
Clinton Presidential Records

Mandatory Declassification Review

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Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full or released in part.

The document released with redactions has been restricted under Sections 3.3 (b)(1) of E.O. 13526 and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/8/98 11:08:14 AM
FROM Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(c)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 08/08/1998
DECLASSIFYON 08/08/2008
SUBJECT Checklist for Sandy's 1PM PC [~~TOP SECRET~~]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT PC080898.doc
~~TOP SECRET~~

Principals Committee
8 August 1998 1PM

Terrorist Attacks on US Embassies in Africa

Checklist

1. Latest Casualty Figures
State

2. Status of Efforts to Rescue those Wounded & Missing
State

--US rescue teams deployment has been slow
--US Medevac out of Africa to Europe has been slow

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PER E.O. 13526
2014 - 0845 - M (1.07)
2/27/2017 KBSH

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--Neither FEST has arrived; one hasn't even left
Discuss response problems with DOD

3. Cooperation on Investigation
FBI

--Embassy guard's report on truck/hand grenades
--Kenyan/Tanzanian police cooperation
--Status of those being detained for questioning
--Crime scene

4. Return of remains and Family Members
State

--State prefers Andrews/ FBI wants Dover AFB
--Plans for Meeting Aircraft (POTUS?)

5. Accountability
State

--law requires independent board(s)
--Justice has concerns about board

6. Security
State

--State did NOT close or thin Middle Eastern embassies

(continued on next page)

7. Status of Investigation
CIA/FBI

--more "thin" reporting related to UBL

8. Usama bin Ladin

--planning terrorist conference on August 20 CIA

--Vice President's call to Crown Prince OVP

--High level message to the Taliban State

--High level messages to Pakistan/UAE

State/CIA

--Seek African help on round-up/crack down CIA/State

9. Press/Congress

All

--Sunday show coordination

--Congressional briefing coordination

10. On Going Work

--CSG to look at CBW protection

--Small group to look at Sudanese CW

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

5958 REDO

WASHINGTON

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2014-0845-M (1.01)
2/27/2017 KBH

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Taliban Guarantees Regarding Usama bin Ladin

You asked about a report that the Taliban had gotten Usama bin Ladin to agree not to stage additional attacks from Afghanistan.

The Taliban have repeatedly assured the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that they would restrain bin Ladin from attacking us or the Saudis from his base in Afghanistan. These assurances came after bin Ladin's move to Qandahar in early 1997, after his late 1997 interview in which he threatened the U.S., and in May 1988 after his speech broadcast from Khost. The Taliban also claimed to have extracted a promise from bin Ladin not to attack in a letter from him late last year. Despite these assurances, UBL continued to plan attacks, surveil targets, deploy attack teams, smuggle and stockpile weapons and explosives while a "guest" of the Taliban.

Until now, the Taliban had little incentive to enforce restrictions on bin Ladin, since they share his ideology and rely on his resources. This said, it is not clear that the Taliban leadership understands the full reach of bin Ladin's operational capabilities, despite the fact that he has used Taliban communications now and then to contact his operatives; they may believe that by keeping him in Afghanistan they are actually constraining his ability to attack.

The attacks against Khost, however, clearly caught the Taliban's attention. On August 22, Mullah Omar joined a phone call initiated by one of his subordinates to a mid-level State Department official, in which Omar proposed a dialogue regarding bin Ladin. We accepted, sent them a paper on bin Ladin, his terrorist network and the treat he poses to U.S. interests, and are now waiting for his emissary to meet our people in Islamabad. Although the dialogue is not likely to result in Taliban action against bin Ladin, Omar's interest in it might

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (c)

Declassify On: 8/26/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

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reflect tensions within the Taliban on the issue of haven for bin Ladin.

In any case, the Taliban track record on assurances makes their latest assurances unpersuasive. Mullah Omar remains in firm control of the movement and continues to refer privately to bin Ladin as a "water jar," (i.e., a life giving force). Thus, he would not be inclined, at this point, to do what we require: expel bin Ladin to us or the Saudis.

Attachment

Tab A August 25 Morning Summary

~~SECRET~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/10/98 12:37:41 PM
FROM Simon, Steven N.
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(c)(d)(g)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 09/10/1998
DECLASSIFYON 09/10/2008
SUBJECT FW: Paper for SRB :UBL Update [SECRET]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.

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PER E. O. 13526

2014-0845-M (1.13)
2/27/2017 KBH

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TEXT_BODY

Mona-
Is this what he needs?
S

-----Original Message-----

From: Sutphen,
Mona K.
Sent: Wednesday, September 09, 1998 6:30 PM
To: @NESASIA
- NE/South Asia; @TRANSNATIONAL - Transnational Threats;
@BOSNIA
- Bosnian Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @EUROPE -
European Affairs; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ASIA - Asian Affairs;
@INTECON
- Economic Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary

Subject: Paper for SRB [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

To
All :

In preparation for his Friday a.m. meeting with Lott/Gingrich, Sandy has asked for a one-page (or shorter) update/status report on the following topics:

ITEM ACTION

Russia Russia Dir.

Kosovo Schulte
North Korea Asia
Iraq NESA
Emergency
Supplemental Leg (if still needed)
UBL Clarke
Northern Ireland Europe
Int'l
Financial Situation Intecon
NMD Bell (if needed)

Please
e-mail your submissions by COB tomorrow, Thursday 9/10. Call
w/questions.
Thanks. Mona

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Update - Status Report Lott Gingrich Berger.doc
Usama bin Ladin Update

Threat warnings. bin Ladin has not made public statements or made a public appearance since the bombings. Warnings continue, however, of preparations for retaliatory attacks in India, Burma, and elsewhere. Although we are at a heightened security status at threatened locations, we are not seeing clear pre-operational activity.

Diplomatic activity. We are still waiting for the Taliban response to the UBL paper we gave their representative in Pakistan. It is not clear whether they are stringing us along, or can't organize a response due to fissures within

the organization. (We know from collateral reporting that the leadership is reviewing the paper.) We have sent messages to the Yemenis, requesting that they move against bin Ladin's people there, to the Pakistanis and UAE requesting their intervention with the Taliban, and the Saudis asking to interview the bin Ladin money manager in their custody. Sanaa anticipated our request and provided our ambassador with sketchy information about a bin Ladin related group. The Pakistanis did meet with the Taliban and have also warned Kashmiri militants not to retaliate against us for their losses in the raid on Khost. The UAE has not responded yet. We anticipate a follow-up POTUS message to Abdullah urging that the Saudis take specific action to press the Taliban to surrender bin Ladin before Abdullah's arrival here later this month.

The Sudanese are pressing their case in multiple fora. We are developing responses for wide dissemination, especially in the region.

Investigation. No new breakthroughs. Suspects in U.S. custody are not cooperating. CIA and FBI continue to work in their channels to

(b)(1), (b)(3)

But there remains no doubt that bin Ladin was behind the embassy bombings.

Supplemental Request. Interagency teams have visited approximately 40 vulnerable diplomatic posts in areas where bin Ladin and other terrorist organizations are active to assess their security, recommend upgrades, or possibly even immediate relocation. The results will be used to refine the supplemental request, which also includes funds for rebuilding our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, assisting the Nigerians and Tanzanians hurt in the bombings, improving our response capabilities, upgrading intelligence community and law enforcement counter-terrorism programs, and increasing anti-terrorism assistance

to other countries. OMB should have a final proposal finished today (Thursday,