



ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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British Embassy  
Washington

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 898-4292  
Facsimile: (202) 898-4253

26 January 1993

*From The Ambassador*

The Honorable  
Professor Anthony Lake  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Room 1/WW  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.  
Washington D. C. 20500

*Dear Tony,*

**FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

I attach a message which the Prime Minister has asked me to pass urgently to the President about former Yugoslavia. There are a number of points arising from this the Prime Minister has asked me to discuss with you this afternoon.

*With best wishes,*

*Robin Renwick*

**Robin Renwick**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBH Date: 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ADD-ON #2

February 24, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HORN

SUBJECT: Additional Points for the President's use With  
Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

Points for the President's use on the subject of opening Tuzla  
Airport (Tab A), a discussion paper (Tab B), and a map (Tab C)  
are attached.

Attachments

Tab A Additional Points to be Raised  
Tab B Discussion Paper  
Tab C Map of Bosnia

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBY/NARA, Date 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-M

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2013-0449-M (5.06)  
10/3/2014 KBM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Clifton Wharton, Jr., Acting *CPW*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister John Major  
of Great Britain

I. SETTING

- U.S.-UK ties remain uniquely close. But the end of the Cold War, the process of European integration, and the strain of prolonged recession are changing British as well as American perspectives, and our relations with each other.
- Britain is our most reliable ally. By policy and instinct, the British will help us, if they can and if we let them, in every area that matters -- defense and security, trade, the Middle East, Russia and Eastern Europe, the UN, environment, and the fights against terrorism and drugs.
- Major's government is no longer in the political free fall of last autumn. But it still faces a bruising battle for parliamentary ratification of Maastricht, and the unaccustomed difficulties of having only a narrow Tory majority in the House of Commons. Nearly three years of recession have taken their toll on British confidence and leadership.
- Major's visit to Washington will be scrutinized by press on both sides of the Atlantic, which had a field day with reports of Tory involvement in the Bush campaign and the Home Office file search. The Major government was excoriated by Thatcherites and Laborites alike for souring the special relationship.
- Given this inauspicious beginning, Major's overriding goal for this visit is to establish a relationship of trust and candor with you, and to be seen as having done so. Major was grateful that you telephoned him to discuss Bosnia, and for the early invitation to Washington.
- Britain sees its nuclear power status as vital to its standing in Europe and the world. Major will want a promise of prior consultation before any Administration decisions on nuclear testing or ballistic missile defense.

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- Major also has some concerns about statements made during the campaign on UN Security Council expansion, Northern Ireland, and MFN for China. However, he is pleased and much reassured by our stance on Bosnia, which tracks very closely with British thinking and concerns.
- Major will be careful not to overload this first meeting with too many issues. He will focus on areas he thinks most urgently require close coordination, probably Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Russia, and the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. He suspects you may raise Northern Ireland. He will touch at least briefly on Hong Kong, China and MFN.

## II. TOPICS

- Affirm that on most important issues British policy is synergetic with our own, and that close bilateral cooperation is essential to achieving our common objectives.
- Express appreciation for the courage and effectiveness of British troops in Bosnia engaged in humanitarian relief.
- Enlist Major's active help in our next steps on Bosnia.
- Lay out your views on key international economic issues such as the Uruguay Round and G-7 policy coordination.
- Recognize Major's effectiveness in promoting agreement on the Uruguay Round, and solicit his continued cooperation.
- Discuss current bilateral economic issues, such as civil aviation, steel, and the proposed minivan reclassification.
- Confirm our support of the talks process in Northern Ireland, and discuss ways in which we can be helpful.
- Share your thoughts on the situation in Russia and on Yeltsin's difficulties.
- Affirm that we will continue to look to the British for close cooperation in obtaining Iraq's compliance with all UNSC resolutions.
- Exchange views on the broader issues of European integration, the future of NATO, and the American presence in Europe.
- Discuss approaches to promoting democratization in Hong Kong and human rights in China.

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## UNITED KINGDOM: POLITICAL OVERVIEW

Prime Minister Major visits Washington this month with his country at the bottom of a long and difficult recession and his countrymen in a distinctly uneasy mood. Though the pressure on Major has eased a bit following a seemingly endless string of troubles last fall, stiff challenges still loom:

- Embarrassing inquiries into government handling of coal mine closures and of sales of arms-related equipment to Iraq will soon come to a head.
- In April and May, a new local tax scheme will be introduced. While undoubtedly fairer than the hated "poll tax" it replaces, it will hit hard at Tory constituencies in southern England.
- From now through at least May, several controversial parliamentary committee votes could derail Maastricht treaty ratification.
- The government must deal with increasing parliamentary concern about British military entanglement in Bosnia.

Major's government will likely muddle through. Unlike Thatcher in 1990, Major gets along well with his Cabinet colleagues, and so far faces no credible challenger. Tory rebels, however much they may want to block Maastricht, do not relish a snap election that Labor might win. But Major also has a majority of only 21, not the 100 or so of the Thatcher years; his whips are only now learning how to handle this reality.

If the government can ride out the Maastricht storm, and limit damage from the inquiries and council tax, it should be able to carry on a full term. (The next general election must be held by April 1997, and is likely to be in spring or autumn 1996.) Economic recovery, plus redistricting, plus Labor's own woes, might well win the Tories an unprecedented fifth election in a row.

Labor should be riding high but it's not. Its morale is certainly better than six months ago, due in no small part to the Democratic win in the U.S. But it has not yet emerged as a truly credible alternative government. It perhaps will not be a serious contender until it reaches the far side of an internal policy debate that has scarcely begun. Labor Party leader John Smith is not an inspiring leader, and he has not used the mandate of his sweeping victory in the July leadership election to take command of the party. Smith's gradualist approach to preparing for the next election gives Major some breathing room.

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UNITED KINGDOM  
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK

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10/3/2014 KBH

The British economy remains weak after three years of recession although industrialists' confidence is improving with some signs of stronger exports. Unemployment reached 10.5% of the labor force in December. Sharp declines in house prices, and fears of job losses, have continued to inhibit consumer spending. Inflation fell to a 1.7% rate in the year to January. Strong speculative pressures forced sterling's departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System September 16. Since early September, sterling has depreciated about 16% against the DM and about 25% against the dollar. Taking the currencies of the UK's trading partners as a whole, sterling has fallen about 13% on a trade-weighted basis. This sterling decline, and the expanding U.S. economy, should improve the UK's export prospects substantially and help an economic recovery to begin later this year. Still, recovery will be modest until the UK's main trading partners in Europe register stronger growth -- an uncertain prospect.

The budget deficit escalated to an estimated 6.7% of GDP in 1992, partly from cyclical factors driving the recession and partly from earlier efforts to stimulate the economy by fiscal policy. The high deficit will severely constrain any effort to use fiscal policy for expansion purposes. Despite the recession, the current account deficit is too high (\$20 billion or 2% of GDP last year), raising fears that even a modest recovery would expand external deficits to even higher levels.

Public dissatisfaction with the economy continues to plague the Major government, and strains have developed within the Conservative majority over such issues as possible tax increases this spring to reduce the budget deficit, and closure of uneconomic coal mines.

With further action to stimulate recovery limited by concerns about sterling, budget deficits and worsening external deficits, the UK is left to hope for recovery elsewhere in Europe (e.g. by an early substantial reduction in German interest rates which could then spread to other countries).

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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British Sensitivity

Few issues have more potential for creating problems in Anglo-American relations than Northern Ireland.

- The British regard it as an internal matter.
- They believe that the U.S. tends to view it from the nationalist perspective.
- The extension of terrorist campaigns to England, innocent loss of life, and the targeting of Britain's political leadership have made HMG sensitive to advice from outside.

In Northern Ireland, the President's campaign statements aroused hopes in the Catholic community and fears among the Unionists that the USG would weigh in on the nationalist side.

Status of the Talks

The political talks, which broke off in November without agreement, contain three "strands" -- devolved government in Northern Ireland, relations between North and South in Ireland, and ties between the UK and Ireland.

- The major stumbling blocks are: 1) who will exercise executive power in Northern Ireland, 2) Dublin's role in Northern Irish affairs, and 3) the Unionists' demand that Ireland revise its constitutional claim to the North.
- Informal talks continue and formal sessions may resume soon. Dick Spring, the new Irish Foreign Minister, is expected to press for an agreement.

Terrorism

The level of violence (84 deaths in 1992 in Northern Ireland) is well down from its 1972 peak of more than 450 deaths. Two recent trends, however, are worrisome: 1) the increased proficiency of the loyalist (Protestant) paramilitaries, who caused more deaths last year than the IRA: 2) the IRA's bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland.

MacBride Principles

British American groups have pressed for an investment code of conduct called the MacBride Principles, modeled after the South Africa-related Sullivan Principles. You spoke favorably about them during the campaign. You should know, however, that generally among responsible leaders in Northern Ireland, the Principles have little support because they impede urgently needed investment. The distinction is drawn with South Africa

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because discrimination is legal there; it is illegal in Northern Ireland. Major is not likely to raise the issue.

### Human Rights

Human rights issues have become a key concern in Northern Ireland. The issues transcend specific incidents and point to a pattern of collusion between British security forces and Loyalist factions as well as an environment of intimidation and fear. Excessive force (including "shoot to kill" practices), harassment by security forces (stopping people unnecessarily or conducting arbitrary and disruptive house searches), unfair detention (holding people for up to seven days with trial) and trials without juries have been prevalent.

Current cases in Northern Ireland with human rights implications (the first two are the most widely known):

- Two Royal Marines were charged in February 1992 with murder for the December 1990 killing of Fergal Caraher.
- In February 1992 four acknowledged PIRA terrorists were killed by security forces shortly after having attacked an RUC station in Coalisland. Human rights groups claimed that excessive force was used and that the men could have been arrested rather than killed. The police are investigating whether the use of force was warranted.
- In September 1992 Peter MacBride (no relation to the "Principles") was shot and killed while running away from an Army patrol. Two soldiers have been charged with murder.
- In November 1992 Pierce Jordan was shot and killed by police after a car chase. A police investigation has begun, but no charges have been filed.

At the Tab entitled "Letters" are letters from the House and the Senate asking you to raise the subject of human rights in Northern Ireland during the Major visit.

### Joe Doherty

Joe Doherty is a PIRA member convicted in 1981 of murdering a British Army officer in Northern Ireland. Just before the conviction was handed down, he escaped to the U.S., where he was picked up in 1983 for immigration violations and remained in jail for almost nine years, while his case was being fought in the U.S. courts. A British extradition request was rejected by a District Court judge on the grounds that his offense was political. The USG then attempted to deport him for having entered the country under false documentation. Doherty asked to be deported to Ireland instead of the UK but, after those two countries signed an extradition treaty, requested asylum in the U.S. Eventually, the matter went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Attorney General had the discretion to deport

Doherty without further hearings. In January 1992, Doherty was deported to the UK, and he is now in prison in Northern Ireland. The British authorities have turned down Doherty's request that he be given credit for time served in the U.S. and some Irish-Americans groups, for whom Doherty was a major cause celebre, have asked the USG to intervene. The U.S. has no current legal or jurisdictional interest in the Doherty case.

#### The Gerry Adams Visa Issue

Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams has been turned down for visas several times in the past few years -- most recently in 1991. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, his advocacy of violence and information that he was a member of the PIRA Army Council, which decides on terrorist actions, makes him ineligible for a visa. (Executive Branch rulings were supported by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990.) To overcome his ineligibility, Adams would need a waiver -- granted by the INS at the recommendation of the State Department. It would be odd to do so now, since Sinn Fein is losing support and Adams himself was defeated in the 1992 Parliamentary election. Nor has Sinn Fein agreed to abandon its support of violence.

A current complication is the request by the defense in the Smyth extradition case that Adams testify. (Smyth was convicted of attempted murder, was imprisoned in Northern Ireland, and escaped in 1983.) The U.S. consul still has the final say about granting a visa, but Justice could be asked to parole Adams into the country. Justice would resist on the grounds that Adam's testimony is not germane in an extradition hearing. Even if it were, he could make it by deposition.

During the campaign, you spoke favorably of providing him a visa, since at the time he was a member of the British Parliament. However, he has since lost his seat in Parliament and this, the main rationale is no longer relevant.

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IRAQ

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The UK continues to be one of the strongest supporters of our Iraq policy, participating fully in all missions, whether political, military, or humanitarian. British leaders believe that continued, steady, proportionate pressure must be maintained on Saddam Hussein.

U.S. policy on Iraq remains to insist upon full Iraqi compliance with all Security Council resolutions and respect for measures enacted by the Coalition to monitor and enforce those resolutions.

- The UK and French have floated the idea of a P3 statement on Iraq's obligations under the UNSCRs -- an idea we fear could weaken the UNSC requirements and open the door for those who want to normalize ties with Saddam.
- Iraq's current "charm offensive" aims to show it is in "sufficient" compliance with UNSC resolutions for sanctions to be eased at the next review in March.
- Past experience suggests that Iraq will not fully comply by March and that, if its strategy does not work, Iraq will return to open defiance.

Joint UN, U.S. UK and EC humanitarian relief efforts are showing some signs of success. Interim reports suggest that at the present pace of aid delivery there will not be a repeat of widespread deprivation and population movements of 1991.

- However, Iraq could easily disrupt deliveries and put the population at risk.

In order to make northern Iraq less reliant on outside aid, the UK is leaning toward finding ways to obtain sanctions exemptions to provide assistance which would reactivate light industries and improve infrastructure in the region.

- We support this idea, but need to act carefully so as to keep the international consensus behind sanctions.

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GATT-URUGUAY ROUND

The Uruguay Round (UR), which involves 108 countries, has been under negotiation since 1986 with U.S. participation authorized by fast track authority that expires June 1. USTR Kantor announced February 11 that the Administration would seek renewal of fast track although details of the request would be decided after consultations with Congress. We are also reviewing our UR negotiating positions.

GATT Director-General Dunkel attempted to accelerate the talks in December 1991 by issuing a draft "Final Act" (DFA), which incorporated agreements already reached and proposed solutions to unresolved issues.

- Most governments will accept the DFA without changes beyond U.S.-EC amendments on agriculture resulting from the November "Blair House Accord." The EC is pressing this approach, although it also wants comprehensive market access agreements, with U.S. concessions, to "balance" the agreement before concluding the Round.

The U.S. position has been that we need substantial progress in market access in goods (including free trade in key sectors), agriculture, and services as well as improvements in the DFA.

- The U.S. agreed to use the DFA as the basis for negotiating a final agreement, but stated that improvements were necessary, especially on antidumping, intellectual property, trade-related environment issues, and the Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO).

The UK has worked energetically as an EC member and as EC President in July-December 1992 to complete the UR as soon as possible. While the UK can accept the DFA, it also favors tougher antidumping rules and is the EC country most willing to accommodate U.S. interests. The UK wants the U.S. to reduce "peaks" (i.e. high tariffs on ceramics and textiles) and is prepared to meet our zero-for-zero sector offers (e.g. non-ferrous metals, paper and wood).

- Prime Minister Major can be expected to urge completing the Round as quickly as possible.
- The U.K. and the EC have urged us to limit fast track authority extension to six months in order to maintain needed pressure to conclude the Round.
- The U.K. will resist attempts to reinstate Super 301 in fast track renewal due to sensitivity about unilateral U.S. extraterritorial actions.

RUSSIA

The Russian economy continues to decline. Yeltsin has started reforms in a number of important areas: creating market mechanisms, liberalizing trade, unifying the currency exchange rate, and undertaking an ambitious privatization program - but all of these gains could be swept away by hyperinflation. (Inflation is now running at a monthly rate of about 30 percent.)

Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program is not justifiable for Russia. Such a program is a pre-requisite, however, for other forms of financial support, including a \$6 billion currency stabilization fund promised at the G-7 summit last year. Given Russia's need and the inability to produce an IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are currently examining new ways in which we could render aid to Russia.

The British approach to debt re-scheduling is similar to ours: flexibility and a willingness to accept any sensible arrangement between Russia and Ukraine on responsibility for the debt. (The UK portion of the official bilateral debt owed by the FSU is only .1%, or less than \$400 million.)

The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes that stabilizing the economy is its main economic priority, but it will face stiff resistance to its proposed austerity measures from the Supreme Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin, led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued to chip away at Yeltsin's powers and policies.

Yeltsin had hoped to break both the political and economic impasse by means of a national referendum on constitutional reform to be held April 11. Opposition from parliamentarians as well as regional leaders, fear of abetting separatist tendencies within Russia itself, and uncertainty over the outcome of the vote apparently have forced him, however, at least to consider other ideas.

Yeltsin has proposed instead early parliamentary and presidential elections during 1994 and 1995 respectively. Unless accompanied by a genuine consensus on economic and constitutional reform, this proposal would continue the current stalemate for the next year with no guarantee that elections would produce a more pliable legislature. Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, and Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin are engaged in negotiations to hammer out a solution to Russia's political crisis. Pressure is increasing on all the participants and the outcome is far from certain. If agreement is reached, an extraordinary session of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies could convene in early March to ratify the agreement.

Absent some renewal of Yeltsin's authority, the Russian domestic and foreign policymaking process will continue to be marked by bureaucratic infighting combined with parliamentary pressures

toward greater assertiveness of Russia's prerogatives as a great power. On a number of foreign policy issues (Bosnia, Iraq, non-proliferation), Yeltsin's margin for maneuver will be constrained.

Despite the pressures, he has shown no sign of abandoning his basic pro-Western orientation.

- Almost since election day, the Russians have been pressing for an early summit. Christopher is proposing April 3-4, with March 28-29 as a back-up, to Kozyrev on Thursday.
- The preliminary Russian reaction to our new approach on the former Yugoslavia has been positive.
- We continue to cooperate closely on arms control. Yeltsin has formally submitted START II to the Supreme Soviet for ratification, and we are working closely with the Russians to persuade the parliament that the treaty is fair and balanced.

The most urgent task in arms control is to obtain fulfillment of the Lisbon Protocol by Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine, which has neither ratified the START I Treaty nor adhered to the NPT, is key here. (Belarus has already approved START and NPT; Kazakhstan has approved START but not yet adhered to the NPT.) We have pressed the Ukrainians to fulfill their commitments under the Lisbon Protocol, and both we and the UK have offered them security assurances and assistance in the dismantlement of strategic arms.

At the same time, we have urged the Russians to amend their own security assurances to Ukraine in order to take account of Ukrainian concerns. We have also insisted that the proceeds of Russian sales to the U.S. of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads be equitably shared with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, something the Russians have resisted.

#### UK Views

Major is becoming increasingly skeptical of Yeltsin's ability to hold his political opponents at bay, and to continue to implement meaningful economic reform. This sense of a looming crisis has been echoed by his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.

Major will be bringing with him his in-house advisor on the FSU, Sir Rodric Braithwaite (who is also Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and was the UK Ambassador to Moscow from 1988 to 1992). Braithwaite's views of Yeltsin's problems are summed up as follows:

- Russia has no tradition of constitutional limits on the power of the executive or of the rule of law.
- The decay of the Communist party structure has not been offset by the development of new political organizations.

- Yeltsin toyed with the idea of creating a "President's" party, but abandoned it. In Russia, parties are equated with conspiracies. Yeltsin chose instead to use the Russian historical model of "going to the people". Yet, as economic hardships turn into crises, this tactic is losing its effectiveness.

Braithwaite's recommendations to Major are:

- Expand programs whereby younger Russians study and work abroad as a way to help develop a new political culture.
- Provide greater economic technical assistance and training programs in Russia.
- Ensure that the IMF take into account the micro-economic problem facing Russia: the dismantlement of rustbowl defense industries and the need to retrain workers.
- Treat Russia as a great power (if not a super-power) rather than a supplicant. Part of the reason for Gorbachev's downfall was the perception that he was no longer viewed as an equal in the West.

Braithwaite wrote his memorandum as a follow-up to a conversation you had with Major last December. The complete memo is included in your briefing book.

British officials expect the last five years of their rule in Hong Kong to be among the most difficult in the colony's history. Their goals are:

- to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong through 1997 and beyond;
- to build democratic institutions capable of withstanding expected Chinese pressure after transition;
- to achieve the least disruptive transfer of power possible;
- to maintain the commercial position of British firms in Hong Kong and China; and
- to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a domestic political football in Britain.

These goals have already come into conflict, most notably over Governor Chris Patten's proposals to broaden modestly the franchise of the 1995 elections to the Legislative Council, which will continue to sit when China takes over sovereignty in 1997. Progress towards the smooth transition to PRC sovereignty has also been marred by an ongoing dispute over construction of a new Hong Kong airport.

Beijing reacted vehemently to Patten's proposals, making threats ranging from undoing any changes to annulling contracts made without its consent after 1997. Although the Chinese may only be posturing, the verbal barrage weakens the foundation for a smooth transition, has caused the stock market to reverberate, and has shaken local confidence in Hong Kong's future stability.

Beijing is moving, however, to resume talks with British officials on Hong Kong's future. Coming back to the table represents a major Chinese concession, and will help to defuse the crisis over Patten's proposals. But it is still unclear whether the Chinese are prepared to resume substantive negotiations with Hong Kong officials, or simply plan to use the talks to delay legislative action on Patten's proposals.

Hong Kong, China, and MFN

HMG believes MFN is the wrong tool for trying to remedy human rights abuses in China. The British claim that Hong Kong could lose up to \$16 billion of its overall trade and as many as 60,000 jobs if MFN were suspended. Although Governor Patten has on occasion hinted that he might favor an informal linkage between China's attitude toward Hong Kong and MFN, he has most recently emphasized that the risks of such linkage are far greater than the potential benefits.

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BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

2013-0449-M (5.14)  
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The British have welcomed the Administration's initiative on Bosnia, which they see as reflecting their own views and concerns. John Major comes to Washington eager to do all he can to help it succeed.

The British have consistently argued that the West has little choice but to support the Vance/Owen plan, however flawed it may be. In recent weeks they urged that the United States and NATO play a larger role in reaching and implementing a Vance/Owen brokered settlement, including providing troops. Our initiative addressed both these points, much to John Major's satisfaction.

The U.S. initiative also put off the kind of action London most dreads - use of force, such as air strikes against Serb targets. London fears that such action would trigger reprisal against UN (including British) troops on the ground, the collapse of the humanitarian effort, and eventual irresistible pressure for massive Western intervention. The British believe that once in, the West would be a long time getting out. They were vastly relieved that their warnings were heard in Washington, and encouraged that the new Administration is ready to consider contributing more militarily to peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts. As you recall from your telephone conversation with Major, the British are not wildly enthusiastic about proceeding to get an enforcement resolution for the NFZ over Bosnia. We have tried to address their concerns via NATO planning, but have not been wholly successful. As we move more aggressively in New York to win passage of the NFZ enforcement resolution, we will have to take care that the British (with the French, Russians, and others) not torpedo our efforts.

Since Yugoslavia erupted in open fighting in 1991, the British have doubted the ability of outsiders to help solve the crisis. Still, Britain agreed with its more activist EC partners that the Community should take the lead in the effort to broker a settlement. When the EC proved unequal to the task, HMG as EC President launched the August 1992 London Conference on Yugoslavia to regenerate a peace process, this time with deeper UN involvement. The British continue to work actively in the UN to resolve the Greek-Macedonian impasse.

So long as the fighting is confined to the former Yugoslavia, London sees no national interests directly at stake. But domestic pressure to "do something" plus EC considerations (and U.S. pressure for an "all necessary means" resolution in the UN) prompted HMG to deploy some 2,500 soldiers to Bosnia. Britain is among the largest troop contributors in ex-Yugoslavia, and operates in one of the toughest areas.

The British response to our proposal to conduct air drops in Eastern Bosnia has been muted. A British contribution to the

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operation is probably not in the cards, but they will give the initiative their public endorsement. London's ambivalence to air drops is consistent with the British unease with much of the international reaction to the crisis in Bosnia. In their view, each step that increases international involvement only brings us all closer to full involvement in the fighting with no obvious way out. Thus, while they will lend verbal support bilaterally and through NATO to our initiative, we can expect that they will also act as a quiet 'conscience' to curb, where they think they can, undirected energies to "do something."

Defense Secretary Rifkind, with military and Tory backbench support, strongly opposes any UK military engagement beyond humanitarian relief. Contributing to a peacekeeping effort in support of a brokered agreement would be a hard decision in London. Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd say they will need close consultations with Washington if they are to overcome Rifkind's resistance. NATO leadership, and commitment of U.S. ground troops, is probably a necessary precondition to further British military involvement in ex-Yugoslavia.

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## G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

This year's Economic Summit will take place in Tokyo July 7-9. Economic issues will be a major focus of the agenda (macro policies and growth, trade, economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, and relations with developing countries). Foreign and Finance Ministers will attend.

-- EC President Delors recently called for an early G-7 Summit to consider measures to stimulate economic growth. The Japanese strongly oppose this.

The agenda will also feature political issues (e.g., FSU, ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq) and cross-border issues such as global environmental concerns, terrorism, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and human rights. Summit preparations are handled through a network of parallel "Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and political directors meetings involving State, Treasury, NSC and other USG agencies. The Sherpas prepare the draft Summit communique (economic declaration) and the political directors prepare the political declaration. The Summit provides a unique opportunity for frank, informal exchanges at the chief of state/head of government level, but the rigidity of a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes precludes such exchanges.

To show Western support for reform, Soviet/Russian leaders have been invited to join the Summit after formal meetings, Gorbachev in 1991 and Yeltsin in 1992. Although we and the Europeans are pressing Japan to invite Yeltsin, Japan is reluctant to do so because of the dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands. The Japanese say, however, that the final decision on inviting Yeltsin rests with all members of the G-7.

Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Summit countries also meet several times a year. Their work often contributes to the Summit, and the Summit sometimes tasks this G-7 group on particular issues.

### British Concerns

Following this fall's suspension of the British pound from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and its subsequent depreciation, Prime Minister Major called for greater G-7 monetary policy coordination, a position he may push during the run-up to the Summit.

Prime Minister Major has argued for a less formal, more flexible Summit that meets less frequently. Japan is resisting changing the format for Tokyo, but may agree to streamlining it in 1994.

The British have indicated they will press for a G-7 statement on the Rushdie affair which declares Iran's decree against Rushdie "contrary to international law."

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THE UK AND AFRICA

The UK remains our most reliable partner on major African issues and crises. Although sub-Saharan Africa has slid down the UK agenda in recent years as other issues came to the fore, the British remain serious players in a dozen African countries, including virtually all the major countries (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Mozambique) of most interest to us. British commercial interests in the first four dwarf ours (over one billion pounds of direct investment in Kenya and Nigeria and nearly four billion pounds in South Africa) and their political ties run deep.

Southern Africa

The U.S. and UK hold similar views and have coordinated closely on the three major southern Africa issues, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

Civil war resumed in Angola in late 1992 after UNITA rejected the September 29-30 election results. UNITA is pressing its military advantage; an immediate ceasefire is unlikely. The second round of direct talks between the government and UNITA has been delayed while both sides attempt to improve their bargaining position through success on the battlefield. The UK has told us it considers its evenhanded approach has been unproductive and now intends to be more openly supportive of the government. HMG would like us to recognize it.

In Mozambique, despite delays in the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces (ONUMOZ), the cease-fire is holding and food relief is getting to needy areas. The U.S. and UK participate in several UN-chaired commissions overseeing the peace accord. We are now considering a UN request for a U.S. engineer battalion for ONUMOZ. The British, with the French and Portuguese, will train the new, unified Mozambican military.

The South African Government (SAG) and the African National Congress (ANC) are making progress in bilateral talks on the process and timetable for negotiating South Africa's transition to nonracial democracy. However, large gaps remain over key issues such as powersharing and federalism. The SAG and ANC hope to resume multi-party negotiations in March and hold the country's first democratic election within a year. It is unclear whether Inkatha leader Buthelezi will join the negotiations. Political violence remains widespread, although the major South African parties agree that the UN and other international observers have been a very positive factor. Meanwhile, the economy continues to deteriorate, resulting in a nearly 50% unemployment rate among blacks.

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The UK has provided approximately \$60 million toward humanitarian relief in Somali since January 1992. While the UK has not furnished ground forces to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), it has deployed 90 airmen and two C-130s to support coalition transport operations in Somalia.

The British prefer American replacements for departing UN Special Representative Kittani as well as relief coordinator Johnston. HMG also supports the idea of "seconding" professional staff from U.S. and UK diplomatic and development agencies as a means of strengthening UN operations in Somalia.

The UK strongly backs us on the need for a Security Council resolution giving UNOSOM II an expanded mandate in Somalia, including flexible rules of engagement. Overseas Development Minister, Baroness Lynda Chalker, deserves our thanks for convincing Kenyan President Moi to agree "in principle" to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces on the Kenyan side of the Kenya/Somalia border. This could prevent incursions into Somalia by forces reportedly loyal to former Somali dictator Siad Barre.

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TARIFF RECLASSIFICATION OF  
MULTIPURPOSE VEHICLES (RANGE ROVERS)

The Administration is reviewing the tariff classification of four-door multipurpose vehicles, including minivans and possibly the Range Rover. Reclassifying these vehicles as trucks rather than automobiles would raise the tariff applied from 2.5% to 25%. Range Rover claims the tariff increase would add \$7,000 to the \$42,000 cost of each of the 3400-3500 Range Rovers sold in the U.S. annually. The British and EC are aware of the issue and are actively lobbying against it. Both have threatened to challenge any reclassification as a violation of U.S. GATT obligations.

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SPRINT'S APPLICATIONS TO BUILD  
TELEPHONE NETWORK IN THE UK

In November 1991, the British Government issued a White Paper opening the UK telecommunications market. Consistent with this new policy, Sprint, in January 1992, applied for permission to build and operate a national network in the UK and to connect this network to a Sprint owned international network. This would allow Sprint to offer end-to-end service on Sprint facilities.

Early discussions with HMG were promising. However, after the April 1992 elections, the new political leadership at the Department of Trade and Industry began to raise objections to Sprint's application to own and operate international circuits. Instead, they have suggested that Sprint lease international circuits from either of the UK carriers, British Telecom or Mercury. Sprint contends that this would place them at a competitive disadvantage and makes their investment in a UK domestic network highly questionable.

The United States has allowed Mercury's parent company, Cable and Wireless, to construct and operate a network in the United States. C&W is authorized to own and operate its own facilities between the United States and Canada, our largest telecommunications trading partner. C&W has applications pending before the FCC to own and operate facilities between the United States and the UK and Hong Kong.

There is an imbalance between the way the USG has treated the UK company, and HMG is treating Sprint. To achieve a balance, HMG should, at a minimum, be prepared to grant the U.S. applicant the right to operate internationally between the UK and the U.S., Britain's largest telecommunications trading partner.

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Status of Maastricht Ratification in the UK

In December 1991, EC leaders agreed at a summit in Maastricht, Netherlands, to a broad-ranging treaty which will, if ratified, move Europe toward deeper integration and broader membership.

- Denmark's rejection of the Maastricht treaty in a referendum last June fueled opposition in the UK. Major, who supports the treaty, is caught between the right of his own party and the opposition Labor Party.
- Denmark votes again May 18 on the basis of a special agreement intended to meet public concern about loss of sovereignty.
- Most believe that the UK parliament will ratify the treaty, assuming the Danish referendum succeeds. But it will be a difficult process in any case and could go either way.
- All three UK parliamentary parties, including a majority of Conservatives, support it in principle. Major has staked his personal prestige, if not his government, on ratification.
- If the Danes reject it a second time, however, the UK will probably not ratify either, setting off an EC constitutional crisis.
- European integration would probably continue but at a slower, more uneven pace and in a different format.

Britain's Place in the EC

Major has moved the debate about Britain's place in Europe from Thatcher's intransigent rhetoric to a general acceptance of a more activist and engaged European policy while at the same time retaining opt-outs on monetary and social issue provisions of the Maastricht treaty.

- Major used the EC Presidency role during the latter half of 1992 to successfully advance the UK's concept of the EC.
- With the agreement reached at the Edinburgh Summit last December to begin negotiations to admit Sweden, Austria and Finland to the EC, and to eventually admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the UK got its sought-after widening of the EC. The prospects for the more federal vision of the Community, most closely associated with the French, are now much less certain.

-- As Britain becomes "a better European," more closely tied to the EC, the UK will be less able to break ranks with its EC colleagues on issues of importance to us. This dynamic can already be seen in the UK's position on such issues as the recognition of Macedonia where its position has been circumscribed by its EC allegiance.

## Britain and European Security Architecture

Britain has been one of our most active allies in trying to ensure that the development of a European security and defense identity not bring about a rupture in trans-atlantic relations, or, at a minimum, foster an inward-looking America. The British have a second set of concerns as well: proving their European bona fides by demonstrating to the French, Germans and others that Europe should take action in the security and defense field, while trying to ensure that we remain committed to a strong NATO, and a significant (e.g., 100,000) U.S. troop presence in Europe. British policy has been manifested through its relations with the French in NATO, actions in the West European Union (WEU), attitude toward the Franco-German corps, and support for expanding NATO membership.

**Dealing With the French.** The British see an evolution in French security policy vis a vis NATO, and, despite the difficulties in dealing with the French in the NATO context, prefer to see as much work as possible done in cooperation with the French. This is particularly important to them (and to us) given French willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations -- an increasingly important role for NATO.

**WEU.** The British supported the WEU's move from London to Brussels (last month) and its embryonic planning activities. That said, they insist on close ties between WEU and NATO (they have dual-hatted their NATO ambassador to the WEU), and want full transparency in planning. Their view is that, when serious security issues are at stake (e.g., contingency planning toward enforcing the No-Fly-Zone) NATO must take priority over the WEU.

**Franco-German Corps.** The British pushed very hard to ensure that this corps would not form the nucleus of an independent European army with only minimal ties to NATO. They were satisfied with the successful negotiations (conclude last month) between SACEUR and the French and German militaries which tied the corps to NATO. (They were also pleased with the close coordination with us in resolving this dispute.

**NATO Membership.** The British are on record as favoring an expansion of NATO membership to keep pace with the likely expansion of the EC and the WEU. They see this is a slow, gradual process, and over the last year discussed quietly with us the idea of using the same criteria used in accepting new members into the EC/WEU as for NATO. The debates over Maastricht which have focused EC attention on deepening its unity (rather than broadening its membership) have put these plans on hold.

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BRITISH DEFENSE POSTURE CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Despite Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's characterization of the UK as "primarily a middle-ranking European power," Britain, alone among our allies, is a strategic nuclear power, a full and major military partner in NATO, and a substantial military power with worldwide commitments. The British are determined to remain our closest partner and are predisposed to enlist with us when trouble brews. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union has created familiar pressures to cut back the military, a process now painfully underway in the UK.

Nuclear weapons, seen as the ultimate guarantor of Britain's security, have so far escaped the budget-cutting ax, but British conventional forces have not. By the mid-1990's, army manpower will drop from 145,400 to 116,000. UK troops in Germany will plunge from a full corps to little more than a division. Air Force manpower will be trimmed, and the Royal Navy's total of 47 frigates and destroyers will shrink to 40 or fewer.

Although the government has recently reluctantly bowed to strong Parliamentary pressure to retain some army units scheduled for elimination (much of the pressure arises from sentimental attachment to historic regiments), the planned reductions will stretch a UK military whose commitments are growing, at least in the short term. Almost 20,000 British troops are deployed to Northern Ireland; another 5,000 are now committed -- either on the ground or in a support role -- to the Bosnia crisis.

UK officials assert that modernization will compensate for smaller conventional forces, but we believe that both operational flexibility and effectiveness could suffer. That matters to us: as the British showed in the Gulf, they are the ally most likely to join in with a major military contribution -- including ground troops -- when it counts. The British recognize the value of coalition-type operations (such as policing the no-fly zones over Iraq) and are usually willing to contribute.

But with limited assets, London now has to set priorities on its deployments, and future U.S. requests for even small contributions from the UK might prove more difficult. For example, Britain virtually opted out of "Restore Hope" in Somalia. Even if peacekeeping and other contingency operations pass the means test, they will face tougher political scrutiny. Growing UN demands for peacekeeping forces have triggered a debate in the UK about the use of British forces for non-traditional defense roles. Defense Secretary Rifkind is adamant that UK forces will not expand their role in Bosnia beyond the present humanitarian relief one. Although Foreign Secretary Hurd recently reaffirmed that Britain will do its part, he and other senior British leaders will prove ever warier about committing UK forces, especially if the commitment seems open-ended or ill-defined.

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THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on November 15, 1985 by PM Thatcher and PM Garret Fitzgerald. It can be seen as essentially giving Ireland an agreed role in the affairs of the North (and thus a voice in protecting the Catholic community there) in return for an affirmation that the status of Northern Ireland will only be changed in accord with the will of its inhabitants. Ireland gains its role in the North through the Intergovernmental Conference, which meets about once every six weeks at the level of Irish Foreign Minister-British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to discuss political, security, and legal matters and cross-border cooperation. In general, the Irish use the meetings to raise concerns about discrimination against Catholics and problems in the administration of justice (use of excess force, harassment by cooperation in fighting terrorism. For the U.S. the Anglo-Irish Agreement has the advantage of getting the GOI and HMG speaking to (not shouting at) each other - thereby making relations with two close friends easier.

