

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Richard Clarke & Mary McCarthy to Samuel Berger re: Al-Shifa (1 page)	<del>04/17/07</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VZ 9/27/2022
001b. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Al-Shifa [incomplete copy] (3 pages)	<del>ca. 4/00</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> VZ 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 National Security Council  
 Paul Kurtz; Mark Montgomery (Transnational Threats (TNT))  
 OA/Box Number: 3578

**FOLDER TITLE:**

Sudan

2007-1063-M  
ds200

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

April 17, 2000

**COPIES:** Ruz  
PBK  
Ruc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: RICHARD A. CLARKE *RAC*  
MARY O. MCCARTHY *mom*

SUBJECT: Response to the President Concerning the Al-Shifa Target

After reading reports of George's disciplinary actions relating to the mistaken targeting of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the President asked if CIA had picked the wrong target in Sudan as well. Our reply (at Tab A) details the evidence on al-Shifa that led to the decision to target the plant.

Concurrence by: Jamie Baker *B*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Your Query Concerning the Accuracy of Our Targeting of the Al-Shifa Plant

After reading reports of the actions George has taken to discipline those accountable in CIA for the mistaken targeting of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, you asked if the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was also the wrong target. The answer is that we had physical evidence to indicate that the plant was associated with chemical weapons activity; and the Intelligence Community judged that al-Shifa was part of the Sudanese Military Industries Corporation (MIC) which oversees Sudan's CW programs and, by inference, the plant was associated with Usama bin Ladin. Other intelligence revealed contacts between this facility and officials of Iraq's CW program.

Targeting of the al-Shifa Plant

Given bin Ladin's demonstrated determination to kill Americans, his clear interest in chemical weapons, his ties to Sudan and Sudan's MIC, the strong physical evidence of a VX precursor with no alternative use at the site and the Intelligence Community's judgment that al-Shifa was part of the MIC, I continue to believe that our strike was the right thing to do. Information obtained since then regarding bin Ladin's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction only reinforces this judgment.

Nonetheless, media skepticism has persisted, fueled by scientific challenges to the forensic evidence mounted by the owner of the plant, the somewhat inferential nature of our suspicions about its activities and inconsistencies in our public statements at the time of the strike. Arguments supporting the validity of the strike ultimately rest on intelligence judgments derived from incomplete, but persuasive, information.

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (c) (1), (d)  
Declassify On: 1.6, X1

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

v2 10/25/2012 (1.24)

2007-1063-111

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Sudanese to test various poisonous substances, and to improve techniques for using and producing them. He also provided significant funding to help Sudan build its Military Industries Corporation, which is responsible for chemical weapons production. NIF leader al-Turabi, with whom bin Ladin has close ties, has said that the MIC would furnish weapons and munitions for use against countries perceived to be enemies of Islam.

**The MIC-Shifa Tie.** Although prior to the strike the IC assessed that Shifa was part of the MIC, the association between Shifa and the MIC was inferred from the soil sample found adjacent to Shifa, the MIC's association with CW research and production and links between bin Ladin and the MIC, including his financial contribution to it.

**Shifa Ties to Bin Ladin.** Bin Ladin's connection to Shifa is suggested by several sources. Muhammad Bin Moisaalih, a money manager for bin Ladin who defected to Saudi Arabia in early 1998, claimed that bin Ladin had invested in Shifa. A separate source alleged in 1998 that bin Ladin actually owned the plant. A link is suggested also by the fact that the general manager of the Shifa facility, Osman Sulayman, resided in a house in Khartoum that bin Ladin had lived in.

**Links Between Idris and Bin Ladin.** We were unaware at the time of the bombing that ownership of the plant had been transferred to Idris. Since then, sources have reported that Salah Idris was a financial front man for bin Ladin and a member of the al Qida Shura Council. Intelligence reporting also suggests that some of Idris' firms may have engaged in nefarious activities on behalf of the NIF and possibly UBL, such as transporting contraband and arms. There is also information that they shared financial interests in several ventures, including large shares in a Sudanese bank in 1996. In particular, they are both linked to the Saudi banking figure Khalid bin Mahfuz, and to Abdul Basit Hamza, whom CIA believes managed Bin Ladin's Khartoum office. A few intelligence sources have asserted that there is no link between Idris and bin Ladin.

**Ties to Iraq.** Given the rudimentary state of Sudan's indigenous chemical industry, we do not believe Sudan could have produced VX without a foreign benefactor, most likely Iraq. Indeed, there is ample evidence that Iraqi chemical warfare personnel were working in Khartoum during this period.

Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it planned to produce VX for its CW program using the EMPA process. Prior to the Sudanese soil

sample, Iraq was the only country we knew of that had pursued this production process.

Shifa officials had direct contact with Iraqi officials associated with the Iraqi VX program. Shifa signed an agreement with Iraq's Ministry of Agriculture to supply veterinary drugs to Iraq as part of the UN's "oil for food" program. According to the United Nations, however, Shifa never delivered the contracted material.