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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPOKE~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~NOCONTRACT~~

SECTION 1 OF 8

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PASS: (b)(3), 1.4c USCENTCOM PASS TO
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REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT
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SERIAL: (b)(3)

SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)

DOI: 19 AUG 94

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KEY JUDGMENTS

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1. (C) THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY (EX-FAR) WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY LAUNCH
AN INSURGENCY AGAINST THE NEW RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)-DOMINATED
GOVERNMENT TO REGAIN POLITICAL BARGAINING POWER THE FORMER INTERIM
GOVERNMENT LOST IN ITS RECENT MILITARY DEFEAT.

2. (C) THE EX-FAR HAS THE MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION TO BEGIN
SMALL-SCALE INSURGENCY OPERATIONS ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, THE
EX-FAR WILL PROBABLY NOT BEGIN ITS ATTACKS IN EARNEST FOR AT LEAST 90
DAYS.

3. (C) SEVERAL LIMITING FACTORS PREVENT A LARGE-SCALE INSURGENCY FROM
OCCURRING WITHIN THE NEXT 90 DAYS: THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL
ATTENTION IN THE GOMA AND BUKAVU REGIONS OF ZAIRE, THE ABSENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMS SUPPLIERS AND FINANCIAL BACKING, AND THE NECESSITY
FOR THE EX-FAR TO REORGANIZE FROM A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL NATIONAL
ARMY TO THAT OF AN INSURGENT FORCE.

4. (C) MOST HUTU REFUGEES IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA WILL NOT RETURN TO
RWANDA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE (WITHIN A YEAR). THIS
POPULATION-IN-EXILE WILL PROVIDE THE POLITICAL SUPPORT BASE FOR A

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SUSTAINED AND LARGE-SCALE INSURGENCY UNLESS IMMEDIATE STEPS ARE TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REPATRIATE THE REFUGEES, TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF HUTUS IN RWANDA, AND TO DISARM AND DEMOBILIZE THE EX-FAR IN ZAIRE.

5. {G} REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PRECEDING CONDITIONS ARE MET, AN INSURGENCY WILL DEVELOP AS HUTU EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WILL NOT RETURN TO A RWANDA WITH A TUTSI-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT. THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE INSURGENCY, WHICH IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WILL BE UNDER WAY WITHIN 6 MONTHS, WILL DEPEND ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO THE EX-FAR.

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DISCUSSION

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6. {S/NF} BACKGROUND. RWANDA'S CIVIL WAR BEGAN IN 1990 WHEN THE REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA), THE MILITARY ARM OF THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF), INVADED RWANDA FROM RPA BASES IN UGANDA. AT THE TIME, KIGALI'S MILITARY FORCE, THE FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR), WAS ONLY ABOUT 7,000 SOLDIERS STRONG. IN RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL WAR, THE FAR RAPIDLY EXPANDED TO 31,000 TROOPS. THE NEW CONSCRIPTS RECEIVED LITTLE TRAINING BEFORE THEY WERE COMMITTED TO BATTLE--SEVERELY REDUCING THE FAR'S OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS--AND THE FORCE CONTINUED TO RELY ON HASTILY CONSCRIPTED AND POORLY TRAINED

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SPOKE-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT~~

SECTION 2 OF 8

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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? {U} SOLDIERS THROUGHOUT THE CIVIL WAR. THUS, DESPITE HAVING A TOTAL FORCE OF ABOUT 31,000, THE FAR HAD A CORE OF ONLY ABOUT 10,000 SEASONED, COMBAT-TESTED TROOPS.

