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## Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 10 March 95 23:14  
 FROM Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Major telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Baker, Jane E.  
 Cicio, Kristen K.  
 Darby, Melanie B.  
 Dohse, Fred J.  
 Emery, Mary C.  
 Gray, Wendy  
 Hall, Wilma G.  
 Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
 Itoh, William H.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Jim Reed  
 Sens, Andrew D.  
 Veit, Katherine M.  
 Wolin, Neal S.

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 PER E.O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M  
 05/26/16 KDE

CARBON\_COPY Gardner, Anthony  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Marshall, Betty A.  
 Maxfield, Nancy H.  
 Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

## TEXT\_BODY

Wendy, here's the draft telcon briefer. Also, "for the record," since the question has been raised about why Major's letters of Feb. 22, March 6 and March 10 haven't been answered:

-- Sandy V. e-mailed the Feb. 22 letter while I was in Ottawa Thursday Feb. 23 with instructions to have an answer drafted by Monday. I did, but Nancy S. advised me Monday morning to hold it until we had a decision on fundraising.

-- The March 6 letter was hand-delivered to the V-P late March 7; I got a copy March 8 and sent forward a package reply March 9 immediately after the fundraising decision was finalized.. It was sent back March 10 with instructions to revise to emphasize more the fundraising decision rather than response to letters' points.

-- The March 10 letter got to me mid day March 10 and it is still .. for 50 minutes more . . March 10 as I forward this package.

Thanks for your help.

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[[ 310AL.DOC : 5983 in 310AL.DOC ]][[ 310PRE.DOC : 5984 in 310PRE.DOC ]][[ 310TP.DOC : 5985 in 310TP.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

10 March 95 21:33

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

310AL.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to British  
Prime Minister Major

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding suggested talking points for his telephone call with British Prime Minister John Major.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Points to be Made

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

10 March 95 23:3

ATTACHMENT

## FILE NAME

310PRE.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TELEPHONE CALL TO  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR  
DATE: March 11, 1995  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 11:00 am

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

## I. PURPOSE

To assuage some of Major's concerns about your decision to permit Gerry Adams to fundraise and to reassure him of your commitment to close cooperation with him on Northern Ireland and other issues.

## II. BACKGROUND

Major and his government were angered by our decision to let Gerry Adams fundraise. They believe we gave up valuable leverage for little in return. Major wrote you March 10 (Tab A) reiterating British concerns that money raised in the U.S. will be used for arms or violence and that Sinn Fein will now be more reluctant than ever to take the steps on decommissioning the British say are necessary to getting the Unionists to come to the same table with Sinn Fein.

## III. AGENDA

Northern Ireland: Reaction to your decision to allow Gerry Adams to fundraise in the U.S. and to invite him to the St. Patrick's Day White House reception has been along predictable lines: Irish-Americans, the Irish government and Sinn Fein are delighted; Unionists are outraged; the British feel deeply bruised, even betrayed.

While we have agreed to disagree with the British government on the advisability of lifting the fundraising ban now, you should make clear to Major your recognition of the risks he has taken in moving the peace process forward this far and the particularly delicate state of British relations with the Unionist community. Major has staked his fragile government on Northern Ireland, telling his Cabinet that if the government

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

goes down he prefers it be over "doing the right thing" on Northern Ireland than in a duel with the Europhobes.

You should assure Major that we recognize the importance of Sinn Fein entering into a serious discussion of arms decommissioning with the British; we have told Sinn Fein and will continue to tell them we expect them to follow through on the public commitment they made March 8 which opened the way for us to allow Adams to fundraise.

V-E Day Travel: Major is wrestling in much the same way we are with the decision of whether to go to Moscow. He is likely to go, but he is interested in your views and plans. The British press, which is portraying the Adams fundraising decision as another sign that British views no longer count in Washington, has also seized upon the notion that you may not attend V-E Day events in London as another sign that the

Anglo-American relationship is in tatters, but Major understands this is not the case. Nonetheless, he would welcome your going to London.

Croatia: Tudjman's agreement with the Vice President to allow UN peacekeepers to operate in Croatia past March 31 is a breakthrough. We need to work closely with the British in New York to develop a mandate for a new UN force in Croatia.

World Bank Presidency: You should follow up on your letter to Major supporting James Wolfensohn to be World Bank President.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B March 10, March 6 and February 22 letters from Major

Tab C Your Letter to Major on the World Bank

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

10 March 95 22:57

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

310TP.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

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## Northern Ireland

- Anxious to talk with you about Northern Ireland. Appreciate your March 10 letters and the concerns you expressed about the peace process.
- Aware my decision on Adams' fundraising causing you problems with the Unionists and in your press, who are always looking to show our relations are bad. Want you to know that, whatever the British press may say, I meant what I said when you first came to meet with me in February 1993: As long as I am President, we will always have a special relationship with you.
- But close friends can disagree. I know you think we gave Adams something for nothing. I don't see it that way.
- We used this process to make Adams say in a very public way that he's going to address arms decommissioning in his talks with you. That seems to go at least a good way toward what Sir Patrick Mayhew said was needed.
- We intend to hold Adams to his public commitment. We can do that better, with more leverage, when we have the Irish-American community on our side.
- We will continue to say to Sinn Fein and the loyalists that they both must address the hard questions of decommissioning of arms, and that they must start that dialogue now, not later.
- We are also serious about making sure that the funds Sinn Fein raises are used to support only legitimate, legal political activity. If this privilege is abused, it can and will be taken away.
- I admire the courage and conviction with which you have approached Northern Ireland.
- I am aware that you have staked your political life on this; you have taken enormous risks. Your willingness to take these risks has made possible the extraordinary progress made so far.
- My decision to let Adams fundraise and invite him here is also a risk. I am going to do what I can to make sure it produces the results we both want: a permanent peace in Northern Ireland and all the parties around the table negotiating their future.
- The Joint Framework Document you and John Bruton have agreed upon is a huge step forward. I am also encouraged by the numerous steps

you have taken to reduce the military presence in Northern Ireland in response to the lessened threat.

-- Irish Prime Minister John Bruton will be here next week. Are you and he in accord on next steps? How can we be helpful?

#### V-E Day Travel

-- I haven't decided whether to go to Moscow for the V-E Day events. I understand you are leaning toward attending.

#### Croatia

-- Greatly encouraged by Tudjman's agreement with Vice President Gore to allow UN peacekeepers to operate in Croatia past March 31, when UNPROFOR's mandate expires.

-- This is real breakthrough that offers good chance to head off wider Balkan war.

-- Need to work closely together in New York on mandate for new UN force in Croatia.

#### World Bank Presidency

-- Have written you why we are supporting Jim Wolfensohn for World Bank Presidency. Hope we can work together to make this happen.

#### Major's April 4 Visit

-- Looking forward to seeing you here April 4. As always, we have much to talk about. Especially hope we can talk at length about how you see the situation in Northern Ireland and how we can be helpful.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL TO  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DATE: March 19, 1995

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

*(TL called -  
Rennie was right  
March 8)*

I. PURPOSE

To assuage some of Major's concerns about your decision to permit Gerry Adams to fundraise and to reassure him of your commitment to close cooperation with him on Northern Ireland and other issues.

II. BACKGROUND

Major and his government were angered by our decision to let Gerry Adams fundraise. They believe we gave up valuable leverage for little in return. They were equally incensed over what they perceived as inadequate consultations with them as the decision was made. Major wrote you March 10 (Tab A) reiterating British concerns that money raised in the U.S. will be used for arms or violence and that Sinn Fein will now be more reluctant than ever to take the steps on decommissioning the British say are necessary to getting the Unionists to come to the same table with Sinn Fein.

Your March 14 letter (Tab B) went a good way in assuaging Major's concerns; the British publicly termed the letter "constructive." However, Major's unavailability to take your phone call was interpreted by the British press, despite official denials, as an intentional snub.

III. AGENDA

Northern Ireland: While we have agreed to disagree with the British government on the advisability of lifting the fundraising ban now, you should make clear to Major your recognition of the risks he has taken in moving the peace process forward this far and the particularly delicate state of British relations with the Unionist community. Major has staked his fragile government on Northern Ireland, telling his Cabinet that if the government goes down he prefers it

be over "doing the right thing" on Northern Ireland than in a duel with the Europhobes.

Major is grateful for the public remarks you made along these lines during the St. Patrick's Day presentation of the shamrocks. He also appreciates the effort we have made to reach out to Unionists and loyalists; you should affirm that we will try to deepen this dialogue.

You should emphasize that we recognize the importance of Sinn Fein entering into a serious discussion of arms decommissioning with the British; we have told Sinn Fein and will continue to tell them we expect them to follow through on the public commitment they made March 8 which opened the way for us to allow Adams to fundraise. There are encouraging signs from both Sinn Fein and British sources that there could be a British minister at talks with Sinn Fein as early as next week; you should sound Major out on that.

**V-E Day Travel:** Major is wrestling in much the same way we are with the decision of whether to go to Moscow. He is likely to go, but he is interested in your views and plans. The British press, which is portraying the Adams fundraising decision as another sign that British views no longer count in Washington, has also seized upon the notion that you may not attend V-E Day events in London as another sign that the Anglo-American relationship is in tatters, but Major understands this is not the case. Nonetheless, he would welcome your going to London.

**The Middle East:** Major met with Rabin, Arafat and King Hussein during his just-concluded Middle East trip. His visit to Israel -- only the second ever by a UK Prime Minister -- went very well, helping to close a long history of troubled bilateral relations. With Arafat, he expressed concern over the economic plight of the Palestinians and noted the importance of a more active EU role in assistance efforts. In Jordan, King Hussein pressed him on the need for economic/security assistance. We understand Major will raise with you his concern, reflecting Hussein's strong urging, that a way be found to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the Iraqis.

**Croatia:** Tudjman's agreement with the Vice President to allow UN peacekeepers to operate in Croatia past March 31 is a breakthrough. We need to work closely with the British in New York to develop a mandate for a new UN force in Croatia.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Your March 14 Letter to Major on Northern Ireland

Tab C Major's March 10 and previous letters to you

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Northern Ireland

- Anxious to talk with you about Northern Ireland. Appreciate your March 10 letters and the concerns you expressed about the peace process.
- Aware my decision on Adams' fundraising causing you problems with the Unionists and in your press, who are always looking to show our relations are bad. Want you to know that, whatever the British press may say, I meant what I said when you first came to meet with me in February 1993: As long as I am President, we will always have a special relationship with you.
- But close friends can disagree. I know you think we gave Adams something for nothing. I don't see it that way.
- ✓ -- We used this process to make Adams say in a very public way that he's going to address arms decommissioning in his talks with you. That seems to go at least a good way toward what Sir Patrick Mayhew said was needed.
- We are holding Adams to his public commitment. We can do that better, with more leverage, when we have the Irish-American community on our side.
- ✓ -- I reiterated on St. Patrick's Day that Sinn Fein and the loyalists need to begin seriously discussing how to get rid of the arms. Tony Lake pushed Adams hard on this when they met on Tuesday.
- I understand British officials have been in touch with Sinn Fein about resuming and possibly upgrading your dialogue to ministerial level. Where do things stand? How can we be helpful?
- I have made clear my view that a serious discussion on arms decommissioning should begin, and begin as soon as possible. But we have not, and will not be taking, positions on the method or timing of disarmament. We think that is for you to work out with the parties.

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- We are also serious about making sure that the funds Sinn Fein raises are used to support only legitimate, legal political activity. Sinn Fein has engaged an accounting firm and we have made clear our expectation that funds will be strictly and frequently accounted for. If this privilege is abused, it can and will be taken away.
- I admire the courage and conviction with which you have approached Northern Ireland.
- I am aware that you have staked your political life on this; you have taken enormous risks. Your willingness to take these risks has made possible the extraordinary progress made so far. This fact is underappreciated on this side of the Atlantic, and I have tried to emphasize it in my public remarks.
- My decision to let Adams fundraise and invite him here is also a risk. I am going to do what I can to make sure it produces the results we both want: a permanent peace in Northern Ireland and all the parties around the table negotiating their future.
- The Joint Framework Document you and John Bruton have agreed upon is a huge step forward. I am also encouraged by the numerous steps you have taken to reduce the military presence in Northern Ireland in response to the lessened threat.
- Irish Prime Minister John Bruton make a very good impression here last week. Are you and he in accord on next steps? How can we be helpful?

#### Middle East

- Important U.S. and EU work together closely as peace process moves ahead. Very encouraged by results of Christopher's trip -- negotiations have been given a real push and the regional atmosphere improved.
- On Palestinian track, understandings reached between Peres and Arafat demonstrate commitment on both sides to energize the process. I know Palestinian need for economic assistance/political benefits is great. With Arafat taking steps to meet Israeli security concerns, believe Rabin committed to his side of the bargain.
- Donor community needs to redouble efforts to deliver on promised aid. We are refocusing our aid on employment generating, quick disbursing projects.

- Important progress on Syrian negotiations. Sides have agreed to resume meetings next week here. I will send Dennis Ross to region shortly to lay the ground for resumed military contacts on security arrangements. Many challenges ahead, but I am convinced both Rabin and Asad are serious. We will do all we can to help them reach a settlement.
- Know King Hussein very concerned over debt forgiveness issue. Difficult fight in Congress, but we are exerting maximum efforts; also hope to do something on military assistance side. Important we stand by King. Hope you can help further with debt.
- On Iraq, I can appreciate the importance of responding to the humanitarian crisis, even if it is the result of Saddam's ruthless policies. As you know, Ambassador Albright signaled our deep interest in renewing resolutions 706/712 which would permit limited sale of oil for purchase of food/medicine.
- Our mission in New York ready to work with yours and Argentina's to develop a plan to put these resolutions back on the Security Council table as soon as possible. We will be forward leaning on the question of quantity of oil to be sold and on ways to adequately monitor the distribution of goods inside Iraq.

#### V-E Day Travel

- I haven't decided whether to go to Moscow for the V-E Day events. I understand you are leaning toward attending.

#### Croatia

- Greatly encouraged by Tudjman's agreement with Vice President Gore to allow UN peacekeepers to operate in Croatia past March 31, when UNPROFOR's mandate expires.
- This is real breakthrough that offers good chance to head off wider Balkan war.
- Need to work closely together in New York on mandate for new UN force in Croatia.

#### Major's April 4 Visit

- Looking forward to seeing you here April 4. As always, we have much to talk about. Especially hope we can talk at length about how you see the situation in Northern Ireland and how we can be helpful.

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 March 95 09:10  
 FROM Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT FW: PM Major 3/19 Memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Beyrle, John R.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

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 PER E. O. 13526

2012-0801-M 0512/elle KDE

Attached is sitroom draft of Clinton-Major telcon.

From: Turner, Joe T. (Thorn)  
 To: Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 CC: /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: PM Major 3/19 Memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Date: Sunday, March 19, 1995 05:31 PM

[[ MAJ0319.DOC : 2395 in MAJ0319.DOC ]]

Kathy,

Attached is our draft Memcon. Please send us a final copy.

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE 19 March 95 17:29

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME MAJ0319.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's conversation with British Prime Minister Major

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez and Thorn Turner

DATE, TIME 19 March 1995, 1022-1044 EST

The President: Hello?

Prime Minister Major: Yes Bill.


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The President: I can barely hear you. Did you have a good trip?

Prime Minister Major: Yes, the Middle East trip went very well. I would like to talk to you about Rabin, Arafat and King Hussein as well as a particular point on Iraq.

The President: I know we disagree on the trip by Gerry Adams to the U.S. We pushed him very hard on decommissioning of weapons. Irish Prime Minister Bruton did a good job holding up your end. We will continue to reach out to the Loyalists and I hope we can do more. We stressed two points: Adams must begin serious talks on arms decommissioning and made our expectations clear that funds raised by Sinn Fein must be used for legitimate purposes. On balance, the visit went well.

Prime Minister Major: I should have phoned you before the visit. I know we disagree on this. That happens from time to time, it's the nature of politics and friendships. There are several points I'd like to explain. I understand the domestic pressure you're under from the Congress and public. We've dealt with Sinn Fein for some time and learned about them



EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I'm anxious as well. I'm looking forward to your visit.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I hope to have a crowded program. I'd like to discuss  
t  
he Middle East. As  
you know, I met with Rabin, Arafat and Hussein, and I'd also like to look at  
Russia.  
They're may be a  
range of other things we should discuss.

The President: Let's talk about Moscow. Are you going?

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I think so. I'd thought of not going; it might be  
awkwa

rd to have Chechnya  
veterans marching by. Given the circumstances though, it seems that less trouble  
wi  
ll be caused by

going. I'm about 90% sure I'm going.

The President: I'm planning on going, but please don't say anything since it hasn't  
been announced yet.

However, our celebrations here are the day before. It was scheduled over a year  
ag

o and the consensus is

that, due to the D-Day celebrations over there last year, I should stay here.

Prime Minister Major: I understand.

The President: I think we should go to Moscow.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, we have our own celebrations here and then I'm off  
to Pa

ris and Bonn to

meet with Mitterrand and Kohl. Then I fly straight to Moscow with a very hectic  
sche

dule. I will tell

Kohl I'm coming. He's been going through some tough times.

The President: I'm glad you're going. I'm going to call Kohl and tell him. I don'  
t see how I can't stay  
here though.

Prime Minister Major: That will be fine. Is the Vice President coming?

The President: Yes.

Prime Minister Major: Fine. He will be very welcome.

The President: We've been working with Tudjman to keep the Peacekeepers in  
Croatia

beyond the 31

March deadline. He was here this week. He is antsy, but it was still a breakthroug  
h and we're making

progress in Congress on the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. I'm sure you'll  
be meeting with some

of them while you're here.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I'll press ahead.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: We just have to keep moving ahead by inches until they get tired of killing each other.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Well at any rate I think we are in better shape. I'm looking forward to a longer conversation on the Middle East during your trip. Christopher is there now.

Prime Minister Major: Yes. I think he achieved progress in Syria. The striking impression \*\*\*\* Rabin and Peres want to press ahead. They're in a difficult domestic situation with Likud \*\*\*\*.

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: We must do our part as well to help him. The House is very isolationists. They've cut some of the Jordanian aid from the budget.

Prime Minister Major: One more thing. Norma heard this also in some of her meetings. There is considerable concern toward Iraq, and they were very firm that this was a humanitarian problem, not merely support of Saddam Hussein. Before long, I expect we'll be seeing TV pictures of Iraqi families starving.

The President: But he can sell oil for food and medicine. (???)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, and he could have the sanctions lifted tomorrow if he  
wo  
uld abide by the UN  
resolutions.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I'll work on it as well and we can talk when I see you in April.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, in April and then in Moscow. Good-bye Bill.

The President: Good-bye John.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Private Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

U.K.  
Prime Minister John Major  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary, Notetaker

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 4, 1995, 12:05 - 12:45 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: How has your trip being going? (U)

Prime Minister Major: I arrived Sunday night. (U)

The President: I hear you spent an hour and half with the Vice President this morning. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, we had a good breakfast meeting and covered a lot of subjects. A lot of the time was spent on Northern Ireland. (C)

The President: How was the dinner last night? (U)

Prime Minister Major: There was a good cast of characters. (U)

The President: Were there any Senators there? (U)

Prime Minister Major: About half of the Foreign Relations Committee was there. The guests included Senators Pell, Warner, Lugar, Simpson and Congressman Gephardt. (U)

The President: Were any of them for lifting the arms embargo? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Some of them were. (U)

Roderic Lyne: Senator McCain kept his mouth shut. (U)

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The President: Did your discussion do any good? (U)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] there will be tremendous pressure on the U.S. to act. That is a shorthand description of the case that I made. (C)

The President: Did any of them contest your arguments? (C)

Prime Minister Major: No. One of them raised the moral dimension. I said that there were two moral dimensions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: That is exactly my problem. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] No one argued against me, although that doesn't mean that they agreed with me. I said the same thing to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (C)

The President: I might win on this in the Senate. Last year, however, the House voted overwhelmingly for unilateral lift. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I made the case to Senator Dole too when I met with him. I was very blunt and said lifting the embargo would be a mistake. (C)

The President: How did Dole react? (C)

Prime Minister Major: He also did not contest my arguments, although he did not respond substantively. He had heard my arguments before when he visited Number 10. He said his resolution might come to a vote in May, but he did not respond to the merits of my argument. (C)

The President: We just have to keep chipping away. I think we are gaining ground on this issue. I ask members of Congress how we can tell the Europeans what to do when we don't have ground forces in Bosnia. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How do you judge the political issue?

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

... are you going to force a veto? (C)

The President: That is just it. Even though we are better at running the government, the Republicans are better politicians. They want to have the best of both worlds -- to pass unilateral lift legislation and then force me to veto it. They would have the benefits of supporting lift without the consequences. At the same time, if we stick with our current policy, everything could go to hell and we could get blamed for that too. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have both been very unlucky to have this insoluble problem on our plates. (C)

The President: We are in the same pickle on the economy. We get no credit for having a sound economic plan. This is the first time in history that we have generalized prosperity that does not translate into increased personal security. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Mickey Kantor told me that the American economy is getting better and better, yet people think the country is going to the dogs. We have the same problem in the UK. No one sees the gains. (C)

The President: Every story in the media emphasizes the insecurities that people now have. A case in point is Money magazine. It is widely read and its readers are well educated; although they are not rich, they are comfortable. Money did a readers' survey two years ago in which 43% of the people were worried about their own future. Today, even though people give me credit for reducing the deficit and strengthening the economy, 65% are worried about the future. The problem is that there is so much publicity when bad things happen that everyone knows someone who has been hit by downsizing. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I saw stories in the paper today about downsizing. The same thing is happening in the City of London. Big cuts are taking place in the banking sector. Reducing overstaffing is a good thing, but it accentuates the gap between rich and poor. So we are hearing the same echoes in our country. (C)

The President: This is the central problem of our time. The whole idea of progress is being questioned. The purveyors of progress are at risk in both political parties. The people are very susceptible to divisive politics. This is seen in the rising opposition to affirmative action, welfare, and immigration. Another manifestation is that religious groups are getting more active as people look for refuge in the big

evangelical churches. The Christian Coalition has become an arm of the Republican right. (C)

Prime Minister Major: This is a problem that we don't have in Britain. (C)

The President: It is hard for people to feel secure in the global economy. There are objective reasons in the U.S. for people's insecurity. After the war, growth was very even among all classes, but the poor did somewhat better, growing 140% of the average. Between 1978 and 1990 however, the bottom 60% stayed about the same. The next 20% increased their income by 5% and the top 20% increased by 18%. Part of the reason for this is the expansion of the job market to accommodate the baby boomers. (C)

Prime Minister Major: But you have had job expansion in the last two years as well. (C)

The President: The introduction of the baby boomers, more women and immigrants has caused a drop in incomes. The globalization of the economy has been part of the problem. Moreover, we do not have national health care and, when people they lose their jobs, they lose their retirement and health insurance. A smaller part of our workforce under 65 has health insurance today than did so ten years ago. (C)

Prime Minister Major: This defies logic. (C)

The President: As fewer people are insured, the rates go up. The insurance companies don't want to insure sick people and the young and healthy people can't afford to buy insurance and expand the pool. The ultimate success of the free market may help, but keeping people in line is increasingly difficult. The media and the objective reality have made change a more ever-present factor in people's lives. How to balance change with a sense of security, and to support things like affirmative action, is a real challenge for all the advanced countries. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Your political position seems to have improved. (C)

The President: Yes, I am doing better in the polls. The media demonized me so much over the first two years that the intensity now is falling off. People are more open to what I am trying to do. I've gone from 45 to 48%. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Do you think a third-party candidate will run in 1996?

