Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4116A				
Document ID: [PDD-2 Organization of the National Security Council, January 20, 1993]				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 2. (5 pages)	01/20/1993	P1/b(1) NDE 9/25/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4116A

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-2, January 20, 1993]

2010-1227-M
vz406

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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No. PDD 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20003

January 20, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-2

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
Representative of the United States to the United Nations
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
United States Trade Representative
The Chief of Staff to the President
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council (U)

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities in the area of national security, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be organized as follows.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M(1.01)
09/25/19 KDE

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The functions, membership and responsibilities of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and this Presidential Decision Directive. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States -- domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my principal means for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy. (U)

The NSC shall have as its members the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, as prescribed by statute. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC shall attend NSC meetings. In addition, the new membership of the NSC shall include the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President. The Attorney General shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions. The heads of other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisers to the NSC, and other senior officials shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate. (U)

The NSC shall meet as required. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and, when appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council staff, as provided by law. (U)

B. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) (S)

An NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is established as the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC shall review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security

policy. The NSC/PC should be a flexible instrument -- a forum available for Cabinet-level officials to meet to discuss and resolve issues not requiring the President's participation. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall serve as Chair. The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall be informed of meetings and be invited to attend all those with international economic considerations. (C)

The NSC/PC shall have as its members the Secretary of State (if unavailable, the Deputy Secretary of State or the designee of the Secretary of State); the Secretary of Defense (if unavailable, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the designee of the Secretary of Defense); the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as appropriate. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General or other heads of departments or agencies shall be invited as needed. (C)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible -- in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and, when appropriate, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy -- for calling meetings of the NSC/PC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. (C)

C. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) (C)

An NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) shall serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process (including Interagency Working Groups established pursuant to Section D below). The Deputies Committee also shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of the Administration's major foreign policy initiatives shall be scheduled to ensure that they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Also, these reviews should periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded. (C)

The NSC/DC shall have as its members the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as the Chairman); the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as needed. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, may invite representatives of other Executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, to attend meetings of the NSC/DC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed. When meeting on sensitive intelligence activities, including covert actions, the attendees shall include the appropriate senior representative of the Attorney General. ~~(C)~~

The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible -- in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NEC, as appropriate -- for calling meetings of the NSC/DC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. The NSC/DC shall ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each. The NSC/DC may task the interagency groups established pursuant to Section D of this Presidential Decision Directive. ~~(C)~~

The NSC Deputies Committee shall also be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the National Security Council. In this capacity, the group shall be designated the Deputies Committee/CM, for Crisis Management. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, may request a meeting of the Deputies Committee in its crisis management capacity. The Committee also shall focus on crisis prevention -- including contingency planning for major areas of concern. While meeting as the Deputies Committee/CM, the group shall be assisted by a small support staff -- to provide institutional memory, develop agendas and record decisions. ~~(C)~~

D. Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWGs) ~~(C)~~

A system of Interagency Working Groups -- some permanent, others ad hoc -- is hereby authorized. The NSC/IWGs shall be established at the direction of the Deputies Committee, which shall also determine the chair of the NSC/IWG -- either departmental or NSC or NEC. In general, foreign policy and defense issues should be chaired at the Assistant-Secretary level by the Departments of State and Defense, respectively; international economic issues by

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the Department of the Treasury or the NEC, as appropriate; and intelligence, nonproliferation, arms control and crisis management by the NSC. The IWGs shall convene on a regular basis -- to be determined by the Deputies Committee -- to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. Strict guidelines shall be established governing the operation of the Interagency Working Groups, including participants, decision-making path and time frame. The number of these working groups shall be kept to the minimum needed to promote an effective NSC system. (S)

William J. Clinton

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4116A				
Document ID: [PDD-3, March 24, 1993]				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 3. (5 pages)	03/24/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4116A

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-3, March 3, 1993]

2010-1227-M
vz407

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 3. (5 pages)	03/24/1993	P1/b(1)

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[PDD-3, March 3, 1993]

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Original OA/ID Number: 4116A				
Document ID: [PDD-6 U.S. Policy on Somalia, May 19, 1993]				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 6: U. S. Policy on Somalia, May 19, 1993 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4116A

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-6, U. S. Policy on Somalia, May 19, 1993]

2010-1227-M
vz408

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 6: U. S. Policy on Somalia, May 19, 1993 (3 pages)	05/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 4116A

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-6, U. S. Policy on Somalia, May 19, 1993]

2010-1227-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4116A				
Document ID: [PDD-9 Alien Smuggling, June 18, 1993]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 9: Alien Smuggling, June 18, 1993 (5 pages)	06/18/1993	P1/b(1)

LDE 9/25/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4116A

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-9 Alien Smuggling, June 18, 1993]

2010-1227-M
vz409

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Initials: VZ Date: 10/04/2010
2010-1227-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M(1.05)
09/25/19 KDE

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC POLICY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
THE COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
THE COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: Alien Smuggling (U)

The recent increase in Asian criminal syndicate smuggling of Chinese nationals illegally into the U.S. by air, sea and across land borders is a matter of serious concern. At least until completion of the tasks set forth below, I direct that criminal-syndicate alien smuggling be dealt with in the following fashion:

Policy

The U.S. Government will take the necessary measures to preempt, interdict and deter alien smuggling into the U.S. Our efforts will focus on disrupting and dismantling the criminal networks which traffic in illegal aliens. We will deal with the problem at its source, in transit, at our borders and within the U.S. We will attempt to interdict and hold smuggled aliens as far as possible from the U.S. border and to repatriate them when appropriate. We will seek tougher criminal penalties both at home and abroad for alien smugglers. We will seek to process smuggled aliens as quickly as possible. ~~(S)~~

At the same time, we will also attempt to ensure that smuggled aliens detained as a result of U.S. enforcement actions, whether

in the U.S. or abroad, are fairly assessed and/or screened by appropriate authorities to ensure protection of bonafide refugees. (C)

The following represents U.S. Government organization and tasks for dealing with alien smuggling:

Organization

-- Justice and INS will be responsible for criminal enforcement and all U.S. prosecutions and for conducting law enforcement operations and investigations outside the U.S. under existing interagency arrangements. (U)

-- State will be responsible for international policy and relations with foreign governments and international organizations. (U)

-- Transportation and Coast Guard will be responsible for interdiction at sea with appropriate support by Defense, under existing interagency arrangements. (U)

-- The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for foreign intelligence in support of interdiction efforts by INS and Coast Guard in accordance with existing authorities. (C)

-- The Border Security Working Group will be responsible for coordinating the interagency effort overall. (U)

Efforts at the Source

-- State will approach source nations whose nationals, businesses and/or infrastructure provide assistance to alien smuggling and to develop common policies to prevent the departure of criminal-sponsored, non-refugee and undocumented aliens. (U)

-- State will make efforts to ensure that repatriated migrants are not unfairly or unlawfully penalized simply for seeking to emigrate without authorization. Such efforts may include monitoring returnees and information exchanges with host government officials on post-return status of returnees. (U)

-- USIA will coordinate information programs to discourage economic migrants from dealing with alien smugglers. (U)

Efforts in Transit

-- State will approach flag states of vessels engaging in alien smuggling to seek their cooperation to:

- monitor suspects and deny flagging to ships and licensing to captains involved in alien smuggling;

- criminalize alien smuggling, including asset seizure and other financial penalties as well as restitution by vessel owners for enforcement costs;

- allow the Coast Guard to stop, board and determine the status of suspect vessels and their cargo on the high seas, either in advance or upon request; and

- receive ships and smuggled aliens apprehended on the high seas for disposition in accordance with standards that ensure protection of bonafide refugees and safe treatment for all migrants. ~~(C)~~

-- The Coast Guard will direct U.S. interdiction efforts at sea with appropriate DoD support if necessary and will board suspect vessels when authorized. It will direct/escort them to flag states or the nearest non-U.S. port if practical and assuming host nation concurrence. ~~(C)~~

-- The Intelligence Community, in support of our interdiction and law enforcement efforts, will collect and disseminate foreign intelligence to help locate and track smuggling vessels in international waters and foreign ports. ~~(C)~~

-- State will approach Mexico, as both an initial North American destination for alien smuggling and as a nearby state to which smuggling ships might be diverted, to pursue cooperation. ~~(C)~~

-- State and INS will work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to develop procedures to ensure that migrants landed outside the U.S. are fairly and appropriately treated in accordance with standards that ensure protection of bonafide refugees. (U)

-- State and INS will work with air carriers to preempt attempts to use commercial air to gain entry to the U.S. for illegal aliens, e.g., the pre-screening Carrier Consultant Program works with Embassies and air carriers to detect fraudulent documents and prevent boarding before departure to the U.S. These measures will be undertaken subject to safeguards for those genuinely fleeing persecution. (U)

Efforts at the Border and within the U.S.

-- Within available physical and fiscal resources, INS will detain illegal aliens entering the US with the assistance of criminal syndicates. Absent a credible claim for asylum, smuggled aliens will remain in detention pending final determination of asylum status so as to ensure repatriation if asylum status is denied. To the extent possible,

smuggled aliens will have priority in processing for asylum or removal. (U)

-- Defense will study and recommend which of its facilities could be made available to INS for back-up detention of illegal aliens and the cost to INS of the use of such facilities (including costs of any services provided by Defense). ~~(S)~~

-- Justice will review criminal and civil authorities and penalties for alien smuggling and recommend alternative prosecution strategies or penalty increases if appropriate. Justice will determine whether U.S. Attorneys should be instructed to prioritize prosecution of alien smuggling cases in light of limited penalties. Justice will also consider including alien smuggling as a RICO predicate, expansion of authorities to seize property and money and whether wiretapping should be permitted as an investigative tool. (U)

-- Justice will review and make recommendations concerning Executive Order 12711, the interim rule published January 29, 1990, the proposed Final Rule, administrative decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and INS field directives pertaining to eligibility for asylum based on coercive family planning practices. (U)

-- The Border Security Working Group will complete its review of expedited asylum and exclusion legislation and related asylum reform efforts. The review will include draft legislation and recommendations to improve and expedite administrative hearings, administrative procedures and regulatory measures. (U)

Funding

-- Justice and INS will review and recommend appropriate action on the use of the Immigration Emergency Fund for funding international repatriation, domestic detention and processing illegal migrants. (U)

-- OMB will determine funding alternatives to the Immigration Emergency Fund. (U)

-- Except as otherwise indicated, agencies will pay for their own regular operating expenses. (U)

-- State, in consultation with Justice, should review the special repatriation fund, administered by our Embassy in Mexico City, to determine adequacy and alternatives, including funding sources. (U)

Implementation

This policy guidance should be considered ad interim, pending completion of the tasks assigned above. The assigned tasks, studies and reviews should be completed within two weeks with recommendations submitted to the Border Security Working Group. (U)

William J. Clinton

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 10: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1993 and FY 1994, June 25, 1993. [Atomic Energy Act] (6 pages)	06/25/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 11, July 4, 1993 (4 pages)	07/04/1993	P1/b(1)

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001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 11, July 4, 1993 (4 pages)	07/04/1993	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 13: Nonproliferation and Export Controls, September 27, 1993 (12 pages)	09/27/1993	P1/b(1)

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[PDD-13 Nonproliferation and Export Controls, September 27, 1993]

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Original OA/ID Number: 4116A
Document ID: [PDD-14 U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere, November 3, 1993]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 14: U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere, November 3, 1993 (5 pages)	11/03/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 09/25/19

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[PDD-14, U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere, November 3, 1993]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere (U)

The scourge of illegal narcotics is severely damaging the social fabric of our society and those of many other nations, including those where the drugs are grown and processed. (U)

Thus, the United States will treat as a serious national security threat the operations of international criminal narcotics syndicates, requiring an extraordinary and coordinated response by civilian and military agencies engaged in national security. We will act unilaterally and in concert with other nations to implement an international strategy that is fully integrated into our overall national drug strategy. We must provide leadership, moral and financial support and material technical assistance to states that have the political will to confront this serious threat to democracy, safety and health. (U)

Role in Foreign Policy

International narcotics control is a major foreign policy objective of the United States. The Secretary of State shall insure that our ambassadors, particularly in drug source, transit

and money laundering countries, place a high priority on counter-narcotics policy and programs. (U)

Counternarcotics programs are fundamentally essential to strengthening democratic institutions and defending them against one of the most insidious threats to representative government, free market economies, human rights and environmental protection. (U)

Redirection in Policy

Having reviewed our past policies and programs, I am hereby directing a change in emphasis from the past concentration largely on efforts to stop narcotics shipments to a more evenly distributed effort across three programs:

o Assisting Institutions in Other Nations: In those nations that demonstrate the political will to fight the narcotics syndicates, we should expand our programs to assist them in the creation and strengthening of their own institutions to defeat the narcotics threat. This effort will include assistance to judicial and police systems, indigenous interdiction, and cooperative programs to deal with narcotics leadership, money laundering, and chemical precursors. (S)

The most effective long-term solution to the problem of narcotics production and trafficking has been shown to be broad-based economic growth with equity. Such growth will generate legitimate alternative employment and income opportunities to replace narcotics-related occupations and enterprises throughout the national economy. Efforts will include both targeted development within the coca-growing areas, as well as outside the drug-growing areas, and will encompass social sector activities targeted on the poor. The U.S. Government will pursue a program of sustainable development aimed at meeting these goals and leading to broad-based economic growth with equity and democratic institution-building. Where necessary, we will support eradication of illicit crops, in collaboration with host nations and other international donors. (S)

We will continue diplomatic, public awareness, demand reduction, and other low-cost efforts to strengthen the political will to combat trafficking in key countries where that commitment is weak. (S)

o Destroying Narco-Trafficking Organizations: Departments and agencies should increase their efforts in a coordinated program to arrest, or assist friendly nations to arrest, the narcotics syndicate leadership. Similarly, they should engage in a greatly enhanced, unified effort to defeat narcotics money laundering here and abroad as a high priority. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General should coordinate an expanded U.S. and international program to control the precursor chemicals essential for drug production abroad. (S)

o Interdiction: The United States should continue a program of narcotics shipment interdiction at and near the border, in the transit zone, and in source countries. While maintaining flexibility to readjust our programs if required, we should engage in a gradual shift of emphasis for our own activities from the transit zone to the source countries. In addition, we will expand our support to other nations' interdiction efforts, both civilian and military, particularly in the source countries. (S)

International Cooperation

Because drug trafficking is a worldwide criminal enterprise that dwarfs the counternarcotics capabilities and resources of any single nation, the United States will lead an effort to mobilize international cooperation and action against all aspects of the illicit drug trade. (S)

The Secretary of State should seek to increase the effectiveness of the counternarcotics activities of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other regional bodies. (U)

The Secretary of the Treasury should insure that counternarcotics programs receive increased emphasis in the Multinational Development Banks and other international financing institutions. (S)

The Secretary of Defense should facilitate the regional fusion of source and transit countries' air, ground, and maritime counterdrug interdiction campaigns and develop cooperative efforts on a regional basis. (C)

Funding

U.S. counternarcotics assistance holds the potential to assist us in reducing U.S. drug consumption. Nonetheless, many departments and agencies have experienced Congressional reductions in the funding levels for crucial international counternarcotics programs. The ONDCP Director, and the OMB Director, working with the relevant department and agency heads, should report to me by 1 December on what the reductions have been, what options exist for reprogramming (primarily within the 150 and 050 budgets) to partially restore the cuts, and what programmatic offsets and trade-offs would be necessary. As a first step, the Secretaries of State and Defense should submit a proposal for utilizing Section 506 a(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide support to indigenous counternarcotics programs as soon as possible. (S)

The Directors of ONDCP and OMB, working with relevant agency and department heads, should also develop budget projections to implement this policy through FY 1996 and include them in the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy. (S)

In conjunction with the rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act, drug programs in the Economic Support Fund, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and

International Narcotics Matters accounts should be consolidated into a single Counternarcotics Fund. (C)

To release the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill's hold on all FY 1994 counternarcotics ESF and FMF funds, the Counternarcotics IWG should develop and present to the Committees on Appropriations a new counternarcotics strategy, including budget estimates, for the Americas. (C)

In complying with the Foreign Assistance Act's current requirement for certification of aid recipients' full cooperation in counternarcotics, the Secretary of State should apply stringent standards, employing national interests waivers where necessary. There should be full interagency review of the certification report prior to its transmission to me. In addition, there should be internal Executive Branch conditionality for continued assistance. This conditionality should involve measurable progress and periodic interagency reviews. (U)

Interagency Structure

The Director, ONDCP shall provide oversight and direction for all counternarcotics policy development and implementation, in coordination with other concerned Cabinet members. The Director shall mediate interagency counternarcotics policy and program disputes, including recommending that the NSC convene Deputies or Principals Committee meetings or seek Presidential decisions on the basis of coordinated interagency views. The Director will conduct at least quarterly reviews of the international counternarcotics effort and will annually prepare and submit a classified international drug control strategy. (C)

An Interagency Working Group (IWG) chaired by the Department of State will develop and insure coordinated implementation of international counternarcotics policy. The IWG shall report its activities and differences of views among agencies to the Director, ONDCP for review, mediation, and resolution with concerned Cabinet members and, if necessary, the President. (U)

The Director, ONDCP shall appoint a coordinator for interdiction who shall insure that the assets committed by departments and agencies to international interdiction are adequate and that their location and scheduling are integrated and optimized. The coordinator shall be advised by a committee of concerned agencies and should report unresolved issues to the Director, ONDCP. (C)

Implementation

The heads of departments and agencies should submit reports to the Director, ONDCP by 15 December on steps they have taken to implement this directive. The Director, ONDCP should submit a consolidated report to me by 15 January on implementation to date and on an overall implementation plan. (C)

In addition, the Director, ONDCP should undertake the following and report to me in 120 days:

A. Together with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, resolve interagency responsibilities for acting against international counternarcotics money laundering and launch an expanded, coordinated program; ~~(C)~~

B. Review the multiplicity of command/control and intelligence centers involved in international counternarcotics and recommend steps to streamline the structure for consideration among concerned Cabinet members; ~~(C)~~

C. Review the requirements for additional "end game" assets and capabilities, particularly in the source zone, and develop a plan for enhanced U.S. support to this aspect of interdiction; and ~~(C)~~

D. Review the impediments to sharing counternarcotics related information between the Intelligence Community and the Law Enforcement Community and report, with the Director of Central Intelligence and Attorney General, on steps that can be taken to improve sharing. ~~(S)~~

This Directive focuses on Latin America and cocaine. In order to address non-hemispheric and heroin problems, I have directed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director for ONDCP to coordinate a NSC/Presidential Review Directive within 120 days to be developed through the IWG. ~~(C)~~

William J. Clinton

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Decision Directive 15, November 3, 1993 (5 pages)~~	~~11/03/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ LDE 9/25/19

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Stockpile Stewardship Under an Extended Moratorium and a Comprehensive Test Ban (S)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and directs the implementation of U.S. policy on the stewardship of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile under the conditions of an extended moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing and a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). (S)

Background

PDD-11 (signed July 4, 1993) established and directed the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear testing and a CTB. PDD-11 stated the United States would seek to negotiate a multilateral nuclear test ban and extended the current U.S. nuclear testing moratorium through the first annual Congressional reporting and authorization period established in the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment (i.e., through September 30, 1994) provided no other state tested. (S)

PDD-11 also directs the Department of Energy to formulate a specific safeguard program to compensate for the effects of a CTB and protect the capability to resume U.S. nuclear testing. A Safeguards Task Force co-chaired by the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense was formed to implement this directive. The Task Force Report, "Plan for Stockpile Stewardship Under a Test Ban," was submitted to the Interagency Working Group (IWG)

on Defense Policy and Arms Control on August 19, 1993 and approved by relevant agencies on October 7, 1993. (S)

Following the nuclear test conducted by China on October 4, 1993, I approved policy guidance directing the Department of Energy to take such actions as are necessary to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision to test or not test will be based on U.S. fundamental national security interests and will take into account (1) the contribution further tests would make in improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB, (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium, (3) progress in the CTB negotiations and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader nonproliferation objectives, including indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. The stockpile stewardship measures directed in this PDD are to be implemented whether or not I decide to ask Congress for the authority to conduct a test or tests next year. (S)

Plan for Stockpile Stewardship

The continued maintenance of a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent is a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. The objective of the Plan for Stockpile Stewardship is to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. (U)

Achieving this objective will require (a) continued use of current facilities and programs, (b) a limited set of new experimental and computational facilities and programs, (c) strengthened integration of all program areas, (d) a long term commitment to support these programs and (e) periodic review and evaluation of all program elements. (U)

The Plan will be structured around a strategy of using past nuclear test data in combination with future, nonnuclear test data and aggressive application of computational modeling, experimental facilities and simulators to further comprehensive understanding of the behavior of nuclear weapons and the effects of radiation on military systems. (U)

The Plan will include stockpile surveillance; experimental and research, development and engineering programs; and the maintenance of a production capability to support these efforts. (U)

Program Elements

Specific program elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Plan, while conditioned to an extent by the eventual terms of a CTB Treaty, generally will consist of:

-- Stockpile surveillance and evaluation. Key elements include laboratory system testing, joint flight testing, laboratory component testing, retirement testing and reliability assessment. (U)

-- Hydrodynamic testing and hydronuclear experiments. The loss of nuclear testing to assess and evaluate the safety, reliability and performance of the stockpile will require improved and expanded hydrodynamic testing and hydronuclear experiments at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). (S)

Major new hydrodynamic testing programs will include developing baseline hydrodynamic experimental data for the enduring stockpile and increasing the number of hydrodynamic experiments as part of the stockpile sampling and aging programs. Hydrodynamic testing also will support a development program necessary to help retain and exercise weapon design engineering skills and to examine safety modifications in existing nuclear warhead designs that could be introduced into the stockpile without nuclear testing in case they are needed in the future. (U)

Guidance with respect to hydronuclear experiments remains the same as that articulated in PDD-11: the U.S. will seek to negotiate a CTB Treaty that does not preclude the conduct of hydronuclear experiments similar to those conducted during the 1958-1961 U.S. testing moratorium. The NSC was tasked in PDD-11 to coordinate the interagency legal and policy review on whether experiments for (a) rendering safe a mock terrorist device, (b) ensuring that a U.S. weapon that had been seized by unfriendly forces could not generate a nuclear yield and (c) other hydronuclear experiments can and should be conducted under the conditions of an extended moratorium. This follow-up review should be submitted to me for decision no later than December 6, 1993. (S)

-- Weapons physics experiments. Weapons physics experiments are required to provide improved data to assess the stockpile. Key elements include increasing the shot rate on existing laser and pulsed power facilities, as well as the construction of new facilities for simulation of nuclear secondary processes. (U)

-- Military systems, radiation hardness and weapon effects simulation. Nuclear weapons and their components, nuclear capable missiles and aircraft and many other military systems must be hardened against adverse radiation environments. The Plan will ensure that the appropriate simulation capabilities are available for the radiation

certification requirements for materials, subsystems, components and military systems. (U)

-- Review and analysis of historical data. Key elements of such a program are researching, cataloging, analyzing and preserving the design, test, engineering and manufacturing data for weapons and weapon experiments, and developing and maintaining computer based archives to help maintain our scientific and technical knowledge base. Additional nonnuclear experiments may be necessary to complete the data base for modern stockpile devices and military systems. (U)

-- Numerical simulation. The objective of this program will be to enhance significantly our numerical simulation capabilities through the use of advanced computers and new numerical simulation techniques. (U)

-- Engineering design and development. Enhancements in the engineering design and development program will be required to provide effective stockpile stewardship. Current capabilities will focus on assessing and responding to aging effects, modifications in operations and logistics and changes in military requirements. Enhanced program elements will provide the information required for understanding the design, output and effects issues and solutions unique to nuclear weapon systems, a basis for addressing modifications to stockpiled weapons resulting from changes to logistics or system requirements and expansion of the current analytical tools to characterize warhead response to a broader set of normal, abnormal and combined environments. (U)

-- Chemistry and materials. Key elements include improved characterization of both nuclear and nonnuclear material properties, aging studies and material compatibility issues. (U)

-- Production capability. Production and Laboratory Capability Assurance Programs and Complex 21 Reconfiguration activities are evaluating changes to this capability and the nature of the residual complex is still being defined. In the near term, to support effective stockpile stewardship, additional production resources will be necessary to support an enhanced stockpile surveillance program, functional and environmental test requirements, hydrodynamic and hydronuclear experiments. (C)

-- Safeguards. Safeguards are considered an essential element in ensuring the nation's ability to have the technical means and knowledge necessary to support the nuclear deterrent. The stockpile stewardship plan described in this PDD functionally satisfies the intent of the historical safeguards. With respect to Safeguard C, the emphasis should shift to the retention of the capability to resume underground (vice atmospheric) nuclear testing should the U.S. cease to be bound by a CTB. (U)

-- Maintaining the capability to resume testing. Under a CTB, keeping a viable infrastructure and staff at the Nevada Test Site, the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Agency will be a fundamental requirement to retain the capability to resume nuclear test activities. Nevada Test Site resources should, therefore, include (1) those necessary to conduct the appropriate experimental activities, (2) infrastructure that would allow for future return to underground nuclear testing, (3) those which will permit other program efforts, (4) the continuation of environmental and health related functions, and (5) activities to assure public safety and physical protection. (U)

In order to resume underground nuclear tests, a capability to conduct a nuclear test within 6 months up to FY 1996, and to conduct a nuclear test within 2-3 years after that time will be assumed by the Department of Energy. (U)

Implementation

The Department of Energy, Department of Defense and Office of Management and Budget will ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to this objective. This will require increased funding for DOE and DOD research, development and testing activities, as well as for construction of new and upgraded experimental facilities as envisioned in the Task Force Report over the next several years. The estimated costs in the Report should be used as a long-term guide for the program; however, precise funding requirements will be determined in conjunction with the appropriate fiscal year budget cycle. (U)

On July 31 of each year, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy shall submit a Joint Report to the IWG that includes (a) a review of the stockpile stewardship plan for the first ten months of the current fiscal year, and (b) recommendations for the next fiscal year. These recommendations will be reviewed by the IWG and will then serve as a basis for planning for the next fiscal year. (C)

The NSC staff shall ensure that the appropriate Members of Congress are briefed on this Plan and provided with annual updates. (U)

William J. Clinton

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 20: U.S. Policy on Detargeting (2 pages)	01/21/1994	P1/b(1)

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001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 21: FY 1994-1999 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 1, 1994. [Atomic Energy Act] (4 pages)	03/01/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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[PDD-21, FY1994-1999 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 1, 1994]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4117				
Document ID: [PDD-22, March 4, 1994]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 22, March 4, 1994. [Atomic Energy Act] (5 pages)	03/04/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-22, March 4, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz418

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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21470

No. PDD 22

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Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
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Initials: VZ Date: 10/04/2010
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 22, March 4, 1994. [Atomic Energy Act] (5 pages)	03/04/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-22, March 4, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz418

RESTRICTION CODES

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4117
Document ID: [PDD-27 Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development, August 17, 1994]

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	6	8	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 27: Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development. (2 pages)	08/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-27, Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development, August 17, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz419

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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20822

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No. PDD 27

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Initials: YZ Date: 10/04/2010
2010-1227-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 27: Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development. (2 pages)	08/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-27, Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development, August 17, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz419

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 4118				
Document ID: [PDD-31, October 7, 1994]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 31, October 7, 1994. (1 page)	10/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-31, October 7, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz420

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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21163

No. PDD 31

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Initials: VZ Date: 10/04/2010
2010-1227-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 31, October 7, 1994. (1 page)	10/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4117

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-31, October 7, 1994]

2010-1227-M
vz420

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4118				
Document ID: [PDD-32 Freedom of Navigation, January 23, 1995]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 32: Freedom of Navigation. (2 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1) ~~VDE 09/25/19~~

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4118

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-32, Freedom of Navigation, January 23, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Initials: VZ Date: 10/04/2010
2010-1227-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M (1.32a)
09125/19 KDE

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Freedom of Navigation (U)

This directive provides current guidance for protecting U.S. navigation, overflight rights and freedoms, and related interests on, under, and over the seas against excessive maritime claims. The purpose of this policy is to preserve the global mobility of U.S. forces by avoiding acquiescence in excessive maritime claims of other nations. (U)

This directive supersedes National Security Directive 49 dated October 12, 1990. (U)

Policy

The United States considers the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) to accurately reflect the customary rules of international law concerning maritime navigation and overflight rights and freedoms. (U)

It is U.S. policy to respect those maritime claims that are consistent with the navigational provisions of the LOS Convention. Additionally, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights on a worldwide basis in a manner consistent with the LOS Convention. The United States will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other traditional uses of the high seas. (U)

U.S. naval ships and military aircraft shall operate freely worldwide, in accordance with this policy. Freedom of Navigation (FON) assertions in areas designated as Politically Sensitive Areas (PSA), or where a significant military reaction is expected to the assertion, are subject to existing notification procedures in accordance with PDD-33. ~~(C)~~

Action

The Department of State shall, through diplomatic efforts, act assertively to preserve U.S. navigation and overflight rights under international law, as reflected in the LOS Convention. The Department of Defense shall preserve U.S. navigation and overflight rights by operational assertions, which shall be documented. Assertions shall utilize both Defense and Coast Guard units as appropriate. The Departments of State and Defense shall publish annual, unclassified summaries of their efforts. ~~(C)~~

William J. Clinton

PHOTOCOPY
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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4118				
Document ID: [PDD-33 Significant Military Operations and Exercises, January 23, 1995]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 33: Significant Military Operations and Excercises. (3 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4118

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-33, Significant Military Operations and Excercises, January 23, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz422

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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21343

No. PDD 33

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Initials: VZ Date: 10/04/2010
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 33: Significant Military Operations and Excercises. (3 pages)	01/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4118

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-33, Significant Military Operations and Excercises, January 23, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz422

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4118				
Document ID: [PDD-34 U.S. Policy on Conventional Arms Transfer, February 10, 1995]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Decision Directive 34: U.S. Policy on Conventional Arms Transfer. (10 pages)~~	~~02/10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE9125/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4118

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-34, U.S. Policy on Conventional Arms Transfer, February 10, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz423

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-34

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Conventional Arms Transfer (U)

Conventional weapons, particularly advanced ones, can be expected to play a decisive role in future conflicts, and global conventional arms transfer patterns will, therefore, have significant implications for U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Given that America possesses the most advanced weapons technology and holds the single largest share of the world arms market, our conventional arms transfer policy will play a very important role in determining the nature of these global patterns. ~~(C)~~

In an insecure world, conventional weapons are legitimate instruments for self-defense and broader state policy. Not all states can produce the full range of defense equipment necessary for their legitimate defense needs. Therefore, trade in conventional weapons is inevitable. However, conventional weapons can do enormous harm in the hands of hostile states and

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can create or exacerbate tensions in international relationships. Their production, purchase, and maintenance are a serious economic burden in many countries as well. Therefore, trade in conventional weapons cannot be left solely to market forces; regulation and restraint of the conventional arms trade are appropriate and necessary. (C)

The United States transfers conventional arms to support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals, including helping friends and allies deter aggression, promoting regional security goals, and gaining interoperability with friendly forces. Arms sales also contribute to maintaining the U.S. defense industrial base. Because the United States is not the only producer of conventional weapons, ensuring that arms transfer patterns leave its friends adequately armed while restraining the capabilities of its enemies requires the United States to seek multilateral support for restraints on arms sales to hostile states and on sales of especially dangerous weapons and sensitive technologies. Conventional arms transfer policy, therefore, has the dual purpose of guiding decision-making on the sale of U.S. weapons and of designing the goals of multilateral approaches. U.S. policy toward conventional arms transfers should be consistent with, and complement, the Presidential Directive/NSC-13 Document on nonproliferation and export control policy. (S)

The intentions of arms exporters are at least as difficult to assess as their capabilities. Although international support exists for greater transparency and perhaps some regional restraints in arms transfers, economic considerations can be expected to play an increasingly important role in the decision making process of exporters. Governments may not be willing to undertake arms restraint measures if they perceive that such measures will conflict with their economic need to retain or expand market share and support a level of domestic defense production capability that they deem necessary for security. This conflict of interests is particularly acute with respect to the most advanced and costly weapon systems. (S)

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the spike of sales following the Gulf War, arms trade has declined dramatically, with the market now dominated primarily by recipients friendly to the U.S. and generally prosperous enough to afford their purchases. The principal challenges for arms transfer policy do not arise from the overall market structure, but from transfers to a few pariah states and a handful of areas of regional

instability that are difficult to stabilize in the context of a global regime. These challenges are amplified by global defense production overcapacity, which generates strong economic pressures to export arms to these states and areas. (C)

This regionally-based set of challenges combined with the end of global bipolarism means that U.S. conventional arms transfer policy must be largely regional in focus, aimed at advancing specific U.S. security interests. The likely endurance of a small number of major suppliers and the increasingly stiff competition for sales in a shrinking market also mean that efforts to limit transfers to pariah states or regions of concern must be multilateral if they are to be effective. (C)

Goals of U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

U.S. conventional arms transfer policy will serve five goals:

-- Ensuring that our military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries.

-- Helping allies and friends deter or defend themselves against aggression while promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are required.

-- Preserving regional balances of military forces in areas critical to U.S. interests, especially Central Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

-- Promoting peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, supporting regional stability, avoiding human rights violations, and promoting other U.S. foreign policy objectives such as the expansion of democracy.

-- Supporting the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs. (C)

Arms Control and Arms Transfer Restraint

Arms control measures, on both the demand and supply sides, are an essential part of any conventional arms transfer policy. A major goal for U.S. conventional arms transfer policy will be to increase the transparency of arms transfers. Transparency can

induce greater responsibility in arms transfers, and may be a first step to more formal and farther reaching restraint measures. By increasing participating states' knowledge of each others' transfer policies, transparency can help build confidence regarding a state's military programs. (C)

The UN Register of Conventional Arms is a useful vehicle for building an international norm on transparency. The U.S. will use its diplomacy to encourage increased participation in and expansion of the Register. Additionally, the U.S. will support regional initiatives aimed at transparency such as those being examined by the OAS and ASEAN. Moreover, the U.S. will continue to adhere to existing principles regarding the sale of conventional weapons (e.g., the P-5 London guidelines and the CSCE "Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers"), work to ensure adherence of other participants, and encourage others to adopt similar principles. (C)

The U.S. will use the negotiation of the COCOM successor regime as a way to advance transparency in transfers of conventional arms and related technology, establish serious international controls, and promote restraint. The overall goal will be to promote peace and stability through a regional approach to security. For regions where conflict could arise, steps will be taken to exchange information on arms and related dual-use exports, and to enhance transparency. This could include regular meetings, denial notification, the exchange of aggregate information on transfers and, for major weapons systems and sensitive technology, notification of individual transfers. In addition, a key objective is to stem the flow of arms to dangerous states -- Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya -- and to retard development of their military-industrial complexes by also limiting access to sensitive dual-use technologies. The large conventional arms holdings of Russia and other newly independent states present special risks. In our proposal for this regime, we seek agreement from members of the new regime (which could include Russia and Eastern European as well as the 23 current COCOM and cooperating state partners) to refrain from arms exports to dangerous states and to exchanges of information on arms and related dual-use exports to regions of concern. (C)

Given the potential for instability in other areas significant to U.S. interests and the role that arms transfers can play in exacerbating instability, even a successful adoption of a COCOM successor regime will not be sufficient to address U.S. interest

in fostering multilateral restraint. The U.S. will continue to look for opportunities to develop and pursue: 1) other multilateral restraint measures that could be negotiated to limit arms transfers by weapon type/capability to certain regions, and 2) measures that could be negotiated to foster demand restraint in selected regions. The regions and capabilities to be considered should focus on achieving U.S. regional security goals such as redressing destabilizing imbalances, promoting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and supporting democratic institutions and market reforms. Proposals should complement the steps taken in the COCOM successor negotiations. (C)

Additionally, the U.S. should pursue, on a case-by-case informal basis within an inner circle of close allies, a strategy of linking increased arms and technology cooperation, and market access, to greater cooperation in restraining conventional arms transfers to countries outside the circle. This strategy will be implemented on an informal, case-by-case basis with our closest allies (e.g., France, the UK and Germany), in a manner analogous to the informal Four Power process in NATO. (C)

Specific proposals for Inner Circle cooperation will be developed based on countries and candidate technologies identified by the Department of Defense, with full interagency coordination by the Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Decisions on individual transfers and production arrangements will be made in accordance with the relevant statutory authorities and procedures governing arms and dual-use exports. (C)

On the demand side, the U.S. will continue to support ongoing regional arms control and confidence building efforts. These efforts bolster stability in a variety of ways and thereby decrease the demand for arms transfers. The U.S. will continue efforts already underway in the Middle East (the Arms Control and Regional Security talks) and Europe (the Conference On Security and Cooperation in Europe). (C)

Given the multiplicity of suppliers and legitimate U.S. interests served by some transfers, the U.S. should avoid policies of unilateral restraint except in certain narrow areas. Unilateral restraint should be considered on a case-by-case basis and limited to the following conditions:

-- Cases where the U.S. has a very substantial lead on a weapon technology.

-- Cases of pariah states.

-- Cases where the transfer of weapons raises human rights issues or indiscriminate casualties are an issue, such as anti-personnel landmines.

-- Cases where the U.S. has no fielded countermeasures.

-- Defense technologies and systems whose export the U.S. restricts to preserve its military edge or regional stability. ~~(C)~~

Policies of unilateral restraint beyond those laid out above are of limited use when there are other suppliers that are capable of and willing to fill market demand. ~~(C)~~

Defense Conversion, Cooperation and Export Control Assistance

The global shrinkage in domestic defense budgets and the corresponding overcapacity in the global defense industry has heightened international arms export competition. U.S. policy must support effective means to reduce these supply-side pressures in the global arms market. The difficulties of the transition to market economies, and the limited export potential of non-arms industries, magnify arms export pressures in the nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For these reasons, the U.S. should continue to provide assistance for defense conversion in both the newly independent states and Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. will also explore other cooperative means to encourage Russia, and as conditions may permit China, to conduct responsible arms exports. ~~(C)~~

Many small and emerging suppliers lack the administrative structure to regulate arms sales effectively. Carefully targeted export control assistance can help to remedy this problem as well as support efforts to promote sound export policies in these states. Such assistance shall be a high priority element of policies to encourage the adoption and implementation of responsible arms transfer policies among arms supplying nations. Agencies will review FY 1995 and FY 1996 export control assistance programs and coordinate funding proposals for future programs for inclusion in the President's FY 1997 budget. ~~(C)~~

Limited armaments cooperation with states in Central and Eastern Europe can help build strong defense relationships, and enhance interoperability with friendly forces. Limited cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe should be extended to democratic, industrialized states possessing effective export controls which adopt responsible arms transfer policies and in which we have a strategic interest. Arms transfers and armaments cooperation should be limited to defensive weapons initially, understanding that this criterion may have to be relaxed as the NATO Partnership for Peace expands and in the event that some of these nations move toward NATO membership. This cooperation should reflect the national security consideration established in PRD-36 and should in no way create concerns about compliance with the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). ~~(C)~~

U.S. Government Support for American Arms Exports

The U.S. government should provide support for U.S. defense exports, where consistent with overall arms transfer policies and legal requirements. Active participation by the U.S. government in supporting or promoting U.S. arms sales can support U.S. national security, defense industrial, or regional interests. Support for U.S. defense exports includes:

-- Tasking U.S. mission personnel to support the overseas marketing efforts of American companies bidding on defense contracts.

-- Supporting official DOD participation in international air and trade exhibitions when the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with existing law, determines such participation to be in the national security interest and notifies Congress.

-- Actively involving senior government officials in promoting arms sales of particular importance to the U.S. ~~(C)~~

This policy balances the benefits of transfers -- the fact that sales strengthen our security relations with recipients, provide significant earnings for U.S. industry, and in some instances, may help keep critical parts of the U.S. defense industrial base viable -- against the costs -- the possibility that official U.S. promotion could undercut the credibility of our efforts to foster regional arms control and arms transfer restraint. This latter

concern is particularly valid since U.S. market share has risen dramatically in the last five years. ~~(C)~~

Measures taken to promote or control U.S. sales should be applied equally to government-to-government (FMS) and direct commercial sales. The Administration will seek legislation to repeal the statutory requirement to recoup nonrecurring costs on government-to-government sales and to align the retransfer restrictions applied to government-to-government sales with those now applicable to commercial sales. ~~(C)~~

This review has identified no further measures necessary at this time to support U.S. arms exports. Should market conditions or other relevant circumstances change, however, other measures may be considered. ~~(C)~~

Decision Making on U.S. Arms Exports: Criteria and Process

Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions and the multiplicity of U.S. interests involved in each arms transfer decision, decisions will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. This case-by-case review will be guided by the general criteria below:

-- Consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives.

-- Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and recipient security needs.

-- Consistency with U.S. regional stability interests, especially when considering transfers involving power projection capability or introduction of a system which may foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race.

-- The degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic and foreign policy interests through increased access and influence, allied burdensharing, and interoperability.

-- The impact of the proposed transfer on U.S. capabilities and technological advantage, particularly in protecting sensitive software and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge.

-- The impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base whether the sale is approved or not.

-- The degree of protection afforded sensitive technology and potential for unauthorized third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to unauthorized uses.

-- The risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting U.S. operational capabilities in the event of compromise.

-- The risk of adverse economic, political or social impact within the recipient nation and the degree to which security needs can be addressed by other means.

-- The human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question.

-- The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.

-- The ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end-use. (C)

Upgrades of equipment -- particularly that of former Soviet-bloc manufacture -- is a growing segment of the market. The U.S. government should support U.S. firms' participation in that market segment to the extent consistent with our own national security and foreign policy interests. In addition to the above general criteria, the following guidelines should govern U.S. treatment of upgrades:

-- Upgrade programs must be well-defined to be considered for approval.

-- Upgrades should be consistent with general conventional arms transfer criteria outlined above.

-- There will be a presumption of denial of exports to upgrade program that lead to a capability beyond that which the U.S. would be willing to export directly.

-- Careful review of the total scope of proposed upgrade programs is necessary to ensure that U.S. licensing decisions are

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consistent with U.S. policy on transfers of equivalent new systems.

-- U.S. contributions to upgrade programs initiated by foreign prime contractors should be evaluated against the same standard.

-- Protection of U.S. technologies must be ensured because of the inherent risk of technology transfer in the integration efforts that typically accompany an upgrade project.

-- Upgrades will be subject to standard USG written end use and retransfer assurances by both the integrator and final end user, with strong and specific sanctions in place for those who violate these conditions.

-- Benchmarks should be established for upgrades of specific types of systems. ~~(S)~~

For certain types of systems and levels of technology for particular categories of recipients, benchmarks will be developed to supplement general criteria. Benchmarks translate general criteria into specific guidelines for consideration of specific types of arms transfer proposals. Benchmarks do not substitute for case-by-case review and decision making, but rather provide a policy baseline against which individual arms transfer proposals can be assessed and proposed departures from the policy must be justified. ~~(S)~~

Policy Implementation

The Non-Proliferation and Export Controls Interagency Working Group, chaired by the NSC, is assigned responsibility to provide interagency coordination for implementation of the conventional arms transfers policies set forth in this Presidential Decision Directive and to provide a forum for the discussion of other conventional arms transfer issues. The activities of this IWG shall not in any way derogate from exercise of statutory authorities relating to arms export decisions and procedures. ~~(S)~~

The NSC will prepare a public statement highlighting the salient features of this policy. (U)

William J. Clinton

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 38, June 9, 1995. (12 pages)	06/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-38, June 9, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz426

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-40 U.S. Port Security Program, September 12, 1995]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 40: U.S. Port Security Program. (3 pages)	09/12/1995	P1/b(1) NDE 09125/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-40, U.S. Port Security Program, September 12, 1995]

2010-1227-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 12, 1995

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-40

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M(1.36)
9/25/19 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Port Security Program (U)

POLICY

National security interests require that measures be taken to control the access of foreign flag vessels to U.S. ports and internal waters. The objectives of this control are as follows:

1. Protect U.S. vessels, ports, harbors and waterfront facilities from sabotage or other activities intended to hazard their safety. (C)

2. Protect sensitive operations and U.S. defense facilities in waterfront areas from espionage and intelligence collection. (C)

3. Protect U.S. national interests defined in terms of foreign policy considerations: examples include limiting port access for countries that sponsor international terrorism or as a reciprocal response to limitations on access for U.S. vessels. (S)

4. Protect the exercise of U.S. maritime rights and high seas freedoms from intentional interference by specific vessels. (U)

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. To meet the objectives listed above, the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall promulgate and implement a port security program in coordination with the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice and the Intelligence Community. (U)

2. A Port Security Committee comprised of a chairman, appointed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and representatives of the above departments and agencies will advise the Commandant of the Coast Guard in the administration of the port security program. (U)

3. For objectives 1, 2 and 3 the Defense Policy Interagency Working Group (IWG) will be responsible for oversight of the Program and resolution of differences that cannot be reconciled by the Port Security Committee. For objective 4, the Global Environmental Affairs IWG will have that responsibility. ~~(C)~~

APPLICABILITY

This program is applicable to all foreign flag vessels, except sovereign-immune vessels and vessels under force majeure or distress. (U)

PORT ACCESS

1. Unless denied or restricted under this program, access to U.S. ports open to commercial trade shall be on the basis of 24 hours' notice to the appropriate Coast Guard authority. (U)

2. Denial of access to all U.S. ports of all vessels flying the flag or under the effective control of a specific country requires a determination that such vessels are a threat to the national security interests outlined above. Such denial shall occur, normally, only as an element of a broader national security program of sanctions against the country. Countries so designated are listed in Annex A. For the purpose of this determination, effective control refers to vessels owned, operated or chartered by the country in question. (U)

3. Denial or restriction of access to U.S. ports of an individual vessel that intentionally interferes with the exercise of U.S. maritime rights and high sea freedoms requires a determination by the IWG for Global Environmental

Affairs and approval by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. ~~(C)~~

4. Restrictions on access to U.S. ports of vessels or classes of vessels flying the flag of a specified country shall result from a determination that restriction is necessary to meet the objectives of the program. Restrictions shall be the minimum necessary, commensurate with the threat involved and conducive to the efficient administration of the program. Countries and ports so designated are listed in Annex B. Determinations shall be made in accordance with the following considerations:

-- the ability of the vessels or classes of vessels to exploit U.S. national security vulnerabilities;

-- the ability of the U.S. to compensate for those vulnerabilities through reasonable measures;

-- the effect on the U.S. military's operational capability and defensive posture;

-- the ability of the foreign government to defeat the objectives of this program through other means;

-- the impact of the restriction on U.S. foreign, economic and trade policy objectives. ~~(C)~~

SECURITY MEASURES

Appropriate defensive security measures shall be applied to specified vessels of countries designated in Annex B, including boarding and search by the U.S. Coast Guard at intervals considered appropriate by the Commandant. ~~(C)~~

UPDATING

The categories specified in Annexes A and B and the ports listed in Annex B may be updated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the recommendation of the Defense Policy Interagency Working Group. (U)

RESCISSION

This statement of policy on U.S. port security supersedes National Security Directive No. 57 dated May 7, 1991. ~~(C)~~

William J. Clinton

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ANNEX A

COUNTRIES WHOSE VESSELS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO ENTER U.S. PORTS

Cuba

Iran

Iraq

Libya

North Korea

Sudan

Syria

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Annex B

The following controlled ports are open to vessels under flags of registry of the newly independent former Soviet republics (see note), Cambodia and Vietnam on request 7 calendar days in advance of the desired entry, subject to concurrence of the naval authority designated by the cognizant Fleet commander.

New London/Groton
Port Canaveral
Kings Bay
Port Hueneme
San Diego

Access to the above five ports will be on request by the shipping agent to the appropriate Coast Guard authority who will query the designated naval authority for the port requested. The naval authority will either concur in the entry or certify that security considerations require that the request be denied for reasons to be provided for the record in the response. The naval authority's decision will be final for each particular entry request.

The following controlled ports are open to such vessels on notice 3 calendar days in advance of the desired entry:

Charleston
Hampton Roads
Honolulu
Fort St. Joe
Panama City
Portsmouth, N.H.
Pensacola

NOTE: Newly Independent Former Soviet Republics:

Armenia	Moldova
Azerbaijan	Russia
Byelarus	Tajikistan
Georgia	Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan	Ukraine
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119
Document ID: [PDD-41 U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russian and Other New Independent States, September 20, 1995]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 41: U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Other Newly Independent States. (10 pages)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)

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[PDD-41, U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Other Newly Independent States, September 20, 1995]

2010-1227-M
vz428

RESTRICTION CODES

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OA/Box Number: 4119

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[PDD-41, U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Other Newly Independent States, September 20, 1995]

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-43 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1996, November 9, 1995]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 43: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1996. [Atomic Energy Act] (5 pages)	11/09/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-43Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1996, November 09, 1995]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 44: U.S. Policy on Interational Heroin Control. (5 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Annex A: USG Counternarcotics Policy Toward Burma (3 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	Annex A: USG Counternarcotics Policy Toward Burma (3 pages)	11/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 4119

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[PDD-44 U.S. Policy on International Heroin Control, November 21, 1995]

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-45, March 1, 1996]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Decision Directive 45, March 1, 1996. (2 pages)~~	~~03/01/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 07/25/19 CDE

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-45, March 1, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz431

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No. PDD 45

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
3/5/96			

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: V2 Date: 10/05/2010
2010-1227-FM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1996

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-45

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M (1.44)
09/25/19 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Amendment to the Organization of the National Security Council ~~(C)~~

I hereby direct that the National Security Council system, as described by Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2, dated January 20, 1993, be amended as follows:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 2/15/06

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

In addition to the NSC members and attendees described in section A of PDD-2, the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, shall be invited to attend National Security Council meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction. ~~(C)~~

B. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

In addition to the NSC/PC members and invitees described in section B of PDD-2, the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, shall be invited to NSC/PC meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction. ~~(C)~~

C. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)

In addition to the NSC/DC members and attendees described in section C of PDD-2, the appropriate senior representative of the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy shall be included in NSC/DC meetings pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy. ~~(C)~~

Except as amended by this directive, all other portions of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2 remain in effect. (U)

William J. Clinton

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-46 FY 1996 - 2001 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 11, 1996]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 46: Fiscal Year 1996-2001 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Energy Act] (5 pages)	03/11/1996	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-46, Fiscal Year 1996-2001 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 11, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz432

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

No. PDD 46

COPY ORIGINAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VZ Date: 10/05/2010
2010-1227-F

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 46: Fiscal Year 1996-2001 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Energy Act] (5 pages)	03/11/1996	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-46, Fiscal Year 1996-2001 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 11, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz432

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-49 National Space Policy, September 14, 1996]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 49: National Space Policy. (22 pages)	09/14/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-49, National Space Policy, September 14, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz433

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

No. PDD 49

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Initials: YZ Date: 10/05/2010
2010-1227-M

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 49: National Space Policy. (22 pages)	09/14/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-49, National Space Policy, September 14, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz433

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-51, October 12, 1996]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Decision Directive 51, October 12, 1996. (2 pages)~~	~~10/12/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~

WDE 09/25/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-51, October 12, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz434

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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No. PDD 51

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Initials: YZ Date: 10/05/2010
2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1996

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-51

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M(1.5)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Amendment to the Organization of the National Security Council (S)

I hereby direct that the National Security Council system, as described by Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2, dated January 20, 1993, and amended by PDD/NSC-45, dated March 1, 1996, be amended as follows: (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Derivative
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/15/06
Derived From: PDD/NSC-2; PDD/NSC-45

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

In addition to the NSC members described in section A of PDD-2, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, shall be a member of the NSC. (S)

B. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

In addition to the NSC/PC members described in section B of PDD-2, the NSC/PC shall have as a member the Director, Office of Management and Budget, as appropriate.

C. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)

In addition to the NSC/DC members described in section C of PDD-2, the NSC/DC shall have as a member the appropriate senior representative of the Director, Office of Management and Budget, as needed. (S)

Except as amended by this directive, all other portions of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2 remain in effect. (U)

Bill Clinton

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WJC HANDWRITING

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 4119				
Document ID: [PDD-52 Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997, November 15, 1996]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 52: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997. (2 pages)	11/15/1996	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Annex to Attachment 1. [Atomic Energy Act] (3 pages)	11/15/1996	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-52, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997, November 15, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz435

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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~~SECRET~~

PDD 52

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2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 52: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997. (2 pages)	11/15/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4119

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-52, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997, November 15, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz435

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	Annex to Attachment 1. [Atomic Energy Act] (3 pages)	11/15/1996	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-52, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1997, November 15, 1996]

2010-1227-M
vz435

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Document ID: [PDD-54 Antipersonnel Landmines (APL) - Additional Guidance on U.S. Policy, January 17, 1997]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 54: Antipersonnel Landmines (APL): Additional Guidance on U.S. Policy, (4 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1) KDE 9/25/19

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[PDD-54, Antipersonnel Landmines (APL): Additional Guidance on U.S. Policy, January 17, 1997]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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No. PDD 54

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1997

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-~~5~~4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Antipersonnel Landmines (APL): Additional Guidance on U.S. Policy (U)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) supplements U.S. policy on antipersonnel landmines (APL) established in PDD/NSC-48. (U)

I. NEGOTIATING VENUE

On May 16, 1996, I announced that the United States would aggressively pursue a worldwide agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel landmines (APL), with a view to completing that negotiation as soon as possible. Since that announcement, the United States has conducted extensive consultations with many countries regarding their views on the best forum in which to pursue such an agreement. While keenly aware of the magnitude of the challenges we will face, I have decided that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) offers the most practical alternative for achieving the U.S. goal of a worldwide APL ban. (U)

- **CD Negotiating Mandate for a Comprehensive Ban.** During the next CD session in January 1997, the United States will begin work with our Allies, friends and other nations to achieve consensus on creating an Ad Hoc Committee with a broad mandate

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authorizing negotiations on a comprehensive APL ban, consistent with the May 16 policy announcement. (U)

- **Interim Steps in the CD.** The United States will remain open to agreement on meaningful interim measures in the CD that could constitute steps on the road toward a comprehensive ban, including a ban on export and transfer of APL and a cap on APL stockpiles. In order to give impetus to such measures, we will announce our intent to observe unilaterally a permanent ban on APL exports and transfers and a cap on our APL stockpile level (see below) and will call on others in the CD to do the same. If enough other countries demonstrate a willingness to join us, we will pursue an interim multilateral agreement in the CD. In any case, we will continue to vigorously pursue, in parallel, a comprehensive ban. (C)

- **"Ottawa" Process.** Recognizing the strong views of many governments, as well as NGO support for the "Ottawa" process, we will not seek to dissuade countries who want to participate in both the CD negotiations and the "Ottawa" process from doing so or seek to dissuade non-CD members from joining the "Ottawa" process. While making clear we cannot subscribe to Ottawa's near-term timetable for a total ban and that we believe broader participation is needed from the outset in order to secure a ban that includes more than "like-minded" states, we will speak positively of the "Ottawa" process as a way to provide momentum to the overall effort to ban APL. (C)

- **Possible Alternative to CD.** If an acceptable CD negotiating mandate is not established within a reasonable timeframe or if little progress has been made on interim steps in the CD, the United States will review its decision to determine whether an alternative or additional forum should be sought. To this end, the United States will review progress on this issue at a senior level, immediately following the end of the CD's second session (late June). Under this review, we would consider, for example, working with the Canadians with the objective of shaping the "Ottawa" process in a way that would allow us to attend and sign a ban on the export and transfer of APL and a cap APL stockpiles at current levels (i.e., consistent with sections II and III below). This approach does not preclude us from attending the planned pre-Ottawa conference meetings, beginning in February in Vienna. (C)

- **Diplomatic Gameplan.** To begin developing support for our approach immediately, in particular for a CD negotiating mandate, State will prepare a gameplan, in accordance with PDD/NSC-48. Efforts to develop support for a CD negotiating mandate should commence upon announcement of our venue decision. (C)

II. EXPORT AND TRANSFER BAN

The United States will extend its moratorium on export and transfer of APL to a permanent ban. (U)

- "Export and transfer" means the selling, giving or receiving of either title or control over the APL to or by another state or entity. (U)

- "Control" over APL means a degree of physical control or direct or indirect supervision of the APL that is sufficient to ensure that the APL are not moved or used without the direction of the originating state and that the originating state can fulfill its responsibility for compliance with international legal standards governing their use and possession. (U)

- Export and transfer of APL components and technology, as they would be defined under the Leahy export moratorium law, will also be prohibited. Assistance in making APL detectable will not be considered a transfer of APL components or technology. (U)

- Receipt of very small quantities of APL for use in improving countermine and humanitarian demining capabilities are excepted. (U)

- This policy does not preclude use of APL by personnel in a coalition or as part of a combination of forces, in the collective self-defense of U.S. and Allied forces, as long as the APL remain under U.S. title and the direct or indirect supervision of a U.S. commander, as described above. Thus, for example, use of APL by coalition personnel could be permitted as long as a U.S. commander retains direct or indirect supervision of the APL, regardless of which country were to lead the coalition. (U)

- This policy does not preclude the transfer from one country to another of territory containing emplaced APL. (U)

III. STOCKPILE CAP

The United States will cap its APL stockpile at its current level. (U)

- "Stockpile" includes all APL in the U.S. inventory, except those already emplaced. (U)

- Replenishment of the stockpile, in the event it is drawn down for any reason, is permitted, as long as the stockpile does not exceed its current level. (U)

- This policy does not preclude the Department of Defense from modifying the mix of APL types within the declared stockpile ceiling, to adequately provide for current and future operational requirements until a global ban takes effect or alternatives are developed. (U)

William J. Clinton

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidntial Decsion Directive 55, March 12, 1997. (8 pages)	03/12/1997	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:
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Document ID: [PDD-56 Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 20, 1997]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. report~~	~~Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations. (7 pages)~~	~~05/20/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 2/5/2019
~~001b. report~~	~~Annex A: Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex Contingency Operation. (2 pages)~~	~~05/20/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 2/5/2019

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1997

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-56

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Representative of the United States to the United Nations
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Managing Complex Contingency Operations (U)

In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency operations. (U)

For the purpose of this directive, "complex contingency operations" are defined as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991). Since the specific type of initiative or operation to be conducted in response to a troubled area, if any, is seldom known

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when the crisis management process must begin, the Deputies Committee, as described in PDD-2, will decide in which of these situations to invoke the management processes of this PDD. Unless otherwise directed, this directive does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict. (C)

In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency operations in coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in ad hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never relinquishing the capability to respond unilaterally, future operations will continue to be conducted in coalition whenever possible. (U)

In many instances, the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the involvement of only non-military assets. However, we have learned that the deployment of military forces in a complex contingency operation can quickly affect the dynamic of the situation and may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving the underlying conflict or dispute. However, we have also learned that many aspects of complex contingency operations are not best addressed through military measures. Furthermore, given the level of U.S. interests at stake in most of these situations, U.S. forces should not be deployed in an operation indefinitely. (U)

We must also be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and political consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, and/or radiological hazards may be present; the introduction of any one of these elements could significantly increase the sensitivity and complexity of a planned response. In addition, it is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we are prepared to respond in a robust, effective manner. To foster a durable peace or stability in these situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components. (U)

However, while agencies of government have developed capacities to respond individually to crises to various degrees, military and civilian agencies have often operated independently of each other and have required special mechanisms to coordinate their efforts effectively. Failure to plan properly and integrate operations early on can cause delays, increase pressure

on the military to expand its involvement in non-military tasks and jeopardize the overall success of an operation. ~~(C)~~

Intent (U)

The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future years, demanding varying degrees of U.S. involvement. I expect all U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. This directive is designed to ensure that the lessons learned -- including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms -- will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. My intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. Dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes will be needed. From our recent experiences, we have learned that these can help to:

- identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;
- develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;
- accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation;
- intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;
- integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level and
- rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions. (U)

I also expect all agencies to review their legislative and budget authorities for supporting complex contingency operations and, where such authorities are inadequate to fund an agency's mission and operations in complex contingencies, propose legislative and budgetary solutions. (U)

Executive Committee (U)

As determined in PDD-2, the Deputies Committee is responsible for crisis management and will establish appropriate sub-groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution. In recent operations, the Deputies have established an Executive Committee (ExCom) with Assistant Secretary-level membership to supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in each complex contingency operation. Unless otherwise decided by the Deputies Committee, the appropriate NSC staff member will chair the ExCom. The ExCom brings together representatives of all agencies that might participate in the operation under review, including those not normally part of the NSC structure. When this is the case, both the Deputies Committee and the ExCom should be augmented so that they include representatives from all agencies that might participate in the operation under review. The chair of the ExCom should designate an agency (or the NSC itself) to chair a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group, whose role should be to consult with the ExCom to ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can be performed by the assigned agencies consistent with legal and fiscal authorities. This ExCom approach has proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for Deputies and Principals. ~~(S)~~

The guiding concept behind the ExCom approach to interagency management is the personal accountability of Presidential appointees. Members of the ExCom effectively serve as functional managers for specific elements of the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, elections, economic assistance, police, intelligence, public diplomacy, etc.). They implement the strategies agreed to by the interagency and report to the ExCom and Deputies Committee on any problems or issues that need to be resolved. (U)

In future complex contingency operations to which the United States contributes substantial resources, I expect that the Deputies Committee will establish organizational arrangements akin to those of the ExCom approach. (U)

The Political-Military Implementation Plan (U)

A political-military implementation (or pol-mil) plan shall be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. government actions in a complex contingency operation. The pol-mil plan will include a situation assessment and will specify the missions, objectives, and desired endstates. It will outline a concept of operations for all agencies, synchronize agency efforts, and provide a game plan for individual agencies to

follow. (Annex A is an illustrative outline of a pol-mil plan.) With the use of the pol-mil plan, my goal is to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. The desired unity of effort among the various agencies that will be created by these initiatives will contribute to the overall success of these complex operations. ~~(C)~~

When a complex contingency operation is contemplated, the Deputies Committee shall task the development of a pol-mil plan and assign specific responsibilities to Assistant Secretary-level officials. I expect to be provided with such a plan for those complex contingency operations in which the U.S. Government plays a substantial role. ~~(C)~~

Individual elements of the plan describe major functional areas and implementation tasks (e.g., humanitarian assistance, public security/law and order, economic reconstruction, human rights protection, social development, etc.) as well as the principal preparatory and organizational issues of the operation (e.g., legal authorities, funding, intelligence, coalition troop recruiting, and relations with allies, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations). ~~(C)~~

Each ExCom official shall develop their respective chapter of the plan, which will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This development process will be transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being posed to the Deputies Committee, the Principals Committee, and, when necessary, to me. Based on the resulting decisions, the plan will be finalized and widely distributed among relevant agencies. ~~(C)~~

The pol-mil plan shall include demonstrable milestones and measures of success, including detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities which might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government. Because time constraints often force operations and planning to take place concurrently, the pol-mil plan will be updated as the mission progresses to reflect milestones that are (or are not) met and to incorporate changes in the situation on the ground. ~~(C)~~

Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal (U)

A critical aspect of the planning process will be the interagency rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. This activity shall involve a rehearsal of the plan's main elements, with each ExCom official presenting to the Deputies or Principals Committee the elements for which he or she is responsible. By simultaneously reviewing all elements of the plan, differences over mission objectives, agency responsibilities,

timing/synchronization, and resource allocation can be identified and resolved early, preferably before the operation begins. The interagency review also underscores the accountability of each program manager in implementing their assigned area of responsibility. Regular reviews of the plan ensure that milestones are met and that appropriate adjustments are taken when they are not. The Deputies or Principals shall convene to review the entire implementation plan as presented by the ExCom before an operation is launched (or as early as possible once the operation begins), at the planned mid-point or as major changes occur, and prior to an operation's termination. (C)

After-Action Review (U)

After the conclusion of each operation in which this planning process is employed, the Executive Committee shall charter an after-action review involving both those who participated in the operation and Government experts who did not participate. This comprehensive assessment of the operation shall include a review of interagency planning and coordination, (both in Washington and in the field) and legal and budgetary difficulties encountered, as well as proposed solutions, in order to capture lessons learned and to ensure their dissemination to relevant agencies. (U)

Training (U)

The U.S. Government currently lacks adequate means to prepare agency representatives for the responsibilities they will be expected to take on in a complex contingency operation. Creating a cadre of professionals familiar with this planning process will improve the USG's ability to manage future operations. (U)

With the support of the State and Defense Departments, the NSC shall work with the appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions -- including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Army War College -- to develop and conduct an interagency training program. This program, which should be held at least annually, will train mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans for complex contingency operations. Those participating should have an opportunity to interact with expert officials from previous operations to learn what has worked in the past and what has not. Appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions shall also explore the appropriate way to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their curricula. (U)

Agency Review and Implementation (U)

Each agency Principal and Deputy should review the adequacy of their agency's structure, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, and crisis management procedures to ensure that we, as a government, are learning from our experiences with complex contingency operations and institutionalizing the lessons learned. To implement the recommendations contained herein, NSC will establish and chair an interagency working group including State, OSD, JCS, AID, OMB, and other agencies deemed relevant to the subject, as soon as possible. ~~(C)~~

William J. Clinton

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Annex A

Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex Contingency Operation (U)

- Situation Assessment. An interagency assessment of the situation in the region to identify essential elements of information that, in the aggregate, constitute a comprehensive understanding of the situation. ~~(S)~~

- Assessments of U.S. Interests and Capabilities. An interagency assessment of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and an analysis of US government abilities to defend those interests. ~~(S)~~

- Mission Statement. A statement of the overall USG strategic purpose for the intervention and the pol-mil mission for the operation. ~~(S)~~

- Objectives. The key objectives to be accomplished by the mission/intervention -- both civilian and military components. ~~(S)~~

- Desired Pol-Mil End State. The conditions the mission is intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or terminates. It integrates military and civilian dimension and describes how success of the operation will be judged. ~~(S)~~

- Concept of the Operation. A conceptual description of how the mission will be accomplished -- how the various components of USG policy will be integrated to get the job done throughout all stages of the operation. ~~(S)~~

- Transition/Exit Strategy. A strategy that is linked to the realization of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of both civilian and military officials of the USG and the international community. ~~(S)~~

- Lead Agency Responsibilities. A definition of the areas of responsibility for different USG and international agencies. (U)

- Pol-Mil Organizational Concept. A portrayal of the organization for the operation, in Washington and in theater,

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including a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels for the operation. ~~(C)~~

- Preparatory Tasks. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the operation begins (diplomatic consultations, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding for the operation, intelligence requirements, congressional consultations, media relations, etc.). ~~(C)~~

- Functional Element Plans. Key operational and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation (humanitarian assistance, public security/law and order, infrastructure and economic restoration, human rights and social development, etc.). ~~(C)~~

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001b. report	Annex to Attachement 1. [Atomic Energy Act] (4 pages)	10/20/1997	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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[PDD-61, U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program, February 11, 1998]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 61: U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program. (5 pages)	02/11/1998	P1/b(1)

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001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 62: Protection against Unconventional Threats to Homeland and Americans Overseas. (14 pages)	05/22/1998	P1/b(1)

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[PDD-62, Protection against Unconventional Threats to Homeland and Americans Overseas, May 22, 1998]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 22, 1998

Declassified Under the Authority of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, Section 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP Appeal No. 2013-003, No. 1 Declassification Date: March 18, 2014

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-62

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

SUBJECT: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (U)

In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated United States counter-terrorism policy in PDD-39. That policy directive remains valid. (U)

Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations, are increasingly likely to attack us in unconventional ways. Adversaries will be tempted to exploit vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities, disrupt our transportation systems, attack us when we gather as a community at special events, and prey on our citizens overseas. (U)

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As this cluster of threats matures in the coming century, I am determined that we will be prepared to deter them, prevent them, or, if necessary, limit the damage they can inflict. Success requires that we recognize the common nature of these threats, the need for an integrated response, and, in the case of critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a public-private partnership. (U)

Successes and Remaining Challenges (U)

Current policy has led to substantial success:

-- an increased rate of renditions, apprehensions and convictions of terrorists;

-- a significant expansion of counterterrorism legislative authorities;

-- a large increase in counterterrorism funding with consequent improvement in capabilities at FAA, FBI, and CIA;

-- important progress in counterterrorism planning, particularly in the areas of consequence management (FEMA, EPA and PHS) and WMD preparedness;

-- elevating the place of terrorism as an important item on the diplomatic agenda, especially as it affects other countries' relations with Iran, Libya, and Sudan;

-- improved anti-terrorism force protection within DOD;

-- expansion of assistance to, and cooperation with, other democracies threatened by terrorism, including Israel; and

-- routinizing the management of counterterrorism through PDD-39 and the creation of a professional, trained and coordinated interagency cadre. (U)

Yet the threats posed by potential adversaries in the twenty-first century are changing, in nature and scope:

-- States and state-sponsored groups, knowing that they cannot defeat us in a conventional military confrontation, may seek to engage in asymmetrical assaults on our vulnerabilities at home and abroad through terrorism, use of weapons of mass destruction and cyber warfare.

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-- The attack on the Tokyo subway demonstrated that terrorists seek and have used weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or radiological devices) to increase the destructiveness of their acts.

-- Civil defense and continuity of government programs developed during the Cold War have been largely dismantled or downsized. Few American cities are prepared to deal with an incident involving weapons of mass destruction, or even large-scale conventional attacks such as the World Trade Center or Oklahoma City bombings.

-- Advances in encryption technology threaten the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent terrorist acts.

-- Our critical infrastructure is becoming more reliant upon information and computer-based technologies that are vulnerable to covert attack by terrorists or other hostile groups. (U)

Meanwhile, the bombings of U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia and the murders in Karachi remind us that Americans remain the target of capable terrorists and signal the urgent need to reduce our vulnerabilities to such "traditional" threats. (U)

Program Objectives and Responsibilities (U)

To address these changes in the continuing danger from unconventional threats, I hereby direct an integrated program to increase our effectiveness in countering these threats and to prepare to manage the consequences of attacks against U.S. citizens or infrastructure. All of these programs will be carried out in full compliance with applicable law and existing procedures governing the activities of the agencies involved. (U)

Lead Agencies responsible for programs supporting our security and counter-terrorism policy should designate a Senior Program Coordinator who will be responsible for coordinating these programs within the U.S. Government, and identifying goals and milestones. (U)

1. Apprehension, Extradition, Rendition and Prosecution: Foreign terrorists who violate U.S. laws will be apprehended and tried, no matter where they hide and no matter how long it

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takes. The Justice Department is the lead agency for this program. In pursuing extradition and rendition, the Justice Department will act in coordination with the State Department. (U)

-- Other departments will make assistance to these Justice Department efforts a top priority and will budget and structure priorities accordingly. The Intelligence Community will maintain collection and capabilities to support apprehensions. The Defense Department will, if requested, provide nonreimbursable transportation in support of renditions to the extent permitted by law. The State Department will ensure that at the top of our bilateral agenda with other governments, especially those that harbor terrorists, is action against those that threaten or have attacked U.S. interests and cooperation on apprehension, prosecution, extradition, or rendition. ~~(S)~~

-- The Justice Department will identify the highest priority pending foreign terrorist apprehensions, and the FBI, in coordination with CIA and the State Department will develop plans for their rendition. ~~(S)~~

2. Disruption: Foreign terrorists who pose a credible threat to the United States and its citizens will be subject to preemption and disruption abroad, consistent with U.S. laws. CIA is the lead agency for this program. ~~(S)~~

-- Disruption program plans and specific actions will be developed and coordinated for interagency approval in accordance with existing procedures. ~~(S)~~

-- Other departments with relevant capabilities (such as Treasury on financing) will contribute expertise and assets to this program. ~~(S)~~

3. International Cooperation: The goal of zero tolerance for international terrorism will guide bilateral and multilateral efforts to eliminate sanctuaries, penalize states that sponsor terrorism, and assist friendly states victimized by terrorism. The State Department is the lead agency for this program, which will combine the following elements:

-- Support for efforts to obtain the extradition or other rendition of indicted terrorists. All programs and activities conducted abroad will be implemented in full compliance with existing Chief of Mission authorities.

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-- Adoption and implementation of the eleven major international conventions on terrorism will be a major foreign policy priority. (S)

The State Department shall be responsible for coordinating with relevant agencies all assistance related to international terrorism. The State Department shall also maintain, in coordination with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy through the National Science and Technology Council, a robust international research, development, and procurement effort for counter-terrorism technologies. (S)

4. Preventing Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction: To reflect the importance of efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), I reiterate PDDs 39 and 41, which require:

-- The U.S. Government will work through interagency efforts with other nations to reduce or eliminate WMD; to safeguard such weapons, their components, and precursors; to prevent further WMD proliferation and to ensure that such weapons, their components and key precursors, do not come into the possession of terrorists. We will maintain a robust capability to respond to crisis situations involving the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. With NSC coordination, State, DOD, DOE, Treasury, Commerce, HHS, FBI, and CIA will continue to direct components of this overall effort and to provide the necessary programmatic support. I reiterate the importance of ensuring support to HHS and DOJ and other agencies, to implement and enforce safeguards and procedures to assure that select infectious agents and toxins are acquired, stored, transferred, or used only for legitimate scientific purposes and not for other non-approved purposes nor by terrorists as WMD. (S)

5. Consequence Management for Terrorist Incidents: If, despite our efforts, a terrorist incident occurs in the United States, the Federal Government will respond rapidly, working with state and local governments, to restore order and deliver emergency assistance. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, will be the lead agency for operational response to a weapon of mass destruction incident. FEMA is responsible for preparing for or responding to the consequences of a WMD incident, with participation by PHS (health/medical), EPA (hazmat/ environmental) and DOE (radiological), as necessary. When the Attorney General, acting on the advice of the Director, FBI, and

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in coordination with the Director, FEMA, determines that the incident or threat of an incident has subsided, lead agency responsibility may be transferred to FEMA. (U)

For consequence management of terrorist incidents outside of the United States, initial U.S. efforts will be coordinated through the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) led by the State Department, and with its Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT). (U)

Our domestic goal is to build a capability in 120 major cities for first responders to be able to deal with incidents involving weapons of mass destruction by 2002. Toward that end, several departments will participate in a coordinated program in conjunction with local and state response authorities. ~~(C)~~

-- DOD, in coordination with the DOJ/FBI, FEMA, PHS, DOE, and EPA, will provide training to metropolitan emergency responders and will maintain military units (active and reserve components) to serve as augmentation forces for weapons of mass destruction consequence management and to help maintain proficiency of local emergency responders through training. ~~(C)~~

-- DOE will plan for and provide emergency responder training for nuclear, radiological incidents; EPA will plan for and provide emergency responder training for hazardous materials and environmental incidents. ~~(C)~~

-- HHS (PHS) will be the lead agency to plan and to prepare for a national response to medical emergencies arising from the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. HHS, with the support of other Federal agencies, will provide enhanced local response capabilities through the development of Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams systems; will develop and maintain the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), including the National Medical Response Teams; will work with DOD to ensure deployability of NDMS response teams, supplies and equipment; and, working with the Department of Veterans Affairs, ensure adequate stockpiles of antidote and other necessary pharmaceuticals nationwide and the training of medical personnel in NDMS hospitals. (U)

-- DOJ, in coordination with DOD, FEMA, EPA, and DOE, will provide personal protective equipment, detection and diagnostic instruments, on a selective basis, to State and local law enforcement agencies. ~~(C)~~

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Coordination of this overall effort will be effected through an interagency WMD Protection Group. (U)

6. Transportation Security: I accepted and expect the full implementation of the recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. The Department of Transportation is the lead agency for this program. (U)

-- Funding for the timely implementation of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommendations will be reflected in Administration budget requests. (U)

-- As technology advances and the threat evolves, DOT will ensure that our technologies and procedures keep pace. Toward that end, the DOT will coordinate, in cooperation with NSTC, an interagency research and development program on transportation security. With respect to aviation security, DOT will periodically review whether additional measures beyond those in the Commission Report are required. As a first step, the FAA will develop and implement a more rigorous system for air cargo inspection, to include use of private verification and inspection firms. Parallel measures will be researched, developed, and deployed to improve the security of ground and maritime transportation. ~~(S)~~

-- In addition, the Department of Transportation is responsible for dissemination of aviation security information, in coordination with State, as appropriate. (U)

7. Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Systems: We will minimize the risk from attacks on our critical infrastructure and cyber systems, whether the attackers are nations, groups, or individuals. We will also be prepared to deal with the consequences of such attacks. (U)

Therefore, having reviewed the recommendations of the presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, I am issuing a complementary directive on our policy toward protection of our critical infrastructure. (U)

8. Continuity of Government Operations: Attacks by nations or groups will not be permitted to disrupt the functioning of either the constitutionally mandated functions of the Federal Government, nor the operation of its critical components. ~~(S)~~

-- As outlined in Executive Order 12656, every department and agency will be able to rapidly and effectively transition

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from routine operation to emergency operations of vital functions following an attack that incapacitates its headquarters, key facilities, or leadership. (U)

-- In particular, agencies will ensure that key counter-terrorism staff can operate in low to mid-level WMD contingencies by providing protective equipment and transportation to a rapidly accessible relocation site. ~~(C)~~

-- The National Security Advisor will submit for my review and approval a draft of an updated and comprehensive Presidential Decision Directive on Enduring Constitutional Government that takes into account the terrorist and unconventional threats, and requires continuity of operations capabilities by all departments and agencies as a foundation for continuity of government for the future. ~~(C)~~

9. Countering the Foreign Terrorist Threat in the U.S.: Foreign terrorists will not be allowed to enter the United States and the full force of legal authorities will be used to remove foreign terrorists from the U.S. and to prevent fundraising within the U.S. to support foreign terrorists. The Justice Department will be the lead agency for this program. ~~(C)~~

-- Visa applicants that pose a terrorist threat will be identified and denied entry into the United States. The State Department, Justice Department (FBI and INS), and CIA will ensure that information about such persons, including their aliases, is collected and disseminated in a timely manner to deny them entry into the United States. ~~(C)~~

-- The State Department will work closely with other governments to adopt and implement standards for travel documentation. Such documents should be computer readable, tamper resistant, and difficult to counterfeit. ~~(C)~~

-- Justice (INS and FBI) and State will develop a strategy, to be implemented by DOJ (INS and FBI), to limit the duration of stay of students from terrorism list countries, to track them while they are in the U.S. and to know when they depart. In addition, State and DOJ, together with the Commerce Department and Defense Department, will determine how best to prevent foreign students whose studies are sponsored by terrorist list countries from acquiring WMD-related knowledge in the United States. ~~(C)~~

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-- Justice will ensure that, in accordance with PDD-9, alien smuggling rings are disrupted and disbanded, and will, in particular, thwart attempts to smuggle potential terrorists into the United States. ~~(C)~~

-- Justice, using removal procedures, including the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, will seek to swiftly remove alien terrorists from the United States and will detain them awaiting removal proceedings. The Administration will again seek legislation clarifying the definition of "engaging in terrorist activity" to better facilitate exclusion and removal of alien terrorists under the immigration laws. ~~(S)~~

-- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, will designate foreign terrorist organizations that are prohibited by law from raising funds in the United States. In addition, Justice and Treasury will work to prevent such activities. E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, 1.4(c)

-- The DCI will work to support the Secretary of the Treasury in developing usable information for the designation by Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of State, of entities and individuals of foreign terrorist organizations that are located in foreign jurisdictions, particularly in those countries that are not state sponsors of terrorism. (U)

10. Protection of Americans Overseas: The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens. That duty extends to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official or private capacity. (U)

-- The State Department, through its chiefs of mission, will be responsible for ensuring the security of personnel associated with diplomatic and consular posts abroad, including DOD personnel subject to the force protection responsibilities of the chiefs of mission pursuant to the DOD/State Universal MOU, and for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S. citizens abroad. U.S. citizens should be adequately warned of the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary measures and afforded appropriate assistance and protection. (U)

-- The Secretary of Defense, through geographic CINCs, will be responsible for force protection of CINC-assigned forces and those DOD personnel for whom the Secretary of State has

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delegated force protection responsibility to DOD under the Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of State and Defense on Security of DOD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas (the Universal MOU). (U)

ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES

In addition to the programs described above, the national counter-terrorism effort requires the following elaboration to the guidance in PDD-39. (U)

1. National Special Security Events: Scores of special events receive Federal protection annually. Some of these, such as Presidential nominating conventions, Presidential Inaugurations, Presidential Summits, State of the Union addresses and Olympic games have a national significance and could attract unconventional attacks. ~~(S)~~

The interagency Counter-Terrorism and Security Group (CSG) shall notify the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury of events when it believes they should designated a "National Special Security Event." The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury are required to agree on the designation. ~~(S)~~

I have decided that for such National Special Security Events, the full protective and consequence management capabilities of the Federal Government shall be available as necessary, including those of both the FBI and the Secret Service. ~~(S)~~

Lead Agency responsibilities shall be as follows:

FBI. The FBI will be the lead agency for intelligence, crisis management, hostage rescue, counter-terrorism (except as noted below regarding Secret Service protective anti-terrorism measures and counter-terrorism assets) and its statutory Federal criminal investigations. The FBI will identify and coordinate appropriate anti-terrorism measures and FBI counter-terrorism assets (including, when necessary, DoD assets) that will be needed to perform its lead agency responsibilities. The USSS will coordinate its activities regarding security design/planning and implementation with the FBI. The FBI will also identify and coordinate its measures and assets to effect consequence management planning, coordination, and transition from the crisis management phase to consequence management by FEMA. ~~(S)~~

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FEMA. FEMA shall be the lead agency for consequence management planning and coordination. Transition from the crisis management phase to the consequence management phase shall be as agreed by the Attorney General, the FBI Director and the FEMA Director, or their designees. ~~(C)~~

The U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service shall be the lead agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service anti-terrorism measures and counterterrorism assets (and, if necessary, the assets of other agencies in mutual agreement with those agencies) that will be needed to effect the overall security requirements (including E.O. 13526, 1.4(g) E.O. 13526, 1.4(g) E.O. 13526, 1.4(g) and other activities required by their statutory Federal criminal investigations.) ~~(C)~~

The FEMA Director, U.S. Secret Service Director, and FBI Director shall ensure that their respective lead agency responsibilities are fully coordinated and effectively implemented. Unless mutually agreed upon between the Directors or their designees, the Secret Service and the FBI will maintain full command and control of their respective agency assets in all circumstances and incidents.

Defense, State, Energy, HHS, Transportation and EPA shall, consistent with their authorities and appropriations, make available specialized units in support of security operations, crisis management, and consequence management. ~~(C)~~

The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, in cooperation with other concerned Principals including the Director/OMB, should within 120 days submit for my approval a plan to implement this decision. The plan should, inter alia, cover: ~~(C)~~

-- Command/control arrangements of the FBI, Secret Service, FEMA, DOD and other relevant agencies; ~~(S)~~

-- how to achieve quickly an air space security capability centered on the enforcement arms of the Treasury (U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Customs Service); ~~(S)~~


-- any required changes in funding and/or legislative authorities. (U)

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2. National Capital Area Rapid Response Capability for a WMD Terrorist Incident: The most inviting domestic target for a terrorist employing WMD is downtown Washington and the national security headquarters nearby in Virginia. Yet there is no specialized explosive ordnance disposal team in the Washington area trained or equipped to deal with WMD; or any detection and alerting system to identify when WMD move into the metropolitan area on main approach routes. Accordingly, we must be able to detect and safely deal with any WMD within or approaching Washington, DC. ~~(S)~~

-- The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, shall ensure that there is a robust capability to render safe a nuclear, biological, or chemical device in the National Capital area and that such a capability be deployable in the shortest time possible. ~~(S)~~

-- DOE will lead a technology research and demonstration project to examine the feasibility of installing covert WMD detection systems on approaches to the metropolitan area. ~~(S)~~



4. Statutory Authority and Funding for Combating Terrorism Operations: The burden for finding the statutory authority to

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use resources during combating terrorism operations is unfairly left to each agency. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in coordination with the OMB Director, will develop comprehensive proposals for statutory authority for funding to combat terrorism operations. These proposals shall be submitted to the APNSA within 120 days. (U)

5. Exercises: There shall be at least one annual exercise involving the participation of Agency Principals to validate policies, procedures, and capabilities for the resolution of unconventional attacks against the U.S. and its citizens. ~~(S)~~

Implementation

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism: Program coordination in support of this Directive will be under the auspices of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. While not directing the activities of agencies, the National Coordinator will integrate the Government's policies and programs on unconventional threats to the homeland and Americans abroad: attacks on our infrastructure, cyber systems, and government operations, terrorism, and defenses against covert delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Reporting to the APNSA shall be an NSC staff Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection and a Senior Director for Counter-Terrorism. In the context of the established annual budget process the National Coordinator will provide advice regarding the budgets for counter-terrorism. (U)

For these purposes, the National Coordinator will chair assistant secretary/flag rank groups, reporting to the Deputies Committee (or, at the call of its chair, the Principals Committee) including:

-- The Counter-Terrorism Security Group (CSG) to coordinate counter-terrorism issues and review ongoing crisis operations/ activities concerning foreign terrorism and domestic terrorism with significant foreign involvement; ~~(S)~~

-- Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG) to coordinate the implementation of the Presidential Decision Directive on Critical Infrastructure; ~~(S)~~

-- The Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness (WMDP), Consequence Management and Protection Group to coordinate policies and programs relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emergency preparedness, training, equipping and organizing

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WMD consequence managers, interdiction of WMD and associated components being introduced into the United States and security of WMD-related facilities in the United States. ~~(S)~~

The National Coordinator will also be responsible for ensuring program coordination between these three groups (CSG, CICG and WMDP) and the existing interagency working group on Enduring Constitutional Government (IWG/ECG, chaired by the Counselor to the APNSA)), which coordinate development and implementation of policy and programs related to government-wide continuity of operations and continuity of government. ~~(S)~~

The National Coordinator may call these groups to meet jointly or form joint sub-groups to address inter-disciplinary issues. The Counter-terrorism Security Group and the National Coordinator will conduct their reviews of intelligence programs and activities consistent with existing procedures and authorities and in coordination with the DCI and/or the Chair of the Intelligence IWG, as appropriate. ~~(C)~~

The National Coordinator shall report regularly to the Principals and annually to me in a Security Preparedness Report (this report supercedes the PDD-39 reporting requirements). The National Coordinator will also participate as a full member of Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to consider counter-terrorism, security, WMD defense, or infrastructure issues. In addition, while not directing the actions of agencies, the National Coordinator shall coordinate the development of interagency agreed guidelines for crisis management and the procedures for authorizing deployment and employment of specialized crisis assets. ~~(C)~~

Bill Clinton

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4120
Document ID: [PDD-64 Antipersonnel Landmines (APL)- Expanding Upon and Strengthening U.S. Policy, June 23, 1998]

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43	6	9	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 64: Anti-personnel Landmines (APLs): Expanding Upon and Strengthening U.S. Policy. (4 pages)	06/23/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4120

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-64: Anti-personnel Landmines (APLs): Expanding Upon and Strengthening U.S. Policy, June 23, 1998]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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PDD 64

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Original OA/ID Number: 2573
Document ID: [PDD-66 U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III, August 17, 1998]

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31	6	3	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 66: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III. (7 pages)	08/17/1998	P1/b(1). NLE9125/19

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 2573

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-66, U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III, August 17, 1998]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 17, 1998

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III (U)

I. PURPOSE

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes principles and objectives for nuclear arms control with Russia and provides guidance for the negotiation of further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces in or related to START III. (U)

II. BACKGROUND

In Presidential Decision Directives 3, 11, 15, 17, 20, 30, 37, 47 and 60, I directed changes in U.S. nuclear posture and policies commensurate with a diminished threat of nuclear war and established a policy to build a new relationship with Russia that includes adapting the nuclear forces of both sides to the changed international security environment. (U)

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In the March 21, 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement (HJS) on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, President Yeltsin and I agreed on the basic components of START III, including: establishment of aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads; measures relating to the transparency and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads; the goal of making START I and II unlimited in duration; and early deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II. President Yeltsin and I also agreed in the HJS that, in the context of START III negotiations, experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building measures, and to consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. (U)

III. U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE AND POLICY ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

A. U.S. Nuclear Posture

Although nuclear weapons play a smaller role today in our national security and defense policy and posture than at any point during the second half of the 20th century, nuclear weapons will remain an integral part of the international security picture for the foreseeable future. In my *1997 National Security Strategy*, I set forth how nuclear forces serve U.S. objectives:

> *"...Our nuclear deterrent is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In this context, the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile."* (U)

In PDD-60, I further stated that:

> *"...U.S. nuclear forces protect both the U.S. and our allies by deterring massive and limited nuclear attacks, and by*

contributing to deterring major conventional aggression and attacks employing chemical and biological weapons." (S)

In this context, and consistent with the HJS, the United States is committed to seeking further reductions in and constraints on both strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, consistent with the principles and objective established below. The United States will not, however, begin formal negotiations on START III until START II is ratified in Russia, although experts consultations will be conducted to continue our dialogue on nuclear issues and prepare for prompt negotiations. Furthermore, the United States will remain essentially at START I levels until the START II Treaty enters into force. (U)

B. Principles to Guide Reductions

Building on the principles I established in PDD-37, the following principles will guide further reductions in nuclear forces:

1. *Deterrence*. The United States will maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size, survivability and capability to support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives including Alliance needs and fully implement U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies.

2. *Stability*. Arms control commitments should preserve and, if possible, enhance the crisis stability that will be achieved at the end of the START II draw-down period and seek greater predictability through transparency measures and appropriate constraints.

3. *Equivalence*. Mindful of the sides' differing practices and national security needs, large disparities in force capability and infrastructure that represent an imbalance between U.S. and Russian capabilities must be addressed, as they could tempt a potential aggressor. We cannot allow our nuclear capabilities to be perceived as inadequate or inferior.

4. *Verification*. We must preserve and, if necessary, enhance key verification measures from START I and II and achieve agreement on measures for monitoring key new obligations with confidence sufficient for the United States to achieve its national security objectives.

5. *Safety, Security and Proliferation*. Russia's large nuclear arsenal and fissile material stockpiles pose a significant risk of weapons or material slipping out of Russian control

into third party hands. Our best safeguard against this is to seek deep reductions in that arsenal and a further consolidation of their storage sites. We must also work with Russia to ensure that material, technology and expertise do not fall into third party hands. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program's Weapons Protection, Control and Accountability project has a major role to play in helping Russia upgrade the security and accountability of both the residual storage sites and fissile material. (C)

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IV. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Under reductions below START II levels, the United States will require greater understanding of, and constraints on, Russia's capabilities to rapidly reconstitute its nuclear forces (strategic and non-strategic) and thereby achieve a significant military imbalance. The United States will therefore seek to make rapid and substantive progress in all elements of the framework in the HJS. While the HJS will serve as the basis to begin the negotiations, the outcome in each of these areas must be consistent with the principles in Section III above and with the following U.S. objectives and guidelines. (U)

A. START III Warhead Ceiling

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START III will produce further stabilizing and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Based on a May 1998 Department of Defense comprehensive review of strategic force requirements and U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies, the United States will pursue the limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads of 2,000-2,500 agreed at Helsinki. (C)

B. Extension of START I and II

Both START I/II will be made unlimited in duration in START III, as agreed at Helsinki. (C)

C. Non-strategic Nuclear Forces

COPY

It is estimated Russia will have to eliminate some 3,200 - 7,200 warheads by the year 2000 to meet its 1991/1992 "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI) pledges. Even with the full implementation of the 1991/1992 PNI commitments, Russia's residual NSNF stockpile will greatly exceed U.S. NSNF levels and Russia's legitimate defense needs. The importance of this disparity will grow as strategic nuclear forces are further reduced. Moreover, concerns exist regarding the safety and

security of Russian NSNF. To: promote greater transparency of Russia's NSNF warhead stockpile; reduce the probability of diversion, accident or unauthorized use of Russian NSNF; and reduce the numerical disparity between U.S. and Russian NSNF, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- Codification of PNI. Reaffirmation of the Bush/Gorbachev/Yeltsin 1991/92 pledges relating to NSNF in a politically binding agreement. The agreement would call for these commitments to be implemented by a date certain.

- Commitment to reduce NSNF disparities. Political commitment to eliminate over a reasonable time period the imbalance between the respective U.S. and Russian NSNF postures.

- Data and transparency. Each side would be required to include NSNF warheads in a regime requiring a comprehensive data exchange with confirmatory inspections as described in Section IV(D); moreover, NSNF warheads that were eliminated under the "freedom to mix" provision described in Section IV(D) would be subject to the same procedures for monitored dismantlement and storage as those for strategic warheads. (C)

D. Warheads and Related Fissile Material

Substantial disparities exist between U.S. and Russian total warhead and fissile material stockpiles and their associated production infrastructure, exacerbated by large uncertainties in these areas. To: reduce our uncertainties regarding the size and composition of Russian nuclear forces and asymmetries between Russian nuclear warhead production and the size of its reduced nuclear forces; encourage tighter control on the location and handling of excess nuclear weapons and material; and make progress towards the goal of promoting "irreversibility" by validating concepts for monitored warhead dismantlement and storage that might be used in future arms control treaties, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- Data and transparency. This will include a comprehensive data exchange and the right to conduct a limited number of confirmatory inspections at any location where nuclear warheads are stored or produced adequate to reduce the uncertainty about the size and composition of Russian nuclear

forces. The regime need not require excessively intrusive elements such as Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring.

- Monitored dismantlement and storage. Elimination of a significant number of warheads (in the range of 500-1,000) with a "freedom to mix" provision (i.e., with respect to warheads subject to monitored dismantlement, each side will be free to choose any strategic or non-strategic warhead from its stockpile, from deployed or non-deployed delivery vehicles, or from storage sites). Excess fissile material components (not those designated for the strategic reserve) from dismantled warheads will be placed in storage and monitored until pits are handed off to a bilateral or multilateral fissile material control regime and the highly enriched uranium components are transferred for disposition or for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons components. The intrusiveness and impact of the monitoring regime at DOE facilities will need to be minimized so that there is no adverse impact on the annual certification of the stockpile.

- Infrastructure reductions. The United States will vigorously pursue the "Nuclear Cities Initiative" launched during GCC-10 designed to directly address the challenges faced in the Russian nuclear cities and reinforce Russian interest in adjusting the size of their nuclear complex. Building on this initiative, the United States will seek a commitment from Russia to shut down (i.e., close or convert) two or three of the four known MINATOM warhead assembly/disassembly plants by the year 2000.

- No increase commitment. The United States will seek a political commitment not to increase aggregate nuclear stockpiles above declared levels.

- Net New Production. The regime described above should provide increased confidence that net new production is not taking place and that stockpile sizes are decreasing. Assessments relating to net new production and stockpile sizes will be enhanced through the provision of data and confirmatory measures envisioned by this regime. (C)

E. START II Deactivation

Once START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will proceed immediately with negotiations with Russia on a method for completing the deactivation four years early of those strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated

under START II. Conclusion of this agreement will not be linked to START III. In the context of our agreement to extend the deadline for START II eliminations, we will continue to argue for warhead removal as the preferred method for deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II, as it remains the most verifiable and irreversible method. (C)

V. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

- Negotiations within Strategic Stability Group (SSG) on Arms Control. Immediately after START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will propose to begin formal negotiations on START III. Initial discussions with the Russians will take place within a small, senior-level group chaired at either the Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary level and reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.

- Ad Hoc Group. As required, the SSG on Arms Control will delegate to an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) issues for study, as well as the negotiation of detailed text. At this point, I do not envision a set-piece negotiation, chartered in Geneva, similar to the Reagan-Bush era Nuclear and Space Talks (though I do not rule it out); rather, the AHG will meet on an "as needed" basis to explore issues and negotiate text.

- Arms Control IWG. The Arms Control IWG will continue to review U.S. proposals in these areas based on Russian responses and be prepared to recommend, if necessary, changes in the U.S. position, consistent with the principles and objectives outlined in Section III. (C)

William J. Clinton

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4120				
Document ID: [PDD-69 FY 1999 - 2000 Nuclear Arms Stockpile Plan, July 2, 1999]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 69: FY 1999-2000 Nuclear Arms Stockpile Plan. (2 pages)	07/02/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Table 1: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Energy Act] (1 page)	07/02/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
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[PDD-69, FY 1999-2000 Nuclear Arms Stockpile Plan, July 2, 1999]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 69: FY 1999-2000 Nuclear Arms Stockpile Plan. (2 pages)	07/02/1999	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	Table 1: Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Energy Act] (1 page)	07/02/1999	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
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OA/Box Number: 4120

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-69, FY 1999-2000 Nuclear Arms Stockpile Plan, July 2, 1999]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 24, 2000

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies (U)

Contemporary peace operations and other complex contingencies, though aimed at mitigating military conflict, often confront considerable civil disorder, violence, and crime. Time and again, we have seen that as military conflict ends (and armies demobilize), a security vacuum develops that indigenous law enforcement organizations cannot fill, at least initially. These institutions usually have been destroyed, rendered ineffective by the conflict or corruption, or become part of the conflict due to partisan behavior. In Somalia, for example, the police simply left their posts in 1991 when a new government failed to emerge after the Siad Barre government was deposed. In Haiti and Bosnia, the police were involved in the conflict and consequently were viewed as biased combatants rather than public servants by large segments of the population. Even before the conflict arose, the public safety forces in Haiti, as in many areas where peace operations are conducted, were the primary instrument for state-sponsored repression of the citizens. (U)

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: July 1, 2008

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M (1.82)
09/25/19 KOE

The phenomenon of nonexistent, inept, or partisan police forces is not unique to peace operations. Similar problems occurred following the U.S. interventions in Grenada and Panama during the 1980s. Furthermore, in all these situations the other aspects of the indigenous criminal justice system, the judicial system, the penal system, and the law code, were in disarray and needed substantial reform. (U)

Effective indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a society to achieve and maintain durable peace. Therefore, helping to reestablish an indigenous criminal justice system is often, and appropriately, a fundamental aspect of a successful peace operation or other complex contingency operation. The experience of the U.S. Government and the international community has demonstrated the difficulty and complexity of this task. In spite of the difficulties that have been faced, our experience also demonstrates that participating in both bilateral and multilateral efforts to reconstitute indigenous criminal justice systems, promoting public safety in the short term and developing responsive criminal justice institutions over the long term, can successfully and economically support American interests. (U)

In addition to helping bring peace operations to successful completion, an effective and just criminal justice system in countries emerging from conflict serves other very important U.S. interests. In particular, it helps to deter the presence of criminals who seek to base their operations in areas where they can operate without fear of arrest and prosecution. Such wrongdoers often include organizers of terrorism, illicit drug and arms trafficking, and international criminal syndicates. (U)

Intent

My intent is that the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government improve its capacities to participate in rebuilding effective foreign criminal justice systems by implementing the directives described in this document. Furthermore, together with our allies, and as guided by my directives herein, the Executive Branch shall seek to improve the capacities of other organizations to participate in these activities. By enhancing our own capabilities and helping others to do the same, we will be better prepared to advance our national interests when those interests require the reestablishment of a criminal justice system overseas. (U)

Scope of the PDD

This directive is the third in a series of PDDs designed to promote U.S. interests by improving our ability to effectively

manage or resolve inter and intra-state conflict. The other two documents, *PDD-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* and *PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, and this new directive should be applied together. This directive amplifies my guidance given in PDD-25 concerning police and judicial dimensions of peace operations. Unless otherwise specified, nothing in this directive supersedes earlier directives. (U)

This directive applies to U.S. Government processes dealing with peace operations and other complex contingency operations as defined in PDDs 25 and 56 respectively. The Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) as described in PDD-25, under the review of the Deputies Committee, shall remain the primary interagency policy development body for peace operations, including the issues related to public safety and criminal justice addressed in this directive. Further, when an Executive Committee (ExCom) as described in PDD-56 is established, it shall be the primary interagency mechanism to conduct political-military planning and to coordinate the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a specific operation. (U)

Throughout this directive, the terms "peacekeeping force" and "peacekeepers" refer to both the civilian and military components of the peace operation. Furthermore, these terms refer to the entire coalition peacekeeping force of civilian and military elements. (If a specific component of the overall coalition or the U.S. portion thereof is intended, it is further identified.) The term "public safety" is used to mean functions related to law enforcement, and not other municipal public service activities providing for the health and well-being of the citizenry such as fire protection, sanitation, utilities, emergency medical, or health services, etc. The directive is organized in four sections: improving U.S. Government organization and capabilities, improving capabilities of other organizations, activities at the operational level, and general policy guidance. (U)

Improving U.S. Government Organization and Capacities

Create a Lead Agency: The State Department shall create an office, or modify an existing one, to assume lead agency responsibility for the full spectrum of issues related to U.S. Government involvement in the reform of criminal justice systems during peace operations and complex contingencies. This office shall be responsible for policy development, all aspects of provision and oversight of U.S. CIVPOL to field operations, development and implementation of training and technical assistance plans and programs for foreign police forces, and priority setting and coordination among other U.S. activities

relating to the criminal justice system, among other tasks. Consolidation of these functions within the agency that has primary responsibility for foreign policy will enable the U.S. Government to be more responsive by clarifying responsibilities among the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (U)

When the integrated planning processes described in PDD-56 are used, the lead agency shall normally lead development of the portions of the political-military (pol-mil) plan dealing with public safety and restoration of the criminal justice system. When related issues fall under the purview of another part of the Government, such as reform of the judicial system, which has traditionally been accomplished by USAID and the Department of Justice, the lead agency shall normally organize and lead an interagency working group of the various governmental organizations to coordinate and prepare products for the pol-mil plan. When the lead agency is developing policies and long-range plans for future programs and contingencies, it shall involve the Department of Justice and other interested agencies. (U)

At the request of the Peacekeeping Core Group (PCG) or ExComm, the lead agency shall be responsible for developing and providing pol-mil planning advice and liaison on public safety and criminal justice issues in peace operations and complex contingencies to other organizations and countries. (U)

At the request of the PCG or ExComm, the lead agency shall organize and lead an interagency criminal justice assessment team. The purpose of such a team shall be to gather information and facilitate development of a comprehensive plan for reform. Assessment teams could also be used to help develop benchmarks, measure progress against those benchmarks, and develop advice for mid-course corrections. An assessment team will normally be composed of a full range of criminal justice experts from throughout the U.S. Government, including persons from the Department of Justice, USAID, and federal law enforcement agencies. The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture, Interior, and any law enforcement agencies under their auspices shall be prepared to participate in these assessment teams as needed. (U)

It is appropriate for the lead agency to use contractor support to assist in its duties when cost effective, reasonable, and consistent with laws and regulations. Furthermore, the other Departments and Agencies shall consider providing various types of support to the lead agency, including seconding personnel to serve in the responsible office. (U)

Since our efforts to help rebuild foreign criminal justice systems are usually a multiyear activity, the lead agency and other responsible agencies shall seek adequate, designated funding in subsequent years of a particular operation until our foreign policy goals are accomplished. Further, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall work together to ensure that programs conducted by or through the lead agent are funded at a level that reflects the high priority I give to these activities. (U)

Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide CIVPOL to Field Operations: Since 1994, which marked the initiation of the operation in Haiti, the United States has steadily increased its contributions of civilian police officers to peace operations. In 1996, the U.S. contribution was 154 officers in an average month; in 1997 the average was 275. By the end of 1999, the U.S. had more than 600 CIVPOL deployed. These contributions have been to operations in Haiti, the Former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. It will be in the U.S. interest to continue to participate in and support CIVPOL activities. As always, future decisions on U.S. involvement in CIVPOL activities will be coordinated on a case-by-case basis through the Peacekeeping Core Group, as described in PDD-25. (U)

The current process used by our Government to recruit, prepare, train, and deploy civilian police officers to CIVPOL operations is not adequate. The lead agency shall place special emphasis on making immediate improvements. Improvements should focus, in part, on improving the speed with which the U.S. is able to provide personnel for specific CIVPOL operations and enabling the U.S. to participate in UN Standby Arrangements with CIVPOL. The lead agency also should develop mechanisms to improve the discipline and accountability of U.S. CIVPOL officers deployed in UN missions, to include the possibility of a more formal affiliation with the lead agency. The lead agency shall identify any new legislative authorities that would be necessary to implement such improvements. Another broad area for improvement relates to the recruitment and preparation of U.S. CIVPOL. In this regard, the lead agency, or another agency operating under its supervision, must develop training programs for U.S. CIVPOL that incorporate all aspects of service in a CIVPOL field operation. To further enhance the law enforcement expertise of the lead agency, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Park Police shall consider providing, if requested, an individual with appropriate law enforcement and technical expertise to the lead agency to serve within the office responsible for the management of U.S. CIVPOL contributions. (U)

The lead agency shall specify funds within its budget submissions to cover the costs related to the provision of U.S. CIVPOL to field operations, including reimbursement to the state and municipal law enforcement agencies for their participation and seek any additional implementing legislation, if necessary. Necessary reimbursement procedures shall be negotiated between the federal government and the law enforcement agencies. Given the organization of the U.S. law enforcement system, the majority of U.S. CIVPOL will likely come from state and municipal law enforcement agencies. It is my intent, however, that members of the federal law enforcement agencies also be available for CIVPOL service on a voluntary basis similar to municipal officers, or via another appropriate method. (U)

Enhance U.S. Government Capacity to Provide Training and Developmental Assistance to Foreign Police Forces: It is my intent that the U.S. Government enhance its capability to train and develop foreign police forces during peace operations and other complex contingencies. The agencies involved in implementation must work from a common set of goals and must receive adequate institutional support, especially at the headquarters-level. Furthermore, they must devise programs that include mechanisms to ensure that human rights issues receive adequate attention and oversight. (U)

To carry out my intent, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, within four months of my signing this directive, shall prepare a plan to implement this guidance and present it to me through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In the plan, the Attorney General should specifically address measures by the Department of Justice which are necessary to broaden and strengthen ICITAP's capacity to engage in long-range planning to support the policy and planning development work of the lead agency, as well as ICITAP's capacity to both provide training and coordinate with CIVPOL activities in support of peace operations and other complex contingencies. (U)

Create an Interagency Partnership in Judicial, Penal, and Legal Code Developmental Assistance: In the increasingly global world, our national security and other interests are inescapably linked to the effectiveness of foreign criminal justice systems. When such systems break down or are destroyed, the damage is felt in a variety of ways, ranging from our economic interests, to our humanitarian concerns, to the physical safety of American citizens. We must therefore continue to expand and improve our cooperation and development activities with other countries, especially those emerging from periods of instability where havens of criminal impunity might otherwise develop. (U)