7. {S/NF} WHEN THE AIRCRAFT CARRYING RWANDA'S HUTU PRESIDENT CRASHED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN EARLY APRIL, THE RPA RENEWED AND INTENSIFIED ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE FAR. THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES COMBINED NUMBERED ABOUT 39,000 SOLDIERS. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT FORCES ARRAYED ALONG THE NORTHERN FRONT (THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE) NUMBERED ABOUT 18,700 SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES, AND MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN THE CAPITAL RANGED FROM 5,200 TO 6,350 MEN. THESE TROOPS SERVED AS THE FAR'S STRATEGIC RESERVE. GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THE RPA, AND THE FAR WAS JUDGED VERY COMPETENT BY REGIONAL STANDARDS. NONETHELESS, THE RPA, A MUCH SMALLER AND LESS WELL-EQUIPPED FORCE, DEFEATED THE FAR BY MID-JULY.

8. {S/NF} EX-FAR EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO 6 APRIL 1994.

ARMORED CARS	TOTAL
PANHARD AML-60 (MM CANNON)	25
AML-90 (MM CANNON)	12
AML-245 (MACHINEGUNS)	25
ARTILLERY/MORTARS	
122MM HOWITZER, D30	6*
105MM HOWITZER	6
122MM MRL, BM-21	5
120MM MORTAR	24
82MM MORTAR, TYPE 53	75
81MM MORTAR	50
60MM MORTAR	100+
AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS	
37MM AD GUN, M1939	10
23MM AAA, ZU-23/2	11

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14.5MM AAMG, ZPU-4	24	
20MM AD GUN	1	
DOES POSSESS SA-7 FAMILY ADA MISSILES	UNKNOWN	
MISTRAL ADA MISSILES	15	
ANTITANK WEAPONS		
75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE	50	
HELICOPTERS		
SA-342 GAZELLE, ASSAULT	3	
SA-365 DAUPHIN, UTILITY	1	
SA-318 ALOUETTE II, UTILITY	2	
REPORTS INDICATE THAT SOME OF THESE HELICOPTERS ARE ARMED AS GUNSHIPS AND ARE OPERATIONAL		
9. (S/NF) EX-FAR FORCE COMPOSITION, LOCATIONS 6 APRIL 1994.		
MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS	STRENGTH	LOCATION
25 INFANTRY BNS	13,000	SEVEN OPERATIONAL
	(600-800 EACH BN)	SECTORS
2 COMMANDO BNS	1,000	RUHengeri/ GISENYI SECTORS

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SECTION 3 OF 8

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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)

PARACOMMANDO BN	1,000	KIGALI
1 ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BN	690	KIGALI
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BN	600	KIGALI
HEADQUARTERS/SUPPORT UNITS	4,770	KIGALI
TRAINING BN	600	BUTARE
SUBTOTAL	23,460	
10 GENDARME TERRITORIAL GROUPS	5,300	ONE GROUP PER
	(BN)	PREFECTURE (10)
1 GENDARME TERRITORIAL CO	400	KIGALI
2 GENDARME INTERVENTION BNS	920	KIGALI
1 ROUTE SECURITY CO	200	KIGALI
1 GENDARME AIR ASSAULT CO	200	KIGALI
1 GENDARME HEADQUARTERS	200	KIGALI
SUBTOTAL	7,200	
MAJOR UNIT TOTAL	30,660	

TOTAL FORCES AVAILABLE ABOUT 39,000 INCLUDES MILITIA FORCES

10. (U) THE FLIGHT OF THE EX-FAR AND ITS GENERAL LOCATIONS. ON 17 JULY, SOME 20,000 FAR FORCES IN NORTHWESTERN RWANDA FLED TO GOMA, ZAIRE, AS INTACT COMBAT UNITS BRINGING WITH THEM THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS (TOTALS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT UNKNOWN). THE PRIMARY REASON GIVEN BY THE FAR FOR THIS RETREAT WAS A SEVERE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AND HEAVY WEAPONS THAT WOULD HAVE ENABLED THE FAR TO SUSTAIN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE RPA.