The President: This would help me unless it is a candidate of the left like Jesse Jackson (except for the fact that a left-wing candidate would make me look more moderate than liberal, which is a dirty word in this country). (C)

Prime Minister Major: Will Perot run? (C)

The President: I don't know. The White House has a good working relationship with Perot; NATFA was an exception. Based on today's facts, a Perot candidacy would help me. If he had not run in 1992, I would have had a larger popular vote, yet a lower electoral majority. My mandate would have looked stronger (about 54 to 46%) but I would have won about 50 fewer electoral votes. What is interesting about the Perot people is that they think they are more conservative. They certainly want tax cuts and a balanced budget, but they are also very secular and hate the religious right. There are more nationalistic and, in this respect, have done worse economically than the typical Clinton voter. I tend to get the progressive yuppies who are in favor of a free market with a social conscience and don't like the divisiveness of the Republicans. Perot's voters simply want protection. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have a similar thing in reverse. Liberal party voters are increasingly disillusioned. They could never vote Labor, yet they think the Conservatives are too centrist and are moving away from them. (C)

The President: Won't they begin to come back to you if the economy improves and on the strength of your international policies? That would suggest a strategy of not going too early to new elections. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I need to go all the way through to 1997. (C)

The President: Look at the shape that Kohl is in now. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, Labor has a big lead now, but it is ephemeral. Many people are looking for reasons to vote for the conservatives. Our people are not better off yet, so I need to wait for the full five-year period to run out before holding elections. (C)

The President: The global economy is a good thing. It means more jobs without inflation. But the flip side is that for the foreseeable future there is little chance it will make people feel more secure. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The shocks people have endured to their personal security -- in terms of job security and savings -- are very real. It will take time for people to recover. Wages are not rising but employment is increasing. Over the next two years we expect a massive return of voters and I will play it long. Dr. Johnson's principle is that if you are about to be hanged, it concentrates the mind wonderfully. That argues for playing it long. I think things have bottomed out in Britain, or I certainly hope they have. (C)

The President: Do you have the same perception of the gap between the classes becoming greater in Britain? Here we are developing into a two-track middle class. In 1993 we had the largest number of new businesses and new millionaires, yet the middle class has been stagnating. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It is not quite the same in Britain but it is similar. (C)

Roderic Lyne: The Labor Party is trying to create the impression that the top half of British society has become richer, but this is not widely believed. It depends on stretching the statistics. The problem we have is that people are not confident enough about the future to spend money. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is right. Our recovery has been based solely on investment and trade, not on consumption. We have been taking markets away from the French and the Germans. We have a current-account surplus with Japan. We are exporting cars, TVs and medium and high-tech equipment to Japan. There was a lot of Japanese investment in the UK in recent years and we are now selling back to Japan. Financial services are also a big source of foreign exchange, although we need to open up that market more. (C)

The President: I certainly agree with that. (C)

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
 We need to agree on our lines before we have our press conference. I also wanted to discuss a few things here. If we look at American perceptions of Western Europe, we may be appearing to be increasingly insular and isolationist. The same could be said about Western European perceptions of America. We no longer have the common enemy -- the dragon of the Soviet Union. I would like to explore with you what we can do collectively to extend areas of common interest. A lot could be done to open up free trade, to reduce non-tariff barriers in areas like audio-visual services. We should create a wider free trade relationship between Western Europe and North America. Looking to the press conference, we need to have clear lines on

Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. We might divide up the obvious questions. (C)

The President: My major objective for this whole visit is to reaffirm the many things on which we are working together. We are creating conditions for a world with precedent. On balance, I think we've been working together in harmony. Moreover, we have record levels of investments in both direction. What can I say that would be most useful on Northern Ireland? You have risked so much to move things forward. I could emphasize that we anticipate and expect serious discussions of decommissioning forthwith. If pressed, I can also say that decommissioning cannot be linked to the British soldiers and police in Northern Ireland. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have had another meeting with Sinn Fein today. We have already agreed upon an agenda for talks with the Protestant Loyalists which have created the basis for a ministerial dialogue. We have made a lot of progress with them (more than we have admitted publicly) on getting rid of the weapons. We are close to an agreement with Sinn Fein that would permit us to move from the official to the ministerial level. The agenda would cover decommissioning and a range of other issues.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] as we make progress of decommissioning, we will make our own decisions of the basis of the security environment. We have already taken out some troops a few weeks ago, and we are prepared to tell Sinn Fein what we are going to do as we go along. So if you say that Sinn Fein needs to discuss decommissioning and not link it to the army and police, it would be very helpful. (C)

Roderic Lyne: [Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
[Redacted] this needs to stop. (C)

The President: If I were a Loyalist, I wouldn't think of giving up my arms. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Loyalists won't give up their arms until the IRA does. They will agree on the arrangements, but not implement them until the IRA agrees to do the same. (C)

The President: We need to identify the 3 or 4 most difficult questions and get our answers straight. (C)

Prime Minister Major: One question is obviously the status of our overall relationship. There has been a lot of rubbish written on this. Looking at the broad strands, we have a common view on a broad range of subjects. We cooperate on security and intelligence issues, the UK has Trident missiles on its submarines and may soon have Tomahawks. These are just some of the many practical illustrations of the absurdity of claims that the special relationship is dead. I have never used the phrase special relationship; we usually speak of a very close relationship. (C)

The President: We may get all the hard questions on our relations from the British press. The American press may ask me other questions such as about the CIA and Guatemala, the latest Republican tax relief proposal that will allow self-employed people to buy health insurance, cut tax breaks for minority media, but give a huge benefit to Rupert Murdoch. I have to decide whether to veto this bill or to sign it while excoriating the Congress for including this benefit for Murdoch.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Prime Minister John Major  
of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
John M. Deutch, Acting Secretary of Defense  
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of  
State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for  
European Affairs, NSC Staff

U.K.

John Major, Prime Minister  
Robin Renwick, Ambassador to the U.S.  
John Ward, MP, Parliamentary Private  
Secretary  
Alex Allen, Principal Private Secretary  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary for Foreign  
Affairs  
Christopher Meyer, Press Secretary  
Peter Westmacott, Political and Congressional  
Counselor, British Embassy

DATE, TIME April 4, 1995, 1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Family Dining Room

The President: (After exchanging pleasantries about the NCAA  
basketball final and the First Lady's trip to South Asia) I know  
you had a long meeting with the Vice President this morning.  
There are several things, however, that we should still discuss.  
We have already reviewed what you have said to members of  
Congress about Bosnia. It would be helpful to us, to maintain  
support for our current policy, if we could strengthen UNPROFOR.  
What are your thoughts? (E)

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PER E. O. 13526  
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Prime Minister Major: I would like to look at what exactly could be done. I have an open mind. We will be happy to do what can be done safely. What specific ideas do you have in mind? (C)

The President: We are thinking of things such as enforcing the anti-sniper agreement in Sarajevo, keeping the airport open, and the like. (C)

Secretary Christopher: UNPROFOR could be given new and better weapons. It could be given general guidance on when it should agree in advance that NATO airpower could be called in. We should devise a menu and have the Contact Group work it through. Making UNPROFOR more robust will be critical to keeping the Bosnians in a frame of mind conducive to continuing the ceasefire. The Prime Minister's statement of readiness to look at the options with an open mind represents a positive reaction. (C)

The President: I am sensitive to putting UNPROFOR troops at greater risk, but we are walking a tightrope. While we don't want to put the people at risk, we don't want to see UNPROFOR emasculated either. I don't want to be publicly at odds with you on this, since you have ground forces in Bosnia and we don't. But keeping UNPROFOR effective will be necessary to restrain the Bosnian government and help contain pressures here to lift the arms embargo. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Anything that is credible and safe and can ease the possibility of unilateral lift, as well as ease the possibility of the Bosnian government continuing to seek small military gains with the inevitable Serb response, would be advantageous. We would be happy to work bilaterally or within the Contact Group. May I ask what Chris has in mind by better weapons. Does he mean heavier equipment? (C)

Secretary Christopher: Not necessarily. The Ministers of Defense focused on equipment like night-vision goggles. Such things could make the troops more effective. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Our troops are already well equipped. When they are fired upon, they fire back. Other troops, such as the Bangladeshis, may not be so well equipped. General Rose had instructions to fire back twice when he was fired upon. I would be surprised if our troops need any the new equipment. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: Rose's successor, General Smith, is taking the same tough approach, EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Deputy Secretary Deutch: It would be helpful if General Shali got together with Sir Peter Inge to develop a list of options. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, they have a direct line between them. (C)

The President: Let's talk about Iraq. We believe it is important to take a firm line on sanctions. We don't believe that Ekeus will report that the Iraqi are in full compliance with UN resolutions. You have been very supportive, although I know there are many humanitarian concerns in Europe about the impact on the Iraqi people. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I got hit by King Hussein regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation. (C)

The President: There is a large Iraqi-American community in Michigan which is beating me up on this issue. But we offered the Iraqis the flexibility to sell more oil to support humanitarian purchases and they rejected it. We can't give in on sanctions. (C)

Prime Minister Major: There is no difference between us on this issue, but we could find ourselves isolated in relationship to the others. As you said, there is a UN Security Council resolution that would enable the Iraqis to sell oil, but they won't use it. I heard Congressional views last night. When people see large numbers of people starving, however, they may take a contrary view. Nevertheless, I agree we should not lift the sanctions until they comply with the UN resolutions in full. You should have no doubt about our position. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: A lot of the other Europeans are pressing for more flexibility. (C)

The President: How much of this is motivated by humanitarian concerns and how much by commercial interests? (C)

Ambassador Renwick: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

We will need to be firm and you can be certain about the UK's position on this. (C)

Anthony Lake: I don't think we will be in bad shape regarding the next extension. The Iraqis have rejected the proposal before we even made it. The Ekeus report won't be clear. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] The Queen of Jordan was away during my visit, but the Prime Minister's wife took the same tack as the King. This was very surprising. I don't think it was raised by accident. [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d

Secretary Christopher: It is hard to discuss Iraq without discussing the Turkish operation in Northern Iraq. This is still an unresolved problem. (C)

Richard Holbrooke: The Turkish Foreign Minister is here in town. Strobe Talbott and I will be going to Ankara next week and Prime Minister Ciller will be here in two weeks time. These will be important opportunities to resolve this issue. (C)

The President: How has the UK reacted so far? (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: They are just chasing the PKK around. Bill, what do you think? (C)

Ambassador Crowe: I think that the operation will be unsuccessful even if we leave them to their own devices. (C)

The President: The operation won't succeed even if they stay another three or four weeks. At the beginning of the operation, Prime Minister Ciller called to explain what they were doing. During their previous operation in 1992, we were less reserved in our criticism. Given the internal situation in Turkey, we have been very reserved publicly. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Ambassador Renwick: We went out on a limb to get the Customs Union approved. (C)

The President: The strategic realities haven't changed much in the last few years in Northern Iraq. (C)

Richard Holbrooke: The Foreign Minister may tell us that the Turks will set a date. The Turkish Ambassador hinted about this in a meeting with Strobe Talbott. The military may be trying to undermine the Prime Minister. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] Turkey is the front-line state in so many respects. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Are they close to setting a date for withdrawal? (C)

Richard Holbrooke: We will know more when we meet with the Foreign Minister. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Richard Holbrooke: They have asked for a full review of Provide Comfort. That operation is at a crossroads too. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: If we can't persuade them to preserve Provide Comfort, we will have a big problem. (C)

The President: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

The Vice President: We have some months since Provide Comfort was just renewed. (C)

Richard Holbrooke: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] but this still shows the danger. (C)

The President: Can we turn to the Middle East? I understand you have forgiven Jordan's debt. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have forgiven a great deal of Jordan's debt. Overall, we are happy with our relations with Jordan. The only difficulties occurred during the Gulf War. (C)

The President: What is your assessment of the Palestinians? (C)

Prime Minister Major: I visited the Gaza Strip during my trip. I must say, I never expected that I would be standing on a red carpet in Gaza next to Yasir Arafat and hearing bagpipes played in my honor. (C)

The President: What are you going to do with the Palestinians?  
(C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: The dilemma is that the only way to get a lot of money into the Palestinian areas in a hurry is to reopen the borders. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Secretary Christopher: I am a little more optimistic. It depends on what day you visit. The Israelis still seem committed to the road map between now and July.

EO 13526 1.4d

He has suggested increasing the number of workers from 20,000 to 25,000. Rabin is haunted by the settlement issue. How can he give greater governance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and maintain the security of the settlements? The settlements could become encircled camps. The difficulty of this issue could lead Rabin to focus more on the Syrian track; as difficult as it is, it is a question of borders. But still, since it is so integrated in their long-term goals, Arafat and Rabin might reach agreement by July 1st. There might not be a total redeployment, but the elections and increased West Bank governance could go forward. There might need to be a package. We need to get in more economic aid and achieve more Palestinian action against

terrorism. In Gaza yesterday there was a happy event of sorts, when a Hamas terrorist blew himself up. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: They scored an own goal. (C)

The President: Are you going to give any money to the Palestinians? (C)

Prime Minister Major: We will give some assistance, but not much. (C)

The President: If the borders are not politically feasible, we will need to do some highly visible things that can provide psychological relief. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I spoke with some of the CEOs of big UK corporations. I encouraged them to do specific projects in the Palestinian areas. A few of them are following up. (C)

Secretary Christopher: It is disappointing that Palestinians outside the region are not responding. There has been little Palestinian investment. It's surprising if one compares this with other examples of emigres supporting their homeland. In the Palestinian case, they are not prepared to take any high risks and treat the Palestinian lands as they would investments anywhere else. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The Vice President: I had a productive exchange with Arafat on that point. I used it as a wedge to describe our reinventing government ideas. I suggested he consider a hiring freeze and a firm budget. Some of his advisers were interested and asked specific questions. It is clear that his ability to get a favorable response from other Arabs will depend on establishing confidence that he is not throwing foreign assistance away. (C)

The President: We will have to keep plugging away on this. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Can we talk about Halifax? You will recall that in 1994 in Naples, we agreed that we would reexamine the international economic institutions. We have done a lot of work on the international financial institutions, on the way that we deal with poverty in the world, on the overlapping UN agencies dealing with the environment and economic assistance. We have

also been thinking about what we might do on conflict prevention, crime, drugs and money laundering. Down the road we will produce a series of concrete proposals. We would like to make sure that the review at Halifax is not just a casual chat with few concrete results. We believe there is scope for rationalizing the IFIs. We also think we should look at the UN agencies since there is an enormous amount of duplication that is wasteful. If the G-7 can reach an agreement on rationalizing these agencies, it could ease your Congressional funding problems with respect to the UN and help make the UN a more effective instrument for the 21st century. We should see if our thinking is developing in the same way. There is a lot of overlap in how we deal with issues like sustainable development and the environment. Given the limited resources available, we need to consolidate these efforts. How far have you gone in your own examination of these issues? It would be a real advance if all of us at Halifax came out in favor of reform. (C)

Secretary Christopher: I welcome your statement. We are working on the same kind of road map for Halifax, focusing on reform of the IFIs and the UN. This whole problem was dramatized by the Mexican experience. It illustrated the need to create a mechanism for dealing with international bankruptcy problems. We may need more Sherpa meetings and further bilateral consultations as well. We agree that if Halifax does not produce results, we will pay a heavy price in Congress. We need to think about how to deal with a future Mexican crisis, or even worse, two such crises at the same time. Had there been two Mexican problems, we would have failed. In sum, what we did at Naples was even more relevant than what we thought at the time. (C)

Laura Tyson: Our efforts have been redoubled following the Mexican crisis. We have had extensive internal meetings. On the UN, we are in agreement on the need for restructuring. International bankruptcy is an important question to discuss both at Halifax and afterwards. It will be difficult to come up with specific proposals before Halifax, but we are working on it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We want a more concrete result in Halifax than just a discussion. (C)

The President: Let me give my perspective on the international financial institutions. If our objective is to encourage democracy, the integration of markets, and the development of market economics in the developing countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union, we need to answer the following question: Are the institutions that we have adequate to the task or do we need new policies? For example, in countries like Russia and Poland we need to think through the question of

strengthening the social safety net. On the question of a mechanism to deal with international bankruptcies, if our premise is that some countries will succeed but then fail, they will become targets for speculators. Mexico had a booming economy yet it could not protect its own currency. There is a danger of the Mexican problem repeating itself in countries like Argentina and Brazil, if people take out their money suddenly. We may not be able to find a solution, but that is not a happy prospect. Therefore as we limit chemical weapons and biological weapons, we also have to deal with the problem of new developing economies that grow for a time and then have the rug pulled out from under them. (C)

Alex Allan: We have a lot of sensitivity about using the word bankruptcy for countries, but we agree we need a better system for dealing with problems like Mexico. Part of the solution may be better monitoring and surveillance. One has to say that the IMF slipped up in not forecasting the Mexican crisis. The crisis may not have emerged in such a rush had we had some advance warning. Regarding the World Bank we hope that Jim Wolfensohn will do a lot. He has some good ideas. The World Bank is a good institution but it has become too big and its focus has become blurred. (C)

The President: I have a lot of confidence in Wolfensohn. (U)

Prime Minister Major: We will put together our concrete ideas. There is an advantage in concerting our efforts. Alex will come over to talk with his counterparts. (U)

The President: At Naples, the two of us were more interested in this question than the other five members of the G-7. (C)

The Vice President: There are a lot of other items on the world agenda than the IFIs such as sustainable development. These missions are new and still evolving; they need direction. Look at countries like Sierra Leone or Haiti. One can see how environmental devastation helped contribute to the disintegration of society. Similar problems occurred in Rwanda and Burundi and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is apparent that over the next decade the world is going to need to pay more attention to a whole complex of factors, to keep control over developments like environmental decay, depletion of fish stocks, and destruction of farm lands. (C)

The President: Let's turn to Russia. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We don't have any different views on Russia. I don't know what Yeltsin will do.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

You were right to go to Moscow in May. (C)

Regarding economic reform, Chernomyrdin has outdone what we have expected of him. I initially thought the international financial institutions were demanding too much, yet Chernomyrdin has done better than I imagined. Looking to the next few months, we have no idea what will be the composition of the next parliament.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

It is not clear who his opponents will be or whether Yeltsin himself will run for reelection. (C)

With regard to the Paris Club application for debt deferment, we are not big creditors so we could agree to a three-year program. But we don't feel strongly about this. If others have different views, we will be sympathetic.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: The Russians have a compulsion to be part of every club. (C)

The Vice President: Yes, they want to join the Paris Club and NATO, and have a special relationship with the U.S. (C)

The President: We don't know the answers ourselves about what will happen in Russia. It is still in our self-interest to stay engaged with Russia. Our two countries' position has not changed on this. I am more concerned that the Russians may want to have it both ways. On the one hand they want to appear helpful and be members of the clubs; on the other hand, they are playing up the notion that Russia is being disrespected. When the Vice President met Yeltsin in his hospital in December, they had a good meeting about how to develop relations with NATO. Yet, since then, they have been clearly backing off. Their objections are only stoking the fears of those countries who want to be members of NATO. I thought that if we could get an understanding with the Russians, we could achieve some level of comfort and tone down the rhetoric. We could then build up Partnership for Peace and joint exercises. I thought we could proceed at a deliberate pace, but my current feeling is that Yeltsin is mishandling the issue. This affects his interests more than ours, apart from the discomfort of the public exchanges. Anything that we can do in May to get him more centered on the issue would be helpful. When we stay away from Yeltsin, domestic politics begin to affect him. (C)

Roderic Lyne: I don't know what is going to happen next year in Russia, but the underlying trends are moving in the right direction and a new generation is beginning to emerge. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: As democracy develops in Russia, we will need to show understanding when we see manifestations of the same personal insecurities that are present in our own countries. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Another question that has been rumbling around in our thinking is that the terms of trade in U.S.-European relations have changed with the passing of a definable enemy. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] We don't have the same interrelationship at the parliamentary level as we have between our administrations. The fact that we are not in as close touch leads to gaps in our thinking and in our perceptions, for example over Bosnia. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] There are a lots of things we should be talking about. For example, we have a transatlantic hemispheric conference of government and business leaders which has been remarkably successful. We need to fill the gap in other areas. (C)

We have been thinking about a possible North Atlantic free trade area, whether formalized or not. There is a lot to do in reducing non-tariff barriers. We would like to start exploring these ideas. Our thinking is nebulous at this stage, but lurking in it is the idea of a more concrete relationship between Western Europe and the United States than exists at the present time. I don't know if you heard of the advice given to Winston Churchill by Randolph Churchill: "Never lose touch with the Americans." This saying was handed down through the generations. Today there is a tendency to believe that Europe and the United States will look in different directions. It is not a serious problem today but we want to keep working to ensure that it doesn't become a serious problem. We have a lot of common interests: bringing the Central and East European states into Western institutions (the EU and NATO) and extending security and prosperity in their direction; coordinating our longer-term policy toward Russia and Ukraine; working to deal with the problems of North Africa and the Middle East, including helping such friends as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan; building on the World Trade Organization by

achieving more trade liberalization. As I said, we have not formulated these ideas in full, but these are the kinds of subjects we should be looking at. (C)

The President: I am very encouraged by what you're saying. We have tried to be supportive of European integration and the political economic and security dimensions. We don't see this as intrinsically threatening as long as the specifics don't damage our traditional partnerships. But there is uncertainty in the United States regarding how things will develop. I agree on the need to strengthen transatlantic links. I am very worried about the percentage of the new members of Congress who are quite isolationists. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Almost half of the members of Congress are in their first or second term and represent a different generation. (U)

The President: Another problem is that a large part of the American people are presently inward-looking and preoccupied with domestic concerns. A few weeks ago I had a press conference with editors of college newspapers and I did not get a single question on foreign policy. Moreover, none of their economic questions reflected any awareness of the limits imposed by the global economy. These people were not illiterate or unconcerned, but foreign policy issues did not score high on their hierarchy of interests. Look at Mexico. At the start of the crisis we had all the Congressional leaders supportive of solution -- Dole, Gingrich, Daschle and Gephardt. Three or four days later, however, the votes were disappearing and we probably couldn't get more than three votes today. The turmoil in the U.S. has nothing to do with Europe but it produces an isolationist influence. More outreach is needed. I was struck by a Washington Times article attacking a possible visit by a Congressional delegation to the Middle East. I would happily send them all on a tour of the world to overcome their isolationist attitude. (C)

Secretary Christopher: Not one of the first-term Congressmen is traveling abroad during the upcoming recess. (U)

Leon Panetta: I would agree that interparliamentary exchanges have lost their meaningfulness. It is worth a shot trying to improve them. I am concerned that in the budget we will suffer direct hits on the State Department budget, on foreign aid and on the 150 account. There is an isolationist trend and anything we can do to break it will be difficult. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How should we proceed? Should we float some ideas in Western Europe? (C)

The President: We will put some high-level energy into it and coordinate with you. You may need to make the first move, for example, to get Dole and Gingrich to invite distinguished European parliamentarians to Washington and then get our Congressmen to go back to Europe. I am very concerned that this trend could become bipartisan. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Gingrich was interested in my idea. (C)

The President: He is pretty good on this. He is worried himself about the isolationist trend. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: We should target the freshmen Congressmen. (U)

The President: A lot of them were elected on an extremist platform. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: This is what I said earlier: they are playing to people's fears. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I may float this idea publicly and see what happens. I am also happy to send some people over here to discuss this and to live in the squalor of the British Embassy. (C)

The President: What do you think about the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty? (C)

Prime Minister Major: I think we have a better chance now. (U)

The President: We have been working like hell on it. The aversion of some of our best friends has been surprising. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It will be very embarrassing if we fail to get an unlimited extension. (C)

The President: An extension for another 25 years seems like a long time but it is not sufficient. (C)

Secretary Christopher: If we extend for 25 years we will be hanging on the edge and we won't be able to achieve a long-term solution to the problem. Returning to the Prime Minister's two ideas: With the Asians and the Latin Americans we have a timetable for establishment of a free trade area. We don't have the same goal with respect to Europe. We should do this,

although it will cause some tensions, particularly in the agricultural area. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I would like to begin to discuss this publicly. We had a seminar at Chequers. My Defense Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, spoke about an Atlantic community of free trade. It is an idea worth floating. It has many attractions. (C)

The President: We have two options: we could agree on a long-term goal, as with APEC and the Summit of Americas in Miami; or alternatively, since the U.S. and Europe are so closely involved in the GATT, we might be able to go for specific agreements -- lopping things off one at a time. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: Financial services could be one of the first areas. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We should also be able to lop off non-tariff barriers. Free trade in the broadest sense does engage the question of agriculture, which is problematic on both sides of the water. One of the reasons why I wanted to raise this idea now is because some of our EU partners believe that, with GATT out of the way, nothing more needs to be done. I want to ride the wind before it is completely gone. I don't know who is going to win the French election, but right now it looks like Chirac.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] I near you are down to eight and a half percent unemployment in Britain. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's right, although we are not at the level of five percent and a bit like you are. Our unemployment is dropping by about one-tenth of a percentage point a month. (C)

The President: That is quite good. (U)

Richard Holbrooke: There are two issues I would like to raise regarding the Congress. Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd in their contacts on the Hill have had a major impact and they should continue to engage directly. The formal interparliamentary structures have atrophied. With respect to Executive Branch contacts, the most promising areas would be to rationalize our policies toward Central Europe and Russia. NATO

expansion and the enlargement of the EU will go slowly for their own reasons, yet expectations in Central Europe are high. If we can work more closely on the region, it would accomplish the Prime Minister's goal of strengthening transatlantic ties and doing for Central Europe what we did for Western Europe in the post-war years. We have a tremendous opportunity and should engage multilaterally and bilaterally. The U.S.-UK channel can be the core, and it can be also be broadened to include Germany and maybe France, depending on the results of the election. There is a lot we can do, if not before the Moscow Summit, then immediately afterward.

The President: Do we need to discuss Libya? (U)

Anthony Lake: Rod Lyne and I have already had a good discussion.  
(U)

The President: Let's coordinate on the hard questions we are going to face at the press conference. (G)

-- End of Conversation --

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 12 April 95 12:23

FROM Rose, Gideon G.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT Subject: RE: Major Memcon ~~[SECRET]~~

TO Gardner, Anthony  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
Schmidt, John R.  
Stephens, Kathleen D.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.

CARBON\_COPY Cleveland, Carolyn E.  
Gorsuch, Robert P.  
Indyk, Martin S.  
Laipson, Ellen B.  
Parris, Mark R.  
Rose, Gideon G.  
Satterfield, David M.

TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
05/26/11 KDE

Yes, that's Palestinian workers the Israelis will allow to come in from the PA. We cleared this by phone half an hour ago; this confirms NSC/NESA's concurrence in the transcript as is.

Gideon Rose

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
To: @NESASIA - NE/South Asia  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: FW: Major Memcon ~~[SECRET]~~  
Date: Wednesday, April 12, 1995 12:19 PM

<<Attached File: 2650MEM.DOC>>

Sent to Ellen last night. If she's away, could someone else look at the relevant parts to be sure the facts are straight? I'd like to move the package today -- State is eagerly awaiting.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.  
To: Laipson, Ellen B.  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Major Memcon ~~[SECRET]~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Date: Tuesday, April 11, 1995 06:17 PM

Could you look at the Iraq and Middle East portions of this ((pp. 3-7)) for a sanity check? I'm not fully conversant with the peace process details, e.g. the reference to 20,000-25,000 on page 6: is that Palestinian workers or something else?

Thanks.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 May 95 15:15

FROM Stephens, Kathleen D.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT Talkers for Telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Baker, Jane E.  
 Bass, Peter E.  
 Cicio, Kristen K.  
 Darby, Melanie B.  
 Dohse, Fred J.  
 Emery, Mary C.  
 Gray, Wendy  
 Hall, Wilma G.  
 Harmon, Joyce A.  
 Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Itoh, William H.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Marmol, Madelyn P.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Jim Reed  
 Sens, Andrew D.  
 Veit, Katherine M.

DECLASSIFIED  
 PER E.O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M  
 05/26/16 KDE

CARBON\_COPY Drew, Samuel N.  
 Gardner, Anthony  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Marshall, Betty A.  
 Maxfield, Nancy H.  
 Schmidt, John R.  
 Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT\_BODY Please pass to Nancy: Attached as requested are talking points for TL phone call to UUP leader James Molyneaux.  
 [[ LAKEUUP.DOC : 3886 in LAKEUUP.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 19 May 95 15:11

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME LAKEUUP.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
JAMES MOLYNEAUX, UUP LEADER

- Very disappointed to hear you have announced you are not coming to Washington next week.
- We have made clear from the outset that next week's Conference is about business, not politics.
- Some 300 U.S. business leaders are slated to participate in the Conference. Also have an excellent representation of top British and Irish firms coming.
- Inevitably the press is seeking to make much of the political elements of the Conference, particularly as they relate to Sinn Fein.
- I want to set the record straight because I know there have been inaccurate reports datelined from Washington: No one in the Administration made any suggestion at all to the British about whether or not Mayhew should meet with Adams.
- The Vice President and I each saw Douglas Hurd on Wednesday. We both said the same thing, clearly: What Mayhew decided to do vis a vis Adams was up to Mayhew. We would try to be helpful in order to assure that the focus of the Conference remains on trade and investment, not politics.
- Most unfortunate that Mayhew's announcement of his decision to meet "informally" with Adams distracted attention from the UUP-SDLP joint meeting with Prime Minister Major. Understand your frustration.
- Also understand your own domestic political difficulties in going to the Conference when you're in a by-election with Ian Paisley's party.
- But want to assure you that this Conference is about business and economic development. Important that you be there. Hope you will reconsider.



# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 May 95 19:03  
 FROM Gardner, Anthony  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Kohl Telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 0512/elle KDE

[[ 4069AS.DOC : 4871 in 4069AS.DOC ]][[ 4069SB.DOC : 4872 in  
 4069SB.DOC  
 ]][[ 4069TEL.DOC : 4873 in 4069TEL.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 26 May 95 10:51

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 4069AS.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 4069  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
 on May 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
 between the President and German Chancellor Kohl on May 25, 1995.

Concurrence by: Dan Poneman; John Beyrle

## RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

26 May 95 10:51

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

4069SB.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4069

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL

Executive Secretary

Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
Between the President and German Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

26 May 95 19:0

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

4069TEL.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
4069  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
Present: Alexander Vershbow; Dan Poneman  
Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:  
[Enter date, time and  
location of conversation]

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. Guten Abend. (U)

The President: Guten Abend to you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you? (U)

The President: Well, and you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. Stay with the course, Bill. You're  
doing well. (U)

The President: Yes, I think pretty well. There's a movement among  
the isolationists in Congress to destroy the foreign aid budget,  
but we managed to postpone a vote on the bill. We have a chance of  
defeating it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about my trip to Moscow and my meeting with Yeltsin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. I have plenty of time, Bill. (U)

The President: I think we did the right thing to go to Moscow to express our respect for the Russian people. The day after the commemorations Yeltsin seemed alert and was well prepared for our meeting. We met one on one for three hours. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: We spent an hour on NATO issues. He is clearly concerned about NATO enlargement and its impact on the elections in Russia in 1996. He clearly thinks he has a chance to win. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: First, he asked me to postpone expansion until

2000, then stepped back and said until after 1996. I said that I understood his problem and would be as supportive as possible, but that I can't postpone expansion indefinitely. I then went through the timeline on the 1995 study which will focus on the "why" and the "how" of expansion rather than the "who" and the "when." (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You did not discuss a specific date, did you? (U)

The President: No, but I said that in the first months of 1996 the NATO ministers would work on processing all they had heard in the study on the "why" and the "how." I said that there will be no announcement of the "who" and the "when" until after the 1996 elections. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)


The President: Only one more comment. I also told him that neither of us can be seen as giving in to the other. We need to avoid discussion on speeding up or slowing down expansion. I made clear to him that he should not put so much pressure on us in public because this has a counterproductive reaction...

Chancellor Kohl: Yes... (U)

President Clinton: Let me finish and then you can comment. At the end of our conversation, he said that he would drop Russian

opposition to participation in PFP and that he would give approval before the NAC meeting on May 30. This would open the way toward negotiations on a Russia-NATO relationship. I said that the NAC Ministerial would do three things in return: first, it would state that enlargement will be transparent and gradual; second, it will reinvigorate PFP and emphasize its importance; third, it will launch a dialogue with Russia on a NATO-Russia relationship. I think we can meet his political needs without being seen as giving in. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: So, Bill. With respect to your report, I think it is excellent. Let me tell you openly how I assess the situation.



EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I spoke to Chirac about this last week and tomorrow Major will be coming here. I also spoke to Dutch Prime Minister Kok. I think we have everyone in line and we have good cards to play. You did a good job in Moscow; but we cannot let foreign policy become a blunt instrument of domestic policy. We must be very clever and wise now. That's my opinion. We'll be able to discuss this again before the summit in Halifax. (C)

The President: Well, I'm very encouraged by all of this. I would like to say... (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. I have plenty of time. (U)

The President: NATO enlargement will be important in the primaries. But if I can keep my position over the next six months, I won't have any opposition in the primaries. (E)

Chancellor Kohl: You mean from the Democrats? (E)

The President: Correct. That means that I won't have to deal with the question until September or October of next year, well after the Russian elections. (E)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: My goal is to be seen as steady so that the polls won't make an issue out of it. We must keep the dialogue steady and deliberate so that there are no adverse consequences for the Russians or for us. (E)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I totally agree with you. I will do everything so that the Europeans follow this path. (U)

The President: Great. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So we are in agreement on the main points. If anything new comes up, we'll keep one another informed. (U)

The President: Yes, we need to keep each other informed. Both of us will be meeting with Yeltsin in Halifax. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. (U)

The President: Just two more points. Yeltsin and I reached agreement on closing off Russian conventional arms sales to Iran. This enables them to become members of the post-COCOM regime and will help to improve their international prestige. With regard to the sale of light water reactors to Iran. Yeltsin believes that they cannot be used for the construction of nuclear weapons. But he was concerned about the implications of intelligence we shared with him. So we agreed that Chernomyrdin and the Vice President would continue to discuss the issue and find a solution. I think that's a step in the right direction. (E)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: One last point we need to discuss in Halifax. I

have a special committee here to follow security arrangements for nuclear materials in Russia. I turn to you since there have been instances of smuggling to Germany. Yeltsin says there is no problem of security. Either he's entirely unaware of the problem or he won't admit to it. We need to speak to him about this in Halifax. (C)

Chancellor Kohl:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: We need an exchange of information. It is Germany that is most likely to be affected because of its proximity to Russia. It is important not to embarrass Yeltsin. We have been spending time and money with them to improve security. We think they're doing a good job at military sites, but we are still very concerned about other sites. There's no need to say more about this now, but we do need to discuss it further at Halifax. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, this is very serious. We need to make him understand all the facts. (U)

The President: In Moscow he did not seem to have all the facts. We need to make him understand the importance of this issue. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I'm without illusions on this issue. We need to talk to him directly. (U)

The President: Yes. I'll have our government share the results of our work with him. But we need for both of us to tell Yeltsin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: The last thing I wanted to do is to follow up on the letter I sent to you regarding North Korea. We are entering a critical round in the talks. We need to convince North Korea that the KEDO project is viable. I know that Europe has concerns about our approach, but I honestly believe that it is the best approach and that we need the involvement and participation of Germany. We are hoping for a contribution which is more than symbolic. You know that the Australians have contributed \$5 million. We hope you can manage something around that figure. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, we're going to do something. I'm going to

discuss this with others in Europe. I have no problem with doing something that is more than symbolic. The problem lies in becoming a member [of the project]. (E)

The President: We can talk about that in Halifax. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: OK, friend. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: My best to your wife. Good luck. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 May 95 09:44  
 FROM Gardner, Anthony  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Kohl Telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Poneman, Daniel B.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 8012-0801-11 05120116 KDE

[[ 4069AS.DOC : 2348 in 4069AS.DOC ]][[ 4069SB.DOC : 2349 in 4069SB.DOC ]]  
 ]][[ 4069TEL.DOC : 2350 in 4069TEL.DOC ]]

Dan, please review 4059tel.doc to see if you agree with it.

I was going through old files in NYC and came across a paper I wrote for you in 1984 on ASATs for Gen Ed 159! Those were the good old days.

my name is coming up for a vote for term membership in the council on foreign relations very soon. I seem to recall that you're a member. would you be willing to put in a good word? Letters were written for me already, but I'm wondering whether a call might help. trouble is I don't know who's on the Screening Committee. The new head of the membership committee is Shelley Stonecipher.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 27 May 95 15:53  
 ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 4069AS.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 4069  
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 Declassify on: OADR  
  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
on May 25, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
between the President and German Chancellor Kohl on May 25, 1995.

Concurrence by: Dan Poneman; John Beyrle

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of  
Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for  
the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments  
Tab I Memorandum to State  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

27 May 95 15:52

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

4069SB.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
4069  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
Between the President and German Chancellor Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Bonn for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

28 May 95 12:21

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

4069TEL.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
4069  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl  
Present: Alexander Vershbow; Dan Poneman  
Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:  
May 26, 1995, 4:35-4:55 pm,  
Oval Office/  
Kohl's Home

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill. Guten Abend. (U)

The President: Guten Abend to you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: How are you? (U)

The President: Well, and you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. Stay the course, Bill. I see you are fighting hard and doing well. (U)

The President: Yes, I think things are going pretty well. There's a movement among the isolationists in Congress to handcuff the President's authority in foreign affairs and destroy the foreign aid budget, but we managed to postpone a vote on the bill. We have a chance of defeating it and maintaining our present course. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about my trip to Moscow and my meeting with Yeltsin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. I have plenty of time, Bill. (U)

The President: I think we did the right thing to go to Moscow to express our respect for the Russian people and the magnitude of their loss during the war. The day after the commemorations I met with Yeltsin. He seemed alert and was well prepared for our meeting. We met one-on-one for three hours. We spent about an hour on NATO issues. He is clearly concerned about NATO enlargement and its impact on the elections in Russia in 1996. He clearly hopes to run and thinks he has a chance to win. (C)

First, Boris he asked me to postpone expansion until 2000. Then he stepped back and asked us to wait until a year or two after 1996.

I said that I understood his problem and would be as supportive as possible, but that I can't abandon the timetable we have set forward or postpone expansion indefinitely. I then went through the timeline on the 1995 study which will focus on the "why" and the "how" of expansion rather than the "who" and the "when." (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You did not discuss a specific date, did you? (C)

The President: No, but I said that in the first months of 1996 the NATO ministers would work on processing all they had heard in response to the study on the "why" and the "how." I said that there wouldn't be any announcement of the "who" and the "when" before the 1996 elections. That would occur later in 1996. (C)


Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Only one more comment. I also told him it was important that neither of us be seen as giving in to the other. We need to avoid discussion on speeding up or slowing down expansion. I made clear to him that he would be all right, but that he should stop putting so much pressure on us in public because this has a counterproductive reaction...I said we could control the timing in a way that he wouldn't be hurt by it.

Chancellor Kohl: Yes... (U)

President Clinton: Let me finish and then you can comment. At the end of our conversation, he said that he would drop Russian opposition to participation in the partnership agreements with NATO and that he would give approval just before the NAC meeting on May 30. This would enable us to move ahead with PFP and a NATO dialogue with Russia. I said that at the NAC Ministerial, we would urge that Ministers would do three things in return: first, it would reaffirm that enlargement will occur in a gradual, transparent and open way; second, it would reinvigorate PFP and enhance its importance; third, it would will launch a dialogue with Russia on an expanded NATO-Russia relationship. I think we can meet his political needs and still pursue our approach without anyone being seen to have given way. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: So, Bill. With respect to your report, I think it is excellent that you discussed this with Boris directly. Let me tell you openly how I assess the situation.



EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I spoke to Chirac about this last week and tomorrow Major will be coming here. I also spoke to Dutch Prime Minister Kok. I think we have everyone in line and we have good cards to play. You did a great job in Moscow; but we cannot let foreign policy become a blunt instrument of domestic policy. We must be very clever and wise now. That's my position. I think we are in agreement. We'll be able to discuss this again before the summit in Halifax and at the time of that meeting. (C)

The President: Well, I'm very encouraged by all you have said. Let me tell you about the political situation here. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, of course. I have plenty of time. (U)

The President: NATO enlargement may be an important issue in the primaries. But if I can keep my position over the next six months, I won't have any opposition in the primaries. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: You mean from the Democrats? (C)

The President: Correct. That means that I won't have to deal with the question in a political context until the period from August to November of next year, well after the Russian elections. (C)

My goal is for us to be seen as steady so that neither the Poles nor the Russians will make an issue out of it. We must keep the dialogue steady and deliberate so that we can get through June 1996 without any adverse consequences for Yeltsin or for us. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I totally agree with you. I will do everything so that the Europeans follow this path. (C)

The President: Great. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: So we are in agreement on the main points. If

anything new comes up, we'll keep one another informed. (C)

The President: Yes, we need to keep each other informed. Both of us will be meeting with Yeltsin in Halifax. If we get through those meetings, we will be okay for a year. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Exactly. (U)

The President: Just two more points. Yeltsin and I reached agreement on closing off Russian conventional arms sales to Iran. This enables them to become members of the post-COCOM regime and will help Yeltsin to improve his prestige. With regard to the sale of light water reactors to Iran, Yeltsin believes that they cannot be used for the construction of nuclear weapons. But he was concerned about the implications of intelligence we shared with him. So we agreed that Chernomyrdin and the Vice President would continue to discuss the issue and find a solution. I think that's a step in the right direction. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. (U)

The President: One last point we need to discuss in Halifax. I have a special committee here to follow security arrangements for nuclear materials in Russia. I turn to you since there have been instances of smuggling to Germany. Yeltsin says there is no problem of security. Either he's entirely unaware of the problem or he won't admit to it. We need to speak to him about this in Halifax. (C)

Chancellor Kohl:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: We need an exchange of information. It is Germany that is most likely to be affected given the routes out of Russia. Of course, it is important not to embarrass Yeltsin. We have been spending time and money with them to improve security of their sites. We think they're doing a good job at military sites, but we are still very concerned about other sites. There's no need to say more about this now, but we do need to discuss it further at Halifax. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, this is very serious. We need to make him understand all the facts. (C)

The President: In Moscow he did not seem to have all the facts. We need to make him understand the importance of this issue. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I'm without illusions on this issue. We need to talk to him directly and personally. (C)

The President: Yes. I'll have our government share the results of our work with him. But both of us will need to tell Yeltsin. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: The last thing I wanted to do is to follow up on the letter I sent to you regarding the North Korea nuclear issue. We are entering a critical round in the talks. We need to convince North Korea that the KEDO project is viable. I know that a lot of people in Europe have concerns about our approach, but I honestly believe that it is the best approach and that we need the participation and leadership of Germany. We are hoping for a contribution which is more than symbolic. You know that the Australians have contributed \$5 million. We hope you can manage something around that figure. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, we're going to do something. I'm going to discuss this with others in Europe. I have no problem with doing something that is more than symbolic. The problem lies in becoming a member [of the KEDO project]. (C)

The President: We can talk about that in Halifax. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: OK, friend. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: My best to your wife. Good luck. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 May 95 18:26  
 FROM Martinez, Alejandro  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Subject: Major MEMCON 27 May 1995 1550-1609 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Drew, Samuel N.  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 05/12 Collie KDE

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Clinton's call with British Prime Minister Major.

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez and Nelson Drew.

DATE/TIME: 27 May 1995, 1550-1609

President Clinton: John, Hello.

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. I thought the conference went quite well.

President Clinton: Hope your people can play this up. The speech I gave was well-received. Adams complained a little. I really hit them hard.

Prime Minister Major: All went well. Save for the Unionists who were a bit silly but they did recover quickly.

President Clinton: I keep hoping the parties see huge peace dividends...

Prime Minister Major: I think we have a better chance if we can persuade them on decommissioning. We have had over 90 days without incident and it looks like they may be serious. Every day is like money in the bag.

President Clinton: Is any of this helping you domestically.

Prime Minister Major: No not really. Most people here don't really care what happens in the world.

President Clinton: I know how you feel. Most Americans could care less about what is happening outside U.S...I guess since there is no longer a strategic threat people do bother any more.

Prime Minister Major: I know how you feel. It is pretty much bead and butter politics...I guess that is the price we pay for winning the cold war.

President Clinton: People also see it as a burden. I just got off the phone with President Chirac.

Prime Minister Major: I just talked to Juppe yesterday.

President Clinton: [redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4d  
Chirac said he spoke with Yeltsin today. [redacted]  
[redacted]  
1.4d

Prime Minister Major: This is fairly the same line that Juppe had and I am amenable to this.

President Clinton: Do you agree

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
[redacted] We have a meeting tomorrow and clear what will happen. We need better follow-up [redacted]  
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I think airstrikes worked well. We can't give up though with UNPROFOR under strength. If no threat is not there, we have no way to punish Serbian misconduct. We need to make a public change to the rules of engagement. If diplomatic efforts result in mutual recognition [redacted]  
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4d  
Need to make up weapon collection points and it has hurt that we never dismantled weapons. It is painful to watch Serbs get weapons out and then watch Serbs uses them to shell civilian targets.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I'm worried that if we concentrate UNPROFOR that Serbs may see this as opportunity to attack eastern enclaves. Bosnians say they can defend the, but we don't think they can.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I don't want to make them vulnerable and therefore we

should change rules of engagement...

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: Since we were in Russia have I talked to you since then. Well, I spoke with Yeltsin for about three hours and got better feel for Yeltsin's situation. He is in danger domestically because he does not want to look weak...If we can give him an avenue to show progress and show positive role Russian troops are having maintaining peace. May be we can have Russians man heavy weapons site. If we can do this it will help further the cause. Believes the need to keep ultranationalist at bay and worried about Western support.

Prime Minister Major: I was sitting with Kohl and trying to get Yeltsin to understand. Heard there were three hostages being held and one had been beaten up. I had side bet with Kohl that that one beaten up was Canadian and not the Russia. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: If Russians will do their job.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I think we need to look closer...Bosnians may not like it. What best fits Yeltsin?

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: The Bosnians begin to feel good and they launch offensives...they forget about they artillery and then get the crap kicked out of them. We have urged restrain. They may have different view of Russian role. I haven't really thought it through and it hinges on if Milosevic recognizes Bosnia.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I can't confirm/deny that, Chirac did not raise whole issue. Pleased he didn't want to withdraw.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I'll be here over the weekend if you need to speak with me further.

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye.

President Clinton: Good-bye.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 10 June 95 13:25  
 FROM Drew, Samuel N.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Major Memcon Draft-~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
 TO Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CARBON\_COPY Drew, Samuel N.  
 Gardner, Anthony  
 Marshall, Betty A.  
 Maxfield, Nancy H.  
 Schmidt, John R.  
 Stephens, Kathleen D.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-11 05/26/11 KDF

TEXT\_BODY  
 In case you wanted the file:  
 [[ MAJORMC.DOC : 3395 in MAJORMC.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 10 June 95 13:24  
 ATTACHMENT FILE NAME MAJORMC.DOC

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Clinton's call with British Prime Minister Major.

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez and Nelson Drew.

DATE/TIME: 27 May 1995, 1550-1609

President Clinton: John, Hello.

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. I thought the conference went quite well.

President Clinton: I Hope your people were pleased. They can play this up. The speech I gave was well-received. Adams complained a little bit. I really hit them hard.

Prime Minister Major: It was an extremely good speech. I thought it all went well, save for the Unionists who were a bit silly, but they did recover quickly.

President Clinton: I keep hoping the parties see huge peace dividends...

Prime Minister Major: If we can persuade them on decommissioning, I think we have a better chance now. We have had over 90 days without incident and it looks like they may be serious. Every day is like money in the bag.

President Clinton: Is any of this helping you domestically? Are your people recognizing what's been done?

Prime Minister Major: No not really, not a bit. For most people here, Ireland is just another island. They don't really care what happens elsewhere in the world.

President Clinton: I know how you feel. Most Americans could care less about foreign policy, about what is happening outside U.S. either. I guess since there is no longer a strategic threat people don't bother any more.

Prime Minister Major: I know how you feel. It is pretty much bead and butter politics...I guess that is the price we pay for winning the cold war.

President Clinton: People also see it as a burden.

I just got off the phone with President Chirac. I suppose you might have spoken with him too.

Prime Minister Major: No. I just talked to Juppe yesterday.

President Clinton: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Chirac said he spoke with Yeltsin today, and he thinks he's on board too.

[Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] The Russians are going to Belgrade, and may talk with the Bosnian Serbs.

Prime Minister Major: As I said, I talked with Juppe. This is fairly the same line that Juppe had, and I am amenable to this.

President Clinton: Do you agree?

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] We have a meeting here at Downing Street tomorrow, and it may clear what will happen. We need better follow-up strategy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: Yes. A pause...

Prime Minister Major: We need to take the advice of General Smith.

President Clinton: He is very capable, isn't he?.

Prime Minister Major: Yes he is. I had a talk with him. He won't panic. He'll do fine.

President Clinton: I think airstrikes worked well earlier. We can't give up. Although with UNPROFOR under strength and dispersed, they're sitting ducks. They need to be concentrated, and to have the capacity to defend themselves. If the threat is not there, we have no way to punish Serbian misconduct. We need to make a public change to the rules of engagement.

I'm not hung up on the sanctions issue, but I don't want Milosevic to sucker us and not go all the way. Diplomatic efforts must result in mutual recognition. [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] Yeltsin does too.

Another thing, we have to do something about the sham of the weapons collection points. It has hurt that we never dismantled weapons. It is painful to watch Serbs get weapons out and then watch Serbs uses them to shell civilian targets.

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I'm worried that if we concentrate UNPROFOR that the Serbs may see this as opportunity to attack eastern enclaves. The Bosnians say they can defend them, but we don't think they can.

Prime Minister Major: They have the numbers, but not the

capabilities. I'm personally not sure they can.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I don't want to make them vulnerable. That has to be part of the trade-off: we should tell them that we've changed the rules of engagement. We want them to see this.

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

President Clinton: Maybe there's some way we could make more unique use of the Russian troops. Since we were in Russia, have I talked to you since then? Well, I spoke with Yeltsin for about three hours and got better feel for Yeltsin's situation. he sees both opportunities and danger. It's complicated by the situation in Chechnya. He is in danger domestically so he does not want to look weak...If we can give him an avenue to show progress, and show a positive role the Russian troops are having maintaining peace. He could be seen as getting a pause in the bombing, and getting a role for the Russian troops that's strategically significant. Maybe we can have the Russians man heavy weapons sites. If we can do this it will help further the cause. That's just off the top of my head. It's not vetted with any of my staff. But Yeltsin believes he needs to keep the ultranationalists at bay. He doesn't want to lose the capacity to reform, and he's worried about Western support.

Prime Minister Major: I was sitting with Kohl yesterday and trying to get Yeltsin on the phone. We heard on TV there were three hostages being held and one had been beaten up. I had side bet with Kohl that that one beaten up was Canadian and not the Russian.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: If Russians will do their job.

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Smith and

the others will have to make the judgment.

President Clinton: I think we need to look closer. Sandy Berger has just handed me a note, and he says Bosnians may not like giving a strategic role to the Russians.

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: The Bosnians begin to feel good and they get confident and launch offensives. They forget about their artillery and then go out and get the crap kicked out of them. They forget the larger strategic concept. We will continue to urge them to exercise restraint. They may have a different view of a Russian role if we back it with confidence. I haven't really thought it through, and it hinges on if Milosevic recognizes Bosnia.

Prime Minister Major: I have a point regarding Chirac.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: I didn't explore that, Chirac did not raise the whole issue. I was pleased he didn't want to withdraw. I think we all understand that if there is no UN there, all hell breaks loose.

Prime Minister Major: I agree. EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
We'll have our meeting here, and I'll have my people call Tony Lake. Our Ministers will meet on Monday, first just the four, and then with the Russians, and then at NATO.

President Clinton: I'll be here over the weekend if you need to speak with me further.

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye.

President Clinton: Good-bye.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom of May 27, 1995

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major  
Notetaker: Nelson Drew, Deuce Martinez, Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1995, 3:50 - 4:09 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: John, Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. I thought the conference went quite well. (U)

The President: The Irish conference -- yes. I hope your people were pleased. They can play this up. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I just spoke to Paddy Mayhew, who is in Virginia with his feet up in a bar. (U)

The President: This was the first meeting with representatives of all the political parties. The speech I gave was well-received. Adams complained a little bit. I really hit them hard. (U)

Prime Minister Major: It was an extremely good speech. I thought it all went well, save for the Unionists who were a bit silly in the way they behaved. That often happens, but they recover quickly. (U)

The President: I keep hoping that the Irish-Americans -- who were so excited -- and all the parties will see a huge peace dividend if they push farther and help you. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I think we have a better chance for peace than we ever had if we can persuade them to start decommissioning. Then we'll really be in business. (U)

The President: I agree. (U)

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Prime Minister Major: We have had the cease-fire for over 9 months without incident, and it looks like they may be serious. Every day is like money in the bank. (C)

The President: Is any of this giving you a boost at home? Are your people recognizing what's been done? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Not a bit. For most people here, Ireland is just another island. They don't really care what happens elsewhere in the world. (C)

The President: I know how you feel. Most Americans could care less about foreign policy, about what is happening outside U.S. I guess it's a blessing that people don't believe their security is threatened. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I know how you feel. It is pretty much bread-and-butter politics. I guess that is one of the benefits of the end of the Cold War. (C)

The President: It's also one of the burdens, which brings me to Bosnia. I just got off the phone with President Chirac. He had some good ideas. I suppose you might have spoken with him too. (C)

Prime Minister Major: No. I haven't spoken with Chirac personally, but I talked to Juppe yesterday. (C)

The President:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] Chirac said he spoke with Yeltsin today, and he thinks he's on board too. (C)

[Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] ne told me Yeltsin had sent Kozyrev and Gracnev to Belgrade and that they may talk with the Bosnian Serbs. (C)

Prime Minister Major: As I said, I talked with Juppe. This is fairly the same line that Juppe had, and I am amenable to this. (C)

The President: Do you agree? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Basically. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] we have a meeting here at Downing Street tomorrow with our defense people and the Foreign Secretary, and it is pretty clear what will happen. We need a better follow-up strategy. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes, a "pause" is a better word. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We need to take the advice of General Smith. I spoke with him. He was calm and relaxed. (C)

The President: He is very capable, isn't he? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes he is. He won't panic. He'll do fine. (C)

The President: I think airstrikes worked well earlier. We can't give up on them. But with UNPROFOR under strength and dispersed, they're sitting ducks. Currently they have no threat of airstrikes and no means to defend themselves. They need to be concentrated and to have the capacity to defend themselves. We need to make a public change to the rules of engagement. We could then have a pause in the airstrikes. (C)

I'm not hung up on the sanctions issue, but I don't want Milosevic to sucker us into lifting sanctions, and then not go all the way. Diplomatic efforts must result in mutual recognition [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] Apparently, Yeltsin is prepared to reinforce. (C)

Another thing, we have to do something about the sham the Serbs have made of the weapons collection sites. It has hurt us that we never disabled the weapons. It is painful to watch Serbs come and take weapons out at will and shell civilian targets while our people watch. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I'm also worried that if we concentrate UNPROFOR, the Serbs may see this as a green light to take the eastern enclaves. The Bosnians say they can defend them, but we don't think they can. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They have the numbers, but not the capabilities. (C)

The President: It's the artillery threat, isn't it? (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: There is a trade-off: if we render UNPROFOR less vulnerable and we tell them that we've changed the rules of engagement, then we would want them to know that they are more vulnerable to airstrikes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Maybe there's some way we could make more unique use of the Russian troops. Since we were in Russia, have I talked to you since then? Well, I spoke with Yeltsin for about three hours and got better feel for Yeltsin's political situation. He sees both opportunities and danger. It's complicated by the situation in Chechnya. He is in danger domestically so he does not want to look weak. If we can all give him some role in solving the situation. He could be seen as getting a pause in the bombing, and at the same time finding a role for the Russian troops that would be strategically critical to maintaining peace. Maybe we can have the Russians man the heavy weapons sites to stop the Serbs from using the weapons. If we can do this, it will help further the cause. That's just off the top of my head. It's not vetted with any of my staff. But Yeltsin believes he needs to keep the ultranationalists at bay. He's shown his strength over Chechnya, but he is worried about losing the support of friends in the West and support for reform. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I was sitting with Kohl yesterday discussing the hostages and were trying to get Yeltsin on the

phone. We heard on TV there were three hostages being held and one had been beaten up. I had side bet with Kohl that that one beaten up was Canadian and not the Russian. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: ...if the Russians do their job fairly. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] Smith

and the others will have to make the judgment. (C)

The President: I think we should think about it. Sandy Berger has just handed me a note, and he says Bosnians may not be too keen about giving a strategic role to the Russians. We should think about how we can play psychologically on the interplay between the Russians and the Bosnian Serbs and how it would affect Yeltsin's political situation. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]

The President: The Bosnians begin to feel good, and they get confident and launch offensives. They forget about the artillery and then go out and get the crap kicked out of them. This is compounded by the fact that the weapons collection sites are a joke. They forget the larger strategic concept. We will continue to urge the Bosnians to exercise restraint. They may have different view of a Russian role if we back it with confidence. I haven't really thought it through. It could hinge on whether Milosevic recognizes Bosnia. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It's worth looking at. I have a point regarding Chirac. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I didn't explore that; Chirac did not raise whole issue. I was pleased he didn't want to withdraw. I think we all understand that if there is no UN there, all hell breaks loose. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

6

Prime Minister Major: I agree.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] We'll have our meeting here, and I'll have Rod Lyne call Tony Lake. Our Ministers will meet on Monday, first just the four, and then with the Russians, and then at NATO. (C)

The President: I'll be here over the weekend if you need to speak with me further. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6/12/95

4425

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

June 9, 1995

95 JUN 9 All : 57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Major

Purpose

To assure Prime Minister Major of your assistance in resolving the next immediate problems in Bosnia.

