

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 139				
Document ID: 9300052				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (3 pages)	01/23/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 139

### FOLDER TITLE:

9300052

2015-0782-M  
rs1504

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 28 JAN 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
SIGLER  
WALKER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY JDA DATE 1/28 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 2 OF 2

*over 2/22*  
*(initials)*

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 93012517 FOR DECISION
001	X 93012811 ITOH APPROVED RECOM
002	X 93012811 ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002	930128	GROSSMAN, M
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**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WAA LOG # 005Z  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG NO A/O \_\_\_\_\_

W

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS BEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>SJN</u>	<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>WAA</u>	
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>RB 1/28</u>	<u>X</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>JDA 1/28</u>	<u>D</u>

**A = Action**   **I = Information**   **D = Dispatch**   **R = Retain**   **N = No further Action**

cc:      **VP**                      **McLarty**                      **Other** \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

25 JAN 93 3:14

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**

SEND E.O. TO EXEC SEC CHASSMAN:  
 "E.O. FM SEC CHASSMAN & NO. 15  
 CABLE TO ENB. MOSCOW FOR (U)  
 CHANGE ONLY"

Will -  
 For the time  
 being, we can  
 prepare transmitted  
 memo based on  
 your guidance  
 for distribution  
 MANUAL. MEMO FROM  
 NSC RE E.O.  
 [initials]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9300052  
DATE 28 JAN 93

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

1/29

9am



COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9300052  
DATE 28 JAN 93

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

1/28/93

TIME

2:35

SIGNATURE

Harlee Wood

COPY: ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

~~SECRET~~

**EYES ONLY**

0052

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 28, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin  
of Russia (U)

Attached is a copy of the memorandum of telephone conversation for the President's January 23 conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia. Please ensure that a copy is provided Eyes Only for Secretary Christopher and that a copy is transmitted Eyes Only via NODIS channels to Charge Collins in Moscow. (S)



William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments  
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KRM NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

**EYES ONLY**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on January 23, 1993 (U)

PARTICIPANTS; The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC staff

DATE, TIME January 23, 1993, 10:45 - 11:17am  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, this is President Clinton. Good morning, Mr. President. (U)

Now that I have become President, I want to reemphasize with you my commitment that Russia be a top priority for U.S. foreign policy during my Administration. Thank you very much for your congratulatory message to me. I am determined that, together, we create the closest possible U.S.-Russia partnership. This is a complex time in Europe and in Asia and we will need to work together effectively to use the power of our two countries for the good. And I want our governments to get off to a fast start. I am looking forward to an early meeting between us. Secretary of State Christopher will contact Foreign Minister Kozyrev to schedule an early meeting between them and to begin discussions about our meeting. I know how vitally important their relationship will be to us both. (S)

I am also determined to find the best possible person as my Ambassador to Moscow. At the present time, I want you to know that we are determined to do whatever we can to help Russia's democratic reforms to succeed. We will try to make our economic aid as beneficial as possible. I have appointed a very close friend and expert on Russia, Strobe Talbott, to oversee all of our assistance programs in Russia and in Eastern Europe. His appointment will ensure that I can maintain a high level of personal involvement on this important issue. This will be good for both you and me. (S)

I will also do my best to get as soon as possible a good person in Moscow as Ambassador who has my complete confidence and attention. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I would like to thank you and tell you that I personally know Bob Strauss and believe that these good personal contacts did much for the development of relations between our two states. I would be very thankful if you could in a preliminary way give me the name of your candidate to be Ambassador to Russia. (S)

The President: Thank you. Let me mention a couple of specific issues. I want to reiterate my support for a rescheduling of Russia's debt in the Paris Club. I also want to boost American investment and trade. I would also like to work closely with you to resolve differences on Ukraine's ratification of START I and the NPT so that we can make progress on START II. (S)

I also want to make sure that we consult closely on important foreign policy issues. I know that the situation in Bosnia has presented you with some difficulties at home. The U.S. will continue to work closely with you on this issue. I will appreciate your continued support. On Iraq, we believe strongly that Saddam must comply with the UN Security Council resolutions and measures the coalition has established to enforce and monitor them, including the No-Fly Zones. I want to assure you that we will stay in close touch and I have instructed Secretary of State Christopher to speak to Foreign Minister Kozyrev as soon as possible about this and other issues of foreign policy. I want them to meet quickly and to set an agenda and a particular time to get together. I am anxious to see you and to get going. And I want our relations to be the same as in the past. (S)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I want to thank you very much for your nice and good words and your constructive proposals. I thank you, Mr. President for these proposals. Of course, I want us to cooperate on Yugoslavia, but hope the cooperation will be closer to your "softer line", stressing not only confrontation with military forces, but also a political settlement through the UN Security Council and the UN, to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem. (S)

Now, about our meeting. I believe that the entire world is awaiting this meeting because the new U.S. President would probably make some corrections in policy, while supporting the general line of our policy and with me personally. Our Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, has got instructions personally from me to get in touch with Secretary Christopher to begin the organization of a working meeting in a third, neutral country. I believe this is the sentiment of all the world -- for the U.S. and Russia, it is important that we meet very soon to elaborate the common positions in our relations. I would like to believe that this kind of meeting could take place no later than February. As for the place, I leave the initiative to you and would accept your proposal. (S)

The President: I think that's a pretty good idea. Let me tell you -- I have to give a State of the Union address in early February to outline all of the economic issues here in the U.S. with the Congress. As soon as that is out of the way, we can

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~~SECRET~~

proceed to a meeting with you. Let me talk to Secretary Christopher and the schedulers and we will be in touch. I appreciate your letting me choose the site. I'll try to pick something convenient for you. We might have to do it on a weekend so as not to conflict with the schedule of the Congress. I will be in touch soon. I am eager to do it. (S)

President Yeltsin: I thank you, Mr. President. This meeting should have an informal character. The most important thing is to meet. I agree with your support for a meeting between us personally which will not conflict with the schedule of the U.S. Congress or the Parliament of the Russian Federation. I believe we could make it at the end of February, after the 20th. I also believe that we should meet in a country of your choice. It will be good for all of us -- the U.S. and Russia. I had good relations with Bush. Now I need to develop relations with President Clinton. Everyone in the world wants this. The first meeting with you was very good. I am confident our relations will improve in the future. We just need to set a date and place. (S)

The President: I agree and we will be back in touch soon. Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: I agree with you, Mr. President and am grateful and we will be in contact. Congratulations on your inauguration. You are the President of the U.S. from the Democratic party. I believe you will play a great role in the life of the U.S. which will benefit America's national self-awareness as well as its foreign policy. I stand ready to cooperate in the future. I am anxious to meet with you and to get to know you as "Bill". (U)

The President: Good. Thank you very much. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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0052

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM:

NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT:

Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia which took place on January 23, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve

✓

Disapprove

\_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Telcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 140				
Document ID: 9300488				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	02/10/1993	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 140

### FOLDER TITLE:

9300488

2015-0782-M  
rs1505

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 13 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL      CLOSED BY: NSASK      DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH

Z 93021214 FOR DECISION

001

X 93021511 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: WAB LOG # 0488  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG JDA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec <sup>amw</sup>	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
ExecSec	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JDA 2/15</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc. VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

~~COMMENTS:~~  
12 FEB 93 11: 25

12 FEB 93 11: 04

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0488

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on February 10, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve

*X* *ve*

Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-1 (1.02)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President  
Boris Yeltsin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME February 10, 1993, 1:51 - 2:14pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. Mr. President. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello. Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: I am fine. Thank you for taking a few minutes  
to speak with me today. (U)

I have just written you about a more active American policy  
toward Bosnia. I wanted to call you personally and go over the  
main points. (S)

First, we will be much more engaged in the search for a  
diplomatic solution. I have appointed the NATO Ambassador  
Reginald Bartholomew as my full-time representative at the talks.  
He will leave his NATO post and undertake this full-time. (S)

As his first task, I have asked him to go to Moscow to give you a  
fuller sense of our thinking and, even more importantly, to get  
your thoughts first hand. I know that you and I need to  
cooperate closely on this. (S)

Second, if a fair and workable agreement can be reached the U.S.  
would be prepared to participate with the UN, NATO, and others to  
implement it. This itself will help address one key concern of  
the Bosnians. And I would hope if agreement can be reached that  
Russia would participate in it. (S)

We want to work to strengthen the Vance/Owen plan; but I think it  
has to be modified to be successful. (S)

Third, getting a good agreement will require us to raise the  
price of aggression and ethnic cleansing. I believe we should  
enforce the no-fly zone, accelerate work on a war crimes

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: NARA, Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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tribunal, and tighten sanctions enforcement against Serbia. And, I want to get back to you with some specific ideas on that last point. (S)

I have also reiterated President Bush's warnings to Belgrade about the consequences of spreading the war to Kosovo. Enforcing the no-fly zone could give our warnings credibility. (S)

All the parties will have to compromise; and we are going to tell the Bosnians that this is their best chance for a fair outcome. I hope you will convince the Serbs they must also compromise. (S)

We also are looking for other ways we can help the humanitarian effort, and we hope to have some specific ideas to share with you soon on that. (S)

I know this is a very difficult problem for you; I appreciate Russia's historic ties with Serbia and don't want to cause trouble for you at home. But if ethnic cleansing is seen as a successful way to deal with minority problems, then ethnic Russians outside Russia could be at risk too. (S)

I am looking forward to meeting you soon so that we can discuss the many issues on our agenda. (S)

I know Secretary Christopher will meet with Foreign Minister Kozyrev on February 25 in Geneva. At that time, they can finalize arrangements for our meeting. I very much support you and believe the U.S. can be of help. I believe that, together, we can bring a successful conclusion to the crisis in Bosnia. Thank you Mr. President. (S)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, thank you very much for calling. I want to thank you for your kind words and for your wishes of cooperation between our two countries and for giving priority to your relations with Russia. (S)

I am looking forward to the February 25 meeting between Kozyrev and Christopher. I do hope they will come up with ideas for the country where we will meet and the timing. We have a number of issues that must be discussed between you and me.

Concerning Yugoslavia, I personally fully support the Vance-Owen plan - these are two distinguished people, one of whom is American. We will certainly bring pressure to bear on the Serbs. (S)

On the whole, certain changes may be introduced to Vance-Owen but on the whole I don't believe there is an alternative to that plan. We are now working with the leaders of former Yugoslavia, Milosevic, Karadzic and others. I was really discouraged and distressed that Karadzic spoke on behalf of the Serbs while he was in the U.S. and departed from Vance-Owen in his speech at the UN. I think it would be useful if the U.S. took measures to bring the Moslems to hear the voice of reason. Our Ambassador to

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the UN, Vorontsov, will be ready to cooperate with your special representative. We hope that when Vance-Owen is endorsed by the UN Security Council, it will be supported too, including in enforcing the No-Fly-Zone. But force should be used only as a means of support for the Vance-Owen plan. Let me say again -- we will do our best to use our influence to convince the Serbs. (S)

Also, taking account of the negative views that Karadzic expressed to the Vance-Owen plan, perhaps the U.S. could use its clout to get the Serbs in the U.S. to motivate Karadzic to endorse the plan. (S)

I want to thank you for your views on the priority and importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship. I would like to say again that when Kozyrev and Christopher meet, I do hope you will have proposals for our meeting. I hope the meeting will take place real soon. I don't think the meeting should be postponed later than mid-March. After all, the world at large is looking forward to the outcome of the summit of the U.S. President and the President of Russia. Everyone is waiting to see if your foreign policy will change. I think that the policies of our two countries will cause a reaction and echoes in the policies of smaller countries. I am really looking forward to our meeting real soon. (S)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: I just want to promise to do our best to bring pressure on the Serbs, especially Milosevic. Thank you for calling, Mr. President. I really appreciate the call and think calls should take place on a regular basis. (S)

The President: I agree. Thank you very much and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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*See ↗*  
Case Number: 2014-0901-M; 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 145				
Document ID: 9302226				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-2 (1.53)  
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Dinner with President Boris Yeltsin  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of Treasury  
Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff  
George Stephanopoulos, Assistant to the  
President and Director of Communications  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Thomas Pickering, Ambassador-Designate to  
Russia  
Toby T. Gati, Special Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Nicholas Burns, Director for Russian,  
Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff  
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russian,  
Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff  
(Notetaker)

Boris Yeltsin, President  
Boris Fedorov, Finance Minister  
Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister  
Alexander Shokhin, Deputy Prime Minister  
Viktor Ilyushin, Chief Assistant to the  
President  
Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the US  
Dmitri Ryurikov, Assistant to the President  
Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Vyacheslov Kostikov, Press Secretary

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 3, 1993, 6:30 - 8:30pm  
Vancouver, Canada

(Both Presidents opened the dinner by giving prepared toasts)

President Yeltsin: This is an excellent place with the  
background of Vancouver harbor. (U)

The President: Did you take a boat ride after our meeting today?  
(U)

~~SECRET~~  
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President Yeltsin: Yes, we took a ride and saw one of the biggest ports in the world -- it handles 79 million tons per year. I don't know about the U.S., but our biggest port turns over only 60 million tons. The surroundings are not only picturesque but good for development. (U)

The President: As I drove up, I saw many people holding Russian flags. Do many Russians live here? (U)

Minister Shokhin: These are not real Russians, or else they wouldn't carry flags upside down. (U)

President Yeltsin: They might be Russians who have emigrated -- we call them our "compatriots abroad." They might have suffered during the time of the Tsars. The Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich was alive at the time. It was a very touching meeting. We have adopted a law on dual citizenship. This is another benefit of democracy. If all of the states of the former USSR adopted such laws, there would not be a problem. To be a citizen of Lithuania and Russia is okay; Estonia and Russia is okay. But Estonia doesn't have such a law. (U)

Secretary Bentsen: Mr. President, how much time will you spend campaigning between now and April 25? (U)

President Yeltsin: All the time until April 25. (U)

The President: That's the right answer. That's a politician speaking. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'll not miss a day. (U)

Secretary Bentsen: You should use television. (U)

President Yeltsin: There will be a special program every five days with students, artists, workers, intellectuals etc. For example, on April 12, I will meet 12,000 students. I don't have the right to lose. It would be treachery to Russia. Things the people have only dreamt of for years, now they have them. We have 60,000 private industries, and 5000 of them are big corporate enterprises. Thirty million people are private owners. Where the genetic code has been removed from the brain, there is no notion of private ownership. Today, the most important thing is psychological change in Russia -- people do not want the communists to come back. Of course, we will have difficulties along the road, but we will manage. What Bill suggested today is very important to helping us along the road. We welcome it. (C)

The President: What I thought we would talk about tonight is what we can do. I want to put together a program to build on what you are doing and what you think is important. Members of Congress have asked me: what can we do for Yeltsin that responds to what he wants, what he thinks is needed to help the Russian people. (C)

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President Yeltsin: I believe its been a long time since I have spoken to a member of Congress. (U)

The President: They might be more likely to do what you want rather than what I want. (C)

President Yeltsin: But I understand it depends on you and your influence with Congress. Today, I've tried to explain that the major issues depend on a solution from Congress, especially the issues that are irritants to many Russians. (C)

I don't want to issue a formal invitation tonight, at the dinner table, and will do so tomorrow. But when you come, you will see a real difference in Russia. It is a country that has felt freedom and civil liberties. It no longer helps forty Communist governments abroad, not with a single kopek. It pursues equitable relations in foreign policy. It has sniffed the air of democracy, felt freedom. I would suggest that once we have left behind all the constraints that have been placed on us, it will be not the Soviet Union but a different country. We fight sometimes with the Communists, but when you label us as Communists, we get offended. I have already explained our concerns to you. You need to meet more people from our team. I will pass the floor to Fedorov. (C)

The President: He is young even by the standards of my administration. (U)

President Yeltsin: He is one of the youngest members of my government, but he is close to the age of many. Some are younger. Our single deficit is that we have no women. We have reformers, democrats, but no republicans. (U)

Minister Fedorov: I am responsible for finance and development of economic reform, without which reform is impossible. It is important that all elements of our reform package be supported by the United States and the rest of the world. The reforms are in three main directions: first, the battle with inflation, which devalues people's savings, bars investment, and undermines the economy. That is why it is so important to implement a stabilization fund. The ruble is the basis of our economic development. Success in our fight with inflation will mean that we can move forward with wider economic reforms and restructuring, the creation of private enterprises, and conversion of the military. (C)

President Yeltsin: I should point out that the program the U.S. Treasury has outlined contains proposals that serve our needs in health care, support for small enterprises, and so forth. (C)

Minister Fedorov: It is important to have a clearcut program in the G-7 package so that we have an idea of what to expect this year in the way of support. We have a program of private ownership of land, social support of the people and restructuring of industry so that we can help the people, so that they will not suffer. (C)

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The President: The Secretary of the Treasury has put in a lot of work to help stabilize the economy over and above the stabilization fund. (S)

President Yeltsin: What we need is to pursue a very tough budgetary policy. There was a period when we lost control of it and adopted a populist program. But now Federov is in control and in pursuit of stability. Even in April with these hard times, we won't bend. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: Mr. President, I spent the day with your two Deputy Prime Ministers. They are very impressive and they represented you well. I am particularly impressed by the Federov plan. It is absolutely critical to stabilize the ruble. We will help if we can. It is also essential that you control the Central Bank and the explosion of capital, including the expansion of the budget. (S)

President Yeltsin: Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to rip the Central Bank from the Parliament. But we made its Chairman a member of the government, so his duty is to it. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: We share that objective. If the Federov plan is put into effect, you will stabilize the currency and get the deficit down. (S)

President Yeltsin: Federov is a very tough personality, but he is also mild in character. But he is tough on the budget so even the pressure of the President won't affect his policies. So, the President has to support Federov, Shokhin and Mikhailov, who will get his \$800 million for the uranium. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: We accelerated the G-7 meeting in Tokyo to April 14-15. Japan wanted to be host, and I am sure they will be a major contributor to the effort when we get through. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know that Bill discussed this with Miyazawa and there seems for the first time in years to be a shift in Japan's policy toward us. That is he should not link the territories to our problems. (S)

The President: Sometimes when the Japanese say yes, they mean no. I hope when Miyazawa says yes, he means yes. I think they mean yes this time. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: Canada, the U.S. and Russia share a common ocean but also admiration of the rebirth of a nation and the courage of a President that has impressed the rest of the G-7 too. They are the major stockholders of the international financial institutions. We will see that they participate in the G-7 process as stockholders. (S)

President Yeltsin: As far as I know, France and Canada decided to double their share. (S)

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Secretary Bentsen: Yes, that's right. Secretary Christopher and I will be in Tokyo and will report back to the President. We are very optimistic that we'll see some action. We are impressed by the privatization of industry. We are interested in seeing the restoration of oilfields and of trade. We want to help on the stabilization of the currency. (S)

President Yeltsin: As for oil, we need approximately \$2 billion. First, we need to restore the level of production and then to raise it. Well, take for example the proposal made to you to move into new areas of oil and gas sources. This requires capital -- in the Stochman oil and gas area, for example, and can be developed only by the U.S. or Japan. Sakhalin can be developed by the U.S., Japan and Europe. So, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. can develop these areas. Our business people are too modest or too careful in developing that area. Take another example -- the gas reserves found by our geologists. If I were a young businessman, I would start a venture to open up that Stochman area. It so happens that we in Russia have a huge reserve of gas and oil and we can share it on an equitable basis. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: I come from Texas. We once had more oil and gas than anywhere in the Union. We found that what works in Texas can work for you in Russia. But you must do something on private property, on the uniformity of taxes and on other reforms. (S)

President Yeltsin: (after conferring with Shokhin) No, we have passed the exams for the first grade out of ten in market economics. So, give us some time, with your help, to learn. You understand that our managers don't have the necessary skills. They know only state planning. (S)

The President: The only point we want to make is that we believe we can help much more in energy to help you increase your pipeline efficiency. We have also given thought to more assistance in improving the safety of your nuclear power plants. I will work on this with the Congress next week. If you are interested, we can work with you on this and on the Exim Bank \$2 billion loan. (S)

President Yeltsin: (nodding) I understand you. Germany, Italy, Canada said they would do it and they gave up. We could raise oil production by twenty percent by improving the pipelines. This is a specific and concrete project. You can invest your money and get it back. (S)

The President: We would like to try and have a detailed conversation with you and to work on it over a three to five year period. We believe your greatest opportunity is in energy and we want to make a major effort there. (S)

President Yeltsin: You said five years. No. How about two or three years? (S)

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The President: Even better. Two is fine. (S)

President Yeltsin: Absolutely. So we know that. Well, we could raise our production by twenty percent by improving wells and pipelines. And if that happens, we wouldn't need the \$1.6 billion or even three dollars from the U.S. We could get it by raising production. But our technology isn't good enough. (S)

So, you can chastise us, but do something. I am certain that, in five years, we will be competing in the arts, in jazz, in oil and we will catch up with you. I am sorry about jazz, actually I am not certain about that. (S)

The President: Maybe not in jazz. But we need to catch up with you in your rich culture. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes. We have ballet, classical music. (U)

The President: This afternoon, we discussed the possibility of changes in our law on space. I told you that I would review your request, which I will do. But it is clear that in the next two to three years, we have economic potential in space and energy. You should be able to earn hard currency and be competitive. We thought it would be helpful, in addition to our economic assistance, to establish a Russia-U.S. Council on Energy and Space. My Vice President is an authority on both issues. We believe that, over the next six months to a year, we can put together a range of things to add income to your country. It seems it should be organized as an ongoing effort in energy and space. Your Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, mentioned this idea to me and mentioned Chernomyrdin. (S)

President Yeltsin: He is not mentioning the right names. I will decide who will be on this commission. (S)

The President: No, not your Vice President, mine! No Rutskoi. Nyet! (both Presidents laughed at this point). (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I believe this matter should be given to Chernomyrdin who knows energy and oil and gas. Immediately after my return, I will authorize him to deal with your Vice President. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: Maybe your Vice President should be sent into space. (S)

President Yeltsin: For two years, for example! We will do it. (S)

The President: In the U.S. we send teachers into space. In Russia, you can send politicians. (S)

President Yeltsin: Why not! I believe we can have the whole team use our Soyuz spacecraft. (S)

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The President: I'll pay half the costs if you let me send a few people along. (C)

President Yeltsin: Granted! I do wonder at all the people trying to do harm to Russia. We are experiencing difficult times and are at a turning point. We are fighting for freedom. And at this point, there are certain people who try to do us harm. However, my team is doing the right thing. We can fight. How about Lukin? Is he doing well or should we transfer him? (C)

The President: I want him to work for me; he is doing so well. (C)

President Yeltsin: He is a wiseguy, and he likes to be known as a wiseguy. (C)

The President: He is representing you very well here. (C)

President Yeltsin: Very well. This post is considered more important than any in Moscow. We hope your new Ambassador to Moscow will help us greatly especially at this time in the development of our reforms. Today we agreed to establish another working group on military and technical issues. Grachev will visit the U.S. in June and we will name the group then. (C)

Due to your President's proposal, we agreed to call each other by our first names. It was difficult to start with it. (U)

The President: Bill means "hit" in Russian. (U)

President Yeltsin: In Russian, it does mean "hit". Boris means fighting, struggling with no result! (U)

The President: In my country, Bill means he gets hit. I have a doctor who says that people should eat lobsters, grapes and pears all at the same time every day in order to live a long time. Secretary Bentsen says no, that if you eat that food, it will just seem like you'll live a long time. (U)

President Yeltsin: I was born in a poor, peasant family. We had a lot of suffering and hardships. But we had a grandfather who lived to 96! He never knew what a pear meant and never saw one. He never went to a hospital, not once. And when he died, the pathologist opened him up and his body was in fine condition. He just died of old age. All those organs ran out of life. He was a great grandfather with a heart and a fist. (U)

Ambassador Lukin: Boris Nikolayevich, have you heard about the time when they opened a dead man up and afterward the certificate said: "Death followed after the opening up of the body". (U)

President Yeltsin: Now you can see that our Ambassador to your country is growing up. (U)

The President: The Secretary of State is always very calm. He never raises his voice. So, the other night at a banquet, the

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speaker looked at him and said: he is eloquent, a statesman, and, yes, he's alive! (U)

President Yeltsin: I would say that, compared to another Secretary of State, he is mute. (U)

CNN two hours ago reported that the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Vance-Owen plan. Despite the fact that Churkin worked very hard on this, they voted against it. So, we need to talk about this. What should we do? It is impossible to lift the arms embargo for Bosnia. We need to find political measures and a high-level meeting to stop the bloodshed. We could send Kozyrev. Kozyrev suggested that the UN Security Council should meet with Foreign Ministers participating and invite the Bosnian Serbs.

(S)

Secretary Christopher: Your Foreign Minister and I talked about this at some length today. I would suggest that he and I discuss it tonight to reach a common plan. (S)

President Yeltsin: Certainly. You should do it. (U)

Secretary Christopher: We have talked about this for some months and I have found him to be a good companion. It is an impossible problem, but we must try. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree. We must support Kozyrev. But if he fails in Bosnia and Serbia, things will be bad. You should not shift responsibility to the Presidents. You should act with Kozyrev. (S)

The President: The UK, France and Canada were against lifting the arms embargo because they had soldiers there. But I feel very badly because the Serbs in Bosnia had access to weapons from the old Yugoslav army. But these arms weren't given to the Bosnian moslems. We told them to sign Vance-Owen. All they did was to lose more ground and people. So, even though it might make the situation more violent, sometimes I think we should have let them fight for themselves. (S)

President Yeltsin: There is too much bloodshed. We need another political attempt. If we send Kozyrev and you send your high-level representative, we could invite the UN too to try for a political settlement. The arms in that area could make for thousands of deaths, especially if you know the Moslems. (S)

The President: They kill each other at abandon. (S)

President Yeltsin: Today, I agreed with the President about Georgia and I give my word that I will meet Mr. Shevardnadze. The discussions will be difficult, but we have to start somewhere. We must start personally -- him and me. I promised you, and I will do it. (S)

The President: Anything else? When do we begin in the morning? (U)

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President Yeltsin: Tomorrow you are the guest at 10:45 a.m. sharp! It's at the Pan Pacific Hotel. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: We will continue the negotiations until the press conference. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Security Issues (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury  
George Stephanopolous, Assistant to the President and Director of Communications  
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State  
Anthony Lake, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs  
Thomas Pickering, Ambassador-designate to Russia  
Toby T. Gati, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Daniel Poneman, Senior Director for Nonproliferation, NSC Staff (Notetaker)  
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Boris Yeltsin, President  
Boris Fedorov, Finance Minister  
Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister  
Alexander Shokhin, Deputy Prime Minister  
Dmitri Ryurikov, Assistant to the President  
Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Viktor Mikhailov, Minister for Atomic Energy  
Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador to the US  
Vyacheslov Kostikov, Press Secretary

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 4, 1993, 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.  
Pan Pacific Hotel, Vancouver, Canada

President Yeltsin: Yesterday your representatives from Congress, Messrs. Michels and Gephardt, left for Russia where they will meet with our parliamentarians in the Supreme Soviet. I would like to give them some advice. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev will work with them and will advise them on what to say in the Supreme Soviet with regard to my position. If that's all right with you. (8)

[Press corps comes in for photo-op.]

President Yeltsin: (comment at flashing cameras) "Some kind of journalistic storm." (U)

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President Yeltsin: The second question I wanted to address: Were we able to reach the HEU Agreement. (Turning to Minister Mikhailov:) Was it agreed? (U)

Minister Mikhailov: No, Boris Nikolaevich. I did talk with Ms. Lynn Davis, the Under Secretary for Security Issues. There is a very specific issue we need to resolve. (S)

President Yeltsin: We can wait if you will solve it in one week. (Turning to President Clinton:) Let's get them together in one week. (S)

The President: Secretary Christopher tells me that we have at least agreed to a set of principles to guide the discussion. The agreement will be helpful to us in working out relations with Ukraine. It is a high priority for me. We will work hard on it during the next week. (Russian photographers ask the two presidents to shake hands. They shake hands for cameras.) (S)

The President: There are two things I wanted to come back to you on, Jackson-Vanik and COCOM. (S)

President Yeltsin: And GATT. (S)

The President: We are in favor of working with you on GATT. On Jackson-Vanik and COCOM, we will go back and work with the leaders of both houses of Congress to review all the restrictions that grew out of the Cold War. The issue is, are there any more refuseniks waiting to leave Russia? I'm told there are a couple of hundred left, if you could check. (S)

President Yeltsin: I don't have any data myself. If you do, give me their names, and I will look into the cases. The policy is not a real problem. We will solve it. I understand the problem on the sale of rocket engines to the Indian Space Research Organization. We discussed it last night. We cannot go back completely on the deal signed by the former U.S.S.R. We are reliable people, so we cannot renege. Perhaps the most we can do would be to deliver the engines without delivering the technology. If we can work out a compromise on that basis, maybe your Congress will be satisfied. In return, if you will look at our space launch services, in particular, an agreement on space launch, we will be satisfied. (S)

The President: I explained last night that we are interested in working on the Europeans to afford you a separate segment of the market that would help you without hurting our market. We will be back to you soon on that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Turning to weapon exports, I suggest that we agree that firms should be able to compete directly on market terms, with quality and price determining who wins. We are not selling to certain nations like Cuba, Iraq, Yugoslavia and, in a limited sense, Taiwan. But we are selling fighter planes to China. I say, let firms compete to gain access to markets. Only not on forbidden items like nuclear weapons and their delivery

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vehicles. In June 1993 our Ministers of Defense will meet. Maybe they can come up with a more definitive stand. (S)

The President: In the countries you listed you did not list Iran. Your Minister of Foreign Affairs said you were not going to sell heavy water reactors to Iran, which we appreciate. But Iran continues to promote terrorism, so we are concerned about arms sales and nuclear sales. On chemical warfare agents, I'm frankly concerned that those regimes who don't respect human life will use them. (S)

President Yeltsin: On Iran, I will ensure that we either completely forbid or limit sales to small arms. That's a possibility. The export of chemical weapons is completely forbidden to any state. We are only working on destruction, and doing it with you. These are weapons to destroy, not to export. All our strength is being spent on their destruction. (S)

The President: Are there other comments, Chris? (U)

Secretary Christopher: No. (U)

President Yeltsin: Further, defense conversion is difficult and needs a "political impulse" from your side. There is an intragovernmental committee. We have to give an impulse to it so that it will really work. It works badly now. (S)

The President: You want me to urge our people to be more forthcoming. (S)

President Yeltsin: I want conversion to work better, and to come to decision faster. The Committee hasn't even had its first meeting. (S)

(Member of his delegation remonstrates that Committee will meet in May, for a special "Commission.") (S)

Probably our bureaucrats are guilty but yours must be guilty, too. If they only meet for a special Commission, they will never get anything done. (S)

The President: We will do what we can to accelerate the process. (S)

President Yeltsin: Now, on training for a market economy. I like Mulroney's idea of a "Yeltsin Scholarship" under which 50 people will come to Canada to study every year. I said 150,000 firms have been privatized, but we need a million. (S)

The President: So you want to have people coming from Russia? (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, once they have learned English. (U)

The President: We are ready to fund a sizeable number but will look to you on how to do it. (U)

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President Yeltsin: About 200 people per year at two or three universities? (U)

The President: We can do at least as many, but it is ok if we do more? (U)

President Yeltsin: Great -- 200 more, but they should be able to do as they do in Canada, and come with their spouse. (U)

The President: With their families? (U)

President Yeltsin: With one family member. (U)

The President: Would you like the program to be set up the same as in Canada? (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, but higher numbers. (U)

The President: Good, we would like to do it. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, because this will deal with our lack of education. Now let's talk about private investment. I want to talk about insurance. German firms will insure investments in Russia, but U.S. firms will not, because of the "political risk." If we could get one or two firms to take on such responsibility, it would be an advance for private investment in Russia. (S)

The President: How many German firms do such insurance, two or three? (S)

President Yeltsin: One, the firm "Hermes". But it is a big firm. We would like to have more American firms involved. You have many more. (S)

The President: We have given considerable thought to what we can do to guarantee investment. Mark Weiner, the manager of McDonald's in Moscow, recently wrote me to say how we could protect the investments of small firms. We'll look at it to see what we can do. (S)

Mr. Fedorov: We would like to create a risk insurance institute to consider the question of insuring political risk. But maybe an "international agency" is needed. We can look at this question later. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have five pages of material outlining restraints on Russia and COCOM and U.S. restraints. (Hands the President a paper.) There is also a very interesting program involving the Ilyushin-96 aircraft. Nineteen American firms are working on it. However, once again many elements are covered by COCOM restraints, and therefore we cannot build that aircraft. I also met this morning with a firm from British Columbia that is using our helicopters. They want to buy them but cannot because of COCOM restraints. There is a mass of questions on the U.S.

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side on fair policy toward firms wanting to invest in Russia.

(S)

The President: I asked the senators to compile in my absence a list of all restraints growing out of the Cold War. I have your list now. We'll work on it next week and try to figure out which we can repeal or modify. (S)

President Yeltsin: We are also working with the UK, France and Germany. But we are friends and partners, Bill. (U)

The President: And when you win on the 24th (sic), all America will know. (S)

President Yeltsin: I'd like to discuss a project on space management, transportation and telecommunications. It involves rail transport, airplanes, telecommunications, computers and the aerospace industry. We hear Japan is interested, but we want to deal with the U.S. We have the most powerful experience in space and you, on land, in developing infrastructure. We need to put these two advantages together, and we will have a powerful cooperation. Not in autos, but this is very realistic for satellites. (S)

The President: It's an interesting idea. We would like to put space and energy issues together on a very fast track. I have named my Vice President, Albert Gore, to work with you. You mentioned Chernomyrdin. I fully agree we need to move forward on space projects. (S)

President Yeltsin: I commend to you Chernomyrdin. He knows his stuff. Now, concerning agreements that have not been ratified, like the double taxation agreement. It was ratified by the Supreme Soviet, but not by the Congress of People's Deputies. As for START-II, we will ratify it, but it is a longer-term project. On nuclear testing, we must decide how to work together further. We want to stop all testing. We only have the Novaya Zemlya test site now, and it will require a big investment. Weather conditions are very severe there, 50 degrees below zero (celsius). We have to build a huge underground facility, which will be very expensive. Why should we even prepare to build it if you will agree to stop testing?

(S)

The President: Why don't we agree that we'll set in motion comprehensive test ban negotiations at the earliest possible time? You and I will agree about how to set them in motion, through a multilateral negotiation. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, France has already agreed. Only the UK and China are left. We don't want nuclear potential to spread.