To respond rapidly and effectively to emerging contingencies, the Secretary of State will call upon relevant departments and agencies to participate in operations pertaining to urgent and immediate interventions in the criminal justice sector. The Department of State, as lead agency, will harmonize and assure rapid response assistance, training and other necessary support to strengthen judicial and penal systems and legal code reform during complex contingencies and in their aftermath. (U)

The Attorney General and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development shall establish a partnership that will include subordinate offices, including ICITAP, OPDAT, and the USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, to improve the capability of the U.S. Government to develop and assure delivery of rapid response assistance. Working through the Center for Democracy and Governance, these offices will conduct contingency planning and develop emergency assistance programs, relying on analyses of ongoing and past assistance programs and resulting lessons learned to guide future actions. The Center will draw upon the expertise of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives as well as the expert resources available within other departments and agencies as necessary. (U)

During the planning and execution of peace operations and complex contingencies, the Center for Democracy and Governance shall coordinate its developmental assistance activities with the lead agency, which will retain overall responsibility for planning, overseeing, and coordinating U.S. actions to rebuild the criminal justice sector. Programs must be developed that enable us to respond quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies. These programs must at the same time lead to sustainable, credible, and legitimate state institutions necessary for long-term stability. Therefore, they should be implemented in the context of a broader criminal justice reform strategy. (U)

The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the USAID Administrator, and the Director for the Office of Management and Budget shall work together to ensure this initiative receives authority and funding that is commensurate with the high priority that I place on it. The operating costs of the Center shall continue to be borne by USAID while costs of DOJ's participation in the Center's contingency planning and program development shall be borne by the Department of Justice. The field operations conducted through it should normally be funded from foreign assistance appropriations and other sources as appropriate. None of these funds shall be used by other USAID or USG elements for judicial, penal, or legal code developmental assistance unless coordinated through the Center. (U)

Improving the Capacities of Other Organizations and Countries

Despite the critical importance of U.S. enhancements in these areas, U.S. Government capabilities should not become the international community's instrument of first resort whenever CIVPOL-related requirements arise. Many other countries and organizations have similar interests and responsibilities and should share the burden of these activities. Therefore, the U.S. Government shall seek to enhance the capacities of non-U.S. entities including those of other countries, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. Government shall seek to build and sustain the will of other countries and organizations to be involved in this type of activity and develop mechanisms for greater cooperation and coordination. (U)

Although UN CIVPOL activities to date have encountered difficulties, the UN is the international body with the most extensive experience and dedicated mechanisms focused on peace operations. Indeed, until the recent advent of the police role for the OSCE in Eastern Slovenia and Kosovo, the UN had been the only international or regional organization to mount a significant CIVPOL operation. Among international organizations, the U.S. Government shall focus its reform efforts for CIVPOL activities on the UN, just as we did for general peacekeeping reforms following PDD-25. At the same time, the United States shall continue to support efforts to improve regional organizations' peace operations capabilities, including those related to criminal justice systems. In particular, we should work to further develop the capacities of the OSCE to conduct these operations. (U)

Because we can only advocate, rather than direct, specific policies and processes of international organizations, this directive outlines general policy objectives. During the implementation phase, specific proposals and a strategy for achieving them shall be developed. To facilitate our policy objectives, the State Department shall seek like-minded states and organizations to serve as partners in our efforts to improve the capacities of the UN and other regional organizations. (U)

Within the UN Secretariat staff, greater emphasis should be placed on matters related to the criminal justice system during peace operations. The current staff devoted to CIVPOL matters in DPKO is insufficient to accomplish the planning, coordination, and conduct of these operations. The United States shall advocate that DPKO strengthen its capabilities by installing an appropriate, senior-rank individual, with appropriate staff support, to oversee criminal justice matters. The United States

will consider providing individuals with criminal justice expertise to serve within DPKO. Furthermore, criminal justice functions should be fully integrated with other peacekeeping functions in DPKO. Adequate planning capacity within DPKO should account for CIVPOL requirements, including a criminal justice element, before a new operation is initiated or a mandate renewed. Criminal justice planners should be integrated into UN assessment teams that deploy to sites of potential peacekeeping operations and CIVPOL capabilities of more member states should be entered into the UN Standby Arrangements system. The Standby Arrangements system enables the international community to respond more quickly to crises through rosters of pre-identified, screened and trained police experts from around the world who can be deployed on very short notice. Finally, UN and other organizations should develop means to take over the longer-term aspects of criminal justice development once the peacekeeping phase of a complex contingency is completed and peace-building activities have begun. (U)

The U.S. Government will advocate that UN missions make use of a suitable mix of military and paramilitary forces to accomplish the assigned tasks of any new peace operation. Constabulary forces, that is, paramilitary forces that train for and conduct a law enforcement function in their home countries, should be deployed by the UN in appropriate circumstances. Such forces bring specialized skills, such as crowd control capabilities, that are not common to traditional military or civilian police organizations. These forces are most effective when deployed as units rather than individuals. Generally, constabulary and other paramilitary units should be placed under the operational control of the military force commander, like the Multinational Support Units (MSU) that have been part of the military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to place a constabulary-type force under the operational control of the UN police commissioner. When under the operational control of the military force commander, and when feasible and allowable under existing statutes, these elements should receive logistic, intelligence, and other types of support in the same manner as the regular military units. (U)

The lead agency shall develop methods to provide specialized training to foreign civilian police and foreign gendarme or constabulary forces in order to enhance their preparedness for service in peace operations and other complex contingencies. The lead agency shall seek new legislative authorities, if required, and adequate funding to allow such activity. This new capacity will provide the U.S. Government a means to improve the overall performance of CIVPOL operations, by enhancing the quality of CIVPOL participants. The training should include standard operating procedures for field operations, which may need to be

developed in concert with other countries, the United Nations, and other international organizations. Given the high priority I place on human rights issues and risks involved in training foreign police forces, we will ensure appropriate mechanisms to guarantee that human rights issues are fully considered. (U)

Improving Activities at the Operational Level

Our experiences in recent operations have shown that a number of operational level activities related to rebuilding the indigenous criminal justice system can be improved. The aim should be to have a public security and law enforcement network with trained, certified, and equipped police -- all of which are firmly embedded in a system of legitimate and credible justice sector institutions. A key measure of progress would be to assess the extent to which a self-sufficient and impartial law enforcement system is being established. (U)

Enhance CIVPOL Headquarters Capacities: Currently, operational-level headquarters capacities for CIVPOL are generally deficient. If field activities are to be improved, this shortfall must be corrected. Ideally, the CIVPOL component should be capable of operating independently, since CIVPOL will not always be deployed with military forces, as was the case at the end of the Haiti operation. Headquarters capacity becomes even more important if the CIVPOL component is controlling some sort of special security unit or a constabulary force. At a minimum, the headquarters should have the ability to conduct current operations, plan future operations, collect and assess intelligence, and manage its logistical support. The headquarters element should also have the ability to conduct liaison with elements of the host state and the other components of the peacekeeping force as well as other actors involved in rebuilding the criminal justice system. (U)

Where appropriate, the CIVPOL headquarters should be capable of assuming responsibility to coordinate and oversee the overall reform process for the criminal justice sector. As more outside agencies become involved with this sector, the importance of coordination increases. The CIVPOL operational headquarters should incorporate a coordination mechanism akin to the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) used by the military and civilian agencies to synchronize their activities. When the United States is participating in a peace operation involving CIVPOL, but is not leading it, the PCG shall give special consideration to contributing qualified U.S. personnel to the operation to serve in the planning and coordination roles of the CIVPOL headquarters. Such contributions would help ensure these important functions are carried out effectively and would give the U.S. an opportunity to influence the planning process from the inside. (C)

Enhance Coordination and Synchronization: Just as CIVPOL and other peacekeeping functions should be coordinated at the strategic level, they must also be coordinated fully at the operational level. The USG shall advocate that military peacekeepers and CIVPOL shall, as feasible, coordinate activities to ensure maximum support of the overall objectives of the operation. Past operations have been successful by colocáting headquarters, or colocating with the CMOC, or developing other effective liaison processes, to allow sharing of information on planning and execution processes. In addition, in every recent peace operation involving CIVPOL, the conduct of joint and/or parallel patrols consisting of indigenous police, CIVPOL monitors, and military peacekeepers has proven valuable in maintaining public safety and raising the effectiveness of the indigenous police. The first source for CIVPOL communications and logistic support should be from commercial sources; however, since the military component of a peacekeeping operation is more likely to have effective communication systems, logistic support systems, and intelligence or information structures throughout the area of operations, the military commander should consider providing the CIVPOL component access to and mutual use of these capabilities when feasible and allowable by law and when it will not interfere with execution of the mission of the military component. The military force commander should continue to have the authority to deny access to military information and systems when that is deemed necessary. When making a decision to deny access to information or systems, the force commander should carefully consider the negative effects such denial will likely have on accomplishment of the overall mission of the peace operation. Independent CIVPOL support systems should be developed as soon as possible to minimize the dependency on military systems and allow full withdrawal of military forces when the military mission is completed. (U)

In some instances, military support to the CIVPOL component has proven essential to successful accomplishment of the overall mission. Such support might take the form of technical assistance resident in the civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, or military police elements of armed forces. At the same time, we must avoid situations in which the CIVPOL component is completely dependent upon the military peacekeeping component. Such military support may not always be feasible, or allowable under existing statutes, and the military-unique aspects of the mission will likely be completed prior to the public safety related tasks. Any U.S. military equipment, services or supplies should normally be provided to CIVPOL on a reimbursable basis as directed in PDD-25, Annex VI. (U)

Enhance CIVPOL Competence: The United States will advocate that whichever organization is organizing a particular peace operation, be it the UN or a regional grouping like the OAU or the OSCE, a military alliance such as NATO, or a lead state, will develop specific job descriptions and other standards for the various individual experts required in an operation, e.g., police monitor and mentor, police operations planner, penal system advisor, judicial system advisor, etc. The United States will urge that the organizing body abide by the highest standards for recruitment and have the authority to dismiss CIVPOL that fail to perform adequately. The U.S. lead agency will prepare template job descriptions and other standards that would speed the process of recruiting a CIVPOL force and share them with potential CIVPOL organizing bodies. (U)

Training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to coalition peace operations should remain a national responsibility. However, international organizations or other organizing bodies may need to supplement national training from time to time. The U.S. lead agency shall maintain the capacity to provide tailored training packages to U.S. and international CIVPOL when requested by the organizing body or the contributing state and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriate reimbursement is available. (U)

General Policy Guidance

Constabulary Activities: As already described, in some cases indigenous police forces are unable to provide adequate public safety when peacekeepers arrive. In these cases, outside agencies may need to assist in ensuring basic public safety until this function can be accomplished effectively by newly strengthened indigenous police. Generally, outsiders should not be tasked to conduct law enforcement as there are significant complications to using outsiders to enforce the law of the country in crisis, with which outsiders may not be familiar. Furthermore, ultimate responsibility to conduct law enforcement should not be taken away from local police forces as this may breed dependency. Rather, outsiders may be given responsibility to carry out a more narrow range of activities to create and maintain a reasonable measure of public safety. Such tasks may include actions to regulate movements which may be necessary for the cause of safety; intervene to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes; stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots, or other mob-type action; and disperse unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances, among other tasks. For the purposes of this PDD, this general category of tasks shall be termed constabulary activities. (U)

Military or paramilitary forces are best suited to accomplish constabulary tasks. International civilian police officers (CIVPOL) as they have been traditionally deployed to peace operations do not have the unit cohesion, training, or equipment to conduct constabulary functions. Generally, the United States shall prefer that constabulary functions, when they are necessary, be conducted by a paramilitary force such as exists in many other countries. However, suitable partners may not always be available, or a short lag time may occur before a civilian, paramilitary force becomes operational in a specific situation. Therefore, U.S. military forces shall maintain the capability to support constabulary functions abroad, and if necessary carry out constabulary functions under limited conditions for a limited period of time. For example, in Haiti, in operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the U.S. military contingent temporarily conducted constabulary functions and other law enforcement-like activities until civilian organizations were able to conduct these tasks. Maintaining a constabulary capability in no way obligates the U.S. military to conduct these tasks in any particular operation or to develop specialized constabulary units dedicated to this mission. As always, specific missions and tasks of U.S. military elements will be developed and approved by the NCA. (U)

Executive Authority: Generally, the U.S. Government shall advocate that CIVPOL not be given responsibility to enforce local law (executive authority) -- the responsibility for local law enforcement will remain with the indigenous police forces. In some instances, it may be appropriate to give monitors the authority (if not the responsibility) in their mandate to respond to local crimes when indigenous police are unable to take action. This authority may include the right to use detention and deadly force, for example, in an instance where there is a risk of death or serious bodily harm. In these situations, which place them at greater risk, CIVPOL officers should be given sufficient discretion over whether or not to exercise their authority. Where CIVPOL officers are granted such authority, their activities must be thoroughly coordinated with the military force commander to avoid the potential for conflict between elements of the overall peace operation force. As always, the U.S. Government position on specific rules of engagement (ROE) and rules of interaction (ROI) will be determined on a case-by-case basis. ~~(S)~~

In some exceptional circumstances, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor where the international community is responsible for administration of a territory, CIVPOL might appropriately be tasked with full law enforcement responsibility and authority. Due to the challenges and risks of such authority and responsibility, this level of involvement should be infrequent. ~~(S)~~

Protection of CIVPOL: CIVPOL, as other peacekeepers, have the right to self-defense. Appropriate measures therefore must be taken to ensure that monitors are adequately protected. In many cases, the prestige and respect imbued to monitors because of their affiliation with the overall peacekeeping operation provides sufficient safety. In the instances where monitors have been at risk, they were able to call upon the military component of the operation for support. Recently, in Haiti, this type of support was transferred from the military component of the operation to a civilian, paramilitary unit. Generally, this method of protecting CIVPOL monitors has worked well. However, in some instances, this method may be insufficient. In these cases, the United States shall consider advocating that the CIVPOL monitors be armed in order to facilitate their self-defense. We generally shall not consider sidearms alone to constitute adequate defense for the monitors, as they often will be significantly "outarmed" by the civilian population and, in particular, criminals and other rogue elements. We must recognize that if CIVPOL monitors are armed, their training and preparation needs will increase. Nonetheless, in addition to increasing the personal security of CIVPOL, experience in Haiti suggests that, in some situations, an armed CIVPOL monitor is better able to mentor indigenous police if by being armed they are allowed to be present in the dangerous situations indigenous police face. Obviously, in those situations where CIVPOL are tasked to conduct law enforcement, they must be armed appropriately. (U)

The Role and Limits of Military Support: Actions related to criminal justice are primarily civilian in character: military forces are not police officers. U.S. armed forces do not normally have inherent law enforcement authority overseas. Furthermore, using military forces for law enforcement tasks over an extended period may send inappropriate signals to civil authorities and the local population, may place U.S. forces in situations for which they have not been thoroughly trained, and may detract from other purposes of the military forces. We should use democratic civilian policing models as the basis for rebuilding and training indigenous police forces, and that is what we hope to build in recovering societies. Nonetheless, the military component of a peace operation does have a vital role to play in the overall recovery of criminal justice capacities. Unless basic public safety is provided, the civilian organizations will be unable to conduct their tasks. If public safety is not maintained, the social fabric will not be ready for the assistance to be provided by the civilian agencies. In addition to the task of contributing to public safety, there are a number of supporting tasks that the military can conduct to hasten the progress of the civilian agencies dealing with criminal justice as described above in the section on operational level improvements. (U)

U.S. military personnel shall not provide formal training to foreign criminal justice systems unless authorized under existing authorities. However, this does not restrict U.S. military personnel from interacting with or conducting joint operational activities with elements belonging to the indigenous criminal justice system. And nothing in this directive shall prevent military or civilian peacekeepers from temporarily detaining individuals as needed to maintain public safety or to reduce risks and dangers to the peacekeepers, in accordance with appropriate laws and other authorities. In accordance with laws and regulations, the U.S. military may provide training and assistance to host state security elements that are part of the host state's defense establishment. Furthermore, DOD shall, if appropriately directed and on a case-by-case basis under appropriate legal authorities, provide assistance and support to the agencies providing training and developmental assistance to foreign police forces. Such assistance and support may include, inter alia, logistics, communications, transportation, and selected technical expertise. (U)

Implementation Guidance

Consistent with previous PDDs, the NSC staff shall oversee and chair an interagency working group to guide the process of implementation of this PDD. A status report shall be made to me by the NSC four months following my signing this directive, and at six-month intervals thereafter. (U)

William J Clinton

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WJC HANDWRITING

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4121				
Document ID: [PDD-72 FY 2000 - 2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 7, 2000]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 72: FY 2000-2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. (2 pages)	03/07/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Table 1, FY00-05 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Engergy Act] (1 page)	03/07/2000	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-72, FY 2000-2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 7, 2000]

2010-1227-M
vz448

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Decision Directive 72: FY 2000-2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. (2 pages)	03/07/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-72, FY 2000-2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 7, 2000]

2010-1227-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	Table 1, FY00-05 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [Atomic Engergy Act] (1 page)	03/07/2000	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-72, FY 2000-2005 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, March 7, 2000]

2010-1227-M
vz448

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4121				
Document ID: [PDD-73 U.S. Colombia Initiative, August 3, 2000]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 73: U.S. Colombia Initiative. (8 pages)	08/03/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-73, Colombia Initiative, August 3, 2000]

2010-1227-M
vz449

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No. PDD - 73

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 73: U.S. Colombia Initiative. (8 pages)	08/03/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

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[PDD-73, Colombia Initiative, August 3, 2000]

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4121				
Document ID: [PDD-74 Nuclear Weapons Deployment, November 29, 2000]				
Row: 43	Section: 6	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Decision Directive 74: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization. [Atomic Energy Act] (3 pages)	11/29/2000	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 4121

FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-74, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, November 29, 2000]

2010-1227-M
vz450

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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No. PDD-74

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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FOLDER TITLE:
[PDD-74, Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization, November 29, 2000]

2010-1227-M
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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 3975				
Document ID: 0006616 [PDD-75, Counterintelligence]				
Row: 43	Section: 3	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. draft	Presidential Decision Directive 75: U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. (8 pages)	11/08/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	Presidential Decision Directive 75: U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. (8 pages)	11/07/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 3975

FOLDER TITLE:
0006616 [PDD-75, Counterintelligence]

2010-1227-M
vz451

RESTRICTION CODES

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RECORD ID: 0006615
RECEIVED: 20 OCT 00 14

TO: AGENCIES

CHRON FILE

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PDD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT PDD RE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 26 OCT 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ALMON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ALMON
		CLARKE
		EXECSEC
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2010-1227-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	00110716	FOR DECISION
001		X	00110911	KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
002		X	00110911	BRADTKE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	001108	FUERTH, L	
002	001108	KENNEY, K	
002	001108	CRIBBS, M	
002	001108	TOWNSEND, F	
002	001108	SOLIT, J	
002	001108	KYLE, R	
002	001108	WOLFE, T	
002	001108	WHALEN, D	
002	001108	GALLAGHER, N	

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O

(BSW)

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
HAAS			
POWELL			
BASH	1	BB 11/7	
BRADTKE	2/4	Fixes & f... 11/8	
RUDMAN	cag		
KERRICK	3	(D)	
BERGER	~~4~~		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	5	SM 11/8	D
RECORDS MGMT.	6		

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: New CI POD

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE gcs

LOG # 6616

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

FM BB TO RAB DATE 11/7

2nd DRAFT to go out to AGENCIES. SRB previously reviewed 1ST Draft

FM _____ TO _____ DATE _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 8, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence Policy
Department of Justice

MR. JAMES N. SOLIT
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPT. DOUGLAS F. WHALEN, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. NEIL J. GALLAGHER
Assistant Director, National Security Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) Counterintelligence Program

Attached for Principals' review and concurrence is a draft PDD, effecting a reorganization of the current counterintelligence structure established by PDD-24. This draft reflects counterintelligence community contributions from State, Defense, Justice, Energy, OMB, the CIA, Joint Staff, and the FBI.

Classified by Robert Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify on: X1

Please provide any comments to Timothy C. Almon, Intelligence Programs, National Security Council, (202) 456-9341 by November 17, 2000.

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Draft PDD, U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 21st Century

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
[PDD]
OA/Box Number: 3975

FOLDER TITLE:
0006616 [PDD-75, Counterintelligence]

2010-1227-M
vz451

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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 7, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: MARY O. MCCARTHY

FROM: TIM ALMON

SUBJECT: New Counterintelligence PDD

Attached at Tab A is the draft "CI-21" PDD which is now ready, pending your approval, to be sent out for Principals' concurrence.

The draft reflects staff agreement among State, Defense, Justice, Energy, OMB, the CIA, Joint Staff and FBI on the establishment of a Counterintelligence Board of Directors, the Board's appointment of a CI executive and the CI Executive's chairmanship of the Counterintelligence Policy Board. The NSC Deputies Committee will review an annual *National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment* and the intelligence community's progress in implementing the *National Counterintelligence Strategy*. The CI Executive will head an Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, which will, among its other functions, assume those of the National Counterintelligence Center.

IWG participants agreed that the CI Executive, on behalf of the Board of Directors, will serve as, "the substantive leader of national counterintelligence." This language would provide the CI Executive the mandate necessary to fulfill the strategic goals of the CI-21 initiative, while avoiding any implication that the CI Executive would have an operational role. In response to concerns expressed by several agencies about a potential operational role, the proposed PDD also contains language that explicitly denies the CI Executive any operational role in any counterintelligence investigation or operation.

We have made one significant change to the earlier draft provided to you. That draft instructed the Attorney General to select a Justice Department attorney, with the concurrence of the DCI and Board of Directors, as the CI Executive's Principal

Legal Advisor. The CIA proposed, and the Attorney General agreed, that the language had unnecessarily limited the pool of potential nominees available to the Attorney General. This draft reflects that change and allows the Attorney General to appoint any attorney as the Principal Legal Advisor, provided she has obtained the concurrence of the DCI and Board of Directors.

This draft also instructs the CI Executive to work together with the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism to ensure that their programs are well coordinated and that this directive reinforces PDDs 62,63, and 67.


We have worked closely with DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel to ensure that the appointment of the CI Executive and evolution to the Office of the CI Executive can be accommodated within existing statutory requirements.

We would like to circulate the draft one more time for Principals' concurrence prior to its going to the President.

Concurrence by: Stephen Devine TA for Richard A. Clarke TA for

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Bradtke to sign the attached transmittal letter attached at Tab B.

Approve 

Attachment
Tab A Draft PDD on reorganization of the counterintelligence system
Tab B Transmittal letter

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	Presidential Decision Directive 75: U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 21st Century. (8 pages)	11/07/2000	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6616

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. FRANCES F. TOWNSEND
Counsel for Intelligence Policy
Department of Justice

MR. JAMES N. SOLIT
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. ROBERT D. KYLE
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPT. DOUGLAS F. WHALEN, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. NEIL J. GALLAGHER
Assistant Director, National Security Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) Counterintelligence Program

Attached for Principals' review and concurrence is a draft PDD, effecting a reorganization of the current counterintelligence structure established by PDD-24. This draft reflects counterintelligence community contributions from State, Defense, Justice, Energy, OMB, the CIA, Joint Staff and the FBI.

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Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify on: X1

Please provide any comments to Timothy C. Almon, Intelligence Programs, National Security Council, (202) 456-9341 by November 17, 2000.

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Draft PDD, U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness Counterintelligence for the 21st Century

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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001. report	Presidential Review Directive 1. (4 pages)	01/22/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 10/1/2013

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 22, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia ~~(S)~~

We are scheduling a Principals Committee Meeting for Wednesday, January 27, in preparation for a possible NSC meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to the former Yugoslavia. The Principals committee meeting will decide on the process for providing a coordinated interagency response to this Directive before an NSC meeting. ~~(S)~~

The objective is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward the former Yugoslavia. The Administration needs to decide what it wants to achieve and what price it is prepared to pay to get it. To that end the meeting will consider an initial range of options, such as:

-- Concentrating on ensuring delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia-Hercegovina;

-- Stopping further Serbian aggression;

-- Rolling back Serbian conquests to date;

-- Taking punitive action against Serbia for the effect it might have on others;

-- Attempting to strengthen the Vance/Owen negotiating track;

-- Building a strategy around reaffirmation of the Bush Administration's Christmas demarche, including a more detailed statement to the Serbs of what it means and of the instruments we are prepared to use to enforce it. ~~(S)~~

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In preparation for the Principals Committee meeting and a possible NSC meeting, please provide by Tuesday, January 26, the best current information on the questions listed in Part I, below, and an assessment of what would be required to implement the possible actions listed in Part II, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

Some questions are tasked to more than one Department or Agency. We appreciate that the short deadline may make a coordinated product impossible. If agencies do choose to coordinate their responses, any differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

BACKGROUND

During the campaign, President Clinton called for stronger action on Yugoslavia but without specifying particular steps beyond enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina, to which the Bush Administration already has given strong American support. (S)

In a Christmas day demarche to Serbian President Milosevic, the Bush Administration warned that certain circumstances could provoke a forceful response from the United States. We will circulate a separate paper for Principals' use on this issue. (S)

In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Christopher said that the Clinton Administration "will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies to end the slaughter in Bosnia...Europe and the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing." (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. What are the present and likely humanitarian needs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and what supplies would be necessary to meet them? (CIA, DOD) (S)

2. What is the refugee situation, inside Bosnia-Hercegovina and elsewhere, and what additional resources are needed to deal adequately with it? (CIA, STATE) (S)

3. How many detainees are in camps, and under whose control? How is this estimate computed? (CIA) (S)

4. What are the status and prospects of the Vance/Owen negotiations in Geneva? (STATE) (S)

   What do the parties perceive as their prospects in and motivations for the negotiations? (CIA, STATE) (S)

5. What is the status of the fighting in Bosnia and its likely course if present Western policies remain unchanged? (CIA) (S)

6. What are the prospects for the war's spilling over into Kosovo, Vojvodina, or Macedonia? (STATE, CIA) (S)

7. How might Macedonia's application for UN membership affect the situation? (STATE, CIA) (S)

8. How dependent are the Bosnian Serbs on support from Belgrade and how does Belgrade influence events in Bosnia? (CIA, STATE) (S)

9. To what degree is the arms embargo being violated, and by whom? To what military and political effect? (CIA, STATE) (S)

10. What are the prospects for the war's resumption in Croatia? (CIA, STATE) (S)

11. What are the views of this conflict in Moscow and how might it exacerbate Yeltsin's political problems? (STATE, CIA) (S)

12. What is the role of Islamic countries in the conflict and what is the likely impact of it on them and their relations with the U.S. and other Western states? (STATE, CIA) (S)

13. To what degree in Kiev or elsewhere will American and/or UN actions play a role in the credibility of security assurances? (CIA, STATE) (S)

II. POSSIBLE ACTIONS

1. What are the options for action, short of military action, in the former Yugoslavia itself (e.g., tightening sanctions, including military assistance to cut overland or Danube routes; stepping up efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal and to identify and bring criminals to justice; support to the opposition in Serbia; complete diplomatic and economic isolation of Serbia)? What would be the costs and benefits of each? (STATE, CIA) (S)

2. What economic assistance would front-line states (Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania) or Macedonia require to keep full implementation of sanctions from undermining their efforts at political and economic reform? What are the political effects of filling these needs or leaving them untended? (CIA, STATE) (S)

3. What actions would be required, up to and including the use of force, to ensure that neither Serbs nor others interfere with delivery of humanitarian relief supplies? (CIA, STATE, DOD) (S)

4. Is there an alternative to the present relief effort, e.g. by opening a rail line or air drops? (CIA, DOD) (S)

5. What types and scale of military equipment, e.g. anti-tank weapons or communications gear, would best enable Bosnia to

prevent further conquests? To establish better defensive perimeters around territory the government still controls? To retake territory conquered by Serbia? Would it be possible to selectively lift the arms embargo so the GOB could defend what it now holds but not launch significant counterattacks, and if so how? What training would Bosnia need to use any additional arms effectively? Who might be willing to provide equipment, money, or training? (STATE, CIA) ~~(S)~~

6. What would be required militarily and politically to halt further Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina, including defending Sarajevo and other territory still held by the government? (STATE, CIA, DOD) ~~(S)~~

7. What would be required to establish and defend safe havens? (CIA, DOD) ~~(S)~~

8. What would be require to roll back Serbian conquests in Bosnia-Hercegovina? (CIA, DOD) ~~(S)~~

9. What would be required, militarily and politically, to enforce implementation of the Vance Plan in Croatia? (STATE, CIA, DOD) ~~(S)~~

10. If the Bosnian government and all other former-Yugoslav parties accept the constitutional principles in the Vance/Owen plan for Bosnia-Hercegovina, how might the U.S. influence implementing details that would remain to be worked out, including specific times for actions which would enable us to judge whether Serbs and others were complying? (STATE) ~~(S)~~

11. If a completed peace agreement is not entirely satisfactory in principle or implementing details, might the U.S. go beyond its provisions in enforcing it or in pursuing goals that it does not encompass? (STATE, DOD) ~~(S)~~

12. What would be required to enforce the provisions of a settlement if Serbs or others did not comply willingly? (CIA, DOD) ~~(S)~~

13. What threats of -- or action on -- punitive military steps against Serbia would be necessary simply to deter similar aggression elsewhere? (STATE, CIA) ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE 2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia (S)

We are scheduling a Deputies Committee Meeting for the week of March 1, in preparation for a possible Principals Committee Meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to Cambodia. (S)

The objective of this review is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward Cambodia. In preparation for the Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals meeting, an options paper should be prepared based on the best current information, addressing the questions listed below in Parts I and II. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

Cambodia continues to be an important concern for the United States, both in terms of preventing further human rights abuses and the significant investment we have made in the United Nations peace process. (C)

The Paris Accords signed in October, 1991, provide for a UN supervised cease fire, disarmament and free and fair elections to form a new government. Signed by Prince Sihanouk and the four warring factions, the Accords have resulted in the establishment of the symbolic Supreme National Council and the presence of 18,000 peacekeeping forces on Cambodian soil. Due to Khmer Rouge unwillingness to proceed with the disarmament portions of the Agreement, the Paris Accords have been only partially implemented. Political freedom has, however, expanded considerably and approximately 4.6 million Cambodians have registered to vote. A significant consensus has emerged among "core group" countries supporting the Cambodian settlement that a

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presidential election in conjunction with UNTAC supervised assembly elections would assist in maintaining stability. Prince Sihanouk is expected to be the easy winner in the Presidential election now anticipated in May. (S)

On the other hand, the State of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge continue military skirmishes and the threat of renewed fighting hangs over the country threatening to disrupt elections. A growing concern has been the escalating political violence directed at non-communist political operatives and attributed in some cases to supporters of the Phnom Penh regime. (S)

Given the non-implementation of the military provisions of the Paris Accords, the newly elected Cambodian government will face a serious military threat from a heavily armed Khmer Rouge still in control of about a half million people and 15% of the country. This will present the international community, including the United States, with very serious decisions on the depth and nature of our engagement to try to defer or deal with what could be a major new crisis. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What are Khmer Rouge long term political and military capabilities and objectives? Is there any evidence it is not still a potential massive human rights violator? (S)

-- How effective are the UN sponsored economic sanction against the Khmer Rouge? (S)

-- Will the Khmer Rouge seek to disrupt elections through military and/or political means? What is its capacity to do so? (S)

-- Will the State of Cambodia faction use political violence to affect the outcome of the election? (S)

-- In view of the above questions, what are the prospects for elections to be held in Cambodia which will be considered free and fair by the populace? What can the U.S. do to help the elections be free and fair? (S)

-- Will the State of Cambodia (or any other faction) seek to postpone or cancel the assembly elections? (S)

-- What will be the military capabilities of the newly elected government to defend itself against the Khmer Rouge? (S)

-- What is the status of outside assistance to the Khmer Rouge? What is likely to be after the election? (S)

-- How does the Cambodian settlement relate to Vietnamese-Chinese relations? (S)

-- What, if any, is the role of the Vietnamese in Cambodia? Are there any "hidden" troops? (S)

-- Have the vietnamese fulfilled their requirements for the "roadmap?" ~~(S)~~

-- Status of Refugees along border. ~~(S)~~

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- How does the issue of Cambodia relate to U.S. interests in Vietnam, Thailand, and the stability of Southeast Asia? ~~(S)~~

-- What should be U.S. goals in addressing the issue of Cambodia? ~~(S)~~

-- What actions should the U.S. take to strengthen the prospects for the survival of democracy in post-electoral Cambodia? ~~(S)~~

-- What sanctions (economic and otherwise) would be useful in convincing the Khmer Rouge either to avoid challenge to the elections or to a new government? ~~(S)~~

-- What type of assistance (if any) should the UN and/or U.S. provide to the new Cambodian military force, either in the event of a peaceful outcome after the elections or in the event of fighting with the Khmer Rouge? ~~(S)~~

-- What type of ongoing UN civilian presence (if any) should the U.S. support after the new government is formed? ~~(S)~~

-- What contributions should the international community, including the U.S., make to post-war reconstruction (e.g., regarding refugees)? How might plans therefor be used to encourage a peaceful outcome? ~~(S)~~

-- What powers should the U.S. support for the newly elected Cambodia President (Prince Sihanouk)? ~~(S)~~

-- What should the U.S. position be if Prince Sihanouk and/or the new Prime Minister seek to include Khmer Rouge leaders in a new government, even if they don't stand for election to the Assembly? ~~(S)~~

PART III: TASKING

-- The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. ~~(C)~~

    -- Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (U)

-- The final options paper is due to the NSC on February 26, 1993. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
February 4, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Russia and Ukraine (S)

The survival of democracy and reform governments in Russia and Ukraine is one of the most critical foreign policy issues facing the U.S. and the world. The success of these and other reform governments in the former Soviet Union will enhance our long-term national security and global stability. The President believes, and argued during his campaign for the Presidency, that the U.S. must devote considerable energy, resources and creativity to assist in the promotion of the spread of democracy and of market economic reforms in the former Soviet Union. (S)

The immediate challenge for the Administration is to build upon steps taken by the Bush Administration to strengthen partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, to secure Russian (and where necessary Ukrainian) cooperation on important foreign policy issues such as Bosnia, Iraq and the Middle East peace process, and to secure important security objectives such as the ratification of START I and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus) and the ratification of START II. (S)

The objective of this Policy Review Directive is to launch a speedy, but thorough examination of political and economic conditions in Russia and Ukraine and to examine U.S. policy options to advance our interests regarding relations with these countries during the next six months as we set new agendas with both and engage their leaders in a series of important meetings on bilateral and global issues. (S)

A separate policy review directive is being initiated on non-proliferation and next steps in strategic arms control. (S)

Subsequent Policy Review Directives will examine U.S. relations with the other states of the former Soviet Union, including the three Caucasus states and the five Moslem states of Central Asia. We may also initiate separate Policy Review Directives on the Baltic States and on functional issues that cut across national boundaries in the former Soviet Union such as denuclearization

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and the provision of effective economic assistance programs to all of the new states. (C)

This Directive is intended to support and energize policy coordination in advance of early meetings with the Russian and Ukrainian leaderships. The President has spoken to Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk during his first week in office and has made clear to both his strong interest in forging close working relations. We are seeking early meetings between the Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers Kozyrev and Zlenko, and an early summit meeting with President Yeltsin. (S)

In order to prepare a new agenda for discussion with Russia and Ukraine, we will convene a high-level interagency policy group, chaired by Ambassador-at-Large-Designate and Special Adviser to the Secretary on the New Independent States Strobe Talbott, and by NSC Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian States Toby Gati (vice-chair) to prepare for these meetings and for a longer-range examination of our policy options. Agency papers will facilitate the work of this group and lay the basis for an eventual NSC meeting before the President's meeting with Yeltsin. (S)

<u>To prepare for these meetings and to assist the Interagency policy group, agencies should submit the following papers by the close of business on February 12.</u> (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

1. What is the impact of the December Congress of People's Deputies in Russia on the political balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government? What is the status of and prospects for the April 11th referendum and the following Congress, including the writing of a new Constitution and the possibility of new legislative elections? (CIA) (S)

2. What is the strength of Yeltsin's opponents -- the center and the Red-Browns -- and who are they? Assess the strength and unity of the democratic reformers. What are the tactics of the democrats and the opposition likely to be leading up to the referendum and the Congress? Has Yeltsin's new political party gotten off the ground? (CIA) (S)

3. What is the assessment of Russian economic performance in 1992? What is the current economic situation in Russia? What are likely major economic developments in Russia and Ukraine during the next six months? What are the prospects for sustained hyperinflation in Russia and for unemployment? (CIA) (S)

4. Analyze the struggle for economic power among Chernomyrdin, Federov and Geraschenko, particularly the prospects for continued division on the issue of monetary policy. (CIA, Treasury) (S)

5. What are the cultural and ethnic problems Yeltsin faces within the Russian Federation? What are the consequences of continued decentralization of political and economic power in Russia? Is there a realistic possibility of a splintering of the Russian Federation in 1993? (CIA, State) (S)

6. What are the prospects for a successful implementation of Prime Minister Kuchma's economic reforms in Ukraine? (CIA, State) (S)

7. What are the major issues in Ukrainian-Russian relations? Will Kravchuk and Yeltsin be able to contain the many disagreements between Ukraine and Russia on the division of military and economic assets of the former USSR? (CIA) (S)

8. As the breakup of the old Soviet army proceeds, what are the critical problems that are emerging -- beyond the division of military assets -- in the formation of Russian and Ukrainian armed forces? (CIA) (S)

9. What are the major directions in defense policy and doctrine formulation in Russia and Ukraine? How is each country currently assessing the main threats to its security? (CIA) (S)

10. What is the division of labor in the formulation of Russian foreign policy -- particularly between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President's Security Council? What are the future prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation on major foreign policy issues such as Iraq, Bosnia, and the Middle East Peace Process? (CIA, State) (S)

11. What are the prospects for early, pre-summit ratification of START I and the NPT by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus? (CIA, State) (S)

12. What were the accomplishments of Yeltsin's recent visits to China and India? (CIA) (S)

13. What is the current status of the CIS? What intra-CIS arrangements have emerged? Will coordination and cooperation accelerate in the wake of the agreements reached at and after the January 1993 Minsk summit? (CIA) (S)

PART II POLICY OPTIONS FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

1. Please recommend the best U.S. policy approach, with advantages and disadvantages, on the following critical and related economic issues with Russia and with Ukraine in order to support their reform efforts and advance our interests:

--Rescheduling of Paris Club Debt through the Paris Club (Treasury)

--Reinvigoration of Russia and Ukraine's negotiations for Stand-by agreements with the IMF (Treasury)

--Resolution of Russia's default to us on Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) grain debt (Agriculture)

--Expansion of American trade and investment with Russia and Ukraine, particularly in the energy sector (Commerce)

--Provision of effective humanitarian, technical economic, and environmental clean-up assistance to Russia and Ukraine during the next few months (State)

--The privatization process (Treasury) ~~(C)~~

2. How can the U.S. sustain Russia's cooperation on foreign policy issues critical to us during the next six months and how important is that cooperation to U.S. interests?

--Bosnia (State, OSD)

--Iraq (State, OSD)

--Somalia (State, OSD)

--Middle East Peace Process (State)

--Baltic Troop Withdrawals (State)

--Conflicts along Russia's periphery--including Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Tajikistan. (State) ~~(S)~~

3. What progress can be achieved on the most important U.S. security objectives in the run-up to the projected meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin?

--START I and NPT ratification by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (State, OSD, ACDA)

--START II ratification by Russia (State, OSD, ACDA)

--SSD and related denuclearization activities (State, OSD, ACDA)

--Completion of the HEU deal with Russia (State, OSD)

--Improved military-to-military ties with Russia and Ukraine (State, OSD)

--Arms sales (State, ACDA) ~~(S)~~

4. What strategies should be developed for pursuing U.S. security objectives with regard to Russia and Ukraine in the longer term?

--Implementation of existing arms control agreements (State, ACDA)

--Military-to-military contacts (OSD, State)

--Defense cooperation (OSD, State)

--Conflict resolution means and methods (State)

--Cooperative peacekeeping (State, OSD) ~~(S)~~

PART III TASKING

1. NSC should convene a high-level policy group by February 8 to begin preparation for the Secretary of State's meetings with Russian and Ukrainian leaders, and the President's meeting with President Yeltsin. ~~(C)~~

2. NSC should convene a denuclearization working group to examine the actions required for early, pre-summit progress on START I ratification and implementation, SSD, and related denuclearization activities. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 6, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategic Offensive Arms Control Policy After START II Signature (U)

The U.S. is committed to the successful entry into force and implementation of the START I and START II Treaties. This will require immediate attention to the following issues:

- START ratification by Ukraine, and accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states by Ukraine and Kazakhstan;
- Elimination of all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms now located on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as soon as possible, but no later than the end of the seven-year START reduction period;
- Successful ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Russian Supreme Soviet of the START II Treaty;
- Full implementation and, if possible, acceleration of the reductions required by the START I and START II Treaties. ~~(S)~~

The review of U.S. strategic offensive arms control policy after START II signature should address all of the above issues. Future PRD's will address questions and issues related to possible reductions of strategic offensive arms below the levels specified in START II, nuclear testing, and strategic defense. The review should be completed by February 19, 1993. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full

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range of options for dealing with this issue. Any differences in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues:

Part I: Assessment

A. Denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan

- o What is the current status of the START and NPT approval process in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan? Do the continuing delays in the ratification process reflect an underlying intention to retain the nuclear weapons; or a desire to use nuclear weapons as leverage in bargaining with the U.S. and Russians; or are they the benign result of democratic growing pains in these three countries? (S)
- o What is the relative strength of proponents and opponents of START and NPT approval in these three states? (S)
- o What is the safety, security, and maintenance status of nuclear forces now located in these states? Who commands these forces? Who controls them? What would be required for Ukraine to assume control of nuclear weapons? (S)
- o What is the status of discussions/negotiations between these states and Russia concerning nuclear warheads and strategic nuclear delivery systems on their territory? (S)
- o What are the underlying security concerns and objectives of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan? (S)
- o What actions by the United States, Russia and/or other states would be likely to influence the denuclearization process in these three states, either positively or negatively? To what extent is the denuclearization linked to perceptions of political, economic, and military threats from Russia and to the course of political reform and democratization in Russia? (S)
- o What would be the effect on U.S. interests of a failure of one or more of these states to approve or implement START or the NPT? (S)
- o What is the impact on START of current efforts to multilaterize the INF Treaty? (S)

B. Ratification of START II

- o What is the current status of the START II ratification process in Russia? (C)
- o What actions by the United States, Russia or other states would be likely to influence Russian ratification of START II, either positively or negatively? Is ratification of START I and/or the NPT by Ukraine and Kazakhstan a precondition for ratification of START II by Russia? (S)
- o What are the relative costs and benefits of immediate or later ratification of START II by either the United States or Russia? (C)
- o What would be the effect on U.S. interests of a failure to bring START II into force? (S)
- o What would be the effect on U.S. interests if Russia fails to obtain removal of SS-18 missiles from Kazakhstan? (S)

C. Implementation of START I and START II Reductions

- o What are the implementation positions and demands of the other START Parties? (S)
- o What is the current status of U.S. and former Soviet planning for/implementation of reductions required by START I and START II? (S)
- o What are the relative costs and benefits to the U.S. of accelerated START I and START II reductions on both sides? (C)
- o What timetable for possible acceleration of reductions and/or deactivations would be realistic, given fiscal and logistics constraints in each of the countries? (S)
- o What actions by the United States would be required to help Russia to implement START I and START II reductions? To accelerate those reductions? (S)
- o What would be the effect on U.S. interests of Russian failure to implement fully START I and START II reductions? (S)
- o Should the United States accelerate the reductions timetable unilaterally if Russia or any of the other states' Parties are unable or unwilling to accelerate? (S)

- What is the status of U.S. early deactivation proposals? (S)

Part II: Options for Policy

A. Denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan

- How does the issue of denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan relate to other major U.S. goals and interests, both with regard to those states and more globally? What should be the U.S. goals in addressing this issue? What is the proper balance of "carrots" and "sticks" in pursuing this objective? (S)

- What are U.S. options?

  -- Options considered should address, but need not be limited to:

    - Security assurances;
    - Nunn-Lugar and Freedom Support Act assistance;
    - Financial and other forms of assistance for denuclearization from allies;
    - Sharing of proceeds from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) sales;
    - Technology access;
    - Adjustments to START inspection costs and dismantlement requirements;
    - Strategic nuclear delivery vehicle elimination;
    - Nuclear warhead elimination;
    - Denial of economic and other assistance;
    - Diplomatic isolation of non-complying states. (S)

  -- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible course of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. arms control policy, any applicable legislation, and budgetary implications. (S)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (S)

B. Ratification of START II

o How does ratification of START II relate to other major U.S. goals and interests? What should be the U.S. goals in addressing this issue? (C)

o What are U.S. options? (S)

-- Options considered should address, but need not be limited to:

o U.S. ratification schedule and strategy (for example, should we hold off until Ukraine and Kazakhstan ratifies START I);

o U.S. involvement in Russian ratification process. (S)

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible course of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. arms control policy, any applicable legislation, and budgetary implications. (S)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy and should be interrelated to overall U.S. goals. (S)

C. Implementation of START I and START II Reductions

o How does the implementation, including the schedule, of START I and START II reductions relate to other major U.S. goals and interests? How can the U.S. ensure implementation by the other Parties is <u>sustained</u>? What should be the U.S. goals in addressing this issue? (S)

o What are U.S. options? (S)

-- Options considered should address, but need not be limited to:

o Nunn-Lugar assistance (including additional funds beyond $800 million and/or a broadening of the purposes for which Nunn-Lugar funds may be obligated);

o U.S.-Russian agreement on START II dismantlement assistance;

- o Withdrawal of all SS-18 missiles from Kazakhstan for destruction;

- o Interim storage of warheads in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, pending destruction in Russia. (S)

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible course of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. nuclear force and arms control policy, any applicable legislation, and budgetary implications. (S)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy and should be interrelated to overall U.S. goals. (S)

Part III: Tasking

The review should be conducted by the interagency working group on arms control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Somalia ~~(S)~~

The presence of over 20,000 American forces in Somalia attests to the importance the United States attaches to creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance there. As we prepare to hand that mission to the UN, we need to review our future policy toward Somalia focusing on:

-- What can be done to prevent Somalia from falling back into the anarchy and famine that existed in 1992;

-- Ensuring that Somalia takes full advantage of the opportunity that the coalition has afforded for national reconciliation and reconstruction; and

-- Placing Somalia into our overall priorities for assistance and peacekeeping. ~~(S)~~

Toward that end, the following studies should be prepared and sent to the Deputies Committee by March 1. ~~(S)~~

1. National Reconciliation: The Africa IWG should coordinate papers on:

a. Prospects for Reconciliation: The Intelligence Community should develop an assessment of various scenarios for Somali politics over the next 24 months, with some sensitivity analysis of the variables that could effect their probability. ~~(S)~~

b. U.S. Diplomatic Strategy: State should develop an analysis, including evaluative criteria, of what political circumstances in Somalia the U.S. seeks, and those which we would find acceptable. The paper should then include an

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analysis of the ways in which the U.S. could affect the outcomes, taking into account the UN-lead in the negotiations. The paper should examine U.S. policy options in the event the Somalis fail to achieve political reconciliation and continue hostilities. It should develop options for UN withdrawal. It should also develop and evaluate options for dealing with the issue of northern secession, in the near and long-term. ~~(S)~~

2. Humanitarian Relief and National Reconstruction: The African IWG, including AID and OMB, should coordinate a paper which responds, at a minimum, to the following questions:

-- What are the requirements for a long-term supply system for food and its distribution in Somalia?

-- What is required to achieve various levels of indigenous production?

-- What assistance funding is needed for those levels and who can supply it?

-- What are the reconstruction assistance requirements, their costs, and possible funding sources?

-- What are the requirements and sources for U.S. assistance funding?

-- What feasibly can be done to build functioning national and local administrative structures, including police?

-- What feasible can be done to build a civil society that respects political and individual rights?

The paper should develop a strategy for international burden-sharing for Somali reconstruction and assess its probability of success. ~~(S)~~

3. Funding: OMB, working with the Departments, should develop options for FY-93 and FY-94 support of Somali operations, including specific reallocations where necessary. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam (S)

We are scheduling a Deputies Committee Meeting for the week of February 22, in preparation for a possible Principals Committee Meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to Vietnam. (S)

The objective of this review is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward Vietnam. In preparation for the Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals meeting, a decision paper should be prepared based on the best current information, addressing the questions listed below in Parts I and II. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

The U.S. continues to have important interests in Vietnam: There are 1,654 POW/MIAs not yet fully accounted for in Vietnam and it may be able to assist in accounting for 606 others in Laos and Cambodia; we seek Vietnam's continued cooperation on the implementation of the Cambodian Peace Accords; and we have important humanitarian concerns regarding refugees and human rights. Vietnam is also a potential new commercial market for U.S. goods and services, a market other countries (e.g. Taiwan, Japan, France) are beginning to develop. Additionally, Vietnam has the potential to play a significant role within ASEAN affecting the regional balance of power. (C)

There must be significant progress toward the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIA unresolved cases before the relationship with Vietnam can be placed on a more normal footing. Recently Vietnam has been more forthcoming on information and claims to be

doing all it can to cooperate. Yet many believe that Vietnam is holding back. (C)

The prospect of UN supervised elections in Cambodia has created widespread interest among other developed countries in increasing international assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam. Many U.S. allies have now established modest bilateral assistance programs. France has told us that it is time to clear Vietnam's IMF arrears and wants us to join a consensus to do so; President Mitterand will have promoted this during his visit to Vietnam. Vietnam has opened its economy to trade and investment and undertaken macro-economic reforms. Commercial interest and activity also is rapidly expanding. As a result, the ability of the U.S. to continue to block the IMF and World Bank from starting up programs for Vietnam is eroding, thus decreasing U.S. leverage over Vietnam. Some minor steps have been taken to facilitate commercial activity by U.S. companies, but there should be a determination whether further steps would be consistent with U.S. overall interests. (S)

A review of U.S. policy toward Vietnam should be undertaken to determine how we can continue and, if possible, accelerate efforts to secure the fullest possible accounting of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Vietnam war, provide support for the Cambodian peace process, address important humanitarian concerns, and expand and enhance the opportunities for activity by U.S. businesses. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What is the evaluation of Vietnam's performance to date in accounting for POW/MIAs, supporting the Cambodian peace process, and meeting humanitarian concerns such as the release of political detainees and treatment of refugees? (C)

-- What policies and actions have best elicited Vietnam's continued cooperation on POW/MIA, Cambodia and humanitarian issues?

-- What position are we at on the "roadmap"? (S)

-- Is the trade embargo effective? (S)

-- What are the prospects that the U.S. can maintain its leverage over Vietnam by continuing to block loans and programs for Vietnam in the international financial institutions? What are the political and economic costs of this position? (S)

-- If this leverage cannot be maintained, how long will it be until Vietnam is made eligible for IFI programs? (C)

-- What are the major commercial opportunities in Vietnam and the nature and extent of other countries' operations in Vietnam? How does our current policy affect our long-term economic interests in Vietnam? (S)

-- What is the degree and nature of Congressional interest in developing the U.S.-Vietnam relationship? (C)

-- What actions are necessary to provide adequate protection for the expanded number of U.S. citizens in Vietnam? (S)

-- What is the significance of Vietnam in the region? Of Vietnam's presence in the Spratly islands? (S)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- What are the primary U.S. objectives of U.S. policy toward Vietnam? (S)

-- What constitutes the "fullest possible accounting" of the POW/MIA cases? What is the best way to achieve this accounting? (S)

-- Does the "roadmap" continue to be the most effective instrument for expressing U.S. policy toward Vietnam? (S)

-- What are our options within and beyond the "roadmap" (S)

-- In the context of achieving our other objectives, what steps could the U.S. take to expand and enhance the opportunities for U.S. business in Vietnam? (S)

-- Under what circumstances should we drop our opposition to clearing Vietnam's arrears, in the face of eroding support for our position? (S)

-- How does the issue of normalization of relations with Vietnam relate to other important U.S. interests such as: Peace in Cambodia; regional political stability; the military balance in Asia, (e.g. the dispute over the Spratly Islands); expanding U.S. commercial activity in Southeast Asia; efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics; and improving human rights? (S)

PART III: TASKING

-- The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. (C)

  -- Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated, rather than forwarding compromises for the sake of an agreed product. (U)

-- The final decision paper is due to the NSC on February 19, 1993. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 10, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE /NSC-7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Japan (S)

We are scheduling a Deputies Committee Meeting for the week of February 22, in preparation for a possible Principals Committee Meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to Japan. (S)

The objective of this review is to develop broad goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward Japan. In preparation for the Deputies Committee meeting, a possible Principals meeting, a possible visit by Prime Minister Miyazawa in March and a trip to Tokyo by the President for the G-7 Summit in July, a policy paper should be prepared based on the best current information, addressing the questions listed below in Parts I and II. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

Our relationship with Japan is exceptionally complex and important. It forces us to deal with issues of globalization and interdependence, competition and burden sharing. Japan is one of our most important strategic (in the broadest sense) allies, often the most important political and economic partner on a broad range of regional and global issues, and the largest overseas export market for American goods and services. At the same time, the end of the Cold War, the growing trade imbalance and intractable market access problems are causing great strains. In the next few months we face potential disputes in civil aviation, semiconductors, and supercomputers and continued pressure for relief from the U.S. auto industry. The frameworks within which we have discussed trade issues with Japan (e.g. MOSS, SII) have been criticized in the Congress and elsewhere.

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Moreover, the priorities within our multifaceted relationship -- strategic, political, economic -- may not always be clear, to the Japanese or ourselves. (S)

The strategic framework in East Asia is predicated on a solid U.S.-Japan security relationship. The U.S. forward-deploys significant forces in Japan for regional and Middle East contingencies and Japan assumes the majority of the cost for their stationing. East Asian countries see the U.S.-Japan security relationship as the most stabilizing factor in East Asia. The security relationship with Japan enjoys broad public support in Japan, but Japanese government officials have warned us not to take it for granted. Many in East Asia are concerned that defense budget pressures will require a rethinking of U.S. forward deployments in Japan, and that the U.S. is lessening its strategic commitment to the region, influencing Japan to pursue a more independent and Asia-first foreign policy. There is potential for divergence of U.S. and Japanese policies toward China, Russia, Korea and Vietnam. (S)

In the post-Cold War era, there is a need for Japan to assume greater global responsibilities. Japan seeks permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, a greater role in other UN organizations and is now in the process of generating public support to change its laws to allow greater participation in UN peacekeeping. Japan supports GATT but is unwilling to be a leader in moving the process forward; however, it is actively pursuing leadership on global environmental issues. In addition, Japan is the largest provider of ODA, much of it linked to Japanese economic interests, but increasingly taking into account broader interests as well. (S)

The Japanese economy is undergoing an economic adjustment that has left it with the lowest growth rates in decades. Business confidence is low and the financial sector has serious problems. The long term prognosis is not clear. However, Japan continues to have high investment in commercial R&D and is well positioned for a strong economic comeback. (S)

The problem of chronic Japanese trade surpluses with the U.S. and the world persists. While the U.S. trade deficit with most of the industrial world dropped sharply in the late 80's, following depreciation of the dollar, the deficit with Japan, after dropping for a few years, is rising dramatically, as is Japan's overall trade surplus with the world. The continuing trade deficit with Japan has led some in the U.S. to argue that Japan's economic structures and/or policies present unique resistance to foreign penetration and, therefore, require distinct U.S. trade policies more focused on measurable results. Others argue that such policies distort trade and undermine economic efficiency and long-term U.S. competitiveness. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What fundamental American interests are at stake with respect to Japan? (S)

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-- What is our strategic/security interest in Japan with the end of the Cold War and the diminution of the Russian threat? What is our security leverage with Japan? What do we want Japan to do? (S)

-- How important is Japan as a political ally in East Asia, in other regions, in the UN and on global issues? What is the current trend in each area of U.S. interest? (S)

-- What is the economic importance of Japan to the U.S. as a market, source of strategic goods, source of investment capital and as a coordinator on multilateral issues (e.g., foreign assistance)? How does this limit our ability to influence Japan? (S)

-- To what degree do Japan's economic policies, practices and structures adversely affect U.S. economic interests at home and in third country markets? (S)

-- How significant are Japan's bilateral and global trade and current account surpluses in economic terms? In political terms? (S)

    -- Will these imbalances increase or decrease? What are the key variables? (S)

-- What have been the most effective sources of influence on Japan's economic policies? How important is outside pressure? Clear expectations and objectives? How effective would military/strategic leverage be in achieving economic objectives? (S)

-- To what extent is Japan engaged in internationalization of its economy? What are the major remaining problems for foreign market and investment access to Japan? (S)

-- Is Japan reformulating its international role and image? (S)

    -- Is Japan likely to embark on a more independent foreign security, and/or economic policy course? Is Japan's dependence on an export-driven economy significantly changing? What are the key internal and external variables in determining Japan's strategic and economic orientation? (S)

    -- What U.S. actions would have the greatest potential effect in increasing U.S. exports? Would a sectoral approach or a cross sectoral approach net more benefits? (S)

-- How will U.S.-Japan relations affect U.S. interests elsewhere in East Asia and more broadly? (S)

    -- Korean peninsula, China, Southeast Asia, Russia, G-7, UN, Middle East? (U)

-- Global issues including GATT, proliferation, environment, terrorism, human rights? (U)

-- Is the current U.S.-Japan Treaty of Cooperation and Mutual Security effective? What, if anything, should be changed? (S)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- What broad policy choices do we have to advance our interests with respect to Japan? (S)

-- Strategic/Military? (U)

-- Political? (U)

-- Economic? (U)

-- What are the trade-offs among these three areas? (U)

-- Trade-offs against other Asian relationships? (U)

-- What are the pluses and minuses and the implications for broader U.S. policy concerns? What are the budgetary, legislative, congressional, and public affairs implications? (C)

-- What regional security mechanisms would strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationships and would they be effective in terms of overall regional policy? (S)

-- What is the best framework within which to conduct the U.S.-Japan dialogue on economic, security and other issues? (S)

PART III: TASKING

-- The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. (C)

-- Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (U)

-- A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than February 19, 1993. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 10, 1993

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2010-1227-M (2.00)
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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Nonproliferation and Export Controls ~~(C)~~

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons poses a growing danger to the security of the United States, its forces, friends and allies. The United States has long been in the forefront of international nonproliferation efforts. President Clinton has stressed the urgency of a strengthened international effort to combat proliferation as a priority for his administration. (U)

In recent years, the resort to ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, coupled with our subsequent experience in Iraq, have underlined the gravity of this problem. The dangers of proliferation, however, are not confined to a single region. Demand for weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems persists. The availability of equipment and technology to develop them is growing. While a number of international norms -- such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, now, the Chemical Weapons Convention -- have attracted widespread support, in many areas the barriers against proliferation could be greatly strengthened. ~~(C)~~

Recent developments have affected the dangers of proliferation. Some have been helpful. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown beyond 150 parties and the

Chemical Weapons Convention has been opened for signature. Export regimes have expanded their membership and control lists. Expected reductions in superpower arsenals have raised the prospect for minimizing the threat from international stocks of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium. ~~(C)~~

Other developments are worrisome. Militarily-useful technologies have become increasingly available through the relaxation of East-West export controls and increased industrialization worldwide. New suppliers of dangerous technologies are emerging, further complicating our efforts to ensure that dual-use technologies are not diverted to military purposes. Expanded export controls are not adequately harmonized or implemented. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union has raised the possibility of leakage, or even a hemorrhage, of weapons, technology, and talent to third parties. These changes are eroding U.S. leverage to accomplish nonproliferation objectives unilaterally, increasing the importance of increased multilateral collaboration. ~~(C)~~

In light of these changes, the United States must develop a stronger and more integrated nonrproliferation policy. This review is intended to provide the basis for such a policy. (U)

Part I: Assessment

-- What is the level of threat of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, and advanced conventional proliferation in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean peninsula, China, and elsewhere? Where is the threat most urgent? How is that threat likely to change in the years ahead? ~~(C)~~

-- How effectively do existing U.S. nonproliferation efforts address that threat? ~~(C)~~

-- What vulnerabilities in existing international nonproliferation norms and institutions require immediate attention? ~~(C)~~

-- What are the most important gaps in our knowledge of proliferation-related activities worldwide? ~~(C)~~

-- How successful have the various export control regimes (e.g., COCOM, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, supercomputer control regime) been in stemming weapons proliferation? ~~(C)~~

-- How effective are existing international organizations in controlling proliferation (e.g., IAEA) and what deficiencies exist? ~~(C)~~

-- What proliferation risks are posed by exports from the members of these regimes, as well as from other countries, such as China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union? ~~(C)~~

-- What threat is posed to U.S. national security by the transfer to various countries of conventional weapons, advanced or otherwise? (C)

-- How successfully does U.S. policy go beyond supply side controls to address the demand side of the proliferation equation, especially in the missile and conventional spheres? (C)

-- Are U.S. laws and regulations well matched to our nonproliferation objectives? Are they being effectively implemented? (C)

-- What changes to U.S. export control laws, regulations, enforcement and institutional arrangements would strengthen restrictions on suppliers of nuclear technologies? (C)

-- What organizational impediments, redundancies, or other obstacles now exist within the U.S. government to more effective nonproliferation policies? (C)

-- What are the effects of U.S. nonproliferation policies upon other U.S. priorities, e.g., U.S. economic growth; political and economic reform in China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union; the Middle East peace process? (C)

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What policies and actions, beyond those which the United States currently is pursuing, should be undertaken to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them? What current U.S. nonproliferation policies, if any, should be abandoned? All available policy tools -- diplomatic, political, intelligence, economic, security assistance, military, and other -- should be considered. Particular focus should be given to the Middle East, South Asia, China, the Korean peninsula, and the former Soviet Union. (C)

-- What additional steps should be taken to strengthen existing international nonproliferation norms and institutions, including the IAEA? What additional measures, including penalties as well as benefits, are required to inhibit the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction? (C)

-- What steps should be taken to improve the linkage between nonproliferation intelligence and nonproliferation policy? What should be our highest intelligence priorities for nonproliferation? (C)

-- In what ways does the possibility of the acquisition, use, or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and advanced conventional weapons against U.S. interests, forces, or allies require modification of U.S. defense policies, research and development, training, planning, and

procurement? What modifications should be considered under those conditions? (C)

-- What actions can be taken to minimize the threat posed by present or future inventories of fissile materials? What actions can be taken to hasten the destruction or dismantlement of weapons and materials of proliferation concern? (C)

-- What steps should be taken, if any, to integrate U.S. missile nonproliferation policy with U.S. policies toward commercial use of space and theater missile defenses? (C)

-- Should the United States seek support for a binding international commitment against missile proliferation and, if so, what should that commitment include? (C)

-- What modifications, if any, should be made to existing security assurances? (C)

-- What actions should be taken to harmonize and strengthen domestic and multilateral approaches to export controls? (C)

-- How should the United States balance its nonproliferation and other national security objectives with its need for a robust export sector? What changes, if any, should we adopt in our application of munitions and dual-use export controls (including telecommunications and computer controls)? (C)

-- What institutional and organizational changes within the U.S. government would strengthen our nonproliferation efforts? (C)

-- What additional steps should be taken to address the dangers of destabilizing conventional arms transfers? (C)

-- What steps, if any, should be taken to modify U.S. nonproliferation laws and regulations, including sanctions provisions? What steps, if any, should be taken to improve their implementation? (C)

Part III: Tasking

-- The NSC Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls should convene an Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls to conduct this review, task specific drafting responsibilities, set deadlines, and assure implementation. (C)

-- The review should be conducted in a manner that will provide a basis for resolving concrete issues currently requiring decision. It should include analysis and recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with these issues. Any differences in view among agencies should be noted. (U)

-- Each option should include pros and cons (reflecting implications for broader U.S. national security and economic interests as well as budgetary impact) and an outline of an implementing strategy (including applicable legislation). (U)

-- This review is due to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than March 12, 1993. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 9, U.S. Policy Toward Angola. (2 pages)~~	~~02/11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 9/25/19

COLLECTION:
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[PRD-9, U.S. Policy Toward Angola, February 11, 1993]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-9

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
RDS 10/21/14 2010-127-M
LPILM 2014-004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Angola (U)

The breakdown of the Bicesse Accords and the national reconciliation process in Angola present a major policy challenge of how to terminate the renewed civil war and encourage the establishment of a democratic and representative government in Luanda. One immediate issue for the Clinton Administration is whether to recognize Angola and establish diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Angola. (C)

This policy review should be completed by February 22. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues: (C)

Part I: Assessment

-- What are the U.S. interests in Angola? Do our political and economic interests, and historical relationship with the Angolan parties, justify a more active USG involvement in Angola? Less involvement? (S)

-- What are the immediate and longer term goals of the Government and UNITA, and can they be reconciled? (S)

-- What is the most likely outcome for continuing civil war? Does time favor the Government, UNITA, or neither? (S)

-- What is the impact of continuing civil war on other countries in southern Africa, particularly on the prospects for implementation of the Mozambique peace accords, the transition in South Africa, and the prospects for Namibia? (S)

-- What would be the effects on Angola of continued instability in Zaire?

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What role should the U.S. take, if any, in promoting national reconciliation? Should the U.S. play a mediating role? How would any U.S. role relate to the UN's role, and that of the other major outside actors (Portugal, Russia)? ~~(C)~~

-- What are our options for recognition (or continued non-recognition) of the GRA? The options should discuss the impact on the peace process, including whether recognition can be conditioned in a fashion to maximize the incentives for both parties to reach a peaceful and durable accommodation. ~~(C)~~

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. African policy, any applicable legislative constraints, and any budgetary implications (including foreign assistance). (U)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (U)

Part III: Tasking

-- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 10, U.S. Policy Toward Zaire. (3 pages)~~	~~02/11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ • YDE 9/25/19

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RESTRICTION CODES

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2010-1227-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-10

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M (2.02)
9125/19 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Zaire (U)

Faced with escalating violence, a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, strong political and public opposition, and coordinated U.S., French and Belgian pressure, President Mobutu reluctantly and grudgingly compromised with Zaire's National Conference in 1992 and established a tripartite transition mechanism to put Zaire on the road to multi-party, electoral democracy. Since then, Mobutu has demonstrated his determination to cling to power despite his near-total lack of legitimacy. Splits and disarray within the opposition have aided his attempts to resist democratization. He has worked to undermine the transition process using his control of the security forces, his de facto stranglehold on the money supply, and his considerable political skills. The wave of violence that swept Kinshasa January 28-30 was one result. ~~(S)~~

Over the past year, the U.S. has publicly distanced itself from Mobutu. We have strongly supported the efforts of Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, first as chairman of the National Conference and now as head of the High Council, to mediate a peaceful course between Mobutu and the opposition that would lead to national elections. However, the ineptness of the Tshisekedi government and Mobutu's ruthless but effective maneuvering have brought Zaire to the edge of an abyss. We need to determine whether and how to remain engaged in Zaire, the aims we should seek, and the policy tools available to achieve those aims. ~~(S)~~

This policy review should be completed by February 24. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in

view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues: (S)

Part I: Assessment

-- What are U.S. interests and objectives in Zaire?

-- What are the interests and objectives of our NATO allies primarily concerned with Zaire, France and Belgium? Are they compatible with ours?

-- What are the prospects for a successful transition to a post-Mobutu Zaire? Could Mobutu be part of this transition, or must he completely stand aside if it is to succeed? What other actors (such as Monsengwo and Tshisekedi) are likely to play a role in the transition?

-- What are the likely scenarios for a failed transition?

-- Can Zaire maintain itself as a single state, or is ethnic and regional fragmentation inevitable? What would be the costs of its disintegration?

-- What are the consequences (political, regional, economic, humanitarian) of a failed transition? What are the costs to the U.S. likely to be (e.g., share of UN operation, humanitarian relief, refugee expenses)? (S)

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What should our role in Zaire be vis-a-vis France and Belgium? Should we attempt to take the lead, seek a cooperative consultative relationship, or urge them to take the initiative?

-- At what level, if any, should the U.S. be engaged in Zaire? (Options could range from total disengagement to active intervention.)

-- What posture should we adopt on Mobutu's role, both in the transition and the post-transition phases?

-- What should we do to influence Mobutu? The use of direct financial sanctions against Mobutu personally, as well as the state, should be explored fully. Other possible levers could include the church or other indigenous institutions, and other interested countries in Africa or beyond.

-- What should our public posture be toward Zaire, and toward Mobutu?

-- What should our attitude be toward personal security and asylum abroad should Mobutu voluntarily leave Zaire?

-- If Mobutu steps aside, voluntarily or involuntarily, and a transition process takes hold, what should we do, if anything, to maximize its prospects for success? How can we

encourage the evolution of a civil society in which democracy and respect for human rights can take firm root? This should include options for political support, U.S. direct assistance, and the role of the IFIs.

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify any implications for broader U.S. African policy, any applicable legislative constraints (including the Brooke Amendment), and any budgetary implications (including foreign assistance.)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. ~~(S)~~

Part III: Tasking

-- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 11. (5 pages)~~	~~02/12/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VDE 9/25/19

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Clinton Presidential Records
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1993

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2010-1227-M (2.03)
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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward China (S)

We are scheduling a Deputies Committee Meeting for the week of February 22, in preparation for a possible Principals Committee Meeting, to consider specific steps we might take with regard to China. (S)

The objective of this review is to develop broad strategic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward China. In preparation for the Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals meeting, a policy paper should be prepared based on the best current information, addressing the questions listed below. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

As the remaining major communist power and the fastest growing economy in Asia, China presents a number of potential challenges for United States foreign policy. A nuclear armed country of over a billion people with a veto in the UN Security Council, China is in the midst of rapid economic expansion that will greatly enhance its economic and trade position in the years ahead. While we share common economic and strategic interests in some areas, conflicts have continued over the repressive nature of the Chinese political regime, its military modernization program, proliferation practices, and unacceptable economic practices. President Clinton has emphasized that Chinese behavior in these areas affects our relationship and expressed support for conditioning MFN on Chinese progress. (S)

A comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward China should seek ways to address these issues, capitalizing on U.S. leverage and the interest of the Chinese government in good relations with the United States. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

In recent years, China has been going through a political transition. We expect further leadership changes at the March session of the National People's Congress. Additionally, Taiwan is proceeding along its own democratization path and Governor Patten has made democracy proposals for Hong Kong which have upset Beijing. (C)

-- As Deng Xiaoping and other elderly leaders play less of a role in the political process, what direction will China's political evolution take? (S)

-- Who are likely to emerge as the new leaders? (C)

-- How will the regime's program of economic reform progress and how will it affect its monopoly on political power? (S)

-- What effect will leadership changes have on Chinese attitudes toward the United States? (S)

-- How are China's policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan likely to evolve and what are the implications for U.S. economic and strategic interests? For the promotion of democracy? (S)

-- What is the future of Taiwan democratization and its impact on the one China policy? (S)

-- What is the impact of the Hong Kong democracy proposals? How is this best handled? (S)

Despite its rapid economic modernization, China's government remains opposed to political reform and democratization. It has refused to account for those arrested or killed during the Tiananmen Square clashes in 1989; it continues to imprison people for the peaceful expression of their political or religious views; its rule in Tibet is harsh; and it violates basic human rights in other areas. (S)

-- What sanctions imposed after Tiananmen Square remain in effect? Which ones are most effective? (S)

-- What progress has been made in political reform since June 1989? What are the current estimates of political prisoners, including students involved in Tiananmen? (S)

-- Which approaches are most effective in bringing about progress in these areas? The Japanese believe that with continued economic liberalization in China, democratization will follow. Has this pattern been demonstrated elsewhere in Asia? Has it been effective? (C)

-- What can the U.S. do to encourage peaceful reform in China's political system which would permit greater participation, the free expression of opinion and a relaxation of political controls? (S)

-- What are the prospects for Tibet? (S)

As a result of market-oriented reforms, China's domestic economy and trade with the world has expanded rapidly. China is now our fifth largest supplier of imports and our seventh largest trading partner. China is also the source of our second largest bilateral trade deficit, reaching close to $19 billion in 1992. China has agreed to reform its trade regime by protecting intellectual property rights, improving market access and preventing exports of products made by prison labor and by adhering to GATT rules through accession. Nonetheless, unfair trade practices still exist. (S)

-- What are our economic objectives in China? How effective has our current strategy been in achieving them? (C)

-- How will China's expanding economic relations with Japan and other East Asian countries affect U.S. economic and strategic interests? (C)

-- What are the prospects for continued market-oriented economic reforms and what effects will these reforms have on economic relations? China's GATT accession? (C)

MFN is the core of our economic relationship with China. Following the Cold War, many would argue that MFN is currently the glue that binds the overall relationship. Since Tiananmen, conditioning MFN on Chinese democracy/human rights progress is viewed as an effective tool for inducing change. Debate over renewal of MFN raises questions about whether it can/should remain the focus of our relationship. (S)

-- What would be the impact on U.S. economic and other foreign policy interests were we forced to withdraw MFN status? Particularly, what would be the impact of this on the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan? (C)

-- What sectors of the U.S. economy might be most adversely affected? (S)

-- If conditions were imposed on renewal of MFN along the Pelosi/Mitchell approach, would the Chinese meet them? How far is China from the conditions now, including the POW issue? (S)

-- What are the implications of Chinese GATT accession for Jackson-Vanik's requirement of conditional MFN? (S)

Spurred by the financial demands of its modernization program, China's military has looked toward arms exports as a means of financing weapons development. China has shown a willingness to

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sell conventional weapons and dangerous technologies to unsavory regimes such as those in Iran and Libya. Its long-standing nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan has also been of concern. By signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention and by adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime, China has committed itself to curb proliferation practices. (S)

-- What is the Chinese record with respect to commitments? List violations. Which entities have been supplying? (S)

-- How do we persuade China to abide strictly to its nonproliferation commitments? (S)

-- Can we encourage China to adopt full-scope safeguards for nuclear sales and to follow or join other control regimes? (S)

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has voted with the U.S. on critical votes on collective security and UN sanctions. Similarly, China has acted responsibly in the region by opposing North Korean nuclearization and supporting the Cambodian peace process. These actions -- taken in contravention of historical Chinese positions -- have generally served U.S. interests, but have not reached the stage where China can be considered a supporting partner in shaping a post-Cold War order. (S)

-- Where has China been helpful? Not helpful? Is it still helping Khmer Rouge? (S)

-- What areas should we watch Chinese behavior most closely? What is its record at the UN? What is its position toward Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia? (S)

-- Will the Chinese seek an increasingly multi-polar world to set itself up as a rallying point in the UN and in Asia for opposition to U.S. interests? (S)

-- To what extent does our economic and political relationship provide leverage to encourage more cooperative actions? (S)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- What are the objectives of U.S. policy toward China? (S)

-- What are the policy tools to bring about these interests? (C)

-- How can the U.S. use the tools to influence China's behavior in these spheres:

  -- Political? (S)

  -- Trade? (S)

  -- Military/Strategic? (S)

SECRET

-- Human Rights and Democracy? (S)

-- What are the trade-offs between U.S. interests in these four areas? (S)

-- What are the trade-offs between other Asian relationships? (S)

-- How should the renewal of MFN in June be handled? (S)

-- How should we expand ties to the democracy movement? (S)

-- What is our assessment of Radio Asia (which the President has endorsed) and its impact on achieving objectives in China? (S)

-- What is the likely reaction to various policy options from interested actors in the Congress, the private sector, and among our principal allies? (S)

PART III: TASKING

-- The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. (C)

-- Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (U)

-- A final paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than February 19, 1993. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 15, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-12

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2010 1227-M (2.04)
9/25/19 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Global Environmental Affairs (U)

The President has determined that international environmental issues are significant factors in United States national security and foreign policy, particularly following the 1992 United Nations' Conference on Environment and Development. More and more nations, international organizations, and regional bodies are becoming involved in a growing number of multilateral negotiations and conferences dealing with such diverse but inter-related matters as global climate change, protection of oceans and the atmosphere, preservation of biological diversity and forests, population growth, decertification, trade and environment, development assistance and technology transfer, the implementation of Agenda 21 generally, and other international environmental concerns. These negotiations and conferences will affect a broad range of United States interests, and it is critical to establish an early, positive leadership role for the new Administration. (U)

To develop a coherent and positive United States policy on these issues, a careful systematic review must be undertaken, considering U.S. economic, environmental and foreign policy objectives. To this end, the Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy, the National Security Council, the National Economic Council, and the Domestic Policy Council should coordinate a comprehensive review of global environmental policies and programs. This review should initially focus on the following thirteen issues:

1. Global Climate (U)
2. Biodiversity preservation (U)
3. Trade and environment (U)
4. U.S. Policies toward the multilateral development banks and the Global Environmental Facility (U)
5. AID policies and programs on environmental assistance (U)
6. Forest preservation (U)
7. Desertification (U)
8. Oceans, fisheries and freshwater resources (U)
9. U.S. policies toward United Nations organizations (U) dealing with environmental issues (U) (i.e. UNEP, UNDP, HCHR, etc.) (U)
10. The Sustainable Development Commission (U)
11. Population (U)
12. The Arctic (U)
13. Environmental factors as a source of aggression ~~(C)~~

The review should be completed, for the first 7 issues, by March 30, 1992, and for the remaining 6 issues by April 16, 1992. For each of the issue areas identified, the review should analyze current policies and identify critical new issues and broad policy options. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues:

Part I: Assessment

-- What is the current policy, and what is its legislative basis, if any? (U)

-- What is the current international situation and its likely future course? (U)

-- What are the linkages between this issue and other international and domestic environmental issues? (U)

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What are U.S. options, including the current policy? (U)

-- Within each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible course of action, identifying impacts (environmental, economic, and

foreign policy, as well as budgetary implications). A full range of options should be assessed for each issue, including those that would present a major presidential initiative. (U)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy, including identification of constituencies and an indication of likely public response to the option. (U)

-- A recommended option should be provided. (U)

Part III: Tasking

-- The Department of the Treasury shall prepare the draft review paper on U.S. policies toward the multilateral development banks and the Global Environmental Facility. (U)

-- The U.S. Trade Representative shall prepare the draft review paper on trade and the environment. (U)

-- The Central Intelligence Agency shall prepare the draft assessment on environmental factors as a cause of aggression. (S)

-- The Department of State shall prepare the draft review papers on all other issues. (U)

-- All papers shall be prepared through a coordinated interagency process, with one representative from each agency on the working group. The NSC, NEC and DPC staffs shall be responsible for making sure that this review is coordinated with other related interagency policy reviews now underway. (U)

-- Consultations with outside institutions, non-governmental organizations, and industry shall be conducted as appropriate. (U)

The review papers shall be presented to the Deputy Assistant to the President for Environmental Policy, who shall make them available to all members of the NSC Deputies Committee, and the staffs of the NEC and the DPC, for further distribution as appropriate. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Directive 14, U.S. Policy Toward Sudan. (3 pages)	02/22/1993	P1/b(1) KDE 9/25/19

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Sudan (U)

U.S. relations with Sudan have fallen to an all-time low. The reasons are fairly clear. The NIF-dominated military regime, having overthrown an ineffectual but democratically elected government, has embarked on a policy of Islamization that has resulted in large-scale human rights violations, interference with international relief efforts, support for terrorism, and attempts to spread militant Islam throughout the region and beyond. (S)

Alarming reports of mass starvation, the obvious suffering of the non-Islamic, non-Arab southerners, the unjustified execution of two USG employees, all add urgency to the need for a fundamental review of our policy toward Sudan and examination of options on how to deal with this country. (S)

This policy review should be completed by March 24. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with this issue. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues: (S)

Part I: Assessment

-- What are U.S. interests in Sudan? (S)

-- Does the behavior of the Khartoum regime, at home and abroad, constitute a threat to U.S. national security that would justify making Sudan a higher priority in terms both of declared policy and of action? (S)

-- What is the current and potential scope of the humanitarian emergency in Sudan? (S)

-- What is the terrorist threat from Sudan? (S)

-- What is the potential for regional instability as a consequence of Sudanese activities and of the famine and fighting in the South? How do Sudan's neighbors judge the threat from Sudan, and what are they doing to counter it? (S)

-- Is there any potential for indigenous opposition to the regime outside the South? (S)

-- What are the likely short and medium term results of the rebellion in the South, and the Government's efforts to extinguish it? (S)

-- What are the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the war in the south? Are the parties willing and capable of meaningful negotiations? Would they require outside assistance (mediation) and who are the likely candidates for such a role? (S)

-- Is public international pressure against the regime effective? Counterproductive? (C)

-- What is the impact of Operation Restore Hope on Sudanese outlook and intentions? (C)

-- What influence does the U.S. have over Sudanese government behavior? (C)

Part II: Options for Policy

-- What are our options for enhancing the delivery of humanitarian relief to people in need in Sudan? (C)

-- What level of aid should the U.S. provide, through what organizations and with what conditions? (C)

-- What diplomatic course of action should we pursue vis-a-vis Sudan? (C)

-- What role, if any can the UN play in all areas -- humanitarian, human rights, and conflict resolution? Would a UN-sponsored safe haven zone in the South be effective and achievable? (C)

-- What are our options in the economic area? What can we do with the IFIs, if anything, to influence Sudan in a positive direction? (S)

-- Are there additional courses of action that we should consider employing? (C)

-- Within the confines of each of the options, fully set forth the pluses and minuses of the possible courses of action, identify an implications for broader U.S. African policy,

any applicable legislative constraints, and budgetary implications. (C)

-- Each option should contain an outline of an implementing strategy. (C)

Part III: Tasking

-- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua (S)

The objective of this policy review is to define a strategy that will best contribute to achievement of our fundamental goals in Nicaragua: consolidation of democratic processes and institutions, self-sustaining economic recovery, and respect for human rights by all factions in the country. In addition, we seek an end to political violence, civilian control over a professionalized police and military, and resolution of existing property claims. (S)

BACKGROUND

The deteriorating political and security situation in Nicaragua has become the subject of increasing concern among our hemispheric neighbors and a source of controversy at home. We urgently need to identify a strategy that will work to halt further political and economic deterioration in Nicaragua and help get it back on the road toward political and economic recovery. (S)

The prospects for rapid progress on political and economic reform are not promising. The Chamorro government, dominated by Presidency Minister Lacayo, remains committed to accommodation with the Sandinistas, led by Army chief Ortega. Elections on January 9 in the National Assembly, boycotted by the anti-Sandinista UNO coalition, resulted in a new leadership group loyal to the Lacayo-Ortega alliance. Given the new leadership and Lacayo's one vote working majority in the Assembly, he is likely to move slowly on political and economic reforms as well as on the property rights issue. Ortega's veto authority over all aspects of police reform further diminishes prospects for increased civilian control over the police and military. UNO, the political coalition that supported President Chamorro's

candidacy three years ago, has declared its opposition to the Chamorro administration, and is conducting a series of rallies nationwide, to culminate in a massive demonstration February 28 against the government. (C)

These developments have fueled growing unrest and political polarization. Violence has increased, and armed groups operate in areas outside major urban centers. The economy is stagnant, inflation is increasing rapidly, and Nicaragua has little hope for resumed growth absent stabilization of the political situation and significant inflows of outside resources. (C)

I. ASSESSMENT

1. What are U.S. interests in Nicaragua? What are our priorities? Do these interests and our historical relationship with Nicaragua justify a major U.S. effort to strengthen democracy and economic recovery in Nicaragua? (State) (S)

2. Given the substantial political and financial support it has received from the United States and the international community, why has Nicaragua under Chamorro not been able to strengthen its democracy and move to a situation of real and sustained economic growth? What have been the obstacles? What are the lessons for the future? (State, CIA) (S)

3. What are the causes and sources of growing political violence in Nicaragua? What measures has the government undertaken to deal with political violence? To what degree have they been successful? What is the likelihood of a resurgence of organized civil conflict in Nicaragua? (State, CIA) (S)

4. What are the sources and degree of U.S. influence on the Nicaraguan government? Which political groups are likely to seek a close relationship with the United States government? (State) (S)

5. What other outside actors have influence in Nicaragua? Which institutions and governments? Which individuals and with whom? (State) (S)

6. Is the Sandinista-anti-Sandinista framework still the best for analyzing the Nicaragua political scene, or is a new dynamic developing? If so, who are the new power elites? Is Nicaragua reverting to its earlier political traditions? (State, CIA) (S)

7. What are the long-term objectives/prospects of Minister of the Presidency Lacayo? Of Army Chief Ortega? Cesar? Daniel Ortega? Is the Humberto Ortega-Lacayo alliance viable over the long-term, or will Ortega abandon Lacayo as the 1996 elections approach? What is the future of the UNO coalition? Why has President Chamorro surrendered Presidential powers to son-in-law Lacayo? (State, CIA) (S)

8. Who among the various political factions in Nicaragua are likely to support political and economic reform measures? What is their strength? What other indigenous institutions can be enlisted in promoting human rights, economic reform and democratic institutions in Nicaragua? (State, CIA) (S)

9. How effective have the various elements of U.S. policy been? In particular:

   a. What level of U.S. aid has been provided to the Chamorro government? Of what kind? Under what political and economic conditionality? How effectively has it been used?

   b. Has withholding U.S. assistance increased prospects for the changes we want? Why or why not? How has withholding aid affected internal political dynamics? Is there a way to condition aid without it becoming a factor in internal Nicaraguan political struggles? (State, CIA) (S)

   c. How do the various political factions view U.S. policy? What do they believe we stand for? (State, CIA) (S)

   d. What would the likely consequences be of a policy of more active engagement of the FSLN? (State) (S)

10. What is the current economic situation and outlook for Nicaragua? The assessment should include:

   a. Results of the stabilization program; balance of payments; trade; GNP; per capita income; inflation; foreign reserves; investment; privatization. (State, CIA, NEC) (S)

   b. The causes of Nicaragua's rapid economic downturn. (State, CIA) (S)

   c. State of relations with the IMF and other international financial institutions; with bilateral donors; extent to which Nicaragua has benefitted from GSP and CBI; effect of the NAFTA on Nicaragua; external developments affecting exports of bananas, coffee, other key exports. (State, Treasury, CIA) (S)

   d. Sources of potential U.S. assistance funding; the extent to which the PDD has channeled resources to Nicaragua; the likelihood that Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments might have to be invoked against Nicaragua. (State, Treasury) (S)

   e. The level of outside assistance that would be needed to assure recovery. (State, CIA) (S)

11. What are the effects of continuing instability in Nicaragua on Nicaragua's Central American neighbors?

II. POLICY OPTIONS

1. What policy options are available to the United States to strengthen democracy and promote economic recovery in Nicaragua? What would be the nature/degree of Congressional support/opposition to such options? How can we engage the OAS, the UN and Nicaragua's neighbors, including the G-3 nations (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela) to support democracy and reform in Nicaragua? How can we encourage the MDBs to be more supportive? Other sources of bilateral assistance? (State, AID) (S)

2. Under what conditions should we release the $50 million currently being withheld? (State, AID) (S)

3. What conditions should be applied to future U.S. assistance to Nicaragua? (S)

4. What steps can be taken by the United States to assure that Nicaragua benefits fully from such trade initiatives as the GSP and CBI? Under what conditions should those steps be taken? What steps can be taken by Nicaragua? How can we help assure adequate markets in the EC and elsewhere for major export products, including bananas and coffee? (State, NEC, USTR) (S)

5. The President has said we need to do more to support those struggling to establish grassroots democracy. How can this be applied to Nicaragua? (State) (C) In particular:

   a. What measures can the United States take to help bring political violence under control and improve the human rights situation in Nicaragua? (State) (S)

   b. How can we reinforce the national political infrastructure? (State) (C)

   c. What can the United States do to help resolve the land tenure issue? (State) (C)

III. TASKING

1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs should convene an Interagency Working Group to review these issues and assign specific drafting and other responsibilities. (C)

2. Identify a recommended policy option in each case. Should there be differences of opinion among relevant agencies that cannot be resolved at the IWG level, they should be clearly and concisely stated in the final papers. (S)

3. Pros and Cons for each policy option should be clearly laid out in options papers. (C)

4. After review by the IWG, assessment and options papers should be submitted to the NSC for final review and to serve as a basis for decision making. Assessment and options papers are due March 1. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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February 22, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-16

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran (S)

Iran's resources and location make it strategically important for U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. As part of the Administration's review of key foreign policy issues, we plan to begin a thorough review of policy toward Iran. (S)

Our objective is to develop a broad and coherent strategy to guide our policy toward Iran. In preparation for a Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals Committee meeting, a policy paper should be provided by March 8, 1993, that addresses the best current information and assessments on the questions listed in Part I below, and an assessment of what would be required to implement the possible actions listed in Part II, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

President Clinton has publicly noted his concern about Iran's efforts to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. He also has expressed his intention that the issues of counter-terrorism and human rights be major concerns of the foreign policy of his Administration. Finally, he has pledged continuity and signalled his strong support for the Arab-Israeli peace process by sending Secretary Christopher on his first diplomatic mission to the Middle East. The Clinton Administration also is committed to maintaining security in the Gulf and preventing its domination by any hostile power. In all of these important areas the United States has significant and longstanding concerns about the policies of the Iranian government. (S)

U.S. policy has been to offer to discuss these and any other outstanding issues with the government of Iran face to face through an authoritative channel. The Iranians have refused to meet with U.S. representatives directly and official communications are conducted via the Swiss Embassy. Iran has been placed on the Terrorism List and remains under sanctions. The U.S. and Iran continue to participate in the Hague Tribunal to resolve outstanding claims dating from the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis, as well as the shootdown of an Iranian Airbus in 1988. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. What fundamental U.S. interests are at stake with respect to Iran? What threats does the Iranian government pose to U.S. interests and what are their relative priority? (S)

2. What is the nature and status of President Rafsanjani's regime and its hold on power? What are the dynamics of the regime's politics and the relationships between its key actors? Is there any evidence that substantial unrest is likely? From what forces? What is the status of the loyalty of the military (including the Revolutionary Guards)? (S)

3. What is the status of the Iranian economy? Are the Iranian regime's current economic policies capable of rebuilding the country from the destruction of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war? What are the long-term economic prospects for the country? What are the implications for the government's foreign policies and military build up of Iran's growing economic debt? (S)

4. What are Iran's military capabilities and its military intentions vis-a-vis Turkey and Central Asia, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab states? To what extent is Iran a military threat to its neighbors? (S)

5. What is the status of, and projections of, Iran's development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction arsenal, its ballistic missile force and other delivery systems? Who are the key external sources of support for these programs? Specifically, what is the current status and future prospects of Iran-Russian military acquisitions? (S)

6. What is the status of Iran's conventional capabilities and defense industrial base? Who are the key external sources of support for these capabilities? (S)

7. What is the status of the Iranian opposition, including the Mujadhedin-e Khalq and the various Kurdish, and other minority oppositionists? What is the status of U.S. government relations with the opposition? (S)

8. What is the impact on Iran of our current strategic trade controls for each of the following: COCOM, nonproliferation, and terrorism control lists? What is the status of our consultations with the G7 on restricting technology transfer (including nuclear reactors) to Iran? What is the status of our consultations with Russia, China and other states on restricting destabilizing technology transfer? What new steps would bring improved results in these consultations? (S)

9. What is the extent of Iran's support for international terrorism and subversion? To what extent is the Iranian leadership directly involved in terrorist operations against dissidents and other targets? (S)

10. What is Iran's policy toward the Arab-Israeli peace process and how does Tehran manifest this policy in practice? What is the status and likely direction of Iran's relations with Hezballah and Hamas and the other Palestinian fundamentalist groups? (S)

11. What is Iran's policy toward Iraq and the United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq? To what extent is Iran enforcing sanctions? What is Iran's policy toward the Saddam Hussein regime? Toward the Iraqi opposition? What is the state of relations with Iraqi Shia groups particularly in southern Iraq? (S)

12. What would be the impact on Iran's position in the Gulf of a significant weakening of Iraq or its disintegration? (S)

13. What is Iran's policy toward the newly emergent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan? How is it seeking to maximize its own influence? What is the status of its competition with Turkey for influence in this region? (S)

14. What is Iran's policy in South Asia, especially toward Afghanistan and Pakistan? (S)

15. What is Iran's policy toward Turkey? Does it seek to destabilize Turkey? (S)

16. What are Iranian policies and actions regarding the conflicts in the Balkans? (S)

17. To what extent is Iran actively supporting extremist Muslim organizations in the Islamic world, including the Gulf, North Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, Turkey, the Balkans and elsewhere? What is the nature of this support? How effective is this support? (S)

18. What is the nature of Iran's human rights policy toward its own citizens, especially toward minority elements such as the Bahai? (S)

19. What are Iran's policy objectives toward the United States? To what degree are they the subject of debate with the Iranian regime? (S)

In addressing these questions, please note where there are significant intelligence gaps in our information. (S)

PART II: POSSIBLE OPTIONS

Iran threatens U.S. interests in the following areas: Gulf security, non-proliferation, international terrorism, the Arab-Israeli peace process, Islamic extremism in the Muslim world, and human rights abuses. What are the options for U.S. strategy if our objective were to be:

a) confrontation with and containment of Iranian threats, or

b) moderation of Iranian behavior. (S)

These options should be developed by providing answers to questions such as these for each option as well as assessments of potential Iranian reactions: (S)

1. What kind of a dialogue, if any, would we seek with Iran, and under what preconditions to further our objectives? What would U.S. declaratory policy be toward the regime in Iran? What would be the level of U.S. policy interaction with the Iranian opposition? (S)

2. Under the various options, how would the U.S. inhibit Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles and other systems with which to deliver WMD? (S)

3. How would the U.S. deal with Iran's conventional military buildup? How would we ensure the security of our Gulf allies? (S)

4. How would the U.S. discourage Iranian support for terrorism, violent opposition to the peace process and active sponsorship of extremist Muslim organizations? What would be our policy on the Iranian "fatwa" on Salman Rushdie? (S)

5. What would we do about the policies toward Iran of our allies in Europe and Japan? What steps could be taken to improve the international consensus that Iran is a threat to our collective interests? How could we improve effectiveness of the multilateral commitment to strategic trade controls on Iran? (S)

6. How would we harmonize and coordinate our policy toward Iran with our goal of securing full Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSCRs? (S)

7. What, if any, changes would we make in our positions in the Hague claims process, including in our position on humanitarian compensation for the IranAir tragedy? (S)

8. What would U.S. policy be toward encouraging or discouraging trade, loans and capital investment in Iran. (S)

9. What actions would we take to support the efforts of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others to compete effectively with Iran for influence in the region? ~~(S)~~

PART III: TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather then compromised for the sake of an agreed product. ~~(S)~~

A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than March 8, 1993. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4123				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Directive 17, U.S. Policy Toward Liberia. (3 pages).	02/16/1993	P1/b(1) VDE 9/25/19

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
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RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 16, 1993

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2010-1227-M(2.08)
9125119 KOE

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Liberia (U)

Despite the historical relationship between the United States and Liberia, the threat of vicious civil war, and a widescale humanitarian emergency, the U.S. adopted a minimalist approach toward Liberia during the initial Charles Taylor rebellion in 1990. While moving vigorously to protect U.S. lives and Embassy Monrovia premises, the fundamental approach was to encourage first the Liberians themselves, and then their West African neighbors, to resolve Liberia's problems. The U.S. provided strong encouragement to the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, and financial assistance to Senegal to join that force at a critical juncture. However, other than the aid to Senegal our role has been primarily diplomatic and supportive. Most recently, we have urged the UN to seize the lead in bolstering ECOWAS and searching for a negotiated return to the Yamassoukro process of encampment of the warring factions, disarmament, demobilization, and free and fair countrywide elections. (C)

Since ECOMOG's arrival in Monrovia, it has provided security and stability for the capital but has had little impact on the rest of the territory, which has largely been controlled by Taylor. In October 1992, Taylor pushed ECOMOG back to Monrovia proper, conducted raids inside the city, and launched artillery attacks on urban targets. Nigeria, the main force contributor, reinforced ECOMOG which gradually repulsed the NPFL, re-established its original perimeter, and then went on the offensive against Taylor. (C)

There are, however, serious questions about ECOMOG's staying power. The Senegalese pulled their contingent out in January. Nigeria's intentions are also uncertain, especially if the planned transition to civilian rule occurs on schedule this

summer. Taylor is a resourceful survivor, and may be looking beyond ECOMOG for a renewed opportunity to seize power. (C)

The challenge for U.S. policy is to craft an approach which maximizes the odds of a successful and peaceful resolution of the Liberian civil war, preferably within the framework of ECOWAS's unprecedented regional initiative. This must be accomplished without encouraging the Liberians to look to the U.S. to resolve their problems for them, and within the confines of very limited financial resources and Brooke Amendment restrictions on assistance to Liberia. (C)

This policy review should be completed by March 17. It should include clear policy options/recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with Liberia. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the following questions and issues. (U)

Part I: Assessment

-- What are U.S. interests and objectives in Liberia? To what degree is the historical relationship still a legitimate factor in our policy deliberations?

-- What are the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict? Are there any circumstances under which Charles Taylor will voluntarily fulfill commitments?

-- What is ECOMOG's staying power? How long can we expect the Nigerians to continue their military engagement in Liberia?

-- What are the intentions and role of France?

-- What are the likely costs (human, economic and political) of renewed active civil war? What pressures will this generate on the U.S., and what is the likely requirement for humanitarian relief? (C)

Part II: Options for Policy

-- How actively engaged should the U.S. be in seeking a resolution to the conflict? How should our role relate to the regional countries, regional organizations, and the UN?

-- What level of resources are we willing to commit? This should include consideration of both regional and UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief, and post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation. It should address the source of funds, and relative priorities among competing funding requirements.

-- What course should we pursue if Nigeria and/or ECOMOG withdraw from Liberia? (C)

Part III: Tasking

-- The IWG on Africa, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, should carry out this review. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Directive 18, U.S. Policy Toward International Narcotics Trafficking. (5 pages)	03/01/1993	P1/b(1) NLC 9125119

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2010-1227-M
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1993

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2010-127-M (2.09)
KOE 09125/19

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward International Narcotics Trafficking (U)

The trade in illicit narcotics creates violence, health and social problems, and economic dislocation in this and many other countries. In some nations, the trafficking also corrodes democratic systems. (U)

Our efforts to combat narcotics trafficking can only be successful if we reduce demand in this and other countries. The Administration will separately be examining what can be done to enhance demand reduction programs and develop an overall drug strategy, as required by law. (U)

U.S. government counternarcotics efforts should, however, continue to have an international dimension to support like-minded nations in their fight against the effects of narcotraffickers, to preserve the integrity of our borders, and to limit the flow of narcotics into our country. In a time of reduced federal expenditures, we need to determine which international programs are most effective and how we would best organize to conduct those programs. (U)

To permit the President to make those determinations, there should be a comprehensive assessment of our international counternarcotics performance, organization, and options as set out below. (C)

I. BACKGROUND

A. TRENDS: Describe the trends over the last several years with regard to the amount of illicit narcotics grown, by type and by country. Describe the trends in amounts entering the United States by type, by country of origin, and by method of entry. This section should describe the range of confidence we have in each estimate provided and the reasons for uncertainty when the confidence levels are low. (Intelligence Community) (S)

B. EFFECTS IN PRODUCING/TRANSITING COUNTRIES: Describe the effects that drug production and transiting have had in those countries where the effects have been significant. Attention should be given to the relationship between narcotics and democratization, environmental concerns, violence, corruption, and the economic system. (Intelligence Community) (S)

C. COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS: Describe what the United States and other governments and international organizations have been doing to combat the international trafficking in narcotics, noting in particular the U.S. agencies involved and their level of effort (detailed financial analysis is called for later in the study).

1. Crop Control: substitution and eradication. (STATE)

2. Interdiction: with specific description of the efforts in the regions of the Andes, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. (ONDCP)

3. Leadership: money laundering and "king-pin" efforts. (DEA)

4. Chemicals: the control of precursors. (DEA)

5. Enhancing Indigenous Institutions: courts, police, political will. (STATE)

6. Intelligence: U.S. collection and analysis efforts; support of indigenous services. A compartmented annex should accompany the study. (Intelligence Community) (S)

II. FUNDING AND ECONOMICS

A. U.S. BUDGET: Portray the financial resources the US Government has devoted in recent years to international counternarcotics programs by type of program and by agency. Show the percentage of each agency's counternarcotics efforts that go to international efforts; the international total as a percentage

of the overall supply control budget; and as a percentage of the overall USG counternarcotics budget. (OMB) ~~(C)~~

B. ECONOMICS: Describe the magnitude of funds that flow from the United States due to the illegal purchase of narcotics and where the funds go. Describe the effect of narcotics related monies on the economies of major producing and transiting countries. (Intelligence Community) ~~(S)~~

III. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

A. PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: Summarize which U.S., indigenous, and international programs have demonstrated success in achieving their stated objectives and which have not (what has worked, what has not, by country or region). This analysis should be explicit about its measures of success. Where possible, it should identify likely reasons for the lack of success of programs: e.g., funding levels, host nation support, and overall feasibility. The analysis should identify problem areas or promising counternarcotics methods and technologies, if any, that have not been given enough attention to permit meaningful evaluation. (ONDCP) ~~(S)~~

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: Describe the extent to which the interagency organizational structure may have been an impediment to optimum efficiency, focusing in particular on lack of clarity or overlap in agency roles and missions, decision making structures, and operational command/control authorities. Include a separate examination of the organization of intelligence support. (NSCS) ~~(S)~~

C. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS: Identify and review any statutory or regulatory impediments to international narcotics control that merit analysis. Include a review of: i) barriers to effective support by the Intelligence Community to law enforcement agencies, and ii) difficulties in controlling aerial smuggling due to air traffic control practices and regulations. (ONDCP) ~~(S)~~

IV. STRATEGY OPTIONS

Agencies should present and analyze possible international counternarcotics strategies, including both current and alternative practices. Each strategy should show explicit program and funding tradeoffs at existing and decreased levels of international counternarcotics resources. The strategies should each be evaluated on a consistent set of criteria including effects on:

-- the flow of drugs into the United States;

-- bilateral foreign relations;

-- democracy and order in producing/transiting countries;

-- overall feasibility. ~~(S)~~

Among those strategies analyzed should be:

-- A Greater Emphasis on Multilateral Efforts: U.S. policy has been largely bilateral or unilateral, although some regional approaches have been fostered. What would a strategy look like that emphasized multilateral organizations for standards and controls, assistance, and interdiction? (STATE) (S)

-- An Indigenous/Economic-Stability Focus: The American consumer of narcotics is indirectly responsible for the distortions and economic dislocations created in production and transiting countries. What would a strategy look like that emphasizes helping such countries deal with the problems that we indirectly create, e.g., enhancing alternative development assistance programs? (STATE) (S)

-- A Selected Country Approach: Our efforts have failed in some countries because those nations lack the political will to take the steps that we have believed necessary. In other nations, there has been some progress. What would be the effect of a strategy that concentrated resources on a few countries where the possibility of success is high? (STATE) (S)

-- Focused Interdiction: The aircraft, ships, radars and other counternarcotics assets of at least ten Federal U.S. agencies are scattered from the Andes, through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, in the Atlantic and Pacific. What would be the effect of concentrating interdiction efforts on a small number of choke points and reallocating interdiction resources into a small number of agencies? (ONDCP) (S)

-- An Infrastructure Strategy: U.S. policies have emphasized direct approaches to the drug product itself through techniques aimed at stopping its production or seizing it during distribution. What would be the effects of greater concentration of efforts at the infrastructure, including leadership, money laundering, and chemical precursors? (DEA) (S)

For each of these and any other strategies proposed, OMB should portray a reallocation of resources by agency and program from the existing, increased and decreased funding levels. (U)

V. STUDY PROCESS

Lead agencies indicated above should draft their section of the study after discussion with other concerned agencies. Subsequently all concerned agencies should review the drafts and agency comments, criticisms, and disagreements should be fully shown in the final study. The NSC staff will chair a steering group to assure that all agencies views are aired, that all issues raised by any agency are addressed even if not included in this study outline, and that an actionable summary document is prepared, fully cleared, and made available to the Deputies Committee, along with the full study, by April 19. (S)

SECTION	FIRST DRAFT DUE TO STEERING GROUP
I. BACKGROUND	8 MARCH
II. FUNDING	10 MARCH
III. EFFECTIVENESS	15 MARCH
IV. OPTIONS	22 MARCH

While this study is being conducted, operational decisions about the implementation of our current strategy and the conduct of operations will have to be made. An IWG on International Narcotics is hereby constituted for coordinating such activity. It will be chaired at the Under Secretary level by the Department of State. The interagency structure to implement a strategy emerging from the PRD study process will be reviewed at the time of any resulting Presidential decisions. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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March 3, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing and a Comprehensive Test Ban ~~(S)~~

In the fall of 1992, the U.S. Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell amendment (Section 507) to the FY 1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act prohibiting all U.S. nuclear tests before July 1, 1993. The legislation stipulates that on or after July 1, 1993, a limited number of safety and reliability tests are allowed through September 30, 1996, at which point all U.S. nuclear tests are banned. However, if a foreign state tests after that date the ban on U.S. testing is lifted. (U)

The legislation also requires the President to submit a report to Congress not later than March 1 of each year, beginning in 1993, that includes, inter alia, (1) a schedule for resuming the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia, (2) a plan for achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) on or before September 30, 1996, and (3) a schedule for conducting nuclear tests to incorporate modern safety features into the remaining weapons stockpile. Testing can resume on or after July 1, 1993, only if the President has submitted this report and 90 days have elapsed without Congress passing a Joint Resolution of disapproval. (U)

On January 19, the Bush administration submitted a report on nuclear testing to Congress. However, the report did not contain a schedule for resuming the nuclear testing talks with Russia, a plan for achieving a CTB by 1996, or a schedule for conducting nuclear tests to incorporate modern safety features into the remaining stockpile. On February 12, President Clinton informed Congress that this report did not comply with the substantial

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majority of the requirements of this legislation, and therefore has no bearing on the provisions contained in the legislation that prescribe the conditions upon which a limited program of U.S. nuclear testing could be resumed on or after July 1, 1993. The President supports the Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell amendment and the limitations and requirements contained therein. He has, therefore, stated his intention to submit his own report pursuant to Section 507 at an early date. ~~(C)~~

This Policy Review Directive (PRD) requires a comprehensive examination of the political, military, technical, diplomatic, and verification questions associated with negotiations to achieve a CTB. The PRD also directs the Interagency Working Group to identify a limited program of U.S. nuclear testing consistent with the provisions of the Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell amendment. Upon completion of this review, the Administration will submit its Section 507 report to Congress. ~~(S)~~

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. CTB Negotiating Issues

1. What is the current status of nuclear testing by Russia, China, France, and the UK?

   - Which of these states are currently observing nuclear testing moratoria? What would be their attitude towards extending (or enacting) moratoria?

   - Which nuclear weapon states are likely to extend their moratoria without reference to U.S. actions or those of other nuclear weapon states?

   - Which of these states would support negotiating and concluding a CTB? What kind of permitted experiments would they seek?

   - How would a moratorium -- and a CTB -- affect the nuclear weapons programs of these states and the threat Russian and Chinese programs pose to the U.S.? ~~(S)~~

2. How would a CTB affect undeclared nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East and South Asia?

   - What would be the attitudes of states with such programs towards negotiating and concluding a CTB?

   - Would attainment of a CTB help obtain the compliance of such states with international norms, including adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and compliance with the Treaty, especially Article II? (S)

3. What would be the attitude of the non-nuclear weapons states towards negotiating and concluding a CTB? (S)

4. Would other states be willing to agree to a CTB by September 30, 1996? (S)

5. Would extension of the U.S. moratorium facilitate or hamper the CTB negotiations? (S)

6. How would a CTB affect U.S. allies that rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent? (S)

7. How important is progress toward or attainment of a CTB for U.S. efforts to extend indefinitely the NPT at the Extension Conference in 1995? (S)

8. What are current and projected U.S. capabilities for monitoring a CTB? How will these be affected by pending resource decisions? What U.S. programs that are currently not in the budget or are underfunded could provide improved verification if adequately funded? (S)

9. What level of testing will be detectable even with the improvements cited? (S)

B. U.S. Nuclear Testing Issues.

1. What warheads should the U.S. retain into the 21st Century assuming (a) full implementation of START I and II, and (b) failure to implement START I and II? (S)

2. What will be the effect on overall stockpile safety if the scheduled reductions under START I/II are implemented? (S)

3. What safety features are incorporated in these warheads? (S)

4. How safe are existing nuclear weapons designs? (S)

5. What safety improvements were recommended in 1991 by the Drell Commission? (S)

6. What would be the cost and impact on military capabilities associated with incorporating all Drell Commission improvements in all weapons in the residual U.S. inventory? If pit manufacturing were needed, how would it be done and at what cost? (S)

7. What percentage improvement in safety would result from these modifications? (S)

8. How would our level of confidence in the reliability of the modified designs compare with our level of confidence in the reliability of existing designs? (S)

9. How long would it take to make the Drell Commission modifications? (S)

10. How many nuclear tests of each modified design would be required to verify its effectiveness and design specifications in production models, assuming: no decrease in permitted level of confidence; a decrease in permitted level of confidence? (S)

11. How long would it take to conduct these verifying tests? (S)

12. What nuclear tests does Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell permit? (S)

13. Once these tests were completed and all U.S. nuclear testing ceased for the indefinite future, what would be the effect of a CTB on the U.S. nuclear weapons program (including the nuclear weapons labs, scientific/ engineering expertise, and the Nevada test site) and our ability to resume testing if our national security requirements change in the future? (S)

14. What would be the effect of a CTB on our nuclear deterrent? ~~(S)~~

15. How will the performance of our stockpile be certified under a CTB, and with what level of confidence? ~~(S)~~

16. Based on previous experience, what sort of reliability problems can we expect after (a) 10 years, (b) 20 years, and (c) 30 years after cessation? ~~(S)~~

17. What techniques could we employ to maintain confidence that the stockpile is safe and reliable without further testing? To what extent could improvements in computer modeling and simulator technology improve our level of confidence? ~~(S)~~

18. How might reliability problems be corrected under a CTB? ~~(S)~~

19. What are the requirements of the Test Ban Readiness Program and how do they compare to Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell? ~~(S)~~

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In each area below, analyze the listed options and make appropriate recommendations.

A. CTB Negotiating Options

1. With whom do we negotiate, and in what forum?

- Options for participants should include:
  - o the declared nuclear powers or some subset thereof;
  - o the non-declared nuclear weapons states; and
  - o the non-nuclear states.
- Options for fora should include:
  - o a five power conference among the declared nuclear powers (or subset thereof); and

- o multilateral talks, either in the CD or as part of an LTBT amendment conference or a separate multilateral forum.

- Phased approaches should also be considered. For example:

  - o the LTBT amendment conference could be reconvened to endorse the goal of a CTB, and then refer the problem to the declared nuclear powers and/or the CD; or

  - o the declared nuclear powers could begin negotiations, and at some point, break off discrete aspects of the problem to the CD, or bring an amendment to the LTBT conference for approval. ~~(S)~~

2. What limitations, if any, would be placed on foreign nuclear testing before EIF?

   - Options should include:

     - o placing TTBT/PNET yield limits on France and China; and

     - o placing limits on the number and purpose of nuclear tests of all nuclear states.

   - Options should consider what verification provisions would be required during this interim period. ~~(S)~~

3. What should be the U.S. standard for verification of a CTB, and what specific verification provisions are required to monitor compliance?

   - Options for monitoring compliance should include:

     - o on-site challenge inspections; and

     - o the establishment of seismic stations within parties' territories.

   - Who has access to information, either through these measures or national technical means, also should be addressed. ~~(S)~~

4. Should the lower end of the CTB be limited to what we can verify? (S)

5. What should be the duration of the treaty? If not indefinite, what would be the process for renewal? Specifically, should renewal require a positive act by the Parties? (S)

6. What sanctions, if any, should be applied to states that refuse to join a CTB or violate its provisions? Should the CTB Treaty itself deal with sanctions or should that be left as a separate issue? (S)

7. Should the U.S. observe a CTB if one or more nuclear weapons states refuse to join and/or continue testing? Does it matter which states continue testing? (S)

8. What should our strategy be to ensure that our approach to the negotiations most effectively promotes U.S. nonproliferation goals, including extending the NPT indefinitely? Specific attention should be given to timing our CTB efforts in light of the 1995 Extension Conference. (S)

B. U.S. Nuclear Testing

1. What should be the U.S. test program, consistent with the provisions of Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell, to support the nuclear stockpile into the 21st century? Specifically, identify the number, type and cost of tests, and the time, required to:

   (a) incorporate modern safety improvements into the remaining stockpile; and

   (b) ensure we can retain a safe and reliable stockpile without further testing. (S)

2. What "nuclear" experiments, if any, should be permitted after entry into force? (S)

3. Should there be any provisions for infrequent testing to deal with urgent safety problems after entry into force? (S)

4. How should we define a "nuclear" test in the context of a CTB? (S)

5. What safeguard programs can/should be undertaken to maintain the physics competence of the U.S. nuclear weapon design community under a CTB? (S)

PART III: TASKINGS

This review should be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council and completed by March 29, 1993. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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March 8, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-20

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
PRESIDENT, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

SUBJECT: International Programs and Resources (C)

Two factors dominate our current and future approach to funding overseas programs: declining U.S. government resources and changing foreign policy problems and priorities. For decades, we used "foreign aid" as another weapon in our fight against Communism. There was public and Congressional understanding and support. (C)

Now we face a different set of challenges and we do so at a time when funding is severely limited. That changed situation dictates first that we review the purposes and structures of our foreign assistance programs. Then, we must ensure that as a government we are integrating our efforts for the most cost effective, coordinated application of resources toward those objectives. (C)

The Congress must be closely consulted in the review and redesign of our international resource and foreign assistance programs. Thus, we should pursue a three part process. First, the Executive Branch should review its existing programs, structures, and priorities and develop recommended new policy goals and options for change. Second, we should share the results of that review with concerned Members of Congress and staff, discuss their ideas and build a consensus for a new, mutual approach. Third, we should submit to the President options and recommendations for changees, those requiring legislation and those that can be made by executive direction. (C)

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I. Existing Programs: (OMB)

International programs and resources encompass a wide variety of USG activities, including foreign aid funded by the Foreign Assistance Act, leases and training, U.S. financial resources to Multilateral Development Banks, and USG support for international activities of U.S. companies and organizations. (U)

A. Each agency should describe the purposes, funding and other resource commitments for all programs which transfer funds or provide international support. Where relevant, agencies should indicate the recipient countries. (C)

B. Each agency should describe major impediments to current program goals or objectives, including:

-- legislative requirements and prohibitions;

-- Congressional earmarking of funds by country;

-- cost of delivery/overhead;

-- inefficient organizational forms or procedures; and

-- difficulties in interagency coordination. (C)

OMB will standardize and coordinate these submissions. (U)

II. Policy Objectives and Priorities: (State/Treasury)

A. OBJECTIVES: U.S. assistance programs should reflect clearly stated national priorities with broad support, as suggested illustratively below. Describe how the changing, post-Cold War international situation has or should have altered our funding priorities. Analyze how well our existing programs fulfill the priorities we might seek to pursue. Propose options for future policy initiatives that require assistance programs. Within current and lower budget levels, describe options for allocating (on a percentage basis) resources from all U.S. foreign assistance budget accounts to support these initiatives. Although some programs address several goals, for purposes of this analysis, funds should be identified by their primary objective. (State) (C)

Define the projected economic situation, including level of development, trade and capital flows, and external debt, likely to confront key recipients of U.S. assistance over the next decade. (Treasury) (C)

Illustrative examples of the goals that should be addressed are:

-- sustainable development (environmental and economic);

-- meeting basic human needs;

-- democratization;

-- U.S. overseas markets and investment, as well as foreign trade competitiveness;

-- denuclearization, arms control and non-proliferation; and

-- Middle East peace and other regional U.S. security interests.

B. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS: The options developed should include all agencies' views on the objectives and the share of overall resources that should be provided. The options should be analyzed using a common set of criteria. Illustrative criteria are:

-- likelihood of success of program;

-- consistency with previous U.S. pledges and commitments;

-- domestic support; and

-- probability of avoiding greater future costs. (C)

III. Delivery Mechanisms: (State/Treasury)

OPTIONS: Develop options to deliver U.S. assistance more effectively and efficiently, including those which change existing types of delivery. These include:

-- USG versus private and non-government organizations;

-- multilateral versus bilateral;

-- managed project or cash transfer;

-- grants vs. loans;

-- conditional vs. non-conditional; and

-- country or functional categories. (C)

The options should be evaluated by a common set of criteria. (U)

IV. Reform of USAID: (State)

Working through the IWG, the State Department will create a Task Force, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, to restructure USAID and the Foreign Assistance Act. The Task Force chairman will appoint a subcommittee to review the structure and function of USAID, including its relationship to the Department. A wide array of functional and organizational options should be considered. The chairman will also appoint a subcommittee to review the Foreign Assistance Act, and review the State Department's responsibility to evaluate the foreign affairs budget function (150). (C)

V. Other Intradepartmental Organizational Issues: (OMB)

Each agency should provide an analysis of organizational and structural measures to ensure that assistance programs are more closely tied to current or future policy and have the least possible delivery and overhead costs (consistent with necessary audit/oversight requirements). Agencies are invited to comment on desirable organizational measures in other departments. ~~(C)~~

VI. Interdepartmental Organization: (NSC/NEC)

Agencies should supply their views on the following issues: how should U.S. foreign policy objectives requiring financial support be established and reviewed periodically on a government-wide basis? What inter-agency mechanisms now exist to monitor and coordinate international programs? What, if any, new mechanisms should be employed to ensure that agency policies are in accord with Presidential guidelines? How should the USG ensure that its international resource instruments are coordinated to achieve those objectives? How should this process recognize the work of PVO/NGOs and other governments and international organizations? ~~(C)~~

The NSC staff should then develop options for interdepartmental organization and analyze them based on a common set of criteria. ~~(C)~~

VII. Congress: (State)

What are current Congressional views on the issues addressed in this PRD? Which changes analyzed in the study would require legislative change and which can be effected by a Presidential Decision Directive? Develop a plan to implement those that require Congressional action. ~~(C)~~

VIII. Study Plan:

The study outline above indicates lead agencies for the coordination of initial drafts for each section. Lead agencies should solicit the views of other relevant agencies while drafting the initial papers. ~~(C)~~

Coordination of this study will be under the co-chairmanship of the National Security Council and the National Economic Council. An initial draft of the study should be submitted to the Deputies Committee by 5 April 1993. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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WASHINGTON

March 8, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (S)

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this policy review is to develop broad goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The review should design overarching policies that apply to the region in general, as well as approaches that are specific to prominent sub-regions and individual nations. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should be made explicit in the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

The United States has important interests in the survival and deepening of democracy and in the economic prosperity of Latin America and the Caribbean. The immediate challenge for the Administration is to reverse the backsliding from democratic practices experienced in Haiti and Peru, and to forestall the evident threats to democracy in Venezuela, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. At the same time, the United States must design a strategy that seeks to strengthen democratic institutions and practices throughout the region. This pro-democracy strategy should have both bilateral and multilateral components, and should give particular attention to reforming and bolstering the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as to the involvement of the non-governmental organizations seeking to advance human rights and democracy. (S)

SECRET

On the economic front, we also face serious challenges. While there has been significant progress in financial stabilization and trade and investment liberalization, the reforms are not deeply rooted and the risk of retrenchment to an inward-looking populism remains. Clearly, the U.S. has a strong political and economic stake in Latin American prosperity. Open and growing Latin American economies in which all segments of society share in the benefits of growth provide strong support to democratic governance. They also offer major commercial opportunities for U.S. business, which historically has viewed Latin American countries as important trade and investment partners. (S)

One important element of that economic strategy will be to implement the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The President is committed to moving ahead with the NAFTA provided that adequate supplemental agreements can be negotiated on the environment, labor standards, and import surges. We will also want to explore mechanisms for establishing closer trade and investment relations with other Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly those well advanced on economic reform. The availability of U.S. Government financial resources to support this strategy will be extremely limited, however. To the extent that significant official resources are needed, we will have to engage the multilateral development banks and third countries. (S)

Separate policy review directives are being initiated on several functional issues relevant to the region, including non-proliferation, environmental protection, foreign assistance, and anti-narcotics policy. Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Panama will also be addressed separately. (C)

I. ASSESSMENT

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

1. What are the major obstacles to the stability and deepening of democratic institutions and practices in this hemisphere? (State, CIA, AID) (C)

2. How has narcotrafficking impacted on the capacities and legitimacy of democratic institutions? Focus not only on the Andean countries, but also on the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, and Brazil. (State, CIA) (C)

3. In which countries are military coups a serious threat? In particular, consider the outlook for democracy in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Venezuela. (State, CIA) (S)

4. What are the strengths and weaknesses in the structure, operations, and charter of the OAS that affect its capacity to promote human rights and democracy? Which countries generally have been supportive and which have been obstructionist in this regard? (State, USOAS) (C)

SECRET

5. Discuss the major political-military trends in the region, with particular reference to progress on subordination of military organizations to civilian rule, military downsizing, arms control, proliferation, regional security arrangements, and the definition of new missions for the military (e.g., U.N. peacekeeping missions). Include discussions of trends toward strengthening judiciary, legislatures, human rights organizations. (State, DOD, JCS) (C)

TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. What are the economic conditions, prospects, and trends in the region, including those for income growth and distribution? What are the implications for U.S. interests? (NSC, NEC, State, CIA, CEA, Commerce) (C)

2. How important, in trade and investment terms, is the hemisphere to the United States, both at present and potentially? For example, what would be the costs and benefits to the United States of a free trade community encompassing the entire hemisphere? Of an arrangement that permitted free investment flows? Of participation by nations beyond the hemisphere? (NEC, NSC, State, USTR, CEA, Commerce) (C)

3. What is the outlook for the various subregional trading areas, and what opportunities and competitive disadvantages does each offer for U.S. business? (NEC, NSC, State, USTR, CEA, Commerce) (S)

4. What is the likely outlook and timeframe for completing negotiations and Congressional approval of the NAFTA, implementing legislation, and the parallel agreements? What are the implications of an extension of "Fast Track" legislation for potential FTAs with other countries and groups of countries? (NEC, NSC, USTR, State) (C)

5. Do current circumstances warrant a continuation or modification of existing debt-reduction strategies? Project net resource flows by official and private sources, for countries of the region for the period 1990-1996. (NEC, NSC, Treasury) (S)

6. What is the likely economic impact of the NAFTA on the trade and investment opportunities facing the rest of the region, CBI, and ATPI beneficiaries? Political impact? Impact of a NAFTA disapproval by the Congress? (NEC, NSC, USTR, CEA, Commerce) (C)

7. How effective have the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and U.S. bilateral assistance been in promoting regional integration, structural adjustment, human resource development, and poverty alleviation in the region? (NEC, NSC, Treasury, AID) (S)

MAJOR COUNTRY CASES

1. What are U.S. interests and objectives in Mexico? What are the objectives of the Mexican government regarding our bilateral relationship, and what leverage does that give us? What is the potential for improving cooperation on narcotics, immigration, and other issues? What is the likely future of economic and political reform in Mexico after Salinas? (State, CIA) (S)

2. What are U.S. interests in Brazil? What are the opportunities for us to engage Brazil over the short and medium run on trade, proliferation, narcotics, and other issues? (State, CIA, Treasury) (S)

3. How can we encourage Argentina to continue to pursue a constructive role in international issues of importance to us, such as nonproliferation? (State, NSC) (C)

II. POLICY PROPOSALS

Policy proposals should specify preferred course of action, other options, instrumentalities, and indicate resource requirements and their implications if any for the budget and for legislation. Moreover, a detailed schedule of events that demand action or that offer opportunities for initiative should be provided, including recommendations for speeches, meetings, and trips to the region by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and other cabinet officials. Include recommendations on the substance, timing, and venue of a first Latin America policy speech by the President. (C)

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

1. What policies should the U.S. pursue, bilaterally and multilaterally, to strengthen human rights and democratic institutions and processes throughout the region? Give special attention to policies tailored for Peru, Venezuela, and Central America, and within Central America, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, aimed at overcoming the legacies of civil violence and polarization and at promoting reconciliation and democratic tolerance by both Right and Left. (State, DOD) (S)

2. In the event that we fail to forestall illegal interruptions of democracy, how should we and others react to get democracy back on track? How should we publicly signal such an intent? Proposed options should consider their symbolic impact on the rest of the Hemisphere, and the signals they emit regarding the risks that anti-democratic actions are likely to entail. (State) (S)

   a. Design generic contingency plans to deal with a coup attempt while it is in progress, including a range of options in the public and private diplomacy areas. (State) (S)

b. Design specific contingency plans for responding to a successful coup in countries where the threat appears particularly grave, including Venezuela. (State, CIA) (S)

3. In considering instrumentalities for promoting democracy, suggest options for strengthening the OAS and NGOs. (State) (C)

a. In examining various ways to make the OAS a more effective instrument for the collective defense of democracy, what should be done to fortify the Unit for Democracy? Should the OAS evolve a peacekeeping capacity? How can the OAS best work with the United Nations? In this regard, what diplomatic strategies must we pursue to gain the cooperation of Europe and Japan? (State) (C)

b. NGOs (including political parties, trade unions, business and consumer groups, civic associations, and community organizations) are major building blocks of civil society. Without compromising their independence, how can the U.S. government and multilateral agencies nourish their development? (State) (U)

c. How can public diplomacy, including educational and cultural exchanges, be employed to promote grassroots democracy and other U.S. policy goals? (State, USIA) (C)

4. Explore the options for the United States to achieve the goals of smaller, professional armed forces subordinate to civilian rule in the region, and new, more effective regional proliferation and security arrangements? Can a reformed Inter-American Defense Board play a role? (State, DOD, JCS) (C)

TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

President Clinton has underscored the value to the U.S. economy of increased trade with Latin America and the Caribbean. Keeping in mind this objective and our interest in promoting open, market-oriented economies in Latin America:

1. What should be the Administration position on the concept and components of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative? How can its component elements -- the Multilateral Investment Fund, bilateral debt relief, freer regional trade -- be modified to better reflect Administration priorities? (NEC, NSC, Treasury, State, USTR) (C)

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2. President Clinton has advocated building free trade agreements with other nations of the hemisphere:

   a. Should the NAFTA be the cornerstone of our trade policy toward the hemisphere? If so, what should the NAFTA's role be? If not, what alternative approaches exist? (NEC, NSC, USTR, Treasury, State) (C)

   b. What should be the criteria for opening FTA negotiations, and what should be our requirements for admission, to an FTA? Which countries or groups of countries would meet these criteria today, or are likely to do so in the next three years? (NEC, NSC, USTR, Treasury, State) (C)

   c. President-elect Clinton reaffirmed U.S. intentions to negotiate an FTA with Chile. Should Chile be the next country in line for an FTA? If so, when? Should Chile accede to the NAFTA, or is a bilateral accord preferable? Should Argentina then be next in line? (NEC, NSC, USTR, Treasury, State) (C)

3. At least some countries will not be eligible for an FTA in the near future. What should we do to offset the predictable diversionary affects of the NAFTA? In particular, should we entertain some variant of the "parity" proposals being advanced by the CBI countries? (NEC, NSC, USTR, Treasury, State) (C)

   a. How can we strengthen our trade and investment relations with non-FTA countries? For example, should the NAFTA establish a form of temporary, associate status, possibly allowing for a gradual phase-in of required reforms? (NEC, NSC, USTR, Treasury, State) (C)

   b. As the number of countries adhering to the hemispheric free trade area increases, will it be desirable to strengthen the various incipient institutions established by the NAFTA, including the Ministerial Commission, the commissions on environment and labor, and the dispute settlement mechanism? Will an overarching institutional structure be necessary? (NEC, NSC, USTR, State, Treasury) (C)

   c. Should we promote the development of an Americas Commission as a streamlined, more modest equivalent to the EC Commission? Of an organization modelled on the OECD for the hemisphere? Can such institutions help the hemisphere achieve sustained economic growth while also advancing human rights and democracy? (NEC, NSC, State, Treasury) (C)

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d. What contributions can existing institutions, including the IDB, UN, ECLAC, and the OAS, make to this emergent regional architecture? (NEC, NSC, State, Treasury) (C)

e. How do we deal with exogenous impediments to trade that impact on key commodity exports, such as bananas, coffee, and sugar? For example, how can we overcome proposed EC regulations biased against Central America and Ecuadoran banana producers? (NEC, NSC, USTR, State) (C)

4. Latin America needs to generate and attract more financial resources if it is to attain non-inflationary, steady growth. We should, however, avoid market-distorting subsidies that promote the outflow of U.S. capital to low-wage areas. (C)

a. What strategies should we encourage in the region to stimulate domestic savings and investment? (NEC, NSC, Treasury, State) (S)

b. Provide options to existing strategies to reduce debts owed to official and commercial lenders. How can we induce other donors to join our bilateral debt-reduction efforts? (NEC, NSC, Treasury, State) (C)

c. How can we induce the international financial institutions to be more responsive to the needs of countries with long-term negative resource flows? How do we deal with Sec. 701 and other restrictions that trigger cutoffs? (NEC, NSC, Treasury, State) (C)

5. Overcoming the region's vast inequalities and widespread poverty is essential if our other economic and political objectives are to be achieved. Please outline an integrated development assistance strategy, encompassing our bilateral programs and the international financial institutions, to achieve these ends in Latin America and the Caribbean. (NEC, NSC, AID, Treasury) (C)

a. Propose options for obtaining MDB support for our key economic objectives, including regional integration, environmental protection, structural adjustment, human resource development, and poverty alleviation. In addition, consider their potential contribution to our human rights and democracy strategies, including dealing with corruption and other governance issues. (NEC, NSC, Treasury, State) (C)

b. What should be done to avoid wasteful duplication between the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, fostering instead enhanced collaboration and an efficient division of labor? (NEC, NSC, Treasury) (C)

SECRET

c. Critically assess the progress of the PDD and provide options for strengthening it. (NEC, NSC, State) (C)

d. Provide options for reconsidering U.S. immigration policies in the Caribbean Basin in light of the region's economic development needs as well as the requirements of U.S. labor markets and other U.S. interests. Consider a program to provide work opportunities that offers preferential treatment to the Caribbean Basin, or to the Western Hemisphere (NEC, NSC, State, AID, Justice) (C)

THE MAJOR NATIONS: MEXICO, ARGENTINA, AND BRAZIL

To fulfill our hemispheric goals, we will need the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of the region's three dominant powers--Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. What strategies should we pursue to gain their support for our hemispheric political and economic strategies? (State, Treasury) (S)

A POSSIBLE WESTERN HEMISPHERE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES

President Clinton has suggested the construction of a "Western Hemisphere Community of Democracies." What actions, in addition to those recommended above, might we take to advance this overarching objective? In particular, all agencies participating in this PRD should propose ways in which it can support regional cooperation, economic integration, and democratic progress through interactions with its counterpart agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean. (State, NSC, all participating agencies) (S)

III. TASKING

1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, should convene a high-level Interagency Working Group (IWG) to conduct this review and to task specific drafting responsibilities. (C)

2. Working groups should be established for both the Assessment and Policy Proposals sections as follows:

Working Group	Lead Agency
Democratic Governance	State
Economic Development	NSC/NEC
Major Nations	State
Western Hemisphere Community	State/NSC

Agencies should contribute as indicated under each part of the Assessment and Policy Proposals sections. Other agencies receiving this memo may contribute as desired. Differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of consensus. (C)

3. Assessment papers are due March 17, and options papers are due March 25. Papers should be submitted to the State IWG Chairperson for forwarding to the NSC through formal channels. Information copies should be sent informally to the NSC by the chairman of each Working Group. (C)

4. NSC should draft the final options paper in consultation with State, and it should be submitted to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than April 12, 1993. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 22. (5 pages)~~	~~03/16/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KDE 9/25/19

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 16, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-22

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2010-1227-M (2.13)
9/25/19 KDE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward South Asia ~~(S)~~

The U.S. has important political, economic and strategic interests at stake in South Asia -- home to nearly one-fourth of mankind. As part of the Administration's review of key foreign policy issues, we plan to begin a thorough review of policy toward South Asia. This review should seek to provide a framework for a comprehensive and coherent policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. ~~(S)~~

In preparation for a Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals Committee meeting, a policy paper should be provided by March 31, 1993, that addresses the best current information and assessments on the questions listed in Part I, below, and an assessment of what would be required to implement the possible actions listed in Part II, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should of course be part of the analysis. ~~(S)~~

BACKGROUND

Among numerous American interests in the area, a few stand out: South Asia contains the most populous democracies in the world. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are all struggling to strengthen their democratic institutions. The countries of the subcontinent have turned toward market-oriented economic reform in recent years and sought to open their markets to greater outside investment. We have an interest in promoting these trends. ~~(S)~~

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President Clinton has publicly emphasized his concern about global efforts to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Nuclear proliferation has already occurred in South Asia; both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. The risk of a nuclear conflict is perhaps greater in the subcontinent than anywhere else in the world given the relatively advanced weapons programs and unresolved Indo-Pakistani differences over Kashmir and other issues. Since 1990 the U.S. has suspended most aid to Pakistan under Congressional stricture (the Pressler Amendment) due to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism in India threatens to further polarize the subcontinent's politics and could increase the threat of war. (S)

The U.S. has other major interests in the subcontinent as well. Among these are seeking solutions to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka; improving the human rights performance of all the governments in the area; reducing the narcotics trade; and assisting in the resolution of the many refugee crises in the region. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. What fundamental U.S. interests are at stake with respect to South Asia? (S)

2. What are U.S. security interests in the region? What is the status of U.S. military cooperation with each country? (S)

3. What are the status and viability of the current governments in India and Pakistan and their hold on power? How threatening is the ethnic and religious unrest in both? What is the prognosis for Hindu fundamentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and their implications for U.S. interests? (S)

4. What is the status of and prognosis for India's development, acquisition, and production of weapons of mass destruction, its ballistic missile force and other delivery systems? For Pakistan's? Who are the key sources of support for these programs? (S)

5. What is the status of India's and Pakistan's conventional military capabilities and defense industrial base? Is the balance of power stable? (S)

6. What is the extent of Pakistan's support for terrorism and covert activity in India? What is the extent of India's support for terrorism and covert activity in Pakistan? (S)

7. What are the prospects for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute? Is the conflict "ripe" for outside mediation? (S)

8. What is the outlook for the conflict in Afghanistan? For the spread of unrest from Afghanistan to Central Asia? (S)

SECRET

9. What is the outlook for the conflict in Sri Lanka? (S)

10. What are the prospects for democratic regimes surviving and flourishing in the subcontinent? (S)

11. What is the status of economic reform, particularly market oriented reforms, in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan? Will the reform effort now underway in South Asia be sustained over the medium term? What are prospects for avoiding financial crises? Will South Asian countries open their economies further? Will they become more supportive of market opening strategies in international fora such as the GATT? In light of recent economic reforms, have U.S. commercial opportunities in the region expanded? What are other industrial countries (e.g., Japan) doing in the region economically? Will the region be able to compete with the fast growing Pacific Rim countries? Should the U.S. Government do more to promote expanded trade and investment with South Asia? (S)

12. What is the status of other U.S. concerns in the region, such as narcotics, population growth, refugees, AIDS, and the environment? (S)

In addressing these questions, we should note where there are significant intelligence gaps in our information. (S)

PART II: POSSIBLE ACTIONS

The U.S. traditionally has not made South Asia a high priority. The first issue that needs to be addressed in reviewing policy is what level of priority and thus resource allocation South Asia should receive? For example, should we send cabinet level officials to the sub-continent or relegate it to relatively junior officials (as in the past several years)? Is a more active and high profile policy appropriate? (S)

A second fundamental policy question is whether the U.S. should pursue a balanced approach to the two largest South Asian states, India and Pakistan, or should it pursue a deliberate tilt to one or the other. The previous administration began office in 1989 with NSD 20 which advocated a tilt to Pakistan. Some now urge a tilt to India. We need to address the broad strategic options of:

-- a balanced approach to India and Pakistan on key war and peace issues, or,

-- an approach that emphasizes better relations with one or the other state. (S)

Within this broad context, we need to review the following: (S)

1. How best can the U.S. inhibit the development and use of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles and other systems with which to deliver WMD in South Asia? Should we continue our consultations with Russia, China, Pakistan and India to arrange a five power conference to discuss proliferation in the region? What new steps would bring improved results in these consultations? Should we pursue an alternative formula for addressing the South Asia proliferation issue? Should we seek changes in the Pressler Amendment or in how it is applied? What should U.S. policy be toward export of dual use strategic technology? How should we seek Indian and Pakistani support for the NPT? (S)

2. What should be our basic policy toward India in light of the rise of Hindu fundamentalism? How can we best achieve our national goals given the trends in Indian politics? (S)

3. How best can the U.S. discourage Pakistani and/or Indian support for terrorism and active sponsoring of extremist organizations? What are the broad options available to alter Pakistani and Indian behavior in these areas? (S)

4. What role should the U.S. take in the Kashmir dispute? Is there a solution to the Kashmir dispute that best serves our interests? How can we assist in preventing Kashmir and other disputes from precipitating another Indo-Pak war? (S)

5. What can the U.S. government do to promote economic reform, improved market access and increased trade with South Asia? How can the USG best organize itself to assist these efforts? (S)

6. What steps should the U.S. take to assist democratic development and human rights in South Asia, especially in light of ethnic and religious conflicts in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, etc? (S)

7. Should the U.S. assume a greater role in helping to resolve the Afghan conflict? How best can the Afghan conflict and the weapons arsenal in Afghanistan be contained if conflict resolution is unlikely? How can we secure our broader interests in Afghanistan if conflict resolution is unlikely? (S)

8. Should the U.S. take a greater role in helping to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka? (S)

9. What approach should the U.S. take toward military and security ties to states in the region? What should U.S. arms sales policy be toward South Asia? (S)

10. What more should the USG do to achieve its goals on the environment, AIDS, narcotics control, and population issues? (S)

PART III: TASKING

The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Should there be differences of opinion, they shall be clearly stated rather then compromised for the sake of an agreed product. A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than March 31, 1993. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
April 9, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-24

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Turkey ~~(S)~~

Turkey has a unique geostrategic position, at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. As part of the Administrations's review of key foreign policy issues, we should undertake a thorough analysis of U.S.-Turkish relations to establish a comprehensive and coherent Administration approach toward Turkey. ~~(S)~~

In preparation for a possible Presidential meeting with Prime Minister Demirel, addressees are asked to provide contribute by April 30, 1993 to a policy paper that incorporates our best current information and assessments on Turkey -- its domestic and regional situation, as well as what would be required to implement possible policy initiatives, including an initial analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing such initiatives. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should, of course, be part of the analysis. ~~(S)~~

BACKGROUND

A valuable, if at times problematic, ally during the Cold War, Turkey has emerged in a new light and importance in the wake of communism's collapse. Events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the past four years, combined with the persistent rise of Iranian-inspired fundamentalism, and the threat to Gulf resources represented in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, underscore the critical nature of solid Western relations with Turkey. The United States will be key to these relations, in part because of thinly-veiled continental neuralgia toward Turkey, and in part because Turkey lies at the intersection of two regions of the world that host interests we consider among our most important -- Europe and the Middle East. ~~(S)~~

Three areas (in order of priority) where U.S.-Turkish interests overlap:

-- Looking South. In the Gulf and Middle East, Turkish cooperation is a critical component of our strategy to contain both Iraq and Iran. At the same time, we want to align Turkey with our moderate Arab friends in the Gulf and Egypt and with Israel against radical forces. ~~(S)~~

-- Looking West. We want to encourage strong Western ties to Ankara, urge the Turks to take clear steps toward resolution of Cyprus and improve their human rights performance, encourage priorities Turkish policies in the Balkans and Southern Europe, and offer political support to the Turkish government against domestic criticism of its limited role. ~~(S)~~

-- Looking East. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, we want to encourage a Turkish role of model secular democracy as a bridge to the new republics and counterweight to Islamic extremism promoted by Iran, while helping to avoid exacerbating Russian-Turkish tensions. ~~(S)~~

PART I: ASSESSMENT

General/Domestic

1. What is Turkey's current domestic economic, sociological, and political situation and how do these factors constrain or impel its foreign policy pursuits? ~~(S)~~

2. What are the threats to Turkish democracy and how serious are they? Under what circumstances would the military stage another coup? What are the prospects for a significant challenge to secularism and democracy from Islamic fundamentalism? ~~(S)~~

3. How serious are the terrorist threats to Turkey and what is the ability of the Turkish government to deal with them? What more could the U.S. do to assist Turkey in its anti-terrorist campaign? What is the current Turkish performance on human rights and what more can we do to encourage improvement? ~~(S)~~

4. How has the end of the Cold War altered Turkey's domestic and regional situation and role in Western affairs? What has the effect been on the role/influence of the Turkish military? What changes will Ankara's new role impose on Turkey as NATO ally, member of Europe, and cooperative friend of the U.S.? ~~(S)~~

5. What domestic or regional factors would cause Turkey to lean more toward more radical Muslim states, exploit the limits of Turkic sympathies, or become more active -- perhaps interventionist -- around its periphery? ~~(S)~~

Iraq/Iran/The Middle East

6. What is likely to be Turkey's long term policy toward Saddam Hussein and the coalition effort to compel Iraqi compliance with all relevant UN resolutions? Will Turkey continue to extend the mandate for Provide Comfort? Under what scenarios will Turkey allow PCII aircraft to carry out air strike missions in Iraq? (S)

7. What leverage does the U.S. have to influence the Turkish-Iraqi relationship? What can the U.S. do to maintain Turkey's support for enforcement of UN resolutions on Iraq? (S)

8. How will Turkey's relationship with the Iraqi Kurdish Front and the Iraqi National Congress evolve? What impact will this evolution have on Iraqi-Turkish relations? (S)

9. What are the implications for U.S. goals vis-a-vis Iraq of Turkey's Kurdish problem? What are the prospects for continued Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian support for the PKK? How can the U.S. influence PKK sponsors? (S)

10. What is likely to be Turkey's long-term policy toward Iran? Does Turkey perceive Iran to be a threat to its national interests in the region and its stability at home? What are the relationships between Turkey, Iran, the Kurds, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and what are the implications for Turkish-Iranian relations? How can the U.S. influence Turkish-Iranian relations? (S)

11. What are the prospects for improved Israeli-Turkish relations and cooperation between the two in the region? What can the U.S. do to stimulate cooperation? (S)

12. What are the prospects for greater cooperation between Turkey and the GCC States? How critical is continued GCC financing for the Turkish military? Does the U.S. role in creating the Turkish Defense Fund offer us leverage? (S)

Europe/The Balkans

13. What are the prospects for Turkish-European relations? What opportunities/assets do the Turks have to deepen their connections with the West? How can the U.S. facilitate relations between Turkey and Europe? (S)

14. What is the Turks' attitude toward a successful conclusion of the Cyprus negotiations? What must Ankara do to help achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations this year? How can the U.S. work most effectively with the Turkish government to this end? (S)

15. How do the Turks view improvements in relations with Greece? What pitfalls exist and how can the U.S. play a facilitating role? (S)

16. What are Turkish policies in the Balkans more broadly? What do we foresee for Turkish-Bulgarian relations? With Turkey's

relationship with Albania, Macedonia and the other states of post-war Yugoslavia? (S)

Caucasus/Central Asia

17. What are the Turks' long term goals for Central Asia? What initiatives/resources are they bringing to bear to achieve their goals? What specific programs are the Turks conducting in Central Asia? To what extent are they coordinating with U.S. programs? Can we create greater synergy? At what level of commitment? Should we channel some U.S. funds through Turkey to reduce the overhead costs of delivering U.S. assistance? (S)

18. How does Iranian-Turkish competition in Central Asia influence Turkish actions there? How can the U.S. support Turkish efforts to compete effectively with Iran for influence in the region? (S)

19. What are the long term prospects for Russian-Turkish relations? Where do potential flash points exist? How can the U.S. defuse potential tensions that might arise? (S)

20. How has the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute influenced prospects for Turkish-Armenian relations? How realistic are the scenarios in which Turkey would intervene militarily in the NKO dispute? How has the Turkish-Azeri relationship complicated Turkey's aspirations for relations with Armenia/Russia/Central Asia? (S)

U.S.-Turkish Relations

21. What are the current political, economic, diplomatic, and military contours of the U.S.-Turkish relationship? (S)

22. What is the state of U.S.-Turkish military cooperation? What can we expect in the upcoming DECA review? What do the Turks expect regarding security assistance? Intelligence cooperation? How will our own budget climate affect what we are prepared to give them? (S)

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS

1. What material and political resources do we have to apply now to achieve our strategic goals? (S)

2. Given those issues and circumstances for which the Turks expect/will solicit our active political support, what additional diplomatic contingency plans should we develop in the event of Turkish military intervention in the Balkans or the Caucasus? (S)

3. What concrete steps should we take over the next year to our advance our strategic goals? I.e., how can we use security assistance, surplus equipment, democratization programs/funding, political support to Ankara on key issues, etc. to advance our shared agenda? (S)

4. Do we need new consultation mechanisms to shepherd our policy along more effectively? Are there programs/initiatives we can

develop and announce in conjunction with a President/Premier meeting? (S)

TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than April 30, 1993. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 9, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (U)

In confronting the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, the United States will continue to assign the highest priority to arms control and nonproliferation. Although the danger of a massive, coordinated nuclear strike against the United States is greatly diminished, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and enhanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems will constitute a fundamental security threat to the United States, its friends and allies, in the coming decade. The strategic nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons agreements successfully negotiated during the last several years must be ratified, implemented and their compliance assured. At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that "negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date." The two countries are also preparing to resume their dialogue on the ABM Treaty and cooperation in the area of strategic defense. Finally, arms control and confidence building measures in regional areas of tension could well take on added importance in the years ahead. ~~(C)~~

The U.S. Government must be efficiently organized to address the tasks associated with fulfilling these arms control and non-proliferation priorities. Some agencies have already taken steps to that end, particularly in terms of placing greater emphasis on addressing nonproliferation concerns. However, decisions have yet to be made with regard to one paramount issue: the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ~~(C)~~

Given our commitments to stemming proliferation, implementing existing arms control agreements, and pursuing more vigorously new arms control priorities, the following organizational issues must be expeditiously addressed:

-- What has been the historical role of ACDA; how has that role changed; what is the budget/staffing of ACDA; how effective has the agency been?

-- Does having a separate agency devoted solely to analysis of arms control and nonproliferation issues and representation of those considerations in the interagency process best serve U.S. interests?

-- If so, what are the options for revitalizing and/or restructuring ACDA?

-- If not, how should the State Department be reorganized to assume ACDA's responsibilities? Would there be cost savings? If so, of what magnitude and how achieved?

-- What are the policy and resource implications of each alternative? ~~(C)~~

Part II: Tasking

This review will be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff, in consultation with the Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. The review will focus on two written products: (1) The March 28, 1993 State Department paper entitled "The Future Role of ACDA", which was prepared by the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs in informal consultation with representatives from DOD, ACDA and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and (2) a separate paper to be prepared by ACDA which will make the case for its continued existence, as concisely as possible. ~~(C)~~

All agencies should provide comments on the State Department paper and the options it outlines no later than Wednesday, April 14, 1993. The separate ACDA paper should be submitted to the NSC by this date as well. ~~(C)~~

The review should be completed by April 21, 1993. It should include clear policy options/recommendations which will reflect analysis of the reasonable spectrum of possibilities for the future of ACDA. Differences in view among agencies should be noted. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 13, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Democracy Programs (U)

Support for democracy and human rights is a guiding principle of the Administration's foreign policy. President Clinton has declared: "Our strategic interests and our moral values are both rooted in this goal. As we help democracy expand, we make ourselves and our allies safer. Democracies rarely go to war with each other or traffic in terrorism. They make more reliable partners in trade and diplomacy. Growing market economies expand individual opportunity and social tolerance." (U)

In addition, democracies are less likely to harm the environment and more likely to respect human rights and to foster tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities. Ultimately, our concern with opportunities to promote democratization abroad both draws upon and reinforces democratic traditions in the United States. (U)

Japan and Western Europe have added democratization to their international agenda. The USG is challenged to consider how to coordinate its own democratization programs with its industrial allies while working with like-minded developing and formerly socialist countries. (C)

This review process will proceed in two stages. First, agencies will describe their current programs, policies, funding levels and institutional mechanisms that promote democratization. The Interagency Working Group (IWG) will then schedule a meeting to discuss these items. Second, agencies will propose options for policy and programs. The IWG will be chaired by the Department of State. Final reports will be submitted by May 15. (C)

A special sub-group on Public Diplomacy and Broadcasting will be formed to consider that subject, co-chaired by State and OMB. (C)

I. BACKGROUND

A. TRENDS (INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY)

1. Describe the trends in the number and type of democratic governments over the past ten years, five years. Describe the main factors that account for the trends, including those which are regional in nature. Include examples of democratization including the building of a civil society and the relationship of the development of civil institutions to the democratization process (e.g. independent judiciary, professionalized military, etc.) What has been the relationship of the evolution of democracy and of human rights? (C)

2. Analyze the factors which affect the viability of newly democratic states (such as Chile). Identify the major difficulties they are experiencing in institutionalizing democracy and civil society. (C)

3. Characterize the relationship between the open entrepreneurial economy and political democracy. (C)

4. Project likely scenarios for democratization in regions and key countries over the next year and three to five years. Specify the major variables that could cause different outcomes. Special attention should be given to ethnic and religious conflicts. (C)

5. To what extent and in what forms has outside influence effectively promoted and defended democracy in various societies? Evaluate the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like the National Endowment for Democracy, in contrast to programs of governmental agencies like USAID. Provide concrete examples of successful and unsuccessful efforts to promote democratization. (C)

7. In what ways does USG support for democracy internationally strengthen democratic traditions and institutions in the United States? ~~(C)~~

B. CURRENT PROGRAMS (ALL)

1. Each agency should submit data and narrative describing its existing programs to promote democracy. (A section on program evaluation follows.) Included should be:

a. Public diplomacy (USIA);

b. Development assistance (USAID);

c. Counternarcotics/anti-terrorism/refugee/human rights assistance (STATE);

d. Security assistance (including IMET) and military cooperation (DOD/STATE);

e. Multilateral lending (e.g., IMF, IBRD, EBRD, etc.) (TREASURY/STATE);

f. Concessional loans/credit guarantees/investment insurance (USDA, OPIC);

g. Trade policy (e.g., MFN) (USTR);

h. UN institutions (STATE);

i. Regional organizations (STATE); and

j. Bilateral/regional policies; discussion of current strategy to coordinate with other industrial democracies (Western Europe, Japan, and Canada) in support of democratization inside and outside their regions; (STATE)

k. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; (STATE)

l. Population, environment and democracy; (STATE/USAID)

m. Educational institutions (i.e. university school exchanges); (State/USIA)

n. U.S. NGOs and NGOs overseas. (ALL) ~~(C)~~

2. What are the current mechanisms to set democratization priorities globally, regionally, and by country within the Department of State? Within the Executive Branch? Who takes the lead, and at what level? What are the current interagency mechanisms for the coordination of global, regional, or country programs within the Function 150 Account? What are the current interagency mechanisms for coordination of global, regional, or country programs between Function 150 and other programs? (State) ~~(C)~~

3. Each agency should submit an evaluation of its current programs. (U)

4. Based on those submissions, OMB and State should prepare a summary of current programs and their effectiveness. (U)

5. Give special attention to evaluating the effectiveness of USG-supported NGOs that promote democratization. (ALL) ~~(C)~~

II. OPTIONS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMS (STATE)

A. DEFINITION AND DOCTRINE

Develop and evaluate options for USG working standards for democracy and democratization. A baseline definition is at Tab I. How does "democratization" differ from or overlap with "human rights" or "civil society"? Develop and evaluate options for a USG rationale that can be used to explain to the public, the Congress, the media, and foreign governments why the U.S. believes that it is in our interest to promote democracy in other countries. ~~(C)~~

B. POLICY ELEMENTS

In addition to having themes such as the options above, a policy on democratization must include responses to questions such as those listed below. State should develop proposed policies to promote and encourage democracy globally with special attention to emerging democracies and those at risk (e.g. South Korea and Venezuela):

1. How should the U.S. approach political reform in non-democratic states of strategic importance (e.g. Saudi Arabia);

2. How could we justify taking political and economic steps against some non-democratic states and not others (e.g. Burma versus China);

3. Under what circumstances, if any, are we prepared to accept limitations on democracy (e.g. Algeria's potential democratic election of a non-democratic party, or Peru's limits on democracy during an insurgency);

4. How should we deal with the threat of disorder in the wake of the removal of a non-democratic government (e.g. Zaire)? How do we relate to countries in which a democratic government is overthrown;

5. How do we relate democracy to other U.S. foreign policy goals when they may conflict (e.g. proliferation, environment, terrorism, and narcotics);

6. What is the explanation for the apparent contradiction between the U.S. policies of non-interference in the internal affairs and promotion of democracy in non-democratic countries;

7. What is the relationship of U.S. policies on democratization and ethnic/regional self-determination;

8. In what ways does religious fundamentalism affect democratization movements;

9. Are there trade-offs involved in meeting short-term goals (e.g. supervising elections) and long-term goals (building institutions of civil society)? Should different agencies be responsible for these different tasks;

10. How does the spread of U.S. popular culture intersect with pro-democracy policies of the USG -- both positively and negatively;

C. POLICY OPTIONS (ALL)

Develop a spectrum of concise and differentiated options for overall policy on the role of democratization in U.S. foreign policy. Compare those policies against a common set of criteria. All agencies may submit options. Illustrative options include:

1. Existing Policy: Declaratory support for "democracy" supported by specialized programs and conditionality on some forms of assistance. ~~(C)~~

2. Sustaining Policy: Expanded and coordinated political, trade, and assistance efforts to assist newly democratic states. ~~(C)~~

3. Multilateral Declarations, Alliance and Guarantees: Mutual commitment among democratic states to non-military measures, to be taken in a coordinated manner, in the event democracy is threatened in a partner state. ~~(C)~~

4. Democratic Expansion: Targeting specific countries where there is a good prospect that coordinated positive inducements and negative disincentives could produce measurable change to democracy. ~~(C)~~

5. An NGO-Based Democratization Policy: Concentrating most USG resources on non-governmental organizations (U.S. based and indigenous NGOs). What potential exists for enlisting NGOs of the development and humanitarian communities in civic developments as well? ~~(C)~~

D. PROGRAM OPTIONS (ALL)

Agencies should propose new or significantly enhanced programs related to one or more of the policy options (examples below). The programs should be compared against a common set of criteria. Each option should include (at an annex, if necessary) a detailed program justification and description, including a three-year funding profile, if applicable. The following list is illustrative only: ~~(C)~~

1. Democracy Corps;

2. Support of Parties in Exile;

3. Asian Democracy Radio;

4. Selective Trade Conditionality;

5. Additional MDB Conditionality;

6. Enhanced Civil-Military Relations, Democracy Training for Militaries;

7. Formal International Organization of Democratic Nations;

8. Amendments to U.N. Charter and/or other basic documents of the U.N. and/or other international organizations;

9. Expanded sanctions against countries in which democracy is overthrown;

10. Women's issues;

11. Expanded use of public diplomacy, media, cultural activities, exchanges, etc., to disseminate broad-based message of the advantages of the democratic path. (U)

E. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (STATE)

The singular importance for American interests of a successful transition to sustainable democracy and a market economy in the former Soviet Union cannot be over-estimated. The resurgence of an intolerant and authoritarian State armed with nuclear weapons would undercut the economic and political basis for America's economic recovery program and threaten the stability of Europe. The USG has already some programs in place but, given the extraordinary importance of the FSU, what programs are available to the USG to promote and sustain democracy in those new nations - including technical assistance, support for NGOs and so forth? (C)

F. MAKING POLICY OPERATIONAL (STATE)

1. Develop and evaluate options for creating an interagency group to establish near/mid-term goals and monitor progress toward those goals. Among the options that should be considered are a) a list of target countries and milestones for them, and b) an annual report to Congress. (C)

2. Develop a plan for a high-level U.S. official announcement of policy and programs on democratization followed by appropriate diplomatic and public diplomacy action. (C)

III. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

A subgroup co-chaired by State and OMB should develop and evaluate options for making our international broadcasting services more effective instruments of the President's agenda, including but not limited to democratization. The subgroup should identify the **broad goals** that U.S. international broadcasting should pursue and how they can best be met. For example, it should evaluate complementary services, such as targeted or surrogate broadcasting and general interest programs, determine the relative emphasis that each should receive, and consider organizational forms and relationships most appropriate

for achieving the goals associated with each. What criteria should be employed to evaluate alternative options? This review should be done with an eye toward rationalizing and, where possible, consolidating broadcast services. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

ANNEX: KEY ELEMENTS OF A WORKING DEMOCRACY

The key elements of a working democracy are:

-- conducive conditions for the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms (freedoms of: expression and right to communication; peaceful assembly and demonstration; association; thought, conscience and religion; movement; also right to enjoy property alone or in common); also the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to minorities;

-- rule of law (based on acceptance of value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression): equality before the law and equal protection, effective means of redress; independent judiciary, provisions for due process;

-- political pluralism, free and fair political processes and elections;

-- representative government, an executive accountable to the elected legislature or to the electorate;

-- duty of government and public authorities to comply with the constitution and to act consistent with the law;

-- clear separation between the State and political parties;

-- government, administration, and judiciary exercised in accordance with the system established by law;

-- military forces and police under the control of, and accountable to, the civil authorities;

-- open legislative process;

-- tolerant, civil society with independent institutions and voluntary groups;

-- independent media;

-- conformity with international law obligations;

-- all of the above reinforced by a secure environment (peaceful relations with neighbors and the solving of internal problems via peaceful democratic means) and a market economy. (U)

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)

New developments in telecommunications hold great promise for the American economy -- its productivity and global competitiveness. But they also pose risks to the government's ability to enforce laws and protect national security. We must, with some urgency, find new ways to accommodate the government's interests in law enforcement, privacy, national security, productivity and competitiveness. (U)

The President has directed in Presidential Decision Directive/ NSC-5 that agencies (1) seek the installation of a key-escrow technology in communications encryption devices for commercial sale; (2) seek the adoption of a new encryption standard based on key-escrow techniques; and (3) acquire certain encryption devices. In addition to these actions, the President has directed a thorough study of broader telecommunications and encryption issues for the purpose of determining the least burdensome and most effective methods of maintaining our current capabilities to conduct legally-authorized and effective communications intercepts and to control encryption exports. This PRD initiates that study. ~~(C)~~

BACKGROUND

The Clinton Administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and National Information Infrastructure that depends on a developing synergy between telecommunications and computer technologies. Rapid changes in both the telecommunications and computer industries have blurred the traditional gaps that separated these technologies. The result of these changes has significantly improved both our telecommunications infrastructure and computational capability. (U)

At the same time many of the technologies that facilitate rapid implementation of these advanced information systems inhibit lawfully authorized electronic surveillance by government agencies. For example, some advanced telecommunications that form the backbone of the information superhighway also nullify the effectiveness of traditional methods of carrying out court authorized wiretaps. The encryption technologies that can be used to protect privacy and business data can also be used by lawbreakers to prevent the government from obtaining contents of information it is authorized to intercept. (U)