Background

Prime Minister Major, in his letter of June 8, outlines his approach to "three immediate key issues" for Bosnia: obtaining unconditional release of the remaining hostages while avoiding overplay of the issue in public; securing access for relief convoys to the UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves; and seeking a renewed agreement on cessation of hostilities for Bosnia as a necessary condition for progress toward a negotiated settlement and the retention of UNPROFOR.

The attached letter offers support for Prime Minister Major's approaches. It also informs him of initiatives already undertaken in this regard through Bob Frasure's negotiations with Milosevic and notes we used the opportunity of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic's visit to Washington to press for a renewed cessation of hostilities agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message to Prime Minister Major.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
05/26/11 KDE

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM HALL LAKE SIT

SIT: COQ GRAY HOTLINE\_OUT LAKEA SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121608Z JUN 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
DS126116 KDE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 8 LETTER ON BOSNIA. THE RETURN OF OUR F-16 PILOT, CAPTAIN O'GRADY, WAS INDEED A RARE BIT OF GOOD NEWS. HIS COURAGE AND SKILL IN STAYING ONE STEP AHEAD OF THE SERB SEARCH PARTIES FOR SIX DAYS WERE TRULY REMARKABLE.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERNS ON THE THREE SHORT-TERM ISSUES RAISED IN YOUR LETTER, AND I AGREE WITH THE APPROACH YOU RECOMMEND. WE HAVE CONVEYED MESSAGES SIMILAR TO THOSE YOU HAVE ASKED BORIS YELTSIN TO DELIVER TO MILOSEVIC THROUGH BOB FRASURE.

DESPITE MILOSEVIC'S UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS FRASURE WAS CARRYING FROM THE CONTACT GROUP, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY HIS SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE. OUR HOPE IS THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SIMILAR RESULTS IN ENSURING PASSAGE OF RELIEF CONVOYS TO UNPROFOR UNITS IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. AT THE REQUEST OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WE INSTRUCTED FRASURE, IN HIS LAST MEETING PRIOR TO DEPARTING BELGRADE, TO IMPRESS UPON MILOSEVIC THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. MILOSEVIC UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE SUCCEEDS IN FACILITATING THE RESUPPLY OF THE ENCLAVES WILL BE READ AS A MEASURE OF HIS INFLUENCE OVER PALE IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE MET WITH BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC ON FRIDAY, JUNE 9, AND HE URGED HIM TO WORK TOWARD A RENEWED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. LIKE YOU, I AM CONVINCED THAT ONLY

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THROUGH CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CAN WE HOPE TO BRING THIS TRAGEDY TO A CLOSE. I BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR IS ESSENTIAL IN THIS REGARD, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE TO MAKE THAT PRESENCE POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, CONVINCING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AS THE STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE KEY TO SECURING AN ENDURING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. TOWARD THIS END, I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS MILOSEVIC TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA ON THE TERMS PUT FORWARD BY THE CONTACT GROUP AS A MEANS OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT PEACE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING OUR EFFORTS PERSONALLY WHEN WE MEET IN HALIFAX.

SINCERELY,

BILL

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
JOHN MAJOR, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6243

NNNN  
<MSGID> M1712534

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Talking Points for a Pull-Aside in Halifax with  
British Prime Minister John Major

Purpose

Proposed talking points to be used in pull-aside with PM Major in  
Halifax.

Background

Major will want to discuss developments in Bosnia. You may want  
to ask Major about his June 7 meeting in London with Kozyrev.  
Major will be interested in your latest thinking on timing and  
itinerary of your possible travel to the UK and Ireland later  
this year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
05/26/16 KDE

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING POINTS FOR HALIFAX PULL-ASIDE  
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
65120116 KDE

UK/Ireland Trip

- Appreciate your efforts to find mutually agreeable dates for trip before the end of year. If agreeable to you and the Irish, hope to announce soon dates and itinerary to include London, Belfast and Dublin.

(Only if Major offers:)

- Would be delighted if we could go to Belfast together.

Northern Ireland

- George Mitchell will make another trip later this month to follow up on Conference.
- Believe Gerry Adams understands IRA must do something on decommissioning. We will keep pushing. Do you see any signs of movement by Sinn Fein or loyalists? Important that political momentum be sustained.

Bosnia

- We are committed to supporting efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR to reduce its vulnerability and enhance its ability to fulfill its mandate, including provision of equipment and intelligence support for Rapid Reaction Force.
- But important that RRF be accompanied by tougher UNPROFOR stance on the ground, rather than return to business as usual. Otherwise, impossible to avoid withdrawal.
- Real key to resolving Bosnian conflict lies in our diplomatic efforts.
- Despite lack of progress during Frasure's most recent talks, still should work on Milosevic to increase isolation of Pale Serbs and pressure them to accept Contact Group plan.
- Must hold firm to our position that sanctions suspension, not lifting, can occur upon Milosevic's acceptance of mutual recognition package and tightening border controls.

Russia/NATO


- Key now is to get Russians to work to develop NATO-Russian relationship. As discussions begin in Brussels, need to urge active Russian participation and real give-and-take.

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- On NATO enlargement, need to give Yeltsin same message: process will be gradual, transparent. No surprises, no acceleration, but no slowing.

Transatlantic Initiatives

- I discussed our ideas for strengthening transatlantic relations with Chirac and Santer earlier this week.
  - Favor developing ways to further liberalize trade relationship, in step-by-step "building block" manner, and identifying additional areas for U.S.-EU common action.
  - Strengthening support for CEE countries should be focal point of new transatlantic initiatives.
  - Want to discuss in more detail with you and EU in coming months. Hope we can launch a new initiative at time of next U.S.-EU Summit.
- 

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

UK  
Prime Minister John Major  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME: June 16, 1995, 11:30 - 11:40 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Summit Place, Halifax, Canada

The President: I'm looking forward to my trip to Britain in the fall. I'm sorry we had problems with the original dates we proposed for late September. That will be the end of the fiscal year. We may be having difficulties with the Congress about the next year's budget, so I can't be out of the country at that time. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I thought you were the government! But I fully understand. Unfortunately, the later date you proposed [November 29] doesn't work for us. (U)

The President: Let's work it out. I would like to do it before the end of the year. (U)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I will work when I get back to get money from Congress for the Rapid Reaction Force. (U)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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2

Samuel Berger: Madeleine was responding, in part, to the British explanation of vote, which said that the language added to the resolution [that funding modalities would be determined later] was meaningless. She was trying to preserve our options. We need time to work this with the Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I understand. (C)

The President: Why do you think the Bosnian government launched this offensive? (C)

Prime Minister Major: You were right last night. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree that none of us should get involved in a combat role. On the Rapid Reaction Force, we will find a way to pay our share. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Your speech at the Irish Trade and Investment conference was perfect. It couldn't have been better if I had written it myself. It made a big difference. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] The danger is that the whole affair will grind to a standstill. Your visit could actually help: the fact you are coming could decrease the chances of violence. So the sooner we can fix dates the better. (C)

The President: What can I do to be helpful on Northern Ireland? (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Roderic Lyne: We have never said anything about a timetable. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Neither have we said that weapons must be given to us. What's important is that there be movement. (C)

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3

Roderic Lyne:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: On Russia, 'm not as pessimistic as Helmut Kohl was last night about what would happen after Yeltsin. The sense I had during my trip was that while the political situation is still very uncertain, the underlying economic trends are looking better. (C)

Roderic Lyne: Yes. Privatization is now irreversible. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 17 June 95 12:03  
 FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Draft major Memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Clarke, Richard A.  
 Drew, Samuel N.  
 Marshall, Betty A.  
 Sheehan, Michael A.  
 Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526

2012-0801-11 0512/elle KDE

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

## TEXT\_BODY

Attached FYI. This is with Sandy Berger for corrections. He was notetaker,  
 not me.  
 Betty: please set this up as a package for Monday.

[[ MAJMEMCN.DOC : 3126 in MAJMEMCN.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE 17 June 95 11:58

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME MAJMEMCN.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime  
 Minister John Major in Halifax

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. UK  
 The President Prime Minister Major  
 Samuel Berger Roderic Lyne,  
 Deputy Assistant Private Secretary  
 to the President for Foreign Affairs  
 for National  
 Security Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

June 16, 1995, 11:30-11:40  
a.m.  
Summit Place, Halifax, Canada

The President: I'm looking forward to my trip to Britain in the fall. I'm sorry we had problems with the original dates we proposed for late September. That will be the end of the fiscal year. We will probably be having difficulties with the Congress about the next year's budget, so I can't be out of the country at that time. You know how our government works.

Prime Minister Major: I thought you were the government. But I understand. Unfortunately, the later date you proposed [November 29] doesn't work for us.

The President: Let's work it out. I would like to do it before the end of the year.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I will work when I get back to get money from Congress for the Rapid Reaction Force.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Samuel Berger: Madeleine was responding, in part, to the British explanation of vote, which said that the language added to the resolution [that funding modalities would be determined later] was

meaningless. She was trying to preserve our options. You need to give us time to work this with the Congress.

Prime Minister Major: I understand.

The President:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: What do you think they're trying to do?

Prime Minister Major: You were right last night.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree we should not get involved in a combat role. On the Rapid Reaction Force, we will find a way to pay our share.

Prime Minister Major: Your speech at the Irish Trade and Investment conference was perfect. It couldn't have been better if I had written it myself. It made a big difference.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The danger is that the whole affair will grind to a standstill. Your visit could actually help: the fact you are coming could decrease the chances of violence. So the sooner we can fix dates the better.

The President: What can I do to be helpful on Northern Ireland?

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Roderic Lyne: We never said anything about a timetable.

Prime Minister Major: Neither have we said that weapons must be given to us. What's important is that there be movement.

Roderic Lyne: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: On Russia, I'm not as pessimistic as Helmut Kohl was last night about what would happen if Yeltsin leaves. The sense I had during my trip was that the political situation is still very uncertain, but the underlying economic trends are looking better.

Roderic Lyne: Yes. Privatization is now irreversible.

-- End of Conversation --

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 June 95 11:44  
 FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED  
 SUBJECT Major Memcon [UNCLASSIFIED]  
 TO Bass, Peter E.  
 Cicio, Kristen K.  
 Emery, Mary C.  
 Hall, Wilma G.  
 Veit, Katherine M.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 051216116 KDE

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT\_BODY  
 Peter/Kris:  
 Does Sandy have any fixes to the attached (I passed draft in Halifax as well)?  
 [[ 4665MEMC.DOC : 2833 in 4665MEMC.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 19 June 95 10:38

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 4665MEMC.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 4665  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Declassify on: OADR  
  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs

UK  
Prime Minister John Major  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary for

Foreign  
Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

June 16, 1995, 11:30 - 11:40  
a.m.  
Summit Place, Halifax, Canada

The President: I'm looking forward to my trip to Britain in the fall. I'm sorry we had problems with the original dates we proposed for late September. That will be the end of the fiscal year. We will probably be having difficulties with the Congress about the next year's budget, so I can't be out of the country at that time. You know how our government works. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I thought you were the government. But I understand. Unfortunately, the later date you proposed [November 29] doesn't work for us. (U)

The President: Let's work it out. I would like to do it before the end of the year. (U)

Prime Minister Major: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I will work when I get back to get money from Congress for the Rapid Reaction Force. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Samuel Berger: Madeleine was responding, in part, to the British explanation of vote, which said that the language added to the resolution [that funding modalities would be determined later] was meaningless. She was trying to preserve our options. You need to give us time to work this with the Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I understand. (C)

The President: [Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
[Redacted]

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: What do you think they're trying to do? (C)

Prime Minister Major: You were right last night.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree we should not get involved in a combat role. On the Rapid Reaction Force, we will find a way to pay our share. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Your speech at the Irish Trade and Investment conference was perfect. It couldn't have been better if I had written it myself. It made a big difference.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The danger is that the whole affair will grind to a standstill. Your visit could actually help: the fact you are coming could decrease the chances of violence. So the sooner we can fix dates the better. (C)

The President: What can I do to be helpful on Northern Ireland? (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Roderic Lyne: We never said anything about a timetable. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Neither have we said that weapons must be given to us. What's important is that there be movement. (C)

Roderic Lyne:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: On Russia, I'm not as pessimistic as Helmut Kohl was last night about what would happen if Yeltsin leaves. The sense

I had during my trip was that the political situation is still very uncertain, but the underlying economic trends are looking better.  
(C)

Roderic Lyne: Yes. Privatization is now irreversible. (C)θ

-- End of Conversation --

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 July 95 21:06  
 FROM Sitroom  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Subject: [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~] Draft Memcon of Presidential Telcon with Major  
 TO Stephens, Kathleen D.  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2612-0781-11 05126116 KDE

White House Situation Room Memorandum of Conversation .  
 Subject: Presidential Telcon with British Prime Minister Major  
 Notetakers: Kevin Wooton, Brian Gates, and Mary Canty  
 Date and Time: 1926-1928 EDT, Tuesday, July 4, 1995

The President: Hello, John?

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill, good evening.

The President: Sorry to call you so late! I know you must be tired. I just wanted to call and congratulate you on winning the election.

Major: That's very kind of you. It has been a long few days.

The President: I hope it is all behind you. I know after all you went through, it must be good for you.

Major: Well, it was a risk [redacted]  
 [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Well, 90 percent of it is just hanging on and showing up.

Major: Yes. I know you understand.

The President: I'm happy for you.

Major: I appreciate your call and God bless.

The President: Tony Lake will call Rod Lyne tomorrow to set up dates for a trip.

Major: Great, yes, we're looking forward to that.

The President: One other thing, just to let you know, we laid low regarding the stirring and the recent events in Northern Ireland. I think they may have been connected to your election. Now, maybe we can get the peace process going. Hopefully, we can help reinvigorate the process. Well, once again, congratulations.

Major: I appreciate it. Thank you. Good night.

The President: Okay. Good night.

Major: Thanks. God bless.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telcon with British Prime Minister Major

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major

Notetakers: Kevin Wooton, Brian Gates, Mary Canty and Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 4, 1995, 1926-1928 EDT, Camp David

The President: Hello, John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill, good evening. (U)

The President: I'm so sorry to call you so late. I know you must be tired. I just wanted to call and congratulate you on winning the election. (U)

Prime Minister Major: That's very kind of you. It's been a long day -- a long few days. But things came out okay. (U)

The President: I hope it is all behind you, so that we can get back to work. I know after all you went through, it must be good that it's over. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Well, it was a risk. [redacted]

[redacted box containing text: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d]

The President: Well, 90 percent of it is just hanging on and showing up every day. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. We've both learned a lot about that. (U)

The President: I know you don't want to talk business right now, but I just wanted you to know how happy I am for you. (U)

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PER E. O. 13526  
2012-0801-14 05/26/16 KDE

Prime Minister Major: I appreciate your call and God bless. (U)

The President: Tony Lake will call Rod Lyne tomorrow to work out dates for my trip. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Great, yes, we're looking forward to that. The sooner we can announce dates, the better. (U)

The President: One other thing, just to let you know, I've tried to lay low in the last few days with the stirrings in Northern Ireland. I figured there must have been some connection with your election. Whatever we can do to reinvigorate the peace process let me know. We'll want to talk about this in the days ahead. (C)

Once again, congratulations. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I appreciate it. Many thanks for ringing. Good night. (U)

The President: Okay. Good night. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Thanks. God bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

- Calling about Bosnia situation after fall of Srebrenica.
- We need to regroup and devise strategy for making UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal: to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces of the four major powers.
- Jacques posed this as an either/or choice: large-scale intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pull out.
- I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw, but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after Srebrenica.
- We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we could get a better understanding of the proposal and its implications.
- Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky. They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with 1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.
- We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
- Understand he spoke to you earlier today. What is your interpretation of Chirac's proposal? Do you think he really wants to pull out if we don't agree?
- Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions. Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress.

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-11

05126116 KDE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL, CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

-----  
PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:141544Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1251

RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0006  
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 1616  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7190  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3874  
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 9074

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 009948

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL BK UK  
SUBJECT: HMG PAUSES TO REFLECT ON BOSNIA POLICY,  
REAFFIRMS VALUE OF UNPROFOR

REF: LONDON 9894

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS MARKED. OADR FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION.

2. ~~TS~~ SUMMARY: THE BRITISH ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA, INCLUDING DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE, DESPITE STRONG FRENCH PRESSURES TO DO SO. SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF ANY OPERATION TO REINFORCE ZEPA OR GORAZDE, BUT BELIEVE THAT OPENING UP OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WOULD BE FEASIBLE MILITARILY AND DESIRABLE IN POLICY TERMS. MEANWHILE, BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE REAFFIRMED THE BRITISH COMMITMENT TO REMAIN IN BOSNIA UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. END SUMMARY.

NO HASTY DECISIONS  
-----

3. ~~TS~~ SENIOR-LEVEL CONTACTS AT THE FCO, MOD AND OWNING STREET (CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE CHARLTON,

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OMAND, AND ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY FOR OVERSEAS AFFAIRS (OAKDEN) TOLD US JULY 14 THAT HMG WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANY QUICK DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN BOSNIA DESPITE STRONG PRESSURES FROM PARIS TO DO SO. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT A DEFINING MOMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON BOSNIA, BUT FOR THIS VERY REASON THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO TAKE A FEW DAYS TO LOOK QUIETLY AT THE OPTIONS BEFORE TAKING ANY DECISION. WE ARE TOLD THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP, TO INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE SECRETARIES) IS TO MEET SHORTLY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION.

4. (C) PART OF THIS RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SNAP DECISIONS STEMS FROM UNCERTAINTY IN WHITEHALL AS TO EXACTLY WHAT THE FRENCH ARE PROPOSING. WHAT EXACTLY DOES PRESIDENT CHIRAC HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPEAKS OF "LIMITED MILITARY ACTION TO PROTECT THE OTHER ENCLAVES?" AS NOTED SEPTTEL, PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WILL BE CALLING CHIRAC TODAY TO TRY TO CLARIFY FRENCH INTENTIONS.

PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY OPTIONS  
-----

5. (C) OUR CONTACTS STRESSED TO US THAT THERE ARE FEW VIABLE MILITARY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA. CHARLTON REAFFIRMED THE BRITISH VIEW THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO THINK THAT SREBRENICA COULD BE RETAKEN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE RRF. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN AIRBORNE DIVISION OR TWO, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE U.S. AS TO ZEPA, CHARLTON SAID THAT THE BRITISH WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT COULD BE HELD, EVEN WITH REINFORCEMENT IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, AGAINST A BOSNIAN SERB ATTACK. TO BE AT ALL EFFECTIVE, REINFORCEMENT WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. ATTACK HELICOPTERS. OMAND SAID THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD TAKE ZEPA TOMORROW IF THEY WANTED, ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTED THEY WOULD MOVE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WAS MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD PAUSE TO "DIGEST" SREBRENICA AND "BEHAVE" FOR A WHILE IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION. (OMAND NOTED THERE WERE SOME SIGNS OF THIS; THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE AT THE MOMENT BEING MORE COOPERATIVE ON SARAJEVO CONVOYS.)

6. (C) OMAND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN HMG FOR PULLING OUT OF GORAZDE, BUT EQUALLY MOD SAW NO POINT IN ENFORCING THE ENCLAVE. (OAKDEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT THE POLITICAL LEVEL HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISION YET ON THE ISSUE OF REINFORCEMENT OF GORAZDE.) THE BRITISH TROOPS WERE NOT THERE TO FIGHT. HE THOUGHT IT STILL UNCLEAR WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WOULD MOVE ON GORAZDE; SURELY THEY RECKONED THEY WOULD BE IN FOR A FIGHT, THE ASSUMPTION BEING THAT BOSNIAN FORCES, WHO WERE FAR MORE NUMEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN SREBRENICA, WOULD STAND RATHER THAN FLEE. EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, THE BOSNIAN SERBS COULD TAKE GORAZDE. WHEN ASKED HOW HMG WOULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REACT IF GORAZDE WERE ATTACKED, OMAND COUNTERED THAT THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. HIS ASSUMPTION, HOWEVER, WAS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD BE TOLD TO DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS AS BEST THEY COULD UNTIL IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE TOWN WAS LOST, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WOULD ACT MUCH AS THE DUTCH HAD IN SREBRENICA, FOCUSING ON HELPING REFUGEES.

7. ~~(S)~~ THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE FRENCH FOR

SOME TIME ABOUT SECURING OVERLAND ACCESS TO SARAJEVO, AND THEY REGARD THIS AS A MUCH MORE FEASIBLE MILITARY OPERATION THAN REINFORCING THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. CHARLTON SAID THAT THE MORE LOGICAL ROUTE WAS OVER MT. IGMAN; ALTHOUGH THE ROAD WAS POOR AND VULNERABLE TO BOSNIAN SERB ARTILLERY, IT RAN THROUGH GOB-HELD TERRITORY. TRYING TO PUSH THROUGH FROM KISLEYAK WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, IN THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE CROSSING A LARGE EXPANSE OF BOSNIAN SERB TERRITORY. CHARLTON THOUGHT THAT OPENING UP AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO SARAJEVO WAS CRUCIAL IF THE VIABILITY OF THE CITY WAS TO BE RESTORED. OMAND REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION TO US THAT GENERAL SMITH HAS AUTHORITY FROM HMG TO MOVE TO SECURE ACCESS TO SARAJEVO WHENEVER HE IS READY, USING EITHER ROUTE. HOWEVER, SMITH'S VIEW IS THAT NOW (I.E. THE NEXT FEW DAYS) IS NOT THE BEST TIME TO DO THIS, SINCE AT PRESENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE BEING MORE HELPFUL IN ALLOWING CONVOYS THROUGH TO THE CITY. MOREOVER, SMITH NEEDS THE RRF TO BOLSTER UNPROFOR POSITIONS ELSEWHERE.

FRANCO-BRITISH DIFFERENCES  
-----

8. ~~(S)~~ CHARLTON SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY ANY PERCEPTION OF SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARIS AND LONDON OVER BOSNIA. ANY DIFFERENCES THERE MIGHT BE WERE MATTERS OF STYLE RATHER THAN POLICY. IT WAS NOT THE BRITISH CUSTOM, HE NOTED, TO LAUNCH INITIATIVES WITHOUT CAREFULLY THINKING THROUGH WHETHER THEY WERE FEASIBLE. NOR WAS LONDON IN THE HABIT OF GOING AROUND THREATENING TO WITHDRAW BRITISH TROOPS. THIS SAID, CHARLTON ACKNOWLEDGED A FAIR DEGREE OF IRRITATION IN LONDON OVER PRECIPITATE FRENCH RHETORIC, WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE SMOOTHED OUT IN TODAY'S PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR AND CHIRAC. SOMEWHAT IN CONTRAST, OMAND AND OAKDEN ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES, WITH BOTH EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER FRENCH PRESSURE FOR SOME MILITARY ACTION SUCH AS DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND AT GORAZDE. OAKDEN NOTED THAT THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACEMAKING OPERATION.

SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED UNPROFOR PRESENCE

-----  
9. (U) MEANWHILE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVE PUBLICLY REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO KEEP BRITISH TROOPS IN BOSNIA UNLESS CONDITIONS DETERIORATE SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER. SPEAKING TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS JULY 13, MAJOR SAID:

-- "IF UNPROFOR WITHDREW WE WOULD CERTINLY PUT AT RISK THE PEACE WHICH REMAINS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS. WE MIGHT PUT AT RISK THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES THAT HAVE BEEN SAVED AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS."

-- "ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY I FELT IT RIGHT TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE AND WHY I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO REMOVE THEM UNLESS IT BECAME IMPERATIVE TO DO SO, IS THE DANGER OF A WIDER BALKANS WAR. I CONCEDE THE SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND I HAVE SAID TO THIS HOUSE BEFORE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR UN TROOPS TO REMAIN."