11. ~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ ZAIRE HAD BEEN THE MAIN SOURCE OF OUTSIDE AID TO THE EX-FAR THROUGH GOMA AIRFIELD; FRENCH OCCUPATION UNDER OPERATION TURQUOISE, CAUSED ARMS AND MUNITIONS FLOWS TO THE FAR TO DWINDLE SEVERELY, HAMPERING THE FORCE'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN COMBAT WITH THE RPA. AS THE FAR CROSSED INTO GOMA, ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF THE TROOPS WERE DISARMED. THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY HAS CONFISCATED SOME EX-FAR HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN THE GOMA AND BUKAVU AREAS. ALTHOUGH SOME EX-FAR UNITS RETAINED SMALL ARMS AND CACHES OF AMMUNITION, THERE WAS PRACTICALLY NO AMMUNITION FOR CREW SERVED WEAPONS IN ZAIRE. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE EX-FAR'S PARACOMMANDOS AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD REMAIN HIDDEN IN THE NATIONAL PARK OF THE

VOLCANOES BETWEEN RUHENGARI AND GISENYI IN ORDER TO BEGIN INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RPA.

12. ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ EX-FAR EQUIPMENT UNDER ZAIRIAN CONTROL.

EQUIPMENT TYPE	QUANTITY	LOCATION
ARMORED VEHICLES		
AML-TYPE ARMORED CARS	AT LEAST 15	GOMA
	APPROXIMATELY 10	RUMANGABO
VBL ARMORED SCOUT CARS	5	GOMA
ARTILLERY/MORTARS		
HOWITZER (TYPE UNKNOWN)	6	GOMA
105MM HOWITZER	UNKNOWN	RUMANGABO

#1049

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~~S E C R E T SPOKE NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~

SECTION 4 OF 8

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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)

106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES	40	RUMANGABO
ROCKET LAUNCHERS (TYPE UNK)	2	RUMANGABO
ROCKET LAUNCHER, BM 21	5	GOMA
MORTAR, 120MM	6	GOMA
MORTARS 60MM	UNKNOWN	RUMANGABO

AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

AAA GUNS (TYPES UNKNOWN)	15	RUMANGABO
AAA GUNS (TYPES UNKNOWN)	12	GOMA

{AAA GUNS WERE USED BY THE FAR IN THE GROUND MODE DURING THE FIGHTING}

HELICOPTERS

SA-342 GAZELLE, ASSAULT	3	BUKAVU
SA-318 ALOUETTE II, UTILITY	2	BUKAVU

13. ~~(S/NF/WW)~~ OTHER LESS ORGANIZED AND LESS WELL-EQUIPPED EX-FAR TROOPS-- 5,000 TO 7,000--FLED TO BUKAVU, ZAIRE, SINCE 17 JULY. DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR, PROBABLY IN EARLY MAY, ABOUT 1,000 TO 2,000 ADDITIONAL EX-FAR SOLDIERS SOUGHT REFUGE ALONG THE TANZANIA FRONTIER NEAR THE AKAGERA NATIONAL PARK AND HAVE LAUNCHED SPORADIC ATTACKS AGAINST THE RPA IN NORTHEASTERN RWANDA. ANOTHER GROUP OF ABOUT 3,000 EX-FAR SOLDIERS ARE IN THE BENACO REGION OF TANZANIA. FINALLY, THERE ARE REPORTS OF AS MANY AS 5,000 ARMED HUTU ELEMENTS (EX-FAR AND MILITIA) IN THE FRENCH SAFE ZONE, PRIMARILY IN THE NYUNGWE FOREST WEST OF GIKONGORO. ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF EX-FAR IN RWANDA, ZAIRE, AND TANZANIA RANGE FROM 34,000 TO 37,000, BUT MOST OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE ASSESSED TO BE OF GENERALLY LOW COMBAT CAPABILITY. ONLY ABOUT 10,000 ARE BELIEVED TO BE WELL-DISCIPLINED AND WELL-TRAINED, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE IN THE GOMA AREA.

14. ~~(S/NF)~~ EX-FAR FORCE POSSIBLE COMPOSITION AND LOCATIONS.

MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	LOCATION
12 INFANTRY BNS	8,400	GOMA AREA
	{600-800 EACH BN}	
2 COMMANDO BNS	2,000 {1,000 EACH}	GOMA AREA
PARACOMMANDO BN	1,000	GOMA AREA
1 ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BN	600	GOMA AREA
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BN	600	GOMA AREA
HEADQUARTERS/SUPPORT UNITS	4,000	GOMA AREA
1 GENDARME TERRITORIAL CO	400	GOMA AREA
2 GENDARME INTERVENTION BNS	900	GOMA AREA
1 ROUTE SECURITY CO	200	GOMA AREA
2 GENDARME TERRITORIAL GROUP	1,000	GOMA AREA
1 GENDARME HEADQUARTERS	200	GOMA AREA

SUBTOTAL 15,000 - 20,000
 6 INFANTRY BNS {LESS ORGANIZED} 4,200 BUKAVU AREA
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 SECTION 5 OF 8
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 SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? {U}
 1 GENDARME AIR ASSAULT CO 200 BUKAVU AREA
 SUPPORT TROOPS 700 BUKAVU AREA
 SUBTOTAL 5,000 - 7,000
 3 INFANTRY BNS {LESS ORGANIZED} 2,100 NYUNGWE FOREST
 3 GENDARME TERRITORIAL GROUPS 1,500 NYUNGWE FOREST
 /SAFE ZONE
 MILITIA 1,400 NYUNGWE FOREST
 SUBTOTAL 5,000
 1 OR 2 INFANTRY BNS {LESS ORGANIZED} 1,400 AKAGERA PARK
 2 INFANTRY BNS {LESS ORGANIZED} 1,400 BENACO CAMP
 2 GENDARME TERRITORIAL GROUPS 1,000 BENACO CAMP
 MILITIA 1,000 BENACO CAMP
 SUBTOTAL 3,000
 TOTAL FORCES AVAILABLE ABOUT 34,000 TO 37,000 INCLUDES MILITIA FORCES
 15. ~~(S/NF)~~ ESTIMATE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE
 EX-FAR POSSESSES VERY FEW RADIOS OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT,
 BUT IT COULD BE USING HAND-HELD MOTOROLA TYPE WALKIE-TALKIES AND
 CELLULAR TELEPHONES. THE FRENCH PROVIDED THE MAJORITY OF THE EX-FAR
 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, PARIS PURPOSELY DENIED
 STATE-OF-THE-ART DEVICES OUT OF FEAR THIS EQUIPMENT WOULD FALL INTO
 RPA HANDS. THE EX-FAR RELIES ON COURIERS AND FACE-TO-FACE
 COORDINATION TO EFFECT COMMAND AND CONTROL. COMMAND AND CONTROL
 PROBABLY IS ADEQUATE FOR LIMITED INSURGENCY OPERATIONS OR SMALL-SCALE
 (SQUAD OR PLATOON) CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, BUT NOT ADEQUATE TO
 CONTROL CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS.
 16. ~~(S/NF/WW/NC)~~ THE EX-FAR'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP HAS PROBABLY NOT YET
 DEVELOPED A COHERENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH IT NOW
 FINDS ITSELF; SOME EX-FAR LEADERS ARE ACTIVELY TRYING TO NEGOTIATE
 THEIR RETURN TO RWANDA (SOME REPORTEDLY HAVE SUCCEEDED). THE MAJORITY
 OF THE INFLUENTIAL HUTU MILITARY OFFICERS ARE IN THE GOMA AREA AT A
 PROBABLE HEADQUARTERS ENCAMPMENT. KEY LEADERS INCLUDE: BRIG GEN
 BIZIMUNGU, CHIEF OF STAFF AND A HUTU FROM RUHENGARI; COL SETAKO,
 CABINET CHIEF OF THE FORMER RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTRY, A HUTU FROM
 GISENYI; COL NSENGIYUVA, LIAISON OFFICER WITH FRENCH OPERATION
 TURQUOISE, A HUTU FROM GISENYI; LT COL BAHUFITE, FORMER COMMANDER OF
 THE GISENYI OPERATIONAL ZONE, A HUTU FROM GISENYI.
 17. ~~(S/NF/WW/NC)~~ BRIG GEN NDINDILIIYIMANA, THE FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF
 OF THE GENDARMERIE AND PROBABLY THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OF ALL THE
 SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, HAS KEPT COMPLETELY SILENT AND REMAINS IN
 THE FRENCH SAFE ZONE IN RWANDA. THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS HAVE BEEN
 IMPLICATED IN GENOCIDE, AND THEIR LOCATION IS PRESENTLY UNKNOWN:
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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ ~~SPOKE-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT~~
 SECTION 6 OF 8
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 SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? {U}
 FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER BIZAMINA; HIS PERSONAL CABINET DIRECTOR COL
 BAGASORA; PARACOMMANDO BATTALION COMMANDER LT COL NTABAKWEZE; AND
 PRESIDENTIAL GUARD COMMANDER LT COL NKUNDYIE. THESE OFFICERS MOST

