

POINTS TO BE MADE AT DINNER WITH
CZECH PRESIDENT HAVEL

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KRM/NARA, Date 4/30/2007
2024-0540-m (1.02)

European Security, NATO

- Will stay engaged with Europe. Some in U.S. wrongly argue, absent a Hitler or Stalin, we can withdraw. But we'll not repeat mistake of 1920's.
- Committed to integration of Central European democracies with West: NATO, EU, OECD.
- NATO enlargement inevitable. Purpose to build security underpinning for growing democratic community; not directed against democratic Russia.
- In parallel with NATO enlargement, seek to develop NATO-Russian relationship. Russia cannot veto fact or timing of expansion, but do not want to force Moscow into isolation.
- Yeltsin has misgivings about NATO enlargement but agreed to launch NATO-Russia process.
- NATO Study on expansion will be briefed to Partners in fall, leading to NATO consultations with partners based on Study. Do not anticipate decisions this year on "when and who"; work on "how and why" will continue well into 1996.
- Czech Republic can help by: stressing to Moscow non-threatening nature of NATO expansion; avoiding premature speculation about timing; helping build consensus within CEE, among NATO allies.

Russia

- History need not be fate for Russia, though we understand it might be.
- Despite Chechnya, corruption and authoritarian currents, first Russian civil society since 1917 now taking shape: ground-up economic development, self-government, new generation taking responsibility. A better future still possible for Russia.
- U.S.-Russia policy seeks engagement with Russia and Russian society to promote positive trends, while keeping open options in event of failure.
- Made clear to Moscow we do not wish to use CEE instrumentally against Russia, but CEE not object of superpower negotiation. Reject idea of joint NATO-Russian security guarantees for CEE.

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Ex-Yugoslavia

- Working with Contact Group and European Allies to resolve latest stage in crisis. Vital to strengthen UNPROFOR so it can contain conflict and carry out humanitarian mission.
- Pressing Milosevic to recognize Bosnia within internationally-recognized borders; seek to isolate Bosnian Serbs, pressure them to accept Contact Group plan.
- Success on Contact Group diplomatic front should help make Belgrade leadership less worrisome to neighboring states.
- Key to resolving situation in long term rests with convincing Bosnian and Krajina Serbs they have no option but negotiated settlement. Require solidarity and resolve, both within UNPROFOR and wider Euro-Atlantic community.
- Cannot impose political settlement by force or invasion, but can try to prevent spread of conflict, minimize civilian casualties, work toward political solution.

RFE/RL

- Happy to tell you restructured radios are up and running. Move symbolizes both successful Czech transformation and U.S. commitment to CEE region.
- RFE/RL will emphasize broadcasts to less developed CEE and NIS countries; while Czech media can still develop, it is relatively strong and independent.
- I'm confident funding for RFE/RL will remain sufficient; we plan to maintain funding through 1999, after which radios will be privatized.

Sudeten German issue (if raised)

- Fully appreciate sensitivities in Czech Republic to any suggestion of historical injustice done to Sudeten Germans. Understand Prague and Bonn are discussing agreement to set up foundation for German compensation to Czech victims of fascism. This might clear way for mutual, symbolic steps to resolve historical issues.
- U.S. would be concerned if issue hindered Czech integration with West. Know of no such German intention and support Czech-German dialogue.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 20:
By KRH NARA, Date 4/25/24
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DECL:9/10/08

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Madeleine K. Albright

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic

Vaclav Havel is an inspiration not only to his countrymen but also to millions of people around the globe. His name is synonymous with tolerance, civility and courage in the face of oppression. He has shown himself to be one of the great humanists of this century, and is seen by many as a symbolic descendant of another great humanist and father of Czechoslovak democracy, Thomas G. Masaryk.

Havel visits at a time when his political clout at home is declining and his health precarious. We want to use this opportunity to pay tribute to Havel's extraordinary contributions to democracy and human rights, but at the same time help refocus Havel on the role he plays most effectively -- moral compass of his nation and the region. By encouraging Havel to step up to the bully pulpit, we can marshal his immense moral authority behind our agenda for Central Europe, deepen ties with a soon-to-be ally, and draw attention to progress toward NATO enlargement as we move toward the Washington summit.

Frustrated by Czech politics, Havel may be eager to play on a broader stage. After the split verdict in the Czech Republic's June elections, Havel tried to act as kingmaker, even though his institutional role as president is largely ceremonial. As a result, Havel tarnished his luster among Czechs, antagonizing the two largest political parties to the extent that they may seek a constitutional amendment to limit his duties.

One of the most pro-American leaders in the region, Havel is outspoken in support of U.S. policies ranging from Bosnia to the NATO Open Door. He is both a good friend and a persuasive advocate for our most fundamental beliefs and ideals, and is a thinker on a grand scale. Havel has an uncanny ability to relate large moral issues to everyday life in a way that is immediately understood by everyone. No one else in the region can so poignantly address the issues of civic responsibility, corruption

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Reasons 1.5(b) and (d)

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and interethnic relations that are so salient in today's post-Communist Europe. The one blot on the Czech Republic's otherwise strong human rights record is discrimination toward and violence against the Roma. We should encourage Havel to be vocal in the Czech Republic and the region on these issues to realize our shared goal of a Europe, whole and free.

Havel understands that European stability must include Russia. He has argued forcefully about the danger of being indifferent to the fate of others, and the Czech historical experience provides a tragic backdrop to his beliefs. Czechoslovakia's own negative record with the Soviet Union has not embittered him or distorted his views. Given this, Havel will no doubt be willing to share his ideas on stabilizing Russia, and other trouble spots, such as Kosovo, as well as on the pivotal late September elections in Slovakia.

The Czech Republic is in the midst of its own dramatic changes. Many thought the work of economic reform -- perhaps the single most important task facing the Czech Republic -- had been accomplished years ago by long-time PM Vaclav Klaus. But this is not the case. These reforms, begun in earnest by a caretaker government only in the last eight months, face an uncertain future. The new government in power, the first left-of-center government since the Velvet Revolution, is torn about the need for further reform, and dependent on the toleration of the largest right-of-center party. Coupled with an anemic economy, this is a tough mix for continuing the hard work of reform. With his stature, Havel can be a voice for responsible economic policies. Since Havel may find it difficult to open up with ministers present, this topic is best addressed in the restricted session in the context of discussion of managing the ruble collapse fallout.

A strong economy is key to the Czech Republic achieving the kind of quality NATO membership it seeks and we expect. Havel deserves praise for leading his country into NATO, and you will no doubt find him in strong agreement with our thinking. A few months before formal entry to the Alliance is a heady time for Havel to visit, yet the hard work of accession is just beginning. The Czechs must remain focused on the nuts-and-bolts of preparation, including keeping their promise to increase military spending to bring the country up to NATO standard.

In short, this visit is about developing a U.S.-Czech partnership grounded in our common democratic values and, as befits future allies, taking advantage of the unique resource that is Vaclav Havel to advance our shared agenda in the region and throughout the world.

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
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Cleared: EUR:MGrossman
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Prague

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2009.
By *KPM* NARA, Date *4/30/2024*
2024-0540-M (1.12)

I. SETTING

You will visit Prague January 11-12 for a meeting -- organized at U.S. initiative -- of the leaders of the Visegrad group (V-4) comprised of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Major events include a Plenary Lunch at which you will make a televised substantive presentation, and four bilaterals with the Presidents and Premiers of each country. You also will have some informal time with Czech President Havel and a meeting with business representatives.

The region faces a moment of strategic choice -- theirs not ours -- but what we say and do can effect the success and Westward orientation of Central and Eastern Europe's new democracies. You will want to: a) convey America's admiration for the tremendous progress these countries have made toward stable democracy and functioning free markets, while recognizing that the outcome is not yet certain and demonstrating intensified U.S. support as their reforms continue; b) stress that you take seriously NATO's historic decision to open itself to future new members and elicit Visegrad support for the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which is an element the NATO expansion process; c) assure the Visegrad countries that the Western option they chose with hope in 1989 remains open and valid, allaying their fears that they will be consigned to a Russian sphere of influence or perpetual outsider status vis a vis the West and; d) encourage Visegrad and other forms of cooperation among Central and East European countries, not as a substitute for but rather to facilitate their integration into the West.

Success of the new and aspiring democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a key test of your objective of enlarging the world's free community of market democracies. This goal may be more attainable in CEE than anywhere else in the world. And it is not yet secured. Even the V-4, among the most advanced of the post-communist world, are still in the nervous, vulnerable half-way point of their transformation. Their successes have been impressive; even inspiring; the remaining problems are

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daunting. Reform fatigue is setting in and vulnerability to extremism is rising. They worry the West will never accept them.

The fact of this first-ever U.S.-CEE regional meeting -- and its timing after the NATO Summit and before Moscow -- gives it considerable political significance. It is neither crisis-driven nor intended to produce agreements but instead is designed to advance our broad vision of new security in Europe. The Visegrad countries welcomed your initiative in calling the meeting and hope -- somewhat apprehensively -- that it indicates continued U.S. interest in their security and reform process. It does, and drawing from the Administration's recently-completed review of our CEE policy, you will be able to offer some specific -- albeit fairly modest -- initiatives in addition to PFP to demonstrate the commitment to reinvigorated engagement that lies behind our rhetoric. The success or failure of the CEE states is their responsibility, but we can do more to help at the margin, and the difference we make can be critical.

CEE and Russia

The V-4 believe themselves kept at arms' length by the West and exposed to what they feel is a neo-imperialist Russia. Zhirinovsky's strong showing ensures that Russia will hang like an ill-favored spirit over the Prague meetings. Your interlocutors may hit hard on Russia, arguing that the situation is deteriorating; that the West is over-optimistic at best; that NATO needs to differentiate actively now, offering the V-4 a fast track toward membership with a timetable and criteria. They are to varying degrees disappointed by PFP, wary that it represents a Western shell game rather than an answer to their security problems. You must overcome these concern.

The V-4 leaders may be eloquent and history lends their arguments some weight, but we are not seeking to use CEE "strategically" against Russia and you should say so. The Russian elections notwithstanding, we should not abandon Russian reform, which is what too rapid or overtly preferential treatment of the V-4 in the process of NATO expansion would mean. Doing so would play into the hands of Russian hardliners and thus likely make CEE states less secure. Yet neither will we treat CEE as a forgotten grey zone. We will conduct a distinct CEE policy, taking its security seriously and supporting its evolutionary integration into the West in all areas -- economic, political and military -- without giving Russia a veto. The PFP is an integral part of this broader policy, not a dodge.

And U.S. Interests.

Thus, one message of the Prague stop -- even if indirectly expressed -- is that our policies toward Russia and the NIS on the one hand and CEE on the other are elements of a consistent strategic vision. The U.S. will conduct active CEE and NIS policies; neither these policies nor the PFP should be seen -- as the Visegrad states, Russians and others may be tempted to see them -- as a zero-sum game. The central challenge of post-

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communist reform in both the NIS and CEE is similar, and our policy toward both reflects our deeply-held principles that democratic and thorough market economic reform is the way to meet that challenge. Reform's success in CEE would make it impossible to argue, as many across the NIS and CEE currently do, that the Western path of democracy and market reform is simply beyond the ability of post-communist societies. Success in at least some CEE countries is important in its own right, and may be essential for success anywhere in NIS.

Moreover, reform is likely to fail somewhere in CEE and NIS, but of the two, Visegrad's chances of success are greater. If our policy seemed focussed exclusively on Russia -- as many Visegrad leaders and others fear it is -- then the policy principles we espouse for the whole post-communist world may come to hang by the weaker thread. Our policy will be more durable in the face of the inevitable setbacks if we broaden our scope to include Visegrad and the other CEE's with Russia as part of a sustained effort to promote our vision. This message of sustained engagement in support of our deepest foreign policy interests and values is what your presence in Prague will convey.

II. PURSUING OUR GOALS

Tackling the V-4 Agenda

Your Brussels speech will have outlined themes for the entire trip and the NATO Summit will have launched the Partnership for Peace. We want the V-4 countries to endorse the Partnership and they likely will, though not all may do so during the Prague meetings and the dynamics there will be complex. Your walkabout with Havel the evening before most of the formal meetings may give you a sense of V-4 thinking.

The V-4 leaders will want to hear what we are prepared to offer on their number one agenda item -- NATO expansion -- specifically how the PFP fits in. They know that a firm NATO membership offer or timetable is not in the cards. What they will listen for -- as Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski told me December 16 -- is a statement from you along the lines of "the security of Central Europe is important to the security of the United States"; that PFP is the first stage along a firm path ahead toward NATO membership for reformist democracies and not a detour; that we will not move the goalposts at endgame. They would like NATO to establish more explicit criteria now for NATO membership. Criteria and a firmer link between PFP and NATO expansion, they claim, would reassure their publics that they are accepted by the West and more secure vis-a-vis Russia.

And Turning to Our Own: PFP.

You will need to resist calls for such an explicit tilt in favor of the V-4, but you can address this by confirming that:

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-- NATO anticipates expanding to new democracies in the East, especially including the V-4 but without prejudice to any other CEE or NIS democracy;

-- PFP is part of the process of enlarging NATO -- albeit not a guarantee of membership;

-- PFP was not intended as a membership holding room, but was designed to get real cooperation underway as soon as possible, on the ground where it counts;

-- PFP is not a dodge to delay NATO expansion; active participation in it can accelerate countries' ability to meet NATO political and military standards;

-- PFP has a political as well as military dimension, and we regard as important NATO's commitment under PFP to consult in the event of threats to a Partner's security;

-- The U.S. takes the CEE security seriously and will step up bilateral security cooperation.

Finally, you should stress that PFP will be as effective as new partners make it. If the V-4 countries consider themselves the best candidates for NATO membership, they can demonstrate this through active cooperation through the Partnership. Similarly, whether it is seen as an opportunity or rebuff by V-4 electorates will largely depend on how V-4 leaderships portray it.

You should encourage V-4 leaders to be the first to join the Partnership by signing the PFP's Partnership Framework Declaration. Signature will be the first step by nations interested in joining the PFP. The Declaration will include general political as well as military obligations of signatories (e.g., commitment to democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian control of the military).

But we have deliberately avoided articulating explicit criteria for NATO membership. Doing so would spark competition and apprehension among CEE's about who came closest to meeting them. Factors NATO members will consider include a potential new member's democratic institutions and stability; its human rights record; whether it has minority, border or other complaints against its neighbors and the state of its cooperation with them; and other factors such as the impact of expansion on security and stability in Europe as a whole. This last point does not mean giving Russia or any other state a veto on new members. It does mean that NATO will make its own judgements about the likely consequences of admitting any potential new member. In addition, NATO legislatures must agree to extend security guarantees to a potential member and pay to make these credible. In short, we should at this time preserve a creative ambiguity surrounding the question of NATO membership and criteria.

In the meantime, the PFP is the beginning of political and military integration with NATO, and active participation in it

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can prepare Europe's new democracies to meet the obligations of full membership. And PFP also can help us prepare to respond in the event of a catastrophic failure of democracy in Russia.

U.S. Policy Themes

We do not want the meetings to focus solely on NATO. Indeed, you need to show that the military aspects of security are only one dimension of our engagement in CEE. You should use your position as host of the bilaterals and plenary meetings to broaden the discussions. The V-4 argue that they need NATO membership not just because of the Russians but because "belonging" to the West would help their reform process, e.g., by encouraging foreign investment and by showing their publics that reform pays. You should stress that security is broader than military security; indeed, the success of their reforms depends as much or more on economic, political and human rights elements as on Western military guarantees.

You will be able to announce a number of specific initiatives. While none is very dramatic, taken together they amount to significant shifts of emphasis which we believe better fit the region's needs and our experience over the past four years. These include:

- More support for democracy and technical assistance to reform social services. A flourishing private sector is a necessary condition for successful reform, and the private sectors in the V-4 are doing very well, though we can still help. But a strong entrepreneurial sector is not a sufficient condition for successful reform. Grass roots democracy, a modernized public sector, including reformed social safety net programs to ease the shock of economic change, are needed and need some outside support. We estimate our support for democracy programs alone will grow from \$30 million to \$47 million in FY94.
- Matching our NATO summit initiatives with bilateral steps, e.g., training with CEE units and eliminating cold war-era prohibitions on arms transfers. The CEE's want to believe PFP is serious. We can more easily convince them if our own programs are enhanced to support the PFP's goals.
- New stress on support for intra-regional cooperation, not as a substitute for integration into the West, but to facilitate it. The emphasis of the meeting is regional, and you should note that NATO does not want to import any new intramural quarrels (e.g., Greece-Turkey). The new and raw CEE democracies, jealous of their newly-regained sovereignty, need to learn to think of one another as friends. Yet our programs hitherto have not been tailored to promote regional integration (only about 5 percent of our assistance has gone to regional projects). We will do more in the future.

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U.S. Initiatives

Our specific initiatives for this trip can be grouped as follows:

Refocussed and new assistance efforts.

-- You will be able to note a significant, new "Partnership in Democracy" program designed to strengthen civic society at the grass roots by supporting independent, indigenous CEE groups. In referring to this, you should not seem to suggest that we regard the Visegrad countries as undemocratic. The point is that their emerging democratic structures may need resources and expertise that we can provide.

-- You will want to note that thorough economic "shock therapy" reform has worked -- Poland, which pioneered it, went from being regarded as Europe's basket case to one of Europe's fastest-growing economies; the Czech Republic's popular PM Klaus has shown that fast track reform can be sustained politically. But you can stress that we are aware of reform's social side effects and will devote more attention -- bilaterally and through IFI's - to social safety net reform. Treasury also is working on an innovative program to help firms and communities make privatization a success, including by coping with some of its social impact. We plan as well to increase support for public administration, aiming to help democratic governments respond better to their voters.

-- You also will be able to announce a new policy of support for regional cooperation, including V-4 cooperation. Bilaterally and through our role in the IFI's we will give priority consideration to projects that involve more than one nation and will offer technical assistance to regional groups in preparing projects. You can offer an innovative program to help the V-4 and perhaps other CEE's establish an integrated, regional airspace management network. The Poles and Hungarians will welcome our stress on regionalism; PM Klaus may be far more reserved.

Increased support for trade and investment.

-- The V-4 have complained of EU protectionism and, although much of the vast trade deficit they currently run with the EU is due to the recession in the West, they have some grounds for their claims. Lech Walesa has raised this issue recently, and the Polish post-communists claimed EU protectionism made their September electoral victory possible. You can confirm that the U.S. will put market access on the West's agenda where it can, and will press the EU to match U.S. levels of openness. We hope you will have been able to announce U.S.-EU agreement at your January 11 EU Summit that market access for CEE will be a major theme of the Naples G-7 Summit next July.

-- We want to increase our efforts to bring trade and investment to CEE, and you may be able to announce a [White House-sponsored] Conference on CEE trade and investment. You will be able to

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announce increases in OPIC's ability to support U.S. trade and investment.

Bilateral Military programs to reinforce PFP.

-- In presenting PFP, you can note that we will change our bilateral military programs to reinforce our efforts to integrate the CEE's into NATO structures. You will be able to offer modest assistance in organizing and training, and to the degree available stockpiles permit, even some equipping of CEE units to NATO standards. You can encourage creation of CEE peacekeeping units for joint operations with NATO. We recommend you announce our intention to end Cold War-era prohibitions and restrictions on U.S. arms sales and transfers, thereby putting CEE's on the same footing as most other countries in terms of security assistance eligibility. Sales and transfers would still be subject to other existing laws and regulations and would be handled on a case-by-case basis. But the announcement would be a significant signal of a new phase of security relations with these countries.

We estimate the non-military initiatives can be funded from current levels of the SEED Act budget, assuming these remain constant over the next 2-3 years. The military programs may require modest levels of additional funding (as will programs associated with the PFP).

THE PRAGUE SCENARIO

The Plenary Lunch, bilateral meetings, business event and other activities will provide the occasions for working in the above themes and specific initiatives that support them.

Upon arrival in Prague you will proceed to the Castle for a welcoming ceremony and then the Czech bilateral with President Havel and Premier Klaus. This will be a standard bilateral meeting, but it will be followed by a very informal walkabout with Havel across the Charles Bridge and possibly to a pub. This will be a good time to explore the broader themes of your trip in a setting that will bring out Havel's best thinking.

The following morning you will visit Prague's medieval Jewish Cemetery and then proceed to Ambassador Basora's Residence for bilaterals with the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks. You will meet with both Presidents and Premiers in each bilateral; Foreign Ministers may be present as well. Much of your presentations will overlap, especially points concerning NATO, the PFP and Russia, and the U.S. commitment to remain engaged in the region. You will have a few country-specific issues to raise as well.

The Plenary Lunch

The Plenary Lunch also will be held at Ambassador Basora's Residence, so as host you will be able to set the tone and agenda. We hope for give-and-take, but the Plenary Lunch is the substantive centerpiece of the trip and the venue to address the

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security issues on the minds of the Visegrad leaders, and the platform to launch our other, non-PFP initiatives.

Because the bilaterals precede the lunch, you will have good advance indication of your interlocutors' mood and concerns. You will begin with about 10 minutes of televised remarks. After that, you should lead the discussion, working in American initiatives under each agenda point (the NATO summit, PFP and military security, democracy and market economics, regional cooperation).

At minimum, we want to obtain strong V-4 statements in support of PFP -- which should prove attainable in most cases (the Poles are still reserved); however, the V-4 will highlight that their objective remains early and full NATO membership. We have not sought to negotiate a joint statement, which might have the effect of sharpening differences rather than expressing agreed points, but we will have a draft ready.

Press After Lunch

A short photo op following the Plenary Lunch will give the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks at least some of the exposure they seek (the Czechs, as hosts, are less concerned). You should expect shouted questions.

Attendees:

Czech Republic	President Vaclav Havel Premier Vaclav Klaus	(Ha-vell) (KLAUS)
Poland	President Lech Walesa Premier Waldemar Pawlak	(va-WHEN-sa) (PAHV-lok)
Hungary	President Arpad Goencz Premier Peter Boross	(GOENTS) (BOR-osh)
Slovakia	President Michal Kovac Premier Vladimir Meciar	(KO-vach) (ME-chiar)

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2000
By KSH/NARA, Date 7/30/2024
2024-0540-17 (1.13)

MEETING WITH
CZECH PRESIDENT HAVEL AND PREMIER KLAUS

CONTEXT OF MEETING

The Czech Republic currently is doing the best of the Visegrad states in its drive to consolidate democracy and a free-market economy, owing to high-caliber leadership, a stable governing coalition and government policies geared to macro-economic stability. The Czechs look to join the EU and NATO and value a U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe; lacking a common border with the NIS, they seek but are less nervous about rapid NATO membership than either the Poles or Hungarians.

After initial disappointment that offers of membership were not forthcoming, Prague has welcomed the Partnership for Peace (the Foreign Ministry called it the "minimum acceptable and the maximum obtainable"). Nevertheless Havel, a vocal proponent of a strong U.S. security role in Europe, still urges NATO not to bow to Russian pressure, but rather to expand rapidly into Central Europe. The Czech Republic recently secured election to hold a UN Security Council seat for a two-year period beginning January 1 (and will serve as UNSC President for one month starting January 1). Czech-Slovak relations are fairly good, and no major issues remain unresolved from the still-recent breakup of former Czechoslovakia.

Politics and Leadership

While Havel -- whom you met last April during the Holocaust Museum opening -- deservedly enjoys fame and stature in the West, Klaus wields the power in the country. Klaus presents himself as a hard-eyed economist in a Margaret Thatcher mold. In fact, he is more pragmatic than he lets on; Klaus's greatest strength has been his political ability -- alone among all CEE leaders -- to sell fast-track economic reform to the electorate. Although initial relations were strained, Havel and Klaus make a good team: Havel the intellectual and conscience of his nation; Klaus the competent and decisive head of government.