-- "BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARISE, I BELIEVE IT IS RIGHT FOR THEM TO DO SO AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE WAY THEY HAVE THUS FAR."

10. (U) SEPARATELY, FOREIGN SECRETARY RIFKIND TOLD THE PRESS THAT BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN BOSNIA IF IT WAS FELT THAT THEY COULD STILL CARRY OUT THE UNPROFOR MANDATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE RISK. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIM POPULATION IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, WHERE BRITISH AND OTHER TROOPS CONTINUED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION SUCCESSFULLY.

11. ~~(C)~~ BOTH OMAND AND CHARLTON CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE GENERAL MOOD AMONG MINISTERS WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF STAYING IN BOSNIA.

12. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

CROWE  
BT  
#9948

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT., BELL, CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

-----  
PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:141622Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO:

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1260  
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUSNAAA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN AB GE PRIORITY  
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 1619  
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0009  
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 9077  
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 009960

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL UK FR BK  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S TELCON WITH MAJOR: PM LIKELY TO  
PROPOSE BOSNIA CONFERENCE

REF: LONDON 9894

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. A CONTACT AT NUMBER TEN ADVISES THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR IS LIKELY TO PROPOSE AN EARLY MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING ON BOSNIA (REFTEL) DURING HIS TELCON WITH THE PRESIDENT LATER TODAY. MAJOR IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERING A MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF CONTACT GROUP AND TROOP CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LONDON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JULY 17. THE MEETING MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY A SESSION, A DAY OR TWO EARLIER, OF SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS.
3. THE BACKDROP TO THE PROSPECTIVE MEETING IS BRITISH CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF ALLIED COHESION AGAINST A DANGEROUS, FAST CHANGING SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE BRITISH OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING WITH A CONSENSUS ON A WAY FORWARD, INCLUDING ON MILITARY OPERATIONS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ONTACT GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES FIND THEIR WAY BACK TO A COMMON APPROACH.

4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE FRENCH ARE TELLING LONDON THAT THE U.S. IS RECEPTIVE TO PARIS' PROPOSAL OF "DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND" AT GORAZDE AND THAT WASHINGTON HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER LIFT AND CAS FOR THEIR FORCES. HE ADDED THAT HMG HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL, WHICH IT CONSIDERS A NON-VIABLE MILITARY OPERATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN TURNING UNPROFOR INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.

CROWE

BT

#9960

NNNN

<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN> 9960

<^TOR> 950714125133 M1764412

FROM:

SITREPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia and also Northern Ireland.

II. BACKGROUND

**Bosnia.** The British have argued that the UN should seek to reestablish the safe area at Srebrenica as a demilitarized zone, arguing that abandonment of the eastern enclaves would leave the UK and the UN "without a policy." But the British have not offered any specifics on how to achieve this, and they seem unwilling to follow Chirac's lead in retaking Srebrenica militarily. In any case, the ongoing expulsion of the civilian population by Bosnian Serb forces may quickly render the idea moot.

You should probe Major's thinking on what action, if any, should be taken at Srebrenica. More important, however, is to gauge British readiness to support strong action by UNPROFOR in other areas to reassert its authority and halt the Bosnian Serbs' pattern of aggressive actions. In our view, the two priorities are to use the Rapid Reaction Force to establish secure access to Sarajevo, and to prepare to use the RRF to help protect Gorazde, the most important of the three eastern enclaves and the one where the Bosnian Government has substantial forces. The British have 300 peacekeepers in Gorazde who, London has stressed, are not capable of defending the enclave on their own.

**Northern Ireland.** The peace process in Northern Ireland is stalled by an impasse between the British and Sinn Fein/IRA over decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons. The British government is insisting that decommissioning at least begin before all-party political talks get underway; Gerry Adams says the IRA will not turn over weapons until a

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political settlement is reached. Ambassadors Crowe and Smith have pressed him on this to no avail. With the first anniversary of the IRA cease-fire six weeks away, Adams is warning that unless talks begin, the "patience" of the IRA could run out and violence begin again. The British decision to release a British Army soldier convicted of murder from prison after only four years sparked calls for relaxation of rules governing release of paramilitary prisoners. You should explore Major's thinking on how to restart the peace process.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Bosnia

- Fall of Srebrenica and a new round of ethnic cleansing presents us with new and dangerous situation in Bosnia.
- Dutch performed valiantly in trying to block overwhelming Serb assault and deserve our thanks. They have shown under fire why they are trusted and valued allies.
- In wake of Srebrenica, we must regroup and devise a strategy for making UN presence work, so that we can halt pattern of Serb aggressiveness and avert a UN withdrawal.
- I know you have called for reestablishing the safe area at Srebrenica, but do you think that is still feasible? What is your latest thinking?
- Most important place where UNPROFOR must demonstrate its effectiveness is Sarajevo. We should support French efforts to open the Mount Igman route, using the RRF as necessary, to prevent Serbs from strangling the Capital.
- All indications are that next Serb assault will be on Zepa, followed by an attempt to grab and cleanse Gorazde.
- We believe it is important to hold Gorazde. If we do not, Serbs will feel they have carte blanche to move against Sarajevo.
- What do your men on the ground in Gorazde feel are the chances of the Bosnians successfully defending the enclave? What sort of help would they need to do so? Would RRF make a difference if deployed to back up your small peacekeeping detachment?
- I want to stay in close touch over coming days as we try to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean a devastating setback for NATO and the UN, and a humanitarian disaster of large proportions. It will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift legislation in the Congress.

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
05/26/16 K0E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Northern Ireland

- Turning to Northern Ireland, I was pleased to hear that the marches on July 12 went off relatively calmly. The next big date is the anniversary of the cease-fire on August 31.
- Senator Mitchell passed on to me your request that I make a public statement saying I look forward to visiting a peaceful Northern Ireland in the fall. I will be happy to do so before the cease-fire anniversary, perhaps in a press interview.
- I noted press reports that your government is considering legislation to allow earlier release of imprisoned paramilitaries. Are they accurate? Is this imminent?
- The problem now seems to be decommissioning of weapons.
- We have pressed Gerry Adams for progress on decommissioning, and will continue to do so, but I don't think he will get IRA to actually turn in weapons before talks. I do think it is important that talks get moving.
- Has there been any progress in the talks between your government and the Irish government to develop an agreed model for decommissioning, as a way to break the logjam?

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 13:46  
FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.  
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT Add-on to Major Telcon Package ~~[SECRET]~~  
TO Baker, Jane E.  
Darby, Melanie B.  
Dohse, Fred J.  
Gray, Wendy  
Harmon, Joyce A.  
Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Sens, Andrew D.

CARBON\_COPY Bass, Peter E.  
Cicio, Kristen K.  
Drew, Samuel N.  
Emery, Mary C.  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Veit, Katherine M.

TEXT\_BODY Please add this to the package. Sandy Berger has cleared over the phone.  
[[ 5361ADD.DOC : 3352 in 5361ADD.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 14 July 95 13:45

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 5361ADD.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
5361 add-on  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADD-ON TO  
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Background: Major has decided to invite Foreign Ministers, Defense

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PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-14  
05126116 KDE

Ministers and Chiefs of Defense of troop-contributing nations to a meeting in London next Friday to discuss options for UNPROFOR, as well as diplomatic and humanitarian issues. This may be an effort to slow things down and provide time for the UK to try to steer the French toward less robust options.

We have no problem with the idea of the meeting, but believe serious decisions will need to be taken well before next Friday. The more important event may be the meeting of Chiefs of Defense slated to take place over the weekend.

Talking Points:

- Proposal for a Foreign and Defense Ministers' meeting is a good one.
- We may not have luxury of waiting a full week to make decisions, however, given fast-moving situation on ground and political pressures for action in wake of Srebrenica.
- Hope that Chiefs of Defense meeting this weekend will help in arriving at common approach to Sarajevo and Gorazde.

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DATE: TBD  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: TBD

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia and also Northern Ireland.

II. BACKGROUND

**Bosnia.** The British seem prepared to go along with efforts to regroup UNPROFOR in defensible areas, concentrating on central Bosnia and perhaps Gorazde, but see problems in Chirac's insistence on retaking Srebrenica militarily. Major had not spoken with Chirac on Thursday, but probably will have done so by the time you speak with him Friday.

You should probe Major's thinking on how to deflect Chirac from his ultimatum on retaking Srebrenica or withdrawing from UNPROFOR. The key will be finding a common approach on a strategy that enables UNPROFOR to act in a more robust manner that will salvage French pride while steering away from Chirac's choices. You will need to press Major on British readiness to support strong action by UNPROFOR in other areas to reassert its authority and halt the Bosnian Serbs' pattern of aggressive actions.

In our view, the two priorities are to use the Rapid Reaction Force to establish secure access to Sarajevo and to prepare to use the RRF to help protect Gorazde, the most important of the three eastern enclaves and the one where the Bosnian Government has substantial forces. There is some British reluctance on both points: they see the use of force to open the Mt. Igman route -- especially in advance of the full RRF being operational -- as "grandstanding;" and view the key to retaining Gorazde as the willingness of the Bosnian government to defend the city, not the 300 British troops there. The British may be hesitant even to reinforce Gorazde (a proposal advanced Thursday by Admiral Lanxade).

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Northern Ireland. The peace process in Northern Ireland is stalled by an impasse between the British and Sinn Fein/IRA over decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons. The British government is insisting that decommissioning at least begin before all-party political talks get underway; Gerry Adams says the IRA will not turn over weapons until a political settlement is reached. Ambassadors Crowe and Smith have pressed him on this to no avail. With the first anniversary of the IRA cease-fire six weeks away, Adams is warning that unless talks begin, the "patience" of the IRA could run out and violence begin again. The British decision to release a British Army soldier convicted of murder from prison after only four years sparked calls for relaxation of rules governing release of paramilitary prisoners. You should explore Major's thinking on how to restart the peace process.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Bosnia

- Calling about Bosnia situation after fall of Srebrenica. Would also like to say a word about Northern Ireland.
- As Tony Lake told Rod Lyne, Jacques Chirac called yesterday with a radical proposal: that the four major powers deploy ground forces to retake Srebrenica militarily.
- Jacques posed this as an either/or choice: large-scale intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pull out.
- Told Jacques we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw, but we need to bolster its credibility after Srebrenica.
- Said I wasn't sure about his idea. Even if we retook Srebrenica, what would we do next? Defend it forever?
- Spoke to Helmut Kohl, who pointed out other problems such as Dutch opposition and difficulty in obtaining UNSC approval.
- Jacques and I agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow to get a better understanding of the proposal and its implications.
- Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade last night, learned that French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky.
- They are focusing on second option -- reinforcement of Gorazde, possibly with 1000 French peacekeepers -- as well as opening Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo using RRF.
- We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
- Tricky question for us is Lanxade's request that we provide helicopters to airlift French troops into Gorazde. Very high-risk proposition.
- *↓ understand you spoke earlier today with Chirac*  
~~Have you spoken today with Chirac?~~ Did he make same pitch about retaking Srebrenica? Do you think he really wants to pull out if we don't agree? How can we steer discussion toward a more realistic yet robust approach.

(After Major response)

- Believe it's very important to hold Gorazde. If we don't, Serbs will have carte blanche to move against Sarajevo.

- Recognize that Bosnian readiness to defend Gorazde is the key, but reinforced UNPROFOR presence as proposed by Lanxade could help deter Serbs by raising costs of offensive.
- What do your people on ground feel are chances of Bosnians successfully defending Gorazde? Do you think additional peacekeepers from RRF would make difference?
- Should also support French plans to use RRF to open Mt. Igman route. Can't let Serbs strangle capital.
- Aim should be common approach we can take back to Jacques: a strategy that can demonstrate UNPROFOR's resolve and show its ability to deal firmly with Serbs.
- Unless we succeed, will make it hard to avoid UNPROFOR withdrawal, and almost impossible to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress. (Working to defeat Dole; will veto if necessary.)

Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a united strategy.

#### Northern Ireland

- A word on Northern Ireland. Pleased to hear marches July 12 went off relatively calmly. Next big date is anniversary of cease-fire on August 31.
- Senator Mitchell passed to me your request that I make public statement saying I look forward to visiting peaceful Northern Ireland. Happy to do so before cease-fire anniversary, perhaps in press interview.
- Noted press reports your government is considering legislation to allow earlier release of imprisoned paramilitaries. Are they accurate? Is this imminent?
- Problem now seems to be decommissioning of weapons.
- We have pressed Gerry Adams for progress on decommissioning, and will continue to do so, but I don't think he will get IRA to actually turn in weapons before talks.
- Has there been progress in talks between your government and Irish government to develop agreed model for decommissioning as way to break logjam? Important to get talks moving.

ADD-ON TO  
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Background: Major has decided to invite Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Defense of troop-contributing nations to a meeting in London next Friday to discuss options for UNPROFOR, as well as diplomatic and humanitarian issues. This may be an effort to slow things down and provide time for the UK to try to steer the French toward less robust options.

We have no problem with the idea of the meeting, but believe serious decisions will need to be taken well before next Friday. The more important event may be the meeting of Chiefs of Defense slated to take place over the weekend.

Talking Points:

- Proposal for a Foreign and Defense Ministers' meeting is a good one.
- We may not have luxury of waiting a full week to make decisions, however, given fast-moving situation on ground and political pressures for action in wake of Srebrenica.
- Hope that Chiefs of Defense meeting this weekend will help in arriving at common approach to Sarajevo and Gorazde.

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2012-0801-M  
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
7-14-95 5361REDO

REVISED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 14, 95 JUL 14 P2:39

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DATE: July 14, 1995

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia and also Northern Ireland.

II. BACKGROUND

**Bosnia.** The British seem prepared to go along with efforts to regroup UNPROFOR in defensible areas, concentrating on central Bosnia and perhaps Gorazde but see major problems in Chirac's insistence on retaking Srebrenica militarily. Major had not spoken with Chirac on Thursday but probably will have done so by the time you speak with him Friday.

You should probe Major's thinking on how to deflect Chirac from his ultimatum on retaking Srebrenica or withdrawing from UNPROFOR. The key will be finding a common approach that enables UNPROFOR to act in a more robust manner sufficient to salvage French pride, while steering away from Chirac's choices. You will need to press Major on British readiness to support strong action by UNPROFOR in other areas to reassert its authority and halt the Bosnian Serbs' pattern of aggressive actions.

In our view, the two priorities are to use the Rapid Reaction Force to establish secure access to Sarajevo and to prepare to use the RRF to help protect Gorazde, the most important of the three eastern enclaves and the one where the Bosnian Government has substantial forces. There is some British reluctance on both points: they see the use of force to open the Mt. Igman route -- especially in advance of the full RRF being operational -- as "grandstanding"; and view the key to retaining Gorazde as the willingness of the Bosnian government to defend the city, not the 300 British troops there. The British may be hesitant even to reinforce Gorazde (a proposal advanced Thursday by Admiral Lanxade).

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2012-0801-M  
05/26/16 KDE

Major has decided to invite Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Defense of troop-contributing nations to a meeting in London next Friday to discuss options for UNPROFOR, as well as diplomatic and humanitarian issues. This may be an effort to slow things down and provide time for the UK to try to steer the French toward less robust options.

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**Northern Ireland.** The peace process in Northern Ireland is stalled by an impasse between the British and Sinn Fein/IRA over decommissioning of paramilitaries' weapons. The British government is insisting that decommissioning at least begin before all-party political talks get underway; Gerry Adams says the IRA will not turn over weapons until a political settlement is reached. Ambassadors Crowe and Smith have pressed him on this to no avail. With the first anniversary of the IRA cease-fire six weeks away, Adams is warning that unless talks begin, the "patience" of the IRA could run out and violence begin again.

The British decision to release a British Army soldier convicted of murder from prison after only four years sparked calls for relaxation of rules governing release of paramilitary prisoners. There have been press leaks suggesting that Major may soon take a step in this direction. You should explore Major's thinking on how to restart the peace process.

**UK Buys American.** The UK announced yesterday they plan to buy American Apache rather than European helicopters, a deal worth almost \$4 billion, along with Tomahawk cruise missiles worth \$140 million. We credit new Defense Secretary Portillo, a Euro-skeptic, with the decision, but recommend you thank Major for buying American.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Prime Minister Major

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment  
Tab A Points to be Made

7-14-95

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Bosnia

- Calling about Bosnia situation after fall of Srebrenica. Also like to say word about Northern Ireland.
- As Tony Lake told Rod Lyne, Jacques Chirac called yesterday with radical proposal: that four major powers deploy ground forces to retake Srebrenica militarily.
- ( Jacques posed this as either or choice: large-scale intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pull out.
- Told Jacques UNPROFOR should not withdraw, but we need to bolster its credibility after Srebrenica.

Said I wasn't sure about his idea. Even if we retook Srebrenica, what would we do next? Defend it forever?

Like to Helmut Kohl, who pointed out other problems such as patch opposition and difficulty in obtaining UNSC approval.

- Jacques and I agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow to get better understanding of proposal and its implications.
- Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade last night, learned French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky.
- They are focusing on second option -- reinforcement of Gorazde, possibly with 1,000 French peacekeepers -- as well as opening Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo using RRF.
- Believe this is more realistic approach: to reestablish UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
- Tricky question for us is Lanxade's request we provide helicopters to airlift French troops into Gorazde. Very high-risk proposition. We are considering.
- Have you spoken today with Chirac? Did he make same pitch about retaking Srebrenica? Do you think he really wants to pull out if we don't agree? How can we steer discussion toward more realistic yet robust approach.
- Agree with your proposal for a Foreign and Defense Ministers' meeting.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 Quit Boon  
 in 1991  
 clearing  
 Lyne  
 150,000 km

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- We may not have luxury of waiting full week to make decisions, however, given fast-moving situation on ground and political pressures for action in wake of Srebrenica.
- Hope Chiefs of Defense meeting this weekend will help in arriving at common approach to Sarajevo and Gorazde.

(After Major response)

- ✓ -- Believe it's very important to hold Gorazde. If we don't, Serbs will have carte blanche to move against Sarajevo.
- Recognize Bosnian readiness to defend Gorazde is key, but reinforced UNPROFOR presence proposed by Lanxade could help deter Serbs by raising costs of offensive.
- What do your people on ground feel are chances of Bosnians successfully defending Gorazde? Do you think additional peacekeepers from RRF would make difference?
- Should also support plans to use RRF to open Mt. Igman route. Can't let Serbs strangle capital.
- Aim should be common approach we can take back to Jacques: strategy that demonstrates UNPROFOR's resolve and shows its ability to deal firmly with Serbs.
- Unless we succeed, will make it hard to avoid UNPROFOR withdrawal and almost impossible to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress. (Working to defeat Dole; will veto if necessary.)
- Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so we avoid rift with France and come up with united strategy.

#### Northern Ireland

- ✓ -- Word on Northern Ireland. Pleased to hear marches July 12 went off relatively calmly. Next big date is anniversary of cease-fire on August 31.
- \* ✓ -- Senator Mitchell passed to me your request that I make public statement saying I look forward to visiting "peaceful Northern Ireland." Happy to do so before cease-fire anniversary, perhaps in press interview.
- Noted press reports your government is considering legislation to allow earlier release of imprisoned paramilitaries. Are they accurate? Is this imminent?
- Problem now seems to be decommissioning of weapons.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Pressed Gerry Adams for progress on decommissioning, and will continue to do so, but don't think he will get IRA to actually turn in weapons before talks.
- Has there been progress in talks between your government and Irish government to develop agreed model for decommissioning as way to break logjam? Important to get talks moving.

Apache Purchase

- Pleased with decision to purchase Apache helicopter and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Your armed forces will be happy with both, as ours are. Decision to subcontract Hellfire missiles to Shorts of Belfast is good way to create jobs there.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

Bosnia

- Fall of Srebrenica and new round of ethnic cleansing presents us with new and dangerous situation in Bosnia.
- Dutch performed valiantly in trying to block overwhelming Serb assault and deserve our thanks. Showed under fire why they are trusted and valued allies.
- In wake of Srebrenica, we must regroup and devise strategy for making UN presence work, so we halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Know you have called for reestablishing safe area at Srebrenica. [ Jacques Chirac just called to propose retaking it militarily ] Do you think that is feasible? What is your latest thinking?
- In our view, more practical for UNPROFOR to demonstrate its resolve in other areas.
- Most important place is Sarajevo. We should support French efforts to open Mount Igman route, using RRF as necessary, to prevent Serbs from strangling capital.
- Believe it also important to hold Gorazde. If we do not, Serbs will feel they have carte blanche to move against Sarajevo.
- What do your men on the ground in Gorazde feel are chances of Bosnians successfully defending the enclave? What sort of help would they need? Would RRF make difference if deployed to back up your small peacekeeping detachment?
- Want to stay in close touch over coming days as we try to devise strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions. Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress.

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Northern Ireland

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- Senator Mitchell passed to me your request that I make public statement saying I look forward to visiting "peaceful Northern Ireland." Happy to do so before cease-fire anniversary, perhaps in press interview.
- Noted press reports your government is considering legislation to allow earlier release of imprisoned paramilitaries. Are they accurate? Is this imminent?
- Problem now seems to be decommissioning of weapons.
- " We have pressed Gerry Adams for progress on decommissioning, and will continue to do so, but I don't think he will get IRA to actually turn in weapons before talks. Think it important talks get moving.
- Has there been any progress in talks between your government and Irish government to develop agreed model for decommissioning, as way to break logjam?

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 19:46  
 FROM Sigler, Ralph  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Major Telcon ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~  
 TO Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 0512/elle vdf

Gary - Attached is our final "draft" of the 14 July Major-Clinton call. Procedurally, we now send this to the staffer who went to the oval office and they turn into a final.

[[ MAJOR14.DOC : 4957 in MAJOR14.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 14 July 95 19:43

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME MAJOR14.DOC

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR OF GREAT BRITAIN

DATE: JULY 14, 1995  
 TIME: 1539-1608 EDT  
 PLACE: THE OVAL OFFICE

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, John?

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted]

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that.

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Gorazde won't go down quickly. There are 5,000 government troops and 12,000-14,000 Serbs. [redacted]

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We don't want to do anything militarily stupid. We have to have an understanding. If there is a consensus on this issue, there must be [redacted]

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EO 13526 1.4d

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lost Srebrenica. They will have to decide what the hell they want!

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: They're wrong.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: ?????

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: When is the vote?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time around.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: There are two relevant facts ignored: The casualty rate has decreased because of contributions made by UNPROFOR. The average TV viewer sees it as bad or worse as it was 1992.

EO 13526 1.4d Those safe areas were always in Serb danger.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the lifting of arms embargo will pass by overriding my veto. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic have been lobbying Congress.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. What they see is Muslims being split by sexes, ethnic cleansing on TV which helps support the lifting of the embargo move. They see the UN failure and believe we should give the Muslims guns. They are telling Congress that if they had guns they would be kicking the crap out of them. But if the French and British leave, the American public is not willing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. They are just kicking the can down the

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you  
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PRESIDENT CLINTON: I do not understand it. They have spent 12 million on  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Yes.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: How worried should I be about the violence in northern Ireland?

I was urged by Senator Mitchell to make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted]

McCartney, is the newly elected independent leader.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

There has been no progress over

decommissioning issues. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. 31 August is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton. Your visit in November is vital.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be available.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You probably know by now we have invited ministerial missions to London next week to discuss Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes, I will talk to them about going.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we

look at the military options.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: By the way, thanks for buying the Apaches.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh, yes...Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have no regrets about it.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK then, we'll be in touch.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Good-bye. God bless.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK. Good-bye.

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 17 July 95 08:49  
 FROM Peters, Mary A.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT FW: Major memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Baldwin, Kenneth  
 Bass, Peter E.  
 Canty, Mary T.  
 Crispell, Thomas G.  
 Dragone, Karen D.  
 Flessas, Daniel  
 Gates, Brian K.  
 Gerstner, Christina L.  
 Glinski, David  
 Guekel, Kathi A.  
 Hamilton, Roy A.  
 Harmon, Joyce A.  
 Harrison, Lyle M.  
 Hofmann, Stephen D.  
 Marmol, Madelyn P.  
 Martinez, Alejandro  
 Stefan T. Mauzy  
 Miller, Matthew E.  
 Niemerski, Stephen  
 O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 Reade, Evan G.  
 Realuyo, Celina B.  
 Sevigny, Theodore T.  
 Sigler, Ralph  
 Turner, Joe T.  
 Unrue, Michael M.  
 Wallack, Matthew D.  
 Weber, Paul A.  
 Wooton, Kevin B.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0821-14 0512/elle KDE

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT\_BODY

From: O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 To: Drew, S. Nelson; Peters, Mary A.; Wooton, Kevin B.  
 CC: /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: Major memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Date: Friday, July 14, 1995 06:34 PM

[[ MAJ14.DOC : 2073 in MAJ14.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE

14 July 95 22:33

ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME

MAJ14.DOC

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT  
CLINTON  
AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR OF GREAT BRITAIN

DATE: JULY 14, 1995  
TIME: 1539-1608 EDT  
PLACE: THE OVAL OFFICE

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, John?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Hi Bill. It has been an interesting day. We just had a three  
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Bosnia, and I had a livelier conversation than usual with Chirac. The situation looks awful. Backtracking  
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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: He wants to reinforce Gorazde and Sarajevo and retake Srebrenica.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We have to do that on Sarajevo. Helmut said that any of these military actions besides defending Gorazde would require UNSC approval. I hadn't thought about it.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: As a peacekeeping mission it would have to be a loose interpretation of the mission.

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Sorry, God knows what happened there

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We were talking about the French point of view and the status of things. What is your thinking about it?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Regarding Gorazde. France wants to reinforce it

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: Lanxade asked for helicopters. They would be sitting ducks with out taking out their ability to shoot them down.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

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These are the hard problems we'll have to face. Our defense minister is going to Bosnia this week end to see what has to be done.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We must stay in close touch.. UNPROFOR seemed like the best of all bad alternatives.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: No shred of doubt that it was right. The whole of central Bosnia is at

peace. UNPROFOR has saved 150,000 lives. That's not a negligible contribution by UNPROFOR.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: ...