This study will broadly assess trends in telecommunications and encryption technology and their impact on law enforcement and intelligence gathering. It will also evaluate the impact of the encryption technology proposed in PDD/NSC-5. This policy review should be completed with a report of the NSC Deputies Committee by June 30, 1993. It should include a full range of clear policy options/recommendations for dealing with these issues. Any difference in view among agencies should be noted. At a minimum, the review should address the questions and issues stated below. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

Telecommunications Technologies

1. What are the trends in telecommunications technologies -- both in the United States and elsewhere -- that could affect the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence communities to meet their respective missions? How widespread is the use of advanced telecommunications technologies and in what applications, both domestic and foreign? What is the estimated future demand for these types of technologies in the near, intermediate and long term? How are these trends affected by changes in encryption technology? (S)

2. What is the impact, including risks and opportunities, of advances in telecommunications services on:

a. federal, state and local law enforcement capabilities and performance (including public safety); (U)

b. national security intelligence capabilities and performance; (S)

c. privacy and security of personal, commercial, and government information in the U.S. and abroad; (U)

d. U.S. commercial competitiveness? (U)

Encryption Technologies

3. What are the principal encryption techniques in use within the United States and elsewhere throughout the world? How widespread is the use of each encryption technique and in what applications, both domestic and foreign? What is the estimated future demand for these encryption techniques in the near, intermediate and long term? What is driving this demand for both legitimate and non-legitimate end-users? How are these trends affected by other trends in advanced telecommunications? (S)

4. What is the impact, including risks and opportunities, of advances in encryption technologies on:

a. federal, state and local law enforcement capabilities and performance (including public safety); (U)

b. national security intelligence capabilities and performance; (S)

c. privacy and security of personal, commercial, and government information in the U.S. and abroad; (U)

d. U.S. commercial competitiveness; (U)

e. the security and reliability of the telecommunications network. (U)

Key-Escrow Technique for Encryption

5. What are the uses, domestic and foreign, of the key-escrow technology developed by the government in software, hardware and telecommunications applications? Assess the relative practicality of voluntary versus mandatory uses of this approach? What are the reactions of industry to this approach? What reactions to this encryption approach might be expected from foreign manufacturers and governments? For domestic and foreign licensing of the technology? What institutional agents are feasible for key-escrow safekeeping? (U)

6. Are there unacceptable risks that the key-escrow technique may be readily disabled when implemented in software encryption products? If so, what other possible solutions might assure authorized government access to information protected by software encryption and still afford reasonable encryption protection to software end-users? (U)

7. Can key-escrow techniques other than the techniques described in PDD/NSC-5 be developed by drawing on the resources of U.S. encryption and telecommunications industries, as well as on

government experts? Review of alternative techniques should consider how to prevent the development of interoperable devices that defeat the key-escrow feature. (C)

Export Controls

8. Do export controls have an impact on these industry sectors? Is that impact quantifiable? Do they have an impact on national security? Is that impact quantifiable? What are the current and likely future techniques by which foreign governments control encryption and advanced telecommunications technologies of concern to law enforcement and the intelligence community? How effective are these controls? What has been the effect of changes in export controls over the past few years? (S)

PART II: OPTIONS

Options should be developed to answer the following key question: How can the government accommodate: (1) the use of encryption and advanced telecommunications; (2) the need to assure government capabilities to access communications content and to decrypt such content when authorized by law; and (3) the continued competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers of encryption, advanced telecommunications equipment, and computer hardware and software? In answering this question, specific attention should be given to the key-escrow technique. The results of previous proposals to regulate advanced telecommunications and encryption should also be assessed as part of developing these options. (S)

The following should guide the development of the options:

-- Whether and in what circumstances legislation or other regulation of encryption and advanced telecommunications is warranted; (U)

-- Whether these interests can be accommodated through (1) cooperative arrangements with manufacturers and telecommunications service providers and those who manufacture and offer encryption services; (2) alternative investigative/collection techniques; (3) technological innovation; (4) international agreements/arrangements; and (5) adjustments to domestic and international standards. (U)

In developing these options, their costs should be provided along with likely reactions of industry, the Congress, foreign manufacturers and governments, and those entities affected by the recommended option. Recommended implementing strategies should be provided. (U)

PART III: TASKING

An IWG will be established by the NSC that will include representatives from all cognizant agencies. The IWG will ensure that there are early and frequent consultations with industry throughout the course of this review, subject to appropriate protection of classified information. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Directive 28, War Powers Issue. (6 pages)	04/23/1993	P1/b(1)

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2010-1227-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1993

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2010-1227-M (2.18)
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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SUBJECT: War Powers Issues (U)

The President has called for a review of the War Powers Resolution and related issues, in consultation with relevant agencies of the Executive branch and Members of Congress. In so doing, he has underscored that it is in the national interest that Executive-Congressional relations on this issue minimize unnecessary tensions while maximizing those constructive discussions dictated by the Constitution and the public good. (U)

The Administration needs to determine its position on the War Powers Resolution, and decide whether it should respond differently than past Administrations to congressional efforts to authorize uses of U.S. military forces overseas. If the Administration decides to break with the status quo, it needs to determine whether to pursue legislative or non-legislative avenues to address use of force issues with the Congress. (C)

The non-legislative route could entail a presidential statement of policy and follow-on discussions with the Congress to reach a new understanding. The legislative alternative could include an effort to amend the War Powers Resolution to accommodate principal Congressional and Executive Branch concerns; or to seek agreement with the Congress on a new mechanism to deal with use of force issues. (C)

In preparation for a Deputies Committee meeting and a possible Principals meeting, three papers should be prepared as listed below. Agencies should endeavor to identify and assess alternative options and no presumptions should be made about policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should be made explicit in the analysis. While a lead agency is

designated for preparation of the papers, the views of each agency should be indicated on each major issue. Differences of view should be explained and not reconciled. The lead agency should provide its paper to the other agencies for comments. Papers are requested by close of business May 7. (U)

I. **LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF WAR POWERS RESOLUTION** (Justice)

The paper should address the following issues:

1. In brief, what is the historical background of the War Powers Resolution? What were the main reasons Congress enacted it? Why was it vetoed? What are its major provisions, in summary form? (U)

2. What are the agencies' views on the constitutionality of the major provisions of the War Powers Resolution, including, in particular, sections 2(c), 5(b), and 8(a)? (U)

-- To what extent do these views differ from legal positions of past Administrations? (U)

-- When past Administrations have questioned the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, what general policy statements have they made regarding compliance with the resolution? (U)

-- To what extent are these views shared or challenged by leading constitutional scholars? What are the contrary viewpoints? (U)

3. In what situations is the President constitutionally required to obtain Congressional authorization prior to using U.S. armed forces overseas? (U)

-- What has been the legal view and practice on this issue of past Presidents? What has been the legal view of leading constitutional scholars? (U)

4. Can Congress, by joint resolution, constitutionally require the removal of U.S. forces from deployments overseas? (U)

-- Can Congress, by joint resolution, constitutionally compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces by terminating funding for a particular deployment? (U)

5. Under what circumstances, if any, would the Courts find justiciable questions of Executive branch compliance with the War Powers Resolution? (U)

-- Can Congress, by joint resolution, constitutionally confer justiciability on the courts or create standing for members of Congress concerning Executive branch compliance with the War Powers Resolution? (U)

II. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION (DoD)

The paper should address the following issues:

A. Deployments of U.S. Forces

1. To what extent has the existence of the War Powers Resolution affected U.S. decision-making about the deployment of U.S. forces? (Provide specific examples). ~~(C)~~

2. To what extent has the War Powers Resolution influenced foreign perceptions about U.S. willingness to deploy or our ability to maintain the deployment of forces? (Provide specific examples). ~~(C)~~

-- CIA should review major foreign press reports on the War Powers Resolution and past congressional-executive conflicts regarding it. ~~(C)~~

3. Has the War Powers Resolution adversely affected the conduct of foreign policy? How have any difficulties manifested themselves? ~~(C)~~

4. What problems have arisen in applying the War Powers Resolution to special deployments for counterterrorism, covert paramilitary actions, law enforcement or other operations? ~~(C)~~

-- How have past Administrations handled such operations with respect to the War Powers Resolution? ~~(C)~~

5. In the past, how has the War Powers Resolution affected Executive branch decisions on U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations? ~~(C)~~

B. Reporting Under the War Powers Resolution

1. What reports have prior Administrations made to Congress in connection with the War Powers Resolution? [List] (U)

2. Has Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the substance of the reports provided by the Executive branch under the War Powers Resolution? If so, what corrective steps were taken? (U)

3. What legal approaches have prior Administrations developed to avoid conceding the constitutionality of the resolution in their reporting to Congress on U.S. uses of force? What was the congressional reaction to these approaches? (U)

C. Consultations Under the War Powers Resolution

1. What has been the practice of past Administrations concerning consultations with Congress? With whom were they carried out, in what time frame and on what kind of deployments? Are there examples where Congress was "consulted" to solicit their views rather than to "inform" them of a decision? (U)

2. What bureaucratic process has been established to bring potential war powers situations to the attention of senior officials? Does this process bring the situations to their attention in time for them to make decisions about how to consult? ~~(C)~~

3. What concerns, if any, have limited consultations in the past (e.g. operational security)? How valid are these concerns? Does CIA's reporting experience with its oversight committees confirm or contradict these concerns? ~~(C)~~

4. What have been the primary congressional criticisms of the consultation process? (U)

5. How have past Administrations interpreted the phrase "imminent involvement in hostilities"? (U)

III. **POLICY OPTIONS** (State)

This paper should address three overall issues:

1. The areas where executive-congressional cooperation can be improved. (U)

2. The merits of pursuing any proposed changes in policy through legislative versus non-legislative approaches. ~~(C)~~

3. The implications of increased U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations for the Administration's position on war powers issues. ~~(C)~~

The paper should analyze the following specific issues:

A. Reporting

1. What changes can be made in the timing, content or method of supplying reports to Congress on U.S. uses of force? (U)

2. What are the advantages and drawbacks of providing more substantive information in the reports? (U)

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of sharing more intelligence information with the Congress in classified annexes to these reports? ~~(C)~~

B. Consultations

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of bringing Congress into the decision-making process earlier on U.S. uses of force? (U)

2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of major proposals to improve consultations with Congress? Do these proposals require legislative action or can they be carried out solely by

the Executive branch? In answering these questions, discuss the merits of proposals that: (U)

-- Define the purpose of consultation (e.g. to inform in a timely manner, discuss and seek advice). (U)

-- Specify the Members of Congress who will be consulted. (U)

-- Broaden the consultation requirement beyond situations of imminent hostilities to reach all significant deployments of U.S. armed forces. (U)

-- Establish a new consultative mechanism (such as in the Nunn-Byrd-Warner-Mitchell proposal) for periodic executive-congressional consultations on areas of potential military deployment. (U)

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of sharing more intelligence information with Congress in an improved consultation process? (C)

C. Congressional Authorization of Use of the Armed Forces

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of seeking congressional authorization before using U.S. military forces overseas? Identify and assess major congressional proposals regarding such authorizations. (C)

2. What are alternative policy statements, with their advantages and disadvantages, that the President might make concerning his intention to seek or welcome congressional authorization for uses of U.S. military forces in specific circumstances (e.g. when time permits and the decision is to commit substantial numbers of U.S. forces to combat; in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations)? (C)

3. Would conclusion of Article 43 agreements under the UN Charter respond to or exacerbate Congressional War Powers concerns? What are the legal and policy advantages and disadvantages of such agreements? (C)

4. What changes might be required in the U.N. Participation Act to provide for more extensive and regular participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations? (C)

5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Nunn-Byrd-Warner-Mitchell proposal, which would remove the 60-day automatic withdrawal provision in exchange for an improved consultation mechanism and/or expedited procedures for consideration of a joint resolution to require withdrawal of U.S. armed forces? How would these proposals affect the ability of the Executive branch to formulate and carry out foreign policy? (C)

D. Legislative Versus Non-Legislative Approaches

1. If the Administration were to seek amendment of the War Powers Resolution, what elements should the Executive branch seek to have removed from the current Resolution? Why? (U)

-- What provisions should the Executive branch seek to add (such as advance authorization of U.N. peacekeeping operations) or be prepared to accept being added by Congress to the War Powers Resolution? Why? (U)

2. If the Administration does not seek repeal or amendment of the War Powers Resolution, what policy statement could the Administration offer about compliance with it? Identify alternatives, with advantages and disadvantages. (U)

3. Would foreign countries' perception of the U.S. ability or desire to use military forces be affected by an Administration decision to 1) maintain the status quo on its views of the War Powers Resolution; 2) seek non-legislative changes in dealing with Congress on War Powers questions; or 3) seek legislative changes in the existing War Powers Resolution? ~~(C)~~.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Direcitve 30 (8 pages)	04/26/1993	P1/b(1)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-30

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2010-1227-M(2.19)
KDE 09125/19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIR, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the European Community (S)

OBJECTIVE

The objective of the policy review is to develop agreed goals and strategies that will guide our relations with the European Community. The review should also consider how best to assure effective coordination of U.S. policy toward the EC, given the many facets of our interaction with the Community. (S)

BACKGROUND

The European Community is collectively our largest trading partner, our largest export market, a major economic competitor, an aspiring player in the formation of world macroeconomic policy, and an important partner in dealing with regional and global problems. (S)

The transatlantic tie is the most balanced trading relationship that we have. In 1991, U.S. exports to the EC rose to $103 billion for a trade surplus of $17 billion. The U.S. and the EC have $200 billion invested in each other's economies, and major U.S. and European corporations now have substantial, integrated operations striding the Atlantic. Collectively, the EC is second only to the U.S. as an economic entity, with its 1992 GDP estimated at $5.7 trillion. Cooperation with the G-7 is vital for the world economy. The EC includes four of the G-7 states, and the President of the Commission and current EC Council President attend all G-7 summits. (S)

Increasingly, our relations with the EC have moved beyond a focus solely on trade and economics. Today, it is impossible to

separate our relations with the European Community from our political, security, and defense relations with Europe via NATO, in the CSCE, and through bilateral cooperation. We talk with the Europeans about world problems -- Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Bosnia -- as much or more in EC-related contexts as we do in the context of the Alliance, and our allies are increasingly consulting among themselves and developing common positions on these issues within the EC framework. (C)

Our relationship with the EC must thus be viewed in the context of our historic ties to Europe, our role in the security of Europe, and the shared perspectives and values with which we and Europe approach world problems. As the EC evolves, so too must U.S. policy. The EC is attempting a significant transformation: from a customs union to a unified market; from a group of 12 to one of 18 or more members with additional associates; from an economic community to a community with political, monetary, and foreign policies, and potentially a defense identity. The outcome of this transformation is uncertain, because of dynamics within the EC and because much depends on developments beyond the EC's control, especially to its east. (C)

The transformation of the EC will be the source of both opportunities and challenges for the United States. To the degree that the transformation produces an outward-looking, unified EC, it will be both a potentially powerful and wealthy partner on a range of political, security, and economic issues and a world actor more capable of independent actors. However, to the degree that the process of internal transformation distracts the EC member states, produces gridlock, or creates a looser organization, the EC may be reluctant or unable to assume a broader role. Whatever the outcome, we will still want to try to mobilize Europe's resources, and they will remain our close allies no matter what shape they are in. (C)

Our approach to the EC and to the other aspects of our relationship with Europe will have an impact -- those in the EC often say a major impact -- on the EC's development and the tenor of transatlantic relations that emerge. At a minimum, with the end of the Cold War, it is unlikely that we could successfully wall off U.S.-EC relations from the Atlantic Alliance or our political interests in Europe. In addition, the potential exists to complement current military and political links with Europe with a solid U.S.-EC relationship and partnership on global issues. (C)

THE CURRENT U.S.-EC RELATIONSHIP

Trade: While the overall, U.S.-EC trade picture is strongly positive, bilateral trade disputes (e.g., discrimination in government procurement practices), as well as disputes in multilateral fora (e.g., agricultural policy in the Uruguay Round) reflect serious differences that must be managed, if not resolved. Our trade disputes often reflect important domestic interests (e.g., farmers), different philosophies about government intervention in the economy (e.g., Airbus), and different legal structures (e.g., uniformly applied EC legislation versus state and local legislation in the U.S.). The

EC's institutional shortcomings make it more difficult to resolve trade disputes. Although the Commission has the negotiating lead, the Council must approve the strategy and the results. In the Council, consensus remains the goal, and members are reluctant to isolate states determined to hold out (especially if they are large). As a result, the dynamics among the member states have a direct impact on the Commission's negotiating authority. Still, the U.S. and the EC share a range of common economic interests, including the opening of Japan's market and the stabilization of economies in transition, that can expand the scope of our economic cooperation. (~~C~~)

Macroeconomics: On global macroeconomic issues, member states retain primary responsibility. They alone participate in the G-7 finance ministers' consultations, although the Commission attends the G-7 Summit. The Commission's role may well increase under the Maastricht Treaty as it gains responsibility for the surveillance process which is to promote the convergence of European fiscal and monetary policies. The Commission has already begun to speak out more on EC-wide macroeconomic policy and the G-7 process, on which it is eager to engage in a dialogue with us. (~~C~~)

Political Cooperation: In order to promote better overall relations, the U.S. and the EC agreed to a declaration on relations in November 1990. That document outlines areas of cooperation and commits us to a range of consultations, including bi-annual presidential-level meetings. This framework has resulted in an intense network of U.S.-EC discussions. Simultaneously, the EC has emerged as an important source of resources and support for the pursuit of shared interests around the world. The EC is, for example, an essential partner in achieving the economic and democratic transformation in Eastern Europe, an important aid contributor for Russia, a vital source of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and other crisis areas, and a major source of development aid. But the consultative process falls short when quick or decisive action is needed. U.S.-EC discussions often run aground on the EC's inability to reach consensus or to take a decision when a member state resists. (C)

Problems of Modern Societies: We have a growing dialogue with the EC on problems that we both face as modern societies such as dealing with privacy, safety and environmental regulations, and tax collection. While some of these issues are trade related, in general this field of discussion has been cooperative and mutually beneficial, and it is expanding. (~~C~~)

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES

Given this setting, our policy goals toward the EC and its member states include the following:

-- To liberalize trade through the successful conclusion of a Uruguay Round agreement and further movement toward common laws, regulations, and policies affecting trade through bilateral and multilateral channels;

-- To resolve bilateral trade disputes not included in the GATT negotiations, to find ways of managing future disputes which avoids trade disruption, to prevent EC protectionism and to make it easier for U.S. companies to operate in the EC;

-- To open third markets, with particular attention to Japan, Russia, and China;

-- To encourage stronger global macroeconomic growth and to strengthen macroeconomic policy coordination;

-- To establish an overall pattern of effective U.S.-European cooperation on regional and global problems and to encourage more responsibility-sharing among us in dealing with them.

-- To improve collaboration on promoting political and economic reform in Russia, the rest of the NIS, and Central and Eastern Europe.

-- To make full use of EC resources in the quest for peace and in any post-peace reconstruction in such areas as the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

-- To promote similar approaches and stronger cooperation on global issues -- on the environment (particularly in multilateral policy development and implementation), counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, human rights and development assistance.

-- To enhance the mutual benefit from our dialogue on problems faced by modern societies.

Underlying these objectives is the potential for developing an effective global partnership on international economic, political, and security issues with what could be an emerging European political and economic superpower. ~~(C)~~

ASSESSMENT AND OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES

I. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

What are the likely trade and investment trends in the U.S.-EC context over the next 10 years? What are the key export and investment sectors? How are those sectors likely to evolve over the next 10-20 years? ~~(C)~~

Agreement with the EC (e.g., market access, agriculture) is a precondition for the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The central question is what approach is most likely to facilitate an agreement that fulfills U.S. objectives, given the conflicting positions within the EC and its current institutional arrangements. USTR Kantor is engaged in trying to forge a Uruguay Round agreement with the EC. The Uruguay Round working group is currently looking at strategies for completion of the Round. This study should not interfere with their efforts, but the PRD can look at the broader question of the best strategies and tactics to use with the EC on trade issues. ~~(C)~~

If the Uruguay Round is successfully concluded, what should be our priorities with the EC in addressing trade and investment issues for the future? Are these better pursued bilaterally or multilaterally? (C)

What are the prospects for resolving current disputes with the EC? What further disputes may emerge over the next year? Should we consider establishing new bilateral mechanisms to manage and resolve these disputes? Are there grounds to be concerned about movement toward a "fortress Europe" mentality in the EC, and if so what should we do to counter such a trend? (C)

II. MACROECONOMIC POLICY

What are the prospects for encouraging the EC to pursue a stronger growth-oriented policy and how best should we go about doing that? The President recently raised this subject with Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand and Jacques Delors. All three pointed to EC efforts to promote growth as an essential complement to member state initiatives. (C)

Do efforts to establish an EMU facilitate or hamper growth? What are the pluses and minuses of EMU for us? What approach should we take toward the EMU process? (C)

At present, macroeconomic coordination with the EC takes place primarily with its member states in the context of the G-7 process. Can we use the Commission to advance our G-7 goals with individual EC member states? Should we consider expanding our bilateral dialogue with the Commission to include appropriate macroeconomic issues? (C)

III. EUROPEAN UNITY AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY

The U.S. has regularly stated that it supports European integration, and that it is up to the Europeans to decide how they want that process to proceed, provided that Europe remains open and outward looking. This has been based on the judgement that on balance we would probably gain more from increased unity than we would lose and that we could not in any case be seen to oppose that process. There has been criticism here and in Europe that we have not been as supportive of European integration as our stated policy indicates, especially in the security area. The most skeptical Europeans, particularly in France, argue that we want to keep Europe divided politically and economically to maintain our dominant position. (C)

What are the prospects for further political and economic unification (i.e., European Union)? Do we need to be concerned about an upsurge of nationalism, protectionism, or right-wing parties within the EC? To what degree, and under what conditions, is the EC likely to maintain a common foreign and defense policy? What would an EC foreign and defense identity be likely to mean in practice? What would the implications be for NATO, for CSCE, in the UN? What are the costs and benefits of European Union for U.S. interests? (C)

What can the U.S. do to affect the development of the European Union? Should the U.S. take a more active role in aiding its development? If so, how? If not, should we try to remain neutral or somehow make our views known? (C)

How is the EC likely to address the pressures for enlargement? What are the economic and political implications of developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the EC (e.g., trade, immigration)? What impact would enlargement have on the "deepening" of the Community and on its decision making? What effect would enlargement have for the WEU and for NATO, both via indirect security commitments to new EC members and via possible NATO membership for new members? What are the advantages and disadvantages of enlargement for us? How can the U.S. ensure that enlargement takes place in a manner that does not harm U.S. interests? (C)

IV. AREAS FOR EXPANDED COOPERATION

It is increasingly difficult to separate our dialogue with European allies on international political and security questions into clear categories -- NATO, bilateral, or EC. In the UNSC, we regularly deal with the "EC three" on key questions. On Bosnia, we deal with some questions in NATO and others in the EC context. On the Middle East, we deal as intensely in an EC context as we do bilaterally, and on Eastern Europe, the EC (G-24) forum is the focus for most of our dialogue. In the CSCE, we now confront EC proposals in the security as well as the political areas. In this context, a strong U.S.-EC link that facilitates responsibility-sharing on regional and global problems can complement a renewed NATO in our overall relations with Western Europe. Indeed, if we consider a broad definition of "security" to include democracy, free market systems, and a habitable world, the EC with its democratic values and resources can be an essential partner for us. Thus, a key U.S. objective must be to maximize the use of EC resources and political support where we share common interests, and to create a pattern of responsibility sharing with the EC that serves our interests. There are, for example, areas where we would like the EC to provide most of the resources as it is doing in Eastern Europe, while in other areas we will want to maintain the leading role but benefit from EC support. (C)

What key interests are shared both among the EC members and between the EC and the U.S.? What is the best means for turning our shared interests into common action, including in areas where EC member states disagree? In that regard, what can be learned from the Yugoslav crisis? What areas are ripe for responsibility sharing? Where should we encourage the EC to take the lead and how best can we do that? (C)

In reviewing the best prospects for enhanced cooperation, we should consider the opportunities in the following areas, among others: assistance to economies in transition; the former Yugoslavia; ethnic and nationalist conflict elsewhere in Europe and the former Soviet Union; Middle East peace process; Maghreb; Africa; Haiti and other Caribbean states; Central America; environment; narcotics trafficking; counter-terrorism; nuclear

safety; proliferation; human rights; and development assistance. Delors and his staff have also suggested increased cooperation in scientific and technical research and training. (Note that in the EC, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism fall under the inter-governmental Trevi process rather than the European Political Cooperation, EPC.) ~~(C)~~

V. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL, TRADE AND ECONOMIC

There will be opportunities for us as well as pressures from the EC to make trade-offs between political cooperation, trade and macroeconomics. At some point, for example, we may well want to try to use the leverage associated with our role in Europe and our broader relationships with EC member states to move them on difficult trade and macroeconomic issues. They will hope to do the same. We should consider how to manage this process and perhaps reflect upon some trade-offs or cross-bargaining that might be in our interest. For example, would it be easier, as some Europeans have argued, to get the French to sign on to a GATT accord if it were part of a larger package including German, Japanese, and U.S. contributions to macroeconomic growth and aid to Russia? Would treating the EC more seriously on foreign policy or being more supportive of European unity, yield any benefits in the trade area? ~~(C)~~

VI. BILATERAL MECHANISMS

The question of our institutional relationships with the EC arises in connection with the areas discussed above. Some in the EC (both the Commission and member states including Germany) continue to talk of the desirability of a U.S.-EC treaty. Since the mention of a treaty in the 1989 speech of then-Secretary of State Baker, the consensus in the Bush Administration had been that consideration of a treaty will only be possible once the EC has matured institutionally. ~~(C)~~

Are there steps we can take to enhance the mechanics of our relationship with the EC? How well has the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration worked? Has it boxed us into the wrong set of relationships or meetings with the EC? How can we improve its functioning? Under what circumstances might we consider a formal treaty or other relationships with the EC and what form might those take? What would be the content of a treaty? Could it be negotiated without reviving harmful debate about the roles and relationships of the EC, WEU, and NATO? Is there some mechanism short of a treaty that would be useful? ~~(C)~~

VI. ORGANIZATION

Because of the overlap between the U.S. approach toward the EC and a range of other relationships (e.g., bilateral, NATO, G-7) and the number of U.S. agencies deeply involved in U.S.-EC relations, it would seem to be useful to establish an interagency group to coordinate U.S. policy. What form should that on-going organization take? ~~(C)~~

TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs shall convene a high-level Interagency Working Group (IWG) to conduct this review and to task specific drafting responsibilities. It is understood that USTR would take the lead in preparing trade papers, Treasury would take the lead on macroeconomic issues, and State would take the lead on political issues and those discussing the overall U.S.-EC relationship. Other agencies may be asked to draft specific papers and can contribute as desired. Possible conflicts among policy options and differences of opinion should be stated clearly. Papers should be kept short and useful for IWG discussion. Initial papers should be submitted to the State IWG Chairperson by April 30 for forwarding to the NSC/NEC through formal channels in order to allow a first discussion meeting of the IWG on May 3. NSC should draft the final options paper in consultation with State and the NEC. It should be submitted to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than May 21. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty ~~(S)~~

Background

From March 1983 to January 1991, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy was focused primarily on providing a defense against a massive nuclear first strike emanating from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, U.S. BMD policy was reoriented in light of the reduced Soviet threat toward protecting the United States, its forces deployed abroad, and its friends and allies against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes -- the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes system (GPALS). (U)

Congressional views regarding U.S. BMD policy are reflected in the 1991 Missile Defense Act (MDA), as amended in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization bill. The MDA, as amended, sets forth the following missile defense goals of the United States: (1) comply with the ABM Treaty, including any protocol or amendment thereto, ... while deploying an anti-ballistic missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles; (2) maintain strategic stability; and (3) provide highly effective theater missile defenses to ... the Armed Forces of the U.S. and to friends and Allies. It also urged an effort to negotiate selective amendments/clarifications to the ABM Treaty to improve defense effectiveness. (U)

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In January 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that Russia was ready "jointly to work out and subsequently to create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI." At the June 1992 Summit, it was agreed that the U.S. and Russia should work together with allies and other interested parties in developing a concept for a Global Protection System (GPS) as part of an overall strategy in response to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. GPS talks between the U.S. and Russia at both the political and technical level took place last year, along with consultations with our allies and friends. While these talks have been constructive, no consensus has emerged regarding the form or implementation of a GPS concept. In particular, Moscow did not accept the need to modify the ABM Treaty, on the ground that the relevant threat was of intermediate rather than strategic range. On the other hand, the Russians indicated a need to defend against 3,500 km ballistic missiles and seemed attracted to cooperation with regard to sensors. (S)

On February 2, 1993 Secretary of Defense Aspin directed that FY 1994 funding for SDI be maintained at the FY 1993 nominal level, consistent with the following priorities:

-- Theater Ballistic Missile defense programs should be given highest priority and should be pursued on a prudent event-orientated schedule that provides for adequate testing prior to committing to major deployments.

-- National missile defenses should be given second priority relative to theater missile defenses. The national missile defense program should support deployment beginning no earlier than 2002 of a defensive capability for the continental United States.

-- Brilliant Pebbles funding should be reduced to support a technology base program. Brilliant Eyes development should be slowed pending further review of the role of this system in the revised ballistic missile defense architecture and its contribution to space-based surveillance and warning of ballistic missile attacks. (S)

The Arms Control IWG has determined that the U.S. should propose to the Russians that the next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) take place in June, 1993. In preparing for this SCC meeting, the U.S. Government must determine its position on the ABM and BMD-related issues identified in this PRD. (S)

Review Objectives

This PRD requires a comprehensive examination of U.S. BMD policy, focusing on the following three areas:

-- the objectives the Administration should pursue as a priority in ballistic missile defense;

-- an assessment of what, if any, changes in the ABM Treaty should be sought in light of these objectives, and the modalities for achieving any changes; and

-- a strategy for pursuing our ballistic missile defense objectives with Russia and with friends and allies. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. The Threat

1. What is the current strategic threat to the U.S. from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and how is this threat likely to change in the next 10-15 years?

   - What are the worst reasonable case scenarios of the strategic threat if a successor Russian government emerged with external ambitions or if turmoil in the FSU undermined command and control of strategic weapons? (S)

2. What is the current threat to the U.S. from an accidental and/or unauthorized ballistic missile launch from the FSU? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years? (S)

3. How might the analysis in questions one and two above change if Ukraine continues to stall in carrying out its Lisbon Protocol commitments? (S)

4. What is the current intercontinental-range ballistic missile threat from China? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years? (S)

5. What other countries are likely to develop intercontinental-range missile capabilities over the course of the next 10-15 years? (S)

6. What is the threat to U.S. friends and allies and U.S. forces deployed abroad from intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles? How will this threat evolve over the next 10-15 years? (S)

B. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

1. What are U.S. national security requirements for strategic and theater ballistic missile defense? (S)

2. What is the maximum level of defense that can be provided by a single ABM site that is compliant with the ABM Treaty, against a range of limited attack scenarios, including accidental or unauthorized launch of a few CIS SLBMs or ICBMs or a single launch of an intercontinental range missile by a proliferant state?

   - What contribution would sensor enhancements (e.g., ground-based ABM radars, GSTS, Brilliant Eyes, upgrades to existing BMEWS radars) make to the effectiveness of such a single-site defense?

   - What would this system cost to deploy and maintain, over what period?

   - How much more effective could this defense be made by adding more ground-based sites and/or interceptors (with or without various sensor enhancements)? How much more would it cost to deploy and to maintain? Would such an expanded defense pose a threat to Russia's deterrent capability using START II forces? (S)

3. What are the capabilities of THAAD and other ground-based ATBMs against theater ballistic missiles?

   - What capabilities would a Russian interceptor comparable to THAAD have against U.S. strategic systems, UK/French systems? (S)

4. What ATBM capabilities can be developed with sea-based and/or air-delivered ATBMs?

   - Could the sea or air-based systems contribute to multi-tier defense? How mobile would they be? How long could they remain on station? (S)

5. What increase in capability would deployment of space-based sensors (e.g., Brilliant Eyes) provide to theater defenses? (S)

6. What is the status of the Arrow ATBM program? Is the program consistent with the MTCR and ABM Treaty? (S)

7. Under current budget assumptions, what are the probable dates of deployment for currently-planned ground and space-based sensors, theater and ABM interceptors? (S)

8. What states of the FSU have ABM systems or components or other ABM-related facilities (e.g., early warning LPARS, ABM production facilities) on their soil?

   - What is the status and capabilities of these systems, components, and ABM-related facilities?

From a technical point of view, how could these systems be internetted?

- To what degree has the effectiveness of the FSU's missile detection, tracking and battle management system been degraded by the breakup of the FSU?

- What newly independent states have the capability to produce, deploy, and/or export these systems? ~~(S)~~

C. ABM Treaty

1. Can additional ground-based radar sites, GSTS, or Brilliant Eyes be deployed without changes to the ABM Treaty?

   - Can existing BMEWS radars be upgraded? If so, to what extent and under what conditions or limitations? Should we build X-ban early warning radars?

   - What legal issues must be resolved to certify a single site is treaty compliant? ~~(S)~~

2. What, if any, changes would have to be made to the ABM Treaty to deploy an effective defense of the United States against limited threats? ~~(S)~~

3. What threshold demarcates ATBM and ABM interceptors? What are Russian views on the dividing line between ATBMs and ABMs? ~~(S)~~

4. What changes and/or clarifications to the ABM Treaty, if any, would have to be made in order to develop effective theater missile defenses? ~~(S)~~

5. What are the attitudes of Russia, other potential ABM Treaty successor states, and our friends and allies, to the possible changes to the ABM Treaty discussed above? ~~(S)~~

6. What has the U.S. done with regard to multilateralizing the CFE, INF, TTBT and START Treaties? Has the approach taken in each case furthered U.S. interests? ~~(S)~~

7. What is Russia proposing to do with regard to multilateralizing the ABM Treaty? ~~(S)~~

8. How are the interests of the newly independent states vis-a-vis their relationship with Russia affected by the ABM multilateralization issue?

- How does a decision on multilateralizing the Treaty relate to U.S. interests and objectives with regard to each of these newly independent states (other than Russia)? (S)

9. What was the status of the SCC agenda as of the last session? (S)

10. What would be the effect of a U.S. decision to multilateralize the ABM Treaty on (1) the goals established in the MDA, as amended, and (2) U.S. proposals in the discussions on a Global Protection System, as left pending at the end of the last administration? (S)

11. Leaving aside considerations that go beyond the ABM Treaty as now written and observed, does the U.S. have an interest in multilateralizing the Treaty per se? (S)

D. Global Protection System

1. What is the status of GPS discussions with Russia, NATO, and others? (S)

2. What are the positions of and major issues and concerns that have been raised by Russia and our friends and allies? (S)

3. What elements of a GPS appear to be broadly acceptable to Russia, friends and allies? (S)

4. What is the Russian view of GPS and how does it accord with our own view? What would be the Russian reaction if we dropped GPS? (S)

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. National Missile Defense

1. Should the U.S. pursue an ABM Treaty-compliant defense of the United States?

- Should we pursue development of such a defense with an option to deploy or should we decide now to seek actual deployment? In what time frames?

- Should we consider a defense that exceeds that now permitted by the ABM Treaty? (S)

B. Theater Missile Defense

1. What emphasis should we give to BMD vis-a-vis other instruments of our nonproliferation policy? How do we square the sharing of defensive missile protection or technology with MTCR objectives? (S)

2. Which theater missile defense systems should we deploy? (S)

3. Should we seek to deploy Brilliant Eyes or some less capable variant to enhance theater defenses even if we do not decide now to deploy a defense of the United States? (S)

4. If Brilliant Eyes or other sensor enhancements are required to provide an effective defense of the U.S. or to enhance the effectiveness of theater defenses, how should we proceed to ensure that these actions are consistent with the ABM Treaty as it is written or might be amended; e.g., should we seek Russian agreement that such upgrades are permitted under the Treaty, or do we need to propose an amendment? (S)

5. Should we seek a clear demarcation of the line between ATBMs and ABMs? If so, should such clarification be formally recorded in a joint declaration, an agreed statement in the SCC, or an amendment or protocol to the Treaty? (S)

C. ABM Treaty

1. Should we continue to seek the amendments to the ABM Treaty recommended in the MDA? Specifically, should we seek:

   - construction of numbers of ABM sites and ground-based interceptors beyond those currently permitted;

   - use of space-based sensors for direct battle management;

   - the ability to develop and test space-based missile defenses beyond what is currently permissible under the Treaty? (S)

2. If we seek clarification/changes to the ABM Treaty, in what time frame would they be needed to permit the necessary development, testing, or deployment of effective ATBM and ABM systems? (S)

3. How does the current political crisis in Russia affect the time-table by which we should seek these changes/ clarifications?

D. Global Protection System

1. Should we continue to pursue a multilateral Global Protection System? If so, what elements should it contain, and how much will they cost? For example:

   - in what context and under what conditions should we offer Russia and others early warning information and, if so, how much? Are we prepared to offer Brilliant Eyes and other data that would enhance ballistic missile defenses? In exchange for what?

   - what kinds of technologies, e.g., ATBMs, sensors, are we prepared to share? Is it feasible to share the benefits of GPS without sharing the technology? With what countries could we share such technology or benefits? What are the implications for our nonproliferation objectives? Are we prepared to make technology sharing a truly two-way street?

   - how should this be linked to our BMD objectives and ABM Treaty issues? ~~(S)~~

2. Should we adopt an all-or-nothing approach to gaining international agreement to GPS or take a step-by-step approach?

   - Are there some steps which have intrinsic value (e.g., the sharing of early warning information) and which should be pursued independently of our BMD objectives?

   - Should we continue to seek Russian agreement to the GPS concept before bringing other participants into the discussions?

   - Are there special requirements -- e.g., ensuring the viability of the Russian BMD system -- that suggest a need for priority inclusion of the relevant non-Russian NIS in the GPS? ~~(S)~~

E. Negotiating Forum and Game Plan

1. In what forum should we seek our ballistic missile defense objectives: the SCC, ad hoc meetings or a formal negotiation at a designated location?

- How do we approach this issue in NATO? with other friends and allies?

- Should we seek recommitment to the June 1992 summit statement? (S)

2. Assuming a decision is made to discuss succession in the SCC, are there other discrete issues that can also be addressed to advance our agenda? (S)

3. Taking all factors into account, how should the U.S. respond to the Russian proposal to reconvene the SCC? (S)

PART III: TASKINGS

This review shall be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Defense and Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, and completed by May 28, 1993. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-32

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Peru (S)

The purpose of this policy review is to define a coherent strategy in support of our objectives in Peru: return to constitutional government, strengthening of democratic institutions, promotion of human rights, self-sustaining economic recovery, an end to political violence and a sustained effort against the illegal narcotics infrastructure. The strategy must be broad enough to encompass all of these goals; efforts on one front should complement and be consistent with our efforts across-the-board. (S)

BACKGROUND

In many respects, Peru represents a test case for United States policy in the hemisphere. On April 5, 1992, Peruvian President Fujimori closed the congress, intervened in the judiciary to bring it under executive control, and initiated an indefinite period of government by executive fiat. In so doing, he presented a serious challenge to U.S. regional and bilateral interests such as democracy, human rights, and constitutional processes. (S)

Peru remains in a profound, multifaceted crisis, without any clear path toward resolution, despite Fujimori's continuing popularity. Human rights abuses and political violence both from government security forces and insurgent groups are pervasive. The economy is depressed, ravaged by acts of violence and political instability. The Sendero Luminoso remains a potent threat in spite of the capture of Abimael Guzman. The government's narcotics efforts, while enjoying some successes, so far have not produced dramatic results against traffickers, in

part because of the higher priority assigned to defeating insurgent groups by both the government and army. A failed military coup in November of 1992 and a major challenge by the military to the authority of the constituent assembly (CDD) on April 21 are indicators of ongoing unrest prevalent among sectors of the armed forces, and a military coup remains a possibility. (S)

We need to identify and implement policies that will help to restore democracy and constitutional processes to Peru, improve human rights, support self-sustaining growth, deal with narcotics trafficking and production, and reduce, and eventually eliminate, the political violence that has impeded progress toward these goals. (S)

I. ASSESSMENT

1. What are U.S. interests in Peru? What are our priorities? Do these interests justify a major commitment of U.S. prestige and resources to help assure democracy, respect for human rights, and sustained economic recovery? (S)

2. What are the prospects for full achievement of the goals outlined in the response to question #1 above? What are the factors prejudicing achievement of these goals? (U)

3. What are the consequences for Peru, for the region, and for U.S. policy if these goals are not achieved? (S)

4. What are our sources of influence in Peru, and especially with the Peruvian Government and military? How can we maximize this influence to achieve our policy goals? (S)

5. What are Fujimori's medium- and long-term objectives? What would be the impact of his re-election on our policy objectives? What are his sources of support in Peru? Externally? (S)

6. What are the sources and causes of political alienation and violence in Peru? What measures has the government taken to deal with this phenomenon? Do Peruvian security forces exacerbate the situation? (S)

7. What were the consequences for the political parties in Peru of Fujimori's seizure of power in April of 1992? Does any single party or coalition of parties offer an alternative to Fujimori in the immediate future? For the next elections (scheduled for 1995)? (S)

8. What role do NGOs now play in Peruvian politics? How can they play a significant role in rebuilding democracy in Peru? (S)

9. How effective have the various elements of U.S. policy been? (U)

a. What levels of assistance have been provided to the Peruvian government from U.S. and other external sources since Fujimori's election? How has assistance been conditioned? How effectively has the assistance been used? (S)

b. Has conditioning assistance proved an effective source of leverage and influence in the past? If not, why not? In those cases where the Peruvian government accepted conditions linked to assistance, has it implemented these commitments? Specifically, has the GOP kept its commitments on democracy made to the OAS last June, and its commitments to the U.S. in February on human rights? (S)

c. Have there been conflicts between U.S. goals in the political area, such as democracy and human rights, and narcotics? What efforts have been made to assure both policy priorities have been achieved? Have they been successful? (S)

d. How do the various political and military factions in Peru view the United States and U.S. policy? What do they believe we want to achieve in Peru? (S)

e. Has our strategy of working through the Organization of American States been effective? What have been the reactions of other states, including Peru's neighbors, other OAS members and Japan? (S)

f. Has the United States tried to promote reconciliation between the Peruvian government and insurgent groups? If so, what were the results? If not, why not? (S)

g. Describe the essential components of our drug policy in Peru, including interdiction, alternative development, money laundering, and other elements. How effective has the policy been in achieving our goal of stemming the flow of drugs from Peru to the United States? What are the problem areas? Funding? Management of the programs from the U.S. end? The Peruvian response? (S)

10. What is the current economic situation and outlook for Peru? Include:

a. A summary of Peru's economic reform program and an assessment of its results. Please include numbers on balance of trade and payments, international reserves, debt, inflation, GDP growth, per capita income, income distribution, domestic and foreign investment, and social indicators. (S)

b. The state of Peru's relations with the international financial community, including the IMF and other international institutions; bilateral donors;

commercial banks. Please provide tables which indicate trends in net resource transfers, by source. ~~(S)~~

c. The importance of narcotics to the Peruvian economy as a source of hard currency. As a source of employment? In terms of government revenue gains or losses? ~~(S)~~

d. The sources of potential U.S. financial assistance, including balance of payments support, project assistance, security assistance, and narcotics assistance. ~~(S)~~

e. An estimate of the assistance Peru is likely to need over the next five years to help assure sustainable economic recovery. Are there other sources of support (e.g., trade concessions) that could be helpful to Peru? ~~(S)~~

II. POLICY OPTIONS

1. What broad policy options are available to the United States to pursue our goals on democracy, human rights, narcotics, economic stabilization, and an end to political violence? (U)

2. How do we assure that efforts and strategies in the narcotics area are consistent with and complement our goals in the political, economic and human rights areas? If there is a conflict, should narcotics cooperation enjoy priority over other goals? ~~(S)~~

3. How can we tailor our strategy to assure maximum Congressional and non-government organization support for our policies? (U)

4. How can we engage the OAS, the United Nations, the International Financial Institutions, Peru's hemispheric neighbors, and other countries (e.g., Japan, the EC) in support of our policies? ~~(S)~~

5. President Fujimori is often described as a popular political leader with strong authoritarian instincts who dominates the Peruvian political landscape. How do we respond to his efforts to perpetuate himself in power through a constitutional change allowing reelection of incumbent Presidents? ~~(S)~~

6. How can we influence the work of the CDD, including the development of a constitution that establishes strong and viable democratic institutions? Should we try? ~~(S)~~

7. What conditions should be applied to future U.S. assistance to Peru? Design a matrix of conditions on security assistance, narcotics assistance, financial assistance through 1995. ~~(S)~~

8. What other measures can the United States take to assure progress toward achievement of our fundamental policy goals? (U)

9. The President has said we need to do more to support advocates of grassroots democracy. How can this commitment be implemented in Peru? Specifically, how can we strengthen the political party system in Peru? Non-governmental organizations such as human rights organizations, rural cooperatives, and labor organizations? The delivery of basic government services, such as justice? (S)

III. TASKING

1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs should convene an Interagency Working Group to review these issues and assign specific drafting and other responsibilities for both assessments and policy options. (U)

2. If possible, identify a preferred policy option or options. Should there be differences among agencies that cannot be resolved at the IWG level, they should be clearly spelled out in the papers submitted to the NSC. (U)

3. Pros and cons for each policy option should be clearly summarized. (U)

4. After review by the IWG, assessment and options papers should be submitted to the NSC to serve as a basis for future decisionmaking. Assessment and options papers are due ten days after issuance of this PRD. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 4124				
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~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 33, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. (4 pages)~~	~~05/01/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ YOE 9/25/19

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WASHINGTON

May 1, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-33

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa (U)

Recent developments in South Africa point to the strong possibility that the key parties will reach within four to six months a political agreement that would chart the path to nonracial democracy. An early step on this path would be the establishment of a multi-party transitional executive council possibly as early as this summer to oversee key government functions to ensure a "level playing field" in the lead-up to the country's first elections open to all South Africans. Given the political, economic and strategic importance of South Africa to the United States and its impact on all of southern Africa, a policy review is called for in order to determine how we can best support the democratization process, ensure its success and normalize and enhance our relations with a post-apartheid South Africa. (C)

Part I: Assessment

As the process of democratization continues to evolve in South Africa, the USG must decide what steps it will take to support this political evolution and at what point, or points, in the process it will take them. Once a political agreement has been reached and the USG has decided to become more engaged, it should give appropriate recognition to and facilitate these developments by working to:

-- support South Africa's economic recovery and its eventual reintegration into the international economic community, (C)

-- resolve nonproliferation concerns regarding South Africa's nuclear activities and missile development programs, (S)

-- assist the security forces in making the transition to post-apartheid realities, and (C)

-- remove South Africa from the FBI National Security Threat List. (S)

Part II: Options for Policy

This policy review should address the whole range of policy options toward South Africa including the following issues:

OVERALL:

-- What are U.S. interests in South Africa? What steps can be taken to enhance the prospects for success of South Africa's transition to democracy? What steps should be taken now? At what point should the other steps be taken?

-- What steps need to occur before we agree to lift remaining sanctions and support South Africa's reacceptance into the international community? Is the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council adequate? Or do we need to wait for elections while holding out as leverage our remaining sanctions?

-- What is the appropriate timing for an initiative? What developments in South Africa are required to establish a supportive political environment both in the U.S. and in South Africa? (C)

NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS:

-- Once a decision to re-engage is made, what can the U.S. and the international community do to support the negotiating process, especially if the talks bog down over deep divisions on fundamental issues? Can we play a mediating role? How can we best support the elections? (C)

ECONOMIC ISSUES:

-- What legislative actions will be needed to terminate/modify restrictions on U.S. involvement in South Africa, e.g., Evans Amendment, Fair Labor Standards, GSP exclusion, limitations on use of AID funding, others? Or to provide additional resources? What is our strategy for achieving legislative action?

-- What appropriate actions can the Executive Branch take, e.g., Gramm Amendment, OPIC bilateral agreement, EXIM activity, tax treaty, Peace Corps, others?

-- How should U.S. efforts relate to those of other donors, e.g., World Bank, G-7?

-- How can we best promote the mobilization of private sector resources? When should we do so? How should we be organized to do so? Can we make further positive contributions to South African policy formulation? How should we address the lifting of state and local sanctions?

-- What are the remaining State and local sanctions? Under what conditions should we press for their removal, when and how?

-- How could all these measures to support South Africa's economic recovery be coordinated effectively?

-- Discuss the pros and cons of establishing a South African Development Bank, as well as the mechanisms to do so. (C)

NONPROLIFERATION:

-- Taking advantage of recent revelations of South Africa's past nuclear weapons activities, how can we move to resolve outstanding questions concerning South Africa's compliance with its NPT obligations? How do we address most effectively Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act and other legal concerns arising from South Africa's nuclear activities? How/when/under what circumstances should we remove South Africa from Export Administration Regulations Supplement 4 "Special Country List" of countries about which we have nuclear-related concerns?

-- How/when do we proceed with concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa? What kinds of cooperation do we seek -- sale of nuclear fuel and equipment, research and development, safe waste disposal, other? How do we proceed with buying HEU?

-- How do we pursue our missile nonproliferation policies if South Africa continues pursuit of a space launch vehicle?

-- What, if anything, can be done to address the SAG's concerns about the court case in Philadelphia against ARMSCOR? (S)

SECURITY ISSUES:

-- How can we best assist in integrating the security forces and otherwise prepare them for the "new" South Africa? What laws/policies need to be changed to enable us to do so? (C)

INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES:

-- How/when should we remove South Africa from the FBI National Security Threat List?

-- Should an intelligence liaison relationship be established with the ANC and, if so, at what point? What type of relationship is appropriate with a transitional government? (S).

Part III: Tasking

The IWG on Africa, under the chair of the Department of State, should carry out this review and work to draw up its conclusions by May 15. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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WASHINGTON

May 21, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-34

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties (S)

As stated in PDD-3, ratification and implementation of START I and START II are priority objectives of U.S. foreign, security, and non-proliferation policy. PDD-3 also states that acceleration of START I and START II is in the U.S. interest, and directs the USG to develop a schedule and plan by June 1, 1993 for (a) accelerated START I implementation in all four FSU states, including early deactivation and warhead removal, and (b) working out an assistance package to Russia that would allow it to agree to move up to December 2000 the deadline for achieving final reductions under START II. (S)

Even after completion of the reductions of START I and START II, however, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will roughly equal those existing in the late 1960s, despite the fact that the likelihood of conflict has decreased substantially. Further, as the United States and Russia work together to establish a new relationship of partnership, an opportunity exists to institutionalize additional confidence building measures. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider what additional approaches the United States could pursue with Russia to reduce strategic forces further or to enhance strategic stability in other ways, consistent with American security interests in a still dangerous world. (S)

This Policy Review Directive (PRD) requires a comprehensive review of the political, military, technical, diplomatic, and verification considerations associated with (a) reductions below the level of START II, (b) force structure provisions not involving reductions, and (c) confidence building and declaratory policy measures in the area of strategic offensive arms. (S)

The following guidance is provided for the conduct of the review:

-- the review should assume either that START I and START II enter into force essentially unchanged, or that the U.S. and Russia move toward START I and START II levels through separate but parallel unilateral policies.

-- the review should assume that accelerating completion of the START II reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine remain vital U.S. objectives. Any relationship (either positive or negative) between options developed by the review and these priority objectives should be explicitly noted.

-- the review should assume that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not feasible. All options should include retention by the United States of a credible nuclear capability.

-- the review should assume that the U.S. complies with the ABM Treaty as written, or as modified through modest amendments consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1991. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. Further Reductions

1. What are the likely strategic forces of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China in the year 2000, assuming START II is ratified and implemented? What are the likely nuclear capabilities of other states in the year 2000? (S)

2. What would be Russia's attitude toward further reductions beyond the level of START II (a) involving only the United States and Russia, (b) involving all five declared nuclear powers? What reductions would Russia be likely to seek or accept in each case? (S)

3. What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, and China toward participation in negotiations on further reductions? What are the incentives to induce them to participate in negotiations on further reductions? What limitations on its own forces would each be likely to accept? (S)

4. What, if any, would be the military benefits to the United States of further reductions in Russian strategic offensive arms? How much would Russia have to reduce for us to realize these benefits? How much would these benefits depend on the composition/ characteristics of Russian forces? (S)

5. What would be the impact on United States security and deterrence policy of further reductions in U.S. strategic offensive arms? Are there specific reductions or force restructuring measures which would require our targeting policy to be changed? (S)

6. What is the maximum level of further reductions the United States can make while still maintaining a viable triad of strategic forces? What strategic force structure characteristics and capabilities should be preserved at any level below START II? (S)

7. What role should United States nuclear weapons play in deterring conventional aggression in regional crises or the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by a Third World state? (S)

8. Are there any direct military benefits to the United States from reductions in Chinese strategic offensive arms? How much would China have to reduce for us to realize these benefits? Are there indirect benefits, in terms of regional security or non-proliferation, from reductions in Chinese strategic offensive arms? (S)

9. Is there a level of Russian strategic offensive arms below which the monitoring and verification regime of START I and START II would be inadequate? If so, what is that level? (S)

10. At what point would potential breakout or cheating become a significant problem? Are there means to address this problem at lower levels? (S)

11. To what extent will prospects for extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely in 1995 be influenced by the presence or absence of negotiations on further reductions? From the NPT perspective, does it matter if those negotiations involve only Russia and the United States or all five declared nuclear powers? (S)

12. What effect would a CTB have on negotiating further reductions? (S)

13. What effect would failure to implement the Lisbon Protocol have on negotiating further reductions? (S)

B. Force Structure Alterations

1. Assuming that Russian strategic offensive arms are reduced to START II levels, is there any restructuring of Russian strategic forces which would significantly increase strategic stability? If so, what, if any, considerations might induce Russia to undertake such a

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restructuring? What changes would Russia be likely to seek in U.S. force structure? (S)

2. Would the elimination of ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) from the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals be a net plus or a net minus for U.S. security:

   -- if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia only?

   -- if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear powers? (S)

3. What would be the Russian attitude toward the phased elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs:

   -- if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia only?

   -- if they were eliminated from the strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear powers? (S)

4. What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, and China toward the phased elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs? (S)

5. Historically, the United States has concluded that legal restrictions on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are unverifiable. Is there any reason to alter this conclusion? (S)

6. What would be the Russian attitude toward imposing legal restrictions on nuclear-armed SLCMs? Would they insist on them, accept them but not insist on them, or resist them? (S)

C. Strategic Confidence Building and Operational Measures

1. What aspects of current U.S. strategic operational policy are likely to be of concern to Russia? What aspects of their operational policy are of concern to us? (S)

2. Which previous Russian/Soviet proposals (ASW free zones, ballistic missile submarine stand-off zones, restrictions on stealth technology, etc.) are the Russians likely to advocate in future negotiations? What new CBMs might the Russians propose?

   -- What, if any, are the advantages and disadvantages to the United States of each of these proposals?

   -- What would be the attitude of the United Kingdom, France, or China to being involved in negotiations based on such proposals? (S)

3. Are there confidence building and/or operational measures vis-a-vis Russia, beyond those in existing treaties, which could be in the interest of the United States (detargeting strategic forces, reducing SSBN patrol rates, zero or reduced alert status, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, etc.)? How verifiable would these measures be? What would be the Russian attitude toward them? (S)

4. Are there confidence building measures with China in the area of strategic offensive arms which would be in our interest? What would be the attitude of China toward such measures? (S)

5. How is Russia's declaratory policy on nuclear weapons use likely to evolve in the post-Communist era? What would be the implications of a Russian decision to drop their No First Use pledge? (S)

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Further Reductions

1. Should the United States seek to negotiate reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms below the level of START II?

-- Options should include:

o no further reductions;

o 2000-2500 warheads (previous Russian proposal);

o 1750 warheads (another fifty percent); and

o a few hundred warheads.

-- In each case the military and political rationale for seeking such reductions should be noted, along with potential drawbacks to the United States. (S)

2. For each potential reductions level, how, if at all, should the United Kingdom, France, and China be involved in such negotiations?

-- Options should include:

o no involvement;

o seek agreement that these three states will not increase beyond current levels; and

- o seek agreement that these three states will reduce their strategic offensive arms below current levels. (S)

3. For each potential reductions level, what, if any, additional verification provisions beyond those of START I and START II would be required? (S)

4. Should the United States be willing to accept some linkage between further offensive reductions and our BMD policy? (S)

5. Should the United States proceed unilaterally with cuts below the START II level? (S)

6. Should the U.S. seek to negotiate measures relating to warhead elimination and controls on fissile material in conjunction with deeper cuts, as stipulated by the Biden amendment? Should such measures involve all five nuclear powers? (S)

B. Force Structure Alterations

1. Should the United States seek to negotiate any restructuring of Russian strategic forces after they are reduced to START II levels? (S)

2. Should the United States seek the elimination of ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) from the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals? From all five declared nuclear powers?

   -- Options should include:

      - o not to seek such elimination;
      - o to seek such elimination from the arsenals of the United States and Russia only;
      - o to seek such elimination from the five declared nuclear powers; and
      - o to seek a global ban.

   -- In each case the military and political rationale for seeking such reductions should be noted, along with potential drawbacks to the United States.

   -- In each case in which eliminations are proposed, the review should indicate what verification measures should be included in the U.S. proposal. (S)

3. Should the United States seek additional restrictions on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and if so what?

-- Options should include:

o not to seek such restrictions;

o to seek to convert existing restrictions to a legally binding form;

o to seek lower levels or a ban through reciprocal political statements; and

o to seek lower levels or a ban in a legally binding form.

-- In each case in which additional legal restrictions are proposed, the review should indicate what verification measures should be included in the U.S. proposal. (S)

C. Strategic Confidence Building and Operational Measures

1. If the Russians renew their call for ASW free zones or ballistic missile submarine stand-off zones, should the United States agree to discuss such proposals?

-- If so, should the United States conduct such discussions bilaterally or should we seek to include the United Kingdom, France, and China? (S)

2. Should the United States seek to negotiate any confidence building and/or operational measures with Russia in the area of strategic offensive arms?

-- Options should include:

o de-targeting strategic forces;

o reducing SSBN patrol rates (e.g., from two-thirds to about one-third for Ohio-class boats);

o sharing of early warning data;

o zero or reduced alert status;

o separating warheads from delivery vehicles.

-- Should such negotiations aim at a legally binding agreement or reciprocal political obligations?

-- How can we involve Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in this process? (S)

3. Should the United States seek to negotiate any confidence building measures with China in the area of strategic offensive arms? If so, what measures?

Should such negotiations aim at a legally binding agreement or reciprocal political obligations? (S)

4. Does the U.S. have an interest in discouraging the Russians from dropping their No First Use pledge? If so, what options do we have for influencing this decision? Should the U.S. consider adopting a "No First Use" policy? (S)

D. Negotiating Forum

1. In what forum should we seek to negotiate (a) further reductions, (b) force structure alterations, and (c) strategic confidence building and operational measures? (S)

PART III: TASKINGS

This review shall be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council and completed by July 9, 1993. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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001. report	Presidential Review Directive 35, National Security Review - Strategy 2000. (33 pages)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)

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[PRD-35, National Security Review - Strategy 2000, June 11, 1993]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Presidential Review Directive 37. (6 pages)	08/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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No. PRD 37

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001. report	Presidential Review Directive 37. [partial] (6 pages)	08/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1993

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2010-1227-M (2.26) KDE 9/25/19

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-37

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan (S)

Taiwan's economic dynamism, political liberalization and relationship with the PRC present important opportunities and substantial challenges for the United States. As part of the Administration's review of key foreign policy issues, we plan to examine U.S. policy objectives and strategy toward Taiwan. Our purpose is to design a comprehensive and coherent framework to guide future policy EO 13526 1.4d (C)

In preparation for a Deputies or Principals Committee meeting, a policy paper should be provided by the State Department by September 10 which addresses the questions listed below in Parts I and II. No presumptions should be made about limitations on policy. Possible conflicts among different policy options should be part of the analysis. (S)

BACKGROUND

Taiwan policy has been a major success for the U.S. over the last three decades, in terms of the island's economic and political development and our management of its impact on U.S.-PRC relations. (S)

In 1949, Taiwan was an impoverished island with an authoritarian one-party government and futile claims to rule all of China. With U.S. economic assistance and political support, it undertook difficult structural reforms that laid the basis for its economic take-off, followed by progressive democratization. (U)

Today, Taiwan is an emerging democracy and an economic powerhouse. For the first time in its history, Taiwan has a democratically elected National Assembly which actively participates in policy-making, challenges executive authority and includes a sizeable opposition party to the ruling Kuomintang

(KMT) government. It is the thirteenth largest trading power in the world, our sixth largest trading partner and holds the world's largest foreign exchange reserves ($84 billion). Taiwan imports more from the U.S. than from any other country except Japan. (S)

Although Taiwan's economic and political development creates an environment for closer U.S. ties, U.S.-Taiwan relations are inextricably linked to the mainland. Any change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan will affect directly our ability to pursue U.S. interests with the PRC. (S)

Both Taipei and Beijing claim sovereignty over all of China. However, the PRC is recognized by the UN, U.S. and other major countries as the sole legal representative government of all of China. The PRC continues to claim the right to use force in the event Taiwan declares independence. (U)

Despite the PRC government's success in obtaining recognition, Taiwan has successfully developed a web of unofficial ties with foreign governments and the PRC itself. Taiwan has mapped out an aggressive two-track strategy toward the mainland of: (1) improving unofficial ties by easing travel restrictions, facilitating investment in the PRC and establishing direct, unofficial contact through non-governmental organizations; and (2) enhancing its international stature vis-a-vis the PRC by leveraging its economic strength in order to cultivate more official ties with developing countries and participate in international organizations. Thus, Taiwan seeks to rejoin the UN even as it increases ties to China. (S)

The United States "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China," as expressed in the three Joint Communiques between the U.S. and the PRC. However, our consistent position has been that it is up to the PRC and Taiwan to work out their future relationship. EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d We have maintained "extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan" as provided by the Taiwan Relations Act. We have done so through a unique framework that includes AIT Washington and procedures governing contact, visits and agreements. (S)

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d Interpretation of the Joint Communique has caused friction between the U.S. and PRC as U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan continue, including the last Administration's decision to sell Taiwan 60 F-16 A/Bs. (S)

EO 13526 1.4d

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

Overarching U.S. Interests

1. What are the fundamental U.S. economic, political and security interests in Taiwan? ~~(S)~~

2. What are the key political, economic and financial elements of U.S. policy toward Taiwan? Will this framework continue to serve U.S. interests in Taiwan and the region? Will it help or hurt the U.S. in our competition with third countries for business or investment in Taiwan? ~~(S)~~

EO 13526 1.4d

Level of Contact

EO 13526 1.4d

7. What is Taiwan's strategy for increasing its foreign contacts with international organizations and third countries? What international organizations is Taiwan seeking to enter and why? What organizations are most likely to accept either formal or informal participation by Taiwan? ~~(S)~~

Economic Relations

8. Will Taiwan's economic success continue? What challenges does Taiwan face and what is its capacity to meet these challenges? What role will foreign interests generally, and U.S. companies in particular, play in Taiwan's economic development? What are the implications of future developments in financial market liberalization in Taiwan? Is Taiwan serious about becoming a regional financial center? ~~(C)~~

9. How will Taiwan's economic relationships with the PRC and Southeast Asia evolve? Will Taiwan continue shifting labor-intensive manufactures and polluting industries? Is there some "natural limit" to this trend? ~~(C)~~

10. What are the implications for U.S. interests if the economic integration of the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan continues? ~~(S)~~

11. How has the PRC responded to Taiwan's bid for GATT accession, participation in APEC? How were problems resolved? ~~(C)~~

12. How will Taiwan's commitment to GATT and other standards for international economic activity develop? How will this affect U.S. trade and investment with Taiwan? ~~(C)~~

Democratization

13. What are the prospects for continued political liberalization in Taiwan? How best can the U.S. encourage further democratization? ~~(C)~~

14. How will internal political changes (Taiwan democratization and PRC succession uncertainties) affect the development of EO 13526 1.4d relations? ~~(C)~~

15. What effect will Taiwan demographic changes -- especially the passing of the revolutionary generation -- have on prospects for reunification with or independence from the mainland? ~~(C)~~

Political/Security Issues

EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

EO 13526 1.4d

Economic Relations

6. How can the U.S. most effectively encourage Taiwan's commitment to honor international trade norms, including intellectual property rights protection? ~~(S)~~

7. Should the U.S. take any steps to alter its trade approach to "Greater China" if the economic integration of the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan continues to move forward? ~~(S)~~

U.S. Response to Taiwan Domestic Issues

8. How should the U.S. respond to the increasing debate in Taiwan about its status vis-a-vis China? Should we attempt to influence that debate either by public or private statements? ~~(S)~~

EO 13526 1.4d

10. How can the U.S. encourage further democratization in Taiwan? EO 13526 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4d

Political/Security Issues

EO 13526 1.4d

PART III: TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Any differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. A final paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than September 10, 1993. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIR OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia (U)

The President believes it is a high priority for the U.S. to devote energy, resources and creativity to assist in the promotion of democracy and market economic reforms in the former Soviet Union. The President has also highlighted the importance of denuclearization and non-proliferation. (U)

The objective of this policy review is to define a strategy that will best contribute to the achievement of those fundamental goals in Central Asia. This review should provide a framework for a comprehensive and coherent policy toward Central Asia as a region and toward its individual members: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The review should take into account both bilateral and multilateral efforts in promoting U.S. interests. (C)

Major U.S. goals in the area include the promotion of arms control, democracy, market reform, conflict resolution, regional security and narcotics control. These goals further U.S. interests by promoting stability, supporting American business, promoting trade, discouraging terrorism, increasing social tolerance and bolstering human rights. Our greatest immediate policy interest in the region is the denuclearization of Kazakhstan. While PRD-4 and PDD-3 address the broader issue of

denuclearization, particularly in Russia and Ukraine, this PRD will address specifically denuclearization in Kazakhstan. The long-term goal is to encourage stable regimes which respect human rights and develop market economies. (S)

BACKGROUND

Central Asia encompasses five countries with an area nearly as large as Western Europe and a population of more than 50 million. There are minority populations, including over nine million Russians, in the region. The area is rich in resources such as oil, gas and gold, but these resources are unevenly distributed. (U)

Fresh from long decades of Communist rule, these countries are still in the process of forging new relationships, not only among themselves, but also outside the former Soviet Union. Old ties that bind them to Russia limit their room for economic maneuver and prevent them from forging new economic relationships. The lack of civil societies inhibits normal political life, creation of political parties and informal structures necessary for political development. (C)

Central Asian countries have been struggling to adjust to the post-Soviet era. This adjustment has taken very different forms in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, for example, has moved ahead with political and economic reform, counting on economic progress to maintain social cohesion. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, has consolidated its authoritarian regime, insisting that strict control is necessary to maintain stability. Practice has shown that old Soviet habits are hard to break. Most Central Asian countries have not implemented much political and economic reform. None of these countries has a democratic tradition or history from which to draw in its reform effort, and this is reflected in the tendency of some to revert to authoritarianism. Kyrgyzstan is the only country which is attempting to follow a true democratic and reformist path. (C)

Another aspect of the disintegration of the USSR is the renewed role that long-suppressed social phenomena such as religion and tribalism now play in politics. This has created the basis for conflict in all republics and is at the root of the one "hot" war in the region -- the conflict in Tajikistan. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

REGIONAL ISSUES

What are the regional political and economic dynamics in Central Asia? (CIA) (S)

What is the political, economic, and military role of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Germany, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia and China in Central Asia? What is the role of other powers such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and India? (State and CIA) (S)

What is the political, economic, and military role of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the region? (CIA) (S)

What is the potential for intraregional conflict? What are potential ethnic/religious hotspots in the region? (CIA and State) (S)

SECURITY ISSUES

How does each country define its security interests? What is the role of the Russian Army in the region and in each country? How has each country reacted to the presence of the Russian Army? What steps has each country taken to build its own military? (CIA, State and OSD) (S)

What is the prognosis for Kazakhstan's timely accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state? (CIA) (S)

Where are nuclear weapons-related facilities or nuclear materials, equipment and human resources located in Central Asia? What controls do Central Asian countries have on the export of nuclear materials, equipment and related technologies? (CIA) (S)

What is the situation with non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, missiles, advanced conventional weapons, chemical, biological and "traditional" (tanks, airplanes, etc.) conventional weapons in each country? Do stockpiles of these weapons exist in Central Asian countries? What production facilities and human resources exist for the development of these weapons in these countries? Are these weapons stockpiles owned or controlled by the host country, or does Russia exercise actual ownership or control? Are any Central Asian countries contributing to the proliferation of these commodities? Describe patterns of sales/transfers of these items in the region. (CIA and ACDA) (S)

What is the situation with regard to the sale and/or transfer of sensitive strategic minerals such as beryllium and uranium to proscribed countries such as Iran? (CIA) (S)

What is the impact of Central Asian countries' participation in multilateral arms control fora such as CSCE, the UN First Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament? (ACDA and CIA) (S)

POLITICAL ISSUES

What are the status and viability of the current governments and their hold on power? Which are the most stable and why? What is the status of the opposition in each country? How do the various political factions in each country, particularly the oppositions, view the U.S.? How is the process of statebuilding proceeding in each country? (State and CIA) (S)

What are the prospects for democratic regimes developing and surviving in Central Asia? (See definition of democracy at Tab A.) What have the U.S. and others done thus far to promote democracy, and how effective have these efforts been? (State, AID and USIA) (S)

What are the prospects for resolving the internal political dispute in Tajikistan? To what extent are outside powers becoming involved? (CIA and State) (S)

ECONOMIC ISSUES

What are the economic conditions, prospects and trends for the region and for each country? What is the current condition of each state's infrastructure, including transportation networks (both internal and external) and energy systems? (CIA and AID) (S)

Where do the Central Asian countries stand on economic reform, including the development of a market-oriented legal framework, progress on privatization and price liberalization, creation of a modern banking sector and tax reform? What obstacles do these countries face in reforming their economies? (CIA, State, Commerce, and AID) (S)

What are the key barriers to trade and investment in each country? What are the prospects for foreign and domestic investment regionally and by country? (Commerce, USTR and AID) (C)

What are Central Asia's most valuable natural resources? To what extent have they been exploited? What is the economic potential of these resources? What prohibitions or controls has each government placed on exploitation of these resources? (CIA) (S)

What is the role of the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, EBRD) in economic development in the region and in each country? How effectively have these institutions promoted economic reform, structural adjustment, human resource development and poverty alleviation in the region and in each country? (Treasury and AID) (C)

What role has the U.S. Export-Import Bank played in economic development in the region and in each country? (Export-Import Bank) (U)

How much economic and technical assistance have we offered and given the region and each country? How effectively has U.S. assistance promoted economic reform, structural adjustment, human resource development and poverty alleviation in the region and in each country? (State and AID) (S)

To what extent has corruption pervaded the control of economic resources, particularly natural resource exploitation? What are the economic and social effects of this problem? (CIA) (S)

Identify nuclear power plant facilities in Central Asia. What are the potential problems with these facilities? What has been done to safeguard these facilities? (DOE and State) (S)

SOCIAL ISSUES

How much humanitarian aid have we given each country? Has the aid reached its target and had the desired effect? (State and AID) (C)

What is the role of Islam in the region? Where are different kinds of Islamic activists, including fundamentalists, most active? How effective are they? What are the possible effects of this activism on regional stability? How are they supported from beyond the region? What role have regional powers such as Iran played in promoting various types of Islamic belief and activism? How likely are these states to remain secular? (CIA and State) (S)

What role has international terrorism played in Central Asia? Which countries have been involved in international terrorism? Describe the extent of each country's involvement. (State) (S)

What is the situation with refugees from Tajikistan? How many are there, and how have they affected regional and local politics? (State and CIA) (S)

What is the present status of the Aral Sea and other precious water resources? What are the possible implications of further Aral Sea losses and water problems for the future health and economic well-being of the region? (CIA) (S)

Describe production in Central Asia and narcotics trafficking patterns involving Central Asia. What is the status of narcotics control in the region and in each country? Describe cooperative (bilateral/multilateral) efforts to curb production/sales. (CIA and State) (S)

What role does tribalism play (i.e, within the same ethnic group) in each country's politics? Has the role of tribalism increased in the wake of the USSR's dissolution? (CIA) (S)

Looking at Kazakhstan, what can we learn about the effects of nuclear testing on humans? What are Kazakhstan's needs with regard to the victims of that testing? (DOE and State) (C)

In addressing these issues, we should point out any gaps in our intelligence on a given topic. (S)

PART II: POLICY PROPOSALS

Each policy proposal should identify the sources and degree of influence the U.S. has on each issue and the range of bilateral and multilateral tools the U.S. can use to further its policy. (U)

Policy proposals should specify a preferred course of action, other options, policy instruments and indicate resource requirements and their implications, if any, for the budget and for legislation. In addition, a detailed list of recommendations for speeches, meetings and trips for government officials should be outlined. (U)

GENERAL

What are U.S. interests in the region as a whole and in each country? We should differentiate among countries based on geostrategic importance, economic potential and reform efforts. (State) (U)

What tradeoffs are involved in our policy toward the region? For example, will promoting democracy tend to destabilize the region? Will the presence of U.S. businesses promote democracy and economic reform, or will they be more interested in maintaining Soviet-style autocratic rulers? (State) (S)

Should we directly engage Turkey, Israel or other countries as actors on behalf of United States interests? What is the U.S. attitude towards continuation of a dominant Russian role in the region? (State) (S)

POLITICAL INTERESTS

What policies should the U.S. pursue, bilaterally and multilaterally, to strengthen democratic institutions and processes and protection of human rights throughout the region? If democratic reform is slow in coming or non-existent, should we push it? Should we differentiate among these countries according to their democratization efforts? Given the particular structure of interests in each country, what is likely to be the best strategy in terms of presenting the benefits of democratic reform? (State and AID) (S)

How can public diplomacy, including educational and cultural exchanges, be employed to promote U.S. policy goals? How effective are Voice of America and Radio Liberty broadcasts to the region? (USIA and AID) (C)

What role should the U.S. play in the Tajikistan civil war, which is rapidly becoming a wider conflict involving regional powers? How actively involved should the U.S. be in seeking a resolution of the conflict? How should our role relate to the regional countries, regional organizations, the CSCE and the UN? How should we react to the Russian role in the conflict? The options should include consideration of both regional and UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief, CSCE operations and post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation. (State) (S)

SECURITY INTERESTS

How best can the U.S. encourage Kazakhstan to vote to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a timely manner? (ACDA and STATE) (S)

What can the U.S. do to help Kazakhstan reach agreement with Russia on the return of non-deployed SS-18s to Russia for destruction under START II provisions? (ACDA) (S)

What approach should the U.S. take towards the future of the space-launch facility at Baykonur and towards Kazakhstan, Russia and other users of that facility, in light of U.S. START and missile non-proliferation obligations? (ACDA) (S)

What can the U.S. do to help Kazakhstan prepare for implementation of the START Treaty? (ACDA) (S)

What role can other types of arms control (e.g., CSBMs) play in contributing to the stability of the region? (ACDA) (S)

What measures can the U.S. take to help stop the export or retransfer of sensitive nuclear commodities from these countries to countries of proliferation concern? How can the U.S. assist these countries, particularly Kazakhstan, with nuclear material accounting and control and the physical protection of nuclear facilities? (ACDA) (S)

What approach should the U.S. take toward military and security ties to the region? Should the U.S. encourage military-to-military contacts as a way of encouraging the development of a professional army which would not intervene in politics? What kind of military-to-military contacts would be most appropriate? What are other factors which would outweigh these kinds of contacts? (OSD) (S)

What steps should the U.S. take to discourage proliferation of non-nuclear weapons from these countries? (ACDA) (S)

SOCIAL POLICY INTERESTS

How should the U.S. react to Islam's role in Central Asia? What is the best way to address possible problems which may arise, particularly in Tajikistan? (State) (S)

What can the U.S. do to address the problems of the Aral Sea? (State and AID) (U)

What should the U.S. do to achieve its goals on narcotics control? (State) (C)

What should the U.S. do to achieve its goals on anti-terrorism? (State) (C)

What role should the U.S. play in dealing with the refugee problem arising out of the Tajikistan conflict? (State and AID) (C)

What role can the U.S. play in helping Kazakhstan deal with the social/psychological/physical effects of nuclear weapons testing in and around Semipalatinsk? (State) (C)

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Given the particular structure of economic interests in each country, what are the best ways to pitch market economic reform effectively? (State) (C)

What can the U.S. do multilaterally to promote market economic reform (e.g., international financial institutions, World Bank consultative groups and the G-7)? (Treasury) (U)

Should we encourage market-oriented Asian nations or friendly Arabic countries to engage more in the economic reform process in Central Asia? (State and AID) (C)

How can the U.S. support U.S. business interests in each country? (Commerce and AID) (U)

How can U.S. business assist and participate in the development of natural resources in the region? (Commerce) (U)

What should U.S. trade policy be toward each country? (USTR) (U)

What can the U.S. do bilaterally and multilaterally to help Central Asia safeguard its nuclear power plants? (DOE and State) (C)

PART III: TASKING

The NSC will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities and set deadlines for drafts. Differences of opinions should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (C)

Responses are due to the NSC two weeks from the date of issue. (C)

Tony Lake

Attachment
Tab A Annex

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ANNEX: KEY ELEMENTS OF A WORKING DEMOCRACY

The key elements of a working democracy are:

-- conducive conditions for the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms (freedoms of expression and right to communication; peaceful assembly and demonstration; association; thought, conscience and religion; movement; also right to enjoy property alone or in common); also the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to minorities;

-- rule of law (based on acceptance of value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression): equality before the law and equal protection, effective means of redress; independent judiciary, provisions for due process;

-- political pluralism, free and fair political processes and elections;

-- representative government, an executive accountable to the elected legislature or to the electorate;

-- duty of government and public authorities to comply with the constitution and to act consistent with the law;

-- clear separation between the State and political parties;

-- government, administration, and judiciary exercised in accordance with the system established by law;

-- military forces and police under the control of, and accountable to, the civil authorities;

-- open legislative process;

-- tolerant, civil society with independent institutions and voluntary groups;

-- independent media;

-- conformity with international law obligations;

-- all of the above reinforced by a secure environment (peaceful relations with neighbors and the solving of internal problems via peaceful democratic means) and a market economy. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 30, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-39

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Towards East Asia and the Pacific (S)

The New Pacific Community (NPC) conceptualized by the President in Seoul and Tokyo established the framework for our post-Cold War policy towards East Asia and the Pacific. Crucial U.S. economic, security and political interests are at stake in this region -- the most dynamic economic region in the world and increasingly the third leg in a tri-polar world. (S)

Strengthened U.S.-Japan relations will empower the NPC, but its driving force will be shared effort and a sense of collective benefit and destiny among East Asian/Pacific nations. The NPC agenda would promote: (1) open economies and free trade; (2) accelerated democratization and protected human rights, and (3) stable military alliances and sturdy security arrangements. (S)

The building blocks of the NPC are in place. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and possibly the proposed Northeast Asian security forum, comprise the institutional bases of the NPC. We must shape these fora into a new economic and security architecture suited to the unique challenges of post-Cold War Asia. (S)

To implement the NPC we need an action plan that defines a comprehensive and coherent strategy, incorporating regional aspects of our bilateral ties with Japan, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, on which separate papers exist, and with other countries important to U.S. interests such as Australia and the ASEAN states. At the APEC ministerial in Seattle, the President would elaborate on our vision, setting in motion a region-wide dialogue that would constitute the first step towards building the NPC. (S)

In preparation for a Deputies or Principals Committee meeting, a policy paper should be provided by September 17 using the best current information and assessments to address the questions below in Parts I and II. This paper must also analyze advantages

and disadvantages of specific policy options and requirements for implementation. Conflict among options should be part of the analysis and limitations on policy should not be presumed. (S)

BACKGROUND

The New Pacific Community: The Cold War's end, East Asia's explosive economic development and its growing democratization provide the U.S. a critical window of opportunity to shape the region's security and economic architecture. As the President has stated, we must build a New Pacific Community unified not by the common Soviet threat of the past, but by shared strength, prosperity and commitment to democratic values. The NPC will be the touchstone for shaping existing bilateral arrangements, building new institutions, and developing our policies and priorities in the region. (S)

Economic Stakes: East Asia is singularly important to the U.S. economy and thus to our domestic policy goals of growth and job creation. This region has the fastest-growing economies in the world, substantial foreign exchange reserves (Taiwan's $84 billion constitutes the world's largest holdings) and it has become our most important regional trading partner. Two-way trade reached $344 billion in 1992; 50 percent more than our trade with Western Europe and three times greater than our trade with Latin America. Last year, U.S. exports to East Asia worth $128 billion supported approximately 2.4 million U.S. jobs -- more than any other regional export outlet. (S)

Economic growth in East Asia is projected to outpace North American and Western European growth this decade. In 1991, East Asia produced one-quarter of both world output and exports; by the year 2002, it is projected to produce one-third of each. This growth has conferred a new self-confidence and assertiveness in the region and a strengthened willingness to challenge U.S. policies on trade, human rights and other areas. (S)

In 1993, we have a unique opportunity to set our economic agenda with the region for the rest of this decade. We chair APEC this year and should look to the November Ministerial in Seattle and the informal APEC leaders conference as opportunities to shape our economic policy goals in Asia, to reaffirm our commitment to engagement, and to initiate a dialogue on the NPC. In the long-run, APEC can be the forum for developing region-wide economic agreements and a mechanism for public and private sector leaders to tackle regional economic problems (such as technology transfer and transportation bottlenecks). (S)

Security/Political Stakes: The United States has vital security interests in Asia. While there are no wars in the region, the seeds of potential conflict are ever present. Tensions across the Taiwan Straits and across the 38th parallel in Korea, competing national claims to the Spratly Islands and a continuing Cambodia peace process all have the potential to ignite significant sub-regional conflicts. (S)

We have a strong interest in encouraging democracy and respect for human rights, which enhance prospects for peace and stability. Four years after Tiananmen, China continues to restrict severely many internationally recognized human rights. And, while there are democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan, several countries in the region deny fundamental freedoms and resist political liberalization. Some governments are showing solidarity in resisting what they characterize as imposition of inapplicable Western human rights concepts, though many Asian NGOs endorse the principle of universality. (S)

East Asia and its periphery host an enormous concentration of military power, both conventional and nuclear. China and Russia have significant and sophisticated nuclear arsenals, and Japan, Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea have the capability to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short time-frame. Some of the largest armies in the world are in Russia, China, the two Koreas and Vietnam. Military modernization throughout the region, though aimed to build or maintain defensive capabilities, raises the specter of an arms race. (S)

Our military presence continues to preserve stability in East Asia and secure its economic dynamism. We have mutual defense agreements with five nations -- Japan (the key security relationship and foundation of our Asian presence), Korea, Thailand, Australia and the Philippines -- and our forward-deployed forces literally stand guard to maintain peace in the region. We are a welcome presence, regarded as a stabilizing force and a restraint on the potential power aspirations of regional (and global) actors such as Japan and China. (S)

However, the strength of our continued security commitment is questioned by our Asian allies and is of serious concern to them. They know they no longer act as the bulwark against Soviet communism and fear that without this Cold War rationale for our intensive involvement, we will disengage. Their anxiety is fueled by our current and necessary focus on domestic issues and budget difficulties, attention to trouble spots elsewhere in the world, closure of our Philippine bases, and, to a lesser extent, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). (S)

We can allay these fears somewhat by strengthening bilateral ties with Asian nations. Key, in the short-run, will be our active participation in the ASEAN PMC process and APEC, which must become principal mechanisms for security and economic dialogue within the region. In the long-run, the development of the NPC (from ASEAN, APEC and other fora) will underscore clearly our commitment to the region. (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

1. What are our objectives for the New Pacific Community (C):

   a. Economic? (S)

   b. Strategic/security? (S)

c. Political? (C)

d. Global (e.g., environment, population growth, migration, human rights and democratization)? (C)

2. How do these individual objectives mesh and define a strategy for creating the NPC? (C)

3. Are our objectives compatible with those of our allies in the region? If not, what tensions might exist? (C)

4. Are current strategy and resources adequate to achieve the goals of the NPC? What more must be done? (C)

5. What are the best frameworks within which to pursue the economic leg of the NPC, including expansion of free trade and development of poorer Asian nations such as the South Pacific Islands and Mongolia? (C)

6. What are U.S. strategic/security interests in East Asia and the Pacific in the post-Cold War period? How will these be expressed in the NPC? What are the future threats to U.S. interests likely to be? (S)

7. What are the most pressing global/transnational concerns (refugees, narcotics, environment, proliferation, human rights and democratization) affecting the region? (C)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

Within this broad context, we need to review the following:

Economic Issues:

1. How should the U.S. use APEC -- and our APEC chairmanship this year -- to advance our economic goals in East Asia and begin to build the economic leg of the NPC? (C)

   a. How can we increase trade and investment with/in the region, particularly job-producing exports? What role should the departments of the Executive Branch play in this effort? How can embassies and consulates help? What U.S. legal and regulatory policies are trade-restrictive with Asia? (U)

   b. What is our strategy for trade in goods and services with East Asia? What is the best mechanism to promote expanded trade between the U.S. and the region? (C)

   c. What should be our strategy and time-frame for promoting Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in East Asia? Should we pursue bilateral FTAs, regional FTAs, both or neither? (C)

   d. How does the EAEC caucus affect APEC and our interests, and how much support does it have from our allies? (C)

Strategic/Security:

3. What strategic/security concerns do we currently face and how do they shape our vision of this leg of the NPC? (S)

   a. Are Asians convinced our security presence continues to be meaningful? (S)

   b. How best can we reaffirm our security commitment to East Asia with more limited defense resources? (S)

   c. Is it possible to continue force draw-downs under the three-phased East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI), and still reassure Asian nations of our continued engagement in the region? How? (S)

   d. What are the most realistic contingencies in which U.S. troops might be required for combat in the region? (S)

   e. Are current levels of burden-sharing (by Japan and Korea) and divisions of financial responsibilities for the forward deployment to U.S. troops appropriate? (C)

4. Can we build from the ASEAN PMC process a new regional security dialogue? What new mechanisms, if any, are needed for the NPC? Should multilateral security regimes (such as an Asian version of a CSCE) supplement, replace, or overlap with existing bilateral arrangements? (S)

   a. Should we actively pursue South Korea's proposal for a Northeast Asian forum of the two Koreas and the four major powers (U.S., Russia, China and Japan) to discuss regional concerns, particularly Korean Peninsula issues, including the DPRK's nuclear program? (S)

   b. How best can Northeast and ASEAN countries be brought together for regional security dialogue? (S)

5. How do we involve North Korea and China in building the region's new security architecture? What efforts can or should we undertake to integrate them into the NPC? What would be the outcome of their isolation? Can we have a meaningful NPC without China? Without North Korea? (S)

6. What are the primary issues that might appear on the agenda of regional security discussions? How should we address other issues: (S)

   a. Conflicting claims by six countries to the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands, and Chinese reassertion of its claim, make the Spratlys a possible trouble spot in the near term. What role, if any, should the U.S. play in seeking a resolution of these claims? (C)

b. The role of the UN in settling Asian regional crises, e.g., nuclear proliferation, Cambodia, North/South Korea, the Spratlys? (C)

c. Whether our new nuclear posture allows modification of our current policy towards New Zealand, or should we continue our arms-length approach towards New Zealand until it revises its anti-nuclear policy? (S)

Political Issues:

7. What is the role of Russia as an Asia-Pacific power? How quickly and to what extent should the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific partners integrate Russia into regional or sub-regional economic or security fora or activities? What are the advantages and disadvantages of Russian participation? What factors limit the extent to which Asians will accept/tolerate Russian participation? Should Russia be part of the NPC? (C)

8. What are our human rights priorities in the region? What are the challenges to promoting democracy? How do we pursue this effectively? Whom will it bring us into conflict with and what consequences will it present, including conflicts with other interests? How do we balance other interests emerging from the NPC? (S)

9. Are there special roles Japan, ASEAN and other like-minded countries/organizations can play in cooperation with the United States on democracy and human rights issues? (C)

10. What are the prospects for democratic regimes surviving and flourishing in East Asia? Would accelerating democratization in Asian countries affect our military strategy and planning? (S)

Global Issues:

11. Which global issues (AIDS, population growth, narcotics trafficking, proliferation, refugees) pose special problems and where? What role can we play to address these -- unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally, through the UN? (C)

12. Which environmental concerns -- global warming, increased energy consumption, deforestation, etc. -- require immediate attention? How can we forge a regional consensus and approach on these issues? (C)

PART III: TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities, and set deadlines for drafts. Any differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than September 17. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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November 19, 1993

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Expanding the Open Skies Treaty to Environmental Monitoring (U)

The Open Skies Treaty was conceived and negotiated as a confidence-building measure to enhance transparency of military forces and activities between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members. While European security concerns have changed considerably since the U.S. put the Treaty concept forward in 1989, Open Skies remains an important tool for enhancing transparency and predictability, especially among states in the East and of the former Soviet Union. But the fact that Open Skies was designed for one purpose does not preclude its use for others. (C)

One area in which there has already been very informal consideration for Open Skies' expansion is environmental monitoring. Among the emergent new problems in the aftermath of the collapse of the Pact and the former Soviet Union are environmental concerns in Europe. In recognition of these concerns, Open Skies negotiators agreed to a Treaty text that would make it possible to upgrade sensors and to add new sensors to the regime. Such sensors could be used for environmental monitoring purposes. In this respect, the Preamble to the Treaty notes "...the possible extension of the Open Skies regime into additional fields, such as the protection of the environment." (C)

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There is work remaining in the Open Skies Consultative Commission prior to the Treaty's entry-into-force, as well as an expectation that this work could be completed by 1994. The United States should continue its efforts to ensure entry-into-force and full implementation of the Treaty as signed. (C)

However, given the high priority the U.S. attaches to environmental concerns and the possible advantages to us and to our Open Skies Treaty partners of an environmental monitoring regime, it is not too early to undertake a full-scope analysis of the possible use of Open Skies for environmental monitoring purposes. This Review should assess the costs and benefits of expanding Open Skies for the purposes of enhancing transparency about the environment on and above the territory of states parties. (C)

I. Assessment (U)

A. What broad goals could the U.S. achieve through an environmental monitoring agreement? (U)

-- What would be U.S. objectives for environmental monitoring in an Open Skies context? (U)

-- What are the precedents, if any, of such an agreement? What are the cooperative environmental monitoring activities in which we have participated in the past, and are there lessons that can be drawn from them for the purposes of Open Skies? (C)

-- What would be the effect of requiring countries to open their territory to the acquisition of environmental information by other states? Would enhanced transparency be confidence-building? (C)

-- Would Treaty-based guaranteed access to airspace of other participants (vice access through a cooperative regime) help the U.S. to meet its goals on environmental policy? (C)

B. What information can be obtained through use of airborne platforms for the collection of environmental data? For each sensor which might be a candidate for use, specify the sensor type (multispectral, air samplers, etc.) and assess the following: (U)

-- What information would this sensor provide? (U)

-- How would this information be of value to the United States? How would it be of value to other states parties?; States not party to Open Skies; non-governmental parties? (U)

-- Would this sensor make a unique contribution to the collection of environmental data? Of what dimension? (U)

-- Would it be possible to ensure a standard agreed usage of the sensor among all states parties? (U)

-- What would be the flying conditions under which this sensor would be of most value, e.g. altitude, weather, day/night, etc? Could such flight requirements be accommodated within existing Open Skies Treaty provisions? If not, what modifications would be required? (U)

-- What would be the characteristics of overflights recommended for this sensor (range, number, length, flight path, etc)? Advance notification required? Could these be accommodated within existing Open Skies provisions? If not, what modifications would be required? (U)

-- What is the international availability of this sensor? Are there technology transfer considerations or restrictions? What are they? (U)

-- What verification provisions would be required to help prevent illegal use of this sensor? (U)

-- Could this sensor be used in parallel with existing Open Skies sensors, e.g. could missions be "dual-use"? (U)

C. How could environmental monitoring through an Open Skies agreement help the U.S. collect information it needs or wants on the environment? (U)

-- For scientific research (atmospheric, terrestrial, biological)? (U)

-- Assessments of foreign disasters (natural and manmade)? (U)

-- For monitoring compliance with international environmental regimes? What are those regimes? What is their membership? Status? Current effectiveness? (U)

-- Are there ancillary benefits, such as detection/analysis of proliferant activities/capabilities? (U)

D. What would be other principal parameters for acquiring and using information if Open Skies were expanded to include environmental monitoring? (U)

-- What would be the mission quota requirements? (U)

-- Would environmental monitoring require the same "entire territory" provisions contained in the Open Skies Treaty? (U)

-- What would be the requirements for analyzing, distributing, and archiving data collected through an Open

Skies environmental regime? What government agencies/components would be responsible for performing these tasks? (U)

-- Would environmental monitoring information be useful if shared among states parties alone? Would an environmental monitoring regime be more beneficial if the data collected pursuant to that regime were publicly available? If so, what Treaty or other provisions would be required to accommodate this sharing of data? What domestic legislation, if any, would be required? (U)

E. What would be the most cost-effective way to deploy airborne platforms for an environmental monitoring agreement? (U)

-- Can sensors be added to the U.S. IOC or FOC aircraft? At any time? How long would it take to modify the aircraft? At what cost (for each sensor)? What impact would the process of modification have on availability of aircraft to perform missions under the current regime (i.e. downtime)? ~~(C)~~

-- What would be the impact of developing each aircraft for "dual-use"? What is the expected number of missions, training time and maintenance for each aircraft as currently configured? What missions could be added? What would be the effect on availability for carrying out missions under the current regime? ~~(C)~~

-- Are there other aircraft which already have these capabilities which might also be flown pursuant to an Open Skies monitoring regime? What are they? Who owns them? Would they have to be purchased and/or further modified? At what cost? What is their availability? ~~(C)~~

-- Do we know how other parties, including the Russians, would be likely to implement environmental monitoring? (U)

F. What contributions would an environmental monitoring agreement make to addressing environmental concerns of non-U.S. Treaty parties? (U)

-- What are the key environmental concerns of non-U.S. Open Skies parties? Non-parties who might want to join? (U)

-- How could a new regime address those concerns? What would key objectives be for non-U.S. parties? (U)

-- What have the Russians proposed for Open Skies? What are their objectives? How is their interest in environmental monitoring likely to affect their efforts to implement the Treaty as signed? ~~(C)~~

G. What effect would an Open Skies environmental monitoring regime have on existing bilateral and multilateral cooperative

environmental monitoring efforts? Would it duplicate or complement those efforts? (U)

-- What are the existing international agreements and programs for monitoring the environment that include airborne collection of information? (U)

-- What plans are there for establishing new cooperative agreements? (U)

-- Would Open Skies supplement or complement these agreements? If so, how? (U)

-- What objectives would be fulfilled under the expansion of the Open Skies Treaty that are not now being met through the remote sensing efforts of NASA, NOAA, or the United Nations Environmental Program Global Environmental Monitoring System (Gems), for example? (C)

-- Would Open Skies conflict with or undermine these existing or planned cooperative efforts? (U)

H. What are possible adverse implications of opening up U.S. airspace to an environmental monitoring regime? Assess each of the below on the assumption that information will (a) be intended only for states parties; or (b) will also be shared with the non-governmental scientific community and public. (U)

-- What would be the legal implications? (U)

-- What would be the counterintelligence implications for national security information for each type of sensor? For information collected by sensors in the aggregate? (C)

-- What would be the terrorist or other adversary concerns? (C)

-- What well-defined, specific exemptions should be in place to protect the security of sensitive United States facilities (e.g. against providing information of significant use to terrorists)? (C)

-- What would be the counterintelligence concerns for proprietary information? (C)

-- What would be the likely reaction of industry? Are there measures which could be taken to mitigate industry's concerns? What would they be? Would there be legal implications with respect to the private sector? How could those be addressed? (C)

-- If the U.S. decides to notify industry, on request, of overflights under the current Open Skies provisions, how would it affect our decision to notify in the event that "environmental" sensors are used? What would be the legal

implications of notifying some industries and not others? (C)

-- What is the likelihood of detecting the illegal use of an agreed sensor during a mission? What could be the adverse impact of undetected illegal use? What are the safeguards required to protect against illegal use? (C)

I. What would be the impact on Treaty implementation of adding a new set of environmental objectives, as opposed to retaining the focus of Open Skies on military activities and forces? (U)

-- What would be the likely impact of an environmental add-on initiative to current work in the OSCC? (U)

-- What would be the likely reaction of other states parties to a proposal to modify the Open Skies agreement for environmental monitoring? (U)

-- Where should negotiations be conducted? (U)

-- Could we proceed with such an initiative and ensure that the Treaty as agreed will enter into force and be fully implemented (our first priority)? (U)

-- Would such a negotiation require a U.S. representative dedicated solely to Open Skies? (U)

-- If the U.S. were to make a proposal, when should that be? (U)

II. Options for Policy (U)

In light of the assessment above, outline the pros and cons of the following options. (U)

(A) Adding sensors, with no other changes to the Treaty. (C)

(B) Developing an environmental monitoring package, separate from, but building on, Treaty provisions (e.g. as a protocol to the Treaty). (C)

(C) Permitting use of environmental sensors on Open Skies aircraft, but outside the framework of the Treaty. (C)

(D) Leaving the initiative on environmental monitoring to other Treaty parties. (C)

III. Tasking (U)

This review will be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff. It should include clear policy options/recommendations which will reflect analysis of the spectrum of possibilities for expanding

Open Skies to include environmental monitoring. Differences in view among agencies should be noted. The Review should be completed by January 15, 1994. (C)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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December 15, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (U)

The PDD on nonproliferation and export controls (PDD-13) calls for a review of our policy on conventional arms transfers, taking into account national security, foreign policy, arms control, trade, budgetary and economic competitiveness considerations. Few issues bring to bear as divergent a set of policy concerns. (U)

On one hand, regional violence and instability in the post-Cold War world prompts us to consider unilateral or multilateral limits on conventional arms exports. The potential for U.S. military involvement in regional conflicts has also raised concerns that our forces might someday face advanced weapons previously exported from the U.S. or its allies. These concerns have stimulated interest in countermeasures. (C)

On the other hand, strengthening the ability of friendly countries to defend themselves can reduce the need for direct U.S. military support. In a world of declining defense budgets, export markets are increasingly important for our defense industry. Other countries -- including former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states -- face similar incentives to export. (C)

While conventional arms build-ups may be prompted by some of the same insecurities that have contributed to efforts to acquire non-conventional weapons, we cannot treat the conventional arms transfer issue as simply another form of proliferation. Some arms sales undercut regional stability or damage U.S. interests.

They can erode U.S. military superiority or increase the risk of U.S.casualties in regional conflict. Others help friendly countries meet legitimate security concerns and thereby play a stabilizing role. We should therefore avoid automatically extending to conventional arms transfers the stigma attached to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. ~~(C)~~

As PDD-13 notes, we will need to integrate a very broad array of U.S. policy objectives in tackling this issue. Our policy review should address the following subjects.

I. Analytical Background

Assessments on the following subjects should be prepared.

A. For each of the following regions, describe the potential impact of likely arms imports (including from the U.S.) on the regional military balance, the level of tension among key regional actors, and the economies of the importing states:

Middle East/Persian Gulf
Northeast Asia
Southeast Asia
South Asia
Latin America
Eastern Europe/Former Soviet Union
North Africa and Southern Africa

To what extent will recipients be able to assimilate advanced weapons systems and technology? To what extent does the acquisition of more advanced weapons or transfer of large quantities of arms aggravate (or alternatively, reduce) regional instability? Are potential adversaries acquiring capabilities that would erode U.S. or allied military advantages in a future conflict? ~~(C)~~

B. What pressures and objectives will influence the actions and policies of other major arms suppliers, including Russia, China, North Korea, Eastern European and former Soviet countries and our allies? How important are exports to the Russian, Chinese, and Western European defense industries? ~~(C)~~

C. What pressures and constraints will influence the policies of major arms importers? Where are the most important potential markets for arms imports? ~~(C)~~

D. What are the legal and policy mechanisms by which the leading suppliers (including the U.S.) control their own arms exports? What do we know about Russian and Chinese practices? What are the arms transfer policies of the leading exporters and how do they view negotiated restraints? ~~(C)~~

E. What multilateral regimes or arrangements currently exist to enhance transparency or promote appropriate restraint on conventional arms transfers? How effective have they been? (C)

F. Identify specific technologies/weapons systems meriting special consideration because they provide capabilities:

- Whose transfer would erode future U.S. military dominance. (C)
- Against which our forces will require specific countermeasures. (C)
- Producing rapid changes in the strategic environment or regional military contexts. (C)
- Whose transfer would erode future U.S. industrial competitiveness. (C)
- Which if misused would cause indiscriminate civilian casualties or unnecessary suffering or which would raise other human rights issues. (C)

G. What are the major trends in the international market for major conventional weapons systems, related technology and production capabilities, upgrades to existing systems/platforms and other arms exports? What are our best projections of demand (broken down by countries and major weapons types) over the next five to ten years? What portion of this market is currently or potentially open to the U.S.? What is the impact of the end of the Cold War? (C)

H. How important are exports to the viability of our defense industry, including specific sectors, and to our overall national economy? Specifically, what role do exports play in making possible the down-sizing or diversification of the U.S. defense industry in the near-to-medium term? How important are they in determining the availability or price of equipment for our own armed forces and the development of new defense technology? (C)

I. What are the recent trends in the internationalization of manufacturing and technology in the arms industry (both platform and component manufacture)? To what degree have U.S. companies been involved in such trends? To what extent are U.S. military systems dependent on components or sub-components manufactured offshore? (C)

J. What opportunities exist for the U.S. and others to upgrade existing U.S. and foreign-supplied systems rather than supply new platforms? Can significant improvements in military capabilities be achieved? To what extent could such upgrades be accomplished with dual-use technology? (C)

II. Policy Considerations

In developing our policy, agencies should be mindful of the need to integrate a broad range of policy objectives, including the following.

A. Avoiding shifts in military capabilities that create opportunities for aggression or preemption or erode regional U.S. military advantages. Preventing conventional force build-up by unfriendly states; constraining potential adversary access to technology that confers significant military advantage. (C)

B. Reducing defense expenditures of others and U.S. foreign assistance obligations; avoiding wasteful military expenditure by friends or aid recipients; helping militaries downsize and reducing undue military influence in domestic politics. (C)

C. Avoiding harm to civilians or human rights violations. (C)

D. Promoting responsible arms export policies by others. (C)

E. Fostering global and regional arms control and nonproliferation efforts, particularly in regions of tension, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. (C)

F. Maintaining regional stability and security of our friends; maintaining regional military balances in the face of arms sales by others; reducing incentives for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. (C)

G. Building or maintaining U.S. influence; demonstrating U.S. commitment to the security of friends; supporting peacekeeping operations. (C)

H. Generating export earnings for U.S. companies; maintaining the U.S. defense industrial and R&D base; reducing the cost of our own defense procurement; ensuring that the U.S. is successful in a diversified, interdependent market for high technology and is not cut off from offshore manufacture and supply of defense-related technologies. (C)

I. Reducing unit procurement costs for the U.S. military; reducing U.S. military force requirements by enhancing

the capabilities of friendly states; ensuring interoperability of friendly military forces. (C)

III. Policy Options

The policy review should identify and develop for decision options for U.S. policy, including options that address the following issues.

A. Should the U.S. pursue additional multilateral agreements, seek to expand existing regimes or undertake unilateral action to achieve a greater degree of restraint or greater coordination between regimes on conventional arms transfers? If so, what are the prospects others would take comparable action? The following options should be considered.

1. Increasing transparency
   a. Expanding the UN registry.
   b. Reviving the P-5 process.
   c. U.S. post-COCOM proposal for prior notification of arms transfers.
   d. Bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to advocate greater transparency and public accountability; U.S. public diplomacy. (C)

2. Constraints on arms transfers
   a. Agreements with other suppliers on qualitative or quantitative limits on transfers, e.g., efforts in the CD.
   b. Informal agreements against supply to particular destinations (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea).
   c. Agreements in CSCE or other regional multilateral bodies on restraints, standards for transfers or transparency. (C)

3. Cooperative efforts or international contributions to address defense conversion/defense industry downsizing, particularly in Russia and other former Soviet and Eastern European countries; collaboration to manage global overcapacity in the face of a shrinking market. (C)

4. Voluntary regional regimes/limits on overall force limits (e.g., through the CSCE, the Madrid process or other settings); collective security arrangements, peacekeeping efforts or security commitments to reduce motivations for arms acquisition. (C)

5. Unilateral U.S. action; restraint or moratorium on U.S. sales globally or to specified regions or types of regimes. (C)

6. U.S. efforts to promote higher standards in national export control/arms transfer regulatory systems or the adoption of "rules of the road." (C)

B. To what extent should the U.S. actively promote arms exports by U.S. firms? Options:

1. Support defense requirements of friendly countries by exporting needed military articles. Actively advocate U.S. defense industry interests overseas. (C)

2. Provide export credits or other USG financial assistance in support of defense exports. Specifically, defense export financing could be included in the FY 95 budget request. (C)

3. Continue case-by-case review of export requests taking into account regional stability, U.S. national security and economic interests, but refrain from actively assisting U.S. exporters. (C)

4. Encourage internationalization of U.S. and allied defense procurement where it will enhance interoperability, promote U.S. technology, ensure the continued flow of defense-relevant technology developed overseas, and lower U.S. defense procurement costs. (C)

C. What criteria should govern U.S. arms export decisions in specific cases? Areas requiring specific policy review include:

1. Special consideration or prohibition on transfers of certain types of weapons:
   a. Antipersonnel landmines or other weapons that cause grave damage to the civilian population.
   b. Non-WMD strategic systems, e.g., long-range strike aircraft, submarines, aerial tankers.
   c. Certain technologically advanced systems with implications for U.S. military advantage, e.g., stealth capabilities, night vision. (C)
   d. In particular countries or regions, small arms and automatic weapons.