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**ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT**

**ARTICLE 1**

**The two Governments**

(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;

(b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland;

(c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.

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## THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

The Fund was established in 1986 as a way of showing U.S. support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Since then, the U.S. Congress has appropriated \$210 million for the Fund. Other donors are Canada, New Zealand and the EC. The former have given small amounts; the EC has been contributing about \$18 million annually since 1989. The Fund concentrates on employment programs, training, and the encouragement of private enterprise in Northern Ireland and in six border counties of the Republic. Increasingly it is focussing on disadvantaged areas, such as West Belfast and remote towns along the border. Because of financial constraints, a sense that the Fund had sufficient funds for the projects identified, and a belief that other donors could do more, the Executive Branch did not itself propose appropriations for the Fund in recent years. The initiative has come for the Congress (particularly the House of Representatives) while appropriate nearly \$20 million yearly.

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## BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Along with other Europeans, the British often show greater sympathy to Arab positions than to Israel's, particularly regarding the occupied territories. This reflects traditional British links to the Arab world, plus the influence of Foreign Office Arabists.

Nevertheless, the UK strongly supports the U.S.-brokered Arab-Israeli peace process. It has, for example, followed our lead on the Palestinian deportees issued, while informally looking for ways to check unhelpful activity at the UN. The British back us in demanding balanced treatment of Israel in UN resolutions, and they have worked to shape EC (particularly French) designs on the peace process to meet U.S. concerns. They are, however, just as insistent as the French and others that Europe's security, political and economic interest entitle the EC to a prominent seat at the table.

The moderate British approach to the PLO offers some advantages to us. London maintains contact through the British Embassy in Tunisia and through an individual in London who calls himself the PLO representative, but who has no official standing. These channels enable the FCO, at our behest, to urge moderation on Palestinian negotiators, the PLO and Arab governments.

HMG does not advocate a Palestinian state and regards the PLO only as an umbrella organization expressing Palestinian identity and aspirations. Despite strong FCO interest at both the working and the political level, the British have deferred to our wish to put off ministerial-level contacts with the PLO.

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PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES

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When Israel announced its package of measures to resolve the deportation issue on Feb 1, Britain insisted that Israel should comply fully with UNSCR 799.

The Foreign Office agreed with us that reinvigorating the peace process should be the top priority, but they doubted that Rabin had offered enough to enable the Palestinians to return to the negotiations.

The British supported the scenario worked out at the Security Council February 12, in which the SC President obtained the Council's approval to convey five points to the Israeli representative. The British Perm Rep played a helpful role.

- The British now agree that the deportation issue is behind us and that we should focus on moving forward in the peace process.
- Britain remains concerned at Palestinian rejection of the Council's actions and would support further Israeli gestures to the Palestinians.

As Hamas-sponsored terrorist attacks on Israelis continue, we doubt Rabin is inclined to offer anything further to the Palestinians at this time.

Britain could usefully employ its contacts with the PLO to urge the Palestinians not to allow Hamas and other opponents of the peace process to block the negotiations.

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U.S. policy toward Iran has focused on altering Iranian behavior in key areas - terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threats to its neighbors, and human rights - through specific sanctions and public condemnation.

- Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism we face today. Iranian agents assassinate Iranian dissidents residing abroad. Iran also provides vital support to terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, and seeks to expand its ties to radical Islamist groups in North Africa.
- Iran is pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. It also seeks to acquire other destabilizing weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines, with which it could threaten its neighbors.
- Iran's dismal human rights record includes summary imprisonment and executions, and a denial of basic legal rights.
- We seek broad international support to make our pressures more effective, in the belief that Iran will change its policies only if the economic or political price is high.

The U.K. shares our concerns and has worked closely with us in developing a common G-7 political approach on Iran and on seeking to coordinate G-7 export control policies. It has been more willing than many in the G-7 to use political and economic pressures to change Iranian behavior.

But Britain's policy toward Iran is torn between political and economic interests. Government and Parliamentary concerns about Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, Iran's arms buildup and the "fatwah" against author Salman Rushdie have confined relations to a low level. The Iranian market's attraction to British business argues for better relations. The result is a certain ambivalence. For example, the UK has pushed hard for a tough EC line against Iranian support for terrorism, while arguing that our latest G-7 proposals on export controls are excessive. However, following Britain's "arms to Iraq" scandal, the government reviewed export policy and has announced new, tighter regulations closer to our own.

The British have also been more outspoken on Rushdie's behalf and will ask you to do so too.

Security Council sanctions (aviation and arms embargoes) imposed last year are having an impact, but Libya has not complied with Resolutions 731 and 748.

- Libya continues to delay and search for private channels to negotiate new terms.
- It has taken only a few cosmetic, easily reversible steps such as closing some terrorist training camps.

The Security Council resolutions require Libya to turn over the indicated Pan Am bombing suspects for trial in the U.S. or UK, cooperation with the French on the UTA bombing, compensate victims and cut its ties to terrorism.

The Security Council will next review sanctions in mid-April.

- The U.S., UK and France said publicly in November that if Libya did not comply, new steps might soon need to be taken.

A new sanction not affecting oil revenues would be unlikely to sway Libya, but it will be difficult to get an oil-related sanction through the Security Council.

- The Palestinian deportation issue and Bosnia have heightened the sense among many Third World states that the West has a double standard on resolutions involving Muslim states.
- Some Western European allies (e.g., Spain, Italy, Germany) are heavy purchasers of Libyan oil.

We are in close contact with the British and French, and all options remain open.

- The British believe a full embargo on Libyan oil may be too difficult, but they would probably support an effort to get an embargo on shipment of oil technology to Libya. Over a year or so, such an embargo, if rigorously enforced, would severely restrict Libya's ability to produce oil.
- If we seek an oil sanction, we will need to launch a major diplomatic campaign in March. The first step will be full coordination with the British and French, followed by consultation with other Council members.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

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Background

Many of the non-aligned and others support expansion in the number of the Security Council's permanent members. Japan, Germany, and several others aspire to permanent seats. We would support permanent seats for Germany and Japan, but expanding the Council without diminishing its operational effectiveness will be difficult.

We would want to avoid too large an expansion. At its last session, the General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution on equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council. The resolution asks member states to submit comments on the issue to the SYG prior to June 30 and for the SYG to report on the matter to the next UNGA. There is no consensus among UN members about how to manage expansion. Disagreement also exists over whether permanent members should have the veto.

British Views

Not surprisingly, the British are unenthusiastic about making changes in the Security Council. Foreign Secretary Hurd responded to a question recently on the subject with the retort, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

Prime Minister Major relayed this mood of caution in private comments he made to our Ambassador in India last month. Major noted that if Germany tried to become a permanent SC member, the developing world would object seriously to three permanent seats going to Western Europe. He predicted that the U.S. would not be pleased with the nature of French-German cooperation on the Council. Major indicated he would support Japan coming on alone. Major cautioned that the U.S. (and UK) should avoid casting a veto (against Japan) but feared China and Russia might eventually do so.

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THE FALKLANDS

Foreign Secretary Hurd's January visit to Argentina, the first by a British cabinet secretary since the 1982 Falklands War, marked an important step in normalizing UK-Argentina relations. Although both countries continue to claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (the U.S. is neutral on the issue), the UK and Argentina in 1990 agreed to disagree about their competing claims and not let it affect progress on other issues negatively. This so-called "sovereignty umbrella" paved the way for the UK and Argentina to reestablish diplomatic relations three years ago. By pushing the sovereignty issue aside, the two countries have been able to seek solutions to other sources of bilateral friction, chiefly oil exploration and fishing rights in the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands.

Despite the improvement in relations, the UK continues its embargo, established during the Falklands War, of arms sales to Argentina. In recognition of Argentina's return to democracy and improved human rights record, the U.S. resumed limited arms sales to Argentina in 1983.

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CYPRUS

Now that the Cypriot Presidential elections have been decided, the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations, in recess since mid-November, can again go forward, although newly-elected President Clerides has stated his intention to consult first with the Greeks -- consultations which might slip the UN schedule for talks.

- The U.S. told both sides we expect them to return to New York as agreed in March and to be ready to make the decisions necessary to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
- Glafcos Clerides's victory in the February 14 Cypriot presidential election may well cause a temporary delay while he gets organized and puts his stamp on the UN proceedings. However, he may be able to make up lost time later due to his greater influence with Parliament and with this community. His anti-UN "set of ideas" campaign posturing will give way rapidly to a more pragmatic approach for which he is known.
- Turkey will have to put a great deal of pressure on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash if he is to be brought into line. The UK, as a respected European power and a member of the EC can and should dangle political and economic bait in front of the Turks to motivate them to lever Denktash into position.

The U.S. and the UK have cooperated closely throughout the UN-sponsored talks.

- On February 19, U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator John Maresca met in London with his counterparts to discuss possible approaches to the next round of UN negotiations.

The U.S. and the UK agree on confidence-building measures (CBM's), which were recommended by Boutros-Ghali and unanimously endorsed by the Security Council (UNSCR 789). The U.S. position was conveyed to all parties: CBM's are not a package; each side should start implementing at least some CBM's even before the talks resume; and implementation of CBM's is not a precondition for resumption of the talks and should not distract the parties from the talks.

The UK has announced that it will reduce its troop commitment to UNFICYP by 50 percent and has begun the first (25%) stage of that reduction. This, along with the already completed total withdrawal by Finland and the planned Canadian total withdrawal (mid-1993) will reduce UNFICYP strength from 2,400 in mid-1992 to below 1,000.

- The UN Secretariat has consulted troop contributors on how UNFICYP's organization and mission will be changed.
- The UK (which still has Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) is taking a leading role in these consultations.

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## YELTSIN AND THE STYLE OF RUSSIAN POLITICS

This note examines the background to Yeltsin's problems with the Russian parliament, and makes some suggestions.

The old Soviet Union was a system of networking *par excellence*. Those who rose to the top were very skilled politicians indeed.

The formal structures of the Soviet Union - the "most democratic Constitution in history", a directly elected Supreme Soviet, a Government with a Prime Minister and the normal complement of Ministers, a network of elected local bodies, and a full panoply of courts - all mimicked the institutions of a modern liberal state. They were all of course a sham.

The real network of power was the Communist Party, its Regional Secretaries, its Central Committee, the Politburo, and - with near dictatorial power - the General Secretary. Its "leading role" was enshrined in Brezhnev's revised constitution. But from the start it rigged every election, approved every appointment in industry as well as the administration, shadowed the Government at each turning. Whatever the formal appearances, nobody in the Soviet Union was ever in any doubt about where the real power lay.

Russia has no tradition of constitutional limits on the power of the executive, or of the rule of law: the Russian Chief of Police said in the 1830s that "Laws are written for underlings, not for their bosses". The central political proposition is that of autocracy ("tempered by assassination", as a 19th century observer remarked). Both the Tsars and the General Secretaries were careful to ensure that none of their advisers could combine to limit their power. They surrounded themselves with cronies - the Tsar's courtiers, Stalin's Georgian mafia, Brezhnev's Ukrainians - and deliberately set out to provoke rivalry amongst their entourage. There was no orderly system of Cabinet, nor even a properly organised secretariat for the autocrat himself. Business was conducted on the basis of personal relationships, intrigue in smoke filled rooms, and - in this century - with the bullet and on the telephone.

During the Communist period the Party structure provided a ready-made basis for networking throughout the country. It served for the conduct of corrupt business as well as politics. The typical Russian political phenomenon - in politics and in business - is the antechamber full of petitioners. It is the atmosphere which surrounded a mediaeval or Middle Eastern monarch. For all his break with the past, Gorbachev's style was merely a comparatively benign version of the way in which previous General Secretaries had run the Soviet Union.

Yeltsin, who is the same age as Gorbachev, grew up in the same tradition. His career differed little from that of any other Party bureaucrat: powerful regional boss, brought to Moscow in mid-career by the whim of the General Secretary, bringing his cronies with him from Sverdlovsk. His political style at that time was old-fashioned: bullying, impetuous, autocratic. To get where he did, he must have used the techniques of Communist networking as

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well as the next man. But his challenge to the Politburo in 1987, and Gorbachev's unprecedented willingness to let him retain a political foothold in Moscow, marked a crucial break with the Russian and Communist political tradition, which has never admitted the concept of a loyal opposition. Bukharin once remarked: "Of course we could have a two party system in Russia: but one party would be in power, and the other in prison". Gorbachev's reluctant willingness to accept that this tradition could change may turn out to be one of his main achievements.

Yeltsin played his role as leader of the "loyal opposition" from 1987 to 1991 with great skill. He was the object of a black propaganda campaign by Gorbachev designed to show that he was an irresponsible and erratic drunk. Not all the accusations were unjustified. But he was successful in distancing himself increasingly from the Party and appealing to Russian patriotic sentiment, while avoiding capture by the forces of virulent chauvinism and anti-Semitism which in Russia are never far below the surface. Ordinary Russians loved him precisely because he got drunk, fell into rivers, and hated the Communists - just like they did.

The problem today is that the decay of the networks provided by the Communist Party state within a state has not yet been matched by the growth of robust new political organisations on a national scale. At one time Gorbachev toyed with the idea of splitting the Communist Party into its liberal and conservative fractions, thus creating the basis of a two party system. The reactionaries within the Party prevented him; while the liberal politicians surrounding him - Shevarnadze, Yakovlev and others - failed to ally themselves effectively with the democrats who had got together into loose political groupings distinguished more by common anti-Communist rhetoric than by practicable common policy programmes.

Yeltsin has found the problem of politicking in the post-Communist world as difficult as Gorbachev did. There are no set structures and none of the organisational discipline formerly imposed by the rigid hierarchies of the Party: only the struggle for dominance between individuals and groups, and between Moscow and the provinces. Ever since Yeltsin came to power at the end of 1991 people have suggested forming a "President's party", or an effective democratic party, which could articulate and push through a coherent policy of reform. During the Congress last December Yeltsin announced that he would now set up such party.

Nothing has yet come of it, for reasons which run deep. First, and most important, the lack of a democratic tradition means that Russians have no experience of setting up parties rather than conspiracies. The democratic experiment before the First World War failed partly because the democratic parties spent most of their time quarrelling with one another: the democratic groupings in the Supreme Soviet are doing the same. Second, many Russians rationalise this failure on the grounds that Russia has had too much Party government in the last seventy years, and that any attempt to create an effective new party will therefore be deeply unpopular.

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The essence of the constitutional struggle in Russia at present is rather different: it is whether the future political system should be "Presidential" or "Parliamentary". There is an analogy with the struggle between King and Parliament in England in the 17th century: it was only after this issue had been settled in favour of Parliament that modern political parties began to emerge in Britain. The same could be true in Russia.

In this contest, Yeltsin has not been ineffective. Like Gorbachev he certainly spends a good deal of time - perhaps too much - meeting people influential in current Russian politics. Operating through the "President's men" in the Supreme Soviet he has at least held his own with his main opponent, the Parliamentary speaker Khasbulatov. He remains vulnerable to biased and random advice from his cronies. He has recently sacked some of the most unpopular. But he still cannot rely on a coherent and effective body of support within the Supreme Soviet, and his popular appeal is inevitably diminishing as life in Russia gets harder. His position may not be much restored even if the people support Presidential government in the referendum in April, and even if the Parliamentary elections in 1995 sweep out the Communist old guard who were elected in 1990.

#### **What can we do to help?**

What follows is based on the assumption that it is in the West's interest that Russia should not descend into chaos, or reconstitute itself under an authoritarian and potentially aggressive regime.

Genuine political and economic progress in Russia depend on fundamental changes in the political culture. But significant qualitative change is already occurring: the people are now almost universally literate, they live in cities instead of villages, and they are in contact with the outside world through travel, television, radio, and the press. There is a great difference between the Soviet Union in Khrushchev's time and Russia today. Despite the difficulties Russia now faces, all this provides some ground for hope that Russia may indeed be at the beginning of an historic process of modernisation and that a reversion to old patterns of authoritarianism - the nightmare of liberal Russians - will be averted.

There is not all that much that foreigners can do to promote institutional change directly, and not much we can do to teach Yeltsin about political infighting in Moscow. The Russians are if anything getting too much advice. The ultra nationalists claim that the reformers are selling out to the West, which is simply exploiting Russia's present weakness for its own ends. There is the risk of a backlash.

But that does not mean we have to stand idly by. Western political mechanisms cannot of course be applied directly even in a changing Russian reality. But good and tactfully managed schemes are already in place: to give the ablest younger Russians - the rising politicians as well as journalists, academics, and people from the infant world of Russian commerce and finance - the opportunity to work and study in the West; to provide technical

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assistance and training programmes in Russia itself; and to offer discreet advice on Parliamentary and political management. One such scheme - on the reorganisation of central government machinery - draws on expertise from several European countries and had the backing of Yeltsin's Chief of Staff, Yuri Petrov, who has unfortunately recently been sacked. Another modest scheme is successfully helping the Russians to set up a nationwide employment service: vital when economic reform inevitably brings unemployment in its wake. Such schemes need to be multiplied, not only in Moscow but in the provinces as well.

The West must also continue to support the economic reform. This involves not only the provision of humanitarian aid (a short term alleviation of the hardship which reform brings), financial assistance, and debt relief. It also requires policy advice which takes full account of the Russian reality. Some of the advice which has been provided hitherto, by the IMF and others, has been dangerously superficial in its concentration on macroeconomic issues and its failure to grapple with the hideous difficulty of dismantling the Soviet Union's rustbowl defence industry. This accounted for a substantial proportion of the Soviet economy. An orderly scheme of restructuring, offering the hope of alternative employment to the millions of skilled and unskilled people who work in the sector, is a political as well as an economic imperative. The failure by Gaidar and his Western advisers to propose a convincing scheme helped to give the reactionaries their chance at the recent Congress. Western governments, who find it hard enough to dismantle their own rustbowl industries, should be well able to appreciate the underlying politics.

More broadly, we need to help the reformers in Russia demonstrate to their reactionary critics that cooperation with the West is not turning Russia into a mere satellite. It is very important that we should treat Russia as a great, if not a super, power; that we should ensure that Russia is seen to be fully involved in the international decisionmaking process on the great issues such as Bosnia and Iraq; and that the Russian leadership - particularly Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Defence Minister Grachev - should be seen by their own people to be treated as full equals by their Western counterparts. Gorbachev was greatly damaged in his last year in power by the popular perception in Russia that he had become a mendicant of the West.

London, 12 January 1993

Sir Rodric Quentin Braithwaite

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0727 #2  
ADD-ON

February 24, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HONL

SUBJECT: Additional Points for the President's use With  
Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

Points for the President's use on the subject of opening Tuzla  
Airport (Tab A), a discussion paper (Tab B), and a map (Tab C)  
are attached.

Attachments

Tab A Additional Points to be Raised  
Tab B Discussion Paper  
Tab C Map of Bosnia

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

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## Opening Tuzla Airport

London has publicly welcomed the proposed air drop operation, but believes that high altitude parachuting of supplies has limited effectiveness; a longer-term solution must be found for Eastern Bosnia. Opening the airport at Tuzla may offer a partial solution as well as represent a much needed supplement to Sarajevo. The British believe the airport could be opened with engineers (and are willing to share their technical assessments); large-scale security forces would not be required, as the airport is, in their view, reasonably secure.

Major may suggest that the U.S. take the lead in opening and running Tuzla airport, since the British are stretched too thin on the ground.

Our own assessment roughly corresponds to London's. Tuzla is in Muslim hands (in fact, Bosnian Foreign Minister Siladzic has asked the U.S. several times to run an airlift operation into Tuzla). The Serbs, although located in the mountains some 6-8 miles outside the city, are not shelling the town seriously. The airport itself lies about 6 miles south of Tuzla, and we have no reports that it has been shelled (suggesting that it may just lie at the margins of Serb artillery range). The airport has limited infrastructure and no warehouses to speak of; the main runway (C-130 capable) has been cratered, but is now repaired. The road from the airport to Tuzla is good, but roads to other parts of Eastern Bosnia are poor, and at times impassable in winter.


We suggest the President hear Major out and offer to have our military experts meet with theirs to explore the possibilities that Tuzla may offer as well as the effort and risks involved in getting it up and running.

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## UNITED KINGDOM: POLITICAL OVERVIEW



Prime Minister Major visits Washington this month with his country at the bottom of a long and difficult recession and his countrymen in a distinctly uneasy mood. Though the pressure on Major has eased a bit following a seemingly endless string of troubles last fall, stiff challenges still loom:

- Embarrassing inquiries into government handling of coal mine closures and of sales of arms-related equipment to Iraq will soon come to a head.
- In April and May, a new local tax scheme will be introduced. While undoubtedly fairer than the hated "poll tax" it replaces, it will hit hard at Tory constituencies in southern England.
- From now through at least May, several danger points on Maastricht treaty ratification will occur.
- The government must deal with increasing parliamentary concern about British military entanglement in Bosnia.

Major's government will likely muddle through. Unlike Thatcher in 1990, Major gets along well with his Cabinet colleagues, and so far faces no credible challenger. Tory rebels, however much they may want to block Maastricht, do not relish a snap election that Labor might win. But Major also has a majority of only 21, not the 100 or so of the Thatcher years; his whips are only now learning how to handle this reality.

If the government can ride out the Maastricht storm, and limit damage from the inquiries and council tax, it should be able to carry on a full term. (The next general election must be held by April 1997, and is likely to be in spring or autumn 1996.) Economic recovery, plus redistricting, plus Labor's own woes, might well win the Tories an unprecedented fifth election in a row.

Labor should be riding high but it's not. Its morale is certainly better than six months ago, due in no small part to the Democratic win in the U.S. But it has not yet emerged as a truly credible alternative government. It perhaps will not be a serious contender until it reaches the far side of an internal policy debate that has scarcely begun. Like Major, Labor Party leader John Smith is not an inspiring leader, and he has not used the mandate of his sweeping victory in the July leadership election to take command of the party. Smith's gradualist approach to preparing for the next election gives Major some breathing room.

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UNITED KINGDOM  
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK

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The British economy remains weak after three years of recession although industrialists' confidence is improving with some signs of stronger exports. Unemployment reached 10.5% of the labor force in December. Sharp declines in house prices, and fears of job losses, have continued to inhibit consumer spending. Inflation fell to a 1.7% rate in the year to January. Strong speculative pressures forced sterling's departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System September 16. Since early September, sterling has depreciated about 16% against the DM and about 25% against the dollar. Taking the currencies of the UK's trading partners as a whole, sterling has fallen about 13% on a trade-weighted basis. This sterling decline, and the expanding U.S. economy, should improve the UK's export prospects substantially and help an economic recovery to begin later this year. Still, recovery will be modest until the UK's main trading partners in Europe register stronger growth -- an uncertain prospect.

The budget deficit escalated to an estimated 6.7% of GDP in 1992, partly from cyclical factors driving the recession and partly from earlier efforts to stimulate the economy by fiscal policy. The high deficit will severely constrain any effort to use fiscal policy for expansion purposes. Despite the recession, the current account deficit is high too (\$20 billion or 2% of GDP last year), raising fears that even a modest recovery would expand external deficits to even higher levels.

Public dissatisfaction with the economy continues to plague the Major government, and strains have developed within the Conservative majority over such issues as possible tax increases this spring to reduce the budget deficit, and closure of uneconomic coals mines.

With further action to stimulate recovery limited by concerns about sterling, budget deficits and worsening external deficits, the UK is left to hope for recovery elsewhere in Europe (e.g. by an early substantial reduction in German interest rates which could then spread to other countries.

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GATT-URUGUAY ROUND

The Uruguay Round (UR), which involves 108 countries, has been under negotiation since 1986 with U.S. participation authorized by fast track authority that expires June 1. USTR Kantor announced February 11 that the Administration would seek renewal of fast track although details of the request would be decided after consultations with Congress. We are also reviewing our UR negotiating positions.

GATT Director-General Dunkel attempted to accelerate the talks in December 1991 by issuing a draft "Final Act" (DFA), which incorporated agreements already reached and proposed solutions to unresolved issues.

- Most governments will accept the DFA without changes beyond U.S.-EC amendments on agriculture resulting from the November "Blair House Accord." The EC is pressing this approach, although this also wants comprehensive market access agreements, with U.S. concessions, to "balance" the agreement before concluding the Round.

The U.S. position has been that we need substantial progress in market access in goods (including free trade in key sectors), agriculture, and services as well as improvements in the DFA.

- The U.S. agreed to use the DFA as the basis for negotiating a final agreement, but stated that improvements were necessary, especially on antidumping, intellectual property, trade-related environment issues, and the Multilateral Trade organization (MTO).

The UK has worked energetically as an EC member and as EC President in July-December 1992 to complete the UR as soon as possible. While the UK can accept the DFA, it also favors tougher antidumping rules and is the EC country most willing to accommodate U.S. interests. The UK wants the U.S. to reduce "peaks" (i.e. high tariffs on ceramics and textiles) and is prepared to meet our zero-for-zero sector offers (e.g. non-ferrous metals, paper and wood).

- Prime Minister Major can be expected to urge completing the Round as quickly as possible.
- The U.K. and the EC have urged us to limit fast track authority extension to three months in order to maintain needed pressure to conclude the Round.
- The U.K. will resist attempts to reinstate super 301 in fast track renewal due to sensitivity about unilateral U.S. extraterritorial actions.

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*← should it be Super 301 Yes*

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10/3/2014 KBH

RUSSIA

*What is  
Boris Yeltsin  
w/IM  
He needs that  
help, not general  
political reform*

The Russian economy continues to decline. Yeltsin has achieved a number of important accomplishments - monetizing the economy, creating market mechanisms, liberalizing trade, unifying the currency exchange rate, and undertaking an ambitious privatization program - but all of these gains could be swept away by hyperinflation. (Inflation is now running at a monthly rate of about 30 percent.)

Under present economic conditions an IMF stand-by program is not justifiable for Russia. Such a program is a pre-requisite, however, for other forms of financial support, including a \$6 billion currency stabilization fund promised at the G-7 summit last year. Given Russia's need and the inability of producing an IMF standby agreement any time soon, we are currently examining new ways in which we could render aid to Russia.

The new Chernomyrdin government recognizes that stabilizing the economy is its main economic priority, but it will face stiff resistance to its proposed austerity measures from the Supreme Soviet and Central Bank. Parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin, led by speaker Khasbulatov, has continued to chip away at Yeltsin's powers and policies.

Yeltsin had hoped to break both the political and economic impasse by means of a national referendum on constitutional reform to be held April 11. Opposition from parliamentarians as well as regional leaders, fear of abetting separatist tendencies within Russia itself, and uncertainty over the outcome of the vote apparently have forced him, however, to consider other ideas.

Yeltsin has proposed instead early parliamentary and presidential elections during 1994 and 1995 respectively. Unless accompanied by a genuine consensus on economic and constitutional reform, this proposal would continue the current stalemate for the next year with no guarantee that elections would produce a more pliable legislature. Yeltsin, Khasbulatov, and Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin are engaged in negotiations to hammer out a solution to Russia's political crisis. Pressure is increasing on all the participants and the outcome is far from certain. If agreement is reached, an extraordinary session of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies could convene in early March to ratify the agreement.

Absent some renewal of Yeltsin's authority, the Russian domestic and foreign policymaking process will continue to be marked by bureaucratic infighting combined with parliamentary pressures toward greater assertiveness of Russia's prerogatives as a great power. On a number of foreign policy issues (Bosnia,

Iraq, non-proliferation), Yeltsin's margin for maneuver will be constrained.

Despite the pressures, he has shown no sign of abandoning his basic pro-Western orientation.

- Almost since election day, the *R*ussians have been pressing for an early summit.
- The preliminary Russian reaction to our new approach on ex-Yugoslavia has been positive.
- We continue to cooperate closely on arms control. Yeltsin has formally submitted START II to the Supreme Soviet for ratification, and we are working closely with the Russians to persuade the parliament that the treaty is fair and balanced.

The most urgent task in arms control is to obtain fulfillment of the Lisbon Protocol by Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine, which has neither ratified the START I Treaty nor adhered to the NPT, is key here. (Belarus has already approved START and NPT; Kazakhstan has approved START but not yet adhered to the NPT.) We have pressed the Ukrainians to fulfill their commitments under the Lisbon Protocol, and both we and the UK have offered them security assurances and assistance in the dismantlement of strategic arms.

At the same time, we have urged the Russians to amend their own security assurances to Ukraine in order to take account of Ukrainian concerns. We have also insisted that the proceeds of Russian sales to the U.S. of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads be equitably shared with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, something the Russians have resisted.

UK views

(See attached)

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← the former Yugoslavs

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## UK Views

Major is becoming increasingly skeptical of Yeltsin's ability to hold his political opponents at bay, and to continue to implement meaningful economic reform. This sense of a looming crisis has been echoed by his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.

Major will be bringing with him his in-house advisor on the FSU, Sir Rodric Braithwaite (who is also Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and was the UK Ambassador to Moscow from 1988 to 1992). Braithwaite's views of Yeltsin's problems are summed up as follows:

- Russia has no tradition of constitutional limits on the power of the executive or of the rule of law.
- The decay of the Communist party structure has not been offset by the development of new political organizations.
- Yeltsin toyed with the idea of creating a "President's" party, but abandoned it. In Russia, parties are equated with conspiracies. Yeltsin chose instead to use the Russian historical model of "going to the people." Yet, as economic hardships turn into crises, this tactic is losing its effectiveness.

Braithwaite's recommendations to Major are:

- Expand programs whereby younger Russians study and work abroad as a way to help develop a new political culture.
- Provide greater economic technical assistance and training programs in Russia.
- Ensure that the IMF take into account the micro-economic problem facing Russia: the dismantlement of rustbowl defense industries and the need to retrain workers.
- Treat Russia as a great power (if not a super-power) rather than a supplicant. Part of the reason for Gorbachev's downfall was the perception that he was no longer viewed as an equal in the West.

Braithwaite wrote his memorandum as a follow-up to a conversation you had with Major last December. The complete memo is included in your briefing book.

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HONG KONG AND THE UK

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2013-0449-M (5.13)  
3/4/2019 K8H

British officials expect the last five years of their rule in Hong Kong to be among the most difficult in the colony's history. Their goals are:

- to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong through 1997 and beyond;
- to build democratic institutions capable of withstanding expected Chinese pressure after transition;
- to achieve the least disruptive transfer of power possible;
- to maintain the commercial position of British firms in Hong Kong and China; and
- to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a domestic political football in Britain.

These goals have already come into conflict, most notably over Governor Chris Patten's proposals to broaden modestly the franchise of the 1995 elections to the Legislative Council, which will continue to sit when China takes over sovereignty in 1997. Progress towards the smooth transition to PRC sovereignty has also been marred by an ongoing dispute over construction of a new Hong Kong airport.

Beijing reacted vehemently to Patten's proposals, making threats ranging from undoing any changes to annulling contracts made without its consent after 1997. Although the Chinese may only be posturing, the verbal barrage weakens the foundation for a smooth transition, has caused the stock market to reverberate, and has shaken local confidence in Hong Kong's future stability.

Beijing is moving, however, to resume talks with British officials on Hong Kong's future. Coming back to the table represents a major Chinese concession, and will help to defuse the crisis over Patten's proposals. But it is still unclear whether the Chinese are prepared to resume substantive negotiations with Hong Kong officials, or simply plan to use the talks to delay legislative action on Patten's proposals.

Hong Kong, China, and MFN

HMG believes MFN is the wrong tool for trying to remedy human rights abuses in China. The British claim that Hong Kong could lose up to \$16 billion of its overall trade and as many as 60,000 jobs if MFN were suspended. Although Governor Patten has on occasion hinted that he might favor an informal linkage between China's attitude toward Hong Kong and MFN, he has most recently emphasized that the risks of such linkage are far greater than the potential benefits.

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2013-0449-M (5.14)

BRITAIN, THE U.S. AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 10/3/2014 KBH

The British have welcomed the Administration's initiative on Bosnia, which they see as reflecting their own views and concerns. John Major comes to Washington eager to do all he can to help it succeed.

The British have consistently argued that the West has little choice but to support the Vance/Owen plan, however flawed it may be. In recent weeks they urged that the United States and NATO play a larger role in reaching and implementing a Vance/Owen brokered settlement, including providing troops. Our initiative addressed both these points, much to John Major's satisfaction.

The U.S. initiative also put off the kind of action London most dreads - use of force, such as air strikes against Serb targets. London fears that such action would trigger reprisal against UN (including British) troops on the ground, the collapse of the humanitarian effort, and eventual irresistible pressure for massive Western intervention. The British believe that once in, the West would be a long time getting out. They were vastly relieved that their warnings were heard in Washington, and encouraged that the new Administration is ready to consider contributing more militarily to peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts. As you recall from your telephone conversation with Major, the British are not wildly enthusiastic about proceeding to get an enforcement resolution for the NFZ over Bosnia. We have tried to address their concerns via NATO planning, but have not been wholly successful. As we move more aggressively in New York to win passage of the NFZ enforcement resolution, we will have to take care that the British (with the French, Russians, and others) not torpedo our efforts.

Since Yugoslavia erupted in open fighting in 1991, the British have doubted the ability of outsiders to help solve the crisis. Still, Britain agreed with its more activist EC partners that the Community should take the lead in the effort to broker a settlement. When the EC proved unequal to the task, HMG as EC President launched the August 1992 London Conference on Yugoslavia to regenerate a peace process, this time with deeper UN involvement. The British continue to work actively in the UN to resolve the Greek-Macedonian impasse.

So long as the fighting <sup>is</sup> confined to former Yugoslavia, London sees no national interests directly at stake. But domestic pressure to "do something" plus EC considerations (and U.S. pressure for an "all necessary means" resolution in the UN) prompted HMG to deploy some 2,500 soldiers to Bosnia. Britain is among the largest troop contributors in ex-Yugoslavia, and operates in one of the toughest areas.

Defense Secretary Rifkind, with military and Tory backbench support, strongly opposes any UK military engagement beyond

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Yugoslavia*

Defense Secretary Rifkind, with military and Tory backbench support, strongly opposes any UK military engagement beyond

humanitarian relief. Contributing to a peacekeeping effort in support of a brokered agreement would be a hard decision in London. Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd say they will need close consultations with Washington if they are to overcome Rifkind's resistance. NATO leadership, and commitment of U.S. ground troops, is probably a necessary precondition to further British military involvement in ex-Yugoslavia.

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## G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

This year's Economic Summit will take place in Tokyo July 7-9. Economic issues will be a major focus of the agenda (macro policies and growth, trade, economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, and relations with developing countries). Foreign and Finance Ministers will attend.

- EC President Delors recently called for an early G-7 Summit to consider measures to stimulate economic growth. We are evaluating the idea and trying to weigh the views of other prospective participants.

The agenda will also feature political issues (e.g., FSU, ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq) and cross-border issues such as global environmental concerns, terrorism, nuclear safety, non-proliferation and human rights. Summit preparations are handled through a network of parallel "Sherpa," sub-Sherpa and political directors meetings involving State, Treasury, NSC and other USG agencies. The Sherpas prepare the draft Summit communique (economic declaration) and the political directors prepare the political declaration. The Summit provides a unique opportunity for frank, informal exchanges at the chief of state/head of government level, but the rigidity of a "pre-cooked" agenda and communique sometimes precludes such exchanges.

To show Western support for reform, Soviet/Russian leaders have been invited to join the Summit after formal meetings, Gorbachev in 1991 and Yeltsin in 1992. Although we and the Europeans are pressing Japan to invite Yeltsin, Japan is reluctant to do so because of the dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands.

Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Summit countries also meet several times a year. Their work often provides input for the Summit, and the Summit sometimes tasks this G-7 group on particular issues.

### British Concerns

Following this fall's suspension of the British pound from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and its subsequent depreciation, Prime Minister Major called for greater G-7 monetary policy coordination, a position he may push during the run-up to the Summit.

Prime Minister Major has argued for a less formal, more flexible Summit that meets less frequently. Japan is resisting changing the format for Tokyo, but may agree to streamlining it in 1994.

The British have indicated they will press for a G-7 statement on the Rushdie affair which declares Iran's decree against Rushdie "contrary to international law."

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*R G-7  
Should not  
be split.*

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*He saw  
Rushby  
Jeremy Pomeroy*

*Work in a  
brief history of  
Northern Ireland*

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING WITH  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

It is a pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Major to the White House. The ties that bind our two countries are not only those of shared history, culture, and political values, profound as those are. We also share a conviction that our common objectives in the world can best be achieved by working closely together.

*some  
in a personal note,  
my father's memory  
my quotes are  
my days  
at Oxford.*

The Prime Minister and I reviewed the situation in the former Yugoslavia. I expressed to him my admiration for the courage of the British troops serving under U.N. auspices in Bosnia on their life-saving humanitarian mission. I emphasized to him my determination to add the full weight of United States diplomacy to E.C. and U.N. efforts to reach a just and workable settlement in Bosnia, one that will halt ethnic cleansing and prevent that dangerous conflict from spreading.

We agreed on the importance of maintaining high-level attention to the trade

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2013-0449-17

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*Ruby*  
*He saw*  
*Jeremy Corbyn*

*Work in a brief history of Northern Ireland*

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING WITH  
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*at 9/11 a personal note, some of my father's memories, my grandmother are my days at Oxford.*

*Needs to be triple spaced  
One FF per page*

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relationship between our two countries, and between the U.S. and the E.C. We are determined to deal with problems before they become crises. Both of us are keenly aware that the health of our two countries' economies depends in large measure on our ability to compete and participate in a vibrant and increasingly open international trading environment.