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have been in touch with my military commanders. They were all here in Washington for a military conference, except for Joulwan, who stayed behind in Europe. Actually, Admiral Boorda, EUCOM commander, who was in charge of the whole Bosnia thing before Joulwan, is here in Washington. Yesterday we went over it in great detail. I called Colin Powell too. He said if you change the nature of the mission and decide to fight, you have to win. You must be willing to take casualties, inflict casualties and use air power which may hurt civilians if you think it is a sustainable strategy in the long run and are prepared to enter war on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. I was moved when 3,000 Bosnian government troops left Srebrenica without fighting, you cannot blame the Dutch position.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame.

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You and I have pressures that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that.

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EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted]


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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Good-bye. God bless.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK. Good-bye.

# MS Mail

DATE-TIME 17 July 95 17:17  
 FROM Peters, Mary A.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT FW: Major Memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 05126116 KDE

Here is the revised memcon incorporating Nelson Drew's and my changes. However, before you go to final, I would like to compare notes on the exchange on Northern Ireland since I have some sentence fragments I cannot decipher.

From: Drew, S. Nelson  
 To: Peters, Mary A.  
 CC: /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: Major Memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Date: Saturday, July 15, 1995 08:22 PM

[[ JUL14MAJ.DOC : 4369 in JUL14MAJ.DOC ]]

With my additions/fixes. I wish I had more confidence in my notes!

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 17 July 95 17:11

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME JUL14MAJ.DOC

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: He seems to have shifted off that somewhat now.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Now he wants to reinforce Gorazde.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Yes. He wants to reinforce Gorazde, retake  
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PRESIDENT CLINTON: We have to do that on Sarajevo anyway. Helmut said  
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hadn't  
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He seemed to think so, at least.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: They're on a peacekeeping mission. It would have  
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LINE DROPPED AND REESTABLISHED

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Sorry, God knows what happened there

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We were talking about the French point of view and  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Regarding General Franchet de Pelelle...

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR:

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: Lanxade asked for helicopters to support it, but they  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Thank you, Bill.

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I don't have a shred of doubt that it was right. Let's not forget that the whole of central Bosnia is at peace. There is no ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia. UNPROFOR has saved 150,000 lives. That's not a negligible contribution by UNPROFOR, it's a contribution well worth having.

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame at all.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I don't know who said it. but they do it all the time [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'm just going let it go. Look, I think it is very important if possible to hold Gorazde. If it falls, Sarajevo will be more vulnerable. It is psychologically and strategically more important. We have to look at other options. Serbia says they are not cooperating, but they have more sophisticated equipment now to shoot our planes down.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Gorazde won't go down quickly. But there are 5,000 governmen t troops who won't hold out long against 12,000-14 000 Serbs

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'm open to provide help, but we don't want to do anything milit arily stupid. We have to have an understanding. We can't just kick the can down the road. If the re is a consensus on this issue, there must be an understanding with the Bosnians.

1.4d

1.4d

They do not want UNPROFOR to leave but at the same they have this idea to urge the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo here. They are telling the Congress that that is the only reason that they lost Srebrenica, because they have no heavy equipment.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: They're wrong.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Before we make any decisions, they will have to decide what they want!

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: When is the vote?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time

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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: There are two relevant facts ignored: The casualty rate  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. But they are  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I see. Let me check the timetable. The Senate votes  
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PRESIDENT CLINTON: The vote can be done in a few days and the override  
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PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you

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PRESIDENT CLINTON: I do not understand it. They have now spent 12 million on the investigation of a land deal I lost \$40,000 on and a \$20,000 campaign contribution. Every report says that neither I nor Hillary did anything wrong.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Yes.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: How worried should I be about the violence in Northern Ireland?  
Senator

Mitchell passed on your request that I make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland. I will do it before the cease-fire anniversary.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: There are problems on both sides. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d [redacted] In the by- ele

ction, McCartney, is the newly elected independent. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d [redacted] There has been no progress on decommissioning. We

are in contact and trying to stitch a way forward. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. 31 August is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton and discussions continue. Your visit in November is vital [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d [redacted]

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be avail

able.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You probably know by now we have decided to call a conference at the ministerial level next week in London next week to discuss Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend. We need to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes, I will talk to them about going.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we look at the military options.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: By the way, thank you for your decision to buy the Apaches.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh, yes. That did not add to my conversation with Chirac. Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have not a shred of regret about it.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK then, we'll be in touch.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Good-bye. God bless.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK. Good-bye.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major  
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Nelson Drew,  
Katherine O'Loughlin, Celina Realuyo, Lyle  
Harrison and Kenneth Baldwin

DATE, TIME July 14, 1995, 3:39 - 4:08p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. It has been an interesting day. We just had a three-hour meeting on Bosnia and I had a livelier conversation than usual with Chirac. In our assessment, the situation looks awful. Backtracking a little bit -

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] They are presently attacking Zepa as we speak, and it is one or two days before Zepa falls. The next question is whether they will move down the eastern enclaves from Zepa to Gorazde. We judge they will, but before mounting a proper attack in Gorazde, they will have to regroup and will need at least four to five days. We have some pretty experienced people inside at Gorazde, and they tell us they probably will attack in 4 to 5 days. We expect the Bosnian government forces will defend it. We have 3-400 of our Royal Welsh fusiliers there. The question is what to do militarily and politically? I think you spoke with Chirac? (C)

The President: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: He seems to have shifted off that somewhat now. (C)

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The President: Now he wants to reinforce Gorazde. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. He wants to reinforce Gorazde, retake Srebrenica and reinforce Sarajevo as well. (C)

The President: We have to do that on Sarajevo anyway. Helmut said that any of these military actions, besides defending Sarajevo or Goradze, would require UNSC action. I hadn't thought about it. He seemed to think so, at least. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're on a peacekeeping mission. It would have to require a fairly loose interpretation of self defense. As far as Chirac is concerned... (C)

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Prime Minister Major: Sorry, God knows what happened there. (U)

The President: We were talking about the French point of view and the status of things. What is your thinking about it? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Regarding Gorazde, France wants to reinforce it.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d, 1.4d

[Redacted] we must examine the military reality to see if it's practical. We expect our Chief of the Defense Staff, General Shalikashvili and Admiral Lanxade to meet over the weekend. (C)

The President: Lanxade asked for helicopters to support it, but they would be sitting ducks without taking out their, the Serbs, ability to shoot them down. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Thank you. Bill.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] These are the hard problems we'll have to face. Our defense minister is going to Bosnia this weekend to work out what has to be done. (C)

The President: We must stay in close touch. You know, at the time UNPROFOR seemed like the best of all the bad alternatives. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I don't have a shred of doubt that it was right. Let's not forget that the whole of central Bosnia is at peace. There is no ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia. UNPROFOR has saved 150,000 lives. That's not a negligible contribution by UNPROFOR, it's a contribution well worth having. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I have been in touch with my military commanders. They were all here in Washington for a military conference, except for Joulwan, who stayed behind in Europe. Actually, Admiral Boorda, EUCOM commander, who was in charge of the whole Bosnia thing before Joulwan, is here in Washington. And General Shalikashvili was there before Joulwan. Yesterday we went over it in great detail. I called Colin Powell too, to make sure of a balanced view. He said if you change the nature of the mission and decide to fight, screwing around is not an option. You must be willing to take casualties, inflict casualties and use air power, which may hurt civilians. You must decide if you think it is a sustainable strategy in the long run and are prepared to enter the war on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. I was moved by the report that 3,000 Bosnian government troops left Srebrenica without fighting -- how can you blame the Dutch? (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame at all. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I don't know who said it, but they do it all the time. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that. (C)

The President: I'm just going let it go. Look, I think it is very important, if possible, to hold Gorazde. If it falls, Sarajevo will be more vulnerable. It is psychologically and strategically more important. We have to look at other options. Serbia says they are not cooperating, but they have more sophisticated equipment now to shoot our planes down. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Gorazde won't go down quickly. But there are 5,000 government troops who won't hold out long against 12,000-14,000 Serbs. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I'm open to provide help, but we don't want to do anything militarily stupid. We have to have an understanding. We can't just kick the can down the road. If there is a consensus on this issue, there must be an understanding with the Bosnians. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d They do not want UNPROFOR to leave but at the same they have this [redacted] 1.4d idea to urge the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo here. They are telling the Congress that that is the only reason that they lost Srebrenica, because they have no heavy equipment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're wrong. (C)

The President: Before we make any decisions, they will have to decide what they want! (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is the vote? (C)

The President: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time around; unless I can figure out some alternative (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh. (U)

The President: There are two relevant facts that are ignored: the casualty rate has gone way down and central Bosnia is at peace because of contributions made by UNPROFOR. The average TV viewer sees it. He thinks it's as bad or worse than it was in 1992. [redacted] 1.4d Those safe areas were always there at the sufferance of the Serbs, particularly when the Serbs started taking hostages. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the lifting of arms embargo will pass by overriding my veto. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic have been lobbying Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. But they are in a dream world over there. What they see is Muslims being split by sexes, ethnic cleansing on TV which they think is just as bad as in '92. There's no telling them it's different. It all helps support the lifting of the embargo movement. They see the UN failure and believe we should give the Muslims guns. They are telling Congress that if they had guns they would be kicking the crap out of them. But if the French and British leave, the American public is not willing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. They are just kicking the can down the road. No one likes to appear weak but we are at step 10 now, not step 2. I wouldn't be alarmed by that or condition our conduct on it but if it looks like there is a certain resolve and clarity of explanation it would help me to moderate a firestorm. We'll have to act together. It will help. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I see. Let me check the timetable. The Senate votes next week, then the House. The lift wouldn't take effect until September? (C)

The President: The vote can be done in a few days and the override vote a few days after that. They can set an effective time sometime later, or even immediately. They might set a date soon, because of their perception that the UN is routed. The perception is that the U.S. is on the side of the Government and the problem is that UNPROFOR has no mandate to enter into war. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have a pretty full report of your problems. (C)

The President: I am not hung up about vetoing it. This issue and a domestic one have me in a fun house. All the press is one way and facts are irrelevant. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I am very familiar with that. (U)

The President: Our citizens have good motives. Compassion and neo-isolationism are leading to support for lifting the arms embargo. They don't want our soldiers there, but they badmouth the UN and want to give them arms. I just want you to know what is going on. The press is playing on popular emotions in the most irresponsible way. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I understand. (U)

The President: There is a possibility it'll happen quicker than you suggest. It could be the law of our country. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you about the Whitewater stuff. I'm sorry it keeps coming up. You don't need that sort of rubbish. (U)

The President: I do not understand it. They have now spent \$12 million on the investigation of a land deal I lost \$40,000 on and a \$20,000 campaign contribution. Every report says that neither I nor Hillary did anything wrong. (U)

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The President: How worried should I be about the violence in Northern Ireland? Senator Mitchell passed on your request that I make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland. I will do it before the cease-fire anniversary. (U)

Prime Minister Major: There are problems on both sides. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] In the by-election, McCartney is the newly elected independent. [redacted]

[redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d

There has been no progress on decommissioning. We are in contact and trying to stitch a way forward. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching the 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. August 31 is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton and discussions continue. Your visit in November is vital [redacted]

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The President: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be available. (C)

Prime Minister Major: You probably know by now we have decided to call a conference at the ministerial level next week in London to discuss the Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend. We need to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there. (C)

The President: Yes, I will talk to them about going. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we look at the military options. (C)

The President: By the way, thank you for your decision to buy the Apaches. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh, yes. That did not add to my conversation with Chirac. Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have not a shred of regret about it. (C)

The President: OK then, we'll be in touch. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye. God bless. (U)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Prime Minister John Major  
 Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, Kenneth Baldwin, Alejandro Martinez and Andrew Kerr

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 19, 1995, 9:15 - 9:50 a.m.  
 Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello. Hey John, how are you? I just had a long talk with Chirac. (U)

Prime Minister Major: What kind of mood is he in today. (U)

The President: He was in a pretty tough mood today. You know, based on Secretary Christopher's conversation with Foreign Secretary Rifkind, exactly where we are going. I need to tell you of my conversation with Chirac. Let me start by saying I am convinced that the only way I can sustain the position we have taken is to work, support and cooperate with UNPROFOR and our allies to take some new action to save Gorazde. I think I can then sustain a veto of unilateral lift. (U)

Prime Minister Major: When is the vote? (U)

The President: The first vote could be tomorrow in the Senate. Then there's the vote in the House, then the reconciliation. They start rolling me tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Major: What is the veto-proof majority? (U)

The President: It is 67 Senate members and 290 some-odd House members. Here's the issue: whatever they pass will pass with a veto-proof majority, but some will fall off if they believe I have an alternative with any chance of working. The arguments

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are that it would Americanize the conflict. It would undermine support for other UN embargoes, on Iran, Iraq and Libya, which they like. We are being killed in the press. All the papers, not just in Washington and New York, but even the local paper in my hometown of Little Rock are saying "Why won't the Americans help us defend ourselves." The whole U.S. press is spinning like that. It appears that the UN cannot defend the Muslims and will not let them defend themselves. We have to do more so I can prevail here and also to try to reestablish the vigor we had in the spring of last year, when we established the safe areas and got the heavy weapons out and achieved diplomatic progress in the peace talks. (C)

Our plan here is to come up with a concentrated UN force and a disproportionate air threat. Proportional response does not work. Chirac is still pushing the idea of flying in 1,000 troops to join your guys. You are worried about retaliation against UK and other troops. I asked him during our conversation, if French troops go in and Serbs attack, would the French plan on shooting back? He said "yes, these will be real soldiers, not blue helmets." Mladic is a smart man, he will retaliate and take hostages if he can. If one U.S. helicopter is shot down, he agrees that we would have to retaliate. So, if that is the end game, why not get the same benefit by establishing the deterrent now? I asked him to work through it. Our common partnership, UN, NATO and the strength of the West, depend on us not showing up Friday without a common position among the UK, France and the U.S. I think Chretien will go along, and I can get the Ukraine to support us. Yeltsin will not like it, but he is not in any position to do anything else. We need to tell him to go back to their position in February 1994. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Exactly. I like Chirac because he is strong and smart and wants to do the right thing, but he is very French; he wants to make the grand gesture. He clearly hopes for psychological impact. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's the trouble, he is prepared to drive into their guns, which is brave, but where do you go when they fire? (C)

The President: [redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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Prime Minister Major: The reverse! (U)

The President: If we do take aggressive action, we could tip the balance against you. We have to hope the 9,000 Bosnians stay and fight. (C)

Prime Minister Major: On the issue of the 1,000 troops, I don't rule it out entirely, depending on what other decisions we take. Let's turn to Gorazde, where we have 300 Welsh fusiliers and 9,000 government troops who will probably fight, but lose. They may not fight at all like in Srebrenica. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree. Militarily, this proposal is not sound; it only makes sense for its psychological value or if you're looking for a pretext, if they shoot down a helicopter, to kick the crap out of them. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] Where we are coming from

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together is that something has to be done; it is not practical politics to do nothing. Something must be done and it will involve the threat of air power. If it has a chance of being effective, Mladic must believe we mean it.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

That's what I think. I hope you, Chirac and I can agree today or tomorrow in time to come up with a position for Friday. (G)

The President: You've thought it through well. Two things need to be done. I do not know the exact position of all the UNPROFOR troops and associated civilians. And I do not know how long it will take them to get into positions that are relatively immune. Secondly, I agree with your analysis that if we had to launch a major air campaign, it might be the end of the UNPROFOR mission. We have to calculate what that means. Can we get multilateral lift? Do we do a NATO lift if Russian blocks multilateral lift in the UN? Does a new international force come in or, do we take all international forces out? Also, depending on the results of the bombing, we must consider the situation under which it could

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bring about a cease-fire or meaningful movement in the peace process. If we are successful, UNPROFOR can stay without fear of hostages being taken; they can continue with humanitarian relief, resume air drops and open the Mt. Igman route. Time is running out on us. If bombing secures our position, we would still have only a few months to juice up the peace effort and reach an agreement. We need to see what we could do to change the dynamics of the process and hasten an agreement. I believe it's possible it would work like it did in 1994 when the safe areas were established. Those decisions bought us a few months. This assumes that you and others want to stay. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, we want to stay. (C)

The President: We still need a fast timeline for this effort or the Serbs will quickly bite us in the rear. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We also have to consider how they will react. They may react savagely or they may be smart. They may not attack but just leave Gorazde bottled up and attack Sarajevo. (C)

The President: Yes. Then we would have to pull out all the stops. If Sarajevo falls, it will be a disaster for all of us. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I think the French will ask if we are ready to add troops in Sarajevo. In principle, we would. We would replace someone else's battalion, because there is not billeting for another unit. We would replace less effective troops with more effective troops. We need cohesion. We need to look at land routes, both summer and winter. For example, in Sarajevo, Mt. Igman is not a winter route without a great deal of policing.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: They're very artful at that. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Bosnian Foreign Minister is in the U.S.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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The President: They never ask UNPROFOR to leave. They want it all -- the embargo lifted and UNPROFOR there to boot. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I doubt anyone has been keener to keep the UN there than me. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] Will the Congress accept contributing U.S. troops to get the UN out? (C)

The President: Yes. Even Dole has acknowledged that we have a moral duty to ensure the safe withdrawal of our allies. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: You and I think along the same lines. This may lead to the collapse of UNPROFOR, but it is better to go out with a bang than with a whimper; otherwise we go out with our tail between our legs. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I've had no discussion of the details of this, but if we make a bold military thrust, we should accompany it with a bold diplomatic initiative. We need to find out where Bildt is, whether there is any progress in his talks. Regarding the message to Mladic, I will talk to my people who understand his psychology and his way of operating. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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The President: There is a third option that would have to be done by NATO since Russia would veto a UN resolution. We could consider the use of NATO air power to stabilize the situation on the ground pending the development of some kind of equilibrium in artillery. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have thought of that, establishing some equilibrium with air power. I'm not sure how to justify it legally, although it is possible militarily. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: That is a difficult thing. The effort would have to be carefully circumscribed. The point to make to the Russians would be that they supported the Contact Group plan and the Serbs said no, ignored Russian wishes and screwed them. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] That might be what is at the end of the yellow brick road. (C)

The President: Yes, we know all of that. But the position we are in is untenable. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I agree. We have tended to look down the road too many times over the past 3-4 years and have crossed our fingers like Dickens' Mr. Micawber, hoping something good would come of it. But like Micawber's benefactor, nothing turned up. Still, we have done what we thought was right. (C)

The President: We bought a year with UNPROFOR in which no one was killed and peace might have been achieved. It wasn't, but it might have been. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have saved lives. Peace was achieved in central Bosnia. We have nothing to reproach ourselves about. I just want to do the right thing. We may go down this path, the end of which could lead in the direction I have been laying out. (C)

The President: We will work through all the short-term questions -- where the troops are and how long it will take to get them into safer positions; what to say to Mladic -- and the longer-term issues you have been talking about. I suggest we get back in touch in 24 hours. You, I and Chirac need to be together at this meeting on Friday. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: Absolutely. I'm committed to that. I will speak to the French today. (C)

The President: Your analysis of the military wrongheadedness of their proposal is the same as ours, including the potential for failure. I'm not sure it would do any good but it wouldn't make it much worse. And, if they shoot down one helicopter, the bombing starts. I don't want to rule it out. We can't afford to rule out some version of the French proposal. I have to go give an important speech. I'll be available to talk with you after that. Thank you, John. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We all have to give a little. I will talk to you tomorrow or later today. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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DATE-TIME 19 July 95 11:40  
 FROM O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Draft Chirac memcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Drew, Samuel N.  
 Peters, Mary A.  
 Saunders, Richard M.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY [[ CHIR19.DOC : 2887 in CHIR19.DOC ]]  
 ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 19 July 95 15:39  
 ATTACHMENT FILE NAME CHIR19.DOC

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 05/26/116 KDF

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

JULY 19, 1995

PRESIDENT CLINTON  
 FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

START TIME: 0820  
 FINISH TIME: 0900

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello. How are you?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Fine and you? Do you mind if we use an interpreter. It will be easier.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: That will be fine. I would like to talk about where we are here on the Bosnia question. I agree that the status quo is clearly no longer tolerable. You have done a tremendous service in rallying support for stronger action. I agree with you that we need to draw the line at Gorazde. The issue is finding the best way to do this militarily. Our military advisors feel strongly the most effective thing is to be able to bring air power to bear in a decisive manner and not in a tim

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lately. We propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs that any attack on  
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be met by a sustained air campaign that will actually cripple their military capabil  
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we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering. Of course, we  
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personnel from being taken hostage. Our planners believe the first targets would  
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Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery, radar and com  
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believe once air defenses are neutralized, we would be able to a mount a major  
air c  
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elsewhere.  
But to do this and  
make it work we need changes. The dual key could not apply in its current form.  
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affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual mis  
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ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary. We need a big  
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anything to UN forces. Now, I have talked to John Major and Warren Christopher  
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Rifkind last night urging the British to get on board with this. We will also need  
to get other Allies and  
Boutros Ghali on board with this. In addition to supporting an effective Bosnian  
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important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. I believe this should be t  
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mission for the RRF.

Now with regard to the suggestion you made last week regarding deploying 1,000  
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Gorazde. ....I believe that the primary threat to Gorazde is from artillery shells a  
nd adding troops might

increase deterrence but may create an increased problem of resupply and reinforcement. They also say that if we were to do it, we have to take pre-emptive suppression of air defenses of otherwise French troops and our helicopters will be sitting ducks and the likelihood that we will lose helicopters with your troops on board is quite strong. I agree with you that we cannot abandon Gorazde, but we must make certain we have what are the most effective means to take to defend it. I know in sending another 1,000 troops especially French troops it may have a psychological effect on the Serbs, but in sending in troops there is a high risk and it wouldn't change the threat because of the nature of Gorazde. Any rate we need to work together between now and Friday. We have to make sure that together we can sell it to Major. I think Kohl will go along if we get Major. We can't let this go on. It will mean disaster for Bosnia and the West if it happens. Let me make one more point. In two years, I have labored with this problem and the only thing that works is a clear and credible threat that the UN will let NATO take strong air action. It has always bought us time for the political process. It allowed the creation of the safe areas. It has worked. When the UN has moved away from this, the Serbs have taken advantage. I believe this will work if we stay behind it.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Bill, I understand your position, but it would be difficult to implement. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] In the minute we attack and we're not sure if they'll

be exact, they will retaliate by taking hostages or attacking with massive artillery [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me comment. With any solution, greater action carries a risk of greater danger. If we put 1,000 French troops in Gorazde and announce it, that also goes beyond the UN mandate and past what the British said they would do. It also runs the risk of hostage taking. If French troops are killed in the actual defense of Gorazde, I believe we would have to take retaliatory action. I agree with you if we carry out the plan for air power, we don't agree to withdraw UN troops but concentrate them in Gorazde, Sarajevo and Central Bosnia in places the Government controls.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Bill, the minute our troops move, the Serbs will understand the maneuver.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I understand there is practical error to it all. If we issue the threat, it amounts to the U.S. being willing to go to war with Serbia. If you go back to when we got the agreement to establish the safe areas and put all Serb heavy artillery in collection areas, this happened because we threatened heavy air retaliation by NATO and the Russians told the Serbs that they had to do this and get back to the negotiations. They thought that the air activity would be disproportionately not selectively calibrated to take out one or two guns. With regard to your proposal, it seems to me that if we work with you and deploy your forces and the Serbs shoot down one helicopter or if we redeploy forces and one of your soldiers is killed, even by distant shelling, that we have to take most effective retaliatory action which is in the air. We may have to do some in advance to create a security corridor for the helicopters. I'm afraid we will find ourselves in this situation regardless. Before, our UN and NATO allies agreed on two previous occasions that an air threat is the only way to save the UN mission without involving troops on the ground.

Let me say two other things and then I will listen. I want to reemphasize that there will not be war on the Serbs if they don't attack. There will be no air action if Gorazde is not hit and Sarajevo is not shelled. We simply will be reestablishing the safe areas that have eroded. I have also been handed a note that the British are prepared to keep their 300 troops in the area without withdrawing. Jacques, I have to give a speech today, but after that I will be working on this for the next 48 hours. You have the ability to put some drive in Allied support. We want something that works. We don't want to collapse the UN mission. Those in Congress who want to do so are wrong. In my experience over the past two years, this will work.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: O.K. I don't mind talking to the experts.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I have one question. Will Congress be on board to lift the embargo?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: They likely will lift it in some form. I will veto it and in the veto if and only if all of us are working on an alternate program with some chance of success. Otherwise I'm afraid if they voted today, they'd override the veto. They believe the UN failed and the embargo derives them the only chance to defend themselves. Let me ask two questions. Several months ago when the safe areas were worked out, the Serbs had artillery and they gave it up and I still believe Milosevic would like some relief from sanctions. If we put 1,000 French troops in Gorazde and the Serbs attack the city what will the French do? Will they retaliate?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Of course. Real soldiers will be sent.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If that happens, then you can argue that that is as much a change in the UN mission. Mladic is a smart man. If you repel him, he'll take action elsewhere. He will take Ukrainians or Canadians hostage. If we fly you in there and they take action, we both have to take action. Anything we do runs the risk they will take UN peacekeepers hostage. We have to protect Gorazde. Either course runs the risk of hostages. We have never in the past had to take extreme action when they really thought we had a comprehensive plan. We got the safe areas. We have to recreate these conditions. We only have a few months for the peace process. We can't keep doing this. We have to take positive

ve action.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: I understand. I am pretty sure that all of the people on the ground will ask to regroup before airstrikes and this will take time. Gorazde will be taken in 10 days then Sarajevo. We need time for this strategy. Let's ask our Chiefs of Staff.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I understand. I want to work on this with you. Ask your staff if there is a greater likelihood of hostage taking if air power is used as opposed to the chance hostages will be taken if the French fight back and kill a lot of Serbs. Mladic is very smart and will be elsewhere. If they shoot down a helicopter, we have to strike hard.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: There are also others - Canadians and Ukrainians.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I know. We have a close relationship with Ukraine I think. I can convince Yeltsin to go along.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: The last time Yeltsin went to Milosevic saying you can't do this to yourself or me, we have to protect these areas. I don't know whether he is in the position to do anything.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Let's get back in touch within 48 hours.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Maybe we should talk in 24 hours. We cannot afford to go to the London meeting and have it be a disaster.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: I agree, but we must get in touch with the others.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have talked to Chretien and Kohl, but not the Ukrainians, Dutch or Yeltsin. We must get close on an agreement.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Okay, thank you very much.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good-bye.