(S)

The President: Let's do it. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, let's do it. (U)

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The President: Let's agree to get the multilateral negotiations going, and you and I will work with the Chinese and the British.  
(S)

President Yeltsin: The moratorium will end July 1, so we have to hurry. Shall we extend the moratorium to January 1, 1994? (Quickly, without waiting for answer:) Now, what shall we do about Ukraine? (S)

The President: We keep working on Ukraine to ratify START. That's one reason why we want the HEU agreement, as leverage over Ukraine. (S)

President Yeltsin: Let's talk about the destruction of nuclear weapons. We are working to destroy our heavy missiles. As for warheads, we destroyed 3,000 in February (sic). (To Mikhailov:) Isn't it so? (S)

Minister Mikhailov: Right. (U)

President Yeltsin: He (Mikhailov) is Director of one of the biggest plants involved in nuclear destruction. On the biological weapons problem, we shut all the doors, and the personnel were dispersed to other institutions. We have some researchers working on research and development for peaceful purposes, openly. Please come and look whenever you want, without invitations. We accept your committee any time and in any town. You can inspect. There is no longer any sin on our soul. (Going through notes) We discussed yesterday the formation of a permanent group to discuss strategic questions, in verification, submarines and military issues. Turning to GPS, we notice you've been reviewing SDI and have cut back on it in the budget. What about the GPS? We have begun to develop an understanding about it but do not see how practical links between our firms and research and development institutions will develop. We need to think about how we will move forward. We have to get together. If we do, we will build a system against an unexpected nuclear aggressor -- Iraq or anyone else -- that is two times cheaper than it otherwise would have been. (S)

On nuclear targeting, I wanted to tell you that we've removed the targeting cards from the missiles that are scheduled to be eliminated. When an aggressor appears, we will restore the targeting data. This is a serious -- big question. (S)

A senior level person, Mamedov, is in charge of an interagency group on this. We are working for a U.S. proposal. We understand the U.S. is reviewing old plans. I believe we need to move toward specific scientific and technical projects, beyond the political level. (S)

The President: I'd like to make a suggestion. Independent of this meeting, I had asked for a review of the ABM Treaty issues. That review is almost done. I would like to come back to you after we have completed that review. It will not be a long time.  
(S)

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President Yeltsin: Very well, Mr. President. I'd like to move to a bilateral agreement to monitor the oceans to track submarines. Our two nations have a monopoly, so together we can learn where all the subs are at one time. (S)

The President: We will consider that. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'd like to discuss taking nuclear systems out of readiness status early. If we can agree on a "not combat-ready" status for those systems, then all the world will know that they are very tightly under mutual control. We could also give thought to taking multiple warheads off, and perhaps we could sell them to you as uranium or plutonium. (S)

The President: Do you have a specific proposal, or do you want to assign people to work on this? (S)

President Yeltsin: I want to put together a working group to figure out what to do. In the year 2003 (note: the end of the START-II reduction period), I won't be President anymore. I want to achieve this during my presidency. (S)

The President: I can't serve for a third term, so I want to speed up, too. You've raised a number of issues that require a specific and careful response. We'll review the issues and get back to you. This is a significant proposal, and we will respond to you. Now I would like to respond to you on foreign policy issues and discuss the G-7 meeting. First, thank you for your cooperation on re-starting the peace negotiations in the Middle East. I hope you will continue to work to get the Palestinians to come to the table. (S)

President Yeltsin: We will support you on that line. (S)

The President: I would like to get your support for a firm position enforcing UN resolutions on Iraq and Libya. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have no real influence on Iraq. It is true they owe us \$2.5 billion. They say to us if we stop supporting the U.S., they will give us \$4 billion. So this is a "cheap" policy for us. We will not be selling weapons to them nor any spare parts. (S)

The President: We've received reports of new military activities by the Armenians. I'd like to be able to say that in the next couple of days we will work closely together to moderate the fighting. (S)

President Yeltsin: We know about the above situation. We have been talking to Elchibey. I am most concerned that there would be an escalation if we insert ourselves and somehow Armenia would take heart from that. (S)

We have been thinking about what kind of action to take. Elchibey has a very difficult personal political situation.

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Azerbaijan has always had a better military position; now Armenia has it. This is Elchibey's political downfall. We have been in close contact with Azerbaijan rather than Armenia, because for us Azerbaijan, if it develops ties with Iran, is more dangerous than Armenia. If you don't demand an immediate answer, I will think about this for a few days. (S)

The President: The final thing I'd like to talk about in front of our advisors: I have appreciated your candid review of the situation in the republics, especially your willingness to talk about solutions with Shevardnadze in Georgia. One more subject: we are quite concerned about the recent military activity in North Korea. Do you believe that the younger Kim is having any influence here? The most problematic thing is their threat to withdraw from the IAEA. If they withdraw, it will be very difficult. (S)

President Yeltsin: I'll say something first about the nuclear situation. We have stopped all deliveries to all nuclear plants and cut economic relations. Perhaps you have noticed that I have links to South Korea, not North Korea. (S)

The President: I did. (U)

President Yeltsin: That shows you how seriously I take the situation. We share your concern, but have not had current contact with the North Koreans. I suggest the only way is economic pressure on them. But we have no contacts, no delegations going back and forth. I do not think this is the existing influence of Kim Chang Il but just the beginning of the Communist agony, and North Korea may make terrible blunders. When I was in South Korea, we talked about more significant cooperation. We are also concerned. (S)

The President: Just one more question, about the Middle East. We have invested quite a lot in trying to get the peace talks back on track. I'd like to ask you to discuss where you are, and how you can influence the Palestinians to agree to a date. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have cut back our contacts with the Palestinians. That was during the Soviet period -- the Central Committee maintained contacts. Now we have no contacts, delegations, or anything. Although the Syrians are trying to deal with the details of the political situation, it is such a difficult thing to do. Our cooperation with the Syrians is cut way back. That's our position. (S)

Now, with regard to debt: Syria owes us a lot, and so we need \$120 billion. We would like to sell the debt, but we cannot do so because of sanctions against Cuba. Shokhin jokes that maybe you can buy the Cuban debt. (S)

The President: One final question: You know we have a big dispute -- Libya. They are harboring two people who had a big role in destruction of the Pan Am 103 flight. We have had mixed signals. Sometimes they like to cooperate -- other times they

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say no; the answer is that Khaddafi's whole government would fall if those two people were let out. Khaddafi will not even discuss the trial of these two people. (S)

President Yeltsin: Our position regarding this is that there is no cooperation now. If you want strengthened sanctions, we will not oppose them. (S)

We have discussed 52 questions during this summit. (S)

The President: We should get some credit for that. (S)

President Yeltsin: We will raise it at the press conference. (S)

The President: We would like to talk about the G-7 process; and before we close, we would like to discuss anything you might need. I will ask Secretary Bentsen to summarize what we are doing in the G-7 context. (S)

Secretary Bentsen: We fully understand with your inflation and budget concerns that you need early action on assistance. The President has directed us -- and Secretary Christopher and I will be attending the G-7 meeting -- to try to set up a new facility for countries that don't have a full economic program yet in place, like Russia. By creating this new facility, we hope to release \$500 million almost immediately. Once the economic program is in place, then we would envision several billion more this year. But you need to put your central bank in order. It is an absolute imperative that you get control of your currency. The G-7 can implement by the end of the year, once the economic stabilization program is put in place. We are going to encourage the World Bank to expand its activities in agriculture and energy. Many countries are having their own economic problems, but they want to help. But all of this is predicated on your getting control of the central bank. (S)

President Yeltsin: The chairman of the central bank is a member of the government, and without government authorization, the central bank will not issue currency. Fedorov and the government are working hard to get the bank under control. But this is not simple: we have to work together with the Congress (of People's Deputies). (S)

Secretary Bentsen: We hope you have a big win in the referendum. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, true, true. This is collective work -- we have to work together. (S)

The President: Anything else from any member on your side? (U)

President Yeltsin: You should consider my words the product of collective thought. (S)

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Minister Fedorov: We have created a Space and Energy Commission yesterday. Will we be creating others? The Conversion Committee we discussed? (S)

The President: Absolutely, we just have to get that one moving. (S)

Minister Mikhailov: I would like to add something. We have not found a compromise on uranium and low-enriched uranium. We are losing \$200 million per year in the U.S. market, and today we have not reached an agreement. That is very important to us. We dream of free competition, especially with high value-added products and technologies in U.S. markets. It is important for us and for your industry. That would make it possible for you to make use of Russian high technology. I would like to say that we very much support the supercollider work. That is something that will put our scientists and technical specialists to work. Last of all, I would like to mention our joint project to put together the reactor of the future. We are working on it with "General Atomics," a good firm, to work on safe, atom-generated energy of the future, but we need your support. (S)

Ambassador Lukin: I would focus attention on internal issues, symbolic things such as getting rid of the "Captive Nations" laws. From the point of view of parliament, we're treated as a communist power, while China is not. Our parliament notices it. (S)

The President: As I said, I asked Senator Warner to put together a list in the next few days. I gather public statements are not harmful to the cause? (S)

President Yeltsin: Before April 25, that will be very important. (S)

Minister Kozyrev: To eliminate them all in three weeks would be very difficult. But a resolution could be passed to say that these acts would be reviewed and suspended until the review was complete. It will be important to say we are working on changing the laws, and the outcome will be seen by April 25. Foley and others were interested. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK, Mr. President, now the historic Vancouver declaration. As President, I want to officially invite you to make a state visit to Russia, at a time convenient for you. That time will always be convenient for us. (S)

The President: I will be honored to come. I will discuss it and will come when the time is consistent with my economic struggles at home and when it is appropriate and helpful for you. (S)

President Yeltsin: I won't say it's a question for between now and April 25. But I won't want to be considered half a president. (S)

The President: No danger of that. (U)

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President Yeltsin: Maybe we'll just have some quiet time for you and I to discuss any questions with our delegations, especially what might be raised during the press conference. (S)

The President: (Agrees. Break is called.)

(Resuming: Discussion of press conference:)

President Yeltsin: On nuclear tests: Time is short before July 1. If you haven't figured out what to do on testing, can't we stretch the moratorium to January 1, 1994? (S)

The President: We have to talk to the British. They do all their testing in the United States. (S)

President Yeltsin: But let's do something practical and stretch out the moratorium. (S)

The President: We will have to say we discussed this openly. (S)

Another difficult question we will get: Will the economic package make any difference? (S)

President Yeltsin: I, of course, will answer that it will make a difference in this, this and this area. On the Paris Club deal, I will answer that we accept things as worked out in Paris. (S)

On the Indian engine and technology deal, I will say in answer to a question on that: If we drop the Indian deal, it will be a \$240 million loss for us. If the United States is positively ready to broaden access to commercial space launch, then we are ready to take that loss. (S)

The President: And I will say that we are ready to go forward with greater cooperation in space. We are ready to do so, and we are going to work on it. Now, we are likely to be asked a question about aid to the other republics. I will answer if they broaden their reforms to the level achieved in Russia, they can expect more aid. (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course. (U)

Mr. Kostikov: We had better not use the word "assistance" (pomoshch), but "support" (poderzhka).

President Yeltsin: Yes, "support" (sovporerzhka) or "cooperation" (sotrudnichestro). (S)

The President: I will say "partnership in working with America." Now, we will be sure to get two questions: First, was our summit meeting planned to win the referendum, or was the date of the referendum chosen with the summit in mind, because it would influence vote outcome? (S)

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12

President Yeltsin: The answer is clear. We decided to meet long ago, the Congress decided the date would be April 25. (S)

The President: Yes, we decided long ago to meet during the first 100 days of my Presidency. And, the answer to the second question? (S)

President Yeltsin: The answer is simple: We don't have any doubts as to the outcome of the vote. (S)

The President: Yes. We will also be asked about Bosnia. (S)

President Yeltsin: Unfortunately, the Serbs turned down the Vance-Owen plan. Now we must reconsider how to handle the corridor issue. (S)

The President: The Serbs have a specific modification they seek. We should say, if the Serbs can come up with a proposal for immediate negotiation, then we will negotiate. If not, the U.S. will resort to its original position.

On Iran, I will say we discussed it and reached agreement, period. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. (U)

The President: We have a law on arms sales to Iran, and you are within our law. (S)

Minister Fedorov: Maybe you'll let us have the Malaysian fighter plane deal? (S)

The President: On the HEU deal, we are haggling over price, but you and I are going to make it happen. (S)

President Yeltsin: It is also a question of quota. I will answer that earlier, the American side was not willing to discuss these issues, but now we have talked, and the American side is willing to get together and discuss all remaining questions with regard to the agreement. And, we gave an order (ukazaniye) that the agreement should be reached in one week. (S)

Minister Mikhailov: In the week. (U)

President Yeltsin: Especially since the head of your delegation is a woman of tough character (zhestkogo kharaktera). (S)

The President: Another question we will get: Will all these investments be wasted unless Yeltsin gets control of the central bank? (S)

President Yeltsin: I won't give Fedorov's whole biography, but I will answer as I said before: We are working to control the central bank. It is time for us to start. (S)

- END OF MEETING -

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# MIR MARKER

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Document ID: 9302835				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	04/26/1993	PT/6(T) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 147

### FOLDER TITLE:

9302835

2015-0782-M

rs1506

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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RECORD ID: 9302835  
RECEIVED: 27 APR 93 09

TO: GROSSMAN, M  
SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 30 APR 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ YELTSIN

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMOS

DUE DATE: 30 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRYNARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

COMMENTS:

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DATE

*4/30/98*

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 93043014 FOR DECISION  
X 93043020 ITOH SGD MEMOS

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930430 GROSSMAN, M  
002 930430 SHERFIELD, M

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 2835  
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>PA 4/30</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>BN</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:                    VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

29 APR 95 11:39

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9302835  
DATE 30 APR 93

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ YELTSIN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBY Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


April 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Conversation with President  
Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Attached is a copy of the memorandum of conversation for the President's April 26 telephone conversation with President Yeltsin of Russia. Please ensure a copy is provided Eyes Only for Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin. A copy should also be transmitted Eyes Only via NODIS channels to Charge Collins in Moscow. (e)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
As Stated

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko  
Notetaker: Beth SannerDATE, TIME April 26, 1993, 1:50 - 1:58pm  
AND PLACE: ResidenceThe President: Boris? (U)President Yeltsin: I'm listening. (U)The President: Congratulations on a splendid victory. (U)President Yeltsin: I thank you Bill. It was a big victory indeed. (U)The President: I'm about to issue a statement in support of your policies. I want you to know that we're in this with you for the long haul. We made some significant progress in Vancouver and Tokyo. We'll keep working here to be supportive. If there is anything I can do for you here, please let me know. (✓)President Yeltsin: I'm really grateful for your wise policy. Indeed it is a policy of a very wise man. You know it is really tough to get a victory like this under these conditions. But we are up to 62 percent in support of the referendum. You know yourself very well just how tough it is to be put in elections under the conditions of a referendum. I know you understand this well. At the same time, I am gratified that the people have confirmed their attitude toward reform and the Presidency. A major part of the credit goes to you and what you said when we met in Vancouver. I am very grateful. It is not only our common task, it is a common battle and a common victory. (✓)The President: Thank you. I know you're tired and should get some rest. I'm very happy with the outcome. But there are going to be some tough weeks and months ahead. You must keep up your spirits and your strength. I want you to know that the U.S. will be there with you. (✓)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Yeltsin: I thank you for the call. It is very important for my spirits. I thank you not only for me and my wife, but for all the Russian people. (U)

The President: Thank you and good night Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: I want you to know that all the Russian people were pleased with our meeting in Vancouver. They really understood your sincerity. The people of Russia felt close to you as the President of the United States, the most powerful nation in the world. (U)

The President: I felt close to the Russian people too. I think the referendum showed that the Russian people understood what was at stake. I'm going to do all I can to work with you to make this world a safer place for our children. (U)

President Yeltsin: I think the two of us will be able to do this. (U)

The President: That's great. (U)

President Yeltsin: I thank you for your call and your great attitude. (U)

The President: Thanks. (U)

President Yeltsin: I hug you from the bottom of my heart. (U)

The President: Why thank you. Good night. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye and good night. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2835

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 27, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI *TGT*

FROM: BETH SANNER *BES*

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on  
April 26, 1993

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
which took place on April 26, 1993, between the President and  
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia.

Concurrence by: Nicholas Burns *NB*

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve *Kaw* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBY/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 148				
Document ID: 9303034				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	05/02/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 148

### FOLDER TITLE:

9303034

2015-0782-M

rs1507

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TO: ITOH

FROM: BURNS  
GATI

DOC DATE: 03 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 2 MAY

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 06 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR INFO

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
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X 93050513 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

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ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>ll</u>	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ll</u>	<u>ll</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

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COMMENTS:  
  
4 MAY 93 7:20

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3034

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 3, 1993

ACTION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI *TGT*

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNSNB

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia which took place on May 2, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KRY* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia  
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns

DATE, TIME: May 2, 1993, 8:45 - 8:51am  
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello, Boris, can you hear me? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Good. As you know, I've asked Secretary Christopher to come see you to discuss the situation in Bosnia. Milosevich signed on to the Vance-Owen plan. We're hopeful but clear he signed because all of us are growing impatient and want a settlement. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know that and I am hopeful for May. I'll discuss it with Secretary Christopher. (S)

The President: It is very important that between now and May 5 we all say the same thing. I want to keep pressure on and I hope that we stay united. Especially, if you could make it clear that the Bosnian Serbs must not derail the process. We need specific steps to end the fighting and solve the problems. (S)

President Yeltsin: We will have to wait until May 5 when we articulate our position. (S)

The President: I hope by then we'll also see further progress. (S)

President Yeltsin: It would be nice indeed. (U)

The President: Whatever is done, we will have to do it together. I want to mention a special word of praise for Vitaly Churkin. All of my people say he has been very helpful. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, of course. Our positions should be joint and we should take identical actions. It is important for the world on May 5 that we reach agreement with Christopher on the issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 135262015-0782-M.1 (1.04)  
3/13/2018 KBH

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2

~~SECRET~~

The President: I am looking forward to the results of your meeting with Christopher. We need to keep the pressure on for a real settlement - then we'll talk again after May 5. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK, Bill. I agree with you totally. (U)

The President: Great. I'll talk to you again after a few days. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 148				
Document ID: 9303261				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	05/10/1993	P1/b(T) K8H 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 148

### FOLDER TITLE:

9303261

2015-0782-M  
rs1508

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: GOTTEMOELLER

DOC DATE: 07 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN 10 MAY

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 13 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
GOTTEMOELLER  
SIGLER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93051019 FOR DECISION  
X 93051210 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 3261  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PBS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (A) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<sup>W</sup> DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>WS</u>	<u>A</u>
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

10 MAY 93 11:53

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EN4

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~~SECRET~~

3261

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILL H. ITOH

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *RG*

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia which took place on May 10, 1993.

Concurrence by: Nicholas Burns *NB*

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBYNARA*, Date *3/13/2012*  
2015 - 0782 - M-1

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3261

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-1 (1.05)  
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia  
Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Christine Potts

DATE, TIME: May 10, 1993, 8:12 - 8:19am  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello, Boris. Good morning. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning. (U)

President Clinton: I do not want to take a lot of your time. I understand that Minister of Defense Grachev has briefed you on the proposal that we received from Mr. Dudayev to inspect alleged nuclear weapons in his possession. (S)

The possibility that such weapons might be outside firm control is one that I know both you and I take very seriously. Since Dudayev has come to us with this proposal, we believe it is in our interest and yours that we should use the opportunity to find out what weapons, if any, he has. We will do so with the utmost discretion. (S)

Based on our earlier conversations with General Grachev, we have prepared a small inspection team, which is now standing by and is ready to proceed with the inspection within the next few days. (S)

I wanted to ensure that you had been briefed on the proposed inspection, and to ensure that you are fully on board with the idea of doing it. (S)

As we promised General Grachev, we will provide the complete results of the inspection to you as soon as the raw inspection data is analyzed. (S)

I know that this is a delicate situation. Mr. Dudayev, in making the proposal last November, had asked my predecessor not to tell your government about it. I share the view of President Bush, however, that this effort can only be followed through in

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partnership with you. And that is the way I want to handle it. But, I think in view of the seriousness of the situation, we should go ahead and do it and see if there is anything to it.

(S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I understand the situation. I am aware of the situation and of the proposal made by Dudayev. Indeed, I believe the situation is delicate, because we have not recognized Chechenya as independent and still see it as part of Russia. Dudayev has found himself in a difficult situation, because of the increasing resistance to his rule, which we are assisting.

(S)

According to our preliminary information, they want to get something from the United States. But, as far as we know, they do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. I believe that behind this there is a desire to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the world, telling the world that they have these weapons there and that they are dealing with the U.S. Still, I believe that even if there is only a one-thousandth likelihood of truth to this, it needs to be checked out. I agree with what you said. So, you should send the inspection team over and inform us as soon as possible of the results. (S)

President Clinton: If this is a ploy by Dudayev to get recognition then it will backfire. If they do not have nuclear weapons, then it means that they have not been telling the truth. If they do, there will be a lot of pressure on them from outside to give them up right away. We really appreciate your attitude. We will proceed and let you know the results. Thank you very much. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you and good-bye. (U)

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 152				
Document ID: 9304871				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (4 pages)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1) <b>KBN 7/13/2018</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 152

### FOLDER TITLE:

9304871

2015-0782-M  
rs1509

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: SANNER  
BURNS

DOC DATE: 30 JUN 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 28 JUN

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 03 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: 7 PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
SANNER  
SIGLER

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 8/7/14

~~2014-0916-M~~  
2015-0782-M-1

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY NSJDA DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93070210 FOR DECISION  
X 93071215 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM



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4871

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: BETH SANNER *BES*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which took place on June 28, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve            *uaw*

Disapprove           

Attachment  
Tab I      Telcon

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VR NARA, Date 8/7/2014

~~2014-0996-M~~  
2015-0782-M-1

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Declassify on: OADR

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1 (1.06)

3/13/2018 KBH

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Demitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Beth Sanner

DATE, TIME: 28 June 1993, 1:05 - 1:33pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

President Clinton: I want to thank you for taking a few moments to talk with me today. Thank you for Foreign Minister Kozyrev's statement on Iraq. That was very helpful. (S)

President Yeltsin: That was not the statement of Kozyrev. It was the opinion of the leadership of Russia. (S)

President Clinton: Thank you. I wanted to talk to you about a couple of issues today. I am genuinely sorry that Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin could not meet today as planned and that last week's talks on missile sanctions failed. The law here provides little room for me on the missile technology issue. It is important that we reach agreement by July 15 and before our meeting in Tokyo next week, because I want to talk about the future, not the past. (S)

I hope you will be agreeable to me sending Ambassador Strobe Talbott, who is very close to me and coordinates U.S.-Russia relations in our government, along with Lynn Davis, our top negotiator on this issue, and Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor. I hope they will be able to meet with Chernomyrdin and perhaps meet with you for a few minutes to settle the India missile issue. I would like that issue to be out of the way by the time we meet in Tokyo. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I fully agree with you. I would like to say just a few words. First, as to the Constitution, the process is going on well. And, I believe, if we resolve this, it will help improve our economy. Of course, as to Tokyo discussion

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on all the parts of the \$43 billion, we will need to exert additional efforts. Today everyone is waiting for the practical integration of Russia into the world economy and the removal of all the obstacles, as we discussed in Vancouver. I really count on our meeting in Tokyo, and I hope we can sign a declaration, not of the seven leaders, but of the eight leaders. You will understand this, that to Iraq, we declared that your actions were justified. This remains in effect, but you understand, we have many Muslims and they are somewhat worried. (S)

As to your last point on missile technology and the engines for India. As we say in Russian, this is not a matter for the czars. And I would say, let the experts discuss India, Iraq, and Iran. There are many questions. This is a matter for experts, not politicians or presidents. We should avoid taking decisions that could affect the global relationship between our countries that could affect the world. I agree we should decide before Tokyo. (S)

President Clinton: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: This problem should not affect the friendly relations between the United States and Russia. And I would say, the meeting with Chernomyrdin could take place in the second half of July. And they might put the final touches on. Well, I agree that your envoy Strobe Talbott should come to Moscow so that we might sooner have an agreement. (S)

President Clinton: Good. (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill, look here, maybe we could suggest to India that they have strict limitations on missile exports. But, the agreement is not between us but between the former Soviet Union and India, and no one can blame us for this. You understand, we cannot just break this agreement, and we cannot just break our relations with India. You must also understand that we are working on a memorandum of understanding on space technology and we are prepared to join the Freedom project. (S)

President Clinton: Yes, I understand that. Let me make one or two comments on this. I appreciate your agreement to let Ambassador Talbott come back. I will have him there by Wednesday. I understand that the missile technology agreement with India was signed by the former Soviet Union, but my experts believe these sales could lead to the creation of a nuclear delivery capability by India. U.S. law is very strict on this. I do not have a lot of discretion. In May, we reached agreement to give Russia access to participation in the space launch market, as well as our efforts in the oil and gas sector. We need to get on with that, because there will be immediate economic benefits for Russia. We need to resolve this issue. I want that to be translated then I will say something about the G-7. (S)

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Now, about the G-7. The IMF is going to approve the first \$1.5 billion in assistance this week. The G-7 is shaping up well on Russian issues. I think it will agree on the privatization fund, including establishing an office in Moscow to improve the efficiency of our assistance. This program will be useful, although the fund will be smaller than we had hoped. As to the United States, we have obligated over half of the program announced in Vancouver. As you know, I went back to Congress for another \$1.8 billion. This bill has passed the House by a 75 percent margin. It is now before the Senate and will pass there without any trouble. I believe the G-7 summit will be a good one for Russia. The fact that Japan is having trouble, as are some other G-7 countries, may limit their ability to help, but I think it will be a success. (S)

With regard to Russia signing the Political Declaration, it is too late to change the G-7 structure, and the other countries would not agree. But I believe the meeting will be successful and helpful to you back home. (S)

Since I met with you, I have worked with Congress to eliminate Cold War restrictions on Russia. We have pages and pages we want to eliminate, and we will proceed. On Jackson-Vanik, the only thing standing between us on that is the list of refusniks that you were going to provide, as we discussed in Vancouver, and what you were going to do to resolve them. Once we have that, I think there will be broad support in the country to do something on Jackson-Vanik. (S)

We are moving forward on the aid package here at home. With a good aid package and the IMF decision this week, I think Russia may be the only success of the G-7 based on the problems we see in the other countries. I think it will be a good meeting, and I am looking forward to meeting with you. (S)

President Yeltsin: I thank you, Bill, for your optimistic forecast. What you have been saying is extremely good. As to refusniks, we have no problems in this respect. After our discussion in Vancouver, I asked my people to look into this. Eight people out of the 15 have been released. As to the seven remaining, they just did not want to leave -- they have neither the possibility or the opportunity to leave. And, I do not think this should create any problems in our relationship. (S)

And of course, I hope for the positive outcome of the G-7 summit in Tokyo. I wouldn't like to be in a situation, or maybe someone would like to put me in the situation, like Gorbachev was in when he attended the summit in London, where he came away with nothing. (S)

President Clinton: That won't happen. (U)

President Yeltsin: I hope we will have a good and productive meeting. Now we must convince the rest of the G-7 to help Russia. The rest of the process is going on well. (S)

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President Clinton: I agree and I'll see you there. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm looking forward to it. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you. Good night, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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St 2

Case Number: 2014-0996-M; 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 153				
Document ID: 9305178				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-2 (1.55)  
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador at Large and  
Special Adviser to the Secretary on the New  
Independent States  
Nicholas Burns, Acting Senior Director for  
Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs,  
NSC staff (notetaker)

President Boris Yeltsin  
Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Boris Federov, Minister of Finance  
Viktor Ilyushin, First Assistant to President  
Yeltsin  
Dmitri Ryurikov, Assistant to President  
Yeltsin  
Sergey Glaziev, Minister of Foreign Economic  
Trade (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME July 10, 1993, 7:45 - 9:15am  
AND PLACE: Ambassador's Residence, Tokyo

The President: Let me begin now, so we don't run out of time. I would like to speak about three matters today. First, I thought it would be helpful to provide a review of the issues from our Vancouver meeting. Second, we should discuss the dispute we have on the missiles issue. Third, I also want to discuss a few foreign policy issues. (C)

Let me begin by saying that in Vancouver you invited me to visit Russia. If it is acceptable to you, it now appears that I could come in the autumn. (C)

President Yeltsin: Is this September or October? (C)

The President: We could work out the dates later at a time convenient to you and me. If it is better for you to wait, I am flexible. (C)

President Yeltsin: Very good. (U)

The President: On the \$1.6 billion package I announced in Vancouver, we have already obligated 65% of the money. It is either already out there or coming out soon. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. (U)

The President: We'll stay on top of that. On your request for Cold War legislation and the COCOM regime, we've first prepared a very long list of Cold War legislation to repeal. We have the support of both political parties in the Congress. We'll start this when I go home. On COCOM.... (S)

President Yeltsin: How long will it take? (U)

Secretary Christopher: It will probably be done before the Thanksgiving recess. (S)

The President: This year. (U)

President Yeltsin: Not bad. (U)

Secretary Bentsen: That is a very fast schedule for our Congress. (U)

President Yeltsin: This is why I said it's good. (U)

The President: Congress may act faster for you than for me! On COCOM, of course this involves other countries, we will support a reorganization of COCOM for new business. We already have a long list of items we want to see liberalized -- machine tools, computers and telecommunications such as fiber optics. These are things you are interested in. (S)

President Yeltsin: It would be good if we could take part in this new organization. (S)

The President: How long will it take for us to act? (S)

Secretary Christopher: The review of COCOM will be complex and will take a lot of time. It involves negotiations with other countries which will be deliberate. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. (U)

The President: We will do what we can to speed it up. (U)

On Jackson-Vanik, you and I have talked about cases you have processed. I went back to the people in the U.S. and we have 65 cases of people who want to leave. I would like to give you that list and make judgments about each case. (S)

President Yeltsin: You mean new persons? A new list is being set up? (S)

The President: Apparently, we have a difference of opinion on the numbers. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, after we discussed this, I checked with the Security Ministry. They told me there were only 17 people, of whom only 6 remain now. Your list is new. I will study it and give you my opinion. (S)

The President: As we move to graduate you out of Jackson-Vanik, from time to time there will be other cases. You and I don't need to discuss this every time. I suggest there be a process so we don't have to discuss it every time. We can refer the cases to this process. (S)

President Yeltsin: I set up a commission on this -- the Lavrov Commission. He is a Deputy to Kozyrev. Thus, if any questions arise, Lavrov will discuss them. (S)

The President: We want to close the deal on HEU. We have an agreement on the value -- \$12 billion. But we need you to negotiate an agreement with Ukraine and Kazakhstan on the funds. We want to close this deal. (S)

President Yeltsin: As for Belarus, this is Russian property. As for Ukraine, the process is complicated. We have agreed that warheads with weapons grade uranium will be dismantled and returned to Russia. We will then send back enriched uranium to Ukraine for their nuclear power stations. But you understand that it is always difficult to deal with Ukraine. Today they agree, tomorrow they backtrack. So I ask you to press Ukraine on this. (S)

The President: It's the same case with us. (S)

I have a couple of other issues to mention. First, I am pleased that we apparently have your support on nuclear testing and a move toward a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. I thank you for your leadership on this. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. You mean an agreement with all five? (S)

The President: Not with China but with the UK and France. (S)

President Yeltsin: Not China? (S)

The President: Maybe you can get them to move. (S)

President Yeltsin: China is observing. (S)

The President: They are now. Maybe you can get them to agree. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think that when the big four sign the treaty, China will have to comply. Anyway, technologically, they are not advanced so they don't represent a threat. We are

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testing the most modern technology and they don't have this technology. (S)

The President: I'm on my way to Korea. Things are tense with North Korea. We question whether they will let inspectors in and join the NPT. We have had good cooperation on this issue. I hope our cooperation can continue. It is a big issue. Many Japanese brought it up with me. They don't want to be a nuclear power. But there is a serious debate here on this. So, I hope we can continue our cooperation on this. (S)

There are a couple of other issues. We are very concerned about Iran and the things we see them doing. We know they have had some discussions with you about the sale of reactors. We hope you don't do that. We discussed this in Vancouver. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, we discussed the sale of nuclear submarines to Iran. We have already discussed the fact that we sent them the hull of a sub without the nuclear reactor. And this reactor for the sub will not use heavy water but material under IAEA guarantees. It can't be used as a weapon, only as an engine. You understand that this reactor can be verified not only by the IAEA but by experts in your own country. Before Vancouver, we had an agreement to sell two submarines. After Vancouver, we canceled the second sale. If you want to send a representative to verify that reactor, you can do it. (S)

The President: We would like to do so. (S)

President Yeltsin: By all means. (S)

The President: There is another issue. Every time I see you, I get pressure at home on the Lubavitcher Library. We discussed this before. I would like to name someone who works for me to work with someone who works for you. So, then I can tell Congress about this -- they vote on Russia aid. I would like to name someone who works for me and you can name someone. (S)

President Yeltsin: I promised in Vancouver to do something and I've done it. I opened up the public library to them so they can see the books. I said they could copy the samples. So, they now have this right. They can come anytime to look at it. In the past it was closed to the public. Today, it is open. (S)

The President: We went at this before. The dispute is about who owns the books. (S)

President Yeltsin: Let's do it this way. Our Minister of Culture, Mr. Siderov, will deal with this. (S)

The President: And I will assign Leon Fuerth who is on our staff. (S)

President Yeltsin: So, let them cooperate. (S)

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Minister Kozyrev: About every three months, a family of Lubavitchers prays outside my office. (S)

The President: Let's talk about the missile issue. I know this is a difficult issue for you. I understand that now even though in Vancouver I thought we had agreed to terminate the India deal. I understand this is a difficult matter. But it seems to me that there is a lot to be gained by Russia in Space Launch and Space projects to be discussed. (S)

President Yeltsin: The Freedom project. (S)

The President: I want to avoid restrictions under our law and in our policy which require sanctions. So I thought I would give you a chance to comment to see how we can work it out. (S)

President Yeltsin: No. There should be no sanctions between friends. I cannot imagine sanctions between us. We're friends. I would say that Mr. Talbott did a good job. But our component of the commission did a very bad job. We said our negotiators couldn't stop the deal with the Indians or declare a moratorium on the deal. We might have suggested that both India and Russia join the MTCR. Now I am changing our Commission. They got bad marks. They are fired. Now Koptiev will be in charge. Talbott knows him. He is a professional expert in space. At least when we launch spaceships, his is the first signature. (S)

I know you understand this and I would like to propose the following. India opposes a change. They will try to gain something from us and from you. I suggest the new commission have until the New Year to agree with India to stop the deal. At the same time, there would be a moratorium on your sanctions. The law can't be retroactive. You passed your law after the USSR signed the deal with India. So, a double moratorium to January 1. We will provide no technology during this time. And for you, it will mean no sanctions until January 1. This sounds reasonable. (S)

