
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

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Those documents released with redactions have been restricted under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) of E.O. 13526.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5-5-97

3092

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

'97 MAY 5 AMB:40

May 3, 1997

ACTION

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *RB*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Europe in May

Purpose

To approve the outline of your May trip to Europe and decide whether to stop in London for a meeting with Tony Blair.

Background

You will be making a short trip to Europe in late May. At this point, you will be departing the evening of Memorial Day, Monday, May 26 and returning Thursday, May 29. This trip will focus largely on European security in the run-up to the Madrid NATO Summit in July.

There are two alternative scenarios for the trip. If we succeed in negotiating a NATO-Russia agreement with Moscow (and we are cautiously optimistic), then the first major event of your trip will be a NATO-Russia Summit May 27 in Paris. A NATO-Russia agreement would be a major step toward achieving your vision of a democratic, undivided and prosperous Europe. The Summit and related events would take virtually all day Tuesday.

For May 28, you have accepted the invitation of the Dutch Government to visit The Hague to participate in the semiannual U.S.-EU Summit and deliver an address commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. We envisage that address as a major speech to the people of Europe linking your vision for Europe's future with the generosity and commitment of the Marshall Plan. The Dutch have invited each of the 52 OSCE countries to send their heads of state or government and two youth leaders to the Marshall event; at this point we expect 40 of those leaders, including Kohl and possibly Yeltsin, to attend. There will not be time for bilateral meetings in the Hague but Queen Beatrix will host a luncheon in your honor for the visiting leaders.

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 5/2/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The third major piece of the trip, subject to your agreement, would be a short stop in London to meet with Tony Blair. A stop in London would be seen by the British public as a compliment to Blair and would set the stage for what we expect to be an extremely productive relationship. We would also recommend that you use an early meeting with Blair to encourage him to try to make progress on Northern Ireland right away, rather than putting it on the back burner. If there is a NATO-Russia Summit May 27 you could stop in London on your way back to Washington May 29; if there is no Summit, you could stop there on your way to The Hague May 27.

I will send you a more detailed description of the themes and goals of the trip closer to the event; at this point I would appreciate your agreement to the outline described above and your decision on London.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the general outline for the trip described above.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you agree to stop in London to see Tony Blair.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID
0-10-97 3996

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

87 JUN 10 - 4:38

June 10, 1997

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBM**

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Your Phone Call with Prime Minister Blair,
June 10, 1997, 2:45 p.m.

My counterpart John Holmes called to ask that you accept a call from Prime Minister Blair this afternoon. Blair wants to give you an update on the British response to the four issues Sinn Fein has said must be settled before they can go to the IRA for a ceasefire. We expect Blair will also ask that you take a tough line on the resumption of violence in Northern Ireland.

In his May 16 speech in Northern Ireland, Blair announced that British officials would meet with Sinn Fein representatives to discuss the prospects for a ceasefire (the first such meetings since the ceasefire was broken in February 1996). There have been two meetings so far. Sinn Fein has said it needs progress on four points: a date for Sinn Fein entry into talks once there is a ceasefire; assurance that the decommissioning issue will not block meaningful negotiations; a timeframe to ensure that negotiations do not go on indefinitely; and confidence-building measures from the British Government. Though Sinn Fein has not said so explicitly, it should already be satisfied on two of those points: the timeframe and confidence-building measures (e.g. the transfer of prisoners, acknowledgment of partial British responsibility for the Great Famine, and Mo Mowlam's comments on reform of police).

Sinn Fein has complained that the British have not yet set a firm date for their entry into talks contingent on a ceasefire, but they understand that the British would be willing to do so.. It is the decommissioning issue that may prove the most intractable. Dublin and London are now working out their differences over how to handle this issue in the Belfast talks, but they will have to sell David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party on whatever plan they agree on. Up to this point, Trimble has remained adamant that decommissioning must start before the talks move into their

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 6/10/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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substantive phase; the governments want to use Mitchell's formula of decommissioning "in parallel" with progress in negotiations.

About 10 days ago, what had looked like a "de facto" IRA ceasefire began to unravel when the IRA abandoned a van full of explosives (reportedly not primed to explode) that was probably on its way to a military site. Today the IRA claimed responsibility for a shooting attack on British troops in which no one was injured.

The British have made clear that they are deeply concerned about the renewal of IRA violence, even if it has not claimed any victims yet. Blair will want your support in condemning this violence and making clear to the IRA that it is counterproductive, as well as wrong.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

Northern Ireland

General points as appropriate:

- As always will do what we can to help.
- Renewal of IRA violence deeply unsettling, coming as Sinn Fein's electoral successes show that they have a future if they pursue the democratic path.
- With your government, election of Ahern, Mitchell in Belfast and my own commitment, IRA has best possible constellation. If they do not grab opportunity, agree that talks must move ahead without them (though without closing door to Sinn Fein participation on basis of a ceasefire.)

If Blair says HMG officials will stop meeting with Sinn Fein:

- Understand that you feel you must do this. IRA violence not only wrong but completely illogical.
- Assume you will continue to seek agreement with Dublin on how to handle decommissioning. Still think you need to put all pieces in place so that there is no excuse for IRA not calling ceasefire.
- Will you stop contacts with Sinn Fein indefinitely?

If Blair asks for strong message condemning IRA violence:

- NSC (Jim Steinberg) already plans to deliver tough message to Adams on resumption of violence in Northern Ireland. (Call will probably take place Thursday).
- *If asked:* Will be happy to have Mike McCurry make public statement condemning renewed violence.
- *If appropriate:* If you are not talking to Sinn Fein directly, we will be happy to pass any other messages you may have.

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If Blair discusses progress on Sinn Fein's four points:

- You have taken number of confidence-building steps -- your moves on prisoners, your comment on the famine (first British acknowledgment of some responsibility), Mo Mowlam's remarks on need for reform of policing. All have made clear your good faith, determination to address all aspects of problem.
- On timeframe, agree that May 1998 expiration of your legislation authorizing the Forum is natural period to assess progress of negotiations.
- Urge you to press ahead with Irish to reach agreement on how to handle decommissioning and how to sell it to Trimble. If there is any chance for ceasefire, will only happen if IRA assured Sinn Fein will not be stuck in talks about decommissioning.
- On date for Sinn Fein entry, have impression this can be worked out as long as talks do not proceed in plenary session without Sinn Fein after an IRA ceasefire.

New Irish Government

- Although new government (led by Bertie Ahern) will not be formally in place until June 26, understand top Irish officials expect to be empowered to act when they meet your officials next week to discuss decommissioning.
- Doubt you will see change in basic Irish positions on peace process. What do you think?

NATO

- Have been considering further which countries to invite to join NATO at Madrid and will be meeting with Congressional leaders tomorrow.
- Will be in touch with you in couple of day to discuss how to bring this issue to closure within Alliance -- if possible, without messy argument with Jacques Chirac.
- *If asked:* Still leaning toward small first group combined with strong "open door" to assure those not selected that process will continue. Will elaborate when we talk again.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SUM2, BASS, BERGER, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, STEINBERG, HOTLINE_IN, PETERS, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG: 111845Z JUN 97

FM: CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO:
THE WHITE HOUSE

////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABO CHANNELS
QQQQ
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

11 JUNE 1997.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND PERSONAL

DEAR BILL

IT WAS GOOD TO TALK TO YOU ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT, PARTICULARLY ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR AGREEING TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH SINN FEIN TO PUT A STOP TO RENEWED IRA VIOLENCE, WHICH COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES JUST AT THE TIME WHEN WE ARE TRYING TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. THE KILLING OF A LOYALIST TERRORIST THIS MORNING FURTHER INCREASES MY FEARS, ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS IS NOT YET CLEAR.

AS YOU KNOW, I WANT TO GET SINN FEIN INTO THE TALKS IF I CAN. WE HAVE HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THEM AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THEM, AND TO SET OUT OUR OWN. I NOW WANT OFFICIALS TO SEND THEM A SHORT PIECE OF PAPER BY THE END OF THIS WEEK, SO THAT THEY CAN BE IN NO DOUBT OF WHERE WE STAND. I ATTACH A COPY OF WHAT WE PROPOSE TO SEND. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TREAT THIS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FOR THE MOMENT. WE MAY WANT TO ARRANGE A FURTHER MEETING OF OFFICIALS WITH SINN FEIN EARLY NEXT WEEK, BUT THAT ITSELF IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY CONTINUING IRA VIOLENCE.

IN ANY CASE I PLAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT OUR POSITION, PROBABLY NEXT WEEK. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN AGAIN OUR POSITION ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, DECOMMISSIONING, AND THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SET OUT THAT WE HAVE IN MIND A PERIOD OF SOME SIX WEEKS TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE. IN OTHER WORDS A CEASEFIRE IN MID-JUNE WOULD LEAD, IF IT WERE SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, TO SINN FEIN'S FORMAL ENTRY INTO THE TALKS BY THE END OF JULY.

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I SHOULD ADD THAT I PROPOSE TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL TALKS GET UNDER WAY IN SEPTEMBER, WHETHER SINN FEIN ARE IN THE TALKS OR NOT. I AM NOT PREPARED TO ALLOW FURTHER DELAY. SO SINN FEIN NEED TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHETHER THEY WANT TO BE PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS OR NOT.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE READY TO SUPPORT FULLY THIS APPROACH. I AM PREPARED TO MAKE A REASONABLE OFFER TO SINN FEIN, DESPITE THE RISKS THIS ENTAILS. I HOPE THEY WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE POSITION OR MY DETERMINATION. I WILL NOT TOLERATE AN APPROACH FROM THEM WHICH CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL BUT REMAINS UNDERPINNED BY VIOLENCE OR THE THREAT OF IT. THEIR CURRENT TWIN-TRACK STRATEGY LEAVES ME GENUINELY ALARMED ABOUT THEIR SINCERITY.

I WANT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS THIS SUMMER AND WILL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS. I KNOW I CAN COUNT ON YOUR INFLUENCE TO HELP ME DO SO.

KINDEST REGARDS TO HILLARY.

YOURS EVER

TONY

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AIDE MEMOIRE

MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN

THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN FEINS. THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON THE POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.

FIRST, SINN FEINS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS. THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN INTO THE TALKS REQUIRES AN UNEQUIVOCAL RESTORATION OF THE IRA CEASEFIRE. NEGOTIATING WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES, OR UNDER THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE, IS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE THE TALKS PROCEED ON AN INCLUSIVE BASIS, AND MOVE ON TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BY SEPTEMBER. IT WANTS TO SEE SINN FEIN PARTICIPATING IN THESE TALKS. SINN FEINS ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF THE GROUND RULES FOR ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS LEGALLY OBLIGED TO ISSUE AN INVITATION TO SINN FEIN WHEN SHE CONSIDERS THOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, HAVING MADE A POLITICAL JUDGEMENT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ROUND.

SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH.

WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE, AND IS SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO A PLENARY SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL 6 PRINCIPLES.

IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CEASEFIRE, WE EXPECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER ADJOURNING THE TALKS. AS WAS SAID BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND THIS GOVERNMENT, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WITH SINN FEIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL AND OTHER MEETINGS IN CASTLE BUILDINGS, INCLUDING BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT CHAIRMEN AND SINN FEIN. SINN FEIN WOULD ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO AN OFFICE IN CASTLE BUILDINGS.

SECOND, TIMEFRAME. BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING, THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE TALKS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND MAY 1998, THE DATE ENVISAGED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY THEN. THERE WILL BE REGULAR REVIEWS OF PROGRESS.

THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR IT SUPPORTS PARALLEL DECOMMISSIONING AS RECOMMENDED BY MITCHELL AND THAT IT WANTS TO RESOLVE THIS RAPIDLY TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT DOES NOT BLOCK THE START OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER. IT IS WORKING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO DO SO. THIS CAN ONLY BE ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT. AS MUTUAL PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS CAN CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.

ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS? A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF THE PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT? AND A REVIEW MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

FOURTH, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES OF THE COMMUNITY, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, EQUITY OF TREATMENT AND PARITY OF ESTEEM. MEASURES ALREADY ANNOUNCED INCLUDE THE INCORPORATION OF THE ECHR INTO DOMESTIC LAW? A REVIEW OF TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE? A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET? A COMMITMENT TO LEGISLATE THIS YEAR ON THE NORTH REPORT? AND A COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT PROPOSALS TO DEVELOP A POLICING SERVICE CAPABLE OF SECURING THE SUPPORT OF THE WHOLE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING A MORE INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS SYSTEM.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS OF COURSE A TWO WAY STREET. A GENUINE AND LASTING ABANDONMENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD DO MORE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE ACROSS THE COMMUNITY THAN ANY OTHER STEP. OTHER PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY SUCH AS INTIMIDATION THROUGH SO-CALLED PUNISHMENT ATTACKS SHOULD ALSO STOP, ON ALL SIDES. THIS WOULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY-FORCE DEPLOYMENTS.

SINN FEIN CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS NOTE ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.

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<^SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN> 0001

<^TOR> 970611162018 M2800269

FROM:
SITREPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: COQ, PETERS, SUM2, VERSHBOW, NSC, BASS, BERGER, BRADEN, BROWN, DAVIES, FUERTH, HELWEG, KERRICK, SIT{C2}, SODERBERG, STEINBERG, TRIP

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:132145Z JUN 97

FM: CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO: WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

////////CORRECTED COPY////////

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QQQQ

MESSAGE FROM JOHN HOLMES
TO SANDY BERGER

DEAR SANDY

I WAS GRATEFUL THAT YOUR PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO RESPOND SO QUICKLY TO THE DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH WE SENT TO YOU UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT. WE HAVE TRIED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS YOU AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE. I NOW ENCLOSE A REVISED VERSION OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, WHICH WE ARE PASSING TO SINN FEIN THIS EVENING.

YOURS EVER
JOHN HOLMES

BEGINS

AIDE MEMOIRE

THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING ON 21 AND 28 MAY WAS TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION OR OF SINN FEINS. THIS NOTE SETS OUT THE GOVERNMENTS POSITION, IN PARTICULAR ON THE POINTS RAISED BY SINN FEIN.

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SOME TIME WILL BE NEEDED TO ASSESS A CEASEFIRE TO SEE THAT WORDS AND DEEDS ARE MATCHING BEFORE SUCH A JUDGEMENT CAN BE MADE. THIS PERIOD SHOULD BE USED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEEDS OF ALL

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PARTIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AN OPEN-ENDED TIME PERIOD GIVES RISE TO ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH. WE ARE PREPARED THEREFORE TO REMOVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY SAYING THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS SOME 6 WEEKS. IF AN UNEQUIVOCAL CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE BY MID-JUNE, AND IS SATISFACTORY IN WORD AND DEED, SINN FEIN WOULD BE INVITED TO A PLENARY SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF JULY. THAT WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SINN FEIN TO MAKE CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO THE MITCHELL 6 PRINCIPLES.

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THIRD, DECOMMISSIONING. THE TALKS PARTICIPANTS ARE CURRENTLY ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF DECOMMISSIONING. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WANTS TO RESOLVE THIS RAPIDLY TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS SO THAT IT DOES NOT BLOCK THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. REALISTICALLY, THIS CAN ONLY BE ON THE BASIS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT. IT IS WORKING WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SECURE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THIS BASIS. AS MUTUAL PROGRESS IS MADE ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND DECOMMISSIONING, THIS CAN CREATE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.

ANY AGREEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING SEEMS LIKELY TO INCLUDE A COMMITMENT BY EACH PARTICIPANT TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, TO BE ESTABLISHED IN PARALLEL WITH THE LAUNCH OF SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS; A DEDICATED COMMITTEE OF THE PLENARY TO ADVANCE ALL ASPECTS OF THE MITCHELL REPORT; AND A REVIEW MECHANISM FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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IMAGINATIVELY IN AREAS SUCH AS SECURITY FORCE DEPLOYMENTS, AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT.

SINN FEINS CONCERNS WERE SET OUT IN ITS PAPER OF 10 OCTOBER. THIS NOTE ANSWERS THOSE CONCERNS FULLY. AN IMMEDIATE AND UNEQUIVOCAL IRA CEASEFIRE IS NOW NEEDED TO ENABLE SINN FEIN TO ENTER THE TALKS AS SET OUT ABOVE. IF SINN FEIN DO NOT ENTER THE TALKS, THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN FORWARD IN SEPTEMBER IN ANY EVENT.

ENDS
#0001

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>0001
<^TOR>970613201812 M2804944

FROM:
Alexander R. Vershbow/National Security Council

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

June 16, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW /*AV*

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS /*MAP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Northern
Ireland/Reply to Prime Minister Blair

As you recall, Prime Minister Blair sent the President a message last week covering the original text of the British offer to Sinn Fein on Sinn Fein's entry into the peace talks if an unequivocal cease-fire is declared. We had intended to send a Presidential reply later this week, following Jim's planned conversation with Adams to get Sinn Fein's initial reaction to the British offer. In light of the IRA murders today, Jim did not talk to Adams. However, a Presidential letter is needed in any event to express sympathy on the loss of the policemen. We recommend using the letter also to make clear that we think the offer is a good one and to pass on a message Mary Ann got from Sinn Fein today.

The local Friends of Sinn Fein representative, Mairead Keane, called Mary Ann with a message from Adams. He said to tell us that he will not be distracted by the IRA attack from the task of getting the political process going and that we should read nothing into the attack beyond the IRA's ongoing campaign. Adams said Sinn Fein had received the British offer Friday and Sinn Fein (read IRA) are studying it; though there remains a problem with decommissioning, the draft contains positive elements. If it would be useful, Adams said, he is ready to talk to Jim about this. The bottom line appears to be that today's attack was not intended as a response to the British offer.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Statement on Murders in Northern Ireland
- Tab C Final Text of British Offer to Sinn Fein
- Tab D Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Blair on Northern Ireland

Purpose

To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who were murdered by the IRA June 16 and to pass on a message from Sinn Fein.

Background

On June 16, two policemen walking a beat were shot and killed in the Northern Ireland town of Lurgan. The IRA claimed responsibility for the attack within hours. Blair and Bruton (who is still Taoiseach until June 26) were both in Amsterdam for the EU Summit; both issued strong statements condemning the murders. Future Taoiseach Bertie Ahern issued a passionate statement, clearly intended to disabuse republicans of the notion that a Fianna Fail prime minister will be soft on violence. Senator Kennedy issued his strongest denunciation yet of the republican tactic of seeking to combine violence with the democratic process. The statement we issued in your name is at Tab B.

The British government had passed to Sinn Fein on June 13 its offer for Sinn Fein entry into the Belfast talks on the basis of an unequivocal cease-fire. The text (Tab C) reflected suggestions from us and from the Irish government. Assuming that the British and Irish governments can reach a more specific agreement on how to handle decommissioning in the talks process, this is the best offer Sinn Fein can expect from the British. It would allow them into talks within 6 weeks of the declaration of a meaningful cease-fire; it states that decommissioning will not be allowed to delay substantive negotiations; promises additional confidence-building measures; and sets May 1998 as the notional timeframe for completion of negotiations.

We have no indication that the British are going to withdraw the offer in the wake of the murders, though Blair did announce that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 6/16/07

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2013 - 0472 - M
8/6/15 KBH

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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the British have called off the meeting with Sinn Fein scheduled for this week. Blair will also probably postpone the public announcement of the elements of the offer.

We will be working on a strategy to get to a cease-fire on the basis of the British offer in spite of the murders of the policemen. Publicly, we will want to take a high profile to underscore your continued personal commitment to the process, particularly as the worst of the marching season approaches in early July.

Jim Steinberg had planned to talk to Gerry Adams today to get his initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business of getting a political process going and that we should read nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA campaign. We believe the purpose of the message was to tell us that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer. The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair know that we heard this from Adams.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Blair at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Statement on Murders in Northern Ireland
- Tab C Text of British Offer to Sinn Fein
- Tab D Incoming Message

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR TONY:

LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ~~YOU HAVE MY SINCERE SYMPATHY AND HILLARY'S.~~ OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.

I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT.

I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN. ~~PRIOR TO THE ATROCITY ON MONDAY, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JIM STEINBERG, HAD INTENDED TO TALK TO ADAMS AND TELL HIM THAT WE BELIEVE YOUR OFFER IS FORTHCOMING AND SERIOUS AND THAT THE IRA SHOULD ACT ON IT WITHOUT DELAY. BECAUSE OF THE MURDERS, JIM DID NOT GET IN TOUCH WITH ADAMS,~~ Following our phone call, my Deputy National Security Advisor, Jim Steinberg, contacted Adams to pass on my deep concern about the continued violence, and to urge a forthcoming response to your efforts. We had planned to follow up on Monday, but put off the call following the murders. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF IT WAS THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE READ INTO THE ATTACK BEYOND THE WHICH WAS THAT the attack was not in response to your proposal, but rather a CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN. WE TAKE THAT TO MEAN THAT SINN FEIN DOES NOT WANT THE MURDERS TO BE SEEN AS THE REPUBLICANS' RESPONSE TO YOUR OFFER. WHILE I AM NOT REPOSING ANY CONFIDENCE IN THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.

SANDY BERGER AND JIM STEINBERG ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE.

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2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Blair on Northern Ireland

Purpose

To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who were murdered by the IRA June 16 and to pass on a message from Sinn Fein.

Background

On June 16, two policemen walking a beat were shot and killed in the Northern Ireland town of Lurgan. The IRA claimed responsibility for the attack within hours. Blair and Bruton (who is still Taoiseach until June 26) were both in Amsterdam for the EU Summit; both issued strong statements condemning the murders. Future Taoiseach Bertie Ahern issued a passionate statement, clearly intended to disabuse republicans of the notion that a Fianna Fail prime minister will be soft on violence. Senator Kennedy issued his strongest denunciation yet of the republican tactic of seeking to combine violence with the democratic process. The statement we issued in your name is at Tab B.

Following up on Blair's request to you, Jim Steinberg made clear to Adams last week your concern that the violence in Northern Ireland was threatening the prospects for getting Sinn Fein into talks. We also issued a statement by the press secretary warning against violence at this juncture. While the attack was probably planned well before our message was given, nonetheless the IRA carried out the murder of the policemen in the face of clear warnings from the British and from us.

The British Government had passed to Sinn Fein on June 13 its offer for Sinn Fein entry into the Belfast talks on the basis of an unequivocal cease-fire. The text (Tab C) reflected suggestions from us and from the Irish Government. Assuming that the British and Irish governments can reach a more specific agreement on how to handle decommissioning in the talks process,

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Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 6/16/07

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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We have no indication that the British are going to withdraw the offer in the wake of the murders, though Blair did announce that the British have called off the meeting with Sinn Fein scheduled for this week. Blair will also probably postpone the public announcement of the elements of the offer.

There are no attractive choices in the wake of the murders: if the British withdraw their offer, violence ~~could~~will return to the levels of the "The Troubles" with little prospect of a political solution~~ing~~ for several years. Nonetheless, the British have made clear that if no ceasefire is declared in the reasonably near future (perhaps by this fall) they will try to move the peace process forward without Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, ~~t~~The only alternative is to continue to try to put together a deal for a cease-fire. Assuming the British leave their offer on the table, we will be working on a strategy to support them and the Irish at this crucial time. Publicly~~time. Publicly~~, we will want to take a high profile to underscore your continued personal opposition to violence and commitment to peace and reconciliation, particularly as the worst of the marching season approaches in early July.

Jim Steinberg had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business of getting a political process going and that we should read nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA campaign. We believe the purpose of the message was to tell us that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer. The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair know that we heard this from Adams.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Blair at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Statement on Murders in Northern Ireland
- Tab C Text of British Offer to Sinn Fein
- Tab D Incoming Message

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION *SB*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Blair on Northern Ireland

Purpose

To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who were murdered by the IRA June 16 and to pass on a message from Sinn Fein.

Background

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Following up on Blair's request to you, Jim Steinberg made clear to Adams last week your concern that the violence in Northern Ireland was threatening the prospects for getting Sinn Fein into talks. We also issued a statement by the press secretary warning against violence at this juncture. While the attack was probably planned well before our message was given, nonetheless the IRA carried out the murder of the policemen in the face of clear warnings from the British and from us.

The British Government had passed to Sinn Fein on June 13 its offer for Sinn Fein entry into the Belfast talks on the basis of an unequivocal ceasefire. The text (Tab C) reflected suggestions from us and from the Irish Government. Assuming that the British and Irish governments can reach a more specific agreement on how

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On: 6/16/07

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBM

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

to handle decommissioning in the talks process, this is the best offer Sinn Fein can expect from the British. It would allow them into talks within six weeks of the declaration of a meaningful ceasefire; it states that decommissioning will not be allowed to delay substantive negotiations; promises additional confidence-building measures; and sets May 1998 as the notional timeframe for completion of negotiations.

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(see probably September)

Jim Steinberg had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business of getting a political process going and that we should read nothing into the attack beyond the continuation of the IRA campaign; ~~We believe~~ the purpose of the message was to tell us that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer. The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair know that we heard this from Adams. *See over*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Blair at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attached at Tab A is the reply to Blair message that I authorized on your behalf.

but a continuation of the ongoing campaign against the British!

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Statement on Murders in Northern Ireland
- Tab C Text of British Offer to Sinn Fein
- Tab D Incoming Message


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

97 JUN 17 10:12

June 17, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER 

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Blair on Northern Ireland

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

Purpose

To express condolences on the deaths of the two policemen who were murdered by the IRA June 16 and to pass on a message from Sinn Fein.

Background

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 6/16/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

to handle decommissioning in the talks process, this is the best offer Sinn Fein can expect from the British. It would allow them into talks within six weeks of the declaration of a meaningful ceasefire; it states that decommissioning will not be allowed to delay substantive negotiations; promises additional confidence-building measures; and sets May 1998 as the notional timeframe for completion of negotiations.

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There are no attractive choices in the wake of the murders: if the British withdraw their offer, violence could return to the levels of the "The Troubles" with little prospect of a political solution for several years. Nonetheless, the British have made clear that if no ceasefire is declared in the reasonably near future they will try to move the peace process forward without Sinn Fein (probably in September). Meanwhile, the only alternative is to continue to try to put together a deal for a ceasefire. Assuming the British leave their offer on the table, we will be working on a strategy to support them and the Irish at this crucial time. Publicly, we will want to take a high profile to underscore your continued personal opposition to violence and commitment to peace and reconciliation, particularly as the worst of the marching season approaches in early July.

Jim had planned to talk to Adams June 16 to get his initial reaction to the British offer, but did not do so because of the murders. However, the local Sinn Fein representative did call an NSC staff member with a message from Adams that he does not intend to be "distracted" by today's attack from the business of getting a political process going and that we should read nothing into the attack; the purpose of the message was to tell us that the attack is not any kind of response to the British offer, but a continuation of the ongoing campaign against the British. The British already realize this, as they know that such attacks are planned well in advance, but we recommend that you let Blair know what we heard from Adams. Adams' message is, of course, disingenuous since Monday's attack could presumably have been called off if the IRA leadership had wanted to do so. From the republicans' warped perspective, the violence will continue unless an actual deal is reached on a ceasefire. They may also be under the mistaken impression that continued violence will soften the British position.

Attached at Tab A is the reply to Blair's message that I authorized on your behalf.

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Statement on Murders in Northern Ireland
- Tab C Text of British Offer to Sinn Fein
- Tab D Incoming Message

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: CABINET OFFICE LONDON
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR TONY:

LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND. OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.

I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU, JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ALSO ISSUED A VERY FORCEFUL STATEMENT. SINN FEIN CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT.

I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER LAST WEEK FORWARDING THE DRAFT TEXT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S OFFER TO SINN FEIN. FOLLOWING OUR PHONE CALL, MY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JIM STEINBERG, CONTACTED ADAMS TO PASS ON MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, AND TO URGE A FORTHCOMING RESPONSE TO YOUR EFFORTS. WE HAD PLANNED TO FOLLOW UP ON MONDAY, BUT PUT OFF THE CALL FOLLOWING THE MURDERS. BUT SINN FEIN PASSED A MESSAGE TO US; THE ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT THE ATTACK WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER A CONTINUATION OF THE IRA'S CAMPAIGN. WHILE I DO NOT PLACE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR GOOD FAITH, I WANTED TO PASS THAT ON TO YOU.

SANDY BERGER IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOUR OFFICIALS AND WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOUR THERE.

SINCERELY,

BILL

(END TEXT)

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BASS BERGER BRADEN COMM DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG

SIT: COQ FICKLIN FRIEDRICH MILLISON PETERS SUM2 VERSHBOW

SIT: NSC

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 172336Z JUN 97

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR TONY:

LIKE YOU, I AM OUTRAGED AND DEEPLY SADDENED BY THE IRA'S
VICIOUS MURDER OF THE TWO POLICEMEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
OUR HEARTS GO OUT TO THEIR YOUNG FAMILIES.

I ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT THAT WAS IN STEP WITH WHAT YOU,
JOHN BRUTON AND BERTIE AHERN ARE ALL SAYING. SENATOR
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CANNOT MISS THE MESSAGE BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT
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PEACE PROCESS ON TRACK IN SPITE OF THIS TERRIBLE CRIME. WE WILL
HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK PERSONALLY IN DENVER. I LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE.

SINCERELY,

BILL

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 July 1997

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8/6/15 KBH

Dear Bill,

When we spoke on the telephone on Sunday, I promised to send you some more specific thoughts on Northern Ireland and areas where you may be able to help.

As we agreed, the renewed IRA ceasefire offers a new opportunity to move to a lasting political settlement and the lasting peace which the people of Northern Ireland are so desperate to see. Halting violence is a very welcome move by the republicans. As the word suggests, a ceasefire is not of course the same as peace. We must all work very hard to turn what may be currently no more than a tactical move by the republican movement into a permanent abandonment of violence and commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. Nothing else will do in the end. This means keeping up the pressure on Sinn Fein to move away from a twin-track strategy of politics and violence to politics alone. Your influence may be very important here. I hope your response to Sinn Fein over the next few months will be carefully graduated to reflect real progress in consolidating the ceasefire and making it permanent.

It is the issue of permanence which gives the vexed question of the decommissioning of illegally held arms its importance, particularly in Unionist

eyes but also in our own. Of course decommissioned arms could be replaced, even if the decommissioning process were complete. But readiness to decommission implies readiness to give up violence. That is why Sinn Fein statements that the IRA will not give up a single weapon cause such disquiet, and are so unhelpful in terms of keeping the Ulster Unionists tied in to the multi-party process.

We spoke about how you might be able to help influence David Trimble. As I said, I think it is useful if the Administration keeps in close touch with him, to show that his effort to stay in the process is both important and appreciated, and to reinforce that you are even-handed in dealings with both communities (the Unionists will obviously be watching your contacts with Sinn Fein very closely). Anything you can say to show understanding of the Ulster Unionist concerns about decommissioning would also be helpful. I hope that we and the Irish Government may be able to say a little more in due course about our own desire to see at least some actual decommissioning during negotiations, in accordance with George Mitchell's proposals. This may be very important in influencing David Trimble towards staying in the talks.

I also mentioned to you my desire to do more to harness the strong desire of the people of Northern Ireland for a settlement, by showing them that this is now a real prospect with high-level international support. You may be able to play a key role in this at the right moment, when substantive talks are well under way. I hope we can be in touch about this in the autumn.

I am absolutely determined to make progress soon on the substance of the Northern Ireland issue. That is why I have set a timetable of September-May for a settlement to come out of negotiations. This is an arbitrary target, but I believe it can be achieved if all concerned are prepared to put aside old enmities and prejudices. Our aim must be to create conditions where they can most easily do so.

It was great to talk to you
& let us keep in touch

Yours truly
/m



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 October 1997

Dear Sir,

I am pleased to say that in the past couple of weeks we have made progress in Northern Ireland. As you will have heard, Sinn Fein have joined the talks and sworn their commitment to the Mitchell principles; we have kept the Ulster Unionists in play – though only just; we succeeded in finding a procedural way through the decommissioning problem for now and ultimately got agreement to move, at last, into the substantive talks.