Czech Republic politics is relatively stable, more so than is the rule among other Visegrad countries. Partly as a result of Klaus's abilities on the stump, the four-party center-right governing coalition is relatively stable and is likely to survive its four-year term. Parties of the far right and left exist but have not captured mass support.

Economics

The Czech Republic is coming out of its post-1989 recession. Unemployment is very low at 3-4 percent; Prague runs a budget surplus and has held annual inflation to about 20 percent. The international financial community has shown confidence in

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Prague's policies by upgrading the Czech Republic's investment ratings to "BBB," two steps higher than Hungary's and one step higher than Greece. Prague, though not representative of the entire country, is booming thanks partly to massive tourism.

Obstacles lie ahead, and economists in the region suggest the country will go through a rough patch later in 1994. Unemployment almost certainly will rise, probably doubling next year as large state firms go bankrupt or are restructured. Notwithstanding his free market rhetoric, Klaus has avoided pushing bankruptcy proceedings to date beyond small- and medium-sized firms. Klaus -- whose self assurance occasionally borders on hubris -- speaks of the Czech Republic as having completed its reforms; he is loathe to acknowledge that more needs to be done and you should not emphasize U.S. assistance with the Czechs, but in this bilateral can concentrate on business and investment promotion, and U.S. interest in greater market access for CEE.

Relations within the Visegrad Group

Klaus's rhetoric of crediting Czech exceptionalism for his country's relative success sometimes has led him to denigrate the Czech Republic's CEE neighbors and the whole concept of Visegrad cooperation. The government has argued that it can "go West" faster if it goes alone, and has opposed "institutionalization" of Visegrad cooperation. In preparing this visit, the Czechs irritated their Visegrad partners by stressing its bilateral rather than regional aspects. You should emphasize to the Czechs our support for regional cooperation in general and Visegrad in particular. Havel does not fully share Klaus's skepticism about Visegrad cooperation, but will not break with the government on the issue.

RFE/RL

The Czechs have encouraged RFE/RL to relocate to Prague and have offered the former Federal Parliament building as a site. RFE/RL's oversight body, the Board for International Broadcasting, is studying the financial, legal and technical implications of a possible move. Moving the radios to Prague rather than to Washington could signal continued U.S. engagement in the region and support for democracy. However, significant budgetary and Congressional complications would have to be addressed as part of any USG decision about the Czech offer. We thus recommend a positive but non-committal approach to the issue.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Elicit strong Czech support for the Partnership for Peace initiative, including a declaration of intent to join. In explaining the PFP, address Czech concerns that the U.S. has consigned CEE to a Russian sphere of influence.
- o Set out the broad U.S. agenda of intensified engagement to support CEE democracy and reform.

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- o Encourage the Czechs to support regional cooperation.
- o Note our concerns on bilateral questions, including high-tech trade with pariah regimes and business issues.
- o Expressing appreciation for the Czech offer, explain current USG thinking about a possible RFE/RL move to Prague.

CORE POINTS

NATO Summit/PFP

- o NATO has just taken the historic decision to begin a process of expanding.
- o PFP is a major step forward in that process; I count on the Visegrad countries becoming its most active members.
- o PFP will promote the practice of military cooperation on the ground -- getting NATO and Partner militaries planning, training, exercising and operating together.
- o PFP has a political dimension as well, including NATO commitment to consult if there is a direct and immediate threat to a Partner's security.
- o Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.
- o The U.S. will reorient our bilateral military programs to support the Partnership.
 - For example, within our own budgetary limitations, the U.S. will help organize and train, and perhaps help equip, selected Partner country military units.

Visegrad Concerns re PFP

- o Understand your interest in explicit timetables for NATO membership, detailed criteria, and firm commitments.
- o We cannot give these now. Not because of a Russian "veto" -- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington. And not because we consign Central Europe to Moscow's sphere of influence. We do not and will not.
- o Moving immediately on NATO membership -- directly or via elaborate criteria -- would mean a new line in Europe; giving up on Russia, Ukraine, other CEE's (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltics).
- o That could create tensions in Russia and elsewhere making your countries less secure. Must not create self-fulfilling, pessimistic prophecies.

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- o Better a process that is open, flexible and creative -- to fit an ambiguous situation to our East. PFP also can lay basis for us to respond to a catastrophic reversal of democracy in Russia or elsewhere.

U.S. Engagement in CEE

- o U.S. seeks expansion of the world's free community of market democracies. Your success thus is key for us.
- o CEE reforms' success depend on economic results, strength of democratic societies, not just military security.
- o U.S. will intensify engagement in CEE; have specific ideas.
- o Public Administration/social safety net reform: CEE proves serious, comprehensive economic reform works; private entrepreneurship is the engine, but governments have legitimate role in a modern, free market economy.
 - U.S. can provide more help for public administration and social safety net reform. We are also looking at ways to provide post-privatization assistance to firms and communities.
- o Democracy programs: Adjustment to new system brings tremendous stress. Now that basic democratic structures are established in CEE, we can work on support of civil society, especially at the grass roots. Czech success building democracy could be shared with other new democracies.
 - U.S. has prepared a new program -- the "Partnership in Democracy" -- to support independent, non-government organizations in the region.
- o Market access: Way to economic growth is through trade. Countries introducing bold market reforms have a right to open markets for exports. U.S. will work with EU, G-7 to put market access for CEE high on the world's trade agenda.
- o Trade and Investment: More can, should be done. I will announce that in 1994, the [White House/U.S.] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. will expand OPIC programs.

Regional Cooperation

- o U.S. supports regional cooperation in CEE -- e.g., Visegrad group -- to facilitate integration into the West. Cooperation among West European nations after WWII was key step in building Atlantic Community.
- o Understand Czech reservations. But regional cooperation can help countries think of one another as allies, not rivals. And it makes good practical sense: roads, rivers, pollution, communications, air traffic systems do not

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recognize borders; nations must work together to resolve problems.

- o The U.S. will do more to support regional cooperation.
 - U.S. will offer technical assistance to regional groups to help design projects that involve more than one country; will look favorably on good regional projects.
 - The U.S., other Western nations and international organizations can do more to help Central European nations improve transport infrastructure in the region.
 - U.S. can support Visegrad efforts to modernize your airspace system -- important economically and as part of your integration into the Western community. U.S. can offer now to develop with you a complete plan for a cooperative Visegrad system compatible with Western airspace systems, including that of NATO.

Bilateral Issues

- o Trade and Investment: Very pleased by the rise in U.S. investment in the Czech Republic; proud that American investors have committed over \$1.8 billion to projects here, more than investors from any other country.
 - To continue that momentum, we ask you ensure that U.S. businesses receive a fair opportunity to compete in the Czech market, including aviation, telecommunications.
- o Export Controls: Pleased COCOM agreed to remove Czech Republic the list of proscribed destinations as of January 1, 1994. Very important to avoid irresponsible sales of arms and dual-use technologies that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction or missiles.
 - Also very glad to learn your government would not permit the sale of the Tamara radar or equipment for a nuclear reactor to Iran.
- o RFE/RL: Appreciate Czech offer to make the former federal parliament building available to house Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. RFE/RL contributed to democracy's advent in 1989; much yet to do and I will support them. A more to Prague has real attraction; would send right signal.
 - Difficult technical, legal and budgetary considerations must be resolved before we can decide on radios' location. I expect recommendations soon and will consider the issue very closely.
- o Defense Cooperation: Pleased to tell you that I have issued a Presidential Determination to remove Cold War-era ineligibility for USG transfer of defense articles and services to the Czech Republic.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KRM/NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-m (1.14)

BACKGROUND
INFORMAL EVENING IN PRAGUE WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Following your bilateral with President Havel and Premier Klaus in the Prague Castle, you and President Havel will meet [at the Prague Castle] and walk across the Charles Bridge and into the heart of the Old Town of Prague. This will be as informal and unstructured as possible; there will be no formal remarks or events. This setting will provide an ideal venue for you to draw out Havel on major thematic issues of your trip: the future of democracy and reform in CEE and Russia.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o To elicit from Havel, in an informal context, a sense of Central Europeans' priorities for your visit and concerns.

CORE POINTS

- o U.S. objectives toward Central Europe reflect our prime foreign policy objective of expanding the free community of market democracies. The U.S. has not and will not consign Central Europe to a Russian sphere of influence or "grey zone."
- o U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington, not Moscow; Russia does not exercise a veto over the West's Central European policy. Yet we must be careful not to take steps that would draw a new line in Europe; we should not, out of fear of Russian nationalism's potential achievement of power, act in ways that inadvertently made our fears reality.
- o CEE's success depends on much more than military security, and U.S. engagement in the region likewise is based on much more than military relations. As discussed in the formal meetings, the U.S. has specific ideas about ways to deepen our support for CEE reforms across the board.

BACKGROUND

The Charles Bridge, one of Prague's most famous landmarks, links the old town with the "small side" of the Vltava River under the Prague Castle. The first stone bridge across the river was built near this site in the 12th century; it was eventually destroyed by flooding. The current bridge was one of the works of Charles IV in the Golden Era of Prague, and was completed in 1357. It is the second oldest bridge in Central Europe (after Regensburg).

The Cobble Bridge, now only open to foot traffic, is 520 meters long and ten meters wide. It is marked by large neo-gothic

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towers at either end (whose predecessors were redoubts in the defense of the city against Swedish attack in the Thirty-Years War). Along the bridge are thirty statues, mostly baroque, gradually added over the centuries: These statues include Saint Wenceslas, the patron saint of Bohemia.

The bridge is now a focal point for young people, artists and craftsmakers who sell to the many tourists who crowd Prague. On summer evenings, there is a sense of 1960s America, as young guitarists entertain passersby and throngs of visitors enjoy the scene.

From the bridge, one gains a broad view of the Prague Castle and the dome of Saint Nicholas Church to the north and west, and the sight of the spires of the old town's many churches, including the Tyn Church on Old Town Square, to the east.

Wenceslas Square is best known for its statue of St. Wenceslas, the 10th-century Bohemian king who is considered the father of the Bohemian nation. The statue, built at the turn of the 20th century, has been a focal point of Czech national pride.

The square, originally a horse-market, slopes nearly half a mile from the National Museum to the twisted alleys of the old town. Today its hotels and shops offer an eclectic mix of architectural styles, from Empire to Art Nouveau, Art Deco to Constructivist.

Next to the National Museum above the square is the modern Federal Assembly Building, built in the 1970s, which has been discussed as a possible future home for the offices of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Further in the same direction is the Woodrow Wilson Train Station, the main station in Prague, which honors the American President whose influence helped create Czechoslovakia in the wake of World War I.

Just below the statue of St. Wenceslas is a monument to the victims of communism, at the spot where the Czech student Jan Palach burned himself to death in early 1969 to protest the Warsaw Pact's military response to Alexander Dubcek's experiment with "Socialism with a Human Face."

It was Dubcek once again who electrified a crowd estimated at over half a million in November, 1989, when after nearly 20 year of silence he joined Vaclav Havel on the balcony of the Melantrich Building overlooking the square to greet the Czechs and Slovaks who sought to drive out the communist regime and install a democratic government.

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YOUR PLENARY LUNCH WITH VISEGRAD LEADERS

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

This working Plenary Lunch is the substantive centerpiece of the Prague stop. As host, you will be able to set the tone and agenda. We hope to have time for give-and-take, but there are a number of concrete points you should get on the record. Moreover, the Visegrad leaders badly want to hear a strong statement from you that their security and stability are important to us.

You therefore will begin with 10-15 minutes of remarks, which will be televised. After the press departs, you, as host, should continue your presentation. Following broad remarks confirming our engagement in CEE, we propose turning to NATO and the Partnership for Peace. You should explain the PFP's broader context: how it fits our strategy and how it can help CEE's security problems by forging an operating Partnership with NATO now and beginning an evolution toward full membership. You then should outline shifts you are making in American policies to increase our support for democracy and market economic reform (including more active encouragement of American private investment), and conclude by emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation. We have organized your substantive points under these headings and suggest you weave them in during the conversation.

We anticipate releasing to the press an integrated text of your remarks as prepared even if, as is virtually certain, time does not permit you to make all the points at the lunch. For this reason, the text below is presented in full sentences.

At the table will be the Presidents, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Four (V-4), and from our side Secretary Christopher, Mr. Lake and Ambassadors Albright and Basora. Notetakers and interpreters will be seated in the room.

You will have just concluded bilaterals with the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks (and will have met with the Czechs the previous evening), and thus will be well aware of your guests' concerns and expectations. Uppermost on their minds will be the NATO Summit and PFP; they will argue that the Russian elections strengthen their case for more explicit differentiation and more rapid movement toward membership.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Set out the U.S. agenda of intensified engagement in support of CEE democracy and reform.
- o Elicit strong V-4 endorsement of your Partnership for Peace initiative.

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- o Assure the V-4 (and other CEE's) that their strategic choice of Western values and a Western orientation remains valid; the U.S. will neither lose interest in Central and Eastern Europe nor consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.
- o Encourage intra-CEE/V-4 regional cooperation.

A note of caution:

The Visegrad Group was created in 1991 as the newly-free countries of Central Europe sought to maintain the cooperative spirit that had animated relations among their democratic dissidents during the 1980's. It has promise but its future is still uncertain. Despite basically common problems and outlooks, the "V-4" often tend to look at one another as rivals and -- the Czechs especially -- are wary that closer association could slow their integration into the West. Moreover, interpersonal dynamics among the eight Presidents and Premiers vary; they have never before been assembled together. All will want the meeting to succeed, but there may be some jockeying between national delegations as well as within them. The Poles especially were irritated that Prague was chosen as the venue and fear the Czechs have sought to slight the regional character of the meeting.

YOUR KEY POINTS

Thematic Remarks (To be revised)

[Televised; to be provided to the media as full text]

- o The United States and Europe are at a moment of strategic choice. The old totalitarian system is gone. Europe's new democracies -- whose people led the revolutions of 1989 -- have made tremendous strides in overcoming its legacy. Some of the leaders of 1989 are gathered here now and I am honored to be in their company.
- o Let us remember how much your nations have accomplished in so short a time. Your cities and highways are transformed, with commerce, color and increasing wealth visible in place of shortages, greyness and stagnation. The first, hard period of adjustment may well be coming to an end, thanks to the courage and determination of the people of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
- o Perhaps most inspiring of all, the new democracies of Central Europe have accomplished this through democratic means -- through parliaments, political parties, vibrant newspapers and television, and vigorous debate.
- o Yet difficulties and doubts remain. The benefits of the new reforms have not reached throughout society. The promise of 1989 has not yet been fulfilled; the victory of democracy and reform is not yet won. Some say it cannot be won; that democracy and market reforms are beyond the capacity of the new democracies in Central Europe and the NIS. Those who

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have given up the path of reform speak a language we recall from a darker recent past: a language of fear, of anger, of narrow nationalism, of hate, of aggression.

- o Those who counsel despair and defeat were wrong in 1989 and they are wrong today. The democratic and free market transformation pioneered by the nations of Central Europe since 1989 has not been easy. But by continuing your reforms you are proving that it is possible.
- o You do not stand alone. Indeed, you must not stand alone: the fates of our nations are intertwined. Two World Wars and a Cold War that lasted over forty years demonstrate beyond all doubt that if freedom and democracy are at risk in Central Europe, then they are at risk in all of Europe and beyond.
- o My country learned through bitter experience three times in this century that the security of American democracy and the ability to sustain American prosperity depend on the security and the prosperity of other democracies.
- o This why the central purpose of my country's foreign policy is to enlarge the world's free community of market democracies. Opportunities to fulfill that vision may be greater in Central Europe -- in the Visegrad countries -- than anywhere else in the world. I envision the full integration of a democratic, free market Central Europe into this community of market democracies.
- o The security of Central Europe is important to the security of the United States. All countries, but especially democracies who are behaving as good neighbors with one another, deserve a sense of security. That is why I have come here, straight from the NATO Summit. I want to talk with you about security in all its dimensions -- because, as the Polish saying has it, there should be "nothing about us without us." (FYI - This Polish idiom, well-understood in the region, means essentially "No more Yaltas.")
- o With the stakes high, the United States will remain engaged, helping across the board as the Visegrad and other new democratic countries help themselves. Our relations are rich in every field and will deepen. We will do more together in the security area, in support of democratic and market economic reform, and we can work together to support regional cooperation, cooperation which is a major part of your integration into Western institutions.
- o I spoke of a strategic choice that lies before us. Shall we fulfill the promise of 1989 and complete the task we have begun? Shall we build a larger, durable community of democracies, prosperous market economies and good neighbors? Shall we turn to one another with hope for the future? I say we shall. And with God's help we will.

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[Non-televised; also to be provided to the media as full text]

- o I also am here to say not just what the United States believes, but to discuss what the United States and the Visegrad countries can do, working together. I want to focus on specifics, and there is much to cover:
 - First, I want to tell you about the NATO Summit and the new Partnership for Peace that can address security concerns of democracies in Central Europe and the NIS, and to hear your views.
 - Second, I want to share ideas about how the United States can support your democratic and free market transformation.
 - Finally, I want to discuss specific ways how the U.S. can support regional cooperation among the new democracies, including your own Visegrad group. This is not an alternative to integration with the West. Proof that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can work together to overcome historic rivalries and tensions will make them more attractive partners to the established democracies of the West.

NATO Summit and PFP

- o The NATO Summit in Brussels made a historic decision to begin a process of expanding.
- o As a major element of that process, NATO has launched a new proposal to expand practical military cooperation to democracies in Central Europe and the NIS -- the Partnership for Peace.
 - We want to get practical cooperation underway as soon as possible between NATO militaries and the militaries of the new democracies who want to join it. Under the Partnership, our militaries can plan, train, exercise and even operate together.
 - The Partnership also has a political dimension. NATO will commit itself to consult with a Partner state if there is a direct, immediate threat to that state's security.
- o I cannot promise NATO membership or dates; nor can I promise a precise road map to NATO expansion.
- o But I want NATO to expand, through the Partnership. The Partnership will be as effective as you make it; active participation in it will speed our military cooperation and integration. I will be delighted if your countries were the

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first to join and become the most enthusiastic and active members of the Partnership.

- Central Europe is not and will not be a "grey zone" or "buffer area." Military cooperation is complex, but the Partnership's meaning is simple: NATO is ready to get to work to improve your security, and ours.
- o To support the Partnership and the new security relationship it establishes, the United States is reorienting some of its bilateral military programs and policies. Our resources are limited but we have some new ideas.
 - The U.S. will help organize and train, and perhaps even be able to help equip, selected units from Central Europe to NATO standards. Such units could be designated for possible joint operations with NATO units, if governments agreed on their use in some future contingency.
 - In addition, I am directing that the United States remove remaining Cold War Era-restrictions that still prohibit transfer or sale of defense articles to some Central and East European countries. The United States will be able to judge each transfer or sale on a case-by-case basis, as we do with most other countries.
 - Of course, as responsible members of the international community, I know I can count on you to do your share in keeping weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous items out of the hands of rogue nations.

- o I look forward to welcoming you as new Partners for Peace.

Support for Democracy and Free Markets

- o Military security is only a small part of America's engagement with you. Security goes far beyond its military dimension, and the success of your reforms will depend more on economic and social factors.
- o The United States wants to be more active here, and in some different ways than in the past. I have some ideas in mind.
- o Your progress since 1989 shows that serious, comprehensive economic reform produces fast results -- look at the Czech Republic. And Poland, which undertook radical reforms regarded at the time as extraordinary daring, is now Europe's fastest-growing economy.
- o But the process of reform can bring serious social strains. A flourishing private sector is necessary, but needs to be accompanied by modernization and reform of government administration and social safety net structures.

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- o The United States will give greater emphasis in its assistance program to help reform public administration and social safety net systems. I hope international financial organizations -- such as the World Bank -- can do the same.
 - It is wrong to think of a trade-off between support for the private or public sectors. Both are necessary. We are exploring a proposal to help newly-privatized firms and their communities; to work with public and private sectors to make economic transformation a success for the whole society.
- o The United States also will intensify its programs in support of what we call civil society, especially at the grass roots.
 - Democratic structures rest on a sturdy web of values and civic institutions, woven into every day life. The United States will establish a new "Partnership in Democracy" program to share the spirit, skills and experience of independent, non-government organizations in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe that are engaged in civic projects.
- o Some of you here have expressed the hope that the United States will continue to support Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
 - These radios played an irreplaceable role in the transition to democracy. And their tasks are not yet complete. I intend to keep supporting the good work RFE and RL do as democracy is built in Central Europe and the NIS.
 - The Czech Government has made a very generous offer to help if the United States decides to move RFE/RL to Prague. That is a serious offer and we are looking at it very seriously. The issue is complex, with budgetary and legal issues to be resolved. We will be considering these very closely over the coming weeks.
- o Successful reform rests on your integration into the world economy. Countries that have overthrown communism and are introducing bold market reforms have the right to expect open markets for their exports.
- o I urge the European Union to join me in putting fair market access for the nations of Central Europe high on the world's trade agenda, and I call on the EU to work with the United States in making sure our markets are open to the fair exports of the new democracies of Central and East European.
- o I also will do more to encourage American investment in Central and Eastern Europe. As your private sectors grow, these opportunities have multiplied.

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- In the first half of 1994, the [U.S.][White House] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, inviting the American and Central European business communities to discuss business opportunities and ways to reduce barriers to trade and investment.
- I am also pleased to announce an expansion of programs by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in Central Europe. OPIC will accept proposals to establish investment funds in the region, increase from \$50 to \$200 million its project lending limit, and will seek legislative authority to enable it to provide equity as part of a total project financing package.

Support for Regional Cooperation

- o In a region where national rivalries have produced horrors, a regional group like Visegrad is to be valued. The Atlantic community of the post-WWII world was built on cooperation among West European nations. Cooperation among Central European states will speed your integration into the larger community of market democracies.
- o Moreover, a good deal of economic development is regional by nature. Major roads and other forms of transport and communications infrastructure make more sense if they are designed with a regional perspective. Simply removing bottlenecks at border crossings would bring visible economic results, help link nations together and make lives easier for thousands of people.
- o I am determined that the United States will do more to support regional cooperation.
- We will provide technical assistance to regional groups, or to ad hoc groups of more than one country, in designing projects that would benefit more than one country. In our bilateral assistance programs and through international financial organizations, the United States will give preference to sound regional projects.
- In particular, the United States will seek to mobilize international support for sound regional transport and communications infrastructure projects, by offering technical assistance to countries in designing such projects, and by encouraging international financial institutions and the European Union to finance them.
- The United States is prepared to support efforts of the Visegrad countries, and eventually those of other countries in the region, to establish a regional airspace system. Beyond its economic payoffs, modernizing your airspace systems could be a good example of practical cooperation within the region to

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ease your integration into the Western community. The U.S. could offer now to work with you, individually and collectively, to develop a complete plan for a cooperative system that would bring your countries together and could be compatible with Western airspace systems, including those of NATO.

- The U.S. will welcome opportunities to engage in regular dialogue with the Visegrad group and with other emerging regional groups.

Summary

- o My country's priorities are clear: Central Europe's security, economic transformation and democracy are indispensable elements of the new Europe and the new world.
 - Central and Eastern Europe is intrinsically important to us. Two of my senior advisers were born in Visegrad states; I am proud that one of them is here with me today. Madeline Albright and John Shalikashvili are visible reminders that America's European roots stretch deep into this region.
 - The success of your democratic, free market transformation also has broader ramifications. America cannot be secure unless Europe is secure. The Western part of Europe cannot be stable and prosperous if Europe's heart and Europe's east are in turmoil. The success of your reform efforts also can have important -- perhaps decisive -- influence on the democratic transition of the New Independent States.
- o I have presented a specific action plan of how the United States can help now, across the full agenda of your interests and ours. I am honored to have met with you.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 7/30/2024
2024-0540-7 (1.14)

VISEGRAD

The Visegrad group takes its name from the Hungarian town which hosted a February 1991 summit meeting between Presidents Havel and Walesa and Prime Minister Antall of Hungary. Though never institutionalized and although beset with reluctance on the part of the Czechs, Visegrad group cooperation nevertheless has yielded results in ministerial consultations, cooperation on border issues, and, most notably, a regional free trade agreement signed in 1992 (to be implemented gradually over an 8-year period).