The President: Let me make a counter-proposal which is not inconsistent with what you have said. Since you have a new group, why don't you send them to Washington next week. Under our law and policy, we need to be able to say progress is being made. You send your team, and then I'll have the basis to extend the deadline because I believe you'll negotiate in good faith. In the meanwhile, I have another suggestion. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. (U)

The President: Your team could put your proposal on the table and mine could too. (S)

President Yeltsin: For a moratorium. (S)

The President: We will put another proposal on the table and if you agree, we would like to involve Ambassador Pickering in an effort to resolve the problem with India. He was in India before

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Moscow. We may be able to do something for India which is good for them and for us. (S)

President Yeltsin: Very good. Agreed. (U)

The President: It is important that they come on Monday due to the deadline. We need to show the world. We have to try as hard as we can not just with you but with India, China, Pakistan to stop the nightmare of the 21st century. You must understand that this is a very important issue. I feel it is a very important issue -- one of my jobs for the whole world. You send your team and we'll talk. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. They will be in Washington on Monday. (U)

The President: Now, can we reschedule Gore-Chernomyrdin for this summer? (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes. When? (U)

The President: Anytime this summer. (U)

President Yeltsin: August is fine. (U)

The President: A lot of good things can come out of this meeting. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: There are two energy projects which we believe will be good for you and for us. First is the \$10 billion Sakhalin project. The other is the Texaco project in the Arctic Circle. Can you give me some idea on the status of these? (U)

President Yeltsin: As to the Sakhalin project, the competition is ended. A number of firms prepared technical material. It was very useful. Japan and South Korea will profit from this. But the pipeline must go through North Korea and this is a most difficult path for a pipeline at the bottom of the bay. The U.S. firms won this competition. As to the other project, we have just finished prospecting for reserves. I would say that the Academy of Sciences has depicted what this project would look like. (U)

The President: When we were in Vancouver, we discussed the inspection teams for the biological weapons sites. I have been told that our teams were not allowed to visit. I wanted to raise this to see if we could work out a visit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yesterday I was told there was a technical mishap in planning the visit. I will give my instructions on this as soon as I return to Moscow. All the sites are closed. You can check this anytime. These are old bureaucrats doing this. Kuntsevich is the Chairman of our special committee. If

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he is responsible for this delay, he will be fired immediately.  
(S)

The President: You were forthright yesterday on the Baltics and on the problems of the Russians in Estonia. We have been pressing Estonia to make them more sensitive to this problem. We believe it is important for them to respect the rights of the Russians but also for you to withdraw your troops. We are willing to do more on the Baltic issue if you have suggestions. If it would help, we will do more. (S)

President Yeltsin: I would like you to make a legal investigation of the laws to show how they discriminate. Whatever we tell them about this, they disagree. (S)

The President: I'll see what we can do. (S)

On Georgia, before you came in yesterday, the G-7 agreed to help economically. I hope you will do what you can to help bring an end to the Abhaz rebellion. Shevardnadze is our friend. We want to help him. I wonder who would be there if he is not. We just need to help him. We received a letter from him on his problems and he's almost not the same person. We will do more. I hope you can use your influence with the Abhaz. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yesterday, we supported the UNSC resolution to send observers to Georgia. Let's begin with that. Let's consider what else to do. As for Eduard Shevardnadze, I treat him with great respect. I don't know either who could replace him. (S)

The President: On Japan, I want to be helpful and to do what we can to help your relationship. Of course, I have mixed feelings about this since they may push us out of business opportunities in Russia! But it is important for you to have a good relationship with Japan. There is a limitation on their military power. The only way they can be a world power is through investment. This trip helped your stature. Miyazawa talked about it over and over last night. You should work out the details of your trip here in the autumn. Anything we can do to help we will do. I believe that Japan can help Russia to develop more quickly. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you for your part in this. We agreed on October 12-14 for the visit. Of course you understand the difficulties I will have in arriving at an optimal decision on the islands by October. (S)

Now you have gone through the list of all my issues to raise.  
(U)

The President: We can't joke about the Japanese. That wasn't your fault, though. It was the Canadian press. (S)

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President Yeltsin: You have gone through all my list of issues. There must be two copies of the list of issues, one in English and the other in Russian. (U)

The President: I can see a scandal emerging -- Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin have the same staff! (S)

President Yeltsin: You have your CIA. We have Russian Foreign Intelligence. They both have to earn their money! (S)

On Nagorno-Karabakh, we should raise the level of our cooperation. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Yeltsin: Secretary Christopher and Kozyrev discussed this. They should cooperate more. We can't ignore the bloodshed there. (S)

On Ukraine, yesterday our Supreme Soviet said that Sevastopol is a Russian city. It is a peculiar situation. Sevastopol is on Ukrainian territory. It is a very odd decree. When I get back, I will have to work on relations with Ukraine. Thank God no one takes the Supreme Soviet seriously! (S)

Perhaps we could tell Ukraine that it would be good for the three of us to have a signed agreement on nuclear weapons. (S)

The President: Good. (U)

President Yeltsin: So let's prepare our instructions. (U)

The President: They (referring to Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Talbott) say we have to talk about this. (S)

How do you say if looks could kill in Russian! (after Yeltsin glared theatrically at Secretary Christopher) (S)

President Yeltsin: I want to extend the IAEA functions. (S)

The President: To do what? (U)

President Yeltsin: For verification and monitoring. I suggest that we extend their prerogatives for nuclear power. (S)

Minister Kozyrev: The answer is positive, right? (S)

The President: Very. I believe in this. We have to keep trying. We need to work to expand it. In this case, as the Secretary of State points out, the IAEA is underfunded and understaffed. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The NPT treaty ends in 1995. We favor an indefinite duration. (S)

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The President: We do too. This is a big issue in Korea. That's also why the North Korea issue is important in Japan. The Japanese are looking at 1995. All the older Japanese politicians who remember World War Two and who want Japan to be a great economic power want the NPT to be maintained. They trust the U.S. But if North Korea hangs out, some of the younger Japanese may argue for a different tactic. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Case Number: 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 160				
Document ID: 9306715				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (4 pages)	09/07/1993	P1/b(1) <b>KBN 7/13/2018</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 160

### FOLDER TITLE:

9306715

2015-0782-M

rs1510

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: SANNER  
BURNS

DOC DATE: 07 SEP 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS.

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 7 SEP

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ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 10 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 1 OF 1

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 93090721 FOR DECISION  
X 95022414 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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6715

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

**SUSPENSE**

September 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: BETH SANNER *NB for*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which  
took place on September 7, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

*P*

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-1 (1.07)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Demitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Beth Sanner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 7, 1993, 11:40am - 12:10pm  
Oval Office

The President: Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Greetings Bill. (U)

The President: I just wanted to call and check in with you. I haven't talked with you since the G-7 summit. I know you are going through some difficult times. I just want you to know that I'm thinking of you in these difficult times and to tell you still have my support. (C)

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was just here. It was a great visit. He and Vice President Gore got off to a great start on the Agreement on Space Cooperation and the Joint Commission on Energy and Space. (C)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I am also satisfied that at last I have a chance to talk and to have discussions on a number of questions. I am also satisfied with the results of visit of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the first results of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, if I can call it that. (C)

The President: I am as well. I hope we can move forward and do more work on energy projects and environmental cleanup. These are areas that U.S. companies are anxious to participate in. There are a number of large projects pending approval in the oil and gas sector. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin said he would speed the process. Texaco has been in touch with me concerning their deal at Timon Pechora. I hope we can make progress on these things because I think they can be a help to the Russian economy. (C)

President Yeltsin: I agree. We will take the necessary steps. It's a pity we couldn't sign the contract on Highly Enriched

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Uranium. We must move promptly and settle the Ukrainian aspect of this problem. (S)

The President: I will do what I can to support resolution of that. I understand you had a successful meeting with President Kravchuk. Did you reach agreement on early deactivation of missiles in Ukraine and transfer to Russia? (S)

President Yeltsin: I must tell you about Crimea. This was one of the most productive meetings we have had with Ukraine, with Kravchuk. We finally reached agreement on strategic nuclear weapons. The agreement calls for the total removal in 24 months of nuclear warheads to Russia for their elimination. As a trade off, we will give Ukraine Low Enriched Uranium for use at nuclear power plants. (S)

Of course they are aware of U.S. willingness to provide \$175 million in compensation. But they are not satisfied with that figure. And they would like to obtain more from you. I told them that they would need to resolve that with the U.S. I said that now that Ukraine has relations with the U.S. it is up to the two sides to resolve this matter. (S)

We also resolved the Black Sea Fleet matter, finally. As Ukraine owes \$2.5 billion to Russia, we will get their part of the fleet as payment for this debt. With this eventuality, all the fleet will belong to Russia and we will keep the base at Sevastopol. I believe the Crimea trip has been highly productive. (S)

The President: Thanks. How do you assess the position of Kravchuk at home? Is he in better shape? (S)

President Yeltsin: No worse off. (S)

The President: Same with all of us maybe. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well in the first place, the situation concerns the state of the economy. They have gotten off to a late start for economic reform, compared to Russia. Because of this, they are in bad economic shape. (S)

The President: I understand that. Congratulations on your decision to withdraw your troops from Lithuania. I know you face domestic opposition. But the decision you made was courageous and the right thing to do. I was wondering about your plans for Estonia and Latvia? (S)

President Yeltsin: In the first place, next week we will pull out all our troops from Poland. (S)

The President: Great. (U)

President Yeltsin: In Latvia and Estonia it is more difficult because of their failure to comply with the human rights of ethnic Russians living there. (S)

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The President: Is there anything we can do to push that? (S)

President Yeltsin: Only in the sense that you can try to exert influence on them so that they can change their legislation, especially in the sense that it affects Russia. We pulled out from Lithuania because their legislation does not adversely affect Russians living there. We would be prepared to pull out from Latvia and Estonia provided there are no discriminatory attitudes toward Russians there. We are taking queue from the U.S. because you have been working quite well in the area of protecting your minorities. (S)

The President: I wanted to raise a few other issues with you. Congress is back in session today. I want you to know we will be working hard on passing the \$2.5 billion assistance package for Russia. It is now before the Senate; it has already passed the House. It will be a difficult fight but I think we will win it. It is difficult not because there isn't support for Russian aid, the difficulties are because of our own budget problems. But I'm confident we will win it. (S)

We also are planning on passing a law this fall to eliminate the legislative remnants of the Cold War system. We also are working on transforming COCOM with our allies and we hope to get a new system where you could be members. (S)

We are very encouraged about the recent breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. We look forward to working with you on this important issue. Secretary Christopher recently talked to Foreign Minister Kozyrev about coming to Washington for the signing ceremony. I hope to find out in the next couple of days that this will come about. (S)

President Yeltsin: I am very appreciative of your stand on granting us \$2.5 billion and your efforts with the Congress on enacting this package. I know this is an uphill battle. But I know you will win and also on the repeal of the 60 pieces of legislation you just mentioned, as well as on COCOM reform. In respect to the Middle East and Palestine, I wish to congratulate you on this victory and of course Kozyrev will go there. I will instruct him appropriately. (S)

We still have the question of Yugoslavia to discuss. Here we will have to work jointly with the Serbs so we can finally have resolution on this issue. (S)

The President: Thank you. I hope we can resolve this through the peace talks. The Serbs and Croats seem more willing to negotiate for peace recently. If there is anything you can do to help resolve this issue we would very much appreciate it. We seem fairly close on the land issue. I hope we can resolve the negotiations before winter. I am worried about going through another winter over there without peace. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I can simply assure you that we will continue to work very hard with the Serbs. Before coming to the

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U.S., Kozyrev will fly to Sarajevo so he can do something and put more pressure on the Serbs. (S)

Bill, I am very happy we had this chance to talk. I am quite appreciative of the fact you called first this time. (U)

The President: It won't be long till we talk again. Please call me anytime. If I don't hear from you soon, I will call you in a couple of weeks. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'll call you within a very short time, especially in connection with questions about our domestic life and the situation in parliament. I'm right now engaged in a bit of fighting with parliament which is moving away from reforms and the changes we are trying to make. But I hope that in the long run I will prevail. (S)

The President: I surely hope so. We will be pulling for you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you Bill. I am very glad to have had this conversation and to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Thank you Boris. Good bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 163				
Document ID: 9307171				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (3 pages)	09/21/1993	P1/b(1) <b>KBH 7/13/2018</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 163

### FOLDER TITLE:

9307171

2015-0782-M  
rs1511

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 22 SEP 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 21 SEP

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 24 SEP 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOTTEMOELLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

GOTTEMOELLER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY

*WA*

DATE

*9/22*

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	ITOH	Z	93092112 FOR DECISION
001		X	93092219 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93092219 KENNEY SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	930922	GROSSMAN, M	
002	930922	MCALEER, R	
002	930922	LAUDER, J	

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7171  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG WFO A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W</i> DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>None</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Ex Sec's Office has the file*

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: \_\_\_\_\_

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MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM H ITOH 456-6534 \_\_\_\_\_  
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN

NSC LOG # 7171

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBI Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9307171  
DATE 22 SEP 93

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 21 SEP  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. JOHN A. LAUDER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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7171

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin and to DCI Woolsey. (S)

*Kristie A. Kenney*  
for William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KKK NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-m-1 (1.08)

3/13/2013 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Demitry Zarechnak  
Notetakers: John Beyrle and Rose Gottemoeller

DATE, TIME: September 21, 1993, 3:56 - 4:13pm  
AND PLACE: White House Residence (President's Study)

President Yeltsin: Good evening, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. I have just been briefed on your speech tonight and I wanted to call you right away to get your personal sense of what this step will mean for you, for the Russian political process, and for reform. I want to issue a public statement to state my support for you but before I do I wanted to hear from you how this affects your position and the process of reform in Russia. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, the Supreme Soviet has totally gone out of control. It no longer supports the reform process. They have become communist. We cannot no longer put up with that. For that reason, today I signed a decree on elections to a new democratic assembly to take place on December 11 and 12. In that period, the Supreme Soviet and Congress actions will not have any effect. Everything will be governed by Presidential decree. All the democratic forces are supporting me. (S)

The President: Are the military and security services with you? (S)

President Yeltsin: Both the military and Ministry of Internal Affairs have come out in support of me. There is no disorder for the time being. There are about 300 people gathered but they are dispersing. I think there will be no bloodshed. (S)

The President: That's good. Your speech comes at an important time here -- the Senate will act this week on the \$2.5 billion assistance package for Russia and the other states. Secretary Christopher is with key members of Congress now to underscore our continued support for the bill. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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President Yeltsin: Yes, of course, now the reforms will go faster. (S)

The President: That's good. It will also be important for me to be able to tell the U.S. people and the Senate that you intend to pursue the elections in a fully democratic manner, that they will be free and fair and that the outcome will be observed by you and all other parties. It will be important to confirm publicly that is what you said and that is what you believe. (S)

President Yeltsin: Absolutely, this will be the case, and I thank you for your support. (S)

The President: Let me ask you one question that I know the press will ask me today. I have heard that Rutskoi and Khasbulatov are claiming that they are being denied access to the press. Freedom of expression will be important during the elections. It will be important to be able to say that they proceeded really freely and democratically. Free access to the press is an important part of that. What are the facts from your point of view and what is the connection to the election? (S)

President Yeltsin: This is not connected to the elections and nobody has forbidden them to talk to the press. I have made no such decisions. (S)

The President: Thank you. I intend to be in touch with our allies in Europe and Asia to underscore the importance of support for reform in Russia at this critical juncture. I just want to say again that you will have my support and the support of the American people. I will continue to push for the aid package. It will be important if you can confirm to us and to your own people that you are really going to continue the process of reform and that the elections will be free and fair. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you for your support. I promise that the elections will be fully carried out in a democratic way without discrimination of any kind. Anybody who wants to take part will be able to do so. The reforms will go much faster now than in the past. The Supreme Soviet hindered reforms in the past. And thank you for your support. The Russian people will not forget. (S)

The President: I know you need your rest, but before you go I wanted to ask you what will the opposition do? (S)

President Yeltsin: The opposition will try not to recognize what has happened. But the people will understand all of this, especially the intelligentsia. We don't want to use force. Everything will take place peacefully. We do not in any circumstances want bloodshed. (S)

The President: I thought it would be important to talk to you before I spoke to the press, because the American people are standing with you and the Russian people. This conversation has

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helped. If you need to talk to me any time in the next two days, I'll be available any time of the day or night. All the best. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. Then we should tell the press about our conversation. (U)

The President: Yes, I will immediately issue a statement to the press. Good night. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. I embrace you, Bill. (U)


-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER NB for

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which took place on September 21, 1993.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin and DCI Woolsey.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to State, DOD and CIA  
Tab A Telcon

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 165				
Document ID: 9307653				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (3 pages)	10/05/1993	P17b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 165

### FOLDER TITLE:

9307653

2015-0782-M

rs1512

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 93100519 FOR DECISION  
X 93100611 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 931006 GROSSMAN, M  
002 931006 MCALEER, R

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7453  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 114 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wall</u>	
ExecSec			
Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>JPH 10/16</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC    VP    McLarty    Other Hilliard

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

5 OCT 95 7:10 PM

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Exec Sec's Office handled*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9307653

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 OCT 93

MEMORANDUM FOR: GROSSMAN, M

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GROSSMAN, M

SOURCE: ITOH

DATE: 06 OCT 93

SUBJ: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA / 5 OCT

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
REQUIRED ACTION: PLEASE TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

ON AN "EYES ONLY" BASIS

DUE DATE: 06 OCT 93

COMMENT:

FOR

  
WILLIAM H. LEARY  
NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9307653

REFERRAL

DATE: 06 OCT 93

MEMORANDUM FOR: MCALEER, R

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DOD

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GROSSMAN, M

SOURCE: ITOH

DATE: 06 OCT 93

SUBJ: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA / 5 OCT

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REQUIRED ACTION: PLEASE TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY ASPIN ON AN

"EYES ONLY" BASIS

DUE DATE: 06 OCT 93

COMMENT:

FOR

  
WILLIAM H. LEARY

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-1

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7653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin on an "eyes only" basis.  
(S)

*for Kristie A. Kenney*  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0732-M-1 (1.09)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak  
Notetaker: John Beyrle

DATE, TIME: October 5, 1993, 1:42 - 2:02pm  
AND PLACE: Air Force One

President Yeltsin: Bill, good evening. It's good to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Good evening, Boris. I wanted to call you and express my support. I have been following events closely and have tried to support you as much as possible. I know this has been a difficult time for you, and I wanted to know how you are doing. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Bill, thank you very much for your support, which I knew and felt would be coming. Now that these events are over, we have no more obstacles to Russia's democratic elections and our transition to democracy and a market economy. The fascist organizations that had been active in these events have now been banned, so now I feel that all will be fine. It's too bad that some people were killed, but this is the fault of those who were the first to open fire and acted in a provocative way. They brought to Moscow a gang of people from the Transdnier region, the Riga OMON -- these were special forces. They had them come here, gave them machine guns and grenade launchers, and had them fire on peaceful civilians. There was no other alternative than to use force against them. This was terrorism and banditry at work. I felt that the people supported me. Now that we have all this behind us, I plan to move forward in a strong way. (Ø)

The President: What will your timetable be for elections? Will you keep to the same schedule you had planned? (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Yes, the elections will be held Dec. 11 as planned. But I also think that maybe, in order to meet the desires expressed by other parties, I will consider holding early elections for the president simultaneously with the parliamentary elections. I'm not sure, but I may end up in the Guinness Book of

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World Records for standing for election three times in three years. (S)

The President: (Laughing) Yes, I don't know what I'd do if I had to run for election three times in three years. But you just seem to get stronger and better. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I guess I can't do much about it. And no real rivals to me are visible. My current rating stands at 90 percent. (S)

The President: What is the prevailing attitude among the regional leaders? Can we do something through our aid package to send support out to the regions? (S)

President Yeltsin: That would be good. Those regional leaders who were supporting the opposition are now changing their support to us. But nonetheless, this kind of regional support would be very useful. (S)

The President: I will have my people follow up with yours on that issue. (S)

Another question I have for you: how will you decide who can run in the elections after all that's happened, and which papers and press outlets to open again? Will that be a problem for you? (S)

President Yeltsin: There will be no restrictions on the elections except for those who have been charged with crimes, who have incited murder or bodily harm. Thirty-nine people have now been killed on our side. (S)

The President: What will happen to Ruts koy and Khasbulatov and the other leaders that are in custody? (S)

President Yeltsin: The courts, the prosecutors, and an investigation will decide. We will not take part in this. For now, they are in custody and are being held in prison. If the court decides that they were not involved in murders or other crimes, if they issued no orders to shoot to kill -- though I'm certain that Ruts koy did give such orders -- if they are not guilty, they should be acquitted. Or, if they are found guilty, I could pardon them as long as they resolve to leave public life. In any case, this will all be done in a democratic fashion. (S)

The President: That's good. In closing, I want to express my intention to continue to work on our bilateral relations. Energy Secretary O'Leary was recently in Moscow, and I know other cabinet secretaries are planning visits. Secretary Christopher will be there the third week of October. I assume you want us to press ahead on all of these projects. I'm also looking forward to my own visit in January. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill, I am very happy for the support you have given, I appreciate the cooperation. And I am looking

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forward to the visit by you and your wife Hillary in January.  
(S)

The President: Great. I hope you'll be able to get some rest now. I know it has been very hard for you, but you did everything exactly as you had to and I congratulate you for the way you handled it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you for everything. I embrace you with all my heart. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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7653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM:

JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the  
President and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which took place on October 5, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Will Itoh's Memo to State and DoD  
Tab A Telcon

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBH/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 165				
Document ID: 9307659				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Clarification on your October 5 Telephone Conversation (1 page)</del>	<del>10/07/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBH 7/13/2018</b>
<del>001b. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (3 pages)</del>	<del>10/05/1993</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBH 7/13/2018</b>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 165

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9307659

2015-0782-M  
rs1513

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
 PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
 RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 07 OCT 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION ON PRES 5 OCT TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 08 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 93100610 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
Z 93100712 FOR INFORMATION  
X 93100916 NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

Rec'd 10/8 6:50 pm

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 7659  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>LS</u>	<u>I</u>
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
APNSA	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	<b>Natl Sec Advisor has seen</b>	_____
West Wing Desk	<del>2</del> <u>4</u>	<u>ASK 10/8</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	<del>N</del>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                    McLarty                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: m s

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*[Handwritten signature]*

\_\_\_\_\_

Rec'd 10/6 10:25am  
Rec'd 10/7 9:28am  
National Security Council  
The White House

JWR  
9/6

PROOFED BY: ASK LOG # 7659  
URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG HA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

W

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	<u>1</u>	<u>Wall</u>	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
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APNSA	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	<b>Natl Sec Advisor</b> has seen	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JWR 10/7</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP \_\_\_\_\_ McLarty \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

cc: NS ✓

5 OCT 95 9:34

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

\_\_\_\_\_

Ext Sec's Office has desalted

Need signatures  
at Tab I,  
please

OK - but it wasn't  
the time for  
me to raise the  
newspaper issue  
on the 5th.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 10/8

~~SECRET~~

7659

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1 (1.10)  
3/13/2018 K84

October 7, 1993

93 OCT 7 P1:57

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKH

SUBJECT: Clarification on your October 5 Telephone  
Conversation with President Yeltsin

*Handwritten note:*  
Get this - but if you want to put this in the file, you need to get the original from the CIA.

I wanted to highlight for you two possibly confusing statements made by President Yeltsin in your October 5 telephone conversation.

First, Yeltsin mentioned that a gang of people from Riga (in Latvia) and the Transdnister (in Moldova) had participated in the opposition's attempt to overthrow the government on Sunday. These men were from the elite Russian security forces stationed in Latvia and Moldova (against the wishes of both governments). Since Yeltsin did not fully explain who these people were, we wanted to be sure you understood that they were not connected in any way with the Latvian and Moldovan governments which actually supported Yeltsin throughout this crisis.

Second, you asked Yeltsin who will be able to participate in the December elections and which of the papers and press outlets will be free to publish. Yeltsin said in Russian that there would be no restrictions on the elections and that only those who faced criminal charges would be ineligible to run for office. Unfortunately, Yeltsin's interpreter mistakenly translated this to say there would be no restrictions on the press. Yeltsin did not say that and avoided altogether answering your question on press freedoms.

For your information, Yeltsin has banned ten right-wing newspapers under the current state of emergency which is due to expire on Saturday. We are unsure if he will choose to extend the emergency beyond that day. We have taken the position that we can understand temporary restrictions to restore order after the attempted coup against him but hope that they will be lifted as the situation returns to normal. We are concerned about this issue and have asked Ambassador Pickering to raise it directly with Yeltsin.

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation of your telephone call with President Yeltsin

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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7659

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

SUBJECT: Clarifications on the President's October 5  
Telephone Conversation with Yeltsin

There were two important parts of the President's telephone conversation with Yeltsin today that could have been misinterpreted by the President due to the translation and lack of specificity by Yeltsin. The attached memorandum to the President is intended to assure he understands what Yeltsin meant to say in both instances.

Concurrence by: John Beyrle *NB/jm*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation of October 5 Telephone  
Call

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015 - 0782 - M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-M-1(1.11)  
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT:** Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (U)

**PARTICIPANTS:** The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak  
Notetaker: John Beyrle

**DATE, TIME AND PLACE:** October 5, 1993, 1:42 - 2:02pm  
Air Force One

President Yeltsin: Bill, good evening. It's good to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Good evening, Boris. I wanted to call you and express my support. I have been following events closely and have tried to support you as much as possible. I know this has been a difficult time for you, and I wanted to know how you are doing. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, thank you very much for your support, which I knew and felt would be coming. Now that these events are over, we have no more obstacles to Russia's democratic elections and our transition to democracy and a market economy. The fascist organizations that had been active in these events have now been banned, so now I feel that all will be fine. It's too bad that some people were killed, but this is the fault of those who were the first to open fire and acted in a provocative way. They brought to Moscow a gang of people from the Transdniestier region, the Riga OMON -- these were special forces. They had them come here, gave them machine guns and grenade launchers, and had them fire on peaceful civilians. There was no other alternative than to use force against them. This was terrorism and banditry at work. I felt that the people supported me. Now that we have all this behind us, I plan to move forward in a strong way. (S)

The President: What will your timetable be for elections? Will you keep to the same schedule you had planned? (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, the elections will be held Dec. 11 as planned. But I also think that maybe, in order to meet the desires expressed by other parties, I will consider holding early elections for the president simultaneously with the parliamentary elections. I'm not sure, but I may end up in the Guinness Book of

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World Records for standing for election three times in three years. (S)

The President: (Laughing) Yes, I don't know what I'd do if I had to run for election three times in three years. But you just seem to get stronger and better. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I guess I can't do much about it. And no real rivals to me are visible. My current rating stands at 90 percent. (S)

The President: What is the prevailing attitude among the regional leaders? Can we do something through our aid package to send support out to the regions? (S)

President Yeltsin: That would be good. Those regional leaders who were supporting the opposition are now changing their support to us. But nonetheless, this kind of regional support would be very useful. (S)

The President: I will have my people follow up with yours on that issue. (S)

Another question I have for you: how will you decide who can run in the elections after all that's happened, and which papers and press outlets to open again? Will that be a problem for you? (S)

President Yeltsin: There will be no restrictions on the elections except for those who have been charged with crimes, who have incited murder or bodily harm. Thirty-nine people have now been killed on our side. (S)

The President: What will happen to Rutskoy and Khasbulatov and the other leaders that are in custody? (S)

President Yeltsin: The courts, the prosecutors, and an investigation will decide. We will not take part in this. For now, they are in custody and are being held in prison. If the court decides that they were not involved in murders or other crimes, if they issued no orders to shoot to kill -- though I'm certain that Rutskoy did give such orders -- if they are not guilty, they should be acquitted. Or, if they are found guilty, I could pardon them as long as they resolve to leave public life. In any case, this will all be done in a democratic fashion. (S)

The President: That's good. In closing, I want to express my intention to continue to work on our bilateral relations. Energy Secretary O'Leary was recently in Moscow, and I know other cabinet secretaries are planning visits. Secretary Christopher will be there the third week of October. I assume you want us to press ahead on all of these projects. I'm also looking forward to my own visit in January. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill, I am very happy for the support you have given, I appreciate the cooperation. And I am looking

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forward to the visit by you and your wife Hillary in January.  
(Ø)

The President: Great. I hope you'll be able to get some rest now. I know it has been very hard for you, but you did everything exactly as you had to and I congratulate you for the way you handled it. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Thank you for everything. I embrace you with all my heart. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 178				
Document ID: 9309998				
Row: 44	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (4 pages)	12/22/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 178

### FOLDER TITLE:

9309998

2015-0782-M  
rs1514

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELECON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 27 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE

~~RUSSIA~~

EXECSEC

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	ITOH	Z	93122718	FOR DECISION
001		X	94010313	KENNEY APPROVED RECOM
002		X	94010313	KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	940103	GROSSMAN, M	
002	940103	MCALEER, R	

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: VA LOG # 9998

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG JB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec <u>aw</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>mm</u>	<u>A</u>
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Staff Director			
D/APNSA			
APNSA			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JK 1/4</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ExecSec Has Disc

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9998

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telecon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin. (8)

*Kristi A. Keaney*  
for William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *JB for NB*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which took place on December 22, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *JB* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I William Itoh's Memorandum to State and DoD  
Tab A Telecon

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9998

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1 (1.12)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak  
Notetaker: John Beyrle

DATE, TIME: December 22, 1993 9:10 - 9:40 am  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris, good evening. It's good to hear your voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good day, Bill. Yes, I haven't heard your voice for a long time. (U)

The President: Well, you've been through a lot recently. I wanted to congratulate you and the Russian people on your historic elections. In my public statements, I tried to emphasize the positive results of the elections -- that they were free and fair, that the constitution was approved, and that reformers will still be by far the largest faction in the Duma. (U)

President Yeltsin: That's absolutely correct. (U)

The President: I know that the anti-reform vote and the success of Zhirinovskiy pose problems for you. I've just received a report of your recent public statement, and I wanted to ask your thoughts on the impact of the elections in Russia. Will the reform parties come together and be able to work effectively with your government? And will the election results have an impact on your economic reforms or on Russian foreign policy? (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, thanks for your attention to all of this. You see, there are two different types of constituencies in the parliament: a multiparty constituency and a single seat constituency. In any event, the democrats will have the majority in the parliament. It's a bicameral assembly. And in the upper house, 80 percent will be democratically minded people. And so I'm sure that we will be able to work well with this parliament, especially since the working relationship is supported by a strong democratic foundation in the new constitution. (S)

The President: That's great. I had one question regarding Zhirinovskiy. For our part, I think we've decided not to make

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Declassify on: OADR

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too much of him or build him up too much. Do you agree with this -- how does he fit into your own calculations? Do you agree that we should play him down? I think that Vice President Gore was right to say the things he said about him, but now I think we're inclined to try not to say too much about him. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have just held a press conference to discuss the results of the recent elections, and I said we will judge Zhirinovskiy by his deeds. Words are words, promises are promises, but we will see how he works in the new parliament, and if his role and the role of his party will be a constructive one. That's the criterion we will use. But one thing is clear: there is no room for extremism or fascism in the new parliament. The President and the constitution will guard against that. I believe we shouldn't pay exaggerated attention to Zhirinovskiy and his party, but at the same time, we must not ignore him or exclude him. (S)

The President: I'm really looking forward to our summit in January. You know that Hillary and Chelsea will be joining me in Moscow on the 14th. Hillary will be pleased to see Naina again. This will be an important meeting. Some have questioned whether the U.S. and Russia can build an effective partnership. I think we can convince them otherwise. (S)

I wanted to highlight today three issues that I believe are critical to the success of our meeting: economic assistance to support your reforms; our common effort to convince Ukraine to go non-nuclear; and our foreign policy agenda. (S)

President Yeltsin: I fully agree with that. We are looking forward to your arrival and are preparing a good program for that. We have accepted fully the very good program that you presented, but with one small adjustment I'd like to suggest. It is maybe not needed, as Vice President Gore did, to invite to a meeting all the leaders of all the parties and all factions of the new parliament -- so as not to give them an exaggerated opinion of themselves. But I fully agree on the agenda you propose: bilateral issues; Ukraine -- a subject that gives me great concern; and international affairs. (S)

The President: Regarding economic reform and western assistance, I will give you a status report in Moscow of U.S. economic assistance since Vancouver. The \$1.6 billion package from Vancouver has been fully obligated and 71 percent of the funds have been expended. The larger \$2.5 billion package has been underway for two months and funds are now starting to flow. (U)

But I want to know your views on the course and pace of your economic reforms. It is critical to continue those reforms. You have a good team and a good reform program. I understand that you may have to react to domestic pressures and that this might require some adjustments to your policies. (S)

We have begun a quiet study within our government of possible ways the U.S. and other G-7 countries could help improve IMF and

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World Bank assistance to Russia. I intend to discuss these ideas with my G-7 counterparts and then to share them with you in Moscow. I hope the results would help you improve the situation of average Russians, and therefore to strengthen political support for you and for reform. But we will do this quietly and keep your experts informed. (S)

President Yeltsin: I thank you for the help you have provided and for your unfailing support. Regarding reforms, it's true that during the elections we slowed the pace down a bit, but now, with the elections behind us, with a new Parliament, the mood in our society has turned toward the economic agenda, and we are again busily engaged in the reform effort. We have our government in place. And we still have a President, and that President will not stand for elections in 1994. Under the new constitution, the President will stay in office until June 1996. This means that we will continue the strong implementation of our reforms. (S)

The President: Thank you. I also hope that the summit will produce historic progress in convincing Ukraine to become a non-nuclear nation. I know that you and Vice President Gore discussed this last week. As a result of those talks, and the talks that Strobe Talbott and Yuriy Mamedov held with the Ukrainians in Kiev, we have made substantial progress in agreeing on the outlines of a deal. (S)

Ukraine agrees that we should resolve outstanding issues by the time of our summit. So we would like to invite Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov to Washington on January 3 for a trilateral meeting with us and the Ukrainians in order to make more progress. Your meeting with President Kravchuk on Saturday will be critical in moving this forward. If we can conclude this historic agreement, we might even consider inviting President Kravchuk to Moscow so that the three of us can announce it together, on your turf. (S)

President Yeltsin: I'll meet Kravchuk tomorrow [December 23] at the CIS summit in Ashgabat. We'll talk about this, and other issues, and I'll propose to him that he come to Moscow during your visit so that the three of us can decide how best to finish the final agreements and put the seal of approval on a deal, and possibly sign a document. (S)

The President: That's great.