This is all good news. Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionists and one of the other smaller Unionist parties have withdrawn from the discussions but otherwise the pieces are now in place for us to press on with the real negotiations. As always, part of the credit must go to George Mitchell and the other independent chairmen who have skilfully helped to guide the parties round the obstacles.

I also want you to know how grateful I am to you for providing Ambassador Donald Johns on as a member of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, which was formally established on 24 September, and to Ambassador Johnson for agreeing to take on this challenging role. The Commission is now ready to commence work on decommissioning alongside the substantive negotiations. It marks an important

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- 2 -

step in our objective to bring about an enduring political settlement in Northern Ireland by May next year. As before, we have found we can rely on you to give generous and speedy assistance. I am most grateful.

Both communities will need constant encouragement to make the most of the opportunity so painstakingly created. I know I can look to you for help over this. I look forward to staying in close touch.

*Yours truly,
-
Bill*

The President of the United States of America

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5707 REDO 4

October 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Tony Blair, Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom

The President and Blair have kept in regular touch on Northern Ireland and other issues. There have been very significant developments in Belfast, the subject of a Blair letter to the President dated October 2. Prior to that, the President called the Prime Minister September 1. Earlier, Blair wrote to the President following their phone conversation July 27 conveying his thoughts on the Northern Ireland peace process, asking that we find ways to support the Unionists. It would be appropriate, now that the talks are due to start and Trimble will see the President and you October 7, for the President to send a congratulatory letter. Attached at Tab I for your approval is your memorandum to the President forwarding a draft message to Prime Minister Blair in both signed original (Tab A) and cable format (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Cable version of letter to Prime Minister Blair
Tab C Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5d

Declassify On: 09/30/07

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2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to British Prime Minister Tony Blair

Purpose

To congratulate Prime Minister Blair on recent developments in Northern Ireland.

Background

You spoke with Blair October 9 briefly on Northern Ireland. Blair wrote you October 2 with an update. With the substantive talks underway, it is worth congratulating Blair for the breakthroughs in Belfast which have made this possible. Earlier in the summer he conveyed his impressions on the process (letter attached at Tab C), and asked that you look for ways to support David Trimble, who you did October 7. Attached at Tab A is your letter on these developments.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Tony Blair at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Cable Version of Letter to Prime Minister Blair
Tab C Incoming correspondence

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8/6/15 KBH

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Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 9/30/07

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT
SOBERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: BANDLER FICKLIN POOLE RIEDEL SUM2
SIT: HOTLINE_IN

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 082245Z NOV 97

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE
INFO ////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M

8/6/15 KBH

FM THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

ONCE MORE, WE FACE A TEST OF OUR RESOLVE OVER IRAQ AND THE DANGERS POSED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. I KNOW THIS WILL BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO YOU, AS IT IS TO ME.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, AS IN THE PAST, WE MUST STAND ABSOLUTELY FIRM AND ABSOLUTELY TOGETHER. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN ACHIEVE THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF UNSCOM RESUMING ITS OPERATIONS AND COMPLETING ITS WORK IN AN UNFETTERED WAY. CLEARLY OUR PREFERENCE MUST BE FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IF ONE CAN BE FOUND. EQUALLY, IN THE LAST RESORT, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE OTHER MEANS.

WE WILL FACE A SIGNIFICANT TEST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND PARTICULARLY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM. BUT WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THIS MESSAGE IS ROBUST ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT, WHILE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EVENTUAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE UNSCOM HAS FULLY AND SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED ITS TASK. THAT WILL NOT BE AN EASY BALANCE TO STRIKE, GIVEN THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME TO CONTEMPLATE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST IRAQ.

I AM PARTICULARLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS FOLLOWING MY DISCUSSIONS AT THE END OF LAST WEEK WITH JACQUES CHIRAC. AS YOU WILL KNOW, HE HAS STRONG PERSONAL DOUBTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. SO WE WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY HARD TO KEEP THE FRENCH WITH US, NOT TO MENTION THE RUSSIANS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MUST BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THEM, AS FAR AS WE CAN, TO ENSURE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US BECAUSE OF ALLEGED LACK OF CONSULTATION.

I KNOW OUR PEOPLE ARE IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT ALL THIS ALREADY, BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW PERSONALLY THE STRENGTH OF MY SUPPORT FOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

YOU IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. I WILL BE MAKING THIS VERY CLEAR IN A
SPEECH ON MONDAY. IF WE NEED TO TALK BEFORE THEN, I WILL OF COURSE
BE HAPPY TO DO SO.

#0001

NNNN

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>0001

<MSGID> M3016124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Conf
 Points for ~~Presidential~~ ² call to (PM) Tony Blair
~~11/14/97~~ *spillout*

- Appreciate very much the message you sent me earlier this week. We share views on the threat Iraq poses with its latest attempt to undermine UNSCOM, and how resolute we must be. Firmness is essential.
- Iraq's latest demand is a very serious challenge to the UN, the UN Security Council, and the security of the Persian Gulf.
- Since Saddam challenged us on October 29, we have tried to work through diplomatic means to respond. Your and my countries' successful efforts in New York yesterday ^{resulted in} ~~got us~~ a clear statement from the Council about the need for Iraq to step back.
- Saddam's announcement today to expel the Americans is a clear repudiation of the Security Council's will. We support Ambassador Butler's decision to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq.
- We will continue to seek diplomatic means to turn back Iraq's challenge. Secretary Albright will be in London tomorrow, and she will lay out to Robin Cooke our ideas on how to move forward together on this challenge, and how to work together with the French and Russians.
- Tony, I have real concerns that diplomacy will not be sufficient. I will need you to join with me should we need to use military force.
- Once the UNSCOM staffers are out of Iraq tomorrow, I plan to announce the increase of U.S. military assets in the Gulf region. In particular, this means movement of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington to the Gulf.
- We remain committed to flying the U-2 flight in support UNSCOM this weekend, and periodically thereafter.
- I want us to consult closely during this period. As ever, I take strength from the close working relationship we have. I know that I can count on you.

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 2013-0472-M
 8/6/15 KBM

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 Reason: I.S. (d)
 Declassify on: 11/13/07
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

'97 NOV 14 PM6:35

November 14, 1997

TELEPHONE CALL TO
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: Friday, November 14, 1997
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER (K) *for*

I. PURPOSE

Place phone call to British Prime Minister Blair to respond to his November 8 letter (Tab B) on the Iraq challenge, to advise him of our deployment of additional forces to the Persian Gulf and to ask that he be with us as we move forward.

II. BACKGROUND

Blair's letter was written before the UN Security Council resolution was passed, and prior to Thursday's demand that UNSCOM remove all Americans immediately. As in past confrontations with Iraq, the British have been both resolute and desirous of full consultation. You'll want to explain our planned movement of the USS George Washington to the region, and press for his support if and when we need to build the case for use of force. You can commit to closest consultations as this crisis unfolds.

- Attachments
- Tab A Points to be Made
 - Tab B Incoming Cable

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2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/13/07

Points for Call to Prime Minister Tony Blair

- Appreciate very much the message you sent me earlier this week. We share views on the threat Iraq poses with its latest attempt to undermine UNSCOM, and how resolute we must be.
- Firmness is essential. Know that Madeleine made these points to Robin Cook.
- Iraq's latest demand is a very serious challenge to the UN, the UN Security Council, and the security of the Persian Gulf.
- Since Saddam challenged us on October 29, we have tried to work through diplomatic means to respond. Your and my countries' successful efforts in New York on the resolution and on the Presidential statement produced clear statements from the Council about the need for Iraq to step back.
- Saddam's expulsion of the Americans is a clear repudiation of the Security Council's will. We support Ambassador Butler's decision to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq.
- Madeleine laid out to Robin Cook our diplomatic strategy.
 - First, maintain UNSC unity.
 - Second, press French and Russians to use all of their leverage to get Iraq to comply; if they fail, challenge them to join us in ratcheting up pressure.
 - Finally, your and my governments should discuss quietly some creative means to give Iraq some "light at the end of the tunnel" that gets UNSCOM back operating and continues our ability to contain Iraq.
- Tony, I have real concerns that diplomacy will not be sufficient. I will need you to join with me should we need to use military force.
- I announced yesterday the movement of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington to the region. I may announce further force movements as necessary. Know you have started moving HMS Invincible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 11/13/07

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

- We remain committed to flying the U-2 flight in support of UNSCOM this weekend, and periodically thereafter.
- I want us to consult closely during this period. As ever, I take strength from the close working relationship we have. I know that I can count on you.

If Asked:


- Q. Don't we need finding of "material breach" to conduct military operations?
- A. If we can get Council on board that would be excellent. But we may not be able to. Shouldn't let that stop us from taking necessary action.

Our lawyers and yours are consulting on how to handle.

Iraq-Potus-Blair-11-14

Helweg, M. Diana

File



From: Courtney, William H.
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 1997 8:50 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia
Subject: FW: Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin [CONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High

FOR SANDY AND JIM FROM BILL

Embassy Moscow just called to say that a few minutes ago Yeltsin foreign policy aide Prihodkho had informed them Yeltsin would call the President on Iraq. The call would most likely take place tomorrow, but timing was unclear. We'll work with NESASIA on contingency talking points.

The President's doing a short note of the kind proposed below is now less urgent, but it would still be a good gesture, especially if we could get it out today.

-----Original Message-----

From: Courtney, William H.
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 1997 8:34 AM
To: Malley, Robert; Helweg, M. Diana
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject: Proposed POTUS Note to Yeltsin [CONFIDENTIAL]
Importance: High

Now might be a good time for the President to write a short note to Yeltsin offering appropriate praise for Russia's effort on Iraq, for CWC ratification and Yeltsin's China visit, and for the appointment yesterday of the new, reformist economics minister, which will could help maintain international confidence in Russian economic policy.

In his call on Sandy two weeks ago, Jim Collins suggested occasional handwritten notes to Yeltsin to bolster his confidence and augur relations. Sandy agreed.

I would be grateful if you could run this proposal for a note by Sandy and Jim to see if they concur. Thanks.

*SRB -
Jim thinks
"not now." wait
to see on Iraq
issue and on
APEC issue.
mdh*

Pursue Note to Yeltsin?

yes _____

no _____

disagree Ⓝ

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PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH**

*- Chirac
- Yeltsin
- Blair*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PREC: IMMEDIATE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR TONY:

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THE RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO TO JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM. MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE READOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.

WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW. IRAQ HAS ^{see} PROMISED TO COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NEED TO TEST THAT COOPERATION ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR. WE SHOULD EXPECT AN END TO IRAQ'S ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAMPER UNSCOM INSPECTIONS, AS WELL AS A CESSATION OF IRAQI THREATS AGAINST U-2 FLIGHTS.

I SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE. ~~I PROPOSE THAT OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WORK TOGETHER TO BRING THIS ABOUT QUICKLY.~~ THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ DESERVE OUR HELP.

I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, MY BELIEF THAT THE LAST CHAPTER OF THIS STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL NEED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM PLEASED THAT STRONGLY DETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY HIGHLY CREDIBLE FORCE, APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0472-M

8/6/15 KBH

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT
SODERBERG STEINBERG

SIT: COQ FICKLIN MARTY POOLE RIEDEL SUM2 + *Beutler Baudler*

SIT: NSC

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 221819Z NOV 97

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

1. AMBASSADOR OR DCM: PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA5482 ~~SECRET~~

DEAR TONY:

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE
THE RECENT CRISIS WITH UNSCOM, AND WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS REGARDING IRAQ. I WILL BE WRITING TO
JACQUES AND BORIS AS WELL. WE WORKED TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY
TO ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVERSE ITS EFFORT TO WEAKEN UNSCOM.
MADELEINE GAVE ME A POSITIVE READOUT ON THE GENEVA MEETING.

WE NEED TO KEEP TOGETHER NOW. IRAQ HAS PROMISED TO
COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM FULLY, AND WE NEED TO SEE THAT
COOPERATION ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR. WE SHOULD EXPECT
AN END TO IRAQ'S ATTEMPTS TO HARASS AND HAMPER UNSCOM
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~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA5482 ~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER OF THIS STORY HAS NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN. WE WILL STILL NEED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. THAT SAID, I AM PLEASED THAT STRONGLY DETERMINED DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY HIGHLY CREDIBLE FORCE, APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED US TOWARD A PEACEFUL AND PRINCIPLED RESOLUTION OF THIS LATEST CRISIS.

SINCERELY,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON

END TEXT.

<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>5482
<MSGID> M3038215



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 February 1998

Dear Bill,

I am writing to mention one matter I did not have the chance to raise with you during my visit to Washington.

I have recently learnt that the Kuwaitis may be on the point of selecting a system to meet their requirement for self-propelled artillery, even though they have given assurances that they would hold an open competition first. I understand that the only real contenders in any such competition would be your M109 and our AS90. There are obviously arguments in favour of both. Nevertheless, I strongly believe that the AS90 would be much better for the Kuwaitis. I therefore hope that they will not be rushed into a decision and that the two systems will be allowed to compete on equal terms.

yours ever
Tony

The President of the United States of America

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Blair

Purpose

To respond to a letter from British Prime Minister Blair.

Background

the sale of a self-propelled artillery system to Kuwait.
 Tony Blair wrote you a ~~letter dated February 18,~~ but not delivered until ~~March 4,~~ ^{to Blair} alerting us ^{of} to his interest in competing for a ~~weapons systems sale to Kuwait.~~ We have ^{The United States is} practically locked up this sale for a self-propelled artillery system. Your response acknowledges the British interest and notes that it is up to the Kuwaitis to decide which system is better for them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

March 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER *DB*

FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER *(L)*

SUBJECT: Blair Letter to President on Kuwait Artillery Sale

Prime Minister Blair sent a letter to the President, dated February 18 but not delivered until March 4, regarding competition to sell a self-propelled artillery system to Kuwait. We have locked-up this contract for our superior Paladin system. The Blair letter appears to be a pro forma appeal on behalf of the competing British system. Given that this is a done deal for us, there is little point in the President replying in writing to Blair. Instead, we propose that the President respond to this letter the next time he and Blair speak on the Middle East; NESA would prepare a talking point.

Concurrence by: *(L)* Joe Marty and *(S)* Steve Simon

RECOMMENDATION

That the President use his next call with Prime Minister Blair to respond to the letter.

Approve _____ Disapprove *JS*

*short note
"up to the King
to send S."*

Attachment
Tab A Incoming correspondence

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1617 redo

March 26, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD BANDLER (L)
FROM: LAWRENCE E. BUTLER
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to UK Prime Minister Blair on
Kuwait Artillery Sale

As a postscript to his official visit here February 5-7, Prime Minister Blair wrote the President with a pro forma appeal for us to pull back from closing an arms sale to Kuwait. Your memorandum covering the President's reply is at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Joe Marty and Steve Simon

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to PM Blair
Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1998


Dear Tony:

Thank you for your note on the Kuwaiti self-propelled artillery system sale. I can appreciate your keen interest in this issue.

I am sure that the U.K. and U.S. systems both have strong merits and that the Kuwaitis will face a difficult decision. I know you agree that, in the end, it will be up to the Kuwaiti government to decide which system best suits their needs.

Again, thanks for your note. I hope to talk with you soon.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

98 MAY 8 11:49

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1998

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2013-0472-M

8/6/15 KBM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER SUBJECT: Your call to British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
Friday, May 8, 1998, time TBD.

Tony Blair has asked to speak to you regarding the Middle East Peace Process and Northern Ireland.

Background

Northern Ireland. The press is now aware that you are not going to Northern Ireland before the May 22 referendum. Blair visited Northern Ireland on Wednesday, with John Major, to press for a yes vote on May 22. He met with Ulster Unionists and Orange Order leaders in an effort to alleviate their anxieties regarding the April 10 Peace Accord and secure their backing. Key questions raised were decommissioning, policing reform and prisoner releases. In response to a question on whether the accord can be made to work if approved, Blair said the yes vote enables people to have a chance, asking what alternative was offered by the "no" vote campaign. His previous intervention in the north was to block the release of a Parades Commission report recommending that the most contentious marches (in July) be banned. This would have given ammunition to the opponents of the Accord, weakening the yes vote on May 22.

Trimble gave a blistering speech Wednesday accusing unionist opponents of "political cowardice" and of "running away from the battlefield last year." Pundits are being careful not to presume a large Unionist majority in favor of the accord, but various NI town councils with Unionist majorities have passed resolutions for the accord -- a bitter blow to Ian Paisley.

Sinn Fein members will vote Sunday on motions in favor of the Accord and changing the SF constitution to permit members to take seats in the new Assembly. A copy was leaked prematurely, to the distress of SF leadership but to warm welcomes in Ireland

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/8/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as evidence that Sinn Fein is serious about peace. The IRA continues to have problems with dissidents. There are reports that they are seeking to make alliances with other fringe republican groups for joint attacks. The Irish police killed one such person, part of a gang attempting to rob an armored car transporting cash. There have been a series of so-far ineffective attacks in the North. Blair's people now believe, since the problems with the vote are in the Unionist community, a Blair-Ahern-Clinton event is inadvisable; we will work on something with you and Blair.

Middle East Peace Process. Dennis arrived in Jerusalem today and will see Netanyahu immediately. We will get you a readout as soon as available. He will see Arafat either later tonight or for lunch tomorrow with a message of reassurance that we are not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans to see Netanyahu again after Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting Sunday. Interestingly, Infrastructure Minister Sharon has not returned to Israel for the cabinet session, strongly suggesting he is confident Bibi will not accept our ideas.

Attachment

Tab A Points to Make

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Northern Ireland

- Met with a terrific victims support group yesterday - WAVE. Wounded woman police officer, widows and mothers who lost sons, and a Methodist preacher whose father was killed. They are the reason why this peace must work. Their courage inspires us, and shames others.
- Also announced initiatives -- we'll help with funding for Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI assembly. Also, Secretary Daley will lead business mission next month -- hope we can speed up job creation there. Jim Lyons has some great ideas for that.
- Powerful image of you and John Major in Belfast this week. Are you having any luck with the Orange Order and the undecided Unionists?

Middle East Peace Process

- Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress. Bibi and Arafat were serious and constructive.
- Bibi asked for few days to consult with his Cabinet. Hopeful he is using this time to convince them of the need to move forward.
- He faces important decision -- serious consequences whichever path he chooses. He needs time to work this out.
- At Bibi's request, I sent Dennis Ross back to pursue creative ways to make our ideas acceptable to both parties.
- We have consistently pursued a policy of confidential diplomacy and "no surprises" with the Israelis, and I will continue that approach.
- I'm not going to sell Arafat out. I know we can't let him down and risk losing him.

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2013-0472-M

8/6/15 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- But it is important we get real results on the ground, not a package to which one party says yes and the other cannot.
- If that is not achievable, we will remain engaged in the peace process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
- I spoke last night to an Arab American Leadership conference; made clear that while I am best friend Israel has ever had in White House, I am also committed to peace process and to solution meeting the needs of both parties.
- Dennis should be back by the time I see you in Birmingham where we can discuss this more in depth.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Northern Ireland

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- Also announced initiatives -- we'll help with funding for Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI assembly. Also, Secretary Daley will lead business mission next month -- hope we can speed up job creation there. Jim Lyons has some great ideas for that.
- Powerful image of you and John Major in Belfast this week. Are you having any luck with the Orange Order and the undecided Unionists?
- Do you think it would be useful for you, Bertie Aherne and I to meet? I gather the only time that works for Bertie is Sunday.

Middle East Peace Process

- Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress. Bibi and Arafat were serious and constructive.
- Bibi asked for few days to consult with his Cabinet. Hopeful he is using this time to convince them of the need to move forward.
- He faces important decision -- serious consequences whichever path he chooses. He needs time to work this out.
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- We have consistently pursued a policy of confidential diplomacy and "no surprises" with the Israelis, and I will continue that approach.
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CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 5/7/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBH

as evidence that Sinn Fein is serious about peace. The IRA continues to have problems with dissidents. There are reports that they are seeking to make alliances with other fringe republican groups for joint attacks. The Irish police killed one such person, part of a gang attempting to rob an armored car transporting cash. There have been a series of so-far ineffective attacks in the North.

Middle East Peace Process.

~~Despite media claims to the contrary, Madeleine and Dennis made some progress in London. Both Netanyahu and Arafat were serious and constructive. Netanyahu asked for a few days to go back and consult with his Cabinet. We are hopeful that he is using this time to convince them of the need to move forward in the process. Netanyahu faces an important decision and we need to give him the time and space to work this out. At Netanyahu's request, Dennis Ross went back to the region to pursue creative ways to make our requests acceptable to both parties.~~

You are up to date on current developments in the peace process.

last night to

Your points for Prime Minister Blair talking points for Blair provide him with a readout of the London meetings and underscores that you are seeking a solution that meets the needs of both parties.

Attachment
Tab A Points to Make

as evidence that Sinn Fein is serious about peace. The IRA continues to have problems with dissidents. There are reports that they are seeking to make alliances with other fringe republican groups for joint attacks. The Irish police killed one such person, part of a gang attempting to rob an armored car transporting cash. There have been a series of so-far ineffective attacks in the North. ~~You will want to ask Blair whether he thinks you, Ahern and he should meet after the Birmingham Summit on Sunday, May 17.~~

Middle East Peace Process. Dennis arrived in Jerusalem today and will see Netanyahu immediately. We will get you a readout as soon as available. He will see Arafat either later tonight or for lunch tomorrow with a message of reassurance that we are not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans to see Netanyahu again after Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting Sunday. Interestingly, Infrastructure Minister Sharon has not returned to Israel for the cabinet session, strongly suggesting he is confident Bibi will not accept our ideas.

Attachment
Tab A Points to Make

Blair's people now believe, since the problems with the vote are in the Zionist community, a Blair - Ahern - Clinton event is inadvisable; we will work on something with you and Blair.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Your call to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Friday, May 8, 1998, time TBD.

Tony Blair has asked to speak to you regarding the Middle East Peace Process and Northern Ireland.

Background

Northern Ireland. The press is now aware that you are not going to Northern Ireland before the May 22 referendum. Blair visited Northern Ireland on Wednesday, with John Major, to press for a yes vote on May 22. He met with Ulster Unionists and Orange Order leaders in an effort to alleviate their anxieties regarding the April 10 Peace Accord and secure their backing. Key questions raised were decommissioning, policing reform and prisoner releases. In response to a question on whether the accord can be made to work if approved, Blair said the yes vote enables people to have a chance, asking what alternative was offered by the "no" vote campaign. His previous intervention in the north was to block the release of a Parades Commission report recommending that the most contentious marches (in July) be banned. This would have given ammunition to the opponents of the Accord, weakening the yes vote on May 22.

Trimble gave a blistering speech Wednesday accusing unionist opponents of "political cowardice" and of "running away from the battlefield last year." Pundits are being careful not to presume a large Unionist majority in favor of the accord, but various NI town councils with Unionist majorities have passed resolutions for the accord -- a bitter blow to Ian Paisley.

Sinn Fein members will vote Sunday on motions in favor of the Accord and changing the SF constitution to permit members to take seats in the new Assembly. A copy was leaked prematurely, to the distress of SF leadership but to warm welcomes in Ireland

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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as evidence that Sinn Fein is serious about peace. The IRA continues to have problems with dissidents. There are reports that they are seeking to make alliances with other fringe republican groups for joint attacks. The Irish police killed one such person, part of a gang attempting to rob an armored car transporting cash. There have been a series of so-far ineffective attacks in the North.

Middle East Peace Process. Dennis arrived in Jerusalem today and will see Netanyahu immediately. We will get you a readout as soon as available. He will see Arafat either later tonight or for lunch tomorrow with a message of reassurance that we are not watering down our ideas. Dennis plans to see Netanyahu again after Shabat ends on Saturday before the cabinet meeting Sunday. Interestingly, Infrastructure Minister Sharon has not returned to Israel for the cabinet session, strongly suggesting he is confident Bibi will not accept our ideas.

Attachment
Tab A Points to Make

*You will want to ask Blair whether he feels
you, Abu + he should meet after
the ^{my} summit in Syria, ~~Abu~~ 17*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Northern Ireland

Do you think it would be useful to meet, for you, Bertie Ahern and I do not. I gather the only time that works for Bertie is Sunday

- Met with a terrific victims support group yesterday - WAVE. Wounded woman police officer, widows and mothers who lost sons, and a Methodist preacher whose father was killed. They are the reason why this peace must work. Their courage inspires us, and shames others.
- Also announced initiatives -- we'll help with funding for Springvale campus and to support establishment of the NI assembly. Also, Secretary Daley will lead business mission next month -- hope we can speed up job creation there. Jim Lyons has some great ideas for that.
- Powerful image of you and John Major in Belfast this week. Are you having any luck with the Orange Order and the undecided Unionists?

- *Do you think it would be useful for you, Bertie Ahern and I to meet? I gather the only time that works for Bertie is Sunday*
Would have liked to have see Bertie Ahern with you in London, but his schedule doesn't permit.

Middle East Peace Process

- Despite media claims, Madeleine and Dennis made progress. Bibi and Arafat were serious and constructive.
- Bibi asked for few days to consult with his Cabinet. Hopeful he is using this time to convince them of the need to move forward.
- He faces important decision -- serious consequences whichever path he chooses. He needs time to work this out.
- At Bibi's request, I sent Dennis Ross back to pursue creative ways to make our ideas acceptable to both parties.
- We have consistently pursued a policy of confidential diplomacy and "no surprises" with the Israelis, and I will continue that approach.
- I'm not going to sell Arafat out. I know we can't let him down and risk losing him.

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- But it is important we get real results on the ground, not a package to which one party says yes and the other cannot.
- If that is not achievable, we will remain engaged in the peace process, but we re-evaluate our approach.
- I spoke last night to an Arab American Leadership conference; made clear that while I am best friend Israel has ever had in White House, I am also committed to peace process and to solution meeting the needs of both parties.
- Dennis should be back by the time I see you in Birmingham where we can discuss this more in depth.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME May 23, 1998, 12:13 - 12:16 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello?

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President?

The President: Bertie, it's a great day for the Irish. You must know by name every S.O.B. that voted in the Republic.

Prime Minister Ahern: I think we got 95 percent.

The President: They broke 70 percent in the North.

Prime Minister Ahern: Well I headed out trying to get 80-20 here, but I think its going to be 95-5 on a huge vote. It's almost as good as our last election. I'm really happy about that. Yes, by our reckoning they got 71 percent. Four or five percent of the Republicans would have voted "No," but it is certainly a majority of Republicans by five percent. There is a majority of Unionists who voted "Yes," but even on the very worst case every single nationalist would have to have voted against. That couldn't have happened, so, clearly I would say five or six percent more voted "No;" but we got the Nationalists, Republicans, Irish and that wasn't bad, Mr. President.

The President: God it's wonderful. I'm happy for you.

Prime Minister Ahern: I appreciate your help. We look forward to getting you back soon.

The President: Well, if there is anything we can do to help, you let me know. I hope the assembly elections now go as well.

Prime Minister Ahern: Paisley will have to be negative.

The President: Well, I bet a lot of people who voted with Paisley will be sufficiently impressed to come over and work with this agreement.

Prime Minister Ahern: About 85 percent of the island voted "Yes." I can't think of anywhere in the world where such a clear vote has been held in the last 50 years.

The President: God, it's so touching.

Prime Minister Ahern: We appreciate all your effort Mr. President. If we didn't internationalize this, it would never have happened Mr. President. Without your support we never would have been able to stay around the table.

The President: I can't wait to come because it will be a great celebration.

Prime Minister Ahern: We'll have a good celebration.

The President: Keep in touch.

Prime Minister Ahern: Thank you, Mr. President. We look forward to seeing you get back here.

The President: I look forward to getting back. Take care, good bye.

Prime Minister Ahern: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with David Trimble, Ulster Unionist
Party Leader

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Trimble

Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME May 23, 1998, 1:01 - 1:04 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: David?

Mr. Trimble: Yes.

The President: Congratulations.

Mr. Trimble: Thank you very much Mr. President. Everything came through in the end with a bit of a fight, but we got there.

The President: I'm really proud of you. In the last three days everyone was really pumping hard. You got all the undecided to break for you.

Mr. Trimble: It took the whole run of the week, but I think it turned over the weekend and more people will come after the event. Even some of those who voted "No" will change.

The President: I believe that also. I've heard what Paisley is saying, but I believe a lot of people who voted "No" will say give it a chance. Do you think you got 52 percent in the Protestant elections?

Mr. Trimble: I don't know if it was as good as that. If it was a Westminster election today, I would have lost my seat. I have a problem but it will come right. I've got a few years.

The President: You did a hell of a thing and you were very brave. I want to help however I can.

Mr. Trimble: That was one thing I was quite sure of in my mind and I managed to do it. It was the right thing and I knew that it would come right in the end. There were some times last week when I wondered if we would actually make it.

The President: I just wanted to say congrats.

Mr. Trimble: I am now looking for Adams to divvy up a bit. There are a number of things he has got to do and the sooner he starts doing them the better.

The President: I will get on it. Have a wonderful day. You earned it.

Mr. Trimble: I'm heading off in 45 or 50 minutes time for the first meeting of our constituency council to plan for our first assembly election.

The President: That's great. Take care man.

Mr. Trimble: Right.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein Leader

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: David Higgins, Sean Rice,
George Chastain, Joel Schrader and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME May 23, 1998, 1:28 - 1:32 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

Mr. Adams: Hello?

The President: Gerry, congratulations.

Mr. Adams: Thank you very much; you are very kind.

The President: You guys did a great job.

Mr. Adams: I have told everyone all day that this is the beginning and we're moving to the future. Thank you for keeping faith in all this. I reflect sometimes on the first time I went there, and I think you were right then -- well done.

The President: What do you think the final Protestant vote was?

Mr. Adams: It's impossible to know. It's clear that the majority voted in favor of this, and I think it was a very sophisticated vote. Obviously people from all quarters, including Republicans had problems. I do believe this is a leap of faith into the future. I was appealing to the "No" voters that they were voting through fear and not to think about it. There will be resistance from this quarter, but we continue to stay focused and work through it.

The President: That's what I think. We have to work at it now, and look at some ways to keep everybody's faith and good spirits

up now. We need to get the process on the right track. You are in a stronger position now; with this vote; you have been validated.

Mr. Adams: 70 percent voted in favor in the north. In the south, there wasn't such a high turnout, but 92 percent in favor... to me, it's that they were voting in favor of a whole raft of future issues. I am going to talk to Blair later. I'm going to be at the White House next week, Thursday or Wednesday; I'd like to see you there. I'm going to the States for some speaking engagements.

The President: If I'm in town, I'd be glad to see you.

Mr. Adams: My sense of all this is that the people are ahead of the politicians.

The President: They often are; not just there, but everywhere. You have a good time and enjoy your celebration.

Mr. Adams: Please say hello to my wife.

The President: Sure.

[Mr. Adams passes phone to Mrs. Adams.]

Mrs. Adams: Hello?

The President: Hello. How are you? You must be feeling so good today.

Mrs. Adams: Yes. Isn't it grand. It's great to talk to you.

The President: Thank you. I'm really looking forward to keeping on with this. You must be very proud.

Mrs. Adams: Well, I'm very proud of my husband.

The President: It's nice speaking to you.

Mrs. Adams: Well, it was nice speaking to you. Thank you; bye bye.

[Mr. Adams back on line.]

Mr. Adams: Thanks for that.

The President: Okay, man.

Mr. Adams: Tomorrow, by the way, my county team, the one my son plays on, plays Donegal in Gaelic football. That will be the real test; Antrim hasn't beaten them in 15 years. That would be the ultimate miracle.

The President: Well done, and thanks again.

Mr. Adams: Good bye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with John Hume, Social Democratic and Labour Party Leader

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Hume

Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Anthony Campanella, Robert Ford, Joel Schrader and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME May 23, 1998, 7:05 - 7:09 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: John?

Mr. Hume: Yes. Hi there, Mr. President.

The President: I just wanted to say congratulations before the day was over.

Mr. Hume: Thanks a million. Thank you for your help and support. We could not have done it without you, and we would not be where we are today.

The President: Well, I'm just thrilled. Everyone over here is ecstatic.

Mr. Hume: Very good. It was truly amazing and quite an historic day. We had 80 percent come out to vote and 71 percent voted yes.

The President: You got a slight majority of the Protestants, didn't you?

Mr. Hume: Oh, yes, right across the board. There is a great mood among the people. It was marvelous all together. There is great gratitude for all you've done.

The President: Well, thank you. It's been my pleasure. We have to keep at it and I'll do my part.

Mr. Hume: Absolutely! The months ahead will be very crucial. Politicians are now moving to work together across our divide. The real thing is working the common ground, which I call economics. Economically, both sides will be able to break down the barriers of centuries.

The President: I agree with that. Like I said, I am ready to go to work. I talked to Bertie and Tony and others.

Mr. Hume: That will be very good and encouraging to everyone. I understand that the Secretary of State (sic - Commerce) will be coming here next month.

The President: That's what I hear.

Mr. Hume: Funny, the two days he is here, I am in New York. I will be looking forward to your next visit.

The President: Yes, I'd like to come. It's a great day. It took years and years. You must feel somewhat vindicated today.

Mr. Hume: Ah, yes. It's very good. I told people the problem has not changed and neither should our approach to solve it. You know what is really interesting is the mood of the people, especially the mood of the young people. Young people are generally very cynical about politics; but their positive response in the streets -- I couldn't believe it. It was powerful. We had a special show the other night with U2, you know the pop group. Well, a young person got up on stage and said, "our generation is the one generation that has lived with the troubles our whole life. And we don't want to see another generation live through it." The statement made a tremendous impact.

The President: Oh great.

Mr. Hume: I am about to call your Ambassador, Jean Kennedy Smith. She had a great TV show last night. It was on all over. It's a pity she's leaving us.

The President: She's a good soul.

Mr. Hume: She really got down to the grass-root level in a way most ambassadors don't.

The President: Well, I'll try to pick another good one for you who will do the same.

Mr. Hume: I look forward to seeing you. Thanks a million.

The President: Thank you. Goodbye, friend.

Mr. Hume: All the best.

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4114
Redo (2)

June 16, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKI *AW*

SUBJECT: Landmines: POTUS Letter to Prime Minister Blair

At Tab A is a proposed letter to be sent via privacy channels from the President to Prime Minister Blair on U.S. APL concerns, given UK adherence to the Ottawa Convention. On April 27, on the margins of a memo from you, the President agreed to raise the issue with Blair the next time they spoke. However, the press of other business has precluded a discussion on it. Though Secretaries Albright and Cohen have raised the issue with their counterparts, we have been told repeatedly by the British Embassy here that Blair is the key.

Concurrence by: Larry Butler *LB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum for the President at Tab I recommending he send the proposed letter at Tab A.

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Proposed Letter

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 27, 1998

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

DATE: August 27, 1998

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: 4:15 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss your visit to Russia, and the Russian financial situation in particular, and to Northern Ireland.

II. BACKGROUND

Tony Blair will be either in Scotland or have just returned from there when you speak. He has the Russian financial situation very much on his mind. Your talking points cover the main issues that he will cover -- seriousness of the financial situation and who is in power in Moscow.

Russia. News reports and rumors of Yeltsin's death or resignation have circulated throughout Moscow and global financial markets today. The most serious is that Yeltsin signed a letter of resignation, but will not date it until Chernomyrdin is confirmed as prime minister; upon Yeltsin's resignation, Chernomyrdin would become acting President for 90 days, followed by new elections. We cannot confirm any of these reports. Yeltsin's spokesman said earlier today, "No resignation has been on the agenda."

Strobe reports from Moscow that the situation is indeed serious, and events are changing rapidly. Blair will also want to review your plans for the Summit and assessment the Russian economic situation. Russia's economic slide accelerated again today. Currency markets did not reopen after yesterday's ruble crash. Stocks continued their plunge, falling 17%. Public concern is growing; lines for basic goods and at banks are being reported in various cities. Work continued on a draft anti-crisis program jointly authored by the Duma, Federation Council, and the

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executive branch; the plan apparently includes several repudiations of the previous government's stabilization and reform measures.

Northern Ireland. Tony Blair will want to review your schedule and trip objectives and themes, as well as brief you on his six step plan to break the logjam in implementation of the Good Friday Accord. He and Bertie Ahern have engaged both leaders in an intensive shuttle dialogue and have a six-step plan. First is getting Adams to make a statement to the effect that the war is over. Second is for a meeting of all the party leaders. Third is an Adams-Trimble bilateral. Fourth is appointing Martin McGuinness as Sinn Fein's coordinator for decommissioning. Fifth is some form of actual decommissioning. Sixth is Trimble naming the Executive (includes two Sinn Fein ministers). The dominant hurdle is number five; Blair may suggest (and we concur) that you call Adams this week to urge him to act boldly on this unique opportunity to demonstrate that process has momentum.

You should ask Blair what concrete steps we can take to bring Adams on board, including any sweeteners that either the UK or we can provide him to make it easier; however, you should also explain that your experience with Adams the past four years shows we need to be cautious in isolating him -- weakening Gerry will not advance our common objective in finally marginalizing the "hard men."

Regarding the Real IRA and Anglo-Irish measures to suppress it, you should indicate to Blair concern about a backlash to suspension of first and fifth amendment rights in Northern Ireland. The UK will enact legislation next week making it possible for a suspected RIRA member to be convicted on the word of a senior RUC officer when the individual refuses to testify against himself. This runs counter to the liberalization envisioned under the Good Friday Accord, seems to be a disproportionate response to the threat posed by a very small group, and (as recent history shows) lends itself to abuse by security officials with old scores to settle.

Northern Ireland Schedule. We are largely in sync with the British on your schedule, the details of which were passed to Blair's office this morning. You arrive mid-morning from Moscow and go directly to Stormont for a short bilateral with Trimble and Mallon, followed by series of

semi-private meetings with the parties at a reception with the assembly. You will then go to Waterfront Hall, briefly meeting with John Hume upon arrival, to deliver your policy speech to the Assembly members and representatives of Northern Ireland's society. Your last stop in Belfast is for the Springvale Educational Village groundbreaking; Blair is uncomfortable with this as he has not been seen in public with Adams yet. Adams will be present among a group of VIPs (in his district) but he will not be onstage and has no individual role. The British are slightly uneasy with what might seem to be a reward to Adams if there is no progress on democracy, but they now seem to accept our logic on the importance of Springvale and its connection with the International Fund for Ireland and the low key nature of the Adams role.

You will then depart for Omagh to meet briefly with a group including a cross-section of community leaders and family members and lay a wreath, and continue on to Armagh for your crowd event. Each of those events accomplishes your major objectives in supporting Northern Ireland's peace and prosperity: the peace process and a new political institute, education, help for economically disadvantaged areas, reconciliation and rededication of American support for the Northern Irish people.

III. PARTICIPANTS

TBD

IV. PRESS PLAN

Closed

V. SEQUENCE

TBD

Attachment

Tab A Points to Make

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Situation in Moscow

- Strobe is on the ground talking to all the major players. He says the situation is obviously serious; some reports of unrest and disorder may be exaggerated. Agrees that we need to watch the situation very closely.
- Key concern: who's in charge. Seen reports of Yeltsin resignation; cannot confirm them. Yeltsin in dacha, Chernomyrdin focused on confirmation.
- Strobe met with Yeltsin's chief of staff Yumashev. He reaffirmed that Chernomyrdin will lead a real government, not a government of national unity.
- Strobe underscored the risk of being over-inclusive. Yumashev said that they are prepared to resist.
- What that means is unclear. Yumashev implied that new government could have members with "different political labels."

Economic Issues

- We are extremely concerned about rapid deterioration in the economy. Central Bank is under tremendous pressure to inject liquidity into the banking sector.
- Banks are taking that money out of the country, instead of meeting their obligations.
- The Russians need to send clearer signals about their economic policy. Concerned that we may get confusing messages before there is more clarity.
- New trilateral commission (Duma/Federation Council/Executive Branch) floating ideas like price controls and renationalizing key industries.

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- This kind of talk will send precisely the wrong signals to markets, even though it's not clear the ideas will be implemented.
- Russians need to understand that stabilization depends on the steps they take internally. No easy choices or silver bullets available.

Summit

- As far as Strobe can tell, Russian summit preparations still underway.
- Know that I'm walking into very complicated situation. My agenda:
 - underscore that engagement with Russia remains very important and has major security implications for the U.S. and international community;
 - reaffirm stakes in Russia's fundamental choice to embrace democracy and free markets and the importance of Russia staying on that path;
 - stress that economic stabilization and recovery depends on Russian solutions to Russian problems; and
 - speak clearly to a broad spectrum of Russian leaders, including Chernomyrdin, the Duma, and regional leaders, about the challenges Russia faces.

Northern Ireland

- Greatly impressed by the reaction to your visit to Omagh. Think that tragedy makes my visit even more important to peace implementation -- remind people that the first blood shed since the Good Friday Agreement does not affect our commitment.
- My instinct was to go to Omagh from the beginning; we wanted to give the community there breathing space before they get caught up in preparations. I was surprised at the warmth of the welcome the town has extended to our advance people. There, and afterwards in Armagh, I intend to reinforce message in private and publicly that a desire for

peace and the promise of reconciliation are the essential ingredients for making the Good Friday Accord work.

- Perversely, Omagh and other bombings in the world this month may have made it easier for Gerry Adams to begin moving on weapons. I am ready to help with the six step plan. What do you want me to do, and how do you envision an actual act of decommissioning? That seems very hard and we need to be careful not to lose him in the process.
- On other events on the schedule, I am looking forward to working the Assembly with you at Stormont; want to keep the formalities there brief to spend more time with the parties. That will give me a better sense for how to deliver my policy address afterwards at Waterfront.
- Afterwards, Springvale stop is important. It is symbol of American support for the IFI and education and economic regeneration. Our joint presence underscores that normality reigns despite Omagh, and that we continue to share in the risks Adams, and Trimble, are taking.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Northern Ireland

13 SEP 11 4:11:45

- Deeply appreciated your and Cherie's hospitality last week. Didn't expect could top the 1995 visit, but think it did.
- What is your thinking on how to finish the Trimble and Adams two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
- Gerry's coming here next month. What do you want me to do?

Russia

- Primakov has a huge task -- insolvent banks, collapsed currency, spiraling inflation -- and no economic experience.
- Fear is that Primakov will try to govern on the basis of political considerations rather than staking meaningful steps to restore the economy. Early indications on his economic team are not encouraging.
- Glad you are hosting G-7 meeting on Russia and that the Russians will join for part of the discussion. Good opportunity for us to share with Russians lessons learned from financial crises in other parts of the world.
- I plan to call Yeltsin now that Primakov is confirmed. Will emphasize that now that he has a Prime Minister in place, he needs to make sure someone in the government can preserve his legacy on economic reform.
- Do you think it makes sense for you to make a similar call to Yeltsin on behalf of the G-7 before the Monday meeting?

New York Conference

- Hillary and I are looking forward to seeing you September 21 at the NYU dialogue on democracy and the global economy; Persson (Sweden), Prodi, Stoyanov (Bulgaria) are on board, and we are waiting for Mandela - will make for diverse and very interesting panel discussion.

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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES

- As we discussed when we were together, I am quite concerned about the international financial system. Over last month, crisis in confidence has taken on global character affecting all emerging markets. Believe it is important to publicly discuss the nature of the crisis and show we are focused on addressing it. Plan to make a speech on Monday in New York.
- I believe it would be helpful if the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors made a statement recognizing the serious strains in the international financial system and committing to respond appropriately. Our Treasury has discussed this idea with your officials.
- Situation in Brazil has deteriorated seriously. Believe we may need to consider bold financial responses. Finance officials are in touch.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Northern Ireland

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- What is your thinking on how to finish the Trimble and Adams two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
- Gerry's coming here next month, so ~~I've got some leverage on him~~. What do you want me to do? ~~What is Bertie's take on this?~~

Russia

- Primakov has a huge task -- insolvent banks, collapsed currency, spiraling inflation -- and no economic experience. ~~Some rumored to head economic team are from the old school.~~ *the name is [unclear]*
- Fear is that Primakov will try to govern on the basis of political considerations rather than staking meaningful steps to restore the economy. Early indications on his economic team are not encouraging.
- Glad you are hosting G-7 meeting on Russia and that the Russians will join for part of the discussion. Good opportunity for us to share with Russians lessons learned from financial crises in other parts of the world.
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(Sweden)

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

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Northern Ireland

- Deeply appreciated your and Cherie's hospitality last week. Didn't expect could top the 1995 visit, but think it did.
• What is your thinking on how to finish the Trimble and Adams two-step - decommissioning and naming the executive?
• Their meeting yesterday looked like it was a solid start to building a relationship
• Know that packaging security presence reductions and troop withdrawals for an IRA act of decommissioning tricky for you, but think would provide sufficient lift for Adams to sell to the hardmen.
• Trimble lost three UUP Assembly members yesterday over the Adams bilat; can he survive letting Sinn Fein into the Executive under any circumstances? What can we do to bolster his position?
• Gerry's coming here next month, so I've got some leverage on him. What do you want me to do? What is Bertie's take on this?

Russia

- Glad Boris finally named a Prime Minister and Primakov likely to be confirmed. The political void was debilitating.
• But Primakov has a huge task -- insolvent banks, collapsed currency, spiraling inflation -- and no economic experience. Some rumored to head economic team are from the old school.
• Real fear is that Primakov may apply to economics the same philosophy he follows on foreign policy -- get international community to bend to Russia's views. If he flaunts realities of international economics, it will be a disaster for Russia.
• Glad you are hosting G-7 meeting on Russia and that the Russians will join for part of the discussion. Good

Fear is that Primakov will try to gain on the basis of political considerations, rather than taking a long-term view of the economy.
Economic team are not encouraging

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

DATE: September 11, 1998
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:15 - 4:35 p.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss further steps in the Northern Ireland peace process to follow up your visit, as well as review developments in Russia and note that you will see him in New York on September 21.

II. BACKGROUND

Northern Ireland. Your visit last week helped unlock a growing logjam on Good Friday Accord implementation (Adams statements on violence and this week's first-ever Adams-Trimble meeting), but the decommissioning-Shadow executive deal is proving elusive. Tony Blair will want to outline his ideas for a second round of steps that could get Adams and Trimble over their respective hurdles.

Trimble delivered on his promise to you last week to meet with Gerry Adams. He engaged Adams in direct dialogue at a multilateral event Monday, and then had an one-on-one yesterday. ~~Trimble paid a price, though. Three UUP Assembly members quit the party, putting Trimble's majority at risk; the anti-accord unionists group can now trigger the special "sufficient consensus" voting mechanism. Trimble will have to appeal to the pro-accord but non-aligned Assembly members (Women's Coalition and Alliance) to register as unionists for tactical voting reasons.~~

Adams and Trimble agreed to meet again next week. The next events are the September 14-15 meeting of the new Assembly, which will be followed by announcement of a final round of consultations September 28-29 before Trimble moves forward

on naming the new Executive. This allows three weeks to finalize a decommissioning deal.

Trimble could be toppled as UUP leader next month at the party convention if he were to put SF into the Executive absent an actual act of decommissioning. However, starting decommissioning in exchange for seats on the Executive is more than Adams can sell to IRA hardliners. As Bertie Ahern outlined, he and Blair are working to exploit the RIRA cease-fire and lessened security threat to sell the consequent drawdown in the British security presence as "demilitarization," to secure an IRA unilateral response (explosion of Semtex that could be verified afterwards).

Adams
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Adams
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A down payment was made yesterday when Chief Constable Flanagan announced that he no longer needs British Army patrols to protect the police in Belfast, which has been understood as a prelude to UK troop withdrawals. ~~The risk to the British is that they could be accused of legitimizing the IRA if they were to engage in a force drawdown exercise with terrorists.~~ **This will require you, Blair and Ahern to engage in very quiet and personal diplomacy to set up the choreography that gives Trimble cover to let Sinn Fein into the Executive, allows the IRA to spin to their folk the decommissioning, and protects Blair from accusations of appeasement.**

We have some upcoming leverage with Adams. He is planning a visit to the United States in October, and will undoubtedly seek an Oval Office meeting; this would be appropriate if he is in the Executive and engaged in decommissioning.

Russia. Primakov's nomination is likely to sail through confirmation on Friday. Early indications about the makeup of the cabinet are not encouraging. Gorbachev-era figures such as Gerashchenko and Maslyukov have the inside track for the Central Bank and macroeconomic czar positions, respectively. Gerashchenko is the man who tried to solve Russia's problems in 1992 by printing money to keep factories open, sparking 25% monthly inflation. Maslyukov has similar views. If the downward spiral continues, it will likely accelerate. The impacts are predictable: runaway inflation, further erosion of the currency, food shortages, the industrial sector goes idle, black markets, crime and corruption become pervasive.

~~We have two obvious options: (1) let the Russians go their own way and not get tarred with the disaster; or (2) try to engage the Russians, attempt to educate Primakov on economic realities and try to mitigate the prospects for disaster. We advise the second route, but we need to accept at the outset that chances for success are not high.~~
In your call with Blair, **you should stress** the importance of the Monday G-7/G-8 London meeting on Russia and the need to have a serious exchange with the Russians on lessons learned from financial crises in other parts of the world. You might also indicate that you will call Yeltsin after Primakov is confirmed to underscore the importance of naming a strong leader on economic reform to the government. You might suggest that Blair make a similar call.

NY event. NYU School of Law is hosting September 21 an "opening dialogue" on democracy in the global economy. The format is a one-day seminar composed of three panels. The first two will be made up of leading world figures and the NYU community and are on civil society, and the new economy and the future for opportunity. The **First Lady** will participate in the first panel. **You will participate** in the third panel on strengthening democracy. Participation of leaders is evolving positively. **In addition to Blair,** Persson (Sweden), Prodi and Stoyanov (Bulgaria). NYU is seeking confirmation from Mandela. Chretien, Cardoso, Havel and Kok were invited but are unable to attend.

III. PARTICIPANTS

TBD

IV. PRESS PLAN

Closed press.

V. SEQUENCE

TBD

Attachment

Tab A Points to make

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

*Self HCF 000
Wesley Markwell*

- Kofi Annan's report is a graphic account of Milosevic's defiance of international community. Believe we need to maintain momentum and build consensus for NATO decision to authorize force.
- Holbrooke continues his meetings in Belgrade and Pristina today. Fighting has been in a lull for the past few days, but Milosevic has not yet withdrawn the necessary police and military forces, nor agreed to measures that would make the end of hostilities verifiable and durable.
- Know that you've been thinking about ways to get Russia on board.
- We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support another UN resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.
- Although I have doubts about the wisdom, we can agree to Contact Group meeting prior to NATO ACTORD but only if key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.
- Also, I understand that some of your officials are pressing to link a decision on approving air strikes to NATO's willingness to commit ground forces to oversee a cease-fire or political settlement.
- You should know that this is a very difficult issue for us, particularly with the Congress. It's been an uphill struggle to sustain support for SFOR given Congress's concerns about readiness and any suggestion that we are also raising forces for Kosovo will make it very difficult to ensure domestic support for possible air strikes.
- Our objective now is to secure full compliance with UNSCR 1199. If there is an agreement on a peace settlement, then we will need to consider what kind of international presence is needed and what if any role we will play in implementing it.

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- We want to keep all options open at this point, rather than beginning to generate forces for a large NATO-led implementation force.

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- Understand that your representative in New York is considering possibility of seeking UN Security Council Resolution more specifically authorizing force.
- We have all gotten a clear signal from Moscow that they will not support ~~such a~~ resolution. Seems to me only harm can come at this point in forcing Yeltsin to veto.
- Seeking a new resolution would also complicate our effort to secure NATO consensus later this week to authorize air strikes.
- Rather than pursuing a UNSCR, we can agree to Contact Group meeting prior to NATO ACTORD as long as key allies agree in advance that NATO will proceed regardless of what Russian position is.
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- We want to keep all options open at this point, rather than beginning to generate forces for a large NATO-led implementation force.

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- If Allies know that Security Council is considering a resolution on use of force, this will reinforce view of some that a further resolution may be necessary. Could also enable Moscow to delay NATO action by prolonging debate in New York.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

Middle East

- Understand you are met with Arafat today. As you know, he's coming here tomorrow to begin intensive talks with Bibi on the interim agreement, so I'd love to hear your thoughts.
- Let me tell you basically where we are. Both sides have taken some important steps - Bibi on the redeployment front, Arafat on the security front. But they still remain far apart.
- There is more distrust here than I had imagined - every step the parties must take and every comma they must agree on is a struggle.

EO 13526 1.4d

- Outcome of the Summit is far from a done deal. I don't know where we will end up on Monday. Sharon is another big new factor. He won't actually show up at Wye until Friday after I've left for a day.
- But I'm persuaded we had to take matters into our hands. The alternative of letting the process founder is unacceptable - especially with the May 1999 deadline looming.

Northern Ireland

- Both Adams and Trimble are in the United States.
- My Deputy Labor Secretary participated in the opening of the NI roadshow last week. Have impression that it is going well.
- Understand de Chastelain's group has the lead on trying to work the decommissioning issue, but that your people think actually decommissioning has to wait until next spring.
- What can I do to help?

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- My Deputy Labor Secretary participated in the opening of the NI roadshow last week. Have impression that it is going well.
- Adams is trying to raise money, and keep supporters behind the peace agreement.
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✓ Key to Phase I to Coleridge
- Key to "2 to Solana

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TELEPHONE CALL WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

DATE: March 21, 1999
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To ensure key allies are ready for NATO to initiate air strikes if Belgrade continues to conduct offensive operations in Kosovo and to reject an interim settlement.

II. BACKGROUND

Several thousand MUP and VJ continue to conduct operations in Kosovo to secure lines of communication for a major offensive, which could be launched at short notice. The North Atlantic Council is meeting to assess the situation, and Secretary General Solana is consulting with allies on the initiation of air strikes. We are pressing for Solana to pass the "key" for Phase I air strikes to SACEUR on Monday, and for the NAC on the same day to give Solana the "key" for follow-on strikes so that NATO can respond quickly if Belgrade mounts a major offensive or attacks NATO forces.

All three leaders who you are calling seem committed to early NATO air strikes if there is no change in Milosevic's position. Over the last several days, senior officials from each of their governments have issued public statements making clear that the threat of air strikes is real. The three leaders will be aware of Dick Holbrooke's impending mission to Belgrade because Madeleine Albright informed their Foreign Ministers yesterday. They may have questions about U.S. willingness to move to early air strikes in light of the upcoming visit by Primakov.

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Attachment
Tab A Points to Make

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR/PRESIDENT CHIRAC/CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

- The situation in Kosovo continues to deteriorate, with several thousand army and police conducting operations against the Kosovar Albanians. Forty thousand Serb security forces are in and around Kosovo.
- While Milosevic has yet not launched an all-out offensive, he continues to augment his forces in Kosovo and is poised to do so at short notice.
- In the meantime, his forces are securing roads, clearing villages in strategic areas and terrorizing their Albanian inhabitants. This is displacing thousands of additional Albanians. The town of Srbica, which had 13,000 inhabitants when Serb security forces moved in yesterday, is today largely vacant.
- Through his aggression and continued defiance, Milosevic has clearly passed the threshold for NATO military action. If he does not change course in the next few days, I believe NATO will need to initiate air strikes. And we will need to initiate these strikes very quickly if he launches a major offensive.
- NATO's air strikes will need to be substantial particularly if he launches a major offensive, in order to achieve their objective of demonstrating NATO's resolve, deterring further aggression and damaging Belgrade's ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo.
- Of course our objective is not to conduct air strikes, but to stop the violence and achieve an interim settlement. With this in mind, we are sending Ambassador Holbrooke tomorrow to Belgrade to give Milosevic one last chance.
- Dick Holbrooke will emphasize that NATO air strikes are imminent and that Milosevic faces a stark choice. He can halt aggression against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an interim settlement with a NATO-led implementation force. Or he can bear full responsibility for the consequences of NATO military action.

- Dick is now scheduled to see Milosevic tomorrow;

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- In the meantime, we need to prepare for military action. Tomorrow Javier Solana should pass the "key" to General Clark, thus starting the countdown to initial strikes. At the same time, the NATO Council should give Javier the "key" for follow-on strikes, so that NATO can respond quickly if Milosevic launches a major offensive or attacks our forces in Macedonia or Bosnia.
- We need to stay firm and united. And we all need to work with President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Primakov to minimize the damage to our relations with Russia if Milosevic gives us no choice but to proceed with air strikes.

If asked about Holbrooke's terms of reference:

- Holbrooke will press Milosevic to pull back his forces in Kosovo and accept the Rambouillet accords, particularly the establishment of a NATO-led implementation force.
- He is not going to re-negotiate the interim settlement already agreed with the Kosovar Albanians.
- We will pull him out of Belgrade immediately if Milosevic launches a major offensive while he is present.

If asked about timing and the Primakov visit:

- We will need to initiate air strikes quickly if Milosevic continues his aggression and rejection of an interim settlement. The precise timing will depend in part on the dynamics in Kosovo and Belgrade.
- We have already warned Russia, so that Primakov can draw his own conclusions for his upcoming trip. Al Gore has spoken to Primakov personally and Madeline has had numerous phone calls with Foreign Minister Ivanov.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Schroeder (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Schroeder

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith, Miles
Murphy and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME: March 23, 1999, 4:57-5:09 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Gerhard? (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. Milosevic gave Ambassador Holbrooke no indication of being willing to negotiate a peaceful solution and refused even to agree to a cease-fire and continued to reject any international presence. He was threatening and bellicose, and it's clear he intends to unleash greater violence in Kosovo. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I was afraid of that, and I quite agree with your analysis of the situation.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Well, I'm glad to hear you say that. I agree with that and am ready to support NATO fully. Two things: first, Prime Minister Primakov has postponed his trip to Washington. It was the best outcome under the circumstances. We need to let him know we will continue to work closely with him and make it clear that, number one, that we share the same objective he does for a peaceful solution and, number two, we are committed to Russia's economic recovery. It might not be a bad idea if you could call him in the next day or so and say that to him. (S)

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Chancellor Schroeder: I will definitely call him, and I see things the same way you see them. I will make clear to him Germany is committed to help with Russia's economic development and private investment, and also we have political options that can be used. I agree that at this point in the game in particular that we tell him these things and make sure Russia does its share to make the International Monetary Fund view the Russia situation in a positive way. But there are things we can do, as well. (S)

The President: Thank you, but let me just mention one other thing. I think there is a chance that Milosevic will attack the NATO forces in Bosnia with missiles. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Does he have what it takes to attack NATO forces in Bosnia? (S)

The President: Yes, the FROG missiles can do that. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, you're talking about the Russian FROGS? (S)

The President: I believe, obviously, we should discourage him and we should try to get Primakov to discourage him from doing that. It's not inconceivable that he will try to use this to wreck our success in Bosnia. We have to be very, very firm on this, and if he does it, we will have to be prepared to strongly retaliate. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: He is afraid, of course, because he thinks that his hold on Montenegro may be broken by this, just by the natural course of things. So we have to be prepared for all these things. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

The President: Yes, that's right. What he may try to do is move against Montenegro, although I think that will backfire against him. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Well, you know, this whole thing has a certain element of unpredictability. We don't know how it will play out in Montenegro, or how it will play out in Serbia itself. We also have to prepare for him to try to strike the NATO forces in Macedonia. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

The President: That is good news, and we're all doing our best to protect the forces. But we have to be prepared that he might be able to hit them, and it has to stiffen our resolve and not force us to withdraw. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I see things exactly the way you do, and it's all the more important for that reason we stay in touch and coordinate what should be done and needs to be done. You're aware, of course, the 15 European heads of state and of government are in Berlin, and we should, to the extent possible, coordinate things with regard to tomorrow, for instance. (S)

The President: Thanks. We'll stay close by and coordinate. I know that Solana is also staying in touch with you. I feel much better after this conversation, and I can't thank you enough. Thank you, Gerhard. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I feel the same way. Best to you. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Jim Smith, Miles
Murphy and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME: March 23, 1999, 5:24-5:37 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Chirac: Bill. (U)

The President: How are you? Thank you for taking my call. (U)

President Chirac: I'm in Berlin for the meeting tomorrow morning about the agenda, but we were with Gerhard Schroeder for dinner. And we agree completely with the decision taken by NATO. (C)

The President: Well, thank you. I agree, too; we don't have any choice. (C)

President Chirac: No, I understand we don't. Holbrooke didn't get any progress? (C)

The President: Nothing. (U)

President Chirac: Nothing at all? (C)

The President: I wanted to speak to you about two issues. The first is Primakov. We talked about this before. He has postponed his trip to Washington, which is probably best under the circumstances. But I think it's important we all communicate to him two things. We all need his help on Kosovo and we want to work with him to get a peaceful resolution to all this, so that whatever he says about us in public, he should be

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working with us in private to get Milosevic to moderate his reaction to the airstrikes. (S)

The second thing is, I think there is a chance that Milosevic will try to attack with missiles the NATO forces in Bosnia, which means the French and the Americans are the most exposed. He may also try to take some action against the NATO forces in Macedonia. The only things I wanted to say is that if he is able to cause some casualties to us where we are already working to keep the peace, I think we have to be very firm to not allow our Bosnia mission to collapse, and not running away from the mission as defined in Kosovo. (S)

And, Jacques, there is only one more point I wanted to make. When we talked before, we discussed the possibility of having the first phase of taking out the air defense system and having a pause to get Milosevic back to the peace talks and agreement. The only point I wanted to make about this is we have to be very careful not to have a pause so long that it defeats our purpose. Because he has 40,000 forces in or on the border of Kosovo and almost 300 tanks, if we waited too long, we could lose the objective for which we struck. So we have to be very careful about that. We'll obviously be in daily contact, but I wanted to mention that. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, concerning these three points, the first, Primakov. I had intended to call him tomorrow and speak to him exactly about what you have spoken of. I say tomorrow, because it is now 12 o'clock at night here. (S)

The President: Tomorrow is perfect. (S)

President Chirac:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: The only problem I'm worried about is what if he just charges ahead. He can displace thousands of people in two days. (S)

President Chirac: [REDACTED]

The President: Good, that's perfect. (S)

President Chirac: Do you have any good news from the ladies in Egypt? (U)

The President: Oh, yes, they are loving it. I'll get a report tonight. (U)

President Chirac: Give them my best regards. They are very lucky. (U)

The President: Yes, they're lucky. I'll tell them. Thank you, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: All right, Bill. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister D'Alema (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister D'Alema

Interpreter: Simm Smiley
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Ralph Sigler and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME March 23, 1999, 5:44-5:49 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Massimo. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Hello. (U)

The President: Before I get to more serious matters I wanted to congratulate you on the success of Roberto Benigni at the Oscars. It was great. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Thank you, thank you. That was a very important moment for our film industry and our country. (U)

The President: The movie was a great gift. I wanted to call to check in with you about Kosovo. I'm sure you know Milosevic gave Ambassador Holbrooke no room to believe that he would agree to a cease-fire or any terms of the peace agreement and made it clear that he intends to unleash greater violence in Kosovo. I feel we have no choice but to go forward with NATO action. I intend to support it and I hope we can all do it together. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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Declassify On: 3/23/09

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PER E. O. 13526

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Well, I agree with that. I've been trying to think of all the permutations. I'd like to start with my first point. Russian Prime Minister Primakov has cancelled his trip to Washington which I believe is best under the circumstances. The thing I think, important for us to do now is to first of all tell Primakov we still want to work with him on a peaceful solution to this crisis and urge him to talk to Milosevic, and secondly, that Europe and the U.S. very much want Russia to recover economically. That will be my message and I hope it will be yours as well. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: There's a point that I would like to raise with you that is important. [REDACTED]

The President: Yes, I agree with that but it depends on what Milosevic does. He could immediately retaliate against NATO forces in Bosnia or Macedonia. He might also redouble his efforts to slaughter the Kosovars. He has moved 40,000 troops and 300 tanks on the border or inside Kosovo. I think it is very important to make it as brief as possible but it all depends on what Milosevic does. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, I think we can stop unless Milosevic is hurtling the troops, village after village after village. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, at the moment, all of us have given the green light to NATO and Solana to act. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The President: Yes, of course, we will all have to be in close consultation and I thank you for taking my call and also hope that you will be in touch with Primakov and keep working with him. Thank you for taking my call. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: I shall call Mr. Primakov undoubtedly. Tomorrow, we have a meeting of the European Council in Berlin so we will have consultations among the EU leaders as well. And possibly we could call Primakov together with the other leaders of the Union, with Mr. Schroeder, Mr.Chirac . (S)

The President: That's a possibility. You should discuss it with them. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Fine, goodbye and best wishes with your work. (U)

The President: Bye, to you too. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Robert Ford and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME April 1, 1999, 6:14 - 6:20 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello, Gerry. (U)

Mr. Adams: You're up very early. (U)

The President: I've been briefed on where you guys are now. I think the Prime Ministers are very worried about a two-week delay and I just called to ask if there's anything that can be done to do it quicker. (U)

Mr. Adams: I understand you have been trying to get in contact. I was in with Tony and Bertie. I don't know but I think we may have an agreement that, even though there would be a two-week timeframe, I would probably get back an indication quicker than that; can't say. (U)

I stepped out from the talks to make this call. We are actually against an adjournment. What we have done is told the government that this is not working the way that they wanted. Nonetheless, we went back in and gave the government our best assessment, and now that they're undertaking to try it again. We would have preferred more time, but they went against our own advice. So we have jumped before we were shoved. (U)

We are against an adjournment. We need cover. The thing that will guarantee this is that we're not ganging up with everyone else against the IRA. We just have to believe that it's going

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to be managed. We moved from that position to doing what they wanted us to do. (S)

The President: In other words you think there's some way you can give him some sort of assurance -- (S)

Mr. Adams: Very definitely assured. We have to sort this out. We have suffered our first defeat in terms of the internal management. Secondly, we cannot guarantee anything else other than our very, very best to get back to them as quickly as possible to let them know how we're getting it on and what has happened. (S)

The President: Yes. Let me ask you this, how will it work if privately you can tell them... why do you want to wait two weeks before you go public? (S)

Mr. Adams: We have actually suggested that they call bilaterals on Tuesday a week from now. We need more time, then, to get away from any prescribed timeframe which engages people. Obviously, if we can get back to them with some indication in four days, three days, two days. We'll do all of that. We don't want to go to the far extreme of any timetable. (S)

The President: Okay, I got it. (S)

Mr. Adams: Is that fair enough? We need space and cover to make this work, and the last thing we want is public speculation. The last thing we want is to have Sinn Fein seen as ganging up on the IRA because that will get people's backs up and make our jobs harder. We will get back with them with honest soundings and that clearly will help them well within the two weeks. (S)

The President: Okay. I understand. (S)

Mr. Adams: I'm going back in to see Tony and Bertie within minutes here. Do you want me to call you back? (S)

The President: I will just call you back if we need to talk again. (S)

Mr. Adams: Good luck. Thanks. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee,
Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Robert Ford and
Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME: April 1, 1999, 6:45 - 6:49 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello Gerry. (U)

Mr. Adams: Good morning. (U)

The President: Look, I talked to Tony and Bertie, and they understand where you are and why, and what they say must be right. I'm sure there's no way this document is not going to leak. (S)

Mr. Adams: I told them that when they give it out. (S)

The President: What they're saying is they think this document can be the basis for agreement but they know the parties need time to reflect on it and suggest reconvening a week from Tuesday. Otherwise it'll look kind of crazy if it just leaks out there. (S)

Mr. Adams: I think all of that's dead on. What we can't have them say is they think we're going to agree to it. (S)

The President: No, no, I think they can say they don't know what you'll say. (S)

Mr. Adams: Mr. President, we told them when they gave out the document it'll end up in the public arena. There is no bad feelings -- they're doing their job and we understand. We

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actually said we couldn't deliver but then they gave us all sorts of trouble. I am trying to manage that and I think it's going to be a public issue. At this point I don't think the government can do anything except put it out there as the basis for agreement. All of that's okay? (S)

The President: Yes. (S)

Mr. Adams: And they are talking about reconvening bilaterals in a week from Tuesday. (S)

The President: Okay. Yeah, I got it. Well, all right, I think if they can publish and say it could be the basis for an agreement and give all the parties time to reflect. (S)

Mr. Adams: We were against adjournment and we told the Government. We told them that we would have to reflect our disappointment. It is more acceptable to them, but they should be saying they'll adjourn for a period of reflection and then we'll resume intense discussion on such-and-such a date. (S)

The President: I got it. (S)

Mr. Adams: You happy enough? (S)

The President: Yes, I think this will work. (S)

Mr. Adams: Okay, goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Schroeder

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Schroeder

Interpreter: Brigitta Richman
Notetakers: Matt Sibley, James Smith, Bob Ford, Sean Tarver and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME April 1, 1999, 4:06 - 4:43 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Gerhard, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I'm fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about where we are on Kosovo. I think in the last couple of nights, even though the weather has been bad, we have started to hit some targets that will make some difference. I am encouraged the Allies have approved what I consider to be an appropriate range of targets for tonight and maybe the next couple of days because of the weather. (S)

But I think we have to find some way of more efficiently picking these targets and going forward. It's taking an enormous amount of time from Solana and Clark, who spends as much time on political relations with the Allies as he does conducting the campaign. I think if we have any chance of a diplomatic initiative working that won't be a defeat for Europe and the United States, we have got to keep hitting hard and give the impression we are willing to do it for some time. (S)

That means to me some way of having the leaders of NATO nations approve categories of targets and then have Clark pick the military targets and then have Solana have our leave to take some off if he believes the collateral damage would be too great. Because we're already being questioned here about why we

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are so slow to ramp up the campaign if he is doing these terrible things. Part of it is the weather, of course, but part of it is this process of picking targets, which I think has become cumbersome. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Can I make a few comments? (S)

The President: Of course. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: First of all, in general I agree with your analysis and obviously I agree with your points. He has to withdraw his troops and stop his military activity; the Kosovars have to be able to return in security; and then I think for a long-term settlement they have to have some degree of the autonomy that they enjoyed before he took it away from them. So in general, I agree with that. My only concern is that if we were to offer such a thing tomorrow -- I can only say how it will be perceived in this country because of the press coverage -- it would look like an offer from the position of weakness. (S)

Like we didn't want to go ahead with the bombing campaign, that's been called half-hearted to date, and that in effect we were suing for peace. That would make it impossible for him to accept. In a way, we would both decrease the chance that he will take a reasonable offer and our being perceived as having defended the people of Kosovo. If we really can ratchet this up and hit him hard for a few days and then discuss the parameters

of a solution, I'm afraid it will be perceived in the United States that we are weak and indecisive and haven't hit him hard. I'm afraid if that is the way he perceived it, it would be impossible for him to accept those terms. He would counter-offer with something we cannot accept, because he would think we are about to quit on him. (S)


Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: First of all, I don't disagree with anything you said. Let me put it another way. Whenever we decide to go public with an offer of negotiation, either from one leader like you or NATO as a whole, if we have not impressed upon the public in Europe and the United States, as well as in Serbia, that we have done a lot of damage and could do a lot more -- that is, if not a lot of damage has already been done and if we do it before that happens, it is imperative we have the agreement of all NATO members to say he needs to understand we are prepared to continue and escalate this air effort for several weeks more, if that is what it takes. And that we have no short-term deadline on this. (S)

And if we say it, we have to be prepared to do it. If we have a peace offer on the table, even if it's one he can't accept, before there's been a perceptible negative impact on his situation on the ground, then we have to be even more explicit that we are prepared to do this for weeks and weeks and we have no set timeline or deadline. We have an objective and we are going to achieve it. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:



EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d



The President: Let me suggest, I think we need to coordinate through our staff people how to handle this as we go forward on this. I know Madeleine is talking to Fischer. I mentioned this to Tony Blair today, because I thought you had probably discussed it with him. If we three could work it out, how do you think we can do this? We certainly have to make it clear there are conditions under which we would be willing to stop the hostilities. We're in there to stop the hostilities, so I agree with that. I want to ask whether you agree we should establish some smoother procedures on the targets issue, because I think we will be moving pretty quickly once the weather clears up.

(S)

[The line to the Chancellor dropped and was reestablished.]

The President: Gerhard, we got cut off. Maybe (the interpreter) can do the translation again. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder:




The President: Yes. I have no problem with that. All I am trying to do is find a system that works more rapidly. Maybe we can have Javier -- he's got sense enough to know what targets are sensitive because of high collateral damage or the location -- maybe we just need to tell him he needs the ability to check in on a daily basis at a certain time, and if they don't present

collateral damage problems or break huge new ground, he ought to let them go. Authorizing him to do it might be an efficient way. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d




The President: Let me say that if we do it that way, we may actually lengthen the process. As it is now, they bring us proposed military targets and if one has considerable collateral damage or represent historical or significant cultural significance to Serbs, they bring it to me and say, "maybe we shouldn't hit this," and I say, "okay, maybe we shouldn't." What I think is, instead of announcing that new phases have just been authorized, we could authorize military targets, but they could come back to us with ones that have collateral damage or cultural significance, then we could say yes or no. If we think we are all inclined to say yes, but all our Allies aren't, then we could go to them. I think that maybe the most efficient way of doing this. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I have no problem with that. (S)

The President: Good. Alright. We will be in touch. I think your thinking on the outline of what we should say is quite right, and we'll work on it. We may have to talk again in a day or so, but thank you very much. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, but I think we have to start -- I am going to be here this week, I'm not going to take an Easter vacation, and I think you aren't, either --



EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I agree. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: And about the question of when we become active, we can discuss this further. [REDACTED]

The President: I think we are on the same page and we just need to work out the details. I am sure Madeleine and Fischer can work out the details. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Perhaps Sandy and Steiner can work together here. (S)

The President: Yes. Absolutely. Okay, thank you. Happy Easter. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary General Annan

Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, Matthew Sibley, Robin Rickard and Robert Ford

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 10, 1999, 1:01 - 1:08 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello Kofi, how are you? (U)

Secretary General Annan: How are you Bill? I am fine, but these are difficult times for us. (U)

The President: Yes, I thought your statement was very good. Notwithstanding the big headline from Russia, I think we have a real chance over next week. I think it was great. Even though the headlines in the New York Times this morning are disturbing, I think we have a chance for a diplomatic united front. What the Russians need is to get back into the ballgame. If they are part of an international force, which I always thought they had to do, like in Bosnia. If the Russians are happy, then the Chinese will stop what they are saying, and then we can get the whole thing sanctioned by the UN. Madeleine is seeing Ivanov next week and we are working through the Europeans and I know you are. If we could get them to take a common diplomatic position, where it is obvious they would be part of any international force, there may be a way to work through this. It's important to get a negotiated settlement. If we keep this up for another month or two, we'll be able to move in there uncontested. Then the thing that concerns me is having Europe with us and being there forever and a day. Look how long we had to stay in Bosnia, with the Russians. It is almost a license for Kosovar military elements to reconstitute themselves and start going the other way. I think we have a chance in the next

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couple of weeks to break the iceberg and get the Russians back in the hunt. They're not just coming to Europe and the United States now, but they're working through a whole range of things. If we can get them there sometime over the next couple of weeks, then I think we have a chance to put this together. (S)

Secretary General Annan:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I think as a practical matter, what would matter there is the level of assurance and detail we have about acceptance, and a timetable for withdrawal and when the international force will get in. What Blair, Schroeder, and I are worried about is having him accept it, having a cessation of bombing, and then a reason why he can't get it across, and the trouble then is having the allies resume bombing. The problem will be in the details. (S)

Secretary General Annan:

The President: Yep. I agree with that. (U)

Secretary General Annan: I will work with you and all the governments concerned to find a way out of this and I think we may get to a point where he will crack, but Milosevic is such an incredibly unpredictable character. (S)

The President: Even though there is a most frightening headline about Yeltsin's bombast, as near as we can tell, this is an effort by Russia to get back into the diplomatic hunt. (S)

Secretary General Annan: It had quite an impact here in Europe, but some of the clarifications from Moscow seem to have clarified things a bit. (S)

The President: Let's stay in close touch next week to see what we can do to put this thing together. I think you have really done a good thing here. We have got a chance to get this done. (C)

Secretary General Annan: Would you say something about my initiative, then? (C)

The President: Absolutely. I thought I put something out yesterday. (C)

Secretary General Annan: I am in Europe. (U)

The President: I was thrilled by what you said. I will double-check. If we haven't put out a statement, I will. (C)

Secretary General Annan: Thank you very much. In fact, one of the European leaders said to me that France, Germany, etc. have said something, but the United States and UK have not. (S)

The President: Tony Blair is supposed to call in the next hour. When he calls, I will ask him to say something also. (C)

Secretary General Annan: EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

I find in these situations that when the whole world comes together, we always make progress. (S)

The President: Okay, I got it. (U)

Secretary General Annan: Thank you Bill and give my best to the family. (U)

The President: I will, thank you so much. (U)

Secretary General Annan: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Miles Murphy,
Doug Bayley

DATE, TIME April 11, 1999, 1:00 - 1:13 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Bill, how are you? (U)

The President: Fine, how are you? (U)

President Chirac: It is very good to hear from you. (U)

The President: Thank you. I just wanted to check in with you to see where we are on Kosovo. I think Kofi Annan made a very good statement on Friday, the way he stated our conditions. The only difference, of course, is that he asked NATO to suspend airstrikes once Milosevic commits to the conditions. But I think we need some sign of implementation first. I am very encouraged that the G-8 political directors' statement has Russia involved. If we can lock that in at the highest levels, I think we can get back on the diplomatic track. (C)

President Chirac: I absolutely share these feelings. I also think that Kofi Annan's statement is perfect. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Well, I think we are agreed on that. I just wanted to mention one or two other things. First, Hubert, Robin Cook and Madeleine will meet with their NATO counterparts in Brussels on Monday. This is an important signal of our determination, and makes sure the smaller Allies not in the Contact Group don't feel left out. I am going to call some of them, especially those contributing forces. Any that you feel particularly close to, if you have the occasion, you could say something useful to them. It would be helpful to spend a little time shoring them up. (C)

President Chirac: I am in absolute agreement, and I shall make my contributions to this effort. I also intend to ask Schroeder, as President of the European Union, to do so. I would also like to add that we have a European Union Council on Wednesday. There will be 15 heads of European states and governments present. At this time we shall consider Kosovo in the spirit just indicated, which will allow heads of smaller governments to express their points of view. It is even possible Kofi Annan might come, and this is something that would greatly please the German president. (C)


The President: That is very good. Let me mention a couple other things. I really appreciate what you have done with the refugees. The situation is beginning to get in better shape, but we need to be sensitive to what is happening to the front line states. We need to ask our people what we are going to do after this is over to help the resettlement of Kosovo and the larger recovery efforts. There may be a way after this is over to get all these countries involved in a common economic endeavor that will reduce ethnic strife. We need to start to think about this now. We need the best people in all these countries thinking about what it will look like five years from now, assuming we get a diplomatic solution here. (C)

President Chirac: This is also my feeling. Also, what we wish to do with the European Union. Also, the specific problem of the refugees, but more precisely the displaced persons, who are still in Kosovo and cannot get out. And we know neither where they are, nor what state they are in. It will be necessary to consider help by the military, particularly how to get more

information about the situation and, if need be, to parachute in the necessary help. (S)


The President: Yes, that is very good. One last thing. I got a couple letters from Yeltsin last week that I thought were pretty encouraging, notwithstanding the rather inflammatory public comments he made. In the next week or so, once we get this G-8 statement nailed down, we ought to make an effort to get the Russians back in the game, and that might serve Yeltsin at home where he is fending off attacks in the Duma. (S)

President Chirac: Yes, I have heard of a resumption of dialogue between Russia and America, and I know Madeleine is meeting with Ivanov on Tuesday. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d




The President: Yes, well, I think that if we can just keep the pressure up, I think we may get a break in the next couple of weeks, Jacques. If we can keep the pressure up. We just have to stay after it. (S)

President Chirac: This is quite possible. The unity of NATO countries is perfect. [redacted]



The President: Yes. (U)

President Chirac: [redacted]



The President: Yes, it is very, very unstable. I am very worried about it. But we are trying to get them to take a higher profile in an attempt to promote stability, because on one hand it brings Russia closer to Europe, and on the other, Yeltsin can say to the nationalists he is trying to stop the bombing. (S)

President Chirac: Yes, I completely agree, and we can make use of the NATO-Russia partnership. (S)

The President: Yes, okay, I will see you here pretty soon, but if we need to talk this week, I will be around all week. I may need to call you again. (C)

President Chirac: Okay, everything is absolutely clear. As long as we stay on the Kofi Annan process, I think we can achieve success.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, I agree with that. (S)

President Chirac: Okay, Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you, Jacques. (U)

President Chirac: Please give my regards to Hillary, and I will see you soon. (U)

The President: All right, good bye. (U)

President Chirac: Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

4-12-99

WASHINGTON

2079

IB

- ① next 72 hrs. critical
- ② hit too few pts last night
- ③ do more w/ China missile
- ④ SPC EUR more authority
- ⑤ put Sr. NATO person in Macedonia
- ⑥ hit more - cut off bridges
 - all of major Media
 - council of ops
 - cut pass. pts.

JC

- ① agree going badly
- ② accept gett. call of day, rule
- ③ aim to hit Northwester in down to comp - NATO's fault
- ④ favor gett. will strike - to go ahead to push III -
- ⑤ Review of test
- ⑥ want to be before of today in - trust NATO.

Argues

- ① cut back

Category of Nation

4-19-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

TELEPHONE CALLS

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1999

TELEPHONE CALLS TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR,
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN

Handwritten notes:
Blair
Chirac
Chretien

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *(Signature)*

I. PURPOSE

Blair. Review UK paper. Discuss shoring up Allies on widening the range of targets and the NATO Summit.

Chirac. Press Chirac to stay for duration of NATO Summit. Secure support for pressing on with the NATO air campaign and widening the range of targets.

Chretien. Express appreciation for strong support, including decision to contribute more fighters. Ask him to buck up Chirac on the NATO Summit. Get readout of Zhu's Canada visit.

II. BACKGROUND

Blair. You spoke to Blair today about moving to Phase III. You'll want to discuss the paper he is sending as well as ways to prevail upon Chirac to stay for the entire NATO Summit. Blair may again raise better coordination on NATO communications -- the British press termed the convoy incident an understandable accident of war but a public relations disaster because of inept handling by NATO public affairs officials.

Chirac [Redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[Redacted] You should prevail upon Chirac to stay for the duration because: (i) every day of the Summit has a Kosovo focus and discussions for which he needs to be present; (ii) leaving early would send

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a terrible message of Allied disunity; (iii) we have eliminated or toned down the celebratory aspects of the summit. If necessary, you can remind Chirac that not only did you attend the Lyons G-8 in the wake of the Khobar Towers bombing, you kept your promise to dine with him in Paris.

Meanwhile, Chirac continues to take a strong public line on Kosovo, speaking to the French people at regular intervals to maintain support for the airstrikes. His leadership has been effective for NATO and for Chirac personally -- the French public's support for the airstrikes (70 percent) is topped only by their support for Chirac (job approval rating: 79 percent). Like Schroeder and D'Alema, Chirac is convinced that a key to maintaining public backing is to constantly take the initiative -- if the public senses stagnation or believes there is no end in sight to (ineffective) air strikes, their support could wane. Hence Chirac's support for the Fischer plan, his call for the UN to be more involved, his public efforts to woo the Russians on board, and his proposal that the EU administer any peace settlement.

EO 13526 1.4d

You also should know that Philippe Seguin, the leader of Chirac's Gaullist party but also his rival, quit Friday as party leader and head of its list for the European parliamentary elections. That's good news for Chirac in the long term because it marginalizes Seguin but bad news in the short term, because it makes the right's already bleak prospects in the European elections even bleaker. Finally, Chirac and the French are preoccupied with Algeria, whose election Friday was discredited by the withdrawal of all but the army-backed candidate.

Chretien wants to talk about the way ahead in Kosovo, how it will fit into the Summit and to give you a readout of Zhu's visit to Canada. He remains steadfastly behind NATO actions in Kosovo and is increasingly in favor of ground force intervention. This Monday, he won complete support

in Parliament for Canada's participation in Allied Force. Additionally, Ottawa will contribute another six F-18 fighters to the effort (bringing its contingent from 12 to 18 planes), and has agreed to take in up to 5,000 Kosovar refugees with pre-existing ties to Canada.

EO 13526 1.4d



Attachments

- Tab A Points to be Made for Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Points to be Made for President Chirac
- Tab C Points to be Made for Prime Minister Chretien

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

- Agree that Summit is pivotal.
- We'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, and show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic. We'll also want to work quietly to deal with any blockages.
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit, showing how we intend to step up economic pressure. I understand that concept is being questioned by France and Italy in NATO; hope that you can help unstick it.
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.
- Our staff should remain in close touch over the next few days^r as we prepare for the Summit. Reserve judgment for now on the need for them to come here.
- Look forward to talking with you Thursday morning.
- Chirac sending signals he may leave Summit as early as Friday because we did not shorten it, focus it entirely on Kosovo as he wants. In fact, there's a heavy Kosovo focus every day for which he is needed, we've gotten rid of the celebratory aspects and his leaving early would send a terrible message about Allied disunity. Maybe you can talk to him about this.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

- Pleased that you're willing to expand range of targets in NATO's air campaign. Essential that we intensify the air strikes and make our determination clear to Milosevic.
- ✓ Appreciate strong messages you and Lionel Jospin delivered on national TV and to the National Assembly.
- ✓ NATO Summit provides important opportunity to demonstrate unity and determination and to show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic.
- It's possible that the Apaches in Task Force Hawk will be able to begin operations at the time of the Summit. That will send a strong signal.
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit, showing how we intend to step up economic pressure. I understand that your delegation has raised various questions in NATO; hope that you can help move it.
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.
- Understand your concerns about not wanting to be so long away from home. But Jacques, it is critical you stay for duration. We reworked agenda so that every day has a heavy Kosovo focus -- you are vital to these discussions. We've eliminated virtually all of the celebratory aspects. Finally, if you left early, it would send a terrible message of allied disunity.
- [If necessary: Jacques, I'd ask you to remember that after the Khobar Towers bombing, not only did I attend the Lyons G-8 as planned, I kept my dinner appointment with you in Paris.]

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- You've probably seen some of the reporting about dissension in the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's leadership. If we keep up the pressure, and make clear that it will intensify, there may be some hope of finding a crack in Belgrade's resolve.
- International pressure continues to mount. Thought Kofi's and the G-8 political directors statements were strong.

4-19-99

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN

Zhu Visit

- Understand you had good meetings with Zhu, and he's now off on a tour of Canada. Interested in your readout.

NATO Summit

- Need to start thinking about NATO Summit in week's time. Given Milosevic's attitude, probable NATO air campaign ongoing.
- We'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, as our Foreign Ministers did earlier this week. But we'll also want to show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic.
- You may have heard Chirac sending signals he may leave Summit as early as Friday because we failed to shorten it and focus everything on Kosovo. In fact, we've re-worked summit so that every day has a heavy Kosovo focus and we've eliminated the celebratory aspects. Most important, if Jacques were to leave early, it would send a terrible message of allied disunity. Maybe you can talk to him.

Kosovo

- Let me say first how much I appreciate your plans to contribute another six fighters.
- It's possible that the Apaches in Task Force Hawk will be able to begin operations at the time of the Summit. That will send a strong signal. Appreciate your sending an additional six CF-18s to participate in the air campaign.
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit, showing how we intend to step up economic pressure. I understand that concept has run into some opposition in NATO; hope that you can help move it.

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- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.
- You've probably seen some of the reporting about dissension in the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's leadership. If we keep up the pressure, and make clear that it will intensify, there may be some hope of finding a crack in Belgrade's resolve.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR

• Agree that Summit is pivotal.

NATO Summit

- ~~Need to start thinking about NATO Summit in week's time. Given Milosevic's attitude, probable NATO air campaign ongoing.~~
- We'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, ~~as our Foreign Ministers did earlier this week. But we'll also want to show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic. We'll also want to work quietly to deal with any blockages.~~ ^{and}
- Chirac sending signals he may leave Summit as early as Friday because we did not shorten it, focus it entirely on Kosovo as he wants. In fact, there's a heavy Kosovo focus every day for which he is needed, we've gotten rid of the celebratory aspects and his leaving early would send a terrible message about Allied disunity. Maybe you can talk to him about this.

Kosovo

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- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit, showing how we intend to step up economic pressure. I understand that concept ~~has run into some opposition~~ in NATO; hope that you can help unstick it. ^{is being questioned by France and Italy}
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.
- You've probably seen some of the reporting about dissension in the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's leadership. If we keep up the pressure, and make clear that it will intensify, there may be some hope of finding a crack in Belgrade's resolve.

• Our people ~~should~~ still should remain in close touch over the next few days as we prepare for the Summit. Reserve judgment for now on the need for them to come here. Thanks

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

Planned that you're will be expand range of targets in NATO's air campaign. Essential that we intensify the air strike NATO Summit and make our determination clear to Milosevic

- Need to start thinking about NATO Summit in week's time. Given Milosevic's attitude, probable NATO air campaign ongoing. *NATO Summit provides important opportunity*
- We'll want to demonstrate unity and determination, ^{and} as our Foreign Ministers did earlier this week. But we'll also want to show that we're stepping up pressure on Milosevic.
- Understand your concerns about not wanting to be so long away from home. But Jacques, it is critical you stay for duration. We reworked agenda so that every day has a heavy Kosovo focus -- you are vital to these discussions. We've eliminated virtually all of the celebratory aspects. Finally, if you left early, it would send a terrible message of allied disunity.
- [If necessary: Jacques, I'd ask you to remember that after the Khobar Towers bombing, not only did I attend the Lyons G-8 as planned, I kept my dinner appointment with you in Paris.]

Kosovo

- It's possible that the Apaches in Task Force Hawk will be able to begin operations at the time of the Summit. That will send a strong signal. Appreciate strong messages you and Lionel Jospin delivered on national TV and to the National Assembly.
- We could also aim to announce the NATO maritime inspection regime at the Summit, showing how we intend to step up economic pressure. I understand that concept has run into some opposition in NATO; hope that you can help move it. *delegations gov. ...*
- Finally, it would be good if our statement indicated the intention of all allies to tighten economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. Our Foreign Ministers' meeting with front-line states can be used for the same purpose.

- You've probably seen some of the reporting about dissension in the FRY, and questions being raised about Milosevic's leadership. If we keep up the pressure, and make clear that it will intensify, there may be some hope of finding a crack in Belgrade's resolve.
- International pressure continues to mount. Thought Kofi's and the G-8 political directors statements were strong.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Schroeder (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder

Interpreter: Harry Obst
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Roger Merletti,
Robin Rickard and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME June 3, 1999, 1:35 - 1:45 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Chancellor Schroeder: Hello, Bill. This is Gerd Schroeder. We have just had the report of Mr. Ahtisaari and it looks to me, after reading it, like a real breakthrough in the situation. The parliament has approved this, the principles of the NATO proposals, and that approval looks to me like that is the same as implementation. (S)

The President: Gerhard, would you ask the intepreter to say that again? (U)

(Interpreter repeats the Chancellor's previous statement)

The President: What the parliament approved is slightly different from NATO's proposal, as they left out the word "all" in terms of troop withdrawal, but it looks helpful. We have to say, obviously, that we appreciate the work that Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari have done and we appreciate the vote in the parliament, but we feel that we need to see some results. We don't want to be once again in the position of thinking we have an agreement and then not have it materialize. We will keep working this but want to see concrete results. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I understand. Well, it looks to us as if it were true. It speaks of the withdrawal of all Serbian troops, it speaks to the repatriation of the refugees and it

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does speak also to having a NATO core in the peacekeeping force. Now it also says this will be dealt with in the Security Council. Now what we have to do is bring about this Security Council meeting as fast as possible. Already, I believe the NATO military experts are sitting down with the Yugoslav military experts. Time is of the essence, we should move this forward as fast as possible. (S)

The President: I agree that we ought to move this forward as fast as possible. My real concern today is only for our public rhetoric. If we are overly positive and there is no caution in our rhetoric, he may not comply. He may get his bombing pause and he'll turn everything back to mud. We need to see real compliance. I agree we should push forward quickly but my only concern is that the NATO Allies be somewhat cautious in our public statements -- so that we don't think that their words are as good as their deeds. He has made a lot of deals in the six years that I have been working with him that he has not kept. I think this one will be kept if we show firmness. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I think our military people have already worked all this out. I don't think we need to talk about it on this line or publicly, but I think our military people have reached a solution on that. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Okay. I agree, by the way, that it would definitely be wrong to spread euphoria in public statements. We are not about to do that. We will do so in a rational, straightforward manner but also indicate there is hope. (S)

The President: Okay. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I hope we will stay in touch. (U)

The President: This could make for a better G-8 meeting in Cologne if this works out. (U)

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Chancellor Schroeder: Yes. Okay. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Chretien

Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Michael Manning,
Miles Murphy and K. C. Brown

DATE, TIME June 6, 1999, 1:35 - 1:42 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Jean, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: I'm doing great. I am beside my lake, and I've got a book I'm sure you read by Michener, a book about Kennedy. It's a good book. There was some rain, so I am just resting at this moment. (U)

The President: That's good. It looks like we got that salmon thing settled. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Yes. That is settled and we managed to settle the magazine thing too, and now I have to see if the war is settled. (U)

The President: That is what I wanted to talk to you about, because we have a little danger here with the Serbs. The Serbs yesterday had three different positions. The Russians were saying we can't approve a UN resolution until the bombing pause, and the Serbs were saying we can't withdraw until NATO comes in because we don't want a vacuum, which I'm sympathetic with. We said we can't have a pause until there is a withdrawal, so we

offered a bombing pause if they begin withdrawal and then we would try 24 hours for a resolution. We didn't want the Chinese and Russians to have a veto and then get a UN resolution, which we could get in short order. (S)

Now the Serbs are coming back at us; they and the Russians want to say they need a resolution before we will deploy and authority to implement these other changes they want. If there is a delay, then the Serbians would stay at the levels they were before they invaded. That is just a way of stealing the peace after losing the conflict. (S)

As long as we stay together, they will agree today or tomorrow. They are trying to give the Russians a veto over everything that happens after this is resolved. I have wanted the Russians to be involved, and I'm pleased they are and want to repair the ties between NATO and Russia, but not if it means he is going to wreck this mission. If it were up to the Russians, they will screw this resolution around, watering down what we can do. (S)

The only reason I called you is that I think it is important that all of us stick behind the positions of our negotiators. We can't let the Russians design and dictate. That's exactly what we would be doing if we said there has to be a UN resolution. We just can't do that. We would have gone to all this trouble for nothing and given it all back to them. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: For me, I have no strong view one way or the other. I think it is over now, and everybody, the Russians, I think, and the Serbs want a fig leaf. (S)

The President: I don't mind about a fig leaf, but if it breaks down, then, the Kosovars won't come home. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: We have to make sure the Kosovars can go home safely and if there is no such agreement it will be very difficult, because of the Kosovar freedom fighters. (S)

The President: Yes, the moderates and the KLA will work with us, but there will be some risk. The operational integrity in what we do is very, very important. Thank you for all your help. I just wanted to say that. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: That's a big deal for me. I hope we stop bombing as soon as possible, but if the bombing takes a few more days, it is all right with me because it is better to do it properly. They want a UN resolution first. (S)

The President: As long as we hang on. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: So they want a resolution first? (S)

The President: Yes, but we can't. That is fine if we try to get one but if we don't get one, we have to go on anyway. We don't want to give the Russians a veto over the contents of the resolution, because they will be ruthless and will basically undo everything that was done over the last few days. Even France, who has always been strong on this, has admitted if we try for a day to get a resolution and can't, we should go in under a NATO order. I think if everyone stays together on this, we should have an agreement within the next 48 hours. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: OK, no problem. I will side with you. (S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Have you been playing? (U)

The President: Yes, I played yesterday and may get to play nine holes today. We are celebrating my mother-in-law's 80th birthday. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: I played golf yesterday and had my best game ever. I shot a 79 and had five pars and a birdie on the back nine. (U)

The President: Good for you. That is wonderful. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: OK, Bill, we will keep in touch, and all the other problems are settled. I got a little bit of flap here in Canada because I was not tough enough on the magazines, but that is settled. On salmon, we have an agreement for 10 years. It is always a touchy issue, and your senators and governors of Washington and Oregon were a little much for Canadians, but that is all right. We put it in a different context of conservation more than catching fish, and they were a little easier to handle when we talked about conservation. (S)

The President: Yes, that's important to do, because our big problem is with the Alaskans. The people in Washington and Oregon were closer to Canada. (S)

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Prime Minister Chretien: OK. I am happy with that, so I will see you in a couple of weeks in Germany. (U)

The President: I can't wait. Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Italian Prime Minister D'Alema
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister D'Alema

Interpreter: Sim Smiley
Notetakers: Michael Manning and Miles
Murphy

DATE, TIME June 6, 1999, 2:15 - 2:36 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello. Massimo? (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Hello. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking this call. I wanted to talk to you a minute about the negotiations. (C)

Prime Minister D'Alema: And that is exactly the same thing I wanted to talk to you about. (C)

The President: Yesterday, we had basically three positions. The Russians wouldn't go to the UN for a resolution until there was a bombing pause. We said we couldn't pause until there was evidence that the troops were withdrawing. The Serbs said, and it was the only thing that I was sympathetic to, they didn't want to withdraw and leave a vacuum. They wanted us to come in as they were withdrawing. So we arrived at what I thought was a good solution. We said, okay you start the withdrawal, we will have a pause and try for 24 hours to get a UN Resolution, but if we fail, we will then go to NATO and get approval to go in. (S)

So I thought we would have an agreement on this basis, but today they came back, the Serbs, and said before deployment, before the mission can be carried out, there has to be a UN Resolution. The problem with that, obviously, is they will try to give the

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Russians veto power over the nature and design of our deployment, of the entire operation, and if that happens, they will then try to give back to the Serbs what they have lost in the conflict. And we will have a situation where it would become unmanageable quickly, and they will add a lot of requirements that will keep the Kosovars from coming home. I think if we can all be firm with our positions we will be fine in a day or so, but I wanted to call to let you know that is where I think things are. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes. I certainly understand we need guarantees on the composition of the force and of the NATO presence on the force itself.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, I agree with that. In Bosnia, we found that solution by having them work in one sector, with the United States, but that wouldn't be acceptable this time because they blame us for the whole thing in Kosovo. So we have to find another solution, but I think the same basic outline will work, where they work with the local commander, one force, but not strictly under NATO. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes, I think that the most crucial point in all this is the technical-military agreement. That is the crucial point now.

The President: I am too but we cannot give the Russians veto power over the design of what is going on. We have to be sensitive to them not serving under NATO, but we cannot let them decide who goes where and in what numbers, because if we did, they would simply install Milosevic again. That is what they would do. We have to keep working over the next day or so. I think we all have to stay together. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes. I agree. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema:

The President: Yes. I agree. The most important thing is to keep the Russians from getting a veto. If we try to get a Resolution and fail, they have to know we are more than willing to stop the bombing and that we want this thing to be over. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema:

The President: I agree with you. We set certain conditions and that is not one of them. We have to honor that. So if the agreement is reached, I will agree with you. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: I think that when we have peace the truth will come out. Witnesses will come out, the problem will explode on the public scene and the public will become aware of the real Milosevic, but we cannot put it on the agenda now. (S)

The President: Yes. I agree with you. First things first. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: There was one last thing I wanted to say. We are very close to agreement on the Silvia Baraldini case and the Ambassador is aware of this. Very soon, in the next few days, we will be able to make this announcement, and I wanted to thank you very much for your help on this matter. (S)

The President: Yes. I know how important this was to you. I asked our people to work hard on it. I hope it will be worked out and that it will be helpful to you when it is. (C)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes. I think so, and I think it will be considered an important signal of the good relations between the United States and Italy. I think that it will be considered a sign of goodwill toward Italy, and for this I thank you. (C)

The President: Thank you. I will be back in touch in a few days. I will see you in Germany. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith and
Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello?

Secretary General Solana: How are you? Good morning to you.

The President: It really is a good morning.

Secretary General Solana: Good morning, in all the sense of the phrase. You have done a really great job. It would not have been done without your leadership. It succeeded because we really maintained the line to the last minute. And we were able to maintain the allies until the last minute. It was fantastic. Thank you very much for everything you have done.

The President: We could not have done it without you. You kept them all together.

Secretary General Solana: When we have forces deployed on the ground in the next few days it will be a memorable picture that will be unforgettable. We will see what we have done. We have established Allied links of friendship among ourselves that can not be broken. We must maintain that forever.

The President: You've got it. Thanks very much.

Secretary General Solana: Thank you so much.

The President: Have a great day.

Secretary General Solana: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Italian Prime Minister D'Alema
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister D'Alema

Interpreter: Elizabeta Ullman
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti and
Jim Smith

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 10:56 - 10:59 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. Massimo? (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: I just called to say thank you. It has been a great day for all of us. I know what a tremendous burden you have borne through this whole thing, and I just wanted to call and say thank you. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Mr. President, I have gathered around me all of our military pilots; I have come here to thank them, and there is also a presence of some Allied officers and an American general. I will give your regards to everyone here. I am on one of the most active bases during the conflict. (U)

The President: I hope you will tell your military people how grateful I am for their brave and effective performance. I am very gratified by what they have done. Especially those of you in Italy, for whom this was a very difficult thing. I am very grateful. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes, I believe that Italy has to get used to becoming a grown-up country and take up its own

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responsibilities. It was a hard test, but I think we have grown up a lot. (S)

The President: Well, you certainly performed in a magnificent manner. I cannot wait to see you in Cologne. We have a lot to discuss there. (S)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Yes, we have a meeting there. I think it is important and useful to organize a meeting in the fall. I think it will be an opportunity for you to come to Italy for a couple of days. (U)

The President: Yes. We are hoping to work that out. I think it is important. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Thank you very much, and I will see you in Cologne. (U)

The President: Thank you very much and goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Arrivederci. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Spanish President Aznar

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Aznar

Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti
and Jim Smith

DATE, TIME: June 10, 1999, 11:40 - 11:43 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Aznar: Hello?

The President: Jose Maria?

President Aznar: How are you?

The President: Fine, thank you. I just called to thank you so much for your loyal support to NATO. This is a good day for us. I just wanted to say thank you.

President Aznar: I'm very happy that you called me. Thank you so much. I'm very happy with your leadership and the success of the operation.

The President: Thank you.

President Aznar: I think you can also count on Spain continuing to cooperate in this new phase. We will cooperate militarily as well as politically, of course.

The President: I can't wait. There is still a lot of hard work to do but we can do it.

President Aznar: Well, we've done a very tough job. We have a tough job ahead, but when all of us work together, we achieve our objectives.

The President: And we always will if we stay together.

President Aznar: Well, you know you can rely on me personally and on Spain. No doubt together we will achieve our goals.

The President: That's great. I will see you soon. Thank you.

President Aznar: Listen, thank you for your call and, just one second, let me ask you, how are the cigars doing?

The President: I just smoked the last one yesterday. Hillary got mad at me because I stopped chewing them and started smoking them. They were too good to keep chewing.

President Aznar: It is much better to smoke them. As I told you, I am reserving one very special cigar that I'll smoke during Hillary's campaign in New York.

The President: Thank you. I'll tell her that.

President Aznar: I hope to see you soon and thank you for the call. All the best.

The President: Thank you.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti
and James Smith

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 11:35 - 11:37 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques?

President Chirac: Bill? Oh, How are you? Congratulations to you.

The President: You too. I just called to thank you.

President Chirac: That is very nice of you. This is a really great success, also a great success for cooperation between the United States and France. Also. Not "only," but "also."

The President: Absolutely.

President Chirac: We are very glad, and French public opinion is very satisfied.

The President: Now we have to get the refugees back in and make it work. I just called to say thank you. We can talk more in Cologne.

President Chirac: Yes, we have, in a week, a dinner in a little bistro in France and we can talk a little longer, but I think everything is going to go all right now.

The President: Well, I can't thank you enough.

President Chirac: Oh, we can thank each other. We have been together and we have been right.

The President: Yes, the same as in Bosnia. Now we have a real chance for Europe to be put right and continue this move toward integration on security and economic strategy. I think 20 years from now this will be looked back on as a great day.

President Chirac: Yes, I think so, too. Public opinion in France approved this all the time like in the United States.

The President: I can't wait to see you. Hillary can't wait to see you.

President Chirac: All my love to Hillary, too. See you soon.

The President: I can't wait. Goodbye.

President Chirac: We will see you in a French bistro. I can't wait to see you. Thank you for calling. I am moved. Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Chretien

Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Jim Smith and
Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 11:45 - 11:47 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Jean, I just called to say thank you. This is a
good day for us. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Oh, good, I am very happy. It is a
great success you got, that we got collectively, to be able to
remain together during these difficult times. (U)

The President: We did and I think it is a great thing for
Europe too. We have to help them so the mission in Kosovo
doesn't get screwed up. This will give Europe enormous self-
confidence because they didn't wait like Bosnia and allow the UN
to unintentionally ratify the ethnic cleansing. I think this
will lead to a more unified Europe and is in the long-term best
interests of the United States and Canada. Reversing ethnic
cleansing is very important. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: You can be sure we will do our part.
We haven't decided how many we will send. We know you have
seven to eight thousand. I already have eight hundred. NATO
wants a thousand more but I don't know if we can afford it. (U)

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The President: Do the best you can. Your guys are so competent and so good. I know one thing we will have hell doing is trying to figure out how to prevent the understandable blood lust of the Kosovars from running against the Serbs that want to stay. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: When do you expect troops to move into Kosovo? (S)

The President: Tomorrow. It has to be tomorrow. We can't wait long because I am afraid these refugees will pour across the border like the Israelites out of Egypt. We have to get the mines out. We don't want a bunch of refugees having their legs blown off trying to go home. (S)

Prime Minister Chretien: We will be participating all the way. Thank you for calling. (S)

The President: Okay, I'll see you in Cologne. (U)

Prime Minister Chretien: Yep. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Portuguese Prime Minister
Guterres (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Guterres

Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Robert Ford,
George Chastain, Sean Tarver, Roger
Merletti and Jim Smith

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 1:47 - 1:49 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Prime Minister Guterres: Hello, Bill. Congratulations, it is a
big day. (U)

The President: I just called to thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Guterres: Not at all. You have nothing to thank
me for. We have all to thank you. You did the right thing.
(U)

The President: I just wanted to say thanks. We had a hard job,
and we have a hard job ahead of us, but you were wonderful. (U)

Prime Minister Guterres: No, I must confess, in my opinion all
this was possible because of the decisions taken at the
Washington Summit. Your position was critical. The opposition
was also key to making this happen. I am very happy, but now we
have a lot to do and many problems to face. But you can count
on us. We are a small country, but our effort will be
proportional, if it is at all possible. (U)

The President: Thank you so much. (U)

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Prime Minister Guterres: I think it will be a very hard task now to make things move in Kosovo, but our experience with the Kosovars is that they want to come back. (U)

The President: Yes. We've got to get them home as quickly as possible. It'll be difficult, but it's possible. (U)

Prime Minister Guterres: Fine. All the best. Thanks. (U)

The President: Thanks. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Guterres: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Kok

Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti and
Jim Smith

DATE, TIME: June 10, 1999, 2:01 - 2:07 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Wim? (U)

Prime Minister Kok: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: I called to say thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Kok: Well, thank you. You did it, the Americans. We gave you all the support you needed, but you did it. I'm most happy for what we realized. (U)

The President: I think it's a great day for Europe. It will be a great day if we can get most of them to go home now. We'll have a reverse in the ethnic cleansing in a way that we couldn't do in Bosnia because it went on so long. (Ø)

Prime Minister Kok: Absolutely, if we can get them home before winter starts in November and October or even September. There is a lot to be done. (Ø)

The President: I think the confidence and the pride I sense in Europe is a great thing. They're so proud. I talked to D'Alema, and it was very hard for him, and they are so proud, and now we have to make the peace work. If we can do this, we may have stopped a lot of this elsewhere. We have been working quietly, and hopefully can talk more later, but we have tried

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quietly for four years in Africa to try to prevent another Rwanda with a rapid reaction force. I think if we can have a set-up now elsewhere, we can stop this from happening in the future, it will be a great thing. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: This will certainly have an effect elsewhere in Europe. I must tell you, here in the Netherlands during the last few weeks, there was a growing sentiment that we needed some kind of pause in the bombing. But I think the way it was done was the best exercise, facilitating the Chinese to agree on the UN resolution. (S)

But I must say, Bill, I was there as you were in the last few weeks and I am so impressed by what Albania, Macedonia and others need in terms of logistics support. At the same time, we have to invest politically and militarily in the future of the whole region, if not elsewhere. (S)

With no economic perspective, people tend even more to nationalistic policies. We are now entering summer but must be aware of the fact that now is when our responsibility starts. To rebuild. Reconstruct. (S)

The President: One thing I'd like you to think about. I will raise all those issues at the G-8 in Cologne next week. I know the EU already began a partnership relationship with countries in Southeast Europe, but it seems to me if we could package this thing structurally the way the Marshall Plan worked, I know it's an over-used analogy, but if we could say to Macedonia, even to Montenegro and Albania, but also to Romania and Bulgaria, "Get yourselves together as a unit and we will do the following things that will be very helpful." The United States will help, but it is important for the EU to take the lead. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: Yes, I have considered that. There is a certain premium on it now. (S)

The President: It could be a dressed up customs union, I don't know, whatever we want, but something to make them say, "We will deepen regional integration with Europe based on common principles and, in return for that, will depend on the EU for help." The Canadians will pitch in and we'll do our part. (S)

Prime Minister Kok: That's a very good idea. I will think about it, Bill. (U)

The President: Thanks, Wim. (U)

Prime Minister Kok: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Schroeder (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Schroeder

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Roger Merletti, James
Smith and Lawrence Butler

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 4:00 - 4:04 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Gerhard, I just called to say thank you. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I have to thank you. Without America, it would have been impossible to intervene in Kosovo. (U)

The President: But we did a good thing together. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I think so. (U)

The President: Yes, me too. And I think now we just have to keep working, we have to make it work. We have to win the peace, now that we've won the conflict. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I think the most important job for us is to make sure the country gets back on its feet economically and politically. They have to in Macedonia and Albania and especially in Montenegro. (U)

The President: Yes, I agree. I strongly support it and will help as much as I can. I think the first thing is to make sure landmines are out of the way, and get the refugees out of Macedonia as soon as we can, then we have to go to work on the economy. It's a decision for Europe, but I would like to see some efforts made in the whole eastern European region for a reconstruction effort that will involve everyone, pull them

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closer together and closer to Europe. I think there is a model there in the Marshall Plan, not so much in the money, but in the way it was done. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I totally agree. We can talk about the details, but it's important to develop the region economically and to give it some prospect of becoming part of Europe. This whole thing should be done in step. There are many economic differences, but it's important they have the prospect eventually of joining. Germany was in support of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joining the EU. We are also in favor of eastern countries being given the prospect of eventually joining. That is something we have to continue to support, this is not a short-lived thing. We intend to work on it. (S)

The President: Well, I think we will have a chance to talk more at the EU, but I think you're going to have a good summit at Cologne, now. It'll be much happier than it might have been. We'll have to work on it together. It was nice to hear your voice. I just wanted to thank you today. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I also thank you very much for your good cooperation and I look forward to seeing you again. (U)

The President: Okay. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Dehaene

Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Robert Ford, Sean Tarver, Roger Merletti,
Jim Smith, Lawrence Butler and Sam Moyn

DATE, TIME June 10, 1999, 4:10 - 4:11 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jean-Luc.

Prime Minister Dehaene: Hello, Bill.

The President: I just called to say thank you.

Prime Minister Dehaene: I think that together we did a good job.

The President: Yes, I think we did a good thing for the world.

Prime Minister Dehaene: I think that it is a good agreement, but now it will be a question of putting the necessary means in and helping the whole area stabilize.

The President: We can do that.

Prime Minister Dehaene: I think so.

The President: We have to work on it.

Prime Minister Dehaene: I think that if we can work the same way, between you and the EU, we can realize it.

The President: Yes, I am optimistic, but there are a lot of operational problems, but I think we can do it. I am looking forward to it and just wanted to call and say thank you very much.

Prime Minister Dehaene: I appreciate it. I think that between NATO and the EU it was a very good thing.

The President: Me too.

Prime Minister Dehaene: Okay, goodbye.

The President: Goodbye.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Bilateral Meeting Between the President and
German Chancellor Schroeder (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Steven Ricchetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
John Kornblum, Ambassador to Germany
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European
Affairs, NSC Staff, (notetaker)

Germany
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister
Michael Steiner, National Security Advisor
Hans Blomeyer, Assistant to the Chancellor
for North America

DATE, TIME June 18, 1999, 2:55 - 3:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Gurzenich, Germany

Chancellor Schroeder: Well, first let me extend to you our warmest welcome. I hope you will get a chance to enjoy the city. (U)

The President: We went out for a wonderful meal last night -- we had a great time and I contributed to the local economy. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Perhaps we could start by talking about Kosovo. (U)

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The President: Why don't I let Sandy give us a report on where we are. (U)

National Security Advisor Berger: It's been an intense two days. The Russians have kept insisting on their own sector. But now we have just heard that they have fallen off that. Where we are now, is that they would have two battalions in our sector, one in the French sector and one in yours. The last two would be contiguous areas, kind of like a figure eight. But the contiguity would be very small. The remaining issues seemed to be figuring out the airport logistics. The Russians want 1500. The British believe that is very excessive. The Russians may also want a 5th battalion. Secretary Cohen is going to say to them "you have until 4:30 to make a deal." (C)

The President: I think this will work out. It's really more about what is going on inside of Russia. What is disturbing is the belief even among the Yeltsin group that we went to war in Kosovo to extend our influence from the Caucasus to the Caspian. That we want to push back the Russians. Of course, this is not true, but we have to convince them of that. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder:

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The President: I agree. And that's why we have to be a little bit flexible. But the red lines are very clear and must not change. First, they cannot have their own sector. The Kosovar Albanians would not go home. It would be a recipe for carnage. Second, there can be no defacto partition. That would be tantamount to losing the peace. But within those red lines I think we can be flexible without embarrassing the Russians. In a larger sense, we need them to understand that this is not about territory, or wealth but to reverse ethnic cleansing. This is not 19th century great power politics. Now given the unique German relationship with Russia, I think you have a unique ability to influence them and help to see what our goals really are. My time is running out, and so is Yeltsin's. I have done my best to support them. Now, I just spoke to Blair. He agrees that we should talk about this tonight. One thing we discussed was to try and bring more parliamentarians to Russia and vice versa. What we need to do is to move the center of Russian politics. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: You know we just had this EU Summit. We adopted a joint statement and an approach to Russia. It goes beyond government-to-government affairs. It includes economic political and youth contacts. A more integral approach as you were saying -- that's the only way to reassure their fears. They are the younger generation of Russian politicians and ironically they have not had the international exposure that the older ones have had. We need to make sure that we work with the up and coming people as well. (C)

The President: Can we talk about Kosovo? Let's assume the Russian piece works out. Then we've got a huge reconstruction job. We want to do our part. Setting aside the question of assistance, it seems to me there are two issues. First, rebuilding civil society in Kosovo. Second, the building of the Balkans as a whole with the EU Stability Pact Initiative. Now, it is vital that we get the right person to handle rebuilding in Kosovo. I don't care about nationality. I am worried that the decision will be political. Not based on competence and energy. We need to approach this as if we were hiring someone to do a job for a million Deutch Marks. What would we look for? Someone with political skills, since the people hate each other. Someone with human feeling, we will literally need to bring an army of psychiatrists and religious leaders. Someone who can handle the machinery of rebuilding houses and roads. Someone with tremendous energy, with real management ability, with imagination. Maybe someone who ran a big German company. That would be better than a former cabinet minister. We cannot allow politics to obscure the need to do it right. Just like our decision that we could not lose the war in Kosovo, it is a critical decision. If we get the wrong person, it will be a disaster. We need to work with Kofi on this. My only interest is finding the right person. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: I totally agree with that. But I wonder if we found a classical manager, would he or she would have the political skills and feeling necessary for the job. My experience is that good managers have organizational skills but this is a highly complex political environment as well. We have a German expression which is that we need a eight-legged warm milk pig. Obviously this doesn't translate but I think you get the point. (C)

The President: I agree with that. We need someone with strong political skills, with strong communications skills, and, of course, with a staff that can do the day-to-day. But again, that person also needs a strong will, energy, tremendous

organizational skills and also the approach to go there and stay there and let the world media come to him. He has to roll his sleeves up. To bring people together, to be deeply committed -- I'd love to do this job. It's incredibly challenging and we just have to find the right person. I understand the Europeans don't want an American. I don't care about the nationality, I don't care where he is from. If all of us could say to Kofi -- this is what we want: a strong person, real organizational skills, don't make a political decision -- that would be very helpful. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: We have also got to move forward on the Stability Pact for the region. (C)

The President: There is a Donor's Conference next month, right? (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, we have to do this speedily, possibly as early as next month. (C)

The President: Let me ask you to think about something. First, I recognize this is really about what the EU wishes to do. But there are two things I think it would be good to think about. First, we need to get the Balkans more integrated among themselves. Then, we need to push integration into Europe over time, including into our security system. I went back and studied what we did with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic after the Berlin Wall fell. And I also looked back at the Marshall Plan. So let me suggest a couple of ideas -- and let me also make clear that while I think the lead has to be with the EU and the international financial institutions on the financial side we will do our share. (C)


In the Marshall Plan, one of the smartest things they did was to say that the major condition for getting money beyond democracy is that recipients have to get together and define their needs as a group. They need to come together to define their future. So in addition to the Donors' Conference, it seems to me that getting the leaders of the Balkans together with us soon, in the region, and to say to them you need to assume responsibility, tell us how you want to allocate funds, and what your priorities are -- this would be an important thing to do and real incentive to get them to work more closely together. (C)

Second, we need to examine whether there are other things we can put on the table in terms of integration. Should we move up NATO enlargement and EU enlargement? If not, EU enlargement

right away, maybe a customs union. We need to create an environment in which the people of the region look forward to the future and create incentives to get them moving forward. Anyway, if you think it is a good idea, maybe we can try and move forward with a meeting of leaders in the region sometime during the next 30-60 days. I'll defer to you, but think about this, we just cannot afford to lose the peace. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: I very much agree especially about getting leaders together in the region. I think this is a very good idea.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d



Now about bringing countries into the EU. I have to tell you there is such a backlog that it will be hard to add them to the list. But ideas like a customs union or association agreements are important and we should pursue them. (C)

The President: One thing to think about is that doing it as a group, not just individual nations, can get these countries to work together, even though, of course, there are dramatic differences among them. It would create a group psychology. We need to set up a system in which countries are rewarded for working together to tell them we'll work with you if you work with each other. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, I think this is an interesting idea and we should talk some more about it. But for now I am afraid we will have to end this discussion or else the two of us will be accused of keeping everyone else waiting to start the Summit. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Former Chancellor Kohl

Interpreter: Birgitta Richman
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, George Chastain,
Robert Ford, Joel Ehrenreich and Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME June 21, 1999, 7:30 - 7:34 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hi, Helmut. I just called to say hello. (U)

Former Chancellor Kohl: Well, Bill, thank you very much. I hope you're doing well, and please also say hello to your wife. I hope you had a good time in Germany. (U)

The President: I had a wonderful time. I am so relieved we worked through our problems with Yeltsin. He seemed in a good frame of mind. (C)

Former Chancellor Kohl: I also had that impression. I talked to him and told him over and over that he had to toe the line now. You know, Bill, you have to discuss as much as possible with him. Everything you can nail down now you have settled. You don't know how things are going to work out with his successor. (C)

The President: Yes. I told him yesterday we have to finish this nuclear work, because he can't afford to let his successor throw it all away. (C)

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Former Chancellor Kohl: Very good. If you think I can do something from here, let me know, because everything you can do now is work well done. (Ø)

The President: Yes, I understand. (U)

Former Chancellor Kohl: Are you going directly home? (U)

The President: No, I'm on the way to Slovenia, then Macedonia, and then I'm going home. (U)

Former Chancellor Kohl: That is very good. Say some good things to the two in Slovenia and Macedonia; they need encouragement. And I think especially in Slovenia, things are going to develop well. (Ø)

The President: I think so, too. (Ø)

Former Chancellor Kohl: Bill, I am going to get in touch with you in two weeks or so in Washington. (U)

The President: Oh, that's great. I would love to hear from you. I look forward to hearing from you then, Helmut. (U)

Former Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much, and goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you, Helmut. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: United States-European Summit -- Restricted
Session (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
European Affairs

European Union
Gerhard Schroeder, Chancellor
Jacques Santer, President of the European
Commission
Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister
Michael Steiner, National Security Advisor
Sir Leon Brittan, European Commissioner

DATE, TIME June 21, 1999, 9:45 - 10:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Palais Schaumberg, Bonn, Germany

Chancellor Schroeder: Welcome, Mr. President. I am very pleased to see you in this special place where Adenauer ruled this country. I was happy to be able to show you his personal office. I must say it is much airier and lighter than the office that I work in right now. As you know, we've spent the last few days discussing problems between Europe and the United States. I think we've covered lots of ground. Today, I thought there were some points that we could discuss for further coordination. Maybe we can start with the question of how Europe and the United States should deal with the problem of Kosovo. We've obviously seen some very important progress; the Helsinki Agreement, which continued the G-8 success, and progress in demilitarization with the UCK. These are important

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achievements. Now, we need to jointly address the problem of reconstruction, not just for Kosovo but for all of the Balkans, as the Stability Pact establishes. (C)

As to the Leaders' Conference that you have proposed, we all agree on the need to move forward. I would propose as an appropriate venue, Sarajevo, and that we move quickly as early as July. We have to think about the contexts depending on who hosts the Conference. If the EU does it, then the invitations must be extended by the Finns who will assume the Presidency. If we put it under a G-8 umbrella, then we can extend the invitations. (C)

Security Advisor Michael Steiner: Ahtisaari could issue the invitations. Maybe we can ask him. (C)

The President: Yes, we should. I think it would be better to do this in July given all the fast moving events. I think the message should be: we're there for them but also that they need to work together and the sooner they do so, the better. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: We need to talk to Ahtisaari and organize this with the Finns. (C)

President Santer: With the EU, we are putting together a reconstruction program for Kosovo. We are setting up an agency to handle this. We're also preparing for the association of Macedonia and Albania. It is important to involve the whole region. Albania has a longer way to go because of the problem of institution building. But we are working on this -- although we must be clear it is not for tomorrow. (C)

The Agency that we are creating would take the lead for Kosovo reconstruction to coordinate humanitarian assistance and physical reconstruction programs. I think it would be good to locate it in the region, if possible in Pristina because the refugees are coming back and we need to have the presence of this agency on the ground. I hope the Commission will give us a green light soon to establish the agency. Meanwhile, we are sending in 20 civil servants to act as liaisons. We have tried to learn from the lessons of Bosnia. We need to move swiftly, to simplify the financial regulations. This agency is the answer. We will also take a lead in organizing the process of the Donors' Conferences. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: There is one question to raise again that we have already discussed and that is the relationship between

the European Union and Turkey.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[REDACTED]

The President: The fact that you made this initiative is very important and I strongly support it. I've always believed that if Turkey believed it had realistic prospects for entering the EU, this would create critical leverage to help resolve human rights problems and its difference with Greece. So what you've done is very helpful. (C)

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4d

[REDACTED] In the end, I think we need to put all of this into a larger context; the Aegean, human rights, Cyprus, and the relationship with Europe. (C)

President Santer: For us, this is important also because of the negotiations with Cyprus. It would be difficult to have a divided island in the EU. (C)

The President: I agree with that. If we can make progress on Cyprus, I believe the Greeks would remove their objections to Turkey in the EU. This week, there was a good sign with Turkey deciding to take the military judges off of the special court panels. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: [REDACTED]

Foreign Minister Fischer: There is also in the wider environment, in the European Parliament, a vast majority for having the human rights line, especially the Scandinavians, but also now Italy. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d There is a difference in perception between the United States and Europe regarding the final sentence and the death penalty. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: [redacted]

Foreign Minister Fischer: [redacted]

The President: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] In the end, we need a comprehensive deal that involves Cyprus, the Aegean, human rights, the Turks in Europe. We need to work very closely with them. We have an important military relationship with the Turks so we can play an important role. But at the same time, we have constraints because of that relationship. But together, we might have enough leverage to move things forward. Now is a good time because of Kosovo. As a result, Greece and Turkey are working together. But the trial complicates matters. We need a sustained effort. It's crazy to have this conflict over Cyprus. (C)

Michael Steiner: I like your idea of a comprehensive approach and the United States and Europe working together. The time might be right in September. It would allow us to take a step forward at the next EU Summit. (C)

The President: I am prepared over the next 18 months to spend a lot of time on this. And, of course, I have appointed a number of special envoys. But I think neither of us has enough leverage to do it alone. We need to do it together. The bottom

line is that I do not believe the Cyprus stalemate is worth the cost that it imposes on either side. (C)

National Security Advisor Berger: If I can add one thing and with all respect, I have watched the EU for six years on Turkey. Nothing has happened. Now the change in German views is a very important development. But the Greeks are blocking things. If Turkey really does embrace human rights requirements, can it truly be put in the queue for the EU, or will it always be in back of the line? (C)

President Santer:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

It is important for us to deal with Cyprus on a political level. We will be finishing a progress report in September.

Foreign Minister Fischer: The Stability Pact can help. The Greeks and Turks realize that they are neighbors in a region and they have common interests.

Secretary Albright: Of course, Turkey will also be the Chairman in office of the OSCE. (C)

Sir Leon Brittan: Realistically, we can give them a real place in the queue.

The President:

Anyway, I think we need to work this in the fall, putting all the cards on the table. (C)

Secretary Albright: There are also the confidence-building measures that Solana is working on. (C)

The President: When is Solana taking his new post? (C)

Security Advisor Michael Steiner: This fall. (U)

The President: Well, we need to move on a new NATO Secretary General. (C)

Let me just ask two other things about Kosovo. First, as I have said to the Chancellor already, it is vitally important that we pick or that the UN pick the right person for civil implementation. I raised this with Chirac and with Jospin. Jospin is proposing Kouschner. I don't know if he is good, but he sounds like he might be the right sort of person. We need someone with international stature, who can speak well, but most of all who can get things done. There must be German business person. This should not be a handout for political reasons. We all need to work Kofi on this. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: The second thing on the agenda is who is the right person to be the European Union coordinator for the Stability Pact? I think whoever it is needs the same qualities that you described. (C)

The President: Yes, I see we need two different people -- one for Kosovo, the other for the Stability Pact. What is the timetable? (C)

National Security Advisor Berger: The United Nations has the lead on Kosovo, in picking what will amount to a procounsel who will be charged with overseeing reconstruction, including the economic, political security and refugee return issues. (C)

Michael Steiner: And the other is the Stability Pact, which the EU will control. (C)

Secretary Albright: Who do you have in mind? (U)

Foreign Minister Fischer: Let me add also, that we need someone for Bosnia to replace Westendorf. We need to make all of these decisions quickly. Especially with the UCK trying to fill the vacuum in Kosovo. I hope we can sign the Stability Pact in Sarajevo at the heads-of-state level. But before then, we need to find the right people of high quality with quick decisions. (C)

The President: So what is your thinking? (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: We don't really have concrete candidates at the moment. (C)

Secretary Albright: Can I make a pitch for Ahtisaari for the Stability Pact. He leaves office as President in January or February. He will be heading the EU. He knows the problems well because he has been in Bosnia. I think he would be very strong, but I know that Joschka doesn't think this is a good idea. (C)

Foreign Minister Fischer: My only concern is that the first six months are key and it would be good to have the permanent person in place right away. (C)

Secretary Albright: What if we got someone to work with him during this time? (U)

Michael Steiner: He'll be deeply involved in the EU Presidency anyway. (C)

Foreign Minister Fischer: Whoever it is must live in Kosovo. Or at least in Sarajevo. (C)

Secretary Albright: He is such an asset, we really need to use him. (C)

Foreign Minister Fischer: If you don't like Bildt, we will need another name. (C)

The President: My only problem with him is that he was gone too much in Bosnia. (C)

National Security Advisor Berger: He had very good deputies. (C)

The President: Michael, do you think we need Bildt? (C)

Michael Steiner: Let's wait for a week on this. Let's give ourselves a week to make these decisions. (C)

The President: Let me just emphasize this is not a publicity job, it's a working job, in place. The media will come to whoever this person is. With the Stability Pact, it's ok to have a high profile person and he or she could work outside the area. (C)

National Security Advisor Berger: One other possibility is Paddy Ashdown. He's very talented. But I recognize it would be hard to have Brits in two jobs. (C)

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Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think our time has run out on the restricted session and I am determined to keep you on schedule. Why don't we move into the other room to meet with our ministers. (C)

-- End of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: U.S.-European Union Summit -- Plenary
Session (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Secretary Albright, Secretary of State
Charlene Barshefsky, Ambassador, United
States Trade Representative
Ambassador John Kornblum, Ambassador to
Germany
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Ambassador
to the European Union
Steven Ricchetti, Deputy Chief of Staff
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President
for Economics
David Aaron, Under Secretary of Commerce
Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State
Lael Brainard, Deputy Assistant to the
President for Economics
Antony J. Blinken, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
Europe, NSC
Lawrence Butler, Director of European
Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Germany
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister
Werner Mueller, Economics Minister
Michael Steiner, Chancellery Diplomatic
Advisor
Klaus Grestchmann, Chancellery Head for
Economics
Uwe-Karsten Heye, Chancellery Spokesperson
Franz Kudlich, European Council Secretariat

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President Jacques Santer, European
Commission
Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President
Hans-Friedrich Beseler, Director General
Hugo Paemen, Washington EC Delegation head
Ivan Rogers, Head of Sir Leon Brittan's
Office
Christine Roger, Counselor to the President

DATE, TIME June 21, 1999, 10:40 - 11:10 a.m.
PLACE: Kabinettsaal, Schaumburg Palace, Bonn,
Germany

Chancellor Schroeder: Let's get started. I would like to
invite our ministers to report on their meeting. (U)

Charlene Barshefsky: First, I would like to say what a pleasure
it has been working with Sir Leon Brittan. I have great
personal affection for Sir Leon. (U)

We met over the past hour to review the progress towards
implementation of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. We
welcomed the initiative to launch a pilot project on
biotechnology and noted progress on the services framework
agreement. There we agreed that we should include engineering
and insurance. We spent time talking about coordinating on
regulatory cooperation and the desirability of creating a
scientific panel, including consumer NGOs, to deal with food
safety issues. (C)

We also discussed the importance of science for the regulatory
process. WTO rules allow for precautionary measures when the
science is uncertain, but we cannot apply precaution in every
instance. (C)

Regarding the upcoming Seattle WTO ministerial, we agreed to
strive for a three-year round, and make progress on labor and
environmental aspects of trade. Other central areas will be
transportation, especially transportation and government
procurement, electronic commerce, and accelerated tariff
liberalization. (C)

We noted the importance of involving the frontline states
(Kosovo) in the WTO. We are already providing technical
assistance to Albania and Croatia in their bid to join; should
extend to Macedonia. (C)

Minister Mueller: Thank you, Charlene and the American delegation for your efforts today. Regarding food safety, it is hard to separate the scientific aspects from consumer fears in the debate. Though we strive for transparency, we must expect to get unscientific questions from consumers. I believe this will enable all sides to find agreement.

We do agree largely on the goals for the WTO round, where a priority is greater transparency. The NGO community will take into account increasingly the overall aims of the trade round. (C)

Sir Leon Brittan: (offers personal remarks about his relationship with Charlene Barshefsky and other U.S. officials) I think that the tone on both sides shows understanding on our mutual trade problems. It is a good sign that we are reducing megaphone diplomacy. (U)

On beef hormones, the solution is on market-opening, not market-closing measures. Americans should not be deprived of European commodities. (U)

The Transatlantic Economic Partnership has helped in this regard, fostering cooperation to kick-start the Seattle multilateral talks. We have a more comprehensive view than you on the new round. We need to have more on the agenda or we will not get the developing nations involved positively. We should try to get an agreement on investment, avoiding the mistakes of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); instead we should seek a more modest agreement on the rules of competition -- this is especially important for dealing with Japan. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

I propose that we make informal calls among the key countries to find an acceptable candidate. (C)

The President: Thank you. I appreciate the constructive work you have undertaken on food issues. The combination of intensity of public feeling and uncertainty has potential for a long-term negative impact. (C)

I would like to echo Charlene's words on Sir Leon. He has been a worthy adversary. I will miss harassing him over bananas! (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: You still have President Chirac to argue with. (C)

The President: (laughs)

Chancellor Schroeder: I would like to review the proposals on the table now, the Bonn Declaration and the Declaration on Ukraine. Regarding Ukraine, we adopt it with a cautious formulation. We asked for that change because of our parliament (Bundestag). I turn to Sir Leon for comments on the Early Warning Declaration. (C)

Sir Leon Brittan: The Early Warning paper is an important step forward. With proper attention to early warning, we can nip problems in the bud. For our part, regarding hushkits, if we had known, we could have defused the issue earlier. On your side, regarding (industrial) fasteners and the 211 Appropriation bill could have been dealt with. But, early warning cannot solve the problem, but it can increase the chances of success. We are not creating a new structure with this. We will employ it at all levels. We plan to put into every piece of Commission legislation a requirement to study impact on EU trading partners. Reciprocally, we need to be aware of things in Congress. (C)

Secretary Albright: The Bonn Declaration sets out a vision for our partnership into the 21st Century. It is not hortatory, but makes a constructive contribution to our relationship. Separately, may I offer our welcome for Javier Solana's appointment as your High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy? (U)

On early warning, this is an important initiative to help us resolve disputes more quickly. It is forward looking. (U)

Ukraine, [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d [redacted] is important to all of us. They have to deal with an united Europe and increasing democratization. [redacted]
[redacted] It is high on our list of countries where we want to push democracy. (C)

The Senior Level Group report summarizes, correctly, the priorities for the coming six months. It is a tribute to Stu Eizenstat, who is moving to Treasury at the direction of the President. This is one thing I cannot forgive the President for. (U)

Under Secretary Eizenstat: I want to pay tribute to President Santer. He has been a true champion of the transatlantic dialogue these past five years. (U)

It is imperative for the coming December U.S.-EU Summit that the Senior Level Group continue to be specific about its goals. The next six months will be critical to the Stability Pact in Southeastern Europe as we attempt to bring it into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. No other relationship comes close. We appreciate the EU load, taking the lion's share of the assistance burden. It is important how we cooperate in the short-term, especially on decisions like Serbian sanctions. We won the war. Now we have to win the peace. (C)

On data privacy, I congratulate the important work David Aaron and John Mogg have done; likewise on Third Generation wireless issues. We have some remaining problems. Biotechnology is a systemic one. The fear in Europe is unfounded. You need an FDA-process to test products. It is critical that Europe develop mechanism to calm publics. As Charlene said, we must begin dialogues. (C)

We look forward to the Finnish presidency and cooperating on northeastern Europe/Northwest Russia. We each have similar initiatives, which can form the basis for recommendations. (C)

Foreign Minister Fischer: On behalf of the German presidency, I thank the American side for its cooperation. The Bonn Declaration is a good platform for cooperation. The Kosovo war, with all its terrible consequences, resulted in more intensive U.S.-EU cooperation. It would be a political error if it were now allowed to go to waste. The Stability Pact has implications for the transatlantic relationship, if we succeed. [redacted]

[redacted]
EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The Early Warning initiative is the right direction on trade disputes. It is hard to explain how we can have cooperation on war, but have conflicts on trade. (U)

We intend to keep working on Ukraine. [redacted]

[redacted] It is not easy for our Ukraine partners. This is a chance for Kiev and we cannot relax. The idea is about integration, change over timing. We want to be their strategic partners. (C)

I wanted to raise changes in the Helms-Burton Act. We need waivers as we confront, together, political challenges, organized crime, so-called criminal states, etc. Overall, we have the closest, trusting cooperation on Kosovo; the war can be used to strengthen our efforts together. (C)

President Santer: The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), agreed in 1995, had important implications for a more effective partnership. Then the EU introduced changes with the Amsterdam Treaty. The NTA first recognized the EU as a security partner. Now the Bonn Declaration acknowledges the EU's status as a full and equal partner. This is a challenge for us to live up to. (U)

Under my presidency, the EU achieved monetary union and a common European currency. We also began the EU enlargement process. There are six accession candidates. Under the Finnish presidency, there will be progress reports as some will be better than others in their preparations. Each will be criticized on its own merits. But, generally, all are on a good track. I hope that Helsinki (the semi-annual European Council meeting) will go a step further; we have to solve the Cyprus/Turkey problem. We need to enter the new millennium with new EU members, reform of our institutions -- we are currently at the margin of effectiveness with 15; the institutions were created for six. This is an important challenge if the EU is to remain effective and efficient. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: We are approaching the end of the time allotted for this meeting. If there is no more discussion, I declare the three documents adopted. (C)

The President: I want to say a final word. I appreciate the leadership of Jacques Santer. I also want to welcome our new Ambassador to the EU, Dick Morningstar. Thank you, Chancellor Schroeder, for your efforts during the German Presidency. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with First Minister Designate Trimble
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
First Minister Designate Trimble

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Frank
Jarosinski

DATE, TIME June 30, 1999 - 11:06 - 11:13 p.m. EDT
PLACE: Air Force One

The President: David, can you hear me? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes, I can. (U)

The President: Well, I am glad you have resumed your good
sleeping habits. (U)

First Minister Trimble: I didn't hear you clearly. (U)

The President: I said you are pulling another all nighter? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. It is so late at night, but we
are about to break here and come back later in the morning after
a bit of rest. (U)

The President: Well, I've been briefed by Tony Blair on the
state of play. As I understand it, Adams has said that they
would publicly commit to decommission on DeChastelain's
schedule, which means a finish by the time described by the Good
Friday agreement and start by the end of the year. But they
want to condition that on going into the government now because
they want to rely exclusively on the sequence in the Good Friday
Accord; and you say your guys want proof that they are serious,
that you want to put them in the shadow government now, and

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achieve devolution only when they start decommissioning. Is that where we are? (✓)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. (✓)

The President: And that you now have tabled two possible alternatives, or you got those and will present them in the morning. (✓)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. I will work up some alternatives along those lines and will leave a few outline ideas here tonight. But, we are going to have to get people around when their minds are reasonably clear, so they can work through the details, some of which may involve quick decisions. But I want to do that in the morning. This whole thing comes down to sequencing, and in a way, each side is sure the other will do it, which is our concern. The time interval is important, otherwise we didn't think we could survive politically. (✓)

The President: Yes. For one thing, I don't know if you saw my BBC interview, but I said I hope your people would stay with you if you made a fair agreement. (✓)

First Minister Trimble: We don't intend to walk away from it. (✓)

The President: No one will be able to understand if it falls apart on sequencing. But as you go home tonight, you guys can wake me up in the middle of the night if you can think of anything I can do or say that will either help you with your own people by showing the United States will give you the high ground by completely disavowing the other side, if they don't keep their word, or if you can think of anything I can do to persuade Sinn Fein to come closer to you. I will do that. I know what position you are in. (✓)

First Minister Trimble: I very much appreciate that. If there is a way, I will come back to you. (✓)

The President: Let me say one other thing. I spent a year, the better part of it -- when ~~was~~ the Good Friday Accord^{was} adopted -- more than a year, a lot of time trying to persuade Gerry Adams. You were right about sequencing because all you wanted was to get him to show good faith, and I failed. And I failed, not because of him, so much as because the IRA wants to be seen as to be decommissioning because the people they represent overwhelmingly voted for the Good Friday Accord. They don't

want to be seen as surrendering to you. They want to surrender to the world or Irish Catholics who voted for the Accord. I understand that. I think personally, they should do more. I appreciate Trimble's political position and difficulties you face. But I can tell you, I have worked harder than you know to persuade them that the initial going-in position you had was a right and reasonable position. And I have failed. On the other hand, I don't think they want you to be deposed. (S)

First Minister Trimble: That is right. (S)

The President: I think he wants you to prevail as a leader and he wants this to work. So, if there is anything you can think of that I can do to put the United States in your corner, as most of your people think I have been too close to them, or something I can give to him to have him come closer to you, you can wake me in the middle of the night. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I will try not to disturb your sleep, but I thank you very much for this call. (S)

The President: I really admire you, David, and I just want to help if I can. (S)

First Minister Trimble: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Okay, goodnight. Get some sleep. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Frank
Jaraosinski

DATE, TIME June 30, 1999, 11:31 - 11:52 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Air Force One

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Gerry? (U)

Mr. Adams: How are you? (U)

The President: I am glad to see you decided to go back to sleeping twelve hours a day. Do you guys ever go to bed? You know, my daughter wrote a paper on you at Stanford. Did someone tell you that? (U)

Mr. Adams: No, I didn't know that. Was it good? (U)

The President: Yes, it was good, but the professor said it was too favorable. However, they said it was supposed to be an academic exercise and should have been more balanced. (U)

Mr. Adams: Ask her to send me a copy, if you would. (U)

The President: Okay, I will. It was just a short essay, not a term paper, like an eight-page paper. She called me and I sent her some stuff, and they gave her a little grief. The professor said while her father is certainly authoritative, he is not really an academic source; you need to be a little more

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balanced. So I drummed up some articles, finding one mildly critical of you; it was really fun. (U)

Look, I know you need to get some sleep, but I wanted to say a couple of things. All of this you know, of course, but it took me a long time to understand your position on this sequencing issue and why the IRA would consider it wrong to have to do decommissioning for Sinn Fein to get in the government. I think I understand it now and how they feel. I think it's important that your people know when you decommission that it's not surrendering to Unionism but to the people who voted for the Good Friday Accord. We all work for people we represent. I got that. (C)

On the other hand, no one will understand, no one in the world or in Northern Ireland, if this comes apart over sequencing. You and I know what the problem is. As I understand it, you offered to support the process to be developed by DeChastelain which would have decommissioning completed by the date of the Good Friday Accord and would start before the end of the year -- if the rest of the Accord is implemented and Sinn Fein went into Executive. Is that accurate? (C)

Mr. Adams: Yes. (C)

The President: As I understand it, the real problem for Trimble is -- I talked to him -- that he would like to take that, but right now he is virtually certain if he did, he would be deposed. So we've got to figure out how to move forward; we don't want that to happen, we've got to figure some way out. I think it would be good for you to get some sleep. I think tomorrow he will table a couple of ideas. Based on my understanding, I don't think you can accept either one of them, but hope that in saying "no," and if that is what you have to do, you figure out how to keep pushing the ball forward. And if there is anything I can do to be helpful to you, or him, when you get up and start working, even though it will be the middle of the night for me, I don't mind waking up. If there is anything within my legal powers to do, I will do it. I don't want to do it now. I think you need to think it through. (C)

Mr. Adams: First of all, I want to thank you for your call and for your interest, which I know is very genuine, very emotional, and real. Secondly, what we put to these people is what Martin McGuinness discussed with Jim Steinberg in the White House on May 5. We took that and gave it to Tony and Bertie. (C)

We actually got a deal done on the 14th of May and an agreement in my presence. The British Prime Minister gave it to us and Trimble walked away. We came back to the idea and, we put it to them today, it was in the general ball park you outlined, but further they rejected it. They said "No." (C)

David Trimble sent his negotiating team home without telling anyone an hour-and-a-half ago and adjourned the talks. He will come back tomorrow and put together a proposal which we can't accept. My concern at the moment is not David Trimble. My concern is Tony Blair. He's been very solid in terms of all this but what Trimble needed today was to be told by the British Prime Minister very vigorously that he had to do this. I asked to talk to his team; they refused to let us do it and their team won't go to their people. (C)

This is my position which Martin worked with Jim and which we have outlined to the Unionists and everybody else involved. They are going to cause us terrible trouble with the Republicans because they will be out in the news in a day or two. Some say Republican activists will not be able to understand how we did so and not get anything in return. I think the problems are quite worsened as a result of these past couple of nights of negotiations. This is the best they are going to get. I just don't know what we can do, to tell the truth. (C)

The President: Let me ask you this. I want to mention two key thoughts, and this is something you don't need to answer but sleep on it. One is, I think if Blair is going to do any good with them, he has to get out of the negotiating session and and go see Trimble's party leaders. (C)

Mr. Adams: I agree. (C)

<u>The President:</u>	EO 13526 1.4d
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Mr. Adams: You are absolutely right. (C)

The President: That is option one, or some variation of it. Option two, and I know where this is going, tomorrow, when Trimble puts something on the table that changes sequencing in ways you can't accept, because you won't accept going into a shadow executive until first decommissioning occurs. Blair will ask if there is something he can do for you along these lines in a way of a guarantee; maybe even an act of parliament, which he can pass in no time because of his massive majority, which takes

the decision away from the Unionists in a sense that Sinn Fein no longer agrees to put its faith in the hands of the Unionists. (C)

The thing I was impressed by in your last offer was your willingness to be far more explicit than in the past in terms of decommissioning. You may not be able to take what Tony wants to do, which is to say, "Can you do these things if I take the decision away from the Unionists by an act of parliament?" I understand the difficulty with that, but I ask you to think whether there is something else he can do by act of parliament. (C)

Mr. Adams: The Good Friday Accord guarantees us, and other parties with mandates, the right to participate. You're talking about ordinary citizens who pay taxes, who have been denied their rights, their entitlements, and the Unionists got away with this for the last twelve months despite the governments are saying there is no preconditions. The only thing that is going to move the Unionists is by your first option. That is a very good option. I just don't know of any guarantee. (C)

The President: All I'm saying is I'm afraid that Tony beating up on Trimble is not enough because I talked to some of those guys and I know what their positions are and I think they are crazy enough to take him down. I know it's crazy on their part and they would be discredited by the world. Here is what I thought I could do. I said to the BBC interviewer last week that it seems to me that if Blair can figure out some way to put some heat on the guys behind Trimble, threatening him every step of the way, and I make more explicit the fact that if all this could be done along the lines you talk about and for some reason the IRA walks away from your commitment, then they could bring the government down and I would support them in doing so. (C)

Mr. Adams: I think all that is useful. (C)

The President: I know you and Trimble have both met and consciously avoided mixing this Drumcree business into the talks but I can't help but wonder, given some of the concessions by the marchers, if there is something you can do to help them with that and whatever. If you did, he might be willing to take more risk himself. In the end, Gerry, no matter what Tony does or what I say, Trimble, to get a deal, is going to have to take some risks. You are going to take a world of crap. We can't immunize him from all that risk. You can be neutralized, but he can be deposed. I got to figure out if something can be done

that he could hold up as a flag, of his bona fides. I know you don't want to mix but... (C)

Mr. Adams: We actually have experience in that situation. The one thing I was very struck by was what you said no one should ever be persecuted by religion or ethnic background, and I think that is where this is in terms of that. I don't have that much influence with the people there but we can continue to try. I will continue wherever I can to make things easier. The problem is David Trimble has brought in the same people who voted against the Good Friday agreement and oppose it publicly are the ones we are negotiating with; David Trimble tolerates them. To me, that crystallizes the problem. Either he stands up to those people -- whatever way he does is a very important element. We have stuck our necks out far enough now to hang ourselves. I will reflect on what you said. I appreciate your attention and the fact that you are very much up to speed, as usual. (C)

The President: Okay, I'm going to call Tony back and then leave you guys to sleep. (C)

Mr. Adams: My sense at the moment is that we are at a very precarious situation and my concern is that Tony must be very assertive with these guys. (C)

The President: Just because of your position alone, I don't think we've got an exit strategy short of an agreement. We have got to protect everybody concerned until we hammer through it. If you walk away with nothing, you might have to modify your position to come back the way he did. Two weeks ago, he would have taken this deal in a bird dog's minute. (C)

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[redacted] so we have to figure out a way to somehow give him some more elbowroom. Whatever you can work on Drumcree, wave in his face and say, "screw you." You think about it. I will call Blair and Ahern back and, if you need me, wake me up. (C)

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Mr. Adams: Okay. Thanks again. (U)

The President: Thanks, Gerry. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Robin Rickard,
Don Cheramie and Jim Smith

DATE, TIME July 1, 1999, 8:08 - 8:13 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Jack Kent Cooke Stadium,

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. How are you doing?
(U)

The President: Bertie, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Not too bad at all. Thanks for all your
time over the last few days. I know you have been in tough
talks with these difficult people. (U)

The President: What about this latest proposal Tony talked
about? Have you run it by Sinn Fein? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Yes. I was talking to them as of half an
hour ago. I think the difficulty is the 12th of August will not
work for them with July and August being the marching season.
They will not be able to sell that to their units but they have
committed themselves now to decommission. They need to
strengthen their position a little. The statements Tony and I
put out tomorrow should be as strong as possible in what we can
say, but I don't think there is any possibility they will say
they will do something by the 12th. (U)

The President: What about moving the whole thing back some?
(U)

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Prime Minister Ahern: Yes, I think if we can get some leeway and move it back a bit. (Ø)

The President: They need it. Trimble said he can't stand more than six weeks with no first act. What if you put up the government in the middle of August? That would give them until the first of October to decommission. Do you think that framework might work? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the framework will work but if we put up the 15th of August it might jeopardize selling it to their guys. (Ø)

The President: Tony wanted me to call Trimble and push the generic idea tonight but I didn't want to talk to him until I talked to you first and I can't talk to Gerry until you have put this to him. Are you going to talk to him about it tomorrow? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I will talk to Gerry the first thing in the morning. (Ø)

The President: I really should not call him until tomorrow. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: The question with Sinn Fein is, now they have it clear in their minds and are going to convince the IRA to do an act of decommissioning before Christmas. The real question is how quickly they will do that. I think from their point of view as soon as they nominate someone to the Chastelain Commission the better. That is not as quick as mid-August. At the same time, we don't want to put a new date that creates frustration and creates a new deadline. We have to get something agreed that automatically happens provided they have decommissioning. Gerry Adams is worried about getting ahead of the IRA because there would be more problems than it is worth. I think John Hume feels, I've spoken to him, that Sinn Fein has not got that far in its statements. They could push themselves a bit further. It is the old story. How far can you push them? If they could give us another sentence that would give it credibility. They really have to give us something. I think you could give them another sentence to make it that much firmer. (Ø)

The President: That it is really going to work. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: Exactly. Otherwise we get into a difficult marching season again. Did you talk to Trimble? (S)

The President: Yes, but I have not talked to him yet on this. Maybe I should wait until morning to talk to him and Gerry in closer proximity. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: That would be wise. We will meet at 8 o'clock in Belfast to finalize the words. So maybe as soon as we got that done we should get that sent to your people right away. (S)

The President: 8 o'clock a.m.? (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: 8 o'clock our time. (S)

The President: I will have my guys wake me at 2 o'clock our time. I would like to call them both at the same time. (sound of cheering in background) Do you know where I am? I am at the World Cup Women's Soccer Game and we just scored a goal to tie Germany. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: You go and enjoy it, Bill. (U)

The President: OK. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: God Bless. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Irish Prime Minister Ahern (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Matt Sibley, Miles Murphy,
Michael Manning and James Smith

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 12:04 - 12:11 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hey, Bertie. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: How do you do? Tony will be joining us in a few minutes; he's still with David and his colleagues. (U)

The President: How are things at the zoo? (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: I'll fill you in. I think we're fairly far along in getting somewhere, but we're not there yet. It's never easy in Northern Ireland. But just to fill you in briefly, I think we've practically agreed that the IRA will nominate someone on the 15th of July. That would set up the executive. The devolution order would be laid before the British Parliament on the 16th of July and take effect on the 18th of July and the difficulty is to allow a period where Sinn Fein nominates an IRA person to start working on decommissioning with General de Chastelain and the other people. What will happen is that the person nominated by the IRA will start discussions in the period after that, talking about actual decommissioning to start within a specified time, and the decommissioning body will make progress reports in September and December. We hope to start decommissioning in September. (U)

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The President: But you wouldn't have a Sinn Fein commitment by a certain time? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: If we achieve that, it will certainly be good, President. (Ø)

The President: What do you think they will say? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think it's looking good at this stage. We've got a little bit of work to do and we need all the help we can get. (Ø)

The President: Is it time for me to call now? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the problems will be in this order. Trimble will be very worried because some of his guys will definitely get wobbly again. We need to pump as much confidence in him and put as much steel behind him as possible. This is the time where the governments, the two traditions in Northern Ireland work today together in the devolution we've worked for all these years and thought we had in the Good Friday Agreement but couldn't get it. And secondly, give us the decommissioning of the paramilitaries in a reasonable time. Third, the fail-safe clause, where the governments undertake that if any difficulties arise in regard to decommissioning, based on the report by the decommissioning body, or arising from devolution, we will automatically initiate an immediate review and suspend the institution. That is, if anybody starts messing we just stop the whole bloody lot. (Ø)

The President: That ought to at least convince Trimble that Sinn Fein will be blamed if the thing goes down. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think we need to have Sinn Fein and the unionists not go bumping each other, but say this is the completion of the historic breakthrough of the Good Friday Agreement, that the two Northern Ireland traditions will work together. This has to be solved. The two need to feel confidence, to see the bigger picture because if we get this through, Bill, this procedure nominating on the 15th of July, that's just a fortnight. The devolution order would be laid before Parliament in 2 weeks. If it gets through, it will be tremendous. These guys have to have the steel to go for it in the next hour or so, as we try to finalize this. I am holding Sinn Fein's hand and Tony is holding the unionists'. I think in terms of where the unionists are, it is more difficult and shaky for Trimble. Tony is doing a great job helping them through it.

The two parties need to have a feeling that something is in this and they really should have a go. I think it will be very helpful if you could call and have a word with them. (S)

The President: I'll call right now. What's the timetable for this? (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: This is the new order. I'm not just dumping on the government for Northern Ireland...traditions...selling it and selling it hard, not just bumping on the other side, Bill. If it shapes up like this, this will be good. I am reluctant to call it yet. (S)

The President: No, I'm happy to call. I got up this morning ready to call, and they said it wasn't time yet. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: If you want, Tony has obviously got the latest, he's still in with the unionists. If you want, we could get back to your people in the next 15 to 20 minutes and tell them now is the time to move. (S)

The President: Right. Give us a call when you're ready for me to call Trimble. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: I think the call to Gerry could be made now, and we could get a message back to you when it is good to call David.

The President: Bertie, the President of Korea is coming in here for 2 or 3 hours, so I will call Gerry now, and the quicker I can call Trimble, the better. It'll be hard to walk out of the meeting. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: What I'll do is check with Tony; he's still with him. As soon as he comes out, I will call straight away. (S)

The President: Okay, man. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Michael Manning, Roger Merletti, Miles Murphy, Joel Schrader, Matt Sibley, James Smith and Amy Swarm

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 12:17 - 12:19 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Gerry? (U)

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: How are we doing? (C)

Mr. Adams: I think we are getting there. (C)

The President: I do, too. The last deal sounds pretty good to me. We have to convince Trimble he should take it. (C)

Mr. Adams: I think he will go for it. (C)

The President: Is there anything to do to make sure they don't try to depose him over it? (C)

Mr. Adams: They will try to do that anyway. EO 13526 1.4b

[redacted] We need to get this done in the shortest period possibly required and make sure someone is helping him. [redacted] I'm sure Tony will do it. He just needs help getting over that period. [redacted]

[redacted] We will help ease him over it. We'll be as magnanimous as possible. (C)

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The President: We don't want anyone claiming victory. (C)

Mr. Adams: No. I already said that to people here. It isn't a matter of getting him to do it. It's just a matter of getting it done. I want to galvanize the positive elements within the Unionists. I think he is going to do it. I'll bet you a dollar he goes for it. (C)

The President: That is a dollar I would love to pay off. (C)

Mr. Adams: Okay. We will be in there. It sounds silly and I couldn't say to him, like I can to you, but we'll make sure he's okay. (C)

The President: Okay. I will get on it. Tony is still with him and as soon as he gets out I'm going to call him. (C)

Mr. Adams: I look forward to taking your money. (C)

The President: Okay. Goodbye. (U)

Mr. Adams: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland First Minister
David Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Trimble

Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Don Cheramie,
Miles Murphy, Robin Rickard and James
Smith

DATE, TIME July 2, 1999, 5:40 - 5:44 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: David? (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes. (U)

The President: How are you keeping? Are you still standing?
(U)

First Minister Trimble: Still standing. Could be worse but it
will be better. (U)

The President: Look, I wanted first of all to thank you and
second, to say I tried to issue a helpful statement. Thirdly,
to ask what can I do to help? Personally, if they screw us on
this, I will support kicking them out and stand up publicly and
say that you are not to blame and they are. (X)

First Minister Trimble: Right. The only problem is I can't
muster enough steam to get it in. Whether we will get in over
the course of the next week or ten days I don't know. I'm
trying to give enough space for people. When I first put the
suggestion to the session of the party, only a couple showed a
favorable response and some were against. Most of the others
were of differing viewpoints. Key members from whom I needed

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support were unhappy. Maybe we can work something in the next week or two to change aspects of this scheme. (S)

The President: Let me ask you, if you think it will help for me to call any of them personally. I will do that. (S)

First Minister Trimble: John Taylor is on our side as is Maginnis; and Reg Empey if we leave him alone for a couple of days. I made a serious mistake in organizing. I thought if I brought Jeffrey Donaldson onto my team we could smother some of the opposition. I am afraid it backfired on me. I need to get Jeffrey away for awhile to get things better. (S)

The President: Yes. You think about it and if you think I can help in any way. If you want me to send somebody over, I will. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I very much appreciate this, Mr. President. I really do. I don't know how we will work it out in the next week or two. If there's any chance I will. (S)

The President: I know you will. You're a good man, David. You've made decommissioning real. This decision would really not have happened if it was not for you. It will work now, I think. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I hope so. They have changed their position. If only I can get my people to see that and take advantage of it. (S)

The President: There's no doubt they changed their position. I honestly believe, based on my conversations with Adams in the last week, that he knows without you that this is a dead dog. You have to come out looking like the leader you are. Once he gets his ducks in a row, he will bust his ass to make it work. I've already told him this is it. (S)

First Minister Trimble: I went out of my way in comments to throw a line out to them. We now hope that works. (S)

The President: All right. Let me know if there is anything we can do. (S)

First Minister Trimble: Once again, I really appreciate your support and encouragement. You may find me calling again next week. (S)

The President: Thanks. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Thanks. Cheers. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland First Minister
Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
First Minister David Trimble

Notetakers: Matthew Sibley, Sean Tarver and
Frank Jarosinski

DATE, TIME July 5, 1999, 10:03 - 10:05 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, David. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Well, the march went pretty well yesterday. (U)

First Minister Trimble: Yes, it did. I'm very glad that it went off as well as it did. I hope it doesn't leave them too big a problem. It is a credit to the Portadown Orangemen that they did well. They are hoping that Tony Blair will reciprocate it. I'm not sure if he can. (U)

The President: What can I do for you? (U)

First Minister Trimble: There are two things that would be a great help to me. One which I think you are already doing and that is to talk to Gerry Adams about a statement from the IRA about decommissioning. The other thing is the so called "fail safe" mechanism. It is fairer to exclude Sinn Fein from the executive, but the problem continues to be John Hume. Seamus Mallon is trying to persuade him. If John Hume could move, that would help greatly. (U)

The President: So I'll call John and get back to Gerry about the other thing. I'll get back to you in a day or so. (S)

First Minister Trimble: Thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with SDLP Leader John Hume (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Hume

Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford,
George Chastain and Joel Ehrendreich

DATE, TIME July 5, 1999, 6:50 - 6:57 p.m. EDT

AND PLACE: Air Force One

The President: Hello, John. (U)

Mr. Hume: Hello, how are you doing, Mr. President? (U)

The President: Well, I'm alright. How are you? (U)

Mr. Hume: Oh, I'm surviving. (U)

The President: Well, I think we got a pretty good proposal if we can get them to take it. I've been talking to Trimble and Adams. Trimble is having a bit of a hard go with Maginnis and with Empey and others who are being critical of the proposal. He thinks they can still get blamed if the government comes down and the IRA doesn't comply. I know Seamus Mallon has a piece in the paper tomorrow, which will help bring the Unionists on board for the Blair-Ahern proposal -- you know what it says -- it doesn't say outright that Sinn Fein should be expelled but gets pretty close. I have told Trimble in private and said publicly if the IRA doesn't live up to its obligations, I would support Sinn Fein being excluded. The United States would say -- it's not their fault, it's your fault and not the Unionists'. Similarly, if anybody else doesn't comply. We have to help Trimble a little. You've been working on this for 30 years now. I believe Gerry is ready to take the final steps. (✓)

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Mr. Hume: I don't think it's easy if he's being seen as being under public pressure. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (S)

Mr. Hume: I think it's better done quietly than with public pressure. (S)

The President: I do agree. (S)

Mr. Hume: What I've been saying today on the radio and TV is there is no way my party would sit in government with any party if they were engaged in violence. I'm convinced from my experience that Sinn Fein is committed to the peace process. Therefore, the international commission is going to report, so what we should all do is suspend judgment until we all hear the report and then make our judgment having heard that report. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. How are we going to deal with Trimble's problem to sell it? (S)

Mr. Hume: The time of the year is the major part of the problem. It's marching season for his people. Every year the tensions are very high for this time of the year. By the second half of July, when we move beyond that, tensions will fall, and it should be easier for him then than now. Do you know what I mean? (S)

The President: Yes, absolutely. And we had a pretty good day for that yesterday. (S)

Mr. Hume: Yes. It was pretty welcome that they behaved very responsibly. (S)

The President: You know, John, he doesn't have to lose very many people before he can't go on. (S)

Mr. Hume: Yes, I know, but the overwhelming majority of people voted for it. In addition, last week we had special messages from organizations representing the business community, trade unions, community groups and youth groups all telling us to keep the agreement on the road. There is very big public support for the agreement. This can be resolved and will be resolved in the coming weeks, but I don't think we should be putting anybody under pressure. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. Is there anything else you think I can do to help Trimble? (S)

Mr. Hume: I think one of the things you could do is make very clear from your point of view that as soon as a new administration is in place, that's when the goodwill of the international world will become evident. That's when the economic development and investment and marketing will transform our economy and society. The sooner the two communities start working together to set up the institutions, the better. There needs to be a clear understanding of the agreement that totally respects both identities, therefore no section of the community is under threat. (S)

The President: Okay, well, I'll just keep plugging along. I understand what you are saying. I really worry about the hard guys on Trimble's side taking him out. If we lose him, we're in trouble. (S)

Mr. Hume: I know that. Listen, thanks again for your interest and support. (S)

The President: If you want to talk anymore, I'm as close as the phone. (S)

Mr. Hume: Okay, thank you. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Steve
Please
look at
these letters
before I go
final
thanks
Wey

Dear Carlos:

I want to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of the negotiations with the United Kingdom regarding the South Atlantic islands. As you know, during our last meeting we addressed the challenges facing Argentina and the United Kingdom, and the importance of attaining diplomatic solutions. I was impressed by your determination to resolve these matters peacefully, and to the mutual benefit of both countries.

importance

Your work, and that of ~~Prime Minister~~ Tony Blair, greatly contributed to resolving important international issues and will enhance the stability and well-being of the region. Again, congratulations and I look forward to ~~working~~ ^{continuing} together with you to advance peace in the region.

continuing to

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Carlos Menem
President of the Argentine Nation
Buenos Aires

Dear Tony:

I want to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Argentina regarding the South Atlantic islands. I appreciate ~~the difficulty you faced in~~ meeting the challenge ~~of~~ facing the United Kingdom and Argentina as you both persisted in diplomatically resolving these important issues. I was impressed by your determination to ~~resolve~~ ^{solve} these matters peacefully to the mutual benefit of both countries.

Your work, and that of ~~President~~ ^{Carlos} Menem, greatly contributed to enhancing the stability of the region and the well-being of its people. Again, congratulations and I look forward to ~~working together~~ ^{continuing to} with you to advance peace in the region.

Sincerely,

clough

The Right Honorable
Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

difficulty
~~of~~

*a form of fact
has been used
twice in the same
sentence.*

Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)

From: Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:36 AM
To: Schulte, Gregory L. (EUR); vonLipsey, Roderick K. (DEFENSE)
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [CONFIDENTIAL]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AP NARA, Date 01/10/08

Greg, Rod -- Not sure which of you is doing the Blair package, but here are a few points on the NATO Secgen question that should be included, based on the call that just ended with Schroeder.

-----Original Message-----
From: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:33 AM
To: Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Cc: @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: RE: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [CONFIDENTIAL]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AP NARA, Date 01/10/08

great. couple of tweaks. pls. work with rod/Greg to get htese in package. Tx.

-----Original Message-----
From: Bremner, Sue L. (EUR)
Sent: Thursday, July 22, 1999 10:19 AM
To: Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Cc: @EUROPE - European Affairs
Subject: Talkers on Solana Successor for Blair? [CONFIDENTIAL]

Think we should seek to have the following, or some version thereof, inserted into the Blair telcall package:

- Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG Solana.
- Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, provided Germany were willing to put him in the running.
- But made clear that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
- Schroeder said he was reluctant to put Scharping forward because he is needed at home but, knowing of our interest, would speak again with Scharping and would make a decision within a week --before Sarajevo. Schroeder also suggested that we chat with you on the margins of the Sarajevo Conference.
- Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.

Put Ashdown for a week

Prodi

Prodi
AS

7-26-99
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1999

488 11 22 48108

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*
GENE SPERLING *ES*

I. PURPOSE

Secure support for our proposed economic initiatives at the July 30 Summit in Sarajevo. Stress to Prodi the need to sustain current EU sanctions against the FRY.

II. BACKGROUND

Economic Initiatives

We are working on a series of economic initiatives for the Sarajevo Summit. You asked us to find a creative approach, similar to the one outlined by George Soros. Although innovative, the Soros proposal would not provide real long-term benefits; their biggest gain would come from access to U.S. and EU markets. In that spirit, we have prepared a comprehensive strategy which includes a trade initiative, an investment compact and a commitment to help achieve WTO membership. We want the Europeans to support these and give a concrete statement regarding eventual EU membership.

Trade Initiative: We recommend you commit to unilateral trade preferences, similar to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to countries in the region except Serbia, but including Kosovo and Montenegro. These preferences should apply uniformly and should be as generous as possible to spur economic development. We would not request special access rights to U.S. or EU exports. This would provide immediate access to developed markets and the greatest short-term tangible benefit. However, in order for this to be a success, EU participation is critical.

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On our side, we are exploring with members of the congressional trade committees legislation providing a ten-year GSP commitment, to include expanding the list of eligible goods, with the exception of certain textiles. Although a majority of products from these countries, except for Bulgaria and Romania, already enter duty-free under GSP or normal trade status, the U.S. would offer a new program that also includes virtually all agricultural products (except sugar) and footwear at little political or economic cost. In addition, a ten-year program would provide much greater certainty to investors than the current GSP program, which is funded from year to year. It would also encourage regional integration by providing special access to products containing inputs from different countries in the region.

Investment Compact: Because investment and trade will drive sustained growth, we propose a "compact" between leaders from outside the region and the international financial institutions to create vehicles for mobilizing private finance and mitigating risk. In return, the regional leaders would commit to concrete actions to improve the investment climate and accelerate economic reforms.

One specific option is establishing an EBRD trust fund with U.S. funds to create a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance through local banks. In addition, we would work with the IFIs to create a regional equity fund. The fund would invest in private or privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and Montenegro) and help leverage private financing. Finally, we are discussing with George Munoz the possible creation of an OPIC fund for the Balkans.

WTO Membership: For non-member countries, we will offer technical assistance needed to meet the international standards and work to facilitate accession on an accelerated basis. In many cases, this is easily provided at very little cost to the U.S. or EU governments.

EU statement: Our key goal is for the region to be integrated into the EU, which offers the best opportunity for development and growth. An EU commitment on membership in a reasonable period will be the most difficult -- but also the most important -- part of our strategy.

Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)

At Monday's meeting of the General Affairs Council, EU Foreign Ministers reviewed current EU sanctions against the FRY. Greece and Italy pressed for a lifting of the oil embargo, with some support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands strongly resisted any lifting of sanctions. Ministers ultimately agreed to task the EU Commission to examine the possibility of lifting some of the sanctions (the flight ban and sporting ban) and of directing oil and electricity to opposition-controlled localities. We oppose any lifting of sanctions in order to avoid bolstering Milosevic politically or financially. We also disagree with the feasibility of directing oil and electricity to specific localities. We are prepared to discuss with allies the concept of assistance to opposition-controlled localities; however, any such assistance would need to be carefully circumscribed, monitored and coordinated, as well as conditioned on increased unity within the opposition.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made for Prime Minister Blair

Tab B Points to be Made for EU Commissioner Prodi

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

- Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. We should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into European and global trade.
- The most meaningful gesture we can make in the near term is to provide unilateral trade access into our markets. This will help catalyze production and investment in the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant unilateral trade concessions as soon as possible to countries in the region. We would exclude Serbia, but include Kosovo and Montenegro.
- I am prepared to work with Congress to provide duty-free access into our market across a range of products. However, I can only succeed in this effort if the EU makes it a similar effort.
- I understand the EU is considering similar initiatives for individual countries in the region. It would be more powerful if the EU could extend to the region as a whole (excluding Serbia) a program providing duty-free treatment for as many industrial and agricultural goods as possible.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult, but we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- Also asking regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. In return for them making reforms, we should mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to investors.
- We're considering creating a trust fund at the EBRD to make loans especially to small enterprises. We should also encourage the IFI and EBRD to create a regional equity fund.
- We should work getting these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

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- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

NATO Secretary General

- Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG Solana.
- Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, if Schroeder puts him in the running.
- Said that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
- Schroeder said he would delay putting Scharping forward, but would make a decision within a week -- before Sarajevo. Schroeder also suggested that we all chat in Sarajevo.
- Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI

Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

- Hope you are settling into your new position. Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. We should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into European and global trade.
- The most meaningful gesture we can make in the near term is to provide unilateral trade access into our markets. This will help catalyze production and investment in the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant unilateral trade concessions as soon as possible to countries in the region. We would exclude Serbia, but include Kosovo and Montenegro.
- I am prepared to work with Congress to provide duty-free access into our market across a range of products. However, I can only succeed in this effort if the EU makes it a similar effort.
- I understand the EU is considering similar initiatives for individual countries in the region. It would be more powerful if the EU could extend to the region as a whole (excluding Serbia) a program providing duty-free treatment for as many industrial and agricultural goods as possible.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult, but we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- Also asking regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. In return for them making reforms, we should mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to investors.
- We're considering creating a trust fund at the EBRD to make loans especially to small enterprises. We should also encourage the IFI and EBRD to create a regional equity fund.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 7/22/09

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- We should work getting these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry.
- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

Serbia and Economic Sanctions

- Also need to use Summit to demonstrate Serbia's isolation under Milosevic, while holding out the prospect of rapid integration after Milosevic.
- Milosevic is seriously weakened, and we have a window of opportunity to bring fundamental change to the region.
- Understand that EU foreign ministers discussed sanctions at their Monday meeting, and asked the Commission to look at possibilities for lifting some.
- Need to keep sanctions fully in place. Milosevic will exploit any hint that they will be relaxed.
- In fact, we still need to tighten implementation of existing financial sanctions targeted at Milosevic and his regime. Hope you can convince individual EU countries to take necessary steps, following the recent example of Switzerland.

are exploring with members 2 of the congressional trade committee providing 5502

On our side, we ~~would propose~~ a ten-year GSP commitment, to include expanding the list of eligible goods, with the exception of certain textiles. Although a majority of products from these countries, except for Bulgaria and Romania, already enter duty-free under GSP or normal trade status, the U.S. would offer a new program that ^{also} includes virtually all agricultural products (except sugar) ^{at} little political or economic cost. ~~We are in the process of making congressional calls to test the waters.~~

Investment Compact: ^{and footnote} Because investment and trade will drive ^{in addition, it will provide much greater} sustained growth, we propose a "compact" between leaders from ^{to investors} outside the region and the international financial institutions ^{to} to create vehicles for mobilizing private finance and mitigating ^{want} risk. In return, the regional leaders would commit to concrete ^{GSP} actions to improve the investment climate and accelerate ^{programs,} economic reforms.

One specific option ^{in addition,} is establishing an EBRD trust fund ^{with US funds} to create a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance through local banks. We would then work with the IFIs to create a regional equity fund. The fund would invest in private or privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and Montenegro) ^{and} help leverage private financing and ~~maximize use of~~ ^{which is funded from year to year.} guarantees offered by national investment agencies such as OPIC. ^{It would also encourage regional integration}

Finally, we are discussing with George Munoz the possible creation of an OPIC fund
WTO Membership: For non-member countries, we will offer ^{Balkan} technical assistance needed to meet the international standards. In many cases, this is easily provided at very little cost to the U.S. or EU governments. ^{and work to facilitate accession on an accelerated basis}

EU statement: Our key goal is for the region to be integrated into the EU, which offers the best opportunity for development and growth. An EU commitment on ~~eventual~~ ^{in a reasonable by a certain period} membership will be the most difficult -- but also the most important -- part of our strategy. ^{by providing special access}

Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)

At Monday's meeting of the General Affairs Council, EU Foreign Ministers reviewed current EU sanctions against the FRY. Greece and Italy pressed for a lifting of the oil embargo, with some support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands strongly resisted any lifting of sanctions. Ministers ultimately agreed to task the EU Commission to examine the possibility of lifting some of the sanctions (the flight ban and sporting ban) and of directing oil and electricity to opposition-controlled localities. We oppose any lifting of ^{to products containing inputs from different countries in the region.}

sanctions in order to avoid bolstering Milosevic politically or financially. We also disagree with the feasibility of directing oil and electricity to specific localities. We are prepared to discuss with allies the concept of assistance to opposition-controlled localities; however, any such assistance would need to be carefully circumscribed, monitored and coordinated, as well as conditioned on increased unity within the opposition.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made for Prime Minister Blair

Tab B Points to be Made for EU Commissioner Prodi

- (A) The most meaningful gesture we can make in the near term is to provide unilateral trade access into our markets. This will help catalyze production and investment in the region.
- (B) I am prepared to work with Congress to provide duty-free access into our market across a range of products. ~~However, I can only succeed in this effort if the EU makes a similar effort.~~
- (C) I understand the EU is considering similar initiatives for individual countries in the region. It would be more powerful if the EU could extend to the region as a whole (excluding Serbia) a program providing duty free treatment for as many industrial and agricultural goods as possible.+

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PHONE CALLS TO U.K. PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI

DATE: TBD

LOCATION: TBD

TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLINGI. PURPOSE

To secure support for our proposed economic initiatives at the July 30 Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo. To stress to Prodi the need to sustain current EU sanctions against the FRY.

II. BACKGROUNDEconomic Initiatives

We are currently working with countries of the EU and southeast Europe to develop a series of initiatives for the Sarajevo Summit, including in the economic field. You have asked us to find an innovative approach, similar to the one outlined by George Soros. Although interesting and innovative, the Soros proposal would not provide real long-term benefits to the countries of southeast Europe. Their biggest gain would be access to U.S. and EU markets. In that spirit, we have prepared a comprehensive strategy which includes a trade initiative, an investment compact and a commitment to help achieve WTO membership. We want the Europeans to support these and give a concrete statement regarding eventual EU membership.

Trade Initiative: We recommend committing to unilateral trade preferences, similar to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to countries in the region other than Serbia, as well as Kosovo and Montenegro. These preferences should be uniform across the region and as generous as possible to rapidly spur economic development. We would not, in turn, request special access rights to U.S. or EU exports. This provides immediate access to developed markets and the greatest short-term tangible benefit. However, in order for this to be a success, EU participation is critical, not only to mobilize Congressional support here at home, but also because access to the European market is an essential component to southeast Europe's economic development.

To effect this, we would propose a ten-year GSP commitment, to include expanding the list of eligible goods, with the exception of certain textiles. Although a majority of products from these countries, except for Bulgaria and Romania, already enter duty-free under GSP or normal trade status, the U.S. would offer a new program that includes virtually all agricultural products (except sugar) at little political or economic cost. We are in the process of making congressional calls to test the waters.

Investment Compact: Because we have underscored that investment and trade, and not donor assistance, will drive sustained growth, we propose a "compact" under which leaders from outside the region would agree to work with the international financial institutions to create appropriate vehicles for mobilizing private finance and mitigating risk. In return, the regional leaders would commit to concrete actions to improve the investment climate and accelerate economic reforms.

We are working on several options. The first is establishment of an EBRD trust fund which would establish a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance through local banks. Based on our experiences in central Europe, we would then work with the international financial institutions to create a regional equity fund. The fund would invest in private or privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and Montenegro), help leverage private financing from institutions and bilateral donors, and utilize guarantees offered by national investment agencies such as OPIC.

WTO Membership: For those countries not currently members of the WTO, we would offer the technical assistance needed to meet the international standards. In many cases, this is easily provided at very little cost to the U.S. or EU governments.

EU statement: The most important step for the region is to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures like the EU; this offers the best opportunity for development and growth. A commitment by the EU on eventual EU membership will be the most difficult part of our strategy, but also the most important to show real commitment by the Europeans.

Economic Sanctions (Prodi Call Only)

At Monday's meeting of the General Affairs Council, EU Foreign Ministers reviewed current EU sanctions against the FRY. Greece and Italy pressed for a lifting of the oil embargo, with some

support from Germany and France. The UK and Netherlands strongly resisted any lifting of sanctions. Ministers ultimately agreed to task the EU Commission to examine the possibility of lifting some of the sanctions (the flight ban and sporting ban) and of directing oil and electricity to opposition-controlled localities. We oppose any lifting of sanctions in order to avoid bolstering Milosevic politically or financially. We also disagree with the feasibility of directing oil and electricity to specific localities. We are prepared to discuss with allies the concept of assistance to opposition-controlled localities; however, any such assistance would need to be carefully circumscribed, monitored and coordinated, as well as conditioned on the local leaders taking steps to increase unity within the opposition.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points for PM Blair

Tab B Talking Points for EU Commissioner Prodi

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI

On Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

- Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. I believe that we should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into the European and global trading system.
- The first step ~~to do~~ is to show the sincerity of our support for the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant, as soon as possible, unilateral, one way trade concessions to countries in the region. We would, of course, exclude Serbia, but want to include Kosovo and Montenegro.
- We are preparing a package which would show our commitment, but I will only have a good shot at winning congressional support if the EU makes a similar effort. I know that you have a range of initiatives underway with Central and Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most generous of these, the Lome or autonomous trade preferences to the whole region.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult for you, as it will be for us. But, we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- We are asking the regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and to commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. I want to make sure that, in return for them making those difficult reforms, we do our best to mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to direct investors.
- To do this, we're looking at working with the EBRD to create a regional equity fund.

had
done

- Would also urge that we work towards getting all of these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry as soon as possible.
- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

On Serbia and Economic Sanctions

- Also need to use Summit to demonstrate Serbia's isolation under Milosevic, while holding out the prospect of rapid integration after Milosevic.
- Milosevic is seriously weakened, and we have a window of opportunity to bring fundamental change to the region.
- Understand that EU foreign ministers discussed sanctions at their Monday meeting, and asked the Commission to look at possibilities for lifting some.
- Need to keep sanctions fully in place. Milosevic will exploit any hint that they will be relaxed.
- In fact, we still need to tighten implementation of existing financial sanctions targeted at Milosevic and his regime. Hope you can convince individual EU countries to take necessary steps, following the recent example of Switzerland.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

- Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. I believe that we should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into the European and global trading system.
- The first step ~~to do~~ is to show the sincerity of our support for the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant, as soon as possible, unilateral, one way trade concessions to countries in the region. We would, of course, exclude Serbia, but want to include Kosovo and Montenegro.
- We are preparing a package which would show our commitment, but I will only have a good shot at winning congressional support if the EU makes a similar effort. I know that you have a range of initiatives underway with Central and Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most generous of these, the Lome or autonomous trade preferences to the whole region.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult for you, as it will be for us. But, we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- We are asking the regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and to commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. I want to make sure that, in return for them making those difficult reforms, we do our best to mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to direct investors.
- To do this, we're looking at working with the EBRD to create a regional equity fund.
- Would also urge that we work towards getting all of these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry as soon as possible.

- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
AND EU COMMISSIONER PRODI

DATE: TBD
LOCATION: TBD
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

Secure support for our proposed economic initiatives at the July 30 [Stability Pact] Summit in Sarajevo. Stress to Prodi the need to sustain current EU sanctions against the FRY.

II. BACKGROUND

Economic Initiatives

RELEVANT
We are ~~currently~~ working with ^{ON} ~~countries of the EU and southeast Europe to develop~~ a series of initiatives for the Sarajevo Summit, including in the ~~economic field~~. You have asked us to find ~~an innovative approach~~, similar to the one outlined by George Soros. Although ~~interesting and innovative~~, the Soros proposal would not provide real long-term benefits ^{ECONOMIC} to the ~~countries of southeast Europe~~. Their biggest gain would be ~~access~~ ^{PEACE FROM} access to U.S. and EU markets. In that spirit, we have prepared a comprehensive strategy which includes a trade initiative, an investment compact and a commitment to help achieve WTO membership. We want the Europeans to support these and give a concrete statement regarding eventual EU membership.

Trade Initiative: We recommend ~~committing~~ to unilateral trade preferences, similar to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to ^{EXCEPT} countries in the region ~~other than Serbia, as well as Kosovo and Montenegro~~. These preferences should be uniform ^{APPLY} across the ~~region~~ and as generous as possible to ^{WELLS} rapidly spur economic development. We would not, ~~in turn~~, request special access rights to U.S. or EU exports. This provides immediate access to developed markets and the greatest ^{WELLS} short-term tangible benefit. However, in order for this to be a success, EU participation is

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~~critical, not only to mobilize Congressional support here at home, but also because access to the European market is an essential component to southeast Europe's economic development.~~

~~To effect this,~~ ^{ON OUR SIDE,} we would propose a ten-year GSP commitment, to include expanding the list of eligible goods, with the exception of certain textiles. Although a majority of products from these countries, except for Bulgaria and Romania, already enter duty-free under GSP or normal trade status, the U.S. would offer a new program that includes virtually all agricultural products (except sugar) at little political or economic cost. We are in the process of making congressional calls to test the waters.

~~Investment Compact: Because we have underscored that investment and trade, and not donor assistance, will drive sustained growth, we propose a "compact" under which leaders from outside the region would agree to work with the international financial institutions to create appropriate vehicles for mobilizing private finance and mitigating risk. In return, the regional leaders would commit to concrete actions to improve the investment climate and accelerate economic reforms.~~

AND

~~We are working on several options. The first is establishment of an EBRD trust fund which would establish a policy framework for investment and facilitate debt finance through local banks. Based on our experiences in central Europe, we would then work with the international financial institutions to create a regional equity fund. The fund would invest in private or privatizing enterprises in the region (to include Kosovo and Montenegro), help leverage private financing from institutions and bilateral donors, and utilize guarantees offered by national investment agencies such as OPIC.~~

^{ONE SPECIFIC OPTION IS} ^{ING}

^{TO CREATE} ^{MAXIMIZE USE OF} ^{NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES}

~~WTO Membership: For those countries not currently members of the WTO, we would offer the technical assistance needed to meet the international standards. In many cases, this is easily provided at very little cost to the U.S. or EU governments.~~

^{WILL}

~~EU statement: The most important step for the region is to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures like the EU; this offers the best opportunity for development and growth. An EU commitment by the EU on eventual EU membership will be the most difficult part of our strategy, but also the most important to show real commitment by the Europeans.~~

~~But also the~~ ^{OUR KEY GOAL IS FOR} ~~most important~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

- Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. We should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into European and global trade.
- The first step is to show our support for the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant unilateral trade concessions ~~sooner~~ to countries in the region. We would exclude Serbia, but include Kosovo and Montenegro.
as soon as possible
- We are preparing a package to show our commitment, but I will only win congressional support if the EU makes a similar effort. I know that you have a range of initiatives underway with Central and Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most generous of these, the Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to the whole region.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult, but we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- *Also* Asking regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. In return for them making reforms, we should mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to investors.
- We're considering creating a regional equity fund with EBRD.
- We should work getting these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry.
- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSIONER ROMANO PRODI

Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

- Hope you are settling into your new position. Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. We should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into European and global trade.
- The first step is to show our support for the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant unilateral trade concessions soonest to countries in the region. We would exclude Serbia, but include Kosovo and Montenegro.
- We are preparing a package to show our commitment, but I will only win congressional support if the EU makes a similar effort. I know that you have a range of initiatives underway with Central and Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most generous of these, the Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to the whole region.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult, but we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- Asking regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. In return for them making reforms, we should mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to investors.
- We're considering creating a regional equity fund with EBRD.
- We should work getting these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry.
- Finally, I would ask your support for as concrete and ambitious a statement as possible at the summit regarding eventual EU membership for the Southeast European nations.

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Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 7/22/09

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5562

NATO Secretary General

- Spoke with Chancellor Schroeder to convey that we needed to come to closure on a successor for NATO SYG Solana.
- Told him we would be prepared to support Scharping, if Schroeder puts him in the running.
- State that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
- Schroeder said he ^{will} delay putting Scharping forward, but ~~would~~ ^{will} make a decision within a week ~~or~~ before Sarajevo. Schroeder also suggested that we all chat in Sarajevo.
- Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR

Sarajevo Summit Trade Initiatives

By fit all for NATO to support

- Looking forward to the Sarajevo Summit. Must work intensively in the remaining days to ensure meaningful results.
- We all agree that we want substantive outcomes from Sarajevo. ~~I believe that we should try to bring together a trade initiative that prepares Southeast Europe for full and rapid integration into the European and global trading system.~~
- The first step is to show ~~the sincerity of our support for the region. The U.S. and EU can agree together to grant, as soon as possible, unilateral one way trade concessions to~~ countries in the region. We would, of course, exclude Serbia, but ~~want to include Kosovo and Montenegro.~~
- We are preparing a package which would show our commitment, but I will only ~~have a good shot at winning~~ congressional support if the EU makes a similar effort. I know that you have a range of initiatives underway with Central and Southeast Europe. Would urge that you expand the most generous of these, the Lome, or autonomous trade preferences to the whole region.
- Understand that offering meaningful trade concessions will be politically difficult, ~~for you, as it will be for us.~~ But, we must make the commitment to try and announce a result at the Summit.
- We are asking the regional leaders to make an "investment compact" and to commit to key reforms that would improve the investment climate. ~~I want to make sure that, In~~ return for them making those difficult reforms, we do our best to mobilize private capital and mitigate risk to direct investors.
- To do this, we're looking at working with the EBRD to create a regional equity fund.
- Would also urge that we work towards getting all of these states into the WTO providing the technical assistance they need to meet the criteria for entry as soon as possible.

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- State that we also liked Haekkerup, and we would look very favorably on any of the UK candidates mentioned in the press, including Paddy Ashdown.
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- Looking forward to seeing you in Sarajevo.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams

Notetakers: Deana Sutliff, Frank Jarosinski,
James Smith and Dick Norland

DATE, TIME: January 31, 2000, 2:55-3:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Gerry. (U)

Mr. Adams: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm alright. I just wanted to call and talk to you one more time before this comes down. I know how hard you've worked on this decommissioning issue, but we've been in touch with the Irish and British governments and I've talked to most of Sinn Fein's friends in Congress the last few days, and no one I talked to believes what the IRA is prepared to say to de Chastelain about arms and explosives and then to say he can't say that publicly will prevent this whole thing from going down. The institutions will be suspended and I don't know how the hell we'll ever get them up again. Then it will be even more difficult; the IRA will look like they're crying uncle, instead of squeezing out the last ounce of good will, especially since Blair is prepared to go forward with implementing the Patten Report. We're just in a terrible situation. I don't know if there's anything you can do to get a clear commitment on a timetable. I am very worried about this. I think de Chastelain will have no choice, and Trimble is gone if the institutions are not suspended. If they are suspended, we will all do our best to keep them alive, but it does not help the IRA at all. (S)

Mr. Adams: It will work backward. (S)

The President: It will be even harder for them. Right now, they're in an admirable political situation, saying, "we made everyone fork over before we did." We can get by without an act if there's a clear commitment and timetable, but without that, I

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think de Chastelain is going to issue his report, institutions will be suspended and the IRA -- I agree with you, it will work backward. Otherwise, Trimble is going to fall. They are going to get him. No one I know thinks he will survive. No one will say, "investments are coming in, we just hope the IRA does right down the road." They just won't do it. (S)

Mr. Adams: I think that there are -- first of all, I agree with you on the seriousness of the situation. Have you seen the words? (S)

The President: It says something like they will consider putting arms beyond use -- (S)

Mr. Adams: Yes, it also says IRA guns are silent and there is no threat to the peace process by the IRA. (S)

The President: But they won't even let him make that one public. (S)

Mr. Adams: I think David Trimble, if he receives a positive report from de Chastelain and he notes the British government accepts that as positive, then he clearly has the political will to go back. (S)

The President: But the problem is, their view is they've done what they're supposed to do and, hell, this could take place in 2010. (S)

Mr. Adams: Well, okay. I mean -- (S)

The President: Look, we can buy a few days here because the British and Irish are both committed to do the best they can, even if the institutions are suspended. The problem is, the language would seem less conditional if there were any reference to a timetable. I know the IRA view is they gave first because they gave the principle of consent, but everybody else's view of this is all the other parts of the Good Friday Accord and even the Patten Report is being implemented and that was difficult for the unionists -- and difficult is a mild word -- and old Trimble is still hanging on, but there is no clear timetable. If the language were public and there was a timetable referenced, it would seem less conditional, but without a timetable this language seems very conditional indeed. I don't think there's any chance of getting a positive report out of this. (S)

Mr. Adams: Okay, I am going to talk to Tony and also go have a meeting with Peter Mandelson. I don't think it is going to be possible, in fact I know it won't be possible. We tried to get a definitive timetable. What we got was intent on modalities and

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on a timetable determined by political developments as opposed to a calendar timetable. It is going to cause trouble within the IRA, no matter what people think, trouble within the IRA and its leadership. The worst possible scenario was failing to get the IRA to move, because the IRA's position was that not under any circumstances will they decommission, and now they are saying they will consider decommissioning, putting weapons beyond use, which is the exact wording of the legislation, which is a total change from their previously stated position. Whatever has been created in terms of public expectation of the IRA, the fact is this is a unilateral deadline set by the unionists. But that is not the way to try and make this work. There is perhaps some room to maneuver in terms of de Chastelain including some of the statement in his report, if that helps, if there are problems in not being able to publicize or publicly comment on this. I think there is a possibility, but only in the context that it would help stabilize the situation. We won't get it; we tried over the weekend to get a definitive timetable. For all that is said about the Patten Report, the reality is it is all promises. We've seen no legislation from the British. Demilitarization has not happened; there has been remilitarization. Two children -- two teenagers -- were killed in my constituency some years ago, a young girl and boy, killed by British soldiers. They were joyriding and they were killed. The soldiers perjured themselves. Today all the charges were dropped. All of this is playing into what was done. The guns are silent. I don't believe for a moment that Tony Blair for one moment disagrees with my analysis of how this can be done. I think he accepts it. The problem is in the unionists who are dictating this, not in the Irish government by itself or in the British government. I think it is in the way this issue has been used to choke the process. (S)

The President: I agree with all that but look, the problem is the whole Good Friday Accord and the elections are all premised on all the pieces falling into place at the same time. [Break]...of the Accord that set up the timetable for decommissioning. All the voting proceeded under the assumption it would happen. Now, the unionists have absorbed the fact that it will not all unfold as the accord predicted, but still there is this process and it has to have some integrity to it. The IRA may not care, but all the Americans who have normally been so supportive of you will basically say the same thing, that they didn't come across. As a practical matter, I think that's what is going to happen. The real problem was Trimble got those guys to go a lot further than I thought he could. He's eaten a lot more than the IRA has, he's eaten his words four or five times, and then he just found a way to get out of it and survive. I just don't think he can do that now. If you can work a deal with Mandelson, you need to go see him. We need to buy a day or two.

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If you can get something specific on the Patten Report, maybe you can use that. Details of how it's going to be implemented and when. Maybe you can synchronize that with the IRA commitment. Maybe they'll be willing to do that. (S)

Mr. Adams: The big problem for the IRA is that the decommissioning issue will be dictated by political circumstances that exist, not a timetable which they never signed up to. (S)

The President: But if that's the issue, what if you worked out with Mandelson and Blair a timetable on the Patten Report and agreed to get the IRA to say, "If they do this and this, we'll do the following things." (S)

Mr. Adams: It wouldn't work in that context. The big problem for the IRA is the unarmed police service. We can probably get unionists to buy it, but for the republicans, it is still a partitionist service. Our whole intent was to get the IRA out of the game, on the sidelines, so other people could take more pragmatic positions. So the big thing is to keep the IRA sidelined and spectating in all this. So I am going to see Mandelson, because we have to make the best effort to make sure this situation is rescued. I would mislead you if you left with the impression that something could be done on Patten which could help on this, but I'll go and see Mandelson now. (S)

The President: Let me ask you: if they want the timetable to be dictated by political circumstances, why can't there be some statement that if such and such occurs, we will do something? (S)

Mr. Adams: That's what the statement says. Let me just read it to you. "The IRA wants a permanent peace in Ireland. IRA guns are silent. We have contributed in a real and meaningful way to the search for a durable peace, but for that goal to be reached, steps taken need to be sustained. British forces and loyalist militias must be removed. The challenge is to remove the cause of conflict. In this context, and in the context of the full implementation of the Good Friday Accord, the leadership of the IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives beyond use. For our part, we are committed to enhancing our engagements with the IICD to resolve the conflict and deliver a durable peace. There is no threat to peace by the IRA." That language is going to cause trouble within republican ranks. (S)

The President: But that's buying trouble without the benefits. The point of view of the other guys is, "After all they've said, they've backed off." This will be read by skeptics as, you know, "We might never do this, even though this was part of the deal, even though parts of the plan precedent to the act of

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decommissioning have occurred." This goes back to my thinking in the beginning. I still think the easiest thing to have done to buy you the most and hamper you the least was a symbolic act.

~~(S)~~

Mr. Adams: I agree with you completely, but we tried and failed. The problem is Trimble said things and then backed off. He shouldn't have said them in the first place and we got him off of them. ~~(S)~~

The President: The fact remains, if he goes, we are sunk. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Adams: There's no reason for him to go. ~~(S)~~

The President: It's not up to us if they depose him. That's the problem, no matter what the right or wrong. It may not matter to the IRA, but based on what I've heard my view is everyone will try for a soft landing if these institutions are suspended, but at least as of yesterday, when I spoke to a bunch of our Irish congressmen who have been so supportive of you and still are, their universal view is they need more. You go to Mandelson and see if you can work it out. We've got to buy a couple of days. I don't think this is going to fly. The institutions will be suspended and if we plead with him to hang on, I think the chances he will be deposed are about 90 percent. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Adams: Let me go see Mandelson and get back to Jim Steinberg. Sorry to keep you waiting; I wasn't near a landline. (S)

The President: Thanks. Good luck. Goodbye. (U)

Mr. Adams: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1242

February 24, 2000

*Language needs to be
more Presidential
& personal*

*Language needs
to be more factual
& personal*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: IAN A. BOWLES **IAB**

SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Prime Minister Blair,
Chancellor Schroeder and President Prodi on
Climate Change

In response to a weekly report item from George Frampton that referenced the findings of a recent Pew Center on Global Climate Change report highlighting the economic efficiency of greenhouse gas emissions trading, the President wrote a marginal note saying "should send this with cover letter from me to Tony Blair and other EU leaders."

Your memo responds to the President's request and provides cover letters to Blair, Schroeder and Prodi for his signature. We recommend these three recipients following consultations with State. As a point of interest, the Pew Center is directed by Eileen Claussen, formerly of NSC/Environment directorate.

The NSC received a copy President's weekly report on January 10, 1999.

Concurrence by: **IAB Per.**
Caroline Krass, Antony Blinken

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair
- Letter to President Prodi
- Letter to Chancellor Schroeder
- Tab B POTUS Note Requesting Letters
- Tab C Reports

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Given~~
~~March~~
Given

Dear Tony:

I write with regard to global climate change. ~~Knowing~~ of our common interest in the subject, I am sending you a copy of a recent Pew Center on Global Climate Change report on greenhouse gas emissions trading.

The report emphasizes that an emissions trading system that is global in scope and flexible in application will significantly reduce the costs of climate change mitigation. Minimizing costs will not only promote compliance with our emissions reduction targets, but will also allow us to move more aggressively over the long term to address this challenge. The study builds on a growing body of literature (including last year's OECD report) that shows trading can ~~significantly~~ benefit European countries and other nations for whom greenhouse gas abatement is relatively expensive. ✓

Numerous studies also make clear that the broader, more open, and unrestricted the trading system, the greater the benefits. As you know, the flexibility mechanisms being designed under the Kyoto Protocol also have tremendous potential to contribute to our broader efforts to promote energy efficiency and cleaner energy development in developing countries.

I hope we can work together to address these important issues and set the tone for ~~what I hope will be~~ close coordination between our governments in the lead-up to the climate change conference at The Hague later this year. I look forward to discussing these issues with you this spring.

With best regards,
→

Enclosure

The Right Honorable
Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

Is this necessary?
F of is not
part of
the
enclosed
report,
I'd
say
no.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister D'Alema of Italy
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister D'Alema

Interpreter: Elisabetta Ullmann

Notetakers: Don Gentile, Roger Merletti,
Miguel Aguilo, Frank Jarosinski,
Deana Sutliff and Hoyt Yee

DATE, TIME March 15, 2000, 1:30 - 1:53 p.m., EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: How are you? (U)

The President: Fine, Massimo. How are you? (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Good. Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking this call. I wanted to talk about Kosovo and my concern about where we're going there. Over the past few weeks, I think we have seen almost daily violence, KFOR attrition and a UN operation that is going very slowly. We're coming into the springtime, which has always been the most dangerous season in the Balkans and I'm deeply concerned that Kosovo could boil over and that Milosevic may stir up some trouble. During the air campaign, we were all focused closely on Kosovo and now we have other things to worry about, and I think the problem is not getting the high-level attention it needs to have success there. (C)

As I see it, there are three critical tasks. First, ensuring that KFOR has the forces it needs to counter any threat; second, getting UNMIK the funding it needs to do its job effectively and; third, deploying enough police to take pressure off of KFOR. (C)

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 3/16/10

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PER E. O. 13526

On the first issue, KFOR is getting weaker when it should be getting stronger. I understand that you are adding troops and hope that you can add an additional full battalion of troops to those you currently have deployed to Kosovo. I'm asking all of us to look at our pledged force level and try to get back up there. I will do the same. We also need to ensure a smooth transition when the new KFOR commander takes over. We must not send a signal to Milosevic that there are weaknesses he can exploit. And I think we need to intensify efforts with the Kosovar Albanians to counter extremist elements. We sent two of our people with the best connections there this weekend to deliver that message. I know that Madeleine has talked to your people about the need for police but this is essential if we are to take the pressure off of KFOR. We're sending more people and I hope you will do the same. We've got to get more people there. (C)

I'm also very concerned about the UN program UNMIK. They have been unable to move forward on critical tasks and are crippled by funding shortages. We have to get them the resources they need as quickly as possible. I think the appointment of General Nash in Mitrovica should help and I'm doing all I can from here. We have already distributed 100 percent of what we committed to, but I hope you can do something to get the EU to disperse the money they have committed more quickly. (C)

Later this month, we also have a regional conference to finance infrastructure projects and reforms, and I think it is important that we all make a concrete pledge. We're prepared to pledge nearly \$500 million if others are willing to do their part. Finally, I know that we'll have to address the Kosovo status issue, but I really think our focus now ought to be on establishing security, building institutions and developing local leaders' sense of responsibility so we can have elections this fall. Thank you, Massimo. (C)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Thank you. Generally, I do share your concerns and your suggestions. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] I will ask that during the next European Council meeting in Lisbon a report should be prepared on this and a confidential discussion among leaders should take place on this issue. So, it is very important that President Guterres be fully involved in your concerns so that we can discuss this issue together next week. (C)

We have decided that we are sending 150 troops that are not exactly police but armed forces and trained for taking control of the territory. And we also have 350 Carabinieri there. We are

not reducing our forces there, on the contrary we are increasing them. And if we also include our people in Albania, we have a presence of 6,300 troops all over the area. For us, this is a very big effort. However, we will focus our attention on the police and Carabinieri and we'll see if on this issue we can do more. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, I agree with that. I think if we are strong in Kosovo, this will discourage Milosevic from mischief in Northern Kosovo and also indirectly support Djukanovic and I agree we have to help him economically. We have been doing what we can but perhaps we can do more. (C)

Prime Minister D'Alema: [REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

So, to summarize, I fully share your suggestions and we will increase our involvement in police forces and military forces and in economic support. I feel the need for a thorough political analysis and for this maybe we could put our diplomatic advisors in touch. And I hope that the European discussion next week will help us take steps forward. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree with all that, and I look forward to working with you on it. Thank you very much. (C)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you, Massimo. I hope to see you soon. (U)

Prime Minister D'Alema: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Jacques Chirac of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac

Interpreter: Carol Walter

Notetakers: Don Gentile, Roger Merletti, Miguel Aguilo, Frank Jarosinski, and Deana Sutliff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 15, 2000, 1:56 - 2:10 p.m., EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hello, Jacques. How are you? (U)

President Chirac: I am very glad to hear you. (U)

The President: Thanks for taking the call. I want to say a few things about Kosovo. (C)

President Chirac: I wanted to talk to you about that. (U)

The President: The situation is difficult there with daily violence and KFOR attrition and a slow moving UN operation. Spring has always been the most difficult season in the Balkans and I am worried that Kosovo could boil over or Milosovic might try to stir up trouble. For understandable reasons, we have lost the high-level attention we gave to Kosovo during the air campaign. I think we should put this operation on a stronger footing. (C)

I think there are three critical tasks as I see it. First, ensuring KFOR has the forces it needs to counter any threat. Second, getting the UN the funding it needs to do its job

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Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: March 16, 2010

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PER E. O. 13526

effectively. Third, deploying enough police to take the pressure off KFOR to maintain security. KFOR is getting weaker when it needs to get stronger. I understand you have offered additional forces and I hope you can employ an additional battalion to those you deployed. I am asking all of us to look at our force levels to see if more is needed. Also, American forces remain available to support the French sector in case of emergency. I know you have the most difficult situation. (C)

We also need to ensure that when the new KFOR commander takes over, the transition is smooth so we don't send a signal of weakness to Milosovic. We need to do more to counter extremist elements among Kosovar Albanians. We sent two of our people with the best connections there this weekend to deliver that message. We also need more police. I know Madeleine has talked to your people about that. We are increasing our contribution by more than 10 percent and we hope you can do the same. (C)

I am also concerned about the status of the UN operation, UNMIK. They have been crippled by funding shortages, and we have to get the resources there so Kouchner can succeed. I think the appointment of General Nash as the regional administrator in Mitrovica will help, and I am doing what I can do here to increase our contribution. I hope you will think about whether there is more that you can do and we can push the EU to disburse the money even faster. (C)

There is also a regional conference later this month to finance infrastructure projects and reforms. I am ready to pledge about \$500 million if all the others are ready to do their part. Of course, at some point, we need to address the status of Kosovo, but right now our focus should be on getting the operation right on establishing security, building institutions, and developing responsibility among local leaders so we can have elections later this fall. (C)

President Chirac: I absolutely agree with this analysis. As concerns the military means, first of all we have already taken the decision to reinforce our military presence there. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[REDACTED] As concerns material assistance to the region, we, within the framework of the EU, are prepared to face up to our share of responsibility.

An hour ago, we received Prodi, EU Chairman, in my office and discussed this matter precisely along the lines you hoped for. From this point of view there is no problem. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[REDACTED] I admit that it is difficult. Last point, I think the Contact Group should meet regularly once again. (C)

The President: Well, first of all, I agree that municipal elections should be first, and I think that it's important that all your allies recognize that Mitrovica is not just a French problem. Everyone should take responsibility. (C)

President Chirac: That's what you did. (U)

The President: And I agree on the Contact Group. I think we ought to include Russia. Putin wants to be a constructive player. We will follow up on all these things. (C)

The President: Thank you. Hope to see you soon. Goodbye. (U)

President Chirac: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

1242

April 5, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: IAN A. BOWLES *IAB*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letters to Prime Minister Blair,
Chancellor Schroeder and President Prodi on
Climate Change

In response to a weekly report item from George Frampton that referenced the findings of a recent a Pew Center on Global Climate Change report highlighting the economic efficiency of greenhouse gas emissions trading, the President wrote a marginal note saying "should send this with cover letter from me to Tony Blair and other EU leaders."

Your memo responds to the President's request and provides cover letters to Blair, Schroeder and Prodi for his signature. We recommend these three recipients following consultations with State. As a point of interest, the Pew Center is directed by Eileen Claussen, formerly of NSC/Environment directorate.

I have revised the letters based on comments from Jim Steinberg. The letters are not time sensitive.

The NSC received a copy President's weekly report on January 10, 1999

Concurrence by: Caroline Krass, Antony Blinken *IAB Gr*

RECOMMENDATION


That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair
Tab B Letter to President Prodi
Tab C Letter to Chancellor Schroeder
Tab D Marginal note on George Frampton's weekly report

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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47-00


Dear Mr. President:

Knowing our shared interest in global climate change, I have enclosed a report on the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions trading.

As you know, I feel strongly that a global emissions trading system represents our best hope to cost-effectively meet the challenge of climate change. This new report by the non-profit Pew Center on Global Climate Change supports the view that a flexible, well designed trading system will significantly reduce the costs of climate change mitigation. The study also builds on a growing body of literature (including a report last year by the OECD) showing that trading will particularly benefit industrialized countries for whom greenhouse gas abatement is relatively expensive.

I appreciate your efforts, and those of your member countries, to build an effective international response to one of the most challenging issues of this new century. I know our governments can work together to achieve additional progress at the climate change conference at The Hague. I look forward to discussing this critical matter with you further.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Romano Prodi
President of the European Commission
Brussels

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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11-6-00
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[Knowing our shared interest in Global Climate change,

Dear Tony:

I have enclosed ~~the~~ a report]

[I thought you would be interested in the enclosed report] on the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions trading.

As you know, I feel strongly that a global emissions trading system represents our best hope ~~for~~ ^{to} meeting the challenge of climate change. cost-effectively. This new report by the non-profit Pew Center on Global Climate Change supports the view that a flexible, well designed trading system will significantly reduce the costs of climate change mitigation. In addition, the study builds on a growing body of literature (including a report last year by the OECD) showing that trading will particularly benefit industrialized countries for whom greenhouse gas abatement is relatively expensive.

I appreciate your efforts, and those of your EU partners, to build an effective international response to one of the most challenging issues of this new century. I know our governments can work together to achieve additional progress at the climate change conference ~~later~~ ^{this year} at the Hague. I look forward to discussing ~~these~~ critical matters with you this spring.

With best regards,

The Right Honorable
Tony Blair, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Samuel
EDITS

Dear Mr. President:

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Sincerely,

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Romano Prodi
President of the European Commission
Brussels

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1242

Dear Gerhard:

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The report emphasizes that an emissions trading system that is global in scope and flexible in application will significantly reduce the costs of climate change mitigation. Minimizing costs will not only promote compliance with our emissions reduction targets, but will also allow us to move more aggressively over the long term to address this challenge. The study builds on a growing body of literature (including last year's OECD report) that shows trading can benefit European countries and other nations for whom greenhouse gas abatement is relatively expensive.

I hope we can work together to address these important issues and set the tone for close coordination between our governments in the lead-up to the climate change conference at The Hague later this year. I look forward to discussing these issues with you this spring.

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T242

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Numerous studies also make clear that the broader, more open, and unrestricted the trading system, the greater the benefits. As you know, the flexibility mechanisms being designed under the Kyoto Protocol also have tremendous potential to contribute to our broader efforts to promote energy efficiency and cleaner energy development in developing countries.

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Enclosure

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Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Berlin

~~Enclosure~~

4-11-00

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER

SUBJECT: Cover Letters to Prime Minister Blair, President Prodi and Chancellor Schroeder for Transmittal of Pew Center on Global Climate Change Report on Climate Change

Purpose

To transmit to Prime Minister Blair, President Prodi, and Chancellor Schroeder a report on greenhouse gas emissions trading by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

Background

You made a marginal note on George Frampton's weekly report to send the referenced report to Tony Blair and the EU leadership with a cover letter from you. The letters you requested are attached.

The Pew Center report asserts that a worldwide greenhouse gas emissions trading program can cut the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions nearly in half. The report found that with no trading, returning emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 would cost the seven largest industrial countries \$111.6 billion. With trading only among the seven Western industrial countries and former Eastern bloc countries, the total cost of the emissions reductions falls by \$20 billion. If trading is worldwide in scope, the savings from trading rise to \$49 billion.

The EU has proposed a set of "caps" on emissions trading mechanisms (e.g. that only 50 percent of emissions reductions could be achieved through trading) under the Kyoto Protocol that would drive up the cost of achieving emissions reductions. The United States opposes any such caps on trading. Your letter

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

highlights the merits of unrestricted trading in light of the report's findings, and urges close coordination between the United States and the EU on these issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters at Tabs A, B, and C.

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Blair
- Tab B Letter to President Prodi
- Tab C Letter to Chancellor Schroeder
- Tab D Marginal note on George Frampton's weekly report

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 2000


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Prime Minister
London

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister Blair (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Blair

Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Michael Manning,
Robert Williams, Matthew Sibley, Don Gentile,
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME May 10, 2000, 5:45 - 6:02 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Army-Navy Country Club

Prime Minister Blair: Hi Bill. (U)

The President: Hey Tony. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: We've hit a snag. (C)

The President: Yes, we sure have. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

This is as much to get your thoughts and advice, Bill. I'm sorry for troubling you. This is the situation. When Trimble last went to his Ulster Unionist Council, they passed a resolution that said they couldn't go back into the Executive again unless he retained the name of the RUC in some way. [redacted]

The President: Yes, I saw it. I even got a copy of the resolution. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: [redacted]

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/11/10

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes, what I think, what I'm concerned about and what the SDLP is also concerned about is that the unionists will call it RUC and the Catholics won't join it. I think the SDLP is worried there won't be any Catholics to join because the unionists will use this to refer to themselves as RUC. (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: Let me tell you what bothers me about your difficulties. I worry that if you put this legislation through like this and Sinn Fein withdraws their offer, we are worse off than if we're in a stalemate and we just hold the IRA to their offer. Ever since the last impasse, I thought the unionists had the complete high ground. Now it looks to me like the IRA and Sinn Fein have the high ground, especially if the SDLP sticks with them rhetorically. If you can't get this done, the question is, what do you want to give up right now? I'm very worried about it. We can try again, but we've been working on Sinn Fein all day and we haven't gotten any further than you. Now they want to change the Patten report, that's their perspective. I know what the counter-arguments are; it's a lousy deal either way. Either way, I feel so badly for you. The only thing that bothers me is the SDLP. No matter what the undertaking is, the unionists would continue to refer to it in that way in every non-official channel possible and that would keep the Catholics from joining. The practical problem is they're two hardheaded sides

pouring old grudges into little words. We can talk to them again, but I have next to no hope they'll change and if they don't, what's confronting you is what you're better off giving up. I'd really be worried if these IRA guys withdraw their offer before we put it on the table. Would you want something else, a tit for tat deal? Any way, can you buy yourself another 24 hours to keep working on this? (S)

Prime Minister Blair:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I'll keep thinking about it some more to come up with anything else. I really have only been pondering it for about 30 minutes because I thought it would get worked out. Our guys pounded Sinn Fein today. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: They feel they're in a very strong position. (C)

The President: Yes, they finally got the high ground back. I know the Irish community here was so relieved when the IRA said that they would commit themselves to put arms beyond use; before that, the Irish here were in the uncomfortable position of finding themselves disillusioned with Sinn Fein. Now they feel they kind of came across and took a huge step forward. I am sympathetic to Trimble's position, but I don't know what to do right now. I sure worry about taking the risk the IRA will take the offer off the table and I don't know what I would do if I were you. (S)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: That's why you try to buy a little time. Do you think there is any chance if Trimble and Adams met, they could work this out? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I will try to buy time. I just thought I would fill you in on the situation. (C)

The President: Do you think that if Trimble and Adams met, they could work it out? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: It's possible, and may be worth getting them to do that.

EO 13526 1.4b. EO 13526 1.4d

The President: That's why I wondered. The problem is if they had a meeting and it leaked, then everyone would try to spin the crap out of it if there was no resolution. It's the sort of thing that might work if they looked at each other face to face, assuming no practical impact and assuming you can work it out with the Catholics to not refuse to join, or even have Hume there. They've been at loggerheads for so long and come so far. It would be truly heartbreaking, since they made this big move on decommissioning. Maybe you could find a way out of it, if they sat down and talked, maybe they could work this out. I don't know if this is true, I'm just thinking. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: It's worth trying. To be honest, anything's worth trying. (C)

The President: Do you think you ought to ask to see if they were willing? (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I do. (C)

The President: Do you think it would be better or worse if Hume were there? (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: Yeah, I know. If he has this language, he can say I'm deciding the requirement has been satisfied, and we are going to stand up the government. If the language is not in there, then he has to actually call them all back together and get another vote. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: Exactly. (C)

The President: Well, let me talk to our guys about this and think about whether you want to ask them to get together and have anybody there, or just the two of them alone in a room talking. I think they both realize they have come a long way and they both have unruly elements in their coalitions. It would be a travesty to let this slip away now, and they might be able to find an answer among themselves that we haven't thought of. They know their needs better than we think we know their needs. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: Yes. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I can't believe there's not a legal way or undertaking capable of eliminating that problem. (C)

The President: Let me ask you this -- the unionists, when they passed this resolution, what did they have in mind? They basically didn't want to erase the role the RUC history played, and pretend that Northern Ireland was independent and not a part of Great Britain? (C)

Prime Minister Blair:

The President: I wonder if there's some way for Burnside to work out some sort of statement that would be sufficiently reassuring to Sinn Fein, so they would be absolutely sure the Catholics would be comfortable joining this force. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: That's a possibility. (C)

The President: If they're not just worried about the words, but the practical impact, there might be some way for people that supported this to help. That's another thing I think that works on them. One of the things I learned about Adams and McGuinness, they were very worried that their requirements would cause Trimble to fall. If you can get some of these guys who caused these problems to help solve it by some sort of statement or

something, maybe even something else that could be adopted that Trimble, given the support of these guys, could take to his people, that might also work. There's a theology of the words, which you may not ever be able to solve, and the practical impact of them, which you might be able to solve, or at least some basis on which Trimble could talk to Adams and work this out. My instinct is this seems to be the real last straw and a situation where Adams might claim that Trimble is trying to change the importance of the Patten report. Maybe that's the answer. Maybe the sponsors of this resolution could do something that would support Trimble and reassure Adams. That and having them meet together are the only ideas I've got right now. I've had a hundred conversations with Gerry Adams and I could have another one, but based on what my guys say, I think I'd be better off calling him and urging him to meet personally with Trimble and urging the same thing on Trimble. There are two things there. There is psychology and theology, where Sinn Fein and the IRA think they have the high ground and then there is the practical, and I think, understandable fear that no matter how you slice this, the people who've been the dominant party will find a way to use this to make it very uncomfortable for the Catholics to be a part of this institution, which will undermine all the grief you've taken for letting people out of prison. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I think there may be something in that. (C)

The President: You want to think about it and I'll have my people be in touch with your guys? I know it's late for you, but it's early here and I will be up late, so I can start early in the morning, if you want. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: That's very helpful; there may be something in that. (C)

The President: Talk to your folks and have them get back to us and if you want me to make calls at the crack of dawn, I will be happy to do that. Get some rest. The worst thing we can do is having everybody where they can't think anymore. It's not so late for me and I've got a lot of work to do, and I'll be happy to do that, so I can make the early morning call. Let me know. (C)

Prime Minister Blair: I'll let you know. (C)

The President: Goodbye, Tony. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ulster Unionist Party Leader
David Trimble (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Trimble

Notetakers: Amy Swarm, Sean Tarver, and
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME May 27, 2000, 11:57-11:59 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Trimble: Hello. (U)

The President: Well, congratulations. (U)

Mr. Trimble: I'm not sure. It was too close for comfort. (U)

The President: I followed the debates all week, and you were
brilliant. (U)

Mr. Trimble: It is kind of unfortunate other people were
incensing their delegates, and there was more than a little bit
of dubious practices going on. There were some discrepancies in
the voting figures, and I have to see if we can't give ourselves
a bigger margin next time. (U)

The President: Good. I'll go back to the others on the CBMs.
(U)

Mr. Trimble: Good. I need a success story quickly. (U)

The President: I will go to work on it. But you were brilliant.
I followed you on BBC and UTV. They may have to give you a
second Nobel Peace Prize. (U)

Mr. Trimble: It was quite a weekend. (U)

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The President: The weird thing about politics is that sometimes you have to take more grief from your friends than your enemies.
(C)

Mr. Trimble: Yes. Well, it's good of you to call. (U)

The President: Okay. Thanks, friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Gerry Adams
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Amy Swarm, and
Richard Norland
DATE, TIME: May 27, 2000, 12:20-12:24 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Adams: Hi, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Gerry, it's been a good day. (U)

Mr. Adams: Good day, surely. Thanks for all your help. (U)

The President: Glad we could do it. I'm really pleased. I hated to see Trimble have to go back to all his crazies, but it came out okay. (U)

Mr. Adams: It continues to be frustrating and messy. David Trimble's line about "house-training" Sinn Fein doesn't help. I can live with it, but it will upset the republican constituency. (U)

The President: I saw all that, but we've just got to get the government up and calm everybody down. (U)

Mr. Adams: You're right about that. I have also been working on Downing Street to claw back the emasculation of the Patten report. I actually had to talk to Number 10 on Thursday night because we almost lost the confidence-building measure on this issue -- the IRA were very close to issuing a statement. Any kind of formal meeting and we would have lost it. They are very clear. (U)

The President: I don't think this whole letter thing amounted to anything. I think we will be all right. (U)

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 05/30/10

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8/6/15 KBH

Mr. Adams: Okay. (S)

The President: I wanted to talk to everyone. The main thing is to get the government up and keep moving forward on the Patten Report and on CBMs. I think Trimble was just traumatized by having to deal with all those people. Sometimes in politics our friends are our biggest problem. (S)

Mr. Adams: I said so publicly here, but once again we are at this point because of your unique understanding. I have been saying to people: let's make sure we get as much progress as we can while you are in the White House. It is no accident that this has happened during your Presidency. Thanks again. (S)

The President: Yes. We've got almost eight months, so we can do it. (S)

Mr. Adams: We'll need you every day. (S)

The President: Have you given your commencement speech yet? (U)

Mr. Adams: No, I will be giving it tomorrow morning. Thanks again. (U)

The President. Okay. Good bye. Thanks for all your help. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Ahern of Ireland
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Prime Minister Ahern

Notetakers: Sean Tarver and Amy Swarm

DATE, TIME: May 27, 2000, 12:45-12:49 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Hey, Bertie. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: How are you, Bill? (U)

The President: Congratulations. It was a good day. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: It was a good day in Northern Ireland.

(U)

The President: Back on St. Patrick's Day, I was a little worried, but I feel good now. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Trimble worked hard. He had to rally troops. But it was a good win, because people are with him. Public opinion was 80 to 20 with him. We now have to get the Executive up and make as much progress as we can. We need the republicans and the IRA to make quick gestures, but the key issue is the Patten issue. Seamus Mallon has come out strongly in favor of serious amendments. If we don't get into position soon where they are recommending Catholics to the RUC, then.... It brings us forward from where we were. (U)

The President: We just got to get the government back up and get those CBMs done too. That will change everything. The unionists will completely change their mood when that happens[gap]. (U)

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 5/30/10

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2013-0472-M
8/6/15 KBM

Prime Minister Ahern: I think that has to happen quickly. The pressure will be back on Trimble. If out of this he gets a quick move on the CBMs, that will mean a lot. (S)

The President: Good. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: It is a good move. I don't know if anyone mentioned it, but Mallon is worried about Patten and RUC, but if we hold our nerve, we should be okay. (S)

The President: I'll call Mallon. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: Cheer him up. He is going to see Tony Blair tomorrow, but just to get his confidence up. How is everything with you? Campaigning? (S)

The President: Hillary is doing well. I think she is going to win that race. We've got two big issues this week -- China and [gap] trying to pass the World AIDS initiative. I'm feeling kind of good. (S)

Prime Minister Ahern: And Mbeki is over with you? (S)

The President: Yes, he was here. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: Give my regards to Hillary. (U)

The President: I will. She was doing great against Giuliani and now we have to do a different race. Al had a good week. (U)

Prime Minister Ahern: That's great. Thanks for the call and all your work and interest. You [gap] been out and we do appreciate it. (U)

The President: Okay. Keep in touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Northern Ireland Assembly Deputy
First Minister Seamus Mallon (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Seamus Mallon

Notetakers: Amy Swarm, Sean Tarver, and
Richard Norland

DATE, TIME May 27, 2000, 1:20-1:21 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Hello. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Hello, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: Seamus, how are you? (U)

Mr. Mallon: Very well. (U)

The President: I'm doing fine. I'm just glad the government is going back up and this is really important and a good sign. I think it has been a tough time for you. I talked to Tony Blair today, and he assured me that they are going to go ahead and implement the Patten report. I think we need to get on with work. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Yes. We will have to make sure he implements it in full. (U)

The President: I think he will. There are difficulties for him, but I think he is intent on doing it. Get the institutions back up and then get the IRA to do the CBMs as promised. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Patten is the key factor now. (U)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

Mr. Mallon: I am seeing him tomorrow...seeing Blair tomorrow and I will be giving him a strong message on it. (U)

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The President: Good. I will do what I can. I had a good talk with him today. I told him you guys are worried about him weakening it more, but he understands and I am hopeful, and just wanted to say congratulations to you today and whatever I can do to help, I will certainly do it. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thank you, Mr. President. We hope to see you here soon. If you can make it, you will be very welcome, and bring the golf clubs with you. (U)

The President: I will do it. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thank you for everything you have done and we look forward to seeing you soon. (U)

The President: Thanks, friend. (U)

Mr. Mallon: Thanks, Bill. We'll be seeing you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --