Clinton Presidential Records
Mandatory Declassification Review

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4690 2672325-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 242325Z SEP 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 242325Z SEP 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9913
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1455
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0086
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0944
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0092
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0076
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0533
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0173
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0196
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0474
SUBJ: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
REF: USUN 4653
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA (DESCRIBED REFTEL) WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 25, FRENCH MISSION HAS CIRCULATED TO THE P-5 SEPTEMBER 24 A DRAFT TEXT OF A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A PKO THERE. SC WILL HOLD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MONDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 27. USUN REQUESTS PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE ON DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OOB TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28. AMB. WALKER MET WITH U/SYG ANNAN SEPTEMBER 23 TO URGE THAT IF THE UN BECOMES INVOLVED IN RWANDA, THEY MUST HAVE A POLITICAL ROLE TO PLAY, RATHER THAN BEING RELEGATED TO A STRICTLY MILITARY ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION. END SUMMARY.
3. THE FRENCH CONVENED A P-5 MEETING FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24 TO DISTRIBUTE THEIR DRAFT TEXT OF A RESOLUTION ON RWANDA (SEE BELOW). THEY DESCRIBED THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE ANTICIPATED REPORT (ALONG THE LINES OF REFTEL), AND ADVISED THAT THE REPORT WOULD COME OUT ON SATURDAY.

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(MISSION WILL ATTEMPT TO CONVEY REPORT TO DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE). INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS THE REPORT AND FOR THE FRENCH TO CIRCULATE THEIR DRAFT TO THE OTHER MEMBERS ARE SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY AFTERNOON. THE DRAFT TEXT WILL THEN BE TAKEN UP BY ALL ON TUESDAY.

4. UK AMBASSADOR HANNAY NOTED THAT HE NEEDED TO SEE THE REPORT BEFORE HE COULD RESPOND, AND THEN GAVE SOME PRELIMINARY REACTIONS: A LARGER ROLE FOR THE OAU, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE UN OPERATION, SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS. TWO PKO'S (ONE IN UGANDA AND ONE IN RWANDA) ARE NOT NEEDED. THE RESOLUTION SHOULD EITHER ROLL THEM INTO ONE, OR SPECIFY THAT THEY WILL BE TERMINATED SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE QUESTIONED THE WORDING OF SUB-PARAGRAPHS C, D, F, AND G DEFINING THE MANDATE.

5. U.S. AMBASSADOR HICKS POINTED OUT THAT WASHINGTON HAS BUDGET CONSTRAINTS THAT WILL SHAPE OUR POSITION ON RWANDA. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE UN TO BE GIVEN SOME ROLE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THIS WOULD, FIRST, ALLOW THE UN TO ASSIST THE RWANDAN PARTIES TO GET BEYOND THEIR DIFFICULTIES IF THEY BECAME LOGJAMMED ON DETAILS OF GOVERNING. SECOND, IT WOULD AVOID THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM FACING THE UN IN SOMALIA, WHERE THE UN HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR PLAYING A POLICE ENFORCER ROLE RATHER THAN A PEACEMAKING ROLE. APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD ASSURE THE PROPER LEVEL OF ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. FRANCE AGREED THAT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, IF THAT WOULD HELP GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH QUICKLY.

6. CHINA EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR HELPING THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. RUSSIA STRESSED THE NEED TO SEE THE REPORT BEFORE BEGINNING DELIBERATIONS.

7. USUN DEPUTY PERMREP AMB WALKER MET LATE SEPTEMBER 23 WITH U/SYG FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATION KOFI ANNAN AND GENERAL DELAIRE ON RWANDA. THE UN OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THIS OPERATION COULD BE A SUCCESS STORY FOR THE UN, GIVEN THE EAGER ATTITUDE OF BOTH PARTIES TO MAKE PEACE WORK. WALKER MADE THE POINT THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO APPROVE SUCH A LARGE OPERATION IN RWANDA, IN VIEW OF OUR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. HE URGED THE UN TO THINK CREATIVELY ABOUT WHERE IT CAN CUT COSTS AND FIND OFFSETS FOR NEW EXPENDITURES. HE UN
DERSCORED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THINKING OUT A PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN, IN ORDER TO PORTRAY THIS OPERATION POSITIVELY. HE VOICED CONCERN THAT THE UN APPEARED TO BE CUT OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND RELEGATED TO A MERELY MILITARY ROLE. ANNAN
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
POINTED OUT THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS ONLY ASKED THE UN TO

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PERFORM MILITARY FUNCTIONS, AND THAT A SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER COULD BE SENT TO RWANDA LATER IF NEEDED. WALKER ARGUED THAT THE UN NEEDED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, POINTING TO SOMALIA TO WARN ABOUT THE OPTICS OF PLAYING ENFORCER.

8. BEGIN TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

22 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993 AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/),

WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS ON 4 AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTRIBUTE OBSERVING THEM TO THE FULL,

PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,

RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,

1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/);

2. APPROVES, FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA (UNAMIR) WHOSE MANDATE WOULD BE TO:

-CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI;

-SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE DEFINING OF AN EXTENSIVE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND DEMOBILIZATION PROCEDURES;

-GUARANTEE THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS;

-CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING, IN PARTICULAR, BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMMES;

-CONDUCT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, INQUIRIES INTO INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES;

-GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;

-SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONSTABULARY AND POLICE;

3. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LOGISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNAMIR) SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;

4. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAW OF UNAMIR, WHOSE MANDATE WILL END, IN PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;

5. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO DEPLOY A FIRST CONTINGENT OF 800 MEN TO KIGALI, IN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004690

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5

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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: DRAFT SC RESOLUTION FOR RWANDA PKO
THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS;
6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE COUNCIL PRIOR TO FURTHER SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENTS OF UNAMIR;
7. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR WITHOUT THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE;
8. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH;
9. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE FORTHWITH A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR UNAMIR WITH THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
10. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL IN RWANDA;
11. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
9. END-TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4690
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 4690
<^SSN>4690
<^SSN>4690

TOR: 930924194316 M0624435
<^TOR>930924194418 M0624438
<^TOR>930924194419 M0624439

DIST:
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE VAX
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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0947
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0095
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0079
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0536
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0176
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0199
SUBJ: RWANDA: MOST SC MEMBERS SUPPORT PKO
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN NEW YORK 004720
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS; J5
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UN, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MOST SC MEMBERS SUPPORT PKO
REF: USUN 4653
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SC HELD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON RWANDA SEPTEMBER 27 IN CONNECTION WITH THE SYG'S REPORT AND THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION (REFTEL). FRANCE, PAKISTAN (ON BEHALF OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS -- CAPE VERDE, MOROCCO, VENEZUELA, DJIBOUTI AND PAKISTAN), NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN, CHINA, AND HUNGARY ALL VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE SYG'S PROPOSALS TO DEPLOY A PKO TO RWANDA. BRAZIL EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE CONCEPT, BUT NEEDED TO STUDY THE DETAILS, PARTICULARLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CURRENT PKO ON THE UGANDA BORDER AND THE PROPOSED PKO WITHIN RWANDA. CHINA HOPED THE OAU ROLE WOULD BE SPELLED OUT MORE COMPLETELY IN THE RESOLUTION. THE UK QUESTIONED WHETHER THE RESOURCES EXISTED FOR THIS OPERATION, REGRETTED THAT THE OAU MANDATE WOULD EXPIRE AT THE END OF OCTOBER, QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE OPERATION ON THE UGANDA BORDER, AND ASKED WHY A

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BATTALION (RATHER THAN SOME OBSERVERS) WERE NEEDED FOR ENCAMPMENT IN THE DMZ.
3. USUN AMBASSADOR WALKER NOTED WE WERE STUDYING THE REPORT AND DRAFT RESOLUTION AND NEEDED TO SEE THE FINANCIAL ANNEX TO THE SYG'S REPORT. HE REMARKED PRELIMINARILY THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SEEMED TO GO BEYOND WHAT THE MANDATE SHOULD BE. HE OBSERVED THAT THE MILITARY OPERATION NEEDED TO BE LINKED MORE CLOSELY TO PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. HE PROMISED TO RELAY SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE FRENCH DELEGATION LATER.
4. COMMENT: IT LOOKS AS IF THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST TEN VOTES IN FAVOR OF A RWANDA PKO, ONE MORE THAN NEEDED TO PASS IN THE ABSENCE OF A VETO.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4720
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4720

TOR: 930927193158 M0628072

DIST:

PRT: SIT
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX
<^DIST>
SIT: WARD
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1468
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0177
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0538
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0200
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0478
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0949
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0080
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0096
SUBJ: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
REF: USUN 4735 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE FRENCH LED A DISCUSSION IN SC INFORMALS SEPTEMBER 29 ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON A PKO FOR RWANDA. THEY WOULD LIKE TO FINALIZE THE TEXT THURSDAY NIGHT AND VOTE FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1. SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL IS STRONG FOR MOVING QUICKLY. THE UK AND RUSSIANS HAVE RESERVATIONS, BUT ARE HAPPY TO HIDE BEHIND US THIS TIME. IF A VOTE IS HELD THIS WEEK WE BELIEVE THE RESOLUTION AS IT STANDS WOULD RECEIVE AT LEAST 13 YES VOTES. FRENCH FONMIN JUPPE WILL RAISE RWANDA WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN THEIR MEETING SEPTEMBER 29. USUN REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON LANGUAGE OF DRAFT RESOLUTION BY OOB THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. END SUMMARY.

3. IN INFORMAL SC CONSULTATIONS SEPTEMBER 29, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VENEZUELA), FRANCE, CAPE VERDE, PAKISTAN ON BEHALF OF THE NAM CAUCUS, AND SPAIN

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ALL SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA AND UNDERLINED THE URGENCY OF VOTING THIS WEEK. SEVERAL NOTED THE ENCOURAGING PRECEDENT F BEING LOBBIED BY A JOINT DELEGATION FROM RWANDA WHICH INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH PARTIES, WORKING WELL TOGETHER. CAPE VERDE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTIES SOME DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., HAD WITH THE TIMING, REMARKING, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD "FIND IT UNFORTUNATE" IF DELAYS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE TO DISRUPT THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA.

4. USUN DPR AMB WALKER NOTED THAT THE FINANCIAL ADDENDUM WAS NOT YET AVAILABLE, LEAVING THE COUNCIL WITH NO IDEA OF WHAT THIS OPERATION MIGHT COST. FRANCE AGREED, AND PROMISED TO PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO PRODUCE THE FINANCIAL ADDENDUM QUICKLY. IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTIONS FROM THE RWANDA JOINT DELEGATION, THE FRENCH PROPOSED SOME AMENDMENTS TO THEIR PREVIOUS DRAFT (SEE BELOW, PARTICULARLY NEW FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, AND NEW LANGUAGE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2, 2(G), 3, 4, 5, 7 AND 12). FRANCE ENDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT BILATERALLY, AND THEN IN A WORKING GROUP OF THE WOLE, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS AGREEING ON A FINAL TEXT THURSDAY NIGHT AND VOTING FRIDAY.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

28 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993 AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,

-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488),

-WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS ON 4 AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE OBSERVING THEM TO THE FULL,

-RECOGNIZING THE URGENCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AS REAFFIRMED BY THEIR JOINT DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.

-PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,

-RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO

OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS,

-1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATE D
24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488);

-2. APPROVES, FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE

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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION
TO RWANDA (UNAMIR) AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 21 TO 26,
WHOSE MANDATE WOULD BE TO IN PARTICULAR TO:
-A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE TOWN OF KIGALI;
-B) SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE
DEFINING OF DEMOBILIZATION PROCEDURES;
-C) CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE
COUNTRY DURING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MANDATE OF THE
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS;
-D) CONTRIBUTE TO MINE CLEARING, IN PARTICULAR, BY MEANS
OF TRAINING PROGRAMMES;
-E) EXAMINE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN
INITIATIVE, INSTANCES OF NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED
FORCES AND DETERMINE THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE;
-F) GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE PROCESS OF
REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;
-G) ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HUMANITARIAN AID;
-H) SUPERVISE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND
POLICE;
-3. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LOGISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR) SHOULD BE
INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR WHOSE MANDATE DEFINED IN
RESOLUTION 846 (1992) REMAINS UNCHANGED;
-4. WELCOMES THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU AND IN
PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE NEUTRAL
MILITARY OBSERVERS GROUP (NMOG II) IN UNAMIR;
-5. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, WHOSE
MANDATE WILL END 22 MONTHS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, I.E. IN PRINCIPLE, IN
OCTOBER 1995, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
-6. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT,
TO DEPLOY A FIRST CONTINGENT OF A BATTALION TO KIGALI,
IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN
PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS;
-7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INFORM THE
COUNCIL PRIOR TO FURTHER SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENTS OF UNAMIR
WHICH SHOULD BE PROCEEDED IN TIME; (SIC)
-8. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF
REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR WITHOUT
THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT
ITS MANDATE;
-9. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH;
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004766
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
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TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC PRESSURE BUILDING TO APPROVE RWANDA PKO
-10. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE

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FORTHWITH A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR UNAMIR WITH
THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
-11. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES RESPECT THE SAFETY OF
UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL IN RWANDA;
-12. URGENTLY CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL,
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE
POPULATION AND OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
-13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END-TEXT OF REVISED FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4766
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 4766
<^SSN>4766
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TOR: 930929200024 M0632815
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DIST:
PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BURGOS CLARKER DARRAGH FILE GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX WARD
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDTA4824 2742209-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 012209Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 012209Z OCT 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0128
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1488
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0095
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0961
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0100
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0083
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0545
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0180
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0482
SUBJ: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
TEXT:
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004824
5-53 !94 89/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
REF: USUN 4766
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT WORKING GROUP CALLED BY THE FRENCH ON 30 SEPTEMBER, REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE UK, RUSSIA AND NEW ZEALAND SUGGESTED SEVERAL TEXTUAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD BRING THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE MORE IN LINE WITH RECENTLY ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS ON PKOS IN LIBERIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND HAITI. THE RUSSIANS WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED THAT THE RESOLUTION CONTAIN EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CALLING FOR A PROGRESS REVIEW, PHASED DEPLOYMENT AND COST SAVINGS. LIKE THE RECENTLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION ON HAITI, THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY THE RUSSIANS APPROVES THE MISSION FOR SIX MONTHS "SUBJECT TO THE PROVISO THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND 90 DAYS ONLY UPON" SATISFACTORY SC REVIEW (NEW OP. PARA 2). IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT THAT THIS WAS A REVIEW

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PROVISION, NOT A HARD AND FAST CONTINGENCY. THIS ALLAYED FRENCH FEARS THAT THE PROVISION WAS TO RESTRICTIVE.

3. THE UK AND NEW ZEALAND BOTH NOTED THAT, LIKE THE GEORGIA AND LIBERIA RESOLUTIONS PASSED THIS SUMMER, THE RWANDA PKO SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A "NORMAL REVIEW FORMULA." THE FRENCH AGAIN VOICED CONCERNS OVER THIS RESTRICTION, BUT SEEMED PARTIALLY SWAYED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT SUCH REVIEW HAD BECOME AN ELEMENT OF ALL RECENT PKO RESOLUTIONS. THE UK STRESSED THE NEED FOR LANGUAGE WHICH PROVIDED FOR "REPORTING AND RENEWAL" OF MISSIONS. THEY ADMITTED THAT, DUE TO THE PHASE-BY-PHASE APPROACH CALLED FOR BY THE SYG IN HIS REPORT, LONDON HAD INSTRUCTED THEM TO SEEK A SECOND RESOLUTION FOR DEPLOYMENT AT D-DAY PLUS 90. HOWEVER, THE UK REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE THAT UP IN RETURN FOR STRONGER LANGUAGE ON REPORTING AND RENEWAL. THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO LET THE UK DRAFT LANGUAGE TO THIS EFFECT.

4. THE RUSSIANS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT A FRENCH SUGGESTION THAT THE MISSION'S MANDATE WOULD END "22 MONTHS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT-" THE GROUP AGREED, WITH VERY GRUDGING FRENCH ACQUIESCENCE, TO SAY THE MANDATE WOULD END "IN PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995." THE RUSSIANS, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM THE UK, RAISED THE ISSUE ON SECURITY FOR UN PERSONNEL. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE RWANDA RESOLUTION SHOULD CONTAIN LANGUAGE IN BOTH PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE SECTIONS WHICH REFERRED TO UNSC RES. 868, ADOPTED ON 29 SEPTEMBER, DEALING WITH SECURITY FOR UN PERSONNEL. FINALLY, THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED LANGUAGE WELCOMING THE SYG'S INTENTION TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

5. THE FRENCH MISSION CIRCULATED A REVISED DRAFT ON OCTOBER 1. WE UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE ASKED THAT IT BE PUT IN "BLUE." WE EXPECT THE COUNCIL TO RESUME DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT EARLY IN THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 4.

6. TEXT OF FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993 AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,

REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1993 CONCERNING THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488 AND ADD. 1),

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004824

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30 WORKING GROUP

WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT ON 4 AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THEM,

STRESSING THE URGE

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NCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED
BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND BY
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND AS AFFIRMED BY THE
JOINT DELEGATION IN NEW YORK,
PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA
AGREEMENTS,
RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST
OF THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
(S/26488 AND ADD. 1);
2. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISO THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND
THE INITIAL NINETY DAYS ONLY UPON A REVIEW BY THE
COUNCIL BASED ON A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS
TO WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
3. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR SHALL HAVE THE MANDATE AS SET
OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 21 TO 26 AND 39 TO 43 OF THE REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHICH INCLUDE IN PARTICULAR TO:
A) ASSIST IN ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF
KIGALI INTER ALIA THROUGH A WEAPONS-SECURE AREA IN AND
AROUND THE CITY;
B) MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT,
INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY
ZONES AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE NEW DEMILITARIZED ZONES
AND OTHER DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES;
C) MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL
PERIOD OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S MANDATE, LEADING
UP TO THE ELECTIONS;
D) ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARANCE, INCLUDING TRAINING
PROGRAMS;
E) INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS
OWN INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT RELATING TO
THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND PURSUE ANY SUCH
INSTANCES WITH THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES AND TO REPORT
THEIR THEREON AS APPROPRIATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL;
F) ASSIST IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
RWANDESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS;
G) ENSURE APPROPRIATE ESCORT AND PROTECTION FOR
HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES UNTIL RELIEVED BY THE NEW
RWANDESE DEFENCE FORCES AND GENDARMERIE;
H) MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;
4. ALSO APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA
(UNOMUR) AS ESTABLISHED IN RESOLUTION 846 (1992) SHOULD
BE INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR
5. WELCOMES THE EFFORTS AND THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU
IN HELPING TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, IN
PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE NEUTRAL MILITARY
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004824
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;

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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: TEXT OF PROPOSED SC RES FROM 9/30
WORKING GROUP
OBSERVERS GROUP (NMOG II) IN UNAMIR;
6. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, WHOSE MANDATE WILL END, I.E. IN PRINCIPLE, IN OCTOBER 1995 SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES;
7. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO DEPLOY A FIRST BATTALION TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
8. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REPORT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ALSO TO REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE MISSION FOLLOWING ITS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT, AND RESOLVES TO REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE, ON THE BASIS OF THAT REPORT AND AS PART OF THE REVIEW REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE REQUIREMENT FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCALE AND COMPOSITION RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT (S/26488);
9. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR, IN PARTICULAR, THROUGH PHASED DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF THE FORCE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE AND REQUESTS THE SECRETA
RY-GENERAL IN PLANNING
AND EXECUTING THE PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TO SEEK ECONOMIES AND TO REPORT REGULARLY ON WHAT IS ACHIEVED IN THIS REGARD.
10. WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD LEAD THE MISSION IN THE FIELD AND EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS ELEMENTS.
11. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH;
12. ALSO INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE FORTHWITH EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND NO LATER THAN 60 DAYS AFTER ITS INSTALLATION, A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR UNAMIR WITH THE RWANDESE AUTHORITIES;
13. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE OPERATION AND PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION;
14. URGES MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS SPECIALISED AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE AND INTENSIFY THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION AND OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
15. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4824

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 4824
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DTG: 050128Z OCT 93
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1500
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0098
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0974
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0103
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0086
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0553
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0183
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0207
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0485
SUBJ: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
REF: A) WARD/WALKER TELCON 10/4, B) USUN 4824, C) USUN 4735
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. GUIDANCE IS REQUIRED BY NOON, OCTOBER 5. SEE PARA BELOW.
3. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO AN AMENDED TEXT OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA, BASED ON U.S. CHANGES, PER REF A. A VOTE IS SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 5, PRIOR TO RWANDAN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TEXT OF CHANGES, AND THE POSITIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS IS SET FORTH BELOW. END SUMMARY.
4. PER REFTELCON, THE U.S. DELEGATION INSISTED ON REOPENING THE AGREED TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA (REF B). OTHER MEMBERS ARGUED VIGOROUSLY AGAINST SOME OF OUR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, BUT WE BELIEVE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET IN ALL CASES.

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5. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 NOW READS: DECIDES TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION NAMED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS SUBJECT TO THE PROVISION THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE INITIAL 90 DAYS ONLY UPON A REVIEW BY THE COUNCIL BASED ON A REPORT FROM THE SG AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.
6. WE PROPOSED INSERTING AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO CHAPTER VI OF THE UN CHARTER, BUT WERE OPPOSED BY THE UK, FRANCE, PAKISTAN, CAPE VERDE, JAPAN, MOROCCO AND BRAZIL. THE UK POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS NO ARTICLE UNDER CHAPTER SIX WHICH AUTHORIZES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. TO AVOID A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY TO MANDATE PKO'S, THE COUNCIL FOR THE PAST 40 YEARS HAS DELIBERATELY AVOIDED MENTIONING CHAPTER SIX EXPLICITLY. FRANCE REMINDED THE U.S. DELEGATION THAT WE HAD ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS POINT IN RELATION TO RESOLUTIONS ON HAITI AND LIBERIA, AND THAT LAWYERS HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT MENTIONING CHAPTER SIX. JAPAN POINTED OUT THAT SINCE CHAPTER SEVEN WAS NOT MENTIONED, IT WAS ASSUMED THIS OPERATION FELL UNDER CHAPTER SIX. IF THE COUNCIL REFERED SPECIFICALLY TO CHAPTER SIX IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, IT WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THE OTHER PKO'S (WHICH HAD NO MENTION OF CHAPTER 6 IN THEIR MANDATES) MIGHT INVOLVE CHAPTER 7. PAKISTAN, CAPE VERDE, MOROCCO AND BRAZIL ALL AGREED THAT MENTION OF CHAPTER SIX WAS INAPPROPRIATE. A COMPROMISE WAS REACHED WHEREBY UNAMIR IS REFERED TO AS "A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION", REMOVING ANY DOUBT THAT IT MIGHT BE A PEACE ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
7. OPERATIVE PARA 3 NOW READS: "DECIDES THAT PURSUANT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS, UNAMIR SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING MANDATE:"
8. WHILE AGREEING TO DELETE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPHS 21-26 AND 39-43 OF THE SYG'S REPORT, FRANCE INSISTED THAT SOME MORE GENERAL MENTION OF THE REPORT BE MADE. AFTER CONSIDERING SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES, SUCH AS "IN ACCORDANCE WITH, IN LIGHT OF, FOLLOWING, IN LINE WITH", ETC., THE COUNCIL DECIDED "PURSUANT TO THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATIONS" DID NOT TIE THE COUNCIL TO ENDORSING ALL PARTICULARS OF THE SYG'S REPORT.
9. OPERATIVE PARA 3(A) NOW READS: "TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF KIGALI, INTER ALIA WITHIN A WEAPONS SECURE AREA IN AND AROUND THE C
ITY;"
10. THE U.S. SUGGESTED DELETING REFERENCE TO A WEAPONS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
SECURE AREA. THIS SUGGESTION WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY NEW ZEALAND, FRANCE, UK, AND CAPE VERDE, ALL OF WHOM NOTED THAT THE DELETION WOULD MAKE THE MANDATE LESS

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PRECISE, RATHER THAN MORE PRECISE. NEW ZEALAND, CAPE VERDE AND FRANCE ARGUED THAT THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE SYG'S PLAN, AND NEEDED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RESOLUTION. ACKNOWLEDGING THE U.S. VIEW THAT UNAMIR SHOULD NOT HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THIS AREA, FRANCE SUGGESTED THAT THE RESOLUTION AT LEAST ALLOW THE PKO TO OPERATE "WITHIN" THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA, AS WELL AS WITHIN THE ACTUAL CITY ITSELF.

11. OPERATIVE PARA 3(B) NOW READS: "TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WHICH CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE NEW DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND OTHER DEMILITAIZATIONS PROCEDURES;"

12. OPERATIVE PARA 3(D) NOW READS: "TO ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARANCE, PRIMARILY THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMMES;"

13. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT ASSISTANCE IN MINE CLEARANCE SHOULD ONLY BE THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, FRANCE POINTED OUT THAT UNTAC ENGAGED IN MINE CLEARING OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND THAT UN TROOPS WOULD NEED TO CLEAR MINES BLOCKING THEIR OWN PATHS. BRAZIL NOTED THE UN MINECLEARERS MIGHT HAVE TO CLEAR SOME MINES THEMSELVES IN THE COURSE OF TEACHING THE LOCALS HOW IT WAS DONE.

14. OPERATIVE PARA 3(F) NOW READS: "TO MONITOR THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO VERIFY THAT THEY ARE CARRIED OUT IN A SAFE AND ORDERLY MANNER;"

15. OPERATIVE PARA 3(G) NOW READS: "TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELIEF OEPRATIONS;"

16. OPERATIVE PARA 3(H) NOW READS: "TO REPORT ON AND INVESTIGATE INCIDENTS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;"

17. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DELEGATION SUGGESTED CHANGING THE WORD "GENDARMERIE" TO "CONSTABULARY", THE FRENCH AND UK DELEGATIONS INSISTED TO DO SO WOULD BE INACCURATE. THE TERMS CONSTABULARY AND POLICE ARE SYNONYMS. THE GENDARMERIE IS A BRANCH OF THE MILITARY.

18. OPERATIVE PARA 6 NOW READS: "FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES, AND NOTES THAT UNAMIR'S MANDATE, IF EXTENDED, IS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, EVENTS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO OCCUR BY OCTOBER 1995, BUT NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 1995;"

19. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WISHED TO RETAIN THE REFERENCE TO STAGED DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR. NONE OBJECTED TO OUR SUGGESTION TO SPELL OUT THE DATES FOR THE ELECTIONS AND NEW GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE UK POINTED OUT THAT IF THE COUNCIL FOLLOWED THE U.S. SUGGESTION OF MENTIONING THE INITIAL MANDATE PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS, THE IMPLICATION WOULD BE THAT UNAMIR WOULD THEN BE OPEN-ENDED UNTIL ELECTIONS. WE AGREED WITH THE UK THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO SUBJECT THIS MISSION TO PERIODIC REVIEW AT EACH STAGE, WITH THE COUNCIL NEEDING TO MAKE A DECISION TO RENEW THE MANDATE AT EACH NEW

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STAGE.
20. OPERATIVE PARA 7 NOW READS: "AUTHORIZES THE SYG, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO DEPLOY THE FIRST CONTINGENT, AS DESCRIBED IN THE SYG'S REPORT, TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004871
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: FINAL LANGUAGE ON RWANDA SC RESOLUTION
PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THA OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;"
21. FRANCE AGREED TO OUR PROPOSAL TO SUBSTITUTE THE WORD "CONTINGENT" FOR "BATTALION" ONLY IF WE SPECIFIED ELIPTICALLY WHAT THAT "CONTINGENT" WOULD BE.
22. OPERATIVE PARA 12 NOW READS: "REQUESTS THE SYG TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE OPERATION AND ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION EXPEDITIOUSLY, TO COME INTO FORCE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE OUTSET OF THE RESOLUTION, AND NO LATER THAN 45 DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;"
23. FRANCE OBJECTED STRENUOUSLY TO THE U.S. SUGGESTION THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF "ANY TROOPS" HAD TO WAIT UNTIL CONCLUSION OF A STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT. THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A DELAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, REQUIRING A SOMA BEFORE "FULL DEPLOYMENT" GAVE THE UN TOO MUCH LATITUDE TO DEPLOY HUNDREDS OF TROOPS BEFORE REACHING AN AGREEMENT. THE UK AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT ON SOME OCCASIONS THE UN WOULD WANT TO DEPLOY RAPIDLY, CITING GEORGIA AS SUCH A CASE. CALLING FOR A SOMA PRIOR TO ANY DEPLOYMENT WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS WHICH WOULD TIE THE UN'S HANDS. UK SUGGESTED DRAWING FROM LANGUAGE ADOPTED LAST WEEK IN THE RESOLUTION ON THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL, AND SHORTENING THE DEADLINE FOR CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT.
24. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, WITH THE AMENDMENTS SPELLED OUT ABOVE, WILL BE CIRCULATED TUESDAY, WITH A VIEW TOWARDS ADOPTION TUESDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 5. USUN REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON WHETHER OR NOT TO VOTE FOR THIS RESOLUTION BY NOON TUESDAY. ALSO, USUN REQUESTS A CLEARED EXPLANATION OF VOTE (EOV) BY NOON TUESDAY, IF DEPARTMENT WISHES AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT TO MAKE ONE. MISSION WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT UPON ESTABLISHING A NEW PKO, IT IS THE USUAL PRACTICE TO MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT OUTLINING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION'S OBJECTIVES, AS WELL AS THE NEED TO KEEP COSTS DOWN.
ALBRIGHT
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 4871
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TOR: 931004215256 M0641943
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DIST:

SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE VAX WARD
□

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA3702 2780322-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O P 050322Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 050322Z OCT 93
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8299
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2996
INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 1278
RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU PRIORITY 4298
SUBJ: CONTINGENCY DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 303702
NSC FOR JENNIFER WARD AND SUSAN RICE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.

3. DEPARTMENT ANTICIPATES THAT THE USG FOSITION ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) WILL BE REACHED AND COMMUNICATED TO USUN AND PARIS EARLY ON OCTOBER 4.

4. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION THAT THE USG WILL SUPPORT A UNSC RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING UNAMIR, USUN SHOULD MEET WITH FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN IN PARIS SHOULD MEET WITH SENIOR FRENCH MFA OFFICIALS AND PRESENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

5. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

- THE USG HAS DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA.

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU ON THE MANDATE, COMPOSITION AND DURATION OF THIS MISSION.

-- IN VIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED SEPTEMBER 27 BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WE WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION TO ENSURE THAT ITS COSTS ARE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED AND THAT

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2011-0263-M
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UNAMIR OPERATES AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE.

-- AS WE INITIATE A NEW PEACEKEEFING MISSION IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF OTHER PEACEKEEFING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IN SOMALIA WHERE UNOSOM II HAS BEEN CHALLENGED.

-- WE URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT COMMITMENT TO UNOSOM II AND TO RESCIND YOUR DECISION TO WITHDRAW YOUR FORCES IN SOMALIA. REDUCTION IN FRENCH PARTICIPATION THERE WOULD CAST INTO DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, NOTABLY THE ONE THAT YOU SO STRONGLY SUPPORT IN RWANDA. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#3702
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 3702
TOR: 931004232323 M0642031
DIST:

SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE VAX WARD
□

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 060125Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 060125Z OCT 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0276
INFO: RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0101
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0210
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0491
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0983
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0108
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0089
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0560
RUFHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0186
SUBJ: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
REF: USUN 4766 AND PREVIOUS
1. (U) SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 872 ESTABLISHING A PEACEKEEPING MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) ON OCTOBER 5. TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTION AND U.S. EOV ARE BELOW. THE RWANDAN FONMIN SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE JOINT DELEGATION OF THE GOR AND RPF, THANKING THE UN. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) PRIOR TO THE VOTE, AMB. WALKER CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO FRENCH PERM REP AMB. MERIMEE:
-- THE USG HAS DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA. WE ARE PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU ON THE MANDATE, COMPOSITION AND DURATION OF THIS MISSION.
-- IN VIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED SEPTEMBER 27 BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WE WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION TO ENSURE THAT ITS COSTS ARE CAREFULLY

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2011-0263-M
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CONTROLLED AND THAT UNAMIR OPERATES AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE.
-- AS WE INITIATE A NEW PEACEKEEPING MISSION IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IN SOMALIA WHERE UNOSOM II HAS BEEN CHALLENGED.
-- WE URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN YOUR CURRENT COMMITMENT TO UNOSOM II AND TO RESCIND YOUR DECISION TO WITHDRAW YOUR FORCES IN SOMALIA. REDUCTION IN FRENCH PARTICIPATION THERE WOULD CAST INTO DOUBT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT OTHER PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA, NOTABLY THE ONE THAT YOU SO STRONGLY SUPPORT IN RWANDA.
3. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION 872:
28 SEPTEMBER 1993-2230
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
-REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 812 (1993) OF 12 MARCH 1993 AND 846 (1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993,
-REAFFIRMING ALSO ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1993 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1993 (S/26488 AND ADD.L),
-WELCOMING THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT (INCLUDING ITS PROTOCOLS) ON 4 AUGUST 1993 AND URGING THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH IT,
-NOTING THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE SUCCESSFULLY AND EFFECTIVELY, THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH THE ORGANIZATION IS REQUIRED,
-STRESSING THE URGENCY OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL NEUTRAL FORCE IN RWANDA, AS UNDERLINED BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND AS REAFFIRMED BY THEIR JOINT DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.
-PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
-RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PATIES, AND UNDER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF ALL THE PARTIES, MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT,
-1. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/26488);
-2. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH A PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION UNDER THE NAME "UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA" (UNAMIR) FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISION THAT IT WILL BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE INITIAL

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NINETY DAYS ONLY UPON A REVIEW BY THE COUNCIL BASED ON A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
3. DECIDES THAT DRAWING FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS UNAMIR SHALL HAVE THE FOLLOWING MANDATE:
-A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE CITY OF KIGALI INTER ALIA WITHIN A WEAPONS SECURE AREA ESTABLISHED BY THE PARTIES IN AND AROUND THE CITY;
-B) TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WHICH CALLS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANTONMENT AND ASSEMBLY ZONES AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE NEW DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND OTHER DEMILITARIZATION PROCEDURES;
-C) TO MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT'S MANDATE, LEADING UP TO THE ELECTIONS;
-D) TO ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARING, PRIMARILY THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMMES;
-E) TO INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND PURSUE ANY SUCH INSTANCES WITH THE PARTIES RESPONSIBLE AND REPORT THEREON AS APPROPRIATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL;
-F) TO MONITOR THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO VERIFY THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN A SAFE AND ORDERLY MANNER;
-G) TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RELIEF OPERATIONS;
-H) TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON INCIDENTS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE;
-4. APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR) ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 846 (1993) SHOULD BE INTEGRATED WITHIN UNAMIR;
-5. WELCOMES THE EFFORTS AND THE COOPERATION OF THE OAU IN HELPING TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (NMOG II) IN UNAMIR;
-6. FURTHER APPROVES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT THE DEPLOYMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES AND NOTES IN THIS CONNECTION THAT UNAMIR'S MANDATE, IF EXTENDED, IS EXPECTED TO TERMINATE FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, EVENTS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO OCCUR BY OCTOBER 1995, BUT NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 1995;
-7. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THIS CONTEXT, TO DEPLOY THE FIRST CONTINGENT AT THE LEVEL SPECIFIED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, TO KIGALI FOR AN INITIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5

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PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH, WHEN FULLY IN PLACE, WILL PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-8. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REPORT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ALSO TO REPORT ON THE PROCESS OF UNAMIR FOLLOWING ITS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT, AND RESOLVES TO REVIEW AS APPROPRIATE, ON THE BASIS OF THAT REPORT AND AS PART OF THE REVIEW REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE REQUIRED FOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCALE AD COMPOSITION RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT (S/26488);
-9. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER WAYS OF REDUCING THE TOTAL MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF UNAMIR, IN PARTICULAR, THROUGH PHASED DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT THEREBY AFFECTING THE CAPACITY OF UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING THE PHASED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TO SEEK ECONOMIES AND TO REPORT REGULARLY ON WHAT IS ACHIEVED IN THIS REGARD;
-10. WELCOMES THE INTENTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD LEAD UNAMIR IN THE FIELD AND EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS ELEMENTS;
-11. URGES THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT IN GOOD FAITH;
-12. ALSO REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONCLUDE EXPEDITIOUSLY AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE OPERATION, ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION IN RWANDA, TO COME INTO FORCE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE OUTSET OF THE OPERATION AND NO LATER THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-13. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF THE OPERATION AND PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION;
-14. URGES MEMBER STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE AND INTENSIFY THEIR ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE RWANDESE POPULATION AND OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN RWANDA;
-13. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END-TEXT OF RESOLUTION.
4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. EOV:
--LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT FOR THEIR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACE ACCORD, WHICH RESULTED IN THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT ON AUGUST 4, 1993. I CONGRATULATE THE FARSIGHTED LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO PUT ASIDE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND OPT FOR PEACE OVER WAR. ALSO, I SHOULD COMMEND BOTH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR THEIR ROLES IN BRINGING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER.
--THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS ANOTHER MAJOR STEP IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA.

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I HAVE EVERY HOPE THAT OUR ACTION TODAY WILL REINFORCE PEACE--A CRUCIAL PREREQUISITE WHICH ALLOWS BOTH PARTIES TO BUILD ON THE TRUST THEY HAVE CREATED. WE SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS FORCE BECAUSE IT WILL ADVANCE THE GOALS OF PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION, AND ALLOW THE RETURN OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF THOSE WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES. IT IS NOW
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004919
STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SUSAN RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AO, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: RESOLUTION ADOPTED 10/5
UP TO THE RWANDANS THEMSELVES TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY MOVES FORWARD.
--AS YOU KNOW, MY GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE INCREASING BURDEN--BOTH IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES--WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS IS BEING ASKED TO SHOULDER. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THIS RESOLUTION HAS A TIGHTLY FOCUSED MANDATE. THIS BODY'S CONTINUED SUPPORT WILL DEPEND, IN LARGE MEASURE, ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN ADVANCE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS. MY GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND WORK TO REDUCE COSTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS THROUGHOUT THIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION ON WAYS TO REDUCE UNAMIR'S LEVELS AND TO CONTAIN COSTS.
--NOW THAT THIS RESOLUTION HAS PASSED, LET ME STRESS THE NEED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL MEMBER STATES TO TAKE PROMPT ACTION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF COOPERATIN. LET US HELP RWANDA BEGIN THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION IN ORDER TO ALLOW RWANDANS TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY AND THEIR LIVELIHOODS.
ALBRIGHT
BT
#4919
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04
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DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: GEORGEL RAGLE RICE SUM2 VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 121608Z OCT 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 121608Z OCT 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0501
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0010
SUBJ: ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 005061
STATE FOR AF-A/S MOOSE, IO-A/S BENNET, IO-WARD,
AF/S-HANKINS, IO/UNP-ZELLE, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC - SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE PERM FIVE WILL MEET OCTOBER 13 TO DISCUSS THE NEXT STEP FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE IN ANGOLA. USUN INTENDS TO SOUND OUT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS, AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PRELIMINARY THINKING ON THE USG POSITION. IT APPEARS THE ANGOLA PKO DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR VIABLE UN MISSIONS SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27 SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. END SUMMARY.
3. PRESIDENT CLINTON ENUMERATED SEVERAL CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE UNGA. AMONG THEM WERE: "DOES THE PROPOSED MISSION HAVE CLEAR OBJECTIVES? CAN AN END POINT TO UN PARTICIPATION BE IDENTIFIED?" AT THIS POINT, THE ANSWERS APPEAR TO BE "NO" ON THESE POINTS. THE NEXT DATE FOR RENEWAL OF UNAVEM II'S MANDATE IS DECEMBER 15, 1993. ALTHOUGH THIS DEADLINE IS STILL TWO MONTHS AWAY, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO START WORKING THE ISSUE SOON, SINCE POWERFUL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. THE PEACEKEEPING OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FULFILL THEIR FUNCTIONS DUE TO THE FIGHTING AND THE LACK OF WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE. IF ANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION SEEMS A POTENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR BEING TERMINATED, UNAVEM II MOST CLOSELY FITS THE BILL. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING ANGOLA AND THE FUTURE OF THE PKO WITH THE SC PERM FIVE ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13 TO SOUND OUT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHERS. HOWEVER, THE PROS AND CONS OF CONTINUED UN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED CLOSELY. PROBLEMS WITH UNAVEM

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2011-0263-M
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4. FIGHTING BETWEEN UNITA AND THE GFA RESUMED AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 1992 ELECTIONS, REACHING WORSE PROPORTIONS THAN DURING MOST OF THE 16-YEAR CIVIL WAR. ATTEMPTS BY SRSG'S MARGARET ANSTEE AND THEN ALOUINE BEYE TO GET THE PARTIES TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. ATTEMPTS BY AFRICAN LEADERS SUCH AS COTE D'IVOIRE PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, MOROCCAN KING HASSAN, SAO TOMEAN PRESIDENT TROVOARE AND OTHERS TO INFLUENCE UNITA LEADER SAVIMBI TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GRA HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.
5. SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA ON SEPTEMBER 25, THE GRA'S POSITION ON RETURNING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE HAS HARDENED. THE GRA HAS EKUMERATED SEVERAL NEW CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET BY UNITA BEFORE THE GRA WILL SIT DOWN TO TALK.
6. SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PASSED 8 RESOLUTIONS (785, 793, 804, 811, 823, 834, 851 AND 864) CONDEMNING THE VIOLENCE, CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE BICESSE ACCORDS, AND URGING BOTH PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE. THESE RESOLUTIONS HAVE HAD NO EFFECT ON THE PARTIES, WHO ARE BOTH BENT ON WINNING MILITARILY. NEITHER SIDE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO TRY SERIOUSLY TO STOP FIGHTING OR TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, IN THE RUN-UP TO EACH RESOLUTION, THE PARTIES HAVE DISPLAYED A (SHORT-LIVED) WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO NEGOTIATE, WHICH EVAPORATES AFTER THE COUNCIL'S ACTION IS COMPLETED.
7. THE UN SUBSTANTIALLY CUT DOWN THE SIZE OF ITS OPERATION IN JANUARY 1993, SHORTLY AFTER FIGHTING RESUMED. THEY LIMITED THEIR SPHERE OF OPERATIONS TO CERTAIN SAFE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE NUMBER OF THEIR OUTPOSTS HAS SHRUNK FURTHER SINCE THAT TIME, AS MORE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY BECAME TOO DANGEROUS FOR THE OBSERVERS. THE UN OBSERVERS, WHO WERE ORIGINALLY SENT TO ANGOLA TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE, ARE UNABLE TO MONITOR OR VERIFY ANYTHING OUTSIDE LUANDA.
8. THE MANDATE GIVEN TO UNAVEM II ON 2
0 MAY 1991 BY
RESOLUTION 696, REFERS BACK TO THE SYG'S REPORT S/22627. IT INCLUDES: (A) VERIFICATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BY THE ANGOLAN PARTIES FOR THE MONITORING OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AS SET OUT IN THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE PEACE ACCORDS FOR ANGOLA; (B) VERIFICATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BY THE ANGOLAN PARTIES FOR THE MONITORING OF THE ANGOLAN POLICE DURING THE CEASE-FIRE PERIOD, AS SET OUT IN SECTION III OF THE ESTORIL PROTOCOL, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE PEACE ACCORDS FOR ANGOLA, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 BELOW.
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 005061
STATE FOR AF-A/S MOOSE, IO-A/S BENNET, IO-WARD, AF/S-HANKINS, IO/UNP-ZELLE, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC - SUSAN RICE
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: JUST SAY NO?
9. UNAVEM CANNOT CARRY OUT THE MANDATE GIVEN IT BY THE

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COUNCIL IN MAY 1991, SINCE THE PEACE ACCORDS HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ABROGATED. THE SYG'S PERIODIC UPDATES ON CONDITIONS IN ANGOLA ARE BASED ON PRESS ACCOUNTS AND COMMUNIQUES FROM THE TWO SIDES. THE SYG OPENLY ADMITS IN THESE UPDATES THAT THE UNAVEM OBSERVERS ARE UNABLE TO VERIFY THESE REPORTS OF FIGHTING, OR OF CEASEFIRES HOLDING.

10. THE MAY 1991 MANDATE GIVEN TO UNAVEM II WAS TO LAST "UNTIL THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA, WHICH ARE TO BE HELD IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1 SEPTEMBER AND 30 NOVEMBER 1992." IT HAS ALREADY RUN TEN MONTHS PAST ITS PROJECTED END. MUCH OF UNAVEM II'S EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SHIPPED OVER TO MOZAMBIQUE FOR THE USE OF ONUMOZ, SINCE MOST OF UNAVEM'S PERSONNEL WERE SENT HOME.

11. BOTH PARTIES ARE ASKING FOR A MUCH LARGER UN PRESENCE. SRSG BEYE REPORTEDLY HAS ASKED THE UN SECRETARIAT TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A FORCE OF UP TO FIFTEEN BATTALIONS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, A FORCE OF THAT MAGNITUDE WOULD BE EXPENSIVE.

REASONS TO KEEP UNAVEM:

12. IF WE DO TRY TO PULL THE PLUG ON UNAVEM II, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY. THE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AS WELL AS BRAZIL, COULD READ THIS AS A SIGN THAT THE USG WISHES TO WASH ITS HANDS AND AFRICA AND AFRICAN PROBLEMS. WE HAVE STRONG ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS CHARGE, HOWEVER, BASED ON LIBERIA, RWANDA, MOZAMBIQUE AND SOMALIA. BOTH UNITA AND THE GRA, FOR DIFFERING REASONS, WANT TO SEE A VASTLY INCREASED UN FORCE IN ANGOLA, AND WOULD COMPLAIN BITTERLY TO THEIR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS ABOUT A PULL-OUT. ARETURN TO FULL-SCALE CIVIL WAR WOULD BE LIKELY IF THE UN WITHDREW. CONTINUATION OF THE UN'S MEDIATION EFFORTS MAY EVENTUALLY RESULT IN A LASTING PEACE, BUT THESE EFFORTS COULD CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF THE FATE OF UNAVEM II. SOME GAINS IN THIS DIRECTION MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT DAYS, IF THE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PARTIES ARE TO BE BELIEVED THIS TIME. IN ADDITION, U.S. OIL COMPANIES IN ANGOLA MAY HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN HAVING THE UN FORCE REMAIN.

CONCLUSION

12. ALTHOUGH ACTION ON UNAVEM II IS STILL TWO MONTHS AWAY, IT WILL BE A TOUGH BATTLE IN THE COUNCIL IF THE USG DECIDES TO VOTE NOT TO RENEW THE MANDATE. WE ARE BRINGING IT UP AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, BECAUSE WE REALIZE THAT WASHINGTON WILL NEED TIME TO MAKE SUCH A CONTROVERSIAL DECISION, AND USUN WILL THEN NEED TIME TO GET OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL ON OUR SIDE.

ALBRIGHT

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 7, 1994

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MEMORANDUM

TO: To the Files

FROM: IO/PHO - David Jensen

SUBJECT: My Visit to Rwanda, February 1-4, 1994

The following are summary notes from my visit to Rwanda last week to consult on the operations of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). A copy of my full schedule is also attached. Copies of materials provided by UNAMIR briefers are also available if you would like to read them in detail.

My General Impressions

My visit to Rwanda generally reinforced my previous impression, gained from UN, embassy, and other reporting, that the implementation of UNAMIR's peacekeeping mandate (as expressed in UNSCRs 872 and 893) is proceeding reasonably well. UNAMIR is under excellent leadership and has satisfactorily completed Phase I of its mission -- i.e., the Kigali Weapons Secure Area has been established; the RPF battalion has arrived safely in Kigali; the ceasefire remains in place throughout the country; and preparations have been completed for the formation of the transitional government, as called for in the Arusha peace accords. Phase II of the mission, which includes deployment of a second battalion to the DMZ and preparation of assembly points for the government and RPF forces, was scheduled to begin as soon as the transitional government was established. However, UNAMIR has decided to begin deployment of the second battalion (from Ghana) to the DMZ during the second week of February, even if the government has not yet been formed.

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Two major problem areas, however, have become more apparent to me as a result of my visit. The first one is that the political difficulties in implementing the Arusha agreement are more troublesome than I had previously thought. The formation of the transitional government has already been stalled more than one month, and many Rwandans on both sides have grown more pessimistic about finding a lasting solution anytime soon. These uncertainties have already delayed UNAMIR's implementation timetable and have also made it more difficult for UNAMIR to carry on its present task of helping to ensure security in the Kigali area.

The second major problem area is the lack of adequate logistical support for the UNAMIR peacekeepers and staff. UNAMIR is especially experiencing considerable difficulties in obtaining UN budgetary authority to procure the transportation and communications equipment needed to fulfill its mission. This shortage of equipment is clearly harming UNAMIR's morale and hampering its overall effectiveness. While some improvements have occurred recently in the provision of logistical support, UNAMIR expects that these shortage problems will continue for several more months. They will likely be exacerbated in the near term by the imminent arrival of the second battalion from Ghana.

Despite these two major problem areas, prospects for the success of the UNAMIR mission are still good, primarily because the support of the Rwandan people for the peace process and the UNAMIR mission remains strong. Nevertheless, patience on all sides is clearly wearing thin. UNAMIR's effectiveness will gradually diminish unless the political stalemate over the transitional government is ended soon. Many of the political parties in Rwanda have extreme elements which are opposed to the peace process, and these groups are using the present stalemate to step up their activities to make the situation even more difficult. Significant amounts of arms remain outside the control of UNAMIR.

Additional Impressions

(1) UNAMIR is operating well, despite the political and logistical problems it is facing. Its leadership is intelligent, energetic, diplomatically sensitive, and well respected by both the government and rebel forces, as well as outside obervers.

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(2) Neither of the two major forces (i.e., RGF and RPF) had any complaints for me about UNAMIR's general plan of action, its commitment to the peace process, or its neutrality.

(3) Only two complaints were raised by the Rwandans about UNAMIR: (a) it has insufficient logistical support to fulfill its mandate as well as hoped; and (b) it has an inadequate mandate to act "aggressively" to gain control over the many bandit groups and scattered supplies of weapons in Rwanda, particularly in Kigali.

(4) UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire has sought greater authority from UN headquarters to be more pro-active, but has been told to hold back.

(5) Most observers I met, including many in the government, believe the main cause of the present stalemate in creating the transitional government is the Rwandan President's reluctance to give up some of his powers to the transitional Cabinet and Assembly; some believe he particularly fears an investigation by a transitional government into alleged past crimes and abuses of human rights by his government.

(6) A large number of Rwandans expressed their hopes to me that the U.S. government would undertake initiatives to bring about somehow a solution to this impasse.

(7) All sides are still generally expressing hope and patience about the peace process, but these positive feelings are diminishing while suspicion and distrust are growing.

(8) It appears that increased actions from outsiders are needed to break the present stalemate; perhaps through a combination of inputs from U.S., Belgian, French, and African sources (note: the OAU and/or former Tanzanian President Nyerere were mentioned to me as possibilities on the African side).

(9) After a reportedly slow start, SRSYG Booh-Booh is playing an increasingly important role in bringing the main parties together to discuss possible solutions to the present political impasse.

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Specific Impressions on UNAMIR

(1) UNAMIR has excellent leadership at the top and generally enthusiastic support at the lower levels, although morale is adversely impacted by logistical problems.

(2) Belgian units are clearly better equipped than the Banglashi units; the Belgians have been given responsibility for the security of the most critical areas in Kigali.

(3) UNAMIR deployment in the DMZ is very sparse, but fortunately no serious violations of the ceasefire have thus far occurred in that area.

(4) Due to a lack of housing arrangements thus far outside of Kigali, most UNAMIR peacekeepers based in the DMZ and RPF sectors travel back and forth from Kigali every day, placing an even greater burden on UNAMIR's limited supply of vehicles.

(5) It is not yet known if the Ghanian battalion will bring significant amounts of equipment and/or vehicles with it; even if they have vehicles to send, it will take months before they arrive in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania by sea for onward transport by land to Rwanda.

(6) There have been some reports of fighting, particularly by Belgian peacekeepers, in local bars, but these have reportedly thus far been only isolated incidents which have been dealt with expeditiously without significantly harming the Rwandans overall high regard for UNAMIR.

(7) Our embassy has, however, heard rumours of drug-dealing by some of the Bangladeshi forces, which, if true, could prove troublesome.

(8) UNAMIR is particularly hampered by the lack of a transitional government because it is never entirely certain with which groups it should work.

(9) UNAMIR officers told me that the government forces have clearly been less cooperative than the RPF units; we certainly noticed a less-than-positive attitude toward our UNAMIR escort from the government forces manning check points during our travels outside of Kigali.

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(10) UNAMIR has stationed some of its observers south of Kigali in Butare to monitor any possible movements of people or troops out of Burundi, especially if the political situation in that country remains unresolved.

Attachment: a/s

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OSD/PK/PE
NSC - Rice
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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1675
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0413
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0150
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RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0308
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0857

<SUBJ> PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM
RWANDA

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001473
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR SRICE, DMOZENA
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG
SUBJECT: PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM
RWANDA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 8 UN, BELGIAN, FRENCH, AND US
REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSSED A POSSIBLE FOUR-STAGE
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING SECURITY COUNCIL "BLESSING" OF
EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR IF THERE IS
NO SOLID CEASE-FIRE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS: MEMBER
STATES NOTIFY THE SYG OF THEIR CONCERN FOR THEIR
CITIZENS IN RWANDA; THE SYG NOTIFIES THE SECURITY
COUNCIL OF THE MEMBER STATES' CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT UNAMIR ALSO BE EVACUATED; THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETS; THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES THE SYG'S
RECOMMENDATION THAT UNAMIR AND FOREIGN NATIONALS BE
EVACUATED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEMBER STATES. END
SUMMARY.
3. ON APRIL 8 UN OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND THE US MET TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCY
PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING SECURITY COUNCIL
"BLESSING" FOR EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM RWANDA
SHOULD THE SITUATION NOT IMPROVE WITHIN THE NEXT 24
HOURS. PRESENT FROM USUN WERE AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH,
MILAD COL. CLONTZ, AND POLOFF MICHAEL BARNETT; AMONG
THOSE FROM UNDPKO WERE U/SYG KOFI ANNAN, DIMITRY TITOV,
AND ISEL RIVERO.
4. UNDERSECRETARY FOR PEACEKEEPING ANNAN OPENED THE

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MEETING BY OUTLINING A DIRE SITUATION IN RWANDA: MANY PEACEKEEPERS EITHER KILLED OR INJURED; POSSIBLY TWO ADDITIONAL BELGIANS KILLED TODAY; ONLY FOUR DAYS OF SUPPLIES REMAINING FOR UNAMIR TROOPS (WHICH MEANS THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY LESS FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS); AND SO FAR FC DAILLARE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE OR ACCESS TO THE AIRPORT.

5. ANNAN UNDERSTANDS THE LIKELIHOOD OF MEMBER STATES EVACUATING THEIR NATIONALS FROM RWANDA, AND UNAMIR IS READY TO ASSIST IN THAT EVACUATION. THERE ARE ROUGHLY 3,000 TO 4,000 FOREIGN NATIONALS THAT WILL NEED TO BE EVACUATED, WHICH INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY 1500 BELGIANS, 300 FRENCH, 300 GERMANS, AND 200 AMERICANS.

6. THEN ANNAN ANNOUNCED THAT UNAMIR MUST BE EVACUATED WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS IF THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE SOON. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS IF UNAMIR REMAINS WHILE FOREIGN NATIONALS DEPART, HE CONTINUED, IT WILL BECOME A TARGET FOR RWANDANS SEEKING REVENGE. ANNAN SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE SYG.

7. THE FRENCH SAID THAT THEY HAD SPOKEN TO THE CHINESE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVE A FRENCH EVACUATION EFFORT THAT WOULD INVOLVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OPENING THE AIRPORT, EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS, AND HAVING UNAMIR BECOME A CHAPTER VII OPERATION. THE CHINESE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE SUCH A MOVE SO LONG AS IT WAS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES AND FOR A VERY LIMITED PERIOD. THE FRENCH GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE READY TO MOVE VERY SOON, AND THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY. PERHAPS SOMETHING STRONGER THAN YESTERDAY'S STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE FRENCH DEPPERMREP SAID.

8. THE GROUP THEN DISCUSSED A POSSIBLE FOUR-STAGE PROCESS FOR AUTHORIZING THE EVACUATION OF BOTH FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO IF THERE IS NO CEASE FIRE. FIRST, THE MEMBER STATES INFORM THE SYG THAT THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THEIR FOREIGN NATIONALS, THAT THEY WILL TAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEIR NATIONALS, AND THAT THEY SEEK UNAMIR'S ASSISTANCE IN THIS EVACUATION EFFORT. ANNAN ADDED THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE MEMBER STATES, AND NOT THE SYG, INITIATE THE REQUEST;

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DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AF/C AND L/AF;
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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG
SUBJECT: PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR FROM RWANDA

OTHERWISE, IT MIGHT APPEAR THAT THE SYG WAS ABANDONING RWANDA.

9. SECOND, THE SYG WOULD USE THIS LETTER FROM THE MEMBER STATES TO APPROACH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND RECOMMEND THAT UNAMIR ALSO BE EVACUATED BECAUSE OF THE THREAT TO THE LIVES OF THE PEACEKEEPERS AND BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS FOR HAVING THE MANDATE NO LONGER EXIST. ANNAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT UNAMIR SHOULD NOT BE LEFT

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BEHIND, AND THAT THOSE STATES WHO ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE EVACUATION EFFORT ALSO MAKE PLANS TO EVACUATE THE 2500 UNAMIR TROOPS.

10. THIRD, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONVENES TO DISCUSS THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND UNAMIR BY MEMBER STATES. FINALLY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES THE AFOREMENTIONED REQUESTS, EITHER BY A RESPONDING LETTER TO THE SYG, A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, OR, POSSIBLY, A RESOLUTION.

11. ANNAN URGED THAT THOSE THINKING ABOUT EVACUATING THEIR NATIONALS SEEK THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; THIS IS A PRECEDENT-SETTING MOVE, HE EMPHASIZED, AND WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL TO ENSURE THAT WE SET THE RIGHT PRECEDENT THAT GIVES THIS ACTION REAL LEGITIMACY: "WE KNOW WHAT WE WANT TO DO, BUT WE MUST DO IT CORRECTLY."

12. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

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Operations Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 31
SITUATION AS OF 1100 EDT, 04/11/94

• (C) The situation in Bujumbura remains calm. Dependents began to depart the evening of April 11. Military assets are scheduled to depart Bujumbura for Mombasa during the daylight hours of the 12th.

• (LOU) A Total of 232 Americans (official and private) have reportedly departed Rwanda and 39 Americans remain. Based on the best information available, the statistics on the evacuation are as follows:

Departed via USG Convoys	105	Amcits
Departed via other means	127	Amcits
Total	232	Amcits

Remaining temporarily with Int'l Organizations (UNAMIR and ICRC)	13	Amcits
Choosing to stay	18	Amcits
On the Zaire Border	6	Amcits
Scheduled to evacuate with an Italian group	2	Amcits
Total	39	Amcits

• (U) The President and Mrs. Clinton and the Secretary and Mrs. Christopher visited the Task Force the evening of April 11. The President offered his sincere thanks to everyone who had helped to evacuate Americans from Rwanda. We understand that this is only the second time a President has visited the Ops Center.

• (C) The Belgian Government has shown a willingness to use its contingent to UNAMIR to extract the 11 German Deutsche Welle technicians trapped at Mt. Kininya. The Belgian MFA has asked us for coordinates for the Germans. We have asked the Germans to get in direct contact with the Belgian Ops Center.

Arlene Render
Coordinator

Mark Kennon
Senior Watch Officer

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
TFRW01
SITUATION REPORT NO. 32
SITUATION AS OF 1100 EDT, 04/11/94

- (U) The Belgian Government has dispatched three Sabena charters for evacuation flights from Kigali at least one of which returned to Brussels on the 11th.

- (U) The French and Belgians are considering closing their missions and withdrawing their troop contributions to UNAMIR while the UN Secretariat is advocating the withdrawal of UNAMIR forces. Decisions are expected from all three within the next two days. A UN withdrawal would remove the very limited moderating effect of the UN presence and place at immediate risk some 5,000 Rwandans who have taken refuge on the UNAMIR compound.

- (U) DOD/OSD has approved a UN request to transfer 6 US provided Armored Personnel Carriers from UNOSOM II to UNAMIR to support evacuation. APCs had been provided on lease and will be transfered on non US aircraft. No US personnel will be involved in the transfer.

Arlene Render
Coordinator

Peter Petrihos
Senior Watch Officer

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RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0327
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0879

<SUBJ>TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE UN SYG PRESENTED TWO OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. THE COUNCIL HOPES TO DECIDE BETWEEN THOSE TWO OPTIONS AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 15. MISSION SEEKS URGENT GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.
3. THE UN SECRETARIAT PRESENTED RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 14 ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO PROCEED IN RWANDA. THE SECRETARIAT CLARIFIED THAT THE SYG WAS NOT RPT NOT RECOMMENDING TOTAL PULLOUT OF UNAMIR. THEY TERMED THAT AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE SYG'S LETTER OF 4/13. FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL DALLAIRE HAS REPORTED THAT BOTH THE PARTIES HAVE CONVEYED A DESIRE TO SEE UNAMIR STAY IN RWANDA. GEN. DALLAIRE WISHES TO USE THIS DESIRE AS LEVERAGE OVER THE PARTIES TO FORCE THEM TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ALSO, IT IS NOT LOGISTICALLY POSSIBLE TO PULL UNAMIR'S TROOPS OVERNIGHT.
4. PRECONDITION: GEN. DALLAIRE WOULD PRESENT AN ULTIMATUM TO THE PARTIES. THEY WOULD HAVE 5 DAYS TO ONE WEEK TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE. GEN DALLAIRE WOULD LET THE PARTIES KNOW THAT DURING THAT TIME, HE AND UNHQ WOULD BE PREPARING A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR. ALSO DURING THOSE 5 DAYS, DALLAIRE WOULD STRENGTHEN UNAMIR'S PRESENCE AT THE AIRPORT. IF THE PARTIES DID AGREE ON A CEASE-FIRE WITHIN 5 DAYS, ONE OF TWO OPTIONS COULD KICK IN.
5. OPTION ONE: ALL OF UNAMIR, MINUS THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, WOULD STAY IN RWANDA, BUT MOVE OUT OF THE DMZ AND REDEPLOY TO KIGALI. DALLAIRE WOULD SET ANOTHER DEADLINE FOR THE PARTIES: THEY WOULD HAVE 3 WEEKS TO RETURN TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO

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MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS -- BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL, GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, KEEP THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL. AT FIVE OR SIX DAYS BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 3 WEEKS, DALLAIRE WOULD WARN THE PARTIES THAT THEIR TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THAT UNAMIR WAS PLANNING FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT RESUMED WITHIN 3 WEEKS, UNAMIR WOULD WITHDRAW.

6. OPTION TWO: ONCE A CEASE-FIRE WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS, REDUCE UNAMIR TO A MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESENCE (THE SRSG, SUPPORT STAFF AND A SECURITY DETAIL OF AT LEAST 150 MEN) FOR AN UNSPECIFIED TIME. THIS WOULD PRESUPPOSE THAT THE PARTIES WERE NOT HEADED BACK TOWARDS THE ARUSHA FRAMEWORK QUICKLY.

7. POSSIBLE OPTION THREE: ALTHOUGH NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE SYG'S OPTIONS, THE SECRETARIAT SUGGESTED THAT OPTION ONE AND TWO MIGHT BE COMBINED. NAMELY, AFTER 3 WEEKS HAD PASSED IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT STARTED THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THE SIZE OF OPTION TWO.

8. THE SYG PREFERS OPTION ONE. FRANCE ALSO PREFERS OPTION ONE. NIGERIA ASKED FOR TIME TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS TO WORK OUT THEIR POSITION. OTHERS ASKED FOR TIME TO GET INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS. ONE THING WHICH IS UNCLEAR, AND WHICH MANY MEMBERS OF THE SC, INCLUDING AMB ALBRIGHT, QUERIED WAS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NO CF WAS REACHED WITHIN 5 DAYS. UK POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL NEEDS TO EXPLICITLY SPELL OUT WHAT THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNDER OPTION 1 OR 2 WOULD BE. ALL AGREED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND DEMANDS THAT THE COUNCIL MAKE A DECISION AND ADOPT A RESOLUTION BY TOMORROW, FRIDAY, 15 APRIL.

9. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, A WORKING GROUP OF THE COUNCIL HAMMERED OUT LANGUAGE FOR A RESOLUTION, LEAVING ASIDE THE MOST-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE FUTURE MANDATE AND SIZE OF UNAMIR. A FEW BRACKETED ALTERNATIVES REMAIN IN THE TEXT, WHICH WILL BE SORTED OUT TOMORROW AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

10. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SC INFORMALS, THE PRESIDENT OF

DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15

THE COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE AND NIGERIA, WORKED OUT AN ADDITION TO THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD MEET AMERICAN CONCERNS. THE TEXT WOULD CLEARLY LAY OUT THE 5-DAY ULTIMATUM, AND PUT OFF ANY DECISION ON THE TWO OPTIONS UNTIL LATER.

11. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW, KEY OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS:

-- DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

-- DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN A RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA

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ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.
-- FURTHER DECIDES THAT, IF WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, THE COUNCIL WILL RECONSIDER THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA.
END TEXT.
12. COMMENT: THESE PARAGRAPHS WILL NOT ACTUALLY COMMIT THE USG TO MUCH, SINCE "ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS" MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SMALL POLITICAL PRESENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THREAT OF PULLING OUT IS IMPLIED BY "RECONSIDERTHE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR". THIS SEEMS A GOOD COMPROMISE FOR NOW. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, WILL EXERT PRESSURE, IF THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE IN 5 DAYS, TO ACCEPT A LARGE UNAMIR PRESENCE. END COMMENT.
13. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION: (NON-AGREED LANGUAGE WITHIN DOUBLE PARENTHESES):
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
NOTING ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994 WITH A SIX-WEEK REVIEW PROVISION ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN ESTABLISHING THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT.
RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) WHICH, INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGED ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IT FULLY,
STRESSING THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA,
EXPRESSING DEEP REGRET AT THE FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE,
WELCOMING THE INITIATIVES OF THE LATE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI TO WORK TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN THEIR COUNTRIES THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN COLLABORATION WITH REGIONAL LEADERS.
SHOCKED AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI ON 6 APRIL 1994,
APPALLED AT THE ENSUING LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE DISPLACEMENT OP A SIGNIFICANT NUNBER OF THE RWANDESE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
POPULATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES,

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DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CONTINUING FIGHTING, LOOTING, BANDITRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI,
EXPRESSING ITS DEEP CONCERN ALSO FOR THE SAPETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL, AND PERSONNEL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN DISTRIBUTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.
((DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY,))
-- 1. EXPRESSES REGRET AT THE TRAGIC INCIDENT IN WHICH THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI LOST THEIR LIVES, AND REITERATES ITS INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS REQUESTED IN ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 1994;
-- 2. EXPRESSES REGRET ALSO AT THE ENSUING VIOLENCE WHICH HAS CLAIMED THE LIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER, CABINET MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THOUSANDS OF OTHER CIVILIANS;
-- 3. CONDEMNS THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI, WHICH ENDANGERS THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;
-- 4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS AGAINST UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL LEADING TO THE DEATHS OF AND INJURY TO SEVERAL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND CALLS UPON ALL CONCERNED TO PUT AN END TO THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TO RESPECT FULLY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;
-- 5. CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE WHICH ARE ENGULFING RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION, ((DEMANDS THAT THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE)) AND THAT BOTH PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD BY THEM BEFORE THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES;
-- 6. COMMENDS THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OF THE FORCE COMMANDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST RESOLUTION OF THE RWANDAN CRISIS;
-- 7. ((DECIDES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA, TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR AND TO REVISE ITS MANDATE TO ENABLE IT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;)) (COMMENT: THE THREE NEW PARAGRAPHS WORKED OUT BETWEEN FRANCE, NIGERIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD APPEAR HERE. END CONMENT)
-- 8. REITERATES THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND INVITES THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD;
-- ((9. URGES ALL COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF OHE REGION, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA;))
-- ((9 ALTERNATIVE. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES, IN PARTICULAR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, ACTING INDIVIDUALLY OR THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CRISIS IN RWANDA;))

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-- 10. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES IN RWANDA ((IN PARTICULAR
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT)) TO RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT
TO ((THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA ON THE BASIS OF)) THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001581
DEPT FOR IO-DAS WARD, ALSO RWANDA TASK FORCE;
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: TFRWOL: UN RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ACTED UPON 4/15
ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT, AND TO ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF A
MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM;
-- 11. CALLS ALSO UPON THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE FULLY
IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO ALL IN NEED THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND IN THIS
REGARD, APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO
PROVIDE INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COMMENSURATE
WITH THE SCALE OF THE HUMAN TRAGEDY IN RWANDA;
-- 12. AFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;
-- 13. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE TO
MONITOR THE EVENTS IN RWANDA AND TO REPORT FULLY TO THE
COUNCIL ON THE EVOLVING SITUATION AND AT LEAST NOT LATER
THAN FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-- 14. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
11. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROVIDE
GUIDANCE ON ABOVE TEXT BEFORE 11:30 AM APRIL 15.
ALBRIGHT
NNNN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Apr-1994 00:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
MOZENA@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

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RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1137
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0376
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0192
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0455
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0356
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RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0172
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RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001682
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE SYG DID NOT HAVE A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES, THAT 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNAMIR TROOPS WERE EVACUATED TO NAIROBI. ALSO 237 GHANAIANS WERE MOVED FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI AND THAT THE REST WOULD MOVE TODAY. NIGERIA REPORTED ON EFFORTS BY UGANDA AND THE OAU TO SEEK A CEASEFIRE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS GHAREKHAN REPORTED THE AIRPORT WAS OPERATIONAL BUT NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEW SHELLING OR PROPAGANDA AGAINST UNAMIR TROOPS. GHAREKHAN HOPED THE SYG REPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TOMORROW BUT WOULD NOT PROMISE. A NUMBER OF NEMBERS STRESSED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TO TAKE ACTION ON RWANDA BEFORE THE WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

WHEN IS A REPORT NOT A REPORT

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
3. AT INFORMALS ON APRIL 20 THE COUNCIL DISCUSSED RWANDA. U/SYG GHAREKHAN BEGAN BY ANNOUNCING THAT CONTRARY TO HIS STATENENT TO THE COUNCIL THE DAY BEFORE, THE SECRETARIAT DID NOT HAVE A REPORT FRON THE SYG ON FUTURE OPTIONS. HE THEN GAVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT FIGHTING HAD BEEN INTENSE ON TUESDAY BUT SLACKED OFF IN THE AFTERNOON. THIS ALLOWED THE ICRC TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED FROM THE STADIUM TO THE HOSPITAL. THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT THE STADIUN WAS NOW PLACED AT 40. THERE WAS ALSO FIGHTING AROUND THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL NORTHWEST OF KIGALI. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD LEFT AND AN ADDITIONAL 264 NON-ESSENTIAL UNANIR TROOPS HAD BEEN EVACUATED TO NAIROBI LEAVING A FORCE LEVEL OF 1707. 237 GHANAIAN TROOPS OF UNAMIR HAD BEEN NOVED FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI ON TUESDAY AND THE REMAINING 87 WERE EXPECTED TO GO TO KIGALI WEDNESDAY.
4. NIGERIA PERM REP GAMBARI GAVE THE COUNCIL SOME INFORMATION ON THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE SAID THERE WAS A NEETING IN KANPALA WHERE UGANDA'S PRESIDENT TRIED TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND THERE WAS TO BE ANOTHER NEETING TONORROW; ALSO THAT LEADERS OF THE REGION HAD AGREED TO MEET IN ARUSHA ON SATURDAY. THE SYG OF THE OAU HAD CONTACTED REGIONAL LEADERS TO COOPERATE ON A COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GANBARI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL COULD RETURN QUICKLY TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA AFTER THE SYG'S REPORT WAS RECEIVED.

MORE QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

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5. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL QUESTIONED GHAREKHAN SEEKING MORE INFORMATION. BRAZIL ASKED IF THE 264 NON-ESSENTIAL WERE ALL OR MIGHT MORE LEAVE, SAYING THEY HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT 500 UNAMIR TROOPS WERE LEAVING. GHAREKHAN SAID THE REPORT OF 500 WAS NOT TRUE, BUT MORE TROOPS MIGHT LEAVE DEPENDING ON THE DECISIONS OF TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND WHAT DECISIONS THE COUNCIL TOOK. ARGENTINA EXPRESSED SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT, ANY SHELLING OF UN FORCES AND ANY REPORTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH SIDES TOWARDS THE UN TROOPS PARTICULARLY ANY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. GHAREKHAN RESPONDED THAT UNAMIR TROOPS WERE AT THE AIRPORT WHICH WAS STILL OPERATIONAL ALTHOUGH NO CIVILIAN FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING NOW. UNAMIR DID NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD ARRANGE FOR THE AIRPORT TO BE CONSIDERED NEUTRAL. ALSO THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER ATTACKS ON UNAMIR AND NO DELIBERATE HOSTILITY OR PROPAGANDA TOWARDS THEM.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001682
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND MOZENA;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA DISCUSSED IN SECURITY COUNCIL, APRIL 20

ACTION BY FRIDAY, THE CALL
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6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY SPAIN GHAREKHAN SAID HE "HOPED" THE REPORT WOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THURSDAY BUT COULD NOT PROMISE THAT. THIS REVELATION PRODDED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO STRESS THE NEED NOT TO GO INTO THE WEEKEND WITHOUT ACTING. UK AMB HANNAY SAID THAT WHILE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS HOLD THE ULTIMATE POWER TO DECIDE IF TROOPS WOULD REMAIN, THE COUNCIL SHOULD TRY TO STAY ONE JUMP AHEAD OF THEM. HE SAID IT WAS BETTER TO RATIONALLY DECIDE TO DOWNSIZE THE MISSION THAN HAVE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS DO IT FOR THE COUNCIL. HANNAY CONCLUDED THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO DECIDE SOON, WE "CAN'T RETIRE FOR THE WEEKEND WITHOUT TAKING ACTION."



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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

9. THE PRESIDENT SAID IF THE SYG REPORT ON RWANDA CAME OUT ON THURSDAY HE WOULD TRY TO ADJUST THE SCHEDULE OF WORK TO ALLOW AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IF NOT HE WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS RWANDA ON FRIDAY.
ALBRIGHT
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Apr-1994 00:02 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA

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PRT: SIT(C2)
SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG SUM SUM2 VAX
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0194
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0378
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0187
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1139
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0174
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SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN NEW YORK 001684
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;

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PER E. O. 13526

2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SYG RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN AMB ALBRIGHT MET WITH SYG BOUTROS-GHALI ON A RANGE OF SUBJECTS (SEPTEL) APRIL 20, INCLUDING RWANDA. BBG TOLD ALBRIGHT OF HIS DILEMMA:

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

UN TROOPS MAY HELP TO DEFUSE TENSIONS. ALSO, IF A CEASE-FIRE IS AGREED, THE RWANDANS WILL NEED TROOPS IN PLACE TO ENSURE THE CEASE-FIRE'S IMPLEMENTATION. THE OAU IS TRYING TO STAGE TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. BBG DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A MASSACRE OF UN TROOPS, ALTHOUGH THE RISKS TO THE FORCES MAY INCREASE IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED. BBG WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE OPERATION IN RWANDA ONE LAST TRY. IT WOULD BE AN EASY THING FOR HIM TO DECIDE TO PULL OUT, BUT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIFTY THOUSAND ADDITIONAL DEATHS IN RWANDA.
3. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REMARKED THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE UN TROOPS. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED BBG'S DILEMMA, AND PROMISED TO REPORT HIS REMARKS TO WASHINGTON.
ALBRIGHT
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SECTION: 01 OF 01
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Susan

INR

Intelligence Assessment

United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR foreign affairs brief

Roots of the Violence in Rwanda and Burundi

Social and political domination of Rwanda and Burundi by the Tutsi ethnic group—which historically constituted 14 percent of the population in Rwanda and Burundi—appears not to have been questioned or effectively challenged by the Hutu majority until shortly before independence in 1962. The Tutsis lost control of Rwanda to the Hutu majority before independence, but they continued to hold all political and military power in Burundi until the election last year of a Hutu government. Ethnic competition for state power in both countries has stimulated several surges of intense ethnic violence since 1959, but there is no cogent thesis to explain the sheer savagery that characterizes the ongoing massacres.

* * *

The ethnic dimension

Tutsi pastoralists more than 500 years ago settled among, and came to dominate, Hutu agriculturalists inhabiting the region. By the time Europeans arrived in the late 19th century, Rwanda was a centralized Tutsi-led kingdom while Burundi was a state of loosely linked principalities led by a Tutsi subcaste. In both countries, Hutus and Tutsis had come to share a culture and language, and ethnicity was often synonymous with caste. Also in both states, Tutsi cattle owners generally had more power and wealth and dominated their Hutu peasant clients. But intermarriage sometimes occurred, and a process even existed by which rich Hutus could be recognized as Tutsis. Tutsi rule was most accepted where it was strongest, in southern and central Rwanda and in most of Burundi. The Rwandan Tutsi monarchy was most resented in northern Rwanda—where its rule was weakest and local people divided themselves into coequal functional castes of Hutu farmers and Tutsi herders.

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Colonial experience

Germany in 1899 imposed a joint protectorate over Rwanda and Burundi. Germany and later Belgium reinforced Tutsi dominance—and Hutu consciousness of social inferiority. Tutsis, who were seen as "superior," were favored with educational and job opportunities. All Rwandans and Burundians carried identity cards stating their ethnicity, heightening ethnic awareness and limiting social mobility.

Rwanda's Hutu revolution

In 1959, Hutu-Tutsi strife in Rwanda prompted Belgian concessions to nascent pro-Hutu political parties. Hutu victories in local elections and anti-Tutsi violence caused the king to flee into exile in 1960. From 1959 to 1964, 20,000 people, mostly Tutsis, were killed and more than 150,000—perhaps 40 percent of Rwandan Tutsis—went into exile.

Following Rwanda's independence in 1962, the Hutu government increasingly became dominated by southerners. Massacres of Hutus in 1972 in Tutsi-led Burundi heightened ethnic tensions in Rwanda. In 1973 Maj. Juvenal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu, seized power in Rwanda and established a one-party state. Despite close links to anti-Tutsi northern Hutus, Habyarimana took a fairly moderate stand on ethnic relations. He presided over a period of relative social peace and economic development, though opponents accused him of favoring the north and murdering his enemies. In 1990, Habyarimana initiated reforms leading to political pluralism and agreed to a gradual return of Tutsi refugees.

RPF invasion

The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda in October 1990. Led by Tutsi refugees who had fled to Uganda and served with President Museveni in Uganda's 1980-86 civil war, the RPF could not force an Army collapse or a popular revolt. But neither could Habyarimana defeat the RPF. Encouraged by the international community, by early 1992 Habyarimana included in his government increasingly vocal political opponents who shared with the RPF a desire to limit his power. They took the lead in negotiating the August 1993 Arusha accords, where Habyarimana agreed reluctantly to end the civil war by ceding substantial power to the RPF and internal opposition parties.

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As the RPF and other parties increased their strength, northern Hutus with close ties to Habyarimana organized militias to defend the President and their privileges. Their fears of a return of Tutsi domination increased after the October 1993 assassination by Tutsi soldiers of Burundi's first popularly elected President, a Hutu,, and tensions continued to rise when party maneuverings in early 1994 delayed installation of the transitional government called for in the Arusha accords.

Rwanda's collapse

Rwanda's Hutu militias and some Army units, including the Presidential Guard, appeared to lead the organized murders of moderate Hutu politicians (thought to be insufficiently anti-RPF) and of Tutsis in the first hours after the April 6 plane crash in which Habyarimana and Burundi President Ntyaramira were killed. The plan appears to have been to wipe out any RPF ally or potential ally, and thus raise the costs and limit the possibility of an RPF/Tutsi takeover. The killings instead stimulated the April 8 RPF invasion out of its northern enclave, which, in turn, stimulated more killings in subsequent days as Hutus—incited by militiamen and fearing that the RPF would kill them—massacred Tutsis. Apparently encouraged by northern Hutus, the anti-Tutsi killing has since spread southward into areas historically characterized by relatively peaceful ethnic relations. No end to the unprecedented bloodshed is yet in sight.

Burundi

In Burundi, by contrast, Tutsis have kept control since independence. After toppling the monarchy in a 1966 coup, a succession of Tutsi military leaders headed the government. They presided over the massacre of perhaps 200,000 Hutus in 1972 and 10,000 more in 1988, but later launched reforms allowing multiparty elections that brought a Hutu President and Hutu-majority parliament into office in July 1993. But Tutsis continued to dominate the military after the election—and some staged an October 1993 coup attempt that killed the newly elected President and sparked a cycle of violence that killed 30,000-100,000 Hutus and Tutsis. The Tutsi military has since demonstrated that it retains effective veto power over Burundi politics, but Tutsi officers and Hutu politicians are trying to work out mutually satisfactory governing arrangements to avoid new bloodshed.

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<TO>RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6063
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0202
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0206
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0480
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0395
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1156
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0186
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0377
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0933
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4891
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

<SUBJ>NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
REF: A) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/28, B) USUN/DEPT FAX 4/29, C)
STATE 112362, D) STATE 112320
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ACTION REQUEST: SEE PARA 14 FOR A LIST OF THE
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WASHINGTON MUST ADDRESS MOST URGENTLY.
3. SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET APRIL 28 AND 29
TO DISCUSS WHAT TO DO ABOUT RWANDA. THE CZECHS PUT
FORWARD A DRAFT STATEMENT BLAMING THE GOR FOR GENOCIDE
(REF A). THIS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY TONED DOWN, AND OTHER
ELEMENTS WERE ADDED (REF B). DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE
AT 4 PM APRIL 29 ON THAT TEXT. SOME MEMBERS (FRANCE,
DJIBOUTI, CHINA) ARE OPPOSED TO A STATEMENT AND TO
POINTING THE FINGER AT THE GOR. THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT
WANTS TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT APRIL 29, AS THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE COUNCIL PASSES FROM NEW ZEALAND TO NIGERIA ON MAY
1, AND MOMENTUM WILL BE LOST DURING THE SWITCH.
4. SUMMARY CONTINUED: THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE UN IS
SETTING UP A "CONTACT GROUP" TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE
ACTIONS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE OAU MIGHT SEND A
CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS TO RWANDA, IF THEY COULD
GET FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THEY ALSO SUGGEST A
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI. THE IDEA OF AN ARMS
EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT,
BUT QUESTIONS OF HOW TO ENFORCE IT AROSE. END SUMMARY.
DRAFT STATEMENT
5. THE COUNCIL HELD DISCUSSIONS THURSDAY AFTERNOON AND
FRIDAY MORNING ON A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR RWANDA, AND WILL
CONTINUE FRIDAY AFTERNOON. THE FIRST TWO DRAFTS WERE

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FAXED TO IO/UNP, IO/PHO AND AF/C (REFS A AND B).
SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS WILL BE FAXED TO DEPT, AND FINAL TEXT
(IF ANY) WILL BE CABLED TO ALL ADDRESSEES. THERE IS A
GOOD DEAL OF CONTROVERSY ABOUT WHETHER, AND TO WHAT
EXTENT, TO ATTRIBUTE BLAME TO RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES
FOR THE MASSACRES AGAINST CIVILIANS. IF A COMPROMISE ON
THIS POINT CANNOT BE REACHED, THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MIGHT
BE SCUTTLED. SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED REWORKING
THE STATEMENT INTO A RESOLUTION. (COMMENT: STATEMENTS
CAN ONLY BE ISSUED WITH THE CONSENSUS OF THE COUNCIL.
RWANDA, AS A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, ALONG WITH FRANCE,
ITS PATRON, CAN BLOCK CONSENSUS. A RESOLUTION REQUIRES
A VOTE. RWANDA WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN,
REVEALING ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION. FRANCE WOULD LIKELY
BE SHAMED INTO VOTING IN FAVOR OF A RESOLUTION. END
COMMENT.) THE ARMS EMBARGO PARAGRAPH WILL PROBABLY BE
STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE AN IMMEDIATE CALL ON ALL PARTIES
TO REFRAIN FROM ARMS TRANSFERS TO RWANDA. THE RWANDAN
PERMREP, AMB BIZIMANA, SPOKE UP IN APRIL 29
CONSULTATIONS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DAYS, TO ARGUE
AGAINST BLAMING THE RGF FOR CIVILIAN MASSACRES AND
AGAINST AN ARMS EMBARGO.
AFRICAN IDEAS
6. IN APRIL 28 INFORMALS, NIGERIAN AMB. GAMBARI RELAYED
THAT THE REGIONAL AFRICA GROUP AT THE UN HELD A MEETING
THAT MORNING, AND SUPPORTED SEVERAL STEPS THAT COULD BE
TAKEN ON RWANDA. A) THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THE OAU
DEPLOYMENT OF A MIXED CONTINGENT OF POLICE AND TROOPS.
NIGERIA POINTED OUT THAT ANY SUCH OAU DEPLOYMENT WOULD
REQUIRE OUTSIDE SUPPORT, SINCE THE OAU HAS FEW
RESOURCES. B) BURUNDI IS TENSE, AND THEY RECOMMEND A
PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT, AS WAS DONE IN MACEDONIA. C)
THEY RECOMMEND AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE OAU CENTRAL
MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CMCR) AT THE FONMIN
LEVEL. D) THEY SUGGEST THE OAU CMCR COORDINATE THE
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF REGIONAL LEADERS. E) THEY AGREE
A CEASEFIRE IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY, SINCE IT WOULD
CREATE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR A HALT TO THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29
SLAUGHTER AND A RETURN TO LAW AND ORDER. F) THEY WILL
SET UP A SMALL "CONTACT GROUP" IN NEW YORK TO EXPLORE
FURTHER ISSUES.
7. GAMBARI ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF FIGHTING IN RWANDA. ONE WAS THE MILITARY
HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE RGF AND THE RPF, WHICH COULD BE
ADDRESSED THROUGH AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE. THE OTHER WAS
THE SLAUGHTER OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, WHICH WOULD NOT BE
AFFECTED BY A CEASEFIRE. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE
ALSO NEEDED COUNCIL ATTENTION. ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONED
DURING THE COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR
INFORMED USUN POLOFF THAT THEY WOULD LIKE A FULL-SCALE,
FORMAL SC DEBATE INVOLVING AFRICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN
MINISTERS, ON THE ISSUE OF RWANDA, SIMILAR TO THE RECENT

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EXTENDED DEBATE ON BOSNIA.
REACTIONS
8. USUN DEPUTY PERMREP WALKER FOLLOWED UP ON SOME OF THESE IDEAS APRIL 29. WALKER INQUIRED WHETHER A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT IN BURUNDI WOULD BE AN EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING OAU FORCE OF 47 MEN, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE A SEPARATE UN FORCE. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE GOB'S OBJECTION TO A LARGER FORCE HAS BEEN REMOVED. NIGERIAN AMB. GAMBARI IMPLIED THAT THE "CONTACT GROUP" MEETING LATER APRIL 29 WOULD LOOK INTO THAT QUESTION. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, NIGERIAN COUNSELOR INDICATED THAT THEY HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE GOB TO SEE IF PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE THIS QUESTION IMMEDIATELY. HE ALSO CLARIFIED THAT AN AFRICAN DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS AND POLICE TO RWANDA TO PROTECT POCKETS OF CIVILIANS AND HELP RESTORE LAW AND ORDER WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNDER UNAMIR AUSPICES. THEREFORE NO REDEFINITION OF UNAMIR'S MANDATE WOULD BE REQUIRED.
9. RUSSIAN AMB. VORONTSOV STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE "TIMID LITTLE STEPS" THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN SO FAR. HE POINTEDLY MENTIONED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS PREPARED TO GO SO FAR AS TO USE AIR POWER TO PROTECT CIVILIANS IN ONE REGION, WHEREAS IT DID NOTHING IN ANOTHER. HE LAMENTED THAT NO COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL ACTION TO STOP THE SLAUGHTER WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED. SPANISH AMB. BAR NUEVO SUGGESTED THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD BE COMPILING INFORMATION SYSTEMATICALLY ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW. CZECH PERMREP SAID HE SPOKE WITH UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHT AYALA LASSO APRIL 28, AND THAT HCHR WAS FOCUSSING ON RWANDA. OMAN RECOMMENDED SETTING UP SAFE AREAS FOR CIVILIANS. THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY THAT WHATEVER EFFORTS WERE MADE BY THE UN, THE OAU, AND VARIOUS REGIONAL LEADERS NEEDED TO BE BETTER COORDINATED.
ARMS SHIPMENTS
10. POLOFF MENTIONED THE POINTS IN REF C TO UN DPKO OFFICIALS AND FRENCH POLOFF. 1!3(9 9!!8:8-) 48;349 -8$ #3 297)$ 3,34&8"3 7,9.74, ON THE UGANDA BORDER, TO INVESTIGATE. FRENCH POLOFF SAID FRENCH AMBASSADOR MERIMEE HAD QUERIED PARIS ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF FRENCH ARMS SALES TO RWANDA. PARIS UNEQUIVOCALLY DENIED HAVING SOLD "A SINGLE BULLET" TO RWANDA DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS, SINCE 1990.
MEETING WITH RPF
11. AMB WALKER MET APRIL 28 WITH RPF NEW YORK REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE DUSAIDI, AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. DUSAIDI THANKED THE USG FOR ALL THE ASSISTANCE IT HAS GIVEN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT. HE NOTED THAT THE CURRENT CONFLICT HAS TWO DIMENSIONS: A) THE MILITARY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RGF AND RPF WHICH HAS RESULTED IN INSIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, AND B)
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001817
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON RWANDA - APRIL 29

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THE RGF MASSACRES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE, FOCUSING ONLY ON THE FIRST DIMENSION, SINCE INNOCENT CIVILIANS WOULD NOT BE SAVED BY A CEASEFIRE. HE TERMED THE KILLINGS "GENOCIDE", AND INDICATED THAT THE RPF KNEW THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. (COMMENT: THE RPF HAS ALREADY CONVEYED THAT INFORMATION TO UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AYALA LASSO. END COMMENT) DUSAIDI ASKED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO CONDEMN THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES BY NAME AND TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION. HE REALIZED THIS COULD BE TIME-CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT, BUT STRESSED THAT GENOCIDE SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED WITH IMPUNITY.

12. DUSAIDI RELAYED THAT THE RPF SUPPORTS AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT KEEP MACHETES OUT, AND MIGHT NOT BE VERY EFFECTIVE AGAINST OTHER WEAPONS EITHER. NEVERTHELESS, AN ARMS EMBARGO IS LONG OVERDUE. AREAS SUCH AS THE STADIUMS, HOTELS AND CHURCHES WERE CIVILIANS WERE HIDING SHOULD BE DECLARED UN SAFE AREAS, AND THOSE CIVILIANS PROTECTED. FINALLY, THE RPF WOULD PREFER A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO A STATEMENT. AMB WALKER INFORMED DUSAIDI THAT THE USG WAS CALLING ON GOR OFFICIALS TO BRING AN END TO MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS, AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE. DUSAIDI EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE RPF, AFTER DECLARING A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE IN ARUSHA EVEN THOUGH THEIR INTERLOCUTORS DID NOT SHOW UP, TO DECLARE ANOTHER CEASEFIRE. ON APRIL 30, DUSAIDI ADVISED POLOFF THAT THE RPF WOULD CALL FOR SRSG BOOH-BOOH'S RECALL. THEY FIND BOOH-BOOH TO BE PARTIAL TO THE GOR. HOWEVER, THEY ARE PLEASED WITH FORCE COMMANDER GEN. DALLAIRE.

13. REF D CONTAINED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED WITH GOR OFFICIALS VISITING PARIS. USUN COULD MAKE THE SAME POINTS TO RWANDA PERMREP BIZIMANA IN NEW YORK, WHO APPEARS TO BE PARROTING THE EXTREMIST HUTU POSITION, BUT WHO ACTS AS THOUGH HE IS REMOVED FROM THE EVENTS IN HIS COUNTRY.

ISSUES FOR FOLLOW-UP

14. THE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY GROUP MIGHT WISH TO FOCUS SOME OF ITS DISCUSSIONS ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY NEED ANSWERS IN NEW YORK:

-- DOES THE POLITICAL WILL EXIST IN WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE RESOURCES FOR AFRICAN TROOPS WHICH THE OAU MIGHT DEPLOY TO RWANDA?

-- SHOULD SAFE AREAS BE DECLARED FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS? IF SO, DO WE APPROVE OF AN OAU FORCE PROTECTING THOSE SAFE AREAS7

-- DOES THE POLITICAL WILL EXIST TO PUT SOME TEETH INTO AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA (E.G. AUTHORIZING OAU-PROVIDED BOATS, IF SUCH MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE, TO PATROL LAKE KIVU AND INTERDICT SUSPECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS, OR AUTHORIZING OAU PATROLS OF THE ZAIRE-RWANDA BORDER)?

-- IS THE USG IN FAVOR OF A PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF 100-200 TROOPS TO BURUNDI? DOES THE USG PREFER EXPANDING THE OAU FORCE TO ESTABLISHING A UN FORCE?

-- HOW FAR DOES THE USG WISH TO GO IN ADVOCATING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY/UN IDENTIFY AND PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES?

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

RWANDA/BURUNDI SITREP, MAY 4

SITUATION ON THE GROUND

- There was very heavy fighting in Kigali yesterday, but it is calmer tonight. One UN soldier was injured at the airport by mortar fire. Yesterday's Mille Colline convoy was blocked after radio RTLM told the people to go out on the street and prevent it from leaving. 350 orphans yesterday were evacuated to Goma from Gysenyi. There are still 5,000 refugees in Cyangugu stadium; local authorities are blocking ICRC efforts to reach them from Bukavu. (TelCon AFC/GOR Gen Rusatira)(C)

- According to UNAMIR, the UN-escorted refugee convoy from the Milles Collines hotel yesterday returned to the hotel after a standoff with GOR forces. Five people in the convoy were injured. No further attempts to leave will be made for a day or two. (Telcon AFC/UNForce commander's office-Kigali)(LOU)

- The GOR today said the Milles Collines convoy had not been allowed to pass because of administrative problems and because the people would not allow it to pass. After the Kigali Prefet and the Rwandan military intervened, the convoy was allowed to return to the hotel. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army said the convoy could try again today. (GOR FAX)

- A Rwandan today told his AmCit spouse the market in Kigali was open and he was able to move freely. Potatoes are available, suggesting the road to the north is open. (AFC/AmCit Telcon)(LOU)

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

- The Rwandan Interim Government and the RPF are in Arusha. Proximity discussions have been held, but direct talks have not yet begun. The GOT tabled a ceasefire proposal; neither side has responded. Some of the observers are planning to leave Arusha. (AFC/De Vos TelCon)(LOU)

- Boutros-Ghali, following talks with several African heads of state, yesterday told Ambassador Albright there is not a lot of interest in an ECOMOG style UN/OAU peacekeeping operation in Rwanda and, if it lacked support, he would turn back to the security council. (USUN 01880)(C)

- The Security Council yesterday discussed Rwanda. Sentiment ran in favor of an arms embargo and humanitarian action, but no action will be taken until after results from the Arusha talks are known.

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NRA — UNOMUR
Virus Recruited Ugandans
TODO - Kigali — No apparent end to violence

- French Ambassador to Rwanda Marlaud will meet with Tanzanian President Mwinyi, then visit other countries in the region. The GOF has little faith in the OAU and only slightly more in the UN to find rapid, durable solutions leading to a ceasefire and resumed negotiations; therefore, Marlaud is to encourage, prod, and assist the neighboring states to develop a regional solution to the crisis. (Paris 12197)(C)

- RPF Commander Kagame on May 1 told DAS Bushnell the impending UNHCR visit may be the most effective mechanism to halt the massacres he says are continuing in GOR controlled territory, suggesting the International Community send a strong message to the GOR leadership that they cannot continue to "kill with impunity". He said a UN/OAU or OAU intervention force to protect refugees was also acceptable. He confirmed fighting continued in Kigali, reiterated the RPF was keeping the Tanzania border open, and pledged to safeguard the lives of Rwandans and relief workers in RPF controlled areas. (SecState 115709)(C)

- The RPF on May 3 called for UNSER Booh-Booh to be replaced, blaming his presence for jeopardizing the establishment of and decisions made by the "Crisis Committee set up in Kigali on April 6. The RPF rejected UN intervention, which "would do nothing more than enable the members of the Presidential guard and...FAR to go unpunished for their crimes". (Radio Muhabura FBIS BR030532)(U)

- Murigande, RPF representative in Washington, confirmed today that a UN/OAU interpostion force to impose a ceasefire and instruct the RPF to negotiate with killers is unacceptable, but if the force was used to stop the murders that would be acceptable., The RPF wants the international community to hold GOR "killers" responsible. if a force would give them a way out or a future role in Rwandan politics, the RPF will oppose.

HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS

- France's initial humanitarian effort includes 40 tons of material flown to Bujumbura. The GOF intends to purchase foodstuffs in the region and keep one plane in the region for use of UN and French NGO's. (Paris 12197)(C) lan

- The UNHCR yesterday asked USMission Geneva if the United States can provide an in-kind contribution for the airlift of plastic sheeting and blankets from Turkey to Tanzania. Canadian C-130 flights into Kigali have been extended until May 8. (Geneva 04175)(U)

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- The ICRC yesterday said 21 children and 13 Rwandese Red Cross Volunteers on May 1 were killed in an attack on an orphanage in Butare. The Rwanda/Burundi emergency unit of the UNHCR estimates there are 304,000 Rwandan refugees from the current conflict and 208,000 Burundi refugees. 188,000 Burundian refugees have returned to Burundi since last January. (USMission Geneva 04176)(U)

BURUNDI

- Bujumbura and surrounding areas remain relatively calm. Kamenge residents are returning to their residences, but Kinama is said to be relatively empty; many of its residents reportedly moved to other neighborhoods or went as far as Uvira, Zaire. The number of Rwandan refugees in Burundi has reportedly jumped since last weekend from 37,000 to about 50,000. (Burundi SitRep 16, Bujumbura 1523)(Ø)

- Interim President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, in an interview with "La Libre Belgique", said reform of Burundi's army, as well as the police and administration, should not be dealt with solely in terms of "ethnic quotas", but rather on the basis of ideological, regional, and ethnic criteria so that they are representative, legal, and respectful of human rights. He also said the United Nations has abdicated its responsibilities, "setting up a human rights commission and at the same time showiing that it is incapable of guaranteeing even the very first of these rights, the right to live". He called for the presence in Burundi of UN civil authorities to serve as a base from which the democratic process could be observed and monitored.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
05/05/94 6-7937 SEPKA 446
IO:DBENNET

SPC:JDOBBINS
JCS:AMACKE
PM/ISP:TGRANT
NSC:

IO:GWARD
IO/UNP:SZELLE
AF:PBUSHNELL
OSD:FWISNER

AF, IO, PM, HA, INR, P

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC, UN SE, BRUSSELS, BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, YAOUNDE
DAR SHOULD PASS TO A/S SHATTUCK AND AMB. RAWSON
YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE

REF: USUN 1898

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. SHOULD WE DECIDE TO SUPPORT ANY PKO

2. IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST REFTEL, USUN SHOULD ADVISE THE UN SECRETARIAT THAT WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT A MORE LIMITED MISSION FOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WHETHER UN OR OAU OR A COMBINATION OF THE TWO, MAKES MORE SENSE THAN THE ONE THE UN APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND. THE UN SEEMS TO ENVISION A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONTROL OF KIGALI, CONTROL OF COMMUNICATION LINKS OUT OF KIGALI, AND MOVEMENTS ACROSS BATTLE LINES. IT APPEARS TO US THAT SUCH AN EXTENSIVE OPERATION IS BEYOND THE LIKELY CAPABILITY OF SUCH A FORCE TO HANDLE.

3. IN OUR VIEW, A UN AND/OR OAU FORCE OPERATING OUT OF NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES INTO BORDER AREAS TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WOULD BE MORE FEASIBLE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
05/05/94 6-7937 SEPKA 446
IO:DBENNET

SPC:JDOBBINS
JCS:AMACKE
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NSC:
IO:GWARD
IO/UNP:SZELLE
AF:PBUSHNELL
OSD:FWISNER

AF, IO, PM, HA, INR, P

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC, UN SE, BRUSSELS, BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, YAOUNDE
DAR SHOULD PASS TO A/S SHATTUCK AND AMB. RAWSON
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE

REF: USUN 1898

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3. IN OUR VIEW, A UN AND/OR OAU FORCE OPERATING OUT OF NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES INTO BORDER AREAS TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WOULD BE MORE FEASIBLE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

BOTH FORCES. EVEN IF DONE WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF THE WARRING PARTIES, HOWEVER, SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED THAN A FORCE BASED IN THE CAPITAL. THE NEEDED FORCE IN OUR JUDGMENT COULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE ONE ENVISIONED BY THE UN.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN DETAIL UNTIL A CLEARER CONCEPT OF OPERATION IS DEVELOPED. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO JOIN OTHERS IN SUPPORTING A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RWANDA. IF IT IS AN ASSESSED UN OPERATION, THE PROCESS OF REQUESTING U.S. ASSISTANCE IS STRAIGHT FORWARD: THE UN WOULD REQUEST SERVICES FROM US FOR WHICH WE WOULD BE REIMBURSED AND WE WOULD PAY OUR SHARE OF ASSESSED COSTS. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PROVIDING AIRLIFT AND SOME EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING APC'S. IF THE FORCE WERE TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE OAU OR OTHERWISE DEPENDENT UPON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, THE NEED FOR A CLEAR AND AGREED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WOULD BE EVEN MORE ESSENTIAL. YY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

05-May-1994 21:55 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB
BEERS@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG

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PRT: STEINBERG SIT
SIT: BEERS CLARKER RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VAX
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6245
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0507
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0394
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0955
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1666
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0418
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1176
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4961
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0221
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0201
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RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001926

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. COUNCIL ACTION: THE SC DISCUSSED RWANDA AGAIN THUSSDAY, MAY 5. THE COUNCIL WANTS TO ATTEMPT TO BREAK OUT OF THE "CHICKEN AND EGG" CYCLE OF SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE SYG TO THE COUNCIL AND BACK AGAIN, AND TO MOVE TOWARDS DECISIVE ACTION. THE SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO THE SYG, ASKING THE SYG TO SET OUT IN AN INFORMAL NON-PAPER A POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER DECISION THE SC MIGHT TAKE. A DRAFT LETTER WILL BE CIRCULATED FOR DISCUSSION FRIDAY. ALSO, THE NON-ALIGNED ARE WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HOPE TO TABLE EITHER FRIDAY OR MONDAY. US AND UK AMBASSADORS NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE PREMATURE TO WORK ON A RESOLUTION BEFORE WE KNEW WHAT THE SYG HAD IN MIND. MANY DELEGATIONS EMPHASIZED THAT HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY AT THIS TIME.
3. SECRETARIAT UPDATE: U/SYG GHAREKHAN GAVE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. UNAMIR HAS COME UNDER DELIBERATE ATTACK. ON MAY 3, THREE GHANAIANS WERE WOUNDED, TWO SERIOUSLY. ON MAY 4, ANOTHER GHANAIAN WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY FIGHTING AND SHELLING IN AND AROUND KIGALI, INCLUDING AROUND THE AIRPORT, UNAMIR HQ, AND THE STADIUM. THE RPF IS ADVANCING, ALTHOUGH MEETING SOME RESISTANCE. IN THE MORNING OF MAY 5 A UN AIRCRAFT CAME UNDER HEAVY MACHINE GUN FIR AFTER LANDING, CAUSING IT TO DEPART WITHOUT UNLOADING. IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING, A MORTAR FELL INTO THE LOADING AREA. GEN- DALLAIRE BELIEVES THE UN IS BEING DELIBERATELY TARGETED, ALTHOUGH THE SOURCE OF THE ATTACKS IS NOT CLEAR.
4. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE GOR WERE READY TO SIGN A CEASEFIRE IN ARUSHA, BUT THE RPF REFUSED. THE RPF CLAIMED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD BEEN OF NO HELP DURING THE MASSACRES, AND THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OAU, THE SRSG, AND TANZANIA WERE NO LONGER IMPARTIAL. THE RPF ACCUSED TANZANIA OF ALLOWING ARMS TO COME ACROSS ITS BORDERS FOR THE RGF. THE RPF DOES NOT WANTED TO BE ROBBED OF ITS VICTORY, WHICH IT SAYS IS VERY CLOSE, AT ARUSHA. AMB GAMBARI AMPLIFIED, ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONTACTS WITH ARUSHA. BOTH PARTIES HAD SEPARATELY COMMITED TO SIGNING A CF DOCUMENT. HOWEVER, WHEN THE RPF LEARNED THAT THE GOR WOULD SIGN A DOCUMENT SIMILAR TO THEIRS, THEY CHANGED THEIR MIND AT THE LAST MINUTE. THE RPF DID NOT WANT TO LEND LEGITIMACY TO THE GOR BY SIGNING SIMILAR DOCUMENTS.
5. GHAREKHAN CONVEYED THAT ON THE HUMANITARIAN FRONT,

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ICRC HAD DELIVERED FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE HOLY FAMILY CHURCH, THE ZAIRE EMBASSY, AND THE KING FAISAL HOSPITAL. 60,000 DISPLACED ARE IN A CAMP NEAR TANZANIA. DHA IS ATTEMPTING TO REMOVE SOME ORPHANS FROM A GRF-CONTROLLED AREA. THE ICRC HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GET ITS FOOD OUT OF ITS KIGALI WAREHOUSE. RED CROSS EMPLOYEES AND A NUMBER OF ORPHANS WERE BRUTALLY KILLED IN BUTARE ON MAY 3. SOME FOOD IS AVAILABLE FROM UGANDA FOR THE DISPLACED. WHILE THE MAIN ROADS ARE GOOD, THE SECONDARY ROADS CANNOT ACCOMODATE TRUCKS. UNHCR ESTIMATES OF REFUGEES ARE: 250,000 IN TANZANIA; 40,000 IN BURUNDI; 5,500 IN UGANDA; AND 8,300 IN ZAIRE. UNHCR WILL NEED USD 38.5 MILLION FOR
3 MONTHS FOR TANZANIA
ALONE, AND WILL ISSUE AN APPEAL SOON.
6. NUNS IN DANGER: USUN HAS BEEN CONTACTED ABOUT A NUMBER OF CATHOLIC NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED IN RWANDA. THE RPF REP ALSO APPROACHED USUN ON THEIR BEHALF. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE USG AND THE VATICAN CONTACT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AT A HIGH LEVEL, TO URGE THE GOF TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH RWANDAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOW
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001926
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC PRESIDENT WILL WRITE TO SYG
IN PARIS TO PERSUADE THEM TO ALLOW THE SAFE DEPARTURE OF THE NUNS. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE GOF HAD RECEIVED AND RECOGNIZED THESE RWANDAN OFFICIALS, THE CONTACT MIGHT AS WELL BE PUT TO SOME USE.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 04:47 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA

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AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2188
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7380
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1130
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 3777
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0108
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 3143
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0102
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0072
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2782
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 8803
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0044
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 2515
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7733
RUEIBS/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 1763
RUSNDNB/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
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UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003325
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL PROVIDED AMBASSADOR WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND UNSYG BOUTROS GHALI. IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS EXCHANGE THAT HE IS FOLLOWING UP ON HIS PROMISE TO A/S SHATTUCK TO CONTACT AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT PROVIDING TROOPS FOR AN EXPANDED UN FORCE IN RWANDA. WHAT IS ALSO CLEAR IS THAT THE TWO SECRETARY GENERAAS ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT ABOUT WHO SHOULD LEAD THE EFFORT, WITH BBG TALKING ABOUT REGIONAL EFFORTS, AND SALIM INSISTING ON THE UN RETAINING THE LEAD AND BUILDING ON THE EXISTING UN FORCE. (NOTE. SOMEONE HAD UNDERLINED THE NAMES OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES IN THE BOUTROS LETTER; WE SUSPECT THIS WAS DONE AT THE OAU, PROBABLY BY SALIM HIMSELF, AND PROBABLY INDICATES WHICH COUNTRIES HE WILL BE CONTACTING AND/OR WHICH HE BELIEVES ARE MOST LIKELY TO SAY YES: GHANA, NAMIBIA, SENEGAL, TANZANIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE).
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI TO SALIM SALIM:
2 MAY 1994
HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. SALIM AHMED SALRM
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
ADDIS ABABA
DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,
AS INDICATED IN MY LETTER OF 29 APRIL 1994 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A COPY OF WHICH IS ATTACHED FOR YOUR ATTENTION, THE SITUATION IN RWANDA HAS DETERIORATED OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS TO THE POINT THAT URGENT ACTION IS REQUIRED.
IT IS IN THAT CONTEXT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY AUTHORIZED ITS PRESIDENT TO ISSUE THE ATTACHED STATEMENT WHICH REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTER ALIA, "IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU, TO REPORT FURTHER ON ACTION WHICH MAY BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING IN THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN RWANDA AND IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS."
IN ORDER FOR ME TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTSWANA, CAMEROON, CAPE VERDE, COTE D'IVOIRE, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, GHANA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, KENYA, MALAWI, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, NAMIBIA, NIGERIA, SENEGAL, TANZANIA, TUNISIA, ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE TO APPEAL FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN THIS REGARD INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, AN INDICATION OF WHETHER THEIR COUNTRIES

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COULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO A REGIONAL EFFORT TO RESTORE
LAW AND ORDER IN RWANDA, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS AND FACILITATE THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO THEM.
I HAVE ALSO SAID IN MY LETTERS THAT WHEN I HAVE RECEIVED
REPLIES FROM THE LEADERS TO WHOM I HAVE WRITTEN I SHALL
BE READY TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT
CONSIDER WAYS THROUGH WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS COULD
ASSIST SUCH A REGIONAL EFFORT.
I LOOK FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH YOU, MR. SECRETARY-
GENERAL, IN THIS MATTER AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003325
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK
GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH FOLLOW-UP ACTION AS YOU DEEM
APPROPRIATE.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
END TEXT.
4. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM SALIM SALIM
TO BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI:
CAB/RWANDA/200.94
MAY 5, 1994
HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
SECRETARY GENERAL
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
NEW
YORK, N.Y. 10017
U S A
DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL,
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 2ND MAY 1994 IN
WHICH YOU INFORMED ME OF THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE DEPLOYED
WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING IN THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND
ORDER IN RWANDA, PROVIDING SECURITY FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS AND FACILITATING THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO THEM.
AS YOU RIGHTLY POINTED OUT, THE SITUATION IN RWANDA,
ESPECIALLY SECURITY AND THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE
WHICH IS UNFOLDING THERE, REQUIRE VERY URGENT ACTION.
THIS IS WHY I NOTE WITH APPRECIATION THE MEASURES YOU
HAVE TAKEN TO SEIZE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE MATTER
AND TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF AFRICAN
COUNTRIES ON THEIR POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS TO AN
INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ASSIST IN THE COUNTRY. THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY REMAINS READY AND FULLY

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DISPOSED TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN ANY
EFFORT AIMED AT ARRESTING THE TRAGEDY THERE.
IN MY MEETING TODAY WITH THE AMERICAN ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, MR. JOHN
SHATTUCK, I UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO MOVE WITH SPEED TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT
PEOPLE AND DELIVER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. I HAVE MADE
IT VERY CLEAR TO HIM THAT THIS TASK CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
MOST EFFECTIVELY IF IT IS UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT OTHERWISE.
IN THE INTEREST OF SPEEDY ACTION AND SINCE THERE IS
ALREADY A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN RWANDA IN THE FORM
OF UNAMIR, IT WILL NOT, IN MY VIEW, BE NECESSARY TO
ENVISAGE THE SETTING UP OF NEW FORCE ALTOGETHER. WHAT
IS NEEDED IS TO BUILD ON WHAT IS ON THE GROUND, WITH AN
ADJUSTED MANDATE TO COPE WITH THE EXPANDED TASKS OF
PROVIDING SECURITY TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS WHERE NEEDED
AND DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. YOU WILL AGREE
WITH ME THAT SINCE THE UNITED NATIONS IS ALREADY ENGAGED
IN RWANDA, THE ACCENT SHOULD BE PUT ON STRENGTHENING AND
EXPANDING THAT ENGAGEMENT INSTEAD OF TRANSFERING
RESPONSIBILITY ELSEWHERE. BESIDES, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
TRAGEDY IN THAT COUNTRY REQUIRES THE KIND OF
COORDINATION AND RESOURCES WHICH CAN EFFECTIVELY BE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003325
DAR ES SALAAM, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA, GENEVA FOR A/S
SHATTUCK
GENEVA ALSO FOR RMA
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
MOSCOW FOR NIBLOCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, AORC, ET, RW
SUBJECT: UNSYG AND OAUSYG LETTERS RE RWANDA
SUSTAINED THROUGH A GLOBAL NETWORK SUCH AS COULD BE
SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED ONLY BY AN ORGANIZATION LIKE THE
UNITED NATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN OTHER
SITUATIONS OF DIRE NEED ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. IT MUST
NOT BE SET ASIDE IN THE CASE OF AFRICA.
WITH THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING, THEREFORE,
THAT THE OPERATION IN RWANDA WILL CONTINUE TO BE A
UNITED NATIONS UNDERTAKING WITH ALL THAT IT IMPLIES IN
TERMS OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND RESOURCE COMMITMENT.
AFRICA AS A REGION WILL THEN SEE HOW IT CAN BRING
PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO THIS UNITED NATIONS
UNDERTAKING. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I AM PROCEEDING
TO UNDERTAKE FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO WHAT YOU HAVE DONE SO
FAR INCLUDING EXPANDING ON THE CONSULTATIONS YOU HAVE
HAD WITH SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES YOU INDICATED.
ONCE MORE I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND
TO URGE YOU TO PERSIST IN YOUR EFFORTS AT ENSURING THAT
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN
PARTICULAR CONTINUES TO HELP IN RWANDA.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
SALIM AHMED SALIM
END TEXT.
5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAAS
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 10:01 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE

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PRT: SIT
SIT: DESHAZER RICE SCHWARTZ SUM SUM2 VAX
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
<TO>
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA NIACT IMMEDIATE 4549
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4634
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0275
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0168
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0422
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1080
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1015
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0550
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8715
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4769
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0101
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1677
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1314
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TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE
DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 002841
KAMPALA FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
1. (C) SUMMARY: TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS CARRIED A REPORT OF A UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE MADE BY THE GOR IN ARUSHA. ACCORDING TO RADIO TANZANIA BROADCASTS, WHICH HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN THE PRINT MEDIA, THE RPF HAS AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE CEASEFIRE STARTING MAY 7 (ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT SIGN THE AGREEMENT). AN MFA OFFICIAL CONFIRMED TO US "UNOFFICIALLY" THAT THE RPF HAD MADE AN "UNDERTAKING" TO THE FACILITATOR THAT IT WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE COMMENCING MAY 10. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION, WE HAVE OBTAINED COPIES OF SEPARATE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN GBADOLITE BY THE GOR (GATSINZI AND COL ALOYA) ON APRIL 23, AND BY THE RPF (TITO RUTAREMARA AND JEAN-BOSCO BUTERA) ON MAY 5. THE DATE GIVEN FOR THE CEASEFIRE ON THE RPF'S GBADOLITE DOCUMENT IS MAY 8. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) TODAY'S GOT-CONTROLLED NEWSPAPER CARRIED A REPORT THAT THE GOR SIGNED, UNILATERALLY, A CEASEFIRE DECLARATION BEFORE LEAVING ARUSHA LATE THURSDAY, MAY 5.
BEGIN QUOTE OF "DAILY NEWS" ARTICLE:
ARUSHA PEACE TALKS COLLAPSE.
THE TWO-DAY RWANDA PEACE TALKS ENDED IN A DEADLOCK HERE YESTERDAY AS THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) DISAGREED WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR THAT BOTH WARRING PARTIES SHOULD SEPARATELY SIGN THE CEASEFIRE DECLARATION.
HOWEVER, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NDUGU JOSEPH RWEGASIRA TOLD NEWSMEN HERE THAT THE RWANDA INTERIM GOVERNMENT SIGNED THE DECLARATION OF A COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT, NDUGU JOSH MALECELA, SIGNED THE DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF THE FACILITATOR, PRESIDENT ALI HASSAN MWINYI, WHILE THE MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION, NDUGU ANDRE NTAGERURA ON BEHALF (SIC) OF THE RWANDESE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
NDUGU RWEGASIRA SAID THAT THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL (POLITICAL), DR. M.T. MAPURANGA, SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE ORGANISATION.
THE SIGNED COMMUNIQUE STIPULATED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS SET ON MAY 10 AND THAT FOUR DAYS LATER, COMMANDERS OF THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF THE RPF WOULD MEET IN KIGALI UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMANDER OF UNAMIR.
THE MINISTER SAID THE RPF COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WAS NOT SIGNED, CALLED ON THE RPF TO CEASE FIRE AND STOP MASSACRES AND HOSTILITIES ON MAY 7 MIDNIGHT AND, SEVEN DAYS LATER, A MEETING OF COMMANDERS TO BE CONVENED (SIC) IN KIGALI BY THE UNAMIR.
ASKED WHAT ASSURANCES THE FACILITATOR HAS OF THE RPF

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COMMITMENT TO THE CEASEFIRE DECLARATION, THE MINISTER SAID "TANZANIA BANKS ON THE HOPE THAT RPF WILL KEEP TO ITS WORD OF BEING COMMITTED TO THE TOTAL CEASEFIRE AS WE DISCUSSED HERE."
"EVEN IF THE RPF SIGNED THE DECLARATION BUT CONTINUED TO COMMIT ATROCITIES, THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT THE FACILITATOR CAN DO. WE ARE NOT ARBITRATORS BUT FACILITATORS," HE SAID.
HE SAID ALL HAD BEEN SET FOR THE TWO WARRING PARTIES TO SIGN THE COMMITMENT OF DECLARATION SEPARATELY BUT THE RPF DEMANDED THAT THE FACILITATOR SHOULD NOT SIGN THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE IT WAS AN ILLEGAL ONE BUT SHOULD ONLY SIGN THAT OF THE RPF.
"THIS DEMAND WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY NDUGU MALECELA HENCE THE RPF REFUSAL
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 002841
KAMPALA FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIAN NEWS REPORTS OF A CEASEFIRE DECLARATION CREATE CONFUSION
TO SIGN A JOINT DECLARATION, THE MINISTER SAID.
END QUOTE
MFA CONFIRMS "UNOFFICIALLY"
3. (C) IN ITS RECENT BROADCASTS, RADIO TANZANIA HAS REPORTED THAT THE RPF AGREED TO IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE ON MAY 7 (ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT SIGN THE CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT). AN OFFICIAL IN THE MFA'S AFRICA DEPARTMENT, ADMITTING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS CONFLICTING, CONFIRMED THAT THE GOR HAD SIGNED A CEASEFIRE DECLARATION IN ARUSHA. HE ADDED THAT THE RPF HAD "MADE AN UNDERTAKING" TO THE FACILITATOR THAT IT WOULD OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE BEGINNING MAY 10, EVEN IF IT DID NOT SIGN A PAPER TO THAT EFFECT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE DIFFERENT CEASEFIRE DATES, THE OFFICIAL NOTED THAT THESE DATES SHOULD BE REGARDED AS STILL IN FLUX. HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT HIS INFORMATION BE CONSIDERED "UNOFFICIAL" UNTIL THERE IS AN OFFICIAL GOT ANNOUNCEMENT.
GBADOLITE CEASEFIRES
4. (C) ADDING TO THE CONFUSION ARE COPIES WE OBTAINED FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY OF SEPARATE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE RPF AND GOR IN GBADOLITE, ZAIRE. THE AGREEMENTS, ALMOST IDENTICAL IN TEXT, WERE SIGNED, ON THE GOR SIDE, BY GENERAL MARCEL GATSINZI AND COL. ALOYA ON APRIL 23; AND ON THE RPF SIDE, BY TITO RUTAREMARA AND JEAN-BOSCO BUTERA ON MAY 5. WE NOTE THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RPF'S CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT, THE COLUMN FOR THE GOR'S SIGNATURE IS ENTITLED "POUR LES FORCES RWANDAISES." ON THE GOR'S COPY, HOWEVER, THIS SPACE IS ENTITLED "POUR LE GOVERNMENT RWANDAIS." ALSO THE DATE FOR THE CEASEFIRE

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ON THE RPF PAPER IS SUNDAY, MAY 8. WE ARE FAXING
COPIES TO KAMPALA, BUJUMBURA AND AF/C.
5. BUJUMBURA, MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
DEVOS
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Rwanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 21:23 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON

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SIT: CLARKER DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG VAX
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RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0224
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0223
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0515
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0421
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1179
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0403
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0958
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4983
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SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
RWANDA MAY 6.
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001959
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON RWANDA MAY 6.

1. (C) SUMMARY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED ON THE TEXT OF A LETTER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEND TO THE SYG ASKING FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA. THE COUNCIL AGREED TO HOLD OFF ON DISCUSSIONS OF ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNTIL THE SYG SENDS HIS RESPONSE. USUN DEMARCHED RWANDA AND FRANCE ON PROTECTION OF THE NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE AS WELL AS THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR STOPPING THE MASSACRES GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) AT INFORMALS ON MAY 6, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED TO THE TEXT OF A LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE SYG ASKING HIM TO REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR UN OR INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA. AMB WALKER TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT USG COULD NOT ACCEPT INDICATIONS IN THE LETTER OF A FUTURE CHAPTER VII OPERATION, SO REFERENCES TO RESTORING LAW AND ORDER WERE REMOVED. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS AT PARA 5.

3. (C) TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (SEPARATELY FAXED TO IO) WERE DISTRIBUTED. ONE FROM THE NAM CALLS FOR A CHAPTER VII ACTION TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. THE OTHER, FROM NEW ZEALAND, CALLS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CREATION OF WEAPONS FREE ZONES IN WHICH UN WOULD PROTECT CIVILIANS. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT THEY WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DRAFTS UNTIL THE SECRETARIAT PRODUCED THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUESTED IN THE LETTER. MEANWHILE THE PRESIDENT SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD ATTEMPT TO AMALGAMATE THE TWO DRAFTS, A TASK THAT THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR NOTED WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE SECRETARIAT HAS AGREED TO PRODUCE THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING PAPER BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK AT WHICH TIME FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFTS IS EXPECTED.

// draft resolutions

4. (C) ON THE MARGINS OF THE INFORMALS, USUN DEMARCHED THE FRENCH AND RWANDA AMBASSADORS ON THE NEED FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA TO PROTECT THE FRANCISCAN NUNS AND FRIARS TRAPPED NEAR BUTARE. ADDITIONALLY THE RWANDA AMBASSADOR WAS FIRMLY DEMARCHED ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO HALT THE MASSACRES AND THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE IF THIS DID NOT HAPPEN.

5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SYG:

6 MAY 1994

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL,

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR TWO LETTERS OF 29 APRIL 1994 (S/1994/518) AND 3 MAY 1994 (S/1994/530) ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

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THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL COMMEND YOU, YOUR SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THE PERSONNEL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR THE
EXEMPLARY MANNER IN WHICH YOU HAVE ALL CONTINUED TO
CARRY OUT YOUR RESPECTIVE TASKS, UNDER VERY DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE AGREED THAT IN VIEW OF
THE UNABATED HOSTILITIES AND KILLINGS, URGENT AND
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACTION BE CONSIDERED. IN ORDER TO DO
SO, THEY HAVE ASKED ME TO REQUEST YOU TO PROVIDE IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE INDICATIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH
REGARD TO THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AS
WELL AS SUPPORT TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA.
THE COUNCIL MAY, AT A LATER STAGE AND AS SITUATION
DEVELOPS, REQ
UEST FROM YOU A FURTHER INDICATION AS TO
WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF LOGISTICS AND
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED UNITED NATIONS OR
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001959
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3,
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES ON LETTER TO SYG ON
RWANDA MAY 6.
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND/OR NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES CAPABLE OF ASSISTING THE PARTIES IN RWANDA,
MONITORING OF A CEASE-FIRE AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE
RESUMPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS UNDER THE ARUSHA PEACE
AGREEMENT.
THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DO NOT EXPECT AT THIS STAGE
ANY FIRM OR DEFINITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM YOUR OFFICE,
SINCE, AS WE UNDERSTAND, CONSULTATIONS WITH REGARD TO
FUTURE UNITED NATIONS COURSES OF ACTION ARE ON-GOING.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, THE ASSURANCES OF
MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS.
PROF. IBRAHIM GAMBARI
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
END TEXT.
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Rwanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-May-1994 20:53 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH

<DIST>
SIT: DESHAZER RICE STEINBERG VAX
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
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USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
RWANDA AIRLIFT
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN NEW YORK 001954
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO AID/BHR/OFDA
WH PLEASE PASS NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBURG
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3, J5, SECDEF FOR
OSD/ISA-GA
E.O. 12356, DECL: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TAGS: PREF, EAID, UN, RW, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, PHUM
SUBJECT: USG REPLY TO DHA REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH
RWANDA AIRLIFT
REF: LOW-GARVELINK TELCON 5/5/94
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REFTELCON USUN INFORMED UN DEPARTMENT OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (DHA) OF USG RESPONSE TO
DHA'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN CONTINUING THE

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KIGALI/NAIROBI AIRLIFT CURRENTLY RUN BY THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE AND SCHEDULED TO TERMINATE MAY 8. USUN RELAYED INFORMATION TO KAZ KURODA, RWANDA DESK OFFICER AT DHA.
3. USUN TOLD DHA THAT WERE A UN AGENCY TO CHARTER A PLANE TO CONTINUE THE AIRLIFT AND REQUEST DONOR COUNTRIES TO PAY FOR THAT CHARTER, THE USG WOULD CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING.
4. DHA WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE USG RESPONSE. DHA MADE SIMILAR REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THE AIRLIFT TO SEVERAL DONOR COUNTRIES. IT WILL CONSIDER USG'S SUGGESTION TO CHARTER A PLANE IN LIGHT OF WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO DO.
5. COMMENT. WE RECOMMEND THAT OFDA ASSIST THE UN BY URGING A UN AGENCY (SUCH AS WFP) TO LEASE A C-130 AND PICK UP THIS MISSION. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT STATE/AID HELP DHA BY FINDING OTHER DONOR SOURCES SUCH AS FRANCE OR BELGIUM. END COMMENT.
ALBRIGHT
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Rwanda

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<PREC>IMMEDIATE<~~CLAS>CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI>RUEHC<DTG>062340Z MAY 94
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<TO>RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>RWANDA SITREP MAY 6, INFORMATION FOR GENEVA PRESS REMARKS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 121075
FOR A/S SHATTUCK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA SITREP MAY 6, INFORMATION FOR GENEVA PRESS REMARKS
R!: (A) 94 GENEVA 4318
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS CURRENT AS OF MAY 6 AND MIGHT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR A/S SHATTUCK'S BRIEFING OF GENEVA-BASED MEDIA CITED IN REFTEL
(LOU) UNAMIR WILL REOPEN THE KIGALI AIRPORT ON SATURDAY.
~~(C)~~UNSYGSR BOOH BOOH WILL RETURN TO KIGALI ON SATURDAY.
(U) AUSTRALIA HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE 1200 TO 1500 TROOPS TO A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
~~(C)~~ CANADA HAS OFFERED A 200 MAN COMMUNICATIONS GROUP AND EQUIPMENT TO A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
THE RWANDA/BURUNDI MAY 6 SITREP FOLLOWS:
SITUATION ON THE GROUND
(LOU) UNAMIR REPORTS THAT KIGALI IS RELATIVELY QUIET THIS AFTERNOON. (AF/C UNAMIR TELCON)
(U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY MORTAR AND MACHINE GUN FIRE CONTINUED IN KIGALI'S CITY CENTER THIS MORNING, BUT THE RPF APPEARS TO HAVE GAINED GROUND AFTER YESTERDAY'S HEAVY FIGHTING. SHELLS WERE FALLING IN THE CITY CENTER AND NEAR THE MILLES COLLINES HOTEL WHERE 300 REFUGEES ARE AWAITING EVACUATION. AID WORKERS ALSO REPORTED RPF FORCES HAVE ENCIRCLED RUHENGARI AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE IT. THE AIRPORT REMAINS CLOSED AFTER A CANADIAN C-130 WAS SHOT AT YESTERDAY WHILE UNLOADING SUPPLIES. (REUTERS, API)
(U) HUNDREDS OF RWANDANS DAILY ARE SWIMMING THE KAGERA RIVER TO REACH THE BENACO REFUGEE CAMP IN TANZANIA. (REUTERS)

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

(U) TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RWEGASIRA TODAY ANNOUNCED IN DAR ES SALAAM THAT RWANDA'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD SIGNED A DOCUMENT CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE STARTING TOMORROW. HE SAID THE RPF DID NOT SIGN, BUT HAD PROMISED TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE. PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT A CEASEFIRE WAS SIGNED IN GABADOLITE, BROKERED BY MOBUTU. (REUTERS)
(LOU) BELGIAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED WITH THE RPF THAT THEY SIGNED A CEASEFIRE IN GABADOLITE, BUT IT WAS CONDITIONED ON THE END OF MASSACRES AND GOR ACCEPTANCE OR

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ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBLITY FOR THE KILLINGS. (AF/C EMBASSY BRUSSELS TELCON)

(U) A/S SHATTUCK AND TANZANIAN PM MALACELA TODAY AGREED ON A PRESS STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED IN DAR ES SALAAM TOMORROW: THE TWO FULLY AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE, THAT THE UNAMIR COMMANDER SHOULD CONVENE A MEETING IN KIGALI OF HIGH RANKING MILITARY COMMANDERS OF BOTH SIDES TO DISCUSS A CEASEFIRE, THAT ONCE A CEASEFIRE IS AGREED, AN EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED, AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION CREATED TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE ARUSHA PROCESS RELAUNCHED. (BUJUMBURA 01578)

~~(C)~~ EU OFFICIALS SEE RWANDA AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S - EU COOPERATION. THEY WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO JOINTLY ENCOURAGE AN OAU PEACEKEEPING FORCE UNDER UN AUSPICES, FOLLOWED BY PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY TO KEEP THE SITUATION FROM SPREADING - ESPECIALLY TO BURUNDI. THE EU IS ALREADY PROVIDING SOME HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES, BUT IS GEARING UP TO PROVIDE MORE AID ONCE THE SITUATION STABILIZES. (BRUSSELS 05050)

~~(C)~~ OAU/SSG SALIM AND UN/SYG BOUTROS GHALI DISAGREE ABOUT WHO SHOULD LEAD THE EFFORT TO PROVIDE TROOPS FOR AN EXPANDED FORCE IN RWANDA. IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS DATED MAY 2 AND 5, BOUTROS GALI SUGGESTED THE UN MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ANY REGIONAL EFFORTS THAT MIGHT BE MADE, WHILE SALIM INSISTED THE UN SHOULD RETAIN THE LEAD AND BUILD ON THE EXISTING UN FORCE. (ADDIS ABABA 03325)

~~(C)~~ OAU SYG SALIM, MET ON MAY 5 WITH A/S SHATTUCK IN DAR ES SALAAM. SALIM FULLY SUPPORTS RECONSTITUTING UNAMIR TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PROTECT REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS, AND MONITOR A CEASEFIRE WHEN ONE IS ACHIEVED. HE STRONGLY BELIEVES UN INTERVENTION SHOULD INCLUDE A HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING COMPONENT, INCLUDING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING AND MASSACRES. SALIM IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT JOINT OAU/UN LEADERSHIP, SAYING THAT WHERE THE OAU CAN "MAKE A DIFFERENCE" IS IN SECURING FIRM AND CONCRETE COMMITMENTS FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE TROOPS. (DAR ES SALAAM 02806)

~~(C)~~ THE UNSC YESTERDAY AGAIN DISCUSSED RWANDA, HOPING TO MOVE AWAY FROM SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE COUNCIL TO SYG BOUTROS GHALI AND BACK AGAIN. IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE TOWARDS DECISIVE ACTION, THE SC IS TODAY CIRCULATING A DRAFT LETTER ASKING THE SYG TO PROVIDE AN INFORMAL NON-PAPER PRESENTING A POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER DECISION THE SC MIGHT TAKE. MANY DELEGATIONS EMPHASIZED THAT HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS SHOULD BE THE CURRENT PRIORITY. THE NON-ALIGNED ARE ALSO WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE TABLED TODAY OR MONDAY. (USUN 01926)

(U) NIGERIA IS CONSIDERING A UN REQUEST TO SEND TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN RWANDA, ACCORDING TO KADUNA RADIO NIGERIA.

~~(C)~~ MONIQUE MUJAWAMIRA AND ALISON DES FORGES YESTERDAY CALLED ON AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH TO ARGUE FOR GREATER US INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA. THEY URGE A US INITIATIVE TO ORGANIZE DONORS TO PROCLAIM THEY WILL NEVER SUPPORT THE CURRENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND CALLING FOR BRINGING THE KILLERS TO JUSTICE, RESUMPTION OF THE ARUSHA TALKS EXCEPT FOR SOME MILITARY LEADERS AND AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE

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KILLINGS. USUN WAS PARTICULARILY STRUCK BY THEIR INSISTANCE THAT ENOUGH MODERATES HAVE SURVIVED TO FORM A VIABLE NEGOTIATING PRESENCE AND EVENTUALLY TAKE PART IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. (USUN 01922)
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
(U) THE UN YESTERDAY APPEALED FOR 38.8 MILLION IN AID TO COMBAT THE CRISIS. UN SOURCES SAID MILITARY TRANSPORT PLANES WOULD START FERRYING SUPPLIES INTO TANZANIA TODAY FOR RWANDAN REFUGEES, ALTHOUGH HEAVY RAIN WOULD DELAY ROAD TRANSPORT. (REUTERS)
CHRISTOPHER
NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN>1075<STOR>940506195138 M1034530
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Rwanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

09-May-1994 20:15 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

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RWANDA UPDATE
<TEXT>
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PRETORIA/JOH FOR A/S MOOSE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL TZ
SUBJECT: RWANDA UPDATE

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
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REF: (A) 94 STATE 121277

CEASEFIRE ACTIVITY

L. THERE IS NO CEASEFIRE. UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE MET WITH BOTH GOR MINISTER OF DEFENSE BIZIMANA AND RPF COMMANDER KAGAME ON SATURDAY. HE SENT A DELEGATION TO GITARAMA SUNDAY, AND HAD PLANNED TO MEET AGAIN WITH RPF COMMANDER KAGAME AND THE GOVERNMENT TODAY, MONDAY. BUT HE COULD NOT MOVE TODAY AS A RESULT OF A SUBSTANTIAL RPF OFFENSIVE TOWARD THE CENTER OF TOWN, ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY SHELLING. PERHAPS TOMORROW...THE RPF TOLD DALLAIRE THAT A CEASEFIRE MUST BE NEGOTIATED ON THE GROUND. THE GOVERNMENT SAID IT HAS AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE AND IS READY TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS. BUT DALLAIRE CAME AWAY FROM HIS SATURDAY MEETINGS WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT NEITHER SIDE IS VERY INTERESTED IN A CEASEFIRE. HE STILL HOPES TO GET THE TWO CHIEFS OF STAFF IN THE SAME ROOM BY THE END OF THE WEEK, BUT OFFERS NOT GUARANTEES.

2. MEANTIME, THE GOR DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS SPENT A COUPLE OF DAYS IN NAIROBI AND WAS EXPECTED TO DEPART FOR KINSHASA ON SUNDAY, THUS REOPENING THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN OF THE ACTION TO MOBUTU. WE ARE UNAWARE WHETHER AN RPF DELEGATION REMAINS IN ZAIRE.

AIRPORT SECURITY

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3. DALLAIRE HAS PROPOSED TO BOTH THE GOR AND THE RPF THAT THE AIRPORT BE MADE A NEUTRAL ZONE. HE SET A DEADLINE THIS WEEK FOR AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES, AND THREATENED TO PULL UNAMIR OUT OF KIGALI IF THE SIDES DO NOT AGREE. DALLAIRE HAS IDENTIFIED AN AIRSTRIP IN THE NORTH WHICH WILL ACCOMMODATE A C-130, AND HAS TENTATIVELY PLANNED TO USE ENTEBBE FOR LARGE SHIPMENTS TO BE TRUCKED TO RWANDA. HE HAS NOT RAISED THIS PLAN WITH RWANDANS OR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

4. DALLAIRE BELIEVES IT IS PREMATURE TO GIVE UP ON KIGALI, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD TO TURN BACK HIS SUPPORT FLIGHT TODAY. THE RPF WILL AGREE TO A NEUTRAL AIRPORT; THE GOVERNMENT, BEING CLOSER AND THEREFORE REQUIRED TO MOVE BACK FARTHER IS STILL HESITATING, BUT DALLAIRE BELIEVES THERE IS STILL A GOOD CHANCE THE GOR WILL AGREE, AND DO THE NECESSARY. THEY HAVE ALREADY WITHDRAWN ABOUT HALF OF THEIR ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES FROM THE AIRPORT TO USE IN THE BATTLE FOR KANOMBE CAMP. DALLAIRE IMPLIED THAT THE GOR MAY HAVE ITS OWN INTERESTS IN BEING ABLE TO REMOVE TROOPS FROM THE AIRPORT AREA, AND HE IS WORKING ON THEM TO FINALLY AGREE.

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UNAMIR EXPANSION
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5. DALLAIRE HAS REFINED HIS PROPOSAL TO REQUEST A TOTAL OF 5500 TROOPS. DALLAIRE SAYS HE HAS RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE UN SECRETARIAT TO HIS PROPOSAL AND HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE GOR AND THE RPF. UNAMIR ALSO HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS TO BRING IN EQUIPMENT AND RELIEF SUPPLIES FROM BURUNDI AND TANZANIA IF NECESSARY. A MEMBER OF DALLLAIRE'S STAFF IS CURRENTLY IN BUJUMBURA STUDYING THE POSSIBILITIES.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
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6. THERE CONTINUE TO BE BARRIERS BOTH IN TOWN AND ON RURAL ROADS. KIGALI HAS BEEN PRACTICALLY DEPOPULATED, PERHAPS ONLY 50,000 PERSONS REMAINING (FROM FORMER 400,000). STILL, SOME OF THE SURVIVORS ARE STILL BEING ABDUCTED FROM THEIR HOMES AND ARE PRESUMED DEAD. DALLAIRE IS RECEIVING MORE AND MORE DATA ON ENCLAVES ON THREATENED PERSONS WHO NEED URGENTLY TO BE PROTECTED OR ESCORTED TO MORE SECURE AREAS. HE CANNOT OFFER THIS PROTECTION WITH THE PERSONNEL ON BOARD.

7. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS AGREED WITH DALLAIRE ON HIS CONCEPT OF PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN SHIPMENTS WITH AN EXPANDED UNAMIR, BUT HAS SUGGESTED THAT RWANDANS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO OTHER RWANDANS. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE HARDLINE RADIO STATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY YOUTH GROUP HAVE STARTED TO COOPERATE WITH UNAMIR AND ARE PUBLICLY CALLING ON THEIR SUPPORTERS TO PERMIT UNAMIR THROUGH THEIR ROADBLOCKS.

8. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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AIDE-MEMOIRE

RWANDA

1. The attached non-paper is in response to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 6 May 1994 by the Presid[illegible] of the Security Council. The paper outlines a possible mandate and force structure for an expanded UNAMIR, capable of providing support for displaced persons and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

2. UNAMIR has broached the possibility of such an operation [illegible] both parties, but further elaboration might be required and explicit commitments obtained to pre-empt possible difficulties.

3. The members of the Council should be aware that the fighting in and around Kigali has intensified. UNAMIR HQs and the Airport have been hit, and humanitarian assistance flights have been halted. One UNAMIR soldier has been killed by mortar fire tod[illegible] The Force Commander again has stressed that UNAMIR cannot continue to cope with the situation indefinitely with its cur[illegible] resources.

budget or supplies?

9 May 1994

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9 May 1994

Rwanda

1. UNAMIR's ultimate objective in Rwanda, as provided in its mandate approved by the Security Council under resolution [illegible] (1993), is to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This process tragically broke down on 6 April 1994, and all attempts to put it back on track have so far been unsuccessful. The first step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha peace process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and to assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. It is hoped that this will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a ceasefire.

2. At present, the situation in Rwanda remains extremely serious. Indeed, more than 1.5 million civilians have been displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Combat between Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) continues. The RGF controls the west and southwestern parts of Rwanda, while the RPF is in control of the northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as areas in the southeast. The capital city is divided between the RGF and RPF. The front line is, however, fluid and changing as military actions continue. Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate, although less frequently than at the beginning of the conflict, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. Moreover, although both the RGF and RPF have separately expressed their readiness to enter into a ceasefire, the fighting has so far continued unabated.

3. Given the security situation, it has not been possible to access accurately the humanitarian situation. It is estimated that at least 1.2 million people have been internally displaced and are in need of assistance. Rwanda is also suffering from a serious drought with an estimated 1.5 million people in need of

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food assistance. The current refugee population in neighbouring countries (Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire) is estimated at more than 300,000. In addition, approximately 80,000 refugees from Burundi are in Rwanda. DHA in cooperation with UNAMIR and the operational organizations of the United Nations system has established a Rwanda Emergency Office in Nairobi and has fielded an Advance Humanitarian Team in Kigali which has also visited other parts of the country. However, humanitarian operations in Rwanda have been severely limited by problems of access and security.

4. It is imperative that a further deterioration of this catastrophic situation is prevented and that the basic humanitarian needs of the huge numbers of Rwandese civilians who have been displaced or otherwise affected by the fighting be addressed. It is also essential that the issue of their safety be addressed on an urgent basis. The Security Council may therefore wish to consider the amendment of UNAMIR's mandate to include support to those in need and assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid. UNAMIR's efforts would be coordinated with those of the humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda or engaged in assisting Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries, including UNHCR. (For convenience, the mission as it would function under this amended mandate is referred to as UNAMIR-A.)

Mandate

5. The mandate of UNAMIR-A would be to support displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda who have been affected by the hostilities, and to assist in the provision of assistance by humanitarian agencies.

Assumptions

6. This concept of operations for UNAMIR-A is based on the following assumptions:

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a. In accordance with resolution 912 (1994), all mediation efforts would be continued with the objective of reaching a ceasefire agreement and restoring the process.

b. At the time of deployment of UNAMIR-A an agreed ceasefire would not be in place.

c. The revised mandate of UNAMIR-A would not envisage enforcement actions.

d. Because of the need to stabilize the security situation in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of UNAMIR-A would have to be rapidly effected.

e. Kigali airport, which is critical to the deployment and sustainment of the mission, would be established as a "neutral zone" with the consent of the parties. The Security Council should, therefore, call on the parties to declare Kigali airport a "neutral zone" under the exclusive control of the United Nations.

f. Lines of communication through neighbouring countries would remain open and available to support UNAMIR-A throughout the mandate of the mission.

g. It is expected that UNAMIR-A would undertake its tasks for a period of four months from the date of initial deployment, on the understanding that UNAMIR's mandate would be reviewed by the Council as necessary and, in particular, following an agreement on a ceasefire.

Concept of Operations

7. The task of UNAMIR-A under an expanded mandate would be to provide support and ensure safety for displaced and other affected persons and for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNAMIR-A would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks and would resort to force only in self-defence.

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a. Humanitarian Assistance: UNAMIR-A would assist humanitarian agencies in their programmes for distribution of relief supplies and other forms of assistance.

not should help provide security for delivery

b. Deterrent Measures: Military units would be deployed to areas where displaced and other affected persons are concentrated and where humanitarian relief assistance would be delivered. These areas would be patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR-A, in conjunction with authorized security forces.

c. UNAMIR-A may be required to enter into self-defence actions against persons or groups who threaten these areas and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and other assistance.

8. In order to execute its mandate, UNAMIR-A must be comprised of a strong, highly mobile force, capable of self-defence. The size of the force would be determined also by the size and terrain of the area of operation which is land-locked, difficult and mountainous with very limited infrastructure. With these criteria, it is estimated that a minimum viable force of approximately 5,500 troops (including five infantry battalions) would be required. cost??

9. The composition of the force would be as follows:

a. Five battalions (approx. 4000 personnel) two of which are mechanized and three of which are motorized with one mechanized company in each.

b. A force support battalion (approx. 721 personnel) providing logistic, maintenance, medical service, and including an engineer company capable of undertaking

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tasks such as: demining; bomb disposal; road, brid and other infrastructure repair.

c. A helicopter squadron (approx. 110 personnel) consisting of:

(1) a troop/support flight with a minimum 1/2 company lift possibly based on 8 x Bell 212 type helicopters. Medical evacuation, logistic sup and night vision capability would be requir

(2) Recce/armed flight of up to 8 light helicopt with light armament and night operations capability.

d. A force headquarters (approx. 219 personnel) which includes a supporting military signals/communication squadron. This would be built around the nucleus of present headquarters and would continue to operat Kigali.

e. A military police force (approx. 50 personnel) of a small company for internal force security.

f. A military observer group of 320 officers to conduct the humanitarian security monitoring and to provid liaison and escort duties throughout the country also along the border areas.

g. A force of 90 UNCIVPOL deployed in a similar fashion the UNMOs but dedicated to maintaining liaison with th local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security.

10. The deployment of the force would be conducted in three phases. "D-Day" referred to below is the date on which the

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Security Council resolution is adopted authorizing the expand[illegible] mandate of UNAMIR-A.

Phase 1 (D-Day + 7): The Ghanian battalion would be br[illegible] to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with APCs. This unit would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport, the Amahoro complex where 4,000 displaced persons are presently housed and would also act [illegible] the Force Reserve.

Phase 2 (D-Day + 14): Deployment of two battalions [illegible] mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of [illegible] support battalion and all of the Force HQ and signal squadron. These troops would be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where there is the highest concentration of displaced persons.

Phase 3 (D-Day + 11): Induction of the rest of the t[illegible] support battalion and two other infantry battalions. Th[illegible] rest of the support battalion would establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two infantry battalions would be deployed principally in [illegible] Western and Northern portions of the country in order to provide the necessary support and assistance to peopl[illegible] need in these areas.

Tasks

11. The Tasks of the UNAMIR-A force would be the following :

a. Security

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(1) Assure safe conditions for displaced and other persons in need, including refugees (mostly from Burundi) who have sought asylum in Rwanda

(2) Provide security to humanitarian assistance activities

(3) Provide escort to convoys

(4) Provide security to UN installations

(5) Assure control of vital geographic features

(6) Monitor border crossing points as operationally required

(7) Monitor deployment of the parties in conflict in order to assure effective conduct of UNAMIR-A operations.

b. Humanitarian Assistance

(1) Assist in the establishment and maintenance of secure areas for the safe support of those in need

(2) Establish access to those in need

(3) Provide support for the provision of food, water, medical services, shelter and other relief to those in need

(4) Provide assistance with demining

(5) Provide assistance for the rehabilitation of essential facilities and services

c. Liaison

(1) Strengthen liaison between UNAMIR-A and all parties

(2) Support liaison arrangements with humanitarian agencies

Logistic Support

12. The deployment and logistic support of a force of 5500 would be an ambitious undertaking. Rwanda is a land-locked country

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with only one major airport (Kigali). Land movement between seaports (Mombassa, Dar-es-Salaam) and Rwanda requires several days in the best of conditions. It is therefore essential to deploy self-sufficient military contingents capable of operating independently, while logistic support is put in place by the United Nations. The concept of operations calls for the first three units to be moved by air, requiring military and comm strategic airlift, i.e., up to 10 passenger flights and 4 flights (C5A aircrafts). The remainder of the force and material would be transported by sea and air as soon as technically possible.

Command and Control

13. UNAMIR-A would be headed by the Special Representative the Secretary-General who would have overall authority for the activities of the mission. As regards the military co of the mission, the present UNAMIR Force Headquarters would be expanded as indicated in para 8.d above and would remain located in Kigali. Battalions would be deployed to designated regions o sectors with assigned responsibilities for the tasks described earlier. Battalion commanders would act as Sector Commanders within their assigned regions under the direction of the F Commander. The military signal unit would establish communications between the Force Headquarters, Battalion Headquarters and other designated sites as necessary.

Conclusion

14. The prospects of success in achieving the aims of UNAMIR depend upon the earliest deployment of the proposed force. longer the delay in the deployment of the force from the ti a Security Council decision, the greater the prospect of the mission not achieving its purpose in operational terms. The most

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rapid deployment would be achieved with the deployment of two formed infantry brigades with their integral logistic support.

If formed brigades cannot be made available it would be ssary to draw on the recent UN Stand-by arrangements. ever, specific contributions for this particular mission must ill be negotiated. It is estimated that this process would require one to two months. Simultaneously with Stand-by arrangements, the traditional method of requesting government military forces would be used. Experience shows that it would ke at least two to three months to achieve full deployment of s. If forces are accepted without adequate equipment, rience shows that a further delay of several months would be rred in providing the necessary equipment for those forces. owever, these delays could be significantly decreased if Member States agree to make the necessary arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and air lift required for the mission.

The UNAMIR Force Commander has had discussions with both the and RPF on the concept of operations and general deployment described above and has encountered no strong objections so ar. He intends to have further discussions with the parties to avoid possible misunderstanding and difficulties.

16. In considering the elements outlines above, its should be pt in mind that resolution 912 (1994) stressed that the Arusha Agreement remains central to the peace process. rdingly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General continue his efforts, in cooperation with the Organization pt the African Unity (OAU) and regional leaders, to end the fighting and to conclude an effective cease-fire agreement to be monitored by UNAMIR, in order to build confidence and facilitate progress on other aspects of the peace process in accordance with the Arusha agreements.

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00526397

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DTG: 101703Z MAY 94
FROM: FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
DOCNO: PRETORIA 006682
BODY:
TAGS: PREL, RW, OAU, US
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MEETING WITH UN SECGEN, OAU SECGEN AND TANZANIAN PRESIDENT ON RWANDA

1. SUMMARY: IN HIS MEETING WITH UN SECGEN BOUTROS GHALI, OAU SECGEN SALIM SALIM AND TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI, VICE PRESIDENT GORE SAID THE U.S. WANTED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY ARRANGING AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO PROTECT RWANDAN REFUGEES ON THE BORDERS OF TANZANIA AND BURUNDI. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT RULING OUT ANY OPTION, THIS APPROACH WAS PREFERABLE IN OUR VIEW TO A KIGALI-BASED EFFORT THAT WOULD INVOLVE CONFRONTING AN ON-GOING CIVIL WAR. ALL THREE INTERLOCUTORS AGREED THAT THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A POSSIBLE IMPORTANT EMERGENCY MEASURE AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER. THEY ALL SOUGHT TO CLARIFY THE MANDATE AND COMMAND STRUCTURES OF SUCH AN OPERATION. SALIM SALIM SAID THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF TROOPS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES IF THIS WERE A "NORMAL" UN MISSION. THE PARTIES AGREED TO MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. END SUMMARY

2. VICE PRESIDENT GORE MET WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS GHALI, OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM AND TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO RWANDA. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED FOR THE 30-MINUTE MEETING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AMBASSADOR LYMAN, VP CHIEF OF STAFF QUINN, VP NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER FUERTH AND NSC AFRICA SENIOR DIRECTOR STEINBERG. THE VICE PRESIDENT PRAISED THE EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT MWINYI AND THE OTHERS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE ARUSHA ACCORDS BACK ON TRACK AND ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER. HE SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RESPOND. ONE PROPOSAL THAT THE U.S. THOUGHT HAD A POSSIBILITY OF EASING THE CRISIS WAS TO CREATE AN AREA OF SAFETY FOR REFUGEES ON THE BORDERS WITH TANZANIA AND BURUNDI. HE SAID THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE SOME SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN EFFORT TO ENSURE A PERIMETER OF SAFETY AND TO SUPPLY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. AT THE SAME TIME, HE NOTED, WE HAVE TO BE RESPECTFUL OF THE DELICATE BALANCE THAT NOW EXISTS IN BURUNDI.

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3. HE SAID THAT THIS APPROACH DID NOT ADDRESS REFUGEES ON THE UGANDA BORDER, BUT SAID THAT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US INDICATES THAT THE RISKS BEHIND THE RPF LINES ARE MUCH LESS. HE ADDED THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE ENCLAVES ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE AT RISK, BUT ENTRY THERE IS DIFFICULT AS LONG AS THE CIVIL WAR CONTINUES TO RAGE.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS WAS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVE AND WE HAD NOT RULED OUT ANY OPTION. HOWEVER, THIS APPROACH SEEMED TO HAVE ADVANTAGES OVER PROPOSALS THAT FOCUS ON KIGALI, INSOFAR AS KIGALI IS NOW AT THE EPICENTER OF THE CIVIL WAR AND ENTRY INTO THE KIGALI AIRPORT HAD BEEN MADE DIFFICULT BY FACTIONS THAT DO NOT WANT TO SEE RELIEF ENTER. HE ADDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO A COMBAT SITUATION. WHILE DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES GO ON, WE CAN MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO SAFEGUARD LIVES.

5. PRESIDENT MWINYI RESPONDED FIRST. HE SAID THAT TANZANIA WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER OUR APPROACH AS A TEMPORARY EMERGENCY MEASURE. HE SAID THAT THE KEY CHALLENGE FACING TANZANIA WAS COPING WITH THE 400-500,000 REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLOODED INTO TANZANIA. THE ONLY LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WAS TO RE-ESTABLISH STABILITY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN RWANDA IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

6. BOUTROS GHALI DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT YESTERDAY FROM NEW YORK SAYING THAT A U.N. PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN KIGALI WOULD REQUIRE 5,500 TROOPS TO PROTECT THE AIRPORT, SECURE ENCLAVES WITHIN THE CITY AND ENSURE THE SUPPLY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE A CHAPTER VI OPERATION -- THUS, HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO TROOPS ENGAGEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ALREADY FOCUS ON HOW TO SECURE THE PEACEFUL RETURN OF REFUGEES. HE SAID HE SENT LETTERS TO THE 30 OR SO AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE PARTICIPATED IN PAST PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS TO INQUIRE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS FOR A RWANDAN MISSION.

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT NECESSARILY RULING OUT PROCEEDING WITH ACTION IN KIGALI. HE SAID THAT IF WE COULD ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO PROCEED WITH THE APPROACH TOWARD THOSE REFUGEES AT GREATEST RISK, IT COULD BUILD MOMENTUM FOR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS SHOULD THEY BECOME FEASIBLE. A/S MOOSE OUTLINED OUR PERCEPTION

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OF THE POPULATION AT GREATEST RISK, INCLUDING DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE SOUTH, REFUGEES WHO HAD NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO ENTER TANZANIA AND BURUNDI AND THOSE IN ENCLAVES THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

8. SALIM SALIM SAID THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD ON A MISSION IN RWANDA, BUT WANTED TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS A "NORMAL UN MISSION." HE SAID THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY ASSEMBLING 5500 TROOPS; IN FACT, HE HAD TALKED THAT MORNING AT MANDELA'S INAUGURATION BREAKFAST WITH LEADERS FROM THREE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO CONFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS. (HE LATER INFORMED A/S MOOSE THAT THESE HAD BEEN FROM NIGERIA, ZIMBABWE AND GHANA, IN ADDITION TO TANZANIA) HE SAID THE PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE VIEWED AS AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, AND STRESSED THE NEED TO CAREFULLY STUDY THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, COMMAND STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE U.N. BEFORE PROCEEDING.

9. BOUTROS GHALI WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS DISCUSSING WAS A PEACEKEEPING MISSION, NO MERELY A HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT. THE LATER HE SUGGESTED, WOULD NO PROVIDE THE NEEDED PROTECTION TO THOSE AT RISK. THE VICE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED WHETHER THE OTHERS HAD SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS. ALL THREE INTERLOCUTORS AGREED TO FURTHER TALKS. SALIM SALIM SAID THE PROPOSAL WOULD LIKELY MET NO OBJECTION FROM THE RPF OR THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCE, WHICH BOTH ACCEPTED THE INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES TO FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. HE STRESSED AGAIN CONCERNS OVER THE DELICACY OF THE BURUNDIAN SITUATION. A/S SUGGESTED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK.

11. COMMENT: BOUTROS GHALI, SALIM SALIM, AND PRESIDENT MWINYI ALL SEEMED TO SINCERELY APPRECIATE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING RELIEF FOR RWANDA, WHICH HAS CLEARLY VEXED ALL THREE MEN. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WAS RECEIVED BY HIS THREE INTERLOCUTORS WITH INTEREST, BUT EACH WANTED TO HOLD HIS REACTION UNTIL THEY COULD CONSIDER THE DETAILS. THEY ALL SEEMED TO VIEW THE PROPOSAL AS AN INTERIM MEASURE THAT COULD SAVE LIVES, BUT NOT THE SINGLE SOLUTION. BOUTROS GHALI WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT PRECLUDE A KIGALI-BASED OPTION; SALIM SALIM STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE U.N. TO TAKE UNDER ITS CONTROL WHATEVER MISSION WAS AGREED TO; AND MWINYI WAS CLEARLY STRAINED BY THE FLOOD OF WHAT HE CALLED UP TO A HALF MILLION REFUGEES ON HIS BORDER. NONETHELESS, THIS

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MEETING LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
IN NEW YORK.
LYMAN
COUNTRY: Zone not in message

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-May-1994 20:04 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS

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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0213
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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 12 COUNCIL INFORMALS
REF: USUN 2015
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: ON MAY 12 THE COUNCIL FOCUSED ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN REFTEL. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE MANDATE OF AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE, WITH MOST MEMBERS FAVORING A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION. A WORKING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO CONTINUE REVISING THE RESOLUTION. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI SAID HE HOPED TO VOTE ON A RESOLUTION FRIDAY, MAY 13; IF THE COUNCIL IS NOT READY, HE ANTICIPATES HOLDING A SATURDAY SESSION. END SUMMARY.
3. USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID RPF TROOPS IN THE SOUTH HAD ADVANCED WESTWARD, RESTRICTING UNAMIR'S MOVEMENTS. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AYALA-LASSO APPEALED FOR A CEASEFIRE ON RWANDAN RADIO, PRESSED THE HEAD OF THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES TO RELEASE HOSTAGES IN KIGALI.S STADIUM, AND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN NAIROBI. HE SAID THE SYG HAD FIRM OFFERS OF TROOPS FROM TANZANIA, GHANA AND NIGERIA, PLUS A TENTATIVE OFFER FROM A FOURTH COUNTRY (PROBABLY SENEGAL OR UGANDA), BUT DID NOT YET KNOW THE NUMBERS OFFERED.
4. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH RPF AND GOR REPRESENTATIVES- BOTH WANT AN EXPANDED UN PRESENCE; THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BIGGER OPERATION WITH A WIDER MANDATE, WHILE THE RPF WANTS A SMALLER FORCE WITH A NARROWER MANDATE CONFINED TO HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT.
5. FRANCE, UK, RUSSIA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, ARGENTINA, SPAIN AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC SPOKE IN FAVOR OF A FOCUSED HUMANITARIAN MANDATE ALONG THE LINES OF THE NEW ZEALAND DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH INCLUDED THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN SAFE AREAS AND THE PROTECTED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE OMANI AND RWANDAN DELEGATES SPOKE IN FAVOR OF AN EXPANDED POLITICAL COMPONENT, STATING THAT WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE, NO UN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE POSSIBLE.
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED THE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESOURCES TO BE USED TO CARRY OUT THE MANDATE. HE ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON TROOP STRENGTH, CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND HOW QUICKLY THEY COULD BE DEPLOYED. HE ALSO URGED CONSIDERATION OF WHICH COUNTRIES COULD PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE TROOPS DEPLOYED. USYG GHAREKHAN SAID THE SECRETARIAT WOULD PROVIDE A FORMAL REPORT WITH A PRELIMINARY BUDGET TOMORROW, MAY 13.
7. FRANCE, THE UK, RUSSIA, NEW ZEALAND AND ARGENTINA SAID THE COUNCIL SHOULD EITHER ADOPT A RESOLUTION

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ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO, WHICH THEY FAVOR, OR IF UNABLE, STICK WITH THE CURRENT UNSC STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT.
8. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE COUNCIL WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO LAUNCH AN EFFORT TO PROSECUTE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE, AND WOULD NEED A SPECIFIC PLAN SUCH AS THAT ADOPTED FOR THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THE RWANDAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT IF AN INQUIRY WERE TO BE CONDUCTED, IT SHOULD COVER THE ENTIRE CONFLICT, SINCE OCTOBER 1, 1990, INSTEAD OF BEGINNING WITH THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
9. THE NEW ZEALAND PERMREP SAID THAT A UN OPERATION COULD NOT FEASIBLY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE IF IT HAS TO SEEK THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AT EVERY TURN. THE OPERATION SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED UNDER CHAPTER VII. THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT WHILE THE OPERATION CANNOT RELY ON TOTAL CONSENT, IT MUST SEEK COOPERATION
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FROM THE PARTIES AND SHOULD BE A CHAPTER VI OPERATION-
10. THE UK PERMREP STATED THAT UNAMIR, ITS FORCE COMMANDER AND UN HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY, I.E. THEY SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE TROOPS START IN KIGALI AND WORK OUTWARDS OR START AT THE BORDER AND WORK TOWARD KIGALI. "DON'T PUT THEM IN A STRAITJACKET," HE SAID. THE SPANISH PERMREP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED A PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT.
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<SUBJ>RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002015
WHITEHOUSE PASS NSC FOR D. CLARK, S. RICE AND D.STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PHUM, EAID, PREL, MOPS, UNSC, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: SC WANTS PROTECTION FOR DISPLACED
PERSONS
REF: A) NSC/USUN FAX 5/10, B) PRETORIA 6682
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: SC WILL DISCUSS A DRAFT RESOLUTION STRENGTHENING THE UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA MAY 12. TEXT IS BELOW. ALL AGREE THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. MANY COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE INTERESTED IN THE U.S. IDEA OF SETTING UP PROTECTIVE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER. UN SECRETARIAT POINTED OUT THAT THE LARGEST NUMBER OF DISPLACED AT GREATEST RISK ARE IN KIGALI. A SECRETARIAT NON-PAPER WAS CIRCULATED MAY 10 SPELLING OUT A PLAN TO SEND 5,500 TROOPS TO RWANDA. END SUMMARY.
3. THE SYG HAS RESPONDED TO THE SC PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF FRIDAY, MAY 6, AND PRODUCED A NON-PAPER WITH A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR RWANDA MAY 10 (FAXED TO DEPT). THE PLAN CALLS FOR 5,500 TROOPS, TO BE DEPLOYED IN KIGALI AND IN OTHER AREAS WHERE DISPLACED ARE AT RISK. THE TASKS WOULD BE LARGELY HUMANITARIAN, INCLUDING ENSURING THE SAFETY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS. THE SYG SPECIFIES THE MANDATE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. THE MISSION WOULD GET UNDER WAY EVEN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE WAS IN PLACE, AND THE AIRPORT WOULD BE A "NEUTRAL ZONE".
4. WHILE THIS PLAN HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE IDEA PRESENTED BY VP GORE TO BOUTROS-GHALI (THE SO-CALLED "OPTION 2" BEING DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON), THE SYG'S PLAN HAS SEVERAL FLAWS. THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH

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WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS IN AFRICA TO MEET THE NEED FOR 2 MECHANIZED BATTALIONS AND 3 MOTORIZED BATTALIONS. THE LOGISTICS OF FLYING NOT ONLY THE TROOPS, BUT ALSO THE APPROXIMATELY 150 APC'S THEY WOULD REQUIRE, INTO THE AREA IS A DAUNTING TASK. RWANDA IS LAND-LOCKED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE CARRIED ON C-130'S, BUT LARGER C-5'S WOULD BE NEEDED. SINCE ONLY THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE THIS SCALE OF AIRLIFT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW IF THE USG WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A LARGE UNDERTAKING. ADDITIONALLY, THE RPF HAVE SAID THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A LARGE FORCE (SEE SEPTEL).

4. IN THE COUNCIL'S MAY 11 DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S CONTINGENCY PLAN, AMB ALBRIGHT USED TALKING POINTS IDENTICAL TO THOSE USED BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE (REFS A AND B) IN HIS DISCUSSIONS OF RWANDA WITH THE UN SYG AND OAU SYG IN SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF POSITIVE INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF SETTING UP PROTECTIVE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDERS. THE RUSSIANS AND UK HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE VERY SIMILAR POSITIONS TO OURS. THE FRENCH AGREE WITH THE SYG'S PROPOSAL, BUT ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE U.S. IDEA AS THE START OF A PHASED OPERATION.

5. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. ALBRIGHT'S EXPLANATION OF THE RESERVATIONS WE HAVE ABOUT USING KIGALI AIRPORT, UN MILITARY ADVISER GENERAL BARIL MAINTAINED THAT THE DISPLACED PERSONS AT GREATEST RISK WERE THE 14,000 STILL UNDER UN PROTECTION IN KIGALI. FORCE COMMANDER GEN. DALLAIRE IS ANXIOUS TO PROTECT THEM, AS WELL AS THE DISPLACED ALONG THE BORDERS. GEN. BARIL INDICATED THAT GEN. DALLAIRE IS EXPLORING WHETHER OTHER AIRSTRIPS IN RWANDA MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE IS ALSO CONSIDERING BRINGING RESUPPLIES FROM KAMPALA, UGANDA, SINCE THE ROADS ARE GOOD.

6. GEN. BARIL ALSO REPLIED TO AMB. ALBRIGHT'S SUGGESTION
THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NEED "ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT". HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE COULD BE NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE RULES REGARDING "MINIMUM USE OF FORCE". HOWEVER, THERE COULD BE FLEXIBILITY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF "SELF-DEFENSE". THE CONCEPT OF "SELF-DEFENSE" CAN INCLUDE DEFENSE OF THE OPERATION'S

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MANDATE, IN THE FACE OF A THREAT. BARIL MADE THE POINT THAT THE SOLDIER OUTSIDE THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES IN KIGALI WAS INSTRUCTED ALONG THOSE LINES.

7. SC PRESIDENT GAMBARI CIRCULATED A NEW DRAFT, COMBINING THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE NEW ZEALAND DRAFT AND THE NAM DRAFT OF 5/6. COUNCIL WILL MEET AGAIN THURSDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 12 FOR MORE DISCUSSIONS. A WORKING GROUP WILL CONVENE FRIDAY MORNING, MAY 13, TO REFINE THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

8. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

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REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR), ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY, 1994, AND ITS RESOLUTION 912 (1994) OF 21 APRIL 1994 BY WHICH IT ADJUSTED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
RECALLING ITS STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL 199& (S/PRST/1994/16) WHICH INTER ALIA, REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, AND THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RE-COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION;
RECALLING ALSO ITS STATEMENT OF 30 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) BY WHICH IT STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE MINDLESS CARNAGE;
CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE INTERNATIONAL DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTION;
EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA;
MINDFUL OF ITS ABHORRENCE OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW;
UNDERLING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE, AND IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS WELL AS WITH LEADERS OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS;
HAVING CONSIDERED THE LETTERS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 29 APRIL 1994 (S/1994/518), AND 3 MAY 1994 (S/1994/530);
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION;
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY;
-- 1. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES AND AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE;
-- 2. REAFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESERVE THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA;
-- 3. STRESSES ITS CONVICTION THAT THE ARUSHA PEACE

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AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION URGES ALL PARTIES TO COMMENCE POLITICAL

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DIAILOGUE :
-- 4. DECIDES THAT UNAMLR.S MANDATE UNDER RESOLUTION 912(1994) SHALL BE ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS:
-- A. TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CEASE-FIRE;
-- B. TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF ANY CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT;
-- C. TO ASSIST IN ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-- D. TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA;
-- 5. ALSO DECIDES THAT UNAMIR.S MANDATE SHALL ALSO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING RESPONSIBILITIES :
-- A. SECURITY
-- 1. ASSURE SAFE CONDITIONS FOR DISPLACED AND OTHER PERSONS IN NEED, INCLUDING REFUGEES (MOSTLY FROM BURUNDI) WHO HAVE SOUGHT ASYLUM IN RWANDA;
-- 2. PROVIDE SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES;
-- 3. PROVIDE ESCORT TO CONVOYS;
-- 4. PROVIDE SECURITY TO UN INSTALLATIONS;
-- 5. ASSURE CONTROL OF VITAL GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES;
-- 6. MONITOR BORDER CROSSING POINTS AS OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED;
-- 7. MONITOR DEPLOYMENT OF THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT IN ORDER TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF UNAMIR-A OPERATIONS.
-- B. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
-- 1. ASSIST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF SECURE AREAS FOR THE SAFE SUPPORT OF THOSE IN NEED;
-- 2. ESTABLISH ACCESS TO THOSE IN NEED;
-- 3. PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE PROVISION OF FOOD, WATER, MEDICAL SERVICES, SHELTER AND OTHER RELIEF TO THOSE IN NEED;
-- 4. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH DEMINING;
-- 5. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES.
-- C. LIAISON
-- 1. STRENGTHEN LIAISON BETWEEN UNAMIR-A AND ALL PARTIES;
-- 2. SUPPORT LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES;
-- 3. ASSIST IN THE COLLATION OF INFORMATION RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAI, HUMANITARIAN LAW.
-- 6. AUTHORIZES AN EXPANSION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL TO 5500 TROOPS AND URGES THE DEPLOYMENT OF THAT FORCE IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME;
-- 7. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE

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HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY MEMBER STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH THE URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE

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EXPANDED UNAMIR;
-- 8. REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO OFFER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL URGENTLY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;
-- 9. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
-- 10. ALSO COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS AGENCIES, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR, IN PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL;
-- 11. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ARMS OR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT, AND STATES ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PROMPTLY THE APPLICATION OF AN ARMS EMBARGO ON RWANDA AND DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL IMMEDIATELY TAKE MEASURES WITH A VIEW TO PROHIBITING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIAL TO ANY OF THE PARTIES IN RWANDA; THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OR SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR TERRITORIES OR USING THE FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFTS, OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT, PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS; // NO
-- 12.FURTHER CALLS UPON ALL STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-- 13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT, NOT LATER THAN 31 JULY 1994, ON POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE OR OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTED IN RWANDA SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES;
-- 15. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THE
IR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-- 16. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER;
END TEXT.
ALBRIGHT
NNNN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-May-1994 20:04 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING

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TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: UNDPKO WAS CLEARLY NOT ENTHUSED ABOUT USG CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR NON-PAPER AND WERE RECEPTIVE TO THE USG PROPOSAL BUT ONLY AS PART OF THEIR KIGALI-BASED MISSION. SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL REPORTED THAT THE FORCE COMMANDER COULD ONLY HOLD OUT FOR ANOTHER WEEK IN KIGALI AT CURRENT STRENGTH. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH REQUESTED THAT THE UN INCLUDE ANOTHER OPTION IN THE SYG'S REPORT AS OUTLINED IN OUR PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH BRIEFED ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS RIZA ON USG CONCERNS WITH THE SECRETARIAT'S NON-PAPER ON A PROPOSED RWANDA MISSION. HE ALSO REVIEWED THE CONCEPT OF A USG PROPOSAL FOR A HUMANITARIAN MISSION IN REFUGEE AREAS ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER.
4. RIZA AND THE SYG'S MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WAS SIMILARITY BETWEEN OUR TWO APPROACHES BUT WERE CLEARLY NOT ENTHUSED ABOUT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE USG PROPOSAL AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
- THE PEOPLE MOST THREATENED RIGHT NOW IN RWANDA WERE IN KIGALI; MANY THOUSANDS OF WHICH ARE UNDER CURRENT UN CONTROL. THE UN WAS STILL PROTECTING PEOPLE IN THREE LOCATIONS IN KIGALI -- THE STADIUM, THE MILLES COLLINES HOTEL AND KING FAISEL HOSPITAL.
- THE FORCE COMMANDER COULD ONLY HOLD OUT WITH HIS CURRENT FORCE LEVELS FOR ABOUT ANOTHER WEEK - THEN HE WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW.
- THE UN WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT LOSING TOTAL PRESENCE IN RWANDA.
- THE UN INSISTS THAT ITS PROPOSAL IS CONTINGENT UPON THE CONSENT OF THE TWO PARTIES, THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED UNOFFICIAL CONSENT FROM BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT THE MISSION AS BRIEFED, AND THAT A CHAPTER VII MISSION WAS NOT PLANNED OR REQUIRED. THE RPF IS ABLE TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF ITS FORCES, BUT THE UN WARNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF THE MILITIAS.
- THE UN ARGUED THAT THE SAFE AREAS NEAR THE TANZANIAN AND UGANDAN BORDERS DID NOT NEED FORCES BUT COULD BE OVERSEEN BY OBSERVERS. THEY ADDED THAT THEIR PLAN ALSO ENVISIONED A BORDER OPERATION SIMILAR TO OUR PROPOSAL, PERHAPS IN THE ZAIRE OR BURUNDI BORDER AREAS.
- THE UN CONFIRMED THAT KIGALI'S POPULATION MIGHT HAVE PLUMMETED TO ABOUT 60,000 BUT NOBODY WAS CERTAIN EXACTLY HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE AT RISK IN KIGALI. THEY BELIEVE MORE THAN 14,000 NEED PROTECTION.
-- DEPLOYING ONLY TO THE BORDERS AND LEAVING THE INTERIOR TO BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER STAGE MIGHT MAKE

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THE SITUATION WORSE.
5. BARIL MADE A FEW ADDITIONAL POINTS DURING THE MEETING AS WELL:
- HE SAID THAT THE GHANIANS AND PERHAPS THE NIGERIANS WERE READY TO PROVIDE A BATTALION BUT THE TANZANIANS AND SENEGALESE WERE LESS CERTAIN ABOUT A COMMITMENT.
- BARIL NOTED THAT THE UN WOULD NEED A BATTALION'S WORTH OF PROTECTED VEHICLES (M113 VARIETY) TO OUTFIT ONE OF THE AFRICAN UNITS. (HE ALSO MENTIONED HIS UNOFFICIAL REQUEST TO THE USG FOR APCS.)
- BARIL SAID THAT THE UN FORCE COMMANDER WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A BATTALION-SIZED REACTION FORCE ON A SHORT NOTICE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT (PRESUMABLY TO ASSIST IN A WITHDRAWAL), BUT WAS NOT MORE SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002035
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA : MAY 12 INDERFURTH-RIZA MEETING
6. THE UN ALSO NOTED THAT THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI HAD BEEN CLOSED TWO DAYS AGO, AND THAT THE FORCE COMMANDER HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM GOING TO GITAR
AMA SINCE THE RGF
COULD NOT GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY.
7. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH TOLD RIZA THAT THE P-5 AGREED YESTERDAY THAT THE FOCUS OF A NEW RWANDA MISSION SHOULD BE HUMANITARIAN AND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANOTHER OPTION IN THE SYG'S REPORT ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED IN OUR TALKING POINTS. RIZA NODDED BUT DID NOT COMMIT TO ADDING OUR PROPOSAL TO THE REPORT. AMB. INDERFURTH PROVIDED A LIST OF DETAILED QUESTIONS TO RIZA. USUN WILL REPORT ON THE UN'S FURTHER REPLY AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED.
ALBRIGHT
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IO:GWARD
IO/PHO:JBRIMS IO/UNP:SZELLE
USUN/W:DSCHEFFER
JCS:PBALTIMORE

SPC:JDOBBINS
AF/C:ARENDER
OSD:MGREENSPON
NSC:SRICE

AF, IO, HA, INR, P, PM

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

REF: STATE 127262

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE KIGALI-BASED UN FORCE BEING PROPOSED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT. THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE. WE PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY TO EXPLAIN OUR PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL AND REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE UN FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI TO PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE WOULD

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DEPLOY TO BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN BURUNDI AT KAYANBA, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS TO SECURE AND ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WITHIN RWANDA, AND PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THOSE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH SECURITY FOR UNHCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED PERSONS TO THE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ALSO SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND RELIEF CONVOYS IN THE ZONE.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN FORCE COMMANDER TO USE ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO DEFEND UN FORCES, CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.

6. ASSUMPTIONS. (A) THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE WOULD REMAIN IN KIGALI TO HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER; (B) WELL TRAINED, DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION; (C) THE UN HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE ZONE IN RWANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH BASE OPERATIONS IN, AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SECURE ZONE THROUGH, BURUNDI; (D) UNHCR WOULD RUN THE CAMPS, AND THE UN FORCE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; AND (E) THE UN AND THE NGOS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE THE UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UN FORCE WOULD DEBARK IN BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A FORWARD SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.

8. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT 6,240 UN FORCE PERSONNEL PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: 3,540 UN PERSONNEL FOR CAMP SECURITY, INCLUDING 20 CAMPS OF 177 MILITARY/CIVILIAN POLICE OR LIGHT INFANTRY EACH; A 1,200 PERSON QUICK REACTION FORCE (INCLUDES 800 PERSON MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION); A 1,000 PERSON SUPPORT ELEMENT; A 100 PERSON TACTICAL AIR LOGISTICS CONTROL ELEMENT; AND A 400 PERSON AVIATION BATTALION, INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY 20 HELICOPTERS.

9. END POINT. RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS OR UNSC DECISION TO END MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS. YY

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DRAFT

May 13, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ambassador Albright

THRU: Ambassador Inderfurth

FROM: POLMIL - Michael Barnett and Michael Sheehan

SUBJECT: SYG's nonpaper on UNAMIR-A

BACKGROUND

The SYG's report on Rwanda fails to address many of the conditions established by the Security Council for approving an operation. Tab A is an analysis of how the report compares to the nine specific issues that must be satisfactorily addressed before the approval of an operation. Simply put, while the Security Council stipulates that each category should be answered "yes," in fact only three of nine merit such accreditation.

Recommendation

- Use analysis of the SYG's report in Tab A to guide the SC and the SYG to develop a viable option for Rwanda that we can support.
- Tab B is the USG's proposal for a border mission that was communicated to Sheehan by a JCS verbal brief and is consistent with VP Gore's brief in South Africa.
- Tab C is a new proposal developed by USUN PolMil, and now circulating in Washington, that describes a discrete, viable, humanitarian mission with an exit strategy in Kigali - and that better meets the conditions formulated by the SC and PDD-25 for approving an operation.

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Analysis of SYG's Report on Rwanda

Threat to Peace and Security

Yes. There is consensus in the SC that the civil war and subsequent massive refugee movements constitute a threat to regional peace and security.

Assistance of Regional and Subregional Organizations

Yes, but selected. While Tanzania has sponsored the cease-fire talks, and some OAU countries have made offers of military troops, the OAU has been relatively tepid in its response and proposed assistance.

Cease-fire in Place

No. Although the Security Council stipulates that a cease-fire should be in place, in fact the cease-fire is no closer today than it was three weeks ago. Indeed, some consideration must be given to the possibility that the proposed peacekeeping operation might provide a disincentive to the parties to reach a cease-fire and move on the political front. There should be some discussion of how this proposed operation might affect both the attempt to achieve a cease-fire and political negotiations.

Commitment to the Peace Process

No. While there is some mention of the continued relevance of the Arusha Accords as the framework for political reconciliation, for all intent and purpose neither party has demonstrated a strong and genuine commitment to the Accords, and appear to be using any possible battlefield victories to secure advantages for any subsequent political dialogue.

Clear Political Goals Reflected in the Mandate

No. The political goals move from the precise - protect the delivery of the humanitarian assistance - to the imprecise - assist and protect displaced persons throughout Rwanda.

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Precise Mandate Formulated

No. In addition to the above considerations, the four month mandate does not have any sunset clause or consideration of how this operation might come to a logical conclusion.

Safety of UN Personnel

Perhaps, though highly dependent on whether the mandate is given a liberal interpretation to include assistance of civilians in jeopardy whereever they are in Rwanda. Additionally, the SYG's proposal to place regional UN military headquarters is various cities might place the UN within war zones and military activities.

Costs

No. The SYG has not yet submitted a budget (though expected today).

Availability of Resources

No. The UN plan cannot guarantee the required men, money or the material. Men: The nonpaper calls for a three-step process to begin immediately, yet a major caveat is the nonpaer's admission that a more realistic time frame is 2-3 months at the least given that the UN has not yet identified the requisite troops. Money: Possibly do-able once a budget is presented. Material: Even if the UN identifies troop contributers, it appears that they will need to be transported to Rwanda and equipped once they get there; the US says that it will not provide such assistance, and no other country has offered to assist. In short, the proposal does not rest on a realistic foundation; in this respect, the SC and the SYG, rather than the US, are jeopardizing the lives of innocents in Rwanda by forwarding groundless proposals.

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TAB B

US (JCS) Draft Concept of Operation for Rwanda Border Operation

Assumptions:

- Availability of well-trained and disciplined troops
- Government of Burundi accepts the operation
- Consent of Rwanda Government and RPF

Planning Assumptions:

- Need about 6,000 troops (+ or -) for about 100,000 refugees
- Forces would need very robust rules of engagement
- The Tanzanian and Ugandan border areas do not need forces
- Zaire border is too hard to do at this point

Concept:

- Operation will operate out of Bujumbara and north on a 70 km road that will be severely tested by heavy military, humanitarian, and normal civilian traffic.

- A forward HQ will operate out of Kiyanza (just south of the Rwandan border) to project the operation north into Rwanda. The HQ would have a Mechanized Infantry Bn (+) with an Air Cavalry Sqn (-) as the mobile protective force for the Area of Operations.

- The protective zone will be an area adjacent to the road leading north to Batari with a series of protected camps. Based on availability of troops and feasibility of the operations, about 20 camps will be established to handle about 5,000 refugees per camp.

- If the operation is extended successfully to Batari, the camps will then extend to the northwest, with the same estimated criteria of 6,000 troops per 100,000 refugees.

- Each camp will have assigned one company of MPs or light infantry; about 177 troops per company x 20 units = 3,500 troops plus 1600 for the Infantry-Cavalry Headquarters forces and about 1,000 support troops for a total of about 6,000 troops.

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TAB C

USUN Proposal for a Discrete Operation in Kigali

Assumptions:

- Availability of well-trained troops
- Use of Kigali airport
- Political/humanitarian imperative to operate in Kigali
- Cease-fire is not in place

Planning Assumptions/Design Criteria:

- Restricted to a humanitarian mission
- Built-in exit strategy
- Review of a peacekeeping mission only when a cease-fire is in place and a political process is on track.
- Would not be approved without budget estimate, lift, forces, and equipment identified.

Concept:

- Airlift two mechanized Battalions into Kigali airport.
- 1st Bn: Secure airport and protect the UNAMIR civilian component
- 2nd Bn: Assist NGOs and agencies move personnel currently under UN protection to refugee camps that are in relatively secure areas (in the Kigali vicinity).
- Forces would not establish permanent sites in or around Kigali.
- Forces will withdraw in 30 days (or however long the mission is designated)--whether the mission is accomplished or not. A new resolution would be required in order to change the schedule for withdrawal.
- A small stay behind force could be maintained to accomplish the mission designed for the current group in Kigali -- protect the civilian component so they can continue the political process; the force would not have an extended or open ended humanitarian or protection mission in Kigali.
- As the peace process progressed, the Council would consider under its normal procedures a renewed UNAMIR Chapter VI peacekeeping operation.

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JCS:BBARTOLAIN NSC:
OSD:MGREENSPON

AF, IO, HA, INR, P, PM

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

REF: STATE 127262

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH A KIGALI-BASED UN FORCE AS PROPOSED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT. THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL. WE PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY, MAY 16 TO EXPLAIN THE PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL AND REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE UN FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI TO PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE WOULD

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DEPLOY TO BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN BURUNDI NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS TO SECURE AND ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WITHIN RWANDA, AND PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THOSE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH SECURITY FOR UNHCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED PERSONS TO THE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ALSO SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND RELIEF CONVOYS IN THE ZONE.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN FORCE COMMANDER TO DEFEND THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO INCLUDE UN FORCES, CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.

6. ASSUMPTIONS. (A) THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE WOULD REMAIN IN KIGALI TO HELP NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER; (B) WELL TRAINED, DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION; (C) THE UN HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE ZONE IN RWANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH BASE OPERATIONS IN, AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SECURE ZONE THROUGH, BURUNDI; (D) UNHCR WOULD RUN THE CAMPS, AND THE UN FORCE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; AND (E) THE UN AND THE NGOS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE THE UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UN FORCE WOULD DEBARK IN BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A FORWARD SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.

8. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT 6,000-6,500 UN FORCE PERSONNEL PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS.

9. END POINT. RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS OR UNSC DECISION TO END MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS. ##

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-May-1994 22:12 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0216
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0238
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0976
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1644
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0436
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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;

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JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
REF: (A) USUN 2035, (B) USUN 2037
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS MAY 13 AGREED AD REF TO A TEXT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD GIVE UNAMIR A HUMANITARIAN AND PROTECTIVE MANDATE AND EXPAND ITS AUTHORIZED FORCE TO 5,500 PERSONS. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF TWO EXTENDED SESSIONS BY A COUNCIL WORKING GROUP FOLLOWED BY DELIBERATIONS OF THE FULL COUNCIL.
3. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON OPERATIVE PARAS TWO AND THREE. IN OPERATIVE PARA TWO, THE COUNCIL ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND OTHERS IN SECURE AREAS AND SECURITY FOR THOSE AT RISK THROUGHOUT RWANDA. IN OPERATIVE THREE, THE COUNCIL TRIED TO GIVE A CLEAR INDICATION THAT UNAMIR WOULD TAKE ROBUST ACTION TO CARRY OUT ITS PROTECTIVE MANDATE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT CALLING INTO QUESTION THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IN OTHER CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS. THE TEXT FOLLOWS BELOW IN PARA 6.
4. COUNCIL PRESIDENT GAMBARI (NIGERIA) INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO PUT THE RESOLUTION "IN BLUE" THAT EVENING AND PROCEED TO A VOTE ON MONDAY, MAY 16. (THE US DELEGATION HAD EARLIER INFORMED GAMBARI THAT WE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO VOTE ON THIS RESOLUTION MAY 13.) AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH CAUTIONED THAT WE STILL HAD MANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHICH HAD JUST BEEN RELEASED THAT AFTERNOON, IN PARTICULAR REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. WE HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN PRODUCING THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK. HOWEVER, THIS IN MANY RESPECTS WAS THE EASY PART OF THE JOB. WE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS TO DISCUSS WITH THE SECRETARIAT AND WOULD NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIRM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BEFORE VOTING.
5. GAMBARI INDICATED THAT HE INTENDED TO GO AHEAD AND PUT THE RESOLUTION IN BLUE, BUT THAT IT WAS OPEN TO FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CHANGE. HE SAID HE INTENDED TO SCHEDULE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, WITH THE HOPE OF VOTING ON THE RESOLUTION THAT EVENING.
6. BEGIN TEXT:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872 (1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR), ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994, AND ITS RESOLUTION 912 (1994) OF 21 APRIL 1994 BY WHICH IT ADJUSTED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR,
RECALLING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE

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COUNCIL ON ITS BEHALF ON 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16)
AND 30 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/...),
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER
1993 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND
PARTICULARLY CONDEMNING THE VERY NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF
CIVILIANS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RWANDA AND THE
IMPUNITY WITH WHICH ARMED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING THEREIN,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY (OAU) AND ITS ORGANS IN PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC,
POLITICAL, AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COUNCIL, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR,
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, WHICH HAS
RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE RWANDAN
POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
EXPRESSING CNCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF
SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA, AS WELL AS
OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY,
RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF
AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A
GROUP IN WHOLE OR IN PART CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
URGING ALL PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH ANY INCITEMENT,
ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC
HATRED,
RECALLING ALSO THAT IT HAD REQUESTED THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT,
UNDERLINING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED
INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE
RWANDAN PEOPLE AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND
IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

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(OAU) AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION,
ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
-- 1. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE,
AND BRING AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE
ENGULFING RWANDA;
-- 2. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR.S MANDATE UNDER
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO IT:
-- A) TO ~~CONTRIBUTE~~ TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN
RWANDA INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE, (AS APPROPRIATE,) OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN
AREAS,
-- B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
OPERATIONS;
-- 3. RECOGNIZES THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO
THREATEN PROTECTED SITES AND POPULATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNELY OR THE MEANS OF
DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
-- 4. AUTHORIZES IN THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE
UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;
-- 5. URGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COMMENCE THE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED FORCE, IN PHASES AS
APPROPRIATE, IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME;
-- 6. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE
HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, TO OBTAIN FROM
MEMBER STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;
-- 7. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED
FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;
-- 8. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA TO COOPERATE
FULLY WITH UNAMIR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE
AND IN PARTICULAR IN ENSURING THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE;
-- 9. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS

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AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE
PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES
THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES
OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
--B
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A
THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS,
--10. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OC
SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR
TERRITORIES OR USING THEIR FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT OF
ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT,
PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
--11. DECIDES ALSO TO ESTABLISH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
RULE 28 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CONSISTING OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO
UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS W©RK
TO THE COUNCIL WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS;
--(A) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE
ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 10
ABOVE;
--(B) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS
ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE
EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE EMBARGO;
--(C) TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO
VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 10 ABOVE
AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS TO THE
SECRETARY GENERAL FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO MEMBER
STATES;
--12. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR
IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENCE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO
THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION);
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002059
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: MAY 13 SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS
--C
--13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PRESENT A
REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INCIDENTS OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

IN RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;
--14. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND COUNTRIES TN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
--15. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN RWANDA UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION, WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND AGAIN IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
--16. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-May-1994 00:50 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

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RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 129527
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: RWANDA: PROPOSED CONCEPT FOR UN FORCE

REF: STATE 127262

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS AS SOON AS FOSSIBLE.

3. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH A KIGALI-BASED UN FORCE AS PROPOSED BY THE UN SECRETARIAT.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE FOLLOWING IS A MORE DETAILED OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATE FROFOSAL. WE PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK ON MONDAY MAY 16 TO EXPLAIN THE PROFOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL AND REPLY TO QUESTIONS.

4. MISSION STATEMENT. THE UN FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH BURUNDI TO PROTECT REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THOSE PERSONNEL. THE FORCE WOULD

DEPLOY TO BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN BURUNDI NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS TO SECURE AND ESTABLISH DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS WITHIN RWANDA, AND PROVIDE CONTINUOUS SECURITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THOSE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH SECURITY FOR UNQCR-RUN CAMPS BUT NOT TRANSPORT DISPLACED PERSONS TO THE CAMPS. THE FORCE WOULD ALSO SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND RELIEF CONVOYS IN THE ZONE.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WOULD CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN FORCE COMMANDER TO DEFEND THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO INCLUDE UN FORCES, CAMPS AND DISPLACED PERSONS BEING PROTECTED.

6. ASSUMPTIONS. (A) THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCE WOULD REMAIN IN KIGALI TO HELP NEGOTIATE A FOLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND PROVIDE THE OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER; (B) WELL TRAINED, DISCIPLINED TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION; (C) THE UN HAS RPF/RGF PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE ZONE IN RWANDA, AND BURUNDI PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH BASE OPERATIONS IN, AND ALLOW LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SECURE ZONE THROUGH, BURUNDI; (D) UNHCR WOULD RUN THE CAMPS, AND THE UN FORCE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY; AND (E) THE UN AND THE NGOS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO RWANDA, WHILE THE UN FORCE WOULD PROVIDE ITS OWN LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. UN FORCE WOULD DEBARK IN BURUNDI, ESTABLISH A FORWARD SUPPORT BASE NEAR THE RWANDAN BORDER, AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ZONE FOR THE DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.

8. FORCE STRUCTURE. ABOUT 6,000-6,500 UN FORCE PERSONNEL PER 100,000 REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS.

9. END POINT. RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS OR UNSC DECISION TO END MANDATE AFTER SIX MONTHS.
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SECTION: 01 OF 01

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J Rwanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-May-1994 22:34 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
STEINBERG@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB
CLARKER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR

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RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0420
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0242
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0980
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1649
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0440
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0241
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RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1198
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0220
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EXPANSION
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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION
REFS: A) USUN 2059; B) 5/16 ALBRIGHT-TARNOFF TELECON
. (U) SUMMARY: AFTER TEN HOURS OF DEBATE, MACHINATIONS AND SOME THEATRICS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 918 ALTERING UNAMIR'S MANDATE, AUTHORIZING ITS EXPANSION TO 5500 TROOPS, DEPLOYING THOSE TROOPS IN PHASES WITH A COUNCIL REVIEW AFTER THE FIRST PHASE, AND ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO. AFTER REQUESTING A SEPARATE VOTE ON PART B OF THE RESOLUTION, THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER VOTED AGAINST ITS EMBARGO PROVISIONS AND DELIVERED A LENGTHY DIATRIBE AGAINST TUTSIS AND NEIGHBORING UGANDA. TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS IN PARA 9; US EOV CONTAINED IN PARA 10. THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE RESOLUTION WERE ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) THE MOST CONTENTIOUS DEBATE CENTERED ON US CHANGES TO THE EARLIER DRAFT (REF A). AFTER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT AND A VISITING US TEAM (SEPTEL), THE US PROPOSED A PHASED DEPLOYMENT, STARTING WITH UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND BRINGING TO FULL STRENGTH ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION IN KIGALI. THE COUNCIL WILL REVIEW THE MISSION, AND IF NECESSARY TAKE FURTHER ACTION, PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND PHASE AND REVISION OF THE UN SECRETARIAT'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
3. (C) FRANCE, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS VOICED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THE US PROPOSAL. WITH UK AND ARGENTINE SUPPORT, A COMPROMISE WAS PROPOSED WHICH RETAINED THE SUBSTANCE OF US CHANGES, IF NOT THEIR ORIGINAL FORM. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT CLEARED COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WITH U/S TARNOFF (REF B). WHILE NEW ZEALAND ULTIMATELY SUPPORTED THE COMPROMISE, PERMREP KEATING VOICED DISSATISFACTION WITH WHAT HE SAID WOULD APPEAR TO BE A RETURN OF THE SAME FORCES THAT WERE REMOVED FROM KIGALI IN APRIL. AFTER SEVERAL MORE HOURS OF DEBATE, THE COUNCIL FINALLY ACCEPTED THE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE.
4. (C) THE COUNCIL ALSO DEBATED THE ISSUE OF THE PARTIES' CONSENT AND COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR. USYG GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT THE UN HAS NOT RECEIVED THE CONSENT OF THE RGF OR RPF TO ITS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. NEW ZEALAND SAID THAT THE BEST THE COUNCIL COULD HOPE FOR IS "ACQUIESCENCE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE CHAOTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL SITUATION." UK PERMREP HANNAY SAID THE COUNCIL IS UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT 5500 TROOPS COULD OPERATE WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES. THE

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COUNCIL SETTLED ON A PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR THE "SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF (UNAMIR'S) MANDATE."

5. (U) THE COUNCIL CONVENED IN FORMAL SESSION AFTER MIDNIGHT, FOLLOWING A PROCEDURAL WRANGLE ARISING FROM THE RWANDAN DELEGATION'S REFUSAL TO SUPPORT SECTION B OF THE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING AN ARMS EMBARGO. IN HIS DETAILED A HISTORY OF TUTSI DOMINATION OVER THE HUTUS AND BLAMED THE RPF FOR THE EVIL THAT HAS BEFALLEN RWANDA. HE DESCRIBED THE RPF AS "THIRSTY FOR VENGEANCE," STATING THAT RPF FIGHTERS "EAT THE HEARTS OF THE MEN THEY HAVE KILLED." HE SAID THE RPF WAS ENGAGED IN A "CAREFULLY PREPARED PLAN" TO OBTAIN POWER WHICH INVOLVED "DRIVING THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA INTO EXODUS" FOR HIRTY YEARS. HE SIMILARLY CONDEMNED THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS SUPPORT OF THE RPF.

6. (U) RPF DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS CLAUDE DUSAIDI ISSUED A WRITTEN STATEMENT WELCOMING THE COUNCIL ACTION WHILE RESTATING THE RPF'S POSITION THAT A FORCE OF 5500 IS TOO LARGE. THE STATEMENT COMMITS THE RPF TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NEUTRALITY OF KIGALI AIRPORT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION

(REFERRING TO A SPANISH-SPONSORED AMENDMENT IN PARA 10 OF THE RESOLUTION BELOW). THE STATEMENT REJECTS "ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION VOTED FOR BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SO-CALLED INTERIM GOVERNMENT" AND CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SRSG FOR RWANDA JEAN ROGER BOOH-BOOH.

7. (U) IN THEIR EOVS, THE UK, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND AND CZECH PERMREPS SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE TONE AND CONTENT OF HIS STATEMENT. PERMREP KEATING SAID THE RWANDAN "DOES NOT REPRESENT A STATE; HE IS A MOUTHPIECE OF A FACTION," AND REGRETTED HIS "SHAMEFUL DISTORTION OF THE TRUTH." THE CZECH PERMREP LAID BLAME FOR THE MASSACRE OF "20 PERCENT OF ALL TUTSIS IN RWANDA" ON THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND ELEMENTS OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES.

8. (U) SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, NIGERIAN PERMREP GAMBARI EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HOW THE COUNCIL TREATS AFRICAN ISSUES IN GENERAL, AND EXPRESSED SPECIFIC DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE CONDITIONALITIES OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE RESOLUTION.

9. (U) TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT RESOLUTION S/RES/918:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 872

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(1993) OF 5 OCTOBER 1993 BY WHICH IT ESTABLISHED THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR),
ITS RESOLUTION 909 (1994) OF 5 APRIL 1994 WHICH EXTENDED
THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 29 JULY 1994, AND ITS
RESOLUTION 912 (1994) OF 21 APRIL 1994 BY WHICH IT
ADJUSTED THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
RECALLING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL ON 7 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/16) AND 30 APRIL 1994
(S/PRST/21),
HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/565),
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 868 (1993) OF 29 SEPTEMBER
1993 ON THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS,
STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE ONGOING VIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND
PARTICULARLY CONDEMNING THE VERY NUMEROUS KILLINGS OF
CIVILIANS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RWANDA AND THE
IMPUNITY WITH WHICH ARMED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING THEREIN,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT
TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND
THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO
ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY (OAU) AND ITS ORGANS, AS WELL AS THE EFFORTS OF
THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR, IN PROVIDING DIPLOMATIC,
POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COUNCIL,
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, WHICH HAS
RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF MANY THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT
CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, THE INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE RWANDAN
POPULATION, AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS ALARM AT CONTINUING REPORTS OF
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
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SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA, AS WELL AS OTHER VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHTS TO LIFE AND PROPERTY,
RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF
AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A
GROUP, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME
PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
STRONGLY URGING ALL PARTIES TO CEASE FORTHWITH ANY
INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO
VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED,

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RECALLING ALSO ITS REQUEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC INCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI,
RECALLING FURTHER THAT IT HAD REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING THE CONFLICT,
UNDERLING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA, AND IN THIS CONNECTION WELCOMING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE OAU AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
DESIRING IN THIS CONTEXT TO EXPAND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THAT MANDATE,
REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE CONFLICT AND CONCERNED THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
A

-- 1. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IMMEDIATELY CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE, AND BRING AN END TO THE MINDLESS VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA;
-- 2. WELCOMES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 13 MAY 1994 (S/1994/565);
-- 3. DECIDES TO EXPAND UNAMIR'S MANDATE UNDER RESOLUTION 912 (1994) TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO IT:
-- A. TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN AREAS;
-- B. TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS;
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR

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TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
-- 4. RECOGNIZES THAT UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST PERSONS OR GROUPS WHO THREATEN PROTECTED SITES AND POPULATIONS, UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL OR THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF;
-- 5. AUTHORIZES IN THIS CONTEXT AN EXPANSION OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL UP TO 5,500 TROOPS;
-- 6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS RECOMMENDED IN HIS REPORT, AND AS A FIRST PHASE, IMMEDIATELY TO REDEPLOY TO RWANDA THE UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS CURRENTLY IN NAIROBI AND TO BRING UP TO FULL STRENGTH THE ELEMENTS OF THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION CURRENTLY IN RWANDA;
-- 7. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE NEXT PHASE OF UNAMIR'S DEPLOYMENT INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, ON THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES, PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASE-FIRE, AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES AND THE PROPOSED DURATION OF THE MANDATE FOR FURTHER REVIEW AND ACTION, AS REQUIRED, BY THE COUNCIL;
-- 8. ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACCELERATE HIS EFFORTS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OAU, TO OBTAIN FROM MEMBER STATES THE NECESSARY PERSONNEL TO ENABLE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR TO PROCEED URGENTLY;
-- 9. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR THE RESOURCES REQUIRED, INCLUDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNAMIR EXPANDED FORCE LEVEL AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE FIELD;
-- 10. STRONGLY URGES ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH UNAMIR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE AND IN PARTICULAR IN ENSURING ITS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE UNIMPEDED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND FURTHER CALLS UPON THEM TO TREAT KIGALI AIRPORT AS A NEUTRAL ZONE UNDER THE CONTROL OF UNAMIR;
-- 11. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING WORK;
-- 12. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
B
--
DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,
ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED

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NATIONS,
13. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL PREVENT THE SALE OR SUPPLY TO RWANDA BY THEIR NATIONALS OR FROM THEIR TERRITORIES OR USING THEIR FLAG VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT, PARAMILITARY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS;
14. DECIDES ALSO TO ESTABLISH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 28 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSISTING
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR EXPANSION
OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO UNDERTAKE THE FOLLOWING TASKS AND TO REPORT ON ITS WORK TO THE COUNCIL WITH ITS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- A) TO SEEK FROM ALL STATES INFORMATION REGARDING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THEM CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE;
-- B) TO CONSIDER ANY INFORMATION BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION BY STATES CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO, AND IN THAT CONTEXT TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL ON WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMBARGO;
-- C) TO RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE EMBARGO IMPOSED BY PARAGRAPH 13 ABOVE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO MEMBER STATES;
-- 15. CALLS UPON ALL STATES, INCLUDING STATES NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ACT STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED OR IMPOSED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR ANY CONTRACT ENTERED INTO OR ANY LICENSE OR PERMIT GRANTED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION;
-- 16. DECIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 15 ABOVE DO NOT APPLY TO ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UNAMIR AND UNOMUR;
-- 17. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMITTEE AND TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECRETARIAT FOR THIS PURPOSE;
C

-- 18. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF

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SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
COMMITTED IN RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT;
-- 19. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND
COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;
-- 20. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN RWANDA UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO
REPORT FURTHER, INCLUDING ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION,
WITHIN FIVE WEEKS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION AND
AGAIN IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE CURRENT
MANDATE OF UNAMIR;
-- 21. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.
10. US EOV, DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH,
FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT OF EOV:
THE CRIES OF THE VICTIMS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN HEARD,
CALLING UPON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT. THE SHEER
MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IN THAT TRAGIC
COUNTRY DEMANDS ACTION. THIS COUNCIL HAS STRUGGLED TO
FORMULATE A RESPONSE THAT IS BOTH APPROPRIATE AND
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002093
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES PHASED UNAMIR
EXPANSION
EFFECTIVE. TO DO SO WE WENT TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTHS
TODAY FOR TWO REASONS:
FIRST--THE UNITED STATES WANTS THE UNITED NATIONS TO
SUCCEED IN RWANDA, AND ALL ITS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS, WE WANT TO BRING THE ENDS AND
MEANS OF THE COUNCIL"S RESOLUTIONS INTO BALANCE.
SECOND--WE BELIEVE THAT THE GUIDELINES OUTLINED IN THIS
COUNCIL'S PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF MAY 3 ARE THE RIGHT
WAY TO EVALUATE THE VIABILITY OF A MISSION, AND WE WANT
TO MAKE SURE THAT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, WE FOLLOW
THAT PROCESS IN OUR DELIBERATIONS
THAT IS WHY IN THE NEXT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
ON RWANDA, I WOULD EXPECT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS TO BE
CLOSELY EXAMINED
- A WELL DEFINED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
- AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES
- CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
- PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE, AND
- THE DURATION OF THE MANDATE
WITH THIS RESOLUTION MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THE COUNCIL
HAS TAKEN THE RIGHT STEPS TO BEGIN TO BRING AID AND HOPE
TO THE INNOCENT VICTIMS. BUT WHATEVER EFFORTS THE
UNITED NATIONS MAY UNDERTAKE, THE TRUE KEY TO THE

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PROBLEMS IN RWANDA IS IN THE HANDS OF THE RWANDESE PEOPLE. THE KILLING MUST STOP, NOT ONLY BETWEEN ARMED COMBATANTS BUT ESPECIALLY THE MASSACRES OF UNARMED CIVILIANS WHICH ALREADY HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS. FURTHER, THE PARTIES MUST CONSENT TO UNIMPEDED UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, AND REFUGEES.
IN THIS REGARD, MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS CRITICAL THAT ALL PARTIES RESPECT ABSOLUTELY THE INVIOLABILITY OF UN PERSONNEL AND PEACEKEEPERS. IF THE PARTIES CAN DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO MEET THESE SIMPLE BUT VITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, THAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO HELP.
MR. PRESIDENT, THE SITUATION IN RWANDA IS HORRIFYING, DIFFICULT AND STILL VERY MUCH IN FLUX. THE RESOLUTION WE HAVE ADOPTED TODAY RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY FOR BOTH A RAPID AND CONTINUALLY REFINED RESPONSE TO BEST DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. WE HOPE THE COUNCIL'S ACTION WILL BE THE IMPETUS TO CONVINCE THE PARTIES TO END THE BLOODSHED IMMEDIATELY. IF NOT, WE WILL LOOK TO FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON HOW BEST TO CARRY OUT TODAY'S DECISION. IN THIS SPIRIT OF HOPE MEASURED WITH CONCERN, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS TODAY'S ACTIONS OF THE COUNCIL.
THANK YOU MR. PRESIDENT.
END TEXT OF EOV.
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→ Rwanda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-May-1994 08:08 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:
VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SCHWARTZ@A1@OEOB
RICE@A1@OEOB
DESHAZER@A1@OEOB

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: RWANDA CRISIS: THE NEXT STEP

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SIT: DESHAZER RICE SCHWARTZ VAX
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AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4756
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1703
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0105
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 4580
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0700
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0176
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0552
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8728
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4778
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1325
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0426
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1136
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0280
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1019
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RWANDA CRISIS: THE NEXT STEP
<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAR ES SALAAM 003106
STATE FOR AF/C AND AF/E
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: RWANDA CRISIS: THE NEXT STEP

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE GOT PLANS ANOTHER EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE KILLING IN RWANDA. IT INTENDS TO CONVENE ANOTHER ARUSHA SESSION MAY 27-29. HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO THE RPF AND GOR, IT HOPES TO BRING TOGETHER THE REGIONAL PRESIDENTS (KENYA, UGANDA, ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA) AS WELL AS RWANDAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS, UN AND OAU KEY OFFICIALS AND, OF COURSE, THE NEW BROADER "OBSERVER" GROUP. (BURUNDI WILL BE INVOLVED BUT NOT, APPARENTLY, IN THE PERSON OF ITS CHIEF OF STATE). FONMIN RWEGASIRA DEPARTED TODAY FOR KAMPALA, KINSHASA, LUSAKA AND NAIROBI TO COORDINATE THE INITIATIVE.
3. IN A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS ARUSHA EFFORTS, IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE GOT IS BRINGING REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE RWANDAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL PARTIES (MDR, PL, ETC) AND OTHERS WITH A POTENTIAL ROLE IN A LONG-TERM SOLUTION SUCH AS CHURCH LEADERS. THE PRESENCE OF THE FIVE REGIONAL PRESIDENTS, ASSUMING THAT MOBUTU SHOWS, WOULD ALSO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT IN MOVING THE RWANDAN ANTAGONISTS TO END THE VIOLENCE.
4. THE ARUSHA MEETING WILL HAVE FOUR BASIC OBJECTIVES:
A.) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE
B.) A COMMITMENT FROM THE WARRING PARTIES TO STOP THE KILLINGS AND MASSACRES
C.) A COMMITMENT FROM ALL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS
D.) THE SETTING UP OF INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
5. COMMENT: THE GOT HAS ONCE AGAIN UNDERTAKEN TO MOVE TO BRING AN END TO THE SENSELESS MAYHEM IN RWANDA. THIS EFFORT IS MORE THAN JUST SUMMONING THE RPF AND GOR TO SIGN A PIECE OF PAPER--AND HAS A FAR GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESS TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD THAN EARLIER ARUSHA MEETINGS THIS YEAR. BECAUSE OF THIS POSSIBILITY, IT IS EMMINENTLY SENSIBLE THAT AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON, WITH HIS UNIQUE BACKGROUND AND INTIMATE INVOLVEMENT WITH ALL THE PLAYERS, ENGAGE DIRECTLY ONCE AGAIN IN THE ARUSHA PROCESS AS THE U.S. OBSERVER.
6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IO/PHO:DEJENSEN:DEJ
05/25/94 6-7937 SEPKA 522
IO:GWARD

IO/PHO:JBRIMS
IO/UNP:SZELLE
P:EBRIMMER
JCS:

PM/ISP:TGRANT
AF/C:KAISTON
OSD:
NSC:

AF, IO, INR, P, PM

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: UN REQUEST FOR APC DATA

REF: UN REQUEST OF 5/12/94 TO USUN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3 BELOW TO THE UN SECRETARIAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THESE TALKING POINTS ARE IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST MADE TO US BY THE UN EARLIER THIS MONTH FOR PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA FOR THE SALE OR LEASE OF 50 TRACKED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCS) FOR UNAMIR TROOPS AUTHORIZED UNDER UNSCR 918 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA TO ASSIST WITH HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS. THE USG TEAM OF EXPERTS WILL BRING A MORE DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF OUR PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA WHEN THEY MEET WITH THE SECRETARIAT ON FRIDAY, MAY 27.

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- THE USG WANTS TO REMAIN SUPPORTIVE OF THE UN EFFORTS IN RWANDA.

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2011-0263-M
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-- IT IS OUR MILITARY JUDGMENT, HOWEVER, THAT FOR THE MISSION THAT THE UN IS UNDERTAKING, IT WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY USING WHEELED APCS.

-- WHEELED VEHICLES ARE LESS EXPENSIVE TO PURCHASE, WOULD REDUCE THE COST OF TRANSPORT, AND ARE LESS EXPENSIVE AND EASIER TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THAN TRACKED VEHICLES.

-- THEY ARE FASTER AND PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL OF PROTECTION AGAINST THE LIGHTLY ARMED FORCES THAT THEY WOULD ENCOUNTER IN RWANDA.

-- WITH WHEELED VEHICLES, THERE WOULD BE A DECREASE IN THE NECESSARY TRAINING PERIOD FOR THE GHANAIANS, NIGERIANS, AND SENEGALESE, WHO ARE ALL EXPERIENCED WITH WHEELED APCS.

-- WHEELED VEHICLES, AS OPPOSED TO TRACKED, WOULD ALSO NOT DESTROY THE RWANDAN ROAD SYSTEM.

-- IF YOU DECIDE TO REQUEST THE WHEELED VEHICLES, THERE ARE MANY SOURCES. BESIDES THE COUNTRIES (AT LEAST 36) WHO USE WHEELED APCS, THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES WHO COULD PROVIDE THE APCS. THIS WOULD PROBABLY COST SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN WHAT WE WOULD ASK FOR TRACKED APCS.

-- NEVERTHELESS, IF YOU REQUEST TO PURCHASE THE 50 TRACKED APCS, WE ARE PROVIDING YOU WITH THE COST DATA NECESSARY TO MAKE YOUR DECISION.

-- THE USG WOULD GREATLY PREFER TO SELL THE APCS AS OPPOSED TO LEASING THEM TO YOU.

-- FURTHERMORE, IF YOU ARE TO RECEIVE THE TRACKED APCS FROM THE USG, WE MUST INSIST THAT YOU PURCHASE, UP FRONT, THE SPARE PARTS PACKAGE NECESSARY TO KEEP THE VEHICLES RUNNING FOR THE MINIMUM OF THE TEN MONTHS THAT THE MISSION IS EXPECTED TO TAKE.

-- AS YOU CAN SEE, PURCHASING THE 50 TRACKED APCS FROM THE USG WILL COST ABOUT 20 MILLION US DOLLARS. THE COST ESTIMATE INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE REQUIRED SPARE PARTS BUT ALSO TRANSPORT AND TRAINING. THE PACKAGE WOULD COST LESS IF YOU CONTRACT OUT OR HAVE ANOTHER NATION PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TRAINING AND TRANSPORT.

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-- {NOTE: IF THE UN IS UNWILLING TO PURCHASE, A LEASE WOULD COST APPROXIMATELY 15 MILLION US DOLLARS FOR TEN MONTHS. THE SPARE PARTS PACKAGE IS A REQUIRED PURCHASE REGARDLESS OF LEASE OR PURCHASE.}

-- TO PREPARE THE VEHICLES FOR USE BY THE UN AND TRANSPORT THEM TO RWANDA, IT WOULD TAKE THE USG A MINIMUM OF FIVE WEEKS FROM WHEN WE SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU. THIS TIME FRAME DOES NOT INCLUDE TRAINING WHICH, AS WE ALREADY SAID, WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FOR TROOPS UNFAMILIAR WITH TRACKED M113S. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE (WE) 05.25. '94 14:35 NO. 1460120139 PAGE 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: DESHAZER, RICE, SUET, VAX

PREC: PRIORITY **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**250631Z MAY 94

FM: AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4451

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0598
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0009
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0050
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0014
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3204
RUEHPM/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 5469
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 4239
RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/J5//
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 7379
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 8113
ZEN/AMCONSUL BRISBANE
ZEN/AMCONSUL PERTH

********** INCOMPLETE MESSAGE **********

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CANBERRA 02866
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UN, RW, AS
SUBJECT: RWANDA PEACEKEEPING - AUSTRALIAN DEFMIN RAISES - MORE DOUBTS
REF: A) CANBERRA 2812, B) CANBERRA 2654, C) CANBERRA 2592 D) FBIS BK2405070894 (NOTAL)

1. (U) SUMMARY: AUSTRALIAN DEFMIN RAY TOLD A SENATE COMMITTEE MAY 24 THAT THE GOA WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO RWANDA IF A U.N. PROPOSAL FOR THEIR DEPLOYMENT FAILS TO ADDRESS KEY CRITERIA, NOTABLY THEIR SECURITY AND A CLEAR MISSION AND TIMETABLE. UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, RAY SAID, SIGNS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) SENATOR ROBERT RAY, MINISTER FOR DEFENSE, TOLD AN AUSTRALIAN SENATE ESTIMATES COMMITTEE ON MAY 24 THAT U.N. PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING PRECONDITIONS FOR A TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA WAS "NOT...VERY ENCOURAGING...." IN PARTICULAR, RAY SAID, THE GOA IS STILL WAITING FOR THE U.N. TO SET A CLEAR MISSION, DETAIL A TIMETABLE WITH A COMPLETION DATE, AND ESTABLISH "POLITICAL PROCESSES ...FOR A POSSIBLE RESOLUTION" TO THE CONFLICT.

3. (U) THE DEFMIN ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE IT "VERY CLEAR" THAT, OTHER REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE GOA HAD

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2011-0263-M
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MADE NO COMMITMENT TO SEND TROOPS TO RWANDA. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE SAID, SECURITY REMAINS CRUCIAL: "IF I CANNOT BE ASSURED OF PROTECTING THEIR SECURITY, WE DO NOT COMMIT."
4. (U) SEN. RAY SAID THAT THE U.N. HAD ASKED AUSTRALIA TO CONTRIBUTE SOME 300 TROOPS, INCLUDING MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICERS, COMMUNICATORS, ENGINEERS, AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL. THE DEFMIN PROJECTED THAT AN AUSTRALIAN FORCE OF 180 ENGINEERS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROTECTED BY A AN ACCOMPANYING RIFLE COMPANY.
5. (LOU) COMMENT: FOREIGN MINISTER GARETH EVANS HAS ALWAYS PREDICATED A SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE (REFS A-C) ON THE U.N. MOUNTING A MILITARILY ROBUST AND POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS OPERATION -- SOMETHING THE AUSSIES APPEAR TO HAVE CONCLUDED THE U.N. IS INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING AT THIS TIME. IN THE DEFMIN'S WORDS, "THERE WERE PROBABLY TWO BROAD PLANS PUT TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEY HAVE CHOSEN A MIDDLE COURSE PROBABLY TAKING THE WORST ASPECTS OF BOTH PLANS....THERE IS NO POINT GOING IN FOR SUPPOSEDLY HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND THINKING YOU CAN DO A BIT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT ON THE SIDE. YOU CANNOT."
6. (C) THE AUSTRALIAN ARMED FORCES OPERATE UNDER GUIDELINES THAT, ORDINARILY, NO MORE THAN 200 MEN SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AT ANY ONE TIME. WITH AUSTRALIANS IN SOMALIA, MOZAMBIQUE, CYPRUS AND ELSEWHERE, THIS LIMIT WOULD IMMEDIATELY BRING INTO DOUBT AN OPERATION IN RWANDA OF THE SCALE REQUESTED BY THE U.N. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE UNDERSTAND THAT RAY'S MILITARY EXPERTS HAVE ADVISED HIM THAT THE RWANDAN OPERATION IS NOT SOUND AS CONFIGURED AND, AS SUCH, THE GOA SHOULD NOT TAKE PART. PERKINS
BT
#2866
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FROM:
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DIST: DESHAZER, RICE, VAX

PREC: PRIORITY **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**251225Z MAY 94

FM: AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4828

RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0116
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 6048
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0293
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 1232
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1334
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0270
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 4594
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8737
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4789
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1168
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0116
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0437
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6662
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0705
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 4522
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0006

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAR ES SALAAM 003285
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TZ, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA CRISIS: HAZY NEXT STEP
REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3246
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN THE AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALLS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI AND FOREIGN MINISTER RWEGASIRA, THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION WAS RWANDA. BOTH MEN WERE DISAPPOINTED AT THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS, THE CONTINUED WARFARE AND MASSACRES, AND THE PERSONALITY CONFLICTS AMONG REGIONAL LEADERS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY PLEDGED, TANZANIA WOULD PERSEVERE IN ITS EFFORTS TO FORGE A LASTING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
3. THE LATEST TANZANIAN THINKING APPEARS TO BE THAT WHATEVER EVOLVES ON THE GROUND MILITARILY IN RWANDA, A CONTINUED NEED EXISTS TO ARRANGE A REGIONAL SUMMIT TO BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION. BOTH ZAIRE'S MOBUTU [redacted] EO 13526 1.4d [redacted] THE GOT IS READY TO CEDE TO MOBUTU'S REQUEST THAT THE ZAIREAN PRESIDENT PRESIDE IN ZAIRE

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(KINSHASA, KISANGANI OR GBADOLITE, BUT DEFINITELY NOT GOMA) OVER THE SUMMIT. ZAMBIA'S CHILUBA IS ALSO ABOARD [EO 13526 1.4d] KENYA'S MOI IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE. THE TANZANIAN LEADERS HAVE ASKED THE U.S. TO APPLY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE [redacted]

[redacted]

THEY HOPED THE SUMMIT COULD OCCUR JUNE 5, AND HAD ENCOURAGED MOBUTU TO ISSUE THE INVITATIONS. THEY THOUGHT MOI MIGHT AGREE, BUT DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED IF HE DID NOT.

4. THE TANZANIAN LEADERS ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADOR'S POINT THAT A SUMMIT WOULD NOT BY ITSELF STOP THE MAYHEM, BUT THEY ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THE RPF WERE TO DOMINATE MILITARILY IT COULD NOT GOVERN FOR LONG IF THERE WERE NO REGIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME. OTHERWISE, EITHER MOBUTU'S AID FOR THE GOR [redacted] WOULD SPOIL ANY ATTEMPTS FOR LASTING PEACE.

5. IN A SHIFT OF POSITION, THE TANZANIANS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD WAS NO LONGER APPLICABLE, AND CERTAIN PARTS WOULD HAVE TO BE RENEGOTIATED BASED ON THE UPHEAVALS IN RWANDA SINCE APRIL 6. THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE A NEW PACKAGE WOULD BE HANDED TO THE FACILITATOR (MWINYI) TO ACCOMPLISH.

6. COMMENT: THE TANZANIANS UNDERSTAND THE FRAILTY OF THE SUCCESS FOR THEIR QUEST FOR A RWANDA SETTLEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THEY ARE UNABLE TO INFLUENCE DIRECTLY EVENTS ON THE GROUND, THUS LEAVING CEASE-FIRE FOR THE UN TO ARRANGE WHILE PUTTING THEIR BEST EFFORTS FORWARD TO PUSH MOBUTU [redacted] TOWARDS REGIONAL COOPERATION.

7. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DE VOS

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ROUTINE CAIRO, ACCRA, SECDEF WASHDC, JOINT STAFF WASHDC,
RUSNNOA/UNCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MOPS, MASS, RW, GH, EG

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR UN TO ASK EGYPT TO PROVIDE APC TRAINING FOR GHANAIAN REINFORCEMENTS TO UNAMIR

REF: (A) USUN NEW YORK 2268, (B) BONN _____

1. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

2. ~~(C)~~ MISSION IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE UN OFFICIALS AND SUGGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ASK EGYPT TO PROVIDE OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING ON (OSD OR JCS FILL IN THE NAME/NUMBER OF APC IN QUESTION) TRACKED ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO GHANAIAN FORCES PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPLOYMENT TO UNAMIR IN RWANDA.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE POSSIBILITY SUCH TRAINING OF GHANAIANS IN EGYPT WAS FIRST RAISED ON THE MARGINS OF MAY 26 DISCUSSIONS ON RWANDA WITH UN OFFICIALS (REFTEL). TRAINING IN EGYPT WOULD BE PREFERABLE DUE TO ITS RELATIVE PROXIMITY TO RWANDA; EQYPT'S EXPERIENCE OPERATING AND MAINTAINING SIMILAR APC'S; AND EGYPT'S STATUS AS A LEADING MEMBER OF THE OAU.

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ARE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

3. (U) BEGIN SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:

-- AT THE MAY 26 MEETING ON RWANDA BETWEEN A U.S. INTERAGENCY TEAM AND UN OFFICIALS, WE DISCUSSED OPTIONS FOR PROVIDING OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING ON ____ ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIES FOR GHANAIAN TROOPS SERVING WITH UNAMIR.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE ESTIMATE IT COULD TAKE FROM 5-6 WEEKS TO IDENTIFY, REFURBISH AND SHIP THE APC'S TO RWANDA ONCE A SALE OR LEASE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

-- WHILE WE WILL TRY TO ACCELERATE THIS DELIVERY SCHEDULE, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE APC'S TO UNAMIR.

-- IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT THIS DELAY HAS ON UNAMIR'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT IS VITAL THAT THE GHANAIAN TROOPS RECEIVE THE REQUISITE OPEATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING NOW SO THAT THEY CAN USE THE APC'S AS SOON AS THEY ARRIVE IN RWANDA.

-- OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT OPERATIONAL TRAINING WILL TAKE 7-10 DAYS, AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING WILL TAKE 25-30 DAYS.

-- WE SUGGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND REQUEST THAT THE LATTER PROVIDE THIS TRAINING TO THE GHANAIAN TROOPS.

-- EGYPT IS THE PREFERABLE TRAINING VENUE BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE PROXIMITY TO BOTH GHANA AND RWANDA AND ITS EXPERIENCE IN OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE _____ APC.

-- IN ADDITION, EGYPT IS ONE OF THE LARGEST MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AFRICAN NATIONS TAKE THE LEAD IN DEALING WITH THE RWANDA CRISIS.

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-- WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHE TO EGYPT IN SUPPORT OF A UN REQUEST. IF YOU THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

END SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS. YY

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Rwanda

DTG:
311502Z MAY 94

FROM:
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

DOCNO:
NAIROBI 09554

BODY:
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE, PHUM, MOPS
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD

1. SUMMARY: IN A MAY 31 MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD AND MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION, UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE REQUESTED GREATER U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE FORM OF IMMEDIATE EQUIPMENT AND AIRLIFT SUPPORT. HE CAUTIONED THAT REBUILDING RWANDA WAS NOT A "SHORT-TERM CRUSADE" BUT THAT TAKING ACTION NOW CAN HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND PREVENT EVEN FURTHER DETERIORATION AND LOSS OF LIFE. THE RPF, CONTINUING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, HAS NO INCLINATION TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE. DALLAIRE DOESN'T THINK KENYA PRESIDENT MOI'S RECENTLY ANNOUNCED PEACE INITIATIVE WILL GO ANYWHERE. HE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" OR A CHAPTER SEVEN U.N. OPERATION. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d END SUMMARY

Dallaire requests greater US support

will not accept cease-fire w/o proper follow up

2. ON MAY 31, AID ADMINISTRATOR BRIAN ATWOOD MET WITH UNAMIR COMMANDER MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE AT THE LATTER'S URGENT REQUEST IN THE VIP LOUNGE OF THE NAIROBI AIRPORT TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN RWANDA. DALLAIRE, WHO HAS COMMANDED THE UNAMIR CONTINGENT IN RWANDA SINCE JUST AFTER THE APRIL 6 ASSASSINATION OF THE RWANDA AND BURUNDI PRESIDENTS, WAS TO RETURN TO RWANDA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING. ATWOOD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN, OFDA DIRECTOR BORTON, NSC REPRESENTATIVE MAC DESHAZER, CHARGE SOUTHWICK, ACTING KUSLO CHIEF HAYES, AND POLOFF CASSIDY.

DALLAIRE CALLS FOR US ACTION
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3. DALLAIRE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE MEETING HIS DESIRE FOR A GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA AND HIS FRUSTRATION WITH THE SLOW PACE OF AMERICAN DECISION-MAKING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S.

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NOW WORKED UNDER "DOCUMENT 25" IN ASSIGNING PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL CAPACITY OR DOMINANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. DALLAIRE WAS PLEASED WITH HIS GHANAIAN TROOPS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN (AND BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT THEIR WAY INTO) LIBERIA. TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SENEGAL, BANGLADESH OR ZIMBABWE WOULD BE HELPFUL BUT DALLAIRE WARNED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT TROOPS WITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMENT. HE URGED THAT THE USG PROVIDE EQUIPMENT OR AT LEAST AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO THE NEW FORCE.

SPECIFIC REQUESTS

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4. DALLAIRE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE, WHICH MIGHT HAPPEN WHEN THE RPF "RAN OUT OF STEAM." TROOPS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT. THE INCREASED VOLUME OF RWANDANS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHWEST AREA OF THE COUNTRY, WOULD INCREASE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF FOOD AND POSSIBLY IGNITE MORE MASSACRES ON A MASSIVE SCALE. INTERNATIONAL TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO WORK WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE PEACE AT DISTRIBUTION CENTERS. DALLAIRE SAID THAT THE RED CROSS IS THE ONLY NGO IN CONTROL OF ITS DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEM ALL THE WAY TO THE RECIPIENTS, AND RELATED A STORY WHERE ANOTHER NGO LEFT 4000 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL, WITH OBVIOUS MILITARY APPLICATIONS, UNSUPERVISED.

5. DALLAIRE HAS REQUESTED 5500 TROOPS AS HIS "MINIMUM VIABLE" NUMBER. HE HOPES THE FORCE WILL BE COMPRISED PRIMARILY OF AFRICANS BUT SAID NORTH AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WELCOMED BY BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONTEMPLATING SENDING A COMMUNICATIONS UNIT. DALLAIRE ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST USING "LOCAL" TROOPS LIKE KENYANS AND ETHIOPIANS, WHOSE COUNTRIES WOULD LIKELY BE INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE USE OF ETHIOPIAN TROOPS, WHO ARE NILOTIC LIKE THE TUTSIS. HE PREDICTED HE WOULD NOT HAVE TROOPS IN RWANDA FOR TWO MONTHS, PARTLY DUE TO USG "STALLING."

6. DALLAIRE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" GIVEN RWANDA'S MIXED-UP ETHNIC MAP, SAYING THAT ONLY THE BAD GUYS -- THOSE INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN MASSACRES -- COULD

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REACH SUCH HAVENS, JUST AS MANY RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVILIAN MASSACRES EARLY IN THE FIGHTING FLED TO TANZANIA WHEN THE RPF ADVANCED SOUTHWARD TOWARDS RUSUMU. IN RESPONSE TO AN ATWOOD QUESTION ABOUT TERMS OF REFERENCE, DALLAIRE SAID THAT A UN CHAPTER SEVEN "PEACEMAKING" PROVISION WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. A CHAPTER SIX OPERATION WOULD AUTHORIZE TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND UN INSTALLATIONS LIKE CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED. THE PROVISION ON "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" COULD BE USED TO HELP GAIN ACCESS TO AREAS CUT OFF BY ROADBLOCKS. DALLAIRE RELATED HOW EVEN NOW HIS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS HAVE TRAVELED WIDELY THROUGHOUT RWANDA, IN ONE INSTANCE MOVING SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH 13 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ROADBLOCKS ON THE ROAD FROM BUTARE TO CYANGUGU.

D favors Chapter 6

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED

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7. DALLAIRE SAID THAT WHEN THE FIGHTING STARTED IN EARLY APRIL, THERE WERE ALREADY 273,000 REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN RWANDA (MAINLY HUTUS FROM BURUNDI) AND 500,000 DISPLACED BY THE LAST WAR STILL IN NORTHERN RWANDA SOUTH OF THE DMZ. TENSION HAD BEEN RISING DUE TO BAD CROP CONDITIONS AND THE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES. A MAJOR PROBLEM NOW IS THE WAVE OF DISPLACED HUTUS FLEEING THE RPF ADVANCE, PERHAPS AS MANY AS 1 MILLION ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE, CAUSED IN LARGE PART BY A GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH WARNS HUTUS THAT THEY WILL BE SLAUGHTERED BY THE RPF, AND BY WIDELY HELD HUTU VIEWS OF THE SUPERIOR QUALITIES OF TUTSIS.

DPD blames RPF adv

8. THE 3 MILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SOUTHWEST RWANDA ARE BEING "SQUEEZED" BY THE RPF ADVANCE. ASKED BY ATWOOD WHETHER THESE DISPLACED COULD SPILL OVER INTO BURUNDI OR ZAIRE, DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT IT WAS A POSSIBILITY BUT THAT A RIVER PREVENTED EASY ENTRY INTO BURUNDI, AND A LARGE FOREST BARRED THE WAY INTO ZAIRE.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

D thinks Burundian army will hit on refugs

MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

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9. SINCE BOTH SIDES ARE STILL RECRUITING AND THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN PARTICULAR HAVE EXPERIENCED DESERTIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKES ESTIMATES OF TROOP STRENGTH. GIVEN THAT CAVEAT, DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF MAY NOW HAVE 30,000 TO 35,000 TROOPS IN THE FIELD,

D says RPF strength 30-35,000

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WITH ITS BEST SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT. IN CONTRAST, THE GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES HAVE SOME 34,000 TROOPS, THOUGH SOME OF THESE ARE RECENT RECRUITS ONLY GIVEN TWO WEEKS TRAINING PRIOR TO BEING THROWN INTO BATTLE. DALLAIRE BELIEVES BIZIMUNGU, THE CURRENT RWANDA ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AS THE RPF ADVANCES, AND IS PROVIDING THE GITARAMA-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH SOME BADLY-NEEDED HONEST INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. THE HUTU MILITIAS AND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE STILL "OUT OF CONTROL" IN MANY AREAS BUT ARE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PLAN AND ARE COUNTED ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT REGULARS, AS IS THE 6000-MAN GENDARMERIE, WHICH DALLAIRE THINKS IS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE SINCE IT ORIGINALLY INCLUDED MANY TUTSI.

GOR
34,000

GOR Army CO's becoming mod admit militia out of control

THE RPF-UGANDA CONNECTION

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10. UNAMIR CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE UGANDA BORDER BY HELICOPTER FOR EVIDENCE THAT THE RPF IS RECEIVING SUPPLIES FROM UGANDA. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF SIGNIFICANT ARMS OR MATERIEL SHIPMENTS ACROSS THE BORDER. DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT MUSSEVENI WANTS THE RPF OUT OF UGANDA SINCE THEY ARE A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR HIM, BUT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT WAS PROVISIONING RPF TROOPS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY. WHILE RPF CERTAINLY HAS SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDA MILITARY AND UNAMIR HAS SEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CROSSING THE BORDER OR AN OCCASIONAL TRUCK OF SUPPLIES, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL CROSS-BORDER SHIPMENTS.

11. DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF GETS MUCH OF ITS MATERIEL FROM FLEEING GOVERNMENT TROOPS. ASKED BY AMBASSADOR SHINN WHETHER UNAMIR WAS ABLE TO TRACK SHIPMENTS FROM UGANDA, DALLAIRE SAID THAT UNAMIR HELICOPTERS WOULD NOTICE SIGNIFICANT SHIPMENTS, AS THEY HAD PRIOR TO THE WAR. DALLAIRE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THE RPF WAS GETTING WEAPONS FROM THE BURUNDIAN MILITARY. ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING MATERIEL FROM ABROAD, DALLAIRE CONFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE VERY SHORT OF AMMUNITION BUT COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THEY RECEIVED ANY SHIPMENTS FROM OUTSIDE.

BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITY

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12. THE RPF HAVE SO FAR MANAGED TO TAKE THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY INCLUDING HALF OF THE CAPITAL CITY,

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THE ENTIRE TANZANIAN BORDER AND MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S BORDERS WITH UGANDA AND BURUNDI. RWANDA GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ALLIED MILITIAS MAINTAIN SOME CONTROL OVER OTHER PARTS. THE RPF IS PUTTING FURTHER PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES FROM THE EAST IN KIGALI AND FROM THE SOUTH IN GITARAMA. THE RPF HAS JUST CUT THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN GITARAMA AND BUTARE. THERE ARE STILL STRONG POCKETS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY AROUND GISENYI AND RUHENGERI IN THE NORTHWEST AND IN THE CYANGUGU AREA OF SOUTHWEST RWANDA. THESE AREAS, ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE, CONTAIN SOME OF THE MOST EXTREMIST HUTU FORCES, WHILE MORE MODERATE HUTUS CONTROL THE REGION AROUND BUTARE TO THE BURUNDI BORDER.

13. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT THE FIGHT FOR KIGALI WAS NOT OVER, SINCE THE HEART OF DOWNTOWN AND SIGNIFICANT POCKETS WERE HELD BY GOVERNMENT FORCES AND HUTU MILITIAS CONTROLLED TRACTS OF THE CITY'S SOUTHWEST. THE ONLY PLACE A TRUCE APPEARED TO APPLY WAS ALONG THE ROAD THROUGH KIGALI. THE RPF ASSAULT THREATENING THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN KIGALI AND GITARAMA WAS A WORRY, DALLAIRE SAID; CUT OFF FROM THEIR LINE OF ESCAPE TO THE CAPITAL OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN GITARAMA, SURROUNDED GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA TROOPS MIGHT DECIDE TO FIGHT TO THE LAST IN THE CITY.

ATROCITIES AND RPF REPRISALS

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14. RPF LEADER KAGEME TOLD DALLAIRE THAT HE WANTS TO GET THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES "IN HIS SIGHTS OR IN COURT" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE. THE SOUTHERN RWANDA TOWN OF BUTARE IS A GOOD EXAMPLE, SAID DALLAIRE. THE AREA WAS LARGELY QUIET UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT CHANGED THE LOCAL COMMANDER, AFTER WHICH UNAMIR STARTED RECEIVING REPORTS OF MASSACRES. DALLAIRE CAUTIONED THAT THE RPF WERE NOT SAINTS BUT WERE MORE "SMOOTH" THAN THE GOVERNMENT. AMONG MANY FOREIGNERS THERE IS A BIT OF NAIVETE ABOUT THE RPF, DALLAIRE SAID, AND MANY NGO'S MIGHT BE ACCUSED OF ASSISTING THEM. THE RPF EVEN BLOCKS HIS RECONNAISANCE TROOPS ON OCCASION, AND ADMITS FRANKLY ITS POLICY OF EXECUTING THOSE IT SAYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES, WHICH DALLAIRE CALLED "TRIAGE."

CHANCES FOR A CEASEFIRE

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15. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS WANTED A CEASEFIRE SINCE APRIL 15 BUT THE RPF IS MAKING TOO MUCH PROGRESS ON THE

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BATTLEFIELD NOW. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT THE STAFF LEVEL (DALLAIRE SAID THE LAST SESSION WAS MAY 30) BUT THE RPF CONTINUES TO DEMAND PROOF OF PROGRESS ON THREE FRONTS -- AN END TO THE MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS, AN END TO INCITEFUL GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS ACROSS BATTLE LINES. PRESSED ON THE POINT BY SHINN, DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT THE RPF HAD LITTLE INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE NOW.

16. THE UPCOMING JUNE 6 MEETING OF REGIONAL AFRICAN LEADERS IN NAIROBI CALLED BY PRESIDENT MOI WILL ONLY

RESULT IN "POSTURING" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE (NOTE: PRESIDENT MOI TOLD ATWOOD DELEGATION EARLIER MAY 31 THAT SO FAR HE HAD NOT/NOT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT MOBUTU WOULD ATTEND). THE GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLED BY HUTU EXTREMISTS AND REJECTS RPF CONTROL OF 50 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY. THE RPF FIGHTS ON, REFUSING TO TALK WITH THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. FOR GENUINE PEACE TALKS TO OCCUR, DALLAIRE OPINED, A NEW GROUP OF HUTU MODERATES MUST EMERGE FROM THE REMAINING HUTU CIVILIAN MODERATES (NOW MOSTLY ABROAD IN PARIS OR BRUSSELS), AND HUTU MODERATES IN THE MILITARY. IN PRIVATE, DALLAIRE WAS TOLD THAT THE COUNTRY'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CALL FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO STEP DOWN, BUT HE CAUTIONED US TO KEEP THAT INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL (PLEASE PROTECT).

no confirmation Mob will attend

17. WHEN ASKED BY SHINN FOR HIS BOTTOM LINE MESSAGE TO THE USG, DALLAIRE REPLIED "SEND THE EQUIPMENT TO PUT THE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON THE GROUND LAST (SIC) WEEK." WITHOUT US EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR CAN DO VIRTUALLY NOTHING. UNAMIR ALSO NEEDS STRATEGIC LIFT FROM THE U.S. SOUTHWICK##

SUBJECT:

SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SUM, SUM2, TT1, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**311502Z MAY 94

FM: AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9795

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2492
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 1355
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1561
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0452
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1519
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0931
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2218
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0119
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0028
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0442
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 1590
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0443
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0788

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
ROME AND GENEVA FOR AID AMINSTRATOR ATWOOD AND AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE, PHUM, MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD
1. SUMMARY: IN A MAY 31 MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD AND MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION, UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE REQUESTED GREATER U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE FORM OF IMMEDIATE EQUIPMENT AND AIRLIFT SUPPORT. HE CAUTIONED THAT REBUILDING RWANDA WAS NOT A "SHORT-TERM CRUSADE" BUT THAT TAKING ACTION NOW CAN HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND PREVENT EVEN FURTHER DETERIORATION AND LOSS OF LIFE. THE RPF, CONTINUING TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, HAS NO INCLINATION TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE. DALLAIRE DOESN'T THINK KENYA PRESIDENT MOI'S RECENTLY ANNOUNCED PEACE INITIATIVE WILL GO ANYWHERE. HE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" OR A CHAPTER SEVEN U.N. OPERATION. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
[ ] END SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

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2011-0263-M
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2. ON MAY 31, AID ADMINISTRATOR BRIAN ATWOOD MET WITH UNAMIR COMMANDER MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE AT THE LATTER'S URGENT REQUEST IN THE VIP LOUNGE OF THE NAIROBI AIRPORT TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN RWANDA. DALLAIRE, WHO HAS COMMANDED THE UNAMIR CONTINGENT IN RWANDA SINCE JUST AFTER THE APRIL 6 ASSASSINATION OF THE RWANDA AND BURUNDI PRESIDENTS, WAS TO RETURN TO RWANDA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING. ATWOOD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/E DIRECTOR SHINN, OFDA DIRECTOR BORTON, NSC REPRESENTATIVE MAC DESHAZER, CHARGE SOUTHWICK, ACTING KUSLO CHIEF HAYES, AND POLOFF CASSIDY.

DALLAIRE CALLS FOR US ACTION

3. DALLAIRE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE MEETING HIS DESIRE FOR A GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA AND HIS FRUSTRATION WITH THE SLOW PACE OF AMERICAN DECISION-MAKING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. NOW WORKED UNDER "DOCUMENT 25" IN ASSIGNING PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL CAPACITY OR DOMINANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. DALLAIRE WAS PLEASED WITH HIS GHANAIAN TROOPS, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN (AND BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT THEIR WAY INTO) LIBERIA. TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SENEGAL, BANGLADESH OR ZIMBABWE WOULD BE HELPFUL BUT DALLAIRE WARNED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT TROOPS WITHOUT PROPER EQUIPMENT. HE URGED THAT THE USG PROVIDE EQUIPMENT OR AT LEAST AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO THE NEW FORCE.

SPECIFIC REQUESTS

4. DALLAIRE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT AND MONITOR AN EVENTUAL CEASEFIRE, WHICH MIGHT HAPPEN WHEN THE RPF "RAN OUT OF STEAM." TROOPS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT. THE INCREASED VOLUME OF RWANDANS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHWEST AREA OF THE COUNTRY, WOULD INCREASE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF FOOD AND POSSIBLY IGNITE MORE MASSACRES ON A MASSIVE SCALE. INTERNATIONAL TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO WORK WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE PEACE AT DISTRIBUTION CENTERS.
DALLAIRE SAIDTCXXCQGQFIQHE ONLY NGO IN CONTROL
OF ITS DISTRIBUTION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
CORRECTEDCOPY
(ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR.ADDED)
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
PARIS FOR PERLOW
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SYSTEM ALL THE WAY TO THE RECIPIENTS, AND RELATED A STORY WHERE ANOTHER NGO LEFT 4000 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL, WITH OBVIOUS MILITARY APPLICATIONS, UNSUPERVISED.
5. DALLAIRE HAS REQUESTED 5500 TROOPS AS HIS "MINIMUM VIABLE" NUMBER. HE HOPES THE FORCE WILL BE COMPRISED PRIMARILY OF AFRICANS BUT SAID NORTH AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WELCOMED BY BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONTEMPLATING SENDING A COMMUNICATIONS UNIT. DALLAIRE ALSO CAUTIONED AGAINST USING "LOCAL" TROOPS LIKE KENYANS AND ETHIOPIANS, WHOSE COUNTRIES WOULD LIKELY BE INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE USE OF ETHIOPIAN TROOPS, WHO ARE NILOTIC LIKE THE TUTSIS. HE PREDICTED HE WOULD NOT HAVE TROOPS IN RWANDA FOR TWO MONTHS, PARTLY DUE TO USG "STALLING."
6. DALLAIRE REJECTED THE IDEA OF "SAFE HAVENS" GIVEN RWANDA'S MIXED-UP ETHNIC MAP, SAYING THAT ONLY THE BAD GUYS – THOSE INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN MASSACRES – COULD REACH SUCH HAVENS, JUST AS MANY RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVILIAN MASSACRES EARLY IN THE FIGHTING FLED TO TANZANIA WHEN THE RPF ADVANCED SOUTHWARD TOWARDS RUSUMU. IN RESPONSE TO AN ATWOOD QUESTION ABOUT TERMS OF REFERENCE, DALLAIRE SAID THAT A UN CHAPTER SEVEN "PEACEMAKING" PROVISION WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. A CHAPTER SIX OPERATION WOULD AUTHORIZE TROOPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND UN INSTALLATIONS LIKE CAMPS FOR THE DISPLACED. THE PROVISION ON "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" COULD BE USED TO HELP GAIN ACCESS TO AREAS CUT OFF BY ROADBLOCKS. DALLAIRE RELATED HOW EVEN NOW HIS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS HAVE TRAVELED WIDELY THROUGHOUT RWANDA, IN ONE INSTANCE MOVING SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH 13 GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ROADBLOCKS ON THE ROAD FROM BUTARE TO CYANGUGU.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED

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7. DALLAIRE SAID THAT WHEN THE FIGHTING STARTED IN EARLY APRIL, THERE WERE ALREADY 273,000 REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN RWANDA (MAINLY HUTUS FROM BURUNDI) AND 500,000 DISPLACED BY THE LAST WAR STILL IN NORTHERN RWANDA SOUTH OF THE DMZ. TENSION HAD BEEN RISING DUE TO BAD CROP CONDITIONS AND THE COMPETITION FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES. A MAJOR PROBLEM NOW IS THE WAVE OF DISPLACED HUTUS FLEEING THE RPF ADVANCE, PERHAPS AS MANY AS 1 MILLION ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE, CAUSED IN LARGE PART BY A GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH WARNS HUTUS THAT THEY WILL BE SLAUGHTERED BY THE RPF, AND BY WIDELY HELD HUTU VIEWS OF THE SUPERIOR QUALITIES OF TUTSIS.
8. THE 3 MILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SOUTHWEST RWANDA ARE BEING "SQUEEZED" BY THE RPF ADVANCE. ASKED BY ATWOOD WHETHER THESE DISPLACED COULD SPILL OVER INTO BURUNDI OR ZAIRE, DALLAIRE

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ADMITTED THAT IT WAS A POSSIBILITY BUT THAT A RIVER PREVENTED EASY ENTRY INTO BURUNDI AND A LARGE FOREST BARRED THE WAY INTO ZAIRE. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
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MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

9. SINCE BOTH SIDES ARE STILL RECRUITING AND THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN PARTICULAR HAVE EXPERIENCED DESERTIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKES ESTIMATES OF TROOP STRENGTH. GIVEN THAT CAVEAT, DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF MAY NOW HAVE 30,000 TO 35,000 TROOPS IN THE FIELD, WITH ITS BEST SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT. IN CONTRAST, THE GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES HAVE SOME 34,000 TROOPS, THOUGH SOME OF THESE ARE RECENT RECRUITS ONLY GIVEN TWO WEEKS TRAINING PRIOR TO BEING THROWN INTO BATTLE. DALLAIRE BELIEVES BIZIMUNGU, THE CURRENT RWANDA ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AS THE RPF ADVANCES, AND IS PROVIDING THE GITARAMA-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH SOME BADLY-NEEDED HONEST INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. THE HUTU MILITIAS AND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE STILL "OUT OF CONTROL" IN MANY AREAS BUT ARE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PLAN AND ARE COUNTED ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT REGULARS, AS IS THE 6000-MAN GENDARMERIE, WHICH DALLAIRE THINKS IS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT KIND OF FORCE SINCE IT ORIGINALLY INCLUDED MANY TUTSI.

THE RPF-UGANDA CONNECTION

10. UNAMIR CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE UGANDA BORDER BY HELICOPTER FOR EVIDENCE THAT THE RPF IS RECEIVING SUPPLIES FROM UGANDA. SO FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF SIGNIFICANT ARMS OR MATERIEL SHIPMENTS ACROSS THE BORDER. DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT MUSSEVENI WANTS THE RPF OUT OF UGANDA SINCE THEY ARE A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR HIM, BUT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT WAS PROVISIONING RPF TROOPS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY. WHILE RPF CERTAINLY HAS SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDA MILITARY AND UNAMIR HAS SEEN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CROSSING THE BORDER OR AN OCCASIONAL TRUCK OF SUPPLIES, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL CROSS-BORDER SHIPMENTS.
11. DALLAIRE THINKS THAT THE RPF GETS MUCH OF ITS MATERIEL FROM FLEEING GOVERNMENT TROOPS. ASKED BY

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AMBASSADOR SHINN WHETHER UNAMIR WAS ABLE TO TRACK SHIPMENTS FROM UGANDA, DALLAIRE SAID THAT UNAMIR HELICOPTERS WOULD NOTICE SIGNIFICANT SHIPMENTS, AS THEY HAD PRIOR TO THE WAR. DALLAIRE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THE RPF WAS GETTING WEAPONS FROM THE BURUNDIAN MILITARY. ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING MATERIEL FROM ABROAD, DALLAIRE CONFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE VERY SHORT OF AMMUNITION BUT COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THEY RECEIVED ANY SHIPMENTS FROM OUTSIDE.

BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITY

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12. THE RPF HAVE SO FAR MANAGED TO TAKE THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY INCLUDING HALF OF THE CAPITAL CITY,
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
(ADDRESSEES AND PASSING INSTR. ADDED)
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY
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TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE, PHUM, MOPS
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THE ENTIRE TANZANIAN BORDER AND MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S BORDERS WITH UGANDA AND BURUNDI. RWANDA GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ALLIED MILITIAS MAINTAIN SOME CONTROL OVER OTHER PARTS. THE RPF IS PUTTING FURTHER PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES FROM THE EAST IN KIGALI AND FROM THE SOUTH IN GITARAMA. THE RPF HAS JUST CUT THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN GITARAMA AND BUTARE. THERE ARE STILL STRONG POCKETS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY AROUND GISENYI AND RUHENGERI IN THE NORTHWEST AND IN THE CYANGUGU AREA OF SOUTHWEST RWANDA. THESE AREAS, ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE, CONTAIN SOME OF THE MOST EXTREMIST HUTU FORCES, WHILE MORE MODERATE HUTUS CONTROL THE REGION AROUND BUTARE TO THE BURUNDI BORDER.
13. DALLAIRE STRESSED THAT THE FIGHT FOR KIGALI WAS NOT OVER, SINCE THE HEART OF DOWNTOWN AND SIGNIFICANT POCKETS WERE HELD BY GOVERNMENT FORCES AND HUTU MILITIAS CONTROLLED TRACTS OF THE CITY'S SOUTHWEST. THE ONLY PLACE A TRUCE APPEARED TO APPLY WAS ALONG THE ROAD THROUGH KIGALI. THE RPF ASSAULT THREATENING THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN KIGALI AND GITARAMA WAS A WORRY, DALLAIRE SAID; CUT OFF FROM THEIR LINE OF ESCAPE TO THE CAPITAL OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN GITARAMA, SURROUNDED GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA TROOPS MIGHT DECIDE TO FIGHT TO THE LAST IN THE CITY.

ATROCITIESTND RPF REPRISALS

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14. RPF LEADER KAGEME TOLD DALLAIRE THAT HE WANTS TO GET THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES "IN HIS SIGHTS OR IN COURT" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE. THE SOUTHERN RWANDA

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TOWN OF BUTARE IS A GOOD EXAMPLE, SAID DALLAIRE. THE AREA WAS LARGELY QUIET UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT CHANGED THE LOCAL COMMANDER, AFTER WHICH UNAMIR STARTED RECEIVING REPORTS OF MASSACRES. DALLAIRE CAUTIONED THAT THE RPF WERE NOT SAINTS BUT WERE MORE "SMOOTH" THAN THE GOVERNMENT. AMONG MANY FOREIGNERS THERE IS A BIT OF NAIVETE ABOUT THE RPF, DALLAIRE SAID, AND MANY NGO'S MIGHT BE ACCUSED OF ASSISTING THEM. THE RPF EVEN BLOCKS HIS RECONNAISANCE TROOPS ON OCCASION, AND ADMITS FRANKLY ITS POLICY OF EXECUTING THOSE IT SAYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES, WHICH DALLAIRE CALLED "TRIAGE."

CHANCES FOR A CEASEFIRE

15. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS WANTED A CEASEFIRE SINCE APRIL 15 BUT THE RPF IS MAKING TOO MUCH PROGRESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD NOW. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT THE STAFF LEVEL (DALLAIRE SAID THE LAST SESSION WAS MAY 30) BUT THE RPF CONTINUES TO DEMAND PROOF OF PROGRESS ON THREE FRONTS – AN END TO THE MASSACRES OF CIVILIANS, AN END TO INCITEFUL GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCASTS, AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS ACROSS BATTLE LINES. PRESSED ON THE POINT BY SHINN, DALLAIRE ADMITTED THAT THE RPF HAD LITTLE INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE NOW.

16. THE UPCOMING JUNE 6 MEETING OF REGIONAL AFRICAN LEADERS IN NAIROBI CALLED BY PRESIDENT MOI WILL ONLY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 NAIROBI 09554
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
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PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, MASS, PGOV, RW, KE, PHUM, MOPS
SUBJ: UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PLEADS FOR IMMEDIATE US MILITARY SUPPORT IN MEETING WITH AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD RESULT IN "POSTURING" ACCORDING TO DALLAIRE (NOTE: PRESIDENT MOI TOLD ATWOOD DELEGATION EARLIER MAY 31 THAT SO FAR HE HAD NOT/NOT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT MOBUTU WOULD ATTEND). THE GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLED BY HUTU EXTREMISTS AND REJECTS RPF CONTROL OF 50 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY. THE RPF FIGHTS ON, REFUSING TO TALK WITH THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. FOR GENUINE PEACE TALKS TO OCCUR, DALLAIRE OPINED, A NEW GROUP OF HUTU MODERATES MUST EMERGE FROM THE REMAINING HUTU CIVILIAN MODERATES (NOW MOSTLY ABROAD IN PARIS OR BRUSSELS), AND HUTU MODERATES IN THE MILITARY. IN PRIVATE, DALLAIRE WAS TOLD THAT THE COUNTRY'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CALL FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO STEP DOWN, BUT HE CAUTIONED US TO KEEP THAT INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL (PLEASE PROTECT).

17. WHEN ASKED BY SHINN FOR HIS BOTTOM LINE MESSAGE TO THE USG, DALLAIRE REPLIED "SEND THE EQUIPMENT TO PUT THE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS ON THE GROUND LAST (SIC) WEEK." WITHOUT US EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR CAN DO VIRTUALLY NOTHING.

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UNAMIR ALSO NEEDS STRATEGIC LIFT FROM THE U.S.
SOUTHWICK##
BT
#9554
NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SSN>9554
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<^TOR>940601034235 M1075415

FROM:
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Rwanda

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SUM, SUM2, TT1, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**020101Z JUN 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6857
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1021
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0456
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5139
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1212
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0471
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0587
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0270
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0236

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
REF: STATE 144262
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USG MET WITH KOFI ANNAN THREE TIMES TO DISCUSS THE SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA AND NEXT STEPS. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH ANNAN ON THE 31ST, UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF IN THE MORNING OF THE LST, AND AN INTERAGENCY TEAM IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE LST. IN EACH OF THE MEETINGS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL GAVE PREVIEWS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEXT REPORT. RIZA STATED OPTIMISTICALLY THAT A CEASEFIRE MAY BE ARRANGED VERY SOON. BARIL BRIEFED GENERAL DALLAIRE'S NEW CONCEPT THAT HAS THE FOLLOWING KEY ELEMENTS: THE COMBINING OF PHASE I AND II (DUE TO THE LATE ARRIVAL OF APCS FOR GHANAIAN TROOPS), TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA FROM KIGALI AND

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EITHER UGANDA OR BURUNDI, AND A FLEXIBLE CONCEPT WHERE THE FORCE COMMANDER "PUSHES THROUGH" TO PROTECT THE MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. END SUMMARY.

INDERFURTH MEETING – 31 MAY

3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ANNAN AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF TO DISCUSS RWANDA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL BRIEFED USUN ON THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION BASED ON GENERAL DALLAIRE'S LATEST PLAN. SINCE APCS FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION HAVE NOT ARRIVED AND THEREBY DELAYED PHASE I OF THE OPERATION, THE UN PROPOSED THAT PHASE I AND PHASE II BE COMBINED AND EXECUTED AS SOON AS TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE.

THE MODIFIED UN CONCEPT

4. THE NEW CONCEPT CALLS FOR TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA, ONE THROUGH RPF CONTROLLED KIGALI AIRPORT AND THE OTHER THROUGH KAMPALA OR BUJUMBURA (THE UN LOGISTICS STAFF PREFERS KAMPALA) AND OVERLAND TO KIGALI. ALTHOUGH SIMILAR TO THE USG CONCEPT IN ARRIVING IN RWANDA FROM AN EXTERNAL LOG BASE, THE UN CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE FORCE COMMANDER TO "PUSH HIS WAY THROUGH" ALL THE WAY TO THE CENTRAL TOWN OF GITARAMA, WHICH ACCORDING TO UNAMIR, IS THE CURRENT AREA WITH THE MOST THREATENED POPULATION. IN AREAS SUCH AS GITARAMA, THE UN MISSION WOULD BE TO "PROTECT THREATENED POPULATIONS" AND "HELP MOVE THEM TO SAFE AREAS." GENERAL BARIL STRESSED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE FORCE WOULD "PUSH ITS WAY THROUGH" TO THE MOST AT RISK POPULATIONS, THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD STILL BE OPERATING UNDER CHAP
R VI AND WITH THE FULL CONSENT AND ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES.

5. BARIL SAID THAT THE UN PREFERS TO OPERATE OUT OF TWO ENTRY POINTS SO THAT THEY WILL NOT BE BEHOLDEN TO JUST ONE OF THE FACTIONS. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

USUN CONCERNS

6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED BARIL FOR MORE DETAILS ON THE NEW CONCEPT INCLUDING THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE TO "PUSH THROUGH TO THREATENED AREAS." INDERFURTH ALSO ASKED IF THE UN CONCEPT MIGHT CREATE A SERIES OF "GORAZDE'S" IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. BARIL REMAINED VAGUE, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IS VERY FLUID AND THE COMMANDER MUST BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY. BARIL, NOTING THE DOWN SIDES OF HIS CONCEPT, SAID THAT IN EFFECT, AS PEOPLE MOVED TO AREAS WHERE THEY WERE MORE SAFE, A

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE

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JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
DE-FACTO DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY WAS UNFOLDING. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE UN WAS INADVERTANTLY ASSISTING IN A "CLEANSING" OF THE RESPECTIVE RPF AND GOVERNMENT ZONES.
UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF MEETING
7. ON THE MORNING OF THE LST OF JUNE, KOFI ANNAN ALSO BRIEFED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF ON THE UN'S PENDING REPORT. THE BRIEFING WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH RIZA FURTHER ELABORATING ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. RIZA ASSURED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF THAT THE RPF AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH UN FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR HUMANITARIAN MISSION. RIZA ADDED THAT THERE WERE TWO RPF PRECONDITIONS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT: THE MASSACRES WOULD HAVE TO STOP AND THAT NO KNOWN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES WOULD BE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH REVIEWED THE TIMING OF THE NEXT STEPS AND THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON APCS AND STRATEGIC LIFT INTO THE REGION.
THE INTERAGENCY TEAM MEETING – 1 JUNE
8. AN INTERAGENCY TEAM INCLUDING ADMIRAL BOWMAN FROM JCS, SUSAN RICE FROM NSC, AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON AND JOHN BRIMS FROM STATE, MET WITH ANNAN AND RECEIVED A SIMILAR BRIEF FROM RIZA AND BARIL. ONE CHANGE NOTED BY BARIL WAS THE UN'S CLEAR PREFERENCE TO GET TO KIGALI THROUGH KAMPALA, WHERE THERE WAS MORE INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT CAPABILITY (SUCH AS TRUCKS TO MOVE APCS), AND THE PRESENCE OF A UN MISSION. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

AND REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO OPERATE FROM TWO ENTRY POINTS TO REMAIN UNBEHOLDEN TO ONE PARTICULAR GROUP.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

12. ON EQUIPMENT, THE US TEAM INFORMED THE UN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE LEASING DATA FORWARDED BY FRIDAY FOR THE APCS AND THAT WE WOULD SEEK TO DELIVERY THE VEHICLES IN INSTALLMENTS BUT WITH A COMPLETE SPARES PACKAGE. BARIL REPLIED THAT IN THE INTERIM THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO GET APCS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND EXPECTED A RESPONSE SOON. IN ADDITION, THEY WERE CONSIDERING EXPANDING THE MOVEMENT OF APCS FROM UNOSOM TO RWANDA (5 ARE ALREADY IN KIGALI FROM UNOSOM). THEY PLANNED IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH UNOSOM FORCE COMMANDER ABOO ON THIS ISSUE.
DEMARCHE ON JOINT APPROACH TO UGANDA AND BURUNDI
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
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14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDTA2316 1530101-CCCC--RUEADWW.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 020101Z JUN 94
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
OSRI: RUCNDT
DTG: 020101Z JUN 94
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6857
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO: RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1021
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0456
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5139
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1719
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1212
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0471
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0587
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0270
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0236
SUBJ: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR J5, J3;
SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA
REF: STATE 144262
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USG MET WITH KOFI ANNAN THREE TIMES TO DISCUSS THE SYG'S REPORT ON RWANDA AND NEXT STEPS. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH ANNAN ON THE 31ST, UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF IN THE MORNING OF THE LST, AND AN INTERAGENCY TEAM IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE LST. IN EACH OF THE MEETINGS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL GAVE PREVIEWS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEXT REPORT. RIZA STATED OPTIMISTICALLY THAT A CEASEFIRE MAY BE ARRANGED VERY SOON. BARIL BRIEFED GENERAL DALLAIRE'S NEW CONCEPT THAT HAS THE FOLLOWING KEY ELEMENTS: THE COMBINING OF PHASE I AND II (DUE TO THE LATE ARRIVAL OF APCS FOR GHANAIAN TROOPS), TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA FROM KIGALI AND EITHER UGANDA OR BURUNDI, AND A FLEXIBLE CONCEPT WHERE

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PER E. O. 13526

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

THE FORCE COMMANDER "PUSHES THROUGH" TO PROTECT THE MOST VULNERABLE POPULATION CONCENTRATIONS IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. END SUMMARY.

INDERFURTH MEETING -- 31 MAY

3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ANNAN AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF TO DISCUSS RWANDA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIZA AND SYG MILITARY ADVISOR BARIL BRIEFED USUN ON THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION BASED ON GENERAL DALLAIRE'S LATEST PLAN. SINCE APCS FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION HAVE NOT ARRIVED AND THEREBY DELAYED PHASE I OF THE OPERATION, THE UN PROPOSED THAT PHASE I AND PHASE II BE COMBINED AND EXECUTED AS SOON AS TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE.

THE MODIFIED UN CONCEPT

4. THE NEW CONCEPT CALLS FOR TWO ENTRY POINTS INTO RWANDA, ONE THROUGH RPF CONTROLLED KIGALI AIRPORT AND THE OTHER THROUGH KAMPALA OR BUJUMBURA (THE UN LOGISTICS STAFF PREFERS KAMPALA) AND OVERLAND TO KIGALI. ALTHOUGH SIMILAR TO THE USG CONCEPT IN ARRIVING IN RWANDA FROM AN EXTERNAL LOG BASE, THE UN CONCEPT ENVISIONS THE FORCE COMMANDER TO "PUSH HIS WAY THROUGH" ALL THE WAY TO THE CENTRAL TOWN OF GITARAMA, WHICH ACCORDING TO UNAMIR, IS THE CURRENT AREA WITH THE MOST THREATENED POPULATION. IN AREAS SUCH AS GITARAMA, THE UN MISSION WOULD BE TO "PROTECT THREATENED POPULATIONS" AND "HELP MOVE THEM TO SAFE AREAS." GENERAL BARIL STRESSED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE FORCE WOULD "PUSH ITS WAY THROUGH" TO THE MOST AT RISK POPULATIONS, THE FORCE COMMANDER WOULD STILL BE OPERATING UNDER CHAP
R VI AND WITH THE FULL CONSENT AND
ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES.

5. BARIL SAID THAT THE UN PREFERS TO OPERATE OUT OF TWO ENTRY POINTS SO THAT THEY WILL NOT BE BEHOLDEN TO JUST ONE OF THE FACTIONS. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

USUN CONCERNS

6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH PRESSED BARIL FOR MORE DETAILS ON THE NEW CONCEPT INCLUDING THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE TO "PUSH THROUGH TO THREATENED AREAS." INDERFURTH ALSO ASKED IF THE UN CONCEPT MIGHT CREATE A SERIES OF "GORAZDE'S" IN THE INTERIOR OF RWANDA. BARIL REMAINED VAGUE, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IS VERY FLUID AND THE COMMANDER MUST BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY. BARIL, NOTING THE DOWN SIDES OF HIS CONCEPT, SAID THAT IN EFFECT, AS PEOPLE MOVED TO AREAS WHERE THEY WERE MORE SAFE, A

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002316

DEPT FOR IO/UNP, IO/PHO, AND AF/C;
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
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SECDEF FOR SEWALL
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, RW, UN
SUBJECT: USG MEETINGS WITH KOFI ANNAN ON RWANDA

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DE-FACTO DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY WAS UNFOLDING. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE UN WAS INADVERTANTLY ASSISTING IN A "CLEANSING" OF THE RESPECTIVE RPF AND GOVERNMENT ZONES.

UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF MEETING

7. ON THE MORNING OF THE LST OF JUNE, KOFI ANNAN ALSO BRIEFED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF ON THE UN'S PENDING REPORT. THE BRIEFING WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH RIZA FURTHER ELABORATING ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. RIZA ASSURED UNDERSECRETARY TARNOFF THAT THE RPF AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH UN FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR HUMANITARIAN MISSION. RIZA ADDED THAT THERE WERE TWO RPF PRECONDITIONS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT: THE MASSACRES WOULD HAVE TO STOP AND THAT NO KNOWN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES WOULD BE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH REVIEWED THE TIMING OF THE NEXT STEPS AND THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON APCS AND STRATEGIC LIFT INTO THE REGION.

THE INTERAGENCY TEAM MEETING -- 1 JUNE

8. AN INTERAGENCY TEAM INCLUDING ADMIRAL BOWMAN FROM JCS, SUSAN RICE FROM NSC, AMBASSADOR DAVID RAWSON AND JOHN BRIMS FROM STATE, MET WITH ANNAN AND RECEIVED A SIMILAR BRIEF FROM RIZA AND BARIL. ONE CHANGE NOTED BY BARIL WAS THE UN'S CLEAR PREFERENCE TO GET TO KIGALI THROUGH KAMPALA, WHERE THERE WAS MORE INFRASTRUCTURE, SUPPORT CAPABILITY (SUCH AS TRUCKS TO MOVE APCS), AND THE PRESENCE OF A UN MISSION. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE
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E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
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14. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ORIGINAL

IO/UNP:SWZELLE:SWZ
06/02/94 72392 SEUNPA 2059
P:PTARNOFF

IO:WARD/SNYDER/JENSEN;DRL:POWERS
PM:MARGULIES;AF/C:RENDER
JCS:RCMACKE;OSD:EWARNER
AID:GARVELINK{INFO}; S/S:
P:BRIMMER;L/UNA:EBLOOM
RP:MMCKELVEY;S/RPP:RBECKHAM
USUN/W:DSCHEFFER;NSC:
S/S-O:

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, PARIS, BRUSSELS, NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, YAOUNDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PREF, MOPS, RW, UN

SUBJECT: DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO SHARE THE FOLLOWING DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. TEXT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. WITH NO CEASE FIRE IN EFFECT AND NO COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE RWANDA CONFLICT OR WITH THE UN, THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THE SYG REPORT OF 31 MAY MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO INVOLVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS. TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MUST BE MADE FULLY AWARE OF THE MILITARY MISSION AND THE ANTICIPATED ENVIRONMENT. FURTHER, UNAMIR MILITARY MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE EQUIPMENT AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO EXECUTE SUCCESSFULLY THE ASSIGNED MISSION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND TO PROVIDE BASIC PROTECTION FOR THREATENED PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. THESE POINTS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 918 (1994) OF 17 MAY 1994 WHICH EXPANDED THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) AND AUTHORIZED AN EXPANSION IN UNAMIR'S FORCE LEVEL,

RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ON 3 MAY 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22) WHICH DEALT WITH IMPROVING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACE-KEEPING, AND BEARING IN MIND THE FACTORS ENUMERATED THEREIN,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 31 MAY 1994 (S/1994/640),

NOTING WITH CONCERN THAT TO DATE, THE PARTIES HAVE NOT CEASED HOSTILITIES, AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE OR BROUGHT AN END TO THE VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA,

REITERATING ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN RWANDA,

EXPRESSING ITS OUTRAGE THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE KILLINGS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING WITHIN RWANDA WITH IMPUNITY,

UNDERSCORING THAT THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF SOME 1.5 MILLION RWANDANS FACING STARVATION AND DISEASE AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,

RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A GROUP, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,

COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FOR THE HOSPITALITY THEY HAVE SHOWN TO REFUGEES FLEEING RWANDA,

COMMENDING ALSO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MADE EMERGENCY AID AVAILABLE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNAMIR, AND REITERATING

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THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONTINUE SUCH EFFORTS AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA,

WELCOMING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,

WELCOMING THE VISIT OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO RWANDA AND TO THE REGION;

WELCOMING ALSO RESOLUTION S/S/1994/1 OF MAY 25 ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITTING IN SPECIAL SESSION, WHICH REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA AND CALLED FOR THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, ASSISTED BY A TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS, TO ACT IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES OPERATING IN RWANDA;

REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,

STRESSING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,

1. ENDORSES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL, CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 19-26 OF HIS REPORT OF 31 MAY 1994, TO DEPLOY THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF UNAMIR IN CLOSE SYNCHRONIZATION;

2. DECIDES TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 6 DECEMBER 1994, WITH THE PROVISO THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL SUBMIT A REPORT BY 8 AUGUST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF UNAMIR'S MILITARY MISSION, PROGRESS TOWARD A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE SAFETY OF THOSE POPULATIONS AT RISK, THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION, AND ~~AND COST CONTAINMENT MEASURES~~

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT ALSO ON VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS AS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE;

4. RECALLING PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994) AND PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 31 MAY 1994, DECIDES THAT, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE

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RESOURCES, THE MANDATE OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNAMIR WILL BE A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN AREAS AND B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS;

5. REAFFIRMS THE CONTINUING MANDATE OF THE POLITICAL COMPONENT OF UNAMIR TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CEASE-FIRE.

6. WELCOMES THE ASSURANCES OF BOTH PARTIES TO COOPERATE WITH UNAMIR IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE, RECOGNIZES THAT THOSE ASSURANCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE MANDATE'S IMPLEMENTATIONS, AND DEMANDS THAT BOTH PARTIES ADHERE TO THOSE ASSURANCES;

7. REAFFIRMS THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994), UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE INCLUDING RESISTING ATTEMPTS BY FORCEFUL MEANS TO PREVENT IT FROM DISCHARGING DUTIES SUCH AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS IN PROTECTED SITES, UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL, AND HELPING PROTECT THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, AND THUS BE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND PROVIDED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO DO SO;

8. NOTES THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION TO HAVE UNAMIR ASSUME THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES OR TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO COMPEL THE TWO PARTIES TO END THEIR FIGHTING;

9. NOTES THAT UNAMIR'S EXPANDED MILITARY COMPONENT WILL REMAIN IN RWANDA ONLY AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE BASIC SECURITY TO POPULATIONS AT RISK AND SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM IN RWANDA; ~~AND~~ AFFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S EXPECTATION THAT, FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UN MILITARY COMPONENT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO ASSIST THE RWANDAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE WORK OF THE UN AGENCIES, NONGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND OTHER ENTITIES; AND

10. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO BRING AN END TO SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS IN AREAS

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UNDER THEIR CONTROL;

11. DEMANDS FURTHER THAT ALL PARTIES CEASE FORTHWITH ANY INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED;

12. REAFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL STATES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994) ON THE SALE TO RWANDA OF ARMS RELATED MATERIEL;

13. URGES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR RESOURCES, INCLUDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY, FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNAMIR FORCES;

14. REQUESTS UNAMIR TO FACILITATE, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND THE TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS REQUESTED BY THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR MANDATES AND TO ENLIST THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WITH THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS;

15. REQUESTS ALSO THAT UNAMIR DESIGNATE AN OFFICER TO SERVE AS LIAISON WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING COORDINATION BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR RWANDA ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE SHARING OF INFORMATION FROM GOVERNMENTS, INDIVIDUALS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND UNAMIR ITSELF , ON POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

16. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING WORK;

17. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL SHALL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE DETAINED WHILE PERFORMING THEIR MANDATE IN RWANDA, AND DECIDES FURTHER THAT IF SUCH PERSONS SHOULD BE DETAINED, THEY SHALL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF ANY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT SUCH PERSONS SHALL BE PROVIDED ALL PROTECTIONS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR,

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PENDING THEIR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND REPATRIATION TO UN AUTHORITIES;

18. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;

19. COMMENDS THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER TO PREVENT MORE INNOCENT LIVES FROM BEING LOST, AND TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;

20. INVITES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND URGES THE PARTIES TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION;

21. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
YY

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**031406Z JUN 94

FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2609

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1179
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ADDIS ABABA 004114
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, OAU, RW, ET
SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUEST FOR UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS
REF: STATE 144263
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED OAU SYG SALIM 3 JUNE ON USG EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RWANDA, AS REQUESTED REFTEL. SALIM TOOK THE MESSAGE ON BOARD, BUT NOTED THAT, BY HIS COUNT, THE UN WAS CLOSE TO GETTING THE NUMBER IT NEEDED (5500). SALIM PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN:

COUNTRY	TROOP COMMITMENT
ETHIOPIA	800 (1 BTN)
GHANA	800 (1 BTN
SENEGAL	850 (1 BTN)
ZIMBABWE	800 (1 BTN)
ZAMBIA	800 (1 BTN)
CONGO	N/A (1 COMPANY)
TOTAL	4550 PLUS ONE COMPANY

NOTES:
- SALIM HAS RECEIVED A "PERSONAL COMMITMENT" FROM ZAMBIA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION WHICH HE COMMUNICATED TO UNSYG BOUTROS GHALI. HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ZAMBIA HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN UN LISTS.
- THE COMMITMENT FROM CONGO IS NOT FIRM.
- NAMIBIA HAS PLEDGED TO PROVIDE ONE-HALF MILLION USD, BUT NO TROOPS.

3. SALIM REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUED USG EFFORTS TO RECRUIT TROOPS FOR RWANDA PKO WHEN THE UN ALREADY HAD CLOSE TO THE NUMBER IT NEEDS.
BAAS
BT
#4114

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>4114
<^TOR>940603101024 M1080481

FROM:
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**031406Z JUN 94

FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2609

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1179
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 004114
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, OAU, RW, ET
SUBJECT: RWANDA: REQUEST FOR UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS
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1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED OAU SYG SALIM 3 JUNE ON USG EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF UN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RWANDA, AS REQUESTED REFTEL. SALIM TOOK THE MESSAGE ON BOARD, BUT NOTED THAT, BY HIS COUNT,,5#3 7, 2- :)93 59 &3558,& 5#3 ,7.?34 85 ,33$3$ (5500). SALIM PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN:

COUNTRY	TROOP COMMITMENT
ETHIOPIA	800 (1 BTN)
GHANA	800 (1 BTN)
SENEGAL	850 (1 BTN)
ZIMBABWE	800 (1 BTN)
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- THE COMMITMENT FROM CONGO IS NOT FIRM.
- NAMIBIA HAS PLEDGED TO PROVIDE ONE-HALF MILLION USD, BUT NO TROOPS.

3. SALIM REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF CONTINUED USG EFFORTS TO RECRUIT TROOPS FOR RWANDA PKO WHEN THE UN ALREADY HAD CLOSE TO THE NUMBER IT NEEDS.
BAAS
BT
#4114

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>4114
<^TOR>940620081448 M1108508

FROM:
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**061706Z JUN 94

FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3807

RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0789
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1116
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1753
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0570
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0444
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1202
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1058
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0217
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0056
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0686
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1073

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 001947
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, UNSC, BY
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI
IN SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT IN RWANDA
REF: (A) STATE 147720 (B) BUJUMBURA 1764
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: CHARGE CALLED ON (b)(6) (b)(6) MORNING JUNE 3 TO INITIATE COORDINATION OF DEMARCHE TO BURUNDIANS ON SUPPORT FOR UN PKO TO RWANDA. (b)(6) INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN CALLED TO GENEVA ON THE WEEKEND TO MEET UNSYG BOUTROUS GHALI AND WOULD RETURN JUNE 9. HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED UN SECRETARIAT INSTRUCTIONS. THE UNSGSR, HOWEVER, PREFERRED THAT HE APPROACH THE BURUNDIANS FIRST AND THAT WESTERN COMS FOLLOW UP. WE AGREED TO REFINE AND DEVELOP AN APPROACH ON HIS RETURN. JUST PRIOR TO HIS SUNDAY DEPARTURE, (b)(6) TOLD CHARGE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OVER THE WEEKEND HAD REPEATED HIS OBJECTION TO THE TRANSIT OF PKO FORCES AND EQUIPMENT, THOUGH BURUNDI COULD ACCOMMODATE HUMANITARIAN GOODS. NONETHELESS, AN UNDAUNTED UNSGSR ASSURED WE WOULD PURSUE THIS CHALLENGE IN EARNEST IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN. END SUMMARY.
3. CHARGE CONTACTED (b)(6) MORNING JUNE 3 CONCERNING COORDINATION OF DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI ON USE OF THEIR TERRITORY TO SUPPORT EXPANDED UN

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PER E. O. 13526

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVE IN RWANDA. AT THAT POINT (b)(6) HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UN SECRETARIAT BUT SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE AND TO HAVE WESTERN MISSIONS FOLLOW UP WITH THEIR OWN. (b)(6) BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH AT PRESENT GIVEN BURUNDIAN SENSITIVITIES TO THE RWANDAN SITUATION AND THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION DISCUSSIONS. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

CHARGE SAID WE WOULD LOOK TO TO CALL COORDINATION SESSION SOONEST. THE UNSGSR INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN CALLED TO GENEVA TO MEET WITH BOUTROS GHALI. (b)(6) WOULD LEAVE JUNE 5 AND RETURN ON THE 9TH; HE RECOMMENDED COORDINATION ON HIS RETURN.

4. JUST PRIOR TO HIS SUNDAY MORNING DEPARTURE, (b)(6) TOLD CHARGE THAT HE HAD RAISED GRB SUPPORT FOR THE PKO WITH PM KANYENKIKO THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE PM, HE SAID, VOWED THAT BURUNDI COULD HELP THE UN EFFORTS TO MOVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES BUT NOT/NOT TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. (b)(6) SAID HE WAS NOT PUT OFF BY THE PM'S REACTION, HE DID ADMIT THAT GETTING BURUNDI TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE REQUEST WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ANOTHER INDICATION OF THAT DIFFICULTY FROM EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d WHO VOLUNTEERED HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY THOUGHT HE UN MIGHT HAVE IN THAT DIRECTION. (b)(6) RECALLED TO CHARGE THAT HE HAD GOTTEN A MORE PROMISING REACTION EARLIER FROM DARADANGWE'S SUPERIORS, THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, ALBEIT A CONDITIONED RESPONSE (REF B).

HINTS TO BELGIANS

5. (b)(6) REPORTED TO WESTERN VISIT EARLY LAST WEEK, THE SUBJECT OF BURUNDI SUPPORT FOR A POSSIBLE UN INITIATIVE WAS RAISED. (b)(6) WAS TRAVELLING THROUGH THE REGION AND STOPPED TO ENCOURAGE AND REASSURE THE GRB ON BELGIUM'S CONTINUED SUPPORT. ACCORDING TO (b)(6) INTERIM PRESIDENT NTIBANTUNGANYA WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION; HE TOLD (b)(6) THAT BURUNDI'S SUPPORT FOR THE UN WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY. ON THE OTHER HAND (b)(6) BROUGHT UP THE TOPIC HIMSELF. INTERESTINGLY, (b)(6) WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN A STRONG PROPONENT OF A FOREIGN FORCE FOR BURUNDI LAST OCTOBER TOLD (b)(6)

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CATEGORICALLY THAT BURUNDI COULD NOT/NOT SERVE AS A
TRANSIT POINT FOR PKO TROOPS. THE FORMIN DECLARED
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 001947
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, UNSC, BY
SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT DEMARCHE TO BURUNDI
IN SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT IN RWANDA
THAT BURUNDI MILITARY SENSITIVITIES DID NOT PERMIT
THIS KIND OF SUPPORT NOW

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

LANGE
BT
#1947
NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>1947
<^TOR>940606131941 M1084079
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>1947
<^TOR>940606131943 M1084080

FROM:
SITREPRT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Rwanda

DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SUM, SUM2, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**070042Z JUN 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6944

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5163
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0602
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0466
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0477
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0281
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1218
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1027
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1716
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0242
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2- THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE WILL BEGIN DELIBERATIONS ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA, IN RESPONSE TO THE SYG'S 31 MAY REPORT. USUN HAS RECEIVED COMMENTS FROM PERM FIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS AND NEW ZEALAND ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FAXED FROM THE DEPARTMENT 6/6. COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN PARA 5 BELOW. UK AND NEW ZEALAND WISH TO DELETE OP PARA 7 ON SELF-DEFENSE. THEY ARGUE THAT BY MENTIONING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, THE COUNCIL IMPLIES THAT DIFFERENT OR DEFICIENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY IN ALL OTHER PKO'S. THEY PARTICULARLY OBJECT TO THE MORE DETAILED LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH, AS OPPOSED TO OP PARA 4 OF RESOLUTION 918. USUN EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT CONCEPT FOR US. UK AND NZ ALSO WISH TO DELETE THE PARAGRAPH

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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NOTING THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT ACT AS A BUFFER FORCE. BARRING THIS, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT MOVED TO THE PREAMBLE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO MOVE THIS PARAGRAPH.

3. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF INCLUDING OP PARA 16 AND WOULD LIKE IT TO BE DELETED. ALL ARE AGREED THAT THE OPERATIVE VERB "DECIDES" IS INAPPROPRIATE. IN LIGHT OF USUN'S EXPLANATION THAT WASHINGTON STRONGLY WANTS TO SEE THIS IDEA REFLECTED IN THE DRAFT, THE UK WILL TRY TO FIND MORE PALATABLE WORDING FOR THIS PARAGRAPH. NEW ZEALAND SEES NO REASON WHY THE MANDATE EXTENSION SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON RECEIVING A REPORT FROM THE SYG. IF THE SC REQUESTS A REPORT, IT WILL CERTAINLY GET ONE, AND MAKING THE EXTENSION CONDITIONAL SENDS A SIGNAL THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S COMMITMENT IS QUESTIONABLE. NEW ZEALAND ALSO WANTS TO HAVE ONE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE MANDATE, RATHER THAN ONE PARA ON THE MILITARY COMPONENT AND ANOTHER PARA ON THE POLITICAL COMPONENT. THEY POINT OUT THAT SUCH A SEPARATION HAS NEVER APPEARED IN AN SC RESOLUTION BEFORE.

4. CHINA WISHES TO DELETE PARAS 13 AND 14 DEALING WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. FRANCE SUGGESTED TO CHINA THAT WE FIND AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION, RATHER THAN DELETE THE ENTIRE REFERENCE. THE RPF WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO GENOCIDE, WOULD LIKE THE COUNCIL TO CREATE A JUDICIAL BODY TO TRY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS, WOULD LIKE THE COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE THE JAMMING OR DESTRUCTION OF RADIO MILLES COLLINES, WOULD LIKE TO OMIT REFERENCE TO THE SRSG, AND WOULD LIKE THE COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION TO SUSPEND THE REPESENTATIVE OF RWANDA FROM THE COUNCIL-

5. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTION 918 (1994) OF 17 MAY 1994 WHICH EXPANDED THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) AND AUTHORIZED AN EXPANSION IN UNAMIR.S FORCE LEVEL,

-RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ON 3 MAY 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22) WHICH DEALT WITH IMPROVING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACE-KEEPING, AND BEARING IN MIND THE FACTORS ENUMERATED THEREIN,

-HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DATED 31 MAY 1994 (S/1994/640),

-NOTING WITH CONCERN THAT, TO DATE, THE PARTIES HAVE NOT CEASED HOSTI

LITIES, AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE, OR BROUGHT

AN END TO THE VIOLENCE AND CARNAGE ENGULFING RWANDA,

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
-REITERATING ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC KILLING OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN RWANDA,
-EXPRESSING ITS OUTRAGE THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE KILLINGS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OPERATE AND CONTINUE OPERATING WITHIN RWANDA WITH IMPUNITY,
-UNDERSCORING THAT THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT OF SOME 1.5 MILLION RWANDANS FACING STARVATION AND DISEASE AND THE MASSIVE EXODUS OF REFUGEES TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF ENORMOUS PROPORTIONS,
-RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE KILLING OF MEMBERS OF AN ETHNIC GROUP WITH THE INTENTION OF DESTROYING SUCH A GROUP, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
-STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA AND THE NECESSITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION,
-COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FOR THE HOSPITALITY THEY HAVE SHOWN TO REFUGEES FLEEING RWANDA,
-COMMENDING ALSO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MADE EMERGENCY AID AVAILABLE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO UNAMIR, AND REITERATING THE URGENT NEED FOR COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONTINUE SUCH EFFORTS AND TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN RWANDA,
-WELCOMING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AS WELL AS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS,
-WELCOMING THE VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TO RWANDA AND TO THE REGION;
-WELCOMING ALSO RESOLUTION S-3/1 OF MAY 25 ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITTING IN SPECIAL SESSION, WHICH REQUESTED THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA AND CALLED FOR THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, ASSISTED BY A TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFXICERS, TO ACT IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND PROGRAMMES OPERATING IN RWANDA;
-REAFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF RWANDA,
-STRESSING THAT THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA BEAR THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY,
-NOTING THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION TO HAVE UNAMIR ASSUME THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, OR TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO COMPEL THE TWO PARTIES TO END THEIR FIGHTING;

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-1. ENDORSES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL, CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 19-26 OF HIS REPORT OF 31 MAY 1994 (S/1994/640), TO DEPLOY THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF UNAMIR IN CLOSE SYNCHRONIZATION;
-2. DECIDES TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR UNTIL 6 DECEMBER 1994, WITH THE PROVISO THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL SUBMIT A REPORT BY 8 AUGUST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF UNAMIR.S MILITARY MISSION, PROGRESS TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE CONTINUING THREAT TO THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION;
-3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ALSO ON VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS AS DETAILED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE;
-4. DECIDES THAT, IN LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994 AND PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 31 MAY 1994, AND WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, THE MANDATE OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNAMIR WILL BE:
-(A) TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY END PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE, WHERE FEASIBLE, OF SECURE HUMANITARIAN AREAS; AND
-(B) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS;
-5. REAFFIRMS THE CONTINUING MANDATE OF THE POLITICAL COMPONENT OF UNAMIR TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THEIR AGREEMENT TO A CEASE-FIRE,
-6. WELCOMES THE ASSURANCES OF BOTH PARTIES TO COOPERATE WITH UNAMIR IN CARRYING OUT ITS MANDATE, RECOGNIZES THAT THOSE ASSURANCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE MANDATE.S IMPLEMENTATION, AND DEMANDS THAT BOTH PARTIES ADHERE TO THOSE ASSURANCES,
-7. REAFFIRMS THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994), UNAMIR MAY BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE INCLUDING RESISTING ATTEMPTS BY FORCEFUL MEANS TO PREVENT IT FROM DISCHARGING DUTIES SUCH AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND CIVILIANS AT RISK IN RWANDA, UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL AND HELPING PROTECT THE MEANS OF DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, AND THUS BE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND PROVIDED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO DO SO;

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

-8. AFFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S EXPECTATION THAT, FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY COMPONENT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL MAINTAIN ITS COMMITMENT TO ASSIST THE RWANDAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER ENTITIES, AND NOTES FURTHER THAT UNAMIR'S EXPANDED MILITARY COMPONENT WILL REMAIN IN RWANDA ONLY AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE BASIC SECURITY TO POPULATIONS AT RISK AND SECURITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM IN RWANDA;
-9. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT CEASE HOSTILITIES, AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE AND IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO BRING AN END TO SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS IN AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL;
-10. DEMANDS FURTHER THAT ALL PARTIES CEASE FORTHWITH ANY INCITEMENT, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE MASS MEDIA, TO VIOLENCE OR ETHNIC HATRED;
-11. REAFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL STATES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 13 OF RESOLUTION 918 (1994) ON THE SALE TO RWANDA OF ARMS RELATED MATERIEL;
-12. URGES MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR RESOURCES, INCLUDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNAMIR FORCES;
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002373
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL REACTIONS TO DRAFT RESOLUTION ON RWANDA
-13. REQUESTS UNAMIR TO FACILITATE, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND THE TEAM OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS REQUESTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR MANDATES AND TO ENLIST THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WITH THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OFFICERS,
-14- REQUESTS ALSO THAT UNAMIR DESIGNATE AN OFFICER TO SERVE AS LIAISON WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING COORDINATION BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR RWANDA ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE SHARING OF INFORMATION FROM GOVERNMENTS, INDIVIDUALS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND UNAMIR ITSELF, ON POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
-15. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES IN RWANDA STRICTLY RESPECT THE PERSONS AND PREMISES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN RWANDA, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE AGAINST

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PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE-KEEPING WORK;
-16. DECIDES THAT UNAMIR AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL SHALL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE DETAINED WHILE PERFORMING THEIR MANDATE IN RWANDA,AND DECIDES FURTHER THAT IF SUCH PERSONS SHOULD BE DETAINED, THEY SHALL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF ANY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT SUCH PERSONS SHALL BE PROVIDED ALL PROTECTIONS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATED TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, PENDING THEIR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND REPATRIATION TO UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES;
-17. COMMENDS THE EFFORTS OF STATES, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL OR
GANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGES THEM TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND URGES OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE;
-18. COMMENDS THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER TO PREVENT MORE INNOCENT LIVES FROM BEING LOST, AND TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
-19. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OAU AND COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION,
-20. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
ALBRIGHT
BT
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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04
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FROM:
SITREPRT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, STEINBERG, SUM, SUM2, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**080937Z JUN 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6976

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5177
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0609
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0472
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0486
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0251
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0290
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1222
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0272
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1033
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1721

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002390
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION, 6/7
REF: A) STATE 150911, B) USUN 2373
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AFTER A MARATHON SESSION OF 7 HOURS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL WORKING GROUP FINISHED REVISING THE TEXT OF THE RWANDA RESOLUTION (REFTELS). AS PREDICTED BY USUN, SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS PROPOSED IN REF A, WHICH DEVIATED EITHER FROM THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 918 OR FROM THE REPORT, RAN INTO WIDESPREAD AND STAUNCH OPPOSITION. CLEAN TEXT WILL BE FAXED TO WASHINGTON. REFERENCES TO THE SUNSET CLAUSE, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE, THE SPECIFIC MANDATE, AND THAT UNAMIR WILL NOT BE A BUFFER FORCE REMAIN, BUT IN SHORTENED FORM. PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN REMARKS BELOW ARE KEYED TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN REF B. END SUMMARY.
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS
3. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE COUNCIL ON OP PARA 1 WAS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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8/19/15 KBH

THAT THE SYG'S REPORT MUST BE WELCOMED. THERE WAS A DEBATE ON WHETHER ENDORSEMENT OF THE SYG'S PROPOSALS SHOULD BE IN GENERAL OR VERY SPECIFIC TERMS. ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS BECAME NEW OP PARA 2. AT 1.4b, 1.4d INSISTANCE, SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WAS PUT INTO BRACKETS SPELLING OUT THE SYG'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

4. ON OP PARA 2, THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL FOR MAKING THE EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE PROVISIONAL ON RECEIPT OF A REPORT. THIS COULD GIVE THE INCORRECT IMPRESSION THAT THE SC.S SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR WAS UNSTEADY- THE REQUEST FOR A REPORT WAS SEPARATED OUT, AND MOVED TO ITS USUAL PLACE AT THE END OF THE RESOLUTION. TWO REPORTS ARE ASKED FOR, ON 9 AUGUST AND 9 OCTOBER. [redacted] ARGUED FOR A 3 MONTH, RATHER THAN A 6 MONTH EXTENSION, BUT RECEIVED NO SUPPORT FROM THE REST OF THE COUNCIL. THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SWAYED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT A 3 MONTH MANDATE WOULD EXPIRE IN SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME RWANDA WOULD PRESIDE OVER THE COUNCIL, MAKING IT UNWISE TO SCHEDULE ACTION DURING THAT MONTH.

5. OP PARA 3 WAS SUBSUMED IN THE REQUEST FOR A REPORT, NOW APPEARING IN NEW PARA 16. OP PARAS 4 AND 5 WERE COMBINED, IN ORDER TO STATE THE COMPLETE MANDATE IN ONE PARAGRAPH AND AVOID CONFUSION.

6. OP PARA 6 WAS REWORDED SLIGHTLY TO TALK ABOUT THE "EFFECTIVE" IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE [redacted] POSITIONS- [redacted] DOES NOT WANT THE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES TO BE A PRECONDITION; THE U.S. INSISTED SUCH COOPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL. [redacted] MAY RE-OPEN THIS PARA AGAIN TO TRY TO CHANGE THE WORD "ESSENTIAL" TO "IMPORTANT". USUN BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW COMPROMISE WORDING WILL PREVAIL.

7. OP PARA 7 RAN INTO UNREMITTING OPPOSITION. [redacted] ALL ARGUED STRENUOUSLY TO DELETE THE PARAGRAPH IN ITS ENTIRETY, SINCE A SIMILAR IDEA HAD ALREADY APPEARED IN RESOLUTION 918. [redacted] ALL INSISTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN THE PARAGRAPH, BUT THAT ANY DEVIATION FROM THE 918 LANGUAGE WOULD LEAD TO CQNFUSION AND MISINTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE COUNCIL HAD IN MIND. THE U.S. DELEGATION FOUND NO ONE IN SUPPORT OF THE LANGUAGE AS PROPOSED IN REF A. IN ORDER TO PREVENT COMPLETE DELETION OF THIS IMPORTANT PARAGRAPH, THE TEXT USED IN RESOLUTION 918 WAS REITERATED.

8. THE PORTION OF OP PARA 8 DEALING WITH THE CONTINUATION OF UN AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR'S MILITARY CONTINGENT WAS THOUGHT TO BE UNNECESSARY AND INAPPROPRIATE BY [redacted]

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E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION, 6/7
1.4b, 1.4d AT LEAST FOUR DELEGATIONS ARGUED TO DELETE THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH, WITH USDEL MAKING THE POINT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO RETAIN SOME FORESHADOWING OF THE END OF THIS OPERATION. [redacted] SUGGESTED THE COMPROMISE THAT THE SUNSET CLAUSE BE MOVED TO THE PREAMBLE, AND REFORMULATED- THE NEW WORDING IS: "NOTING FURTHER THAT UNAMIR WILL CONTINUE ONLY AS LONG AS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS FOR WHICH IT WAS ESTABLISHED." SEVERAL DELEGATIONS GRUDGINGLY AGREED TO ALLOW THAT LANGUAGE TO REMAIN, WHILE INDICATING THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS AS FAR AS THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO. ANY ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND ON THIS COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IS LIKELY TO REKINDLE THE EFFORT TO DELETE IT IN ITS ENTIRETY.

9. OP 9 AND 10 REMAINED UNCHANGED- OP 11 WAS DROPPED AS REDUNDANT, SINCE THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS PUT IN PLACE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO, AND THE COUNCIL SAW NO REASON TO REAFFIRM IT SO SOON AFTER ITS ADOPTION. IN OTHER CASES (SUCH AS ANGOLA OR SOMALIA) WHERE THE SC REAFFIRMED AN ARMS EMBARGO, IT DID SO A YEAR OR MORE AFTER IT WAS PUT INTO EFFECT. THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT LIKE TO PROMOTE THE EXPECTATION THAT EVERY RESOLUTION, IN EVERY SITUATION WHERE THERE IS AN EMBARGO, WILL REAFFIRM IT.

10. OP 12 REMAINS THE SAME. OPS 13 AND 14 WERE STRONGLY OPPOSED BY [redacted] IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET THEIR CONCERNS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS NOT BE SINGLED OUT FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, OPS 13 AND 14 WERE COMBINED AND SHORTENED TO ASK UNAMIR TO GIVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR THE SAME COOPERATION IT GIVES TO DHA AND HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES.

11. OP 15 REMAINS THE SAME. OP 16, AS FORMULATED IN REF A, HAD NO SUPPORT FROM ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL. US DEL EXPLAINED THAT THE USG WAS EAGER TO TAKE UN PEACEKEEPERS OUT OF "LEGAL LIMBO", AND EXTEND THE PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THEM IN ADVANCE OF A TREATY ON THEIR SECURITY BEING CONCLUDED. [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FROM RESOLUTION 868 BE INSERTED INTO THE TEXT TO COVER THIS POINT. NEW COMPROMISE LANGUAGE DRAWS FROM PARA 6 OF RESOLUTION 868 ON THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL.

12. OP 17 REMAINS THE SAME. OP 18 WAS SURPRISINGLY CONTROVERSIAL, AS [redacted] ARGUED THAT THE SRSG SHOULD ALSO BE COMMENDED- THE OPINION OF [redacted] PREVAILED, AND THE FORCE COMMANDER WAS SINGLED OUT FOR SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PRAISE, WHILE THE SG AND SRSG WERE COMMENDED IN OP 19.

PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

13. THERE WAS MUCH RE-ORDERING AND CONSOLIDATING OF PARAGRAPHS. [redacted] PREFERED TO

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DELETE ANY REFERENCE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF MAY 3, 1994, AND IN ANY CASE DID NOT WISH TO CONDENSE THE FOUR PAGE STATEMENT INTO A ONE-SENTENCE SYNOPSIS. DESPITE INTENSB OPPOSITION, US DEL CONVINCED THE COUNCIL TO RETAIN A SHORTENED VERSION OF PREAMB PARA B.

14. A PREAMB PARA ON GENOCIDE WAS ADDED AT THE INSISTENCE OF [1.4b, 1.4d] AS FOLLOWS: "NOTING WITH THE GRAVEST CONCERN THE REPORTS THAT GENOCIDE HAS OCCURRED IN RWANDA AND RECALLING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT GENOCIDE CONSTITUTES A CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW." THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED AFTER A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER WHETHER IT WAS BEST TOREFER TO REPORTS OF "ACTS OF GENOCIDE" OR "GENOCIDE".

15. [ ]OBJECTED TO THE PREAMB PARA ON THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PARA WAS SHORTENED.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002390

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND DESHAZER;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA
E.0.12356: DECL;OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DISCUSSES RWANDA RESOLUTION, 6/7

SEVERAL DELEGATIONS NOTED THAT THE PREAMB PARA ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE NO LONGER MENTIONED THE "ULTIMATE" RESPONSIBILITY, BUT NOW SPOKE OF THE "PRIMARY" RESPONSIBILITY. THIS OPENED THE DOOR TO A LENGTHY DEBATE ON WHAT PURPOSE WAS SERVED BY INCLUDING THIS PARAGRAPH AT ALL, SINCE IT HAD ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED IN PREVIOUS PARAS- DESPITE US DEL'S EXPLANATIONS OF THE SUBTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "PRIMARY" AND "ULTIMATE" RESPONSIBILITY, AND AN EVENTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN REVERTING TO LANGUAGE FROM RESOLUTION 918, THE PARA WAS DROPPED AT THE INSISTENCE OF [ ] NO ONE SUPPORTED THE US DESIRE TO RETAIN THE PARA.

16. SIMILARLY, THERE WAS A STRONG PUSH TO DELETE THE PARA NOTING THAT UNAMIR WOULD NOT BE A BUFFER FORCE. US DEL CONVEYED THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USG TO DROP THAT PARA. [ ] SUPPORTED RETAINING THIS PARA. [ ] POINTED OUT THAT BY SAYING UNAMIR HAD NO INTENTION OF "TAKING MILITARY ACTION TO COMPEL AN END TO FIGHTING", THE ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH GAVE UNAMIR THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS MANDATE IN SELF-DEFENSE COULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THE SAKE OF NOT COMPROMISING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, OR CREATING CONFUSION, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECOND HALF OF THE PARA BE DROPPED, RETAINING ONLY THE WORDING DERIVED FROM THE SYG'S REPORT. [ ] PROPOSED PUTTING THE PARA MORE IN THE PRESENT TENSE, AND DISPENSING WITH "INTENTIONS" ABOUT THE FUTURE. NEW COMPROMISE WORDING READS: "NOTING THAT UNAMIR IS NOT TO HAVE THE ROLE OF A BUFFER FORCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES."

17. COUNCIL HOPES TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION WEDNESDAY OR

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THURSDAY. COMPLETE TEXT BEING FAXED.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
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FROM:
SITREPRT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Rwanda

D A T A F A X

TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET

MESSAGE NO. _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NUMBER OF PAGES: C + 4

HANDLING RESTRICTIONS:

NODIS: _____ EXDIS: _____ EYES ONLY _____

HANDLING PRIORITY:

ROUTINE: _____ URGENT: ✓ IMMEDIATE: ✓

FROM: Steve Sellers (NAME) IO/UNP (OFFICE SYMBOL) _____ (EXT.) _____ (ROOM #)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram - Rwanda Commission of Experts Resolution

TO:	DELIVER TO:	EXT.:	ROOM NUMBER:
1. JCS ~~WHITE~~	HAQ. Bruce Burtolam	(703)	697-0255
2. OSD	- Mike Greenspon	(703)	614-4057
3. _____	- Maj. Mike Biffricks	(703)	695-3355
4. NSC	- Susan Rice	(202)	395-1207
5. _____	- Mark Deslauriers	(202)	395-1206

phone (703) 614-9400

REMARKS: Please look at and get back to me ASAP. Many thanks.

Steve Sellers

SYRIA Damas

8/ During Parl.

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DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 13526 2011-0263-M 8/19/15 KBH

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUTH ____ DRAFT____
CLEAR 1 ____ 2 ____
3 ____ 4 ____ 5 ____
6 ____ 7 ____ 8 ____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IO/UNP:SSELLERS:SDS
06/15/94 7-0038 SEUNPT 325
P:PTARNOFF

IO:DBENNET	USUN/W:DSCHEFFER	IO/UNP:JSNYDER	S/S:
L/UNA:EBLOOM	OSD:	AF/C:KAISTON	S/S-O:
IO/E:ROLSEN	NSC:	DRL:MMARTINEZ	
		JCS:	

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, USUN

SUBJECT: DRAFT SPANISH RESOLUTION ON COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR RWANDA: U.S. RESPONSE

REF: USUN 6/13 FAX

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THE SPANISH DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON A COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ON ATROCITIES IN RWANDA. IT IS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE SPANISH INITIATIVE AND TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO INVESTIGATE THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RWANDA. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO RESTRICT FUTURE ACTION BY DICTATING AT THIS TIME WHAT FORM IT MUST TAKE OR THROUGH WHICH FORA IT MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.

3. IN PRESENTING U.S. MODIFICATIONS TO THE SPANISH, MISSION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE APPRECIATE THE ROLE THE SPANISH HAVE TAKEN IN INTRODUCING THIS RESOLUTION AND THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TO WORK WITH THEM AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNCIL MEMBERS TO SHAPE THE UN'S ONGOING RESPONSE TO CONDITIONS IN RWANDA.

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4. THE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS THE MISSION, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE TEXT OF THE SPANISH DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINED REF WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH THAT WILL READ:
BEGIN TEXT:

NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE EXECUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

END TEXT.

ADD AN OPENING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH (OP 1) WHICH READS:
BEGIN TEXT:

AFFIRMS THAT ALL PERSONS WHO COMMIT OR AUTHORIZE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ARE INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE VIOLATIONS;
END TEXT.

ADD AN NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH AFTER CURRENT OP 4 WHICH READS:
BEGIN TEXT:

REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA TO COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS:

END TEXT.

END CURRENT OP FOUR AFTER THE WORD "EXPERTS" SO THAT IT WILL READ:
BEGIN TEXT:

FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS;

END TEXT.

5. THE SPANISH TEXT WITH THE U.S. MODIFICATIONS WOULD THEN READ:

BEGIN TEXT:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA,

RECALLING THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 30 APRIL 1994 (S/PRST/94/21) IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTER ALIA CONDEMNED ALL BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA, PARTICULARLY THOSE PERPATRATED AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND RECALLED THAT PERSONS WHO INSTIGATE OR PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ACTS ARE INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE.

RECALLING ALSO THE REQUESTS IT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 30 APRIL 1994 AND IN RESOLUTION 918 (1994), CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN RWANDA DURING THE CONFLICT.

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 31 MAY 1994 (S/1994/640), IN WHICH HE NOTED THAT MASSACRES AND KILLINGS HAVE CONTINUED IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER THROUGHOUT RWANDA AND ALSO NOTED THAT ONLY A PROPER INVESTIGATION CAN ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND DEFINITE CULPABILITY.

EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS GRAVEST CONCERN AT THE CONTINUING REPORTS INDICATING THAT SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INCLUDING ACTS OF GENOCIDE, HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RWANDA.

NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE EXECUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

OP 1. AFFIRMS THAT ALL PERSONS WHO COMMIT OR AUTHORIZE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ARE INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE VIOLATIONS;

OP 2. CALLS UPON STATES AND, AS APPROPRIATE, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO COLLATE SUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION IN THEIR POSSESSION OR SUBMITTED TO THEM RELATING TO GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INCLUDING BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION ON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4

THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE BEING COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA, AND REQUESTS STATES, RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS BODIES, AND RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND AS APPROPRIATE THEREAFTER, AND TO PROVIDE OTHER APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW;

OP 3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ESTABLISH AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, AN IMPARTIAL COMMISSION OF EXPERTS TO EXAMINE AND ANALYSE THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED PURSANT TO THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TOGETHER WITH SUCH FURTHER INFORMATION AS THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS MAY OBTAIN THROUGH ITS OWN INVESTIGATIONS OR EFFORTS, OF OTHER PERSONS OR BODIES, WITH A VIEW TO PROVIDING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH ITS CONCLUSIONS ON THE EVIDENCE OF BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE AND OTHER GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA;

OP 4. ALSO REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS;

OP 5. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA TO COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS;

OP 6. REQUESTS THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR APPOINTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO INVESTIGATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RWANDA TO COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS;

OP 6. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.
YY

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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DTG:**161221Z JUN 94

FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3913

RUEHMG/USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0278
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1813
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 1112
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0476
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 1238
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0830
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1152
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0602
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0722
RUSNNOG/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 002092
STATE FOR AF/C, PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA; GENEVA
FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW;
NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR
REQUESTS!
REF: NAIROBI 9554
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. ON JUNE 15 WHILE IN TRANSIT TO BURUNDI, AMBASSADOR RAWSON, SCOTT FISHER (AF/RA), COL. MIKE BERAUD (OSD/ISA) AND KATE FARNSWORTH (USAID/OFDA) MET FOR HALF AN HOUR WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE, COMMANDER OF UNAMIR FORCES IN RWANDA AT UN HEADQUARTERS IN NAIROBI. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WAS CHARLES PETRIE, UNDP DEPUTY RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE FOR RWANDA AND COORDINATOR OF THE UN EMERGENCY OFFICE FOR RWANDA (UN/REO). DALLAIRE MADE THREE REQUESTS OF THE US DELEGATION: RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN AND SENEGALESE UNAMIR TROOPS; A MOVEMENT CONTROL UNIT

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FOR LOGISTICS BACK-UP AT-UP ENTEBBE, NAIROBI AND KIGALI FOR THE UNAMIR EXPANDED DEPLOYMENT, AND USG ASSISTANCE WITH SATELLITE IMAGERY TO FIND THE WHEREABOUTS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE MOVING IN RGF CONTROLLED AREAS. HE DOUBTED THAT BURUNDI WOULD ACCEPT BUJUMBURA AS A STAGING POINT FOR UNAMIR TROOPS BUT URGED THE USG DELEGATION TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH THE GOB. THE GENERAL ALSO EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT PEACE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY UNAMIR, SAYING "WE HAVE THEM TALKING NUTS AND BOLTS." END SUMMARY.

MOBILIZATION OF GHANAIAN AND SENEGALESE CONTINGENTS

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3. THE AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING WITH WORDS OF CONGRATULATION AND ADMIRATION FOR THE WORK THAT UNAMIR IS DOING UNDER MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN KIGALI. HE ALSO OFFERED HIS CONDOLENCES FOR THE LOSSES UNAMIR HAS SUSTAINED IN CARRYING OUT ITS MISSION.

4. TURNING TO TECHNICAL ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTS FOR THE GHANAIAN AND SENEGALESE CONTINGENTS. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENSIVE LIST OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTED, HE INFORMED THE GENERAL THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD REQUESTED THE UN REVIEW AND "SCRUB" THE LISTS. THE GENERAL AGREED THAT THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT LISTS SUBMITTED BY THE GHANAIANS WERE UNREASONABLE AND THAT HE HAD MODIFIED AND REDUCED THE REQUEST.

5. THE AMBASSADOR INFORMED DALLAIRE THAT THE CONTRACT FOR THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) FROM GERMANY HAD BEEN SIGNED. HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT DEPLOYMENT OF THESE ASSETS COULD BE ACCELERATED IN THE NEXT WEEKS. DALLAIRE NOTED THAT SOMALIA-BASED APC'S SHOULD BE ARRIVING IN KIGALI THIS WEEK. HE ADDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL 150 GHANAIANS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO KIGALI; MOREOVER CANADA HAD TALKED ABOUT SENDING MECHANICS IN THE SHORT TERM TO MAINTAIN THE INCOMING FLEET UNTIL THE GHANAIANS ARE TRAINED. ASKED ABOUT TRAINING VENUES FOR APC MECHANICS, DALLAIRE PUT HIS STRONG POSITION THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE, GIVEN REPORTS OF POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN ARMS SALES TO THE RGF. HE WAS NOT AWARE OF POTENTIAL TRAINING IN SOMALIA. DALLAIRE ALSO URGED THAT SPARE PARTS FOR SOMALI APC'S BE HURRIED ON THEIR WAY TO MOGADISHU SO AS TO LEVERAGE RAPID MOVEMENT OF APC'S FROM UNOSOM TO UNAMIR.

APCS CAN'T RUN WITHOUT FUEL AND BACKUP

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FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW;
NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR REQUESTS

6. DALLAIRE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE THAT APC'S WERE ON THE MOVE BUT EMPHASIZED THAT APC'S ALONE WERE INSUFFI
CIENT TO EQUIP THE UNAMIR BATTALIONS
AND MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE. HE NEEDS TENTS, WATER TRUCKS, RADIOS, FUEL TANKERS - ALL THE OTHER ITEMS THAT MAKE UP THE "KITS" TO OUTFIT MILITARY UNITS.

7. MOREOVER, HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT UNAMIR'S ABILITIES TO PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT NEEDED TO HANDLE THE INCOMING EQUIPMENT AND SAID HIS "GREAT FEAR" WAS THAT THE UN WOULD HAVE TO ASK THAT THE LONG AWAITED DEPLOYMENT BE SLOWED DUE TO LOGISTICS OFFLOADING BOTTLENECKS. HE ASKED FOR SOME COUNTRY TO PROVIDE A MOVEMENT CONTROL UNIT TO MANAGE INCOMING FLIGHTS AND TO CONTROL GROUND DISPATCH AND TRANSPORTATION FROM THREE HUBS: KIGALI, ENTEBBE, AND NAIROBI. IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY FROM THE AMBASSADOR REGARDING THE ROLE BURUNDI COULD/WOULD PLAY AS A STAGING POINT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT, DALLAIRE SAID HE FAVORED USING BUJUMBURA SINCE IT WOULD GIVE READY ACCESS TO SOUTHERN RWANDA, BUT THE BURUNDIANS WERE LESS THAN RECEPTIVE. HE NONETHELESS URGED THE USG DELEGATION TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH BURUNDIAN AUTHORITIES DURING ITS VISIT TO BUJUMBURA.

WHERE HAVE ALL THE PEOPLE GONE

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8. FINALLY, DALLAIRE RAISED HIS WORRY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS FALLING BEHIND THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE EXPRESSED HIS FRUSTRATION AT NOT BEING ABLE TO FIND THE ESTIMATED TWO MILLION PEOPLE BELIEVED TO BE MOVING SOMEWHERE IN THE SOUTH WESTERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR USG ASSISTANCE

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

9. IN CLOSING HIS REMARKS, GENERAL DALLAIRE SUMMARIZED HIS THREE REQUESTS TO THE USG: MOBILIZE THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES, HELP WITH GROUND LOGISTICS AT THE MAJOR HUBS, AND [redacted] TO ASSIST WITH HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE. AS A FINAL ASIDE DALLAIRE EXPRESSED HIS OPTIMISM THAT PEACE EFFORTS BEING BROKERED BY UNAMIR MAY EVENTUALLY BEAR FRUIT, "WE HAVE THEM TALKING NUTS AND BOLTS," HE SAID.

HUMANITARIAN UPDATE

10. WHILE WAITING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL DALLAIRE, THE USG DELEGATION WAS BRIEFED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE UN COORDINATION UNIT FOR RWANDA, CHARLES PETRIE. PETRIE EXPLAINED THAT UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION STRATEGY WAS DESIGNED NOT TO DIRECT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS BUT TO PROVIDE A POINT OF INFORMATION AND COORDINATION. THE UNIT HAS SATELLITE OFFICES IN KABALE, BUJUMBURA, KIGALI, AND ITS HEADQUARTERS IN NAIROBI. HE NOTED THAT UN/NGO COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION WAS EXCELLENT IN KIGALI WHERE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES PERHAPS HAVE FACILITATED RELATIONSHIPS THAT NORMALLY MIGHT BE DIFFICULT. HE CHARACTERIZED COORDINATION IN BURUNDI AS NON-EXISTENT, COMMENTING "NOBODY IS AT HOME," CONFIRMING THE USG DELEGATION'S CONCERNS THAT THE RELIEF COMMUNITY IN BUJUMBURA IS ILL-PREPARED FOR POTENTIAL LARGE REFUGEE INFLOWS FROM RWANDA, OR A POTENTIAL DESTABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI ITSELF. PREPAREDNESS IS ALSO SCANT IN

STATE FOR AF/C, PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA; GENEVA FOR RMA; LONDON FOR MCKINLEY; PARIS FOR PERLOW; NAIROBI FOR USAID/REDSO FOR DART/RWANDA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, EAID, MASS, KA, RW, BY, XA
SUBJECT: DALLAIRE URGES RAPID RESPONSE TO UNAMIR REQUESTS

BUKAVU, PETRIE SAID, WITH LITTLE OR NO NGO/UN PRESENCE AND A LESS THAN COOPERATIVE ZAIRE AUTHORITY.

11. PETRIE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED A FORTHCOMING SERIES OF ASSESSMENTS PLANNED FOR BOTH RPF AND RGF AREAS TO BE JOINTLY COORDINATED AND EXECUTED BY THE UN/ICRC/NGO COMMUNITY. THE FIRST ASSESSMENTS IN THE RPF ZONES WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN JUNE 19-22 FOLLOWING A PREPARATORY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP IN KABALE, UGANDA ON JUNE 17. THE TEAMS WILL FOCUS THEIR SURVEY IN AREAS NEWLY CAPTURED BY THE RPF IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF THE COUNTRY. SURVEYS IN THE RGF ZONES ARE UNDER NEGOTIATION WITH GOR OFFICIALS BUT TENTATIVELY TWO TEAMS WILL BE DEPLOYED, ONE TO ASSESS AREAS FROM BUTARE-CYANGUGU AND ONE TO SURVEY THE GISENYI-KIBUYE SECTOR.

12. PETRIE ALSO REPORTED THAT FOLLOWING PROTESTS OVER THE MINING OF UNICEF'S BUILDING IN KIGALI, GENERAL KAGAME PROMISED FULL COOPERATION WITH UN'S HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, INCLUDING ALLOWING CROSS-LINE CONVOYS. THE UN PLANS TO TEST THIS EXPRESSED GOOD WILL WITH A MIXED UN/PVO CONVOY FROM RPF

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TERRITORY INTO THE RGF ZONE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
LANGE
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<^SSN>2092
<^TOR>940616082927 M1102661

FROM:
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RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATUN SE 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0000
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000

Rwanda

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

<SUBJ> SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE ON RWANDA

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 163237
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS, RW, FR
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE ON RWANDA
REF: USUN NEW YORK 2513
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. REFTEL OUTLINES FRENCH PROFOSAL FOR A MULTINATIONAL FRENCH-LED FORCE TO INTERVENE IN RWANDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FROTECT THREATENED CIVILIANS UNTIL THE REGULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS CAN ARRIVE. POST SHOULD INFORM THE GOF THAT THE USG SUPPORTS THIS INITIATIVE BUT HAS SOME CONCERNS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE FRENCH TO ADDRESS AND THAT WE ARE WILLING TO HELP THEM WITH. END SUMMARY.
3. THE USG'S MAIN OBJECTIVE IN RWANDA IS TO STOP THE KILLINGS NOW. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WOULD PUT TROOFS ON THE GROUND TO HELP ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE AND THEY COULD ARRIVE MUCH MORE QUICKLY THAN THE EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCES. FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF WILL CONS RUE THIS AS A FRENCH ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND MAY EVEN RESIST ANY DEPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND.
4. IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR THE OPERATION, MINIMIZE THE RISKS TO THE TROOPS BEING DEPLOYED, AND AVOID UNDERCUTTING THE UN'S EFFORT TO DEPLOY UNAMIR -- WHICH REMAINS THE LONGER-TERM ANSWER TO PROTECTING POPULATIONS -- THE FRENCH SHOULD:
-- COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND OBTAIN UN BLESSING FOR THE MISSION. IN OUR VIEW, A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE OPERATION WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DELAY AN URGENT MISSION.

EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4d

5. FOR PARIS: POST SHOULD INFORM THE GOF OF OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING FOINTS:
-- WE AGREE THAT THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO STOP THE KILLINGS IN RWANDA AND THAT THIS MUST BE OUR FIRST PRIORITY.
-- FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT YOUR PROFOSED PLAN FOR A MULTINATIONAL FRENCH-LED FORCE TO INTERVENE NOW, AND CONGRATULATE YOU ON THIS HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE. WE ALSO SUPPORT YOUR PLAN TO "BRIDGE" THE GAP UNTIL THE REGULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS CAN ARRIVE.
-- IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION AND THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WE RECOMMEND YOU ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES

-- THE MISSION SHOULD HAVE THE SANCTION OF THE UN AND SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH UNAMIR. WE WOULD PREFER A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE MISSION, BUT THAT SHOULD NOT DELAY THE MISSION.
-- WE AGREE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SNOULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO THIS INITIATIVE. WE ARE ENCOURAGED TO HEAR THAT THE SENEGALESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS HAVE AGREED TO JOIN.

-- IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE PERCEPTION THAT YOUR ACTIONS WILL LEND LEGITIMACY TO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS INITIATIVE IS NOT INTENDED IN ANY WAY TO INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS FORCES. WE WILL MAKE THE SAME POINT.
-, IN THE MEANTIME, WE NEED TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS TO DEPLOY AN EXPANDED UNAMIR. WE ARE WORKING HARD TO HELP EXPEDITE DEPLOYMENT. WE HAVE COMPLETED THE LEASE WITH THE UN FOR 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) AND HOPE TO START DELIVERY NEXT WEEK.
-- WE ARE LOOKING AT EQUIPMENT NEEDS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO GET ON THE GROUND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO HELP

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EQUIP THEM AND HOPE YOU CAN DO THE SAME WITH OTHER CONTINGENTS.
-- THE U.S. HAS NO INTENTION OF SENDING TROOPS INTO RWANDA.
6. FOR BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KAMPALA, ADDIS ABABA (FOR OAU): POSTS SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS/OAU OF THE USG DECISION, DRAWING ON BACKGROUND ABOVE AND POINTS BELOW:
-- THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO STOP THE KILLINGS IN RWANDA AND THIS MUST BE OUR FIRST FRIORITY.
-- FOR THIS REASON, WE SUPPORT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO INTERVENE NOW, UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND "BRIDGE" THE GAP UNTIL THE REGULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS CAN ARRIVE.
-- WE WANT THE MISSION TO HAVE THE SANCTION OF THE UN AND TO BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH UNAMIR.
-- WE ARE AWARE OF THE RPF'S CONCERNS OVER FRENCH INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, THIS IS A MULTILATERAL EFFORT AND THE PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS AND SAVE LIVES, NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE RPF OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS FORCES.
-- IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE UN TO ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR. WE HAVE COMFLETED A LEASE WITH THE UN FOR 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) AND HOPE TO START DELIVERY VERY SOON (FYI: WEEK OF JUNE 20).
-- WE ARE WORKING ON OTHER EQUIPMENT REQUESTS NOW AND ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AS WELL.
7. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. TALBOTT
NNNN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN>3237<STOR>940617200252 M1106760
<TOR>940617205404

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6-17-94

Susan

FAXed ~~to~~
Bob Haward
per your request,

pls. refax w/ new # and verbal bus fax #. My

Beverly

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Rwanda

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OSD:BSCHUTZ	USUN/W:WWOODWARD	JCS:

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IMMEDIATE PARIS, BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE, KAMPALA IMMEDIATE, KINSHASA IMMEDIATE, DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UNSC, MARR, PREL, RW

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH RESOLUTION ON PROVIDING TROOPS: U.S. RESPONSE

REF: A. USUN 6/20/10:13 EDT FAX, B. STATE 162453

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN RWANDA PRESENTS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WITH A SITUATION THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL (REF A) TO SEND IN TROOPS TO PROTECT REFUGEES AND RELIEF PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES, WHILE NOT AN IDEAL SOLUTION, DESERVES U.S. SUPPORT. THE PEACEKEEPING CORE GROUP AGREED JUNE 20 TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION, BUT WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS. FOREMOST AMONG THESE ARE THE NEED TO SET A FIXED LIMIT TO THE DURATION OF THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN RWANDA (AND TO WORK TO REPLACE IT QUICKLY BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR), TO IMPROVE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND TO ENSURE THE FRENCH PLAN TO PAY FOR THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

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3. MISSION IS INSTRUCTED, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH DRAFT CONTAINED REF, BUT WITH THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS:

IN THE PREAMBULAR SECTION, MISSION SHOULD INSERT A PARAGRAPH THAT FORESHADOWS THE FACT THAT THIS IS A CHAPTER VII OPERATION:
BEGIN TEXT:

DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION,

END TEXT.

OP 3: MISSION SHOULD SEEK TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE LIMITING THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT TO 60 DAYS AND LIMITING ITS OBJECTIVES TO THOSE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF RESOLUTION 925.
BEGIN TEXT:

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND MEMBER STATES COOPERATING TO IMPLEMENT FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED SIXTY DAYS THE OFFER REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE AND TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH FOUR OF RESOLUTION 925 (1994);

END TEXT.

OP 4: MISSION SHOULD PROVIDE LANGUAGE THAT PROVIDES THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITH THE ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHEN UNAMIR IS OPERATING EFFECTIVELY, AND THUS WHEN THE FRENCH FORCE CAN BE WITHDRAWN;
BEGIN TEXT:

DECIDES THAT THE MISSION OF MEMBER STATES COOPERATING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE LIMITED TO THE SIXTY DAY TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, PROVIDED THAT THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD CAN BE TERMINATED EARLIER UPON DETERMINATION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT UNAMIR IS ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE;

END TEXT.

OP 5: MISSION SHOULD INSERT LANGUAGE ENCOURAGING MEMBER STATES TO SUPPORT THE "ADOPT-A-BATTALION" PROGRAM OUTLINED REF B:

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BEGIN TEXT:

CALLS UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO IDENTIFY AND COORDINATE THE SUPPLY OF THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY TROOPS COMMITTED TO UNAMIR, AND CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO RESPOND URGENTLY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST, IN ORDER TO ENABLE UNAMIR TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE EFFECTIVELY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS LIGHT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES THE OFFER OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER SUPPORT FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION AND CALLS ON OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LIKEWISE SPONSOR SPECIFIC TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO SPEED UNAMIR'S EXPANDED FORCE DEPLOYMENT;

END TEXT.

OP 6: MISSION SHOULD REWORK THE DRAFT ALONG THE LINES OF THE UNITAF RESOLUTION (S/RES/794) OF 12/2/92 TO ENSURE VIABLE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARIAT AND THE FRENCH FORCE. THE DRAFT SHOULD READ:

BEGIN TEXT:

REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE MEMBER STATES OPERATING UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR MILITARY FORCES;

END TEXT.

MISSION SHOULD INTRODUCE ANOTHER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, ALSO IN LINE WITH RES 794, THAT ENSURES VOLUNTARY FUNDING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT:
BEGIN TEXT:

CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO TO PROVIDE MILITARY FORCES AND TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS, IN CASH OR IN KIND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE;

END TEXT.

OP 8: THE MISSION SHOULD ADD LANGUAGE REQUIRING A REPORT FROM THE SYG TO THE COUNCIL BY AUGUST 20 ON THE STATUS OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA. THE SYG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RECOMMEND THAT UNAMIR ASSUME ITS ROLE AS DEFINED BY RESOLUTION 925.
BEGIN TEXT:

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REQUESTS MEMBER STATES COOPERATING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED OF THEIR ACTIONS IN RWANDA THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY AUGUST 12 ON THE COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA;

END TEXT.

4. FINALLY, IN THE EOV THE MISSION SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. SEES THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE, AND THAT THE UN SHOULD WORK TO ESTABLISH UNAMIR IN RWANDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THUS OBVIATING THE NEED FOR A FRENCH PRESENCE. THE MISSION SHOULD ALSO REITERATE THE NEED FOR OTHER STATES TO SUPPORT UNAMIR. 44

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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PARIS FOR PERLOW
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, RW, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ACTION TO STOP RWANDAN RADIO BROADCASTS

UNHQ HAS ASKED THE FRENCH, ONCE THEIR OPERATION IS UNDERWAY, TO BRING AN END TO THE INFLAMMATORY RADIO BROADCASTS BY HUTU EXTREMISTS INSIDE RWANDA. THEY ESPECIALLY WANT TO SEE DISCONTINUED CRITICISMS OF AND THREATS TO GENERAL DALLAIRE AND CANADIAN UN OBSERVERS, AND INSTIGATIONS TO KILL CIVILIANS. THE UN HAS ASKED IF THE USG WOULD REINFORCE THIS REQUEST TO THE FRENCH.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT BT

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

JOINT STAFF V1 16
ACTION (U,8)
INFO SJS-N(1) CMAS(1) SJS-C(1) NIDS(1) J4(5)
J5(1) SHAPE LNO(1) J5:NUC-J(1) J5:AFRICA-J(1)
J5:WCEURNATO-J(1) J8:PBAD-J(1) J5:WTCNP-J(1)
+NACEMEAF

SECDEF V2 18
ACTION (U,6,8)
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+USDP:CCC
+SAFE

MCN=94174/14074 TOR=94174/2252Z TAD=94174/2332Z CDSN=MAJ592

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'94 JUN 24 A8:25

B

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Pls. call drafter + give him my changes. PM

MESSAGE NO. 006144 CLASSIFICATION _____ No. Pages 3

FROM: ROY WHARTON (Officer name) PM/ISP (Office symbol) 73-67743 (Extension) 7426 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE - DRAFT

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	MS SUSAN RICE	395-7310	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☑ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE REVIEW SOONEST - THIS DRAFT CONTAINS REVISIONS YOU SUGGESTED LAST NIGHT. WE HOPE TO GET CABLE OUT THIS MORNING. THE CABLE SEEKS ONLY TO CLARIFY SEMANTICS REQUIREMENTS, AS FRENCH HAVE SENT A DIP NOTE ASKING FOR 100% OF DAILY AIRLIFT SUPPORT.

S/S Officer: [signature]

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE 5.1

AUTH TED DRAFT RMW

CLEAR 1 KA 2 DJ

3 DB 4 EB 5 VK

6 SS 7 PB 8 GBB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PM/ISP:RWHARTON:RMW
06/22/94 X67743 SEAISPRW 227

DRAFT

PM:TMCNAMARA
AF/C:KAISTON
IO/PHO:DJENSEN
P:EBRIMMER
S/S:

NSC:
S/S-O:
OSD:MBITTRICH {SUBS}
JCS:JWAHL {SUBS}+

IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS, DAKAR IMMEDIATE +

ROUTINE KAMPALA, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK, KINSHASA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MASS, RW, FR, SG

SUBJECT: U.S. EQUIPMENT SUPPORT TO FRENCH HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RWANDA

REF: A. DAKAR 5236 B. USDAO PARIS FR 16799
C. PARIS 16740 D. USUN 2498

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE SEEKS CLARIFICATION AS TO WHAT SPECIFIC AIRLIFT SUPPORT THE FRENCH AND SENEGALESE GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOUGHT ~~ARE SEEKING~~ REGARDING SENEGALESE PARTICIPATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY

4. EMBASSIES DAKAR AND PARIS ARE ASKED TO CLARIFY WHAT AIRLIFT REGARDING SENEGALESE PARTICIPATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN RWANDA. REF A FROM DAKAR INDICATES, A) THAT THE SENEGALESE WILL LIKELY BE PROVIDING EQUIPMENT LISTS AT THE LAST MINUTE, AND B) THAT THE SENEGALESE BELIEVE THE FRENCH WILL PROVIDE THEM WITH AIRLIFT TO GOMA, ZAIRE. REFS. B AND C FROM PARIS RELAY VERBAL FRENCH REQUESTS FOR U.S. AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR THE

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SENEGALESE CONTINGENT.

5. POSTS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WHILE THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO THE FRENCH HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, A DECISION HAS YET TO BE TAKEN THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS ON LOGISTICS OR TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT, AND ON REPAYMENT. THE NATURE OF ANY

6. FOR DAKAR: POST SHOULD CLARIFY WHETHER THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING THE AIRLIFT SUPPORT INDICATED IN REF A. IF THE SENEGALESE ARE NOW SEEKING SUCH SUPPORT FROM THE U.S., THEN WE NEED INFORMATION SOONEST AS TO THE NUMBERS OF TROOPS INVOLVED, TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THEY WILL BE CARRYING, DATES OF AIRLIFT, DESTINATION, AND OTHER PERTINENT DETAILS, BEFORE ANY DECISION CAN BE MADE. CONCERNING OTHER EQUIPMENT: EMBASSY IS CORRECT THAT IF THE SENEGALESE ARE SEEKING EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR PLANNED UNAMIR CONTINGENT, THEY SHOULD DIRECT THAT REQUEST TO THE UN. {FYI: WE ARE AWARE FROM REF C THAT THE FRENCH HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED TO EXTEND UP TO 50M FRENCH FRANCS, APPROXIMATELY USD 10M, IN CREDITS AND EQUIPMENT ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO SENEGAL FOR THIS PURPOSE. END FYI}

7. FOR PARIS: EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPORT FRANCE WILL BE PROVIDING THE SENEGALESE FOR THEIR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND WHAT SPECIFIC SUPPORT IS BEING SOUGHT FROM THE U.S. {FYI: THE UNSC RESOLUTION WELCOMING THE FRENCH OPERATION STIPULATED THAT THE COSTS WILL BE BORNE BY THE MEMBER STATES CONCERNED. END FYI}

8. FOR DAKAR AND PARIS: POSTS' ABILITY TO DETERMINE EXPEDITIOUSLY WHAT IS NEEDED WILL GREATLY ASSIST THE DECISION PROCESS. TO AVOID CONFUSION, SUCH REQUESTS SHOULD BE MADE FORMALLY.
YY

IO/UNP: SZELLE
EUR/WE: ACARSON
AF/W: GBBROWN
PM/ISP: TGRANT
PM/P: JCPERRY
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TO:
RUEHMPI/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 6288 IMMEDIATE
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0884

ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS 8025
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 2116
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6458 IMMEDIATE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SA//PRIORITY
ZEN/USDAO ABIDJAN PRIORITY
ZEN/JCS WASHDC//J5-MEAF//PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 3832

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 170060
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MASS, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, RW GH, FR
SUBJECT: GHANAIAN TROOP CONTINGENT IN RWANDA

REF: A.) ACCRA 05339 (NOTAL), B.) ACCRA 05289 (NOTAL),
C.) STATE 168777

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS A PRELIMINARY REPLY TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFS A AND B. USUN SEE PARA 6. BROADER ASPECTS OF THE RWANDA SITUATION WILL BE DISCUSSED SEPTELS.

3. GHANAIAN REQUEST FOR U.S. MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT FOR A TEAM OF GAF SENIOR OFFICERS (REF A): BECAUSE THERE ARE NO U.S. MILITARY FLIGHTS INTO KIGALI, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THE GHANAIAN TEAM SHOULD FLY COMMERCIAL TO THE REGION AND TRAVEL INTO RWANDA WITH UN ASSISTANCE.

4. EQUIPMENT FOR GHANAIAN FORCES (REF B): SCOPE OF THE GHANAIAN REQUEST, WHICH NOW INCLUDES THREE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS, HAS PROVOKED SFECULATION THE GOG MIGHT USE NONFULFILLMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT REQUEST AS A REASON FOR WITHDRAWING THE GAF CONTINGENT.

5. ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE WE RECOMMEND CHARGE MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE:

A. WE APPRECIATE GHANAIAN COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED

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PARTICIPATION IN UNAMIR AND REJECTION OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL (REF A).

B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO MOVE FORWARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY THE EXPANDED UNAMIR (REF C).

C. WE ARE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE UN ON THE RWANDA SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, ON QUESTIONS OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, SECURITY, AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, A GOOD FIRST RULE FOR THE GOG IS TO ASK THE UN DIRECTLY.

D. WE HAVE EXAMINED THE GAF LIST OF EQUIPMENT REQUESTED IN CONNECTION WITH DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO RWANDA. KEEPING IN MIND THAT THE UN, NOT THE U.S., IS THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDER OF EQUIPMENT FOR UNAMIR, AND THAT THEREFORE THE UN SHOULD BE THE GHANAIANS' FIRST POINT OF CONTACT, DATT ABIDJAN IS PREPARED TO VISIT ACCRA TO GO OVER WITH GAF THE SPECIFICS OF THEIR REQUEST.
E. EIGHT APCS ARE NOW ON THE GROUND AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT. THEY WILL BEGIN ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF EIGHT PER DAY AS OF JUNE 24.
F. ON TRANSPORTATION FOR A TEAM OF SENIOR GHANAIAN OFFICERS, THE U.S. IS NOT FLYING INTO RWANDA. WE BELIEVE THE GHANAIAN TEAM SHOULD PROCEED VIA COMMERCIAL AIR TO EITHER NAIROBI OR KAMPALA. FROM NAIROBI THEY COULD TAKE A UNAMIR FLIGHT INTO RWANDA. FROM KAMPALA THEY COULD TRAVEL BY LAND WITH UNAMIR CONVOYS.
6. FOR USUN: PLEASE INFORM UNDPKO ON POINTS 5.C., D. AND F. ABOVE. CHRISTOPHER
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FROM:
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AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
06/30/94 647-3139 SECC 4430
AF:PBUSHNELL

AF/C:RFENDRICK P:ESWICKER IO/PHO:DJENSEN PM/ISP:RWHARTON
EUR:RPE:GBERRY EAP/RSP:BMALKIN AF/S:SKEOGH-FISHER
ARA/BR:JCASWELL EUR/WE:CKELLY NSC:
S/S-O: S/S:

IMMEDIATE ALLEU, PRETORIA, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON,
PRAGUE, MOSCOW, BRASILIA, BEIJING, TOKYO, ADDIS ABABA
PRIORITY USUN NEW YORK, BUJUMBURA, KAMPALA
KINSHASA, DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, HARARE, TUNIS, DAKAR, ACCRA +

YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 2667 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN URGENT ACTION REQUEST. EU POSTS SEE PARAS 6 - 7. PRETORIA SEE PARA 8. OTTAWA AND CANBERRA SEE PARA 9. WELLINGTON, PRAGUE, MOSCOW, BRASILIA, BEIJING, AND TOKYO SEE PARA 10. ADDIS SEE PARA 11.

BACKGROUND

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2. IN RESOLUTIONS 918 AND 925 OF MAY 17 AND JUNE 8, RESPECTIVELY, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVED EXPANSION OF UNAMIR, THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA, FROM 450 TO 5,500 TROOPS, WITH A NEW HUMANITARIAN MANDATE TO HELP PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THREATENED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND FACILITATE RELIEF EFFORTS. DEPLOYMENT OF THIS FORCE WILL ADDRESS OUR NUMBER ONE PRIORITY -- STOPPING THE KILLINGS

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OF CIVILIANS. ONCE THE KILLINGS HAVE STOPPED, A CEASE-FIRE IN THE CIVIL WAR BETWEEN HUTU-DOMINATED INTERIM GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE TUTSI-LED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) WILL BE EASIER TO ACHIEVE. AS THE CRISIS IN RWANDA ENTERS ITS THIRD MONTH, IT IS CRUCIAL THAT DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR MOVE FORWARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION, APPROVED ON JUNE 22 IN UNSC RESOLUTION 929, IS ONLY A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION UNTIL EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED. THE MANDATE FOR THIS OPERATION IS LIMITED TO TWO MONTHS, AND THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE OUT OF RWANDA BY THE END OF JULY. EACH DAY THEY STAY IN RWANDA, THE CHANCE FOR AN UNINTENTIONAL CLASH WITH THE ANTI-FRENCH RPF INCREASES. MOREOVER, AS THE FRENCH CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO SAVE MINORITY TUTSIS, THE CHANCES INCREASE THAT HUTU EXTREMISTS MILITIAS AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS MAY TURN ON THE FRENCH, WHOM THEY HAVE HERETOFORE VIEWED AS THEIR PROTECTORS. IT IS THEREFORE VITAL THAT THE FRENCH-LED FORCES BE REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY BLUE HELMETS OF EXPANDED UNAMIR.

4. THE UN APPEARS TO HAVE ENOUGH TROOP OFFERS TO FIELD THE NECESSARY 5,500-PERSON FORCE. TROOP CONTRIBUTORS INCLUDE: GHANA, SENEGAL, ETHIOPIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE, TUNISIA, CONGO, MALAWI, MALI, AND NIGERIA. HOWEVER, THESE CONTINGENTS NEED EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN ORDER TO DEPLOY. IN A JUNE 28 MEETING OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND DONORS, THE OFFERS FROM THE DONOR COMMUNITY FOR EQUIPMENT FELL FAR SHORT OF UNAMIR'S NEEDS, AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING OFFICE EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE UN'S ABILITY TO FIELD AND DEPLOY EXPANDED UNAMIR IN A TIMELY MANNER.

5. AMONG POTENTIAL DONORS, THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN MEETING UNAMIR'S NEEDS. WE HAVE PROPOSED THE IDEA OF HAVING COUNTRIES WITH LOGISTICAL AND EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES "ADOPT" UNAMIR CONTINGENTS AND PROVIDE FOR THEIR NEEDS, THROUGH THE UN. CONSISTENT WITH THIS PROPOSAL, THE U.S. HAS DECIDED TO "ADOPT" THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS THE FIRST CONTINGENT TO BE DEPLOYED. THE U.S. HAS ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR FOR USE BY THE GHANAIANS. WE ARE ALSO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN TO MEET THE MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN BATTALION. SO FAR NO OTHER DONOR HAS STEPPED FORWARD TO DO LIKEWISE WITH ANY OTHER CONTINGENT.

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ACTION REQUESTS
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6. FOR EU POSTS: THE JULY 6/7 DISCUSSIONS OF THE EU AFRICA GROUP PRESENT AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS RWANDA AND THE URGENT NEED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR. POSTS SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF SPEEDING UP DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, BRIEF THEM ON THE EFFORTS THE U.S. HAS MADE IN THIS REGARD, AND URGE THEM TO PROVIDE AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE TO EXPANDED UNAMIR -- INCLUDING ADOPTING AN AFRICAN BATTALION. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS:

-- THE CRISIS IN RWANDA IS NOW MOVING INTO ITS THIRD MONTH, WITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION STILL UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE.

-- THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS; HOWEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.

-- THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE TO THE RPF'S OBJECTION TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE FRENCH STAY IN RWANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH GROWS.

-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION TO GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AWAY FROM THE BATTLE LINES. HOWEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RWANDANS ARE THREATENED IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.

-- IT IS CRUCIAL TO GET EXPANDED UNAMIR ON THE GROUND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, TO RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RWANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE FOR UNAMIR FORCES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND OTHERS TO TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE UN HAS LINED UP THE NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES THREATEN TO DELAY THE PROCESS.

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-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE UN WITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY WAS COMPLETED LAST WEEK. WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE UN TO MEET THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.

-- WE ENCOURAGE THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO EXPANDED UNAMIR TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE MATCHING UP AVAILABLE LOGISTICS WITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS, INDIVIDUAL EU STATES MAY WISH TO FOLLOW THE U.S. APPROACH OF AGREEING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENT.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE EU AFRICA GROUP MEETING PLANNED FOR JULY 6/7 WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT FORUM FOR RAISING THE URGENT ISSUE OF EXPANDING UNAMIR. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH YOUR COUNTERPARTS IN THE EU IN ORDER TO HELP LINE UP AND COORDINATE SUPPORT TO UNAMIR.

7. FOR PARIS: ABOVE DEMARCHE IS INTENDED FOR EU POSTS OTHER THAN FRANCE. HOWEVER, POST SHOULD INFORM GOF OF OUR DEMARCHE AND ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE GOF OFFICIALS TO MAKE SURE UNAMIR IS ON THE AGENDA AT THE EU MEETING AND THAT GOF REPRESENTATIVES MAKE A STRONG CASE IN FAVOR OF EU SUPPORT TO EXPANDED UNAMIR.

8. FOR PRETORIA: REFTEL REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE 50 APC'S (LIGHTLY ARMORED TRUCKS) TO UNAMIR AND HAS INDICATED A STRONG INCLINATION TO SUPPORT THE MAJORITY OF THE ZIMBABWEAN CONTINGENT'S NEEDS. POST SHOULD SEEK TO CONFIRM/SOLIDIFY THESE SUPPORT PLANS AND SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE CRISIS IN RWANDA IS NOW MOVING INTO ITS THIRD MONTH, WITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION STILL UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE.

-- THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS; HOWEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.

-- THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR

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CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE TO THE RPF'S OBJECTION TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE FRENCH STAY IN RWANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH GROWS.

-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION TO GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AWAY FROM THE BATTLE LINES. HOWEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RWANDANS ARE THREATENED IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.

-- IT IS CRUCIAL TO GET EXPANDED UNAMIR ON THE GROUND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, TO RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RWANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE FOR UNAMIR FORCES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND OTHERS TO TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE UN HAS LINED UP THE NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES THREATEN TO DELAY THE PROCESS.

-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE UN WITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY WAS COMPLETED LAST WEEK. WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE UN TO MEET THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.

-- WE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE SIMILAR SUPPORT TO UNAMIR. WE WELCOME YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP AND WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW YOUR SPECIFIC PLANS FOR SUPPORTING UNAMIR.

-- IN ORDER TO FACILITATE MATCHING UP AVAILABLE LOGISTICS WITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS, YOU MAY WISH TO FOLLOW THE U.S. APPROACH OF AGREEING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENT. WE UNDERSTAND YOU MAY ALREADY BE CONSIDERING ASSISTING TO ZIMBABWEAN BATTALION. WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A MOVE.

9. FOR OTTAWA AND CANBERRA: THE GOC IS CONSIDERING PROVIDING A SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNICATION COMPANY (UP TO 350 PERSONNEL), AND THE GOA MAY PROVIDE ONE MEDICAL COMPANY. POST SHOULD DETERMINE STATUS OF THESE PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS AND ENCOURAGE WHATEVER CONTRIBUTIONS HOST GOVERNMENTS CAN MAKE TO UNAMIR. POSTS MAY DRAW ON

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FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE CRISIS IN RWANDA IS NOW MOVING INTO ITS THIRD MONTH, WITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION STILL UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE.

-- THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING IMPORTANT PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS; HOWEVER, THE OPERATION IS ONLY A TEMPORARY ONE, UNTIL ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS CAN BE DEPLOYED.

-- THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING A VITAL BRIDGE UNTIL UNAMIR CAN ARRIVE, BUT THEY ARE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, DUE TO THE RPF'S OBJECTION TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT. EACH DAY THE FRENCH STAY IN RWANDA, THE RISK OF AN UNINTENDED CLASH GROWS.

-- RPF OPPOSITION HAS LIMITED THE FRENCH OPERATION TO GOVERNMENT-HELD TERRITORY IN AREAS AWAY FROM THE BATTLE LINES. HOWEVER, LARGE NUMBERS OF RWANDANS ARE THREATENED IN KIGALI AND OTHER AREAS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE FRENCH-LED DEPLOYMENT.

-- IT IS CRUCIAL TO GET EXPANDED UNAMIR ON THE GROUND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, TO RELIEVE THE FRENCH-LED FORCES AND BRING LONGER-TERM PROTECTION TO RWANDAN CIVILIANS IN AS BROAD AN AREA AS IS FEASIBLE FOR UNAMIR FORCES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND OTHERS TO TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE UN HAS LINED UP THE NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES THREATEN TO DELAY THE PROCESS.

-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE UN WITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR; DELIVERY WAS COMPLETED LAST WEEK. WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE UN TO MEET THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.

-- WE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE CONSIDERING IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMIR, AS WELL. WE WELCOME YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP AND WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW YOUR SPECIFIC PLANS FOR SUPPORTING UNAMIR.

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10. FOR WELLINGTON, PRAGUE, MOSCOW, BRASILIA, BEIJING, AND TOKYO: HOST COUNTRIES HAVE EITHER EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT HAVE YET TO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS (NEW ZEALAND, CZECHOSLAVAKIA) OR MAY BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE MATERIAL OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT HAVE NOT YET DONE SO (RUSSIA, BRAZIL, CHINA, JAPAN). POSTS SHOULD STRESS THE URGENT NEED TO ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, HIGHLIGHT U.S. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, AND URGE SIMILAR COMMITMENTS FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS, DRAWING ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE CRISIS IN RWANDA IS NOW MOVING INTO ITS THIRD MONTH, WITH LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION STILL UNDER SERIOUS THREAT FROM CONTINUED FIGHTING AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE.

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-- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND OTHERS TO TRY TO SPEED UP DEPLOYMENT. THE UN HAS LINED UP THE NECESSARY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, BUT LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES THREATEN TO DELAY THE PROCESS.

-- TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT, THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE UN WITH NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE GHANAIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS TO BE THE FIRST CONTINGENT DEPLOYED.

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-- WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO EXPANDED UNAMIR TO HELP ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE MATCHING UP AVAILABLE LOGISTICS WITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' NEEDS, YOU MAY WISH TO FOLLOW THE U.S. APPROACH OF AGREEING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENT.

11. FOR ADDIS: PLEASE INFORM OAU OF THIS DEMARCHE AND SHARE APPROPRIATE POINTS.

12. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

YAOUNDE
LUSAKA
BRAZZAVILLE
LILONGWE
BAMAKO
LAGOS
SECDEF WASHDC
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CROSSHATCH

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3 [illegible] 4 AC/AE 5 CR/VIC
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
07/15/94 647-3139 SECC 4533
P:PTARNOFF

AF:GEMOOSE P:ESWICKER IO/PHO:JWOOD PM/ISP:RWHARTON
EUR/RPM:EADLER AF/S:SKEOUGH-FISH EUR/WE:ACARSON NEA/IAI:RROTH
JCS:CROBERTSON OSD:VKERN NSC:
S/S-O: S/S:

IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, ROME IMMEDIATE, BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE, BONN IMMEDIATE, MOSCOW IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE +
PRIORITY BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, NAIROBI, DAKAR, ACCRA, LUSAKA, HARARE, TUNIS, ADDIS ABABA +

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR

REF: A) STATE 177616 B) STATE 188264
C) USEU BRUSSELS 7624

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

3. AS OUTLINED IN REF (A), OUR KEY OBJECTIVE REMAINS SEEING THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED IN RWANDA AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PERMIT UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE AND TO REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH DEPLOYMENT. WE HAVE RECEIVED GENERAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR CONCEPT TO HAVE DONOR COUNTRIES "ADOPT" A BATTALION AND RECOGNITION OF THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FAST ACTION (REF C); HOWEVER, SO FAR, SUPPORT TO HELP THE UN EQUIP AND MOVE POTENTIAL UNAMIR BATTALIONS TO RWANDA HAS BEEN LESS THAN ADEQUATE.

4. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, WE NEED TO FOCUS ON COUNTRIES THAT ARE

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LIKELY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. WHERE APPROPRIATE, WE SHOULD RECOMMEND CONTINGENTS THAT LIKELY DONOR COUNTRIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING, OR AT LEAST SERVING AS ONE OF THE CONTINGENT'S "CORNERSTONE" EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES' HOST COUNTRIES ARE EITHER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO UNAMIR OR ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS TO URGE THEM TO JOIN THE U.S. IN AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO GET UNAMIR CONTINGENTS EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED. THE DEMARCHE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR OR COM TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR EQUIVALENT, WHO SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT THIS IS A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT. POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON REF (A) AND USE THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW.

5. POINTS FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES EXCEPT PARIS AND PRETORIA:

-- OUR KEY OBJECTIVE IS TO SEE THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THE UN FORCE CAN REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH OPERATION AND TAKE UP ITS MISSION OF PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS AND FACILITATING RELIEF EFFORTS.

-- TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST ASSIST UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WITH THEIR DEPLOYMENT, IN PARTICULAR THROUGH PROVIDING MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO UNAMIR.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY LEASED AND DELIVERED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR. WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE UN TO MEET ADDITIONAL MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.

-- HELPING TO EQUIP UNAMIR REQUIRES HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND CONTINUOUS CLOSE WORKING LEVEL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UN, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, AND COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

-- THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS TAKES TIME, AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT COMMITMENTS BE QUICKLY FORTHCOMING AND CLOSELY FOLLOWED AND PUSHED THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS.

-- WE KNOW YOU SHARE OUR DESIRE TO SEE UNAMIR DEPLOYED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE YOU CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN REACHING THIS GOAL THROUGH JOINING THE U.S. IN PROVIDING MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS.

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-- WE URGE YOU TO ENGAGE ALL RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPORT YOU COULD PROVIDE AND WITHIN WHAT TIME-FRAME, AND TO COMMUNICATE YOUR DECISION TO THE UN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR MOSCOW:

-- WE HOPE THAT YOU CAN PROVIDE MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR ONE UNAMIR CONTINGENT, AS THE U.S. HAS DONE FOR GHANA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ETHIOPIANS, ZIMBABWEANS, AND ZAMBIANS ALREADY HAVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPLIES OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT. FOR THIS REASON, YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS ON THE EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF ONE OF THESE CONTINGENTS.

7. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, KIEV, AND TEL AVIV (FOR KIEV AND TEL AVIV: WE ARE REPEATING REF (A) FOR YOUR BACKGROUND. YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON POINTS IN REF (A) AS PART OF YOUR DEMARCHE):

-- WE URGE YOU TO IDENTIFY ONE CONTINGENT ON WHICH YOU COULD FOCUS YOUR ASSISTANCE, WHICH COULD SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE TO A LARGER EFFORT TO MEET THAT CONTINGENT'S NEEDS. YOU COULD THEN APPROACH OTHER WILLING DONORS TO SEEK THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE REMAINING NEEDS OF THE CONTINGENT.

(FOR BRUSSELS): -- WE KNOW YOU LEFT EQUIPMENT IN RWANDA FOR UNAMIR'S USE AFTER YOUR WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS A WELCOME CONTRIBUTION. GIVEN YOUR SPECIAL TIES TO RWANDA, WE HOPE YOU CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THE TUNISIANS MAY BE ONE OF THE FIRST CONTINGENTS READY TO DEPLOY. YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS YOUR EFFORTS ON THEM, BRINGING ALONG ONE OR MORE OF YOUR EU ALLIES TO HANDLE THE BALANCE OF THE TUNISIANS' NEEDS.

(FOR TEL AVIV): -- YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS YOUR EFFORTS ON THE ETHIOPIAN CONTINGENT, GIVEN YOUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA.

8. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR OTTAWA:

-- WE WELCOME YOUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE A COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR. WE KNOW HOW COMMITTED YOU ARE TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION AND HOPE YOU COULD MAKE MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE

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TO THE UN AND/OR ONE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN CONTINGENTS.

9. FOR PRETORIA: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SAG IS NOT INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE "ADOPT A BATTALION" PROPOSAL. POST SHOULD FIRM UP SOUTH AFRICA'S PRE-EXISTING COMMITMENT TO RWANDA, USING THE FOLLOWING POINT:

-- WE VALUE SOUTH AFRICA'S QUICK ENGAGEMENT IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT INITIATIVES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR YOUR DECISION TO PROVIDE APC'S AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE RWANDAN CRISIS. WE BELIEVE SOUTH AFRICAN APC'S ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED TO UNAMIR'S NEEDS. WE ENCOURAGE RAPID CLOSING OF THE APC DEAL WITH THE UN AND ACCELERATION OF RELIEF AID, GIVEN THE UNPRECEDENTED HUMANITARIAN CRISIS NOW FACING THE SUBREGION.

10. FOR PARIS: YOU WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SEPTEL REQUESTING THE GOF TO LEAVE EQUIPMENT IN RWANDA FOR USE BY THE SENEGALESE CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR. PLEASE SHARE CONTENTS OF THIS CABLE WITH THE GOF AND ASK THAT THEY MAKE PARALLEL DEMARCHES.

11. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
KIEV IMMEDIATE
TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

Y

USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
BRAZZAVILLE
BANGUI
YAOUNDE
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
PRAGUE
BRASILIA
BEIJING
TOKYO
LILONGWE
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CJCS WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, IO/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, RW
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
REF: (A) USUN 2954 (B) USUN 2957
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. AMB INDERFURTH, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSAN RICE OF THE NSC, MET WITH U/SYG ANNAN TO GET DETAILS ON THE SYG'S INTENTION TO DISPATCH A SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA. THE MISSION WILL LEAVE AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S JULY 29 REVIEW TO LOOK AT UNOSOM IN TWO WAYS: WHAT PARTS OF THE MANDATE THE FORCE IS NOT PERFORMING AND RESULTANT POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS, AND WHAT TASKS WOULD NEED TO BE ELIMINATED IF THE FORCE WAS REDUCED TO CERTAIN LEVELS. EVEN AS THE SPECIAL MISSION PREPARES TO LEAVE, THE UN IS WORKING TO WITHDRAW A BATTALION TO SEND TO RWANDA. THE MISSION WILL MEET WITH THE SRSG, THE FORCE COMMANDER, USLO, AND WITH THE CONTINGENT COMMANDERS TO GET THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS' VIEWS. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d [redacted] THE UN WILL BE ASKING FOR ASSETS FROM THE US TO ASSIST IN UNOSOM'S WITHDRAWAL AS WE AND THE UN WERE THE ONES WHO CONVINCED MANY TO GO THERE. END SUMMARY.

VISIT TO SOMALIA BY UN SPECIAL MISSION

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3. ON TUESDAY, JULY 19, AMB INDERFURTH MET WITH U/SYG ANNAN TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THE SYG'S PLAN (REFTEL A) TO SEND A SPECIAL MISSION TO SOMALIA FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF UNOSOM. AMB

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INDERFURTH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SUSAN RICE OF THE NSC. PRESENT WITH ANNAN WERE A/SYG RIZA, GEN BARIL AND DESK OFFICER LINDENMAYER. LINDENMAYER PROVIDED A COPY OF THE SYG'S REPORT ON SOMALIA (SEPARATELY FAXED TO IO) WHICH SHOULD BE RELEASED WEDNESDAY.

4. PARAGRAPH 57 OF THE REPORT ADDRESSES THE SPECIAL MISSION. IN IT THE SYG STATES "I AM INCLINED THEREFORE TO THINK THAT IT MAY BE FEASIBLE TO COMMENCE A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF TROOPS AT PRESENT ASSIGNED TO UNOSOM II. I ACCORDINGLY INTEND TO DISPATCH SHORTLY A SPECIAL MISSION FROM HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS THE EXTENT OF SUCH REDUCTION WITH MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER AND TO PRESENT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO ME."

5. AMB INDERFURTH SAID U.S. MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY. USG VIEW IS THAT UNOSOM IS NOT PERFORMING ITS MISSION AND IT IS COSTING A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY, NOT ONLY FROM THE USG. IT IS HARD TO SAY THIS IS THE BEST USE OF RESOURCES. THEREFORE THE USG IS TAKING THE JULY 29 REVIEW VERY SERIOUSLY. USG BELIEVES UNOSOM IS IN ITS FINAL PHASES. ALTHOUGH THE MARCH 1995 DATE IS OUT THERE, IF THE SECURITY SITUATION GETS WORSE THE END WILL BE ACCELERATED, AND IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL PROGRESS BY SEPTEMBER THE END SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. AMB INDERFURTH NOTED THAT PARA 57 MIRRORED MANY OF OUR CONCERNS.

6. ANNAN EXPLAINED THE SPECIAL MISSION IN MORE DETAIL. THEY SHOULD LEAVE AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK. THE COUNCIL'S DELIBERATION FOR THE 29TH REVIEW WILL FORM PART OF THE BASIS OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MISSION, SO THEY WILL WAIT FOR THE COUNCIL'S REVIEW. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE FINAL PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION ONCE THEY HAVE THE SENSE OF THE COUNCIL'S APPROACH.

7. THE SPECIAL MISSION WILL LOOK AT UNOSOM FROM TWO DIRECTIONS. FIRST, WHAT ARE THE TASKS GIVEN BY THE COUNCIL THAT UNOSOM IS NOT OR CAN NOT PERFORM AND WHAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD RESULT. SECOND, WHAT TASKS CAN BE PERFORMED, OR IF NOT, NEED TO BE ELIMINATED, IF THE FORCE IS REDUCED TO 12,000 OR 10,000 OR LESS. THE MISSION WILL MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT IN REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCE. THE MISSION WILL LOOK AT THE CIVILIAN SIDE AS WELL AND RECOMMEND REDUCTIONS THERE, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A SMALL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE POLITICAL MISSION.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973

WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, IO/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, RW
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA

8. ANNAN SAID THAT GEN BARIL WAS WORKING WITH THE FORCE COMMANDER NOW TO SEE IF A BATTALION COULD BE

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WITHDRAWN FROM UNOSOM AND SENT TO RWANDA. THIS IS BEING WORKED ON EVEN BEFORE THE SPECIAL MISSION GOES TO SOMALIA AND THEY EXPECT AN ANSWER NEXT WEEK.

9. ANNAN SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICE. IF TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN THE POLICE MUST REMAIN BEHIND. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

AMB INDERFURTH POINTED OUT THAT IT WS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ICITAP WAS IN NAIROBI AND THAT A DECISION HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE BY THE USG TO CEASE THE TRAINING PROGRAM. HE ALSO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UN TO MAKE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE SOMALI POLICE FORCE IS CAPABLE OF BEING STOOD UP. ANNAN SAID THE TEAM WOULD LOOK AT THAT.

10. AMB INDERFURTH SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SPECIAL MISSION WOULD MEET WITH USLO WHEN IN MOGADISHU. ANNAN SAID THEY WOULD. THE COMPOSITION OF THE MISSION WILL BE RIZA, BARIL AND LINDENMAYER. THEY WOULD BE WORKING WITH SRSG GBEHO AND THE FORCE COMMANDER. ANNAN DID NOT THINK REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD BE MADE PART OF THE MISSION, BUT SAID THEY WOULD MEET WITH THE CONTINGENT COMMANDERS IN SOMALIA, WHICH WOULD GIVE THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS INPUT. THERE WILL ALSO BE A TROOP CONTRIBUTOR'S MEETING NEXT WEEK BEFORE THE MISSION DEPARTS.

11. AMB INDERFURTH OFFERED TO PROVIDE THE USG'S IDEAS ON THE AREAS OF UNOSOM, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, WE BELIEVE CAN BE CUT. RIZA SAID THEY WOULD HAPPY TO RECEIVE THIS BUT THEY INTENDED TO GO WITHOUT PREDETERMINED BIASES.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

ASSISTANCE WITH THE WITHDRAWAL

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13. BOTH RIZA AND BARIL STRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE SOMALIS WOULD RESIST THE WITHDRAWAL AND IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS. BARIL POINTED OUT THAT THE UN HAD NEVER DONE A WITHDRAWAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. CAMBODIA WAS MUCH MORE SECURE AND THEY ONLY LOST A COUPLE HUNDRED VEHICLES. BARIL WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER TROOP CONTINGENTS AS THE WITHDRAWAL BECAME MORE RISKY. HE LIKENED IT TO WHEN THE UNOSOM TROOPS BEGAN TO INCREASE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS LAST YEAR AND THE PROBLEMS THEY HAD WITH CONTINGENTS TAKING ORDERS FROM THEIR CAPITALS. ANNAN SAID THAT THE UN WOULD BE ASKING FOR ASSETS TO HELP WITH THE WITHDRAWAL - AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE HIGH ON THAT LIST, ALONG WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. SUSAN RICE AND AMB INDERFURTH BOTH NOTED THAT THE USG FACES LEGAL CONSTRAINTS, ESPECIALLY THE BYRD AMMENDMENT. ANNAN POINTED OUT THAT BETWEEN THE USG AND THE UN WE HAD TALKED MANY COUNTRIES INTO GOING TO SOMALIA. NEITHER THE USG'S, NOR THE UN'S,
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002973
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR BERGER, CLARKE, RICE;
STATE FOR AF/E, IO/UNP-STANTON, IO/PHO-LOFTIS
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, SO, RW
SUBJECT: DISPATCH OF SPECIAL UN MISSION TO SOMALIA
CREDIBILITY COULD AFFORD TO LEAVE THESE COUNTRIES
HANGING AT THE TIME
OF GREATEST RISK DURING THE
WITHDRAWAL.
ALBRIGHT
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IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: RWANDA: ADAPTING UNAMIR TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 4.

3. THE BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES OF THE RPF, THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERIM HUTU GOVERNMENT, THE MASSIVE REFUGEE OUTFLOWS AND THE RPF'S DECLARATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT ON JULY 18 HAVE DRAMATICALLY CHANGED THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO DEPLOY MILITARY ASSETS TO ZAIRE TO HELP MEET THE URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF RWANDAN REFUGEES. THE RETURN HOME OF RWANDAN REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE BEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF MEETING THIS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS. WITHOUT CHANGING ITS MANDATE, UNAMIR SHOULD REFOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON ENSURING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF RWANDANS. THIS WILL REQUIRE A DIFFERENT TROOP MIX AND CAPABILITIES THAN CURRENTLY ENVISIONED.

4. USUN IS REQUESTED TO USE ITS MEETING WITH DPKO U/SYG KOFI ANNAN ON 7/20 TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

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-- THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SEND MILITARY ASSETS TO ZAIRE TO HELP MEET THE URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF RWANDA REFUGEES.

-- AN ASSESSMENT TEAM WILL ARRIVE IN GOMA ON 7/21. WE ANTICIPATE THAT OUR LIKELY CONTRIBUTION WILL CONSIST OF LOGISTICS PERSONNEL, MILITARY MEDICAL TEAMS, AIRPORT CONTROL TEAMS AND THE LIKE.

-- THE U.S. CONTINGENT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FRENCH AND UNHCR IN ZAIRE.

-- IN ADDITION TO MEETING URGENT NEEDS, THE MOST IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO HELP THESE RWANDANS RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FARMS.

-- UNAMIR CAN AND SHOULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN THAT TASK.

-- WITHOUT CHANGING ITS MANDATE, UNAMIR SHOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SAFE RETURN HOME OF THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH GHANA TO EQUIP ITS CONTINGENT IN RWANDA. MOREOVER, WE REMAIN PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO GET UNAMIR FORCES IN PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE UNAMIR'S MISSION REQUIRES MORE SELF-SUSTAINING AND MOBILE FORCES THAN ARE CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATED AND COMMITTED.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO JOIN WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES TO SEEK MORE CAPABLE AND RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES FOR UNAMIR. WE WOULD SUGGEST APPROACHING SUCH NATIONS AS GERMANY, JAPAN, RUSSIA, AUSTRALIA AND ITALY. CANADA COULD BE REQUESTED TO ADD TO ITS CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATORS AND LOGISTICAL TROOPS.

-- WE WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE UN TO DECIDE THE SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES IT WISHES TO REQUEST OF THESE AND OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. YY

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ckage Subject: (Ø) Rwanda Demarche Cable

em Title: cover note

~~ONFIDENTIAL)~~ The attached cable comes out of Friday's peacekeeping core oup meeting. Ambassador Albright wants to call BBG on Saturday. Please ll your comments and clearances by noon Saturday to John Brims in IO/PHO at 6-7732 or by e-mail. Thanks. Bob

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IO/PHO: RGLOFTIS/USUN:MSHEEHAN:RGL
07/22/94 736-7732 SEPKA 772
IO: GWARD

AF: PM: FCOOK
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S/S: S/S-O:

IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE MOGADISHU, SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE, CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, SO, UNAMIR, UNOSOM

SUBJECT: RWANDA: GETTING UNAMIR MOVING

REF: A) STATE 196016 (DTG 220247Z JUL 93)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST FOR AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT. PLEASE SEE PARA 5.

3. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS MOVING TO ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, THE ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE TRAGEDY IS THE RAPID RETURN HOME OF THESE PEOPLE. IN LIGHT OF THE INFLAMMATORY RADIO BROADCASTS BY THE FORMER INTERIM GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, FEW HUTUS WILL BE WILLING TO RISK RETRIBUTION BY THE RPF DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM THE NEWLY INSTALLED GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THROUGH UNAMIR, NEEDS TO DEPLOY A VISIBLE PRESENCE THAT WILL ASSURE THE HUTUS THAT THEY CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY AND REASSURE THE TUTSIS AND HUTUS WHO REMAINED IN RWANDA THAT THEY WILL NOT BE THREATENED BY THE RETURNEES.

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4. THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR, DEPENDENT UPON ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES, HAS GONE TOO SLOWLY. THE UN SHOULD TURN TO OTHER MORE DEVELOPED OR CAPABLE COUNTRIES TO MOVE MORE QUICKLY TO FILL IN UNAMIR'S GAPS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE UN SHOULD ALSO DRAW ON ITS ASSETS IN SOMALIA TO HELP MEET THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN ZAIRE AND RWANDA. NOT ONLY COULD EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES BE MOVED, BUT, WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS' PERMISSION, SOME TROOP CONTINGENTS COULD ALSO BE DEPLOYED QUICKLY.

5. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT IS REQUESTED TO SEEK A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

-- ALTHOUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS MOVING TO ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, THE ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE TRAGEDY IS THE RAPID RETURN HOME OF THESE PEOPLE.

-- FEW HUTUS, HOWEVER, ARE WILLING TO RISK RETRIBUTION BY THE RPF DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM THE NEWLY-INSTALLED GOVERNMENT.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THROUGH UNAMIR, NEEDS TO DEPLOY A VISIBLE PRESENCE THAT WILL ASSURE THE HUTUS THAT THEY CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY. UNAMIR MUST ALSO REASSURE THE TUTSIS AND HUTUS REMAINING IN RWANDA THAT THEY WILL NOT BE THREATENED BY THE RETURNEES.

-- UNAMIR CANNOT BE PRIMARILY AN OPERATION MANNED BY AFRICAN STATES. DESPITE THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, THESE NATIONS SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO DEPLOY QUICKLY AND TO SUSTAIN THEMSELVES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UN OR OTHER MEMBER STATES. THE PROCESS OF MARRYING THESE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO EQUIPMENT HAS GONE FAR TOO SLOWLY.

- THE PRESIDENT HELD A NEWS CONFERENCE ON JULY 22 TO ANNOUNCE OUR INITIATIVES TO HELP RELIEVE THE SUFFERING IN RWANDA.

- WE PLAN A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF UNHCR, DHA, AND THE OTHER HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS THERE. THE US MILITARY WILL SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING EFFORTS:

-- AIRPORT SERVICES: GIVING GOMA A 24-HOUR CAPABILITY AND IMPROVING BUKAVU AND OTHER KEY AIRHEADS

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-- LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR ALL AIRHEADS TO ENSURE THE RAPID DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES

-- ORGANIZE AN EXPANDED AIRHEAD AT ENTEBBE TO SUPPORT THE WHOLE REGIONAL EFFORT

-- WATER PURIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITY

- BY THE END OF THE WEEKEND WE WILL HAVE HUNDREDS OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REGION AND SOON WE WILL HAVE SEVERAL THOUSAND COMMITTED TO THIS EFFORT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH YOU TO MAKE A STRONG APPEAL TO OTHER MEMBER STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFORT BY SUPPORTING UNHCR, UNAMIR, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY THEY ARE ABLE.

THE ZAIRE RELIEF EFFORT

- OUR IMMEDIATE EFFORT WILL BE IN ZAIRE TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING THERE.

- MOST OF OUR MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORT WILL BE FOCUSED THROUGH ENTEBBE, UGANDA TO ZAIRE. HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO IT ALL, AND I URGE THAT WE COOPERATE CLOSELY IN NEW YORK AND THE FIELD TO IDENTIFY GAPS IN SUPPORT AND SEEK ADDITIONAL DONORS QUICKLY.

RECONFIGURE UNAMIR

- MY STAFF HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH DPKO AND ALL AGREE THAT THE UNAMIR MISSION MUST SHIFTED AND RECONFIGURED TO SUPPORT THE RELIEF EFFORT AND TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA.

- WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE THE US-LEASED APC'S FOR THE GHANA BATTALION FINALLY BEGINNING TO REACH KIGALI -- BUT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PACE OF DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY OF THE REST OF UNAMIR.

- UNAMIR CANNOT BE AN OPERATION MANNED ONLY BY AFRICAN STATES. DESPITE THE BEST OF INTENTIONS, THESE NATIONS SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL TO DEPLOY QUICKLY AND TO SUSTAIN THEMSELVES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UN OR OTHER MEMBER STATES. THE PROCESS OF MARRYING THESE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO EQUIPMENT HAS GONE FAR TOO SLOWLY.

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- WE THINK THAT THE UN SHOULD GO OUT AGAIN TO SOME OF THE MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO ASK FOR SPECIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO MAKE THIS MISSION A SUCCESS IN AREAS SUCH AS LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MEDICAL SUPPORT. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SHOULD AGAIN BE ENCOURAGED TO SUPPORT THE EQUIPPING OF THE AFRICAN STATES THAT HAVE OFFERED TO PARTICIPATE IN UNAMIR'S MISSION.

- WE SUGGESTED TO DPKO THAT YOU MIGHT CONTACT COUNTRIES SUCH AS GERMANY, JAPAN, RUSSIA, ITALY, AND AUSTRALIA.

- WE UNDERSTAND THAT AUSTRALIA HAS DECIDED TO COMMIT A MEDICAL UNIT WITH ITS OWN SECURITY DETACHMENT. THIS IS THE TYPE OF ASSISTANCE THE UN SHOULD BE SEEKING.

- WE ARE PREPARED TO JOIN YOU IN HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHES TO THESE COUNTRIES TO URGE THEIR SUPPORT.

- THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO HAS ASSETS (SUCH AS VEHICLES, GENERATORS, WATER TANKS, ETC.) IN SOMALIA THAT COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO RWANDA AND ZAIRE.

- IN ADDITION TO HELPING TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING IN ZAIRE AND RWANDA, SUCH A TRANSFER COULD SIGNAL CLEARLY TO SOMALIS THAT INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IS MOVING TO OTHER CRISES AND THAT THEY CANNOT COUNT ON INTERNATIONAL AID FOREVER.

- HAVE YOU CONSIDERED ASKING SOME OF THE UNOSOM TROOP CONTRIBUTORS IF THEY ARE WILLING TO TRANSFER SOME OF THEIR FORCES FROM SOMALIA TO UNAMIR? THE TRANSFER OF A BATTALION, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD HAVE A RELATIVELY MINOR IMPACT IN SOMALIA BUT COULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN RWANDA.

CONCLUSION

- THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO A MAJOR US MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA IN THIS CRISIS.

- I APPRECIATE THE ENORMOUS EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE ON BEHALF OF RWANDA AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU ON ENCOURAGING BROADER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE EFFORT IN RWANDA.

- LET US KEEP EACH OTHER INFORMED ON WHAT IS NEEDED TO MAKE THESE OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL AND WHO YOU HAVE

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APPROACHED. WE ARE WILLING TO FOLLOW YOUR APPROACHES WITH HIGH-LEVEL APPEALS TO SUPPORT YOUR ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA.

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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: ROUTINE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**222251Z JUL 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7917

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003033
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR, DIR J5; WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC; OSD
FOR OASD (SR&R)PK/PE
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, OAU, UN, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: UNAMIR STATUS REPORT
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. SUMMARY. AT A MEETING BETWEEN AMB INDERFURTH AND A/SYG RIZA ON 22 JULY (SEPTEL), A REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED ON THE STATUS OF RESOURCES FOR UNAMIR. UNAMIR TROOP STRENGTH CURRENTLY STANDS AT 578 IN KIGALI. BY MID-AUGUST 2000-2500 ARE EXPECTED IN COUNTRY. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

IN BARIL'S WORDS: "WE HAVE TO QUIT DANCING AROUND". UNAMIR IS STILL SHORT SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT INCLUDING ITEMS REQUESTED BY RHANA. USUN MILAD HELD FURTHER TALKS WITH THE UN. END SUMMARY.
3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN USUN MILAD AND UNHQ PLANNING CELL, THE UN SUMMARIZED CURRENT UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT AS: 578 TROOPS IN KIGALI, 89 IN NAIROBI (MILITARY OBSERVERS WAITING DEPLOYMENT), 4 IN BUKAVU (LIAISON TEAM), 11 IN MILINDI, 52 IN ENTEBBE, THAT THE GHANIAN BATTALION IS STILL SHORT ONE COMPANY THAT WILL BRING THEM TO FULL STRENGTH AT 880 TROOPS. THEY ALSO NOTED THAT THE CANADIAN ADVANCE TEAM OF 39 TROOPS WILL ARRIVE IN KIGALI TODAY.
4. ON THE ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT, THE UN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTING THE NUMBERS

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2011-0263-M
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REQUESTED BY THE TROOP CONTRIBUTOR/AVAILABLE FROM UN
AND EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTORS (#/#):

EQPT TYPE	GHANA	ZIMBABWE	TUNISIA	NIGERIA
APCS	48/48	TBD/50	30/0	12/12
4-5T TRUCK	7/7	TBD/34	4/4	
3T VEHS	8/8	6/6		
LT RECCE VEHS	15/15		23/10	
WATER TRK LOOOOL	2/0		1/0	
FUEL BOWSERS	1/0		2/0	
SEDAN 4 WD	4/0			
BUS 25PAX	4/0			
STORES BIN TRK	1/0			
REFRIG UNITS	2/0			
AMBULANCE 4X4	5/0		4/0	
WKSHOP VAN	1/0			
WATER TRK 250G			5/0	
WATER TRLS	28/0			
CARGO TRLS	8/0			
RECOV VEHS	2/2			
WATER PUR UNITS	3/3			
FUEL BLAD 15000L				
FD KITCHENS	8/8		5/4	
WATER PUMP 500G	14/0			
FUEL PUMP 2000L	10/0			
HELMETS	1000/1000			
BINOCULARS	100/100			
NIGHT VIS GLS	15/15			
MINE DETECTORS	10/10			
SQD RADIOS	29/0			
COY/BN RADIOS	38/38			
VIEW MICROFICHE	4/4			
TENT LOMAN	4/4			
SANDBAGS	600K/600K			

EQPT TYPE	ETHIOPIA	MALI	MALAWI	ZAMBIA
APCS	12/12		72/0	
4-5T TRUCK		5/5	150/0	
3T VEHS		8/8	120/0	
LT RECCE VEHS		20/0	4/0	10/0
WATER TRK LOOOOL				5/0
FUEL BOWSERS				5/0
REFRIG UNITS				2/0
WKSHOP VAN				2/0
WATER TRLS			2/0	15/0
CARGO TRLS				15/0
RECOV VEHS				4/0
ROUGH TER FKLIFT				2/0
FRONT END LOADER				2/0
FD KITCHENS				1/0
WATER PUMP 500G			1/0	5/0
FLAK JACKETS	850/850	150/		
150	1000/0			
NIGHT VIS GLS	42/0			

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
JOINT STAFF FOR DIR, DIR J5; WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC; OSD
FOR OASD (SR&R)PK/PE
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, OAU, UN, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: UNAMIR STATUS REPORT

MINE DETECTORS	5/0 11/0
SQD RADIOS	1/0 9/0
VIEW MICROFICHE	205/25
RAZOR WIRE ROLL	200/0
HY MG	12/0
RIFLES	150/0
LT MG	12/0

THE UN ALSO NOTED THAT:
- - THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ZIMBABWE AND MALI ARE BEING DETERMINED BY A UNHQ RECON PARTY CURRENTLY DEPLOYED TO BOTH COUNTRIES (UN TEAM ALSO VISITED MALAWI, ETHIOPIA, TUNISIA, AND ZAMBIA).
- - ZAMBIA IS BEING TREATED AS A RESERVE AS THEIR REQUIREMENTS ARE EXCESSIVE. THE UN IS TRYING TO GET REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS FROM ZAMBIA.
- - THE 50 APCS FROM SOUTH AFRICA WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END OF SEP 94.
- - THE MALI EQUIPMENT MAY BE SUPPLIED DIRECTLY FROM FRANCE.
- - FRANCE HAS OFFERED TO DEPLOY A "FRANCOPHONE" BATTALION, MADE UP LARGELY OF SENEGALESE. THE UN HAS REQUESTED THEY BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. THE UN BELIEVES AS THIS UNIT WILL RELIEVE OPERATION TURQUOISE TROOPS AS PART OF UNAMIR THE FRENCH WILL PURSUE VIGOROUSLY. ACCORDING TO THE UN THE RPF HAS TENTATIVELY AGREED TO THE "FRANCOPHONE" BATTALION AS LONG AS IT IS PART OF UNAMIR.
- - THE UK TRUCKS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END OF SEP 94. COMMENT: USUN MILAD SPOKE WITH UK MILAD WHO STATED THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE TRUCKS IN AS FEW AS TWO WEEKS.
- - THE NETHERLANDS OFFERED LIGHT RECCE VEHICLES BUT THEY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END OF OCT 94.
- - BELGIUM OFFERED $3 MILLION DOLLARS TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDED THE MONEY BE USED TO SUPPORT THE MALAWI UN I T.
- - NEW ZEALAND HAS OFFERED TO SELL UP TO 100 3T TRUCKS.
- - SPAIN IS CONSIDERING PROVIDING APCS. HOWEVER, THE UN POINTED OUT THAT THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAWN FROM ACTIVE UNITS AND THIS OFFER WOULD PROBABLY FALL THROUGH.
- - THE POSSIBILITY OF REDEPLOYING A BATTALION FROM UNOSOM IN SOMALIA TO RWANDA IS ON HOLD, SUBJECT TO THE VISIT OF A DPKO SPECIAL MISSION BEING DISPATCHED TO MOGADISHU AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>3033
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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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<^TOR>940722191108 M1165525

FROM:
SITREPRT

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UNAMIR JUMPSTART STRATEGY

1) Determine status of all potential troop contributing nations (TNCs) -- identify barriers to deployment.

2) Identify potential additional TNCs -- identify barriers to deployment.

3) Make diplomatic demarches to (potential) TNCs urging deployment.

4) Make diplomatic demarches to urge other advanced nations to provide equipment or other support to enable TCN's to participate.

5) After sufficient information/action, follow up these efforts with a high-level team traveling to appropriate states to urge deployment or "sponsorship."

6) Press the UN to push for redeployment of UNOSOM units, if appropriate.

7) Get DC/.PC to determine whether USG is prepared to take additional steps to speed deployment ("sponsorship" of another battalion; free support or equipment; supplementary logistical support for UNAMIR).

8) Pursue blanket airlift LOA, if possible.

9) Communicate strategy with universal cable to coordinate USG efforts.

10) Offer to detail a USG person to work on this issue at the UN.

11) Monitor progress and communicate regularly with UN; press UN to move expeditiously on its actions.

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UNAMIR RECRUITMENT STRATEGY
(State/PM -- 7/27/94)

I. Overall U.S. Recruitment Strategy

- Confirm status of countries already approached by UN and/or U.S. by COB 7/28. (OSD, State/IO)
- Determine status of "adopt-a-battalion" first-world commitments by COB 7/27. (OSD, State/IO)
- Create list of possible additional troop contributors by COB 7/28. (State/PM)
- Determine phone calls to be made by Christopher, Talbott, Lake, or the President in connection with recruitment efforts, including talking points by COB 7/28. (State/PM, NSC)
- Scrub lists of "required" equipment submitted by potential troop contributors, and task P&A request by COB 7/28. (JCS, OSD/DSAA)
- Plan troop recruitment trip (Warner, JCS, NSC, State?) to capitals by COB 7/29. (OSD, NSC, State).
- Draft "master cable" outlining U.S. recruitment strategy -- who's doing what, who's being asked to do what, and what the U.S. is doing or prepared to do; by COB 7/29. (State/PM)

II. Additional Policy/Procedural Issues to be Resolved

- Determine if DoD will provide lift to African troop contributors (are others included?), with eventual reimbursement from the UN, under a "blanket" LOA; by COB 7/27. (OSD)
- Confirm the current status of the UNAMIR logistics plan by COB 7/27. (OSD)
- Articulate how a U.S. JTF, located in Kigali, will interface with UNAMIR. Will the JTF provide any short-term logistical and/or sustainment assistance to newly deploying UNAMIR troops as they transit through Kigali? When will UNAMIR be ready to provide C3, medical, food, water, transportation for all of UNAMIR; by COB 7/27. (JCS, OSD, NSC)

Section

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Rwanda

DECISION PAPER

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

Subject: Use of Kigali Airport

1. (C) Purpose. Provide discussion of key considerations in a decision for deployment and standup of JTF in Kigali.

2. (C) USCINCEUR has tasked Support Hope JTF commander to evaluate the need and capability of Kigali to support continuing tasking for humanitarian operations within the region. JTF will go into Kigali on Thursday, 28 Jul, to meet with Amb Rawson and make recommendation to USCINCEUR. This paper discusses the pro/con arguments for such a deployment.

PRO:

- JTF operations would be centralized with respect to regional operations, improving coordination with US Ambassador (and through him the Rwandan government), UNAMIR, and NGOs.

- TALCE at the airport and additional logistics personnel could provide more expeditious means of convoying air delivered humanitarian assistance to Goma (659 kilometers from airhead at Entebbe, 160 from Kigali).

- Option also maximizes set up for NGO, contractor, or military operations in running future logistics operations supporting return of refugees and displaced persons returning to Rwanda from Goma and Bukavu and the safe zone in southwestern Rwanda.

- Supports option to establish way stations and lines of communications along routes being used by the refugees to return to their homes.

  - (DIA assesses 95% of all refugees in Goma are from the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. Return would require maximum of two days walking time. More difficult issue will be return of displaced in safe area, a large portion of whom will be required to travel 3-5 days to home).

- Helps relieve growing humanitarian airflow backlog by increasing number of entry points available to U.S. airlift for delivering relief supplies into region, especially Goma.

  - Goma runway already deteriorating, limiting types of aircraft capable of landing at airport.

  - Leading by example may encourage other countries to support airlift into Rwanda, region in general.

  - Supports interagency goal of USG being perceived as doing all it can to support humanitarian relief.

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR

- Operations conducted within Rwanda will place the focus of relief efforts on the current government in Rwanda and allow the government to contribute directly to relief efforts.

• CON:

• USG would be placing troops into Rwanda prior to that government receiving formal US recognition.

- Perception that USG supports policies of that government without track record of seeing them implemented, including processes for screening and detaining those suspected of acts of genocide, supporting return of lands to refugees and displaced Rwandans, and working with French government and UNAMIR to ensure security for all refugees and displaced.

• Threat assessment at Kigali airport is low-moderate. Reports of RPF attacks on Hutus in the area and continued extremist Hutu rhetoric on military resurgence could reignite hostilities which could threaten personnel, equipment and operations at Kigali airport.

• Airport is the primary means of mass evacuation if need arises. Establishment of JTF and/ora large scale logistical infrustructure in Kigali would make expeditious departure difficult.

• Depending on degree to which troops will be armed, there may be a requirement to notify Congress of their deployment into Rwanda under the War Powers Act.

3. (~~C~~) Conclusion. Since the possibility still exists for an RPF/Hutu clash (FAR), a degree of risk would be undertaken in using Kigali airport to conduct operations in support of humanitarian relief efforts. Absent any hostilities, the use of the airport would be very supportive of USG goals.

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Department of State

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CLEAR 1 ____ 2 ____

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af/c:tpmcculley:TPM
07/29/94 7-1707 SECB 5909
af:gemoose

af/fo:epbrynn
p:eswicker
io/pho:jwood
pm/isp:jjones
af/c:rjfendrick
nea/mag:evazquez
io/unp:gstanton
prm/aaa:mmckelvey

immediate rabat

immediate kinshasa, geneva immediate, usun new york priority, bujumbura priority, brussels priority, kampala priority+

E.O. 12356: decl: oadr

TAGS: prel, pref, pgov, mops, rw, mo, cg

SUBJECT: Moroccans to Zaire

ref: a) state 202714, b) rabat 7058

1. ~~confidential~~ - entire text

2. department appreciates ambassador's concerns about the proposed scope of the moroccan mission to zaire. while we would prefer the moroccans agree to a larger mission, including an eventual deployment to rwanda as part of unamir, we agree with your assessment of the likely negative response from the king.

3. you are authorized to convey to king hassan a more limited mission for moroccan troops, confined to the provision of security in the rwandan refugee camps in eastern zaire.

4. bujumbura - minimize considered.

\\

dar es salaam priority\
usnmcd/uscincceu vaihingen ge priority\

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2011-0263-M
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Rwanda

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DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, KELLY, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**291601Z JUL 94

FM: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4507

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0964
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0012
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GNEVA IMMEDIATE 6812
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0107
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//CH1//
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0013
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2295
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0072
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0009

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 004695
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PHUM, PREL, EUN, WEU, RW, NL
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE -- THE NETHERLANDS
REFS: A) STATE 202260, B) THE HAGUE 4560
- C) THE HAGUE 4530, D) THE HAGUE 4529,
- E) STATE 197418
- F) THE WHITE HOUSE 231808Z
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. THE AMBASSADOR DELIVERED DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S MESSAGE ON UNAMIR (REF A) TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOOIJMANS JULY 29. KOOIJMANS AND DEFENSE MINISTER TER BEEK HAD ANNOUNCED LATE JULY 28 THAT THE NETHERLANDS WOULD SERVE AS THE "CORNERSTONE" FOR THE ZAMBIAN UNAMIR CONTINGENT WITH THE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL PREVIOUSLY PROMISED TO UNAMIR (REFS C AND D) TO BE GIVEN TO THE ZAMBIANS. THE DUTCH INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET ALL ZAMBIAN EQUIPMENT NEEDS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT

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SOUTH AFRICAN APC'S COULD BE USED TO COMPLEMENT DUTCH CONTRIBUTIONS. TER BEEK INDICATED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE TRAINING FOR ZAMBIAN TROOPS EITHER IN THE NETHERLANDS OR ZAMBIA.

3. MINISTER KOOIJMANS ALSO INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS, AS WEU PRESIDENT, WAS TAKING THE LEAD IN COORDINATING A WEU RESPONSE TO THE U.N.'S AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S REQUESTS REGARDING BOTH UNAMIR AND THE PROVISION OF REMAINING SERVICE PACKAGES (REF F). DUTCH OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT THE WEU WAS FOCUSSING ON SERVICE PACKAGE THREE, ROAD SERVICING AND ROAD SECURITY. IN INITIAL SOUNDINGS, FRANCE, THE U.K. AND GERMANY HAD INDICTED A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A WEU HUMANITARIAN EFFORT. A LEASED RUSSIAN ANTONOV CARGO PLANE DEPARTED THE NETHERLANDS JUNE 29 WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 4 FOUR-TON TRUCKS, 8 WATER WAGONS, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, AND A 7-PERSON RECCE TEAM. END SUMMARY.

NETHERLANDS AS ZAMBIAN CORNERSTONE

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4. AS REQUESTED IN THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO MINISTER KOOIJMANS, THE NETHERLANDS HAS AGREED TO SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF U.N. EFFORTS TO EQUIP ZAMBIA'S UNAMIR CONTINGENT. MOD AND MFA OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ALL OF THE ZAMBIAN BATTALION'S NEEDS, PARTICULARLY APC'S, BUT SUGGESTED LINKING DUTCH EQUIPMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICAN APC'S.

5. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY (REFS C AND D), THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE UNAMIR WITH 50 FOUR-TON TRUCKS, 25 LANDROVERS, 15 AGGREGATE GENERATORS, 10 MOBILE KITCHENS, AND POTENTIALLY OTHER SMALLER ITEMS AS NEEDED. THE DUTCH ARE REVIEWING WITH THE U.N. THE TIMING AND TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ITEMS. THE ARMY CAN HAVE THE EQUIPMENT READY BY MID-AUGUST. THE DUTCH ARE ALSO REVIEWING WITH THE U.N. HOW BEST TO TRAIN THE ZAMBIAN MILITARY. THEY ARE PREPARED TO TRAIN 125 DRIVERS AND 10 MECHANICS, AND WILL DO SO EITHER IN THE NETHERLANDS, ZAMBIA, OR ELSEWHERE. THE COSTS FOR THE PROPOSED DUTCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMIR ARE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 3-4 MILLION GUILDERS.

SEEKING WEU SUPPORT

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6. THE NETHERLANDS IS TAKING THE LEAD AS WEU PRESIDENT TO COORDINATE A WEU RESPONSE TO THE RWANDAN CRISIS, INCLUDING BOTH SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE WEU PLANNING CELL HAS BEEN TASKED TO ASSEMBLE A LIST OF POTENTIAL MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMIR WITH AN EYE TO HAVING THE WEU ADOPT A CONTINGENT. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO COMBINE THE EFFORTS OF SMALL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 004695
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PHUM, PREL, EUN, WEU, RW, NL
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR
- AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE -- THE NETHERLANDS
STATES WITH EXCESS MATERIEL OF LARGER MEMBERS INTO
A COHESIVE CONTRIBUTION. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT
SOME OF THE ALREADY COMMITTED CONTRIBUTIONS COULD
BE PLACED UNDER A WEU UMBRELLA.
7. ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE, THE WEU IS LOOKING TO
PROVIDE ONE OF THE SERVICE PACKAGES AS REQUESTED BY
PRESIDENT CLINTON. CURRENT DISCUSSION IS FOCUSSING
ON SERVICE PACKAGE THREE -- ROAD SERVICING AND ROAD
SECURITY. TO DATE, THE U.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY
HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT SUCH AN EFFORT.