President Yeltsin: So I'm looking forward very much to your visit and want to thank you for this call. (U)

The President: Can I make one other point? (U)

President Yeltsin: Please do. (U)

The President: It's about our foreign policy agenda. I will be in Brussels for the NATO Summit and in Prague before I see you and will want to discuss Russian participation in NATO's

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Partnership for Peace proposal. I also hope we can have a good discussion in restricted session of the many foreign policy issues, some close to your border, on our agenda. I especially want to discuss this because there is substantial concern in Europe and among your neighbors that the election results will make Russia more aggressive and intrusive in their affairs. (S)

I hope we can agree on cooperative efforts to dispel those fears. I would like to send Ambassador Jim Collins, whom you know well, to meet next week in Moscow with Foreign Minister Kozyrev to develop this further. It will be important to allay concerns by producing concrete movement on Ukraine nuclear issues and also on the Baltics. I don't know where you are on that, but I think it would be a good way to demonstrate the positive changes you have already brought to Russian foreign policy. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good -- send him. We are open to this discussion. We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. When I was in Brussels, I met with NATO Secretary General Woerner. We discussed a plan of action for the countries of Eastern Europe to cooperate with NATO in a way that would not be at the expense of Russia and also a plan of action for Russia to join NATO. So I fully agree with you and look forward to meeting with you. (S)

The President: One last point. I believe we should only invite Kravchuk to come to Moscow if we have an agreement with the Ukrainians on the nuclear issues. Otherwise, it might raise more questions than it answers. And we have a lot of work to do on our own. But if our experts can reach an agreement, then we should invite him. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree. Thank you, Bill. Goodbye -- I embrace you. (U)

The President: Goodbye, Boris. (U)

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9309998  
DATE 03 JAN 94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELECON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 470				
Document ID: 9401529				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (3 pages)	02/20/1994	P17b(1) <b>KBM 7/13/2018</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 470

### FOLDER TITLE:

9401529

2015-0782-M

rs1515

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 02 MAR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 MAR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: ~~WM~~ **PA**

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE

BURNS

EXECSEC

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

COMMENTS:

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DATE

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OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2



ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94030215 FOR DECISION  
X 94030219 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940302 GROSSMAN, M  
002 940302 MCALEER, R

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9401529  
DATE 02 MAR 94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. MARC GROSSMAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>

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Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

National Security Council  
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG FSK A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Kenney	<u>1</u>	<u>nan.</u>	_____
Itoh	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>WA 3/2</u>	<u>D</u> FAXED TO AGENCIES
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D*</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

\* WHEN DISPATCHING, DO NOT  
 SEND ORIGINAL OF TELCON!  
 SEND ORIGINAL MEMO TO  
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 TELCON. LEAVE ORIGINAL  
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*Exec Sec's Office has desk set*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1529

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Aspin on an "eyes only" basis.

(e)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 26, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on February 20, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Perry.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I . . . . . Memorandum to State and DoD
- Tab A . . . . . Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1(1.13)  
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with President Boris Yeltsin of  
Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Galina Tunik-Rosniansky  
Notetaker: Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE, TIME February 20, 1994; 1:27-1:47pm EST  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello. (U)

The President: I hear you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill, good evening. Greetings. (U)

The President: It's nice to you hear your voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: If you remember Bill, as we agreed before, the purpose of this call is to finalize measures on Sarajevo. As I promised I got in touch with Milosevic and what I proposed was a political and peaceful solution. He accepted this and sent me a message and immediately thereafter he began the withdrawal of heavy artillery from Sarajevo. What do you think is the current update of the situation as it stands today? (U)

The President: I'm very encouraged the Muslims and Serbs have made efforts to comply with the rules to pull weapons out of the safe zone around Sarajevo. There have been a lot of heavy weapons moved out of the zone in the last 36 hours and there is a great deal of activity going on there as we speak. I want to thank you for your leadership. If you had not gotten involved, I don't think this would have happened. The UN is working hard to see that the weapons in place in the zone are under their control. I think that it is important to make it clear that no prior decision has been made by anyone for airstrikes. The decision is solely for UN Commander, Mr. Akashi and Boutros Ghali to make based on what is happening on the ground. There has been no prior coordination with the NATO Commander. I am very encouraged by what I see happening now. I know that it is getting late and you're going to bed soon. Our people will keep in close contact in case anything happens, but it looks pretty good now. I know Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev spoke yesterday about next steps over the next few days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I am committed to stop the killing around Sarajevo and to work out a fair settlement. I will continue to work to see that happen. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I totally agree with you. Of course our top priority task is to put an end to this murderous war in Sarajevo. The fact that the Serbs, in response to my message, specifically with Milosevic, have almost completed withdrawal of heavy weapons, is already a big success. We should give thought to next steps. I suggest we do the following, Bill, since the Sarajevo war has been dragging - you the President of the United States, me the President of the Russian Federation, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Major, and Chancellor Kohl get together someplace, it remains to be determined, and put together a document that war in Sarajevo is drawing to a close. I'm prepared to play host to all of you in Moscow. So we as leaders of great powers could get together and invite leaders of former Yugoslavia and sign the document to put an end to the bloody conflict in Yugoslavia. What is your view of the situation? (S)

The President: I believe we all should become more active, now that we have stopped the violence. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, could I take it you have no objections to the suggestion I just made? (S)

The President: Tuesday our five countries will have representatives meeting in Bonn. I suggest we see what happens in Sarajevo within the next 48 hours and see if our people can work on details Tuesday. We will see where we are then, that will give us time to see if things are successful in Sarajevo and how we can best contribute to the peace process to keep it going. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I agree. I had a talk with Kohl and he also has an initiative of his own. Well, in that case, I take it within the next 48 hours we should get together by phone and finally decide if we need this meeting. We would first hold a meeting of experts to finalize the document. Then have a meeting with the five members of the Security Council on this situation and then we could invite Milosevic and Karadzic and some other leaders of the former Yugoslavia, and put an end to this. (S)

The President: It is plain we need to do something like that. You have a good idea. Kohl has the same idea of the five leaders meeting. Let's stay on top of the situation and talk about this on Tuesday and then we'll get back together. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I fully accept this idea and if there is a need for that I'm prepared to invite five leaders to Moscow. Of course, we could meet in Geneva, Bonn, or another country in Europe. (S)

The President: Thank you. I'm very excited about this idea. I appreciate your leadership, without it I don't think we would be at this point. Thank you very much. (S)

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3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Yeltsin: I agree, accept a hug from me. I believe what counts most is that we've been successful in avoiding a catastrophe. And on Tuesday we'll talk again. (U)

The President: Have a good night's sleep. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. Good-bye. (U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 472				
Document ID: 9402775				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (5 pages)	04/10/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 472

### FOLDER TITLE:

9402775

2015-0782-M  
rs1516

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 14 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE  
BURNS  
EXECSEC  
HOLL

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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*SP*

DATE

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DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94041316 FOR DECISION  
X 94041507 REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940414 GROSSMAN, M  
002 940414 MCALEER, R

National Security Council  
The White House

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Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>PR 4/14</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EXESEL HAS DISC.

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2775

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Perry on an "eyes only" basis.

(C)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBYNARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-M-1 (1.14)  
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon With President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Kevin Wooton, William Spencer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 10, 1994; Call began at 2315 EDT,  
terminated at 2338 EDT. The White House

The President: Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hi, Bill. It has been some time since we spoke. (U)

The President: Yes, it has. I understand you're about to leave, and I appreciate you taking my call. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

Yeltsin: Yes, I am listening. (U)

The President: I wanted to discuss the events that occurred today - yesterday for you - in Bosnia. The Serbs launched a new attack in Bosnia while negotiations were being held on a cease-fire. The attacks on Gorazde resulted in heavy casualties and put the UN personnel there at risk. (U)

At this point, the connection to Moscow was lost.

The President: Boris, are you on now? Hello Boris? (U)

Yeltsin: Bill, we had a cut in the communication. (U)

The President: O.K.; I guess we'll try again. Anyway, the UN Commander in Bosnia, General Rose, received authorization from UN civilian authorities for NATO close air support. Under existing UN policy, after they were requested by UN civilian authorities and General Rose, NATO forces attacked. F-16 aircraft attacked a target identified by UN forces on the ground. We don't know how much damage was caused, but the purpose was limited, which was to stop the attacks, and that's what happened. I wanted to make sure there is no misunderstanding between us on what occurred. This action was not initiated by NATO. It was an urgent UN request for NATO to take action under a pre-existing UN Security Council resolution. (U)

Yeltsin: Bill, I want to ask you if the United Nations Secretary-General has agreed to this action. (S)

The President: Yes, he did and it all happened very quickly. The planes were not trying to change the course of the battle; it was a brief close air support action in the hopes the attacks would stop, which they apparently did. Because it was cloudy, we're not sure of the results and we're unable to determine damages. It is my understanding that the Serbs intend to resume negotiations on Monday, and I want to make sure we focus on that. I have been very pleased at the way Churkin and Redman have worked together on Bosnia. (S)

Yeltsin: But Churkin was not informed. He did not know this move was in the pipeline. (S)

The President: First of all, I don't know if there was a pipeline. But it's my understanding that the UN had informed him. I'm sorry that they didn't, and if they didn't, we need to address that, and it is my understanding that the UN had informed your government in the appropriate way. (S)

One of the reasons I am calling, besides making sure there is no misunderstanding between us, is that I remain convinced the only way this will be settled is for our governments, that is Russia and the United States and Redman and Churkin, to keep working together. I told you the last time I would do everything I could to keep the Bosnian Muslims from using the Sarajevo negotiations, of which you were a part, to expand their territorial claims unnecessarily. Now I understand the Serbs intend to resume negotiations with the UN on Monday, but they must pull back their forces from the Gorazde safe area to make progress for peace to work. (S)

Yeltsin: I got you, I got you, Bill. (U)

The President: I want to say again -- (U)

Yeltsin: I believe we have to improve our process of preliminary consultations, which does not seem to be working very well, if Russia and the United States are to work together. (S)

The President: This whole thing that happened today happened very rapidly. It took about a half an hour or so. I thought the UN notified everybody. In the future the UN needs to address that. There is one important point I want to make. I have no interest in NATO air power changing the course of the war on the ground or changing the balance of the war...I'm not interested in that. You and I have to get these parties to work together to negotiate some cessation of hostilities. It would help if you would tell Milosevic this...that we want them to continue serious negotiations and pull Serb forces out of the safe area of Gorazde. Then I'll do what I can to work first for a cessation of hostilities and then a fair settlement. (S)

Yeltsin: I got your point Bill, OK. I am trying to impress upon Milosevic these points and will send instructions to Churkin, and will try to do everything to get the Serbs back to negotiations and pull their heavy artillery from Gorazde. I may ask Kozyrev to go there as well. (Ø)

Well, thank you Bill for the call. I understand what you've said, it's clear. I am about to leave for Spain. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking the time to take this call. I will have Warren Christopher talk to Andrei Kozyrev this morning our time. Thank you very much, Boris, and have a good trip. (Ø)

Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill, and all the best to you. (U)

The President: Thank you and good-bye. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 12, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on April 10, 1994.

Concurrence: Jane Holt ✓

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Perry.

Approve *JWR* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State and DoD
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES 5

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH <sup>(IA)</sup> (202) 456-2585 West Wing Desk  
 (NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESIDENTIAL TELCON WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN  
 NSC LOG # 2775

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	_____	_____
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REMARKS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9402775  
DATE 14 APR 94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 472				
Document ID: 9403047				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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<del>001b. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/20/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>
<del>001c. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/20/1994</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
 OA/Box Number: 472

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9403047

2015-0782-M

rs1517

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 21 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA  
RUSSIA

FRANCE  
TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCONS W/ PM CHRETIEN OF CANADA PRES MITTERRAND  
OF FRANCE & PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 23 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
HOLL  
WALKER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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*4/22*

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OPENED BY: NSGP

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DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94042114 FOR DECISION  
X 94042216 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940421 GROSSMAN, M

National Security Council  
The White House

3047

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Soderberg			
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Lake			
Situation Room			
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other \_\_\_\_\_

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 21, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcons with Prime  
Minister Chretien of Canada, President Mitterrand  
of France and President Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Memoranda of Telephone Conversations must be distributed via  
NODIS channels and should not be distributed below the Deputy  
Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If telcons are to be sent to an  
Embassy, they should be sent to the Ambassador and/or Deputy  
Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Telcon with Prime Minister Chretien  
Tab B Telcon with President Mitterrand  
Tab C Telcon with President Yeltsin

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-M-1 (1.15)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Jean Chretien of  
Canada on April 20, 1994 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Jean Chretien  
Notetaker: Rick Waddell

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1994; 1:50 - 1:58pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Hello! How are you? (U)

The President: Fine and you? (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Fine - the weather's been good. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about Bosnia. The situation around Gorazde threatens the progress we've been making. I'm afraid that the Serbs will be emboldened. I had hoped that the negotiations would succeed, but the Muslims wouldn't agree, and the Serbs sought to win on the ground. So we need to increase our pressure -- military and economic -- on the Serbs to reinforce the diplomatic efforts...So that's why I directed our people to go to the North Atlantic Council and ask that NATO be prepared to take action to protect the safe areas. Also Russia has increased its pressure. I'll be talking to Yeltsin today. They were very upset. If the Serbs don't agree their military targets will be subject to attack. I realize that there is some disagreement on this...but not only the targets specifically firing on a safe area, but also other targets. They got Gorazde for free. I also realize that there are Canadians under threat. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: Yes, we had two incidents this week -- 16 soldiers taken in one case. We got our troops out, but....I'm not sure that airstrikes without troops on the ground will do anything. The military opinion around me is that it's a waste of effort. (S)

The President: True -- all military leaders admit that airstrikes can't win a war. But we don't want to enter the war with ground troops on side of the government. We have to do

something...given the conditions. What's your reaction to the proposal to get all the people involved in this together? Yeltsin's been pushing this. My thinking is that you can do this only once. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: My reaction depends on what the Russians tell you. If they push for it, I don't know what else we could do. If they make it more difficult...My view is that we were lucky in getting our troops out of Srebrenica. The difficulty is that we don't have troops in Gorazde as we did in Srebrenica. Maybe we could get some in Gorazde which would....Let's wait to see what Yeltsin says. (S)

The President: I'll be here all week. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: I'd like to talk to you tomorrow about bilateral issues. (S)

The President: I'll be here and we can talk about wheat and salmon. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0732-M-1 (1.1b)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France on April 20, 1994 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Mitterrand  
Interpreter: Stephanie von Reigersberg  
Notetaker: Rick Waddell

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1994; 2:02 - 2:22pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Francois? (U)

President Mitterrand: Hello. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about Bosnia. (U)

President Mitterrand: An inexhaustible topic! (U)

The President: After Gorazde, we need to something to put the negotiations back on track and to restore the momentum that we had. As you know, we also need to do something to reinforce the credibility of NATO. It seems to me, the best approach is to increase our collective pressure -- military and economic -- on the Serbs to reinforce the diplomatic efforts. I recognize that airpower alone may not prevent further Serb action. But if we demand that the Serbs withdraw a distance, and put their weapons under UN control, or if they fail to comply, their military targets -- including targets other than specific weapons firing on safe areas -- would be subject to NATO airstrikes. At least this would prevent further embarrassment. (S)

President Mitterrand: Why didn't they react before? The Japanese representative could have moved. (S)

The President: That's also something I wanted to talk about -- the need to streamline procedure so each incident doesn't become an endless debate. Also, I understand that there was bad weather and the Serbs were too close to UN people and to civilians. We couldn't hit the Serbs without hitting them, too....[This conflict] will never be settled without a negotiated agreement. You have proposed that. So has Yeltsin. What is your view? My thought is that you can only do this once -- best when the Serbs and Muslims are close to settlement and we could use a high-level meeting to push it over the top. But with Gorazde, and with

Russia being insulted by the Serbs, now might be the time. Of course, NATO has to agree, but now is the time for some diplomatic effort. (S)

President Mitterrand: I understand diplomatic efforts, but don't see what military efforts could do. It is a shame that NATO did not intervene in a timely manner at Gorazde as in Sarajevo. Now we can't intervene short of an all-out war, which nobody wants. Who would go there to fight? France wouldn't. I can see no way to intervene short of a real war. What would reoccupation of Gorazde do? (S)

The President: Oh no, I don't want that, just a change in the rules. What happens depends on Russian pressure on the Serbs. But I agree that we cannot go back into Gorazde, just change the rules in case Serbia moves on one of the other safe areas. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but my dear friend, the principle danger that I see is that we make a pronouncement that we wouldn't accomplish...What I am afraid of if we continue on the path we are now on, we keep issuing statements which we don't follow through...for this reason I'm for going immediately into a diplomatic effort. Of course, I'm interested in hearing your proposals with respect to so-called safe areas. France would cooperate, but to do what? (S)

The President: To use the same rules as around Sarajevo for other safe areas...would streamline the rules to prevent another Gorazde....I agree that we shouldn't make empty promises.... (S)

President Mitterrand: I view the whole situation around Gorazde as a danger with respect to other safe areas. Either we get satisfaction around Gorazde or nobody will believe us on the other safe areas. Gorazde is now at the center of controversy. I really don't think any military offensive would be effective even with air power. That's why I'd very much like to see a diplomatic effort with major powers and the UN Secretary General. We must have a conference of four major powers -- of which you are the most important -- plus the European Union and the UN....I don't see the possibility of rapprochement between the Serbs and the Muslims. The "game" they are playing is complementary. The Muslims want to internationalize the war -- that's smart and understandable -- but we're not going to send our armies there, and the Muslims shouldn't be led to think so. I am ready to cooperate on making policy for the other zones besides Gorazde and Sarajevo, as well as explore what else can be done about Gorazde at the same time I'd seek to have the "four power" conference -- of course, there would be more than just four. The EU has Britain and France and Germany, for example...and if Serbia thought that at the end of the conference there'd be a lessening of sanctions....The agreement that we almost had fell through because of the Muslims.... (S)

The President: Exactly. (U)

President Mitterrand: We need to explore further military actions...and concomitantly convoke this conference.... Otherwise we'll get bogged down in a war from which we can never get out.... (S)

The President: I'm encouraged by your views. I agree with your views on restoring Gorazde. I think the Russians are interested in that, too. We need to put our officials to work on the diplomatic front. (S)

President Mitterrand: This must be done simultaneously. We are willing to help but **not** to do just anything. (S)

The President: Good, let's get to work. (U)

President Mitterrand: We can talk anytime....,but we need to have a plan by the end of the week. (S)

The President: I agree. I'll be in touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0782-M-1 (1.17)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of  
Russia on April 20, 1994 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Rick Waddell

DATE, TIME: April 20, 1994; 2:25 - 3:05pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill? Good to hear from you. (U)

The President: It's good to talk to you, too. I know it's late there. (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill, from you, anytime. I'm always ready to talk to you. (U)

The President: First, I wanted to talk to you about Bosnia and Gorazde. I want to first thank you for yesterday's statement about the Bosnia situation and about the need to get diplomacy back on track. I believe that you and I agree that the U.S., Russia, NATO, and UN must work together to turn the bloodshed off. (S)

I want to make a public statement this afternoon but wanted to talk to you first. It seems to me that our credibility is on the line, and we must act decisively to, on one hand, tell Serbia that they can't thwart international will in Gorazde or other areas. On the other hand, we need to increase our diplomatic pressure, as you've wanted, to convince the Muslims that the international community is not going to enter the war on their side. (S)

So, I propose that we increase our economic and military pressure on the Serbs, while simultaneously increasing diplomatic pressure along the lines you suggest. Specifically, I think we need to take action to protect the other safe areas. I believe we need to protect them as we did Sarajevo -- remove the weapons a certain distance. Then, all military targets within the area would be subject to attack. (S)

I believe that our two governments need to work on a joint approach. There won't be success unless the U.S. and Russia work together. We believe that UN Resolution 836 gives authority to protect safe zones as we did Sarajevo, but we could also consider action first at the UN Security Council, or a Security Council presidential statement, or a joint U.S.-Russian approach directly to Belgrade. (S)

I also believe we should tighten economic sanctions as we get the diplomatic efforts on track. But finally, I believe your proposal for a high-level meeting between the U.S., Russia, the UN, and the European Union is a good one. It's obvious we can't succeed without a major new diplomatic effort. (S)

I know that the threat of NATO airstrikes and economic sanctions are controversial in Russia, but after Gorazde...we need to push strongly to send Serbia a message: withdraw from Gorazde and don't attack other safe havens. Also we need to send a message to the Muslims: you won't draw the international community into the war on your side. These two efforts will only work if we work together. That's why I wanted to talk to you before making any statement to the American media. (S)

President Yeltsin: Dear Bill, I'm very sorry that this conflict in Yugoslavia is seen in the American media, and in our media, as a departure from the partnership which you and I have, as well as the partnership between our two countries. The partnership is still strong. There are not any concrete issues that could destroy that impression [of a strong partnership]. There is nothing to suggest that a black cat has crossed our paths. I keep repeating over and over again that President Clinton and I have a good partnership. (S)

With regards to Bosnia, I fully agree with your proposals. As I understand, at the present time, it is hard to understand who shot first and who shot second...hard to tell who is responsible...but I have taken great efforts to talk to Milosevic and to the general in charge to get the shelling of Gorazde stopped. And I sent Kozyrev to a whole series of talks there. And my defense minister has talked to the general in charge to get the shelling stopped. And I promised that if they stopped military activity that I would address the U.S. to get the economic pressure relieved. (S)

At the same time, Bill, I'm worried about airstrikes. I'm afraid that this would so anger the Serbs that there'd be no end to the fighting. So that is the reason that yesterday I proposed that we have a high-level meeting and that our foreign ministers would meet first....Then we'd invite the Muslim and the Serb leaders to sign an agreement. I ask you to agree to that. I think this is the only way to end the bloodshed. Then we can show the world community that we're capable of solving the worst problems. Of course, I understand your problems as well. I just feel, Bill, on the basis of my experience and in my heart, that if we have new airstrikes, there'll be no end to the fighting. The Serbs will not take Gorazde. So we need to have a peace agreement and

sign a cease-fire agreement to end war throughout Yugoslavia.

(S)

The President: I agree.... (U)

President Yeltsin: If we together call upon the world community, the European Union, and all Yugoslav leaders to sign a cease-fire, I'm sure we'll be successful. Helmut Kohl called yesterday and I told him about my proposal, and he agrees completely with it. The Muslim states will agree as will the Muslims [in Bosnia] on whom you have influence. So you will influence the Muslims and the Croats, and we'll influence the Serbs, and we'll be successful. What do you think? (S)

The President: I agree that this is the best way. Here are my concerns: yesterday you made a good statement on Gorazde -- that the Serbs should withdraw a certain distance and let the UN back in. I agree with you that this war cannot be settled by the UN, or by NATO airstrikes, but what we did around Sarajevo worked. The Serbs had to remove weapons but both the Serbs and the Muslims understood that military activity in the zone was subject to airstrikes. Today we do not have the Sarajevo system for Gorazde and the other safe areas. As a result, the rules for airstrikes were unclear. And, when the NATO commander asked for airstrikes, there was a big question over who was responsible, and whether the strikes were right. The present rules leave us in the worst of both worlds: on one hand, they aren't as strong as around Sarajevo with respect to Serb heavy weapons. On the other hand, they leave NATO and UN forces to be manipulated by the Muslims, who can give up ground which brings NATO and UN personnel under attack which then leads to airstrikes to protect them. (S)

So I think we need a credible use of force as in the Sarajevo area, but I agree that we need a new diplomatic effort, as you said, with us pressuring the Muslims and you the Serbs. We should get Christopher and Kozyrev together and get a quick agreement....I agree with you that the only solution is a negotiated agreement....France and Germany agree, too. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I fully agree. Let our foreign ministers immediately begin to prepare for a summit meeting. And after additional warnings, we can tell the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats that if fighting doesn't stop, we will take drastic measures. But at the same time, we must use peaceful measures as much as possible. (S)

The President: I agree...Let's go to work... (U)

President Yeltsin: So let us get our foreign ministers together, and furthermore, let's sign a statement at the UN with two signatures. Thirdly, let's warn all sides that this is their last chance. And at the same time, we can say that if there is movement on their part, we can say in the UN that we'll lessen and eventually end sanctions against Yugoslavia. What do you think, Bill? (S)

The President: We need to work on the details. We are broadly in agreement....I feel good about this conversation....I also agree with one of the first things you said -- we mustn't let the press drive a wedge between us....Christopher and Kozyrev need to get together immediately...We can talk again tomorrow. (S)

President Yeltsin [interrupting]: I agree and I'm glad to talk to you and glad that there are no problems between us. We had a good partnership and friendship and still do. Regards to Hillary and you, too. (U)

The President: One more suggestion: You should make no statement to the press in Moscow or in the U.S. about the meeting while we're working out the details. Only say that we are working together. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I agree, especially to say that there are not any differences between us. (S)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 20, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLDEN

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations with Prime Minister Chretien of Canada, President Mitterrand of France and President Yeltsin of Russia

Attached at Tabs A through C are Memoranda of Conversations between the President and Prime Minister Chretien of Canada (Tab A), President Mitterrand of France (Tab B) and President Yeltsin of Russia (Tab C).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memoranda of Conversations at Tabs A through C.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Itoh's memo to State
- Tab A Telcon with Prime Minister Chretien
- Tab B Telcon with President Mitterrand
- Tab C Telcon with President Yeltsin

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015 - 0782 - M - 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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LOG 9403047  
DATE 21 APR 94

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with Boris Yeltsin of Russia (4 pages)	06/11/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

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NSC Records Management  
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2015-0782-M

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### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DOC DATE: 13 JUN 94  
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PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON PRES PHONECALL W/ BORIS YELTSIN

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DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0732-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin of Russia on  
13 June 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Steven Aoki

DATE, TIME 11 June 1994, 1:24 (EDT)  
AND PLACE: The White House

President Clinton: Hello

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill.

President Clinton: It's nice to hear your voice.

President Yeltsin: It's a pleasure to hear your voice as well.

President Clinton: I received your letter about the G-7 and the possibility of your coming here this fall. I am very interested in that and will be back in touch with you on that. I wanted to talk with you first a bit about North Korea.

President Yeltsin: Okay.

President Clinton: The UN Security Council will soon be considering sanctions on North Korea. We have important common interests at stake there, as you know, both in the stability of the Korean peninsula and in the global nonproliferation regime. Kozyrev and Christopher discussed a common basis for a UN Security Council resolution, one which includes sanctions phased in and also refers to your proposal for an international conference.

President Yeltsin: I'm listening.

President Clinton: The conference would not delay the date that sanctions are imposed if the North Koreans fail to comply and the sanctions can be phased in. We believe that the conference should be held as an incentive if North Korea refuses to comply.

We need to coordinate with South Korea. President Kim made clear to me that the conference should not be used only to delay

taking a resolution. I think I persuaded him of the idea that holding out the conference as a carrot, an incentive to the North Koreans, is a good thing.

President Yeltsin: You see, Bill, I agree with you, but it is very important to have a unanimous vote of all the permanent members of the Security Council, including China. The conference should be on an equal level with sanctions. There should be parity between the two ideas, sanctions and a conference. It is another situation if North Korea does not wish to participate in an international conference. Then the sanctions would remain and we would continue to support such an option. We've discussed the option and agreed on it before.

President Clinton: I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding between what I am saying and what you are saying back to me. We'd intended to offer phased in sanctions, an approach which would begin with fairly moderate sanctions because of the determination of North Korea to break the chain of proof and not to permit us to examine what happened with refueling in 1989. We would not undertake stricter sanctions unless they took steps that would undermine our ability to monitor what they are doing from this point forward. We can consider a conference but we cannot walk away from what they have already done. It is especially important now because we have information that North Korea now says it wants to withdraw entirely from the IAEA and not allow any inspections there. If they did this it would be a very negative step and would force us to impose greater sanctions. I hope you and the Chinese convince them not to do this because it is a very different thing if they are going to get out of it altogether. I agree with you that we should give parity between the idea of a conference and sanctions in the resolution. I hoped we could start the process in a moderate way and hold the conference out to North Korea as a carrot to start talking. I hoped this would also encourage China to vote for the resolution or at least not to veto it. I agree with you that it is very important to include China. I agree that it is important to have the concept of parity in the resolution but I don't think we should use the conference to put sanctions off. This would reward North Korea's behavior.

President Yeltsin: We think the same way, Bill. I also believe we shouldn't begin with the conference. Rather, we should begin with phased in, moderate sanctions, then have a conference that will determine the future stages of the sanctions. The next steps would be determined by the conference which might reduce the sanctions if North Korea goes into negotiations. We would have to see how the situation develops.

President Clinton: This approach will be very difficult for us if they don't comply. For example, under the resolution we have before the Security Council now, they would be forcing us to put on stronger sanctions earlier rather than later if they withdraw from the IAEA.

President Yeltsin: I agree with that. Bill, I agree.

President Clinton: Okay. I have one suggestion. I think we have to have Kozyrev and Christopher talk one more time to make sure we are together on the facts. It is very important that we stand together on this. It is important that there be absolutely no misunderstanding. I'd like Kozyrev and Christopher to meet on this once more so we can be sure we have identical positions.

President Yeltsin: Fine, Bill. I agree. I will tell Kozyrev this right away. It will be up to him and Christopher to fix the time of their meeting.

President Clinton: Let me thank you for a couple things and make a remark before we get off the phone.

President Yeltsin: I'm listening.

President Clinton: President Kim told me that during a recent discussion with you, you agreed to suspend the automatic involvement clause in your treaty with the DPRK and that North Korea will no longer be receiving arms and spare parts from Russia. I want to thank you for this.

President Yeltsin: Bill, we have discontinued all supplies already.

President Clinton: I also want to congratulate you on Russia's decision to join the Partnership for Peace. I hear Christopher and Kozyrev had a good meeting in Istanbul. I hope you will be able to present your framework agreement in Brussels before you come to the meeting in Naples. I think this will be something we can really celebrate and highlight at Naples. It would cement the partnership between the G-7 and Russia.

President Yeltsin: Fine, Bill.

President Clinton: I want to tell you one more thing. I hope you can help me. Because North Korea's reactions are unpredictable and it has been acting in an aggressive manner and because I have 40,000 soldiers in South Korea and there are also soldier from other countries there, I may well take some prudent, defensive measures regarding our forces in South Korea. North

Korea must understand that we have no hostile intent against it. The measures are just defensive. We have no hostile intent. But I have to make sure I am doing all I can to protect our people.

President Yeltsin: I understand. You plan to somewhat strengthen your military troops in South Korea.

President Clinton: I plan to do some things that will improve our position if anything happens. Nothing to take hostile action against North Korea, just to increase the chance of our defending ourselves.

President Yeltsin: I understand.

President Clinton: Let's keep working together and remain in close contact. I agree with what you said in our letter about our maturing relationship. Thank you for our good relationship. I hope to talk to you soon.

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I am also satisfied with the conversion we have just had and also with the way our relations have been developing. I warmly shake your hand. Until we meet in Naples.

President Clinton: Thank you. Good-bye.

President Yeltsin: Good-bye.

-- End of Conversation --

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Document ID: 9405387				
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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001: telcon	re: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin of Russia (3 pages)	07/05/1994	P1/b(1) KBI 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 477

### FOLDER TITLE:

9405387

2015-0782-M  
rs1519

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: GROSSMAN, M  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 07 JUL 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 08 JUL 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE  
BURNS  
EXECSEC

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY



DATE

7/7

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94070719 FOR DECISION  
X 94070719 REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940707 GROSSMAN, M

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5387  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG AB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Reed</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>JWR</u>	
Kenney			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>B 7/7</u>	<del>DIS</del>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

6 JUL 94 5:51 PM

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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National Security Council  
The White House



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URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG AB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>B 71 7</u>	<del>DIS</del>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>


A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

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(hard copy  
diskette only)*

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~~SECRET~~

5387

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


July 7, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with  
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretaries Christopher and Perry on an "eyes only" basis. (S)

  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment(s)  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By: KBNARA, Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Boris Yeltsin of Russia on 5 July 1994

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Kyrill Borissov  
Notetaker: John Beyrle

DATE, TIME 5 July 1994, 9:31-9:49 (EDT)  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill, hello. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice. I am looking forward to seeing you in Naples. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we will have a couple meetings in Naples. I am planning to have a one-on-one meeting with you in Naples in addition to meetings with other people. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about my trip to Europe. I plan to stop in Riga and Warsaw and then go to Naples. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'd like to make a few comments on the Baltics. (U)

The President: Yes, I wanted to talk to you a bit about that and Naples before we meet there. (U)

President Yeltsin: I wrote to you about that earlier. In Riga, I would like you to talk to the people in Estonia and Latvia and tell them that the U.S. is against any infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking people there. I know you and the Secretary of State have been working on this, but there have been no results so far. We need a public statement from you that the U.S. will not support any infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking people. If you do so, the people in Estonia and Latvia and some officials in their Parliaments will act differently. There was a new Latvian law enacted that will push out retired Russian military people and officers. This is not good. This is not how one should act in a civilized world. You see we made a decision regarding the pullout of our troops from Lithuania and also made an agreement with Latvia regarding a pullout in August from Latvia. With regards to Estonia, the Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister and Minister Churkin have just concluded talks in Geneva. There is progress, but Estonia

continues to insist that all army pensioners under age 54 be withdrawn. This is unacceptable on both common sense and political grounds. We are prepared to show flexibility, but are not prepared to accept infringements on the rights of the Russian minorities. The U.S. has shown great understanding on this issue before. (S)

The President: I understand your concerns. In Riga I plan to meet with the three Baltic Presidents. I will raise the issue of the Russian minorities. You know my opinion on this issue: Russians and other ethnic groups must be included in the political and social life of these countries. I was pleased that President Ulmanis sent the bill back to Parliament. It's good to see progress on troop withdrawal. I hope the process will be completed by the end of August. I will continue to push them on the issue of Russian minorities rights. I hope that when we meet at the end of September this issue will not be on the agenda. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, if they don't stop raising the question of Russian language minorities there, we will not be able to pull out our troops by August. If Latvia and Estonia enact laws offering equal status to the Russian language speakers there, then we will make every effort to pull out our troops by August. Bill, I'd like you to say this publicly so that world public opinion will know about it. World public opinion will not support their position on this issue. (S)

The President: I understand. I will do what I can. I will speak to President Meri in particular. I will try to be helpful. I hope that when we meeting in Naples, I will be able to report to you on this. It is important to continue to make progress. I will do what I can to push it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good, Bill. (U)

The President: In Warsaw, I want to emphasize the importance of Partnership for Peace and our willingness to help all partners develop the capability to take part. In January already I said that NATO's role will eventually expand. But I set forth no timetable and no requirements. I would like us to concentrate our efforts on the Partnership for Peace program so that we can achieve a united Europe where people respect each other's borders and work together. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have to say candidly, Bill, that with respect to Poland, the position they take on this does not correspond very closely with ours. Bill, I know there was a great propaganda campaign in Poland to incite Belarusians to unite with Poland. They keep saying Belarus belonged to Poland in history. In addition, I hear they are encouraging migration from the east to Poland. People say they want to join NATO to become stronger and stronger. They talk about threats. Russia is not a threat to anyone. There are a lot of other issues which

we need to discuss in Naples. I don't think we need to discuss them now on the phone. There are many problems to discuss. (S)

The President: I agree. I just wanted to review my Riga and Warsaw stops with you. I look forward to seeing you in Naples. I am pleased you and Russia will have a more leading role this year. I think this partnership has been working out well. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good, Bill. I believe this will be a very crucial trip -- very important for Europe and the world. (U)

The President: I'll see you soon. Thank you for taking the call, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good luck. Till we meet again. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 6, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH  
THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *JB for NB*  
FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*  
SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on July 5, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to Secretaries Christopher and Perry.