We pledged our full efforts to bring the Uruguay Round to a prompt and fair conclusion. We share a desire for an ambitious, equitable Uruguay Round trade agreement that removes trade barriers in agriculture and services as well as industrial products. Such an agreement would provide a powerful impetus to world economic growth, creating exports and jobs in the U.S., the U.K., and around the world.

The Prime Minister and I reviewed a broad range of global issues. I assured the Prime Minister that we remain committed to strong trans-atlantic ties and to efforts in NATO to help address the security challenges we face together. We will continue to work closely to obtain Iraq's compliance with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and to address

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humanitarian needs in the area. We discussed the problems faced by Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union which are bravely struggling to overcome the legacies of economic ruin and political repression under communist rule. \* On these and other issues, I thank the Prime Minister for his candor and his wise counsel.

I place a high premium on the historic and special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. The partnership between our two countries and our two peoples is an enormous strength as we confront the opportunities and the dangers of the post-Cold War era. I am committed to working closely with Prime Minister Major to further our common goals.

\* We discussed ways we could work together to encourage ~~the~~ dialogue and to end the violence in Northern Ireland.

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BRITAIN, MAASTRICHT AND THE EC

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Status of Maastricht Ratification in the UK

In December 1991, EC leaders agreed at a summit in Maastricht, Netherlands, to a broad-ranging treaty which will, if ratified, move Europe toward deeper integration and broader membership.

- Denmark's rejection of the Maastricht treaty in a referendum last June fueled opposition in the UK. Major, who supports the treaty, is caught between the right of his own party and the opposition Labor Party.
- Denmark votes again May 18 on the basis of a special agreement intended to meet public concern about loss of sovereignty.
- Most believe that the UK parliament will ratify the treaty, assuming the Danish referendum succeeds. But it will be a difficult process in any case and could go either way.
- All three UK parliamentary parties, including a majority of Conservatives, support it in principle. Major has staked his personal prestige, if not his government, on ratification.
- If the Danes reject it a second time, however, the UK will probably not ratify either, setting off an EC constitutional crisis.
- European integration would probably continue but at a slower, more uneven pace and in a different format.

Britain's Place in the EC

Major has moved the debate about Britain's place in Europe from Thatcher's intransigent rhetoric to a general acceptance of a more activist and engaged European policy while at the same time retaining opt-outs on monetary and social issue provisions of the Maastricht treaty.

- Major used the EC Presidency role during the latter half of 1992 to successfully advance the UK's concept of the EC.
- With the agreement reached at the Edinburgh Summit last December to begin negotiations to admit Sweden, Austria and Finland to the EC, and to eventually admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the UK got its sough-after widening of the EC. The prospects for the more federal vision of the Community, most closely associated with the French, are now much less certain.

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-- As Britain becomes "a better European," more closely tied to the EC, the UK will be less able to break ranks with its EC colleagues on issues of importance to us. this dynamic can already be seen in the UK's position on such issues as the recognition of Macedonia where its position has been circumscribed by its EC allegiance.

"BARRY2"

## Britain and European Security Architecture

Britain has been one of our most active allies in trying to ensure that the development of a European security and defense identity not bring about a rupture in trans-atlantic relations, or, at a minimum, foster an inward-looking America. The British have a second set of concerns as well: proving their European bona fides by demonstrating to the French, Germans and others that Europe should take action in the security and defense field, while trying to ensure that we remain committed to a strong NATO, and a significant (e.g., 100,000) U.S. troop presence in Europe. British policy has been manifested through its relations with the French in NATO, actions in the West European Union (WEU), attitude toward the Franco-German corps, and support for expanding NATO membership.

**Dealing With the French.** The British see an evolution in French security policy vis a vis NATO, and, despite the difficulties in dealing with the French in the NATO context, prefer to see as much work as possible done in cooperation with the French. This is particularly important to them (and to us) given French willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations -- an increasingly important role for NATO.

**WEU.** The British supported the WEU's move from London to Brussels (last month) and its embryonic planning activities. That said, they insist on close ties between WEU and NATO (they have dual-hatted their NATO ambassador to the WEU), and want full transparency in planning. Their view is that, when serious security issues are at stake (e.g., contingency planning toward enforcing the No-Fly-Zone) NATO must take priority over the WEU.

**Franco-German Corps.** The British pushed very hard to ensure that this corps would not form the nucleus of an independent European army with only minimal ties to NATO. They were satisfied with the successful negotiations (conclude last month) between SACEUR and the French and German militaries which tied the corps to NATO. (They were also pleased with the close coordination with us in resolving this dispute.

**NATO Membership.** The British are on record as favoring an expansion of NATO membership to keep pace with the likely expansion of the EC and the WEU. They see this is a slow, gradual process, and over the last year discussed quietly with us the idea of using the same criteria used in accepting new members into the EC/WEU as for NATO. The debates over Maastricht which have focused EC attention on deepening its unity (rather than broadening its membership) have put these plans on hold.

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THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT

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Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on November 15, 1985 by PM Thatcher and PM Garret Fitzgerald. It can be seen as essentially giving Ireland an agreed role in the affairs of the North (and thus a voice in protecting the Catholic community there) in return for an affirmation that the status of Northern Ireland will only be changed in accord with the will of its inhabitants. Ireland gains its role in the North through the Intergovernmental Conference, which meets about once every six weeks at the level of Irish Foreign Minister-British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to discuss political, security, and legal matters and cross-border cooperation. In general, the Irish use the meetings to raise concerns about discrimination against Catholics and problems in the administration of justice (use of excess force, harassment by cooperation in fighting terrorism. For the U.S. the Anglo-Irish Agreement has the advantage of getting the GOI and HMG speaking to (not shouting at) each other - thereby making relations with two close friends easier.

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## THE INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

The Fund was established in 1986 as a way of showing U.S. support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Since then, the U.S. Congress has appropriated \$210 million for the Fund. Other donors are Canada, New Zealand and the EC. The former have given small amounts; the EC has been contributing about \$18 million annually since 1989. The Fund concentrates on employment programs, training, and the encouragement of private enterprise in Northern Ireland and in six border counties of the Republic. Increasingly it is focussing on disadvantaged areas, such as West Belfast and remote towns along the border. Because of financial constraints, a sense that the Fund had sufficient funds for the projects identified, and a belief that other donors could do more, the Executive Branch did not itself propose appropriations for the Fund in recent years. The initiative has come for the Congress (particularly the House of Representatives) while appropriate nearly \$20 million yearly.

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## BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Along with other Europeans, the British often show greater sympathy to Arab positions than to Israel's, particularly regarding the occupied territories. This reflects traditional British links to the Arab world, plus the influence of Foreign Office Arabists.

Nevertheless, the UK strongly supports the U.S.-brokered Arab-Israeli peace process. It has, for example, followed our lead on the Palestinian deportees issued, while informally looking for ways to check unhelpful activity at the UN. The British back us in demanding balanced treatment of Israel in UN resolutions, and they have worked to shape EC (particularly French) designs on the peace process to meet U.S. concerns. They are, however, just as insistent as the French and others that Europe's security, political and economic interest entitle the EC to a prominent seat at the table.

The moderate British approach to the PLO offers some advantages to us. London maintains contact through the British Embassy in Tunisia and through an individual in London who calls himself the PLO representative, but who has no official standing. These channels enable the FCO, at our behest, to urge moderation on Palestinian negotiators, the PLO and Arab governments.

HMG does not advocate a Palestinian state and regards the PLO only as an umbrella organization expressing Palestinian identity and aspirations. Despite strong FCO interest at both the working and the political level, the British have deferred to our wish to put off ministerial-level contacts with the PLO.

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PALESTINIAN DEPORTEES

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2013-0449-17 (S.27)  
10/3/2014 KBH

When Israel announced its package of measures to resolve the deportation issue on Feb 1, Britain insisted that Israel should comply fully with UNSCR 799.

The Foreign Office agreed with us that reinvigorating the peace process should be the top priority, but they doubted that Rabin had offered enough to enable the Palestinians to return to the negotiations.

The British supported the scenario worked out at the Security Council February 12, in which the SC President obtained the Council's approval to convey five points to the Israeli representative. The British Perm Rep played a helpful role.

- The British now agree that the deportation issue is behind us and that we should focus on moving forward in the peace process.
- Britain remains concerned at Palestinian rejection of the Council's actions and would support further Israeli gestures to the Palestinians.

As Hams-sponsored terrorist attacks on Israelis continue, we doubt Rabin is inclined to offer anything further to the Palestinians at this time.

Britain could usefully employ its contacts with the PLO to urge the Palestinians not to allow Hamas and other opponents of the peace process to block the negotiations.

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IRAN

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U.S. policy toward Iran has focused on altering Iranian behavior in key areas - terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threats to its neighbors, and human rights - through specific sanctions and public condemnation.

- Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism we face today. Iranian agents assassinate Iranian dissidents residing abroad. Iran also provides vital support to terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, and seeks to expand its ties to radical Islamist groups in North Africa.
- Iran is pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. It also seeks to acquire other destabilizing weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines, with which it could threaten its neighbors.
- Iran's dismal human rights record includes summary imprisonment and executions, and a denial of basic legal rights.
- We seek broad international support to make our pressures more effective, in the belief that Iran will change its policies only if the economic or political price is high.

The U.K. shares our concerns and has worked closely with us in developing a common G-7 political approach on Iran and on seeking to coordinate G-7 export control policies. It has been more willing than many in the G-7 to use political and economic pressures to change Iranian behavior.

But Britain's policy toward Iran is torn between political and economic interests. Government and Parliamentary concerns about Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, Iran's arms buildup and the "fatwah" against author Salman Rushdie have confined relations to a low level. The Iranian market's attraction to British business argues for better relations. The result is a certain ambivalence. For example, the UK has pushed hard for a tough EC line against Iranian support for terrorism, while arguing that our latest G-7 proposals on export controls are excessive. However, following Britain's "arms to Iraq" scandal, the government reviewed export policy and has announced new, tighter regulations closer to our own.

The British have also been more outspoken on Rushdie's behalf and will ask you to do so too.

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LIBYA/PAN AM-103

Security Council sanctions (aviation and arms embargoes) imposed last year are having an impact, but Libya has not complied with Resolutions 731 and 748.

- Libya continues to delay and search for private channels to negotiate new terms.
- It has taken only a few cosmetic, easily reversible steps such as closing some terrorist training camps.

The Security Council resolutions require Libya to turn over the indicated Pan Am bombing suspects for trial in the U.S. or UK, cooperation with the French on the UTA bombing, compensate victims and cut its ties to terrorism.

The Security Council will next review sanctions in mid-April.

- The U.S., UK and France said publicly in November that if Libya did not comply, new steps might soon need to be taken.

A new sanction not affecting oil revenues would be unlikely to sway Libya, but it will be difficult to get an oil-related sanction through the Security Council.

- The Palestinian deportation issue and Bosnia have heightened the sense among many Third World states that the West has a double standard on resolutions involving Muslim states.
- Some Western European allies (e.g., Spain, Italy, Germany) are heavy purchasers of Libyan oil.

We are in close contact with the British and French, and all options remain open.

- The British believe a full embargo on Libyan oil may be too difficult, but they would probably support an effort to get an embargo on shipment of oil technology to Libya. Over a year or so, such an embargo, if rigorously enforced, would severely restrict Libya's ability to produce oil.
- If we seek an oil sanction, we will need to launch a major diplomatic campaign in March. The first step will be full coordination with the British and French, followed by consultation with other Council members.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (5.30)  
10/3/2014 KBH

Background

Many of the non-aligned and others support expansion in the number of the Security Council's permanent members. Japan, Germany, and several others aspire to permanent seats. We would support permanent seats for Germany and Japan, but expanding the Council without diminishing its operational effectiveness will be difficult.

We would want to avoid too large an expansion. At its last session, the General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution on equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council. The resolution asks member states to submit comments on the issue to the SYG prior to June 30 and for the SYG to report on the matter to the next UNGA. There is no consensus among UN members about how to manage expansion. Disagreement also exists over whether permanent members should have the veto.

British Views

Not surprisingly, the British are unenthusiastic about making changes in the Security Council. Foreign Secretary Hurd responded to a question recently on the subject with the retort, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

Prime Minister Major relayed this mood of caution in private comments he made to our Ambassador in India last month. Major noted that if Germany tried to become a permanent SC member, the developing world would object seriously to three permanent seats going to Western Europe. He predicted that the U.S. would not be pleased with the nature of French-German cooperation on the Council. Major indicated he would support Japan coming on alone. Major cautioned that the U.S. (and UK) should avoid casting a veto (against Japan) but feared China and Russia might eventually do so.

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## THE FALKLANDS

Foreign Secretary Hurd's January visit to Argentina, the first by a British cabinet secretary since the 1982 Falklands War, marked an important step in normalizing UK-Argentina relations. Although both countries continue to claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (the U.S. is neutral on the issue), the UK and Argentina in 1990 agreed to disagree about their competing claims and not let it affect progress on other issues negatively. This so-called "sovereignty umbrella" paved the way for the UK and Argentina to reestablish diplomatic relations three years ago. By pushing the sovereignty issue aside, the two countries have been able to seek solutions to other sources of bilateral friction, chiefly oil exploration and fishing rights in the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands.

Despite the improvement in relations, the UK continues its embargo, established during the Falklands War, of arms sales to Argentina. In recognition of Argentina's return to democracy and improved human rights record, the U.S. resumed limited arms sales to Argentina in 1983.

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2013-0449-17 (5.32) CYPRUS

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Now that the Cypriot Presidential elections have been decided, the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations, in recess since mid-November, can again go forward

*has not  
decided  
explicitly  
said  
they would  
not*

- The U.S. told both sides we expect them to return to New York as agreed in March and to be ready to make the decisions necessary to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
- Glafcos Clerides's victory in the February 14 Cypriot presidential election may well cause a temporary delay while he gets organized and puts his stamp on the UN proceedings. However, he may be able to make up lost time later due to his greater influence with Parliament and with this community. His anti-UN "set of ideas" campaign posturing will give way rapidly to a more pragmatic approach for which he is known.
- Turkey will have to put a great deal of pressure on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash if he is to be brought into line. The UK, as a respected European power and a member of the EC can and should dangle political and economic bait in front of the Turks to motivate them to lever Denktash into position.

The U.S. and the UK have cooperated closely throughout the UN-sponsored talks.

- On February 19, U.S. Special Cyprus Coordinator John Maresca met in London with his counterparts to discuss possible approaches to the next round of UN negotiations.

The U.S. and the UK agree on confidence-building measures (CBM's), which were recommended by Boutros-Ghali and unanimously endorsed by the Security Council (UNSCR 789). The U.S. position was conveyed to all parties: CBM's are not a package; each side should start implementing at least some CBM's even before the talks resume; and implementation of CBM's is not a precondition for resumption of the talks and should not distract the parties from the talks.

The UK has announced that it will reduce its troop commitment to UNFICYP by 50 percent and has begun the first (25%) stage of that reduction. This, along with the already completed total withdrawal by Finland and the planned Canadian total withdrawal (mid-1993) will reduce UNFICYP strength from 2,400 in mid-1992 to below 1,000.

- The UN Secretariat has consulted troop contributors on how UNFICYP's organization and mission will be changed.
- The UK (which still has Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) is taking a leading role in these consultations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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February 24, 1993


INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HONE

SUBJECT: Additional Points for the President's use With  
Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain



Points for the President's use on the subject of opening Tuzla Airport (Tab A), a discussion paper (Tab B), and a map (Tab C) are attached.

Attachments

Tab A Additional Points to be Raised  
Tab B Discussion Paper  
Tab C Map of Bosnia

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

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# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

## Opening Tuzla Airport

London has publicly welcomed the proposed air drop operation, but believes that high altitude parachuting of supplies has limited effectiveness; a longer-term solution must be found for Eastern Bosnia. Opening the airport at Tuzla may offer a partial solution as well as represent a much needed supplement to Sarajevo. The British believe the airport could be opened with engineers (and are willing to share their technical assessments); large-scale security forces would not be required, as the airport is, in their view, reasonably secure.

Major may suggest that the U.S. take the lead in opening and running Tuzla airport, since the British are stretched too thin on the ground.

Our own assessment roughly corresponds to London's. Tuzla is in Muslim hands (in fact, Bosnian Foreign Minister Siladzic has asked the U.S. several times to run an airlift operation into Tuzla). The Serbs, although located in the mountains some 6-8 miles outside the city, are not shelling the town seriously. The airport itself lies about 6 miles south of Tuzla, and we have no reports that it has been shelled (suggesting that it may just lie at the margins of Serb artillery range). The airport has limited infrastructure and no warehouses to speak of; the main runway (C-130 capable) has been cratered, but is now repaired. The road from the airport to Tuzla is good, but roads to other parts of Eastern Bosnia are poor, and at times impassable in winter.

We suggest the President hear Major out and offer to have our military experts meet with theirs to explore the possibilities that Tuzla may offer as well as the effort and risks involved in getting it up and running.

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2013-0449-M (J.35)

10/3/2014 KBH

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 18 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
IRAN  
RUSSIA

IRAQ  
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
PALAU

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS & BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR PRES MTG & WORKING DINNER W/  
BRITISH PM MAJOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 23 FEB 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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GOTTEMOELLER  
GROSS  
INDYK  
WALKER  
WAYNE

COMMENTS:

*Merged into 0727*

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KCH NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300880  
RECEIVED: 23 FEB 93 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: LOWENKRON

DOC DATE: 23 FEB 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR PRES MTG W / MAJOR RE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 26 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF: 9300091 9300579

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
LOWENKRON  
NSC CHRON  
WALKER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 1 OF 1

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-m

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9300880

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 93022319 FOR DECISION  
X 93022519 NOTED BY LAKE

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0880

MAJOR  
FOLDER

February 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON

SUBJECT: Points for President's Use: Nuclear Weapons Agreement

Sir Robin Butler will be seeing you on Wednesday at 9:40 to exchange the two letters as agreed. We recommend you brief the President on the agreements at the Major pre-brief. In addition, we recommend that you ask the President to confirm the Mildenhall Agreement during his private meeting with Major before dinner along the lines outlined in the attached points.

Concurrence by: Mike Fry

RECOMMENDATION

That you brief the President on the nuclear weapons agreement, and forward for his use with Major the attached points.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Points to Be Made

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (i)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KGH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-m

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

1021

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Mar-1993 13:58 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LOWENKRON@A1@OEOB  
FICKLIN@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room  
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR (S/S

<DIST>

PRT: SIT

SIT: FICKLIN LOWENKRON SUM SUM2 WHSR\_IN

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

UNCLASSIFIED

<OSRI>

RUEHCAA

<DTG>

081845Z MAR 93

<ORIG>

SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9832

<SUBJ>

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR (S/S  
9304277)

<TEXT>

UNCLAS STATE 068936

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, UK

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR (S/S  
9304277)

1. EMBASSY PLEASE DELIVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.S OFFICE  
AN ADVANCE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

MARCH 3, 1993

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND LETTER AND THE TIE. ITS COLORS

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

BRING BACK SOME OF THE HAPPIEST MEMORIES OF MY TIME SPENT  
IN YOUR COUNTRY, TIME THAT PRECEDED THE GLARE OF  
TELEVISION CAMERAS AND BURGEONING IN-BOXES.

I THINK WE GOT OFF TO A VERY GOOD START. THE  
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WE DISCUSSED CONTINUE, BUT I  
BELIEVE THAT THE FRIENDSHIP WE HAVE ESTABLISHED WILL MAKE

THE ROAD AHEAD A SMOOTHER ONE. I CAN ONLY ECHO YOUR NOTE  
TO ME: ALTHOUGH SEPARATED BY AN OCEAN, WE WILL REMAIN  
ONLY A PHONE CALL AWAY.

HILLARY AND I SEND OUR BEST TO YOU AND TO NORMA' AND WE  
HOPE TO TAKE YOU UP ON YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT THE UK IN  
THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) BILL

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
JOHN MAJOR, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON

END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#8936

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

8936

<TOR>

930308134542 M0266183

Ⓜ



1021  
SON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 February 1993

Dear Bill,

May I send you my warmest thanks for your welcome in Washington. It was a pleasure to get to know you and I believe we have established a sound basis of friendship and understanding for what I feel sure will be a fruitful and enjoyable co-operation over the coming years. In particular, I hope you feel, as I do, that we can pick up the phone to each other at any time. You can count on our wholehearted encouragement and support; and I shall always tell you my mind privately and candidly.

I hope I do not need to add how welcome you will be in the United Kingdom. Norma and I would love to see you and Hillary over here just as soon as you can manage it.

Yours Ever,  
Tony  


The President of The United States of America

PHOTOCOPY  
MISC. HANDWRITING

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

March 3, 1993


Dear John:

Thank you for your kind letter and the tie. Its colors bring back some of the happiest memories of my time spent in your country, time that preceded the glare of television cameras and burgeoning in-boxes.

I think we got off to a very good start. The international problems we discussed continue, but I believe that the friendship we have established will make the road ahead a smoother one. I can only echo your note to me: although separated by an ocean, we will remain only a phone call away.

Hillary and I send our best to you and to Norma, and we hope to take you up on your invitation to visit the UK in the future.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable  
John Major, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 1021

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1993

93 MAR 3 P12:53

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Major

Purpose

To thank Prime Minister Major for his letter and gift to you.

Background

Prime Minister Major wrote you February 26 to thank you for his recent visit. In addition, the Prime Minister sent along a gift: a tie from Gieves and Hawkes designed especially in the colors of University College, Oxford College. In your response you thank him for the gift and invitation to you and Mrs. Clinton to visit the UK, and you reaffirm the friendship that the two of you have established.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Major.

*1. Review the tie!*

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3345

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/14/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Memoranda of Conversation (U)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State are memcons from the President's recent phone conversations with Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Ciampi. Please handle these via Nodis channels. You may dispatch copies "eyes only" for the relevant Ambassadors and Charges. (e)

*for Justice A. Kennedy*  
William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Memoranda of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
FRANCE  
HS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
TRINIDAD TOBAGO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE DEBT REDUCTION AGREED BY PARIS CLUB

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF: 6/22

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION  
LOWENKRON

*Walsh*

FOR CONCURRENCE  
CLARKE  
GATI  
KELLY, C  
OWENS-KIRKPATRICK  
SHEEHAN  
WILSON

FOR INFO  
BAKER JANE  
BERGER  
FEINBERG  
ITOH  
KENNEY  
LAKE  
ROSNER  
SODERBERG  
STATE  
VAN ERON  
WALKER  
WALSH

*These are not the right people to see.*

COMMENTS: Staffed to NSC per ANSA office instructions.

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 2

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 JUN 93

MEMORANDUM FOR: GROSSMAN, M

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MAJOR, JOHN

DATE: 24 MAY 93

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE DEBT REDUCTION AGREED BY PARIS  
CLUB

---

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR

*William H. Leary*  
WILLIAM H. LEARY

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4095

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND ROBERT RUBIN

THROUGH: ROBERT FAUVER *HW for*  
FROM: HELEN WALSH *HW*  
SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister John Major on Debt

Prime Minister Major wrote President Clinton to congratulate him on the U.S. debt initiative to join other creditor governments in the Paris Club in providing "Enhanced Toronto Terms."

Attached is a memorandum to the President with a suggested response to Major's kind note, which Treasury prepared and State approved.

Concurrences by: Barry Lowenkron, Dennis Jett, Richard Clarke, Richard Feinberg

*HW for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Incoming Letter from Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By *KBH* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*  
2013-0449-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 4095  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE AND ROBERT RUBIN

THROUGH: W. BOWMAN CUTTER AND SANDY BERGER *HW*

FROM: HELEN WALSH *HW*

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister John Major on Debt

Prime Minister Major wrote President Clinton to congratulate him on the U.S. debt initiative to join other creditor governments in the Paris Club in providing "Enhanced Toronto Terms."

Attached is a memorandum to the President with a suggested response to Major's kind note, which Treasury prepared and State approved.

Concurrences by: Barry Lowenkron, Dennis Jett, Richard Clarke, Richard Feinberg, Jeremy Rosner *HW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Incoming Letter from PM Major

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBA* NARA, Date *3/16/2019*  
2013-0449-M

*Wood*

June 7, 1993

To ~~Barry Lowenkron~~:

Subject: Ltr from PMMajor re Debt Reduction agreed by Paris Club  
/ Log 4095

Can you provide me with a status of this letter.

Do you want it sent to State for draft reply or preparation of a  
CROSSHATCH cable?

Tony Lake has asked us to expedite Heads of State correspondence.

Thank you.

  
George Van Eron



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
FRANCE  
HS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
TRINIDAD TOBAGO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE DEBT REDUCTION AGREED BY PARIS CLUB

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION  
LOWENKRON

FOR CONCURRENCE  
CLARKE  
GATI  
KELLY, C  
OWENS-KIRKPATRICK  
SHEEHAN  
WILSON

FOR INFO  
BAKER JANE  
BERGER  
FEINBERG  
ITOH  
KENNEY  
LAKE  
ROSNER  
SODERBERG  
STATE  
VAN ERON  
WALKER  
WALSH

COMMENTS: Staffed to NSC per AUSA office instructions.

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DOC 1 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4964

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 3, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2009  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: ROBERT C. FAUVER *rcf*

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Major of the  
United Kingdom

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of  
the President's call to Prime Minister Major on July 3 regarding  
the Tokyo Economic Summit.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached Memorandum of Telephone  
Conversation for the files.

Approve  *rcf* Disapprove

Attachment  
Tab I Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 4, 1993


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. EDWARD KNIGHT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Tokyo Economic Summit Memoranda of  
Conversations

Attached at Tab A are the Tokyo Economic Summit memcons. Please  
provide copies to Secretaries Christopher and Bentsen.

These memcons should be very closely held, with no distribution  
below the Under Secretary level.

  
for William H. Itoh  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memcons

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: ROBERT C. FAUVER *rcf*  
SUBJECT: Tokyo Economic Summit Memoranda of  
Conversations

Attached at Tab A are the memcons from the Tokyo Economic Summit.

At Tab I is a memorandum from Itoh to State and Treasury forwarding copies of the memcons to Secretaries Christopher and Bentsen for their information.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memcons for the files.

Approve ✓ by kan per NS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memorandum to State and Treasury.

Approve ✓ by kan per NS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State/Treasury  
Tab A Memcons

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9305945  
RECEIVED: 07 AUG 93 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: BEERS  
CANAS  
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 07 AUG 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
HS  
UN

FRANCE  
LIBYA  
SANCTIONS

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO MAJOR & MITTERRAND

---

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S      DUE DATE: 11 AUG 93      STATUS: C  
STAFF OFFICER: BEERS      LOGREF: 9305968      9308275  
FILES: PA      NSCP:      CODES:

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DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA      CLOSED BY: NSVJD      DOC 1 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBI NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002 PRESIDENT  
002

Z 93080909 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION  
X 95030216 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S  
Z 93080909 FOR DECISION  
X 95022415 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930807  
002 930807

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY<sup>5945</sup>  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
August 7, 1993

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2013-0449-M (S.84)  
3/6/2019 KBH

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER *SRB*

SUBJECT: Letters to Major and Mitterrand on Libya

Purpose

That you approve letters to Major and Mitterrand urging expanded UN Security Council sanctions against Libya.

Background

We have for several months now been engaged in a dialogue with the UK and France regarding expanded Libya sanctions, as you committed to the Pan Am 103 families during the campaign. Our effort is aimed at obtaining agreement for added sanctions during the six month sanctions review scheduled for next week. We have been asking for an oil embargo. The UK and France want less.

Recent discussions have centered on an oil equipment embargo (the UK preference) and an assets freeze (the French preference); this is less than an oil embargo, but it is still meaningful and does not rule out a full oil embargo later.

In a meeting in London last Tuesday, the UK supported a strong oil equipment embargo and a limited asset freeze (the latter to protect their position as a banking center). They also wish to offer a grace period on all sanctions (old and new) for sixty days following passage of expanded sanctions to encourage Libyan compliance. The British are offering their limited asset freeze only if the French will agree to a full oil equipment embargo.

The French will accept an oil equipment embargo as long as it does not affect production or exploration. Anything occurring after production, e.g., transport, shipping, refining equipment, would be acceptable to the French but would make the impact on Libya more gradual.

At issue is whether to push for acceptance of the more limited offers by the two sides or to push for a full oil equipment embargo and full asset freeze next week when the current sanctions are reviewed.

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The Acting Secretary of State believes, and we concur, that we should attempt at your level to convince our Allies to agree to the stronger sanctions. This is more consistent with our oil embargo preference and with what we have been saying to the Pan Am 103 families. We should undertake our best efforts for the toughest sanctions, even if we ultimately are required to settle for less.

If you agree to the attached letters, we would follow up next week with phone calls. There is, however, no assurance that either Ally will go along. If we are unsuccessful, we will have to regroup next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letters/cables at Tabs A and B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Major  
Tab B Letter to Mitterrand

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5945

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: RAND BEERS/RICHARD CANAS

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Major and Mitterand

Following the London experts meeting this past week to discuss Libyan sanctions, the State Department is recommending Presidential letters to Major (Tab A) and Mitterand (Tab B). These letters would serve as the first step in a final attempt to pressure our allies into expanded Libya sanctions.

Concurrences by: Martin Indyk, Jenoune Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Major  
Tab B Letter to President Mitterand

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: RAND BEERS/RICHARD CANAS

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Major and Mitterand

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Concurrences by: Martin Indyk, Jenonne Walker

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Letter to President Mitterand

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY <sup>5945</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 7, 1993

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2013-0449-M (5.87)  
3/6/2019 KBM

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER *SRB*

SUBJECT: Letters to Major and Mitterrand on Libya

Purpose

That you approve letters to Major and Mitterrand urging expanded UN Security Council sanctions against Libya.

Background

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Recent discussions have centered on an oil equipment embargo (the UK preference) and an assets freeze (the French preference); this is less than an oil embargo, but it is still meaningful and does not rule out a full oil embargo later.

In a meeting in London last Tuesday, the UK supported a strong oil equipment embargo and a limited asset freeze (the latter to protect their position as a banking center). They also wish to offer a grace period on all sanctions (old and new) for sixty days following passage of expanded sanctions to encourage Libyan compliance. The British are offering their limited asset freeze only if the French will agree to a full oil equipment embargo.

The French will accept an oil equipment embargo as long as it does not affect production or exploration. Anything occurring after production, e.g., transport, shipping, refining equipment, would be acceptable to the French but would make the impact on Libya more gradual.

At issue is whether to push for acceptance of the more limited offers by the two sides or to push for a full oil equipment embargo and full asset freeze next week when the current sanctions are reviewed.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<sup>2</sup>  
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The Acting Secretary of State believes, and we concur, that we should attempt at your level to convince our Allies to agree to the stronger sanctions. This is more consistent with our oil embargo preference and with what we have been saying to the Pan Am 103 families. We should undertake our best efforts for the toughest sanctions, even if we ultimately are required to settle for less.

If you agree to the attached letters, we would follow up next week with phone calls. There is, however, no assurance that either Ally will go along. If we are unsuccessful, we will have to regroup next week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the letters/cables at Tabs A and B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Major  
Tab B Letter to Mitterrand

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
LIBYA  
TERRORISM

FRANCE  
SANCTIONS  
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTRS TO PM MAJOR & PRES MITTERRRAND RE LIBYA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 12 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CANAS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION


FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO


BEERS  
CANAS  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_



DATE \_\_\_\_\_



BY HAND \_\_\_\_\_

W/ATTCH \_\_\_\_\_

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DC: 4 OF 4

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002  
003  
004 PRESIDENT  
004

Z 93081016 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG  
X 93081111 SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM  
X 93081111 PRES APPROVED CABLE  
X 93081111 PRES APPROVED CABLE  
Z 93081214 FOR INFORMATION  
X 93081214 NOTED BY PRES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930811 MAJOR, JOHN  
003 930811 MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS  
004 930810  
004 930810

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 AUG 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
LIBYA  
TERRORISM

FRANCE  
SANCTIONS  
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PM MITTERRAND OF FRANCE RE LIBYA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 12 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CANAS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CANAS  
CLARKE  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWFA CLOSED BY: NSJDA DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002  
003

Z 93081016 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG  
X 93081111 SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM  
X 93081111 PRES APPROVED CABLE  
X 93081111 PRES APPROVED CABLE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930811 MAJOR, JOHN  
003 930811 MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COCOM  
          INTL TRADE  
          NON PROLIFERATION

GREAT BRITAIN  
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE COCOM

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN      DUE DATE: 16 OCT 93      STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND    W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC    1 OF    1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307832

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STATE  
001

Z 93101319 PREPARE CROSSHATCH CABLE  
X 95022808 OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 931013 STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307832  
RECEIVED: 13 OCT 93 19

TO: PRESIDENT

**SUSPENSE**

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 13 OCT 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COCOM  
          INTL TRADE  
          NON PROLIFERATION

GREAT BRITAIN  
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE COCOM

ACTION: PREPARE CROSSHATCH CABLE

DUE DATE: 16 OCT 93 STATUS: D

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION  
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE  
AOKI  
HOLL  
PONEMAN

FOR INFO  
BERGER  
ITOH  
KENNEY  
KUPCHAN  
LAKE  
ROSNER  
SODERBERG  
VAN ERON  
WALKER

D

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK      CLOSED BY:      DOC 1 OF 1


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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 12, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER/BOB KYLE *BK*  
FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN/MIKE FROMAN *CK*  
SUBJECT: Blair House and Response to Major

The attached memo to the President summarizes recent developments concerning Blair House and asks the President to approve a response to British Prime Minister Major's letter on this topic. We recommend that you forward the memo and letter to the President.

Concurrence by: Jane Holt *JH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo and letter to the President

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Presidential Response to John Major
- Tab B Incoming from Major

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBH* NARA, Date *3/16/2019*  
*2013-0449-M*

Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

date 1 / 5 / 94

WASHINGTON

       ACCEPT

       REGRET

       PENDING

TO: Ricki Seidman  
Assistant to the President and  
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister  
John Major of Great Britain

PURPOSE: To follow up with a key European ally on  
the NATO and EU Summit meetings; to  
discuss plans for Presidential travel to  
Great Britain in conjunction with World  
War II commemoration events; and to  
review developments on Northern Ireland;  
to deepen the President's personal  
relationship with Major.

BACKGROUND: Prime Minister Major will travel to the  
United States to give an address at  
Harvard. He will not have a scheduled  
bilateral meeting with the President  
during the President's January travel to  
Europe and this meeting -- as will the  
January meeting with Kohl in Washington  
-- represents an important opportunity  
to ground our European agenda with a key  
European ally whose support we will need  
to follow through successfully on the  
President's summit initiatives.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President and John Major last met in  
Washington in April 1993.

DATE AND TIME: Late February/early March 1994

DURATION: 90 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office, Old Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: To be provided by NSC

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Brief meeting in Oval Office followed by  
working lunch

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449- m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2


MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool  
FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required  
VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required  
SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required  
RECOMMENDED BY: NSC  
CONTACT: Jane E. Holl, x4996

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 28, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HORN

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

The British seek a meeting with the President and Prime Minister Major in connection with the latter's planned travel to the U.S. in late February/early March to give an address at Harvard. We understand, informally, that if no meeting with the President is possible, Major will likely not come to the States at all.

Major is not seeking a bilateral meeting with the President during the NATO Summit, and we think a meeting in Washington (as with Kohl) is an important opportunity in the wake of the President's trip to Europe to fix with a major ally the direction of our European agenda.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Attachment  
Tab I Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-M

Schedule Proposal THE WHITE HOUSE date 1/5/94  
 WASHINGTON

---

     ACCEPT      REGRET      PENDING

---

TO: Ricki Seidman  
 Assistant to the President and  
 Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister  
 John Major of Great Britain

PURPOSE: To follow up with a key European ally on  
 the NATO and EU Summit meetings; to  
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 to deepen the President's personal  
 relationship with Major.

BACKGROUND: Prime Minister Major will travel to the  
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 Harvard. He will not have a scheduled  
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 during the President's January travel to  
 Europe and this meeting -- as will the  
 January meeting with Kohl in Washington  
 -- represents an important opportunity  
 to ground our European agenda with a key  
 European ally whose support we will need  
 to follow through successfully on the  
 President's summit initiatives.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President and John Major last met in  
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DATE AND TIME: Late February/early March 1994

DURATION: 90 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office, Old Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: To be provided by NSC

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Brief meeting in Oval Office followed by  
 working lunch

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
 By KGM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
 2013-0449-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Jane E. Holl, x4996

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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9988

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 28, 1993

## ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER 

FROM: JANE E. HOLL 

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister John  
Major of Great Britain

The British seek a meeting with the President and Prime Minister Major in connection with the latter's planned travel to the U.S. in late February/early March to give an address at Harvard. We understand, informally, that if no meeting with the President is possible, Major will likely not come to the States at all.

Major is not seeking a bilateral meeting with the President during the NATO Summit, and we think a meeting in Washington (as with Kohl) is an important opportunity in the wake of the President's trip to Europe to fix with a major ally the direction of our European agenda.

## RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Attachment  
Tab I Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBLNARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0419-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 STATE  
002

Z 94012014 PREPARE CROSSHATCH CABLE  
X 94012710 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 940110 STATE

0449

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
Department of State Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

TRANSMITTAL FORM

By KBH NARA, Date 3/16/2014  
2013-0449-m

S/S 9401254  
Date January 26, 1994

**FOR:** Mr. William Itoh  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council Staff  
The White House

**REFERENCE:**

To: President Clinton  
From: John Major, UK Prime Minister  
Date: January 10, 1994  
Subj: Letter to President Clinton From Prim Minister  
Major of Ukraine Regarding Russia

WH Referral Dated: 1/20  
NSCS ID# (if any): 9400449

\_\_\_\_\_ The Attached item was sent directly to the Department of State

**ACTION TAKEN:**

- \_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply is attached.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A translation is attached.
- \_\_\_\_\_ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- X \_\_\_\_\_ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Other (see remarks).

**REMARKS:** The incoming letter was in response to President Clinton's presummit letter. Since then, the President and PM Major have met and discussed the issue. Letter is OBE.

*Sharon O'Neil*  
Director  
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9400449

REFERRAL

DATE: 20 JAN 94

MEMORANDUM FOR: GROSSMAN, M

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

9401254  
7401254  
94 JAN 21 12:02 PM

SOURCE: MAJOR, JOHN


DATE: 10 JAN 94

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE RUSSIA

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION: PREPARE CROSSHATCH CABLE

DUE DATE: 24 JAN 94

COMMENT:



FOR

WILLIAM H. LEARY

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

1994 JAN 21 A 12: 04  
REC'D S/S - IRM/RMD

*Handwritten initials*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 3/4/2019

2013-0449-M

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~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9400568  
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 94 13

TO: ITOH

FROM: WALKER

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO  
BELGIUM

MEMCON  
CZECH REPUBLIC

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES BILATERAL SUMMIT MTGS IN BRUSSELS & PRAGUE ON  
8 - 12 JAN

ACTION: ITOH APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 28 JAN 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WALKER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON ✓

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSMBN DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9400568

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 94012611 FOR DECISION  
X 94012613 ITOH APPROVED RECOM

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's  
NATO Summit Meetings in Brussels, Belgium and  
Prague, The Czech Republic on January 8 -  
January 12, 1994

Attached are the Memoranda of Conversation from the meetings  
between the President and various Prime Ministers and military  
leaders during the NATO Summit held in Brussels, Belgium and  
Prague, The Czech Republic on January 8 through January 12, 1994.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversation be filed for the  
record

Approve *kan* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A MEMCONS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KKH/NARA, Date 3/6/20  
2013-0449-17

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9401268  
RECEIVED: 17 FEB 94 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 17 FEB 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS  
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR

ACTION: SEE 9401299 FOR FINAL ACTION

DUE DATE: 18 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE

LOGREF: 9401299

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSVJD

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BEYRLE  
001

Z 94021719 PREPARE MEMO FOR PRESIDENT  
X 95032109 SEE 9401299 FOR FINAL ACTION

RECORD ID LAST ACTION DATE	FROM SUBJECT KEYWORDS	TO	DOC. DATE STATUS DUE DATE	NOTES
9401268 FEB 17	MAJOR, JOHN LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA RUSSIA	PRESIDENT  HS	FEB 17 S 02/18/94	

See Attached:

~~1268 was answered by 1299 -~~

don't know why. Thanks.

We never got comeback copy.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY NSC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (6.24)

10/3/2014 KBH

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

9403918

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

February 25, 1994

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher *WC*

SUBJECT: Meetings with British Prime Minister John Major

I. SETTING

A prime goal for Prime Minister Major's visit is to demonstrate, to a nervous British public and a skeptical American one, why and how the U.S.-UK relationship matters -- to a prosperous world economy, to a stable Europe, and to our ability to achieve our objectives in Bosnia, Russia, South Africa, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.

Over the past year our long-standing pattern of close communication and cooperation with the British has continued on a range of issues -- GATT agreement, nonproliferation, Libya and Iraq sanctions, to name a few -- but it is the differences that have provoked the headlines, and the angst in London. The Gerry Adams visa decision was a blow to London, and subsequent press coverage reopened earlier, still-tender wounds of bilateral discord over issues from Bosnia policy to the 1992 Presidential campaign.

It is important that we move beyond our differences and reinvigorate our dialogue with the British. In any likely scenario for Europe over the next few years, we will find it very difficult to advance our interests absent British engagement. The events on your schedule with Major in Pittsburgh, the flight back together on Air Force One, and overnight at the White House will send the British a reassuring message that they still count in Washington.

The trip to Pittsburgh also provides a powerful backdrop for the other main messages of this visit. Domestic and foreign policy are linked, and nowhere more so than in the U.S.-UK economic and trading relationship. Our many common interests, shared history, outlook, and values are of continued relevance as we look for solutions to shared problems such as persistent unemployment and environmental degradation. Your joint appearances in Pittsburgh will highlight these themes,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

and preview the March G-7 Jobs Conference. While in the home city of USAir, you should push Major on the need for a more forthcoming British approach to our civair negotiations, which are foundering over British reluctance to provide adequate access to Heathrow Airport for U.S. airlines.

On Bosnia, Major and his Cabinet are pleased with our decision to become more active in the negotiations, though still deeply uncomfortable with the lingering possibility of the use of force. Although the British continue to ask the tough questions, maintaining transatlantic unity is Major's overriding concern in Bosnia policy. You should exploit this. Major will want to expand on his impressions from his Russia trip. He will hope to come to a meeting of the minds with you on Northern Ireland, affirming his commitment to work closely with the Irish government, but warning that no amount of British "persuasion" of Unionists will work if the IRA keeps killing or if Unionists feel they have been abandoned.

## II. TOPICS

- o Outline our strategy on Bosnia. Underscore the importance of presenting a united front to the Serbs, including our readiness to use force if necessary.
- o Exchange views on reform in Russia and Moscow's policies toward its neighbors.
- o Respond to Major's ideas on improving G-7 effectiveness in promoting global economic goals and Russian reform.
- o Note progress on Ukrainian denuclearization and urge more British financial and technical help.
- o Urge strong British support for Partnership for Peace, including adequate funding.
- o Hear Major out on the prospects for renewed political talks on Northern Ireland. Discuss how the U.S. can help keep the pressure on Sinn Fein to join the talks.
- o Stress the importance of progress in our stalemated bilateral civil aviation negotiations.
- o Review planning for your June activities in Britain, outlining your overall goal of defining and demonstrating the meaning of U.S. ties to Europe and to Britain for the post-Cold War era.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

## U.S./UK TELECOMMUNICATIONS

A number of U.S./UK telecommunications issues were the subject of recent bilateral discussions in London among State, Commerce, FCC, the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the UK Office of Telecommunications. Those which may be of sufficient interest to warrant Prime Minister Major's attention are as follows:

- Applications by Sprint and AT&T for licenses in UK
- UK applications for licenses in U.S.
- Future of International Satellite Organizations

Sprint and AT&T have applied for licenses to provide UK domestic and international long distance telecommunications services. The UK has indicated it may soon approve one or more of the U.S. license applications for domestic long distance services. However, approval of an international license for a U.S. company operating in the UK will be more difficult as the UK at present allows no carriers other than British Telecom and Mercury to compete internationally.

Our goal is to open up both the U.S. and UK markets to international competition as soon as possible. The UK has taken significant steps in opening its domestic market and needs to take the next step of opening the UK market for international services to allow full and open telecommunications services between our two great nations.

UK companies have also applied for licenses to own and operate telecommunications companies in the U.S., but have felt frustrated by our statutory restrictions (Section 310 of the Communications Act) which restricts direct foreign ownership of radio licenses to 20% and indirect ownership to 25%. British Telecom (BT) sold its interest in McCaw to AT&T because it felt limited to an equity rather than management interest. British firms are also concerned that Sec. 310 will prevent them from participating in coming applications for the emerging Personal Communications Systems market. Also, BT has petitioned the FCC for a ruling on its proposed purchase of a 20% ownership interest in MCI.

The U.S. has responded that Section 310 allows the USG (FCC) a large degree of flexibility to authorize waivers if it is considered in the U.S. national interest. With regard to the BT/MCI proposed alliance, the U.S. FCC still has the matter under consideration, but the general reaction in the U.S. favors the proposal as an important opportunity to positively address the likely future of global telecommunications -- strong strategic alliances.

The U.S. and the UK are in general agreement that the 72 member-nation INMARSAT Organization and the 124 member-nation INTELSAT Organization should evolve to "privatized" commercially based entities in the future. However, while the U.S. would like to see these organizations shed their treaty status and governmental affiliations as soon as possible, the UK preference is toward an emphasis on the organizations becoming more commercially efficient, but not necessarily shedding governmental involvement.

## POINTS OF U.S.-UK AGREEMENT

### Bosnia

- International efforts to silence the guns in Bosnia must be sustained.
- A joint British/American civil planning mission will be established to work with the Sarajevo city authorities, the UN and the EU in assessing the requirements for restoration of public utilities in Sarajevo.
- Beyond Sarajevo, action must be extended to Tuzla and Srebrenica, as the NATO Summit agreed, and urgent attention must be given to other besieged towns.
- General Rose and UNPROFOR, and the NATO military authorities, deserve a warm tribute. Their cooperation is exemplary.
- Now is the time for an intense negotiation to bring a final settlement to Bosnia. The UK fully supports the U.S. initiative to drive this forward [and welcomes progress in Croat-Muslim talks.]
- The United States and Britain both would commit forces through NATO to the implementation of a viable settlement, with the support of the Congress.

### Russia

- We are agreed on:
  - Continuing support for the process of democratic and economic reform in Russia, led by President Yeltsin.
  - Working together and with others to reinforce our technical assistance programs on the ground in Russia, focusing on areas such as privatization and small business development.
  - Russia's greater integration into the political deliberations of the G-7 at the Naples summit.
  - The need to work closely with Russia and the relevant international organizations to promote peaceful resolution of regional disputes.
  - The principle that if Russian troops operate in neighboring states, they do so only when those states agree to their presence and in strict accord with international standards.

### Ukraine

The U.S. and the UK:

- Urge the Ukrainian Government to institute an effective economic reform program.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- Will help establish an international support group for Ukraine.
- Will work with Ukraine and Russia to promote the implementation of the recent tripartite agreement.

#### **Baltic States**

The U.S. and UK:

- Underline the importance of early withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia.
- Will work together to promote more stable relations between the Baltic States and Russia.

#### **NATO Summit Follow-Up**

- The U.S. and UK agree in their determination to implement energetically and expeditiously the NATO Summit decisions, including activities under the Partnership for Peace and the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

#### **GATT**

- Tribute to Mickey Kantor and Leon Brittan in Bringing Uruguay Round to successful conclusion.
- This is the most important trade-opening agreement ever achieved.

#### **COCOM**

- COCOM, one of the last symbols of the Cold War, is to be terminated at the end of this month. The U.S. and UK look forward to the establishment in its place of new, strong multilateral arrangements to promote responsibility in arms transfers and to address the spread of sensitive dual-use technologies.

#### **Japan**

- The U.S. and UK agree that they share an interest in opening Japan's markets.

#### **Hong Kong**

- The U.S. and UK fully support Governor Patten's policies to promote Hong Kong's political development and economic success.

## South Africa

- The U.S. and UK agree that the historic transformation in South Africa has reached a decisive turning point, with the first non-racial elections scheduled to take place in less than two months. They call on all parties to participate in those elections, to rededicate themselves to the path toward peace and democracy.
- They further agreed to take additional tangible steps to promote the process of democratic reform in South Africa.

## Northern Ireland

- The President reiterates his strong support for the Joint Declaration and the efforts of the British and Irish governments to bring peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.
- The President calls on Sinn Fein and the IRA, as well as others who continue to pursue their goals by violent means, to renounce violence and join the political process within the framework of the Joint Declaration.

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 24, 1994


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLM

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain



The President's package for his discussions with John Major is attached at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Julien LeBourgeois, Dan Poneman, Bob Bell, Kent Wiedemann, Martin Indyk, Nick Burns, Mike Froman, Bill Whyman and Richard Feinberg

*Not  
figure 2/27*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

- ~~Tab A~~ ~~Outline of Events~~ *To be provided by Scheduling & Adv.*
- Tab B Memorandum From the Secretary
- Tab C Points to be Made
- Tab D Additional Background Material
- Tab E Bios
- Tab F Press Qs and As
- Tab G Draft Remarks

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

UNCLASSIFIED

## U.S./UK TELECOMMUNICATIONS

A number of U.S./UK telecommunications issues were the subject of recent bi-lateral discussions in London among State, Commerce, FCC, the UK Department of Trade and Industry, and the UK Office of Telecommunications. Those which may be of sufficient interest to warrant Prime Minister Major's attention are as follows:

- Applications by Sprint and AT&T for licenses in UK
- UK applications for licenses in U.S.
- Future of International Satellite Organizations

Sprint and AT&T have applied for licenses to provide UK domestic and international long distance telecommunications services. The UK has indicated it may soon approve one or more of the U.S. license applications for domestic long distance services. However, approval of an international license for a U.S. company operating in the UK will be more difficult as the UK at present allows no carriers other than British Telecom and Mercury to compete internationally.

Our goal is to open up both the U.S. and UK markets to international competition as soon as possible. The UK has taken significant steps in opening its domestic market and needs to take the next step of opening the UK market for international services to allow full and open telecommunications services between our two great nations.

UK companies have also applied for licenses to own and operate telecommunications companies in the U.S., but have felt frustrated by our statutory restrictions (Section 310 of the Communications Act) which restricts direct foreign ownership of radio licenses to 20% and indirect ownership to 25%. British Telecom (BT) sold its interest in McCaw to AT&T because it felt limited to an equity rather than management interest. British firms are also concerned that Sec. 310 will prevent them from participating in coming applications for the emerging Personal Communications Systems market. Also, BT has petitioned the FCC for a ruling on its proposed purchase of a 20% ownership interest in MCI.

The U.S. has responded that Section 310 allows the USG (FCC) a large degree of flexibility to authorize waivers if it is considered in the U.S. national interest. With regard to the BT/MCI proposed alliance, the U.S. FCC still has the matter under consideration, but the general reaction in the U.S. favors the proposal as an important opportunity to positively address the likely future of global telecommunications - strong strategic alliances.

The U.S. and the UK are in general agreement that the 72 member-nation INMARSAT Organization and the 124 member-nation INTELSAT Organization should evolve to "privatized" commercially based entities in the future. However, while the U.S. would like to see these organizations shed their treaty status and governmental affiliations as soon as possible, the UK preference is toward an emphasis on the organizations becoming more commercially efficient, but not necessarily shedding governmental involvement.

UNCLASSIFIED

GLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 05 APR 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
UN

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE BOSNIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 09 APR 94 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

~~FOR ACTION~~

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~HOLL~~

BEERS

BAKER JANE

*Le Bourgeois*

CLARKE

GRAY

RICE

ITOH

*Holl*

KENNEY

ROSNER

SODERBERG

STATE

WALKER

*Action, in of int. State should draft a brief response for the message.*

COMMENTS:

*Task State to prepare a brief response to this message for crossmatch clearance. Due 4/11.*

DISPATCHED BY

*[Signature]*

DATE

*4/6/94*

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJER

CLOSED BY:

DOC

1 OF

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBH Date: 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~COVERING UK CONFIDENTIAL~~



British Embassy  
Washington

5 April 1994

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 898-4292  
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255

The Honorable  
Anthony Lake  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Rm 1/WW  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington DC 20500

*From The Ambassador*

*Dear Tony,*

BOSNIA : UNPROFOR

I have been asked to pass to you the attached message  
from the Prime Minister to the President.

*With best wishes,*


*Robin*

Robin Renwick

cc : The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY ~~COVERING UK CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: DON STEINBERG *DS*

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER  
MAJOR ON SOUTH AFRICA

On May 5, the President wrote to the other G-7 leaders to outline our intentions to enhance assistance to South Africa in the post-election period and to urge them to do the same. We have just received Prime Minister Major's response, which notes that Britain expects to provide 100 million pounds in assistance to South Africa over the next three years, including 60 million pounds in bilateral aid and the remainder through the Commonwealth and the European Union. Prime Minister Major states that he looks forward to discussing South Africa with the President during their meeting in June.

At Tab I is Clinton's response, which expresses our appreciation for Britain's enhanced efforts.

Concurrences by: *copy provided*  
Julien LeBourgeois

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the transmission by cable of the letter from President Clinton to Prime Minister Major at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*as revised*

Attachments

- Tab I Proposed Letter from President Clinton to Prime Minister Major
- Tab II Letter from Major to Clinton, May 16, 1994

TO: MAJOR, JOHN

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 16 AUG 94  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
SANCTIONS

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY RE PROPOSAL TO LIFT ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA S1T ROOM

DUE DATE: 15 AUG 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STEPHENS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB      CLOSED BY: NSDRS      DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
002 PRESIDENT  
002  
003

Z 94081217 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION  
Z 94081312 FOR DECISION  
X 94081317 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM  
X 94081617 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940813  
002 940813  
003 940816 MAJOR, JOHN

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6522

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

8/15/94  
94 AUG 13 P6:07

August 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓  
SUBJECT: Response to British Prime Minister John Major

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KBH/NARA, Date 10/8/2011  
2013-0449-m 3/6/2019

Purpose

To respond to a message from Prime Minister Major.

Background

Prime Minister Major wrote you August 3 about former Yugoslavia, emphasizing his continuing concerns about the risks of lifting the arms embargo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove  \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Incoming message

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~


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6522

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

August 12, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS *KS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to British Prime Minister Major

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a suggested message to be sent to Prime Minister John Major. Prime Minister Major wrote the President August 3 outlining his views on Bosnia, particularly his continuing concerns about lifting the arms embargo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Incoming message

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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7474 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1994

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KSM* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*  
*2013-0449-17*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS *KS*

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Major

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting a response to Prime Minister Major's letter of September 16 and September 25.

Concurrences by: Rose Gottemoeller and Anne Witkowsky *AW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major  
Tab B Incoming message on Adams  
Tab C Incoming message on Yeltsin

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KGH Date: 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*cc: Verbatim  
for report & lobby  
w/lin*

**FACSIMILE MESSAGE**

**FROM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FILING**  
**(FAX NO. 071 839 3712)**

**TO** *Mr. Young Lake*

*Please pass to the President.*

**DATE** *10 7 94*

**NUMBER OF PAGES  
TO FOLLOW:** *7 (Seven)*



BRITISH LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 January 1995

We are all beginning to look forward to the Halifax Summit in June. Our sherpas meet later this month to begin preparations. They will be considering, in particular, how to take forward the review of the world's financial and other institutions which we commissioned in Naples.

We have been thinking further about this review, and we will be contributing our ideas shortly. But as you take over the chair for the 1995 summit, I would like to draw your attention to one specific issue.

At Naples, we discussed international financial markets, and expressed a desire for greater market stability. I share that desire. Turbulent financial markets undermine confidence, and damage the prospects for economic growth. But I hope we can all agree, from the outset, that the way to achieve greater financial market stability is above all to secure economic stability in each of our countries. That means following sensible economic policies, which keep inflation low, and which maintain sound public finances. We are already committed to such policies.

There have been calls for Governments to try to influence the currency markets through intervention, or to hold back financial flows by exchange controls or new forms of taxation on financial transactions. In my view, such measures would be both ineffective and damaging, as experience over the past 20 years demonstrates. Global private financial flows have increased

enormously, so that total stock of foreign exchange reserves held by our seven countries now represents well under half the value of turnover each day in the currency markets. In these circumstances, intervention is increasingly ineffective.

Exchange controls or new taxes would be equally ill-conceived. Countries have been scaling back controls in recent years - we abolished them entirely in the UK 15 years ago, having concluded that such controls damaged the economy, and that increasingly they did not work. The much greater sophistication and global nature of today's financial markets means that virtually any attempt to block or tax particular flows would simply divert them elsewhere. The existence of controls in the 1970s was a major reason why the Euromarkets grew so rapidly.

Moreover, the free international flow of investment, like free trade, brings significant economic gains, and I believe that to reintroduce direct controls of this sort would be damaging, not only to our economies, but also to others. We all want to see the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and the further expansion of Asian and Latin American countries. These developments will require large amounts of investment which, already, we have seen that open world capital markets are providing. We should continue to encourage that: greater world prosperity will help our economies, and will buttress political and social stability, to everyone's benefit.

I know personally - as do most of the others in the G7 - how damaging and disruptive exchange market turbulence can be. I have therefore thought hard about ideas put forward for direct action to control it. I do not dismiss them lightly. But I am convinced they are a false solution, and that we would be misleading ourselves if we thought we could help matters by embarking down that road.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I am sending copies of this letter to other G7 colleagues.

Your Ever,  
Jean

The Rt. Hon. Jean Chrétien PC QC MP



1211

British Embassy  
Washington

From the Private Secretary

28 March 1995

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 898-4292  
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255

Ms Kathy Stephens  
Director  
European Affairs  
National Security Council  
Room 372  
Old Executive Office Building  
17th St & Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington D.C. 20506

*From The Ambassador*

Dear Kathy,

I have pleasure in enclosing the original copy of the  
Prime Minister's letter of 6 March to the President about  
Northern Ireland for your files.

*With best wishes,*  
*K*

Karen Pierce (Miss)

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KEM Date: 3/16/2019  
2013-0749-m



1711

British Embassy  
Washington

From the Private Secretary

28 March 1995

3100 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone: (202) 898-4292  
Facsimile: (202) 898-4255

Ms Kathy Stephens  
Director  
European Affairs  
National Security Council  
Room 372  
Old Executive Office Building  
17th St & Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington D.C. 20506

*From The Ambassador*

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Northern Ireland for your files.

With best wishes,

Karen Pierce (Miss)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KEH Date: 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1995

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KGM NARA, Date 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the  
President and British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Major of Great Britain is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

*for James W. Sens*  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memcon with Prime Minister Major

## UK ECONOMIC SITUATION

In 1993 while most of Europe was in recession, private consumption drove UK economic growth to 2.1 percent. Exports became the dominant force in 1994, pushing growth to 4.1 percent in the second quarter, substantially above its long-term trend of 2.3 percent. Overall growth for 1994 was 3.8 percent, with tighter monetary policy and higher taxes appearing to slow the rate of growth in the second half. Additional monetary tightening and tax increases in April of this year are expected to slow growth further, with the hope of achieving a soft landing for the economy. Growth of just over 3.0 percent is expected in 1995.

The UK saw its best inflation performance in 30 years, when the Retail Price Index (RPI) remained below 2.0 percent for all of 1993. Inflation continued lower than expected in 1994 but turned up in the fourth quarter because of increased mortgage interest, fuel and excise taxes, as well as some increases on the wholesale level. The RPI averaged 2.5 percent in 1994, and, partially for technical reasons, edged up to 3.3 percent in January. It now stands at 2.8 percent and will probably rise to above 3.0 percent for the last two quarters of 1995.

The policy of monetary easing after September 1992, which reduced the prime rate from 10.0 to 5.25 percent, was reversed by an increase in September 1994. A more autonomous Bank of England appears to have persuaded Chancellor Clarke that preemptive strikes against inflation were warranted. HMG implemented a second increase on December 7, followed by a third on February 1, bringing the prime rate to 6.75 percent. While a weak and unpopular Tory government would prefer an easier policy to generate some of the elusive "feel good factor," it will implement further rate hikes if growth remains unsustainably high.

Although unemployment is declining at a brisk but slowing pace, it remains high at 2.36 million or 8.4 percent of the labor force. The growing economy created 115,000 jobs in the fourth quarter of 1994 following a 109,000 rise in the third quarter.

The UK's visible trade performance in 1994, as well as increased net investment income, have resulted in a sharp reduction of its current account deficit: from \$15.5 billion or 1.7 percent of GDP in 1993 to less than \$5 billion in 1994. While imports grew sharply in the fourth

quarter, exports have continued to expand briskly in early 1995. Most analysts still expect the current account deficit to be negligible.

Chancellor Clarke announced an increased pace of public sector deficit reduction in his FY95 budget speech by taking advantage of lower inflation and increased revenues. Current policies would bring the budget into balance in FY98, but the crucial test will come in the next two November budgets. Elections must be held by 1997, and as they get nearer, the temptation to cut taxes and raise spending will be strong.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.01)

10/3/2014 KBH

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 1995

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL: 4/4/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Warren Christopher *WC*

SUBJECT: Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major

I. SETTING

Although relations are going through a troubled period, the U.S. and UK remain each other's most important global partners.

We are working together constructively on a wide range of important issues, including, for example, NATO expansion, Bosnia, Iran, and Russia. However, on the sensitive subject of Northern Ireland, London has disagreed with at least the timing of our decision regarding Gerry Adams. Prime Minister Major fully deserves the public praise you have offered for his political courage on Northern Ireland. He is personally committed to making the most of this chance for peace, but faces considerable discontent and mistrust from Unionist leaders, especially over the Joint Framework Document he negotiated with PM Bruton. How to address that problem will be near the top of his agenda for this visit.

The opposition parties fully back Major's Ireland policy, but otherwise, he is in serious political trouble. Elections are likely next year. He trails Labor's new leader Tony Blair by huge margins in the polls, and his own party is badly divided over "Europe" as Britain tries to develop a position and seek out allies for the EU's 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

You will not find Major sentimental about the "Special Relationship" (a term he and Douglas Hurd avoid), but instead hard-headed and pragmatic. In fact, more than half a century of history has made our ties with the UK different from those with any other country. It has been our closest partner by far in the single biggest foreign policy transformation in U.S. history -- our shift from non-involvement with the wider world to global engagement. London has worked hand-in-glove with us in every region of the globe, and wants to keep doing so.

Neither our deepening involvement with the countries of this hemisphere and the Pacific Rim, or the UK's own hesitant steps towards "Europe," need detract from the Anglo-American alliance. Beyond the bonds of culture and language, there are unparalleled structures and habits of cooperation built up over fifty years of global partnership, including uniquely close intelligence, nuclear, and military links. The U.S. and UK are each others' top investors, with some \$95 billion going in each direction.

This meeting is an opportunity for you to establish a common approach with Major on a wide range of issues. I can follow up with Douglas Hurd when he is here April 18. The UK is usually our strongest supporter on free trade and our closest ally on developing European security structures. The breadth of current and potential practical cooperation is extraordinary. In the list of topics below, the first five are those on which Major intends to place special priority.

II. TOPICS

- o Northern Ireland, especially keeping the Unionists on board, advancing our common agenda on decommissioning, keeping track of Sinn Fein funds raised, and maintaining the focus of your May conference on trade and investment;
- o Russia, including developing a common Western approach on V-E Day, as well as developments in Chechnya and the reform process (we would particularly like UK help in mobilizing the EU on balance-of-payments support for the NIS);
- o The Middle East, where we should urge the UK to mobilize European political support for the MEDB and financial support for the Palestinian Authority;
- o Iraqi sanctions, where the UK is our staunchest ally in Europe and among the UNSC Permanent Five;
- o Bosnia/Croatia, where, as noted above, we are working much more closely and productively with the UK;
- o Trade, where the UK can help open markets for U.S. exports to the EU in audio/visual, telecommunications, and air services -- plus choose U.S. attack helicopters in a \$3 billion purchase this year;
- o Nonproliferation, especially the NPT, where the UK has used its worldwide influence in support of our policy of getting 50% + 1 for unlimited indefinite extension, and will be key in getting other Europeans to conclude a new U.S./EURATOM Treaty and establish a COCOM successor regime;
- o NATO expansion, where the UK is hard at work to help our strategy for this year succeed, and wants to collaborate with us as we develop a game plan for next year;
- o European security and defense cooperation, where Major has personally proposed initiatives intended to ensure that WEU development does not come at NATO's expense; and
- o Counter-terrorism, where the UK is in lockstep with us on pressing Libya to turn over the Pan Am 103 suspects.

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March 29, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*  
FROM: KATHLEEN STEPHENS *K*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

The President's package for his discussions with Prime Minister John Major is attached at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Don Kerrick, John Beyrle, Ellen Laipson, Mark Parris, Dan Poneman, Ann Witkowsky, Steve Simon, Mike Froman, Richard Clarke and Tom Ross *JKS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Outline of Events
- Tab B Memorandum from the Secretary
- Tab C Points to be Made
- Tab D Exchange of letters on European security
- Tab E ~~List of Participants~~ *Ltr from Major on N. Ireland*
- Tab F Background Material
- Tab G Bios
- Tab H Press Qs and As
- Tab I Draft Remarks

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBA* NARA, Date *3/6/2019*  
*2013-0449-M*



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

Put in system

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 March 1995

*For Bill,*

Thank you for your letter of 11 March telling me of your decision to nominate Jim Wolfensohn to succeed Lew Preston as President of the World Bank.

First, let me say how sad we were that Lew Preston is having to give up the job early because of illness. It is particularly unfortunate that this should have occurred at a time when his plans for institutional reform of the Bank were beginning to bear fruit. We should like to place on record our appreciation for all he has achieved during his tenure.

We were pleased that you moved so quickly to find a successor. Jim Wolfensohn is an excellent choice. Our Executive Director at the World Bank has already offered the United Kingdom's full support. We look to Jim Wolfensohn to sustain the momentum for reform towards a leaner, more sharply focused World Bank, which puts greater emphasis on quality and the developmental impact of its operations.

*Yours Ever,  
Bill*

The President of the United States of America

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


April 12, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's  
Working Lunch Meeting with Prime Minister Major  
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and Prime Minister Major of the United Kingdom is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (e)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memcon with Prime Minister Major

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Declassify on: OADR

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2650

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Prime Minister John Major  
of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
John M. Deutch, Acting Secretary of Defense  
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
William Crowe, Ambassador to the UK  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of  
State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for  
European Affairs, NSC Staff

U.K.

John Major, Prime Minister  
Robin Renwick, Ambassador to the U.S.  
John Ward, MP, Parliamentary Private  
Secretary  
Alex Allen, Principal Private Secretary  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary for Foreign  
Affairs  
Christopher Meyer, Press Secretary  
Peter Westmacott, Political and Congressional  
Counselor, British Embassy

DATE, TIME April 4, 1995, 1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Family Dining Room

The President: (After exchanging pleasantries about the NCAA  
basketball final and the First Lady's trip to South Asia) I know  
you had a long meeting with the Vice President this morning.  
There are several things, however, that we should still discuss.  
We have already reviewed what you have said to members of  
Congress about Bosnia. It would be helpful to us, to maintain  
support for our current policy, if we could strengthen UNPROFOR.  
What are your thoughts? (E)

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PER E. O. 13526

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5/26/2016 KDE

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Prime Minister Major: I would like to look at what exactly could be done. I have an open mind. We will be happy to do what can be done safely. What specific ideas do you have in mind? (C)

The President: We are thinking of things such as enforcing the anti-sniper agreement in Sarajevo, keeping the airport open, and the like. (C)

Secretary Christopher: UNPROFOR could be given new and better weapons. It could be given general guidance on when it should agree in advance that NATO airpower could be called in. We should devise a menu and have the Contact Group work it through. Making UNPROFOR more robust will be critical to keeping the Bosnians in a frame of mind conducive to continuing the ceasefire. The Prime Minister's statement of readiness to look at the options with an open mind represents a positive reaction. (C)

The President: I am sensitive to putting UNPROFOR troops at greater risk, but we are walking a tightrope. While we don't want to put the people at risk, we don't want to see UNPROFOR emasculated either. I don't want to be publicly at odds with you on this, since you have ground forces in Bosnia and we don't. But keeping UNPROFOR effective will be necessary to restrain the Bosnian government and help contain pressures here to lift the arms embargo. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Anything that is credible and safe and can ease the possibility of unilateral lift, as well as ease the possibility of the Bosnian government continuing to seek small military gains with the inevitable Serb response, would be advantageous. We would be happy to work bilaterally or within the Contact Group. May I ask what Chris has in mind by better weapons. Does he mean heavier equipment? (C)

Secretary Christopher: Not necessarily. The Ministers of Defense focused on equipment like night-vision goggles. Such things could make the troops more effective. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Our troops are already well equipped. When they are fired upon, they fire back. Other troops, such as the Bangladeshis, may not be so well equipped. General Rose had instructions to fire back twice when he was fired upon. I would be surprised if our troops need any the new equipment. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: Rose's successor, General Smith, is taking the same tough approach, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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Deputy Secretary Deutch: It would be helpful if General Shali got together with Sir Peter Inge to develop a list of options. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, they have a direct line between them. (C)

The President: Let's talk about Iraq. We believe it is important to take a firm line on sanctions. We don't believe that Ekeus will report that the Iraqi are in full compliance with UN resolutions. You have been very supportive, although I know there are many humanitarian concerns in Europe about the impact on the Iraqi people. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I got hit by King Hussein regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation. (C)

The President: There is a large Iraqi-American community in Michigan which is beating me up on this issue. But we offered the Iraqis the flexibility to sell more oil to support humanitarian purchases and they rejected it. We can't give in on sanctions. (C)

Prime Minister Major: There is no difference between us on this issue, but we could find ourselves isolated in relationship to the others. As you said, there is a UN Security Council resolution that would enable the Iraqis to sell oil, but they won't use it. I heard Congressional views last night. When people see large numbers of people starving, however, they may take a contrary view. Nevertheless, I agree we should not lift the sanctions until they comply with the UN resolutions in full. You should have no doubt about our position. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: A lot of the other Europeans are pressing for more flexibility. (C)

The President: How much of this is motivated by humanitarian concerns and how much by commercial interests? (C)

Ambassador Renwick: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

  We will need to be firm and you can be certain about the UK's position on this. (C)

Anthony Lake: I don't think we will be in bad shape regarding the next extension. The Iraqis have rejected the proposal before we even made it. The Ekeus report won't be clear. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] The Queen of Jordan was away during my visit, but the Prime Minister's wife took the same tack as the King. This was very surprising. I don't think it was raised by accident. [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d

Secretary Christopher: It is hard to discuss Iraq without discussing the Turkish operation in Northern Iraq. This is still an unresolved problem. (C)

Richard Holbrooke: The Turkish Foreign Minister is here in town. Strobe Talbott and I will be going to Ankara next week and Prime Minister Ciller will be here in two weeks time. These will be important opportunities to resolve this issue. (C)

The President: How has the UK reacted so far? (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: They are just chasing the PKK around. Bill, what do you think? (C)

Ambassador Crowe: I think that the operation will be unsuccessful even if we leave them to their own devices. (C)

The President: The operation won't succeed even if they stay another three or four weeks. At the beginning of the operation, Prime Minister Ciller called to explain what they were doing. During their previous operation in 1992, we were less reserved in our criticism. Given the internal situation in Turkey, we have been very reserved publicly. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

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CONFIDENTIALPrime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Ambassador Renwick: We went out on a limb to get the Customs Union approved. (C)

The President: The strategic realities haven't changed much in the last few years in Northern Iraq. (C)

Richard Holbrooke: The Foreign Minister may tell us that the Turks will set a date. The Turkish Ambassador hinted about this in a meeting with Strobe Talbott. The military may be trying to undermine the Prime Minister.