LIKELY WOULD FORM THE NUCLEUS OF AN EXTREMIST HUTU INSURGENCY AND, IN ALL PROBABILITY, WOULD NEVER RETURN TO AN RPF-DOMINATED RWANDA.

18. ~~(S/NF)~~ INTELLIGENCE. THE EX-FAR HAS A LIMITED INSTITUTIONALIZED INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. IT CAN COLLECT VIA DIRECT OBSERVATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE CAMPS. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT A NETWORK OF SPOTTERS OR INFORMERS HAS BEEN FORMED; THERE ARE REPORTS OF LIMITED RECONNAISSANCE UNDER WAY, HOWEVER, NEAR MUTURA IN RWANDA AND CLOSE TO THE VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARK BY THE ELITE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND PARACOMMANDO ELEMENTS. PREVIOUSLY, AN EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK EXISTED RELYING ON HUTUS FROM GISENYI AND RUHENGERI PREFECTURES WHO WERE RECRUITED WHILE IN COLLEGE. THESE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WERE POSTED AS MAYORAL AIDES IN EACH OF RWANDA'S 10 PREFECTURES. THE ORIGIN OF THESE OFFICERS WOULD HAMPER THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AS COVERT OPERATIVES ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH AN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK BEYOND NORTHWESTERN RWANDA.

19. ~~(SS)~~ LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT. MUCH OF THE EX-FAR'S EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS WERE LOST IN BATTLE TO THE RPF OR DISCARDED/DESTROYED IN PLACE IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE FIGHTING. THE EX-FAR DID TRANSFER UNDETERMINED QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION INTO ZAIRE, SOME VIA TRUCK AND SOME CARRIED BY INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS. THE FORCE PROBABLY HAS NO STOCK OF SPARE PARTS FOR WEAPONS, VEHICLES, OR OTHER EQUIPMENT. THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FLED WITH THE TREASURY MONEY, AND HIGH-LEVEL LEADERS HAVE SUFFICIENT PERSONAL FUNDS TO INITIALLY FINANCE AN INSURGENCY. THIS FORCE HAS NO CURRENT SOURCE FOR SIGNIFICANT NEW QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS OR AMMUNITION. HOWEVER, THE CHINA, LIBYA, IRAQ, AND IRAN COULD BE POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS OF WEAPONS ONCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RELINQUISHES CONTROL OF GOMA AIRFIELD AND ATTENTION SHIFTS AWAY FROM EASTERN ZAIRE.

20. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALLIES AND SPONSORS. THE EX-FAR HAS NO OPEN ALLIES OR SPONSORS AT THE PRESENT. ZAIRE IS A POTENTIAL ALLY, THOUGH PROBABLY NOT WITHIN THE NEXT 3 MONTHS WHILE GOMA REMAINS THE SITE OF MUCH INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE LOCAL ZAIRIAN MILITARY IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE HUTUS AND, IF IT IS NOT ALREADY DOING SO, COULD ASSIST THE EX-FAR. MUCH OF THE FRICTION BETWEEN THE EX-FAR AND THE ZAIRIAN ARMY CAME FROM ZAIRE'S ELITE FORCES--THE SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL DIVISION (DSP) AND 31ST PARACHUTE BRIGADE--UNITS WHICH NORMALLY ARE BASED OUTSIDE THE REGION. FURTHERMORE, ZAIRE, WITH FRENCH ASSISTANCE, COULD RENEW ITS SUPPORT TO THE HUTUS IN ORDER TO FORCE A POLITICAL SOLUTION

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SECTION 7 OF 8

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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)
IN RWANDA MORE IN ZAIRE'S INTERESTS.

21. ~~(S/NF)~~ POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, NEAR TERM (30 - 90 DAYS) OUTLOOK AND THREAT ASSESSMENT. OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EX-FAR UNITS IN THE REGION IS JUDGED TO BE LOW. HOWEVER, THERE ARE REPORTS OF SMALL- SCALE RAIDS INTO EASTERN RWANDA THAT ARE PROBABLY CONDUCTED BY ELEMENTS IN THE VICINITY OF THE AKAGERA NATIONAL PARK AND BENACO REFUGEE CAMP IN TANZANIA. THESE FORCES IN ALL LIKELIHOOD LACK A SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FOR A LENGTHY INSURGENCY AND WOULD NEED RESUPPLY WITHIN 2 OR 3 MONTHS. THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES IS THE KEY FACTOR DEGRADING THE EX-FAR'S NEAR-TERM CAPABILITY. THE EX-FAR HAS INSUFFICIENT STOCKS TO MOUNT LARGE-SCALE, SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS.

22. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN THE GOMA REGION, THE PARACOMMANDO BATTALION AND

PRESIDENTIAL GUARD COULD ALSO LAUNCH LIMITED SQUAD- OR PLATOON-SIZE RAIDS AND INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN RUHENGERI AND GISENYI PREFECTURES, POSSIBLY FROM THE VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARK IN NORTHWEST RWANDA. THE PARACOMMANDO BATTALION MAY HAVE RECEIVED EXTENSIVE TERRORIST TRAINING FROM FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1990-1993). THIS UNIT IS THE LINCHPIN OF THE EX-FAR, AND ITS ACTIONS MOST LIKELY WOULD SERVE AS AN INDICATOR OF WHAT THE EX-FAR WILL DO AS A WHOLE.

23. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE FORCES IN THE BUKAVU REGION LACK ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS, AND THUS, POSE LITTLE THREAT AND ARE NOT LIKELY TO BEGIN INSURGENCY OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE FORCES IN THE NYUNGWE FOREST AREA OF THE SAFE ZONE WILL CONTINUE TO TERRORIZE THE LOCAL POPULATION, COULD INTERFERE WITH UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) TROOPS, AND COULD PROMPT THE RPA TO RENEW MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA. IF THE RPA RESUMES ITS ATTACKS, THE LOCAL HUTU POPULATION UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD FLEE TO ZAIRE.

24. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN THE GOMA AREA, EX-FAR UNITS APPEAR TO BE MORE BELLIGERENT AND AGGRESSIVE AND HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS INTO RWANDA AGAINST THE RPA. THESE ELEMENTS HAVE BECOME BLATANTLY ANTI-AMERICAN AND BLAME THE US FOR THEIR CURRENT SITUATION. INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS OF EX-FAR SOLDIERS CONFRONTING US/UN PERSONNEL COULD OCCUR TO OBTAIN FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES. RANDOM ATTACKS, CONSISTING OF A GRENADE ASSAULT OR AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE, IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. THE CURRENT THREAT TO AIRCRAFT IS LOW; HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF A HUTU-EXTREMIST PLOT TO TARGET A US PLANE WITH SAMs. THE FAR HAD 15 FRENCH-MADE MISTRALS AND AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF SA-7S FAMILY MANPADS BEFORE IT FLED TO ZAIRE. THE CURRENT LOCATION OF THESE ADA SYSTEMS IS UNDETERMINED. IF CENTRALLY DIRECTED TERRORIST ATTACKS OCCUR, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD OR