2. What should be U.S. policy regarding transfers of equipment or technology to upgrade existing systems/platforms, particularly Soviet-designed equipment? Is it possible to control dual-use technology transfers for this purpose? Should we permit

upgrade existing systems/platforms, particularly Soviet-designed equipment? Is it possible to control dual-use technology transfers for this purpose? Should we permit cooperation or technology with arms industries in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or China to produce high-performance systems based on upgrading Soviet designs? ~~(C)~~

D. Should we encourage cooperation between U.S. defense firms and the arms industry in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? Are there areas for cooperation that enhance stability? ~~(C)~~

IV. Tasking

The NSC Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Control should convene an Interagency Working Group to conduct this review, task specific drafting responsibilities and set deadlines. (U)

The review should provide a basis for resolution of concrete issues currently requiring decision. It should include analysis and recommendations across the full range of options for dealing with these issues. Any differences of view between agencies should be noted. (U)

Each option presented should include an outline of an implementing strategy and a brief statement of arguments pro and con. (U)

This review is due to the NSC Executive Secretary no later than January 31, 1994. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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February 7, 1994

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ADMINISTRATOR OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward International Heroin Trafficking (U)

The illicit narcotics trade creates violence, health and social problems, economic dislocation, environmental degradation, and threats to democratic systems. While US international drug control efforts have had some impact against cocaine traffickers, including some who traffic in heroin, heroin constitutes a growing domestic problem and an increasing threat worldwide to some democratic governments and institutions. Heroin consumption in the United States is increasing, worldwide addiction appears to be worsening, poppy growing areas are expanding, and global opium production is at record levels. (U)

The heroin threat requires a distinct strategy of its own. Heroin trafficking is generally much less integrated and far more geographically dispersed than the cocaine trade. It involves numerous organizations that typically engage only in certain parts of the trade, or operate only in specific geographic areas, or along particular transportation routes. The family or ethnic base of many of these groups complicates control efforts, but the multiple steps involved -- including transportation, processing, money laundering, and links to importers and wholesalers -- represent vulnerable "links" to be exploited by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. (U)

The past decade has demonstrated the close link between narcotics production and trafficking and the spread of indigenous drug abuse, a grim reality which should encourage cooperation between source/transit countries and the US. The geography of the heroin trade, the current inaccessibility of major producing areas in South Asia, and the expanded production in Latin America magnify the international dimensions of the problem. (U)

The development of courier organizations in areas far removed from producing regions, as well as the involvement of heroin trafficking organizations in other illegal narcotics and non-narcotics smuggling, further underlines our need for help from other concerned countries to develop and implement heroin counterdrug programs. (U)

I. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

Production: Describe: current capabilities to measure the size and yield of poppy growing areas; the sources of and transportation routes for essential chemicals used in heroin manufacturing; changes in processing technologies; and trends in opium and heroin production over the past five years. Identify primary sources of US imports, sources for other major consuming countries, and note changes in trafficking sources and routes. **(Intelligence Community/DEA)** ~~(S)~~

Consumption: Characterize heroin consumption in the US, including changing consumption patterns, purity and price information, and distribution systems. **(DEA/ONDCP)** ~~(S)~~

Economics: Estimate the worldwide and domestic US economic dimensions of the heroin trade, particularly cash outflows of narcotics sales proceeds and the primary destinations for these monies. Identify the percent of economic return to growers, processors, smugglers, wholesalers and retailers. Identify the money laundering methods used in the heroin trade and the extent to which they use professional money launders, financial institutions and underground banking systems. **(DEA/Treasury/State)** ~~(S)~~

Effects in Source/Transit Countries: Describe the effects of the opium/heroin trade and consumption on key source and transit countries, especially links with democratization, environmental and health concerns, violence, corruption, and economic development. **(State/AID)** ~~(S)~~

II. CURRENT EFFORTS AND EFFECTIVENESS

Identify current strategy goals and objectives, and assess the extent of current US, other country and international organization programs that have met these goals. Establish measures of effectiveness and indicators of progress for evaluating the eight strategy areas below. Program approaches should be evaluated for their success or failure based on specific indicators. ~~(C)~~

Crop Control: Review alternative development, crop substitution and eradication programs, noting where and how these approaches have been effective, or have failed. **(State)** ~~(S)~~

Interdiction: Identify the degree to which efforts to seize drugs, attack processing and transportation systems, seize assets and control chemicals have affected heroin flows or the traffickers' cost of doing business. **(ONDCP/DEA/Intelligence Community/Customs)** ~~(S)~~

Investigation and Prosecution: Describe status of international efforts to dismantle major heroin organizations by identifying, investigating, and prosecuting their leaders. Evaluate intelligence, operational, legal, and political factors that affect this tactic. **(DOJ/DEA/State/Intelligence Community)** ~~(S)~~

Money Laundering: Describe current programs to address these two areas, and assess their impact on trafficking activity. **(DOJ/Treasury/DEA)** ~~(S)~~

Chemical Diversions: Describe current programs and assess their impact on trafficking activities. **(DOJ/State)** ~~(C)~~

Institution Building: Assess required political will and the requisite capability of source and transit countries to develop and sustain counternarcotics policies through improvements in judicial, prosecutorial, and police systems. **(State/DOJ)** ~~(S)~~

Demand Reduction/Public Awareness: Assess the effect of these programs and related diplomatic efforts on the increase of host-country public concern and political will to increase counter-narcotics efforts and attack corruption. **(AID/State)** ~~(S)~~

Intelligence: Evaluate US collection and analysis efforts, including internal USG information sharing, and support of indigenous services. A compartmented annex should accompany the study. **(DOD/DOJ/Intelligence Community/Customs)** ~~(S)~~

Expenditures: Review USG heroin counternarcotics programs over the past five years by type of program and by agency. Show the percentage of each agency's resources that are dedicated to international heroin efforts; and the international total as a percentage of both the overall supply control budget and the overall USG counter-narcotics budget. **(ONDCP/OMB)** ~~(S)~~

III. STRUCTURAL ISSUES

Organization Review: Identify problems in the interagency organizational structure, focusing on overlaps, gaps and/or lack of clarity in agency roles and missions, decision making structure, and operational command/control authorities. **(NSC/ONDCP/State/OMB)** ~~(S)~~

IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

A heroin strategy must address clearly the geographic, ethnic and structural diversity of the heroin trade, for example: a program appropriate for a Burmese producing organization, may have no relevance to attacking a Lagos-based courier ring. Analysis must be focused on clearly stated strategy goals and objectives, and linked to appropriate measures of effectiveness. It should address where and how each strategy component can be effective using criteria which include effects on:

-- overall level of opium/heroin production;
-- the flow of heroin to the US;
-- the capability of individual growing areas to supply the US heroin market;
-- the ability of drug trafficking organizations to enter or continue in the trade;
-- bilateral foreign relations and multilateral cooperation;
-- democracy and order in producer/transit countries;
-- overall contribution to the strategy and prospects for successful implementation. ~~(S)~~

Among the components analyzed should be:

Increasing International Attention: From the Presidential perspective, Heroin remains a drug threat priority second only to cocaine. The worldwide rise in opiate use however, may aid efforts to convince nations that effective drug control measures are in their best interest. What would a strategy look like that emphasized diplomatic efforts to build political will (including more aggressive use of the certification process), and which stressed the link between drug trafficking and corruption, refugees, environmental degradation, etc? How can we improve coordination with other major bilateral donor nations? **(State/AID)** ~~(S)~~

Engaging Multilateral and International Organizations: US bilateral counternarcotics concerns tend to become equated with our aid levels, an inaccurate and, in the current budget climate, unhelpful link. Further, key producing areas are inaccessible to US assistance or pressure. UN agencies, the International Financial Institutions, and other concerned countries are often active there. What potential is there for raising the narcotics issues with these bodies, and increasing involvement of the United Nations International Drug Control Program, the Financial Action Task Force, the Dublin Group, etc, to broaden pressure on key problem countries? **(State)** ~~(C)~~

Supporting Indigenous Programs: Narcotics control requires not only successful crop control and/or interdiction efforts, but adequate legal structures and strong judicial systems, as well as demand reduction, public awareness and treatment programs. How and where can we support indigenous institution building that will show results over the medium-term? **(State)** ~~(C)~~

Improving Intelligence Information and Exchange: The major heroin trafficking groups are widely dispersed and engaged in other illegal activities that provide opportunities for concealment and avoidance of law enforcement efforts. Different law enforcement organizations and intelligence collection efforts focus on different aspects of these groups' activities, too often in an uncoordinated fashion. What potential is there to improve internal USG -- federal, state and local LEAs -- information sharing and cooperation, and thereby increase drug control effectiveness? **(DOD/Intelligence Community/DOJ)** ~~(S)~~

Attacking the Trafficking Infrastructure: US policies have emphasized direct approaches to heroin itself through techniques aimed at seizing the drug during transit and distribution. What would be the effects of greater concentration of efforts against the trafficking infrastructure, including leadership, logistical support, money laundering, and chemical precursors? **(DOJ/DEA/Customs)** ~~(S)~~

For each of these and other strategy components proposed, ONDCP and OMB should portray a reallocation of resources by agency and program from the existing, increased and decreased funding levels. ~~(C)~~

V. STUDY PROCESS

The Chairman of the Counternarcotics Inter-agency Working Group will establish a steering group, arranging for input responsive to the questions above. A draft paper will be reviewed by all relevant agencies, and agency comments, criticisms, and disagreements shown in the final study. The completed document will be submitted to the Director of ONDCP. The Director of ONDCP will prepare and coordinate the completed document and submit an actionable summary document for a Deputies Committee. ~~(S)~~

SECTION		DRAFT TO STEERING GROUP
I.	The Nature of the Threat	February 18
II.	Current Efforts and Effectiveness	March 4
III.	Structural Issues	March 4
IV.	Future Directions	March 11

Until this study is complete and the President issues a Presidential Decision Directive for international heroin trafficking, the approved 1994 International Drug Control Strategy will guide department and agency implementation actions against heroin production and trafficking. During this time, the Chairman of the CN-IWG will insure coordinated implementation of this strategy. ~~(S)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 25, 1994

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT: Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development (U)

The United States faces significant challenges in arms control and nonproliferation. At the same time, governmental resources are inherently constrained. Tackling these challenges successfully yet economically will require vigorous, creative and coordinated approaches to research and development (R&D). (U)

Programs exist within departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to identify and, where necessary, develop technologies for implementation, monitoring, verification and improvement of present and future unilateral, bilateral and multilateral arms control, nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives. Moreover, there are a variety of interagency mechanisms with overlapping coordination responsibilities for R&D in the arms control and proliferation areas. (U)

We need to ensure effective coordination of R&D in the areas of arms control and nonproliferation. We also need to guard against redundant arms control and nonproliferation-related R&D and technology programs within and among departments and agencies of the USG. Congress, in several instances, has expressed its desire for better coordination of R&D in these areas. ~~(C)~~

This Presidential Review Directive (PRD) requires a comprehensive examination of current interagency coordination of R&D for arms

control and nonproliferation. The PRD also directs an ad hoc interagency working group to identify recommendations for improving the current structure. The review should provide a thorough discussion of the issues and contain, at a minimum, the following elements: ~~(C)~~

PART I: ASSESSMENT

A. Describe Existing Mandates and Coordination Efforts

1. What is each department or agency's mandate in the arms control and nonproliferation R&D areas?

2. What existing mechanisms have responsibility for interagency coordination for R&D in the arms control and nonproliferation areas?

   - What is the scope of each mechanism?

   - Who chairs the group and how senior is it?

3. What is the extent of overlap in the charters of these existing coordination mechanisms? ~~(C)~~

B. Catalogue Recent Recommendations

1. What recommendations have other working groups, blue ribbon panels or similar advisory groups made for improving coordination of R&D for arms control and nonproliferation?

2. What recent or pending Congressional actions bear on this issue? (U)

C. Coordination Issues

1. What are the pros and cons of aggregating or disaggregating the arms control and nonproliferation R&D issues for the purposes of coordination? How much overlap is there between arms control and nonproliferation R&D?

2. What is the appropriate level for conducting R&D coordination?

3. What is the appropriate voice for "consumers" of arms control and nonproliferation technology in the R&D process?

4. How do the technology "producers" respond to U.S. policy objectives in setting R&D priorities?

5. How are multimission programs integrated into priorities for arms control and nonproliferation?

6. How can we improve R&D coordination while ensuring adequate security to protect compartmented programs? ~~(C)~~

PART II: POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In each area below, analyze the listed options and make appropriate recommendations.

A. Reforming Existing Mechanisms

- o Strengthening existing R&D coordination mechanisms including:
  - revising charter(s)
  - revising participation level
  - changing chair(s)
  - abolishing obsolete and/or redundant mechanism(s)
  - other? (U)

B. Developing New R&D Coordination Mechanism(s)

- o Identifying the appropriate scope, focus, participation and modalities of operation. (U)

PART III: TASKING

The NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, in conjunction with the NSC Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls and the Senior Director for Science and Technology, should convene an ad hoc interagency working group to conduct this review, task specific drafting responsibilities and set deadlines. This review is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than July 1, 1994. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1994

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward International Migration and Refugee Affairs (U)

As we approach the 21st century, refugee and migration issues have become the focus of far greater attention and concern in the United States and other industrialized countries. The end of the Cold War has brought an acceleration of refugee and migration outflows as the outbreak of multiple conflicts has forced people to flee and as restrictions on emigration have been eased. At the same time, the end of Cold War has provided opportunities to develop durable solutions to the plight of refugees, as reflected in large-scale repatriations of former refugees to Cambodia. (U)

A prominent feature of the post-Cold War world has been the humanitarian role played by the United Nations, including its assistance agencies, in conflict situations. The United States has a strong interest in ensuring that the UN and other international organizations are organized and equipped adequately to deal with large refugee and migration movements. Third country resettlement, while an important option in some cases, cannot be a durable solution for the large majority of the world's 18 million refugees. Thus, refugee and migration problems now must be treated increasingly at the source with preventive measures in countries of first asylum through provision of adequate assistance and measures designed to help people repatriate in dignity and safety. (U)

Increased migration has reached unprecedented levels of asylum-seekers in Europe and North America in recent years. The asylum process is costly and time-consuming, and there is a widespread perception in Europe and North America that asylum systems are being abused. The United States has pursued discussions with European countries as well as Canada and Mexico to develop common approaches to this challenge, which has been reflected starkly in incidents involving the smuggling of boat loads of migrants. The Administration has proposed to Congress legislation on expedited procedures at ports of entry designed to enhance our ability to return non-refugees while maintaining a system that protects those who fear persecution. (U)

Refugee protection and resettlement are traditional and fundamental elements of the U.S. humanitarian agenda. Our task is to develop policies which reaffirm this commitment at a time of diminished resources and continuing challenges to effective enforcement of our immigration laws. (U)

The new issues we confront in this area call for a comprehensive assessment of U.S. international refugee and migration policy and programs. The review should take into account previous policy decisions that implicate refugees and migration, especially PDD-25 (Peacekeeping), PDD-9 (Alien Smuggling) and proposed legislation on expedited exclusion. (U)

The review process should be coordinated closely with and contribute to the work of the DPC/INS-chaired interagency group on immigration. The review should also consider carefully the work being completed on international migration issues by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Finally, the review should include consultation with Members of Congress, regional and international institutions and non-governmental organizations involved in refugee assistance, protection and resettlement issues. (U)

Although agencies with lead drafting responsibilities are designated in parenthesis, all agencies will contribute to those sections of the PRD that relate to issues of their agency's concern. (U)

I. Background (U)

-- Describe the origin and the operation of U.S. refugee programs, including overseas assistance and resettlement. (State) (U)

-- Funding: What funds have been devoted to refugee assistance and resettlement? Include DOD support. (OMB) (U)

-- How do U.S. programs -- and in particular levels of assistance and resettlement per capita -- compare to other industrialized democracies? (Include asylees as well as refugees resettled through overseas resettlement programs.) (State) (U)

II. Refugee Assistance and Refugee Protection (U)

-- Evaluate USG decision-making on overseas refugee assistance. Is the magnitude of our assistance adequate, and how is such a measurement made? Do the current funding categories, and the relative distribution between the Migration and Refugee Assistance and the Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance Accounts, provide for most effective use of funds? Describe and assess interagency coordination on humanitarian assistance involving refugees, including emergency responses. What changes, if any, would you recommend? (State) (U)

-- Assess the capacity of international agencies in general and the UNHCR in particular to meet new refugee assistance and protection challenges, such as internally displaced persons, large-scale repatriation and protection in the context of mass migration. In the UN system (and in USG policy), what are the means for managing the transition from refugee relief to repatriation to long-term development assistance? For ensuring protection in increasingly hostile environments for refugees? Where are the critical gaps and what changes would you recommend? For example, is the UN adequately equipped to manage demining operations in the context of repatriation? (State) (U)

-- Describe and assess U.S. policy toward return of economic migrants and return of refugees to their country of origin. Address issues involving refugees from Haiti, Cuba and Vietnam. As a matter of law and of policy, what should be USG positions on these issues and what procedures should we employ as we attempt to implement policy? What are the benefits of consistency? Is this feasible? (State) (U)

-- What procedures are adequate to determine that an individual has no claim to refugee status? (Justice) Is a UNHCR determination adequate? Should the procedures of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees serve as a model? (State) (U)

-- What role should the military play in refugee assistance and protection issues and how should that be coordinated within the interagency arena and with international and non-governmental organizations? (DOD) (U)

-- Provide an assessment of our in-country refugee processing programs. What factors should influence our decision-making on establishment of such programs? With respect to the processing procedures, what measures should be taken to ensure maximum protection in an inherently threatening environment? Are we doing enough in this respect? (State) (U)

II. International Migration Issues (U)

How should the USG engage in ongoing, high-profile discussions on migration issues, both bilaterally and multilaterally? In addition, what should be our positions toward the following

issues that have characterized such discussions and which characterize our own domestic policy debate:

-- new regional and/or international institutions dealing with migration issues (State);

-- migration and institution-building in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (State);

-- "safe country" of transit and origin (State);

-- provision of temporary asylum outside of standard processing channels (Justice);

-- EU and North American harmonization of asylum policies (Justice);

-- repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers (Justice);

-- tolerance and integration policies for migrants (HHS);

-- new adjudicative guidelines for refugee determination relating to women, sexual preference and other criteria (Justice).

-- efforts to control undocumented migration, including alien smuggling. (State) (U)

In several fora, the UNHCR and others have urged efforts to address root causes of population movements, including human rights abuses, population pressures, failure of economic development and the mistreatment of ethnic minorities. In the short-term, how can we better equip USG agencies and international organizations to anticipate refugee flows and thereby preempt them if possible? Over the long term, how can migration issues be better incorporated into policy making on human rights, development and treatment of minorities? (U)

III. Immigration Emergencies (U)

How should the USG be organized to deal with the foreign affairs dimensions of a mass immigration emergency? What roles should the various agencies of government play and what options, in addition to admission and processing in the United States, should be available to policy makers? State, in coordination with INS, DOD, Coast Guard, HHS and other concerned agencies should develop options to deal with the most likely scenarios. State should link its effort to the Justice Department's draft immigration emergency plan. State should focus primarily on actions and activities outside the United States, including admissions policy measures designed to encourage orderly departure, statements and actions directed at the country of origin in advance of and during an emergency, public information and measures directed at U.S. citizens who might seek to encourage boat departures and options for dealing with migrants in transit. These studies should supplement and not supplant work that is already underway

in the Administration on immigration emergency planning with respect to Cuba. (State) ~~(C)~~

IV. Refugee Admissions and Resettlement (U)

-- What level and regional distribution of annual refugee admissions to the United States fulfills our international responsibilities as a resettlement country while maintaining an affordable domestic program? On what basis do we make such a determination? To what extent should practices of other countries play a role? Should we abandon or modify current admissions processing priorities? Should we involve the UNHCR to a greater extent in the U.S. refugee admissions program? If so, how? (State) (U)

-- Is it realistic to assume that decreases in refugee admissions funding might permit increases in the overseas assistance accounts? If so, is that desirable? (State) (U)

-- At what point and by what methods should we adjust the admissions levels from Vietnam and the former Soviet Union, from which the majority of refugees have been resettled in recent years. (State) (U)

-- How do the federal agencies coordinate budget submissions on refugee admissions and how could coordination be improved? (OMB) (U)

-- How can the benefits of refugee admissions and a multi-ethnic/multiracial population be more effectively "marketed" to the general population? (HHS) (U)

-- How can we build into the refugee resettlement program the flexibility envisioned by its founders to increase or decrease levels substantially from one year to the next, or on shorter notice, in response to dramatic shifts in resettlement needs? (State) (U)

-- How should we deal with the medical exclusion issue as it affects refugee admissions? (HHS) (U)

V. Study Process

Lead agencies indicated above should prepare their sections after discussion with other concerned agencies in the IWG established in the PRD. Subsequently all concerned agencies should review and provide written comments on these sections. State will then prepare a summary paper that presents major conclusions as well as issues for decision on which consensus has not been reached. This will be an actionable document that will be made available to the Deputies Committee by July 15. (U)

While this study is being conducted, operational decisions about migration and refugee issues will be coordinated through an IWG on International Migration and Refugee Affairs co-chaired by the Department of State and the NSC. Subsequent to completion and

approval of this study, the IWG on Migration and Refugee Affairs will coordinate policy implementation on these issues. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 47, International Organized Crime. (2 pages)~~	~~11/10/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ NSE 9/25/19

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[PRD-47, International Organized Crime, November 10, 1994]

2010-1227-M
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No. PRD 47

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 10, 1994

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-1227-M(2.36)
9/25/19 KDE

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: International Organized Crime (U)

SCOPE

One of the trends in the post-Cold War appears to be increased organized criminal activity across international boundaries. Various segments of this phenomena have been examined in earlier National Security Council studies and directives. For example, international illegal activity in narcotics was addressed in PDD-14, PRD-18 and PRD-42. International alien smuggling was addressed in PDD-9. Traffic in nuclear materials and other elements of weapons of mass destruction was addressed in PDD-13. ~~(S)~~

Although the U.S. has examined many of these core criminal activities associated with international organized crime, we have not examined the linkages between them, nor the patterns of the groups that conduct them. This directive calls for a thorough review of all traditional international organized criminal activities to include money laundering, counterfeiting, alien smuggling, among other subjects. This review is not meant to duplicate previous efforts, but instead to use information gained in them to examine the problem as a whole. The review will closely examine the links between these organized criminal activities and will apply lessons learned from combating one form of criminal activity to devise strategies to fight others. ~~(S)~~

TASKS

1. Determining the Threat: The review should analyze trends in international organized crime and identify significant threats to U.S. interests emphasizing new or emerging patterns. CIA and FBI should co-chair a sub-group to report on this task no later than November 30, 1994. ~~(S)~~

The threat analysis should specifically examine trends in transnational crime. The analysis should identify and describe groups engaged in these activities and describe their interaction insofar as they are known. It should examine their relationship with governments and government officials. It should also identify those that are the greatest threat to the United States and international security. ~~(S)~~

2. U.S. Government Organization: The review should catalogue the activities of U.S. government agencies engaged in combating international organized crime and propose structural and organizational changes to enhance U.S. government efforts. Justice and State should co-chair a sub-group to report on this task due no later than November 30, 1994. ~~(S)~~

3. International Organization: The study should examine how other nations view the threat, detail the existing foreign counterpart agencies and international mechanisms for seeking cooperation to combat international organized crime, and propose options for changing organizational arrangements to enhance international efforts. The Departments of State and Justice should lead a sub-group to report on this task no later than December 20, 1994. ~~(S)~~

4. Initiatives: The review should examine policy proposals and options for initiatives to improve U.S. and international capabilities to counter international organized crime. NSC should chair a subgroup to solicit and evaluate proposals, including those that have been made by non-government entities and analysts and report no later than December 20, 1994. ~~(S)~~

5. An IWG chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State shall coordinate this PRD. It should review the papers tasked above and issue a final report, with options, to the Deputies Committee no later than 90 days from receipt of this directive. The report should include a recommendation concerning the possible need for an on-going IWG on these issues. ~~(S)~~

William J. Clinton

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001. report	Presidential Review Directive 49. (5 pages)	01/05/1995	P1/b(1) KDE 9125/19

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WASHINGTON

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/ NSC-49

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Issues Related to U.S. Military Presence and Canal Reversion in Panama ~~(C)~~

This Presidential Review Directive tasks an examination of policy issues regarding compliance with the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 and related legislation. ~~(C)~~

I. REVERSION OF PROPERTY AND FACILITIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA

The process of transferring properties and facilities to the Government of Panama per our treaty obligations will accelerate in the coming years. The IWG should review current practice and policy with regard to reversion and identify any steps we should take unilaterally or in conjunction with the Government of Panama to ensure the process meets U.S. objectives. ~~(C)~~

A. Background

What are the specific requirements of the Panama Canal Treaties with respect to reversion of properties and facilities currently maintained by the United States in Panama? What aspects of reversion are left to the discretion of the United States? (U)

Beyond complying with treaty obligations, what are our principal objectives in the reversion process? ~~(C)~~

What is the current schedule for reverting properties and facilities to the Government of Panama and on what cost and other considerations is it based? ~~(C)~~

What bilateral and interagency mechanisms exist for coordinating the reversion of property to the Government of Panama? (U)

B. Assessment

Evaluate the readiness of the Government of Panama now and in the coming five years to receive and effectively employ these properties and facilities. What assistance are we providing to improve its ability to do so? What more could be done by the United States Government or by the multilateral lending agencies to facilitate conversion of these properties to productive civilian use? Are there targeted trade or investment incentives that could be usefully employed? Has Panama tabled any proposals -- such as establishing educational facilities to create a "City of Knowledge" on these properties -- that warrant favorable U.S. consideration? (S)

How would a decision to seek a post-2000 military presence affect the reversion process? (S)

Identify and assess any issues related to the conditions of these properties that are likely to arise between the United States and Panama during the reversion process. Are current mechanisms for resolving disagreements over treaty obligations effective? Discussion of this issue should include possible environmental concerns and the presence of unexploded ordinance on certain properties. What is current U.S. practice with regard to these issues and on what considerations is it based? (S)

C. Policy Options

Identify any substantive or procedural measures that the United States should take or recommend to increase the Government of Panama's ability to manage the properties and facilities that will be conveyed to it. All options should include cost factors and likely Congressional reaction. (S)

II. TRANSITION OF CANAL ADMINISTRATION TO PANAMA

The IWG should assess current policy and practice regarding the transfer of the Panama Canal to the Government of Panama and propose any measures to help ensure that U.S. interests in the Canal will be protected. (S)

A. Background

What are the specific requirements of the Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation with respect to transfer of the Panama Canal? (U)

Which U.S. Government agency bears overall responsibility for ensuring a transition that protects U.S. interests with regard to the Canal. What is the role of the Panama Canal Commission and other U.S. agencies?(U)

Describe the roles various Panamanian government agencies are playing in the transition process. What measures has the Government of Panama taken to prepare for assuming responsibility for the management and operation of the Canal? (U)

Describe current plans for progressively transferring responsibility for management and operation of the Canal to Panama. (U)

B. Assessment

What are the chief obstacles -- actual or potential -- to ensuring a smooth transfer of the Canal to Panamanian control? This review should assess whether the Government of Panama desires and/or will be able to insulate the management of the Canal from domestic political pressures. ~~(C)~~

Assess the effectiveness of measures taken to date to increase Panamanian involvement in the management and operation of the Canal. ~~(C)~~

Assess the degree of confidence Canal users, including relevant governments, have in Panama's ability to successfully operate the Canal after December 31, 1999. ~~(C)~~

How would a decision to maintain a post-2000 military presence affect the transition process? ~~(C)~~

C. Policy Options

Identify any substantive or procedural measures the United States should consider to help ensure the efficient management and operation of the Panama Canal after December 31, 1999, including the possibility of negotiating additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. All options should include cost factors and likely Congressional reaction. ~~(C)~~

III. POSSIBLE POST-2000 U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN PANAMA

Current U.S. policy directs that in compliance with the Treaties all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from Panama by December 31, 1999 unless agreement to the contrary is reached with the Government of Panama. The Interagency Working Group established by this Presidential Review Directive should examine current policy and recommend whether the United States should

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seek to maintain a post-2000 military presence in Panama and, if so, under what legal arrangements. (S)

A. Background

What are the specific requirements of the Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation with respect to U.S. military presence in Panama? What was the rationale behind these agreements? Have conditions changed that suggest a reconsideration of our position? (C)

What is the current size and scope of the U.S. military presence in Panama? Describe the missions assigned to each component and the schedule for withdrawing these forces per treaty obligations. (S)

Describe options under consideration for relocating SOUTHCOM headquarters to CONUS or another location. (S)

B. Assessment

What impacts, positive and negative, would the planned total withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Panama have on meeting SOUTHCOM's future operational missions; advancing general U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America; and achieving U.S. objectives in Panama, including maintaining the security of the Panama Canal and meeting U.S. interests regarding its efficient operation beyond the year 2000? (S)

What is the position of the current Panamanian government toward a post-2000 U.S. military presence in Panama? What would be the reaction within Latin America to our seeking a post-2000 presence? Would it affect negatively or positively our relations with countries in the region? (C)

C. Policy Options

Should the United States seek to maintain a post-2000 military presence in Panama? Options should include but are not limited to a full withdrawal by December 31, 1999 and maintenance of a limited presence beyond the year 2,000. Options for maintaining a post-2000 presence should include specific steps the United States should take in the coming year to secure same. All options should include an assessment of costs, likely Congressional reaction and the likely effect on property reversion and Canal transition. (S)

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IV. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The IWG should prepare a public affairs strategy outlining how we would publicly present any significant changes in U.S. policy that might result from this review. The strategy should focus on gaining public support for such changes both in Panama and Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole. ~~(C)~~

V. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION

There is likely to be considerable Congressional interest in the results of this review, whether or not it results in significant changes in U.S. policy. In addition to assessing each option in terms of likely Congressional reaction as requested above, the IWG should, in coordination with the Congressional liaison offices of the departments and agencies represented, include an assessment of current Congressional attitudes toward the Panama Canal Treaties and related legislation and likely reactions to policy changes. ~~(C)~~

VI. TASKING

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities and set deadlines for drafts. Differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. A final decision paper is due to the NSC Executive Secretary not later than February 3, 1995. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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No. PRD 51

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February 28, 1995

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-51

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

SUBJECT: Direct Communications Links Between Washington and Moscow (~~C~~)

Objective

The objective of this review is to develop agreed policy guidelines governing the architecture and capabilities of all government-to-government communications links between the United States and Russia. (~~C~~)

Background

Existing government-to-government communications links between Washington and Moscow include the Direct Communications Link (DCL or "Hotline"), the Direct Voice Link (DVL) and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) communications network. (~~S~~)

The DCL or "Hotline" was established in 1963 between Washington and Moscow to provide a "permanent, rapid, reliable and private means" by which the two heads of government could communicate directly to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to preclude delays, misunderstandings and misinterpretations by either side which might lead to hostilities. The DCL, which provides data and facsimile transmission only, is reserved for the exclusive use of the President of the United States and others as he may designate. U.S. policy governing the DCL is set out in NSDD 186 (September 1985). (~~S~~)

The capabilities of the DCL have been augmented in recent years by the installation of the DVL, a secure voice communications link between the White House and the Kremlin. The DVL architecture includes both a primary and alternative circuit. (S)

The NRRCs were established between Washington and Moscow under a bilateral agreement concluded in 1987 during implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Intended to reduce further the risk of conflict resulting from accident or miscalculation, the NRRCs transmit notifications of ballistic missile launches and notifications required by the INF Treaty and other arms control agreements; as such, the NRRCs serve as crisis prevention rather than crisis management tools. By agreement with the Russians, the communications network between the NRRCs is identical to that installed on the DCL. U.S. policy governing the NRRC is set out in NSDD 301 (February 1988). (S)

Expansion of the capabilities and functions of the NRRCs has been considered at various times. In response to a congressional tasking, the Bush Administration submitted a 1991 report to Congress that assessed other possible NRRC functions, including use of the NRRCs, inter alia, to: serve as a network to counter nuclear terrorism; transmit notifications under future arms control agreements; and facilitate activities restricting nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation. In 1992, the capabilities of the NRRC were augmented by extending direct communications to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, linking them to the NRRC via the Government-to-Government Communications Link (GGCL -- Kazakhstan and Ukraine) and the Continuous Communications Link (CCL -- Belarus). (S)

The Russian government has recently tabled a proposal to upgrade existing government-to-government communications links between Washington and Moscow by installing a secure digital network with voice, data and teleconferencing capabilities. Significantly, the Russian proposal would integrate the existing Direct Communications Link, the secure Direct Voice Link, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center communications network in a manner that would permit intergovernmental communications between the U.S. and Russian presidents as well as other government officials; it would also provide the capability to convene conference communications involving Washington, Moscow and "third parties," e.g., other capitals of the Newly Independent States. (C)

Consideration of the Russian proposal prompts a need to review the adequacy of existing policy guidance with respect to direct communications links between the two capitals. Given fundamental

changes in the relationship between Washington and Moscow together with advances in telecommunications technology, existing policy guidance may be an inadequate basis for technical decisions regarding the future architecture of government-to-government communications links between the United States and Russia. (C)

Assessment

These fundamental changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship cause us to reexamine the purpose, function and overall architecture of direct communications networks between Washington and Moscow. (S)

1. Setting aside resource considerations and other constraints, what should be our preferred direct, government-to-government communications network between the United States and Russia? (S)

-- Is the redundancy provided by the Direct Communications Link (DCL) and two Direct Voice Links (DVL) necessary and desirable? Should the DCL be retained?

-- Is the redundancy provided by the separate but technically equivalent capabilities of the DCL and the NRRC communications network necessary and desirable?

-- Beyond direct Head of State communications links, what other government-to-government links between Washington and Moscow are necessary and desirable?

-- What functional capabilities are required on direct communications links between Washington and Moscow: voice, data, facsimile, and/or video conferencing?

2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of installing multilateral head of state secure conferencing capabilities involving the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine? (S)

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of continuing to segregate the crisis management communications links such as the DCL and DVL from the non-crisis management networks such as the NRRC and Government-to-Government Communications Link (GGCL)? (S)

-- Should the standards governing equipment utilized on the NRRC communications network be decoupled from those applied to the DCL?

4. Should the functions of the NRRC communications network be expanded beyond ballistic missile launch warning and arms control treaty verification to include, inter alia, any of the possible additional functions described in the 1991 report to Congress? (S)

5. What technology transfer constraints should be imposed on direct communications systems between Washington and Moscow and the Newly Independent States? (S)

Tasking

The NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy will convene an Interagency Working Group, task specific drafting responsibilities and set deadlines for drafts. Differences of opinion should be clearly stated rather than compromised for the sake of an agreed product. (S)

A final decision paper is due the NSC Executive Secretary not later than April 30, 1995. (S)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Document ID: [PRD-54, Nonlethal Weapons Policy Issues and Options, November 21, 1996]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. report~~	~~Presidential Review Directive 54, Nonlethal Weapons Policy Issues and Options. (3 pages)~~	~~11/21/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 9/25/19 KDE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1996

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PER E.O. 13526
Q010-1227-M (2.41)
9/25/19 KDE

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Nonlethal Weapons Policy Issues and Options (U)

Nonlethal weapons (NLW) may expand policy choices by providing a credible capability to use discriminate, measured force to influence conflict and pre-conflict situations. They can potentially: (a) "buy time" in crises while other instruments (diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, etc.) are engaged; (b) control conflict escalation; and (c) minimize self-deterrence (the choice between benign acceptance of a crisis situation and the use of lethal force). NLW (conceptually and in reality) may be suited to some situations where large-scale deaths and infrastructure or environmental damage are to be avoided and could provide decisionmakers increased options for resolving vexing political dilemmas resident in some military and humanitarian operations. (U)

Major decisions and policy guidance already exist for certain classes of nonlethal technologies. For example:

(1) in a June 23, 1994 letter to the Senate that describes the Administration's interpretation of the Chemical Weapons Convention's impact on Executive Order 11850, the President stated that upon receiving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the CWC, he will direct OSD to "accelerate efforts to field nonchemical, nonlethal alternatives to RCAs for use in situations where combatants and noncombatants are mingled;"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(a)(c)
Declassify on: 11/15/06

(2) in August 1995, the Secretary of Defense prohibited the use of lasers specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision and announced the U.S. Government's support for negotiations prohibiting the use of such weapons; and

(3) on May 16, 1996, the President directed DoD to research and develop alternative technologies to replace antipersonnel landmines -- technologies "that will not pose new dangers to civilians." (U)

A review of NLW and technology issues and options will increase interagency awareness and permit the U.S. Government to: (a) develop appropriate policies, commensurate with our strategic needs, to guide development and employment of various NLW and technologies; (b) anticipate future public debates either for, or against, NLW and accommodate likely public reaction; and, (c) coordinate internal USG arms control discussions and NLW development. ~~(C)~~

Scope of the Review

The IWG will review and assess a broad range of current and future NLW technology and policy issues and options. Specific areas for review will include but are not limited to:

-- the potential for expanding policy options and flexibility;

-- types of crisis and conflict situations where NLW may significantly contribute, and occasions when more robust nonlethal options may have provided greater decisionmaking flexibility;

-- legal, arms control and ethical considerations of fielding and employing various categories of NLW;

-- mechanism(s) to examine compatibility of various categories of NLW with the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Conventions (and also the possibility of making sharper distinctions between "permitted" and "prohibited" activities involving biological or chemical NLW);

-- mechanism(s) to ensure potential NLW and technologies are factored into internal USG arms control discussions (so that arms control decisions do not inadvertently constrain or prevent NLW development before they are adequately understood);

-- prominence of role NLW should play in our overall defense posture (high-profile to maximize deterrent effects, or low-profile to prevent countermeasures and possible proliferation);

-- extent of foreign and criminal NLW threats (both real and potential), capabilities and nonlethal technology proliferation potential. (S)

Tasking

The NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control shall chair an ad hoc interagency working group to review nonlethal policy issues and options. The IWG shall complete its review by May 1, 1997. (U)

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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Case Number: 2010-1227-M

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. report	Presidential Review Directive 56, Computer Network Operations (CNO). (6 pages) partial release KDE 9125119	10/23/2000	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Richard Clarke. Subject: [Recommendation] (2 pages)	10/05/2000	P1/b(1)
001c. report	Annotated draft of PRD-56. (6 pages) partial release KDE 9125119	10/2000	P1/b(1)

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CHRON FILE

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: INFRASTRUCTURE PRD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS

ACTION: BERGER SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 11 OCT 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE LOGREF:

FILES: IFR NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CLARKE
		EXECSEC
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DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	00100613	FOR DECISION
002		X	00102318	BERGER SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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POWELL			
BASH	1	BB/10/6	
BRADTKE	2	h 10/12	
RUDMAN	3	See note 10/12	see note
KERRICK	4	(P) See NOTE	
BERGER	5		
SITUATION ROOM			
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CC:

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COMMENTS:

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

FM ____ TO ____ DATE ____

Our question is to do a Policy Review that will not be concluded until the next Administration, even if a preliminary report is due in January.

Dan/Sandy —
I think question Bob poses is appropriate — do we want

FM ____ TO ____ DATE ____

to be tasking something this extensive at this time in the Administration?

M

Sandy:

Recall I mentioned this to you several weeks ago. Rudy, Strobe, Dick, Leon, Jim — all thought it was a good idea. I'll double check again. Rec. you approve & return to me. I'll hold till final response OK

Dan

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 2000

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Subject: Computer Network Operations (CNO) (U)

I. Policy Objectives, Definitions and the Intent of this Presidential Review Directive

The increasing availability of information technologies and the dependence of every level of management and leadership on institutions and infrastructures that process, store, and communicate information are affecting the very nature of conflict and crisis management just as they are profoundly changing the international political and strategic environment in which the United States must act. (U)

A U.S. policy objective is to be able to employ the full spectrum of computer network operations (CNO) to achieve information superiority and shape the international environment to support our nation's national security strategy. It is also possible to use CNO to support and complement other, traditional military, peacekeeping, diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence missions. ~~(C)~~

Computer network operations (CNO), as defined within this document, aggregates three separate, but interrelated, fields of activity:

Classified by: Samuel R. Berger
Reason: 1.5 (a,b,c,d,e,g)
Declassify On: 1.6, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6

- Computer network attack (CNA): Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves;

- Computer network defense (CND): Efforts to detect and defend against the CNO of others, especially those directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks; and

- Computer network exploitation (CNE): Intelligence and information collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. (U)

The United States' ability to effectively attain and employ an information advantage will depend upon creating effective CNA, CND, and CNE capabilities which enable us to:

- Provide the United States the means and technologies necessary to affect the information systems and networks we target.

- Protect United States, allied, and coalition partner information systems and networks.

- Provide the United States the capability to obtain the intelligence and information necessary to identify and affect the information systems and networks our adversaries or competitor states rely upon. (S)

Potential adversaries who employ CNO include non-state actors such as terrorists, criminal organizations, and individual criminals as well as traditional nation-states. (U)

The intent of this review is to improve and institutionalize the United States' ability to employ CNO in support of existing strategy as put forward in the *National Security Strategy* and support the development of CNO capabilities within the U.S. Government, including the development of appropriate policy and legal oversight. As part of this effort a number of legal, privacy, policy, and structural issues surrounding the effective development of CNO policy warrant review, including an effort to determine how to integrate the use of CNO into existing decision-making and organizational structures. (U)

II. Study Process

To accomplish this review, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council (NSC) will chair a Computer Network Operations Interagency Working Group (CNO IWG). The CNO IWG will include

representatives from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence For Community Management, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, NSC, State, Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), Office of Science and Technology Policy and Office of Management and Budget, and other executive branch agencies as required. (U)

III. Issues to be addressed by Review

1. CNO Definitions and Broad Policy.

As part of the review the CNO definitions and broad policy statement articulated in section I above, and other CNO related definitions as required, shall be put to interagency review and evaluation. (U)

2. Declaratory Policy.

The review shall evaluate the utility of the United States Government adopting a declaratory policy on the use of CNO, and if recommended, what that declaratory policy would entail. (U)

3. Engagement Policy.

There is a need for an elaboration of current authorities and legal constraints and responsibilities for the conduct of CNO under uncertain or ambiguous circumstances short of actual hostilities. ~~(C)~~

The review shall examine current engagement policy and determine what changes, if any, are necessary to permit flexible employment of CNO and adequate response to CNE and CNA by an adversary. This review will include the issue of emplacement of CNO tools. The goal of this review is to permit the effective integration of CNO capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. This PRD is not intended to review the use of CNO on the battlefield. ~~(S)~~

4. Deconfliction of CNO.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)	There is a potential for mutual

interference and/or compromise of sensitive capabilities, methods, and sources as CNO increase and become more routine. ~~(S)~~

Deconfliction and, potentially, coordination of CNO activities by multiple agencies of the United States Government will be necessary to ensure appropriate legal oversight, command, and control of CNO activities. After study of current deconfliction and coordination processes, including the interagency target registries, political-military assessments, and intelligence gain/loss mechanisms, the review shall determine if there is a need for improvements or changes in the policy and processes that ensure coordination and deconfliction of CNO activities conducted by agencies/elements of the federal government during peacetime as well as crisis and conflict. ~~(S)~~

5. Relationships Among Response Mechanisms.

The review shall examine what processes, if any, are needed to support the newly created cyber incident groups (CIWG/CISG) and facilitate coordination among law enforcement, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and infrastructure protection response mechanisms for CNO, in light of applicable law and existing Presidential Decision Directives. Specifically, the review shall study indicators such as the use of levels of damage, scope of impact, implications for sources and methods, and other specific conditions which would assist in the rapid evaluation of future cases as deserving law enforcement, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence or infrastructure protection emphasis. ~~(C)~~

6. Active Defense.

There is no definition for 'active defense' of computer networks. One interpretation of the term incorporates the concept of actively seeking out the source of CNA or CNE directed against U.S. systems, then using technical means to negate the perpetrator's ability to continue the attack or exploitation. We are challenged by the frequent inability to rapidly or definitively identify the perpetrator of a CNA or CNE against a U.S. computer network or system. Because identification is not specific or reliable, it is difficult to respond in support of national security decision making, or in legal proceedings. ~~(S)~~

The review shall examine and define the concept of 'active defense', and evaluate possible policy, legal, and process mechanisms to determine what 'active defense' measures are lawful and appropriate under which circumstances. This review shall also reflect the likelihood that the United States will not be able to firmly identify perpetrators. ~~(S)~~

7. Engagement with other Nation States.

Awareness of CNO as both a potential threat and a force multiplier is widespread, and in some countries CNO has been assimilated into warfare plans and operations. Given the U.S. leadership in information technology and CNO, allied nations may seek assistance in developing their own CNO programs. (U)

This review shall determine what areas of CNO could be made available to our allies and if specific policies are needed to ensure coordinated, appropriate response to requests from foreign nations for CNO collaboration, technical support, capabilities sharing, and information exchange. ~~(S)~~

Additionally, the review shall also consider what options for response the United States has upon the discovery of significant, highly compromising CNE conducted by a potential adversary. ~~(S)~~

8. Sharing of Vulnerability Information.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), EO 13526 1.4g

The review shall study existing methods for evaluating computer network vulnerabilities and advising U.S. entities and other organizations of their effects. The review shall determine the need, if any, for further policy to support existing processes. ~~(S)~~

9. CNO Indications and Warning.

The review shall evaluate the current state of interagency organizational structures and relationships for CNO incidents, mutual support procedures, and resources applied to providing indications and warning of CNA or CNE by an adversary. ~~(S)~~

10. CNO Integration Into Existing Contingency Planning Efforts.

When an Executive Committee, as described in *PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, is established it is the primary interagency mechanism to conduct political-military planning and to coordinate day-to-day management of U.S. participation in

peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The review shall explore the applicability of CNO to complex contingency planning operations under PDD-56. (C)

IV. Tasking

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Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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2010-1227-M

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FROM: **NSC** PH: **x69425** ROOM: **WWD**

SUBJECT: **COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS** PAGES: **7**

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	For Samuel Berger from Richard Clarke. Subject: [Recommendation] (2 pages)	10/05/2000	P1/b(1)

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0006288 [PRD-56, October 23, 2000]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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001c. report	Annotated draft of PRD-56. [partial] (6 pages)	10/2000	P1/b(1)

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-XX

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2010-1227-M (2.46b) KDE 9/25/19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MAN
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE P
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SC
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BURE

Bob:
1. Bill Leary should review this PRD.
2. I think there are too many classification markings - each paragraph needs to classified (not each bullet).
3. Berger can sign.

Also, TAB I/2 shows organization as
PART I: ASSESSMENT w/ QUESTIONS
PART II: OPTIONS for Policy w/ Questions

Is this issue best handled w/ a PRD?

Subject: Computer Network Operations

I. Policy Objectives, Definitions and Presidential Review Directive

The increasing availability of inform
dependence of every level of manageme
institutions and infrastructures that
communicate information are affecting
and crisis management just as they ar
international political and strategic
U.S. must act. (U)

It is an objective of U.S. policy t
spectrum of computer network operati
information superiority and shape th
to achieve our nation's national sec
possible to use CNO to support and
military, peacekeeping, diplomatic,
and foreign intelligence and counte

Computer network operations (CNO),
document, aggregates three separat
activity: (U)

- Computer network attack (CNA): Operations to disrupt, ... degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by: Samuel R. Berger~~ stet
Reason: 1.5.a,b,c,d,e,g 1.5 (a)(b) ...
Declassify On: 1.6 X

computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves (U);

Computer network defense (CND): Efforts to detect and defend against the CNO of others, especially those directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks (U); and

Computer network exploitation (CNE): Intelligence and information collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. (U)

The United States' ability to effectively attain and employ an information advantage will depend upon creating effective CNA, CND, and CNE capabilities which enable us to: (U)

- Provide the United States the means and technologies necessary to affect the information systems and networks we target. ~~(S)~~
- Protect United States, allied, and coalition partner information systems and networks. (U)
- Provide the United States the capability to obtain the intelligence and information necessary to identify and affect the information systems and networks our adversaries or competitor states rely upon. ~~(S)~~

Potential adversaries who employ CNO include non-state actors such as terrorists, criminal organizations, and individual criminals as well as traditional nation-states. (U)

The intent of this review is to improve and institutionalize the United States' ability to employ CNO in support of existing strategy as put forward in the *National Security Strategy* and support the development of CNO capabilities within the U.S. Government, including the development of appropriate policy and legal oversight. As part of this effort a number of legal, privacy, policy and structural issues surrounding the effective development of CNO policy warrant review, including an effort to determine how to integrate the use of CNO into existing decision-making and organizational structures. (U)

II. Study Process

To accomplish this review, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council (NSC) will chair a Computer Network Operations Interagency Working Group (CNO IWG). The CNO IWG will include representatives from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint

Staff, Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence For Community Management, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, NSC, State, Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), Office of Science and Technology Policy and Office of Management and Budget, and other executive branch agencies as required. (U)

III. Issues to be addressed by Review

1. CNO Definitions and Broad Policy

As part of the review the CNO definitions and broad policy statement articulated in section I above, and other CNO-related definitions as required, shall be put to interagency review and evaluation. (U)

2. Declaratory Policy.

The review shall evaluate the utility of the U.S. Government adopting a declaratory policy on the use of CNO, and if recommended, what that declaratory policy would entail. (U)

3. Engagement Policy. (U) - Classification Marking Not necessary here.

There is a need for an elaboration of current authorities and legal constraints and responsibilities for the conduct of CNO under uncertain or ambiguous circumstances short of actual hostilities. ~~(S)~~

The review shall examine current engagement policy and determine what changes, if any, are necessary to permit flexible employment of CNO and adequate response to CNE and CNA by an adversary. This will include the issue of emplacement of CNO tools. The goal of this review is to permit the effective integration of CNO capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. This PRD is not intended to review the use of CNO on the battlefield. ~~(S)~~

4. Deconfliction of CNO.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), 1.4(d) There is a potential for mutual interference and/or compromise of sensitive capabilities, methods, and sources as CNO increase and become more routine. ~~(S)~~

Deconfliction and, potentially, coordination of CNO activities by multiple agencies of the USG will be necessary to ensure appropriate legal oversight, command, and control of CNO activities. After study of current deconfliction and coordination processes, including the interagency target registries, political-military assessments, and intelligence gain/loss mechanisms, the review shall determine if there is a need for improvements or changes in the policy and processes that ensure coordination and deconfliction of CNO activities conducted by agencies/elements of the federal government during peacetime as well as crisis and conflict. ~~(S)~~

5. Relationships Among Response Mechanisms.

The review shall examine what processes, if any, are needed to support the newly created cyber incident groups (CIWG/CISG) and facilitate coordination among law enforcement, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and infrastructure protection response mechanisms for CNO, in light of applicable law and existing Presidential Decision Directives. Specifically, it shall study indicators such as the use of, levels of damage, scope of impact, implications for sources and methods, and other specific conditions which would assist in the rapid evaluation of future cases as deserving law enforcement, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence or infrastructure protection emphasis. ~~(S)~~

6. Active Defense.

There is no definition for 'active defense' of computer networks. One interpretation of the term incorporates the concept of actively seeking out the source of CNA or CNE directed against U.S. systems, then using technical means to negate the perpetrator's ability to continue the attack or exploitation. We are challenged by the frequent inability to rapidly or definitively identify the perpetrator of a CNA or CNE against a U.S. computer network or system. Because identification is not specific or reliable, it is difficult to respond in support of national security decision making, or in legal proceedings. ~~(S)~~

The review shall examine and define the concept of 'active defense', and evaluate possible policy, legal, and process mechanisms to determine what 'active defense' measures are lawful and appropriate under which circumstances. This review shall also reflect the likelihood that the U.S. will not be able to firmly identify perpetrators. ~~(S)~~

7. Engagement with other Nation States.

Awareness of CNO as both a potential threat and a force multiplier is widespread, and in some countries CNO has ~~already~~ been assimilated into warfare plans and operations. Given the U.S. leadership in information technology and CNO, allied nations may seek assistance in developing their own CNO programs. (U)

This review shall determine what areas of CNO could be made available to our allies and if specific policies are needed to ensure coordinated, appropriate response to requests from foreign nations for CNO collaboration, technical support, capabilities sharing and information exchange. ~~(S)~~

Additionally, the review shall also consider what options for response the United States has upon the discovery of significant, highly compromising CNE conducted by a potential adversary. ~~(S)~~

8. Sharing of Vulnerability Information.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4(c), EO 13526 1.4g

The review shall study existing methods for evaluating computer network vulnerabilities and advising U.S. entities and other organizations of their effects. The review shall determine the need, if any, for further policy to support existing processes. ~~(S)~~

9. CNO Indications and Warning.

The review shall evaluate the current state of interagency organizational structures and relationships for CNO incidents, mutual support procedures, and resources applied to providing indications and warning of CNA or CNE by an adversary. ~~(S)~~

10. CNO Integration Into Existing Contingency Planning Efforts

When an Executive Committee, as described in *PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, is established it is the primary interagency mechanism to conduct political-military planning and to coordinate day-to-day management of U.S. participation in peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The review shall explore the applicability of CNO to complex contingency planning operations under PDD-56. (S)

IV. Tasking

The CNO IWG will prepare a draft paper for review by participating agencies which addresses the policy and structural issues detailed above. Following agency comments and discussion, and within 180 days of the signing of this directive, the National Coordinator will prepare and coordinate a summary document for Deputies Committee review. An interim report will be provided on January 15, 2001. (U)

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