A good description of Visegrad's origins was made by a Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister and former dissident, who told a USG contact that the Visegrad process represented the logical outgrowth of years of informal contacts among veterans of the democratic opposition who, now in power, wanted their trust and mutual regard expressed as regional cooperation.

When common concerns or interests have been clear, or in cases regarded as emergency, cooperation has grown. Apart from the regional free trade zone, Visegrad members quickly developed a coordinated position condemning the attempted coup by hardliners in Moscow in August 1991, and cooperated in negotiating parallel association treaties with the EU that were signed in December 1991. Visegrad members also cooperate in the security field in areas of common shortcomings, such as military training, air defense technologies and military production. The group maintains high-level bilateral and multi-lateral military contacts and has developed common positions on disarmament negotiations.

However, Visegrad countries are unsure how their cooperation is to develop. In Washington in December 1993, Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski expressed interest in regional economic cooperation, including practical projects among the Visegrad states. However, Czech Premier Klaus believes the Czech Republic stands a better chance of gaining membership in the EU through a "go-it-alone" strategy and has periodically denegated the Visegrad group as a "club of the poor." The Czechs have also flatly rejected Polish and Hungarian calls to hammer out a common approach to Partnership programs and tried to keep the term "Visegrad" from being used in planning for this regional trip. The Visegrad track record on economic cooperation under pressure is mixed. Although the group for a short time last spring presented a united front in the face of an EU ban on East European meat products, its members quickly broke ranks to negotiate individual solutions. Trade among Visegrad members remains low, having fallen sharply since the end of CEMA in 1991.

The Visegrad countries view Partnership programs as a way station toward NATO membership, not a substitute. They want program proposals to be fleshed out as fully and quickly as possible.

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They are divided, however, on how precisely Partnership programs should be tied to NATO membership to best serve individual national interests. The Czechs would like both the NATO and Prague summits to spell out specific criteria for membership that they believe would give them a leg up among the Four. The Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks -- in roughly that order of intensity -- favor admission of the Four only as a group.

The U.S. has consistently commended Visegrad as a valuable initiative in regional cooperation that might serve as a potential model for others. We have also made it clear that we see Visegrad not as an end in itself but as a stepping stone to integration into broader European and transatlantic institutions.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KBT/NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-m (1.17)

U.S. INITIATIVES FOR PRAGUE

Partnerships in Democracy. Under this new program, we will support civil society in CEE through assistance to indigenous public-policy NGO's in the region. It will feature more field-based decision-making, greater flexibility and faster response time than many of our previous democracy programs in the region. Country programs will be drawn up by newly-established Embassy Democracy Commissions and implemented by a designated NGO (probably U.S. rather than indigenous). Programs will involve training and support of host country NGO's; specific areas of activity will depend on the needs of the country (e.g., law, education, local government, inter-ethnic relations). We will support regional cooperation by 1) giving priority to programs with an ethnic or regional balance in their membership and; 2) giving a U.S. NGO a separate mandate to conduct regional programs, working with counterparts from more than one country. This is a \$30 million program for 3-5 years, funded by within existing SEED budgets.

Support for Public Sector/Social Safety Net reform. We will emphasize technical assistance and training to upgrade and modernize public administration and social safety net structures. The Department of Labor is leading an interagency effort to identify the most promising areas of activity. The Department of Treasury is developing an initiative to coordinate World Bank and donor country (G-7) assistance for newly-privatized firms and communities. Funding will come from existing SEED budgets.

Support for Regional Cooperation. We will develop regular dialogue with constructive emerging transnational groups -- such as Visegrad; offer technical assistance to regional groups, giving priority to projects that benefit more than one country; and, support -- through technical assistance and by seeking to influence the IFI's -- regional transportation and communications infrastructure projects.

In addition, we have developed a regional airspace initiative to help the Visegrad and eventually other CEE countries establish a region-wide civil/military airspace management system. We can now offer the first phase -- a \$.5 million architecture study for the Visegrad countries that would give them a comprehensive airspace system modernization plan. The implementation phase will require outside funding, e.g., the World Bank. While the World Bank may be interested in this project, we should not suggest or promise any Phase II funding at this point.

Market access. Independent studies and USG analyses indicate that the U.S. market is far more open than the EU market for CEE exports. In Brussels and Prague, we will challenge the EU and EFTA to open their markets and urge that market access for CEE be put on the G-7 Summit Agenda.

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Support for trade and investment. We have prepared two initiatives. First, we will announce in Prague a [White House/USG] Conference on Trade and Investment to take place in 1994. Second, we will announce an expansion of OPIC programs in the region. OPIC will:

- o Elicit and accept proposals to establish privately-managed investment funds in the region.
- o Increase its per-project lending limit from \$50 million to \$200 million.
- o Seek legislative authority to enable OPIC to provide equity as part of a total project financing package.

Bilateral Military Programs. We will orient our bilateral military programs in CEE to support PFP. Specifically, we will:

- o Encourage CEE countries to maintain or create units capable of and earmarked for possible joint peacekeeping operations with NATO.
- o Work with allies and CEE partners to identify available excess, second-generation, NATO-compatible equipment for potential transfer or sale or that can be purchased commercially at relatively low cost.
- o Seek funding for assistance to CEE countries to modernize the equipment and improve the interoperability of their militaries.

We will also end Cold War-era prohibitions and restrictions on U.S. arms sales and arms transfers. Specifically, we will complete Presidential Determinations for all CEE states (except those under arms embargo), which will allow the USG to transfer U.S. defense articles and services to CEE governments. (Sensitive arms transfers would still be constrained by existing laws and policy). We will also remove all CEE states (except those under arms embargoes) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations list, which will allow commercial purchase of U.S. defense articles.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-m (1.18)

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) is the centerpiece of our NATO Summit proposals. Its operational details, important though they are, should not be allowed to obscure its political aims:

Openness. The Partnership is not a second-best substitute for NATO membership, but a major step toward integrating the new democracies into the Alliance. It is open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC consists of NATO members and all former members of the Warsaw Pact) as well as a number of other European states of NATO's choosing (primarily the former neutrals). While the Partnership responds directly to CEE desires for closer relations with NATO and a path toward full membership, we hope that Russia, Ukraine, the Baltics and others also will participate.

Opportunity. Each Partner can largely determine for itself the nature of its engagement with NATO by the extent and enthusiasm of its participation in the Partnership. Thus, there will be "differentiation in practice," without formally drawing new dividing lines in Europe. In private conversations with Polish, Czech and Hungarian officials, we have made no secret of our hope that they will be the most active participants and of our expectation that most Partnership activities in the east will be on their soil. Moreover, because the Partnership represents an evolutionary, dynamic process rather than a static policy, it keeps the door open to formal expansion of membership down the road and thereby retaining the necessary flexibility to deal with uncertainty in Russia and other regions of the NIS.

Obligation. NATO is an Alliance of mutual obligation. Participation in Partnership activities will prepare eastern states to meet the obligations of NATO membership, not just receive benefits from it.

Demonstration of commitment. The presence of NATO military units on eastern soil, preparing with eastern militaries for eastern contingencies, will provide dramatic and tangible evidence of NATO's interest in Partners' security. Especially in light of developments in the former Yugoslavia, CEE states are concerned that the West will resist engagement in the region. Partnership activities will counter this fear and, in so doing, bolster the position of reformers seeking to orient their policies and societies westward.

Political impact. The Partnership's impact on the "democratization" of eastern militaries, and on their relations with each other, can be as important as its role in integrating them with NATO military forces. Formal reviews of eastern Partners' plans for increasing both civilian control of the military and the transparency of military budgets will be supplemented by the socializing effect of working with forces from established Western democracies. Moreover, the NATO aegis will facilitate cooperation between Hungarian and Romanian, or

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Polish and Ukrainian, militaries as well as between each of them and the west. This can encourage them to think of each other as partners rather than potential adversaries -- much as NATO did for French, German, British and Italian forces after World War II.

NATO allies have responded enthusiastically to the Partnership proposal; many had worried that we would push the membership issue further than they (or their parliaments) now are willing to go. Yeltsin was grateful that we avoided steps that could aid Russia's nationalists. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were relieved that NATO was not going to draw a new dividing line that excluded them, as were Ukraine and the Baltics that we would not implicitly consign them to Russia's sphere of influence.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic initially were very disappointed that we did not explicitly single them out for eventual full membership in NATO; considerable disappointment lingers. Most recently, however, key figures (e.g., Hungarian President Goencz when talking to Vice President Gore in mid-December) have said that while they want a security link with NATO they appreciate their own stake in avoiding actions that would destabilize Russia at this delicate juncture. Many are coming to see the Partnership as the best step for now.

How the Partnership Will Work. Participation in the Partnership will be open to all NACC states (and select others) willing and able to send representatives to appropriate political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and a Liaison Cell at SHAPE, as well as to participate in Partnership activities. NATO authorities currently envisage a number of exercises in 1994, including a command post exercise in Germany in the spring of 1994 and a field exercise in Poland in the autumn. These exercises will be announced either at the NATO Summit or during your visit to Prague.

The Summit will launch the PFP through a Partnership Framework Declaration signed by Secretary General Woerner on behalf of NATO. Prospective Partners will then be invited to sign the Declaration as an indication of their intent to participate. The Declaration spells out in general terms the political and military obligations of signatories (commitment to democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian control of the military, transparency of military budgets and the development of forces capable of operating with NATO). After signing the Declaration, Partners will file "Commitment Documents" with NATO indicating what forces and other assets they will contribute to Partnership activities as well as steps they plan to take to enhance civilian control of the military and transparency of military budgets. NATO officials will help prepare these documents if a Partner so requests. Partnership activities will be designed and prepared at the Liaison Cell at SHAPE, under the political guidance and for the approval of NATO headquarters. The North Atlantic Council (NATO Ambassadors) will have political authority over the Partnership, sometimes meeting as the "NAC plus" (i.e., with Partner states). A Steering Committee

comprised of NATO and Partner state representatives will provide day-to-day oversight. Office space will be provided to partner states at NATO headquarters and at SHAPE.

Partners participating in PFP activities will receive a commitment to consult with NATO in the event of a direct and immediate threat to their security. This provision parallels Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, although NATO allies prefer not to refer to Article IV as such (to avoid the political difficulties associated with even the appearance of committing to a treaty-like obligation). Although it commits NATO only to consult -- not to take action in the common defense (as stipulated in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty) -- this aspect of the PFP has important symbolic value and indicates to states in the east that their security is of direct and material concern to NATO members.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-m (7.19)

RFE/RL

The activities of Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL) and the associated Research Institute are being consolidated and reduced in size as part of a reorganization and modernization of the U.S. international broadcasting effort. The bill to consolidate U.S. international broadcasting, already passed by the House, goes to the Senate on January 25.

Under current plans, for purposes of modernization and cost-saving, many technical activities of RFE/RL will be taken over by USIA's Voice of America (VOA), and all of RFE/RL's present 1,600 employees will either be laid off or moved from the present facilities in Munich, Germany, to Washington or a location in Europe. The bill does not directly address the move, but does establish a board to study options and make recommendations.

Although the original plan only contemplated moving RFE/RL from Munich to Washington, the government of the Czech Republic has strongly appealed to us to move the two radios and research institute to Prague. As a site, the Czechs are offering a modern building which was constructed as the federal parliament for the former Czech and Slovak Republic. After the formal separation of the two nations, the building has remained empty.

RFE/RL's oversight body, the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) strongly favors the move to Prague, if cost and other considerations can be addressed satisfactorily. BIB has engaged a group of outside consultants to look at the technical and financial implications of an RFE/RL move to Prague. Their reports, and BIB's conclusion and recommendations, should be ready by mid-January. Preliminary estimates suggest that up-front costs of the move could reach \$30 million or more, although considerable savings might be realized in subsequent years. (The move to the U.S. may cost even more.)

In any case, a considerable amount of negotiating with the Czechs will be necessary in order to nail down the rent for the building, and the tax status of the radios and of the personnel before we know if the "Prague option" is best for the radios.

American businessman and philanthropist George Soros recently added an interesting element by offering to house in Budapest the Research Institute's archives, and may also agree to fund some of the Institute's operating costs if it moves to Prague. BIB is looking at the legal aspects of Soros's offer, and believes it worth considering, but discussions with Soros are still at a very preliminary phase.

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INFO: ****
SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF PRESIDENT HAVEL MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT CLINTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, Sec. 1.1, 2(a)
By KRM/NARA, Date 7/30/2024
1024-0540-m (1.20)

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 101152
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (HAVEL, VACLAV), PREL, EZ
SUBJECT: CONFIRMATION OF PRESIDENT HAVEL MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHITE HOUSE HAS AUTHORIZED YOU TO INFORM GOCR THAT
PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL BE PLEASED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
HAVEL DURING PRESIDENT HAVEL'S UPCOMING VISIT TO
WASHINGTON IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPENING OF THE HOLOCAUST
MUSEUM.

3. A DATE AND TIME FOR THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED;
BOTH WILL FOLLOW.

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INFO: *****
SUBJ: HAVEL'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH THE
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 03312
DEPARTMENT FOR OXMAN AND EUR/EE
NSC FOR WALKER
SECDEF FOR PERRY
USUN FOR ALBRIGHT
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, MASS, EZ
SUBJECT: HAVEL'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT: SECURITY ISSUES ON THE AGENDA
1. SUMMARY: IN APRIL 13 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR,
CHIEF OF STAFF DOBROVSKY OUTLINED PRESIDENT HAVEL'S
APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES, EMPHASIZING
THAT HAVEL HOPES TO FOCUS ON THIS TOPIC DURING HIS
APRIL 20 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON.
HAVEL BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED U.S. AND WESTERN
ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS CRITICAL. THE
CZECHS WANT NATO MEMBERSHIP NOT JUST TO PROTECT
THEIR TERRITORY BUT TO PROTECT COMMON DEMOCRATIC
VALUES. HAVEL AND HIS PARTY WILL DISCUSS SPECIFIC
U.S. PROPOSALS FOR BIALTERAL MILITARY COOPERATION.
HAVEL IS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE CONTINUATION OF
RADIO FREE EUROPE'S CZECH BROADCASTS, A UN SECURITY
COUNCIL SEAT FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, BUT MAY NOT RAISE THE LATTER
ISSUES IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL MEETING. HE STILL HOPES
TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE.
DOBROVSKY EMPHASIZED THAT THE CZECHS SPEAK WITH ONE
VOICE, AND THAT HAVEL, PRIME MINISTER KLAUS, AND
FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC AGREE FUNDAMENTALLY ON
ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. END SUMMARY.
2. LUBOS DOBROVSKY, WHO SERVES AS CHANCELLOR AND
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE CZECH PRESIDENT, MET WITH THE
AMBASSADOR APRIL 13 TO DISCUSS THE UPCOMING HAVEL
VISIT TO THE U.S. DOBROVSKY, WHO SERVED AS
CZECHOSLOVAK DEFENSE MINISTER UNTIL MID-1992,

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KRH NARA, Date 4/30/2024
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EMPHASIZED THAT THE MAIN TOPIC HAVEL HOPES TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT (AND WHICH VONDRA AND SEIFTER HOPE TO DISCUSS AT THE PENTAGON SEPARATELY) IS SECURITY.

3. DOBROVSKY CONCISELY DEFINED CZECH CONCERNS AS FOLLOWS: HAVEL WANTS TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT MILITARY/SECURITY STRUCTURE OF EUROPE; THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE CZECH ARMY IN NATO PLANNING; THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE (POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY AS WELL AS MILITARILY); AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL NEW THREATS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. DOBROVSKY WELL UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO BE CONCISE IN SUCH HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, AND HOPED THAT THESE SECURITY TOPICS COULD ALSO BE WOVEN INTO A DISCUSSION OF HOW THE U.S. VIEWS THREE SPECIFIC AREAS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE CZECHS: RUSSIA, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND GERMANY.

4. FROM THE CZECH POINT OF VIEW, DOBROVSKY EXPLAINED, THE KEY IS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REMAIN ENGAGED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THAT IT MUST WORK TO KEEP ALL MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE ENGAGED IN THE REGION AS WELL. THOSE WHO PUT THE GREATEST EFFORT INTO RESTORING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF CENTRAL EUROPE -- PARTICULARLY THE U.S.-- MUST NOT LOSE TOUCH WITH THE ONGOING PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE HERE, HE SAID. WITHOUT THIS AMERICAN PRESENCE, QUESTIONS ABOUT RUSSIA'S STABILITY WOULD BECOME INFINITELY MORE WORRISOME TO THOSE, LIKE THE CZECHS, WHO WERE COMPELLED TO LIVE ALONGSIDE RUSSIA.

(NOTE: THOSE WHO REMEMBER HAVEL'S SPEECH TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY 1990 WILL RECALL HIS PLEA FOR U.S. HELP FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN THE THEN-SOVIET UNION. HE IS LIKELY TO REPEAT THAT THEME IN WASHINGTON.)

5. DOBROVSKY MENTIONED TWO SPECIFIC U.S. INITIATIVES IN THE SECURITY FIELD: MILITARY TO MILITARY EXCHANGES, LIKE THOSE ALREADY EXISTING IN POLAND AND HUNGARY; AND THE CREATION OF A COMMON COMMISSION THAT WOULD SERVE AS A LINK BETWEEN THE GENERAL STAFFS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. (DOBROVSKY MENTIONED THAT CZECH CHIEF OF STAFF PEZL WILL BE IN WASHINGTON ON A SEPARATE BUT CONCURRENT VISIT, AND WILL ADDRESS THESE ISSUES AS WELL WITH HIS DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INTERLOCUTORS).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 03312
DEPARTMENT FOR OXMAN AND EUR/EE

NSC FOR WALKER

SECDEF FOR PERRY

USUN FOR ALBRIGHT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP, PREL, MASS, EZ

SUBJECT: HAVEL'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH THE

6. DOBROVSKY STRESSED HAVEL'S PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE SECURITY ISSUE. HAVEL'S SPEECHES, HE SAID, INVARIABLY STRESSED THAT THE CZECH DESIRE FOR CLOSER TIES WITH, AND MEMBERSHIP IN, NATO EMANATE FROM AN UNDERSTANDING THAT NATO IS NOT AN ORGANIZATION DESIGNED TO PROTECT NOT JUST THE TERRITORY OF ITS

MEMBERS BUT THE VALUES THAT THEY SHARE. DOBROVSKY SAID HAVEL WAS SOMETIMES DISAPPOINTED THAT SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT VALUES, NOT TERRITORY, WERE AT THE HEART OF THE CZECH DESIRE TO JOIN NATO, AND THAT THE CZECHS WERE NOT ASKING FOR A FREE RIDE AND WERE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY.

7. DOBROVSKY (AND PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR PAVEL SEIFTER) RAISED OTHER ITEMS THAT CONCERN THE CZECHS:

-- HAVEL IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF RADIO FREE EUROPE, AND EMPHASIZES ITS ONGOING IMPORTANCE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC. HAVEL BELIEVES RFE IS STILL THE MOST IMPORTANT INDEPENDENT MEDIA VOICE IN THE COUNTRY.

-- THE CZECHS SEEK THE EASTERN GROUP'S ROTATING SEAT ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. DOBROVSKY INDICATED THAT HAVEL WOULD PROBABLY RAISE THIS WITH UN AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT RATHER THAN WITH THE PRESIDENT.

-- HAVEL IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, AND HOPES THAT A MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GORE CAN BE ARRANGED (DOBROVSKY INDICATED THAT THE CZECH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS WORKING ON THIS). THE CZECHS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION ON WHAT THE U.S. IS DOING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL AREA IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE, AND WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE PILOT PROJECTS THAT COULD BE DUPLICATED THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

8. FINALLY, DOBROVSKY EMPHATICALLY DISMISSED ANY SUGGESTION OF LINGERING PERSONAL OR POLICY TENSIONS BETWEEN HAVEL AND PRIME MINISTER KLAUS, OR BETWEEN HAVEL'S CASTLE STAFF AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. DOBROVSKY SAID THAT PAST MINOR FRICTIONS HAD BEEN RESOLVED. HAVEL NOT DOES NOT SAY BAD THINGS ABOUT KLAUS'S POLICIES BECAUSE HE DOES NOT THINK BAD THINGS ABOUT KLAUS'S POLICIES. THEY ARE IN CLOSE AGREEMENT ON NEARLY ALL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. HAVEL AND KLAUS MEET WEEKLY, AND KLAUS BRIEFS HAVEL ON KEY GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND THEN THEY HAVE OPEN AND FREE DISCUSSIONS. SIMILARLY, HAVEL'S STAFF IS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH JOZEF ZIELENIEC'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND NO SIGNIFICANT TROUBLES REMAIN THERE EITHER. ZIELENIEC'S ABSENCE FROM HAVEL'S PARTY IN WASHINGTON IS NOT BECAUSE OF ANY DISINCLINATION TO BE LINKED TO HIM, BUT BECAUSE OF A PRESSING PARLIAMENTARY INTERPELLATION THAT COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION THAT WILL KEEP HIM IN PRAGUE. BASORA

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SUBJ: VACLAV HAVEL: SAME MAN, DIFFERENT ROLE
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 03342
NSC FOR WALKER
VIENNA ALSO HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EZ
SUBJECT: VACLAV HAVEL: SAME MAN, DIFFERENT ROLE
REF: PRAGUE 3312
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: VACLAV HAVEL IS A MUCH LESS CENTRAL AND POWERFUL FIGURE AS PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC THAN HE WAS AS FEDERAL PRESIDENT. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, A STRONG, ASSERTIVE CZECH GOVERNMENT, AND THE ABSENCE OF A REAL POLITICAL BASE ALL CIRCUMSCRIBE HAVEL'S INFLUENCE. HE IS ADAPTING TO HIS NEW ROLE, BUT WITH DIFFICULTY, AND SEEMS SOMEWHAT BITTER OR DEPRESSED AT THE PASSING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA IN CZECH POLITICS. THAT SAID, HE REMAINS WILLING TO TAKE A POSITIVE APPROACH, AS A SPOKESMAN FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IN PRODDING THE CZECHS TO ADDRESS SOME OF THEIR SHORTCOMINGS. A ROLE THAT HAVEL CANNOT AND WILL NOT PLAY, HOWEVER, IS THAT OF COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE FEISTY AND OFTEN ABRASIVE PRIME MINISTER KLAUS. HAVEL'S CHARISMA SHOULD NOT LEAD US TO TREAT HIM AS SOMETHING MORE THAN HE CAN BE. HE STILL HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY AS A CHIEF OF STATE, BUT NO LONGER AS A VIRTUAL HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. CZECH POLICY IS DEFINITELY THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESERVE. END SUMMARY.
3. CZECH PRESIDENT VACLAV HAVEL IS MUCH THE SAME MAN AS WHEN HE LAST VISITED WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER 1991: AN INTELLECTUAL INTENT ON KEEPING MORAL AND

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KRM NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-M (1.22)

ETHICAL VALUES AT THE FOREFRONT OF CZECH CONSCIOUSNESS, WHO SPEAKS FROM BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE COST OF SEEING THOSE VALUES SUBMERGED. AT THE SAME TIME, HAVEL'S POLITICAL SITUATION, HIS POWERS, AND HIS INFLUENCE ON CZECH SOCIETY HAVE CHANGED GREATLY SINCE THE LAST CZECHOSLOVAK ELECTIONS IN JUNE 1992.