EO 13526 1.4d

Turkey is the front-line state in so many respects. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Are they close to setting a date for withdrawal? (C)

Richard Holbrooke: We will know more when we meet with the Foreign Minister. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Richard Holbrooke: They have asked for a full review of Provide Comfort. That operation is at a crossroads too. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: If we can't persuade them to preserve Provide Comfort, we will have a big problem. (C)

The President:

EO 13526 1.4d

The Vice President: We have some months since Provide Comfort was just renewed. (C)

Richard Holbrooke:

EO 13526 1.4d

but this still shows the danger. (C)

The President: Can we turn to the Middle East? I understand you have forgiven Jordan's debt. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have forgiven a great deal of Jordan's debt. Overall, we are happy with our relations with Jordan. The only difficulties occurred during the Gulf War. (C)

The President: What is your assessment of the Palestinians? (C)

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Prime Minister Major: I visited the Gaza Strip during my trip. I must say, I never expected that I would be standing on a red carpet in Gaza next to Yasir Arafat and hearing bagpipes played in my honor. (C)

The President: What are you going to do with the Palestinians?  
(C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: The dilemma is that the only way to get a lot of money into the Palestinian areas in a hurry is to reopen the borders. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Secretary Christopher: I am a little more optimistic. It depends on what day you visit. The Israelis still seem committed to the road map between now and July. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

He has suggested increasing the number of workers from 20,000 to 25,000. Rabin is haunted by the settlement issue. How can he give greater governance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and maintain the security of the settlements? The settlements could become encircled camps. The difficulty of this issue could lead Rabin to focus more on the Syrian track; as difficult as it is, it is a question of borders. But still, since it is so integrated in their long-term goals, Arafat and Rabin might reach agreement by July 1st. There might not be a total redeployment, but the elections and increased West Bank governance could go forward. There might need to be a package. We need to get in more economic aid and achieve more Palestinian action against

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terrorism. In Gaza yesterday there was a happy event of sorts, when a Hamas terrorist blew himself up. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: They scored an own goal. (C)

The President: Are you going to give any money to the Palestinians? (C)

Prime Minister Major: We will give some assistance, but not much. (C)

The President: If the borders are not politically feasible, we will need to do some highly visible things that can provide psychological relief. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I spoke with some of the CEOs of big UK corporations. I encouraged them to do specific projects in the Palestinian areas. A few of them are following up. (C)

Secretary Christopher: It is disappointing that Palestinians outside the region are not responding. There has been little Palestinian investment. It's surprising if one compares this with other examples of emigres supporting their homeland. In the Palestinian case, they are not prepared to take any high risks and treat the Palestinian lands as they would investments anywhere else. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The Vice President: I had a productive exchange with Arafat on that point. I used it as a wedge to describe our reinventing government ideas. I suggested he consider a hiring freeze and a firm budget. Some of his advisers were interested and asked specific questions. It is clear that his ability to get a favorable response from other Arabs will depend on establishing confidence that he is not throwing foreign assistance away. (C)

The President: We will have to keep plugging away on this. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Can we talk about Halifax? You will recall that in 1994 in Naples, we agreed that we would reexamine the international economic institutions. We have done a lot of work on the international financial institutions, on the way that we deal with poverty in the world, on the overlapping UN agencies dealing with the environment and economic assistance. We have

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also been thinking about what we might do on conflict prevention, crime, drugs and money laundering. Down the road we will produce a series of concrete proposals. We would like to make sure that the review at Halifax is not just a casual chat with few concrete results. We believe there is scope for rationalizing the IFIs. We also think we should look at the UN agencies since there is an enormous amount of duplication that is wasteful. If the G-7 can reach an agreement on rationalizing these agencies, it could ease your Congressional funding problems with respect to the UN and help make the UN a more effective instrument for the 21st century. We should see if our thinking is developing in the same way. There is a lot of overlap in how we deal with issues like sustainable development and the environment. Given the limited resources available, we need to consolidate these efforts. How far have you gone in your own examination of these issues? It would be a real advance if all of us at Halifax came out in favor of reform. (C)

Secretary Christopher: I welcome your statement. We are working on the same kind of road map for Halifax, focusing on reform of the IFIs and the UN. This whole problem was dramatized by the Mexican experience. It illustrated the need to create a mechanism for dealing with international bankruptcy problems. We may need more Sherpa meetings and further bilateral consultations as well. We agree that if Halifax does not produce results, we will pay a heavy price in Congress. We need to think about how to deal with a future Mexican crisis, or even worse, two such crises at the same time. Had there been two Mexican problems, we would have failed. In sum, what we did at Naples was even more relevant than what we thought at the time. (C)

Laura Tyson: Our efforts have been redoubled following the Mexican crisis. We have had extensive internal meetings. On the UN, we are in agreement on the need for restructuring. International bankruptcy is an important question to discuss both at Halifax and afterwards. It will be difficult to come up with specific proposals before Halifax, but we are working on it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We want a more concrete result in Halifax than just a discussion. (C)

The President: Let me give my perspective on the international financial institutions. If our objective is to encourage democracy, the integration of markets, and the development of market economics in the developing countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union, we need to answer the following question: Are the institutions that we have adequate to the task or do we need new policies? For example, in countries like Russia and Poland we need to think through the question of

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strengthening the social safety net. On the question of a mechanism to deal with international bankruptcies, if our premise is that some countries will succeed but then fail, they will become targets for speculators. Mexico had a booming economy yet it could not protect its own currency. There is a danger of the Mexican problem repeating itself in countries like Argentina and Brazil, if people take out their money suddenly. We may not be able to find a solution, but that is not a happy prospect. Therefore as we limit chemical weapons and biological weapons, we also have to deal with the problem of new developing economies that grow for a time and then have the rug pulled out from under them. (C)

Alex Allan: We have a lot of sensitivity about using the word bankruptcy for countries, but we agree we need a better system for dealing with problems like Mexico. Part of the solution may be better monitoring and surveillance. One has to say that the IMF slipped up in not forecasting the Mexican crisis. The crisis may not have emerged in such a rush had we had some advance warning. Regarding the World Bank we hope that Jim Wolfensohn will do a lot. He has some good ideas. The World Bank is a good institution but it has become too big and its focus has become blurred. (C)

The President: I have a lot of confidence in Wolfensohn. (U)

Prime Minister Major: We will put together our concrete ideas. There is an advantage in concerting our efforts. Alex will come over to talk with his counterparts. (U)

The President: At Naples, the two of us were more interested in this question than the other five members of the G-7. (C)

The Vice President: There are a lot of other items on the world agenda than the IFIs such as sustainable development. These missions are new and still evolving; they need direction. Look at countries like Sierra Leone or Haiti. One can see how environmental devastation helped contribute to the disintegration of society. Similar problems occurred in Rwanda and Burundi and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is apparent that over the next decade the world is going to need to pay more attention to a whole complex of factors, to keep control over developments like environmental decay, depletion of fish stocks, and destruction of farm lands. (C)

The President: Let's turn to Russia. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We don't have any different views on Russia. I don't know what Yeltsin will do.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

You were right to go to Moscow in May. (C)

Regarding economic reform, Chernomyrdin has outdone what we have expected of him. I initially thought the international financial institutions were demanding too much, yet Chernomyrdin has done better than I imagined. Looking to the next few months, we have no idea what will be the composition of the next parliament.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

It is not clear who his opponents will be or whether Yeltsin himself will run for reelection. (C)

With regard to the Paris Club application for debt deferment, we are not big creditors so we could agree to a three-year program. But we don't feel strongly about this. If others have different views, we will be sympathetic.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: The Russians have a compulsion to be part of every club. (C)

The Vice President: Yes, they want to join the Paris Club and NATO, and have a special relationship with the U.S. (C)

The President: We don't know the answers ourselves about what will happen in Russia. It is still in our self-interest to stay engaged with Russia. Our two countries' position has not changed on this. I am more concerned that the Russians may want to have it both ways. On the one hand they want to appear helpful and be members of the clubs; on the other hand, they are playing up the notion that Russia is being disrespected. When the Vice President met Yeltsin in his hospital in December, they had a good meeting about how to develop relations with NATO. Yet, since then, they have been clearly backing off. Their objections are only stoking the fears of those countries who want to be members of NATO. I thought that if we could get an understanding with the Russians, we could achieve some level of comfort and tone down the rhetoric. We could then build up Partnership for Peace and joint exercises. I thought we could proceed at a deliberate pace, but my current feeling is that Yeltsin is mishandling the issue. This affects his interests more than ours, apart from the discomfort of the public exchanges. Anything that we can do in May to get him more centered on the issue would be helpful. When we stay away from Yeltsin, domestic politics begin to affect him. (C)

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Roderic Lyne: I don't know what is going to happen next year in Russia, but the underlying trends are moving in the right direction and a new generation is beginning to emerge. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: As democracy develops in Russia, we will need to show understanding when we see manifestations of the same personal insecurities that are present in our own countries. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Another question that has been rumbling around in our thinking is that the terms of trade in U.S.-European relations have changed with the passing of a definable enemy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] We don't have the same interrelationship at the parliamentary level as we have between our administrations. The fact that we are not in as close touch leads to gaps in our thinking and in our perceptions, for example over Bosnia. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] There are a lots of things we should be talking about. For example, we have a transatlantic hemispheric conference of government and business leaders which has been remarkably successful. We need to fill the gap in other areas. (C)

We have been thinking about a possible North Atlantic free trade area, whether formalized or not. There is a lot to do in reducing non-tariff barriers. We would like to start exploring these ideas. Our thinking is nebulous at this stage, but lurking in it is the idea of a more concrete relationship between Western Europe and the United States than exists at the present time. I don't know if you heard of the advice given to Winston Churchill by Randolph Churchill: "Never lose touch with the Americans." This saying was handed down through the generations. Today there is a tendency to believe that Europe and the United States will look in different directions. It is not a serious problem today but we want to keep working to ensure that it doesn't become a serious problem. We have a lot of common interests: bringing the Central and East European states into Western institutions (the EU and NATO) and extending security and prosperity in their direction; coordinating our longer-term policy toward Russia and Ukraine; working to deal with the problems of North Africa and the Middle East, including helping such friends as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan; building on the World Trade Organization by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12

achieving more trade liberalization. As I said, we have not formulated these ideas in full, but these are the kinds of subjects we should be looking at. (C)

The President: I am very encouraged by what you're saying. We have tried to be supportive of European integration and the political economic and security dimensions. We don't see this as intrinsically threatening as long as the specifics don't damage our traditional partnerships. But there is uncertainty in the United States regarding how things will develop. I agree on the need to strengthen transatlantic links. I am very worried about the percentage of the new members of Congress who are quite isolationists. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Almost half of the members of Congress are in their first or second term and represent a different generation. (U)

The President: Another problem is that a large part of the American people are presently inward-looking and preoccupied with domestic concerns. A few weeks ago I had a press conference with editors of college newspapers and I did not get a single question on foreign policy. Moreover, none of their economic questions reflected any awareness of the limits imposed by the global economy. These people were not illiterate or unconcerned, but foreign policy issues did not score high on their hierarchy of interests. Look at Mexico. At the start of the crisis we had all the Congressional leaders supportive of solution -- Dole, Gingrich, Daschle and Gephardt. Three or four days later, however, the votes were disappearing and we probably couldn't get more than three votes today. The turmoil in the U.S. has nothing to do with Europe but it produces an isolationist influence. More outreach is needed. I was struck by a Washington Times article attacking a possible visit by a Congressional delegation to the Middle East. I would happily send them all on a tour of the world to overcome their isolationist attitude. (C)

Secretary Christopher: Not one of the first-term Congressmen is traveling abroad during the upcoming recess. (U)

Leon Panetta: I would agree that interparliamentary exchanges have lost their meaningfulness. It is worth a shot trying to improve them. I am concerned that in the budget we will suffer direct hits on the State Department budget, on foreign aid and on the 150 account. There is an isolationist trend and anything we can do to break it will be difficult. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How should we proceed? Should we float some ideas in Western Europe? (C)

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The President: We will put some high-level energy into it and coordinate with you. You may need to make the first move, for example, to get Dole and Gingrich to invite distinguished European parliamentarians to Washington and then get our Congressmen to go back to Europe. I am very concerned that this trend could become bipartisan. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Gingrich was interested in my idea. (C)

The President: He is pretty good on this. He is worried himself about the isolationist trend. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: We should target the freshmen Congressmen. (U)

The President: A lot of them were elected on an extremist platform. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: This is what I said earlier: they are playing to people's fears. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I may float this idea publicly and see what happens. I am also happy to send some people over here to discuss this and to live in the squalor of the British Embassy. (C)

The President: What do you think about the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty? (C)

Prime Minister Major: I think we have a better chance now. (U)

The President: We have been working like hell on it. The aversion of some of our best friends has been surprising. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It will be very embarrassing if we fail to get an unlimited extension. (C)

The President: An extension for another 25 years seems like a long time but it is not sufficient. (C)

Secretary Christopher: If we extend for 25 years we will be hanging on the edge and we won't be able to achieve a long-term solution to the problem. Returning to the Prime Minister's two ideas: With the Asians and the Latin Americans we have a timetable for establishment of a free trade area. We don't have the same goal with respect to Europe. We should do this,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14

although it will cause some tensions, particularly in the agricultural area. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I would like to begin to discuss this publicly. We had a seminar at Chequers. My Defense Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, spoke about an Atlantic community of free trade. It is an idea worth floating. It has many attractions. (C)

The President: We have two options: we could agree on a long-term goal, as with APEC and the Summit of Americas in Miami; or alternatively, since the U.S. and Europe are so closely involved in the GATT, we might be able to go for specific agreements -- lopping things off one at a time. (C)

Ambassador Renwick: Financial services could be one of the first areas. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We should also be able to lop off non-tariff barriers. Free trade in the broadest sense does engage the question of agriculture, which is problematic on both sides of the water. One of the reasons why I wanted to raise this idea now is because some of our EU partners believe that, with GATT out of the way, nothing more needs to be done. I want to ride the wind before it is completely gone. I don't know who is going to win the French election, but right now it looks like Chirac.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

[REDACTED] i near you are down to eight and a half percent unemployment in Britain. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's right, although we are not at the level of five percent and a bit like you are. Our unemployment is dropping by about one-tenth of a percentage point a month. (C)

The President: That is quite good. (U)

Richard Holbrooke: There are two issues I would like to raise regarding the Congress. Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd in their contacts on the Hill have had a major impact and they should continue to engage directly. The formal interparliamentary structures have atrophied. With respect to Executive Branch contacts, the most promising areas would be to rationalize our policies toward Central Europe and Russia. NATO

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expansion and the enlargement of the EU will go slowly for their own reasons, yet expectations in Central Europe are high. If we can work more closely on the region, it would accomplish the Prime Minister's goal of strengthening transatlantic ties and doing for Central Europe what we did for Western Europe in the post-war years. We have a tremendous opportunity and should engage multilaterally and bilaterally. The U.S.-UK channel can be the core, and it can be also be broadened to include Germany and maybe France, depending on the results of the election. There is a lot we can do, if not before the Moscow Summit, then immediately afterward.

The President: Do we need to discuss Libya? (U)

Anthony Lake: Rod Lyne and I have already had a good discussion.  
(U)

The President: Let's coordinate on the hard questions we are going to face at the press conference. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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2650

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Private Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

U.K.  
Prime Minister John Major  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary, Notetaker

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 4, 1995, 12:05 - 12:45 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: How has your trip being going? (U)

Prime Minister Major: I arrived Sunday night. (U)

The President: I hear you spent an hour and half with the Vice President this morning. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, we had a good breakfast meeting and covered a lot of subjects. A lot of the time was spent on Northern Ireland. (C)

The President: How was the dinner last night? (U)

Prime Minister Major: There was a good cast of characters. (U)

The President: Were there any Senators there? (U)

Prime Minister Major: About half of the Foreign Relations Committee was there. The guests included Senators Pell, Warner, Lugar, Simpson and Congressman Gephardt. (U)

The President: Were any of them for lifting the arms embargo?  
(C)

Prime Minister Major: Some of them were. (U)

Roderic Lyne: Senator McCain kept his mouth shut. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-m (158)  
5/26/2016 KDE

The President: Did your discussion do any good? (U)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] there will be tremendous pressure on the U.S. to act. That is a shorthand description of the case that I made. (C)

The President: Did any of them contest your arguments? (C)

Prime Minister Major: No. One of them raised the moral dimension. I said that there were two moral dimensions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: That is exactly my problem. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] No one argued against me, although that doesn't mean that they agreed with me. I said the same thing to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (C)

The President: I might win on this in the Senate. Last year, however, the House voted overwhelmingly for unilateral lift. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I made the case to Senator Dole too when I met with him. I was very blunt and said lifting the embargo would be a mistake. (C)

The President: How did Dole react? (C)

Prime Minister Major: He also did not contest my arguments, although he did not respond substantively. He had heard my arguments before when he visited Number 10. He said his resolution might come to a vote in May, but he did not respond to the merits of my argument. (C)

The President: We just have to keep chipping away. I think we are gaining ground on this issue. I ask members of Congress how we can tell the Europeans what to do when we don't have ground forces in Bosnia. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: How do you judge the political  
issue?

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

... are they going to force a veto? (C)

The President: That is just it. Even though we are better at running the government, the Republicans are better politicians. They want to have the best of both worlds -- to pass unilateral lift legislation and then force me to veto it. They would have the benefits of supporting lift without the consequences. At the same time, if we stick with our current policy, everything could go to hell and we could get blamed for that too. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have both been very unlucky to have this insoluble problem on our plates. (C)

The President: We are in the same pickle on the economy. We get no credit for having a sound economic plan. This is the first time in history that we have generalized prosperity that does not translate into increased personal security. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Mickey Kantor told me that the American economy is getting better and better, yet people think the country is going to the dogs. We have the same problem in the UK. No one sees the gains. (C)

The President: Every story in the media emphasizes the insecurities that people now have. A case in point is Money magazine. It is widely read and its readers are well educated; although they are not rich, they are comfortable. Money did a readers' survey two years ago in which 43% of the people were worried about their own future. Today, even though people give me credit for reducing the deficit and strengthening the economy, 65% are worried about the future. The problem is that there is so much publicity when bad things happen that everyone knows someone who has been hit by downsizing. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I saw stories in the paper today about downsizing. The same thing is happening in the City of London. Big cuts are taking place in the banking sector. Reducing overstaffing is a good thing, but it accentuates the gap between rich and poor. So we are hearing the same echoes in our country. (C)

The President: This is the central problem of our time. The whole idea of progress is being questioned. The purveyors of progress are at risk in both political parties. The people are very susceptible to divisive politics. This is seen in the rising opposition to affirmative action, welfare, and immigration. Another manifestation is that religious groups are getting more active as people look for refuge in the big

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evangelical churches. The Christian Coalition has become an arm of the Republican right. (C)

Prime Minister Major: This is a problem that we don't have in Britain. (C)

The President: It is hard for people to feel secure in the global economy. There are objective reasons in the U.S. for people's insecurity. After the war, growth was very even among all classes, but the poor did somewhat better, growing 140% of the average. Between 1978 and 1990 however, the bottom 60% stayed about the same. The next 20% increased their income by 5% and the top 20% increased by 18%. Part of the reason for this is the expansion of the job market to accommodate the baby boomers. (C)

Prime Minister Major: But you have had job expansion in the last two years as well. (C)

The President: The introduction of the baby boomers, more women and immigrants has caused a drop in incomes. The globalization of the economy has been part of the problem. Moreover, we do not have national health care and, when people they lose their jobs, they lose their retirement and health insurance. A smaller part of our workforce under 65 has health insurance today than did so ten years ago. (C)

Prime Minister Major: This defies logic. (C)

The President: As fewer people are insured, the rates go up. The insurance companies don't want to insure sick people and the young and healthy people can't afford to buy insurance and expand the pool. The ultimate success of the free market may help, but keeping people in line is increasingly difficult. The media and the objective reality have made change a more ever-present factor in people's lives. How to balance change with a sense of security, and to support things like affirmative action, is a real challenge for all the advanced countries. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Your political position seems to have improved. (C)

The President: Yes, I am doing better in the polls. The media demonized me so much over the first two years that the intensity now is falling off. People are more open to what I am trying to do. I've gone from 45 to 48%. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Do you think a third-party candidate will run in 1996?

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The President: This would help me unless it is a candidate of the left like Jesse Jackson (except for the fact that a left-wing candidate would make me look more moderate than liberal, which is a dirty word in this country). (C)

Prime Minister Major: Will Perot run? (C)

The President: I don't know. The White House has a good working relationship with Perot; NATFA was an exception. Based on today's facts, a Perot candidacy would help me. If he had not run in 1992, I would have had a larger popular vote, yet a lower electoral majority. My mandate would have looked stronger (about 54 to 46%) but I would have won about 50 fewer electoral votes. What is interesting about the Perot people is that they think they are more conservative. They certainly want tax cuts and a balanced budget, but they are also very secular and hate the religious right. There are more nationalistic and, in this respect, have done worse economically than the typical Clinton voter. I tend to get the progressive yuppies who are in favor of a free market with a social conscience and don't like the divisiveness of the Republicans. Perot's voters simply want protection. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have a similar thing in reverse. Liberal party voters are increasingly disillusioned. They could never vote Labor, yet they think the Conservatives are too centrist and are moving away from them. (C)

The President: Won't they begin to come back to you if the economy improves and on the strength of your international policies? That would suggest a strategy of not going too early to new elections. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I need to go all the way through to 1997. (C)

The President: Look at the shape that Kohl is in now. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, Labor has a big lead now, but it is ephemeral. Many people are looking for reasons to vote for the conservatives. Our people are not better off yet, so I need to wait for the full five-year period to run out before holding elections. (C)

The President: The global economy is a good thing. It means more jobs without inflation. But the flip side is that for the foreseeable future there is little chance it will make people feel more secure. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: The shocks people have endured to their personal security -- in terms of job security and savings -- are very real. It will take time for people to recover. Wages are not rising but employment is increasing. Over the next two years we expect a massive return of voters and I will play it long. Dr. Johnson's principle is that if you are about to be hanged, it concentrates the mind wonderfully. That argues for playing it long. I think things have bottomed out in Britain, or I certainly hope they have. (C)

The President: Do you have the same perception of the gap between the classes becoming greater in Britain? Here we are developing into a two-track middle class. In 1993 we had the largest number of new businesses and new millionaires, yet the middle class has been stagnating. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It is not quite the same in Britain but it is similar. (C)

Roderic Lyne: The Labor Party is trying to create the impression that the top half of British society has become richer, but this is not widely believed. It depends on stretching the statistics. The problem we have is that people are not confident enough about the future to spend money. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is right. Our recovery has been based solely on investment and trade, not on consumption. We have been taking markets away from the French and the Germans. We have a current-account surplus with Japan. We are exporting cars, TVs and medium and high-tech equipment to Japan. There was a lot of Japanese investment in the UK in recent years and we are now selling back to Japan. Financial services are also a big source of foreign exchange, although we need to open up that market more. (C)

The President: I certainly agree with that. (C)

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
 We need to agree on our lines before we have our press conference. I also wanted to discuss a few things here. If we look at American perceptions of Western Europe, we may be appearing to be increasingly insular and isolationist. The same could be said about Western European perceptions of America. We no longer have the common enemy -- the dragon of the Soviet Union. I would like to explore with you what we can do collectively to extend areas of common interest. A lot could be done to open up free trade, to reduce non-tariff barriers in areas like audio-visual services. We should create a wider free trade relationship between Western Europe and North America. Looking to the press conference, we need to have clear lines on

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Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. We might divide up the obvious questions. (C)

The President: My major objective for this whole visit is to reaffirm the many things on which we are working together. We are creating conditions for a world with precedent. On balance, I think we've been working together in harmony. Moreover, we have record levels of investments in both direction. What can I say that would be most useful on Northern Ireland? You have risked so much to move things forward. I could emphasize that we anticipate and expect serious discussions of decommissioning forthwith. If pressed, I can also say that decommissioning cannot be linked to the British soldiers and police in Northern Ireland. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We have had another meeting with Sinn Fein today. We have already agreed upon an agenda for talks with the Protestant Loyalists which have created the basis for a ministerial dialogue. We have made a lot of progress with them (more than we have admitted publicly) on getting rid of the weapons. We are close to an agreement with Sinn Fein that would permit us to move from the official to the ministerial level. The agenda would cover decommissioning and a range of other issues.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

As we make progress of decommissioning, we will make our own decisions of the basis of the security environment. We have already taken out some troops a few weeks ago, and we are prepared to tell Sinn Fein what we are going to do as we go along. So if you say that Sinn Fein needs to discuss decommissioning and not link it to the army and police, it would be very helpful. (C)

Roderic Lyne:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

this needs to stop. (C)

The President: If I were a Loyalist, I wouldn't think of giving up my arms. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Loyalists won't give up their arms until the IRA does. They will agree on the arrangements, but not implement them until the IRA agrees to do the same. (C)

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The President: We need to identify the 3 or 4 most difficult questions and get our answers straight. (C)

Prime Minister Major: One question is obviously the status of our overall relationship. There has been a lot of rubbish written on this. Looking at the broad strands, we have a common view on a broad range of subjects. We cooperate on security and intelligence issues, the UK has Trident missiles on its submarines and may soon have Tomahawks. These are just some of the many practical illustrations of the absurdity of claims that the special relationship is dead. I have never used the phrase special relationship; we usually speak of a very close relationship. (C)

The President: We may get all the hard questions on our relations from the British press. The American press may ask me other questions such as about the CIA and Guatemala, the latest Republican tax relief proposal that will allow self-employed people to buy health insurance, cut tax breaks for minority media, but give a huge benefit to Rupert Murdoch. I have to decide whether to veto this bill or to sign it while excoriating the Congress for including this benefit for Murdoch.

-- End of Conversation --

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2836

*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Rome, March 14, 1995

Dear President Clinton,

with reference to your message of 11 March, I want you to know that Italy will support without reservation the nomination and appointment of Mr. Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank.

His breath of experience and his outstanding personality make Mr Wolfensohn eminently suitable to lead the Bank successfully in this period of rapid change.

Allow me to express my appreciation for this excellent choice.

Sincerely Yours,

Lamberto Dini

-----  
The Honorable William J. CLINTON  
President of the United States  
The White House

PHOTOCOPY  
MISC. HANDWRITING



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 March 1995

*Dear Bill,*

Thank you for your message to me of 28 February about European discussion of the International Space Station. I fully recognise the importance of reaching timely agreement on the European contribution. While the United Kingdom is not directly involved in the European Space Agency's International Space Station programmes, we remain a signatory of the Inter-Governmental Agreement. We will do our best where possible to help achieve an early conclusion.

*Yours Ever,  
John*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Trip to Ireland and Britain

Purpose

To decide whether to announce at the May 24-26 White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland that you will travel to the United Kingdom and Ireland during the second half of 1995. ~~not before 1996 at least during your first term.~~

Background

You have a standing invitation from the British and the Irish to visit London and Dublin respectively. Ambassador Crowe has written you strongly urging an early visit to London (Tab A). A visit to Ireland would underscore on both sides of the Atlantic the depth of your commitment to supporting the peace process in Northern Ireland. Depending on the state of the talks and the situation in the North, a visit to Belfast might also figure into this trip.

Since after Moscow and Kiev you have no other trips planned to Europe in 1995, I propose that you make a two-day visit to the United Kingdom and Ireland. A notional schedule might be as follows:

↳ There are two planned trips to Europe in 1995 ( ) ~~but not~~ during which you could make a stop in London or Ireland. However, given that the Presidential election will be in Nov. Swing, ~~the~~ 1995 is by far the preferable time frame.

Depart Washington in evening.

Day One:

Arrive London early morning.

Events:

- Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street
- Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace
- Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair
- Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

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## Day Two:

Morning flight from London to Dublin

### Events:

Meet with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Golf, or, depending on status of peace process, visit to Belfast

Evening: Depart for Washington

## RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to a two-day trip to the United Kingdom and Ireland in the latter half of 1995.

That you announce this trip in your May 25 speech at the Investment Conference, indicating that the trip will be to London and Dublin but leaving open the possibility of a stop in Northern Ireland.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab A Letter from Ambassador Crowe

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN  
5 2395

May 19, 1995 95 MAY 19 P3:49

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
BILLY WEBSTER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Trip to Ireland and Britain

Purpose

To decide whether to announce at the May 24-26 White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland that you will travel to the United Kingdom and Ireland this year.

Background

You have a standing invitation from the British and the Irish to visit London and Dublin respectively. Ambassador Crowe has written you strongly urging an early visit to London. A visit to Ireland would underscore on both sides of the Atlantic the depth of your commitment to supporting the peace process in Northern Ireland. Depending on the state of the talks and the situation in the North, you will probably want to include a visit to Belfast/Derry.

Since you have no additional trips planned to Europe in 1995, there is no obvious time to visit Ireland and the U.K. I would recommend against trying to do the trip in 1996 given the election schedule. The only planned European trip in 1996 is to the G-7 in France in July and given the Democratic Convention and the heat of the campaign, a trip to Ireland could be misconstrued. Thus, there are four basic options for a trip in 1995:

1. Immediately before APEC
2. Immediately after APEC
3. August
4. December in connection with EU Summit

On balance, the August timeframe probably makes the most sense. Each option is sketched out below for your review.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

OPTION 1. BEFORE APEC

**NOVEMBER 15**

Morning flight from Washington to London

Events:

Dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace

**NOVEMBER 16**

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair

Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

Mid-afternoon flight from London to Dublin

Events:

Meeting/dinner with Irish President Mary Robinson

**NOVEMBER 17**

Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Visit to Belfast/Derry

Mid-afternoon flight from Belfast to Osaka, Japan

**NOVEMBER 18**

Events:

Bilateral meetings

Possible APEC welcoming reception/dinner

**NOVEMBER 19**

Events:

APEC Leaders meetings

Possible side trip to Kyoto

Possible Working dinner

**NOVEMBER 20**

Morning flight from Osaka to Tokyo

Events:

Welcoming ceremony

Call on the Emperor

Meeting with Prime Minister Muryama and Cabinet

State dinner

**NOVEMBER 21:**

Events:

Possible lunch with the Emperor

Flight from Tokyo to Washington

**PROS:**

-- Avoids having to add a separate foreign trip to schedule by combining with APEC.

**CONS:**

-- Makes for a very long, exhausting trip.

-- Would make additional stops in Asia following your APEC meetings and State Visit to Japan very difficult. (You have received invitations from Korea and China thus far.)

-- Precludes down time activities (golf, London tour, visit to Cassidy family region).

OPTION 2. AFTER APEC

**NOVEMBER 17**

Late-morning flight from Washington to Osaka, Japan

**NOVEMBER 18**

Events:

Bilateral meetings

Possible APEC welcoming reception/dinner

**NOVEMBER 19**

Events:

APEC Leaders meetings

Possible side trip to Kyoto

Possible Working dinner

**NOVEMBER 20**

Morning flight from Osaka to Tokyo

Events:

Welcoming ceremony

Meeting/meal with the Emperor

Meeting with Prime Minister Muryama and Cabinet

State dinner

**NOVEMBER 21:**

Early Morning flight from Tokyo to London (might require 2-hour refueling stop in Helsinki)

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street  
Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair  
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

**NOVEMBER 22**

Morning flight from London to Dublin

Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton  
Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Visit to Belfast/Derry

Early evening flight from Belfast to Washington

**PROS:**

-- Avoids having to add a separate foreign trip to schedule by combining with APEC.

**CONS:** Same as for Option 1 plus:

- The timeframe would be tight in order to ensure you are home for Thanksgiving on Thursday, November 23.
- Would only allow an overnight in London, not in Ireland.
- By condensing what is normally a two-day State Visit into one day, risks insulting the Japanese.

OPTION 3. AUGUST

**DAY 1**

Evening flight from Washington to London  
[Alternatively, fly during the day and have dinner with the Queen.]

**DAY 2**

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street  
Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace  
Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair  
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community  
Tour/down time in London

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## DAY 3

Morning flight from London to Dublin

### Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton  
Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson  
Golf/down time

## DAY 4

Possible visit to Cassidy family region  
Visit to Belfast/Derry

Afternoon flight from Belfast to Washington

### PROS:

-- Allows for a more leisurely visit to Ireland and U.K.,  
including touring London, golf and visit to Cassidy family  
region.

### CONS:

-- Would cut into August vacation.  
-- Could be criticized as a political trip.  
-- Could inconvenience foreign governments who would otherwise  
be on vacation.

## OPTION 4. DECEMBER IN CONNECTION WITH EU SUMMIT

### DAY 1

Evening flight from Washington to Madrid, Spain

### DAY 2

#### Events:

Arrival ceremony  
Courtesy call on King Juan Carlos  
Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez  
EU Summit with EC Commission President Santer and Prime Minister  
Gonzalez (President of the EU Council)  
Press conference  
Lunch hosted by the Spanish Government  
Speech

Late afternoon flight from Madrid to London

#### Events:

Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace

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# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

## DAY 3

### Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair

Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

Mid-afternoon flight from London to Dublin

### Events:

Meeting/dinner with Irish President Mary Robinson

## DAY 4

### Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Visit to Belfast/Derry

Mid-afternoon flight from Belfast to Washington

### PROS:

-- Makes an Ireland/U.K. visit more substantive by combining with EU Summit.

-- The Spanish would be delighted by a visit by you.

### CONS:

-- Could be difficult to travel to Europe in December given Christmas season and following long trip to Asia for APEC in November.

-- Could open you to criticism of too much travel.

-- Adds another European trip when could do EU Summit in the U.S.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1) That you agree to a trip to the United Kingdom and Ireland in August.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove  \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively, that you choose an alternate timeframe.

Immediately before APEC \_\_\_\_\_

Immediately after APEC \_\_\_\_\_

December in connection with EU Summit \_\_\_\_\_

2) That you announce this trip in your May 25 speech at the Investment Conference, indicating that the trip will be to London and Dublin but leaving open the possibility of a stop in Northern Ireland.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Submit  
to discussion  
group on  
vacation*

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY <sup>3328</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1995

95 MAY 8 09:38

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Trip to Ireland and Britain

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM/NARA, Date 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-M

Purpose

To decide whether to announce at the May 24-26 White House Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland that you will travel to the United Kingdom and Ireland during the second half of 1995.

Background

You have a standing invitation from the British and the Irish to visit London and Dublin respectively. Ambassador Crowe has written you strongly urging an early visit to London (Tab A). A visit to Ireland would underscore on both sides of the Atlantic the depth of your commitment to supporting the peace process in Northern Ireland. Depending on the state of the talks and the situation in the North, a visit to Belfast might also figure into this trip.

Since after Moscow and Kiev you have no other trips planned to Europe in 1995, I propose that you make a two-day visit to the United Kingdom and Ireland. There are two planned trips to Europe in 1996 (Belgium and France) during which you could make a stop in London or Ireland. Moreover, given that the Presidential election will be in full swing, 1995 is by far the preferable time frame. A notional schedule might be as follows:

Depart Washington in evening.

**Day One:**

Arrive London early morning.

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace  
Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair  
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

## Day Two:

Morning flight from London to Dublin

### Events:

Meet with Irish Prime Minister Bruton  
Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Golf, or, depending on status of peace process, visit to Belfast

Evening: Depart for Washington

## RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to a two-day trip to the United Kingdom and Ireland in the latter half of 1995.

That you announce this trip in your May 25 speech at the Investment Conference, indicating that the trip will be to London and Dublin but leaving open the possibility of a stop in Northern Ireland.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab A Letter from Ambassador Crowe

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3328

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

April 27, 1995

PLEASE STAFF

*to Kathy Stephens*

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

*cc: Tony Lake*

Dear Mr. President:

Having settled back into London, I wanted to pass along some reflections on John Major's visit.

Your warm hospitality was most appreciated by Major and noted as well by the British press. The inspired decision to join the Prime Minister at Georgia Brown's helped dispel any lingering doubts here about your personal relations.

From the vantage point of our bilateral ties, your remarks at the joint press conference in support of the decommissioning of IRA and Loyalists arms were the highlight of the visit. Major was delighted with this support for his -- and John Bruton's -- efforts. The British media also applauded your remarks, characterizing them as a firm underpinning of the peace process. This was a rather amazing turnabout, given their normal predilections. My staff and I will remain alert for instances in the future where you might usefully speak out in a similar vein.

The Northern Ireland peace process took another step forward on April 24, when Sinn Fein finally agreed to talks with a British Minister. It is not yet clear, however, whether they are genuinely prepared to talk seriously about disarmament; if not, the process will soon hit another snag. Sinn Fein continues to stress its "electoral mandate" (10-12% in Northern Ireland), and to insist that it be treated as a "legitimate" party. But with the

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY


-2-

exception of the loyalists, who have already begun serious talks on modalities of disarmament, it is the only party in the Province with arms and a terrorist infrastructure. This reality emphasizes the need for us to keep the pressure on Adams to make good on his commitments, while encouraging both republicans and loyalists to accept the disciplines of democratic politics.

Before I left Washington, the Vice President asked me to send him my thoughts on what we might do both to reinforce Anglo-American relations and to assist the peace process in Northern Ireland. I have just written him and recommended, first and foremost, that you make an official visit to London within the next year. While I think we have things back on track after our recent differences on Northern Ireland, a visit -- which, I might add, is long overdue -- would be a huge boost to this key ally and to the overall bond.

Thank you again for all your good work in Washington.

Sincerely,



William J. Crowe, Jr.  
Ambassador

*P.S. I thank you for visiting Oklahoma City for the Memorial Service. Oklahomans of all stripes, wherever they are, are extremely grateful for your prompt and sensitive response to the bombing. The London Embassy has received a mountain of correspondence extending condolences and sympathy. I have forwarded copies of those letters to the Mayor of OKC as well as the Governor. All the best.*

Initials: KSM Date: 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-M

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: MAY 9 12: 47

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5-10

SUBJECT: Proposed Trip to Ireland & Britain

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McGINTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PANETTA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NASH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McLARTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	QUINN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ICKES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RASCO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BOWLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SEGAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
RIVLIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SOSNIK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMANUEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STEPHANOPOULOS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
GEARAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TYSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GIBBONS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WEBSTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRIFFIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HALE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HERMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HIGGINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LAKE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LINDSEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MIKVA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McCURRY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

per John Angell.  
Panetta does not want memo to go fwd.  
Billy Webster should handle  
TW

REMARKS: Please provide comments directly to this office. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

5/9 copied this for Billy Webster  
S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By KGM NARA, Date 3/16/2019

2013-0449-M

## OPTION 1. - SEPTEMBER 29 - OCTOBER 1

### SEPTEMBER 29

Morning flight from Washington to London

#### Events:

Dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace

(Or depart evening, arrive morning of 30th)

### SEPTEMBER 30

#### Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair

Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

Tour/down time in London

Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace (if do not fly during day on 29th)

### OCTOBER 1

Morning flight from London to Belfast/Derry

Afternoon travel to Dublin

#### Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

### OCTOBER 2

Morning meetings with political leaders/opposition

Possible visit to Cassidy family region/golf

Afternoon flight from Dublin to Washington

#### PROS:

-- Allows for a more leisurely visit to Ireland and U.K., including touring London, golf and visit to Cassidy family region.