Approve *JWR* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*frwz*

Attachment(s)

- Tab I Memorandum to State and DoD
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
by *KB/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

RELEASER: \_\_\_\_\_

DTG: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE NO. _____	CLASSIFICATION <u><del>SECRET</del></u>	PAGES <u>4</u>
FROM <u>WILLIAM H. ITOH</u> (NAME)	<u>(202) 456-2585</u> (PHONE NUMBER)	<u>West Wing Desk</u> (ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION <u>PRES TELCON w/ RUSSIAN</u>		
<u>PRES YELTSIN</u>		NSC LOG # <u>5387</u>
TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>EYECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	
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REMARKS:		
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS Initials: <u>KBM</u> Date: <u>3/13/2018</u> 2015-0782-M-1		

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9405387  
DATE 07 JUL 94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, NW  
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 481				
Document ID: 9408090				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin (7 pages)	09/27/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 481

### FOLDER TITLE:

9408090

2015-0782-M

rs1520

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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TO: LAKE

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA  
AP

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES MTG W/ YELTSIN 27 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 07 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9408090

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 94092716 NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

| Cloze-out as noted by  
LAKE. |

**Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 President Boris Yeltsin  
 Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for  
 National Security (Notetaker)  
 Victor Ilyushin, First Assistant to President  
 Yeltsin (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME September 27, 1994: 11:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m. ;  
 AND PLACE: Oval Office and Patio

The President: Is the schedule okay?

President Yeltsin: We need more time one-on-one in the framework of the talks. We spent thirty minutes with the press. There are many questions and issues to raise here. Life is dynamic and we meet infrequently.

(The two Presidents then reviewed together their schedule for the two-day summit).

President Yeltsin: The Civic Accord agreement has made our situation calm. The President and Parliament are working well together for the first time in our history. Organizers of recent demonstrations have failed to get crowds. There have been no strikes. Crime is a tough problem for me but we are seeking to control it. We've created a special federal program to control crime, in the countryside too. We are fighting drug trafficking. In sum, the political situation is calm. There were no strikes on September 21 (note: anniversary of Yeltsin's suspension of the Supreme Soviet.)

On economic issues, I am encouraged by the low rate of inflation. There have been small price increases for a variety of foodstuffs. The stores are filled. You can buy kiwis now in Russia. Salaries and wages have doubled the price increases. Unemployment is not yet a great problem. Russia has yet to learn how to allow enterprises to go bankrupt. We have little experience with it. Those enterprises still churn out goods no one wants at high prices. There is a private building boom. Over the past seventy-five years, there was no private property. Now, in two years, there has been intensive privatization--75% private or joint stock companies. There are bad things such as

declining production. But this decline is only at the same rate. I hope some of the sectors will now increase in production.

We need more investment. I met your captains of business in New York. I know some of them personally. (I didn't know that Scowcroft was a businessman.) Their reaction was positive. We have forty million rubles accumulated in the country. We need now an inflow of investment for the Timon Pechora and Sakhalin projects.

So, there has been progress. Of course, some people are opposed to our partnership. But they can't put too much pressure on us.

The President: Very impressive. There have been big changes since January for us too. The economy is up. The crime bill passed. We have had some problems with health care--it is expensive and not everyone can be covered. The insurance industry spent \$300 million to beat the bill, according to one magazine, so we couldn't win this time. Maybe next year. We will have mid-term elections in November. While the economy is going in the right direction, most Americans think it is going in the wrong direction because the press tells them so!

President Yeltsin: Yes (laughs).

The President: But otherwise things are going well. There is great attention being paid to our meeting. People wonder where the relationship is going.

President Yeltsin: We have been hearing from our press that we are too focused on the U.S., not others. But people know the partnership program is a good one.

The President: Should we begin?

President Yeltsin: We always speak candidly, openly with one another. We can speak publicly about disagreeable things. I have an issue to raise. Well, some hitches notwithstanding, we continue to abide by the rules we established. Balanced interests, a willingness to make compromises. This is a little hard for me to say, but I have the impression that the U.S. approach to Russia is inadequate. Of course, we are striving to eliminate nuclear and conventional weapons. But there are some officials in the White House and Congress who believe that Russia has lost its superpower status. Of course, not you personally, Bill. You must behave as you must. But some of your promises have not been kept due to red tape in the bureaucracy. For example, who is throwing sand in our peacekeeping efforts in Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Tajikistan? We are not in agreement on all foreign policy issues.

What of the promises made? For example, Jackson-Vanik. Things are left hanging in mid-air. There is no progress on COCOM. On CFE flank restrictions, there is no progress there either. On Bosnia, don't lift the embargo.

People need to see progress, or there will be a cooler partnership. I don't think that will be the case. Russia is not consulted on some issues but Russia is a great power. I don't want to provoke public opinion here, so we should discuss one-on-one, not in the full delegation. We should discuss, for example, GATT and the WTO. Incidentally, we decided to join MTCR.

The President: We need a longer discussion on Nagorno-Karabakh. Let me respond to the other points.

First, I have tried in every way to relate to Russia and to you as a great power and to enhance your role, whether in the G-7 or bilaterally.

On Jackson-Vanik, I did everything I could under our law by ending the annual review. We have to get the law repealed. But I acted as I could. There will be no elections next year, so it will be easier.

President Yeltsin: Why don't you issue an executive order to suspend it?

The President: I did it last week. We announced it.

Mr. Lake: There will be no more annual reviews.

President Yeltsin: This is good news.

The President: On CFE, here is the dilemma. I have said before, and will repeat, that you have a real, legitimate problem. Can we resolve this while preserving the integrity of the treaty? If we open up the treaty, others can change it and could create problems for you. Major told me he proposed trilateral discussions to help resolve the problems so that we can take it to Vienna to resolve.

President Yeltsin: Major said the treaty would only be in force until 1995, then a new treaty would take effect in 1996. It will take the three of us to decide on the year.

The President: Our experts have ideas on how to resolve the problem. Perhaps we could let them discuss it, then we could pick it up again tomorrow.

~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: Okay.

The President: On COCOM, I want to resolve it, if we can, by tomorrow so that we can move on to a successor regime to COCOM.

President Yeltsin: Yes, but I want to contribute to the crafting of the successor regime. Russia should be treated as an equal to settle this more effectively.

The President: The only issue is your cooperation in ending the new sales to Iran. We have discussed this twice before--your meeting contracts from the past. We want you in the new regime. But we need an end to the new sales, and a relatively rapid phaseout of current contracts.

President Yeltsin: I can give you my assurance that no new supplies will be made and no new deals. I will not make any new deals. What we took over were old contracts and we must abide by them or there will be \$500 million in penalties. So, let us agree on this compromise.

I assure you there will be no new deals with Iran and that Russia will contribute to the new COCOM list. But the problem is that when we discontinued our deliveries to forty former communist countries when they couldn't pay, there were (no) penalties. But Iran pays us.

The President: As part of this, are you willing to tell us what the contracts are, what weapons are involved?

The President: Yes, we are prepared to do so.

The President: If there are no new contracts, and you will disclose what current ones are; we can go forward.

President Yeltsin: We will tell you about existing contracts. There will be no new ones.

The President: On MTCR, we will sponsor you in October; you will be eligible for full membership next year.

President Yeltsin: There are only technicalities left.

The President: Yes.

On Bosnia, we are opposed in principle to the U.S. unilaterally lifting the embargo. As a matter of tactics, now is a bad time for the international community to lift. And as you well know, even the Bosnian government has asked for four to six months delay in implementing the lift.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: I discussed this with Boutros Ghali. He supports a delay.

The President: We all do. There are two problems. In the U.S., there are big majorities in both houses of the U.S. Congress to lift, either because they are on the side of the Bosnian government or they think this is a way to do something in Bosnia without U.S. troops. Or some want to tie my hands for political reasons. So we agreed to seek action in the UN if the Contact Group had not succeeded and to start the process of unilateral U.S. action if the UN did not act. Now that the Bosnian government itself has called for a delay in the lift, that will buy us a little more time.

President Yeltsin: You should realize if the embargo is lifted, it will provoke big bloodshed.

The President: You have done what you said you would. Good job in getting Milosevic to act to isolate the Bosnian Serbs.

President Yeltsin: I disengaged from them.

The President: I agreed to send Americans for border monitors. I agreed to some minor lifting in sanctions against Belgrade.

President Yeltsin: Yes, but only sports, culture, air flights. Nothing of economic importance.

The President: We have problems with the Croats, the Bosnian Federation--there is no recognition of their borders. I met with Tudjman, Itzebegovic. We are trying to bring them along. But on Bosnia there are two problems.

In the short run, the Bosnian Serbs are violating the exclusion zones, Sarajevo is isolated. The British, Canadians and French don't want airstrikes. The larger problem is we can't get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group proposals. What are your ideas on how to get them to do so?

President Yeltsin: Yes. I continue to stay in touch with Milosevic. I sent Kozyrev and Grachev to prevent their taking drastic action. The Moslems started first. We need to get them all to the negotiating table, and we should sit with them. I made this proposal long ago. It would apply great pressure on them. We should include the Contact Group members, the French, UK, Germans etc. Kohl said the Germans have influence with the Croats. Now they are accusing Milosevic of betrayal--want to topple him. We can't let that happen. We need to encourage him.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: What about Sarajevo? If we raise the level of negotiations, we at least need to know things will not get worse. What of Sarajevo?

President Yeltsin: I believe Milosevic is the key figure. We can get an end to the conflict through Milosevic, not Karadzic who is very dangerous.

The President: Let me ask a prior question. You have Karadzic, Mladic and the Parliament which are opposed. They believe they can survive a few years even if Milosevic cuts them off. Do you believe Milosevic can bring them around?

President Yeltsin: Well, Milosevic is hard pressed now. He needs encouragement to improve his position against insane radicals in the Parliament. I believe in Milosevic. Mladic is being taken care of, psychologically, by Grachev. They had a long night, a couple of shots of vodka, good discussion.

The President: Might be the solution to the whole thing. I will respond to your idea of a one-day conference in Europe. And also how we might respond to Milosevic. And it is good he has taken observers. We could do a little on economic issue with Milosevic it he can make progress in recognizing the territorial borders of Bosnia and Croatia.

President Yeltsin: I'll tell Milosevic about your proposal. That it is a good proposal. Milosevic will react positively.

The President: I know this has been hard for him. But the whole region is smoldering with suspicion. If we can get border recognition, we can do more on sanctions and this will help isolate the aggressors by organizing everyone else.

President Yeltsin: (nodded)

The President: It is time for lunch.

President Yeltsin: We need to meet one more time.

The President: For later: I've been thinking a lot about Nagorno-Karabakh. What it means for us, and you especially. There are some parallels to Haiti (regarding international support/authorization for action). So, I really think this is something we need to discuss between ourselves. We will meet at four p.m. with delegations. We can go through our understandings. We can then break to talk about Nagorno-Karabakh; then back to the delegation. This is a big deal for you. We need a one-on-one on it.

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~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: Okay. Ten to fifteen minutes.

-- End of Conversation --

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~~SECRET~~

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 217				
Document ID: 9408162				
Row: 44	Section: 3	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 217

### FOLDER TITLE:

9408162

2015-0782-M  
rs1521

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 07 OCT 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 5 OCT TELCALL W/ YELTSIN

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 10 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STERN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
NSC CHRON  
STERN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY MBN

DATE 10/7

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSMBN

DOC

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
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Z 94100712 FOR DECISION  
X 94100718 ITOH SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 941007 BRILL, K

National Security Council  
The White House

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Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>DPB 10/7</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

6 OCT 94 9 3 13

Exec Sec Office has diskette WFS

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 9162  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG OPS A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Sens			
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Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>OPS 10/7</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


8162

October 7, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretary Christopher. (S)

  
for William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Jessica Stern

DATE, TIME: October 5, 1993,  
AND PLACE: 10:30-11:00am, Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Hello Bill. (U)

President Clinton: Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm very glad to hear your voice. (U)

I wish to express to you on my behalf and on the behalf of Naina our gratitude for all the attention shown to us during our visit. I would say that the Washington summit proved a success, something that the people of Russia see in a very positive light. (U)

I talked with Chernomyrdin concerning the agenda of the Gore Chernomyrdin Commission. (U)

As you recall I promised that within 2-3 days I would call you and inform you about the contracts signed by the FSU with Iran. I looked at them personally. They include an agreement dated November 5, 1989, and another May 17, 1990, and also an agreement signed November 13, 1991. These were all signed by Former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations -- the total is \$4 billion. (U)

I wish to confirm to you once again that we will comply with the obligations undertaken by the FSU with respect to Iran, but we intend to conclude no further contracts with Iran. I want you to be quite clear on this and to have confidence in the decision I have taken to that effect. This is the main topic I wanted to discuss with you during this conversation because I promised I would call you about this issue. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

My second point concerns Bosnia. I am troubled by what is happening -- it is not what we agreed to. Milosovic must be given more time to be able to work with the Palais. The use of force would be the beginning of yet another war in Europe. However strange it might seem this reliance on force began right after my visit and the agreements we reached. (S)

Now I want to tell you that the situation in Russia is quite normal but the opposition, as promised, is rearing its head, but that is just a mosquito bite. (S)

So much for what I wanted to tell you at this particular moment. How are things with you? (U)

President Clinton: I'm doing fine. First of all I want to thank you very much for what you said in your press conference -- which was very much like what I said about the summit -- that it was business-like, practical, but at the same time friendly. Hillary and I liked having you and Naina here. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. (U)

President Clinton: On Bosnia we now have a window of 5-6 months because of the delay on the lift of the embargo. This will give Milosovic more time -- and the rest of us also. I've asked Christopher to look into what else we can do with Kozyrev. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I see. (U)

President Clinton: On the arm sales to Iran first of all I appreciate your personal attention to it and your prompt response. When we discussed this before you said that in order to proceed to a Cocom successor regime you would share with us what arms are being sold to Iran and the time table, and that we would work the details out in the Gore-Chernomyrdin context. This is very important. I strongly believe that Russia should be one of the founding members of the Cocom successor regime. You said today that there will be no further sales to Iran. I'm encouraged by this but I think we need to work out the rest of this at the Gore Chernomyrdin Commission and then we can go on. (S)

President Yeltsin: I said no new contracts will be signed. I said no new contracts will be signed, but we will deliver on old contracts signed by the FSU. Russia has no intention to sign any new contracts. I agree with your idea. Let Gore and Chernomyrdin discuss the composition of the contracts signed by the FSU. (S)

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President Clinton. If you have time I'd like to raise two issues. The first one I want to discuss...when you were here I think you agreed that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin would meet soon with Mr. Derr of Chevron concerning the Caspian pipeline consortium. I know that Mr. Derr would have time to fly to Sochi now to meet with the Prime Minister while he is there. I think this should happen soon. We've talked about this but it hasn't happened yet. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I personally had a chance to talk with Chevron President [sic] and he confirms our agreement, our basic understanding, but I agree with you it's a good idea for Mr. Derr to visit Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Sochi. I'll mention it to the Prime Minister tonight. (S)

President Clinton: Thank you very much. Let me ask about Azerbaijan. We're very concerned about the political instability there. I understand that Aliyev announced an agreement with one of his opponents. We seem so close to peace. But we are worried about the situation there, that peace will be undermined. What is your evaluation of the situation? (S)

President Yeltsin: Indeed, last night we witnessed some events there. There seems to be some unrest in the military. But 200,000 people took to the streets there in support of Aliyev. I conferred with Aliyev through Primakov. Aliyev says that he does not want us to come to his aid but he would welcome a statement by the Russian government in support of Aliyev. We'll issue a statement tonight. (S)

President Clinton: That's very good. (U)

I think that will make a big difference for him. I would like to say a word about Nagorno-Karabakh before I sign off. When we talked last week we agreed to keep working on this. If a peace agreement is reached America is ready to put some civilian monitors there. I would like to have a formal cease-fire; confidence building measures like partial withdrawal; a CSCE economic incentives program; and negotiations on the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh. (S)

We did not agree on the role of other CSCE countries in the peace-keeping force which is 3,500-4,000 troops. I want to raise this issue with you again. I am prepared to work with you on this to create stability. However, I'm concerned about instability in Azerbaijan. We should resolve this issue sooner rather than later. I know you'll be discussing this later this month. I have worked a lot on this since you returned to Moscow. You said you did not believe that the other CSCE countries could contribute anything to this. I still believe that they could

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play a role. Just as the UN is participating in Haiti, Russia would have a more positive image in the international community and in the region if you were the leader of a peace-keeping force that was half Russia and half from other CSCE countries. I still think that this can be done. We can do this if you let us. I hope we can continue to discuss this. (C)

President Yeltsin: As you recall during our conversation on this subject I mentioned that there needs to be agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mindful of the current situation in Azerbaijan, I did not mention this to Aliyev [yet]. But I will mention this to Aliyev after things quiet down and I will talk with Ter-Petrosyan as well. We will be prepared to work with you along the lines we discussed. Do you agree with this? (C)

President Clinton: I understand the reply and I agree we should let the situation settle in Azerbaijan for a few days and then you can speak to them. And then we can talk about this again. (C)

This is an area where I hope we can eventually come to agreement. You can take the lead to end one of the most troubling conflict in the world. You can put your stamp on this as a peacemaker and greatly increase the chance of economic development and stability in the entire region. (U)

I will work on this and you will work hard on it. (U)

President Yeltsin: I agree Bill. (U)

President Clinton: OK. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye, and all the best to you and Hillary on my behalf and on Naina's behalf. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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
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8162

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *JW*

FROM: JESSICA STERN *J*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on October 5, 1994.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to Secretary Christopher.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *JW* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*fnwz*

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
 By *KBN* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*  
 2015-0782-M-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 481				
Document ID: 9408229				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (4 pages)	10/10/1993	P1/6(T) K8H 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 481

### FOLDER TITLE:

9408229

2015-0782-M  
rs1522

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 14 OCT 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STERN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS  
EXECSEC  
STERN

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

*JP*

DATE

*10/17*

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OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 94101714 SENS APPROVED RECOM  
X 94101714 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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002 941014 BRILL, K  
002 941014 MCALEER, R

National Security Council  
The White House

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NSC Secretariat			<u>D</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

14 OCT 94 09:46

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin of Russia (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry. The text may be  
cabled to Embassy Moscow EYES ONLY for the Ambassador. (S)



William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBYNARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russian Federation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Jessica Stern

DATE, TIME: October 10, 1993, 12:15 - 12:40pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Good evening. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm glad to hear your voice. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

I'm calling to follow up on the letter I sent you earlier today. I just wanted to reiterate to you personally how grave the situation is in Iraq and how important it is that the United States and Russia remain united in responding to it. The latest information we have shows that Iraqi troops are massing at the border. But we know that the Iraqis are being hurt by the sanctions. The best way for Iraq to get relief is for Saddam to demonstrate that he is prepared to live in peace with his neighbors and to honor the UN resolutions. This buildup of forces shows us just the opposite: that Saddam is still dangerous and unpredictable. The Iraqi military is still a potent force. And as you know, our past experience leaves us with no other choice than to prepare for the possibility that Saddam could invade Kuwait again. We simply cannot assume that Saddam is bluffing. The best way to deter him from exploiting this build-up on the border is to move our own forces into the region as fast as possible so that we can make it clear to him that there is a serious danger represented by his move -- and that he must reverse it. (S)

We must not link this demand in any way to the question of sanctions. To do so would reward Iraq's threatened aggression and could mislead Saddam regarding the strength of our resolve.

We cannot let him, in effect, use this aggressive move to have us reconsider the sanctions. We cannot let him blackmail us on this. We need your support on this. I hope I can continue to count on your support on this. (S)

President Yeltsin: I understand the point. I hope you understand that I'm equally disturbed by the situation in Iraq. I am following the situation very closely...hour by hour. (S)

First, a confidential point of information. Mindful of the fact that Primakov has good relations with the Chief of Iraqi External Intelligence, Primakov called yesterday to speak with him about Iraq's intentions. We also sent a special message to the Iraqi leadership warning against any rash actions. They assured us that what's happening on the border is no more than military exercises. We are satisfied with the information exchange we have had with the U.S. on the problem and because of these exchanges the UNSC is well informed on the situation and has taken steps to warn Baghdad. Kozyrev told me about his discussion with Christopher and I am satisfied with the division of labor here: forceful action together with diplomatic pressure. (S)

I took particular note of what Secretary of State Christopher said to Kozyrev, and reading between the lines of what you've told me. You are massing troops as a defensive measure and will only use force in defense of Kuwait. Still, Bill, I believe we have some diplomatic moves to make. Of course we have to handle Hussein in a tough way but on the other hand we should try not to drive him into a corner. Otherwise we could have on our hands a serious international crisis. And the Middle East Peace Process could be threatened. Saddam Hussein has people close to his way of thinking who would like to see the peace process threatened.

(S)

I also instructed Kozyrev to depart immediately to Iraq for talks with the Iraqi leadership. Next, I have instructed him to go to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and only then, afterwards, to report his results at the UNSC, whether developments are positive or negative. (S)

I request that you in the two-three days while Kozyrev is traveling in the area not present any new initiatives at the Security Council. Since Christopher is also in the Middle East and our co-sponsorship of Middle East peace process has produced positive results, this should be widely publicized by the press.

(S)

Now, if we see any open aggression, Russia would of course be on the side of the U.S. (S)

I now have an important question I want to raise with you on a different subject. As far as I know the Foreign Ministers of G7 are going to convene in Canada to discuss credit lines and Ukrainian debt. Do you remember that when we talked in the past we have talked about the G8? The country to which Ukraine owes the biggest amount -- \$4 billion -- is Russia. And yet Russian representatives have not been invited to attend the meeting in Canada. We were surprised to hear about this. Ukraine supports an invitation to Russia to the G7 meeting. Kuchma mentioned it to Chernomyrdin a couple of days ago when Chernomyrdin was in Kiev. This was all I wanted to tell you. (S)

The President: My understanding is that the meeting is sub-ministerial and that no decisions will be taken and that there will be a later meeting at which Russia would participate. But I support Russia's participation in this first meeting as well. And I have no problem getting back to the G7 to suggest that. People from your side should contact the G7 leaders. I support you on this. I have no problem with your participation in this meeting and I will go back to suggest that. (S)

President Yeltsin: All the more so because Kuchma is going to attend. (S)

The President: I have no problem with your attending the meeting. I support that. If you can have Kozyrev contact some of the other G7 members -- Kohl especially -- that might help. (S)

President Yeltsin: O.K. Good. Thank you. (U)

The President: I have to say one other thing about the Iraqi business so that there can be no misunderstanding between us. I think it is fine for Kozyrev to try to talk some sense into Saddam. But I cannot agree to relaxing the sanctions and the Security Council resolutions in return for his withdrawing his troops. That is completely unacceptable to me. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think these are two different questions that must be considered separately. The first question is the withdrawal of troops. The second issue is that, in the normal prescribed fashion, we must consider whether Iraq is recognizing the relevant UNSC resolutions, they must confirm the border with Kuwait. (S)

The President: Yes. One other point. You have read my intent properly. I do not want armed confrontation with Iraq and I'm moving my troops to defend Kuwait, for defensive purposes only. But there's a limit to how long I can leave them there -- I can't leave them there indefinitely. There will be a point when I will

not be able to leave aircraft and troops there indefinitely. If Hussein creates a permanent threat in the area...I won't take further action without speaking with you further. What we're doing is for defensive purposes but if there are no results I can't keep these troops there indefinitely. We will of course have other discussions before anything happens. But I wanted to lay this out up front. We will talk again. (S)

President Yeltsin: I get your point and I'm in full agreement.  
(U)

The President: O.K. Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: O.K. Thank you and good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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8229

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

FROM: JESSICA STERN JS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin which took place on October 10, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9408229  
DATE 14 OCT 94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____
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Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018  
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

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Document ID: 9408513				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Expanded Session on Security Issues with President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation (10 pages)	09/27/1994	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 482

### FOLDER TITLE:

9408513

2015-0782-M  
rs1523

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9408513  
RECEIVED: 19-OCT 94 12

TO: BRILL, K  
MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 09 NOV 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCON

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 OCT 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOTTEMOELLER

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
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2015-0782-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
002

Z 94110420 FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION  
X 94110917 REED SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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002 941109 BRILL, K  
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Sens			
Itoh	<u>1</u>		
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Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>MRN 11/9</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			<u>D</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

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Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council  
The White House

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NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8513

November 9, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation (U)

Please convey the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to  
Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry as a NODIS  
memorandum. (S)

  
William H. Iton  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Session on Security Issues with  
President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Warren Christopher, The Secretary of State  
William Perry, The Secretary of Defense  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lynn Davis, Undersecretary for International  
Security Affairs  
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the  
Russian Federation  
Nicholas Burns, Special Assistant to the  
President and Senior Director for  
Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs,  
NSC  
Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russian,  
Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC  
Notetaker  
Peter Afanasenko, Interpreter  
  
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian  
Federation  
Oleg Soskovets, Deputy Prime Minister  
Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense  
Oleg Davydov, Minister of Foreign Economics  
Trade  
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign  
Affairs  
Viktor Illyushin, First Assistant to the  
President  
Yuliy Vorontsov, Russian Ambassador to the  
U.S.  
Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 27, 1994; 4:35-5:35pm  
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: I would like to start with a summary of what we discussed earlier, then go to issues on which there is no controversy, then you and I will discuss Nagorno-Karabakh one-on-one for a few minutes. I would like to break promptly at 5:30 so that you have some time to rest before this evening. (S)

On the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, you and I agreed to get our experts together today or tomorrow to discuss areas of flexibility. We agree your concerns are legitimate. We will then move the talks into a trilateral framework as John Major suggested. We agreed that these talks would not be substitutes for the discussions on in Vienna, but would support them. (S)

On COCOM, we discussed the issue of Russian arms sales to Iran. You said that there would be no new contracts, but that you would service existing contracts. Our experts are to get together to discuss this matter. They will discuss it as a dimension of Russia's joining the successor regime to COCOM. (S)

President Yeltsin: We must work together on this. We will fulfill our promise. (U)

The President: On Bosnia, we agreed to consider the idea of an international conference and the Russian government would consider the progress with Milosevic on the question of borders. (S)

We have not yet discussed nuclear safety, but I want to say a word about it. Clearly, we need to work together. The Vice President told me how you raised the NPT issue in your lunchtime toast. I have also appreciated your cooperation on international crime problems. I believe that as a political matter, one way to keep up the public support for our partnership is to work together on the crime problem. People here are very worried about it. (S)

On nuclear security, should we go into specific steps? (U)

Secretary Perry: I already had a very good one-on-one discussion with Minister of Defense Grachev. I start off with the belief that while we remain concerned about nuclear security, we are concerned about ours and yours. The newspapers have overdramatized the problem, but we should take further steps to reduce the risk of losing control of nuclear materials or warheads. Both the United States and Russia have strong controls but both can make improvements in our Defense and Energy ministries. The issue is not only nuclear warheads but materials as well. One action underway in the United States which Russia should follow is to reduce the number of storage sites. Another is documentation control. I believe we should begin with a

confidential exchange of stockpile data and discussion of methods or ways to improve security of warheads and materials already under Defense control, and use Nunn-Lugar monies. In summary, I believe you have good methods of control, but both of us can improve and we should cooperate. The first steps is an exchange of information on stockpiles. The second is discussion of ways to improve control of nuclear warheads and materials. We should do this arm-in-arm, because a failure could affect both--indeed, the whole world. (S)

President Yeltsin: I would like to talk about North Korea. You have reached good results in your discussions, but what we need is a power plant to be reequipped with light water fuels. We are proposing the resources of Russia--we build it. Of course, this would only be done with appropriate controls by the IAEA and the United States. How do you view this? (S)

The President: Mr. Secretary? (U)

Secretary Perry: With respect to North Korea, the negotiations are ongoing, but a great deal still needs to be accomplished. North Korea has agreed to freeze its activities. It is not reprocessing or refueling. It is uncertain whether they will maintain that position. We are still unconvinced as to the nature of their transition. Kim Jong Il has not formally assumed all the positions of leadership, and we are somewhat puzzled. (S)

Mr. Lake: The problem with the reactor is that for reasons of financial feasibility, there is a requirement for a South Korean reactor. We would very much appreciate Russian assistance in supporting projects. (S)

The President: I would like to know what you think. We have a very delicate role to play. Every time we negotiate with North Korea, it makes South Korea nervous. They are trying to establish a bilateral relationship and they are afraid if they do not build the reactor, then North Korea will find a way around it. The issue is not just financial. We have troops there and they are very exposed. We feel we have to work through the South Koreans. Maybe you can say something to North Korea to make them feel more secure. (S)

President Yeltsin: Kim Jong Il is a more rigid person, tougher. Some steps backwards are to be expected. Right now, North Korea is not going to talk to South Korea--it is useless for the next year or two. I understand your situation, taking into account South Korea and your troops. But it may be technically easier for you if we came in and helped with the reactor. We could involve U.S. companies to attract international financing. But

maybe major parts from Russia. If you agree, maybe we could start talking. (S)

The President: The real problem is that South Korea is ready to pay, but not if they cannot do the work. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, that is useless. It is not going to work. (S)

The President: You mean North Korea is not going to take it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. Kim Jong Il wants first to strengthen his power base, which means no contacts with the South. It is not allowing him to take some steps. Time is needed. Until he firms up his power base, under no circumstances is he going to talk to the South Koreans. It is a political problem for him to do so. (S)

Secretary Christopher: There is an important sequencing issue here. North Korea seems to have demanded that a light water reactor be delivered and operating before it agrees not to reprocess. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. (U)

Secretary Christopher: We should not exclude the idea of an international consortium. But until we get agreement on sequencing, it is difficult to move forward. (S)

Secretary Perry: We are worried that even if we agree on financing, they will reverse themselves and refuel, then all hell will break loose here. Thus far they have escaped sanctions by maintaining a freeze. (S)

Minister Kozyrev: The thing is, the difficulties are now visible. To have a South Korean light water reactor causes additional difficulties for North Korea. The leadership simply cannot allow itself to agree. The United States representative is saying that the reactor has to be South Korean--this makes the talks more colicated. At the same time, it was our idea to propose going to a light water reactor, to once and for all solve the problem. In Geneva with Secretary Christopher and Bob Gallucci, we listened to the experts, who said a light water reactor is much more safe. At the same time, the North Koreans are saying that they want a Russian light water reactor. It is very important if the two Presidents could reach an accord saying that when the North Koreans are ready to go to a light water reactor, then it should be a Russian one. It would make current

and future negotiations simpler. Of course, it would also be a multi-billion dollar contract for us. (e)

The President: I have a proposal. But do you think if we agreed they would agree not to refuel? (e)

Minister Kozyrev: It would make it easier. (U)

The President: I have a suggestion. Suppose we asked Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev to come up with a common diplomatic initiative. Our major concern is that we not be put in a position to have to go to the United Nations for sanctions. At all costs, we need to keep the freeze on. (e)

Secretary Christopher: OK. (U)

The President: Let's talk again tomorrow. (U)

President Yeltsin: Sure, let's do it. I agree. I've got a proposal on the issue of nuclear safety. What was being proposed on biological weapons--an information exchange--we should do the same on the nuclear issue. Did you receive our report on biological weapons? (e)

The Vice President: Pickering has it. (U)

Ambassador Pickering: I received it yesterday in New York. (U)

President Yeltsin: We should do the same kind of exchange on nuclear issues. We have told you everything about our BW program in that report. We have fulfilled our commitment. Now we need to figure out how to do a data exchange on nuclear warheads and materials. How much time do we need to set up such an exchange? (Confers with his delegation.) Soskovets says two months should be enough time. Can we agree on two months? (e)

Secretary Perry: It should not take any longer. (U)

The Vice President: We should complete it by December when our Commission meets. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, let's get it done by December. (U)

The Vice President: We're still translating the document received yesterday. (U)

President Yeltsin: The point is, we have done what we said, we have fulfilled our pledge. (U)

Minister Grachev: The cardinal issue is the new U.S. strategy, which I talked about with Secretary Perry yesterday. Nuclear security must be considered at the level of the Energy Department and MinAtom, too. So, before Vice President Gore's visit in December, we will work out an exchange on nuclear security by then. The second issue is nuclear security provided in terms of the START I and II Treaties. I informed Secretary Perry of all the issues of nuclear safety and security that were being implemented. Missiles are coming out of Kazakhstan and Belarus, warheads are being removed from Ukraine, all according to schedule. We are destroying strategic nuclear arms strictly according to schedule. There was a misunderstanding before this visit that we were stopping or slowing down. No. We showed Secretary Perry that we are on schedule. We have cut back 374 ICBMs, you saw 13. For submarines, we have cut back 184 compared to the 52 you counted. As far as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles on heavy bombers--both you and we have taken them all off. I'd like to propose that Perry come to one of our tactical nuclear handling sites when he visits in December, to see that safety is provided for. But we cannot destroy all the tactical nuclear weapons at once--unlike the United States, which is geographically in a more favorable position. You do not need them. But for us, within reasonable bounds we need some. There could be problems with some of the states to the south. They are contained now, but as a restraint to aggression some tactical nuclear weapons are needed. (C)

President Yeltsin: To be objective and fair, Pavel Sergeyevich, I cannot agree. I said this to him: let's just add them up. You say you want to keep tactical nuclear weapons more than strategic, OK, get rid of that many more strategic. Either we knock out all tactical nuclear weapons, or sum them up. (C)