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 July 95 17:43  
 FROM Drew, Samuel N.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Chiric MemCon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526

2012-0801-M 05/26/16 KDE

Here is draft memcon with my notes included:

[[ CHIR19.DOC : 4440 in CHIR19.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE DATE 19 July 95 17:41

ATTACHMENT  
 FILE NAME CHIR19.DOC

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

JULY 19, 1995

PRESIDENT CLINTON  
 FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

START TIME: 0820  
 FINISH TIME: 0900

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Hello Bill.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello Jacque. How are you?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Fine and you? Do you mind if we use an interpreter. It will be easier.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: That will be fine. I would like to talk about where we are here on the Bosnia question. I agree with you that the status quo is clearly no longer tolerable. You have done tremendous service in rallying support in Europe for stronger action. I agree with you that we need to draw the line at Gorazde. The issue is how, finding the best way to do this militarily.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Our military advisors here feel strongly the best thing is to be able to bring air power to bear in a decisive manner and not in a timid way as has been done lately. We propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs that any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air campaign that will actually cripple their military capability. Now if we do this we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering. Of course, we should begin now, or soon, to reduce the exposure of UN personnel to keep them from being taken hostage. Our planners believe the first targets would have to be a full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery, radar and command centers. They also believe once air defenses are neutralized, we would be able to mount a major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo or any military targets elsewhere. But to do this and make it work we would have to have some changes. The dual key could not be maintained in its present form. Of course local ground commanders could retain a voice in the close air support issue and close-proximity airstrikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions. Also current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. We would have to have the ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, and that would be a big deterrent to them doing anything to UN forces. Now, I have talked to John Major yet, but Warren Christopher met with Rifkind last night urging the British to get on board with this. In order to get there, we will also need to get other Allies and Boutros Ghali on board with this.

In addition to supporting an effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, it is important

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Now with regard to the suggestion you made last week regarding deploying 1,000  
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Let me make one more point, and then I'd like to listen to you. In the two years I  
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the UN has moved away from this, the Serbs have taken advantage. I believe this  
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PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Bill, I understand your position, but it would be difficult  
to im  
plement [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] The minute we attack, and we're not sure if  
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I be exact, they will  
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[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Let me comment. First, with any solution, greater action carries a risk of greater danger. If we put 1,000 French troops in Gorazde and announce it, that also goes beyond the UN mandate and past what the British said they would do. It also runs the risk of hostage taking throughout the country. If French troops are killed in the actual defense of Gorazde, I believe we would have to take retaliatory action. I do not agree with you if we carry out the plan for air power, we have to withdraw UN troops, but concentrate them in Gorazde, Sarajevo and Central Bosnia in places the Government controls.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Bill, the minute our troops move, the Serbs will understand the maneuver. They will oppose.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I understand. But there is a practical error to it all. You said that if we issue the threat, it amounts to the U.S. being willing to go to war with Serbia. If you go back to when we got the agreement to establish the safe areas and put all Serb heavy artillery in collection areas, this happened only because two things happened at the same time: we threatened heavy air retaliation by NATO, and the Russians told the Serbs that they had to do this and get back to the negotiations. They thought that the air activity would be disproportionate, not selectively calibrated to take out one or two guns or a single tank here or there.

Let me say another thing with regard to your proposal. It seems to me that if we work with you and deploy your forces and the Serbs shoot down one helicopter or if we redeploy forces and one of your soldiers is killed, even by distant shelling, that we have to take most effective retaliatory action, which is

in the air. We may have to do some in advance to create a security corridor for the helicopters. I'm afraid we will find ourselves in this situation regardless. Before you became President, our UN and NATO allies agreed on two previous occasions that an air threat is the only way to save the UN mission without involving NATO troops on the ground in combat.

Let me say two other things and then I will listen. I want to reemphasize that there will not be war on the Serbs if they don't attack. There will be no air action if Gorazde is not hit and Sarajevo is not shelled. We simply will be reestablishing the weapons exclusion zones that have eroded. I have also been handed a note that the British are prepared to keep their 300 troops in Gorazde without withdrawing. Jacques, I have to give a speech today, but after that I will be working on this for the next 48 hours. Perhaps you would like to talk to your military people some more. We want something that works. We don't want to collapse the UN mission. Those in Congress who say otherwise are wrong. In my experience over the past two years, this will work. It is our best chance, particularly if coupled with a new diplomatic initiative along the lines you have already discussed with me.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: O.K. Well, I don't mind talking to the experts Bill, but

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I have one question. Do you think Congress can be deterred from lifting the embargo?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: They likely will vote to lift it in some form. I will veto it and believe I can sustain the veto, if, and only if, all of us are working on an alternate program with

th some chance of

success. Otherwise I'm afraid if they voted today, they'd override the veto. They believe the UN failed and the embargo denies them the only chance to defend themselves.

Let me ask two questions. First, several months ago when the safe areas were worked out for the first time, the Serbs had artillery and they gave it up; and I still believe Milosevic would like some relief from sanctions. If we put 1,000 French troops in Gorazde and the Serbs attack the city what will the French do? Will they retaliate?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Of course, naturally. These won't be "blue helmets." Real soldiers will be sent.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If that happens, then you can argue that that is as much a change in the UN mission. Mladic is a smart man. If you repel him, he'll take action elsewhere. He will take Ukrainians or Canadians hostage. If we fly you in there and they take action, shoot down a helicopter, we both have to take action. So anything we do runs the risk they will take UN peacekeepers hostage. We have to protect Gorazde. The question is the best way to do it. Either course runs the risk of hostages. We have never in the past had to take extreme action when they really thought we had a comprehensive plan. We got Gorazde, Srebrenica, the safe areas. Somehow, we have to recreate those conditions. We only have a few months for the peace process. We can't keep doing this for another three or four more years. We have to take positive action.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Yes, I understand. I am pretty sure that all of the people on the ground will ask to regroup before airstrikes and this will take time. Gorazde will be taken in 10 days then Sarajevo. We need time for this strategy. Let's ask our Chiefs of Staff.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I understand. I really want to work on this with you. Here's the question: Ask your staff if there is a greater likelihood of hostage taking if air power is used as opposed to the chance hostages will be taken if the French fight back and kill a lot of Serbs. Our expectation is that Mladic is very smart and will go elsewhere. If they shoot down a helicopter and kill Frenchmen, we have to strike hard.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: There are also others beyond us - Canadians and Ukrainians.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I know. There's a lot of work to do. We have to discuss it with Canada. We have a close relationship with Ukraine I think. I can convince Yeltsin to go along.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: The last time Yeltsin went to Milosevic saying you can't do this to yourself or me. He was helpful because he didn't want us to use force to protect these areas. We need to explore whether he is in the position to do anything.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Let's get back in touch within 48 hours.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Maybe we should talk in 24 hours. We cannot afford to go to the London meeting and have it be a disaster.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: I agree, but we must get in touch with the others.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have talked to Chretien and Kohl, but not the Ukrainians, Dutch or Yeltsin. You and I need to agree on a strategy, work together, and sell it to the others. We must get close on an agreement.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: Okay, thank you very much.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good-bye.

# M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 11:42  
 FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Major Telcon of July 19 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Bass, Peter E.  
 Cicio, Kristen K.  
 Emery, Mary C.  
 Hall, Wilma G.  
 Veit, Katherine M.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526  
 2012-0801-M 0512/116 KDE

CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT\_BODY  
 Sandy V asked me to send you the final version of the PM Major telcon of July 19. Here it is.  
 [[ 5606TEL.DOC : 2907 in 5606TEL.DOC ]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 20 July 95 11:39

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME  
 5606TEL.DOC  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 5606  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Declassify on: OADR  
  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister  
Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Prime Minister John Major  
 Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Katherine O'Loughlin, Kenneth Baldwin,  
 Alejandro Mar

tinez and Andrew Kerr

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

July 19, 1995, 9:15 - 9:50

a.m.

Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello. (U)

The President: Hello. Hey John, how are you? I just had a long talk with Chirac. (U)

Prime Minister Major: What kind of mood is he in today. (U)

The President: He was in a pretty tough mood today. You know, based on Secretary Christopher's conversation with Foreign Secretary Rifkind, exactly where we are going. I need to tell you of my conversation with Chirac. Let me start by saying I am convinced that the only way I can sustain the position we have taken is to work, support and cooperate with UNPROFOR and our allies to take some new action to save Gorazde. I think I can then sustain a veto of unilateral lift. (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is the vote? (U)

The President: The first vote could be tomorrow in the Senate. Then there's the vote in the House, then the reconciliation. They start rolling me tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Major: What is the veto-proof majority? (U)

The President: It is 67 Senate members and 290 some-odd House members. Here's the issue: whatever they pass will pass with a veto-proof majority, but some will fall off if they believe I have an alternative with any chance of working. The arguments are that it would Americanize the conflict. It would undermine support for other UN embargoes, on Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which they like. We are being killed in the press. All the papers, not just in Washington and New York, but even the local paper in my hometown of Little Rock are saying "Why won't the Americans help us defend ourselves." The whole U.S. press is spinning like that. It appears

that the UN cannot defend the Muslims and will not let them defend themselves? We have to do more so I can prevail here and also to try to reestablish the vigor we had in the spring of last year, when we established the safe areas and got the heavy weapons out and

achieved diplomatic progress in the peace talks. (C)

Our plan here is to come up with a concentrated UN force and a disproportionate air threat. Proportional response does not work. Chirac is still pushing the idea of flying in 1000 troops to join your guys. You are worried about retaliation against UK and other troops. I asked him during our conversation, if French troops go in and Serbs attack, would the French plan on shooting back? He said "yes, these will be real soldiers, not blue helmets." Mladic is a smart man, he will retaliate and take hostages if he can. If one U.S. helicopter is shot down, he agrees that we would have to retaliate. So if that is the end game, why not get the same benefit by establishing the deterrent now? I asked him to work through it. Our common partnership, UN, NATO and the strength of the West depend on us not showing up Friday without a common position among the UK, France and the U.S. I think Chretien will go along and I can get the Ukraine to support us. Yeltsin will not like it but he is not in any position to do anything else. We need to tell him to go back to their position in February 1994. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Exactly. I like Chirac because he is strong and smart, and wants to do the right thing, but he is very French; he wants to make the grand gesture. He clearly hopes for psychological impact. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's the trouble, he is prepared to drive into their guns, which is brave, but where do you go when they fire? (C)

The President: [REDACTED]


EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: The reverse! (U)

The President: If we do take aggressive action, we could tip the balance against you. We have to hope the 9000 Bosnians stay and fight. (C)

Prime Minister Major: On the issue of the 1000 troops, I don't rule it out entirely, depending on what other decisions we take. Let's turn to Gorazde, where we have 300 Welsh fusiliers and 9000 government troops who will probably fight, but lose. They may not fight at all like in Srebrenica. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d




EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree. Militarily this proposal is not sound; it only makes sense for its psychological value or if you're looking for a pretext, if they shoot down a helicopter, to kick the crap out of them. (C)


Prime Minister Major:



EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d



Where we are coming from together is that something has to be done; it is not practical politics to do nothing. Something must be done and it will involve the threat of air power. If it has a chance of being effective, Mladic must believe we mean it.



EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

That's what I think. I hope you, Chirac and I can agree today or tomorrow in time to come up with a position for Friday. (C)

The President: You've thought it through well. Two things need to be done. I do not know the exact position of all the UNPROFOR troops and associated civilians. And I do not know how long it will

take them to get into positions that are relatively immune. Secondly, I agree with your analysis that if we had to launch a major air campaign, it might be the end of the UNPROFOR mission. We have to calculate what that means. Can we get multilateral lift? Do we do a NATO lift if Russian blocks multilateral lift in the UN? Does a new international force come in or do we take all international forces out? Also, depending on the results of the bombing, we must consider the situation under which it could bring about a cease-fire or meaningful movement in the peace process. If we are successful, UNPROFOR can stay without fear of hostages being taken; they can continue with humanitarian relief, resume air drops and open the Mt. Igman route. Time is running out on us. If bombing secures our position, we would still have only a few months to juice up the peace effort and reach an agreement. We need to see what we could do to change the dynamics of the process and hasten an agreement. I believe it's possible it would work like it did in 1994 when the safe areas were established. Those decisions bought us a few months. This assumes that you and others want to stay. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, we want to stay. (C)

The President: We still need a fast timeline for this effort or the Serbs will quickly bite us in the rear. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We also have to consider how they will react. They may react savagely or they may be smart. They may not attack but just leave Gorazde bottled up and attack Sarajevo. (C)

The President: Yes. Then we would have to pull out all the stops. If Sarajevo falls it will be a disaster for all of us. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I think the French will ask if we are ready to add troops in Sarajevo. In principle we would. We would replace someone else's battalion, because there is not billeting for another unit. We would replace less effective troops with more effective troops. We need cohesion. We need to look at land routes, both summer and winter. For example, in Sarajevo, Mt. Igman is not a winter route without a great deal of policing

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: They're very artful at that. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Bosnian Foreign Minister is in the U.S.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: They never ask UNPROFOR to leave. They want it all -- the embargo lifted and UNPROFOR there to boot. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I doubt anyone has been keener to keep the UN there than me

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[Redacted] Will the Congress accept contributing U.S. troops to get the UN out? (C)

The President: Yes. Even Dole has acknowledged that we have a moral duty to ensure the safe withdrawal of our allies. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: You and I think along the same lines. This may lead to the collapse of UNPROFOR, but it is better to go out with a bang than with a whimper; otherwise we go out with our tail between our legs. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I've had no discussion of the details of this, but if we make a bold military thrust we should accompany it with a bold diplomatic initiative. We need to find out where Bildt is, whether there is any progress in his talks. Regarding the message to Mladic, I will talk to my people, who understand his psychology and his way of operating. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: There is a third option, that would have to be done by NATO since Russia would veto a UN resolution. We could consider the use of NATO air power to stabilize the situation on the ground pending the development of some kind of equilibrium in artillery. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have thought of that, establishing some equilibrium with air power. I'm not sure how to justify it legally, although it is possible militarily.

[Redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: That is a difficult thing. The effort would have to be carefully circumscribed. The point to make to the Russians would be that they supported the Contact Group plan and the Serbs said no, ignored Russian wishes, and screwed them. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] That might be what is at the end of the yellow brick road. (C)

The President: Yes, we know all of that. But the position we are in is untenable. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I agree. We have tended to look down the road too many times over the past 3-4 years and have crossed our fingers like Dickens' Mr. Micawber, hoping something good would come of it. But like Micawber's benefactor, nothing turned up. Still, we have done what we thought was right. (C)

The President: We bought a year with UNPROFOR in which no one was killed and peace might have been achieved. It wasn't but it might have been. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have saved lives. Peace was achieved in central Bosnia. We have nothing to reproach ourselves about. I just want to do the right thing. We may go down this path, the end of which could lead in the direction I have been laying out. (C)

The President: We will work through all the short-term questions -- where the troops are and how long it will take to get them into safer positions; what to say to Mladic -- and the longer-term issues you have been talking about. I suggest we get back in touch in 24 hours. You, I and Chirac need to be together at this meeting on Friday. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Absolutely. I'm committed to that. I will speak to the French today. (C)

The President: Your analysis of the military wrongheadedness of their proposal is the same as ours, including the potential for failure. I'm not sure it would do any good but it wouldn't make it much worse. And, if they shoot down one helicopter, the bombing starts. I don't want to rule it out. We can't afford to rule out some version of the French proposal. I have to go give an important speech. I'll be available to talk with you after that. Thank you, John. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We all have to give a little. I will talk

to you tomorrow or later today. (€)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen**

July 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Major on Bosnia

Purpose

To respond to Prime Minister Major's July 25 letter on Bosnia.

Background


John Major sent you a lengthy message earlier this week addressing a number of aspects of our Bosnia policy. He reaffirms UK readiness to follow through on the London decisions, but expresses concern that if air strikes occur and the Serbs escalate, UNPROFOR will have to withdraw. In that context, he seeks an "urgent assurance" that we will respond "automatically" to a UK request to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR.

Major also expresses skepticism about extending the NATO decision on Gorazde to Bihac and other safe areas. And he presses for early endorsement of Bildt's recognition/sanctions package.

Our proposed reply stresses the urgency of taking action to protect Bihac, adapting the Gorazde plans as necessary. It reaffirms your commitment to participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, while sidestepping the issue of automaticity (given the need to consult with Congress). It also expresses our readiness to work on the Bildt package while noting our key reservations about the text as it now stands.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission by the Situation Room.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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Attachments

Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major

Tab B Major's July 25 letter

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM DOHSE FUERTH HALL HARMON LAKE SENS SIT SODERBERG  
SIT: COQ GRAY HARMON HOTLINE\_OUT LAKEA SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW  
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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 291733Z JUL 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

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QQQQ

SECTION 1 OF 2

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM  
PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: BOSNIA - LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

DEAR JOHN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 ON BOSNIA. I BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN LAST WEEK IN LONDON -- AND REAFFIRMED THIS WEEK BY NATO -- ARE ESSENTIAL TO RESTORING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN MISSION IN BOSNIA. I BELIEVE I CAN SUSTAIN A VETO OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LIFT RESOLUTIONS, BUT ONLY IF WE AND THE OTHER ALLIES HOLD FIRM TO THE COURSE CHARTED IN LONDON AND SHOW WE WILL NOT STAND FOR FURTHER SERB AGGRESSION. I RESPECT THE FACT THAT YOU AND YOUR CABINET ARE PREPARED TO SEE THIS THROUGH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERY REAL RISKS INVOLVED. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS IN HELPING TO PERSUADE BOUTROSGHALI TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO THE UN MILITARY COMMANDERS, WHERE IT BELONGS.

SO FAR, OUR ULTIMATUM IS HAVING THE DESIRED EFFECT IN GORAZDE. THE BOSNIAN SERBS SEEM TO HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM LAUNCHING AN OFFENSIVE (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING), AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE HELPING PROVIDE THEM THE NECESSARY POLITICAL COVER. IN THIS REGARD, I HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION WITH BORIS YELTSIN ON FRIDAY. HE AGREED THAT RUSSIAN AND NATO EFFORTS WERE COMPLEMENTARY, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO MILITARY ACTION WOULD BECOME NECESSARY IF THE SERBS FAILED TO FULFILL THE PROMISES MADE TO ANDREY KOZYREV IN BELGRADE.

IN CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION IN GORAZDE, THE SITUATION IN

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PAGE 02 OF 04

BIHAC HAS CONTINUED TO WORSEN. CONFRONTED BY ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO DEFEND ONE SAFE AREA, THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTACKS ON ANOTHER, IN THIS CASE BACKED BY MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND KRAJINA SERB TROOPS AND ABDIC'S REBEL MUSLIM FORCES. WHILE THE SITUATION IS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX, AS YOU POINT OUT, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT NATO NEEDS TO BE READY TO TAKE ACTION TO EXTEND THE LONDON DECISION TO BIHAC AND TO THE OTHER SAFE AREAS. BEYOND TRYING TO SAVE THE LIVES OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN THE ENCLAVE, WE MUST SHOW THE SERBS THAT THE NEW DETERMINATION EXPRESSED IN LONDON WAS NOT LIMITED TO ONE SAFE AREA, WHICH THEY CAN THEN AVOID. OTHERWISE, OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE UN CREDIBILITY AND STABILIZE THE SITUATION WILL BE POINTLESS.

CROATIA'S INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON BIHAC ONLY ADDS TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. WE HAVE STRONGLY CAUTIONED PRESIDENT TUDJMAN ABOUT THE DANGER OF PRECIPITATING A WIDER CONFLICT, ONE THAT COULD LEAD TO INTERVENTION BY FORCES FROM SERBIA. BUT WE WILL HAVE A HARD TIME DISSUADING HIM FROM HIS PRESENT COURSE IF WE DO NOTHING TO BLUNT THE SERB OFFENSIVE IN BIHAC.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GORAZDE DECISION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO BIHAC IN MECHANICAL FASHION. THE MULTI-CORNERED NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE REGION WILL REQUIRE SOME ADAPTATIONS TO THE PLANS APPROVED BY THE NAC ON WEDNESDAY MORNING. BUT I AM SURE THAT, WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWO OF US, OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CAN COME UP WITH FEASIBLE OPTIONS FOR APPLYING NATO AIR POWER TO DETER AND RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING ENCLAVE. WE NEED TO SEND AN IMMEDIATE SIGNAL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVENT THE SEIZURE OF ANOTHER SAFE AREA BY TAKING A PROMPT DECISION IN THE NAC ON BIHAC. THIS MIGHT ALSO HAVE SOME SALUTARY EFFECT ON TUDJMAN'S CALCULATIONS.

I DO NOT SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO ALTER SERB BEHAVIOR AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IF THE SERBS TEST US AND WIDE-SCALE NATO AIR ATTACKS TAKE PLACE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD ESCALATE IN A FASHION THAT WOULD MAKE UNPROFOR'S PRESENCE UNTENABLE, AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LETTER. BUT IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE THAT, WITH THE SERBS HAVING FINALLY EXPERIENCED A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF NATO MILITARY POWER, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND COULD BECOME MORE STABLE.

IF THE WORST DOES OCCUR, HOWEVER, AND THE DECISION IS TAKEN THAT UNPROFOR MUST WITHDRAW, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I STAND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

BY MY COMMITMENT TO CONTRIBUTE U.S. FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO PROTECT THE WITHDRAWAL. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT A DECISION TO ASSIST OUR NATO ALLIES IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

FINALLY, LET ME RESPOND TO YOUR POINTS ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. I WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE THAT WE NEED TO REVITALIZE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE LONDON DECISIONS CAN PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED EFFORTS TO GET THE BOSNIAN PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CARL BILDT'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PACKAGE WITH MILOSEVIC THAT WOULD PROVIDE SANCTIONS RELIEF IN RETURN FOR ACTIONS THAT PUT REAL PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

I STILL HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE BILDT PACKAGE AS IT #6543

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 2

NOW STANDS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM STILL NOT SATISFIED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS IF MILOSEVIC DID NOT ABIDE BY HIS COMMITMENTS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE IDEA OF A FIVE-NATION REVIEW PANEL. MOREOVER, ALLOWING MILOSEVIC NINE MONTHS BEFORE WE COULD EVEN ATTEMPT TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS WOULD FORFEIT IMPORTANT LEVERAGE IN THE EVENT THE SITUATION SERIOUSLY DETERIORATES ON THE GROUND. FINALLY, IN LIGHT OF THE GROWING EVIDENCE THAT SERBIAN MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAS CONTINUED, I WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR SEALING THE BORDER ARE REALLY EFFECTIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, SINCE MUTUAL RECOGNITION REQUIRES BOTH PARTIES ON BOARD.

OUR PEOPLE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE BILDT PACKAGE. I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT CARL BILDT AND CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ARE COMING TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK TO THAT END. THEY SHOULD INCLUDE ON THE AGENDA HOW WE MIGHT USE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

BILDT'S NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT BOSNIAN SERB RESTRAINT ON THE GROUND AND MOVEMENT TOWARD NEW PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALL, THAT IS THE REAL PURPOSE OF OUR TALKS WITH MILOSEVIC.

ONCE AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTS. LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDS.

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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HARMON, LAKEA, PETERS, SESTAK, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW, WHSR\_IN, WHSR\_SPECIAL,  
WITKOWSKY

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FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0000  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 186725

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/4/05  
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, SK, BS  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR JOHN:

IN LONDON WE AGREED TO RESTORE THE VIABILITY OF UNPROFOR IN THE FACE OF BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON UN SAFE AREAS AND TO DETER AN ATTACK ON GORAZDE THROUGH THE USE OF DECISIVE NATO AIR POWER. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MOVED QUICKLY TO FORM AN AGREEMENT ENDORSING THE USE OF AIR POWER TO DEFEND GORAZDE, AND ON AUGUST 1 AGREED FURTHER TO EXTEND THIS PROTECTION TO THE UN SAFE AREAS OF BIHAC, SARAJEVO AND TUZLA. I WANT TO THANK YOU IN PARTICULAR FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO BRING THIS ABOUT.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI FULLY SUPPORTED THE NATO AGREEMENTS, AND DELEGATED UN AUTHORITY FOR APPROVING SUCH AIR STRIKES TO UN MILITARY COMMANDERS. THIS CHANGE IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL TO

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ENSURE THE RESPONSIVENESS AND UNITY OF PURPOSE WE DESIRED.

NOW WE MUST FOLLOW THROUGH TO ENSURE THE PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT IN THE FIELD THE DETERMINED MANDATE WE HAVE FINALIZED AT NATO AND THE UN. IF DETERRENTS FAIL, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE BE REAL. I WANT TO MENTION TO YOU THREE SPECIFIC AREAS FOR ATTENTION THAT I BELIEVE ARE CRUCIAL IF AIR ATTACKS ARE TO BE TIMELY AND DECISIVE AS WE PROMISED.

FIRST, THE SIZE OF THE "ZONE OF ACTION" REFERRED TO IN THE NAC AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH SO THAT UPON THE TRIGGERING EVENTS, IT WOULD ALLOW PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB AIR DEFENSES SO THAT WE CAN MINIMIZE THE RISK TO NATO AIR CREWS AND AIRCRAFT PROTECTING THE SAFE AREAS; IT SHOULD ALLOW FOR ATTACKS AGAINST SERB FORCES AND HEAVY WEAPONS DIRECTLY THREATENING THE SAFE AREAS BEFORE THEY ENTER INTO CLOSE COMBAT IN THE SAFE AREAS; AND IT SHOULD CONTAIN ENOUGH MEANINGFUL TARGETS TO DETER FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE SAFE AREA. DEFINING THE ZONE OF ACTION TOO NARROWLY WILL LIMIT THE FLEXIBILITY OF OUR MILITARY COMMANDERS TO TAKE TRULY DECISIVE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THE POLITICAL GOALS WE HAVE ESTABLISHED.

MY SECOND CONCERN IS THAT THE SELECTION OF TARGETS BE BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE SUFFICIENT DAMAGE TO THE OVERALL BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY EFFORT TO STOP ANY SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE AGAINST A SAFE AREA AND TO STAND ALONE AS A REALISTIC DETERRENT. SUCH A TARGET LIST WOULD NECESSARILY INCLUDE FORCE CONCENTRATIONS, ARTILLERY AND HEAVY WEAPONS, MUNITIONS SITES, COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, AND EARLY WARNING RADARS.