## OPTION 2. BEFORE APEC

### NOVEMBER 15

Morning flight from Washington to London

#### Events:

Dinner with the Queen at Buckingham Palace

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

## NOVEMBER 16

### Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair

Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

Mid-afternoon flight from London to Belfast

Evening flight to Dublin

### Events:

Meeting/dinner with Irish President Mary Robinson

## NOVEMBER 17

### Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Meeting with Political Leaders/Opposition

Mid-afternoon flight from Dublin to Osaka, Japan

## NOVEMBER 18

### Events:

Bilateral meetings

Possible APEC welcoming reception/dinner

## NOVEMBER 19

### Events:

APEC Leaders meetings

Possible side trip to Kyoto

Possible Working dinner

## NOVEMBER 20

Morning flight from Osaka to Tokyo

### Events:

Welcoming ceremony

Call on the Emperor

Meeting with Prime Minister Muryama and Cabinet

State dinner

## NOVEMBER 21:

### Events:

Possible lunch with the Emperor

Flight from Tokyo to Washington

### PROS:

-- Avoids having to add a separate foreign trip to schedule by combining with APEC.

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**CONS:**

- Makes for a very long, exhausting trip.
- Would make additional stops in Asia following your APEC meetings and State Visit to Japan very difficult. (You have received invitations from Korea and China thus far.)
- Precludes down time activities (golf, London tour, visit to Cassidy family region).

**OPTION 3. AFTER APEC**

**NOVEMBER 17**

Late-morning flight from Washington to Osaka, Japan

**NOVEMBER 18**

Events:

Bilateral meetings

Possible APEC welcoming reception/dinner

**NOVEMBER 19**

Events:

APEC Leaders meetings

Possible side trip to Kyoto

Possible Working dinner

**NOVEMBER 20**

Morning flight from Osaka to Tokyo

Events:

Welcoming ceremony

Meeting/meal with the Emperor

Meeting with Prime Minister Muryama and Cabinet

State dinner

**NOVEMBER 21:**

Early Morning flight from Tokyo to London (might require 2-hour refueling stop in Helsinki)

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street

Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace

Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair

Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NOVEMBER 22

Morning flight from London to Belfast

Visit to Belfast/Derry

Afternoon travel to Dublin

Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

Meeting/Meal with Irish President Mary Robinson

Early evening flight from Dublin to Washington

PROS:

-- Avoids having to add a separate foreign trip to schedule by combining with APEC.

CONS: Same as for Option 1 plus:

-- The timeframe would be tight in order to ensure you are home for Thanksgiving on Thursday, November 23.

-- Would only allow an overnight in London, not in Ireland.

-- By condensing what is normally a two-day State Visit into one day, risks insulting the Japanese.

## OPTION 4. DECEMBER IN CONNECTION WITH EU SUMMIT

DAY 1

Evening flight from Washington to Madrid, Spain

DAY 2

Events:

Arrival ceremony

Courtesy call on King Juan Carlos

Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez

EU Summit with EC Commission President Santer and Prime Minister Gonzalez (President of the EU Council)

Press conference

Lunch hosted by the Spanish Government

Speech

Late afternoon flight from Madrid to London

Events:

Meal with Queen at Buckingham Palace

DAY 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Events:

Meeting with Prime Minister Major at 10 Downing Street  
Meeting with Labour Leader Tony Blair  
Meet with U.S. Embassy staff and/or U.S. business community

Mid-afternoon flight from London to Belfast

Afternoon travel to Dublin

Events:

Meeting/dinner with Irish President Mary Robinson

**DAY 4**

Events:

Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Bruton  
Meeting with Political Leaders/Opposition

Mid-afternoon flight from Dublin to Washington

**PROS:**

- Makes an Ireland/U.K. visit more substantive by combining with EU Summit.
- The Spanish would be delighted by a visit by you.

**CONS:**

- Could be difficult to travel to Europe in December given Christmas season and following long trip to Asia for APEC in November.
- Could open you to criticism of too much travel.
- Adds another European trip when could do EU Summit in the U.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4503


June 19, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KBH NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with  
British Prime Minister John Major (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister John Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memcon with Prime Minister Major

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER COMM HALL LAKE SIT

SIT: COQ GRAY HOTLINE\_OUT LAKEA SIGLER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121608Z JUN 95

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
05/20/16 KDE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 8 LETTER ON BOSNIA. THE RETURN OF OUR F-16 PILOT, CAPTAIN O'GRADY, WAS INDEED A RARE BIT OF GOOD NEWS. HIS COURAGE AND SKILL IN STAYING ONE STEP AHEAD OF THE SERB SEARCH PARTIES FOR SIX DAYS WERE TRULY REMARKABLE.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERNS ON THE THREE SHORT-TERM ISSUES RAISED IN YOUR LETTER, AND I AGREE WITH THE APPROACH YOU RECOMMEND. WE HAVE CONVEYED MESSAGES SIMILAR TO THOSE YOU HAVE ASKED BORIS YELTSIN TO DELIVER TO MILOSEVIC THROUGH BOB FRASURE.

DESPITE MILOSEVIC'S UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS FRASURE WAS CARRYING FROM THE CONTACT GROUP, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY HIS SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE. OUR HOPE IS THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SIMILAR RESULTS IN ENSURING PASSAGE OF RELIEF CONVOYS TO UNPROFOR UNITS IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. AT THE REQUEST OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WE INSTRUCTED FRASURE, IN HIS LAST MEETING PRIOR TO DEPARTING BELGRADE, TO IMPRESS UPON MILOSEVIC THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. MILOSEVIC UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE SUCCEEDS IN FACILITATING THE RESUPPLY OF THE ENCLAVES WILL BE READ AS A MEASURE OF HIS INFLUENCE OVER PALE IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE MET WITH BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC ON FRIDAY, JUNE 9, AND HE URGED HIM TO WORK TOWARD A RENEWED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. LIKE YOU, I AM CONVINCED THAT ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THROUGH CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CAN WE HOPE TO BRING THIS TRAGEDY TO A CLOSE. I BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR IS ESSENTIAL IN THIS REGARD, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE TO MAKE THAT PRESENCE POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, CONVINCING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AS THE STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE KEY TO SECURING AN ENDURING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. TOWARD THIS END, I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS MILOSEVIC TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA ON THE TERMS PUT FORWARD BY THE CONTACT GROUP AS A MEANS OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT PEACE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING OUR EFFORTS PERSONALLY WHEN WE MEET IN HALIFAX.

SINCERELY,

BILL

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
JOHN MAJOR, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#6243

NNNN  
<MSGID> M1712534

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6/12/95

4425

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

June 9, 1995

95 JUN 9 All : 57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Major

Purpose

To assure Prime Minister Major of your assistance in resolving the next immediate problems in Bosnia.

Background

Prime Minister Major, in his letter of June 8, outlines his approach to "three immediate key issues" for Bosnia: obtaining unconditional release of the remaining hostages while avoiding overplay of the issue in public; securing access for relief convoys to the UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves; and seeking a renewed agreement on cessation of hostilities for Bosnia as a necessary condition for progress toward a negotiated settlement and the retention of UNPROFOR.

The attached letter offers support for Prime Minister Major's approaches. It also informs him of initiatives already undertaken in this regard through Bob Frasure's negotiations with Milosevic and notes we used the opportunity of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic's visit to Washington to press for a renewed cessation of hostilities agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message to Prime Minister Major.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Major

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
05/26/16 KDE

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
5/26/2016 KDE

TO: CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 8 LETTER ON BOSNIA. THE RETURN OF OUR F-16 PILOT, CAPTAIN O'GRADY, WAS INDEED A RARE BIT OF GOOD NEWS. HIS COURAGE AND SKILL IN STAYING ONE STEP AHEAD OF THE SERB SEARCH PARTIES FOR SIX DAYS WERE TRULY REMARKABLE.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERNS ON THE THREE SHORT-TERM ISSUES RAISED IN YOUR LETTER, AND I AGREE WITH THE APPROACH YOU RECOMMEND. WE HAVE CONVEYED MESSAGES SIMILAR TO THOSE YOU HAVE ASKED BORIS YELTSIN TO DELIVER TO MILOSEVIC THROUGH BOB FRASURE.

DESPITE MILOSEVIC'S UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS FRASURE WAS CARRYING FROM THE CONTACT GROUP, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY HIS SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE. OUR HOPE IS THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SIMILAR RESULTS IN ENSURING PASSAGE OF RELIEF CONVOYS TO UNPROFOR UNITS IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES. AT THE REQUEST OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WE INSTRUCTED FRASURE, IN HIS LAST MEETING PRIOR TO DEPARTING BELGRADE, TO IMPRESS UPON MILOSEVIC THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. MILOSEVIC UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE SUCCEEDS IN FACILITATING THE RESUPPLY OF THE ENCLAVES WILL BE READ AS A MEASURE OF HIS INFLUENCE OVER PALE IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

VICE PRESIDENT GORE MET WITH BOSNIAN PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC ON FRIDAY, JUNE 9, AND HE URGED HIM TO WORK TOWARD A RENEWED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. LIKE YOU, I AM CONVINCED THAT ONLY THROUGH CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CAN WE HOPE TO BRING THIS TRAGEDY TO A CLOSE. I BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF UNPROFOR IS ESSENTIAL IN THIS REGARD, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE TO MAKE THAT PRESENCE POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, CONVINCING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN AS THE STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE KEY TO SECURING AN ENDURING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. TOWARD THIS END, I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS MILOSEVIC TO RECOGNIZE BOSNIA ON THE TERMS PUT FORWARD BY THE CONTACT GROUP AS A MEANS OF INCREASING THE PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO ACCEPT PEACE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

I LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING OUR EFFORTS PERSONALLY WHEN WE MEET  
IN HALIFAX.

SINCERELY,

BILL

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
JOHN MAJOR, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
5/26/2016 KDE

Purpose

To assure Prime Minister Major of your assistance in resolving the next immediate problems in Bosnia.

Background

Prime Minister Major, in his letter of June 8, outlines his approach to "three immediate key issues" for Bosnia: obtaining unconditional release of the remaining hostages while avoiding overplay of the issue in public; securing access for relief convoys to the UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves; and seeking a renewed agreement on cessation of hostilities for Bosnia as a necessary condition for progress toward a negotiated settlement and the retention of UNPROFOR.

The attached letter offers support for Prime Minister Major's approaches. It also informs him of initiatives already undertaken in this regard through Bob Frasure's negotiations with Milosevic and offers to use the opportunity of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic's visit to Washington to press for a renewed cessation of hostilities agreement. *Frasure*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message to Prime Minister Major.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*notes we*

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Major
- Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Major

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom of May 27, 1995

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major  
Notetaker: Nelson Drew, Deuce Martinez, Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1995, 3:50 - 4:09 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: John, Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. I thought the conference went quite well. (U)

The President: The Irish conference -- yes. I hope your people were pleased. They can play this up. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I just spoke to Paddy Mayhew, who is in Virginia with his feet up in a bar. (U)

The President: This was the first meeting with representatives of all the political parties. The speech I gave was well-received. Adams complained a little bit. I really hit them hard. (U)

Prime Minister Major: It was an extremely good speech.. I thought it all went well, save for the Unionists who were a bit silly in the way they behaved. That often happens, but they recover quickly. (U)

The President: I keep hoping that the Irish-Americans -- who were so excited -- and all the parties will see a huge peace dividend if they push farther and help you. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I think we have a better chance for peace than we ever had if we can persuade them to start decommissioning. Then we'll really be in business. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. (U)

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PER E. O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Prime Minister Major: We have had the cease-fire for over 9 months without incident, and it looks like they may be serious. Every day is like money in the bank. (C)

The President: Is any of this giving you a boost at home? Are your people recognizing what's been done? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Not a bit. For most people here, Ireland is just another island. They don't really care what happens elsewhere in the world. (C)

The President: I know how you feel. Most Americans could care less about foreign policy, about what is happening outside U.S. I guess it's a blessing that people don't believe their security is threatened. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I know how you feel. It is pretty much bread-and-butter politics. I guess that is one of the benefits of the end of the Cold War. (C)

The President: It's also one of the burdens, which brings me to Bosnia. I just got off the phone with President Chirac. He had some good ideas. I suppose you might have spoken with him too. (C)

Prime Minister Major: No. I haven't spoken with Chirac personally, but I talked to Juppe yesterday. (C)

The President: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] Chirac said he spoke with Yeltsin today, and he thinks he's on board too. (C)

[REDACTED]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] he told me Yeltsin had sent Kozyrev and Gracnev to Belgrade and that they may talk with the Bosnian Serbs. (C)

Prime Minister Major: As I said, I talked with Juppe. This is fairly the same line that Juppe had, and I am amenable to this. (C)

The President: Do you agree? (C)

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Prime Minister Major: Basically. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] we have a meeting here at Downing Street tomorrow with our defense people and the Foreign Secretary, and it is pretty clear what will happen. We need a better follow-up strategy. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes, a "pause" is a better word. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We need to take the advice of General Smith. I spoke with him. He was calm and relaxed. (C)

The President: He is very capable, isn't he? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes he is. He won't panic. He'll do fine. (C)

The President: I think airstrikes worked well earlier. We can't give up on them. But with UNPROFOR under strength and dispersed, they're sitting ducks. Currently they have no threat of airstrikes and no means to defend themselves. They need to be concentrated and to have the capacity to defend themselves. We need to make a public change to the rules of engagement. We could then have a pause in the airstrikes. (C)

I'm not hung up on the sanctions issue, but I don't want Milosevic to sucker us into lifting sanctions, and then not go all the way. Diplomatic efforts must result in mutual recognition [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] Apparently, yeltsin is prepared to reinforce. (C)

Another thing, we have to do something about the sham the Serbs have made of the weapons collection sites. It has hurt us that we never disabled the weapons. It is painful to watch Serbs come and take weapons out at will and shell civilian targets while our people watch. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I'm also worried that if we concentrate UNPROFOR, the Serbs may see this as a green light to take the eastern enclaves. The Bosnians say they can defend them, but we don't think they can. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They have the numbers, but not the capabilities. (C)

The President: It's the artillery threat, isn't it? (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: There is a trade-off: if we render UNPROFOR less vulnerable and we tell them that we've changed the rules of engagement, then we would want them to know that they are more vulnerable to airstrikes. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Maybe there's some way we could make more unique use of the Russian troops. Since we were in Russia, have I talked to you since then? Well, I spoke with Yeltsin for about three hours and got better feel for Yeltsin's political situation. He sees both opportunities and danger. It's complicated by the situation in Chechnya. He is in danger domestically so he does not want to look weak. If we can all give him some role in solving the situation. He could be seen as getting a pause in the bombing, and at the same time finding a role for the Russian troops that would be strategically critical to maintaining peace. Maybe we can have the Russians man the heavy weapons sites to stop the Serbs from using the weapons. If we can do this, it will help further the cause. That's just off the top of my head. It's not vetted with any of my staff. But Yeltsin believes he needs to keep the ultranationalists at bay. He's shown his strength over Chechnya, but he is worried about losing the support of friends in the West and support for reform. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I was sitting with Kohl yesterday discussing the hostages and were trying to get Yeltsin on the

phone. We heard on TV there were three hostages being held and one had been beaten up. I had side bet with Kohl that that one beaten up was Canadian and not the Russian. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: ...if the Russians do their job fairly. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] SMITH  
and the others will have to make the judgment. (C)

The President: I think we should think about it. Sandy Berger has just handed me a note, and he says Bosnians may not be too keen about giving a strategic role to the Russians. We should think about how we can play psychologically on the interplay between the Russians and the Bosnian Serbs and how it would affect Yeltsin's political situation. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted]

The President: The Bosnians begin to feel good, and they get confident and launch offensives. They forget about the artillery and then go out and get the crap kicked out of them. This is compounded by the fact that the weapons collection sites are a joke. They forget the larger strategic concept. We will continue to urge the Bosnians to exercise restraint. They may have different view of a Russian role if we back it with confidence. I haven't really thought it through. It could hinge on whether Milosevic recognizes Bosnia. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It's worth looking at. I have a point regarding Chirac. [redacted]

[redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I didn't explore that; Chirac did not raise whole issue. I was pleased he didn't want to withdraw. I think we all understand that if there is no UN there, all hell breaks loose. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: I agree.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] We'll have our meeting here, and I'll have Rod Lyne call Tony Lake. Our Ministers will meet on Monday, first just the four, and then with the Russians, and then at NATO. (C)

The President: I'll be here over the weekend if you need to speak with me further. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Talking Points for a Pull-Aside in Halifax with  
British Prime Minister John Major

Purpose

Proposed talking points to be used in pull-aside with PM Major in Halifax.

Background

Major will want to discuss developments in Bosnia. You may want to ask Major about his June 7 meeting in London with Kozyrev. Major will be interested in your latest thinking on timing and itinerary of your possible travel to the UK and Ireland later this year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2012-0801-M  
05/26/16 KDE

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

TALKING POINTS FOR HALIFAX PULL-ASIDE  
WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
65120116 K0E

UK/Ireland Trip

- Appreciate your efforts to find mutually agreeable dates for trip before the end of year. If agreeable to you and the Irish, hope to announce soon dates and itinerary to include London, Belfast and Dublin.

(Only if Major offers:)

- Would be delighted if we could go to Belfast together.

Northern Ireland

- George Mitchell will make another trip later this month to follow up on Conference.
- Believe Gerry Adams understands IRA must do something on decommissioning. We will keep pushing. Do you see any signs of movement by Sinn Fein or loyalists? Important that political momentum be sustained.

Bosnia


- We are committed to supporting efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR to reduce its vulnerability and enhance its ability to fulfill its mandate, including provision of equipment and intelligence support for Rapid Reaction Force.
- But important that RRF be accompanied by tougher UNPROFOR stance on the ground, rather than return to business as usual. Otherwise, impossible to avoid withdrawal.
- Real key to resolving Bosnian conflict lies in our diplomatic efforts.
- Despite lack of progress during Frasure's most recent talks, still should work on Milosevic to increase isolation of Pale Serbs and pressure them to accept Contact Group plan.
- Must hold firm to our position that sanctions suspension, not lifting, can occur upon Milosevic's acceptance of mutual recognition package and tightening border controls.

Russia/NATO

- Key now is to get Russians to work to develop NATO-Russian relationship. As discussions begin in Brussels, need to urge active Russian participation and real give-and-take.

- On NATO enlargement, need to give Yeltsin same message: process will be gradual, transparent. No surprises, no acceleration, but no slowing.

Transatlantic Initiatives

- I discussed our ideas for strengthening transatlantic relations with Chirac and Santer earlier this week.
  - Favor developing ways to further liberalize trade relationship, in step-by-step "building block" manner, and identifying additional areas for U.S.-EU common action.
  - Strengthening support for CEE countries should be focal point of new transatlantic initiatives.
  - Want to discuss in more detail with you and EU in coming months. Hope we can launch a new initiative at time of next U.S.-EU Summit.
- 

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


June 20, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM NARA, Date 3/14/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's  
Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister  
John Major

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the pull-aside meeting between the President and Prime Minister John Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (e)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memcon w/Prime Minister Major

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

UK  
Prime Minister John Major  
Roderic Lyne, Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 16, 1995, 11:30 - 11:40 a.m.  
Summit Place, Halifax, Canada

The President: I'm looking forward to my trip to Britain in the fall. I'm sorry we had problems with the original dates we proposed for late September. That will be the end of the fiscal year. We may be having difficulties with the Congress about the next year's budget, so I can't be out of the country at that time. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I thought you were the government! But I fully understand. Unfortunately, the later date you proposed [November 29] doesn't work for us. (U)

The President: Let's work it out. I would like to do it before the end of the year. (U)

Prime Minister Major: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I will work when I get back to get money from Congress for the Rapid Reaction Force. (U)

Prime Minister Major: [Redacted]  
EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

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Samuel Berger: Madeleine was responding, in part, to the British explanation of vote, which said that the language added to the resolution [that funding modalities would be determined later] was meaningless. She was trying to preserve our options. We need time to work this with the Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I understand. (C)

The President: Why do you think the Bosnian government launched this offensive? (C)

Prime Minister Major: You were right last night. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I agree that none of us should get involved in a combat role. On the Rapid Reaction Force, we will find a way to pay our share. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Your speech at the Irish Trade and Investment conference was perfect. It couldn't have been better if I had written it myself. It made a big difference. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] The danger is that the whole affair will grind to a standstill. Your visit could actually help: the fact you are coming could decrease the chances of violence. So the sooner we can fix dates the better. (C)

The President: What can I do to be helpful on Northern Ireland? (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

Roderic Lyne: We have never said anything about a timetable. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Neither have we said that weapons must be given to us. What's important is that there be movement. (C)

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Roderic Lyne:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: On Russia, 'm not as pessimistic as Helmut Kohl was last night about what would happen after Yeltsin. The sense I had during my trip was that while the political situation is still very uncertain, the underlying economic trends are looking better. (C)

Roderic Lyne: Yes. Privatization is now irreversible. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telcon with British Prime Minister Major

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major

Notetakers: Kevin Wooton, Brian Gates, Mary Canty and Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 4, 1995, 1926-1928 EDT, Camp David

The President: Hello, John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill, good evening. (U)

The President: I'm so sorry to call you so late. I know you must be tired. I just wanted to call and congratulate you on winning the election. (U)

Prime Minister Major: That's very kind of you. It's been a long day -- a long few days. But things came out okay. (U)

The President: I hope it is all behind you, so that we can get back to work. I know after all you went through, it must be good that it's over. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Well, it was a risk. [redacted]

[redacted]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Well, 90 percent of it is just hanging on and showing up every day. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. We've both learned a lot about that. (U)

The President: I know you don't want to talk business right now, but I just wanted you to know how happy I am for you. (U)

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Prime Minister Major: I appreciate your call and God bless. (U)

The President: Tony Lake will call Rod Lyne tomorrow to work out dates for my trip. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Great, yes, we're looking forward to that. The sooner we can announce dates, the better. (U)

The President: One other thing, just to let you know, I've tried to lay low in the last few days with the stirrings in Northern Ireland. I figured there must have been some connection with your election. Whatever we can do to reinvigorate the peace process let me know. We'll want to talk about this in the days ahead. (€)

Once again, congratulations. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I appreciate it. Many thanks for ringing. Good night. (U)

The President: Okay. Good night. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Thanks. God bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2012-0801-M  
05/26/2016 KDE

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major  
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Nelson Drew,  
Katherine O'Loughlin, Celina Realuyo, Lyle  
Harrison and Kenneth Baldwin

DATE, TIME July 14, 1995, 3:39 - 4:08 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. It has been an interesting day. We just had a three-hour meeting on Bosnia and I had a livelier conversation than usual with Chirac. In our assessment, the situation looks awful. Backtracking a little bit -

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

They are presently attacking Zepa as we speak, and it is one or two days before Zepa falls. The next question is whether they will move down the eastern enclaves from Zepa to Gorazde. We judge they will, but before mounting a proper attack in Gorazde, they will have to regroup and will need at least four to five days. We have some pretty experienced people inside at Gorazde, and they tell us they probably will attack in 4 to 5 days. We expect the Bosnian government forces will defend it. We have 300-400 of our Royal Welsh fusiliers there. The question is what to do militarily and politically? I think you spoke with Chirac? (C)

The President: EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: He seems to have shifted off that somewhat now. (C)

The President: Now he wants to reinforce Gorazde. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. He wants to reinforce Gorazde, retake Srebrenica and reinforce Sarajevo as well. (C)

The President: We have to do that on Sarajevo anyway. Helmut said that any of these military actions, besides defending Sarajevo or Goradze, would require UNSC action. I hadn't thought about it. He seemed to think so, at least. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're on a peacekeeping mission. It would have to require a fairly loose interpretation of self defense. As far as Chirac is concerned... (C)

LINE DROPPED AND REESTABLISHED

Prime Minister Major: Sorry, God knows what happened there. (U)

The President: We were talking about the French point of view and the status of things. What is your thinking about it? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Regarding Gorazde, France wants to reinforce it.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

We must examine the military reality to see if it's practical. We expect our Chief of the Defense Staff, General Shalikashvili and Admiral Lanxade to meet over the weekend. (C)

The President: Lanxade asked for helicopters to support it, but they would be sitting ducks without taking out their, the Serbs, ability to shoot them down. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

These are the hard problems we'll have to face. Our defense minister is going to Bosnia this weekend to work out what has to be done. (C)

The President: We must stay in close touch. You know, at the time UNPROFOR seemed like the best of all the bad alternatives. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I don't have a shred of doubt that it was right. Let's not forget that the whole of central Bosnia is at peace. There is no ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia. UNPROFOR has saved 150,000 lives. That's not a negligible contribution by UNPROFOR, EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: I have been in touch with my military commanders. They were all here in Washington for a military conference, except for Joulwan, who stayed behind in Europe. Actually, Admiral Boorda, EUCOM commander, who was in charge of the whole Bosnia thing before Joulwan, is here in Washington. And General Shalikashvili was there before Joulwan. Yesterday we went over it in great detail. I called Colin Powell too, to make sure of a balanced view. He said if you change the nature of the mission and decide to fight, screwing around is not an option. You must be willing to take casualties, inflict casualties and use air power, which may hurt civilians. You must decide if you think it is a sustainable strategy in the long run and are prepared to enter the war on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. I was moved by the report that 3,000 Bosnian government troops left Srebrenica without fighting -- how can you blame the Dutch? (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame at all. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
(C)

The President: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d  
[redacted]

Prime Minister Major: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that. (C)

The President: I'm just going to let it go. Look, I think it is very important, if possible, to hold Gorazde. If it falls, Sarajevo will be more vulnerable. It is psychologically and strategically more important. We have to look at other options. Serbia says they are not cooperating, but they have more sophisticated equipment now to shoot our planes down. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Gorazde won't go down quickly. But there are 5,000 government troops who won't hold out long against 12,000-14,000 Serbs. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d  
[redacted]

The President: I'm open to provide help, but we don't want to do anything militarily stupid. We have to have an understanding. We can't just kick the can down the road. If there is a consensus on this issue, there must be [redacted]

[redacted] They do not want UNPROFOR to leave but at the same they have this crazy idea to urge the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo here. They are telling the Congress that that is the only reason that they lost Srebrenica, because they have no heavy equipment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're wrong. (C)

The President: Before we make any decisions, they will have to decide what they want! (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is the vote? (C)

The President: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time around; unless I can figure out some alternative (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh. (U)

The President: There are two relevant facts that are ignored: the casualty rate has gone way down and central Bosnia is at peace because of contributions made by UNPROFOR. The average TV viewer sees it. He thinks it's as bad or worse than it was in 1992. [EO 13526 1.4d] Those safe areas were always there at the sufferance of the Serbs, particularly when the Serbs started taking hostages. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d]  
[redacted]

The President: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the lifting of the arms embargo will pass by overriding my veto. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic have been lobbying Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d]  
[redacted]

The President: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. But they are in a dream world over there. What they see is Muslims being split by sexes, ethnic cleansing on TV which they think is just as bad as in '92. There's no telling them it's different. It all helps support the lifting of the embargo movement. They see the UN failure and believe we should give the Muslims guns. They are telling Congress that if they had guns they would be kicking the crap out of them. But if the French and British leave, the American public is not willing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. They are just kicking the can down the road. No one likes to appear weak but we are at step 10 now, not step 2. I wouldn't be alarmed by that or condition our conduct on it but if it looks like there is a certain resolve and clarity of explanation it would help me to moderate a firestorm. We'll have to act together. It will help. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I see. Let me check the timetable. The Senate votes next week, then the House. The lift wouldn't take effect until September? (C)

The President: The vote can be done in a few days and the override vote a few days after that. They can set an effective time sometime later, or even immediately. They might set a date soon, because of their perception that the UN is routed. The perception is that the U.S. is on the side of the Government and the problem is that UNPROFOR has no mandate to enter into war. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have a pretty full report of your problems. (C)

The President: I am not hung up about vetoing it. This issue and a domestic one have me in a fun house. All the press is one way and facts are irrelevant. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I am very familiar with that. (U)

The President: Our citizens have good motives. Compassion and neo-isolationism are leading to support for lifting the arms embargo. They don't want our soldiers there, but they badmouth the UN and want to give them arms. I just want you to know what is going on. The press is playing on popular emotions in the most irresponsible way. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I understand. (U)

The President: There is a possibility it'll happen quicker than you suggest. It could be the law of our country. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you about the Whitewater stuff. I'm sorry it keeps coming up. You don't need that sort of rubbish. (U)

The President: I do not understand it. They have now spent \$12 million on the investigation of a land deal I lost \$40,000 on and a \$20,000 campaign contribution. Every report says that neither I nor Hillary did anything wrong. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. (U)

The President: How worried should I be about the violence in Northern Ireland? Senator Mitchell passed on your request that I make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland. I will do it before the cease-fire anniversary. (U)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] McCartney is the newly elected independent. [redacted]

[redacted] There has been no progress on decommissioning. We are in contact and trying to stitch a way forward. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching the 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. August 31 is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton and discussions continue. Your visit in November is vital [redacted]

[redacted]

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The President: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be available. (C)

Prime Minister Major: You probably know by now we have decided to call a conference at the ministerial level next week in London to discuss the Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend. We need to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there. (C)

The President: Yes, I will talk to them about going. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we look at the military options. (C)

The President: By the way, thank you for your decision to buy the Apaches. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh, yes. That did not add to my conversation with Chirac. Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have not a shred of regret about it. (C)

The President: OK then, we'll be in touch. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye. God bless. (U)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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PAGE 01 OF 04

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TO CABINET OFFICE  
INFO ////

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SECTION 1 OF 2

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM  
PRESIDENT CLINTON.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: BOSNIA - LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

DEAR JOHN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 ON BOSNIA. I BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN LAST WEEK IN LONDON -- AND REAFFIRMED THIS WEEK BY NATO -- ARE ESSENTIAL TO RESTORING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN MISSION IN BOSNIA. I BELIEVE I CAN SUSTAIN A VETO OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LIFT RESOLUTIONS, BUT ONLY IF WE AND THE OTHER ALLIES HOLD FIRM TO THE COURSE CHARTED IN LONDON AND SHOW WE WILL NOT STAND FOR FURTHER SERB AGGRESSION. I RESPECT THE FACT THAT YOU AND YOUR CABINET ARE PREPARED TO SEE THIS THROUGH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERY REAL RISKS INVOLVED. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS IN HELPING TO PERSUADE BOUTROS-GHALI TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO THE UN MILITARY COMMANDERS, WHERE IT BELONGS.

SO FAR, OUR ULTIMATUM IS HAVING THE DESIRED EFFECT IN GORAZDE. THE BOSNIAN SERBS SEEM TO HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM LAUNCHING AN OFFENSIVE (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING), AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE HELPING PROVIDE THEM THE NECESSARY POLITICAL COVER. IN THIS REGARD, I HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION WITH BORIS YELTSIN ON FRIDAY. HE AGREED THAT RUSSIAN AND NATO EFFORTS WERE COMPLEMENTARY, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO MILITARY ACTION WOULD BECOME NECESSARY IF THE SERBS FAILED TO FULFILL THE PROMISES MADE TO ANDREY KOZYREV IN BELGRADE.

IN CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION IN GORAZDE, THE SITUATION IN

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PAGE 02 OF 04

BIHAC HAS CONTINUED TO WORSEN. CONFRONTED BY ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO DEFEND ONE SAFE AREA, THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTACKS ON ANOTHER, IN THIS CASE BACKED BY MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND KRAJINA SERB TROOPS AND ABDIC'S REBEL MUSLIM FORCES. WHILE THE SITUATION IS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX, AS YOU POINT OUT, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT NATO NEEDS TO BE READY TO TAKE ACTION TO EXTEND THE LONDON DECISION TO BIHAC AND TO THE OTHER SAFE AREAS. BEYOND TRYING TO SAVE THE LIVES OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN THE ENCLAVE, WE MUST SHOW THE SERBS THAT THE NEW DETERMINATION EXPRESSED IN LONDON WAS NOT LIMITED TO ONE SAFE AREA, WHICH THEY CAN THEN AVOID. OTHERWISE, OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE UN CREDIBILITY AND STABILIZE THE SITUATION WILL BE POINTLESS.

CROATIA'S INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON BIHAC ONLY ADDS TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. WE HAVE STRONGLY CAUTIONED PRESIDENT TUDJMAN ABOUT THE DANGER OF PRECIPITATING A WIDER CONFLICT, ONE THAT COULD LEAD TO INTERVENTION BY FORCES FROM SERBIA. BUT WE WILL HAVE A HARD TIME DISSUADING HIM FROM HIS PRESENT COURSE IF WE DO NOTHING TO BLUNT THE SERB OFFENSIVE IN BIHAC.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GORAZDE DECISION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO BIHAC IN MECHANICAL FASHION. THE MULTI-CORNERED NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE REGION WILL REQUIRE SOME ADAPTATIONS TO THE PLANS APPROVED BY THE NAC ON WEDNESDAY MORNING. BUT I AM SURE THAT, WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWO OF US, OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CAN COME UP WITH FEASIBLE OPTIONS FOR APPLYING NATO AIR POWER TO DETER AND RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING ENCLAVE. WE NEED TO SEND AN IMMEDIATE SIGNAL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVENT THE SEIZURE OF ANOTHER SAFE AREA BY TAKING A PROMPT DECISION IN THE NAC ON BIHAC. THIS MIGHT ALSO HAVE SOME SALUTARY EFFECT ON TUDJMAN'S CALCULATIONS.

I DO NOT SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO ALTER SERB BEHAVIOR AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IF THE SERBS TEST US AND WIDE-SCALE NATO AIR ATTACKS TAKE PLACE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD ESCALATE IN A FASHION THAT WOULD MAKE UNPROFOR'S PRESENCE UNTENABLE, AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LETTER. BUT IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE THAT, WITH THE SERBS HAVING FINALLY EXPERIENCED A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF NATO MILITARY POWER, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND COULD BECOME MORE STABLE.

IF THE WORST DOES OCCUR, HOWEVER, AND THE DECISION IS TAKEN THAT UNPROFOR MUST WITHDRAW, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I STAND

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PAGE 03 OF 04

BY MY COMMITMENT TO CONTRIBUTE U.S. FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO PROTECT THE WITHDRAWAL. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT A DECISION TO ASSIST OUR NATO ALLIES IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

FINALLY, LET ME RESPOND TO YOUR POINTS ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. I WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE THAT WE NEED TO REVITALIZE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE LONDON DECISIONS CAN PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED EFFORTS TO GET THE BOSNIAN PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CARL BILDT'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PACKAGE WITH MILOSEVIC THAT WOULD PROVIDE SANCTIONS RELIEF IN RETURN FOR ACTIONS THAT PUT REAL PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

I STILL HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE BILDT PACKAGE AS IT #6543

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FINAL SECTION OF 2

NOW STANDS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM STILL NOT SATISFIED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS IF MILOSEVIC DID NOT ABIDE BY HIS COMMITMENTS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE IDEA OF A FIVE-NATION REVIEW PANEL. MOREOVER, ALLOWING MILOSEVIC NINE MONTHS BEFORE WE COULD EVEN ATTEMPT TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS WOULD FORFEIT IMPORTANT LEVERAGE IN THE EVENT THE SITUATION SERIOUSLY DETERIORATES ON THE GROUND. FINALLY, IN LIGHT OF THE GROWING EVIDENCE THAT SERBIAN MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAS CONTINUED, I WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR SEALING THE BORDER ARE REALLY EFFECTIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT, SINCE MUTUAL RECOGNITION REQUIRES BOTH PARTIES ON BOARD.

OUR PEOPLE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE BILDT PACKAGE. I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT CARL BILDT AND CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ARE COMING TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK TO THAT END. THEY SHOULD INCLUDE ON THE AGENDA HOW WE MIGHT USE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

BILDT'S NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT BOSNIAN SERB RESTRAINT ON THE GROUND AND MOVEMENT TOWARD NEW PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALL, THAT IS THE REAL PURPOSE OF OUR TALKS WITH MILOSEVIC.

ONCE AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTS. LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDS.

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL

END TEXT

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# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

TO CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

SUBJECT: BOSNIA - LETTER FOR PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM  
PRESIDENT CLINTON

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 ON BOSNIA. I BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN LAST WEEK IN LONDON -- AND REAFFIRMED THIS WEEK BY NATO -- ARE ESSENTIAL TO RESTORING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN MISSION IN BOSNIA. I BELIEVE I CAN SUSTAIN A VETO OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LIFT RESOLUTIONS, BUT ONLY IF WE AND THE OTHER ALLIES HOLD FIRM TO THE COURSE CHARTED IN LONDON AND SHOW WE WILL NOT STAND FOR FURTHER SERB AGGRESSION. I RESPECT THE FACT THAT YOU AND YOUR CABINET ARE PREPARED TO SEE THIS THROUGH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERY REAL RISKS INVOLVED. I ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS IN HELPING TO PERSUADE BOUTROS-GHALI TO DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO THE UN MILITARY COMMANDERS, WHERE IT BELONGS.

SO FAR, OUR ULTIMATUM IS HAVING THE DESIRED EFFECT IN GORAZDE. THE BOSNIAN SERBS SEEM TO HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM LAUNCHING AN OFFENSIVE (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING), AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE HELPING PROVIDE THEM THE NECESSARY POLITICAL COVER. IN THIS REGARD, I HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION WITH BORIS YELTSIN ON FRIDAY. HE AGREED THAT RUSSIAN AND NATO EFFORTS WERE COMPLEMENTARY, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO MILITARY ACTION WOULD BECOME NECESSARY IF THE SERBS FAILED TO FULFILL THE PROMISES MADE TO ANDREY KOZYREV IN BELGRADE.

IN CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION IN GORAZDE, THE SITUATION IN BIHAC HAS CONTINUED TO WORSEN. CONFRONTED BY ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO DEFEND ONE SAFE AREA, THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTACKS ON ANOTHER, IN THIS CASE BACKED BY MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND KRAJINA SERB TROOPS AND ABDIC'S REBEL MUSLIM FORCES. WHILE THE SITUATION IS EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX, AS YOU POINT OUT, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT NATO NEEDS TO BE READY TO TAKE ACTION TO EXTEND THE LONDON DECISION TO BIHAC AND TO THE OTHER SAFE AREAS. BEYOND TRYING TO SAVE THE LIVES OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN THE ENCLAVE, WE MUST SHOW THE SERBS THAT THE NEW DETERMINATION EXPRESSED IN LONDON WAS NOT LIMITED TO ONE SAFE AREA, WHICH THEY CAN THEN AVOID. OTHERWISE, OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE UN CREDIBILITY AND STABILIZE THE SITUATION WILL BE POINTLESS.

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## CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CROATIA'S INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON BIHAC ONLY ADDS TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. WE HAVE STRONGLY CAUTIONED PRESIDENT TUDJMAN ABOUT THE DANGER OF PRECIPITATING A WIDER CONFLICT, ONE THAT COULD LEAD TO INTERVENTION BY FORCES FROM SERBIA. BUT WE WILL HAVE A HARD TIME DISSUADING HIM FROM HIS PRESENT COURSE IF WE DO NOTHING TO BLUNT THE SERB OFFENSIVE IN BIHAC.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GORAZDE DECISION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO BIHAC IN MECHANICAL FASHION. THE MULTI-CORNERED NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE REGION WILL REQUIRE SOME ADAPTATIONS TO THE PLANS APPROVED BY THE NAC ON WEDNESDAY MORNING. BUT I AM SURE THAT, WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWO OF US, OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CAN COME UP WITH FEASIBLE OPTIONS FOR APPLYING NATO AIR POWER TO DETER AND RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING ENCLAVE. WE NEED TO SEND AN IMMEDIATE SIGNAL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVENT THE SEIZURE OF ANOTHER SAFE AREA BY TAKING A PROMPT DECISION IN THE NAC ON BIHAC. THIS MIGHT ALSO HAVE SOME SALUTARY EFFECT ON TUDJMAN'S CALCULATIONS.

I DO NOT SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO ALTER SERB BEHAVIOR AND CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IF THE SERBS TEST US AND WIDE-SCALE NATO AIR ATTACKS TAKE PLACE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD ESCALATE IN A FASHION THAT WOULD MAKE UNPROFOR'S PRESENCE UNTENABLE, AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LETTER. BUT IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE THAT, WITH THE SERBS HAVING FINALLY EXPERIENCED A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF NATO MILITARY POWER, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND COULD BECOME MORE STABLE.

IF THE WORST DOES OCCUR, HOWEVER, AND THE DECISION IS TAKEN THAT UNPROFOR MUST WITHDRAW, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I STAND BY MY COMMITMENT TO CONTRIBUTE U.S. FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO OPERATION TO PROTECT THE WITHDRAWAL. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT A DECISION TO ASSIST OUR NATO ALLIES IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

FINALLY, LET ME RESPOND TO YOUR POINTS ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. I WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE THAT WE NEED TO REVITALIZE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE LONDON DECISIONS CAN PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR RENEWED EFFORTS TO GET THE BOSNIAN PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CARL BILDT'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PACKAGE WITH MILOSEVIC THAT WOULD PROVIDE SANCTIONS RELIEF IN RETURN FOR ACTIONS THAT PUT REAL PRESSURE ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

I STILL HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE BILDT PACKAGE AS IT NOW STANDS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM STILL NOT SATISFIED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REIMPOSE SANCTIONS IF MILOSEVIC DID NOT ABIDE BY HIS

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# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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ONCE AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTS. LET'S STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION UNFOLDS.

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 29, 1995

Deputy Nat Sec Advisor  
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to Prime Minister Major on Bosnia

Purpose

To respond to Prime Minister Major's July 25 letter on Bosnia.

Background

John Major sent you a lengthy message earlier this week addressing a number of aspects of our Bosnia policy. He reaffirms UK readiness to follow through on the London decisions, but expresses concern that if air strikes occur and the Serbs escalate, UNPROFOR will have to withdraw. In that context, he seeks an "urgent assurance" that we will respond "automatically" to a UK request to participate in a NATO operation to extract UNPROFOR.

Major also expresses skepticism about extending the NATO decision on Gorazde to Bihac and other safe areas. And he presses for early endorsement of Bildt's recognition/sanctions package.

Our proposed reply stresses the urgency of taking action to protect Bihac, adapting the Gorazde plans as necessary. It reaffirms your commitment to participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, while sidestepping the issue of automaticity (given the need to consult with Congress). It also expresses our readiness to work on the Bildt package while noting our key reservations about the text as it now stands.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission by the Situation Room.

Approve *AW*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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## Attachments


Tab A Message to Prime Minister Major

Tab B Major's July 25 letter

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 29, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Prime Minister Major's July 25 Letter on Bosnia.

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen  
**NOTED**

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting a response to Prime Minister Major on Bosnia. It has been cleared interagency.

We should try to get it out today in order to influence British thinking in advance of Sunday's NATO Military Committee meeting on Bihac.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Message
- Tab B Major's July 25 letter

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-m

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


August 8, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the  
President and British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with British Prime Minister John Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major

Notetaker: Mary Ann Peters, Sue Bremner, Katherine O'Loughlin, Matt Miller

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 7, 1995, 3:03 - 3:10 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I wanted to talk to you for a minute about Bosnia. We urged the Croats before they launched an assault on the Krajina to seek a political solution right up to the last minute and to limit military action to relieving pressure on Bihac. But Tudjman clearly had already made up his mind. I guess it's not surprising after the Krajina Serb refusal to negotiate for the past four years and their intervention in Bihac. Anyway, according to our intelligence, Serbia has shown no sign of intervening. But 100,000 new refugees and a new Serb thirst for revenge make it essential we act quickly to stabilize the situation. I think this may be a significant moment to launch a new diplomatic effort. On the other hand, if we don't press for a settlement in the next few weeks, the situation is likely to unravel, making UNPROFOR withdrawal unavoidable. I think the last several days have changed the landscape. I propose Tony Lake make a trip to Europe later this week to meet with his counterparts in London, Bonn and Paris and to work on a common strategy. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'd be very happy with that. (C)

The President: These talks can also address how we bring the Russians along and who would do what in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade, as well as with the Bosnian Serbs on the new diplomatic initiative. We have some ideas on ultimatum resolution of the conflict. Let's try to keep these talks confidential. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. I'm sure you're right; the landscape has changed over the last several days. We have nothing to lose by it. (C)

The President: We have a couple of ideas that will maybe work. (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is Tony likely to come? (C)

The President: No later than Thursday and then maybe we will have a Contact Group meeting. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Ministerial or official level? (C)

The President: The meeting can work out the details. I think we can expand later to include the Canadians and Italians. We need to bring the Russians in. We need to agree on a common course. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'm entirely happy with that. We'll accommodate him whenever he comes. (C)

The President: I sent you a letter over the weekend about the lack of agreement between the UN and military commanders about the "zone of action" around Gorazde and other safe areas, as well as other details of implementing NATO decisions. We can't afford to have stories about the UN not doing anything. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I haven't seen the letter, but I know it's there. It's being examined by my military advisors. I'm in southern France right now, not in London. (C)

The President: Good for you. I know you have been following the situation in Nigeria and the harsh sentences imposed on the 40 alleged coup-plotters there including former head of state General Obasanjo. I have written to Abacha, but have not received a response. I'm considering calling him. I wonder if you would consider calling him as well. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that. I have two other suggestions. One, it is possible, not certain, possible that the Commonwealth Secretary General, a Nigerian himself, may have some influence and could speak to Abacha. Secondly, there is one man who might have some influence and that's his neighbor [redacted] of Ghana. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] ne came to see me recently and we spent the entire 50 minutes talking about Nigeria. (C)

The President: He is an impressive man. He was recently here. (C)

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Prime Minister Major: Yes, he is. I think it would be worthwhile. When will you call? (C)

The President: Not before Wednesday. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll happily do that. I'll call as well. (C)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Major: OK. (U)

The President: We'll touch base later. Have a good vacation. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
August 16, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSHNARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the  
President and British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (U)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Major of UK

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez, Paul Weber, Mary Ann Peters and Nelson Drew

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 13, 1995, 9:53 - 10:10 a.m. EDT  
White House Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hi John, having a little trouble getting this phone to work. (U)

Prime Minister Major: That's OK. I was just relaxing in the south of France. Just stepped away from poolside as a matter of fact. It is very hot here. (U)

The President: That's great. Glad to hear that you can get some time off. You need and deserve it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Thank you. I just wanted to talk to you about a couple of things. We're very pleased with Tony Lake's proposals. We have just a few minor points, but in general, I am very supportive. Did you get a good reaction from Bonn and Paris? (C)

The President: I did and from the Italians and the Spaniards as well. As a matter of fact, Tony just finished his meeting with Kozyrev, and it went surprisingly well. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is extremely good news. Hope it makes some progress. I have two areas of concern: first the prospect for triple recognition and secondly, getting a credible ground force following the withdrawal. However, not so good news on the ground in Bosnia today. I hear Bosnian forces are attacking Donji Vakuf, and there are limited Serbian attacks around Sarajevo. (C)

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The President: Well, Vice President Gore called Tudjman and Izetbegovic yesterday and warned them not to do it. We'll see what happens. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We need to use all the available leverage we have;

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. It looks to me that they are trying to work the western end of the country for the moment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How do you think we should proceed from here? It is excellent that Tony had good talks. (C)

The President: First of all, I have to wait until he gets back and review what everyone said, and then we will go to the parties. Obviously that is the thing to do. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Hope they respond to the stimuli. (C)

The President: The Croatian and Bosnian governments may be getting a little carried away with themselves. They've had some successes but not sure if they see the end gain. On Tuesday, Dick Holbrooke will approach the various parties. We should be able to give you a virtually instantaneous report. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Is he going to all three places? (C)

The President: Yes, he's going, I think; yes, he's going to all three places. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Is Frasure going with him? (C)

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I hope they get the message and realize the opportunity. (C)

The President: There could be real movement; if they let it go without seeing it through to the end of the game, I don't see it happening. They've got a pretty good deal; they ought to take it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's our view. In September we will have to think clearly about the prospects for Winter. Hopefully they take the opportunity. I am very encouraged that the talks with Kozyrev went well. (C)

The President: I was surprised as well. They had some concerns about UNPROFOR's role in the end game. I told them we had to make clear to the Bosnians we wouldn't support that if they didn't support the peace process. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I thought the way Tony presented the idea was very persuasive, with the prizes for each side if it works and the downsides if it doesn't. The problem is we can't seem to agree on what the final map should look like. (C)

The President: We've done what we can, and you know what he said. We're going to wait until he gets back and hear the reactions he got. We will know better after the Holbrooke visits. (C)

Prime Minister Major: If we can help in any way, we'll be happy to. (C)

The President: I'm sure you can. We will call you when I know something. Another thing I would like to talk to you about is a talk I had with General Abacha. We had a good conversation. He took into consideration my comments positively but did not promise not to execute the prisoners. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I had a word with him as well. We spoke for about 25 minutes. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I was able to persuade him to attend the Commonwealth Conference in November, and hopefully we'll have 50 other countries that can give him the same message. He listened well. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] He said he'd like to talk informally about the process of civilian rule. I will get back to him. He and I wish to maintain an informal dialogue. I said I will try to keep in touch. Like you, I have a reasonably positive feeling but no promises. (C)

Prime Minister Major: If he makes good moves we should try and be supportive. You know more than I do about the situation in that country. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I was wondering if I could speak for a moment on Northern Ireland. (C)

The President: Sure. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We're coming up to an important period for Northern Ireland in the next fortnight or three weeks. There are two events: the anniversary of the IRA cease-fire and the summit I will have with John Bruton at the end of the first week of September. A lot is happening on the ground.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I have discussed a number of things with Bruton. Probably you will discuss them with Bruton when he visits Washington in September. (C)

I believe a joint strategy can put life into the political dialogue.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

and second is to address decommissioning of terrorist weapons, not just IRA's but loyalists weapons as well. (C)

Bruton and I will be in touch about making useful progress. The essence of it is an independent commission to consider the modus operandi of decommissioning.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I can't move away from decommissioning; it is not practical.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

There is quite a lot resting on this decision. (C)

What we would like is a joint commission to consist of 3 people. An American would chair; two names come to mind, George Mitchell and Tom Foley. We would approach one of them at some stage unless you would prefer we didn't. In addition to George Mitchell, Bruton would appoint one member with my approval, and I

would appoint one with his approval. We hope combined with other measures we have in mind that we could get solid progress. I would like to have their report in advance of your visit in November. This is broadly the way we are thinking. I wanted to give you a preliminary indication to see if you can live with it. (C)

The President: Actually, it sounds good. I am quite worried about how to start talks and get some progress on decommissioning. I know it is a problem for you, and we may have to have a patina of some party above the fray to handle decommissioning. Obviously we need to make progress on it. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I wanted to give you advance notice. (C)

The President: I appreciate it. I will talk to my people about it. It could be a way to start talks and get progress on decommissioning; you can't do one without another. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We hope to have a unilateral announcement by the British government before the end of the month. We can go ahead with that and political talks if we establish the decommissioning commission. I can bear the political heat if we get progress. The three things hang together. We'll have to defer all if we defer one. (C)

Just one other thing. Before the August 31 anniversary, I would like as many people as possible to make clear the importance of the process. If you have an opportunity to do so, it would be useful. (C)

The President: I will look for an opportunity; that would be a good thing to do. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Sorry to have disturbed your Sunday. (C)

The President: Good to hear your voice. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Please God, we can get out of the devil's brew we're in (in Bosnia). (C)

The President: We'll try to do it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye and God bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 17, 1995


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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBNARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

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Note: This memorandum replaces the August 16 memo already transmitted to you.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Major of UK

NOTETAKERS: Deuce Martinez, Paul Weber, Mary Ann Peters and Nelson Drew

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 13, 1995, 9:53 - 10:10 a.m. EDT  
White House Residence

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Hi John, having a little trouble getting this phone to work. (U)

Prime Minister Major: That's OK. I was just relaxing in the south of France. Just stepped away from poolside as a matter of fact. It is very hot here. (U)

The President: That's great. Glad to hear that you can get some time off. You need and deserve it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Thank you. I just wanted to talk to you about a couple of things. We're very pleased with Tony Lake's proposals. We have just a few minor points, but in general, I am very supportive. Did you get a good reaction from Bonn and Paris? (C)

The President: I did and from the Italians and the Spaniards as well. As a matter of fact, Tony just finished his meeting with Kozyrev, and it went surprisingly well. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is extremely good news. Hope it makes some progress. I have two areas of concern: first the prospect for triple recognition and secondly, getting a credible ground force following the withdrawal. However, not so good news on the ground in Bosnia today. I hear Bosnian forces are attacking Donji Vakuf, and there are limited Serbian attacks around Sarajevo. (C)

<p>DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E. O. 13526 2012-0801-11 05120116 VDE</p>
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The President: Well, Vice President Gore called Tudjman and Izetbegovic yesterday and warned them not to do it. We'll see what happens. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We need to use all the available leverage we have; [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. It looks to me that they are trying to work the western end of the country for the moment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: How do you think we should proceed from here? It is excellent that Tony had good talks. (C)

The President: First of all, I have to wait until he gets back and review what everyone said, and then we will go to the parties. Obviously that is the thing to do. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Hope they respond to the stimuli. (C)

The President: The Croatian and Bosnian governments may be getting a little carried away with themselves. They've had some successes but not sure if they see the end gain. On Tuesday, Dick Holbrooke will approach the various parties. We should be able to give you a virtually instantaneous report. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Is he going to all three places? (C)

The President: Yes, he's going, I think; yes, he's going to all three places. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Is Frasure going with him? (C)

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I hope they get the message and realize the opportunity. (C)

The President: There could be real movement; if they let it go without seeing it through to the end of the game, I don't see it happening. They've got a pretty good deal; they ought to take it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's our view. In September we will have to think clearly about the prospects for Winter. Hopefully they take the opportunity. I am very encouraged that the talks with Kozyrev went well. (C)

The President: I was surprised as well. They had some concerns about UNPROFOR's role in the end game. I told them we had to make clear to the Bosnians we wouldn't support that if they didn't support the peace process. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I thought the way Tony presented the idea was very persuasive, with the prizes for each side if it works and the downsides if it doesn't. The problem is we can't seem to agree on what the final map should look like. (C)

The President: We've done what we can, and you know what he said. We're going to wait until he gets back and hear the reactions he got. We will know better after the Holbrooke visits. (C)

Prime Minister Major: If we can help in any way, we'll be happy to. (C)

The President: I'm sure you can. We will call you when I know something. Another thing I would like to talk to you about is a talk I had with General Abacha. We had a good conversation. He took into consideration my comments positively but did not promise not to execute the prisoners. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I had a word with him as well. We spoke for about 25 minutes. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] I was able to persuade him to attend the Commonwealth Conference in November, and hopefully we'll have 50 other countries that can give him the same message. He listened well. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[redacted] He said he'd like to talk informally about the process of civilian rule. I will get back to him. He and I wish to maintain an informal dialogue. I said I will try to keep in touch. Like you, I have a reasonably positive feeling but no promises. (C)

Prime Minister Major: If he makes good moves we should try and be supportive. You know more than I do about the situation in that country. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I was wondering if I could speak for a moment on Northern Ireland. (C)

The President: Sure. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We're coming up to an important period for Northern Ireland in the next fortnight or three weeks. There are two events: the anniversary of the IRA cease-fire and the summit I will have with John Bruton at the end of the first week of September. A lot is happening on the ground.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I have discussed a number of things with Bruton. Probably you will discuss them with Bruton when he visits Washington in September. (C)

I believe a joint strategy can put life into the political dialogue.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

and second is to address decommissioning of terrorist weapons, not just IRA's but loyalists weapons as well. (C)

Bruton and I will be in touch about making useful progress. The essence of it is an independent commission to consider the modus operandi of decommissioning.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I can't move away from decommissioning; it is not practical.

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

There is quite a lot resting on this decision. (C)

What we would like is a joint commission to consist of 3 people. An American would chair; two names come to mind, George Mitchell and Tom Foley. We would approach one of them at some stage unless you would prefer we didn't. In addition to George Mitchell, Bruton would appoint one member with my approval, and I

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# CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

would appoint one with his approval. We hope combined with other measures we have in mind that we could get solid progress. I would like to have their report in advance of your visit in November. This is broadly the way we are thinking. I wanted to give you a preliminary indication to see if you can live with it. (C)

The President: Actually, it sounds good. I am quite worried about how to start talks and get some progress on decommissioning. I know it is a problem for you, and we may have to have a patina of some party above the fray to handle decommissioning. Obviously we need to make progress on it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] I wanted to give you advance notice. (C)

The President: I appreciate it. I will talk to my people about it. It could be a way to start talks and get progress on decommissioning; you can't do one without another. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We hope to have a unilateral announcement by the British government before the end of the month. We can go ahead with that and political talks if we establish the decommissioning commission. I can bear the political heat if we get progress. The three things hang together. We'll have to defer all if we defer one. (C)

Just one other thing. Before the August 31 anniversary, I would like as many people as possible to make clear the importance of the process. If you have an opportunity to do so, it would be useful. (C)

The President: I will look for an opportunity; that would be a good thing to do. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Sorry to have disturbed your Sunday. (C)

The President: Good to hear your voice. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Please God, we can get out of the devil's brew we're in (in Bosnia). (C)

The President: We'll try to do it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye and God bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9506979  
RECEIVED: 20 SEP 95 16

TO: MAJOR, JOHN

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NIGERIA

GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

SUBJECT: MST RE PM MAJOR MTG W/ NIGERIAN ENVOY

ACTION: CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DUE DATE: 23 SEP 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DESHAZER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
DESHAZER  
NSC CHRON  
PETERS  
RICE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 3 OF 3

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9506979

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	X	95092013 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
001 LAKE	Z	95092017 FOR DECISION
002	X	95092114 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM
003	X	95100214 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC   DATE   DISPATCH FOR ACTION   DISPATCH FOR INFO

002	950921	LYNE, ROD	
003	950921	MAJOR, JOHN	

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1995

Dear John:

I am writing in reference to our joint strategy toward Libya. As we approach a decision on the sanctions rollover on November 30, I urge you to join me in supporting an expansion of sanctions on Libya.

Despite our best efforts, the sanctions approved two years ago have not resulted in the outcome we all seek: the handover of the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing and cooperation in investigating the bombing of UTA 772. In fact, during the past year, Qadhafi's behavior has worsened. He manipulated Egypt and Saudi Arabia into facilitating Libyan violations of the sanctions resolutions during the Hajj. Throughout the past year, Qadhafi has also continued his support for terrorism by providing a haven for terrorist groups and sponsoring the assassination of Libyan dissidents abroad.

Qadhafi must not be permitted to blatantly violate these international norms. Therefore, I propose two courses of action. First, as we agreed at the trilateral meeting between us and the French last July, we should unite to tighten the existing sanctions regime. Second, instead of simply rolling over existing sanctions, I propose that we agree to strengthen and expand these sanctions. Specifically, together with France, we must seek to amend UN Security Council Resolution 883 to include an expansion of existing sanctions on oil-related equipment. I am convinced that unless we increase the pressure from the international community, we will not achieve our goals in bringing to justice those responsible for these acts of terrorism.

I know that you share my view that Libya cannot continue to defy the wishes of the international community. I look forward to working with you to ensure that this defiance is ended as soon as possible.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable John Major, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Sincerely,



*file on record  
mly - had typo -  
now it's replaced  
this one.*

The Right Honorable John Major, M.P.  
Prime Minister  
London

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1995

Dear Jacques:

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Sincerely,



His Excellency Jacques Chirac  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 7737  
11-2-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Libyan Sanctions Strategy

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0449-M (7.45)  
3/6/2019 KBH

95 NOV 1 10:54

Purpose

To obtain French and British support for expansion of UNSC sanctions against Libya.

Background

Despite our best efforts, the sanctions approved two years ago have not resulted in the outcome we seek: the handover of the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing. We need to increase the pressure on Qadhafi and have already begun to increase enforcement of the current ones. We also seek to strengthen UNSC sanctions on Libya by including prohibitions on additional oil-related equipment, even though our allies have been reluctant to support this in the past. It is clear that without support from Britain and France, we will not succeed in our efforts.

If we are to have any chance for success, we will need to appeal directly to Chirac and Major to support an expansion of sanctions. We propose that you write both leaders and urge them to support an effort to amend UNSCR 883 by expanding the list of prohibited oil-related equipment. You may also want to raise the issue next time you speak to them by phone. This amendment should be adopted before the sanctions rollover now scheduled for November 30.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to President Chirac and Prime Minister Major.

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to President Jacques Chirac
- Tab B Letter to Prime Minister John Major

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Anthony Lake  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 10/23/00

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7737

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *ARC*

FROM: IVO H. DAALDER *law*

SUBJECT: Letters from President to Chirac and Major  
Regarding Libyan Sanctions

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.46)  
3/6/2019 KBH

UN sanctions on Libya have failed to produce the results we seek. The sanctions rollover decision on November 30 provides an opportunity to try to expand existing sanctions on oil-related equipment. This requires an amendment of UNSCR 833, approval for which we will only obtain if Britain and France agree to support the proposal.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President urging him to sign the enclosed letters to President Chirac and Prime Minister Major seeking their support for the expansion of existing sanctions.

Concurrence by: Randy Beers; *Sandy Varshbow*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Letter to President Jacques Chirac  
Tab B Letter to Prime Minister John Major

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Classified by: Ivo Daalder

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 10/23/00

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Despite our best efforts, the sanctions approved two years ago have not resulted in the outcome we all seek: the handover of the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing and cooperation in investigating the bombing of UTA 772. In fact, during the past year, Qadhafi's behavior has worsened. He manipulated Egypt and Saudi Arabia into facilitating Libyan violations of the sanctions resolutions during the Hajj. Throughout the past year, Qadhafi has also continued his support for terrorism by providing a haven for terrorist groups and sponsoring the assassination of Libyan dissidents abroad.

Qadhafi must not be permitted to blatantly violate these international norms. Therefore, I propose two courses of action. First, as we agreed at the trilateral meeting between us and the British last July, we should unite to tighten the existing sanctions regime. Second, instead of simply rolling over existing sanctions, ~~next month~~, I propose that we agree to strengthen and expand these sanctions. Specifically, together with Britain, we must seek to amend UN Security Council Resolution 883 to include an expansion of existing sanctions on oil-related equipment. I am convinced that unless we increase the pressure from the international community, we will not achieve our goals in bringing to justice those responsible for these acts of terrorism.

I know that you share my view that Libya cannot continue to defy the wishes of the international community. I look forward to working with you to ensure that this defiance is ended as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Jacques Chirac  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12-5-95

Dear Tom

Thanks so much for the  
fine old book on "your sport" in America.  
Perhaps now I can finally figure it out.

I can't thank you enough for  
every aspect of the visit — the chance to  
speak to Parliament, the good meetings we  
had, and the most enjoyable dinner  
and reception afterwards.

Hilary and I both send our  
warmest regards to you and Norma —

Sincerely,

Bill

PS - I think we'll be OK on  
Boonin in the Congress —

NSC

# 142904

8962

Office of the Prime Minister

Jamaica House  
Kingston

October 26, 1995

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for the very kind letter regarding our recent discussions in Washington.

That visit provided yet another opportunity for us to exchange views on a variety of bilateral and hemispheric issues.

There are important urgent questions which will require constant exchanges between our two countries and I am sure these can be pursued in a spirit of understanding.

The medical supplies arrived expeditiously and are being already used in our system.

Regarding our decision on the US-Caribbean Business Development Council, we are looking forward to hosting the inaugural session here in Jamaica during early 1996.

I also look forward to working with you on these and other matters.

Sincerely,



P. J. Patterson  
Prime Minister

Hon. William J. Clinton  
President of the USA  
The White House  
Washington.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8862

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 18, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's  
Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of the  
United Kingdom

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level.



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 12/12/05

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-m (7.49)  
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Major of the  
United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Senator George Mitchell, Special Advisor for  
Economic Initiatives  
William J. Crowe, Ambassador to UK  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Michael McCurry, Assistant to the President  
and White House Press Secretary  
Mary Ann Peters, Director for European  
Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

John Major, Prime Minister  
Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for  
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
Sir John Kerr, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Pauline Neville-Jones, Political Director  
Rod Lyne, Private Secretary for Overseas  
Affairs  
Paul Lever, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet  
Christopher Meyer, Press Spokesman  
Edward Oakden, Cabinet Office

DATE, TIME November 29, 1995, 11:00 a.m.  
AND PLACE: 10 Downing Street, London

Prime Minister Major: We touched on Northern Ireland and one or two other issues in our private meetings. Given where we are on Bosnia, it might be a good idea to discuss peace implementation, and the details of troop deployments, such as how many, when, under what conditions, and who else might contribute. (C)

The President: There are two or three things we should focus on. First, the terms of the agreement are better than I thought we could get because many functions are left to the central state.

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 12/12/05

Because of what happened to Sarajevo and Gorazde I thought we would conclude an undefined agreement, but the details are pretty good and the annexes are well thought-through. Our military think the military mission is clearly defined and achievable. (C)

I hope the NAC will approve the NATO milop to take over from UNPROFOR to monitor the cessation of hostilities, establish the 4-kilometer zone of separation, oversee transfer of territory and redeployment of forces, and create a secure environment for a year to allow other functions to be carried out, including economic reconstruction, the return of refugees and elections. I have seen the map of British, French and American areas. Other countries will participate as well. (C)

It is important to give Russia a way to participate in the implementation. I had the most amazing conversation with Yeltsin at Hyde Park in which he said he would be happy to serve under us but he could not be seen to put Russian troops under NATO. He said that he trusts us but he would be blown away politically if he did that. I am confident we can work out the political side of their participation. They wanted a political veto, which is not possible, but we are working on how to characterize the relationship at NATO headquarters. (C)

All NATO members except Iceland will have troops there; the last time I checked there were 17 other countries, like Indonesia, that want to participate. There are two problems we have to deal with in the context of the military situation, one direct and one indirect. First, as part of the agreement, within 30 days all foreign military must leave. That includes Serbs and several hundred, maybe as many as 1300, Mujaheddin. This poses a bigger threat to us than to you. It could be explosive but we expect to have intelligence on whether they leave. (C)

Second is that all the functions other than those for the troops must be performed by organizations other than NATO, including the monitoring of any arms control agreement. We have lifted sanctions, but there is a provision for it to take effect gradually over six months, during which arms control talks are to occur. If an agreement is reached, it will be implemented with the help of the OSCE. If not, the parties will reduce their overall arms by 25% from an agreed ratio of 5 to 2 to 2. Within Bosnia the ratio is 2 to 1 in favor of the Bosnian Croat Federation over the Serbs. The problem is that those ratios do not exist today -- someone has to sure that at the end of a year, when the NATO mission concludes, Bosnia has some opportunity to defend itself. The important thing is that this will not be done by NATO but it has to happen. If there is no arms control deal

in six months, that is a potential point of tension even though all the parties have agreed now on the ratios. (C)

Another issue is whether we can work together to bring the benefits of peace to the people there in a timely fashion. I met with Congressional leadership on this and they agreed to funding in installments over three years. Where we are with the Congress is that this is a big issue in the country. Many believe that the people in Bosnia are going to kill each other no matter what and we should get out of the way. (C)

I apologize for attenuating my trip. Did I give a fair description of where things stand? (U)

Mr. Lake: Yes. (U)

The President: Your troops are at greater risk now than in UNPROFOR. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I will ask Pauline to comment in a moment. It was clearly remarkable to get agreement, but I am not blind to the problems in terms of maintaining it over the course of a year or how difficult it may be to get out after a year without leaving chaos. Some ministers from our own party object to the fact that we are spending this money in addition to our obligations elsewhere, and they are skeptical about the possibility of disengaging after 12 months. The fact that you are going to be there is key. British troops are always happy to serve with Americans. As I have said, we envisage a contribution of 13,000 troops for implementation with another 3000 perhaps at sea for a total of 13-16,000. This is not formal yet but the Defense Secretary does not disagree. He is in Brussels now on NATO business. We would envisage leaving at the same time as the U.S. does. The problem is to have a satisfactory exit. I would like to ask Pauline to comment. (C)

Ms. Neville-Jones: I agree that the agreement is rather better than we feared. The military annex is implementable. You have picked out one side, the military, but how IFOR implementation begins will affect the civilian side. The civilian side will be most important in determining whether military implementation is peaceful or not. The ability to hold elections which seal the status of Bosnia is crucial to whether you end up eventually with partition. The agreement creates institutions at the center, but not a military structure, with the result that you have three separate armies. If you do not have elections and you do have three armies, the likely outcome is clear. (C)

The role of the High Representative is important, as is the OSCE. But the OSCE will not go in if there is heavy fighting going on.

The first few months are crucial in how we handle the Bosnian Serbs. They have to come out, and not be holed up. The task is to get the Bosnian Serbs to be outward looking. The big problem is Karadzic and Mladic. We need to encourage responsible leadership to emerge so things can move forward. (C)

Foreign Secretary Rifkind: You mentioned 30 days. In addition to the Mujaheddin and the Serbs, the Croatians have troops there. Relations between Tudjman and Izetbegovic are frosty. Military command and control is a political issue and an issue of coordination. The High Representative has to have a role. On refugees, elections and liaison with civilians, his role is crucial. More work needs to be done on his remit to liaise with the military. (C)

The peace implementation conference will be held in London December 8-9. We will start with the military but focus on reconstruction. This is not a pledging conference but we need to decide on the role of the World Bank. (C)

The President: I called Wolfensohn on another matter but I mentioned this. I think you will get a good response from the World Bank. Has the EU identified its contribution? (C)

Prime Minister Major: There is list of projects totaling 400 million pounds sterling. The EU will pay its share. We are trying to do this while we are continuing support to Eastern Europe and Russia and even a presence in sub-Saharan Africa. We are looking to the Muslim states and Japan to contribute. EU contributions vary -- though the German number is lower, we must keep in mind the 400,000 refugees Germany is supporting. Whatever the overall cost, and however generous we are, demand for funds will exceed supply. (C)

The President: I agree. We need to make sure whatever we do is done competently and helps solve the problems. We do not have to do everything within the first one or two years. The less money we have, the more creatively we need to use it. We need to light up the minds of the people and give them a better way than killing. We will do the best we can to contribute in a timely fashion. (C)

Mr. Lake: Equip and train is a difficult issue with the Congress. It is needed to bring the Bosnians in balance. To the degree it is not settled, then the entire thing is still in question. There are two main issues: if we do not do it, will Iran; and what about the mujaheddin? It cannot be done unless they are expelled. We must not appear to take sides against the Bosnian Serbs. We need to coordinate the best efforts with other governments. We can coordinate but we will not do it ourselves.

If that doesn't work, we could use contractors, but not our military, for this purpose. (C)

Foreign Secretary Rifkind: You have the highest profile in NATO. We are also committed to ensuring it happens, but not to doing it ourselves. (C)

Prime Minister Major: No one doubts it has to be done. (C)

Mr. Lake: We need the cooperation of the OSCE on elections and arms control. (C)


Ms. Neville-Jones: We cannot be confident -- this will be a major qualitative leap in OSCE responsibilities. Like the UN, results will depend on what we put into it. It will require a huge contribution of non-existent resources. (C)

The President: This is the focus of your conference and of the OSCE's conference in Budapest. We will need to conclude whether it will work. An objective of the conference is to alert people to the need to do this. We need to look around the world for people to work on elections and bring them under the OSCE umbrella. OSCE is more appropriate than the EU because it includes Russia. This will be quite good if it works. At the moment the OSCE is an empty suit -- we need to put the body in it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That is the best option. (C)

The President: We need to stay very closely in touch; that is self evident, including on implementation forces and military planning. We need to coordinate and stay together on this. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I would like to discuss another topic: Nigeria. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)



An oil embargo is a difficult proposition; it would require a Security Council resolution. One percent of our trade would be affected; your percentage is larger. Our public position is that we have neither excluded nor encouraged consideration of it. It would be difficult to implement -- it would require a naval blockade and create hardship. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[redacted] But we have not ruled it out, nor

given them encouragement to believe it will be done. In my conversation with Mandela I said I would discuss it with you. (C)

The President: Our position is exactly the same. Eight percent of our trade would be affected. To do it without the Security Council would be a mistake, and Chirac would probably veto it.