Minister Grachev: We're asking that at the level of experts that we look at this question one more time. Here is another difficulty: We are cutting back strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with START I, but the Treaty is not ratified. Now START II is pressing us, with a date of 2003 to complete reductions. If you do not press Ukraine, then we will not be able to proceed with START II. (C)

President Yeltsin: What concerns Ukraine is START I, not II. START II is a matter between us. So we have to press Ukraine with all our might. (C)

The President: President Kuchma is coming here. You said that he is OK. So we need to press them to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the time of the CSCE Summit in Budapest, and we have to ensure they get some credit. (C)

The Vice President: We should urge President Kuchma together to satisfy this requirement by the time of the CSCE Summit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, and Ukraine in general. We should bring all the pressure we have to bear. We signed the Trilateral accord, we three, so then what? I've got to visit Ukraine in November. I'm going to press Kuchma to the wall. NPT or they get no gas or oil! (S)

The Vice President: Don't be too hard on him. (U)

The President: I will tell him that we need to get NPT out of the way to bring START I into force and to ratify START II. Then we can begin to explore START III ideas. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, Kuchma is fine. I think it is very realistic to expect to be able to finish NPT by the end of the year. As Grachev here will tell you, we have got to get START II going. (S)

Minister Grachev: We are already beginning to think about it. The difficulty has been in getting all of the warheads out of those three countries. (S)

President Yeltsin: I propose so that we do not have any surprise misunderstandings, that every three months we exchange information on how much has been destroyed. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then our Ministers of Defense should sign on the bottom line, who has destroyed what, and where. (S)

Secretary Perry: To summarize what we and Minister Grachev have agreed: First, we will cooperate in ratifying START I and II and bringing them into force; second, once that is achieved, we will accelerate the pace of reductions, to go even faster by informal agreement, using Nunn-Lugar funds to do so. Third, we will start discussing what reductions will be possible under START III. And fourth, while we are discussing START III, each side will take unilateral reductions beyond START II. Each side will be taking unilateral steps toward START III (S)

The President: We have been doing some of that already? (U)

Secretary Perry: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: On the ratification of START I, that is fine, we are destroying all of those anyway. On the other points, let's do it this way: when START II enters into force, let us

take all of the weapons to be reduced under START II off of combat status. So all of the nuclear weapons subject to START II would be without their warheads. (S)

Secretary Perry: I like that. (U)

The President: Done. (U)

The Vice President: OK. (U)

Minister Grachev: Let's let our experts examine this. (U)

President Yeltsin: The experts will get it all balled up. (U)

Minister Grachev: President Clinton has said that under the new policy, no more reductions will take place until START II is ratified. (S)

President Yeltsin: That is what I'm talking about: after START II, we should take all the weapons subject to it off combat status right away. And it seems to me, Bill, that we do not have to wait for ratification of START II until we get planning for START III underway. We should create a joint working group. You remember how much time we took to get START II--and it took ten years to get START I going. So, we should just get around a table so by the time START II is ratified, we have a plan ready for START III and we can dovetail right into it. (S)

The Vice President: That sounds very good, partly because such long periods of time are involved here--it is very sound. (U)

The President: This way, we will not have a meeting where people say the experts have not had time to work on it. We will get to work on it right away. We need to be careful what we say publicly. We have to ratify START II. (S)

Secretary Perry. I want to keep a strong emphasis on ratifying START II. (S)

The President: But it is OK to have experts start talking now about the mechanics and details of START III. (S)

The Vice President: Why not? (U)

President Yeltsin: Let's do it. But we will tell the press that after START II, we will remove all the reentry vehicles reduced under the Treaty from combat status. No other states will be required to do that. After START I, we will have taken everything out of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. (S)

Mr. Lake: But if we announce this before ratification, it could be a problem for the Senate. (S)

The President: No, he is saying after ratification. It will make the treaty reductions immediately effective, rather than waiting seven years. It shows we have decided to do something important here. (S)

President Yeltsin: We would also like to limit nuclear submarine patrolling zones. (S)

The President: That is a problem for us. (U)

The Vice President: Freedom of navigation of the seas is vital to us. It goes beyond Russia--other countries are getting submarines. We are not selling them. (S)

Minister Grachev: This has nothing to do with selling submarines. I do not appreciate this humor. Off the Kola peninsula, some submarines have entered our territorial waters and we almost had a catastrophe. (S)

President Yeltsin: We should be able to do this without hurting the naval operations of either side. (S)

Minister Kozyrev: As the member of the Duma elected from Murmansk, I can tell you that I hear from many of my constituents, complaining about this matter. (S)

President Yeltsin: I would like to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Murmansk, to get it out of Moscow. (S)

The President: You have raised a legitimate issue. We have had some long discussions on this. It causes problems for us, but maybe something can be done. We should come back to this tomorrow. (S)

Minister Grachev: So it falls to Perry and me to try to work out a solution. (S)

President Yeltsin: At least a formulation as to how to view this problem. (S)

The President: Before that, I want to stress that this is a big issue for us, throughout the whole history of the twentieth century. I want Perry to meet with you to talk about it. But we cannot agree to restrain operations along the lines you said. Let's talk about it tomorrow. (S)

President Yeltsin: Here is a sixth point for Perry, directly relevant to the Presidents. Let us say we get rid of the nuclear footballs. (S)

The President: What would my military aide do? (U)

President Yeltsin: Go back to the Air Force or Navy. (U)

The President: I have got to think about it. I have given it no thought. (U)

The Vice President: In our military doctrine, we rely on the idea of deterrence not only with the former Soviet Union in mind. As other nations develop long-range missiles and nuclear warheads of their own, we may be in an era where deterrence has a new orientation, regardless of the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. There might be other dangers. This would need to be studied very carefully. (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course we don't have to decide this today. But you have wonderful communications and we have wonderful communication. If I need to communicate with the nuclear forces, I can pick up any number of telephone lines to do so. But to drag around one of these briefcases, have one guy guarding another guy--it seems like too much. (S)

The President: I don't know, I need some time--one thing I have not spent time on is this issue. But when I took this job, I understood the symbolic importance that the football has in terms of civilian control over the military's decisions. It has nothing to do with you. It is a double check that only a civilian, elected leader can make this decision. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. (U)

The President: Now, we have agreed to discuss chemical and biological weapons tomorrow, because you have given us something to look at. And on the demarcation between anti-ballistic missile and theater ballistic missile defense systems--in Naples, we made new proposals, then in August you made some new proposals in response to ours. Now Secretary Christopher has a set of proposals to give you to respond to what you gave us. You can look at them tonight. Maybe we can get close and finish this. (S)

Minister Kozyrev: It is not such a simple matter. I propose we move it to the Commission in October. We have included a provision on this in the joint statement. You send us your version. We will study it back home and decide how to proceed. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 2, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *RJ*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - Expanded Session on Security Issues with President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on September 27, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *JWR*  
*fnwz* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 564				
Document ID: 9500995				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 564

### FOLDER TITLE:

9500995

2015-0782-M  
rs1524

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 17 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE  
EXECSEC  
PIFER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY JP DATE 2/16 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
002

Z 95021612 FOR SIGNATURE AND DECISION  
X 95021612 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950215 BRILL, K

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MBN LOG # 0995  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG: MBN A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Sens	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WENP/15</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	<u>[Signature]</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

UNCLASSIFIED

0995

~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with President  
Boris Yeltsin (U)

Please transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A  
to Secretary Christopher. (U)

  
Andrew Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0995

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President  
Yeltsin: Chechnya, START II

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Steve Pifer

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0782-M-1 (1.24)  
3/13/2018 KBH

DATE, TIME February 13, 1995, 1:03-1:25 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice. Thank you for  
taking my call. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. It's been some time since  
we spoke. (U)

The President: It's been too long. I'm glad we have a chance to  
talk now. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good. (U)

The President: Helmut Kohl and I had a good discussion last  
week. We discussed the difficulties and challenges you face in  
Chechnya. Whenever I've been asked, I have said we consider  
Chechnya a part of Russia and that you are dealing with it as  
best you could. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know, Bill, what you have been saying about  
the situation in Chechnya. I appreciate your objectivity. (S)

The President: Both Kohl and I have tried to be supportive and  
remind people that you stand for democracy in Russia and are the  
best hope of that. (S)

But we are concerned that the heavy military fighting is doing  
heavy damage to Russia's international image and aiding your  
critics at home and abroad. You can see that in the calls by  
some in our new Congress to reduce or even stop assistance to

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Russia and in the signal the European Union sent when it raised questions about implementing its interim agreement with you. Of course, the surest way to counter those critics is to settle the crisis peacefully. (S)

I have seen the OSCE report outlining a series of steps to address humanitarian aspects of the Chechnya conflict that came out last week. I want to commend you for granting the OSCE access to Chechnya. I hope you will agree to their recommendations. The first step is a humanitarian cease-fire; this would be a good first step toward a political resolution. (S)

It concerns me that the fighting in Chechnya has also led many in the West to question your government's commitment to reform. I don't support that view. I think your commitment is strong and clear and have made clear that the U.S. will continue to support reform in Russia and your efforts toward that end. But Chechnya is having an impact on opinion here and in Europe. (S)

The decision on your new privatization official sent a good signal of your real intentions. And I want to urge you to take every opportunity to signal your commitment to democracy, open government and economic reform. (S)

Boris, I would like to say one more thing. I apologize for this long monologue, but I know you will address the Duma this week. The whole world is waiting to hear your speech. It is a terribly important opportunity for you to describe the complex Chechnya dilemma for your people, including the Chechens, in a way that opens the door for a political settlement. (S)

It is also an opportunity to remind the world of why you are the best hope for continued reform in Russia. I want everyone to see you as the person who stood on the tank and stood up for freedom. I don't like some of the things that are now being said. (S)

As a friend, I urge you to take advantage of the opportunity of this speech. These are terribly difficult times for Russia. I think this speech is a great opportunity for you, and I hope that you will seize it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks again for your position and for the political and moral support that I am getting from you, Helmut and several other leaders. It is very encouraging and helps create the appropriate political situation in Russia. It helps get people on our side, in support of the President, in support of our position on Chechnya. (S)

But those people who are suggesting sanctions against Russia, let them not forget that Russia is not Yugoslavia. This is not something that can be used to scare us. (S)

Chechnya is an internal republic of Russia. It is part of the Russian Federation, according to the constitution of the Russian Federation. We are dealing with an open rebellion. Under the constitution, we have the right to use force, just as you do if you have a rebellion on your hands in one of your states. (S)

Of course, we are concerned about the reaction of world public opinion. We do not want to be presented as people who are backtracking on reform or coming out in favor of dictatorship. We are for reform, and this is something I will state very clearly in my address before the Parliament. (S)

I can also tell you that I have talked to Helmut on the phone every week. We use this as an opportunity to synchronize our watches. I have started talks and worked to put an end to the open fighting. We have only police forces remaining in Chechnya to combat bandits who fire on our people. The police forces are there to stand up to those bandits. (S)

We have recognized the provisional government until the time of elections, which are scheduled for this year. We are trying to restore trade services, supply food and clothing and restore housing. All of this comes from federal funds. (S)

Chechnya was a part of Russia and will remain a part of Russia. It used to be a dictatorship within Russia but will become a democratic part of the Russian Federation, I can assure you. (S)

As for the reform process, we are forging ahead. In Davos, Switzerland Chubays mentioned many things that we're doing to push through reform here. So, Bill, thanks for your expression of concern. You may rest assured that I am firmly on my feet, pursuing democracy and reform. I have been in contact with the Chechen elders and municipal officials to ensure a good, peaceful settlement. (S)

The President: Thank you. I think it is important if you can in your speech express support for OSCE and some note of regret about what has happened in Chechnya. What is frightening the world is the large-scale human suffering resulting from the military action. It's important to show the world that you are attempting to restore democracy and want to do it in the least disruptive terms. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think without fail that I will take advantage of your advice. (U)

The President: Another quick word on an important issue. I am working to win approval of the START II Treaty by our Senate, to fulfill the commitment we made last September to exchange instruments of ratification at our next summit. I am optimistic that the Senate will ratify the Treaty by April. If there is anything I can do to increase support for START II in Russia, let me know. I think that we will pass START II here in the springtime. (S)

President Yeltsin: That would be a very good thing if we can have an exchange of instruments of ratification at our next summit. For my part, I'll try to do my best to have it resolved on my side as well. Could I mention the fact that your side plans to have START II ratified by this spring? (S)

The President: Yes, you can certainly say that we've talked, that I'm pressing for ratification in the spring and that I'm optimistic about its chances in the spring. (S)

President Yeltsin: Very good. This reference will help us speed up our process of ratification. (S)

The President: That's great. Well, good luck. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then we can start working on a START III accord. (S)

The President: I can't wait. (U)

President Yeltsin: Same here. I look forward to our next meeting. (U)

The President: Me, too, my friend. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: From me, best regards to Hillary and all my friends. Thank you for your support and the call. (U)

The President: Thanks, and tell Naina hello. Good-bye. Until our next meeting. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. See you next time. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President  
Yeltsin: Chechnya, START II

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on February 13, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to Secretary Christopher.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *John* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*15 Feb*

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9500995  
DATE 15 FEB 95

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 581				
Document ID: 9503572				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 4	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Presidential Telephone Call (4 pages)	04/27/1995	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 581

### FOLDER TITLE:

9503572

2015-0782-M

rs1525

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]  
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9503572  
RECEIVED: 09 MAY 95 13

TO: SENS

FROM: BEYRLE  
BLACKER

DOC DATE: 09 MAY 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES YELTSIN ON APR 27

ACTION: SENS APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 12 MAY 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEYRLE  
BLACKER  
EXECSEC ✓

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC

CLOSED BY: NSMEC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGINARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
001

Z 95052210 FOR DECISION  
X 95052317 SENS APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # ~~337~~ 3572

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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	2	PRS 5/19	N
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc: Blacker  
Boyer

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

May 15, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *CB*

FROM: JOHN BEYRLE *JB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with  
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin that took place on April 27, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin  
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko  
Notetakers: John Beyrle, Kenneth Baldwin,  
Karen Dragone

DATE, TIME 27 April 1995, 9:31 - 10:04am  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Mr. President, I am listening. (U)

The President: Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: As always a pleasure to listen to you and hear your voice. (U)

The President: Good to hear your voice. I hope you had a relaxing vacation in the south. I thought it was important to be in touch with you as we plan for our meeting in May. I was pleased to get your letters on our May meeting and on NATO issues. I share your commitment to a successful summit. Part of that entails staying in close touch like this, by letter and phone. I have just finished a very good meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev here in the Oval Office. Of course, he passed along your best wishes and reiterated your desire for a successful meeting. (U)

I believe that this summit must be a reaffirmation of our joint commitment to Russia's integration into multilateral economic and security and political systems. We have come a long way in two years. Russia's participation in the G-7/P-8 process and our cooperation in the U.N. and OSCE are good examples of this kind of integration we can have. We don't always agree on everything, but we work together as partners, not opponents. Of course, the press and critics of our relations continue to focus on problem areas. We need to make progress in those at our meeting, but we also need to highlight our successes. (U)

I understand Gore and Chernomyrdin are working out an understanding on Russia's joining as a founding member of the post-COCOM regime and your arms sales to Iran. I hope we can announce this as settled in Moscow on May 10. I'm also told we should be able to announce agreement on principles on the ABM Treaty and theater missile defense, which may ease some of the Duma's criticism of START II. They also tell me that two big oil deals, Sakhalin-One and Timan-Pechora, can be finished by May 10. The combined value of these projects is about 24 billion dollars. That is a huge amount and nothing could be a better symbol of our commitment to implement the economic partnership we signed last September. Let's instruct Gore and Chernomyrdin to look into this so we can announce these agreements when we meet in Moscow as well. (S)

President Yeltsin: I fully share your vision of our work to do and your program of accomplishments at the meeting in May. We have to counteract perceptions so that world public opinion views our relationship as stable, reliable and predictable, with no changes or worsening. And we are resolved to continue in that vein. I'm confident that in our upcoming summit in Moscow we'll be able to agree on all outstanding issues, because the personal relations between us are based on mutual respect and friendship. I view you to be a very good friend. There is no question we cannot agree upon. I can assure you of that. That is why I am grateful to you for your bold step in deciding to come to Moscow for our celebration. I fully agree with the program you have proposed, and we fully support and accept it. I'm looking forward to our next meeting. I've actually missed seeing you (*skuchals'ya po tebye*). Will Hillary be there? (S)

The President: Yes, she will. She is looking forward to it. I wanted to raise with you the NATO question. We recognize how sensitive this issue is for you. That is why I want to assure your that this process is proceeding along a path that is consistent with what you and I agreed upon last September and that Vice President Gore reiterated to you when he saw you in December. (S)

President Yeltsin: I fully agree with you on that. (U)

The President: For the future stability of Europe, it is important that Russia be a vital part of the new security structures that are emerging. That means OSCE, the post-COCOM regime, the new NATO -- all of them. None of this can develop normally unless Russia is involved in the process. (S)

President Yeltsin: We'll both have difficult discussions with regards to NATO, but I'm confident we will be able to find an

acceptable solution for this issue. It is impossible to keep the whole world in uncertainty in a situation where two great powers fail to agree on such a vital issue. (S)

The President: Christopher and Kozyrev have just described to me a proposal they discussed yesterday. It offers a way to deal with European security and the NATO question in a way that I think respects your position and ours. I think it is an excellent plan that could give a fresh impetus to the development of the NATO-Russia relationship at the NATO ministerial meeting at the end of May, in connection with your approval of Russia's two agreements with NATO. I want to say to you that this proposal has my personal support. I hope you will be able to support it, too. I will let the translation proceed then explain my understanding of it. (S)

The agreement has three parts: At their May meeting, NATO ministers would reaffirm the deliberate pace of expansion and that there is no desire or intention to accelerate the pace. Second, we would reinvigorate the Partnership for Peace, to demonstrate that we are strengthening this program. And third, in May we would start discussions about a new special relationship between Russian and NATO. All three of these things can be done if you can agree to go ahead with the signing of the two NATO documents. Signing these documents does not mean you endorse NATO's taking in of new members. I am not asking you to make such a public endorsement. I realize you can't do that. What I am asking is that you not let concern over the future process of NATO expansion stop us from building a strong Russian-NATO relationship now. So this is the plan -- "May for May." It is a good one. We can accept it and hope you can accept it.

(S)

[At this point it was discovered that the communications link had been broken during the Russian interpretation of the foregoing remarks by the President. After the link was re-established, the American interpreter repeated the preceding paragraph describing the plan and received confirmation that Yeltsin had heard it.]

(S)

President Yeltsin: I agree with what Kozyrev described. On a preliminary basis I do agree with this, but during our personal meeting you and I can discuss it and seek some clarifications with you. (S)

The President: Well, that's fine. We can further discuss it during our meeting. I hope that you'll be able to confirm your agreement to go ahead with the documents. That will make it possible for me to work with our Allies on this concept before we meet. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I do agree with you, Bill. (U)

The President: That's great. (U)

President Yeltsin: Sure, Bill, I am looking forward to seeing you in Moscow. (U)

The President: Me, too. One more thing before we end our conversation, if I might. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, Bill. (U)

The President: I was pleased by reports that you will declare an end to military action in Chechnya. It's very important that this becomes a permanent cessation that leads to a political solution. We need to intensify the search for a political solution. As you know we have a U.S. assistance worker, Fred Cuny who has been missing in the region since April 9. We've been in close touch with your government, but I would appreciate anything that you could do to help us determine his welfare and whereabouts.

(C)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I today signed the decree on a moratorium on military activity in Chechnya until around the 15th of May [foregoing is what Yeltsin actually said. Russian interpreter misrendered this in English as "...moratorium on military activity in Chechnya for the indefinite future."] (C)

The President: Great. That's great. Let's stay in touch. Hillary and I are looking forward to seeing you and Naina on Victory Day. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. Because of the significance of these holidays, I think the meeting will be fine and useful. (U)

The President: Fine; see you then. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

*SEE ↓*  
Case Number: 2014-0904-M; 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 582				
Document ID: 9503774				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Summary report on  
One-On-One Meeting  
Between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin  
May 10, 1995  
10:10 a.m. - 1:19 p.m.  
St. Catherine's Hall, The Kremlin

- BNY: Thank you for coming to Moscow and for attending this occasion, the 50th anniversary of our great victory. Your participation in yesterday's celebration will add to our partnership, relationship, cooperation, and personal friendship. Thank Hillary, too; she seemed glad to see the Victory Memorial.
- WJC: All the ceremonies were televised back to the U.S., so our people can get a better understanding of the sacrifices of the Russian people -- a better sense of our partnership of 50 years ago. That should make it easier for our people to see that they have a chance to take up where we left off 50 years ago. That is what you and I have been doing. The world is a safer place than it was two and a half years ago when we began our partnership.
- BNY: No question. We now have only to ratify START II. I keep pounding on my parliament to ratify START II. I squeeze, squeeze, squeeze them. Do it!, I say, So that then we can work on START III!" I think this will happen in a short while.
- WJC: I agree with that entirely. We both must work to ratify START II so that we can then go farther.
- BNY: We have a chance. The hardest thing, Bill, is to persuade our militaries -- both yours and ours -- to accept the next step: START III. I've already carried out this operation. My military is prepared to move toward START III. We're firmly abiding by START I. And with respect to strategic and tactical arms, we've destroyed all tactical weapons; we've started to destroy strategic weapons. We've removed the strategic weapons from Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Now on the question of Ukrainian strategic arms -- we're working together on this issue.

We're complying with the timetable for strategic-arms elimination, but so far we've been putting warheads in storage because we don't have the facilities for eliminating them. We appreciate the assistance we've gotten from you; we're building facilities to reprocess weapons-grade material into ordinary fuel for peaceful purposes.

I must say that two years ago, if we were to say, "we're going to destroy this stuff," a lot of people would say, "This is making us weaker than Western countries!" But this talk is over. Even the opposition -- everyone! everyone! -- agrees that this process of denuclearization should go forward. I feel confident we will get past this threshold and go on to START II even before both of our 1996 elections.

But what causes us concern here -- and what we've got to do in time -- is developing a common view of Pan-European security and NATO. This is a complicated issue. We need to discuss it today in a very frank way.

WJC: I agree, but first I want to finish on the other subject and mention something else about disarmament. We are dismantling our weapons ahead of schedule.

BNY: We are, too.

WJC: I know, and I'm pleased with the work we're doing together and the agreements with with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. However, just before I left to come here, I received a report from a committee that advises me on science. It contained distressing information, and I want to share it with you. They concluded that nuclear materials in Russia are quite well managed and secure in terms of not being subject to sale on the black market or diverted. But they expressed concern about a deterioration of safeguards on fissile materials under the control of MINATOM, i.e, non-military material. We can't resolve this today, and I won't say anything about it publicly. Among other things, we need to get on to the subject of European security. But let's ask VP Gore and PM Chernomyrdin to study it and make recommendations to us.

BNY: Good, but I want to say we have our problems; one is Tomsk-7 -- a huge facilities -- where we produce nuclear materials. I've been there; it's huge. If we close it, we won't be able to provide electricity to an entire city that depends on it. So we need to build a new atomic power station that will allow us to close down Tomsk-7. The problem so far is that we don't have enough money. But eventually we won't have any power plants that produce weapons-grade material.

WJC: The report I spoke about raises concerns about small amounts of nuclear material under MINATOM. It is vulnerable to being stolen. I'd like to instruct VP Gore to share our information with PM Chernomyrdin and review it and come up with recommendations for us.

BNY: Good, but I can only say here that this issue involves just Tomsk-7, where they make weapons-grade nuclear material.

WJC: You might disagree with this approach, but we need to discuss this kind of thing. I want to give you the information -- just as I'd expect you to share with me any information you thought I should know about.

BNY: Yes, Bill, that's good. But I was being honest when I said that Tomsk-7 is not military -- it's Mikhailov's, MINATOM's.

What's the gain if we close Tomsk-7 and cannot get power to the big city tied into this station? It's impossible to steal anything from Tomsk-7. I've been all over that site; I've walked through it on foot, in white gloves and a white uniform, with all that protective stuff and safety badges that they make you wear. They have disciplined people and the best security facilities.

WJC: I'd like to repeat what I said earlier. We've got to focus here on a different issue, which is a small amount of nuclear material in a non-power-plant setting in Russia --which could be stolen and sold on the world market: that's something on which perhaps we could do something quietly together. We don't have to discuss this now. I'd like to have the Vice President talk to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and they can do it.

BNY: Well, there is a question of Beloyarsk station, which is a fast-neutron reactor and there's some plutonium. We have shut down one unit, and the two units still working are only for peaceful purposes. They are not for weapons but for power for Sverdlovsk and other cities. When the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meets, we'll open all facilities and who them every site in Russia. Let them see and report to us.

Before getting back to European security, I want to talk about the subject of our relations with Iran. What decisions did I take just before your visit? In our contract, we've left in place only the delivery of energy-producing units for peaceful purposes. We have turned them [the Iranians] down on anything in the contract that has to do with military issues.

There are four points I want to make here:

First, no centrifuge -- Nyet!

Second, the two silos -- Nyet!

Third, we'll refuse delivery of military weapons-gradematerials. ✓

Fourth, only peaceful reactors will be delivered.

In light of what I've said, we should take it easy and stop torturing each other about Iran. You have outcries from your opposition, and so do I. Let's stop stirring them up.

You have \$5.6 billion per year in trade of your own with Iran. We don't give you a hard time for that.

We don't give you a hard time for the fact that it was the U.S. and not Russia that gave them all they wanted; you armed Iran in the first place [in the days of the Shah].

We're giving them equipment for peaceful use, for electric power stations -- not one iota more -- even though we will lose financially because we'll have to cut back on the contract [to eliminate the gas-centrifuge].

WJC: First, let me say that I appreciate the fact that you are not going forward with the enrichment facility. That's a good decision.

But let me tell you about my own decision, which answers one of your points. Ten days ago I announced a total embargo on U.S. trade with Iran, so we'll be giving up the money you mentioned. I realize this is a sensitive economic and political issue for you and for me. Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich have called for an aid cutoff if Iran is given this reactor. I don't agree with what they're saying, and I don't think that we should get into that kind of use of our aid program to punish Russia. I want to discuss this issue in terms of what is right for Russia and what is right for the world.

BNY: Bill, here's what I propose: let's have Gore and Chernomyrdin reach agreement on a protocol that will establish what deliveries can go ahead and which ones we should stop. You and I will then review the protocol.

WJC: Let me make sure we understand each other. If you'll let the GCC present arguments and evidence on why there should be no sale, then I agree. If you expect me to agree now that the sale should go forward, even in part, I cannot agree.

Our position is that nuclear cooperation of any kind with Iran is a mistake -- from your standpoint as well as our. We can also provide you with information to prove that. We can also talk to you about how to minimize the economic cost to you for the loss of the sale.

BNY: Bill, what are you talking about? These are light water reactors! You're providing the same thing to North Korea.

WJC: There's a big difference. First, by building a nuclear reactor and getting money from South Korea and Japan, we're reducing North Korea's nuclear program from the level that already exists. Iran doesn't have LWR technology. So in North Korea, we're moving them drastically away from a program they have, while in Iran we're trying to persuade you not to help them start one up. Don't you see that difference?

BNY: No, no. All the cadres -- all the atomic workers [in Iran] were trained by the U.S.! There are no Russian experts in Iran. We're refusing to provide experts, and we're letting them have only the LWR for peaceful purposes.

That's why I urge that Gore and Chernomyrdin look into the matter and draw up a protocol. We'll provide only what we should. All the other parts of the contract we'll cut out. We'll take the loss and maybe you will be able to make part of it up. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will have to produce a protocol stating what is to be provided and what is not.

WJC: There's a point here you should understand. We have intelligence that we believe proves Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. I will share a copy with you. [Hands over Russian-language text.] Iran does not need nuclear facilities for energy because it has enough oil. It wants reactors for other purposes.

BNY: They are not capable of developing a nuclear-weapons program.

WJC: They are not capable of doing so now, but North Korea proves that even a country under IAEA safeguards can develop such a program over time.

Also, Russia is closer to Iran than the U.S. is; that should make you all the more careful here. Moreover, you are a co-sponsor with us of the Middle East Peace process. Even the Arab states say that Iran is a principal force trying to disrupt peace -- and that it would be a big mistake to build a power plant there. Think about that factor, too.

Now, Boris, I recognize that even if you believed I was right, you could not announce today that you were ending the sale. So I propose announcing today that the enrichment facility and other military-related or -potential aspect are cancelled, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will examine the issue of the reactor sale in the light of our information. This is the kind of equipment that requires maximum safeguards under any circumstances. But we think the answer in this case is cancelling the sale altogether, even though you can't say that today. So you say you are reviewing the information we have given you, the intelligence, and alternative proposals to deal with the economic impact. I realize you can't say today, "I can't sell the reactors." But you can say, "Let's look at the report." So no centrifuge, no militarily useful technology -- that we'll announce today, and we'll turn the rest over to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to work hard on a resolution. For our part, the resolution we'll be arguing for is cancelling the deal, and trying to find ways to help you the overcome the cost of the loss.

BNY: We've got a deal. [Offers his hand and they shake on it.]

Now to the issue of European security -- a question no less important than the one we've been discussion. In fact, it's more important! I want to get a clear understanding of your idea of NATO expansion because now I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed. How do you think it looks to us if one bloc continues to exist while the Warsaw Pact has been abolished? It's a new form of encirclement if the one surviving Cold War bloc expands right up to the borders of Russia. Many Russians have a sense of fear. What do you want to achieve with this if Russia is your partner? they ask. I ask it too: Why do you want to do this? We need a new structure for Pan-European security, not old ones!

Perhaps the solution is to postpone NATO expansion until the year 2000 so that later we can come up with some new ideas. Let's have no blocs, only one European space that provides for its own security. If we leave the question of expansion to the year 2000, we'll calm the whole situation down.

You and I are heading for elections. The extremists and hardliners are exploiting this issue for their own purposes -- on both sides. I am being attacked from both the right and the left on this. We need a common European space that provides for overall security. So let's postpone any change in NATO until 1999 or 2000.

By the way, France is not in agreement with your policy. Mitterrand told me so. As for Kohl and Major, I understand they're under your influence. They tried to talk me into your approach.

But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia -- that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.

I'd be prepared to talk about an alternative: Let's say that Russia will give every state that wants to join NATO a guarantee that we won't infringe on its security. That way they'll have nothing to fear from the East.

WJC: I understand the political complexity of this issue for you, but first I'd like to discuss it on the merits. Then we can talk about the political difficulties it presents for you.

NATO was established for the purpose of making sure that the U.S. and Canada are fully involved in European security; it was founded during the Cold War, and it was set up against the Soviet Union. Now the Cold War is over, and Russia does not present a threat to the NATO states. I acknowledge this. The question is, does the U.S. at the end of the Cold War still need a security relationship with Europe along with a political and economic relationship?

BNY: I'm not so sure you do.

WJC: Well, I believe we do. Yesterday's ceremony was a reminder of why. Europe, including Russia, certainly wanted us involved against Hitler, and for the 50 years since then, during the Cold War, we needed such a relationship. So the question now is how can the U.S. continue to be involved in Europe in a way that makes sure Russia is integrated into Europe and plays its rightful role? Our purpose is to use our presence to work cooperatively with Russia toward integration. But a lot of this is up to you -- what you do, and what you don't do.

Our goal is for the U.S. to stay in Europe and promote a unified, integrated Europe. I propose the following:

First, that we do the best we can with PFP, which I've worked hard to make an important organization in its own right.

Second, that there be a role for Russia in PFP and a clear statement from the U.S. that Russia should not be excluded from NATO membership.

Third, that there be a special relationship between Russia and NATO, as discussed by Vice President Gore with you when he visited you in the hospital.

Fourth, that there be a very deliberate process for review of NATO's membership.

Boris, let me describe for you what we're planning under the decision that NATO made in December. It's important for you to understand what we are, and are not, doing.

I told you in January 1994, after our NATO summit, that NATO is open to admitting new members. We recognized that admitting new members raised a lot of questions that required careful study by our experts as well as our political leaders. In December of 1994, we agreed to start a process to answer those questions. That's what we call the "how" and "why" of NATO enlargement. Those are the questions we need to answer before we could even begin to think about "who" and "when."

We decided to do a preliminary, internal NATO study of the how and why. We'll probably finish that study sometime this summer. Then, after the study is finished, we intend to present the results of that study to all the members of the Partnership for Peace, including Russia. That's going to take place this fall -- we plan to finish the presentations by December.

We expect that our conversations about the how and why are going to raise as many questions as they answer. So after December 1995, we're going to review the results of those presentations -- that will consume us for the first half of 1996.

BNY: The first half? Meaning what?

WJC: At least the first half; at least up to June or July -- the summer of '96. What I'm telling you is that this process will take a major portion of 1996 for further reflection.

I am mindful of political pressures on you. But there are also substantive merits to what we're doing. I'm explaining the structure of the process we have in mind.

There's another point you should understand. You should look at my approach to NATO in the context of greater integration of Russia into other international institutions, like the G-7. You want to be a founding

member of the post-COCOM regime (which I want to discuss with you later). I want a clear partnership for you with the West that protects the rightful role of Russia and respects your security. I don't want to harm your interests. And I want the U.S. to make sure all the doors are open to you.

But you have to walk through the doors that we open for you. That's why I've urged you to sign the PFP documents and launch the NATO-Russia dialogue. By building up PFP it can enhance the security of these other countries. Whatever other arrangements are necessary, we'll work out in the course of the NATO-Russia dialogue. That's the beset way for you to play your part in how European security develops.

BNY: [After a long pause] I understand your line of reasoning. But, Bill, what is involved here besides a strategic issue is that there's an overlay of political problems -- this year the parliamentary elections, next year the presidential ones. One false move now could ruin everything. So please postpone this issue if not until 2000, then at least for the next few years until you and I get through our elections --so that there is only theoretical discussion about expansion. Then we can explain all this to the Eastern Europeans and the Central Europeans; we'll tell them that the time will come for expansion later.

I've got to tell you, my position heading into the 1996 elections is not exactly brilliant. I have to look for positive reports and head off even the smallest wrong moves. Yesterday boosted my standing, and you helped me in that. But let's postpone NATO expansion for a year and a half or two years. There's no need to rile the situation up before the elections.

WJC: You know how I've tried to help you, Boris. When I was preparing to come here, I never had a second thought, despite criticism and advice not to come. Even yesterday, when I was getting ready to speak at the War Memorial, I was thinking: what words can I say that will help President Yeltsin? That's why I said, "Until the Cold War was over, the world didn't appreciate what Russia had done."

BNY: Yes, those were great words.