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T SPOKE NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~

SECTION 8 OF 8

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SUBJ: RWANDA: THE FORMER RWANDAN ARMY: WHAT NOW AND HOW FAR? (U)
PARACOMMANDO BATTALIONS WOULD MOST LIKELY BE THE SOURCE.

25. ~~(S/NF)~~ LONGTERM OUTLOOK (90 - 180 DAYS). THE POSSIBILITY OF A LARGE- SCALE INSURGENCY WILL INCREASE OVERTIME AND WOULD BE LESSENERED BY DISARMING THE EX-FAR, BY HAVING UNAMIR PATROL BORDER AREAS OF ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, OR IF A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION OCCURS. IF THE MAJORITY OF THE HUTU REFUGEE POPULATION IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA REMAINS OUTSIDE RWANDA, THE LIKELIHOOD OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION OR PREVENTION OF AN EX-FAR INSURGENCY AGAINST THE KIGALI REGIME LESSENS GREATLY. BEYOND THE 3-MONTH POINT, AS THE REFUGEE CRISIS STABILIZES AND WORLD FOCUS SHIFTS TO OTHER GLOBAL "HOT SPOTS," FINANCIAL AND ARMS SUPPLIERS WILL EMERGE TO SUPPORT THE HUTUS-IN-EXILE.

26. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE EX-FAR WILL PROBABLY NOT TOTALLY FINISH ITS REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING IN THE NEXT 6 MONTHS; NONETHELESS, IT COULD BEGIN LARGER SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS INVOLVING MULTIPLE FRONTS AND COMPANY/BATTALION ATTACKS. THE GOMA REGION IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WOULD BE THE MAIN FRONT, SINCE GISENYI AND RUHENGERI PREFECTURES ARE THE AREAS FROM WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THE HUTU EXTREMISTS DERIVE, AND THIS AREA IS CLOSEST TO THE EX-FAR LOGISTICS RESUPPLY POINT AT GOMA AIRFIELD. THE BUKAVU/NYUNGWE FOREST AREA WOULD SERVE AS A SECOND FRONT, AND A CAMPAIGN IN THIS AREA WOULD HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES: TO PREVENT RPA FORCES FROM REINFORCING THE NORTHWEST AND TO DRIVE TOWARD BUTARE IN ORDER TO CUT OFF RWANDA FROM BURUNDI. THE RPA WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY SUSTAINING ITS TROOPS IN THE EAST BECAUSE OF THE

LIKELIHOOD THAT THE EX-FAR COULD HAVE AT LEAST MINIMAL SUCCESSES
INTERDICTING THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE RPA. EX-FAR TROOPS IN THE EAST
COULD ALSO CONTINUE TO LAUNCH SMALL RAIDS AND DRAW RPA ASSETS AWAY
FROM THE MAIN THREAT IN THE NORTHWEST. THE EX-FAR WILL ALMOST
CERTAINLY LAUNCH AN INSURGENCY AGAINST THE NEW RPF-DOMINATED
GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO REGAIN POLITICAL BARGAINING POWER FOR THE
FORMER INTERIM GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH AN INSURGENCY SEEMS A VIRTUAL
CERTAINTY WITHIN THE NEXT 6 MONTHS, THE SIZE AND SCOPE WILL DEPEND ON
OUTSIDE SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO THE EX-FAR.

RWANDA WORKING GROUP, DIA/J2M, STU III (b)(3) DSTS 960-4357

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