Foreign Secretary Rifkind:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted]

Prime Minister Major:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted]

Mr. Lake: We need to use our leverage, especially on restoration of democracy and the fate of the coup plotters, but we can only be effective if our actions are universal. Nothing has been ruled out. (C)

The President: Their reaction was that they hadn't killed the guy we asked them to spare, so what was the fuss! (C)

Ms. Soderberg: We are sticking with the measures we have taken. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Turning to Northern Ireland, I just want to say that I feel strongly that Prime Minister Bruton showed great courage. I don't know to what extent we have universal support. Bruton deserves credit for his hard work and willingness to take risks.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted]

On the preliminary talks track, one option is to have both governments meet with the parties, but it is doubtful that this will work. Instead the contacts may be bilateral. The chance of getting Sinn Fein and the UUP at the same meeting is negligible. The UUP view is consistent-- they will not talk until arms are turned in. But an elected assembly could have a mandate to negotiate.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

At the recent SDLP conference there was a sharp difference between the MP's and the activists. I hope they will be as open as possible in the political track. (C)

On the other track, we are grateful to George for taking it on. It won't be easy. We will be appointing the other members in a day or so and will talk later in the day. We hope that enough progress and momentum will be generated to enable us to build an agreement and see a way round the issue. It is not a case of British intransigence but we cannot have all-party talks without all parties. Trimble said there may be a way around, but we don't know what it is. You will be walking silently like a cat at night to find the way through. You will need progress in the political track and on dealing with Washington 1&2 by February to unlock the route to all-party talks. If we get there, I think we will get an agreement. I am grateful to you for walking into a difficult situation; it is in good hands. (C)

Senator Mitchell: Thank you, I am looking forward to it. I hope within a couple of days to contact the other members and commence work with all the parties, consistent with the commission's mandate. (C)

Prime Minister Major: That will be helpful. John Bruton and I wanted to do this; we managed to get the show on the road and we will meeting again in Dublin soon, and perhaps do something social as a visible symbol of cooperation. The third strand is East-West ties; the others are easier. The question is how to deepen the Anglo-Irish relationship. Going back six years or so, for the two prime ministers to talk was an event. But these last two weeks John Bruton and I earned lots of money for British Telecom. (C)

The President: I don't think we need to say anything else about Ireland. You and I talked about it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We will have to make a statement on the basis of last night's agreement. (C)

The President: Let us turn to the question of Turkey's customs union with the EU. (C)

Prime Minister Major: The outlook is better than it was. Prime Minister Ciller was here recently. EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9) We

CONFIDENTIAL

8

gave her public support for Turkish membership. We want this to happen for wider reasons. (C)

Foreign Secretary Rifkind: There is movement toward a majority in favor. (C)

The President: Turkey is very important. There are several reasons to support this: to support Turkish reform and to get a higher level of cooperation on terrorism. After all, the more successful we are at achieving peace, the more vulnerable we are to terrorism. (C)

One other thing -- we still have not reached agreement on the airline dispute. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Our position is pretty clear. We have made an offer that has not been picked up, of two slots at Heathrow and two at Gatwick. We are ready to resume talks at any time. (C)

One last thing, on Libya, what position will you take? (C)

The President: I don't know yet. We'll have an answer in a few days. I don't know if we will ever get those guys out. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They have made previous offers that never amounted to anything -- Scotland, The Hague. There are those who fuel conspiracy theories and say the Libyans are innocent. In Parliament I cannot defend myself because I could prejudice the eventual trial if I said too much. In our lawyers' view our case is against them is pretty good. (C)

Foreign Secretary Rifkind: There was a story that Libya would hand them over to a British embassy, which would of course mean to us, but there has been no confirmation. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Briefly on NATO enlargement, do you have any thoughts on timing? (C)

The President: We expect to leave specific decisions until after the Russian elections. Right now we have a continuing process to get everyone's input on how and why; we still need to figure out who and when. We will do that but in a deliberate way to maximize the chances Russia will look at it responsibly. Russian participation in Bosnia is important for that. (C)

At one point Yeltsin agreed with me, but over a year he modified his position. There is a difference between his public posture and his private talks with me; between his rhetoric and his

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cooperative action. That shows that he wants to build bridges without undermining his political base. (C)

Mr. Lake: It is terribly important that we not say we have delayed the Russian elections. (C)

The President: We set up the timetable to take care of that; it is imperative that it not be leaked. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It is not hard to keep it at bay publicly because Partnership for Peace provides the halfway house for prospective members. PFP has turned out better than many thought it would. (C)

Mr. Lake: Next year we will have individual conversations with individual countries; that will take awhile. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'd be interested in your judgment on whether Yeltsin will contest the election. (C)

The President: He was hurt by those pictures in which he appeared to be inebriated. On the other hand, he seems to be up and around again. If he can stay healthy and sober he might pull it off. Perhaps I am biased because I like him. He is not perfect but it is hard to imagine getting someone better. It is possible a progressive could get elected, but... Yeltsin wants to be seen as effective. There again, if we have success together in a military venture in the real world, in the heart of Europe, I cannot believe that will not undermine the militant nationalists and help tip the scales. The economy is getting better, but there is a 10-month lag before the voters see it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I agree absolutely. I like him and he is familiar. But this is his third heart attack and he is already 6 years older than the average male life expectancy in Russia. (C)

The President: When General Grant started winning battles, President Lincoln's advisors told him that Grant was a crude drunk. Lincoln replied, "Find out what he drinks and give it to the rest of them." (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


February 13, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with Prime  
Ministers Major and Bruton

The attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations between the President and British Prime Minister Major (Tab A) and Irish Prime Minister Bruton (Tab B) are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassies in London and Dublin for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Telcon with PM Major  
Tab B Telcon with PM Bruton

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 2/12/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (754)  
3/4/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Major

Notetakers: Daniel Flessas, Kathi Guekel,  
Deuce Martinez and Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 9, 1996, 6:13 - 6:23 p.m.  
The Oval Office

The President: John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. (U)

The President: I'm really sorry man. (U)

Prime Minister Major: It's bad news, really bad news. Not just the event; it's difficult to see where you put the train back on the tracks. (C)

The President: Well, it's hard to explain. I had no inkling of it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Nor we. (C)

The President: Adams was here, and Dick Spring was here yesterday. I talked to them, and I didn't see it coming. I feel badly. He was grouching, and I told him that he could say what he wanted to say about what John Major had said, but the fact remains he found a way to at least offer you an alternative; the possible permutations of the election proposal. (C)

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 2/12/06

3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: Where do we go from here? (C)

Prime Minister Major: At this moment, I'm unsure. I'm very grateful for your statement and the speed with which it was made. I intend to dampen things down. I spoke to Bruton, and I will speak with him tomorrow and Sunday. I think we just have to see what the ramifications are. 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted]

In any event, I think we are going to see how to keep the show on the road. First, we must make sure that the British and Irish governments lock arms, and I think Bruton and I will be able to do that. Then we can assess things. Trimble is on his way to you, I think. (C)

The President: Yes he is, but he may think it will be a wasted trip now. I hope he still comes. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I hope he still comes to you. 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[Redacted] I hope Trimble still goes to see you and you have a good talk with him, and I can get a good readout from you or Tony. (C)

The President: We'll do that. Tony is talking to Holmes. I just wanted to say I was sorry; if there is anything I can do. We need to send a message to the Irish 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9) (C)

Prime Minister Major: And directly to Adams. Did you see Adam's statement? (C)

The President: Yes, [ 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9) ] That's not a very diplomatic statement! (C)

Prime Minister Major: That's a good way to describe it. (C)

The President: He was here and seemed ill at ease. It's not like I had a premonition about this, but I had the feeling he didn't know what to do. He didn't agree with elections, but I told him you clearly wanted a peace agreement. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [ 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9) ]

The President: Well it seems to me that it's not rational for them to assume you don't want to do this or you wouldn't have taken all the heat you already have on it. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'm grateful for what you have done, and let's keep in touch. (C)

The President: If you can think of anything else, let me know. I'll rack my brain. (C)

Prime Minister Major: OK, God bless. If we think of anything, we'll be in touch. (C)

The President: Thank you John. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.55)  
3/6/2014 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Bruton

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Bruton

Notetakers: Daniel Flessas, Kathi Guekel,  
Deuce Martinez and Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 9, 1996, 6:49 - 6:53 p.m.  
The Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: I just wanted to call and tell you how sorry I am about what happened. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: It is dreadful really. It was completely sudden and unexpected. Thank you for your statement. It touched a lot of people. It appears a lot of Sinn Fein's leadership was taken by surprise. (C)

The President: Adams was just here a few days ago you know. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: I know. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[redacted]

The President: Blaming the British under these circumstances is pretty gutless. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: [redacted] 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9) In any event, the idea that we have been putting forth on proximity talks was beginning to gain some ground, beginning to bring the British opinion around. We will land it soon enough. This of course puts this on the back burner. We obviously have a huge number of

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Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 2/12/06

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2

decisions to take from the security perspective and what attitude to take with Sinn Fein. We don't want to rush into it, but we can't reverse the course. We have to keep hope alive. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree with that. We don't want to overreact. It is sad and troubling. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Yes I know. (C)

The President: I just wanted to call and check in with you and tell you if you have any ideas about what we ought to do, just give us a call and let us know what to do, and we'll do it. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Yes, I'd like to take the opportunity to call in a week or so, if you have the time, when things are a little clearer. (C)

The President: Oh, sure. I know you've got to think through this. I just didn't want this day to go by without talking to you. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: I appreciate it. Thank you very much indeed. (C)

The President: Thank you, friend. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye, thanks. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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PER E. O. 13526

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2013-0449-M (756)  
3/6/2019 KBH

February 22, 1996 <sup>96 FEB 22</sup> P8:12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAMP ~~LAKE~~

SUBJECT: Phone Calls to Prime Ministers Major and Bruton

Purpose

To continue to give impetus to efforts to get the Northern Ireland peace process back on track.

Background

You spoke to both prime ministers on February 9, the day of the first London bombing. In the interim there have been two incidents: the first, a bomb in Piccadilly on February 15, which was defused; and the second, a bomb that blew up a bus on February 18, killing one and injuring eight. It is believed the bomb went off prematurely, killing the IRA individual transporting the bomb. We have condemned all three incidents. At Tab C is the statement we released after the February 18 bombing.

In spite of the resumption of violence, the two governments have been working to put together a package that would enable Sinn Fein to enter all-party talks once the cease-fire is restored. The essence of the package would be an elective process leading directly to talks. Other possible elements at this stage are some variation of the Irish Government's proposal for proximity talks, acceptance of non-violence and parallel decommissioning as suggested in the Mitchell report and a referendum to demonstrate popular support for peace.

The two governments are seeking to have the package ready to be announced by Major and Bruton at a summit, which they hope to hold by the end of the month. It would then be up to Gerry Adams to persuade the IRA to restore the cease-fire so that Sinn Fein could rejoin the process. Adams told us last week that convincing the IRA will be difficult, but it is not hopeless. SDLP leader John Hume will be key to getting a package. In his most recent, acrimonious meeting with Prime Minister Major he

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Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify on: 2/16/06

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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moved off his adamant opposition to any kind of elective process and suggested that a question on party representation at all-party talks be combined with a referendum for peace. It is unclear whether this will go far enough for Trimble and the unionists. We have made the point to Hume, as has Major, that it would be ironic if he were to prevent the peace process from going forward.

We are resisting pressure, including from the Department of Justice, to make decisions now to deny Adams' visa requests and to revoke IRA fundraising privileges in the United States. We believe it is important not to do anything to reduce Adams' stature with the IRA before he has had a chance to sell the package the governments are putting together. There is no need to make an immediate decision on fundraising since none of the Sinn Fein representatives who can raise funds is here at the moment. We will have to make these decisions by early March, when Adams proposes to visit the United States. In the meantime, we are focusing our efforts on getting the cease-fire restored.

Senator Mitchell was in Europe this week on other business and saw both Major and Bruton. He told me he would urge both to agree as soon as possible on a package to get the talks going.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

We are hearing from representatives of the Irish-American community that they continue to see Administration diplomatic efforts as crucial to reviving the peace process. Calls to Major and Bruton would send a public signal of your continued commitment to Northern Ireland and give the two prime ministers added incentive to make necessary compromises on the package leading to talks.

Attachments

- Tab A Points to be Made to Major
- Tab B Points to be Made to Bruton
- Tab C Statement of February 19

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1197

February 26, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with Prime  
Ministers Major and Bruton

The attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations between the President and British Prime Minister Major (Tab A) and Irish Prime Minister Bruton (Tab B) are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassies in London and Dublin for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Telcon with PM Major  
Tab B Telcon with PM Bruton

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 2/23/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-17 (7.59)  
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Bruton (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister John Bruton

Notetakers: Ted Seigny, Katherine  
O'Loughlin, Elaine Florio, Mary Ann Peters  
and Deuce Martinez

DATE, TIME February 23, 1996, 9:15 - 9:20 a.m. EST  
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Hello is that Bill? (U)

The President: Yes, How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: It's good to talk to you. Thanks for going to the trouble to call me. (U)

The President: Well, I just wanted to check in with you. I've been keeping in close touch with events and I appreciate the great efforts your government and the British are making to revive the peace process and get it going again. I know you have been working on a package to allow all-party talks to start if a cease-fire is restored. It will then be up to Adams to get the IRA to agree. I just wanted to call and see where you are and see what else I can to help. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: The specific thing we need is a definite date for all-party talks. The British and the unionists want elections first to give a mandate. The nationalists, John Hume's people, are unhappy about that. I think we could get them to accept some form of election so long as the transition to talks is absolutely direct and there would be no delay and no further conditions. For instance, if the elections are set for May 10 and negotiations for May 15, there will be no question of anything happening in between to keep postponing the talks. The best and only chance to get the IRA to restore the cease-fire is if a specific date is designated. EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/23/06

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The President: Well, we will do everything we can. I stay in touch with Adams as you know. I'll do what I can to persuade Hume to reach agreement on an election proposal. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Yes, that would be very helpful. (C)

The President: Call me at any time. I am heartsick about this but I believe we still have a shot at getting this back on track so if there is anything I can do, I'll do it. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you. The timetable looks like Wednesday for my meeting with Major. We won't have a clear picture of what the British will do until Monday so it will be a short period of time before Wednesday. I may need to talk to you then, or I may not if things go well. That's the timeframe of when things will or will not get done. (C)

The President: That's great. I'll be around and available. You can find me when you need me. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you for taking the trouble to call. It's a critical situation right now. (C)

The President: I think we know what our marching orders are and you know you can call on me. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you. Bye-bye now. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Log # 2115

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm SB To ~~SB~~ SV Date \_\_\_\_\_

Not sure whether this was drafted before or after PC FRIDAY but seems grossly inadequate to priority of Presidential contacts on Bosnian aid decided there.

propose you draft much more substantive POTUS letter to leaders indicated in State matrix to receive such letter. Hand deliver

Fm \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

from Amb.

@

March 29, 1996


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, Jr *JF*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Prime Minister Major



*W) Sandy -  
See note*

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft message to be sent to British Prime Minister Major on Bosnia.


RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

*EX-SIC*

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Draft Message to PM Major
- Tab B Incoming correspondence



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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KKH/NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-m

TO: SENS

FROM: BURNS, W

DOC DATE: 01 APR 96  
SOURCE REF: 9605179

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION  
RUSSIA  
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
CTB

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO ON UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION IN P - 8 SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR  
SAFETY & SECURITY

ACTION: NFAR PER BLACKER

DUE DATE: 02 APR 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKER

LOGREF: 9602157 9602568

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSLA

DOC 7 OF 7

SECRET

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2013-0449. M

## ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICERCAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 PONEMAN	Z 96032908 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 PONEMAN	Z 96032908 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003 PONEMAN	Z 96032908 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004 PONEMAN	Z 96032908 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
005 PONEMAN	Z 96032920 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
007 PONEMAN	Z 96040117 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
007	Z 96040214 ACTION TRANSFERRED
007 BLACKER	Z 96040214 ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
007	X 96042211 NFAR PER BLACKER

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
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 12, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with Prime  
Ministers Major of the UK and Bruton of Ireland  
(U)

The attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations between the President and Prime Ministers Major of the UK and Bruton of Ireland are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassies in London and Dublin for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). (U)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Telcon with PM Major  
Tab B Telcon with PM Bruton

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 6/6/06

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/16/2019  
2013-0449-M

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3974

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.71)  
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister John Bruton of the  
Ireland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Bruton

Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Mary Canty,  
Pete Huggins and Larry Wright

DATE, TIME June 6, 1996, 1:16 - 1:20 p.m.  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello John. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: I just want to let you know you've got the best  
damn Muzak in the world. We don't have Tchaikovsky over here.  
I'm in much better humor than I was 30 seconds ago. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: You had to listen to Tchaikovsky, that's  
shocking. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Very well. Thank you very much for  
phoning. We've had good news. Things are coming through for the  
talks. We are very grateful that George Mitchell is going to be  
involved. The role he is playing is important for the success of  
the talks. (C)

The President: He's a good man. You've done a good job. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you for the sustained interest Tony  
Lake and others in your administration have shown over the last  
few days. We have not lost hope that there may be an IRA cease-  
fire by Monday, it's still possible. There is a meeting between  
our officials and Sinn Fein in the next hour.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens

Reason: 1.5(b)


Declassify On: 6/6/06

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The President: We will do everything we can and call some of their best friends over here. Most American-Irish are 100 percent with you and Major on the agreement for decommissioning and the role of Mitchell. I fully support the position you have taken that Sinn Fein cannot participate in talks unless the IRA agrees to a cease-fire. If it hadn't been for the bombing, it would be much easier. We will do all we can in the next few days, all we can do to build momentum. You've given me one little job, what else can we do? (C)

Prime Minister Bruton:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)



The President: We've been hitting them hard on it. We'll keep doing what we can. (C)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you very much. I'm looking forward to seeing you during the Irish presidency of the EU. (U)

The President: That's right. And also, Mary Robinson is visiting next week. We'll try to show her a good time. (U)

Prime Minister Bruton: Thank you very much, Bill. Good-bye. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3988

June 8, 1996

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Tasking for Bilateral Meeting with President  
Chirac and Prime Minister Major (U)

In preparation for the bilateral meetings with President Chirac and Prime Minister Major on margins of the Lyon Summit, we would appreciate your forwarding to the National Security Council the following briefing material for the President. (S)

UK

- Briefing Papers with talking points on the following subjects (one page limit unless otherwise indicated). Please focus on British policy and attitudes in the background sections.
  - Helms-Burton
  - Northern Ireland
  - Bosnia (two pages if necessary)
  - Russia and Russian elections
  - Nigeria
  - UN Finance and Reform
  - Middle East peace process
  - Cyprus
  - Hong Kong
  - NATO: Enlargement and Adaptation
- Background papers (one page limit)
  - Domestic Political and Economic Situation
  - Non-Cooperation Policy vis a vis the EU (S)

France

- Briefing Papers with talking points on the following subjects (one page-limit). Please focus on French policy and attitudes in the background sections.
  - Helms-Burton
  - Bosnia (two pages if necessary)
  - China

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Reason: 1.5 (b)  
Declassify On: 6/8/06

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- NATO: Adaptation and Enlargement
  - Russia and the Russian Election
  - Africa, including Great Lakes Region and Nigeria
  - Middle East
  - UN Finance and Reform
- Background paper on domestic Political and Economic Situation (one page). (e)

All material should be forwarded to the National Security Council by close of business, June 18. Also, in addition to the hard copy, a diskette should be attached using Word for Windows versions 2.0 or 6.0. (U)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4526

July 2, 1996

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-17

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and Prime Minister John Major of the UK (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. It may be transmitted to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission only. (S)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ w/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT  
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (b, d)  
Declassify On: 07/01/06

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By K8H NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and Prime Minister John Major of the UK (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and  
Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for the  
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed  
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary  
level. It may be transmitted to our embassy in London for the  
Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission only. (S)

Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

For the  
file.  
D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4547

*different #*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and Prime Minister John Major of the UK (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and  
Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for the  
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed  
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(DAS) level. It may ~~also~~ be sent to our embassy in London for  
the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (U)

*transmitted*

Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-17

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Reason: 1.5 (b,d)  
Declassify On: 07/01/06

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6045

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.78)  
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Major

Notetakers: Ralph Sigler, Larry Wright and  
Steve Brennan

DATE, TIME September 1, 1996, 1052-1105 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Little Rock, Arkansas

The President: John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill, good afternoon. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Where are you? (U)

The President: Home in Arkansas. Just finished the nominating  
convention, and I went cross country. (U)

Prime Minister Major: The train was a brilliant piece of  
politics; looks like it went well. (UJ)

The President: It did. We had huge crowds along the way.  
Unfortunately, the United States has allowed passenger service to  
go down hill so this is quite a unique and wonderful thing. We  
had very large crowds by American standards. I am very happy  
about it. (U)

Prime Minister Major: It looked marvelous. I saw a lot of  
coverage on CNN while toasting my toes in the garden. I had a  
slightly more relaxing week than you. (U)

The President: Good for you. You just took the week off? (U)

Prime Minister Major: I had a holiday in France and a few days  
after that to work at home and watch a little cricket. I am  
sorry it is over, but I have to go back to work tomorrow. (U)

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 9/9/96

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The President: Do you feel better though? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, almost human again; I am at the top of my range in politics (U).

The President: I think we don't realize how mentally tired we get. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I absolutely agree. (U)

The President: I have a guy that works for me; brilliant man. He is like a staff secretary; one of his jobs is to put a one page summary on top of everything I read. He saves me hours because he is so smart. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Sounds like a treasure. One or two page notes are sometimes sufficient but sometimes you just have to plow through things. Miserable affair in Iraq. (C)

The President: Yes it is. I know Tony Lake briefed your Ambassador here on the response we are considering. It is a difficult call because one of the Kurdish groups is in line with Saddam, but on the other hand, what bothers me is that if we don't do anything, the demarche was meaningless and might encourage him to go forward. It seems this approach we advocate might serve to let him know he is not in control. Since we issued the demarche, if we don't do anything, he would be left with the initiative and we would be left with his word to withdraw from Irbil. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Have you heard anything from Saudi Arabia and Jordan? (C)

The President: No, I am calling them now. As you can tell my voice is hoarse. I am calling King Hussein and President Mubarak today. I could get back to you after I talk to them. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Good. I know Tony briefed John Holmes. I

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: I think we would make it clear that an attack on SAM sites is not designed to force a withdrawal; we don't think we can force that or have that as an objective. If we attack the SAM sites, that would undermine his ability to interrupt the No Fly Zone and remind him we have a capability to do something to his war capability. (C)

Prime Minister Major: You would justify this action internationally by saying we are removing the threat to our No Fly Zone assets in the region? (C)

The President: Yes, I would say his attack on Irbil shows he still has aggressive intentions and we have to minimize that. We have to extend the "No Fly Zone" a degree and take out the SAM sites and remind him he can't take up wholesale aggression. We don't have the capability to remove him if he doesn't want to. What concerns me far more is both he and Barzani have a deal going on. We can not look the other way from this after the gulf war. I think we have to do something, but not be tied to a withdrawal from Irbil which would set us up for failure. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Have you had any contact with Talabani or has he been in touch with you? (C)

The President: To tell you the truth, Talabani is closer to Iran, which is one of the things that provoked this. We have not been in contact with them except for the talks in London. We have a representative there with you, do you think we should be in touch with them? (C)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: I think Talabani might criticize this as inadequate. (C)

Prime Minister Major: It is possible he might do that. How do you think the other permanent members of the UN Security Council will react? (C)

The President: I do not know. As you know, I always call you first to get your feeling. Then I will call them and call you back. (C)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: Okay, let us call around and get back with you.  
(C)

Prime Minister Major: I will be at 10 Downing Street all day tomorrow so we can catch up. (C)

The President: Okay. If we agree we can't do nothing, I can't think of anything that would not have more complications than this. (C)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: I will get on it. We are on track and will get back to you. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I look forward to hearing from you on this. God bless. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the  
President and British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the  
President and Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for  
the information of the Secretary of State. It must be  
distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant  
Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in  
London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)  
only. (e)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Telcon

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Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (b)  
Declassify On: 09/09/06

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/1/2019  
2013-0449-17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


November 8, 1996

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-17

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Congratulatory Telephone  
Conversations After the U.S. Presidential Election

The attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations from European leaders are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassies in Ottawa, Bonn, Paris and London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). *let*



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab [A] Memoranda of Telephone Conversations

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 16, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*  
FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*  
SUBJECT: Letter to POTUS from Prime Minister Re: JSTARS

At Tab A Prime Minister John Major responds to the President's October 31 letter requesting support for NATO JSTARS. Tab I summarizes NATO's recent decision on an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system and informs the President of JSTARS' latest deployment to support operations in Bosnia.

Concurrence by: *Sandy Vershbow*  
Sandy Vershbow

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature  
Tab A Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E. O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.95)  
3/6/2019 KBH

7541

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Nov 18

Tony,

Are you comfortable sending  
this memcon to State given  
the reservations PM Major  
expressed on page 3 at the  
top

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

[Redacted]

v/r Fred

Memcon OK to go to State  
& Amb Crowe?

Yes  No

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7541

November 19, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KCM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime  
Minister Major (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime  
Minister Major is provided for the information of the Secretary  
of State. It should be delivered "Eyes Only" for the Secretary.  
It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador  
and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). (S)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 11/15/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0449-M (7.96)  
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Major

Notetakers: Val Martinez, Doug Mueller,  
Katherine O'Loughlin and Wylma  
Robinson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 14, 1996; 1:49 - 2:01 p.m. EST  
The Oval Office

Prime Minister Major: Hi, Bill. (U)

The President: Hi, John. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Have you gotten any rest? (U)

The President: No, not much, but I'm going away tomorrow to Hawaii. Then to Australia for a state visit, a couple of days of work and then play, so I will get a little rest. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I envy you. I have never been to Australia, but Norma has. It is one of her favorite places. Where are you going? (U)

The President: Sydney, the Great Barrier Reef and I don't know where else. I have been so busy on the transition and Zaire, I haven't paid much attention to it. They'll just tell me where to go! (C)

Prime Minister Major: You will be able to sleepwalk through it, and they will be delighted to see you. I can't believe you will have any problems with the Australians. I hope it will be a great success. (C)

The President: I think it will be. How are you doing? (U)

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 11/15/06

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2

Prime Minister Major: I am doing fine. Our Euroskeptics are still playing the silly fools. Opinion polls are turning up, and the economy is doing well. All looking much better. (C)

The President: It looks like we might get real lucky. I saw George Mitchell last night, and he said there was a chance of a break there. Do you think so? (C)

Prime Minister Major: No. Did he really say that? (C)

The President: He gave it a one-in-five chance. (C)

Prime Minister Major: A one-in-five chance, I would agree with that. There has been a lot of talk about a new cease-fire.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: That's good. How do you feel about eastern Zaire? (C)

Prime Minister Major: I am worried about eastern Zaire. We had a meeting yesterday and agreed to send troops there, but there is some uneasiness. I told the cabinet and parliament we are sending troops. The announcement of our readiness to send troops was reasonably well received by parliament. There is no enthusiasm for the task, but an acceptance that hundreds of thousands will die if we don't do something. We wish it was not there, but it is, so we will help. I am absolutely sure no one has any enthusiasm for this. (C)

The President: That's how they feel here. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I worry we have public support that is fragile and what would happen if the operation goes wrong because

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humanitarian aid cannot be delivered or they keep fighting. I am most concerned about two or three things. I am prepared to go and to mirror in Bukavu what you are going to do in Goma. I am perfectly prepared to do that. What we do want is a clear mandate, clear rules of engagement. [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[redacted]

The President: We were trying to figure out a way for the French to play without them making a big stink and avoid negative feelings. (C)

Prime Minister Major: [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[redacted]

The President: We were supposed to have the deputy commander and operations officer to help the Canadians. After Tony gets back from New York today, maybe we should reconnoiter to help make it easier for you. (C)

Prime Minister Major: We shall do it. We will swallow hard and do it. This is a very difficult operation, by any measure. It is not just the Goma and Bukavu airports and the refugee camps.

[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

[redacted] The problem we haven't even remotely addressed in eastern Zaire is east of Kivu. First, there are large jungle areas. Beyond that huge tracts. There are unknown hundreds of thousands of people we are not going to remotely touch under any of the plans being discussed. We will most certainly make a contribution, but there will be an awful lot of lives we won't save. [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: When Tony gets back, I will take it up with him and explore it all. I will stay on top of it for the next few days. (C)

Prime Minister Major: If it's appropriate to talk again, I will be around. (C)

The President: Thank you. (C)

Prime Minister Major: EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), 3.3(b)(9)

The President: We have to get four or five countries. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I don't know what your view of it is, but I don't understand why Germany and Japan are not included. (C)

The President: Me either. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I understand Belgium not wanting to go back to the Congo. (C)

The President: Have Germany and Japan declined? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Japan just avoided giving an answer. Germany said no troops. (C)

The President: I'll see what I can do. (C)

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

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Prime Minister Major: It seems to me Germany is a big nation and they have a big role to play. Congratulations again. Hope you enjoy Australia. (C)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001  
By KBINARA, Date 3/14/2019  
2013-0449-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR *Anthony Lake*  
~~ANDREW D. SENS~~

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: VAL MARTINEZ *VM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with British  
Prime Minister Major

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
with Prime Minister Major which took place on November 14, 1996.

Concurrence by: Mike Sheehan *in ASL VM*

RECOMMENDATION

*authorize Andrew Sens to*  
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of  
Telephone Conversation to the Department of State. *Approved [initials] Disapproved [initials]*  
*rec TL note*

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve *P* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607763  
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 96 13

TO: MAJOR, JOHN MP

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
NATO

ARMS SALES  
HS

PERSONS: LOGAN, DAVID

SUBJECT: LTR TO MAJOR RE ASRAM PROGRAM

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 30 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PETERS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:


DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
PETERS

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY 

DATE

12/12

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA

CLOSED BY: NSLA

DOC

4 OF

4

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By KBM NARA, Date 3/6/2019

2013-0449-M1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 MARTINEZ	Z 96112713	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001	Z 96120417	ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 BELL	Z 96120417	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001	Z 96121111	ACTION TRANSFERRED
001 PETERS	X 96121111	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 96121111	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
003 PRESIDENT	Z 96121112	FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 96121217	PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004 STATE	X 96121217	FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
003	961211		VICE PRESIDENT
003	961211		WH CHIEF OF STAFF
004	961211	STATE	
004	961211	MAJOR, JOHN	

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJOR, JOHN

DOC DATE: 26 NOV 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
NATO

ARMS SALES  
HS

PERSONS: LOGAN, DAVID

SUBJECT: LTR RE ASRAAM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 30 NOV 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MARTINEZ

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

MARTINEZ

*Bell*

FOR CONCURRENCE

SIMON

*Peters*

FOR INFO

BASS  
CLARKE  
FEELEY  
FRIED  
LAKE  
MILLISON  
SCHIFTER  
SCHWARTZ  
SENS  
SODERBERG  
VERSHBOW  
WITKOWSKY

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2009  
By KSHNARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-17

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*Europe*

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: FICKLIN, FRIEDRICH, LEBARON, MILLISON, PARRIS, NODIS

----- CLASS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG:190519Z MAR 97

RESPONSE TO PM MAJOR'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON  
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2013-0449-M (8.02)

3/6/2019 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 050123

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/07

TAGS: PREL, XF, UK

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PM MAJOR'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT ON  
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

1.  EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE  
PRESIDENT TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR ASAP. NO/NO  
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

2.  BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MARCH 14 LETTER ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE  
PROCESS. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT EVOLUTION  
OF EVENTS.

I QUITE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND  
WILL BE DANGEROUS IN THE COMING DAYS. I ADVISED PRIME  
MINISTER NETANYAHU THAT THE DECISION TO PROCEED AT HAR HOMA  
WOULD PUT ARAFAT IN A CORNER BY APPEARING TO PREEMPT  
UNILATERALLY ISSUES RESERVED FOR PERMANENT STATUS TALKS.  
URGED HIM TO RECONSIDER OR DELAY THIS ACTION. NETANYAHU  
FACES GENUINE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE, BUT

PROCEEDING AT HAR HORNA HAS HEIGHTENED THE POTENTIAL FOR  
CONFRONTATION AND UNDERMINE THE VIABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TO EXPRESS  
MY COMMITMENT TO WORKING WITH HIM CLOSELY, NOT ONLY ON  
CURRENT ISSUES, BUT ALSO AS THE PARTIES PROCEED WITH  
PERMANENT STATUS TALKS. HE IS WELL AWARE THAT AN ERUPTION  
OF VIOLENCE WILL BE OF NO BENEFIT TO THE PALESTINIANS, AND  
I APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE TO HIM TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. WE  
HAD A GOOD TALK WHEN HE WAS HERE. WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN  
TO ACCELERATE SPECIFIC ACTIONS BENEFITING PALESTINIANS IN  
THE SHORT-TERM, WHILE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GET ISRAELIS AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PALESTINIANS BACK TO THE TABLE ON PERMANENT STATUS  
NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL NEED TO GET THE PARTIES TO DEAL  
SERIOUSLY WITH ONE ANOTHER IN BOTH AREAS.

WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS MADE A SERIOUS START ON FURTHER  
REDEPLOYMENTS. PALESTINIAN CONTROL WAS EXPANDED  
SUBSTANTIALLY. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR PUBLICLY AND  
PRIVATELY THAT MORE IS NECESSARY IN THE SECOND AND THIRD  
PHASES.

I APPRECIATE YOUR TAKING THE TIME TO OFFER YOUR VIEWS ON  
THIS VOLATILE SITUATION. ALL OF US HAVE A STRONG INTEREST  
IN DOING WHATEVER WE CAN TO PREVENT A CRISIS AND TO HELP  
THE PARTIES WORK THROUGH THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH  
NEGOTIATIONS.  
SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON  
ALBRIGHT  
<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01  
<^SSN> 0123  
<^TOR> 970319003008 M2672451

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3109

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 6, 1997

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Former  
British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and former Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (S)

  
Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify on: 5/5/07

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0449-M (8.04)  
3/4/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Former British Prime Minister  
John Major (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
John Major

Notetakers: Natalie Johnson, Sean Rice and  
David Higgins

DATE, TIME May 3, 1997; 12:22-12:26 p.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: Hi, Bill. How are you? (U)

The President: Fine. I just called to tell you that I was  
thinking about you. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: Well, God bless. Thank you. Life  
is a funny old game, but that's politics. (U)

The President: I finally got asked a question about you and I  
wanted to tell you what I said before it appears in your press.  
I said, "I am looking forward to working with Mr. Blair, and I  
like him very much. The Conservatives had a good long run. I  
have no judgement about what happened domestically because I  
wasn't there and I'm not a British citizen, but the people of  
Great Britain should be very proud of John Major. He represented  
his nation very well in the world. He was patriotic, strong and  
effective." You did good work on Bosnia and Northern Ireland.  
You never got credit for what you did. The British people should  
be proud of what you accomplished. Your party hurt you more than  
you hurt it. (S)

Former Prime Minister Major: Thank you, that's very generous of  
you. I shall miss it, but I'm not broken-hearted. Tony Blair  
will do fine. (S)

The President: Are you going to stay in Parliament? (S)

Former Prime Minister Major: I'm going to stay in Parliament, but I'm not going to stay as party leader. Frankly, it would be sort of odd taking an opposition post. There's nothing left for me to do. I have been in government for 14 years now without a break. Every weekend I'm in the box. It is time for some time off. I will stay in parliament for this term and maybe beyond, but who knows. I may decide at the end of this Parliament, that there are other things I would like to do. I'm at an age when some have not even served in parliament. (U)

The President: I really think that it was your party that let you down, but I think that history has treated you very well. The economy is in great shape. You've turned the economy around. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: Yes. The economy is just booming. Tony will have to go a long way to break it. (U)

The President: I always felt ticked off that your press said we didn't get along and that there was something between me and you, but I always thought we had a good relationship. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: Thanks, Bill that's very generous of you. How is Hillary? (U)

The President: She is fine, and you know our daughter has picked a college, she's going off to Stanford. We will have an empty nest next year. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: I remember when I first saw her, she seemed a little girl. Isn't it astonishing? (U)

The President: Yes. Hillary and I just had some of Chelsea's graduating class over last night, and I was telling Hillary that our little girl is all grown up. I was looking at all these kids, and telling Hillary it seems like just yesterday that we were in high school. Hillary and I will have to figure out what to do with each other after 18 years. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: That happens. (U)

The President: Let me know when you will next be over here. I'd like to stay in touch. I'm a lame duck and I'll be out too in a couple years. Give my best to Norma. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: I will, and Norma says hello to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will tell her. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: I'm going to stay in Parliament, but I'm not going to stay as party leader. Frankly, it would be sort of odd taking an opposition post. There's nothing left for me to do. I have been in government for 14 years now without a break. Every weekend I'm in the box. It is time for some time off. I will stay in Parliament for this term and maybe beyond, but who knows. I may decide at the end of this Parliament, that there are other things I would like to do. I'm at an age when some have not even served in Parliament. (C)

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Former Prime Minister Major: Yes. The economy is just booming. Tony will have to go a long way to break it. (C)

The President: I always felt ticked off that your press said we didn't get along and that there was something between me and you, but I always thought we had a good relationship. (U)

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The President: She is fine, and you know our daughter has picked a college, she's going off to Stanford. We will have an empty nest next year. (U)

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Former Prime Minister Major: That happens. (U)

The President: Let me know when you will next be over here. I'd like to stay in touch. I'm a lame duck and I'll be out too in a couple years. Give my best to Norma. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: I will, and Norma says hello to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will tell her. (U)

Former Prime Minister Major: Thank you and good-bye.

The President: Bye, and God bless.

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By K&M NARA, Date 3/6/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Former  
British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and former Prime Minister John Major of the UK is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (Ø)

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify on: 5/5/07

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 20, 1999

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with Major  
Leaders

The attached memoranda of the telephone conversations between the President and Ehud Barak and Binyamin Netanyahu on May 17, 1999, and with Yasser Arafat and Hosni Mubarak on May 18, 1999 are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. They may also be sent to our embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCS) only. (S)

  
Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Telcon with Ehud Barak
- Tab B Telcon with Binyamin Netanyahu
- Tab C Telcon with Yasser Arafat
- Tab D Telcon with Hosni Mubarak

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER SR  
THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL BR  
FROM: ROB MALLEY RM  
SUBJECT: Telcons with Major Leaders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2009  
By KSM NARA, Date 3/4/2019  
2013-0449-M

Attached are the Memoranda of Telephone Conversations between the President and the following leaders:

- May 17 - Ehud Barak
- May 17 - Binyamin Netanyahu
- May 18 - Yasser Arafat
- May 18 - Hosni Mubarak

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memoranda of Telephone Conversation at Tabs A through D to State.

Approve SR Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve SR Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Telcon with Ehud Barak
- Tab B Telcon with Binyamin Netanyahu
- Tab C Telcon with Yasser Arafat
- Tab D Telcon with Hosni Mubarak