FINALLY, I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT NATO AND UN COMMANDERS AGREE ON THE TRIGGER CONDITIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN AIR CAMPAIGN. ANY DIRECT ATTACK OR THREAT TO A UN SAFE AREA MUST BE MET WITH A PROMPT AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO AVOID LATE AND INEFFECTUAL NATO AIR ACTIONS THAT COULD QUICKLY UNDERMINE THE EFFORT TO PROTECT THE SAFE AREAS.

I ASK FOR YOUR SUPPORT WITH YOUR MILITARY COMMANDERS, INCLUDING THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE UN, TO WORK WITH NATO COMMANDERS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE LARGE ZONES OF ACTION, EXTENSIVE TARGET LISTS, AND RESPONSIVE TRIGGER MECHANISMS I HAVE OUTLINED. OUR PURPOSE MUST BE CLEAR -- TO DETER ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS. OUR ULTIMATE AIM IS NOT TO PUNISH ANY SIDE IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT BUT TO BRING PEACE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I DON'T BELIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE ADOPT A DETERMINED STANCE TO DETER AND PREVENT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SAFE AREAS. TO THAT END I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU URGENTLY TO TAKE UP THESE

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MATTERS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE LONDON AND NATO AGREEMENTS AND ENSURE THEIR MILITARY CREDIBILITY.

I KNOW HOW DEDICATED YOU ARE TO ENSURING THAT THIS NEW REGIME OF DETERRENCE WORKS, AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TO THIS END.

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL  
TARNOFF  
BT  
#6725

NNNN  
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01  
<^SSN>6725  
<^TOR>950805002116 M1797028

FROM:  
SITREPRT

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

- Calling about evolving situation in former Yugoslavia.
- Before Croats launched all-out assault on the Krajina, we urged them to seek a political solution right up to last minute and to limit military action to relieving pressure on Bihac. Warned them of dangers of wider war.
- But Tudjman clearly had already made up his mind.
- Hardly surprising after Krajina Serb refusal to negotiate for past four years and their intervention in Bihac.
- So far, Serbia has shown no sign of intervening. But 100,000 new refugees and new Serb thirst for revenge make it essential we act quickly to stabilize situation.
- With Croatian operation in Sectors North and South nearly over and with strains within Bosnian Serb leadership, this may be significant moment to launch new diplomatic effort.
- Chances for success would be enhanced by NATO's new resolve to defend safe areas and UNPROFOR's tougher stance since arrival of Rapid Reaction Force.
- On other hand, if we don't press for a settlement in next few weeks, situation is likely to unravel, making UNPROFOR withdrawal unavoidable. In short, muddling through is no longer an option.
- We have been doing more thinking about how to use the new situation to achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia and to negotiate a peaceful resolution in Croatia.
- I propose that Tony Lake make a private trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in London, Bonn and Paris and to work out a common strategy.
- These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and how we would work with the governments in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as with Bosnian Serbs.
- Tony will be in touch to organize the schedule.
- Success of any new diplomatic initiative requires that we follow through on threats of decisive military action that we made at London conference.

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- In that regard, must underscore concern I expressed in my letter over weekend about lack of agreement between UN and NATO military commanders about "zone of action" around Gorasde and other safe areas, as well as other details of implementing NATO decisions.
- Critical that you weigh in with General Smith to sort this out.
- Can't afford to have new stories about how UN is "hamstringing" NATO at this critical moment.

Nigeria

- Let me raise one other subject. I am sure you have followed situation in Nigeria and harsh sentences imposed on the 40 alleged coup-plotters there, several of whom face possible death, including former head of State General Obasanjo (oh-BAH-San-jo).
- Have written to Head of State General Abacha (A-BOT-cha) but have not received a response.
- Am considering calling him to urge that he grant clemency for the alleged coup plotters.
- Wonder if you would consider calling him as well?
- Think this could be an important step in helping to prevent further violence and political unrest in Nigeria.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

- Calling about evolving situation in former Yugoslavia.
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- In that regard, must underscore concern I expressed in my letter over weekend about lack of agreement between UN and NATO military commanders about "zone of action" around Gorazde and other safe areas, as well as other details of implementing NATO decisions.
  
- Critical that you weigh in with General Janvier to sort this out.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL

- Calling about evolving situation in former Yugoslavia.
- Before Croats launched all-out assault on the Krajina, we urged them to seek a political solution right up to last minute and to limit military action to relieving pressure on Bihac. Warned them of dangers of wider war.
- But Tudjman clearly had already made up his mind.
- You and I are among the few who have shown some understanding about why Tudjman felt he had to act, after Krajina Serb refusal to negotiate for past four years and their intervention in Bihac.
- So far, Serbia has shown no sign of intervening. But 100,000 new refugees and new Serb thirst for revenge make it essential we act quickly to stabilize situation.
- With Croatian operation in Sectors North and South nearly over and with strains within Bosnian Serb leadership, this may be significant moment to launch new diplomatic effort.
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- Tony will be in touch to organize the schedule.

## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 19:27  
 FROM O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJECT Subject: Draft Major Memcon-[CONFIDENTIAL]  
 TO Crispell, Thomas G.  
 Drew, Samuel N.  
 Gardner, Anthony  
 Gates, Brian K.  
 Marmol, Madelyn P.  
 Marshall, Betty A.  
 Maxfield, Nancy H.  
 O'Loughlin, Katherine  
 Peters, Mary A.  
 Schmidt, John R.  
 Sevigny, Theodore T.  
 Sigler, Ralph  
 Vershbow, Alexander R.  
 Wooton, Kevin B.

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 TEXT\_BODY

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## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton  
 British Prime Minister Major

NOTETAKERS: Matt Miller, Katherine O'ELoughlin, Mary Ann Peters

DATE/TIME 7 August 1995; 1503-1510 EDT  
 AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello.

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill. How are you?

President Clinton: I'm fine. I wanted to talk to you for a minute about Bosnia. We urged the Croats before they launched an assault on the Krajina to seek a political solution right up to the last minute and to limit military action to relieving pressure on Bihac. But Tudjman clearly had already made up his mind. I guess it's not surprising after the Krajina

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Serb refusal to negotiate for the past four years and their intervention in Bihac. Anyway, according to our intelligence, Serbia has shown no sign of intervening. But 100,000 new refugees and a new Serb thirst for revenge make it essential we act quickly to stabilize the situation. I think this may be a significant moment to launch a new diplomatic effort. On the other hand, if we don't press for a settlement in the next few weeks, the situation is likely to unravel, making UNPROFOR withdrawal unavoidable. I think the last several days has changed the landscape. I propose Tony Lake make a trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in London, Bonn and Paris and to work on a common strategy.

Prime Minister Major: I'd be very happy with that.

President Clinton: These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and how we would work with the governments in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade as well as with the Bosnian Serbs. Let's try to keep these talks confidential.

Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. I'm sure you're right; the landscape has changed over the last several days. I'm happy with that idea.

President Clinton: We have a couple of ideas that will maybe work.

Prime Minister Major: When is Tony likely to come?

President Clinton: No later than Thursday and then maybe we will have a Contact Group meeting.

Prime Minister Major: Ministerial or official level?

President Clinton: Ministerial meeting. You all can work out the details. I think we can expand later to include the Canadians and Italians.

Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. We'll accommodate him whenever he comes.

President Clinton: I sent you a letter over the weekend about the lack of agreement between the UN and military commanders about the "zone of action" around Gorazde and other safe areas, as well as other details of implementing NATO decisions. We can't afford to have stories about the UN not doing anything.

Prime Minister Major: I haven't seen the letter, but I know it's there. It's being examined by my military advisors. I'm in southern France right now not in London.

President Clinton: Good for you. I know you have been following the situation in Nigeria and the harsh sentences imposed on the 40 alleged coup-plotters there including former head of state General Obasanjo. I have

written to Abacha, but have not received a response. I'm considering calling him. I wonder if you would consider calling him as well.

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that. I have two other suggestions. One, it is possible, not certain, possible that the Commonwealth Secretary General, a Nigerian himself, may have some influence. Secondly, there is one man who might have some influence and that's his neighbor Rawlings of Ghana [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] He came to see me recently and we spent the entire 50 minutes talking about Nigeria.

President Clinton: He is an impressive man. He was recently here.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, he is. I think it would be worthwhile. When will you call?

President Clinton: Not before Wednesday.

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that . I'll call as well.

President Clinton: Thank you.

Prime Minister Major: We'll touch base after that or through

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with British Prime Minister John Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major

Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters, Sue Bremner, Katherine O'Loughlin, Matt Miller

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 7, 1995, 3:03 - 3:10 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I wanted to talk to you for a minute about Bosnia. We urged the Croats before they launched an assault on the Krajina to seek a political solution right up to the last minute and to limit military action to relieving pressure on Bihac. But Tudjman clearly had already made up his mind. I guess it's not surprising after the Krajina Serb refusal to negotiate for the past four years and their intervention in Bihac. Anyway, according to our intelligence, Serbia has shown no sign of intervening. But 100,000 new refugees and a new Serb thirst for revenge make it essential we act quickly to stabilize the situation. I think this may be a significant moment to launch a new diplomatic effort. On the other hand, if we don't press for a settlement in the next few weeks, the situation is likely to unravel, making UNPROFOR withdrawal unavoidable. I think the last several days have changed the landscape. I propose Tony Lake make a trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in London, Bonn and Paris and to work on a common strategy. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'd be very happy with that. (C)

The President: These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and who would do what in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as with the Bosnian Serbs on the new diplomatic initiative. We have some ideas on ultimatum resolution of the conflict. Let's try to keep these talks confidential. (C)

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PER E. O. 13526  
2012-0801-1105126116 KDE

Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. I'm sure you're right; the landscape has changed over the last several days. We have nothing to lose by it. (C)

The President: We have a couple of ideas that will maybe work. (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is Tony likely to come? (C)

The President: No later than Thursday and then maybe we will have a Contact Group meeting. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Ministerial or official level? (C)

The President: The meeting can work out the details. I think we can expand later to include the Canadians and Italians. We need to bring the Russians in. We need to agree on a common course. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. We'll accommodate him whenever he comes. (C)

The President: I sent you a letter over the weekend about the lack of agreement between the UN and military commanders about the "zone of action" around Gorazde and other safe areas, as well as other details of implementing NATO decisions. We can't afford to have stories about the UN not doing anything. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I haven't seen the letter, but I know it's there. It's being examined by my military advisors. I'm in southern France right now, not in London. (C)

The President: Good for you. I know you have been following the situation in Nigeria and the harsh sentences imposed on the 40 alleged coup-plotters there including former head of state General Obasanjo. I have written to Abacha, but have not received a response. I'm considering calling him. I wonder if you would consider calling him as well. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that. I have two other suggestions. One, it is possible, not certain, possible that the Commonwealth Secretary General, a Nigerian himself, may have some influence and could speak to Abacha. Secondly, there is one man who might have some influence and that's his neighbor [redacted] of Ghana. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] he came to see me recently and we spent the entire 50 minutes talking about Nigeria. (C)

The President: He is an impressive man. He was recently here. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, he is. I think it would be worthwhile. When will you call? (C)

The President: Not before Wednesday. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that. I'll call as well. (C)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Major: OK. (U)

The President: We'll touch base later. Have a good vacation. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
August 12, 1995



TELEPHONE CALL FROM  
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR  
DATE: August 13, 1995  
LOCATION: Residence  
TIME: 9:45 a.m.

FROM: SANDY BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To provide points for use response to a call requested by Prime Minister Major.

II. BACKGROUND

British Prime Minister John Major has requested that you receive a call from him Sunday morning. He is expected to want to follow-up on Tony Lake's consultations in London, and to express concern about evidence of a new Bosnian government offensive near Donji Vakuf in central Bosnia. He may also be probing to see how serious we are about following-up on our initiative. You should be emphatic that we intend to carry through on it.

In Tony's consultations on our Balkan diplomatic initiative, the British were very positive. They were supportive of both our negotiating strategy and our proposed post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy. They welcomed U.S. leadership, and agreed on the need for a broad strategy rather than continued piecemeal approaches. They were pleased by our flexibility on the map, and that we were ready to open talks that included the Bosnian Serbs.

Most of their reservations were on matters of detail. They were skeptical about Milosevic's ability to consider recognition of Croatia after the recent offensive, and about NATO's willingness to continue to provide air support over Bosnia after UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Their most serious concern was whether our proposed post-withdrawal strategy might seem so attractive to the Bosnians that they would balk at negotiations and seek to gain the post-withdrawal package of support instead. Tony was able to resolve their doubts by stressing the conditional nature

of the post-withdrawal package -- if the diplomatic initiative fails due to Bosnian government inflexibility, the offer of support is withdrawn. You may need to reaffirm this linkage, especially in the context of reports that the Bosnian government is preparing to launch a major offensive this weekend to retake the town of Donji Vakuf. We are asking the Vice President to call Izetbegovic Sunday to urge restraint; he made a similar call to Tudjman Saturday that went well.

In their talks with Tony, the British indicated that, if the negotiations appear to need impetus when they conduct their review of the status of UNPROFOR in mid-September, they may call for withdrawal in order to signal how serious we are. If Major raises this issue with you, you should be non-committal, and restate our position that we believe that UNPROFOR is worth saving if it becomes tough enough, but that we would respect their decision on withdrawal if the time came.

You should also take the opportunity to indicate to Major our views that it will be extremely useful to include Italy in further Contact Group meetings and negotiations, given their importance to the success of any peace plan implementation, UNPROFOR withdrawal efforts, or our post-withdrawal strategy. The Italians are increasingly sensitive at being left out of Contact Group discussions.

If time allows, you may want to inform Major that you contacted Nigerian leader General Abacha earlier this week and ask whether Major has contacted him. He expressed willingness to do so when you last spoke.

Attachment

Tab A Points for Major

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

- Thank you for the good reception your government provided Tony Lake and the strong support for his mission.
- As I indicated when we spoke last week, I am determined to press forward as quickly as possible on this. There is no time for half measures, and we can't waste even one day.
- Tony should be back in London tomorrow, and then I'll be sending Ambassador Holbrooke with part of Tony's team to Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade from there.
- Tony reports that the meetings with the Germans, French, Spanish and Italians all went very well. They all reacted favorably to the initiative and our strategy for pursuing it.
- The Italians appear willing to be extremely helpful in support of implementation of either a peace plan or our post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy. It would be useful if we could include them in future Contact Group discussions.
- Tony is meeting with the Russians today, and they may be tougher to sell. But I believe there's enough in the plan that they should be receptive to it -- such as an end to the sanctions, the prospect for a referendum on union with Serbia in the Serb areas of Bosnia, and our willingness to re-engage Pale directly.
- Obviously we're doing all we can to prevent escalation of another round of fighting while we're trying to move forward with our diplomatic initiative.
- Yesterday, I had ~~Al Gore~~ call ~~Tudjman~~ to make certain there was no ambiguity about our warnings to the Croats not to initiate further military action. Tudjman gave us his firm assurance that the Croats would refrain from any attacks.
- But I am concerned about the reports this weekend of a Bosnian offensive around Donji Vakuf (DON-yee VA-koof).
- We had issued a demarche to Izetbegovic earlier urging military restraint and letting him know we were asking the same thing of all the parties in the region.
- We will be weighing in with Izetbegovic again to stress that provocative military activity must be stopped.

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- We will let him know that if our proposal is derailed by Bosnian government actions, he will not be able to expect any subsequent security assistance from us.
- As Tony indicated when he was in London, there must be no confusion over the strict conditionality of our proposal for post-UNPROFOR withdrawal support: if the negotiations break down because of Bosnian government actions, they will be on their own.

(IF RAISED BY PRIME MINISTER MAJOR)

- I understand that you will be reviewing your participation in UNPROFOR in mid-September. I still believe that UNPROFOR is worth saving if it becomes tough enough, but we would respect your decision on withdrawal if the time came.

(IF TIME PERMITS, FOLLOW UP ON NIGERIA)

- I was able to reach General Abacha last week and had a positive conversation..
- He said he would consider my comments on the case "positively."
- Have you been able to contact him yet?

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## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 August 95 17:24  
 FROM Peters, Mary A.  
 CLASSIFICATION \*\*\*\* NO CLASSIFICATION \*\*\*\*  
 SUBJECT Subject: FW: MEMCON for President and Prime Minister Major call  
 TO Norman, Marcia G.  
 CARBON\_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
 TEXT\_BODY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
 PER E. O. 13526

2012-0801-M-05126116 KDF

From: Martinez, Alejandro (Deuce)  
 To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @EUROPE - European Affairs;  
 @EXECSEC -  
 Executive Secretary; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @NSA - Nat'l Security  
 Advisor; @VP - VP Nat'l Security Affairs; @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
 CC: /R, Record at A1  
 Subject: MEMCON for President and Prime Minister Major call  
 [CONFIDENTIAL]  
 Date: Sunday, August 13, 1995 04:52 PM

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton  
 Prime Minister Major of UK

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez, Paul Weber, Mary Ann Peters, and Nelson  
 Drew.

DATE, TIME 13 August 1995, 0953-1010 EDT  
 AND PLACE: White House Residence

President Clinton: Hello?

Prime Minister Major: Hello, Bill?

President Clinton: Hi John, having a little trouble getting this phone to  
 work.

Prime Minister Major: That's OK. I was just relaxing in the south of  
 France. Just stepped away from poolside as a matter of fact. It is very

hot here.

President Clinton: That's great. Glad to hear that you can get some time off. You need and deserve it.

Prime Minister Major: Thank you. I just wanted to talk to you about a couple of things. We're very pleased with Tony Lake's proposals. We have just a few minor points but in general I am very supportive. Did you get a good reaction from Bonn and Paris?

President Clinton: I did, and from the Italians and the Spaniards as well. As a matter of fact, Tony just finished his meeting with Kozyrev and it went surprisingly well.

Prime Minister Major: That is extremely good news. Hope it makes some progress. I have two areas of concern; first the prospect for triple recognition and secondly, getting a credible ground force following the withdrawal. However, not so good news on the ground in Bosnia today. I hear Bosnian forces are attacking Donji Vakuf and there are limited Serbian attacks around Sarajevo.

President Clinton: Well, Vice President Gore called Tudjman and Izetbegovic yesterday and warned them not to do it. We'll see what happens.

Prime Minister Major: We need to use all the available leverage we have;

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: Yes. It looks to me that they are trying to work the western end of the country for the moment.

Prime Minister Major: How do you think we should proceed from here? It is excellent that Tony had good talks.

President Clinton: First of all I have to wait until he gets back and review what everyone said and then we will go to the parties. Obviously that is the thing to do.

Prime Minister Major: Hope they respond to the stimuli.

President Clinton: The Croatian and Bosnian governments may be getting a little carried away with themselves. They've had some successes but not sure if they see the end gain. On Tuesday, Dick Holbrooke will approach the various parties. We should be able to give you a virtually instantaneous report.

Prime Minister Major: Is he going to all three places?

President Clinton: Yes he's going, I think, yes he's going to all three

places.

Prime Minister Major: Is Frasure going with him?

President Clinton: Yes.

Prime Minister Major: I hope they get the message and realize the opportunity.

President Clinton: There could be real movement; if they let it go without seeing it through to the end of the game, I don't see it happening. They've got a pretty good deal, they ought to take it.

Prime Minister Major: That's our view. In September we will have to think clearly about the prospects for Winter. Hopefully they take the opportunity. I am very encouraged that the talks with Kozyrev went well.

President Clinton: I was surprised as well. They had some concerns about UNPROFOR's role in the end game. I told them we had to make clear to the Bosnians we wouldn't support that if they didn't support the peace process.

Prime Minister Major: I thought the way Tony presented the idea was very persuasive, with the prizes for each side if it works and the downsides if it doesn't. The problem is we can't seem to agree on what the final map should look like.

President Clinton: We've done what we can and you know what he said. We're going to wait until he gets back and hear the reactions he got. We will know better after the Holbrooke visits.

Prime Minister Major: If we can help in any way, we'll be happy to.

President Clinton: I'm sure you can. We will call you when I know something. Another thing I would like to talk to you about is a talk I had with General Abacha. We had a good conversation. He took into consideration my comments positively but did not promise not to execute the prisoners.

Prime Minister Major: I had a word with him as well. We spoke for about 25 minutes. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I was able to persuade him to attend the Commonwealth Conference in November and hopefully we'll have 50 other countries that can give him the same message. He listened well. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] He said he'd like to talk informally about the process of civilian rule. I will get back to him. He and I wish to maintain an informal dialogue. I said I will try to keep in touch. Like you, I have a

reasonably positive feeling but no promises.

President Clinton: If he makes good moves we should try and be supportive. You know more than I do about the situation in that country.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

President Clinton: Yes.

Prime Minister Major: I was wandering if I could speak for a moment on Northern Ireland.

President Clinton: Sure.

Prime Minister Major: We're coming up to an important period for Northern Ireland in the next fortnight or three weeks. There are two events: the anniversary of the IRA cease-fire and the summit I will have with John Bruton at the end of the first week of September. A lot is happening on the ground [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I have discussed a number of things with Bruton. Probably you will discuss them with Bruton when he visits Washington in September.

I believe a joint strategy can put life into the political dialogue.

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] and second is to address decommissioning of terrorist weapons, not just IRA's but loyalists weapons as well.

Bruton and I will be in touch about making useful progress. The essence of it is an independent commission to consider the modus operandi of decommissioning. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I can't move away from decommissioning. It is not practical. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] There is quite a lot resting on this decision.

What we would like is a joint commission to consist of 3 people. An American would chair; two names come to mind, George Mitchell and Tom Foley.

We would approach one of them at some stage unless you would prefer we didn't. In addition to George Mitchell, Bruton would appoint one member with my approval and I would appoint one with his approval. We hope combined with other measures we have in mind that we could get solid progress. I would like to have their report in advance of your visit in November. This is broadly the way we are thinking. I wanted to give you a preliminary indication to see if you can live with it.

President Clinton: Actually it sounds good. I am quite worried about how to start talks and get some progress on decommissioning. I know it is a problem for you and we may have to have a patina of some party above the fray to handle decommissioning. Obviously we need to make progress on it.

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I wanted to give you advance notice.

President Clinton: I appreciate it. I will talk to my people about it. It could be a way to start talks and get progress on decommissioning; you can't do one without another.

Prime Minister Major: We hope to have a unilateral announcement by the British government before the end of the month. We can go ahead with that and political talks if we establish the decommissioning commission. I can bear the political heat if we get progress. The three things hang together. We'll have to defer all if we defer one. Just one other thing. Before the August 31 anniversary I would like as many people as possible to make clear the importance of the process. If you have an opportunity to do so, it would be useful.

President Clinton: I will look for an opportunity; that would be a good thing to do.

Prime Minister Major: Sorry to have disturbed your Sunday.

President Clinton: Good to hear your voice.

Prime Minister Major: Please God, we can get out of the devil's brew we're in (in Bosnia).

President Clinton: We'll try to do it.

Prime Minister Major: Good bye and God bless.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Major of UK

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez, Paul Weber, Mary Ann Peters and Nelson Drew

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 13, 1995, 9:53 - 10:10 a.m. EDT  
White House Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hi John, having a little trouble getting this phone to work. (U)

Prime Minister Major: That's OK. I was just relaxing in the south of France. Just stepped away from poolside as a matter of fact. It is very hot here. (U)

The President: That's great. Glad to hear that you can get some time off. You need and deserve it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Thank you. I just wanted to talk to you about a couple of things. We're very pleased with Tony Lake's proposals. We have just a few minor points, but in general, I am very supportive. Did you get a good reaction from Bonn and Paris? (C)

The President: I did and from the Italians and the Spaniards as well. As a matter of fact, Tony just finished his meeting with Kozyrev, and it went surprisingly well. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is extremely good news. Hope it makes some progress. I have two areas of concern: first the prospect for triple recognition and secondly, getting a credible ground force following the withdrawal. However, not so good news on the ground in Bosnia today. I hear Bosnian forces are attacking Donji Vakuf, and there are limited Serbian attacks around Sarajevo. (C)

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The President: Well, Vice President Gore called Tudjman and Izetbegovic yesterday and warned them not to do it. We'll see what happens. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We need to use all the available leverage we have; [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. It looks to me that they are trying to work the western end of the country for the moment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How do you think we should proceed from here? It is excellent that Tony had good talks. (C)

The President: First of all, I have to wait until he gets back and review what everyone said, and then we will go to the parties. Obviously that is the thing to do. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Hope they respond to the stimuli. (C)

The President: The Croatian and Bosnian governments may be getting a little carried away with themselves. They've had some successes but not sure if they see the end gain. On Tuesday, Dick Holbrooke will approach the various parties. We should be able to give you a virtually instantaneous report. (C)

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The President: Yes, he's going, I think; yes, he's going to all three places. (C)

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The President: There could be real movement; if they let it go without seeing it through to the end of the game, I don't see it happening. They've got a pretty good deal; they ought to take it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's our view. In September we will have to think clearly about the prospects for Winter. Hopefully they take the opportunity. I am very encouraged that the talks with Kozyrev went well. (C)

The President: I was surprised as well. They had some concerns about UNPROFOR's role in the end game. I told them we had to make clear to the Bosnians we wouldn't support that if they didn't support the peace process. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I thought the way Tony presented the idea was very persuasive, with the prizes for each side if it works and the downsides if it doesn't. The problem is we can't seem to agree on what the final map should look like. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I was wondering if I could speak for a moment on Northern Ireland. (C)

The President: Sure. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We're coming up to an important period for Northern Ireland in the next fortnight or three weeks. There are two events: the anniversary of the IRA cease-fire and the summit I will have with John Bruton at the end of the first week of September. A lot is happening on the ground. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] and second is to address decommissioning of terrorist weapons, not just IRA's but loyalists weapons as well. (C)

Bruton and I will be in touch about making useful progress. The essence of it is an independent commission to consider the modus operandi of decommissioning. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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The President: Actually, it sounds good. I am quite worried about how to start talks and get some progress on decommissioning. I know it is a problem for you, and we may have to have a patina of some party above the fray to handle decommissioning. Obviously we need to make progress on it. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

[Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d [Redacted]

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The President: I appreciate it. I will talk to my people about it. It could be a way to start talks and get progress on decommissioning; you can't do one without another. (C)

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Just one other thing. Before the August 31 anniversary, I would like as many people as possible to make clear the importance of the process. If you have an opportunity to do so, it would be useful. (C)

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The President: Good to hear your voice. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Please God, we can get out of the devil's brew we're in (in Bosnia). (C)

The President: We'll try to do it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye and God bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --