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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 21, 1994

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC- 30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
 THE UNITED NATIONS
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
 SECURITY AFFAIRS
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
 DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 POLICY

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Nuclear Arms
 Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties
 (S)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and
 directs the implementation of U.S. nuclear posture and policy on
 nuclear arms control beyond the START I and START II Treaties.
 (S)

Background

Nuclear posture. In October, 1993, the Secretary of Defense
 tasked a comprehensive review of the role of nuclear weapons in
 U.S. national security strategy. This review examined strategic
 and non-strategic forces; safety, security and use control;
 infrastructure; command, control, communications and intelligence
 and operations; and threat reduction and counterproliferation.
 The conclusions of this review were briefed to me on September
 16, 1994. (S)

Arms control. On May 21, 1993, Presidential Review Directive
 (PRD)-34 tasked a comprehensive examination of U.S. policy on

nuclear arms control beyond the START I and START II Treaties, focusing on four areas:

- Whether to seek further negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear forces;
- Whether to seek to restructure Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces at current or reduced levels;
- Whether to seek operational and or confidence building measures relating to strategic nuclear forces;
- Whether to change U.S. policy regarding the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. (S)

The Review was conducted by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Arms Control and was reviewed by the Deputies Committee on September 9, 1994. (S)

U.S. Nuclear Posture

Role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy. Consistent with the July, 1994 National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) and the recommendations of the NPR, the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. (U)

U.S. nuclear declaratory policy. The U.S. will continue to observe the U.S. nuclear declaratory policy that has been in place since 1978 and make no changes beyond those previously authorized (i.e., to reach agreement among the P-5 on a common formula regarding negative security assurances and incorporate it into a U.N. Security Council resolution). (S)

Strategic nuclear forces. I approve the Nuclear Posture Review's (NPR) recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. This force will maintain flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further, and will include:

- SSBNs: 14 SSBNs, all with D-5 missiles, located at two bases (Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington);
- Bombers: 20 B-2s, a non-nuclear role for the B-1s, and 66 B-52s.

-- ICBMs: Maintain two or three wings of Minuteman ICBMs (500/450 or 350/300 missiles). (S)

Non-strategic nuclear forces. I approve the NPR's recommended non-strategic nuclear force posture. Under this force, the U.S. will maintain USAF dual capable aircraft (DCA) at current strength in CONUS and Europe. I also approve the NPR's recommendations to eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability but to maintain the capability to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs. (S)

Safety, security and use control. The U.S. will (a) equip all U.S. nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices or PAL by 1997, (b) upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers and (c) increase warhead safety without nuclear testing (B-53 replacement, W-62 retirement). (S)

Infrastructure. I approve the NPR's recommendations to sustain the ballistic missile industrial base by Minuteman III sustainment and D-5 production and to sustain the reentry vehicle and guidance system industrial base. The DOD will work with the DOE to ensure effective implementation of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-15 (November 3, 1993), "U.S. Policy on Stockpile Stewardship Under an Extended Moratorium and a Comprehensive Test Ban." (S)

Command, control, communications and intelligence and operations. The DOD will continue to make adjustments to post-Cold War alert and operational requirements and will continue to support programs for assured NCA survivability and continuity. These programs will include: (a) a restructured MILSTAR program, (b) adequate TW/AA and connectivity for ALARM, (c) VLF communications upgrades and (d) TACAMO communications upgrade. (S)

Threat reduction and proliferation. The DOD will continue to support Nunn-Lugar programs to reduce the danger of unauthorized or accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from and within the Former Soviet Union. The DOD will also support the counterproliferation initiative to provide conventional responses to use of WMD in regional conflict. (S)

U.S. Policy on Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties

During the first year and a half of the Administration, our focus has appropriately been on delivering on the promise of START I and II. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-3 (March 24,

1993), "U.S. Policy on the Ratification and Implementation of START I and START II and the Denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan," clearly states that ratification and implementation of START I and II are priority objectives of U.S. foreign, security and non-proliferation policy and that acceleration of START I and II is in the U.S. interest. (S)

The Administration has been successful in achieving many of the goals and objectives set out in PDD-3. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified START I and Belarus and Kazakhstan have acceded to the NPT. All three states have concluded agreements relating to the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons to Russia, and the implementation of these accords is underway. While the Ukrainian Rada has yet to ratify the NPT (thus blocking the entry into force of START I and ratification of START II), we are working diligently with the Ukrainian government to try and bring this about by the Fall. (S)

Goals for the September, 1994 U.S. - Russia Summit. As recommended by the Deputies Committee, the U.S. should focus the security segment of the upcoming U.S. - Russia summit on (a) trying to reach agreement on new initiatives to improve the security and safeguarding of nuclear warheads and fissile materials and (b) encouraging the Russians to take reciprocal steps in response to the unilateral changes and downsizing the U.S. will make in its nuclear posture as a result of the NPR. (S)

Further steps. Also as recommended by the Deputies Committee, the U.S. should agree with Russia at the Summit to continue our dialogue on "further steps" to adapt the strategic nuclear forces of both sides to the changed international security environment and the U.S. Russian strategic partnership. These "further steps" would include (a) the possibility, at some future date, that both countries will make a joint political commitment not to exceed the low-end of the START II accountable weapons ceiling (i.e., 3,000 weapons) and (b) the possibility, after ratification of the START II Treaty, of further reductions of, and limitations on, strategic nuclear forces. After the Summit, the IWG will continue to study and analyze options for further reductions pursuant to the approaches outlined in (a) and (b) above, taking into account military geostrategic and arms control considerations, with the aim of making recommendations to me later this year. (S)

Implementation

The NSC staff will coordinate the taskings identified in this PDD. (S)

William J. Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 17, 1998

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
 THE UNITED NATIONS
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
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 DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 POLICY
 DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
 DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Further
 Reductions in Nuclear Forces in START III (U)

I. PURPOSE

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes principles and objectives for nuclear arms control with Russia and provides guidance for the negotiation of further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces in or related to START III. (U)

II. BACKGROUND

In Presidential Decision Directives 3, 11, 15, 17, 20, 30, 37, 47 and 60, I directed changes in U.S. nuclear posture and policies commensurate with a diminished threat of nuclear war and established a policy to build a new relationship with Russia that includes adapting the nuclear forces of both sides to the changed international security environment. (U)

~~SECRET/PROSE~~

In the March 21, 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement (HJS) on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, President Yeltsin and I agreed on the basic components of START III, including: establishment of aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads; measures relating to the transparency and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads; the goal of making START I and II unlimited in duration; and early deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II. President Yeltsin and I also agreed in the HJS that, in the context of START III negotiations, experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building measures, and to consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

(U)

III. U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE AND POLICY ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

A. U.S. Nuclear Posture

Although nuclear weapons play a smaller role today in our national security and defense policy and posture than at any point during the second half of the 20th century, nuclear weapons will remain an integral part of the international security picture for the foreseeable future. In my 1997 National Security Strategy, I set forth how nuclear forces serve U.S. objectives:

"...Our nuclear deterrent is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In this context, the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile."

(U)

In PDD-60, I further stated that:

"...U.S. nuclear forces protect both the U.S. and our allies by deterring massive and limited nuclear attacks, and by

contributing to deterring major conventional aggression and attacks employing chemical and biological weapons." (S)

In this context, and consistent with the HJS, the United States is committed to seeking further reductions in and constraints on both strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, consistent with the principles and objective established below. The United States will not, however, begin formal negotiations on START III until START II is ratified in Russia, although experts consultations will be conducted to continue our dialogue on nuclear issues and prepare for prompt negotiations. Furthermore, the United States will remain essentially at START I levels until the START II Treaty enters into force. (U)

B. Principles to Guide Reductions

Building on the principles I established in PDD-37, the following principles will guide further reductions in nuclear forces:

1. Deterrence. The United States will maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size, survivability and capability to support broad U.S. foreign policy objectives including Alliance needs and fully implement U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies.
2. Stability. Arms control commitments should preserve and, if possible, enhance the crisis stability that will be achieved at the end of the START II draw-down period and seek greater predictability through transparency measures and appropriate constraints.
3. Equivalence. Mindful of the sides' differing practices and national security needs, large disparities in force capability and infrastructure that represent an imbalance between U.S. and Russian capabilities must be addressed, as they could tempt a potential aggressor. We cannot allow our nuclear capabilities to be perceived as inadequate or inferior.
4. Verification. We must preserve and, if necessary, enhance key verification measures from START I and II and achieve agreement on measures for monitoring key new obligations with confidence sufficient for the United States to achieve its national security objectives.
5. Safety, Security and Proliferation. Russia's large nuclear arsenal and fissile material stockpiles pose a significant risk of weapons or material slipping out of Russian control

into third party hands. Our best safeguard against this is to seek deep reductions in that arsenal and a further consolidation of their storage sites. We must also work with Russia to ensure that material, technology and expertise do not fall into third party hands. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program's Weapons Protection, Control and Accountability project has a major role to play in helping Russia upgrade the security and accountability of both the residual storage sites and fissile material. (U)

IV. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Under reductions below START II levels, the United States will require greater understanding of, and constraints on, Russia's capabilities to rapidly reconstitute its nuclear forces (strategic and non-strategic) and thereby achieve a significant military imbalance. The United States will therefore seek to make rapid and substantive progress in all elements of the framework in the HJS. While the HJS will serve as the basis to begin the negotiations, the outcome in each of these areas must be consistent with the principles in Section III above and with the following U.S. objectives and guidelines. (U)

A. START III Warhead Ceiling

START III will produce further stabilizing and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Based on a May 1998 Department of Defense comprehensive review of strategic force requirements and U.S. nuclear weapons employment policies, the United States will pursue the limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads of 2,000-2,500 agreed at Helsinki. (U)

B. Extension of START I and II

Both START I/II will be made unlimited in duration in START III, as agreed at Helsinki. (U)

C. Non-strategic Nuclear Forces

It is estimated Russia will have to eliminate some 3,200 - 7,200 warheads by the year 2000 to meet its 1991/1992 "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI) pledges. Even with the full implementation of the 1991/1992 PNI commitments, Russia's residual NSNF stockpile will greatly exceed U.S. NSNF levels and Russia's legitimate defense needs. The importance of this disparity will grow as strategic nuclear forces are further reduced. Moreover, concerns exist regarding the safety and

security of Russian NSNF. To: promote greater transparency of Russia's NSNF warhead stockpile; reduce the probability of diversion, accident or unauthorized use of Russian NSNF; and reduce the numerical disparity between U.S. and Russian NSNF, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- Codification of PNI. Reaffirmation of the Bush/Gorbachev/Yeltsin 1991/92 pledges relating to NSNF in a politically binding agreement. The agreement would call for these commitments to be implemented by a date certain.
- Commitment to reduce NSNF disparities. Political commitment to eliminate over a reasonable time period the imbalance between the respective U.S. and Russian NSNF postures.
- Data and transparency. Each side would be required to include NSNF warheads in a regime requiring a comprehensive data exchange with confirmatory inspections as described in Section IV(D); moreover, NSNF warheads that were eliminated under the "freedom to mix" provision described in Section IV(D) would be subject to the same procedures for monitored dismantlement and storage as those for strategic warheads. (S)

D. Warheads and Related Fissile Material

Substantial disparities exist between U.S. and Russian total warhead and fissile material stockpiles and their associated production infrastructure, exacerbated by large uncertainties in these areas. To: reduce our uncertainties regarding the size and composition of Russian nuclear forces and asymmetries between Russian nuclear warhead production and the size of its reduced nuclear forces; encourage tighter control on the location and handling of excess nuclear weapons and material; and make progress towards the goal of promoting "irreversibility" by validating concepts for monitored warhead dismantlement and storage that might be used in future arms control treaties, the United States will seek to reach an agreement that includes the following basic elements:

- Data and transparency. This will include a comprehensive data exchange and the right to conduct a limited number of confirmatory inspections at any location where nuclear warheads are stored or produced adequate to reduce the uncertainty about the size and composition of Russian nuclear

forces. The regime need not require excessively intrusive elements such as Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring.

- Monitored dismantlement and storage. Elimination of a significant number of warheads (in the range of 500-1,000) with a "freedom to mix" provision (i.e., with respect to warheads subject to monitored dismantlement, each side will be free to choose any strategic or non-strategic warhead from its stockpile, from deployed or non-deployed delivery vehicles, or from storage sites). Excess fissile material components (not those designated for the strategic reserve) from dismantled warheads will be placed in storage and monitored until pits are handed off to a bilateral or multilateral fissile material control regime and the highly enriched uranium components are transferred for disposition or for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons components. The intrusiveness and impact of the monitoring regime at DOE facilities will need to be minimized so that there is no adverse impact on the annual certification of the stockpile.
- Infrastructure reductions. The United States will vigorously pursue the "Nuclear Cities Initiative" launched during GCC-10 designed to directly address the challenges faced in the Russian nuclear cities and reinforce Russian interest in adjusting the size of their nuclear complex. Building on this initiative, the United States will seek a commitment from Russia to shut down (i.e., close or convert) two or three of the four known MINATOM warhead assembly/disassembly plants by the year 2000.
- No increase commitment. The United States will seek a political commitment not to increase aggregate nuclear stockpiles above declared levels.
- Net New Production. The regime described above should provide increased confidence that net new production is not taking place and that stockpile sizes are decreasing. Assessments relating to net new production and stockpile sizes will be enhanced through the provision of data and confirmatory measures envisioned by this regime. (C)

E. START II Deactivation

Once START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will proceed immediately with negotiations with Russia on a method for completing the deactivation four years early of those strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated

under START II. Conclusion of this agreement will not be linked to START III. In the context of our agreement to extend the deadline for START II eliminations, we will continue to argue for warhead removal as the preferred method for deactivation of systems to be eliminated under START II, as it remains the most verifiable and irreversible method. (S)

V. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

- Negotiations within Strategic Stability Group (SSG) on Arms Control. Immediately after START II is ratified in Russia, the United States will propose to begin formal negotiations on START III. Initial discussions with the Russians will take place within a small, senior-level group chaired at either the Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary level and reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.
- Ad Hoc Group. As required, the SSG on Arms Control will delegate to an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) issues for study, as well as the negotiation of detailed text. At this point, I do not envision a set-piece negotiation, chartered in Geneva, similar to the Reagan-Bush era Nuclear and Space Talks (though I do not rule it out); rather, the AHG will meet on an "as needed" basis to explore issues and negotiate text.
- Arms Control IWG. The Arms Control IWG will continue to review U.S. proposals in these areas based on Russian responses and be prepared to recommend, if necessary, changes in the U.S. position, consistent with the principles and objectives outlined in Section III. (S)

William J. Clinton

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