
4. Congress did NOT enact a supplemental at once. Instead, it went on its Labor Day recess and did not enact the supplemental until early October. By then, the training had been cancelled and the damage to readiness done.
5. Now, with the supplemental bill and the FY 1995 defense authorization and appropriations act signed into law, we HAVE THE FUNDS to reschedule the training and RESTORE the readiness. (Perry estimates a "get well" date of January-March of next year.)

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6. One of the reasons we will have the money to do this is because we fought for an INCREASE in defense spending in FY 1995 compared to the enacted FY 1994 level of ONE PERCENT (not adjusted for inflation). Specifically, we increased the Defense topline (in Budget Authority) for FY 1995 by \$2.4 billion and added \$11.4 billion back to the defense spending plan across the FYDP.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 November 94 17:46
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Readiness Issue for Press Conference [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Danvers, William C.
CARBON_COPY Andricos, George M.
Blinken, Anthony J.
Funches, Christina L.

TEXT_BODY

For Dole-Gingrich memo.

From: Bell, Robert G.
To: Berger, Samuel
CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Subject: Readiness Issue for Press Conference [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, November 22, 1994 03:06 PM

Readiness and Military Spending:

BACKGROUND:

On November 15, Secretary Perry informed Congress that the readiness status of three active Army divisions (1st and 4th Infantry and 2d Armored) had slipped in September to "C-3" -- a substandard condition that means the units could not execute all their assigned missions. Although SecDef made it clear that this was a temporary situation occasioned by the failure of Congress to pass a supplemental appropriations measure quickly enough this fall to reimburse Defense for unexpected contingencies overseas, many in Congress attacked the Administration for allowing what they saw as a return to the "hollow force." The funding shortfall that led to this readiness problem is being corrected using FY 1995 defense appropriations. Future reoccurrences will be prevented thru the Defense topline increases for FY 1996-1999 you announced with the Joint Chiefs at your meeting on December 1st (Thursday).

TALKING POINTS:

-- Last summer several unanticipated contingencies (Cuba, Haiti, Rwanda, etc.) arose which required immediate funding by the Defense Department.

-- In August, Secretary Perry appeared before Chairman Murtha's defense appropriations subcommittee and urged Congress to enact supplemental

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appropriations at once to pay for these military operations. Perry warned that unless Congress acted immediately, training would have to be cancelled to free up O&M funds to pay for the contingencies.

-- In his testimony, Perry itemized exactly which units would have their readiness impaired if the training were cancelled. He specifically named the three active Army divisions that have now been classified "C-3" for readiness (1st Division, 4th Division and 2nd Armored).

-- Unfortunately, Congress did NOT enact a supplemental in time. Instead, it went on its Labor Day recess and did not pass the supplemental until early October. By then, the training had been cancelled and the damage to readiness done.

-- Now, with the supplemental bill and the FY 1995 defense authorization and appropriations acts signed into law, we have the funds to reschedule the training and restore the readiness. (Perry estimates a "get well" date for the 3 divisions of January-March of next year).

-- One of the reasons we will have the necessary money is because we fought for an INCREASE in defense spending in FY 1995 compared to the enacted FY 1994 level of one percent (not adjusted for inflation). Specifically, last year we increased the Defense topline (in Budget Authority) for FY 1995 by \$2.4 billion and added \$11.4 billion back to the defense spending plan across the FYDP. In our FY 95 defense budget we also increased funding for O&M by 5.7% even though the size of the force was decreasing by 7%. In other words, the dollars available for readiness purposes in FY 1995 on a per-soldier basis have been substantially increased.

-- And, as I announced after my meeting with the Joint Chiefs yesterday, I have decided to increase the defense budget over the levels specified in this year's Budget Resolution for FY 96-99 by \$10.5 billion. This increase will ensure that our defense spending plans will meet our requirement to: (1) protect readiness, (2) maintain the conventional and strategic nuclear force postures specified in the Bottom Up Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, (3) improve the Quality of Life for our military personnel (including the full pay raise authorized under current law), and (4) fund necessary modernization programs.