FROM VITAL CENTER TO THE POLITICAL PERIPHERY

4. AS PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC, HAVEL, ASSISTED BY A STAFF OF LONG-TIME PARTNERS FROM DISSIDENT DAYS, WAS THE TRUEST EMBODIMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC CZECH AND SLOVAK STATE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS WEAK, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF THE FINANCE MINISTRY UNDER VACLAV KLAUS. CZECH/SLOVAK DIFFERENCES PARALYZED THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT ON MOST KEY ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DID NOT GIVE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FEDERATION'S TWO COMPONENT REPUBLICS THE ATTRIBUTES OF TRUE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS SEEMING POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VACUUM, VACLAV HAVEL AND THE CURRENT OF POPULAR OPINION HE REPRESENTED WERE THE CENTER THAT COULD HOLD, AT LEAST FOR A TIME, AND KEEP THINGS FROM FALLING APART.

5. THE JUNE 1992 ELECTIONS, HOWEVER, PROVED A WATERSHED BOTH FOR THE COMMON CZECH AND SLOVAK STATE AND FOR THE POSITION OF VACLAV HAVEL. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TWO REPUBLICS PASSED INTO THE HANDS OF FORCEFUL POLITICIANS, WHO WERE VERY SURE OF THEMSELVES AND HAD STRONG POLITICAL PARTIES AT THEIR BACKS -- VACLAV KLAUS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND VLADIMIR MECIAR IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC. IT QUICKLY BECAME CLEAR THAT THE GOALS OF KLAUS AND MECIAR WERE IRRECONCILABLE IN A COMMON STATE, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGED AFTER THE ELECTIONS CLEARLY HAD ONLY ONE PURPOSE: THE PEACEFUL, ORDERLY, EFFICIENT LIQUIDATION OF FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS. JUST AS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LOST MOST OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE, SO DID THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTIONS DE FACTO STRIP THE FEDERAL PRESIDENCY OF MOST OF ITS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PRAGUE 03342
NSC FOR WALKER
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TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EZ
SUBJECT: VACLAV HAVEL: SAME MAN, DIFFERENT ROLE
SIGNIFICANCE.

6. HAVEL FAILED TO WIN REELECTION IN VOTING ON JULY 3, 1992. (HE CAME UP SHORT IN THE SLOVAK SECTION OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY'S CHAMBER OF NATIONS.) RATHER THAN FACE DEFEAT AGAIN IN OTHER ROUNDS OF PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTING OR CONTINUE IN CARETAKER STATUS, HAVEL RESIGNED THE PRESIDENCY EFFECTIVE JULY 20 AND WENT INTO A SORT OF EXILE. BY ALL

INDICATIONS, THIS WAS A DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR HIM PERSONALLY. HIS CRITICS CAME INCREASINGLY INTO THE OPEN, PARALLELING HIM TO A CAPTAIN WHO HAD ABANDONED A SINKING SHIP. (EVEN IN LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES, MARITIME METAPHORS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE.) LEADERS OF KLAUS'S CIVIC DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ODS) WERE INTENSELY CRITICAL OF HAVEL FOR MEETING WITH MORAVIAN AUTONOMISTS AND LEFTIST OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVES DURING THIS PERIOD, AND RUMORS BEGAN TO CIRCULATE ABOUT ALTERNATE CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, ONCE IT WAS CREATED.

A DIFFERENT PRESIDENTIAL ROLE

7. DESPITE THOSE RUMORS, HAVEL WAS ELECTED AS CZECH REPUBLIC PRESIDENT ON JANUARY 26, BUT HE FOUND HIS NEW CIRCUMSTANCES VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE HE HAD ENJOYED AS FEDERAL PRESIDENT. SOME SIGNS ARE IMMEDIATELY VISIBLE -- HIS STAFF HAS DROPPED FROM APPROXIMATELY 450 TO AROUND 180, AND THE PEOPLE AROUND HIM ARE VIEWED AS "FUNCTIONARIES", LACKING THE STRONG POLITICAL PROFILE FROM DISSIDENT DAYS THAT USED TO CHARACTERIZE HAVEL'S STAFF. ADD TO THIS THE FACT THAT HAVEL'S INFLUENCE DE FACTO IS LIMITED BY THE PRESENCE OF AN ASSERTIVE CZECH GOVERNMENT WITH A SELF-CONFIDENT AND POPULAR PRIME MINISTER. WITH THE SMASHING DEFEAT OF THE CENTRIST CIVIC MOVEMENT (OH) IN LAST JUNE'S ELECTIONS, HAVEL HAS NO REAL POLITICAL BASE. FURTHERMORE, THE CZECH REPUBLIC CONSTITUTION APPROVED LAST DECEMBER CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, AND LIMITS PRESIDENTIAL POWERS RATHER NARROWLY.

8. PAVEL TIGRID, A LONG-TIME FRIEND WHO CONTINUES TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT INFORMALLY, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR RECENTLY THAT HAVEL WAS "ADAPTING TO THE REALITY OF HIS ROLE...BUT IT'S FRUSTRATING ... A DAILY STRUGGLE FOR HAVEL." THAT SEEMS AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION. SOME OF HAVEL'S OLD COLLEAGUES FROM THE DISSIDENT PERIOD -- FATHER VACLAV MALY AND ZDENEK URBANEK, FOR EXAMPLE -- ARGUE THAT HAVEL HAS SOLD OUT FOR THE SAKE OF HIGH OFFICE AND WOULD DO WELL TO BECOME "CITIZEN HAVEL" AGAIN. THE PRESIDENT APPARENTLY AGREES THAT HE CANNOT BRING HIMSELF TO LET GO OF PUBLIC AND POLITICAL LIFE. IN A TELLING INTERVIEW IN THE APRIL 10-12 "SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG" (SEE FBIS VIENNA, AU1204195193), HAVEL SAID THE FOLLOWING: "I HAVE LONG SINCE FOUND OUT THAT PUBLIC LIFE -- AS WELL AS POLITICS -- IS A STRANGE ANIMAL, WHICH, ONCE YOU ARE IN ITS CLAWS, WILL NEVER RELEASE YOU AGAIN.....I HAVE BEEN DEVoured BY PUBLIC LIFE. IT IS IN MY NATURE. I SIMPLY HAVE TO BE INVOLVED IN POLITICS."

CHANGING TIMES

9. HAVEL IS CLEARLY UNHAPPY THAT CZECH SOCIETY AND POLITICS HAVE ENTERED THE "POST-DISSIDENT ERA." ASKED BY "SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG" TO REFLECT ON THE

DIMINISHING PUBLIC ROLE OF MANY PROTAGONISTS OF THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PRAGUE 03342
NSC FOR WALKER
VIENNA ALSO HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EZ
SUBJECT: VACLAV HAVEL: SAME MAN, DIFFERENT ROLE
VELVET REVOLUTION, HAVEL SAID: "SOCIETY HATES
LOOKING BACK AND HATES LOOKING CLOSELY AT ITSELF.
IT PARTICULARLY HATES LOOKING AT THOSE WHO, CONTRARY
TO THE MAJORITY, OFFERED RESISTANCE TO THE
TOTALITARIAN REGIME, SOMETHING WHICH MANY PEOPLE
WERE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO DO....PEOPLE HARDLY EVER
IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WITH THOSE WHO WERE DIFFERENT,
WHO OFFERED RESISTANCE." WITH A TOUCH OF NOSTALGIA,
HE ALSO NOTED: "WE NO LONGER LIVE IN REVOLUTIONARY
TIMES, IN WHICH PEOPLE ARE GENEROUS AND ABLE TO
SWALLOW EVEN UNPLEASANT THINGS."

WHAT ROLE FOR HAVEL?

10. DESPITE SOME BITTERNESS, HAVEL CLEARLY REMAINS
AMONG THE "GENEROUS" PEOPLE, AND CONTINUES HIS
EFFORTS TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION OF CZECHS ON THE
MORAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS THAT, IN HIS VIEW,
SHOULD BE PART OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE. SUCH A
MORAL FOCUS IS MORE APPROPRIATE IN SOME CASES THAN
IN OTHERS. HAVEL'S EMPHASIS THAT NATO IS FIRST AND
FOREMOST AN ALLIANCE TO PROTECT COMMON VALUES
(REFTEL) IS CERTAINLY A USEFUL CORRECTIVE TO MORE
NARROWLY UTILITARIAN VIEWS OF THE ALLIANCE'S
PURPOSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVEN MANY PEOPLE
SYMPATHETIC TO HAVEL'S VIEWS QUESTION THE WISDOM OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC RAISING THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF THE POSTWAR EXPULSION OF THE SUDETEN
GERMANS DURING HIS STATE VISIT TO AUSTRIA MARCH 15.

11. WITH A SHARP, ANALYTICAL EYE TOWARD HIS OWN
PEOPLE, HAVEL HAS IDENTIFIED, TO OUR MIND CORRECTLY,
A CZECH WEAKNESS WITH POTENTIALLY SERIOUS
IMPLICATIONS. UNDERNEATH A VENEER OF BLACKEST
PESSIMISM, MANY CZECHS HAVE A STRONG SENSE OF
SUPERIORITY VIS-A-VIS NEIGHBORING PEOPLES SUCH AS
THE SLOVAKS, POLES, AND HUNGARIANS, AND, MINDFUL OF
WARTIME EPISODES, EVEN VIS-A-VIS THE GERMANS. AS HE
AGAIN TOLD THE "SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG": "THE CZECHS
ARE SOMEHOW FINDING IT VERY HARD TO DEAL WITH THEIR
OWN HISTORY IN A BUSINESSLIKE MANNER."

12. IN THIS LIGHT, IT SEEMS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT
ROLE VACLAV HAVEL MAY YET PLAY IN CZECH HISTORY IS
PRECISELY THAT OF STIMULATING DEBATE ON IMPORTANT
ISSUES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY THAT OTHERWISE COULD
REMAIN UNDER WRAPS. IT IS A ROLE WORTH PLAYING, AND
IS CONSISTENT WITH BOTH HIS PERSONAL INCLINATIONS
AND THE OBJECTIVE PARAMETERS OF THE OFFICE HE HOLDS.

NO COUNTERWEIGHT TO KLAUS

13. THERE IS ANOTHER ROLE THAT HAVEL CANNOT AND WILL NOT PLAY, I.E. AS SOME TYPE OF COUNTERWEIGHT TO PRIME MINISTER KLAUS. IT IS TRUE THAT THEIR CHARACTERS AND PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS DIFFER. NONETHELESS, HAVEL HAS NEITHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY NOR A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD SERVE AS INSTRUMENTS TO CHALLENGE KLAUS. THERE ARE CASES IN WHICH CONSTITUTIONALLY WEAK PRESIDENTS HAVE STEPPED INTO THE VOID LEFT BY GOVERNMENTS OR POLITICAL SYSTEMS THAT HAVE DISCREDITED THEMSELVES (RECENT ITALIAN EVENTS BEING A CASE IN POINT). THIS IS DECIDEDLY NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER, IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC. THE ONLY MECHANISM HAVEL WOULD HAVE TO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT ON A POLICY MATTER WOULD BE A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF DISAGREEMENT. HAVEL IS WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMONSTRATING PUBLICLY A LACK OF UNITY BETWEEN
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PRAGUE 03342
NSC FOR WALKER
VIENNA ALSO HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EZ
SUBJECT: VACLAV HAVEL: SAME MAN, DIFFERENT ROLE
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. HE IS LIKELY TO USE
SUCH AN INSTRUMENT ONLY IN THE ABSOLUTELY LAST
RESORT.

CONSEQUENCES FOR US POLICY

14. IN DEALING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL, WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THE FACT THAT HE IS NOW A CHIEF OF STATE, WITHOUT THE AIR OF A HEAD OF GOVERNMENT THAT SEEMED TO FOLLOW HIM AS CSFR PRESIDENT. HAVEL REMAINS AN UNUSUAL AND HIGHLY ATTRACTIVE FIGURE ON THE WORLD SCENE. HIS CHARISMA IS OF A VERY DIFFERENT SORT THAN THAT OF PRIME MINISTER KLAUS. ALTHOUGH INCLINED TOWARD DEPRESSION, HAVEL IS LIKELY TO SOUND A POSITIVE APPEAL FOR CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL VALUES. IN EXPRESSING THE DESIRES OF THE CZECH PEOPLE, HE WILL CONCENTRATE ON AREAS OF CLEAR CONSENSUS. (SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, WHICH HE PLANS TO RAISE IN WASHINGTON PER REFTEL, ARE THE CZECH EQUIVALENT OF "MOM AND APPLE PIE.") PRIME MINISTER KLAUS IS MUCH MORE VISIBLY THE POLITICIAN, ALWAYS PURSUING HIS OWN PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW OR PROGRAM, AND ALTERNATELY CHARMING, ABRASIVE, SARCASTIC, AND PATRONIZING.

15. OUTSIDE THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AT LEAST, HAVEL IS A MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE PERSONALITY THAN KLAUS. THAT DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD TREAT HAVEL AS SOMETHING MORE THAN HE CAN BE. WE NEED TO RESPECT THE DIVISION OF AUTHORITY -- MORAL AND POLITICAL -- THAT THE CZECHS HAVE WORKED OUT WITH NO SMALL EFFORT. HAVEL MAY BE MORE PRO-AMERICAN THAN THE EUROPEANIST KLAUS, AND MORE PLEASANT TO DEAL WITH, BUT IT IS KLAUS WHO MAKES CZECH POLICY.
BASORA

BT
#3342
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
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<^SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 3342
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TOR: 930415091010 M0340536
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DIST:
PRT: ITOH KEENEY SIT WALKER
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE KUPCHAN SUM SUM2 VAX
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PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KUPCHAN KYIM LAKE SODERBERG WALKER
SIT: FILE
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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OSRI: RUEHPGA
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHPGA3356 1051330-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 151326Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
DTG: 151326Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4675
INFO: RUFHBP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 8592
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8499
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0204
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0151
RUEHBS/USEC BRUSSELS
SUBJ: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ON: HAVEL'S WASHINGTON
AGENDA, INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT
PRAGUE, DEBATE LOOMING IN CZECH GOVERNMENT
OVER FOREIGN POLICY

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 03356
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EFIN, OVIP (HAVEL, VACLAV), EZ, US
SUBJECT: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ON: HAVEL'S WASHINGTON
AGENDA, INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT
PRAGUE, DEBATE LOOMING IN CZECH GOVERNMENT
OVER FOREIGN POLICY
REF: PRAGUE 3312
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF PRESIDENT HAVEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, AMBASSADOR MET WITH CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC APRIL 14 FOR A SHORT TOUR D'HORIZON. ZIELENIEC CONFIRMED THAT PRAGUE CASTLE WAS IN STEP WITH THE GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND THAT HAVEL'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE OF A GENERAL NATURE, FOCUSING ON SECURITY IN A GLOBAL SENSE. HE SAW THE HAVEL VISIT AS A VERY POSITIVE AND IMPORTANT STEP IN US-CZECH RELATIONS. ZIELENIEC REITERATED AN EARLIER INVITATION TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO VISIT PRAGUE, AND ALSO ASKED TO MEET WITH HIM ON THE FRINGES OF THE JUNE 11 NACC IN ATHENS. HE ALSO URGED THAT OTHER TOP-LEVEL USG OFFICIALS, NOTABLY INCLUDING AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, VISIT PRAGUE IN THE COMING MONTHS. IN ADDITION, HE HOPED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE PRIME MINISTER KLAUS TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR.

3. TURNING TO OTHER ISSUES, ZIELENIEC SAID THAT RECENT TENSIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND POLAND OVER TRADE ISSUES WERE AT THE TOP OF HIS LIST OF CURRENT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015

By KRM NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-M (1.23)

CONCERNS. FINALLY, ZIELENIEC REVEALED DETAILS OF AN INTERNAL DEBATE WITHIN THE CZECH GOVERNMENT OVER THE FUTURE OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY: WOULD IT BE DIENSTBIER-STYLE ACTIVISM A LA DIENSTBIER OR SOMETHING MUCH LESS AMBITIOUS -- BUT ALSO LESS USEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES? END SUMMARY.
PRESIDENT HAVEL GOES TO WASHINGTON

4. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT, EXCEPT FOR MINISTER DYBA'S JANUARY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT HAVEL'S VISIT NEXT WEEK FOR THE HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL OPENING WOULD BE THE FIRST MAJOR VISIT OF A CZECH REPUBLIC OFFICIAL TO THE UNITED STATES. IN HIS MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY, THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASSURED BY PRESIDENT HAVEL'S CHANCELLOR (REFTEL) THAT THERE HAD BEEN FULL COORDINATION BY THE PRAGUE CASTLE (PRESIDENT HAVEL'S OFFICE) WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THAT THERE WAS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PRIME MINISTRY (KLAUS) AS WELL. COULD ZIELENIEC CONFIRM THIS FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW?

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT, INDEED, THE VISIT HAD BEEN COORDINATED VERY INTENSIVELY AND HAD BEEN THE MAIN ACTIVITY OF THE SECOND TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO GO OVER LAST-MINUTE ITEMS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE HAVEL VISIT TO THE U.S. GO WELL BECAUSE OF THE CREDIT HE ENJOYS THERE. THE FACT THAT HAVEL WAS BEING RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS TAKEN BY THE CZECH SIDE AS AN INDICATION OF EXTREMELY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

6. ASKED ABOUT THE AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT HAVEL'S TALKS, ZIELENIEC CONFIRMED THAT HAVEL'S FOCUS WOULD BE BROAD, WITH CONCERNS ABOUT EVENTS IN RUSSIA AND BOSNIA HIGH ON THE LIST. THE REASON ZIELENIEC HIMSELF WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPANY HAVEL TO WASHINGTON WAS THAT A FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE HAD BEEN CALLED IN THE PARLIAMENT DURING THE HAVEL TRIP.

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HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS

--7-----
7. ZIELENIEC RESTATED THE INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT PRAGUE THAT HAD BEEN CONTAINED IN HIS LETTER CONGRATULATING THE SECRETARY ON HIS CONFIRMATION. HE ADDED THAT HE HOPED HE MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ON THE MARGINS OF THE JUNE 11 NACC IN ATHENS. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD NEXT BE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PRAGUE 03356

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EFIN, OVIP (HAVEL, VACLAV), EZ, US

SUBJECT: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ON: HAVEL'S WASHINGTON NECESSARY FOR HIM TO PLAN A TRIP TO WASHINGTON, IN PART TO PREPARE AN EVENTUAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY PRIME MINISTER KLAUS, PERHAPS IN THE LATE FALL OR THE EARLY WINTER. THE AMBASSADOR CAUTIONED THAT THE FOCUS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY MUCH ON DOMESTIC MATTERS, AND THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT HAVEL HAD VISITED DURING 1993 ALREADY WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO FIND TIME ON BUSY WASHINGTON CALENDARS FOR ANOTHER CZECH

OFFICIAL VISIT, SO THE FURTHER OFF IN THE FUTURE A KLAUS VISIT COULD BE, THE BETTER.
TROUBLE WITH THE EC

8. TURNING TO HIS OWN CONCERNS, ZIELENIEC NOTED THAT RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD TAKEN A SERIOUS TURN FOR THE WORSE BECAUSE OF LAST WEEK'S BANNING OF MEAT AND DAIRY PRODUCTS. THIS UNFRIENDLY ACTION OPENED UP AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY THE COMMUNISTS, TO EXPLOIT. ZIELENIEC WENT ON TO COMPLAIN THAT THE EC WAS CONSTANTLY TALKING ABOUT PARTNERSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BUT WAS CAPABLE OF AN ARBITRARY APPROACH THAT MADE THE CZECH COALITION GOVERNMENT VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM BY THE LEFT. HE THOUGHT THE PROBLEM WAS PARTLY A LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY SIDES OF A STILL-UNCOORDINATED EC, BUT ALSO THE RESULT OF BUREAUCRATS NOT UNDER POLITICAL CONTROL. FREER TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WERE MORE IMPORTANT TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC THAN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AID DOLLARS, ZIELENIEC SAID.
PROBLEMS WITHIN VISEGRAD GROUP

9. ZIELENIEC (AN ETHNIC POLE) LAMENTED POLAND'S ACTION IN CLOSING ITS BORDERS TO ALL FOREIGN IMPORTS INCLUDING CZECH EXPORTS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS THE CZECH POLICY TO ENCOURAGE REGIONAL COOPERATION ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS; THE EC BAN ON MEAT AND DAIRY IMPORTS WAS ONE SUCH PROBLEM, BUT THE LACK OF CONSULTATION BY POLAND ILLUSTRATED THE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE VISEGRAD GROUP.
BILATERAL TREATIES: DOUBLE TAXATION AND ASSISTANCE

10. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE DOUBLE TAXATION TREATY TALKS IN WASHINGTON SEEMED TO HAVE GONE WELL, BUT THAT WE WERE STILL WAITING TO HEAR THE DETAILS. ZIELENIEC SAID HE THOUGHT THE TREATY COULD BE WRAPPED UP IN ONE OR TWO MONTHS. THIS WOULD, THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT, BE VERY GOOD FOR U.S. INVESTORS, WHO NOW ACCOUNTED FOR SOME 20 PERCENT OF TOTAL CUMULATIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO MENTIONED THAT WE WERE STILL WAITING FOR ACTION TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE TAX-FREE STATUS OF OUR U.S.-FUNDED ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS. ZIELENIEC SAID HE FORESAW NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT, BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENT.
CZECH INTEREST IN AMERICAN VISITORS

11. FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC SAID HE WOULD WELCOME MORE CONTACT WITH AMERICAN VISITORS, ESPECIALLY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. IN HIS EXPERIENCE, THE BEST ADVERTISING FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC WAS A VISIT TO PRAGUE AND A CHANCE TO SEE WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED HERE. ZIELENIEC BRIGHTENED AT THE AMBASSADOR'S MENTION OF U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT AS ONE MEMBER OF THE ADMINISTRATION WHO KNEW THE CZECH SCENE WELL. FOR HER TO VISIT PRAGUE AT SOME POINT WOULD BE WELCOMED, HE SAID, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF PRAGUE'S INTEREST IN THE U.N. SECURITY

COUNCIL SEAT, BUT BECAUSE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD LIKE HER TO SEE THAT A COHERENT CZECH FOREIGN POLICY WAS IN PLACE.

DEBATE OVER FOREIGN POLICY IN OFFING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PRAGUE 03356

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EFIN, OVIP (HAVEL, VACLAV), EZ, US

SUBJECT: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ON: HAVEL'S WASHINGTON

12. ZIELENIEC REVEALED THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM A GOVERNMENT MEETING AND THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WOULD COME AS NEWS TO HIS MFA COLLEAGUES (BUSNIAK AND LOBKOWICZ). THE PRIME MINISTER HAD CALLED THAT DAY FOR A DISCUSSION AT NEXT WEEK'S GOVERNMENT MEETING OF THE QUESTION OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT AND THE FUTURE OF CZECH FOREIGN POLICY, IN PARTICULAR THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY. AS ZIELENIEC PUT IT, THERE WAS A TENSION BETWEEN THE CURRENT RULING GROUP AND THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OVER THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF INNOVATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY. THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED HAVING HEARD IT TERMED "DIENSTBIERISM." ZIELENIEC LAUGHED AND ADMITTED THAT HE WAS NOW KNOWN AS "THE NEW DIENSTBIER." THE AMBASSADOR NOTED, WITH REGARD TO THE UNSC SEAT, THAT TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN THE U.N. DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN COMMITTING TO EXPENSIVE PEACE-KEEPING AND OTHER TASKS. THE SMALLER THE COUNTRY, IN ANY CASE, THE GREATER ITS STAKE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH A MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO MEET IN THE SECOND WEEK OF MAY AFTER THE AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO PRAGUE.

COMMENT

13. THE TENSIONS WE HAVE OBSERVED WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION OVER FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS ARE PARTLY A FUNCTION OF PERSONALITIES (E.G. KLAUS AND BRATINKA), BUT CLEARLY ALSO HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN A POLICY DEBATE THAT NOW LOOKS SET TO BREAK OUT INTO THE OPEN, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN TRACKING IT SINCE LAST AUTUMN. THE QUESTION THE CZECHS HAVE NOT YET ANSWERED IS WHETHER THEIR NEW STATE HAS A VOCATION TO BE FULLY ENGAGED ON THE WORLD SCENE ALONG THE LINES OF A SMALL EUROPEAN NATION LIKE THE NETHERLANDS OR DENMARK, OR TO SLIP BACK INTO A SELF-CENTERED CENTRAL EUROPEAN PROVINCIALISM. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY COMMENTED (PRAGUE 804) AS TO WHY THE FIRST MODEL WOULD BETTER SERVE THE U.S. INTEREST, AND WILL BE FOLLOWING THE DEBATE CLOSELY. BASORA

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

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SSN: 3356

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SIT: KUPCHAN VAX

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CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 301501Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
OSRI: RUEHPG
DTG: 301501Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4882
INFO: RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8929
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0002
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RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0105
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0040
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0047
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0218
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0186
SUBJ: CZECHS PROMOTE UNSC SEAT CANDIDACY
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 03874
VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS PROMOTE UNSC SEAT CANDIDACY
REF: A) PRAGUE 3356, B) STATE 108680, C) 92 PRAGUE 11029
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC CONVOKED CHIEFS OF MISSION IN PRAGUE APRIL 30 TO MAKE A PITCH FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S CANDIDACY FOR THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT IN 1994-95. PRAGUE HAS INVITED BELARUS FOR HIGH-LEVEL TALKS ON THE MATTER AND CLAIMS EIGHT COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, AUSTRIA, BRAZIL, GERMANY, GUATEMALA, HUNGARY, NEW ZEALAND AND POLAND) SUPPORT ITS BID. MINISTER ZIELENIEC APPEALED FOR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FROM OTHERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.
3. THE PRAGUE DIPLOMATIC CORPS TURNED OUT APRIL 30 TO HEAR FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC, IN ENGLISH THAT IS DEFINITELY IMPROVING, DELIVER HIS PITCH FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S CANDIDACY FOR THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT.
4. THE TEXT OF ZIELENIEC'S STATEMENT IS AT PARA. 5. HE WAS ASKED ONE QUESTION, NAMELY, WHETHER BELARUS HAD AGREED TO THE HIGH-LEVEL (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) TALKS IN THE WEEK OF MAY 10. ZIELENIEC SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD A RESPONSE YET, BUT EXPECTED ONE SOON.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF ZIELENIEC STATEMENT.
STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. JOSEF ZIELENIEC,

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KBM NARA, Date 4/30/2014
2024-0540-M (1.31)

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
DELIVERED BEFORE THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN PRAGUE ON APRIL
30, 1993

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
THANK YOU FOR JOINING ME TODAY HERE AT THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW WITH YOU A
QUESTION WHICH THIS MINISTRY AND, AFTER ITS
DELIBERATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, ALSO THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE CZECH REPUBLIC, CONSIDER ONE OF THE PRIORITIES OF
OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CURRENT YEAR. THE QUESTION IS
THAT OF THE CANDIDACY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL.

ALLOW ME FIRST A COUPLE OF WORDS ABOUT OUR POSITION ON
THE UNITED NATIONS AND OUR RELATIONS WITH THIS
ORGANIZATION. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC
PUT AN END TO THE COLD WAR WHICH TO A CONSIDERABLE
EXTENT HAD HINDERED THE PERFORMANCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE
UN AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER, PARTICULARLY IN THE
FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. ONCE THE PERIOD OF
CONFRONTATION WAS OVER, THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF
THE UN AND OF MULTILATERALISM IN GENERAL HAVE BEEN
GROWING. THE ROLE OF THE UN IN ASSURING INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY. ALSO INCREASING
HAS BEEN ITS ABILITY TO ACT IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS.
COMPARED WITH THE PAST, MEMBER STATES ARE MUCH MORE ABLE
AND WILLING TO REACH AGREEMENT. INTENSIFIED COOPERATION
OF MEMBER STATES, PARTICULARLY OF THE SUPERPOWERS, HAS
BEEN MOST EVIDENT IN THE ONE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, I.E., IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. THIS BODY, PARALYSED FOR DECADES BY THE
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF VETO, IS NOW ABLE TO MAKE
DECISIONS EVEN ON VERY COMPLICATED ISSUES, DIRECTLY
CONNECTED WITH POWER INTERESTS.

OUR REPUBLIC IS TAKING NOTE OF THIS TREND WITH GREAT
SATISFACTION AND FULLY SUPPORTS IT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT
FOR MEDIUM-SIZED AND SMALLER COUNTRIES LIKE THE CZECH
REPUBLIC, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CONSTITUTE AN
IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT TO MAKE THEMSELVES FELT AND TO
DEMONSTRATE A ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PRAGUE 03874
VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECHS PROMOTE UNSC SEAT CANDIDACY
WISH TO DEVELOP REALISTIC INITIATIVES, TO EMPLOY OUR
RIGHTS, USE THE OPPORTUNITIES AND TAKE UP OUR DUTY TO
TAKE A STAND AND TO PARTICIPATE IN SOLVING OUTSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE UN
BODY WHICH MAXIMIZES THE POSSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN
DECISION-MAKING. AND THIS IS WHAT MADE US APPLY FOR THE
SEAT OF A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
THROUGH OUR PERMANENT MISSION IN NEW YORK AND THROUGH
OUR EMBASSIES IN YOUR COUNTRIES WE HAVE INFORMED YOU,
MEMBER STATES OF THE UN, OF OUR CANDIDACY FOR THE SEAT
OF A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
ALLOCATED TO THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIONAL GROUP FOR THE
1994-1995 PERIOD AND CURRENTLY HELD BY HUNGARY.
NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THIS CANDIDACY ARE CONTINUING

NORMALLY. A GREAT NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE UNOFFICIALLY PROMISED TO SUPPORT US AND A FEW HAVE ALREADY GIVEN US OFFICIAL PROMISES OF SUPPORT. IN THE FIRST PLACE I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION SLOVAKIA WHICH, FOLLOWING THE DIVISION OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, WITHDREW ITS CANDIDACY IN FAVOUR OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING US. OFFICIAL PROMISES OF SUPPORT HAVE ALREADY BEEN NOTIFIED BY ARGENTINA, AUSTRIA, BRAZIL, GERMANY, GUATEMALA, HUNGARY, NEW ZEALAND AND POLAND. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK ALL THESE COUNTRIES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND OFFICIAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE, YOU MAY WELL ASK WHY WE ARE ORGANIZING AN ACTION LIKE THIS ONE WHICH SOME OF YOU MAY FIND RATHER UNUSUAL.

THE MAIN REASON IS THAT SO FAR, THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIONAL GROUP REMAINS DIVIDED OVER THE CANDIDACY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN ADDITION TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC, BELARUS, TOO, HAS ANNOUNCED ITS CANDIDACY. THE CZECH REPUBLIC FEELS THAT THIS SITUATION COMPLICATES THE SMOOTH COURSE OF ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE HELD DURING THE 48TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS AUTUMN. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS COMPLICATION DOES NOT CONCERN ONLY US AS A CANDIDATE BUT THAT IT CONCERNS THE WHOLE COMMUNITY OF THE UN MEMBER STATES. AND THIS IS WHY WE APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE THIS GROWING PROBLEM. IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE VERY HELPFUL IF MEMBER STATES COULD DECLARE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHOM THEY ARE GOING TO SUPPORT.

WE ARE AWARE THAT IT ALSO DEPENDS GREATLY ON US WHETHER THE ISSUE OF EASTERN EUROPE'S REPRESENTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CEASES TO BE CONTROVERSIAL. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHALL DO OUR BEST. WE HAVE PROPOSED TO OUR COLLEAGUES IN BELARUS A MEETING IN THE WEEK BEGINNING MAY 10, IN PRAGUE OR IN MINSK, AND HAVE AGREED WITH THEM THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE AT THE LEVEL OF DEPUTY MINISTERS. WE ARE EXPECTING BELARUS TO RESPOND ANY DAY. AT THE MEETING WE ARE GOING TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS BY WHICH WE WILL TRY TO PROVE TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELARUS OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE THEIR WITHDRAWAL OF CANDIDACY AS EASY AS POSSIBLE. WE ALSO WISH TO PROVE OUR AWARENESS THAT THE WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT HARM THE PRESTIGE OF BELARUS. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE CERTAIN STEPS. IN 1991, FOR EXAMPLE, WE GAVE UP OUR CANDIDACY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL IN FAVOR OF BELARUS. OUR REGIONAL GROUP TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THAT WE DID SO TO AVOID A DISPUTE OVER THE CANDIDACY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AT ANY RATE, LET ME TELL YOU THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC IS FIRMLY RESOLVED NOT TO WITHDRAW ITS CANDIDACY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PRAGUE 03874
VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECHS PROMOTE UNSC SEAT CANDIDACY

ONE MIGHT ASK WHETHER SUCH RESOLVE IS JUSTIFIED. THE ANSWER IS THIS: IN THE WHOLE HISTORY OF THE UN, OUR COUNTRY HAS ONLY BEEN TWICE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- IN 1964, FOR A ONE-YEAR PERIOD (THE SECOND YEAR OF THE DIVIDED TWO-YEAR PERIOD THE SEAT WAS HELD BY MALAYSIA) AND IN 1978-1979. ON THE WHOLE, ONE AND A HALF ELECTION PERIODS. THIS IS A BIT TOO LITTLE FOR A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, 16 YEARS AFTER THE COMMUNIST COUP IN 1948 AND IN THE SECOND 10 YEARS AFTER AUGUST 1968. HOWEVER, NOW WE ARE A DEMOCRATIC STATE STRIVING TO IMPLEMENT THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. WE UNDERSTAND OUR MEMBERSHIP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN OCCASION TO PRESENT TO THE WORLD A NEW IMAGE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND AS AN OCCASION TO PROVE THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THE FULFILMENT OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE CHARTER. I HOPE YOU SHARE AN UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS APPROACH OF OURS. I APPEAL TO YOU TO DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THESE CONCLUSIONS WILL BE THE SUPPORT OF THE CANDIDACY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN CONCLUSION, ALLOW ME TO ASK YOU TO INFORM YOUR RESPECTIVE CAPITAL CITIES OF OUR APPROACHES AND OF THE ROLE WE ATTACH TO OUR CANDIDACY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I HOPE THAT THIS MEETING WILL HELP SPEED UP THE DECISIONS OF YOUR COUNTRIES FOR WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY THANKS ALREADY NOW. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO JOIN ME HERE TODAY. END TEXT.

6. HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD CHARGE THAT HUNGARY'S "SUPPORT" FOR THE CZECH CANDIDACY WAS PART OF A GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE CZECH REPUBLIC WOULD SUPPORT HUNGARY FOR THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. IN THE EVENT, CZECH SUPPORT HAD BEEN LUKEWARM AT BEST, AND AMBASSADOR VARGA SAID HE HAD A "BAD FEELING" ABOUT IT AND WAS NOT SURE THAT HUNGARY FELT BOUND. POLISH AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT WAS FIRM.

7. COMMENT. PRESIDENT CLINTON, IN HIS RECENT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL, WAS QUOTED IN CZECH MEDIA AS SAYING HE WOULD WELCOME THE CZECHS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD THEY BE ELECTED. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED IN PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE CZECHS (REF C AND PREVIOUS) THAT WE WILL LOOK TO THE EASTERN GROUP ELECTIONS, AND NOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO ANY PARTICULAR CANDIDATE IN ADVANCE. THAT BEING SAID, WE IMAGINE THAT A CZECH VOICE ON THE UNSC WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO NEARLY ALL U.S. POLICY GOALS, AND THAT, IN SUM, THE CZECHS WOULD BE POTENTIAL ALLIES. IN EMBASSY'S VIEW, THERE IS NO NEED TO BREAK WITH OUR PRINCIPLED STAND OF NOT INTERVENING IN THE EASTERN GROUP'S DECISION PROCESS. WE HAVE ALREADY SHOWN SYMPATHY. IF AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT IS ABLE TO VISIT PRAGUE THIS SUMMER DURING PRE-UNGA CONSULTATIONS, THE CZECHS SHOULD BE PLEASED AT SUCH HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION, WHETHER OR NOT THEIR UNSC SEAT BID HAS PROSPERED.

EVANS

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#3874

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 3874

<^SSN>3874

<^SSN>3874

TOR: 930430125702 M0365591

<^TOR>930430130729 M0365624

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DIST:

SIT: VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 050754Z JAN 94
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 050754Z JAN 94
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 9141 IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3162
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 2468
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0969
INFO: ****
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL TRIP - PRAGUE SCHEDULE
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 002710
PRAGUE - PLEASE PASS TO MORT ENGELBERG
CORRECTED COPY FOR PASSING INSTRUCTION
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, EZ, LO, PL, HU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL TRIP - PRAGUE SCHEDULE
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THERE FOLLOWS AS PARA THREE THE PRESIDENT'S TENTATIVE
SCHEDULE OF BILATERAL/REGIONAL ACTIVITIES IN PRAGUE ON
JANUARY 12 AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED BY THE WHITE
HOUSE/NSC. YOU MAY SHARE THIS INFORMATION WITH HOST
COUNTRY OFFICIALS ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

3. JANUARY 11, 1994

1815-1900 BILATERAL WITH CZECH LEADERS.
PRAGUE CASTLE

JANUARY 12, 1994

0900-0945 BILATERAL WITH HUNGARIAN LEADERS

1000-1045 BILATERAL WITH POLISH LEADERS

1100-1145 BILATERAL WITH SLOVAK LEADERS

ALL THREE BILATERALS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE U.S.
AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. EACH WILL BEGIN WITH A
FIVE-MINUTE PRESS POOL SPRAY.

1200-1330 WORKING LUNCH AT RESIDENCE WITH VISEGRAD
LEADERS. LUNCH IS PLANNED FOR THREE
PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE' PLUS ONE NOTETAKER
PER SIDENOT AT TABL AND ONE INTERPRETER
PER SIDE. PRESENTATIONS WILL BE IN ENGLISH

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By KBH NARA, Date 4/30/2014
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OR INTERPRETED INTO ENGLISH WITH INDIVIDUAL
INTERPRETERS SUPPLYING ADDITIONAL WHISPER
INTERPRETATIONS AS NEEDED. THERE WILL BE A
PRESS POOL SPRAY DURING THE FIRST FIVE
MINUTES OF THE LUNCH.

1345-1415 PRESS STATEMENTS: AFTER LUNCH THE PRESIDENT
WILL MAKE BRIEF STATEMENT TO BE FOLLOWED BY
BRIEF STATEMENT BY SPOKESMAN FOR VISEGRAD
GROUPOSTS ARE ASKED TO CONVEY THIS
PROPOSAL TO HOST GOVERNMENTS ADVISING THAT
WE EXPECT THEM TO DECIDE ON APPROPRIATE
SPOKESMEN FOR THE GUESTS).

4. AMBASSADORS THOMAS, RUSSELL AND REY ARE WELCOME TO
TRAVEL TO PRAGUE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. ALL FOUR
AMBASSADORS ARE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BILATERALS
AND CAN BE PRESENT AT THE JANUARY 12 LUNCH, BUT NOT AT THE
TABLE. CHRISTOPHER

BT.

#2710

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2710

TOR: 940105034659 M0810412

DIST:

PRT: ITOH KENNEY SIT{C2}

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE FRIED HOLL KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHPGA0190 0071443-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 071443Z JAN 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
OSRI: RUEHPG
DTG: 071443Z JAN 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8207
INFO: RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 8788
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0427
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 8862
RUCNTXF/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0232
SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER'S AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT
TO PRAGUE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000190
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR ANNE WALLEY AND MIKE LUFRANO
WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE FOR ANNE EDWARDS
NSC FOR LAKE/WALKER/FRIED/ITOH
WARSAW/BUDAPEST ALSO FOR AMB. ALBRIGHT/GEN.
SHALIKASHVILI/JOHNSON/GATI
DEPT FOR EUR (OXMAN) AND VERSHBOW
SECDEF FOR WISNER/SLOCOMBE
USIA FOR EU (HJRROD AND JACOBS)
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, US, EZ, PL, HU, LO
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT
TO PRAGUE.

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY

2. DURING JAN. 7 MEETING, PRIME MINISTER KLAUS SHARED
WITH THE AMBASSADOR HIS THINKING IN ADVANCE OF THE
PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12 VISIT TO PRAGUE. INTER ALIA,
KLAUS:

-- INDICATED THAT HE SAW HIS OWN MAIN ROLE AS BEING IN
THE BILATERAL (VICE REGIONAL) MEETING AND THAT HE WOULD
TRY TO FOCUS THE DISCUSSION LESS ON THE PARTNERSHIP FOR
PEACE AND MORE ON BROAD, OVERARCHING ISSUES RELATING TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA;
-- PUT A MARKER DOWN ABOUT WHERE REAL POLITICAL POWER
IN THE CR RESTS (I.E., WITH THE PRIME MINISTER),
EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD
"DEMONSTRATE AN AWARENESS" OF THE DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT HAVEL;
-- EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NATO
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, CHARACTERIZING IT AS A USEFUL
STEP FORWARD BUT NOT ONE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE. KLAUS,

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By KBM NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-M (1.34)

NEVERTHELESS ASSURED US THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE PUBLICLY; AND
-- COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT THE CZECH REPUBLIC CONSTANTLY BEING LUMPED TOGETHER WITH POLAND AND HUNGARY IN THE VISEGRAD GROUPING, TERMING THE V-4 POLITICAL/SECURITY RELATIONSHIP "ARTIFICIAL," EVEN THOUGH HE FELT THE V-4 FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WAS A WORTHWHILE REGIONAL EFFORT.
BROADLY FOCUSED DISCUSSION

3. KLAUS MADE A POINT OF NOTING THAT THE CZECH DELEGATION WOULD CONSIST OF PRESIDENT HAVEL; KLAUS HIMSELF; MINISTERS ZIELENIEC, BAUDYS, DYBA AND DLOUHY; AND AMBASSADOR ZANTOVSKY. THIS REFLECTED THE CZECH INTEREST IN BROADENING DISCUSSION DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT FROM THE NARROWLY DEFINED SECURITY FOCUS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE TO LARGER, OVERARCHING QUESTIONS -- INCLUDING ECONOMIC -- RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE. THE CZECH POINT WOULD BE THAT SECURITY QUESTIONS CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER ISSUES OF REFORM AND POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION. ON THIS SCORE, KLAUS STRESSED THAT CZECH INTEREST IN NATO WAS ROOTED IN THE DESIRE TO ENSURE A CONTINUING AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE, WHICH WAS IMPORTANT FOR PRAGUE VIS-A-VIS THE EU STATES AS WELL AS THE EAST.

4. AS FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC HAD SUGGESTED EARLIER IN THE WEEK, KLAUS ARGUED THAT THE CZECH SIDE COULD PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH A USEFUL PERSPECTIVE ON THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA -- NOT BECAUSE THEY KNOW THE RUSSIAN BETTER OR LIVE CLOSER, BUT BASED ON PRAGUE'S FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE WITH AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE LOGIC, RULES AND COMPLICATIONS OF THE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION PROCESS. KLAUS IMPLICITLY QUESTIONED THE UTILITY OF THE REGIONAL PORTION OF THE MEETING, ASKING RHETORICALLY AND WITH APPARENT SKEPTICISM: IS THERE ANY CHANCE TO DO ANYTHING REALLY USEFUL DURING THE MULTILATERAL LUNCH? ALTHOUGH SKEPTICAL, HE DID HOPE THERE COULD BE SOME REAL SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION RATHER THAN JUST SET-PIECE SPEECHES.

DIVISION OF POWER IN CR

5. KLAUS OPINED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE PRESIDENT COULD "DEMONSTRATE AWARENESS OF THE DIVISION OF POWER IN THE CR," I.E., BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 000190

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR ANNE WALLEY AND MIKE LUFRANO

WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE FOR ANNE EDWARDS

NSC FOR LAKE/WALKER/FRIED/ITOH

WARSAW/BUDAPEST ALSO FOR AMB. ALBRIGHT/GEN.

SHALIKASHVILI/JOHNSON/GATI

DEPT FOR EUR (OXMAN) AND VERSHBOW

SECDEF FOR WISNER/SLOCOMBE

USIA FOR EU (HARROD AND JACOBS)

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, US, EZ, PL, HU, LO

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT

TO PRAGUE

HAVEL. COMMENT: ALONG WITH HIS STRESS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE CZECH DELEGATION -- AND THE TACIT POINT THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY HIM AT A MEETING WITH HAVEL --

KLAUS CLEARLY SOUGHT BY THIS COMMENT TO ENSURE THAT A MESSAGE WAS CONVEYED ON WHERE THE REAL POLITICAL POWER IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC CURRENTLY RESTS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HAVEL WOULD LEAD OFF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION FOR THE CZECH SIDE, BUT IMPLIED THAT HE AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE A -- IF NOT THE -- PRIME INTERLOCUTOR OF THE PRESIDENT. END COMMENT.

P4P -- SUPPORT PUBLICLY, BUT ...

6. KLAUS SAID HE WOULD PUBLICLY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, BUT CONFIDED THAT HE REALLY DID NOT THINK IT HAD MUCH REAL MEANING. HE CHARACTERIZED IT AS A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD, WHICH DID NOT MERIT MUCH OF HIS ATTENTION BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT. KLAUS ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MUCH DEMOCRATIC DIFFERENTIATION THE PROPOSAL ACTUALLY WOULD OFFER. THE AMBASSADOR STRONGLY DEFENDED THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE OF PFP AND KLAUS DID SEEM TO LISTEN, BUT WITHOUT BEING FULLY PERSUADED.

DON'T LUMP US WITH VISEGRAD

7. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS EXTREMELY DEFENSIVE ON THE CZECH STANCE TOWARDS COOPERATION WITH THE VISEGRAD STATES, SAYING: "DON'T PUSH US INTO SOME SORT OF ARTIFICIAL HOMOGENEITY THAT DOES NOT HAVE AN HISTORICAL OR OTHER BASIS. IT IS ARTIFICIAL." AT ANOTHER POINT HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CR ALWAYS BEING GROUPED WITH POLAND AND HUNGARY. WHY NOT WITH AUSTRIA?, HE ASKED WITH SOME PASSION. KLAUS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RELATIONS WITH POLAND WERE CURRENTLY A BIT STRAINED, SAYING HE JUST HAD AN UNPLEASANT MEETING WITH THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD ACCUSED THE CZECHS OF NOT PREPARING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PRAGUE SUFFICIENTLY.

8. AT THE SAME TIME, KLAUS AND HIS ADVISOR JIRI WEIGL ARGUED THAT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FOUR CEE STATES. THE DIFFERENCES THAT SURFACED WERE MAINLY OVER FORM AND PROCEDURE. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, KLAUS TOOK NOTE OF THE NEED TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF REGIONAL DISUNITY AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT "WALESA AND THE OTHERS" WILL TAKE A Milder STANCE IN PERSON THAN THEIR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST.

COMMENT:

9. THE MEETING WAS VINTAGE KLAUS. HIS BASIC MESSAGE WAS THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT, BUT WAS STRONGLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT WHAT OF REAL SUBSTANCE WOULD EMERGE FROM THE VISIT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS CLEAR THAT, IF HE WERE ACCORDED A MORE CENTRAL ROLE AND DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE LARGER, POLITICAL/ECONOMIC QUESTIONS OF THE DAY, THE MEETING MIGHT PROVE MORE USEFUL THAN HE EXPECTED. IN SUM, KLAUS VIEWS OUR SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA -- MOST NOTABLY THE PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, THE IMPLICIT

EMPHASIS ON THE VISEGRAD GROUPING AND OUR APPROACH
TOWARDS RUSSIA -- AS, AT BEST, TOO NARROW AND POSSIBLY
SOMEWHAT OFF THE MARK. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BASORA

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#0190

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0190
<^SSN>0190

TOR: 940107133010 M0815439
<^TOR>940107133014 M0815441

DIST:
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SODERBERG WALLEY
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE FRIED KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER
□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHUPA0445 0131550-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: P 131550Z JAN 94

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

OSRI: RUEHUP

DTG: 131550Z JAN 94

ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8808

INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SUBJ: PRAGUE ASSESSMENT: HUNGARIANS VERY UPBEAT

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000445

USMISSION VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL, LO, EZ, HU

SUBJECT: PRAGUE ASSESSMENT: HUNGARIANS VERY UPBEAT

REF: BUDAPEST 00209

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ADDRESSING AMBASSADORS FROM NATO STATES IN BUDAPEST ON JANUARY 13, FOREIGN MINISTER GEZA JESZENSZKY LAUDED THE PRAGUE SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE FOUR "VISEGRAD" COUNTRIES. BUDAPEST WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THE UNITED STATES SUCCESSFULLY EMPHASIZED THE REGIONAL -- VICE INDIVIDUAL -- NATURE OF THE SUMMIT. JESZENSZKY ALSO STRESSED THAT THE FINAL TERMS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AGREEMENT ARE "FAR MORE ACCEPTABLE AND PROMISING THAN THOSE ORIGINALLY PROPOSED." THE GOH PROBABLY WILL WASTE NO TIME IN PURSUING FINAL TERMS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, AND MAY SEEK TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT SIGNED EARLY THIS YEAR BY PRIME MINISTER BOROSS IN BRUSSELS. END SUMMARY.

NATO MEMBERSHIP STILL HUNGARY'S GOAL

3. ON JANUARY 13, CHARGE ATTENDED A GATHERING OF NATO HEADS OF MISSION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT WHICH HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GEZA JESZENSZKY DELIVERED HIS ASSESSMENTS ON THE PRAGUE SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND LEADERS FROM HUNGARY, POLAND, SLOVAKIA, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. IN THE MEETING, REQUESTED BY THE UK AMBASSADOR, JESZENSZKY SAID HUNGARY IS PLEASED THE UNITED STATES IS FOCUSING ON THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND THAT MORE ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON LEADS TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE REGION. THIS IS THE MOST ATTENTION CENTRAL EUROPE HAS RECEIVED SINCE 1990.

4. HUNGARY RECOGNIZES THAT AN ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By KRM NARA, Date 7/30/2024
2024-0540-M (1.45)

EUROPE STILL EXISTS, AND BELIEVES THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP IS THE BEST VEHICLE FOR CENTRAL EUROPE'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST. JESZENSZKY PRAISED THE FINAL WORDING OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AGREEMENT. "THIS VERSION IS FAR MORE ACCEPTABLE AND PROMISING THAN THE ORIGINAL WORDING," HE STATED. THE AGREEMENT IS AN OPENING TO EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP AND NOT AN EMPTY DECLARATION.

5. FOR HUNGARY, CLOSER RELATIONS WITH NATO WOULD MAKE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHANGES IN 1990 IRREVERSIBLE WHILE REDUCING EXISTING TENSIONS IN THE REGION. JESZENSZKY REMARKED THAT HE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY IMPRESSED WHEN, DURING A TRIP TO NAPLES, HE WITNESSED GREEK AND TURKISH TROOPS MARCHING TOGETHER. DESPITE "PROPAGANDA" TO THE CONTRARY, THE GOH HAS NO REASON TO EXCLUDE ROMANIA OR UKRAINE FROM NATO MEMBERSHIP.

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6. LIKE OTHER "VISEGRAD" GROUP CAPITALS, BUDAPEST CANNOT ENVISION RUSSIA AS A NATO MEMBER. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, JESZENSZKY EMPHASIZED THAT ALL FOUR VISEGRAD COUNTRIES -- MOST OF ALL POLAND -- FEAR RUSSIA. POLAND HAS BEEN INVADDED BY RUSSIA FOUR TIMES, STILL HAS MANY RUSSIAN TROOPS, AND IS THE ONLY REGIONAL COUNTRY BORDERING RUSSIA. (HUNGARY, JESZENSZKY NOTED, HAS BEEN INVADDED BY RUSSIA THREE TIMES.) JESZENSZKY DOES NOT BELIEVE MOSCOW WOULD FEEL THREATENED BY AN EXPANDED NATO. SLAVOPHILES REMAIN INFLUENTIAL IN RUSSIA, HOWEVER, AND TOO MANY RUSSIANS RECENTLY HAVE BEGUN LISTENING TO "FOOLISH, STUPID, AND DANGEROUS TALK." PERHAPS THE WEST SHOULD UNVEIL A NEW POLICY OF "CONTAINMENT OF REACTIONARIES," JESZENSZKY MUSED.

WHAT'S NEXT FOR PFP?

7. JESZENSZKY INFORMED THE ATTENDEES THAT HE WILL TRAVEL TO WARSAW ON JANUARY 14 TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE FOUR REGIONAL STATES. HE THEN ANNOUNCED THAT A U.S. TEAM WILL PROBABLY COME TO HUNGARY SOON TO BEGIN FLESHING OUT DETAILS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AGREEMENT. THE GOH WILL PROPOSE JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES, AND JESZENSZKY SUGGESTED THE MANEUVERS OCCUR NEAR VESZPREM, HUNGARY. BUDAPEST IS ALSO EAGER TO CONCLUDE A FINAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT SOON, AND SUGGESTED THAT PRIME MINISTER PETER BOROSS COULD SIGN THE ACCORD DURING A VISIT TO BRUSSELS.

HUNGARY PLEASED WITH REGIONAL EMPHASIS AT SUMMIT

8. JESZENSZKY PRAISED THE U.S. ABILITY TO STRESS THE "REGIONAL" NATURE OF THE SUMMIT, AS OPPOSED TO PRAGUE'S
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000445
USMISSION VIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PL, LO, EZ, HU
SUBJECT: PRAGUE ASSESSMENT: HUNGARIANS VERY UPBEAT
EFFORTS TO DOWNPLAY PROSPECTS FOR VISEGRAD
COOPERATION. SENIOR CZECH OFFICIALS RESENTED THE

SERIES OF MULTILATERAL EVENTS, AND KLAUS WAS "UNUSUALLY QUIET." "IT DOESN'T MEAN HE HAS CHANGED HIS POSITION," JESZENSZKY NOTED, "BUT HE COULDN'T SWIM UPSTREAM."

9. BUDAPEST CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT REGIONAL COOPERATION WILL BETTER SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE VISEGRAD MEMBERS. EVEN IF THE VISEGRAD FOUR ALL BECAME NATO MEMBERS, EACH WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE SIMILAR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, MANY OF WHICH THEY HAVE IN COMMON. ALTHOUGH SLOVAK PRESIDENT KOVAC AND SLOVAK PRIME MINISTER MECIAR WERE RELATIVELY QUIET DURING THE SUMMIT, THEY WILL LIKELY "COME ALONG IN THE END." (NOTE: JESZENSZKY TOLD THE ASSEMBLED DIPLOMATS THAT ONE SLOVAK LEADER (KOVAC) IS ORIENTED TOWARD THE WEST, AND ONE (MECIAR) IS ORIENTED TOWARD THE EAST. END NOTE.) IN AN ASIDE, JESZENSZKY MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT SLOVENIA WOULD BE A LOGICAL ADDITION TO THE VISEGRAD GROUP.

"NO, BOSNIA DIDN'T COME UP. BUT SINCE YOU ASKED ..."

10. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, JESZENSZKY REPORTED THAT THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT LENGTH DURING THE SUMMIT. JESZENSZKY EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THOSE WHO ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA WILL HELP BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN SERBIAN BEHAVIOR. "NOTHING HAS EMERGED THAT IS PROMISING," HE SAID. HUDXODJ COUNSELED THE BOSNIANS TO ACCEPT ANY PLAN THAT BRINGS PEACE TO THEIR COUNTRY. "BUT A JUST PEACE PLAN WILL PROVIDE LASTING STABILITY," JESZENSZKY ARGUED. "WE SIGNED AN UNJUST PEACE PLAN WHICH CONTINUES TO CAUSE PROBLEMS." HE SPECIFICALLY PRAISED THE CARRINGTON PLAN IN WHICH THE "SPECIAL STATUS" OF MINORITIES WAS UNDERScoreD.

COMMENT: EAGER TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP

11. HUNGARY IS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT. THE "REGIONAL" TONE OF THE SUMMIT PROBABLY ASSUAGES SOME OF THE GOH'S CONCERNS REGARDING SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED VISEGRAD COOPERATION (PER REFTTEL). BESIDES FORMALIZING THE BEST OUTCOME BUDAPEST COULD REASONABLY EXPECT REGARDING NATO, THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) AGREEMENT REINFORCES THE TRANSATLANTIC BASIS OF THE ALLIANCE -- A FOUNDATION WHICH HUNGARY PROBABLY SUPPORTS MORE THAN SOME CURRENT NATO MEMBERS.

12. HUNGARY WILL SEEK TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM FROM THE SUMMIT AND TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON BUDAPEST'S EARLY PUBLIC EMBRACE OF THE PFP PLAN. HUNGARY WILL LIKELY ATTEMPT TO NAIL DOWN AS MANY SPECIFICS AS POSSIBLE WHEN MEETING PFP DELEGATIONS. THE GOH DOES NOT WANT COOPERATION TO STALL. PRIME MINISTER BOROSS WILL BE ANXIOUS TO SIGN A FINALIZED FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT EARLY THIS YEAR IN HOPES THAT A SIGNING CEREMONY IN BRUSSELS WILL IMPROVE THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF HIS RULING HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC FORUM PARTY DURING THE UPCOMING CAMPAIGN SEASON.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHPGA0351 0141701-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 141701Z JAN 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
OSRI: RUEHPG
DTG: 141701Z JAN 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8265
INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0427
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6602
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8798
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0435
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0087
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 8875
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0480
SUBJ: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION
DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 000351
JCS FOR ADM JEREMIAH
SECDEF FOR WISNER AND KRUZEL
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 123568 DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION
DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT
REF: PRAGUE 212
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO PRAGUE, CZECH DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS, AS WELL AS LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, GAVE STRONG SUPPORT TO PFP, AND SHOWED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF ITS DETAILS AND REQUIREMENTS. PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS CALLED IT THE RIGHT WAY INTO NATO, AND NOTED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO FUND AND OVERSEE CZECH COMMITMENTS TO PFP. DEFENSE MINISTER BAUDYS SHOWED SIMILAR ENTHUSIASM, AND WELCOMED THE FACT THAT PFP CALLS FOR INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE, NOT FOR ANY REQUIREMENTS THAT ALL POST COMMUNIST NATIONS BE JUDGED AS A GROUP. FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC SAW THE NEED FOR DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT AS A PART OF NURTURING THE VALUES NECESSARY TO PFP AND ULTIMATELY TO ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP. ALL SAID THEY CONSIDERED PFP A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND DYNAMIC PATH, EMPHASIZING THAT THEY

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KBH NARA, Date 9/30/2024
2024-0570-M (1.47)

EXPECTED IT TO LEAD ULTIMATELY TO FULL MEMBERSHIP. THESE MESSAGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH PRIME MINISTER KLAUS'S UNEQUIVOCABLE ENDORSEMENT OF PFP (REFTEL), AND PORTRAY A CONSISTENT CZECH POSITION: ENTHUSIASM FOR PFP, CAUTION ABOUT VISEGRAD.

END SUMMARY

3. CZECH LEADERS EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASM ABOUT PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, AND PROVIDED THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTARY FOR PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND CHAIRMAN SHALIKASHVILI IN PRAGUE ON MONDAY, JANUARY 10. THIS CABLE COVERS MEETINGS AT PARLIAMENT (LED BY DEFENSE COMMITTEE CHAIR VLADIMIR SUMAN AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIR JIRI PAYNE), THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (DEFENSE MINISTER ANTONIN BAUDYS), AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC).

THE MESSAGE FROM WASHINGTON

4. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT OPENED ALL MEETINGS BY PASSING TWO MESSAGES: THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO LISTEN, AND ALSO TO EXPLAIN THE PFP. HE SAID SHE SOUGHT TO DELIVER A CLEAR MESSAGE: THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE CZECHS TO KNOW THAT THE SECURITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND OF THE ENTIRE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGION IS OF MATERIAL INTEREST TO THE U.S.. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT QUOTED VICE PRESIDENT GORE AS FOLLOWS: "THE SECURITY OF THE STATES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF THE U.S." THERE SHOULD ALSO BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AS A WHOLE: PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD KEEP U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE.

5. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID, ITSELF DEMONSTRATED U.S. INTEREST IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THE PFP WAS EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC, AND EACH COUNTRY COULD PROCEED IN THE PARTNERSHIP AT ITS OWN PACE, A SELF-DIFFERENTIATING PROCESS, AND WOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO FIND A "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR" IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD. NATO, "THE BEST ALLIANCE IN THE WORLD," HAD HIGH STANDARDS AND A SHARED APPROACH. PARTNERS WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REACH THESE HIGH STANDARDS AT THEIR OWN PACE. AS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, NO ONE SHOULD BE FORCED TO DEVELOP IN LOCKSTEP, ALTHOUGH MANY ISSUES COULD AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT. PFP, FOR ITS PART, CREATED NO LINES, NO BLOCS, NO DIVISIONS.

6. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CZECHS' CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA, AND STRESSED THAT THE U.S. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 PRAGUE 000351

JCS FOR ADM JEREMIAH

SECDEF FOR WISNER AND KRUEL

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION

DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT
WAS VERY AWARE OF THE DANGERS FACED THERE. AT THE
SAME TIME, SHE STATED THE NEED TO SUPPORT POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA,
AND FOREIGN POLICY

REFORM AS WELL TO ENSURE RUSSIA DID NOT ENDANGER
NEIGHBORING STATES.

7. GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI NOTED THAT BILATERAL
U.S.-CZECH MILITARY-TO-MILITARY AND
DEFENSE-TO-DEFENSE RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT, AND
THAT THE U.S. SOUGHT TO BUILD ON THESE AND
STRENGTHEN THEM. BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT PFP WAS NOT
"MORE OF THE SAME." IT WAS, HE SAID, A QUALITATIVE
STEP FORWARD TO BUILD STABILITY IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE. THE PFP CREATED A NEW RELATIONSHIP
AND SERVED AS THE BASIS FROM WHICH NATO MEMBERSHIP
COULD BE ACHIEVED. IT "ESTABLISHED THE PATTERN OF
RELATIONSHIPS WHICH IS AT THE CORE OF THE
ALLIANCE." IT WOULD BUILD THROUGH THE PERMANENT
PRESENCE OF CZECH MILITARY PERSONNEL AND SHAPE AND
CZECH POLITICAL PERSONNEL IN BRUSSELS. PFP WOULD
NOT BE AN AUTOMATIC SECURITY GUARANTEE, BUT WOULD BE
A MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION WITH NATO IN THE EVENT
OF CRISIS.

8. GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI WENT ON THAT HE WAS VERY
AWARE OF CZECH INTEREST IN EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP.
HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THE NATO SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE
WOULD MENTION AS ONE OF ITS GOALS THE MEMBERSHIP OF
THE DEMOCRACIES TO THE EAST. HE NOTED THAT GREAT
PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS ISSUE IN THE LAST FEW
MONTHS: EARLIER, ANY MENTION OF EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP
HAD BEEN CONSIDERED PREMATURE. A FEW MONTHS FROM
NOW, EVEN MORE PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE. THE U.S. HAD
PUT BEHIND IT THE QUESTION OF "WHETHER," AND HAD
MOVED ON TO "WHEN AND HOW". EARLY AND ENTHUSIASTIC
PARTICIPATION IN PFP, HE SAID, WAS THE BEST WAY
TOWARD MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE.

9. GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI OUTLINED PFP, EMPHASIZING
ITS FLEXIBILITY, WHICH ALLOWED IT TO EVOLVE
DYNAMICALLY. THE PFP WOULD REQUIRE SIGNATURE ON A
"FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" EMPHASIZING COMMITMENT TO
DEMOCRACY, RESPECT FOR EXISTING BORDERS, RESPECT FOR
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITMENT TO CIVIL CONTROL
OF THE MILITARY, AND TRANSPARENT MILITARY BUDGETS,
ADDING THAT T33 2343 3/3.0)-46 8, 5#3 : "3:#
4307?)8:.. THEN THE "MARRIAGE" BETWEEN THE PARTNER
AND NATO WOULD PROCEED, WITH PERSONAL CONTACTS AND A
"COMMITMENT DOCUMENT" ON FORCES AND FACILITIES THE
PARTNER WOULD LIKE TO COMMIT. IT WOULD NOT BE THE
QUANTITY, BUT THE QUALITY OF FORCES AND COMMITMENT
THAT WOULD MATTER. IT WOULD BE UP TO THE PARTNER
COUNTRY TO MOVE AT ITS OWN PACE TOWARD INTEGRATION
WITH NATO.

PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSE: EAGER TO CONTRIBUTE

10. PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
VLADIMIR SUMAN HAD FIRST GREETED AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT

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AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI TO THE MEETING, BUT IT WAS FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JIRI PAYNE WHO PROVIDED THE SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. PAYNE ALLUDED TO THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOMENT: THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT, HE SAID, WOULD BRING THE CZECHS FORWARD TO A POINT THEY HAD IN FACT REACHED BEFORE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN 1948, THAT IS, READY FOR ACCESSION TO WESTERN INSTITUTIONS. PAYNE NOTED THAT IN 1990 HE HAD LED A SMALL GROUP OF DEPUTIES WHO DECLARED THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC SHOULD JOIN NATO. OTHERS CONSIDERED THIS "LUNACY," HE SAID, AS THE WARSAW PACT STILL EXISTED, AND CALLED HIM A "POLITICAL SKINHEAD." NOW, PAYNE SAID WITH SATISFACTION, PFP OFFERED PRECISELY THOSE THINGS HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD SOUGHT IN 1990. "PFP IS THE WAY" TO INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST, HE CONCLUDED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 PRAGUE 000351

JCS FOR ADM JEREMIAH

SECDEF FOR WISNER AND KRUEL

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT

11. PAYNE NOTED THAT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, THE MEMORY OF THE 1938 MUNICH BETRAYAL REMAINS. THE CZECHS FEEL THEMSELVES PART OF WESTERN EUROPEAN CULTURE, BUT SUBSEQUENT EVENTS PUT THEM ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE IRON CURTAIN. NOW, HE SAID, WE BELONG AMONG THE DEMOCRATIC STATES. WE SEEK YOUR HELP, AND THE PFP IS THE APPROPRIATE HELP WE SEEK. IT ALLOWS US TO SETTLE OUR OWN PROBLEMS, TO BE SELF-RELIANT, AND YET TO BE REALISTIC THAT NOT ALL OUR SECURITY NEEDS CAN BE SERVED BY OUR MILITARY ALONE, BUT OF COURSE IN CONCERT WITH OUR GROWING PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO. IN DOING SO, WE WILL ALSO WORK WITH OUR OTHER NEIGHBORS IN EUROPE.

12. PAYNE EMPHASIZED THAT PARLIAMENTS OF THE PARTNERS WOULD NEED TO RATIFY ANY MOVES TOWARD COMMITMENTS TO THE PARTNERSHIP AND ULTIMATE MEMBERSHIP, AND NOTED THAT EACH PARLIAMENT WOULD NEED TO BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR PFP ACTIVITY AND TO PROVIDE OVERSIGHT OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF THESE FUNDS. HE SUGGESTED THAT MEMBERS OF CZECH PARLIAMENT MIGHT HAVE TWO CONCRETE CONTRIBUTIONS: FIRST, TO COOPERATE WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE ALLIANCE, AND SECOND, TO INFLUENCE CZECH PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOR OF THE ROAD PRESENTED BY PFP.

13. SUMAN ADDED THAT ONE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE SECURITY RISK: IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, HE SAID, NOT TO RETREAT IN THE FACE OF EVIL, EITHER ACTUAL OR LOOMING.

14. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AGREED WITH PAYNE'S EMPHASIS ON PUBLIC SUPPORT. MUNICH, SHE SAID, HAD BEEN AN EMPTY PROMISE. PFP CANNOT BE AN EMPTY PROMISE. PARLIAMENTS MUST INDEED WORK TO RATIFY AND EXPLAIN PFP DOMESTICALLY. SHE WELCOMED PAYNE'S

UNDERSTANDING OF PARLIAMENT'S ROLE, WHICH INDICATED A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE PFP PROCESS.

15. GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT ALLOW EVENTS IN RUSSIA OR ELSEWHERE TO DICTATE TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS. "I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE NOT NAIVE ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS IN RUSSIA" AND IT REQUIRES OUR CLOSE ATTENTION, HE SAID. BUT WE MUST NOT OVERREACT, AS IT WOULD PARALYZE US FROM SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES STILL OPEN TO US. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY: DO WE FACE BLACKMAIL FROM RUSSIA? AT THE HEIGHT OF SOVIET STRENGTH, THERE WAS ALWAYS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN U.S. DECISIONS MADE IN WASHINGTON AND NATO DECISIONS MADE IN BRUSSELS. NOW THAT RUSSIA IS WEAKER, U.S. DECISIONS ARE ALL THE MORE MADE IN WASHINGTON, AND NATO'S IN BRUSSELS. WE ARE AWARE OF THE DANGERS, HE CONCLUDED, AND WE ARE NOT CAVALIER ABOUT THEM.

DEFMIN BAUDYS: PFP GOOD, VISEGRAD LESS SO

16. AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, MINISTER BAUDYS RESPONDED TO THE PRESENTATIONS BY AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI IMMEDIATELY AND POSITIVELY. HE STATED HIS VIEW OF THE PROGRAM WHICH WISELY CREATED SPACE TO ALLOW SUCH CLOSE COOPERATION AS WAS POSSIBLE (FOR THE CZECHS) TO ACCEPT. ALTHOUGH HE HAD PREPARED QUESTIONS FOR THE PRESDEL, THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN ANSWERED BY AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI. BAUDYS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WAS A MATTER FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND NATO TO CONCLUDE, BUT NOTED THAT, FOR ITS PART, THE MILITARY RESPONSE WOULD BE DYNAMIC. THE MILITARY, HE STATED, WAS PREPARED TO CONSULT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF COOPERATION, AND HAD ALREADY BEGUN PREPARING PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAM VIA SPECIAL SCHOOLING. BAUDYS VOICED THE VIEW THAT PFP WOULD WORK IF IT WAS IN FACT A FIRST STEP TOWARD EVENTUAL FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE CONCLUDED BY
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JCS FOR ADM JEREMIAH
SECDEF FOR WISNER AND KRUEL
VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, EZ
SUBJECT: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT
REITERATING HIS OFT-STATED VIEW THAT EUROPE NEEDED A CONTINUED, STRONG AMERICAN PRESENCE.

17. BAUDYS THEN TURNED BRIEFLY TO THE VISEGRAD GROUP. HE STATED THAT HE OPPOSED ANY GROUPING OR BLOC WHICH COULD SLOW DOWN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ESPECIALLY IN SECURITY AFFAIRS. HE RAISED HIS CONCERN OVER CERTAIN (UNEXPRESSED) DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT SURFACE IN COMING YEARS. WHILE BILATERAL CONTACTS AT HIGH LEVELS WERE WELCOME, HE SAID, INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP WOULD

ALSO EXCLUDE OTHER COUNTRIES (THE BALTICS, SLOVENIA, ETC) WHICH COULD CREATE STILL ANOTHER PROBLEM SET. HE ALLUDED TO CZECH FEARS OF DOMINATION BY OTHERS IN THE VISEGRAD CONTEXT, BUT SOFTENED HIS THRUST BY ADMITTING THAT THE BASIC AIM OF THE FOUR WAS THE SAME -- INTEGRATION INTO EUROPEAN STRUCTURES AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. IN CONCLUSION, BAUDYS ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SECURE, DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA, AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR REFORM THERE.

18. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT NOTED THAT THE NATO SUMMIT WOULD HAVE AN AGENDA ITEM ON FURTHERANCE OF REGIONAL RELATIONS, WHICH THE U.S. BELIEVES CAN BE USEFUL TO THE RESOLUTION OF SOME ISSUES. SHE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES OF CREATING SUCH GROUPINGS (THAT IS, INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF COUNTRIES) AND OBSERVED THAT AN ADVANTAGE OF THE PFP PROGRAM WAS THAT IT ALLOWED EACH COUNTRY TO PROCEED AT ITS OWN PACE, YET ENCOURAGED REGIONAL COOPERATION WHEN IT SERVED A COMMON CAUSE. THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES NEEDED TO COOPERATE, AS THEY DID DURING THE RECENT DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING IN WARSAW. SHE ADDED THAT THE CZECHS COULD COUNT ON THE U.S. TO UNDERSTAND THEIR SENSITIVITIES, AND POINTED TO THE DIFFERENCES THAT EXISTED AMONG THE NATO 16 THAT HAD BEEN DEALT WITH SUCCESSFULLY.

FONMIN ZIELENIEC: PFP AND WESTERN VALUES

19. FOREIGN MINISTER JOSEF ZIELENIEC RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S COMMENT THAT NATO WAS THE WORLD'S BEST ALLIANCE. "FOR US," HE SAID, "IT IS THE ONLY ALLIANCE." THIS WAS THE ONLY GROUP WORTH JOINING, BECAUSE ITS VALUES WERE THOSE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. THIS WAS A QUESTION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY: THE ALLIANCE WAS THE GROUP THAT REPRESENTED THE CULTURAL IDENTITY SHARED BY THE CZECHS. FOR THAT REASON, ZIELENIEC SAID, WE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPT THE OFFER OF PFP BECAUSE IT OPENS THE WAY FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE BASED ON OUR OWN SELF-RELIANCE AND EFFORT.

20. ZIELENIEC WENT ON THAT THE CZECH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM HAD A SIMPLE BASIS: WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR OWN FATE AND TRANSFORMATION. THUS PFP FITS OUR PHILOSOPHY. WE WANT TO BE ACTIVE, HE EMPHASIZED; FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, WE MUST ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF CLEAR POLITICAL CONNECTIONS WITH NATO, WITH THE U.S., AND ESTABLISH THE CONCRETE PRACTICE OF PARTNERSHIP. ALREADY, HE SAID, WE CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE WEST, SO LET US BE EVEN MORE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT ABOUT OUR CONSULTING.

21. THE BIGGEST DANGER, ZIELENIEC SAID, WAS THE INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND SUCCESSFUL MARKET ECONOMIES AND THE ISSUE OF DOMESTIC STABILITY IS THE SOURCE OF OUR DIFFERENCES. HE WENT ON THAT WHILE THE PFP MUST HAVE IMPORTANT MILITARY DIMENSIONS, THE BASIS OF THE

PARTNERSHIP MUST BE SHARED VALUES OF NATIONS.
PRACTICAL STEPS IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY WOULD
BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE PROPER FIT, AND HE
SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A POINT AS PART
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PRAGUE 000351

JCS FOR ADM JEREMIAH

SECDEF FOR WISNER AND KRUEL

VIENNA HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECHS GIVE PFP AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION
DURING ALBRIGHT/SHALIKASHVILI VISIT
OF NATO'S PFP DECLARATION.

22. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI
EMPHASIZED THAT THE "COMMITMENT DOCUMENT" AND THE
"FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" WOULD EMPHASIZED PRECISELY
THESE POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS FOR COUNTRIES EXPECTING
TO TAKE PART IN THE PFP PROGRAM, INCLUDING HUMAN
RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, AND ADHERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.

23. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AGREED THAT SHARED VALUES
WAS INDEED THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSION. STILL,
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT CAUTIONED, PFP WAS NOT
EVERYTHING: IT PROVIDED STRUCTURE. ULTIMATELY,
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET ECONOMIES IN
PARTNER STATES WERE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY. SHE SAID
THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE
CZECH REPUBLIC WERE EXCELLENT.

24. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT NOTED THAT COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE TWO STATES IN MULTILATERAL FORA WOULD BE
ENHANCED BY THE CZECH ACCESSION TO NON-PERMANENT
MEMBERSHIP ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CZECH
PRESENCE THERE WAS FORTUITOUS. IT ALLOWED BOTH
COUNTRIES TO WORK CLOSELY ON SUCH ISSUES AS
PEACEKEEPING, SANCTIONS, AND A HOST OF CHALLENGES
WHERE WESTERN VALUES WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THUS
THE STRONG BILATERAL LINKS, THE NEW EXPANSION OF
MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, AND THAT COOPERATION IN
PFP WHICH WOULD EXIST SOON AUGURED FOR CONTINUED
EXCELLENT TIES.

25. ZIELENIEC ENDED THE MEETING BY ECHOING
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S POINT: THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL SEAT WAS A WELCOME CHALLENGE FOR THE CZECHS,
TO ALLOW THEM TO SHOW THAT THEY ACCEPT TH
EIR

COMMITMENTS AS PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD. WE
WANT TO SHOW THAT WE ARE ABLE TO ACCEPT OUR
RESPONSIBILITIES.

26. COMMENT: THE VISIT OF PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI TO
PRAGUE WAS A RESOUNDING SUCCESS. THE CZECHS
WELCOMED AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT'S CLEAR EXPLANATION OF
PFP AS MUCH AS THEY WELCOMED HER PRESENCE AS A
NATIVE OF PRAGUE. GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI'S LUCID
EXPOSITION OF THE PROGRAM'S DETAILS WAS
EXTRAORDINARILY EFFECTIVE. THE CZECHS MADE THEIR
PITCH FOR THEIR CHIEF CONCERN: THEY WANT TO BE
JUDGED ON THEIR OWN MERITS, NOT THOSE OF THEIR

NEIGHBORS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT PFP WILL ALLOW
PRECISELY THAT, AND THEY WILL CERTAINLY PURSUE THE
PARTNERSHIP ENERGETICALLY. END COMMENT

27. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
BASORA

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05

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SSN: 0351

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PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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OSRI: RUEHPG
DTG: 181732Z JAN 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8289
INFO: *****
SUBJ: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PRAGUE:
BUILDING ON A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE
TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRAGUE 000396
STATE PLEASE PASS TO NSC STAFF FOR WALKER AND FRIED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, EZ
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PRAGUE:
BUILDING ON A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. IT WAS A REAL HIGH POINT FOR ALL OF US AT EMBASSY
PRAGUE TO WORK SO CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THE PREPARATIONS
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND THE VISIT ITSELF.
3. IN OUR VIEW THE PRESIDENT HAS LAID A STRONG
FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY AND
MARKET ECONOMICS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THE VISIT
SHOULD GIVE EACH OF THE MISSIONS IN THE VISEGRAD FOUR
CAPITALS A GOOD BASIS FOR OUR FUTURE WORK.
4. AFTER THE PRESIDENT DEPARTED, YOU MAY KNOW THAT I
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHER THREE
AMBASSADORS (PLUS AMBASSADOR DAVIS) AND OF TERRY SNELL,
TO HAVE A MINI-COMS' CONFERENCE. ONE POINT THAT CAME
OUT OF THAT COLLOQUY WAS THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL
TO ALL OF US IF WE COULD EACH SEE THE RELEVANT MEMCONS
FROM THE FOUR BILATERALS AND THE REGIONAL LUNCH.
5. HAVING WORKED AT THE NSC, I KNOW WHAT PRESSURES YOU
ARE UNDER, AND I ALSO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO PROTECT THE
PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS. STILL,
IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO ENABLE US TO SEE,
WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, THE OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF THE VARIOUS MEETINGS (INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE
CLINTON-HAVEL TETE-A-TETE), WE'D GREATLY APPRECIATE
IT. REGARDS. BASORA
BT
#0396
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 0396
TOR: 940118114321 M0830339

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By KBH NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-7 (1.48)

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LINE3: P 191619Z JAN 94

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

OSRI: RUEHPG

DTG: 191619Z JAN 94

ORIG: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8305

INFO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5616

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4205

RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9471

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0441

SUBJ: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT,
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 000420
VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT,
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. THE CZECH MFA VIEWS THE RECENT VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRAGUE AS A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS -- IN BOTH BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TERMS. OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE WAS THE CLEAR SIGNAL GIVEN ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE THAT WASHINGTON ATTACHES TO CENTRAL EUROPE AS A REGION, INCLUDING THE MESSAGE THAT THE SECURITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND OF THE OTHER THREE CEE STATES IS OF IMMEDIATE AND MATERIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND TO NATO. THE CZECHS ALSO BELIEVE THAT -- DESPITE, OR PERHAPS BECAUSE OF, JOCKEYING AMONG THE VISEGRAD STATES IN THE RUNUP TO THE PRAGUE MEETING -- REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CONCRETE, PRACTICAL MATTERS HAS BEEN GIVEN A BOOST AND CAN NOW MOVE ONTO A QUALITATIVELY NEW AND MORE PRODUCTIVE STAGE. THE CZECHS ARGUE THAT THE 16-PLUS-1 METHODOLOGY OF NATO'S PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE (PFP) "CONFIRMS" THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PRAGUE'S APPROACH TO REGIONAL COOPERATION, ADDING THAT SLOVAKIA AND PERHAPS OTHERS IN THE V-4 ARE BEGINNING TO COME AROUND TO THE CZECH PRAGMATIC APPROACH. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CZECHS HAVE ALSO SIGNALLED THEIR GROWING FRUSTRATIONS WITH V-4 COOPERATION, SINGLING OUT THE UNWILLINGNESS OF SOME OF THEIR PARTNERS TO MOVE OUT MORE SMARTLY ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE FOUR-COUNTRY

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Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015By KRM NARA, Date 4/30/2024
2024-0540-M (1.49)

CEFTA FRAMEWORK. PRAGUE IS INCREASINGLY LOOKING TO AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA AS POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL PARTNERS WITH WHICH IT CAN COOPERATE IN THE REGION, AND BELIEVES THAT VISEGRAD HAS SERVED THE FUNCTIONS FOR WHICH IT WAS INVENTED. THE GOCR APPARENTLY HAS CONCLUDED THAT ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE FOUR VISEGRAD STATES NEEDS TO TAKE NEW SHAPES AND FORMS -- WITH BILATERAL ACTIVITIES APPEARING TO BE THE MOST PROMISING AND LEAST SUBJECT TO THE PITFALLS OF "LOWEST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR" RESULTS, WHICH, IN THE CZECH VIEW, ARE APT TO SLOW RATHER THAN EXPEDITE THE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION PROCESS.

END SUMMARY

VISIT -- A RESOUNDING SUCCESS!

3. MFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR EURO-ATLANTIC AFFAIRS BUSNIAK AND SECOND TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR MRAVEC CALLED IN DCM AND POLCOUNS JAN. 14 TO PROVIDE INITIAL MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S JAN. 11-12 VISIT TO PRAGUE AND THE MEETING WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN (CEE) LEADERS.

4. BUSNIAK PREFACED THE MFA ASSESSMENT BY UNDERSCORING THAT A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND REASSURING RESULT OF THE VISIT FOR ALL IN THE REGION WAS THE CONVICTION THAT CEE NOW HAD THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR STAFF -- AND THAT THE REGION WAS NOT JUST AN ADJUNCT TO WASHINGTON CONCERNS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA.

MFA CONCLUSIONS AFFECTING BILATERAL RELATIONS

5. MRAVEC THEN REVIEWED THREE "CONCLUSIONS" THAT THE CZECHS DERIVED IN THE WAKE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT:

A) THE U.S., LIKE THE CR, PREFERS TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY ISSUE IN A "BROADER CONTEXT," TO INCLUDE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WASHINGTON IS READY TO STRENGTHEN ITS DIALOGUE WITH STATES IN THE REGION IN THE FUTURE.

B) THE U.S. AND THE CR ARE ABLE TO HANDLE -- AND WORK TOGETHER ON -- SENSITIVE ISSUES WITH DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS AFFECTING THEIR RELATIONSHIP. (MRAVEC SINGLED OUT THE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL EXCHANGE ON IRAN AND ON TEMELIN AS EXAMPLES.)

C) THE ISSUE OF THE V-4 AND REGIONAL COOPERATION WAS CLEARLY ADDRESSED AND PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE CZECH ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON PRACTICAL COOPERATION.

ON. (MRAVEC ARGUED THAT THE SERIES OF V-4 DINNERS HELD THE DAY THE PRESIDENT DEPARTED PRAGUE -- PARALLEL FUNCTIONS HOSTED BY THE CZECHS FOR PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS, RESPECTIVELY -- YIELDED SIGNS OF SOME UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CZECH POSITION REGARDING REGIONAL COOPERATION, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 PRAGUE 000420 VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

ESPECIALLY FROM SLOVAKIA.)
BROADER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

6. BUSNIAK THEN REVIEWED THE "POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS" FLOWING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, AS THE CZECH SAW THEM:

A) FOREMOST, AS HE HAD NOTED AT THE OUTSET, WAS THE CLEAR SIGNAL THAT CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IS SOLIDLY FIXED WITHIN THE U.S. VIEW OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE. THIS WAS VIVIDLY UNDERSCORED BY THE PRESIDENT'S STOPS IN BRUSSELS, CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEN RUSSIA.

B) THE MEETING IN PRAGUE -- THE CAPITAL OF A NEW STATE -- SIGNALLED THAT THE CZECH REPUBLIC HAS A CLEAR PLACE IN U.S. EUROPEAN POLICY.

C) ALL FOUR CEE STATES ACCEPTED THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE. IN PART, BUSNIAK ARGUED, THE CZECH APPROACH TO REGIONAL COOPERATION -- WITH EMPHASIS ON RESULTS NOT PROCLAMATIONS -- HELPED ADVANCE THIS RESULT. (HERE BUSNIAK ARGUED THAT HAVEL'S NATIONAL STATEMENT AFTER THE JAN. 12 REGIONAL LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT PROJECTED A MORE POSITIVE MESSAGE THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IN A NEGOTIATED, COMMON V-4 STATEMENT, SINCE THE LATTER WOULD HAVE HAD TO REFLECT SOME NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE POLISH POSITION.)
BRIEFING OF NATO EMBASSIES

7. THE AFTERNOON OF JAN. 14, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VONDRA, ACCOMPANIED BY BUSNIAK, MRAVEC AND MFA SECURITY POLICY DEPUTY DIRECTOR TUMA, BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS ON THE CZECH ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE NATO SUMMIT AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO PRAGUE.

8. VONDRA TERMED THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND THE MEETINGS IN PRAGUE "VERY USEFUL AND A SUCCESS." IT DEMONSTRATED, HE STRESSED, THE LONG-TERM U.S. INTEREST IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND, HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA AND ALLOWED THESE FOUR CEE STATES TO CONVEY THEIR INTEREST IN NATO AND IN A VISIBLE AND ACTIVE U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE. VONDRA SAID THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD UNDERSCORED AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF THE CR AND OF ALL CEE STATES, SAYING IT WAS A "VITAL INTEREST OF THE U.S." AT THE SAME TIME, VONDRA CREDITED THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WILL PROMOTING A BETTER CLIMATE OF UNDERSTANDING AND REGIONAL COOPERATION.

NATO SUMMIT -- POSITIVE SIGNAL

9. TURNING TO THE NATO SUMMIT, VONDRA SAID PRAGUE READ THE RESULTS COMING OUT OF THE BRUSSELS MEETING AS INDICATING THAT:

A) NATO REALLY INTENDS TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AS THE BACKBONE OF SECURITY IN EUROPE;

B) SECURITY IN EUROPE IS INTERDEPENDENT/INDIVISIBLE ("MUTUALLY BOUNDED"); AND

C) NATO IS AN OPEN ALLIANCE.

10. VONDRA SAID THE GOCR SEES THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) AS THE "BEGINNING OF REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS INTEGRATION INTO THE ALLIANCE." THE CR'S "STRATEGIC GOAL" REMAINED MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, BUT PRAGUE

APPRECIATED THAT PFP WAS THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NOW AND WAS PREPARED TO START IMPLEMENTING THE PFP PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY.

12. VONDRA ADDED THAT THE CZECHS APPRECIATED IN PARTICULAR THE METHODOLOGY OF PFP -- "THAT IS, THE INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONSHIP." THE CZECHS ALSO WELCOMED THAT THE OTHER THREE CEE STATES -- "ESPECIALLY POLAND" -- ACCEPTED THE PFP, ADDING THAT "OUR GOALS ARE ALL THE SAME." THIS SAID, VONDRA ECHOED BUSNIAK'S COMMENT THAT A COORDINATED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR CEE STATES ON PFP WOULD HAVE LED TO A LOWEST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR TEXT -- DIFFERENT AND LESS POSITIVE THAN THE NATIONAL STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 PRAGUE 000420

VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION HAVEL.

PFP -- WAY FORWARD

13. VONDRA SAID THAT THE CZECH GOVERNMENT WOULD FORMALLY APPROVE PFP IN "THE VERY NEXT DAYS" AND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ZIELENIEC WOULD THEN CONVEY TO NATO SYG WOERNER PRAGUE'S ACCEPTANCE. HE OPINED THAT THE CZECHS WOULD PROBABLY SIGN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT IN THE SPRING.

(NOTE: MFA SECURITY POLICY DIRECTOR VACEK INDICATED TO POLCOUNS JAN. 18 THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE BY PRIME MINISTER KLAUS DURING A PLANNED EARLY MARCH VISIT TO BRUSSELS.)

14. VONDRA NOTED THAT THE CZECHS WOULD HAVE CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO EXPERTS IN PRAGUE AT THE END OF JANUARY OR THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY, ADDING THAT THIS WOULD MARK THE "FIRST REAL, PRACTICAL STEP OF CZECH ACTIVITY" UNDER PFP. THESE CONSULTATIONS WOULD HELP SHAPE THE CZECH PFP PRESENTATION DOCUMENT. VONDRA INDICATED THAT PRAGUE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONCRETE COOPERATION WITH NATO, INCLUDING THE POSTING OF LIAISON PERSONNEL AT NATO AND A MILITARY OFFICER AT MONS, AS WELL AS COMMON TRAINING AND EXERCISE ACTIVITIES. HE CONCLUDED BY PLEDGING THAT THE GOCR WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN PFP AND TO "INVEST" IN COOPERATION WITH NATO.

15. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING CZECH PFP IMPLEMENTATION, VONDRA:

A) SAID THAT PFP ENJOYS WIDE SUPPORT AMONG THE CZECH COALITION AND OPPOSITION PARTIES -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE COMMUNISTS;

B) DID NOT ANTICIPATE THAT A SPECIAL BUDGET APPROPRIATE WOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE GOCR IN 1994 TO IMPLEMENT PFP, OPINING THAT THERE WAS "SPACE" IN THE RECENTLY ADOPTED 1994 BUDGET TO COVER CZECH PFP START-UP COSTS; AND

C) INDICATED THAT PRAGUE HAD USED THE 6-8 MONTHS PRECEDING THE NATO SUMMIT TO INFLUENCE THE SHAPE OF PFP AND CLAIMED SOME SUCCESSES FOR PRAGUE, WARSAW AND

BUDAPEST IN THIS REGARD.
REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE V-4

16. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON THE FATE OF VISEGRAD, VONDRA SAID THAT IT WAS IN PRAGUE'S INTEREST THAT WARSAW, BUDAPEST AND BRATISLAVA ALSO BECOME MEMBERS OF NATO. HOWEVER, IT WAS A NATIONAL TASK AND RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH PARLIAMENTS INDIVIDUALLY WILL HAVE TO APPROVE. THIS CZECH APPROACH TO SECURITY AND THE NATO ISSUE WAS PART OF THE GENERAL CZECH APPROACH TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY IN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALMS.

17. CONFIRMING AN OBSERVATION BY THE UK AMBASSADOR, BUSNIAK SAID THAT THE CR HAD A "STRONG FEELING" THAT AS A RESULT OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND DISCUSSIONS DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO PRAGUE, THE THREE OTHER CEE STATES HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CZECH CONCEPT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION. SOME, HE ADDED, ARE COMING TO ADOPT THIS APPROACH THEMSELVES AND HE MENTIONED SLOVAKIA PARTICULARLY IN THIS REGARD, AS HE HAD TO EMBASSY REPS EARLIER IN THE DAY. REVIEWING THE CZECH POSITION ON REGIONAL COOPERATION, BUSNIAK SAID PRAGUE'S APPROACH WAS: YES TO A BETTER CHANGE OF VIEWS ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES; NO TO JOINT COMMUNIQUEs AND STATEMENTS; YES TO PRACTICAL COOPERATION; NO TO THE FORMATION OF PRESSURE GROUPS.

18. CONTINUING, BUSNIAK SAID THE CZECH EMPHASIS IS ON THE INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED, ADDING THAT THE "16-PLUS-1" APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE PFP METHODOLOGY "CONFIRMS THE VALIDITY OF OUR CONCEPT." BUSNIAK SAID PRAGUE DOES NOT EXCLUDE ADOPTING JOINT, BILATERAL POSITIONS -- SUCH AS THE DECEMBER POLISH-CZECH DECLARATION ON PFP -- BUT ADDED THEY WOULD BE RARE. AT A SUBSEQUENT POINT, BUSNIAK NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT AND WAS NOT TRYING TO ORGANIZE ANY (SPECIFIC) SORT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION, BUT RATHER HAD SIGNALLED THAT IT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 PRAGUE 000420
VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, NATO, EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION
WAS UP TO THE STATES CONCERNED TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRACTICAL COOPERATION, 2#8:# 5#3 7.S. ENCOURAGED.
MRAVEC ADDED THAT THE JAN. 12 REGIONAL LUNCHEON YIELDED AGREEMENT THAT THERE WERE MANY PRACTICAL ISSUES TO SOLVE, WHICH COULD BE THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN A VERY PRACTICAL WAY.
FRUSTRATION WITH V-4 COOPERATION.

19. PRESSED ON THE TYPE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION THE CZECHS HAD IN MIND, MRAVEC CONFIRMED THAT IT FOCUSED ON TECHNICAL MATTERS. BUSNIAK ADDED THAT THE CZECH EXPERIENCE WITH REGIONAL COOPERATION HAD, TO DATE, NOT BEEN VERY SATISFYING. IN THIS REGARD, HE CITED THE FAILURE OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FRE

E TRADE AGREEMENT

(CEFTA) WITH POLAND, HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA TO LIVE UP TO PRAGUE'S HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE CZECHS STILL HAVE NOT SEEN PRACTICAL RESULTS IN SHORTENING THE TIMETABLE FOR THE AGREEMENT TO COME INTO FULL EFFECT. LIKEWISE, PRAGUE HAS BEEN FRUSTRATED IN ITS EFFORTS TO ENLARGE THE LISTS OF COMMODITIES COVERED. 20. VONDRA CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE "CORE OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE" WAS TO BE FOUND IN NATO AND THE PFP AND NOT IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES.

COMMENT

21. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION WITH NATO REPS, VONDRA AND HIS MFA COLLEAGUES WERE AT PAINS TO AVOID USING THE "V-WORD." THE IMPLICIT STRESS WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST ON BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE REGION. THIS REFLECTS NAGGING CZECH DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE PACE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN PRAGUE'S V25'8̚. ABOVE ALL, PRAGUE IS CONCERNED THAT "LOCK-STEP" AND "ARTIFICIAL" V-4 COOPERATION -- SYMBOLIZED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT POSITIONS AND THE "INSTITUTIONALIZATION" OF THE VISEGRAD PROCESS ABOVE OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION -- WILL RESULT IN LOWEST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR POLITICS AND POLICIES THAT WILL SLOW DOWN, RATHER THAN SPEED UP, THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS.

22. THE CZECHS ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT V-4 COOPERATION IS BEING USED, E.G., IN POLAND, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES. THUS, PRAGUE INTERPRETS WALESA'S POSTURE ON PFP AND EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A COMMON V-4 POSITION AS MOTIVATED IN LARGE MEASURE BY THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THAT COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CZECHS WORRY THAT THE V-4 FRAMEWORK WOULD GIVE POLAND -- WHICH IS LARGER THAN THE OTHER THREE VISEGRAD PARTNERS COMBINED -- THE DOMINANT VOICE IN THE ASSOCIATION. WITH THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN HUNGARY AND THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA, PRAGUE LIKEWISE IS HESITANT TO LINK ITS FUTURE TOO CLOSELY WITH THESE NEIGHBORS AND THUS PREFERS TO MAKE CONCRETE ACTIVITIES (BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL) AND THEIR PRACTICAL RESULTS -- RATHER THAN A FORUM ITSELF -- THE YARDSTICK FOR JUDGING REGIONAL COOPERATION. AS EMBASSY HAS REPORTED, THE CZECHS -- HAVEL AS WELL AS KLAUS -- ARE ALSO LOOKING TO AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA AS PARTNERS FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGIONAL COOPERATION.

23. IN A CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS FOLLOWING THE NATO BRIEFING, BUSNIAK IN EFFECT CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE DIRECTION IN WHICH PRAGUE'S POLICY WAS ORIENTED. HE REPEATED HIS EARLIER POINTS ABOUT THE CEFTA -- AN ARGUMENT THAT PRIME MINISTER KLAUS HAD, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, ALSO MADE TO THE AMBASSADOR ON JAN. 7. IN ADDITION, BUSNIAK NOTED THAT PRAGUE HAD PROPOSED BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON PFP AND NATO MEMBERSHIP WITH ALL THREE CEE PARTNERS, BUT HAD BEEN REBUFFED.

24. WHEN WE RAISED THE V-4 DEFENSE MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE ISSUED JAN. 7 IN WARSAW -- AND, PARTICULARLY, THE AGREEMENT RECORD IN ITS LAST SENTENCE THAT "FOLLOWING CLARIFICATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR

PEACE INITIATIVE, EXPERTS AT THE PROPER LEVEL WILL MEET
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO EXAMINE THE BEST METHODS OF
COOPERATION" -- BUSNIAK INDICATED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE
WAS THE LAST V-4 STATEMENT THAT WILL BE ISSUED, ADDING
THAT THE CZECH DELEGATION HAD EXCEEDED ITS INSTRUCTIONS
AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO V-4 EXPERTS' CONSULTATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 PRAGUE 000420

VIENNA ALSO FOR BRATISLAVA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM), PREL, NATO, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH MFA ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT,

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION

BASORA

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

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TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8422

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RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 6627

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RUEHBS/USEC BRUSSELS

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0459

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9488

SUBJ: CZECH IT OUT - I

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000761

VIENNA ALSO PLS HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, EZ

SUBJECT: CZECH IT OUT - I

1. (LOU) THIS IS THE FIRST IN A REVIVED SERIES OF CABLES ON CZECH DOMESTIC POLITICS, DESIGNED ESSENTIALLY TO FLAG DEVELOPMENTS WHICH CURRENTLY DO NOT MERIT A FULL CABLE, BUT COULD BE INDICATIVE OF COMING TRENDS.

2. (S) SUMMARY: THE CIVIC DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ODS) OF CZECH PRIME MINISTER KLAUS SEEMS TO BE MOVING CLOSER TO ITS OTHER COALITION PARTNERS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE TERRITORIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. A NEW "AUTHENTIC" PARTY OF THE RIGHT IS SET TO EMERGE FEBRUARY 1; ITS FOUNDERS CLAIM THE ODS HAS SOLD OUT TO THE LEFT. POLLING DATA SUGGEST THAT ODS SUPPORT BASICALLY IS HOLDING STEADY, BUT MAY BE ERODING SLIGHTLY; COALITION PARTNER THE CIVIC DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ODA) LOOKS LIKE THE GAINER ON THE CENTER-RIGHT. DESPITE EVIDENCE OF INTERNAL DISSENSION WITHIN THE ODS AND LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN PARLIAMENT, THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS MUCH WORSE OFF, SPLINTERING AT AN IMPRESSIVE RATE. A NEW POLL INDICATES THAT OVER HALF OF CZECHS BELIEVE THE NEW LEADERSHIP IS NOT MORALLY SUPERIOR TO THE OLD COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP. THE PEOPLE SECTION FEATURES ODS EXECUTIVE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN PETR CERMAK, ACCUSED OF DISREPUTABLE BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, AND LUCIE PILIPOVA, WHO HAS DEPARTED AS MFA SPOKESPERSON TO FURTHER HUSBAND IVAN PILIP'S CAREER AS LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDS). END SUMMARY.

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ODS SUPPORT FOR REGIONALISM GROWING?

3. (U) AT ITS JANUARY 21-22 MEETING, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PRIME MINISTER KLAUS'S CIVIC DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ODS) AGREED THAT CREATION OF "HIGHER TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS" (I.E. REGIONS OR LANDS) WOULD PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND FACILITATE IMPROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. DISCUSSIONS ALSO REPORTEDLY INDICATED INCREASING SUPPORT WITHIN ODS RANKS FOR A TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON BETWEEN 8 AND 13 REGIONS OR LANDS, I.E. ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE OFFICE. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT WITHIN THE ODS FOR A SYSTEM OF 25 TO 30 REGIONS, ALLOWING FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE "OKRES" (COUNTY) LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION.

4. (C) COMMENT: ODS COALITION PARTNER THE CIVIC DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (ODA), WHOSE CHAIRMAN JAN KALVODA IS HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE OFFICE, IS LIKELY TO BE SATISFIED WITH THIS TURN OF EVENTS IN THE ODS. OLDRICH KUZILEK, HEAD OF THE ODS DEPUTIES IN THE PARLIAMENT, TOLD POLOFF JAN. 21 THAT HE EXPECTED THE ODS TO ACCEPT THE ODA POSITION (10-13 REGIONS OR LANDS, KEEPING THE COUNTIES FOR THE TIME BEING). KUZILEK SAID IT WOULD TAKE SOME FURTHER MANEUVERING, HOWEVER, "SINCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE KLAUS OF ANYTHING."

5. (LOU) COMMENT, CONT: IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE REGIONAL QUESTION HAS BEEN THE SOURCE OF SOME DISSENSION WITHIN ODS RANKS. JOSEF JEZEK, ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT AS A MEMBER OF ODS, RECENTLY RESIGNED FROM THE ODS DEPUTIES CLUB, CLAIMING THAT KLAUS HAD HELD UP RESOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL QUESTION.

A "TRUE RIGHTIST" PARTY ON THE HORIZON?

6. (U) THE "INITIATIVE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF RIGHT-ORIENTED FORCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC" REPORTEDLY WILL EMERGE ON FEBRUARY 1. ACCORDING TO THE INITIATIVE'S FOUNDING FATHER, JOSEF KUDLACEK, PUBLISHER OF DAILY "CESKY DENIK," THE ODS HAS ABANDONED ITS RIGHTIST ORIENTATION AND MOVED TO THE CENTER, SELLING OUT TO THE ADVOCATES OF SOCIALLY-ORIENTED POLICIES. KUDLACEK ARGUES THAT, BECAUSE OF THESE COMPROMISES, THE ODS FACES THE PROSPECT OF

DOUBLE-DIGIT LOSSES IN ELECTORAL SUPPORT. A NEW PARTY IS NECESSARY, IN KUDLACEK'S VIEW, TO HOLD TOGETHER RIGHT-ORIENTED CZECHS AND ENSURE THAT THEIR VOTES ARE NOT DISPERSED.

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7. (C) COMMENT: KUDLACEK HAS BEEN HARPING ON THIS THEME FOR SOME TIME, BUT POLLING DATA HAVE NOT ON

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THE WHOLE INDICATED SIGNIFICANT EROSION OF ODS SUPPORT, WHICH REMAINS OVER THIRTY PERCENT AND INCLUDES THE MOST STRONGLY COMMITTED CZECH VOTERS. (SEE MORE BELOW ON POLLS.) KLAUS, NONETHELESS, HAS FELT COMPELLED TO RESPOND PERSONALLY. IN AN OP-ED PIECE IN JANUARY 24 "LIDOVE NOVINY," KLAUS UNDERLINES THE PARADOX THAT, AFTER BEING ATTACKED AS AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST, FRIEDMANITE ARCHITECT OF SHOCK THERAPY, HE IS NOW UNDER ATTACK FROM THE "SO-CALLED AUTHENTIC RIGHT" FOR HESITATION IN TAKING "RADICAL AND RISKY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES." THE TITLE OF THE ARTICLE CONVEYS THE BASIC MESSAGE: "REVOLUTIONARY DOGMATISM AND THE NON-TRIVIAL NATURE OF PRACTICAL POLITICS." KLAUS FREQUENTLY EMPHASIZES THE PRACTICAL AND PRAGMATIC NATURE OF HIS POLITICS, BUT HE CLEARLY REMEMBERS THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS, WHEN HE USED MUCH MORE RIGHTIST RHETORIC, AND SEEMINGLY WORRIES THAT THERE IS SOME GROUND FOR ACCUSING HIM OF HYPOCRISY. THOSE WORRIES WILL NOT MOVE HIM, HOWEVER, FROM THE MORE PRAGMATIC COURSE HE HAS CHOSEN.

POLLS: ODS HOLDING STEADY, ODA ON THE RISE (PROBABLY)

8. (U) THE CENTER FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (STEM) CONDUCTED A POLL IN EARLY JANUARY REGARDING VOTER PREFERENCES. IT SHOWS THE ODS HOLDING STEADY WITH 32 PERCENT SUPPORT, AND INDICATES THAT ODS SUPPORTERS ARE THE MOST STRONGLY CONVINCED OF THEIR PARTY PREFERENCE AND THE MOST LIKELY ACTUALLY TO VOTE. COALITION PARTNER ODA COMES IN SECOND, WITH 14 PERCENT OF PREFERENCES, INDICATING A CONTINUED INCREASE IN POPULARITY. OTHER PARTIES WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE STEM POLL, WOULD MAKE IT OVER THE 5 PERCENT THRESHOLD IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD TODAY, ARE THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (13 PERCENT, DOWN SLIGHTLY), COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA (9 PERCENT), AND COALITION MEMBER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION - CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE'S PARTY (6 PERCENT). ANOTHER POLL, BY THE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, PAINTS A LESS ENCOURAGING PICTURE FOR THE ODS, SHOWING A DECLINE IN SUPPORT FROM 28 PERCENT IN DECEMBER TO 26 PERCENT IN JANUARY, AND A DROP FOR THE ODA FROM 11 TO 10 PERCENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IVVM ESTIMATES THAT AN ACTUAL VOTE WOULD GO AS FOLLOWS: ODS - 39 PERCENT, CSSD - 14.4, ODA - 13, KSCM - 7, PARTY OF THE LEFT BLOC - 5.6, KDU-CSL - 5, REPUBLICANS - 6.

9. (LOU) COMMENT: DESPITE SOME OF THE FIGURES FROM IVVM, IT STILL SEEMS EARLY TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A DEFINITE EROSION OF ODS SUPPORT SINCE THE 1992 ELECTIONS. THE STEM DATA AND IVVM'S PROJECTION OF THE ACTUAL VOTE SUGGEST TO US THE ODS IS STILL HOLDING STEADY. THE LONG-TERM GAINER ON THE CENTER RIGHT HAS BEEN THE ODA, WHICH, DESPITE UPS AND DOWNS, IS WAY OVER THE 5 PERCENT IT POLLED IN 1992. OUR OBSERVATIONS TEND TO BEAR OUT THE POLL RESULTS

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ODA LEADERS SUCH AS OLDRICH KUZILEK (SEE ABOVE) PROJECT CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM ABOUT THEIR PARTY'S SHOWING IN FUTURE ELECTIONS. THE ODA SEEMS TO BE DOING BETTER IN MORAVIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE IT HAS PICKED UP THE FORMER SUPPORTERS OF THE PARTY OF ENTREPRENEURS, BUSINESSMEN, AND FARMERS, WHICH GOT OVER 2 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN 1992. A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT ELECTED ON THE MORAVIAN PARTY LIST ALSO HAS JUMPED TO THE ODA GROUP. WHILE LONGTIME ODA STALWARTS OFTEN EXPRESS CONCERN THAT THEY ARE GAINING THE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE WHO WRONGLY CONSIDER THE ODA TO BE SOMEWHAT TO THE LEFT OF THE ODS, THEY ALSO HOPE THAT, AFTER THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ODS FROM A STRONGER POSITION.

TENSIONS WITHIN ODS

10. (U) DESPITE ITS RELATIVELY STEADY RESULTS IN THE POLLS, THE ODS HAS BEEN SHOWING SIGNS OF TENSION WITHIN THE RANKS. THE JANUARY 21-22 ODS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING REVIEWED A DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PRAGUE 000761 VIENNA ALSO PLS HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

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ODS PARLIAMENTARY CLUB LEADERSHIP, ENTITLED "RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT." THE DOCUMENT REPORTEDLY DISCUSSES TENSIONS AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, THE DEPUTIES CLUB, INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. THE DOCUMENT CITES A LACK OF DISCIPLINE AMONG DEPUTIES AND WHAT IT TERMS "ONGOING DIFFERENTIATION" OF VIEWS AMONG ODS REPRESENTATIVES. IT CALLS FOR "EXACT RULES OF PROCEDURE" IN ORDER TO HELP PREVENT "UNPREDICTABLE COUPS." ODS CHAIRMAN KLAUS, AMONG OTHERS, HAS TRIED TO POUR COLD WATER ON ALLEGATIONS OF DISSENSION WITHIN THE RANKS, ARGUING THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ARE BASICALLY HEALTHY. KLAUS ALSO CRITICIZED PEOPLE WHO VIEW EVERYTHING THROUGH THE PRISM OF A SINGLE ISSUE AND MISS THE BIG PICTURE, CITING FORMER ODS CLUB MEMBER JOSEF JEZEK (SEE PARA 5) AS AN EXAMPLE.

11. (LOU) COMMENT: LACK OF PARTY DISCIPLINE AMONG ODS DEPUTIES IS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN. SO FAR IT HAS NOT CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR PASSAGE OF MAJOR BILLS, E.G. THE BUDGET AND TAX LAWS, BUT CROPS UP DURING CONSIDERATION OF LESSER PIECES OF LEGISLATION. THE IRONY IS THAT CRITICS OF THE ODS, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNING COALITION, LONG HAVE PAINTED IT AS AN OVERLY CENTRALIZED PARTY OF MINDLESS FOLLOWERS OF KLAUS.

OPPOSITION INCREASINGLY DISORGANIZED

12. (LOU) WHILE THE ODS IS DISCUSSING ITS INTERNAL

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TENSIONS, THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IS MOVING TOWARD INCREASING FRAGMENTATION. THE MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNING DEMOCRACY OF MORAVIA AND SILESIA (HSDMS) HAS RENAMED ITSELF THE "CZECOMORAVIAN PARTY OF THE CENTER," TRYING TO EMPHASIZE THE "CENTER." ITS PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES CLUB, STILL CALLED THE HSDMS CLUB, NOW HAS 8 MEMBERS OF THE 14 ELECTED ON THE MORAVIAN TICKET IN 1992. THERE IS A SECOND MORAVIAN CLUB, WHICH HAS KEPT THE ORIGINAL TITLE OF MOVEMENT FOR SELF-GOVERNING DEMOCRACY - SOCIETY FOR MORAVIA AND SILESIA (HSD-SMS) AND CLAIMS TO BE MORE STAUNCHLY "PRO-MORAVIAN." THIS CLUB HAS 7 MEMBERS: FOUR ELECTED IN '92 ON THE MORAVIAN TICKET AND 3 REFUGEES FROM THE ULTRA-RIGHT POPULIST REPUBLICANS OF MIROSLAV SLADEK. (THE REPUBLICAN CLUB IS NOW DOWN TO 8 FROM ITS ORIGINAL 14.) TO FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTERS, 9 HARDLINERS HAVE LEFT THE LEFT BLOC CLUB TO CREATE A SEPARATE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA (KSCM) CLUB. THE LEFT BLOC CLUB, NOW WITH 26 DEPUTIES, HAS RENAMED ITSELF "LEVY BLOC (LB, KSCM, SDL)" TO REFLECT THE CREATION OF NEW PARTIES ON THE LEFT. (FOR THE DETAILS, SEE 93 PRAGUE 9948 "COMMUNISTS HEADING TOWARD EXTINCTION?: A VISIT TO THE JURASSIC PARK OF CZECH POLITICS.") TO FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTERS, THE NATIONAL SOCIAL LIBERAL PARTY (LSNS - FORMERLY SOCIALIST PARTY) HAS A 5-MEMBER CLUB IN PARLIAMENT, WHICH GENERALLY VOTES WITH THE GOVERNING COALITION. THE CLUB INCLUDES 3 REFUGEES FROM THE REPUBLICANS, AS WELL AS FORMER SOCIALISTS ELECTED IN 1992 ON THE LIBERAL SOCIAL UNION (LSU) TICKET. THE LSU LOST ANOTHER OF ITS ORIGINAL 16 DEPUTIES TO THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, AND THE REMAINING LSU COMPONENT PARTIES, THE GREENS AND AGRARIANS, HAVE DECIDED TO PART WAYS. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS PROCESS OF ATOMIZATION OF THE OPPOSITION HAS BEEN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WITH A GAIN OF TWO DEPUTIES SINCE THE ELECTIONS, BRINGING IT TO 18. (FOR PURPOSES OF REFERENCE, NOTE THAT THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES HAS 200 MEMBERS IN ALL.)

13. (C) COMMENT: THE GOOD NEWS IS: THERE WILL BE NO QUIZ ON THE MATERIAL IN PARA 12. THE BAD NEWS IS: NONE OF THIS SELF-DESTRUCTION OF THE OPPOSITION CAN BE TRACED TO CLEVER MANEUVERING BY PRIME MINISTER KLAUS. ATOMIZATION IS PRIMARILY AN OUTGROWTH OF THE FRACTIOUS, SPINY NATURE OF THE CZECHS. THE GOVERNING COALITION CAN AT LEAST DISTRIBUTE PATRONAGE, WHICH GIVES ITS MEMBERS A MATERIAL

INCENTIVE TO HANG TOGETHER AND PARTIALLY PAPER OVER THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE OPPOSITION HAS NO SUCH COMMON INTEREST AND GETS BOGGED DOWN IN WHAT ARE PARTLY PERSONALITY DISPUTES, IN PART IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLES, FEW OF WHICH ARE COMPREHENSIBLE EVEN TO A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PRAGUE 000761 VIENNA ALSO PLS HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA
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FAIRLY WELL-INFORMED OBSERVER FROM THE OUTSIDE. NAPOLEON USED TO ASK ABOUT A GENERAL: "IS HE LUCKY?" THE SAME QUESTION IS WORTH ASKING ABOUT POLITICIANS, AND IN KLAUS'S CASE THE ANSWER IS DEFINITELY AFFIRMATIVE.

A NEW NOMENKLATURA?

14. (U) ANOTHER JANUARY STEM POLL SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC IS QUITE CRITICAL OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE CZECH GOVERNMENT. SPECIFICALLY, 53 PERCENT OF THOSE QUESTIONED SAID THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND COALITION REPRESENTATIVES WERE NOT/NOT ON A HIGHER MORAL LEVEL THAN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OLD REGIME. 68 PERCENT THOUGHT THAT CURRENT LEADERS HAD BENEFITS COMPARABLE TO OR GREATER THAN THOSE OF FORMER HIGH COMMUNIST OFFICIALS. (EVEN 40 PERCENT OF ODS SUPPORTERS AND 44 PERCENT OF ODA SUPPORTERS HELD THIS VIEW.)

15. (S) COMMENT: WE HOPE THIS WILL COME AS A SALUTARY SHOCK TO GOVERNING COALITION LEADERS. MEMORIES OF ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE BY FORMER COMMUNIST LEADERS ARE CERTAINLY FADING, WHICH PROBABLY CONDITIONED THIS POLL RESULT TO SOME EXTENT. IN ADDITION, THE CZECH VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE AS SUCH IS NOT A POSITIVE ONE, SO ONE WOULD EXPECT A CERTAIN TENDENCY TO SAY THAT "ALL POLITICIANS ARE ALIKE." NONETHELESS, THE IMAGE OF CERTAIN GOVERNING COALITION FIGURES, PARTICULARLY MEMBERS OF THE ODS, HAS BECOME TARNISHED BY PERSISTENT ALLEGATIONS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST. IF KLAUS GETS THE SENSE THAT HIS PARTY RISKS LOSING VOTES, HE MAY TAKE A MORE ACTIVE APPROACH TO ENFORCING STANDARDS OF CLEAN CONDUCT.

THE PEOPLE SECTION

16. (S) THE JUICIEST GOSSIP CONCERNS PETR CERMAK, ODS EXECUTIVE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND FORMER FEDERAL INTERIOR MINISTER. "CESKY DENIK," WHICH WAS FORMERLY ALMOST AN ODS HOUSE ORGAN, BUT NOW HAS BECOME KLAUS'S NEMESIS, REPORTS JANUARY 26 THAT ONE OF CERMAK'S BUSINESS PARTNERS, MILOS MORAVEC, WAS A MEMBER OF THE SECRET POLICE (STB) FROM 1977 TO THE END OF 1989. THIS COMES AFTER CERMAK TARNISHED HIS CREDIBILITY BY CLAIMING THAT HIS FIRM WAS DESIGNED SIMPLY TO SUPPORT PRAGUE'S "SPARTA" SOCCER CLUB, NOT TO ENGAGE IN TRADE OR OTHER BUSINESS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE BUSINESS LICENSE CLEARLY COVERED TRADING ACTIVITY. CERMAK IS WIDELY UNPOPULAR, PERCEIVED AS GUILTY OF USING POLITICAL CONNECTIONS TO ADVANCE HIS OWN BUSINESS PROJECTS OR THOSE OF HIS WIFE. THE ODS CONGRESS IN NOVEMBER RE-ELECTED HIM EXECUTIVE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, AFTER A STRONG ENDORSEMENT BY KLAUS, BUT THE RELATIVELY NARROW MARGIN SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL OF DISSATISFACTION WITH CERMAK WITHIN ODS RANKS.

17. (S) LUCIE PILIPOVA, WIFE OF IVAN PILIP, THE

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NEWLY-ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDS), HAS RESIGNED HER POST AS SPOKESPERSON FOR FOREIGN MINISTER JOSEF ZIELENIEC (ODS). THE RESIGNATION CAME AS NO SURPRISE. ON TOP OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS, EVERYONE EXPECTED PILIPOVA TO FOCUS ON ADVANCING HER HUSBAND'S POLITICAL CAREER. (SHE IS BY FAR THE MORE HARD-DRIVING OF THE TWO.) PILIPOVA'S REPLACEMENT AT THE MFA IS VIT KURFURST, FORMERLY DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL DESK AT CZECH TV NEWS AND WELL-KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY. BASORA

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