WJC: But you've raised political forces, so let's talk about those. You described what you are facing in '96. Let me tell you about my situation. I face a difficult campaign, but I have a reasonable chance. The Republicans are

pushing NATO expansion. Wisconsin, Illinois and Ohio are key; they represented a big part of my majority last time -- states where I won by a narrow margin. The Republicans think they can take away those states by playing on the idea of NATO expansion.

Let me be clear, Boris: I'm not bargaining with you. I'm not saying, "Do what I want or I'll change my position." I've already met with those groups who want to see NATO expand rapidly and told them I'm not speeding up the process. We're going to stay with our plan, with our decision -- no speed-up, no slow-down; we're going to proceed in the gradual, steady, measured pace, according to the plan I just laid out for you. You can say you don't want it speeded up -- I've told you we're not going to do that -- but don't ask us to slow down either, or we'll just have to keep saying no.

There's a third factor. The truth is that for the people in the Central European countries who most want to be in NATO, it's part of being accepted by the West. But they also have security concerns. That's where it gets complicated. They trust you, Boris. They know it would be inconsistent with your interests for them to be in NATO overnight. But they are not so sure what's going to happen in Russia if you're not around. So they're conflicted: on the one hand, they want to be in NATO in a hurry, but on the other they also want you to succeed with reform and don't want anything to happen that will prevent you from doing so.

So here is what I want to do. I've made it clear I'll do nothing to accelerate NATO. I'm trying to give you now, in this conversation, the reassurance you need. But we need to be careful that neither of us appears to capitulate. For you, that means you're not going to embrace expansion; for me, it means no talk about slowing the process down or putting it on hold or anything like that.

I have a suggestion: months ago you were on the verge of signing the PFP documents. Do it now. Sign PFP and launch the NATO-Russia dialogue before the NAC ministerial in May.

BNY: We need something that will hold back the process [of expansion] until after the elections.

WJC: I told you what our timetable is. Under our plan, we're going to consult with all PFP members, including Russia. Even in what you would regard as the worst case, 1996 would be consumed with a review of the "how and why" and maybe the beginning of a debate on the "who and when."

[Yeltsin's protocol chief Shevchenko enters and says that the others have gathered for the plenary.]

BNY: This is important. Let's keep talking here. Let them start without us.

WJC: Agreed. I was explaining what will happen in '96. You will have questions of your own, along with those submitted by the other PFP members. That will take a few more months.

BNY: So we're talking about half a year in '96?

WJC: At least half a year. When are your parliamentary elections?

BNY: Oh, they're this year, but that's no big deal.

WJC: I'll work hard on this and take some heat. I don't want to see you get hurt. But, Boris, understand: I can't back off. You should sign the PFP and begin the Russia-NATO dialogue. I won't support any change that undermines Russia's security or redivides Europe.

[After a 15-minute break, Yeltsin presents POTUS with a sword and silver medal in recognition of U.S.-Russian cooperation during World War II. Yeltsin then invites Gen. Volkoganov to make a presentation on the work of the MIA/POW joint commission.]

BNY: Okay, back to our work.

WJC: [pouring himself a bottle of mineral water] Would you like some water?

BNY: No, how about beer?

WJC: It's too early.

BNY: On European security and NATO -- how do we deal with this in what we say to the press and the public? I would accept your plan, especially what you said about delaying through the Presidential elections in 1996. But this is something we should not tell the press. Let's tell them that we discussed the issue -- not conclusively, but we understood each other. Then we can say our next discussion will be at Halifax.

As for the political fallout, we can both absorb the punches we'll take.

WJC: Good. So join PFP.

BNY: We sign [podpisivayem] both documents.

[changing the subject] Bill, I must tell you that we're not pleased to hear statements about U.S. plans that are unfair or hurtful to Russia. It's not proper for you to have contacts with the opposition or those in the State Duma who have aspirations to be Presidential candidates in '96. I value your time so much that I wouldn't want you wasting it on them. It's certainly bad to have contacts with Dudayev's people.

Another thing: The CIA is deliberately infiltrating the Russian Central Bank. I ask that it stop because otherwise we have to take steps to protect ourselves. We need to take joint action to keep this from becoming a problem. We should guard against improper behavior.

Partnership is not just being on a first-name basis. It's a genuine determination to understand each other and to work with each other. It's a matter of common values, of understanding each other's problems -- not just of Bill and Boris.

During the break, I've talked to Chernomyrdin and told him he should invite Gore to check on Tomsk-7 and any other facility. Gore should come to Russia from the Far East, via Vladivostok, Tomsk and other places and see these facilities for himself.

Regarding the CIS, we have decided to proceed with deeper and broader integration starting in Belarus, then in Kazakhstan and eventually Ukraine and the others so that integration will have real meaning. The former republics of the Soviet Union will resemble the European Community.

Perry came out against this idea in Kazakhstan. He said not to rush with integration. He got them to agree with him. I think there should be one policy of the U.S. government --the policy of the President.

On Chechnya, there is no need for concern. We intend to establish order. It will be a democratic republic within the Russian Federation. Of course we want to take action to contain pressure from Islamic countries, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in Central Asia and the Caucasus. When I say "measures," I mean not military but diplomatic measures.

We should do more, as we agreed to counteract terrorism and organized crime. I'm very sorry about what happened in Oklahoma. We deeply grieve for you. We haven't done enough on this. We should work together and really squeeze these people [terrorists and criminals].

On Halifax, it will be easier for us to resolve a lot of other issues, including European security, and do so a lot faster if you can follow through on including us in the G-8. This will help me on the eve of the elections here.

WJC: On the G-7, I'll talk to Kohl. He and I consult and cooperate very closely. On terrorism, we just opened an FBI office in Moscow, but there is more we can do. Let's put our scientists together and do joint research work on things like tracers in explosives that can't be destroyed in explosions. Another example of what we can do together is developing non-explosive chemicals in fertilizers so they can't be used to make bombs. Terrorism makes our cooperation on CBW even more important. Take the Japanese subway incident and the agents used there. We need to have a strategy so that we can work together -- and let's put something on this in our joint statement. These are issues that count with the voters.

BNY: Yes, and let's make a statement about this at Halifax.

WJC: Absolutely. On the CIS, the European Union is a good model of the kind integration we favor. I'll make it clear that our administration is unanimous in saying that as long as integration is genuinely voluntary and open -- that is, that it promotes not just integration among the countries involved but external integration, with the rest of the world -- we'll not oppose it.

On Chechnya, I've been as supportive as I could.

BNY: Yes, I know; thank you.

WJC: My concern is that the longer it takes to get this on a genuinely political track, the more it hurts Russia. Beefing up the OSCE would be a good thing to do. If the violence could be brought to an end, we'll make more progress on other issues.

The first time we met in Vancouver you said you wanted to be part of the post-COCOM regime. We talked about that last September too. Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have been following up on the issue of arms sales to Iran. There are only two issues: the first is I need an assurance that the agreement to cut off arms includes a definition of what will be covered, and that definition covers not just arms, but also arms-related technology that's on a recognized list. If you can give me that assurance, our experts should be able to move quickly to an agreement.

BNY: You've got it. I fully agree. But you have Iranian students who are attending courses in your country who are studying nuclear power. We have none.

WJC: I'll look into that and get back to you on it. On COCOM, if we can agree that there will be a cutoff date by the end of 1999, then Russia can be a full member.

BNY: I guarantee it.

WJC: Good. [Offers his hand, and they shake.]

Boris, I know we're running short on time, but I do want to ask you for all your help in finding and returning safely Fred Cuny, our American citizens who is a humanitarian worker in Chechnya.

BNY: It'll be easier for us to help on this now that we have the territory under control. I'll instruct our special services to work on this. Maybe we'll have Volkogonov work on it too. He's very conscientious.

WJC: We hope Cuny is still alive.

BNY: Yes, who knows, they may have him in a basement or something.

WJC: On CFE, I believe we can work this out. We know you have difficulties, but we'll try to find a solution. We'll discuss NATO enlargement at Halifax: you'll hear me say again that the process is going to be gradual, deliberate, and consistent with the goal of an undivided Europe and enhancing the security of all parties, including Russia.

BNY: But what about not letting anything happen [on enlargement] through the first half of '96? How are we going to convey this to the journalists?

WJC: I've already explained that there can't be a delay: no slow-down, no speed-up. All I can do is keep explaining what we are doing so that people will figure out what we're not doing.

BNY: Okay [normalno]. We will discuss European security and NATO in Halifax.

WJC: Yes. In the meantime, NATO will put emphasis on PFP and Russia's role in it, and the Russia-NATO dialogue. We'll refer to a slow, gradual, deliberate process, consistent with the goal of an undivided Europe. The NAC Ministerial will formally launch the NATO-Russia dialogue. But you understand we can do that only once you've signed the PFP documents. Do you understand?

BNY: Yes. We'll do it.

[President Clinton then tries to get Yeltsin to agree to add a passage in the Joint Statement on European Security that would mention NATO expansion. Yeltsin first seemed inclined to go along, but his notetaker Dmitriy Ryurikov intervened, suggesting they look at the language. President Clinton handed Yeltsin the Russian text; Ryurikov swooped it up, looked unhappy with it, whispered to Yeltsin, who proposed alternative language about how the two Presidents would keep discussing European Security in Halifax....]

WJC: Boris, rather than trying to improve on the good work of our colleagues, let's just go with the statement they've prepared as it is.

BNY: Fine.

.....  
Postscript No. 1

Just before the press conference, President Clinton took Yeltsin aside and walked him through again the necessity that Russia proceed with the PFP documents before the NAC Ministerial if the Ministerial was going to be able to take the steps President Clinton had promised to seek. Yeltsin said he understood.

Postscript No. 2

During dinner in the Hall of Facets at the Kremlin, the following exchange took place:

WJC: Boris, I am your friend, We made great progress today. I was moved by yesterday -- your victory and your sacrifices. The door is open now to progress and partnership on many fronts.

To nail it down and avoid a new debate in Washington and attacks by Dole and others on NATO -- attacks that will make it harder for me to hold to the course we have laid out --let me ask you this:

Instruct Kozyrev as soon as possible to take the steps necessary to inform NATO that Russia is implementing the two NATO documents. To make sure that the NATO-Russia dialogue can be launched at the May ministerial, NATO should be informed well before the May 30 Ministerial meeting. Can you give me a date? Would May 25 be all right? I need this to do all I promised.

BNY: I'll sign it the next day after they meet -- on the 31st or June 1st.

WJC: No, you don't understand. You don't have to sign anything yourself. Kozyrev has to take the necessary step, and he has to do so no later than the day the NAC meets. Then, if you want to acknowledge it and sign something yourself, that's fine. But Kozyrev must take the step and proceed with the documents at least the day before the NAC meeting.

BNY: Okay, I'll have him do it the day before.

WJC: We're completely agreed on this?

BNY: Yes.

END

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS	Z 95073111 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
001	X 95073113 SENS APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95073113 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
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National Security Council  
The White House

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG ABK A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<sup>b</sup> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS: This has been faxed already per EXEC. SEC.

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council  
The White House

LOG # 5860

SYSTEM

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- Soderberg
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- Lake
- Situation Room
- West Wing Desk
- Records Mgt.

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A = Action

I = Information

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COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette

D-  
diskette

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5860

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Presidential  
Telephone Conversation with President Boris  
Yeltsin (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. (S)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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Tab A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Discussion with Yeltsin on  
Bosnia, Chechnya

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko  
Notetakers: Steve Pifer, Katherine  
O'Loughlin, Kenneth Baldwin  
and Mary Canty

DATE, TIME July 28, 1995, 10:35-11:19 a.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill? Good afternoon. (U)

The President: It's nice to hear your voice. You sound strong.  
I hope you're feeling well. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I'm out of the hospital and restoring  
my energy in a sanatorium near Moscow. (U)

The President: You looked good in your July 18 interview. I  
hope you continue to make a speedy recovery. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I have good genes and a very strong  
organism, so hopefully my rehabilitation will be quick. (U)

The President: I tell everyone you are as strong as a Russian  
bear. That's what I tell everyone. I have been saying that you  
will recover quickly. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill, for the kind words. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you for a few minutes about  
Bosnia, but I don't want to take away too much time from your  
convalescence. I'd like to share a few observations, and then  
I'd like you to respond. (U)

President Yeltsin: I'm ready, Bill. (U)

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1 (1.26)  
3/13/2018 KBH

The President: As you remember in early 1994 when we worked together on this situation, we stabilized things and there were several months when the safe areas were more or less protected. Unfortunately, things have fallen apart again. Srebrenica and Zepa fell, which the UN was supposed to protect. No action was taken because UN forces were afraid of being taken hostage. It is still clear that there will be no lasting solution until a political solution is reached that takes account of the legitimate interests of all of the parties. (S)

I was very pleased with the reports from Kozyrev's visit to Belgrade. He heard some interesting and hopeful proposals from the Serbs. If they follow through, this might help get us back on the negotiating track -- which is where both of us want to be. (S)

But no real peace is possible unless and until the Bosnian Serbs stop attacks against safe areas. NATO is not eager to bomb; the new warnings from NATO are intended to deter the Bosnian Serbs from further attacks on Gorazde and other safe areas and to restore the credibility of the UN mission, which is badly damaged in this country and throughout the world. (S)

If we are going to get these talks back on track, two things must happen. First of all, the Bosnian Serbs must end their threats to all safe areas and permit humanitarian aid to get in. I welcome the assurances made to Kozyrev that the Bosnian Serbs claim to accept this. But they've broken their promises before and you need to hold them to this one if you can. (S)

Secondly, the Bosnian Serb proposal for a cessation of hostilities can't be pursued in isolation. The only way it will work is if it is part of a package deal, with the cessation of hostilities linked to a Serb agreement to negotiations based on the Contact Group plan. Otherwise the Bosnian government will simply see the cessation of hostilities as a trap. I think we should ask Kozyrev and Christopher to follow up and see if we can move forward along these lines. (S)

I understand your opposition to military action. And we would prefer that the NATO warning and the cautions Kozyrev gave in Belgrade persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease the attacks. But if they keep breaking promises, NATO will have to respond decisively. (S)

I believe our approach and yours are complementary, as they were in 1994. Against the backdrop of NATO's warning, Russian diplomacy and your very good proposal to deploy peacekeepers in Gorazde could really improve the chances of bringing the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating table. That's what we have to do.

I believe the only way we can keep the situation from falling apart and further damaging the UN, U.S. and Russia is by working together. As you know, our Congress is trying to pull me in one direction, while the Duma is pushing you in the opposite direction. We have to resist the pressure to pull us apart, like we did in 1994. I wanted you to hear this directly from me and to be sure we understand one another's concerns and positions. I'd like to hear from you now. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I understand your position perfectly well. I understand your position as you understand mine. That's why it's very easy for us to talk. That's why I sent Kozyrev and the deputy defense minister to Belgrade, to hand over my personal message to Milosevic. Kozyrev insisted that General Mladic, who effectively controls the Bosnian Serb troops, also take part in the meeting. (S)

Preliminary agreements were reached with Milosevic and Mladic. Little by little the Bosnian Serbs showed realism about the situation and openly promised no military action against Gorazde. We are prepared to send our peacekeepers there, 200 to 300 soldiers, so the Bosnian Serbs won't attack Gorazde. They also promised to open a road to Sarajevo for humanitarian aid and promised to decrease other military actions. They promised to get down to the negotiating table and sign an agreement on the cessation of hostilities. (S)

If everything goes according to this plan and there are no provocations by the Muslims or Croats, Milosevic will come to Moscow and we can record this in a protocol or a formal agreement. If you recall Bill, the recent aggravation of the situation the last time was due to Muslim provocation, when they launched an attack with 20,000 army troops. (S)

I have also another concern that relates to the Bihac problem. The problem is that the Croatian forces are carrying out activity in the enclave which aggravates the situation more. I mentioned in my letter that, if the Croats launch a full-scale attack, we won't be able to convince the Serbs to stop. I ask you to contact Tudjman. Maybe you, Kohl or the appropriate person should take action to make sure the Croats stop; otherwise our efforts will fail, and there will be widespread conflict. (S)

I want to say a couple of words concerning the Bildt document, which provides for the suspension of some sanctions on Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because you know it would be an important document, especially considering the fact that Milosevic and Mladic promised to get rid of Karadzic if he gets in the way of this process. My meeting in this context with Milosevic would be useful, a convincing fact

based on the results of the Kozyrev negotiations in Belgrade. We know Milosevic has influence with the Bosnian Serbs. (S)

I understand your proposals and realize yours and mine constitute two pages of one and the same document. We have reached agreements with them and will work toward others. If they fail and they don't keep their word, then we will be forced to take your option. But I hope you understand well the position of the Duma and public opinion with regard to a military options for resolving the situation. So that's basically what I wanted to say. We are working in one direction, and I agree it is mutually complementary. (S)

The President: First, I want to thank you for all you've just said. I am very encouraged; it is clear we can work together, in the hope of making some progress. I would like to mention three specific points in response to what you have said. (S)

First, regarding Bihac, I share your concern. Both Kohl and I cautioned the Croats to exercise restraint and avoid a wider war and to respect UN peacekeepers. Here's the problem, the Croatian Serbs inserted 10,000 troops near Bihac into the fight. Tudjman was afraid it would fall, so he sent troops. Bihac is a safe area protected by a UN resolution and a previous NATO commitment. He is afraid that, if Bihac falls, all other arrangements will fail. We will continue to urge restraint, but it would help if you could encourage the Serbs to pull back. (S)

Two, now on the Bildt package, we are prepared to keep working on it within the Contact Group, but we still have some reservations. I'm afraid Serbia could recognize Bosnia, get sanctions lifted but still have nine months to pour economic and military support to the Bosnian Serbs in a way that will stop the peace process and encourage a wider war. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, not all sanctions, but only part, will be lifted. This will give Milosevic hope that, if he behaves in the right manner and keeps his word, all sanctions will be lifted. (S)

The President: I understand and am prepared to keep working. But I wanted you to understand my reservations. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK, good. (S)

The President: Let me make one final point. You are correct when you say the Serbs took Srebrenica and Zepa after the Muslims launched an offensive in central Bosnia, but the Muslims did it only after months and months of the Serbs refusing to enter negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Earlier

this year, the Serbs said they wanted 53 percent, not 49 percent, of the land, but there is nothing to say that they can't negotiate for more after they enter the peace process. (S)

This is crazy to have all of this killing and international trauma going on in a small country for only four percent of the land. We have to get them negotiating under the Contact Group. They still can negotiate for more land. It's not worth all the hell that's going on. We have to get them talking. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree. (S)

The President: Thank you and let me also say the news on Chechnya is encouraging. Keep pushing ahead, you seem to be doing well, and we are very supportive. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, thank you, Bill. The negotiating group has made a little break for three days. Military hostilities have stopped in Chechnya. Only one item remains outstanding. I personally invited all of the members of the negotiating group to come to my place to talk. On our side we did everything we could to come to an agreement, but the Chechen side recently started thinking differently. But I'm sure we'll work it out. One more thing, the Constitutional Court has made known its opinion on my decree on Chechnya. The vote was 12 to 6, they said it was legal and doesn't go against the constitution. My decision was within the framework of the constitution and of a single state. (S)

The President: Thank you, that sounds great. We may need to talk again in a few days. I hope everything goes well with your recuperation. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much Bill. We can call each other in a few days. We have to follow events in the area closely to see what the Serbs do. One more thing, I heard you would like in October -- when we meet in New York for the UN anniversary -- that I could make a brief stop in Washington, not an official visit, but just a working visit. Is this true? (S)

The President: We are just trying to work out the dates. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK, that's great. Thank you very much. I hope to hear from you soon. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9505860  
DATE 31 JUL 95

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON OF PRES 28 JUL CONVERSATION W/ PRES YELTSIN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

July 31, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *SP for CB*

FROM: MICHELLE DeBORTOLI *MD*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on July 28, 1995. State has requested that we provide a copy for Secretary Christopher as early as possible on Monday so that he may review it before he sees Kozyrev in Brunei.

Concurrence by: Alexander Vershbow *SP for AV*

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to Secretary Christopher.
2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *ADS* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*per 6/29/95*

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the Department of State
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

SEE ↓  
Case Number: 2014-0953-M; 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9505992				
Row: 44	Section: 5	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Bosnia, CFE... (3 pages)	09/27/1995	PT/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 606

### FOLDER TITLE:

9507137

2015-0782-M

rs1527

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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TO: BRILL, K

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 28 SEP 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM OF PRES TELEPHONE CONVERSATION W/ PRES  
YELTSIN

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 SEP 95 STATUS: C

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-m-1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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001	X 95092812 HARMON APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95092812 HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Situation Room			
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Records Mgt.			<u>with disk</u>

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COMMENTS:

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National Security Council  
The White House

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LOG # 7137

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG APR A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse			
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Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>with disk</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Presidential  
Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin

The attached memorandum of conversation of the September 27 telephone conversation between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Pickering.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A                      Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Bosnia, CFE, Hyde Park and a Vice Presidential Meeting with Chernomyrdin

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin of Russia (in Sochi)

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko  
Notetakers: Steve Pifer, Paul Weber, Deuce Martinez, Katherine O'Loughlin, Trey Whitworth

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1995, 10:35-11:53 a.m. EDT  
Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello? Hello, Boris?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I'm here. Hi, Bill.

THE PRESIDENT: It's good to hear your voice. I hope you've had a good vacation. I appreciated your September 22 letter on Bosnia, and I wanted to visit with you on the phone for a few minutes.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. I'm ready.

THE PRESIDENT: Our exchange of letters on Bosnia, and Chris and Andrey's meeting last night, and our work together in the Contact Group, I think, have really helped us to manage this difficult issue. But we have to continue to work together and take advantage of this opportunity to get a negotiated settlement. Yesterday's agreement in New York has moved things forward, but we need your help. You need to work with the Serbs, and we will work with the Bosnians to resolve the remaining issues.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree that we made a big breakthrough, and I agree that we will continue to work with the Serbs.

THE PRESIDENT: Chris raised with Andrey our preliminary thoughts on the implementation of a Balkan settlement, and he got his views on Russia's participation in that process. I know this is a complex problem. But I think we can find an approach that meets both your concerns and ours. This could be a real

opportunity to prove the cynics wrong and to show that NATO and Russia can work together in an atmosphere of genuine partnership.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. I agree, and I can confirm that what you heard from Kozyrev is something we jointly share -- I and he. Of course, what the Serbs want is that sanctions be removed, at least partially.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. I'd like now to talk about CFE. In Halifax, you and I agreed to find a solution to the CFE flank zone issue that all parties would accept. I told you then that we would come up with a proposal based upon your suggestion of a map realignment. I've worked hard with the allies to put together a NATO proposal that I hope will accommodate your military concerns. We and the allies briefed your representatives on this last week, and I appreciate your government's initial response -- that this was a step in the right direction. I hope you can accept this as the basis for resolving the flank zone issue, instead of the "exemption zone" approach, which I don't believe will work with the other treaty parties.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I got your point, and I thank you for your assistance, the assistance you promised in Halifax and have now delivered. I believe we can work together on this and reach an agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: I am really committed to this, and I will work very hard. But I think we need to resolve this by November. I hope we can really work to keep CFE from erupting this fall as a major political problem between Russia and the U.S. and the other treaty parties. I think that that is very important, that we resolve this by then.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I got your point, and I got what you're saying that -- November is a crucial month.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand from Chris that he and Andrey had a good talk on the agenda for our October meeting. I like the idea of a meeting at Hyde Park -- where Roosevelt lived. It will recall the spirit of our wartime cooperation as allies. I think this can be something like the Moscow summit, something that will strengthen our partnership. (Note: President Yeltsin cut in before this last sentence could be translated.)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. I support this idea. It's a very good idea. This would eliminate the need for our going to Washington. We don't need any extra formalities, just good working meetings.

THE PRESIDENT: In addition to the obvious issues -- Bosnia, Russia's role in implementation, CFE, and European security -- I

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think we also should discuss nuclear materials security and next spring's nuclear summit.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Interjecting after the interpreter translated "European security") Also, NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO. This is one of the most difficult issues we will have to discuss. (After the President's translation regarding nuclear materials security and next spring's nuclear summit was completed) I agree. This will be one of the major items.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me make one other suggestion. Last spring, Al Gore's London meeting with Victor Chernomyrdin the week before our summit helped us to move some issues forward. You and I instructed them to try to work out answers on several issues -- like Iran's reactors and the security of nuclear materials -- and I wonder if maybe we should use this as a precedent. I understand Victor will be in Canada next week. Perhaps we could have Al go up there and meet him briefly at the end of the week, to review where we are on these issues and help prepare the ground for our meeting. What do you think about that?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. I think it's a very good idea.

THE PRESIDENT: OK. That's good. And Andrey will be here Thursday for the Israeli-Palestinian ceremony. I will have a little talk with him as well.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. I accept.

THE PRESIDENT: Good. I look forward to seeing you soon and to having some very good things for both of us to announce. That would be very good. I hope you enjoy the rest of your vacation.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, you know half of my time is spent on holiday, and the other 50 percent is dedicated to work, hard work. I have ministers coming in to talk to me and to hold meetings. I just had a special one on Chechnya. There are a series of meetings and conferences. It's not just holiday, but I still have some time to spare. I thank you for the initiative of your call.

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks. I'll see you soon.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: See you soon, Bill.

THE PRESIDENT: Good-bye.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye.

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7137

September 27, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *ADB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of conversation of the September 27 telephone call between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *SP* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Sens-Brill Memorandum

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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LOG 9507137  
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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Case Number: 2014-0948-M; 2015-0782-M

# MIR MARKER

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Lunch with Boris Yeltsin, President of Russian Federation

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

President Clinton  
Secretary Christopher, Secretary of State  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia  
Ash Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy  
General Christman  
Coit Blacker, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, NSC staff (note-taker)

Russia

President Yeltsin  
Foreign Minister Kozyrev  
Yeltsin Principal Assistant Ilyushin  
Yeltsin Foreign Policy Assistant Ryurikov  
Ambassador Vorontsov  
Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov  
Yeltsin Military/Science Advisor Kuzyk  
Protocol Chief Shevchenko

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 23, 1995; 1:30 p.m.-2:40 p.m.  
Dining Room, Hyde Park Library, Hyde Park, New York

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, would it be useful to summarize what we discussed this morning? (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. And I've just talked with my team about how to discuss what we talked about in our discussion this

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 10/31/05

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2015-0782-m-2 (1.58)  
3/13/2018 KBM

morning. Maybe I missed something, but in addressing the press, I think we should answer two to three questions, together, for the press. We should speak on the same wavelength. Simply, we should say that we are making headway, but that it's difficult. That we can't lose our partnership, most importantly. That we can make progress, but that the work continues. And I wouldn't say anything more to the press. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: In other words, that while we do have differences, there is a certain strength to this partnership that enables us to work issues through. I recommend that we use Bosnia as an example: that we are in complete accord on the need for peace; on implementation, that we have made some progress and will continue to work the issue; and that we will instruct our people to press ahead. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree, since the world -- and the United States and Russia -- don't believe we'll reach agreement today. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, there are two or three issues we need to discuss over lunch; you may also have some issues that you want to raise. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. But let's not have a plenary; two or three issues, yes. (C)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARTER: If I might, before you begin. (Directed to President Yeltsin) I'd like to confirm Minister Grachev's visit to the United States; he says he needs his president's permission to attend. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We agree. Our minister should come. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, you said that Russia has trouble with NATO command and control, but that at a minimum Russia will undertake auxiliary operations to help in Bosnia's reconstruction. This is the minimum. And that Perry and Grachev will discuss what might be done beyond that. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. But let's not call these "auxiliary operations;" let's call them "special operations." We will provide as many troops as necessary for this. But let's call them "special," not "auxiliary." This is the minimum to which we agree. We'd like to do more. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I agree. This is the minimum. Let's have Perry and Grachev follow-up and press ahead. (C)

(President Yeltsin, beginning his lunch, comments on the quality of the bread served and on the quality of its Russian counterpart. The President says that he has read reports indicating that the Russian wheat harvest may be smaller than usual this year. President Yeltsin responds that the size of the crop isn't the problem; it's the transport system that's at fault.) (C)

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV: Perhaps we could turn to ...  
(U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN (interrupting Mamedov): No, no. We will talk about CFE after we eat! Otherwise we will miss this excellent American cuisine. (C)

I feel great optimism. I was afraid that Bill and I were going to quarrel today, but now I believe we can come to agreement.  
(C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think so, too. We have more in common than we have dividing us. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. The most important thing is that we are not thinking only of 1996; we are thinking about the relationship. (C)

THE PRESIDENT (laughing): But if that worked out, that would be okay too! (C)

Has the President of China been to Russia? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He was in Moscow in May, during the commemoration. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I saw him there. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This was the first meeting [of a Chinese president] with a Russian president since Stalin; Gorbachev never saw him. (Following a Kozyrev aside) I'll be going on a state visit to China on November 9. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's good. I think the Chinese sometimes think the other great powers are trying to contain them; they have so many people and their economy is growing so fast. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, they do have this fear. There were no contacts between Russia and China for many years; this was quite unusual. Today, we are establishing a normal relationship with China. I started this by saying that we should normalize relations, including the normalization -- the fixing -- of our borders. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: It's good to talk with them. I'll be seeing the President tomorrow. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You can deal with him as a normal person; he's a man of the earth. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, we are supposed to leave here in about an hour and a half. If we do a press statement at 3:30, and we need 15 minutes to prepare, we've got about 40 minutes. We need to decide what else we need to discuss. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN (pointing to the food): I'm ready to forsake all for our discussions. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let's have it all! Bring it on! (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I haven't seen your ambassador, Mr. Pickering, for six months. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he needs to show up then! (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He should show up once a month, or once every two months. Ilyushin should set it up. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We accept. (S)

AMBASSADOR VORONTSOV: It should work this way in both capitals! (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN (to Ilyushin): You'll promote this right away. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Should we do joint press statements? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. But you should stand side-by-side with me. Two rostrums? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We'll answer a couple of questions, right? No more. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: No more. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We can't let the press use this. We need to show them that we're working together. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. Absolutely. (S)

(The Presidents then agree to continue their discussions in the one-on-one format and return to the Roosevelt residence for dessert and coffee.)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9600480				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Reform, Chechnya... (5 pages)	01/26/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2013

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 1082

### FOLDER TITLE:

9600480

2015-0782-M  
rs1528

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

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X 96012919 SENS SGD MEMO

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The White House

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0480

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 29, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone  
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the telephone conversation between the President and President Yeltsin on January 26, 1996, is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador and not be released below the DCM level. (S)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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0480

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 29, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with  
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of conversation of the January 26 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the Sens-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *Adm* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Sens-Burns Memorandum  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: x6

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRYNARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0732-M-1 (1.28)  
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Reform, Chechnya, START II and NATO (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin of Russia

Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko  
Notetakers: Katherine O'Loughlin,  
Kevin Wooton, Deuce Martinez,  
Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME January 26, 1996, 10:46-11:27 a.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. I'm delighted to see you back in the office on a normal schedule. You looked good on television. I just wanted to call and discuss a few things with you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well Bill, I'm in good shape right now. My intention on February 15 is to announce my desire to campaign and get on with running a campaign. But this is off-the-record. It will be after the conference of the Communist party is over in mid-February; then I will make my announcement. I was pleased with your statement on the Hill. I'm a little envious you could make such a statement. The fact of that matter is that I'm going to make my statement in February to the Federal Assembly. Perhaps in mine there won't be as much optimism as in yours. (S)

The President: Thank you. I've received a positive response from the American public. Also, thanks for telling me of your reelection intention. I will keep that quiet. You ought to make that announcement, not me. (S)

President Yeltsin: True, I ask you to do that. (S)

The President: There has been a lot of commentary here on the results of the Duma election and personnel changes in your government. But I'm encouraged by your comments that Russia will not turn away from the path of reform and that there will be no

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big shifts in Russian foreign policy. We will continue to offer support. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, it's true rumors are going around that we're making a change in our course. But bear in mind that I will not let that happen. The Communists in the Duma do not have a majority vote. To override my veto, they need a two-thirds majority; the Communists are not in a position to do that. (S)

Well, the fact of the matter is that I had to remove Chubays. He was a reformer and a strong personality, but he committed several mistakes in organizational matters and particularly in securities trade. I was not in a good position to keep him in my campaign. I had to switch him with two others -- good democrats, very reliable people -- Kazakov and Kadannikov. You may have heard of Kadannikov. He was director general of an auto factory in Moscow. He is very good. (S)

At this point, I guarantee to you the course of reform and democracy will stand. (S)

Incidentally, you may have heard that even the IMF has bought this rubbish on a change in our reform course, that we are not staying on course. They say we have to make a case, to show this is not true. They have delayed their payments to us and obligation of credits of \$9 billion. I hope you might help and push them a little to make the payment that is already overdue. (S)

The President: I am encouraged by what you are saying and appreciate that. You know I support your participation with the IMF and will work with them to see what we can do. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. (U)

The President: If you are staying on the course of reform, they have no reason not to continue their support, as they promised they would. (S)

President Yeltsin: No doubt about that. (U)

The President: Vice President Gore will meet with Chernomyrdin next week, and we will talk with him. I will also see him. (S)

President Yeltsin: That is good. I'll tell Chernomyrdin. (S)

The President: I was very sympathetic to the hostage-taking situation in Dagestan. It was a terribly difficult situation. It was a terrorist action, and we condemned it as such. I know it has been tough for you. What are your thoughts? Do you think you can find a way to bring this conflict to a peaceful end? (S)

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President Yeltsin: Bill, my planning is as follows. We need to start an inter-Chechen dialogue now that a head of the Chechen government, Zavgayev, has been elected. He is very reliable. That lays a good basis for an internal dialogue. Negotiations are already underway that will involve opposition groups, including Dudayevites, and will make it possible for talks. (Ø)

As for parliamentary elections, it is premature now. It may be possible by March-April, but first we have to deal with armed bandit formations. But negotiations are underway, and Dudayev's group is involved. (Ø)

I only have three months to solve this, or I shouldn't run again. We must do this; we need to resolve this problem. A meeting with representatives of republics is underway to get the peace process moving to achieve an agreement, which will happen unless we have to face terrorist attacks on their end again. (Ø)

I'm also thinking of making a trip to the Caucasus in April and perhaps getting everyone involved from the Transcaucasus region. I want to speak with Shevardnadze, Aliyev, Ter-Petrossian, Chechens and other leaders in the region, including on how to help remove problems like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I've had good results with initial discussions with several republics. I believe it will be possible to solve everything at once, to achieve this in the end. (Ø)

The President: I know you have to do what you can to get it behind you. It's been painful. Whatever you can do would be a good thing. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: True story. (Ø)

The President: I think our troops have been working well together in Bosnia, but we need to pay attention there. It's a good demonstration that our partnership is working well. But we'll have to resolve problems in Bosnia. Our generals ... (Ø)

President Yeltsin: I agree. I would like to see the Serbs excluded in the process. In other words, I don't like the insinuation that the Serbs are the only guilty party. As for contacts between our forces, my defense minister has briefed me on this accordingly. (Ø)

The President: Our generals are very impressed with your troops. On another issue, I wanted to mention that I am looking forward to our meeting in April in Moscow. The nuclear summit will give a real boost to nuclear safety and security. (Ø)

I would like to mention a few other things. The Senate is close to ratifying START II, maybe even today. If there is any way to get the Duma to approve it, and we could get some progress on the CTBT, that would add global significance to our summit. It would be a big plus and helpful to you in your election. I wanted to tell you where we are. We can perhaps have ratification today in the Senate. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, that is good news. You've encouraged me. I was aware that you had sent the Treaty to the Senate. This will be good to invigorate the process here. We launched the Treaty in the Duma, but the old group in the Duma failed to work this out, and I will need time with the new Duma. I believe it will be possible to agree on ratification. It's a must that we have it done prior to April. It will be an election issue for both of us. We must render help to each other; it will be important to demonstrate that our relationship is going forward. (S)

The President: I agree with that. We will do whatever we can to help your government and the course of peace, including to push the process in the Transcaucasus. We need to keep things moving forward. I look forward to seeing you in April. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill, thanks for your support. As regards our relations, my position remains that we should pursue the course we did at Hyde Park. There is no way we are going to change that spirit or line. I'll also support the state interests of my country. Remember that Russia is a great power to be reckoned with and that no problem can be addressed without Russia. (S)

NATO is another issue. Today I signed a message about this, after thorough consideration of the Russian vision of the problem, to share my thoughts with you. The whole issue of enlargement will affect many aspects, including our election process. The media could widely use that. (S)

In this regard, your Ambassador has not been tactful, and I have not been happy with his behavior. And Bill, could you please, when you receive this message today, provide me a reaction, whether over the phone or in writing? I ask you to do that. (S)

The other thing I'd like to share: we had a CIS summit in Moscow, and the main outcome we reached is a mutual understanding that there will be no progress on reforms and no chance of upgrading the standard of living without reinforcing the trend towards reintegration. There is an upbeat mood about this, and it is gaining strength. We will pursue this line with Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Central Asian countries. I'm sorry that some U.S. representatives will speculate that, since I've been

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reelected to a third term as CIS chairman, Russia is showing imperialistic trends. That is not serious. I find this insulting, in view of the good relationship we have developed. It's a sign that some still want to make a split between us. (S)

The President: We cannot allow a split to happen. On CIS integration, we talked about it in May, and I'm in favor of integration not only regionally but globally. Secretary Christopher will meet with Primakov in Finland. That is an opportunity for them to get off to a good start. (S)

With regard to your letter on NATO, I want to handle this the way we did in May and at Hyde Park. We have been trying to demilitarize NATO, as you know. We are continuing to reduce troop levels and weapons. I will continue to work on this with you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Understood, Bill, that's very clear. At the same time, at the recent December NATO meeting, they talked about a possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new NATO countries. I don't agree with that. (S)

The President: I agree. I will respond to your letter. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meetings will be Monday and Tuesday. I look forward to meeting with Chernomyrdin and will get back to you on your letter. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. Thank you, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you, Boris. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye, and one more thing: I think it would be a good idea to talk more often on the phone as the election campaign heats up. That way, if we have problems, we can get more positive facts -- that would be good for the election and for the public at large. And concerning the April summit at eight, we're working closely with others to do the preparation work and hope to get a serious final document. Good-bye, Bill. I would like to embrace you on this. (S)

The President: Thank you. Good-bye, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Give my best to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will, and give my best to Naina. (U)

President Yeltsin: Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9600480  
DATE 29 JAN 96

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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2015-0782-m-1

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1086				
Document ID: 9601097				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. / AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. The President's Discussion with President Yeltsin on the Russian Federation, Bilateral Relations... (4 pages)	02/21/1996	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 1086

### FOLDER TITLE:

9601097

2015-0782-M  
rs1529

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W / YELTSIN 21 FEB 96

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 23 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON  
PIFER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY

*AA*

DATE

*2/22/96*

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA

CLOSED BY: NSLA

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
002

Z 96022119 FOR DECISION  
X 96022215 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT


DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960222 BURNS, W

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1097  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG UP A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>M-01/02</u>	<u>D-with</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Diskette</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


1097

February 22, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone  
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (e)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the February 21 call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Pickering. (e)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0722-M-1 (1.29)  
3/13/2018 KRM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Discussion with President Yeltsin on the Russian Election, Bilateral Relations, START II Ratification and NATO

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin of Russia

Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko  
Notetakers: Ted Sevigny, Mary Canty,  
Elaine Florio, Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 21, 1996, 10:38-11:05 a.m. EST  
Oval Office

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking my call. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It's always my pleasure to talk to you. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I won't take a lot of your time, but I want to go over a couple of items. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I was very impressed by your speech announcing your candidacy for reelection. I know you are going to be in a wide-open, rough-and-tumble campaign, just like I face here. I see that as a great achievement of yours, guaranteeing free and fair elections. You have a chance of making a comeback, and I was impressed by what you said and how you said it. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you very much. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I had a good meeting with Chernomyrdin when he was here. I was very pleased with the results of his talks with the Vice President. The new commercial space launch accord and the agreement on financing U.S. engines for IL-96 airliners mean jobs, real benefits to your people. I think that's what it takes for sustaining public support for engagement. I am also

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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: X6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

pleased that the Christopher-Primakov relationship is off to a good start. It looks like they will work well together. Christopher looks forward to visiting Moscow in March. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have been pleased by those very successful meetings. I have been briefed on the successful meeting by Chernomyrdin, and I believe Primakov also had a good meeting. I can tell you the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission already has a good track record with six intergovernmental sessions. So they are off and running. (Ø)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me say also that I am looking forward to the nuclear summit and to coming to Moscow. I hope it will be possible for you to ratify START II. It would be a momentous event if we could exchange instruments on START II; it would add meaning to the nuclear summit. It would also be useful for progress on CTBT and other agenda items. I'd like to know your perspective: what do you see as the prospects in the Duma for START II? (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: As a matter of fact, I had a conversation yesterday with the chairman of the Duma, Mr. Seleznev. According to him, one of these days they will be presenting this Treaty to the committees and after that they will try to pass it in the Duma as a whole. I consider it is realistic that in April the whole operation will be completed. But at the same time, I want to note that we need a sure, firm agreement that there will be no change to the ABM Treaty. This is what I want from you, that the Treaty will stand firm. As for CTBT, I am prepared to sign any document at any time and at any place. (Ø)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you. I agree with you on this. As you know, Congress passed legislation with provisions that would have undermined the ABM Treaty, and I vetoed it. They then took out the provisions that undermined the Treaty. I told them of my commitment to the ABM Treaty, and I believe they understand and that now we are free and clear with the ABM Treaty. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: All this is very good news. Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I want to mention a couple of other things. I am about to meet with President Kuchma. It's important that we provide the support he needs at this critical point, as he is taking bold steps to consolidate democracy and reform in Ukraine. They are having a lot of difficult times, but I believe it is important to keep Ukraine on the path of progress and think we should support him. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: All right, Bill. I can tell you that I met Mr. Kuchma here recently in Moscow. I believe we were able to

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remove some of the controversies, especially on the Black Sea Fleet, in terms of its division. I think that some time in the very near future I will go to Kiev, which will be a good occasion to sign a full-scale agreement between Russia and Ukraine. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: That's good news, very good news. The only other thing I wanted to say is that I was encouraged by reports I've seen that your government is seeking a peaceful resolution to the Chechnya dispute. I know it's a troublesome issue. That would remove a difficult situation and enhance your political reputation around the world. I want you to know that we would do anything we could to support a peaceful settlement. (S)

The other thing I wanted to say is that I am also pleased with our ongoing cooperation in Bosnia. My military commanders tell me things are going well. The quality of our cooperation has been high, and we have enjoyed working with your soldiers. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is also very good news. I think we are getting ready, on your side and our side, for operating in Bosnia very successfully. On Chechnya, in my speech in Yekaterinburg, I said it would be very important to end the conflict in this area and finish, finish this up, before the election. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: This is good news. I just wanted to call and let you know that, during this election year, we should call and talk more often. We need to keep up our partnership and friendship. I would like to know what you are going through and share developments here. If you feel the need to call, I hope you will do so any time. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree we should give and take more often during the election year. We should exchange the experience of our election campaigns. This is very important. Maybe things on your side are going a little easier, but the campaign will be difficult in any case. (S)

I have one more thing if I may -- NATO, the NATO situation and expanding to the east. I think we, you and I, agreed that for one year there would be some kind of hiatus and that no one would raise this issue very strongly. But at this time NATO is holding some kind of sessions raising the issue -- these individual dialogues with the Central and Eastern European states. I would like to stay with the original understanding. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let's discuss what is going on and what is not going on. When the NATO ministers met ... can you hear me? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: First of all, our timetable, which we discussed, provides nothing in 1996 except for private conversations with Partnership for Peace members that have indicated an interest in joining NATO on what it takes for them to meet the requirements. There are no recommendations for timetables, just conversations between countries about their desires. (S)

Publicly, what we seek to emphasize at our next NATO meeting is two issues: first, the desire of France to become more closely involved in NATO and in the European security structure. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is the French and the military committee ... (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Second, we want 1996 to be a year to focus on IFOR and Bosnia and what we are doing together. There will be no surprises on the agenda. We are going to stay with the agreement. The timetable provides only for interested PFP members to be consulted in 1996, but that is all private. The public focus will be on IFOR and France -- whether the French will be more involved in NATO -- mostly IFOR and Bosnia. Nothing more. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, thank you. Thank you very much for your comments. One thing I wanted to ask has to do with the IMF loan in the amount of nine billion dollars. I will be meeting Camdessus here and would like to ask you to use your influence to perhaps add a little, from nine to 13 billion dollars -- to deal with social problems in this very important pre-election situation and help the people. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I support concluding a new agreement. I'll see what can be possible; I will do some work on it. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: All right. Thank you, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you very much. Please receive my big hug. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you. I receive it. Please give my best to Naina. I'll see you soon. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Please give my best to your wife. We'll be in touch over the phone soon. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: All right, bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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1097

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 21, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *AMB*

FROM: STEVE PIFERS *SP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with  
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation of the February 21 call between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the Sens-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *John* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Sens-Burns Memorandum

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: x6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*  
2015-0782-M-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9601097  
DATE 22 FEB 96

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W / YELTSIN 21 FEB 96  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: 1+DISC

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBN Date: 3/13/2018  
2015-0782-M-1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

SEE ↓

Case Number: 2014-1024-M; 2015-0782-M

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1091				
Document ID: 9601848				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1093				
Document ID: 9602172				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. President's Discussion with Yeltsin on Chernobyl, CTBT... (5 pages)	04/09/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Yeltsin and Tel\*...])  
OA/Box Number: 1093

### FOLDER TITLE:

9602172

2015-0782-M  
rs1530

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 10 APR 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 9 APR CALL TO PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 APR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

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PIFER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY AKS DATE 4-10-96 BY HAND W/ATTCH + Disk

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
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Z 96040920 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION  
X 96041012 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960410 BURNS, W

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2172

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG AP A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Dohse			
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>AP</u>	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>APK 4/10</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>APK 4/10</u>	<u>D</u> w/disk & copy of memo
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
A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

APR 05 21 70

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes



National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2172  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG AP A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Dohse			
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>AP</u>	
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>APK 4/10</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>APK 4/10</u>	<u>D</u>

*D* w/disk & copy of memcom

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:



Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 10, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone  
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the April 9 call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Pickering.



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

*Bill - Talbott already has his copy. This is for Secretary and Pickering only.*

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Tab A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Discussion with Yeltsin on  
Chornobyl, CTBT, ABM/TMD, CFE, G-7 vs G-8

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Yeltsin of Russia

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko  
Notetakers: Deuce Martinez, Daniel Flessas,  
Karen Dragone, James Goldgeier,  
Carlos Pascual, Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME April 9, 1996, 8:05-8:45 a.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello. Good morning, Bill. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good morning, Boris. I'm glad we could talk today. I'd like to begin by thanking you for your message on Ron Brown's death. He was a good friend and a valuable adviser. It has been a rough period for all of us here. Thank you for your good wishes and sympathies. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I knew him quite well, and I'm expressing to you my personal condolences because I know he was a very good friend of yours. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you. Secretary Christopher reported at length to me on his meeting with you. I appreciate your giving him so much time. It sounds like you and he and Minister Primakov laid the basis for a good meeting between us next week. (U)

I'm sending Strobe Talbott to Moscow to follow up. He's leaving tonight, and I understand you'll be seeing him on Thursday. He knows my latest thinking on all the issues between us. I thank you for seeing him as well. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. Well, by the way, I was wondering about your thinking on the Chornobyl nuclear power station. What do you think about it? (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I think we should use the meeting next week to develop ideas on nuclear safety. Frankly, with regard to Chornobyl, I am interested in hearing your guidance. I would be interested in your thoughts on what would be most helpful to you and most productive in solving the problem. My basic approach is that we should balance concern for nuclear safety with the problems and promise of nuclear power. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: So, it looks like there will be a shortage of power in Ukraine if we fully close the Chornobyl power station. This will be a great tragedy for Kuchma. So, Bill, probably, we should not insert into the communiqué the idea of demolishing the station. Perhaps we can defer this issue until we meet next week. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I haven't discussed this here. I will take it up with my people. I do believe we need to have a good strong communiqué coming out of the meeting. But I'll discuss your concerns with my people. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. Good. Yes. I think the communiqué will be strong, but regarding Chornobyl we are stumbling on that road. However, we firmly believe that we have to ban nuclear testing forever, that is, any testing of nuclear weapons. And we have to reflect this strongly in the communiqué. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I completely agree. I was very pleased by what you told Chris about your willingness to accept the Australian language on a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban. That will be a centerpiece of a successful summit -- and it significantly increases the chances of us getting a CTBT later this year. So that's very good news. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I do not have doubts in this respect and am firmly convinced that we have to do this. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good. I wanted to mention a couple of other issues. First, as you and your people know, people have been putting a lot of pressure on me over the ABM Treaty. This is the cornerstone of our strategic relationship. I have resisted this pressure and will continue to do so. But one issue people are using to attack me is the lack of progress on the ABM/TMD issue. This is an issue we need to continue to make progress on. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, this goes without saying. I ask you to be very firm on this issue and that we stick together. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have been firm on this issue and I will continue to be firm. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree fully. (Ø)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'd like to talk to you a moment about the CFE issue. My team that was in Moscow a few days ago came home pretty disappointed. They believe that your side is taking a position that guarantees a continuing stalemate, that would allow us to go into the spring and summer with Russia in noncompliance on an international treaty obligation. That is a problem in its own right. It also won't help our overall cause of promoting Russia's integration. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't know who they have spoken to, but I have not given any instructions of this kind. We will act as we agreed. As you promised, you will give me leeway in the northeast and southern regions. We will have a temporary lifting of limits in these two regions. You understand that in the northwest we have pulled our forces from Germany and built houses for troops with German help last year and this year as well. The situation is better this year. (Ø)

Regarding the southern flank, as you know, we have begun pulling our forces to the borders of Chechnya as we put an end to our military operations there. When the situation is stabilized, we will begin pulling our forces from Chechnya itself. After this, I think the situation will become much better. (Ø)

In addition, I am going to visit China on the 25th, and we intend to agree on withdrawing forces, they and us, from our borders. This will also help us reduce conventional forces. (Ø)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: First, Boris, I appreciate what you have said in regard to what we talked about in Halifax and Hyde Park. The position of your negotiators is that you need more than we can offer. The proposal that we've made leaves you with considerable flexibility in the areas you said you needed. We have also worked hard since Vancouver to help you on the officer housing issue. (Ø)

I hope we can resolve the CFE issue before we meet. Secretary Christopher is writing to Primakov on this subject today, and Strobe will be in a position to talk about it further with your people on Thursday. I am pleased with your Chechnya plan. Your announcement made a big impression in this country. We will continue to negotiate. And, with the withdrawal of army groups in Chechnya, I hope this will allow us to close the gap and that we can make an all-out push to resolve the flank issue before we meet. That would be a big result for us. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, things will go as we agreed. I will try to figure out who has invented our new positions. I don't

have a new position. I know only what we agreed to in Halifax.  
(S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Great. I just want to mention one or two other things. It is very important to me that the meeting in Lyons be a success for you. Strobe will discuss my thinking with Primakov and you, if you want to talk. But my bottom line is that we want Moscow and Lyons to be a big success for you. We want to do it the right way and believe that we can do that. From what we hear and read, the election seems to be going well. I am following it closely. I am interested in how you feel and in your perspective. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'll try to explain it now. But first, Bill, tell me one thing. I've been told you won't decide once and for all to determine the G-8 issue at Moscow and Lyons. Is this correct? (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I want to do everything I can to make the summit successful for you. We are working to expand your part. But I believe, and the others do, that timing is a problem. I have been more forthright with you than others on this issue. Because of the timing, there is no consensus for outright conversion from G-7 to G-8. (S)

All of us want to help you. But the truth is that we cannot go to a G-8 at Lyons. We want to be able to show Russian participation is expanding. We don't want a negative story coming out of Lyons. We want a positive story after Lyons about support for Russia and for you and your critical, expanding role within our framework. We can orchestrate the Lyons event in a way that makes the most of your presence. There is no consensus for change, but we want to repeat the fact that Russia's view is expanding and that Russia has made progress on the road to integration. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, the thing is that Helmut and Jacques Chirac have another opinion. They firmly believe that we have to complete the process in Lyons and record conversion to the G-8. Russia is following the right road, the democratic road, the road of market reform per Western standards. (S)

I understand there are doubts due to possible election results. You asked about the election process. Let me try to say something. The situation is becoming better; my rating is growing steadily, and Zyuganov's is declining. We are at approximately the same level. (S)

However, I have strong measures in reserve. My ratings will continue growing. I have been traveling throughout Russia. My

team is going throughout Russia to every house and apartment. The general situation is not bad. The mass media has stopped criticizing me -- and is even trying to support me, which will help me. As I said, I have traveled throughout Russia meeting with people. Their attitude is good and favorable. I'm not absolutely certain, but I'm more certain than I was one month ago. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: This is good news. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. It's very important that I've managed to resolve these problems regarding the elections. I understand, but still, Bill, I'd like very much to have your support in Lyons. We have room to develop and make more steps toward democracy and human rights and Russia's place in the world. We can resolve remaining problems, and the mass media won't be able to criticize. The media is writing about these things now. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: The key thing for me is to have expectations aligned in a way that will make Lyons a big success for you. I have always supported you and Russia from the first time we met. I have always been forthright; it's part of what I owe you as a friend, and I have been forthright and honest from the beginning. I'll be in close touch with others. We should not have any negative stories coming out of Lyons, only positive stories for you right before the election runoff. I'm trying to set this up so that nothing negative will come out of Lyons. It has to be a hundred percent win for you. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am very grateful to you Bill. I know your line of support regarding Russia and myself. I am grateful to you, and Russia is grateful. But let us not drop the subject of Lyons. Maybe we can discuss this with the other G-7 leaders. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Fine. Thank you, Boris. Have a good day. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you, Bill. Thank you, Bill, for calling me, and I understand your situation and am sorry about your loss. I'm glad your race is going well. (C)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you and good-bye, Boris. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

April 9, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER *SP dw CB*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with  
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation of the April 9 call between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the Sens-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Sens-Burns Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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*John:*  
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POTUS-Yeltsin One-on-One

April 21, 1996

10:00-11:45am

notetakers: Talbott, Ryurikov

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PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-1 (1.31)

3/13/2018 KBH

Presidential ceremonial office, the Kremlin, Moscow

Even before the press pool had been fully ushered out of the room, Yeltsin launched into a harsh critique of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.

BNY: I don't understand the American approach in Lebanon. You seem bent on going it alone. That's what Primakov is telling me — the Americans are running a separate operation. Christopher is trying to repeat what he did in '93. This won't be a success if you persist in trying to sideline Russia and France.

WJC: That's not correct. No one's sidelining anybody. We've got to work together. Primakov can play a helpful role, particularly with the Syrians. But our concern is that the parties not be able to play these foreign ministers off against each other. I'm particularly worried about Assad in that regard.

The other factor is the Israelis. They don't want the French or the EU to represent them. The U.S. and Russia continue to work together as cosponsors of the peace process, and we're making every effort to coordinate our efforts.

BNY: This is not very convincing. I think that since these four ministers have gone there with a joint plan of action, they should work together, not separately. Obviously they have their own instructions,

but that's no reason for the American side to break away from the group and started acting individually. If we start pulling in different directions, it will be exploited. Primakov has called twice and asked for instructions about what to do if the Americans go it alone. The question is, can we follow one line and can we work together? Let's get back together.

WJC: Look, you're just not seeing it correctly. It would be a big mistake for all of them to go to see Assad all together and deal with him as a committee. Chirac sent De Charette without telling us he was going to do so. Then the EU sent Agnelli. As for Primakov, his going to Syria obviously makes sense because of your relationship with the Syrians. But there are two sides to this, and we need to bring the Israelis along too. Chris and I felt that four-on-one with Assad would invite him to exploit differences among us. We should certainly try as much as possible to have a common position, but that's different from having the four meet with Assad together. Remember we've got to get the Israelis to stop as well as Hizbullah. Our first objective is to achieve a ceasefire and I think that means each of us using maximum influence where we have it and keeping in touch with each other.

BNY: I'm not talking about four in the same room tied to chairs all the time. I'm talking about cooperation and coordination.

WJC: Well, we're doing exactly that. Secretary Christopher is certainly doing that, but he is also concentrating on bringing the Israelis along. I'll try to talk to him before lunch.

BNY: Still, it's not appropriate for one of us to leave the other three and go off on his own. It's not in keeping with our role as cosponsors.

WJC: Listen, I've told you what our position is, and I owe it to Chris to get his side of the story. I'm not denying that Primakov can be a strong force. Every time we're together, something good happens. Bosnia is the best example.

BNY: This is what I'm getting at. That's why we need to talk more frequently on the telephone.

WJC: I agree. We've got a lot to talk about. There are a lot of problems, but a lot of opportunities, so let's be in touch to set up further contacts.

BNY: OK, I agree fully. With respect to the Middle East, the frequency of contacts depends on the situation on the ground. We'll have to be in touch every couple of days. I think we should think in terms of a Madrid II. But that will depend on the advice of our ministers.

WJC: Well, I'll certainly want to get Chris's advice on that. The first thing is to get a ceasefire and get the peace process back on track. We should certainly stay in touch.

Let me turn to the nuclear summit. I talked to Hillary and she said there was a lot of positive coverage back home of the meeting. I want to thank you for having the idea of the summit when we were in Halifax. It's been even more successful than I expected. I pledge to you I'll follow up on what we've got in motion.

And I listened very closely to Chris's and Strobe's reports on their meetings with you. I know you've shared with them your hopes for and concerns about our relationship. I have paid close attention to what you've told them. I would like to share with you how I see our

relationship at this critically important time. We have done a great deal together since Vancouver three years ago; the world has changed for the better as a result of our work together. You and I are the first leaders of our two countries after the Cold War. We've done a remarkable job in getting a lot done and also in being honest about our differences. My objectives are, first, an integrated, undivided Europe; and second, a cooperative, equal partnership with a democratic, economically successful Russia which is influential in the world.

Yesterday was an example of how it's working. One of the journalists pointed to our disagreement on the Iran reactor deal and asked, "doesn't it cast a shadow?" I said, "no." Look at the progress on START I and II. Also, Boris Yeltsin has been honest with me. That doesn't mean we can't do an even better job of consulting.

I want historians fifty years from now to look back on this period and say you and I took full advantage of the opportunity we had. We made maximum use of the extraordinary moment that came with the end of the Cold War.

BNY: The key word you just used was "equal" partnership. This will restore trust and confidence.

WJC: Let me say a word about your relationships with other countries in this region. I've told everyone in our government that these arrangements you've developed within the CIS are all right with me as long as they meet three standards: one, that they are freely entered into; two, that they respect the independence of these countries, and three, that their integration with Russia is compatible with the larger objective of their integration into the outside world. If those three

conditions prevail, I'll be supportive. A history of negative leadership in the past doesn't necessarily mean there can't be positive leadership in the future.

Russia has a choice here.

There will be areas where we can do more good in the short term, and there are areas where you can do more. For example, you may be the only one who can sell the zero yield CTB to China. In that sense you can exercise leadership coming out of the summit you organized here these past few days.

As for Syria and Hizbullah, there too you've got influence. Use it well. Hizbullah doesn't want the peace process to succeed. They want Peres to lose the election. But Hizbullah and Syria also want to maintain some sort of relationship with Russia, so please use that leverage to get them to accept the ceasefire....

BNY: I apologize for being too open and frank with Mr. Talbott when we saw each other. In the conversation, I told him there are some unhappy aspects of this relationship. Now I think I understand better what you're up to. You're guided by tactical considerations. You're not laying claims to a monopoly in every area. You're saying that each of us has areas of strength where we can concentrate as long as we keep in close touch. I just wanted you to know how I felt and what I was worried about, and I wanted to convey my concerns to you.

WJC: They did convey them, and I'm glad if we understand each other better. None of us has any intention of sidelining Russia, in the Middle East or anywhere else. You've had a relationship with Syria for a long time, and there are important things you can do with the Syrians.

My hopes for the area obviously have a lot to do with my hopes for Israel. I want Israel to be reconciled with her Arab neighbors, first, in a way that permits peaceful relations; second, in a way that removes the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon as breeding grounds for terrorism; third, that brings Syria into more normal behavior and more normal relationship with the rest of the world; and fourth, that removes pressure on Turkey that could move it in an extremist position; and fifth, in a way that will reduce the incentive for Iran to be a rogue state requiring isolation by the international community. We have to give it an incentive to become a more responsible actor. There's one final factor underlying our policy in the Middle East: we have to preserve the stability of the energy supply until we've developed alternative energy sources. If we can achieve these objectives, I don't care who gets the credit. My goal is a Middle East that is not a constant headache, but that is at peace and is a source of spiritual nourishment and prosperity.

I think we could go around the world, looking at every area and identifying what our objectives are, what yours are, and where we can work together. I suspect that in the Middle East, you'd want to avoid radical Muslim fundamentalism. A real, equal partnership would mean each of us deciding what we can do to advance our goals where they are compatible.

BNY: I think we should do this with a small group of trusted experts. They should reflect on possible alternatives and report back to us.

WJC: I agree. Strobe and Mamedov already have something like that going. Why don't we give them this new assignment?

BNY: (checks with Ryurikov, who assents) Okay, let's do that.

WJC: Good. Now, Bosnia is a perfect example of how we can work together....

BNY: (interrupting) On Iran, we're not playing any games. We're sticking to a Soviet-era contract on a diesel powered submarine. If we maintain that kind of relationship with Iran, we can push them in a more positive direction. In that connection, I should tell you I may have to go to Tehran or invite the President of Iran here after my re-election.

WJC: We talked at Hyde Park about CFE. I've made a real effort to move this process a long way. Thanks to the Russian position since Hyde Park, we've been working hard with the Turks, who've been here this week. We are close to a solution and need to resolve the flank issue quickly. Our experts have shown your people how your military can have what they need in the region. It would more than double the equipment the treaty now permits in the flank.

We could solve this today if you'd agree to our map. I worked hard to be in position to say I can sell this approach to Turks. If we can agree to this, we are done.

I know that the issue of Novorossisk is hard for you. But my experts have looked at this very carefully. It all comes down to where 212 armored personnel carriers are based. We are not saying that the base at Novorossisk needs to be closed. We have shown how you can satisfy your military requirements and comply with Treaty by moving some equipment from there to elsewhere in region.

I gather these are airborne units, which are very mobile. They can be used in the region no matter where they are based. It wouldn't cost very much.

I really don't think it's worth putting CFE at risk over the question of where 212 APCs are based.

Solving this one problem would alleviate the last stumbling block.

We've got to get this out of the way. On a couple of occasions you've justified what you're doing with Iran because, as you said, "Look, Bill, I have to do this because it's a contract inherited from the Soviet Union." Well, CFE is the same thing: it's a treaty you inherited from the Soviet Union. These 212 represent less than five percent of the total. If we could resolve this, the Review Conference on May 15 will be a huge success for your administration. You'll be able to say, "I got twice as much equipment and a longer transition time." That could be ratified by the Conference, and the timing would be very good for you.

BNY: OK, first thanks for your efforts here. We're agreed to what you've proposed — this scheme is all right. We accept your solution, including the quantitative parameters.

I've got to tell you, this Novorossisk base is a pain in the neck. It's an integrated part of the division based there. Also, now that we don't have Crimea, it's an important port on the Black Sea. But I agree that we'll take these 212 vehicles out of Novorossisk. We've been resolving bigger issues successfully, so I'm prepared to resolve this the way you suggest and will instruct my military accordingly. And we can tell the press that on this very serious matter, on our level, we're determined to resolve this before May 15.

But still the Conference would have to address modernization.

WJC: What we've done will make it easier to address modernization at the Conference.

BNY: (to Ryurikov) Send Grachev an order to get the 212 vehicles out of Novorossisk.

(To POTUS) At the conference, we'll propose modernization.

WJC: And what I'm saying on that is that the issue will be easier to deal with if we get the flanks question out of the way.

Now, on another subject we've spent a lot of time and effort on — the ABM treaty and the demarcation for theater defenses. As you know, I've had a real struggle on my hands at home over this. I've been attacked on demarcation, and I had to veto the Defense Department bill to protect the ABM Treaty. Our people have been talking and the agreement we are developing will help us preserve the treaty. It will strengthen my ability to rebut critics who want to undermine it.

The agreement reached by our experts calls for:

— Finishing a Part I demarcation agreement covering lower-velocity TMD systems by June, and do our best to complete Part II covering higher-velocity TMD systems by October, and to do this on basis of what experts agreed yesterday should be included in each of these parts.

— Your pushing for Duma approval of START II after your election, with aim of exchanging instruments of ratification by October.

BNY: Yes, definitely. I'll even try to do it before the elections. In the Duma they're asserting that the U.S. is trying to take advantage of us

with all you got from START II, although our military says that isn't true.

(Ryurikov, who is reading along from a Russia document, whispers to Yeltsin, "Testing!") Oh, yes: testing.

WJC: I was coming to that. You have raised concerns about our higher-velocity TMD systems. My officials have explained to yours that, other than agreeing not to test these systems against strategic ballistic missile targets, we will not agree to further flight test limits on our higher-velocity TMD systems, and I am glad your side understands that. However, with respect to our program, I can tell you our military has no plans now to conduct any flight test of such system against any target during the next three years.

BNY: That will be sufficient.

WJC: Now, for purposes of our public and congressional posture, it must be clear that there is no official agreement, but you have my personal assurance on this policy unless I discuss it with you in advance.

BNY: Your word is good enough.

WJC: Excellent. Now, there's also this issue of Yamantau Mountain. I just don't want anyone to make a headache out of this.

BNY: There's nothing mysterious there. No one would do anything there without my permission, and you have my word on it.

WJC: But Lake and Ryurikov can discuss it.

BNY: Yes.

WJC: Good. Now, on NATO, you know I'm committed to avoiding surprises for you. Enlargement is going ahead in the manner I've said before: gradual, steady, transparent. At the NATO meeting in June, they'll focus on some housekeeping, some internal issues, and on dialogues with the PFP states for the remainder of 1996.

As for the relationship between NATO and Russia, we should build on the success we're already having in Bosnia. IFOR is the kind of cooperation we need. Bosnia.

Let's do what we can to make sure the enlargement is as much of a non-issue as possible, consistent with what we agreed at the outset. And let's discuss it a couple of weeks in advance of the NAC so there are no surprises.

BNY: OK (nods)

WJC: The truth is, IFOR will be more of a problem for me than for you because of the dispute over the future of IFOR. The pressure is going to build up in the months ahead. But I don't want it to become a problem for you.

BNY: For me, there will be no problem with regard to our peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. We have an understanding with the Federation Council that we will maintain our presence as long as possible. It so happens that the upper house is on my side. But the State Duma is making a stink.

WJC: We need to talk about Chechnya. I'm assuming that Dudayev won't let you resolve this before the elections. But it's still crucial that you achieve a political solution because the ongoing violence is obviously bad for you.

BNY: My March 31st plan has already helped. My ratings have already gone up. You've endorsed my plan. But we've still got to deal with these bands of terrorists. My plan combines negotiations with tough action against small bands of terrorists. We also have the good offices offered by the former dissident Orlov, Shimiyeu, the President of Tatarstan, and King Hassan II, who is the chairman of the Conference of Islamic States and who is a big opponent of separatism. He's reacted favorably to my message. If you could encourage him to help I'd be grateful. All the more detailed issues we'll deal with through Chernomyrdin's commission. Hassan can help us put pressure on Dudayev. All we want from Dudayev is that Russia remain an undivided country.

WJC: I know Hassan very well. I'll call him.

BNY: That'll be enough. It will help. We're in the process of signing individual agreements with 19 of the 22 districts in Chechnya to eliminate pressure on both the Russian military and the bandits. Only three districts are left. These districts are still under Dudayev's control. On the 30th of April, I'll fly to Chechnya, even though all my advisors are against it.

WJC: Be careful, be safe.

BNY: In short, I'm getting a feeling of optimism. Hassan is a good intermediary.

WJC: On nuclear cooperation with Iran, let's continue to discuss this via the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. It's important to have a way of discussing these issues.

BNY: Fine.

WJC: Either we're working on it, or we've agreed, or we're still in disagreement. But it causes me problems when Minister Mikhailov says publicly, as he has a few times, that we have no objections. That puts me in a bad position.

BNY: Well, Mikhailov is no politician. He's a plant director.

There's still one issue still left over from Hyde Park. The disarmament process is moving ahead under START even though it's not ratified. But there's a perception that nuclear material is piling up at storage facilities. What is the status of the two plants? The question of financing is unresolved, and there's a danger of terrorism.

(The Kremlin bells and the clock on the mantle simultaneously strike noon.)

WJC: Let's get our experts together on this and perhaps I can report to you over lunch.

(Yeltsin takes POTUS off for a tour of the private quarters.)

~~SECRET/NO DIS/IKRA~~

For immediate transmission  
to Secretary Christopher,  
eyes only

From LAKE + Talbott  
Aboard AF 1

over + 13

**National Security Council  
The White House**

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