DUTCH HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS

---

8. BEYOND ITS SUPPORT OF UNAMIR AND MULTILATERAL
EFFORTS THROUGH THE WEU, THE NETHERLANDS IS ALSO
MOVING QUICKLY TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TO RWANDAN REFUGEES. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (REFS
B-D), THE NETHERLANDS HAS DOUBLED ITS ASSISTANCE IN
THE PAST WEEK FROM 20 MILLION GUILDERS TO ALMOST 40
MILLION (1 DOLLAR EQUALS 1.77 GUILDERS.). A C-130
WITH FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARRIVED IN GOMA
EARLIER THIS WEEK, AND A LEASED RUSSIAN ANTONOV
DEPARTED JULY 29 WITH 4 FOUR-TON TRUCKS, 8 WATER
WAGONS, DEHYDRATION KITS AND OTHER MEDICAL
SUPPLIS, FOOD, 2 DOCTORS, A NUMBER OF NURSES, AND
A 7-PERSON RECCE TEAM, WHICH WILL MEET UP WITH THE
EUCOM TEAM IN GOMA. THIS FIRST FLIGHT AIMED ABOVE
ALL AT ASSISTING DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS.
SUBSEQUENT RELIEF FLIGHTS ARE EXPECTED NEXT WEEK,
WHICH WILL INCLUDE A 25,000 LITER WATER
PURIFICATION UNIT MANNED BY A TEAM OF 17, AS WELL
AS A NUMBER OF WATER TRANSPORT TRUCKS.

PARLIAMENT URGES CONTINUED EFFORTS

---

9. AT A SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY HEARING JULY 28,
MPJS URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. SOME URGED
DUTCH MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN RWANDA ITSELF,
HOWEVER THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT SUFFICIENT
TROOPS WERE AVAILABLE, AND THE TOP PRIORITY WAS TO
EQUIP THEM PROPERLY. MINISTERS KOOIJMANS AND TER
BEEK POINTED TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER TO PRIME
MINISTER LUBBERS AS A CLEAR STATEMENT OF U.N. NEEDS
AND PRIORITIES. CONSIDERABLE CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED
ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BURUNDI, AND
PARLIAMENT URGED EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF
VIOLENCE THERE. PARLIAMENT ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO SUPPORT

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PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS, HIGHLIGHTED BY A
75,000 GUILDER CONTRIBUTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD
OFFICERS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER IN GENEVA.
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P:ESWICKER
JCS:BBARTOLAIN
AF/RA:SFISHER

IMMEDIATE PARIS

ROUTINE USMISSION USUN NY, SECDEF WASHDC, CJCS WASHDC, N'DJAMENA, BRAZZAVILLE, DAKAR, BAMAKO+

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, RW, FR, UN

SUBJECT: SEEKING FRENCH INTENTIONS ON RWANDA

REF: A) PARIS 20858 B) STATE 192068

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST

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2. THE DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE AN UPDATE ON FRENCH INTENTIONS CONCERNING THEIR PLANNED STAGED WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA CULMINATING ON AUGUST 21, AND THEIR PLANS FOR EQUIPPING AND DEPLOYING FRANCOPHONE NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN THEIR STEAD. POST IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE GOF AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL DRAWING ON THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW.

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BACKGROUND
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3. OPERATION TURQUOISE, THE FRENCH-LED HUMANITARIAN OPERATION TO RWANDA, DEPLOYED FOLLOWING UNSC APPROVAL UNDER RESOLUTION 929 OF JUNE 22. IN APPROVING THE OPERATION, THE UNSC NOTED THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO FILL THE INTERIM UNTIL UNAMIR COULD DEPLOY. ALTHOUGH UNAMIR HAS BEEN SLOW TO DEPLOY, THE FRENCH HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA BY THE AUGUST 21 EXPIRATION OF THE UN MANDATE, AND HAVE RECENTLY INITIATED THE FIRST OF THEIR STAGED WITHDRAWALS.

4. THE DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED DIFFERING ACCOUNTS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS CONCERNING ITS PLANS TO EQUIP AND DEPLOY FRANCOPHONE TROOPS TO RWANDA TO REPLACE THEIR DEPARTING FORCES. WE WISH TO LEARN FROM THE FRENCH THE EXACT NUMBERS OF FRANCOPHONE TROOPS PRESENTLY IN RWANDA UNDER OPERATION TURQUOISE, THE NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT DATES OF THOSE EXPECTED TO JOIN, AND THE STATUS OF ON-GOING FRENCH ACTIONS TO EQUIP AND DEPLOY THESE FORCES, AS WELL AS PLANS FOR THEIR INTEGRATION INTO UNAMIR. WE ALSO WISH AGAIN TO ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH, AS PER REF B, TO LEAVE BEHIND THEIR EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY THE FRANCOPHONE UNAMIR FORCES.

TALKING POINTS
---

5. POST MAY DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN YOUR DISCUSIONS:

-- THE USG CONTINUES TO APPLAUD THE GOF FOR ITS INITIATIVE AND DECISIVENESS IN DEPLOYING A HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO RWANDA.

-- WE UNDERSTAND YOUR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND FROM DEFMIN LEOTARD'S VISIT TO THE U.S. LAST WEEK AND RECENT STATEMENTS FROM PM BALLADUR, THAT FRANCE WILL MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND NOT EXECUTE A PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL IF IT WOULD THREATEN RWANDAN LIVES IN THE PROTECTION ZONE.

-- WITH THE APPROACHING TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE ACCORDED BY UNSCR 929 AND WITH THE GOF'S STATED INTENTION NOT TO EXTEND ITS PARTICIPATION BEYOND THAT DATE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT APPRISED OF YOUR PLANS FOR AN

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ORDERLY DEPARTURE AND DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL FRANCOPHONE TROOPS IN YOUR PLACE. WE WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE THIS INFORMATION AS WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING VARYING AND SOMETIMES CONFLICTING REPORTS AS TO ACTIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THIS RESPECT.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING:

- THE NUMBERS AND NATIONALITIES OF FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN FORCES PRESENTLY DEPLOYED ALONG WITH YOUR FORCES UNDER OPERATION TURQUOISE

- THE NUMBERS AND NATIONALITIES OF ADDITIONAL FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN FORCES WHICH WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE PROTECTED AREA PRIOR TO AUGUST 21

- YOUR EFFORTS TO EQUIP THESE FORCES, THE TYPE AND QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT YOU ARE PROVIDING, AND YOUR AIRLIFT ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEPLOYING THESE FORCES

- YOUR PLANS TO INTEGRATE THESE FORCES INTO UNAMIR UPON YOUR DEPARTURE

- YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OTHER FORCES UNAMIR INTENDS TO DEPLOY TO THE PROTECTED AREA.

-- AS YOU KNOW, THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO PROVIDE AIFLIFT FOR SEVERAL COUNTRIES DEPLOYING TO UNAMIR. IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE COORDINATE OUR PARALLEL EFFORTS TO EQUIP AND TRANSPORT TROOPS TO RWANDA.

-- ALSO, WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE 15 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES WHICH YOU GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TO THE RWANDAN MILITARY. ARE THERE ANY INDICATIONS THAT THESE SAM'S ARE STILL IN THE HANDS OF FORMER ARMY REMNANTS?

-- IN ADDITION, WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE AGAIN THE ISSUE OF THE EQUIPMENT WHICH YOUR FORCES PLAN TO TAKE BACK WITH THEM UPON TERMINATION OF OPERATION TURQUOISE.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UN AND WITH POTENTIAL TROOP- AND EQUIPMENT-DONOR COUNTRIES TO MEET EQUIPMENT NEEDS WITH AVAILABLE SUPPLIES IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO UNAMIR. WE SEEK YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RENEWED CONSIDERATION TO OUR EARLIER REQUEST THAT YOUR FORCES LEAVE THEIR EQUIPMENT IN

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RWANDA FOR USE BY THE FRANCOPHONE FORCES WHO WILL BE JOINING UNAMIR, AND WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO CONTACT THE UN TO ARRANGE TERMS FOR YOUR EQUIPMENT TRANSFER.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
RWANDA MONITORING GROUP
SITUATION REPORT NO. 33
SITUATION AS OF 1800 EDT, 08/03/94

- (U) Kenya's MoD has granted permission for U.S. military personnel to drive U.S. military vehicles overland in Kenya in support of the humanitarian mission to Rwanda. (Nairobi 13817)

- (U) While a "blanket" flight clearance has been approved by the Government of Kenya, KUSLO Nairobi reports that overflights and landings continue to require GOK clearance. This process normally takes four hours. (KUSLO Telecon)

- (Ø) EUCOM reports that water production at Goma continues to exceed distribution capability. The arrival of US and Finnish water trucks has given the JTF the capability to meet survival needs. According to UNHCR, it is 60 percent of the level required for the basic health of the refugee population. (USCINCEUR SITREP 34)

- (Ø) U.S. Mission Geneva reports that the August 2 U.N. Rwanda Pledging Conference resulted in an additional $137 million pledged in response to the UN appeal and $437 million in-kind contributions for overall needs. Although support was extraordinary, much of what was pledged is not new money, rather it is already in donor pipelines. Non-traditional donors include Croatia, Tunisia and Russia. While this conference is seen as a success, coordination will take time to effect and will not be perfect. (Geneva 6738 and 6736)

- (U) The new Prime Minister of Rwanda, Faustin Twagiramungu, stated that genocide trials, expected to number over 30,000, should be conducted under Rwandan courts rather than by an international tribunal. This conflicts with a statement made last week by AID Administrator Atwood, who announced that the new government had agreed to try suspected war criminals via international tribunal. (Reuter)

Marlene U. de Breen
Coordinator

David Stewart
Senior Watch Officer

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Operations Center
RWANDA MONITORING GROUP
SITUATION REPORT NO. 34
SITUATION AS OF 0600 EDT, 08/04/94

- (U) UNHCR Air Operations Cell Geneva (AOCG) has fourteen C-141 or larger aircraft, twelve C-130 equivalent aircraft, and twelve small aircraft scheduled for Goma today. AOCG reported that 268 sorties from all types of aircraft delivered humanitarian relief supplies to Goma from July 19 through August 1. (UNHCR AOCG Update of Aug 4)

- (LOU) UNAMIR Commander General Dallaire is scheduled to be replaced on August 15. He will assume his new command in Canada shortly thereafter, and another Canadian general will take his place in Rwanda. (Telcon/Embassy Kigali)

- (U) Press reports indicate that hate broadcasts by hard-line Hutus have resumed after two weeks of silence. The broadcasts are causing refugees to run the risk of worsening dysentery and measles in the Zairean camps. (EUCOM Sitrep 35)

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Coordinator

William Davnie
Senior Watch Officer

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RWANDA TROOP RECRUITMENT UPDATE
UNAMIR, Eastern Zaire, Turquoise Replacements
(State/PM/ISP -- 8/02/94)

Contacts: Phil Suter, Robert Dam, or Jacqueline Natter
202-647-3136

- **Australia**

  - Ref: USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
  - 300 troops pledged (medical unit), and 120 man security unit to guard hospital and medical convoys.
  - Advance team arrives Kigali 8/6, balance by 8/22.
  - Self-deployed.
  - Next Steps: State to maintain contact with USUN and Embassy Canberra.

- **Belgium**

  - Ref: Brussels 8461 (291606Z JUL 94)
  - Committed to adopt Malawi contingent (120-150 troops), with BF 1 million to cover 100% of Malawi's equipment requirements.
  - FM Claes has offered to call EU colleagues, encouraging support of Tunisian contingent. FM will brief Embassy Brussels 8/3.
  - Malawi contingent could arrive Kigali as early as 3rd week in August, if Belgian material is there.
  - Belgian UN Mission coordinating directly with UN Military Advisor's office.
  - Next Steps: State to maintain contact with USUN and Embassy Brussels.

- **Burkina-Faso**

  - Ref: Ouagadougou 3016 (291520Z JUL 94)
  - Pledged USD 96,000.
  - Will deploy 10-person medical team.
  - Next Steps: State to clarify deployment date and transportation requirement with Embassy and USUN.

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- **Canada**

  - Ref: Ottawa 3862 (292123Z JUL 94)
    7/25/94 National Defence News Release
  - Relief efforts focus on medical services, water production, and Kigali airport.
  - Also operating C-130 relief flights to Kigali from Nairobi, for Canadian NGO's.
  - 25 ATC and airport management personnel on the ground now. Communications, engineering, and additional medical personnel may bring total deployed to Rwanda temporarily to over 400 by mid-August.
  - Next Steps: State to maintain contact with USUN and Embassy Ottawa. DoD to double-track and coordinate through mil-mil channels.

- **Chad**

  - Ref: USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
  - Part of Francophone group in Operation Turquoise.
  - 44 troops currently deployed in French zone.
  - Some reports have Chad committing 200 troops to Operation Turquoise, with 86 already deployed.
  - French & Chadians discussing post-Turquoise Chadian presence for UNAMIR.
  - Next Steps: State to clarify Chad's UNAMIR plans with Embassy and USUN. DoD to work mil-mil channels with French re: equipment needs.

- **Congo**

  - Ref: Brazzaville 2189 (261906Z JUL 94)
  - Deployed 40 infantry to Operation Turquoise on July 25 (French transported).
  - Some reports have Congo committing 300 troops to Operation Turquoise.
  - Next Steps: State to clarify Congo's UNAMIR plans with Embassy and USUN. DoD to work mil-mil channels with French re: equipment needs.

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- **Denmark**

  -- Ref: Copenhagen 3954 (221012Z JUL 94)
  Copenhagen 4013 (261048Z JUL 94)
  - Seriously UN considering appeal for APC's. MoD and FM discussing allocation of costs.
  - Unlikely to provide military personnel, due to commitments elsewhere.
  - Next Steps: State to clarify status of UN request for APC's, with Embassy Copenhagen and USUN. DoD to double-track via mil-mil channels. Consider call from high-ranking USG official to encourage positive decision.

- **Egypt**

  - Ref: Cairo 11496 (191418Z JUL 94)
  - Embassy Cairo pessimistic. Reports that UN has not requested anything from Egypt.
  - Egypt has troops and APC's in Somalia.
  - Next Steps: State sending cable to USUN encouraging UN to redeploy UNOSOM troops to UNAMIR. State to suggest that UN ask Egypt for support (troops and/or APC's). DoD to work mil-mil channels.

- **Ethiopia**

  - Ref: DAO and other reports
  - Have pledged 800 troops.
  - Have plans to self-deploy -- ferried to Goma, in 10 sorties of an AN-12 Ethiopian aircraft -- possibly by mid-August. UN has suggested U.S. airlift. Ethiopians prefer U.S. lift.
  - Advance team on ground now.
  - Equipment requested (to be reviewed by UN Contracts Committee 8/2):
    - 850 Flak jackets
    - 850 Anti-malarial pills
    - 1 SATCOM unit
    - Other misc (e.g. tents)
  - Per Col Layton, UNAMIR plans call for Ethiopians to take over the western section of the French Free Zone, near Bukavu.
  - Next Steps: State to contact Embassy Addis Ababa to determine date when ready to deploy, and UN willingness to "reimburse later". DoD to work mil-mil channels to finalize lift arrangements.

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France

- Ref: Paris 20858 (291834Z JUL 94)
  Paris 20860 (291931Z JUL 94)
  EUCOM SitRep (301200Z JUL 94)
- Complete withdrawal still scheduled for August 21, as Operation Turquoise mandate ends. 300 of 1500 troops withdrawn from safe zone as of 7/31.
- May reconsider rate of withdrawal if Rwandan lives are at stake.
- Not deploying radio station to counter Hutu message.
- Still reluctant to leave equipment behind for Francophone troop contributors which convert to UNAMIR.
- Next Steps: State and DoD to continue to work all channels in Paris, New York and capitals of Francophone troop contributors to ensure that Operation Turquoise troop contributors remaining to join UNAMIR are equipped.

- **Germany**

- Ref: Bonn 18191 (291824Z JUL 94)
- Heavily engaged in humanitarian relief in Zaire.
- Domestic pressure to increase involvement, including with UNAMIR.
- Willing to provide equipment and other assistance directly to the UN or UNAMIR, but not directly to UN military detachments. Equipment includes 35 trucks, mobile kitchens, etc. A package of APC's also being considered.
- May be indirectly helpful in the UN's effort to equip Tunisia and/or other troops.
- Next Steps: State and DoD to confirm the German offer, and availability date for shipment. DoD to work with USUN on transportation.

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- **Ghana**

  - Ref: USUN 3148 (300038Z JUL 94)
  - 800 troops pledged.
  - Ca. 550 on ground at end of July; 250 to deploy upon receipt of remaining equip (mid-August?).
  - U.S. equipping:
    - 50 APCs -- Final APC's due in Kigali 7/31
    - 15 M1008 truck CUCV
    - 10 M813A1 5T trucks
    - 5 M1010 CUCV Ambulance
    - 2 M185A3 Shop Vans
    - 1 M1098 5K Water Tanker
    - 1 M969A1 5K Fuel Tanker
    - 2 M818A1 5T Tractor
    - 5 Man Mobile Training Team
  - UN has requested 6 month lease; total cost of $5,032,007, including transportation...to be reviewed at Contracts Committee meeting on 8/2.
  - Ammunition request:
    - De-bo/re-ob memo to U/S Davis by 8/2.
    - 15 day CN required (start o/a 8/3).
    - DoD to identify stock location and shipping.
  - Col Layton reports UNAMIR plan to deploy to the eastern section of the French free zone.
  - Determine degree of U.S. airlift involvement.
  - Next Steps: Following UN Contracts Committee commitment, DoD to assemble and ship equipment as soon as possible. State to consider high level USG contact with Pres Rawlings to ensure earliest deployment of remaining troops. DoD to consider lift for remaining troops.

- **Greece**

  - Ref: Athens 7455 (251547Z JUL 94)
  - Hellenic Military has ruled out adopting a battalion due to bad experience in Somalia.
  - Next Steps: None.

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- **Ireland**

  - Ref: Dublin 4148 (290956Z JUL 94)
  - In response to Clinton/Atwood appeals, have committed 32 troops (8 teams of 4, experienced in logistics, transportation and engineering).
  - DFA has asked for USG assistance in transporting troops. Also need 8 jeeps upon arrival. Otherwise will be self-sufficient in Rwanda.
  - Next Steps: DoD to consider providing jeeps, and will work out transportation with UN.

- **Israel**

  - Ref: Tel Aviv 14610 (291425Z JUL 94)
    Tel Aviv 14140 (250908Z JUL 94)
  - Initially offered "ten plus" APC's (M-113's).
  - Then rejected "adopt-a-battalion" concept, but said they would work "in our own way."
  - Next Steps: None.

- **Italy**

  - Ref: Rome 12228 (291620Z JUL 94)
    Rome 11593 (201633Z JUL 94)
  - Have committed 40 APC's (M113) to the UN. Will announce 8/2 in Geneva.
  - Total new pledge of $1.9 million.
  - Next Steps: State to confirm offer with USUN and Embassy Rome. DoD to work out transportation of APC's to Kigali.

- **Malawi**

  - Ref: Lilongwe
  - See Belgium entry.
  - "Disappointed" with recent UN assessment team visit; may withdraw from UNAMIR?
  - Next Steps: State to consider having A/S Moose visit or call Lilongwe to clarify. State to also clarify transport needs and other issues with Embassy and USUN. See also next steps for Belgium.

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- **Mali**

  - Ref: Bamako 5311 (011559Z AUG 94)
    Bamako 5162 (261447Z AUG 94)
    USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
  - 40 person civilian medical team will need food and quartering assistance.
  - Have pledged 200 troops. Timing unknown. Not seeking reimbursement.
  - Have asked UN for equipment:
    20 Light Recce Vehicles
    150 Rifles
    12 Machine Gun H
    12 Machine Gun L
    5 Mine Detectors
    150 Flak Jackets
  - Equipment could be sent directly from France (USUN cable cited above).
  - Next Steps: State and DoD to double-track confirmation of troop readiness status. DoD to work with UN on equipment and transportation. State to look for potential sponsor to "adopt."

- **Morocco**

  - Ref: Rabat (01 AUG 94)
    Rabat 6873 (251218Z JUL 94)
  - Offered to deploy to Eastern Zaire, to provide security and disarmament assistance to Zairian troops (not UNAMIR). Zaire has not yet invited Morocco in.
  - During 8/1 Ginsberg-Hassan meeting, King reminded Ambassador that Rwanda was one of the first countries to recognize the Polisario. King may not be inclined to help.
  - If Morocco does decide to deploy, DoD will provide gratis lift for several hundred troops.
  - Next Steps: NSC to have President call King. DoD to work out equipment and transportation issues with USUN and Moroccans.

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- **Netherlands**

  - Ref: The Hague 4695 (291601Z JUL 94)
    USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
  - Have committed to be "cornerstone" for Zambian UNAMIR contingent.
  - As WEU president, FM taking the lead in coordinating a WEU response to both UN and Clinton requests for both UNAMIR and remaining UNHCR service packages (esp. #3 - roads).
  - Offering military material to UNAMIR for Zambia, including trucks, jeeps, generators, mobile kitchens and Fokker-27 cargo plane to the Zambians, but cannot meet all needs as articulated by Zambia.
  - Light RECCE vehicles may be available, but not until late October (USUN cable cited above).
  - Prepared to train 125 drivers & 10 mechanics in Netherlands or Zambia.
  - Suggests S. African APC's be used to complement their contribution.
  - Next Steps: State to confirm status of offer with USUN and Embassy The Hague. DoD to work transportation issue with USUN and Dutch military. High level USG contacts with Dutch or Zambian officials to be considered.

- **New Zealand**

  - Ref: Wellington 2091
    USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
  - As of 7/29, sent 36 people to Rwanda.
  - NZ has also offered to sell up to 100 3T trucks to the UN for UNAMIR.
  - Next Steps: State to ascertain whether NZ requires assistance of any type.

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- **Nigeria**

  - Ref: USUN 3078 (270018Z JUL 94)
  - UN has requested that Nigeria ready its troops (ca. 250) to move to Rwanda. Could be ready by mid-August.
  - Have requested 12 APC's, which UN says are available (from where?).
  - 4 25-passenger buses requested? Britain?
  - Next Steps: State/DoD to confirm readiness of Nigerian troops. DoD to query UN re where APC's requested might come from.

- **Norway**

  - Ref: Oslo 4172 (211503Z JUL 94)
  - Unlikely to participate militarily, but is interested in humanitarian assistance and human rights issues (e.g. monitors).
  - Next Steps: None at this time.

- **Pakistan**

  - Ref: ( )
  - UN may consider requesting transfer of some troops from UNOSOM.
  - State cable to USUN on requesting movement of UNOSOM troops to UNAMIR specifically excludes a formal request to move Paks.
  - Next Steps: None at this time.

- **Poland**

  - Ref: 7/29 PM/ISP-Polish Embassy TelCon
  - Polish embassy officer reported Poland will contribute to UNAMIR, with provision & transport of APCs. Want to know "what arrangements have been made for reimbursement of APC's"?
  - Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track confirmation of Polish willingness to assist, including requirement to transport. State (IO) to respond to Polish embassy to explain reimbursement plan.

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- **Romania**

  - Ref: USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
  - Some interest in sending surgical team (20 persons); no firm commitment.
  - Next Steps: State to contact Embassy Bucharest and USUN to ascertain if any commitment has been made or contemplated.

- **Russia**

  - Ref: Moscow 21508 (291556Z JUL 94)
    USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
  - Initially showed strong interest (8 transport helicopters & heavy transport cargo aircraft), but with no firm commitment.
  - Amb Pickering made new pitch to Dep FM late July. Was told response would be forthcoming in either New York or Moscow.
  - Next Steps: State to follow-up with USUN.

- **Senegal**

  - Ref: Dakar 5669 (060926Z JUL 94)
  - 240 troops currently deployed in Operation Turquoise. RPF has withdrawn any objection to Senegalese participation in UNAMIR.
  - Expected to commit additional battalion (550?) to UNAMIR, if equipped (by France?). Have asked UN for equipment.
  - Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track status of Senegalese deployment with Embassy Dakar, USUN, and through mil-mil channels.

- **Singapore**

  - Ref: Singapore 4757 (280833Z JUL 94)
  - Considering UN APC appeal.
  - Embassy feels decision will probably be negative.
  - May provide assistance in some form; maybe money.
  - Next Steps: None at this time.

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- **South Africa**

  - Ref: USUN 2667 (290116Z JUN 94)
    State 204348 (300100Z JUL 94)
  - SAG "committed" 50 APC's ("mambas").
  - May make sense to combine sponsorship of Zambia with the Dutch, or possibly to take the lead on sponsoring Zimbabwe.
  - Next Steps: State to confirm current status of offer and how soon equipment can move.

South Korea

  - Ref: Seoul 6352 (282320Z JUL 94)
  - ROK has need of all its APC's. Can't spare any for UNAMIR.
  - Next Steps: None.

- **Switzerland**

  - Ref: Bern 3992 (281509Z JUL 94)
  - May have "a few" APC's in reserve, but legal issues remain unresolved (current law prohibits exportation of military equipment to war zones).
  - Considering other ways to assist UNAMIR without legal restrictions.
  - Next Steps: State to maintain contact with USUN and Embassy Bern.

- **Tunisia**

  - Ref: USUN 3033 (222251Z JUL 94)
  - DoD reviewing massive list of equipment, reducing it to manageable dimensions.
  - Original commitment was for ca. 600 troops...now over 1000 troops.
  - May be a good match for Germany (with UN as middle man).
  - Will likely require lift.
  - Next Steps: DoD to continue to work lists and request for lift with USUN and UN. State will clarify number of troops being offered and timetable for deployment.

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- **United Kingdom**

  - Ref: London 12002 (291703Z JUL 94)
    State 204726 (301421Z JUL 94)
  - 450-600 engineers, electricians & medical personnel committed (field ambulance co. of 200, Royal Engineering Field squadron of 200, electrical/mechanical personnel of 20-30; all self-sufficient for first few days.
  - First troops arrived 8/1.
  - Preparing to send large logistics unit until UN can contract permanent provider, assessment team headed to the area, log. team arrive w/in 14 days, sm. log. team to report back by 8/3.
  - Need C-5 for airlift of 250-300 blue helmet personnel. OSD assessing airlift request for 50 4-ton flatbed "Bedford" trucks.
  - Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track exact list of equipment requiring lift. DoD to work out transportation issues with USUN and UN.

- **Zambia**

  - Ref: Lusaka 4430 (281503Z JUL 94)
  - Offered 800-man battalion.
  - Netherlands to "cornerstone".
  - Ready to deploy when equipment needs are met by UN or bilateral donor (same status as Zimbabwe).
  - Excessive requirements, regarded as a reserve
  - Have agreed to scale down initial requirements; UN will provide "enough" equipment for "basic operational capability".
  - Next Steps: See Netherlands. State will also track through AF Desk Officer. DoD to do likewise through its channels.

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- **Zimbabwe**

  - Ref: Harare 8086 (201341Z JUL 94)
    Harare 7343 (010921Z JUL 94)
  - Not too enthusiastic, but has mobilized an infantry battalion for such duty. UN team visited 7/21 to recruit.
  - Still have troops in Somalia. May be thin.
  - Need equipment. South Africa could help?
  - Currently providing KC-130 refueling hub for Goma humanitarian relief operations.
  - Will not deploy unless paid in advance, or paid for UNOSOM.
  - Will need logistical support once in Rwanda.
  - Next Steps: State/DoD to double-track current status. State to consider high level USG call (A/S Moose to visit?).


END
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Note: There are a number of other countries who have been contacted for UNAMIR, including Austria, Burkina-Faso, Brazil, Gabon, Cote D'Ivoire, Norway. None seems likely at this time but will be re-examined to see if positions have changed.

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UNAMIR II



5 AUGUST 1994

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UNAMIR II
COMBAT UNIT
PARTICIPANTS

COUNTRY	UNIT	DEPLOY
ETHIOPIA	BN	BY 19 AUG
GHANA	BN	MAIN BODY (-) IN PLACE
FR AFRICAN	BN(-)	IN PLACE W/OPN TURQUOISE
MALAWI	CO	AWAIT UN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT
MALI	CO	AWAIT UN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT
NIGERIA	CO	BY MID-AUGUST
TUNISIA	BN	BY 30 AUG; AWAITING UN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT
ZAMBIA	BN	BY MID-AUGUST; AWAITING EQUIP
ZIMBABWE	BN	APPROX 15-31 AUG

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UNAMIR II SUPPORT UNIT PARTICIPANTS

COUNTRY	TYPE UNIT	DEPLOY	ISSUES
AUSTRALIA	FIELD HOSP (300 PERS)	ADV PARTY 6 AUG MAIN BODY TBD	NOT CRIT; UK UNIT HAS MED CAPABILITY
CANADA	COMMO UNIT	MAIN BODY (-) IN PLACE	
UK	LOG BN	ADV PARTY IN PLACE MAIN BODY 15 AUG	UK TRANSPORTS US TRANSPORTS

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UN REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

- A CONTRIBUTING NATION OR UN CDR REQUEST A CAPABILITY OR SERVICE
- UN REQUESTS A DONOR NATION FOR PRICE AND AVAILABILITY (P&A) DATA
- DONOR NATION PROVIDES P&A DATA
- UN ACCEPTS P&A DATA AND ISSUES A LETTER OF ASSIST (LOA)
- DONOR NATION EXECUTES

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AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS

- **AIRLIFT OF UNAMIR CONTINGENTS**
  - ETHIOPIAN BN BY 19 AUG (SELF DEPLOY)
  - TUNISIAN BN BY 30 AUG
  - ZAMBIAN BN BY MID-AUG (UN REQUEST)
  - AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL CO TBD (LOA ISSUED)
  - NIGERIAN CO BY MID-AUG
  - MALI CO TBD
  - MALAWI CO TBD
  - UK LOG BN BY 15 AUG (LOA ISSUED)
  - ZIMBABWIAN BN TBD

- **AIRLIFT OF EQUIPMENT**
  - 50 X GERMAN APC'S
  - 40 X ITALIAN APC'S
  - ASSORTED DUTCH TRUCKS / EQUIPMENT (COUNTRY REQUEST)
  - 50 X SOUTH AFRICAN WHEELED APC'S

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EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

- 45 X LONG RANGE NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS
- 4 X OBSERVATION HELICOPTERS
- 4 X UTILITY HELICOPTERS
- 3 X BAILEY BRIDGES [4M, 12M, AND 20 M WIDE]
- 3000 X FLAK JACKETS
- 3000 X HELMETS

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UNAMIR VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS

- 120 X 1/4 - 1 TON UTILITY VEHICLE
  - 50% WITH SINGLE RADIO INSTALLATION KITS
- 145 X 4-5 TON CARGO VEHICLES
  - 30 TO BE FUEL OR WATER TANKERS
- 50 X 1-1/2 TON CARGO TRAILERS

NOTE: HIGHEST PRIORITY IS
50 X 2-1/2 - 5 TON TRUCKS
(25 WITH TRAILERS)

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UNAMIR UNIT REQUIREMENTS

- **ENGINEER UNIT CAPABLE OF GRADING AND CONSTRUCTING CULVERTS ON 350 KM OF UNIMPROVED LATERAL ROADS BETWEEN THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES**

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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**051601Z AUG 94

FM: AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5484

RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 6705
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0174
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0499
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0118
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 4700
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0147
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8790
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1056
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1070
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0351
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1381
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4840
RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STA VA
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3//
RUSNNOT/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N3/N31/N5/N7//
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/DO/DOX/RS//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGE-0//
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 0753
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP//OASD-PA-DPL//PA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-4/J-5//
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ETCC//

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA, PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP, AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ – ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN BRIEFING PRESIDENT MWINYI ON HIS TRIPS TO BURUNDI AND RWANDA, A/S MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT A REGIONAL MEETING ON REFUGEES AND REFUGEE-RELATED

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MATTERS BE CONVENED ON AN URGENT BASIS. REVIEW OF THE MANY ISSUES MADE CRITICAL BY THE REFUGEE CRISIS, HE OFFERED, COULD EVEN LEAD TO MUCH-NEEDED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPLICATED POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH THREATEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA AND THE CURRENT BURUNDI REGIME. WITH RESPECT TO BURUNDI, A/S MOOSE EXPRESSED IN STRONG TERMS HIS CONCERN OVER THE FRAGILITY OF THE SITUATION THERE. END SUMMARY.

3. IN HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI AUGUST 5, A/S MOOSE THANKED MWINYI FOR THE GOT'S COOPERATION IN FACILITATING REFUGEE RELIEF FLIGHTS TRANSITTING THROUGH TANZANIA AND BRIEFED THE TANZANIAN PRESIDENT ON HIS JUST-CONCLUDED TRIPS TO RWANDA AND BURUNDI (DISCUSSION OF LIBERIA WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL). WITH RESPECT TO CONDITIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, A/S MOOSE NOTED BRIEFLY THAT THE SITUATION, WHILE STILL DIFFICULT, HAS BEGUN TO EASE IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, LARGELY DUE TO THE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE RECEIVED RECENTLY. DEATH RATES IN THE CAMPS ARE DECLINING. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LIKE UNICEF ARE WORKING TO CONTROL FURTHER DISEASE OUTBREAKS.

4. TURNING TO RWANDA, A/S MOOSE DESCRIBED THE DISTURBING, EERIE VIEW HE HAD RECEIVED FLYING OVER THE COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE ONE CAN SEE HOUSES AND PLANTED FIELDS BUT ABSOLUTELY NO PEOPLE--THE COUNTRY APPEARS DEPOPULATED. IN KIGALI, PERHAPS ONLY 5 PER CENT OF THE FORMER POPULATION REMAINS. THE WATER SUPPLY HAS JUST BEEN RESTORED BUT THERE IS STILL NO ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONE SERVICE, BANKS, MONEY OR A FUNCTIONING CIVIL SERVICE.

5. A/S MOOSE INFORMED MWINYI THAT IN MEETINGS WITH GOR OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER, HE CAME AWAY IMPRESSED THAT THEY ARE SINCERE ABOUT ESTABLISHING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT TO ATTRACT SUPPORT. THEY ALSO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO INSTILL A SENSE OF SECURITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY TO PERSUADE REFUGEES TO RETURN. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOR IS SEVERELY HANDICAPPED BY ITS TOTAL LACK OF RESOURCES AND INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. GOR RANKS INCLUDE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THE RPF VICTORY SHOULD TRANSLATE INTO THE FORMATION OF AN RPF GOVERNMENT. IN REFUGEE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA, A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION AND TERRORIZATION BY FORMER MILITIA MEMBERS AND MILITARY--NOT ALL OF WHOM HAVE BEEN DISARMED--CONTINUES. THE DANGER OVER TIME, A/S MOOSE OBSERVED, IS THAT RECRIMINATIONS WILL BE NURTURED AMONG THOSE ELEMENTS HOPING FOR A RETURN. HE POINTED OUT THAT THESE CONSTITUTE PROBLEMS WITH NO EASY SOLUTIONS.

6. ALSO DELICATE, A/S MOOSE CONTINUED, IS THE SITUATION IN THE FRENCH ZONE. THE FRENCH ARE LEAVING AND SHOULD LEAVE BUT IT IS CRITICAL THAT
THE
TRANSITION FROM OPERATION TURQUOISE TO UNAMIR PROCEED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA, PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP, AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. IF NOT, THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL COULD TRIGGER A MASSIVE REFUGEE EXODUS WHICH COULD OVERWHELM NOT ONLY ZAIRE, BUT EVEN MORE DANGEROUS, DESTABILIZE BURUNDI.
7. A/S MOOSE THEN TOOK UP THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI, WHICH HE DESCRIBED IN SOBERING TERMS. HE INFORMED MWINYI THAT WHILE HE HAD BEEN ANXIOUS ABOUT BURUNDI BEFORE TRAVELLING THERE, HE IS EVEN MORE CONCERNED NOW AFTER HIS BRIEF VISIT. THE BURUNDI SITUATION IS EXTREMELY FRAGILE AND TENSIONS ARE RUNNING VERY HIGH. A/S MOOSE POINTED OUT THIS DANGER IN ALL HIS MEETINGS WITH THE GRB AND WITH OTHER POLITICAL PLAYERS. NEVERTHELESS, THE PARTIES REMAIN LOCKED AT THE NOVOTEL HOTEL HAGGLING OVER ARCANE ISSUES WHILE OUTSIDE, A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN SIMILAR TO THE RWANDA EXAMPLE, BEGINS TO MATERIALIZE. MILITIAS ARE EXPANDING AND IN THE INCREASED CLIMATE OF INSECURITY, PEOPLE ARE ARMING THEMSELVES. THE ECONOMY IS PARALYZED BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY; MONEY IS BEING SPENT BUT NO FUNDS ARE COMING IN.
8. A/S MOOSE OFFERED HIS DISTURBING IMPRESSION THAT THE CURRENT BURUNDI SCENE IS ALL TOO REMINISCENT OF RWANDA, PRE-APRIL 6. A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF EXTREMIST ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES ARE DOMINATING THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE, BLOCKING RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND APPEALING TO THE FEARS OF THE POPULATION. THE MODERATES ARE AFRAID TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THEM. A/S MOOSE NOTED THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE URGENTLY TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE OVER THE ISSUE OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE VOICES TO BE HEARD.
9. ANOTHER FACTOR THREATENING THE PEACE IN BURUNDI IS THE REFUGEES IN THE FRENCH ZONE. A/S MOOSE REITERATED THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL PROCEED IN AN ORDERLY FASHION TO PREVENT AN INFLUX OF REFUGEES INTO BURUNDI--A DEVELOPMENT WITH POTENTIALLY OMINOUS CONSEQUENCES. THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN ITSELF COULD CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF ANOTHER CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION.
10. THIS LEAD A/S MOOSE TO UNDERSCORE THAT "ALL OF US HAVE TO EXPEND EVEN MORE ENERGY AND EFFORT" TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS. HE TOLD MWINYI HE IS AWARE THAT TANZANIA IS THINKING OF HOLDING A REGIONAL MEETING ON RWANDA, A

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DEVELOPMENT HE ENCOURAGED. IN HIS MEETING WITH MUSEVINI, THE UGANDAN LEADER HAD AGREED IT IS URGENT FOR REGIONAL LEADERS TO COME TOGETHER TO DISCUSS WAYS TO MANAGE THESE PROBLEMS. A/S MOOSE NOTED THERE ARE DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HOW SUCH A MEETING COULD BE ORGANIZED. SOME MIGHT CALL FOR A COMING TOGETHER OF NEIGHBORING STATES, THE GOR AND PERHAPS EVEN THE RWANDAN OPPOSITION. A/S MOOSE PREDICTED THE REACTION OF THE GOR TO THIS PROPOSAL COULD BE QUITE NEGATIVE AS PASSIONS IN RWANDA ARE "STILL RUNNING STRONG."
11. MOOSE HIMSELF OFFERED THAT A MEETING ON REFUGEES AND REFUGEE-RELATED ISSUES (E.G. ON CAMP SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA, PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
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CRIMINALS) IS URGENTLY NEEDED. A REGIONAL REFUGEE MEETING--INDEED ALREADY PROPOSED BY BURUNDI--CONVENED URGENTLY, PERHAPS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS, COULD OFFER A MEANS TO ADDRESS EVEN MORE COMPLICATED ISSUES. REFUGEE RECEIVING AND SENDING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS WOULD ATTEND SUCH A SESSION--AS COULD OBSERVER STATES LIKE THE U.S. WHICH ARE INTERESTED IN THESE PROBLEMS.
12. MWINYI CONFIRMED THE GOT IS THINKING OF CONVENING A REGIONAL SESSION. THIS PLANNING WAS INTERRUPTED EARLIER ONLY AFTER MUSEVINI LEFT FOR TRAVEL ABROAD. UPON MUSEVINI'S RETURN, NEGOTIATIONS HAD RESUMED. MWINYI, NEVERTHELESS, CONFESSED THAT "WE ARE STILL GROPING IN THE DARK." THE PROBLEM IN BURUNDI, HE CONTINUED, IS COMPLICATED BECAUSE THE ARMY THERE HOLDS THE GOVERNMENT HOSTAGE SO THAT "WHEN YOU TALK TO A GOVERNMENT PERSON, YOU TALK TO SOMEONE WHO CANNOT MAKE A DECISION." EVEN SO, TANZANIA WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO WORK WITH THE REGIONAL PARTIES. MWINYI ADDED THAT HE LIKED THE IDEA OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING WHICH COULD LEAD I
NTO A REGIONAL HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT. MOOSE OBSERVED THAT MINISTERS COULD DEFINE AN AGENDA, SOMETHING NEEDED BEFORE SOLUTIONS CAN BE PROPOSED.
13. OBVIOUSLY STILL TURNING THE IDEA OVER IN HIS MIND, MWINYI COMMENTED THAT "WHILE AT LEAST YOU NOW HAVE A GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, IN BURUNDI YOU HAVE A GOVERNMENT IN A SHELL." THE SITUATION THERE IS DELICATE BECAUSE THE ARMY HAS THE GUNS AND CARE NEEDS

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TO BE TAKEN NOT TO ANTAGONIZE IT. MOOSE AGREED IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT MIGHT INCREASE THE ARMY'S LEVEL OF ANXIETY. THE BURUNDIAN ARMY, HE SUGGESTED, COULD EVEN BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REGIONAL REFUGEE MEETING, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF REFUGEE SECURITY, AS A WAY TO BEGIN POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.

14. MWINYI INFORMED A/S MOOSE THAT IN HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH THE RWANDA PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT, THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE NEED TO PERSUADE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO RWANDA. A WEEK LATER, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES INTO TANZANIA INCREASED TO 3000 A DAY. THIS WAS CAUSED BY YOUNG TUTSIS TAKING REVENGE AGAINST THE HUTU POPULATION. SO, HE NOTED, TANZANIA IS VERY WELL AWARE OF THE NEED TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA IF REFUGEES ARE TO RETURN. MOOSE AGREED AND SAID HE HAD UNDERSCORED TO GOR LEADERS THE NEED TO CONTROL UNDISCIPLINED ARMY ELEMENTS AND YOUNG TUTSIS SEEKING REVENGE IF REFUGEES ARE EVER TO BE CONFIDENT OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. THIS IS YET ANOTHER CRITICAL ISSUE NEEDING TO BE DISCUSSED.

15. REPEATING ASSURANCES HE HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU, MWINYI TOLD A/S MOOSE TANZANIAN FORCES ARE DISARMING THOSE ENTERING TANZANIA--UNLIKE ZAIRE. A/S MOOSE EXPLAINED THAT IN ZAIRE THE PROBLEM IS GREATER BECAUSE ALL THE RWANDAN MILITARY AND MILITIA REMNANTS HAD FLED THERE. ALTHOUGH UNHCR REPORTS THAT 80-85 PER

GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA, PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
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1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

CENT OF THESE FORCES HAVE BEEN DISARMED, THIS STILL LEAVES A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER WITH GUNS. FURTHER, THE MOVE TO KEEP THE MILITARY TOGETHER AS A SEPARATE REFUGEE GROUP, DESPITE HAVING SOME ADVANTAGES, COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO THE FORMATION OF A NUCLEUS INTENT UPON RETURNING TO RWANDA. THUS THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE MILITARY PRESENTS ANOTHER ISSUE DEMANDING URGENT ATTENTION.

16. IN DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM OF SUSPECTED MURDERERS IN REFUGEE CAMPS, A/S MOOSE CITED ONGOING EFFORTS AT THE U.N. TO PASS A RESOLUTION CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO TRY ACCUSED CRIMINALS. THIS RESOLUTION MAY BE PASSED NEXT WEEK. IN ADDITION, THE U.N. IS AWARE THAT THERE ARE PRACTICAL ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT SECURITY NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CAMPS WITHOUT PROVOKING

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INSURRECTION. AGAIN, THIS IS ANOTHER URGENT ISSUE REQUIRING ADDRESS.
17. IN ANSWER TO MWINYI'S QUESTION ABOUT CURRENT RPF VIEWS ON CREATING A NEW ARMY, A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT RPF COMMANDER KAGAME HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS PROVISION TO JOIN RPF AND GOVERNMENT FORCES TOGETHER STILL STANDS (OF COURSE, THOSE INVOLVED IN MASSACRES WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED INTO THE NEW ARMY). KAGAME IS EVEN CLAIMING THAT 100-150 SOLDIERS HAVE RETURNED, INCLUDING SENIOR OFFICERS. THE GOR HAD HINTED THAT THE 40-60 RATIO OF FORCES AGREED TO UNDER THE ACCORDK MIGHT HAVE TO CHANGE; NEVERTHELESS, THE RPF'S ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF AMALGAMATION IS WELCOME.
18. MWINYI'S NEXT QUESTION CONCERNED PROPAGANDA. MOOSE ANSWERED THAT THE HATE RADIO BROADCASTS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN SILENT FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS. UNFORTUNATELY, REMNANTS OF THE INTERHAMWE AND MILITIA IN THE CAMPS ARE STILL INTIMIDATING AND PROPAGANDIZING PEOPLE--MAKING THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE INSIDIOUS AND DIFFICULT. THE QUESTION OF HOW TO SEPARATE THESE ELEMENTS IS YET ANOTHER MATTER MERITING URGENT REVIEW.
19. MWINYI THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF LAND CLAIMS. REFUGEES RETURNING TO RWANDA AFTER MANY YEARS, HE NOTED, ARE REPORTEDLY CLAIMING THEIR FORMER PLOTS. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE GOR HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL ABIDE BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS PROVISION STIPULATING THAT THOSE RETURNING AFTER AN
ABSENCE OF OVER TEN YEARS ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO RECLAIM THEIR LAND. THIS WOULD BE PUBLICLY BROADCAST. WHILE MOOSE SAID HE BELIEVES THE GOR IS SINCERE, IT ALSO NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT ENFORCEMENT OF THIS STRICTURE IS CRITICAL IF REFUGEES ARE TO BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN HOME.
20. AFTER PRAISING TANZANIA'S EXCELLENT STEWARDSHIP OF THE ARUSHA PROCESS AND URGING THAT IT CONTINUE TO PLAY ITS CRITICAL ROLE AS FACILITATOR, MOOSE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST BUJUMBURA AS THE SITE OF A REGIONAL MEETING. THIS VENUE COULD HAVE THE ADDED BENEFIT OF BRINGING A SPOTLIGHT ON INTRACTABLE PARTIES IN BURUNDI AND RESTRAIN THEM FROM DESTABILIZING ACTS.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 DAR ES SALAAM 005023
GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME ALSO FOR FODAG; NAIROBI FOR DART AND REFCOORD; DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, MGRW02, PRM/AAA, PM/ISP, IO/PHO, IO/ESA, IO/UNP, DRL/AAA
USAID FOR AID/A, AID/BHR, AID/BHR/OFDA, AID/BHR/FFP, AID/PPC
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, OVIP (MOOSE, GEORGE), PREL, RW, BY, TZ
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE REVIEWS RWANDA AND BURUNDI SITUATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MWINYI, AUGUST 5
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
PERHAPS TANZANIA COULD SEND AN ENVOY TO NEIGHBORING STATES TO ASCERTAIN IF THEY ARE AMENABLE TO SUCH A

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PROPOSAL. A/S MOOSE ADDED HE OFFERED THIS AS A SUGGESTION ONLY. MWINYI ASSURED THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY THAT HE AND PRESIDENT MUSEVINI REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AND WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR A REGIONAL MEETING.
21. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
BROWNING
BT
#5023
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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SSN>5023
<^TOR>940805122423 M1189110
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FROM:
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~~SECRET~~ *~~NOFORN~~*

Rwanda: UNAMIR Contributors (as of August 2, 1994)

Country	Date Committed	Numbers	Status
Ghana	May 19	Battalion (800)	On ground, short a company
Ethiopia	May 25	Battalion	Needs equipment
Senegal	May 26	550 men	Needs equipment
Zimbabwe	May 27	Battalion	Needs equipment
Nigeria	May 10	300 men	Nearly ready to deploy
Mali	June 2 July 26	150 men 40 (medical team)	Needs equipment
Canada	June 1	440 men	260 on ground
Tunisia	June 23	Battalion (600)	Equipped, will deploy after September 15
Australia	July 25	500 men	Deployment imminent
Britain	July 28	600 men	78 on ground

Contributors to French-Led Operation Turquoise (as of August 2, 1994)

Country	Number and Status	Country	Number and Status
Senegal	243: On ground	Congo	40: On ground
Chad	132: On ground	Guinea	35: On ground
Guinea-Bissau	45: Will arrive "soon"	Mauritania	10: On ground
Niger	43: On ground	Egypt	20: 7 on ground,13 will arrive "soon"

Note: These African forces were recruited and transported to Rwanda by the French within weeks of the French late June deployment. Total troops, with the French, were 3,153 as of August 2, 1994.

~~SECRET~~ *~~NOFORN~~*

according to Embassy Nairobi. NGOs and the French fear another mass exodus of Hutus fleeing the RPF if the French pull out of the area too quickly. 1.4b, 1.4d reports the RPF has systematically massacred some 4,000 refugees who have returned from Zaire to RPF-controlled parts of Rwanda, according to a foreign government service.

Comment: The prevention of a mass exodus of fearful Hutus from the French zone into adjacent areas of Zaire largely depends on France's ability to manage a smooth withdrawal and the insertion of a trusted alternative force. Despite the RPF's professions of its willingness to cooperate with the international community, the conversion to UNAMIR of the approximately 550 FrancophoneAfrican troops serving with Operation Turquoise has not occurred.

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3/11

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THE PRIME MINISTER

Copenhagen, 6 August 1994

The Honourable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 23 July 1994 concerning the Rwandan refugee crisis. I am deeply impressed by your efforts to assist in the international response to this humanitarian tragedy and by your initiative to raise further international support to enhance relief measures.

Since the outset of the crisis, Denmark has been following the situation closely and has taken several measures to meet some of the most urgent humanitarian needs of the affected refugee population.

The total amount from our humanitarian budget allocated so far towards the Rwandan refugee crisis amounts to 40 million Danish Kroner (equivalent to 6.4 million USD). In addition considerable contributions have been made through the European Union's relief mechanisms.

The Danish assistance has primarily been directed to Rwandan refugees in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire in order to meet immediate needs of food, shelter and medical supplies for the most vulnerable groups. The assistance has been channelled through international organizations, primarily the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as through a number of private

RICE 4/11

Pls follow up w USUN

international relief organizations.

On 2 August 1994 Denmark responded favourably to a request from UNHCR to arrange the purchase and transport of medical supplies to address the precarious situation in refugee camps in Goma where severe outbreaks of cholera have occurred. Within a week from now, supplies of cholera medicine from Denmark are expected to reach Goma.

On request from UNICEF the Danish Government is arranging C-130 military flights of UNIPAC medical kits from Denmark to Goma.

Denmark fully shares your view of the importance of assisting in facilitating the refugees' return to Rwanda as soon as the situation allows. The promotion of a massive return to Rwanda should be given the highest priority in the international community's response to prevent a further deterioration of the humanitarian tragedy.

The present situation highlights the need to rally behind UN peace-keeping efforts and to work together to make this unique instrument in international conflict prevention more efficient and able to respond adequately, and in time, to crises around the world.

Although Denmark is not in a position to contribute troops to UNAMIR due to large commitments in other United Nations peace-keeping missions, notably in the former Yugoslavia, we share the concern over the slow deployment of the designated troops for the expanded UNAMIR. A UN presence on the ground will contribute to creating the necessary confidence for the refugees to return to their homes.

In order to assist the United Nations in speeding up the deployment, we intend to lease up to 40 APCs to the UN Peace-keeping department for use with UNAMIR.

Yours sincerely,

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen

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IST.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
RWANDA MONITORING GROUP
SITUATION REPORT NO. 38
SITUATION AS OF 1000 EDT, 08/06/94

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HSR (LDX)

- (LOU) Mrs. Gore has accepted an invitation for breakfast from Mrs. Museveni. Embassy Kampala, which feels that this is important for protocol reasons, is trying to find a convenient time. Monday morning seems likely. Mrs. Gore is scheduled to arrive in Entebbe on 8/6 at 2240 local time. (Telcon TF1/Embassy Kampala)

- (LOU) Reliable reports from missionaries returning from Goma indicate that the security situation in the Goma area continues to deteriorate. Some former Rwandan soldiers have regrouped into units and are stealing from refugees. Zairian soldiers are also preying on refugees and relief supplies; petty crime in the area is also escalating. (Telcon TF1/Embassy Kampala)

- (LOU) The UNHCR radio station in Goma began operating on 8/5. UNHCR apparently believes that for now broadcasts should be limited to comments made in High Commissioner Ogata's speech of 8/2. They will probably also contain refugee assistance information. (Geneva 6852)

- (U) UNHCR statistics of 8/5 list the following Rwandan refugee numbers: Zaire - 1.26 million, Tanzania - 322,000, Burundi - 200,000, Uganda - 10,500. There are also an estimated 1.5 million internally-displaced Rwandans. (Geneva 6852)

- (C) Rwanda's new government has selected Bakuramutsa Manzi as its U.N. envoy. The U.N. is awaiting a formal letter from the Rwandan Foreign Minister appointing Manzi. (Reuter, USUN 3261)

- (LOU) The State Department has decided to replace the Rwanda Task Force with a full-time "coordinating office" effective 8/8. (AF, S/S)

Oliver Griffith
Coordinator

Ronald S. Robinson
Senior Watch Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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8/19/15 KBH

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHGVA6863 2200936-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 080936Z AUG 94
LINE4: FM USMISSION GENEVA
OSRI: RUEHGV
DTG: 080936Z AUG 94
ORIG: USMISSION GENEVA
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2254
INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9222
SUBJ: MGRW02: PDD-25 AND SECONDMENTS TO DHA
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ GENEVA 06863
EXDIS
FOR AMB. ALBRIGHT, AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD,
IO A/S BENNET AND NSC ERIC SCHWARTZ, SUSAN RICE
FROM AMB. SPIEGEL
STATE PASS AID AND NSC
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREF, EAID, RW, UN, AORC
SUBJECT: MGRW02: PDD-25 AND SECONDMENTS TO DHA
REF: A) GENEVA 6643 B) USUN 3233 C) GENEVA 6819
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT AMB. ALBRIGHT'S URGING (REFTEL B) THAT THE USG RESPOND QUICKLY TO U/SYG HANSEN'S REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL TO BOLSTER COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN RWANDA (REFTELS A,C). AS AMB. ALBRIGHT EMPHASIZES, PDD-25 ENVISAGES U.S. SUPPORT FOR THIS TYPE OF SURGE CAPACITY IN TIMES OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS.
3. WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING FROM DHA A DEFINITION OF THE DUTIES OF THE POSITIONS THAT HANSEN NEEDS HELP IN FILLING TO RESPOND TO THE RWANDA CRISIS, AND WE HAVE ALREADY FAXED PRELIMINARY VERSIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT (PRM AND IO), AID/OFDA, AND USUN. HANSEN IS REQUESTING UP TO 20 OFFICIALS TO SERVE AS FIELD COORDINATORS, INFORMATION OFFICERS AND COMMUNICATIONS/LOGISTICS OFFICERS AT SIX FIELD OFFICES INSIDE RWANDA (GITERAMA, GIKONGORO, GISENYI, BUTARE, BYUMBA AND KIBUYE). SOME OF THESE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON WITH GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OFFICES IN THE SAME CITIES.
4. BEFORE AGREEING TO SECOND USG PERSONNEL TO DHA, WE MAY WISH TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH DHA TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF ITS PLANS FOR COORDINATION. IN PARTICULAR,

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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5. DHA REQUESTS THAT SALARY COSTS BE COVERED BY THE COUNTRIES PROVIDING SECONDED PERSONNEL. DHA INTENDS THAT THE UN COVER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM COSTS, BUT NEEDS TO CONSULT WITH UN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS BEFORE A FINAL DECISION CAN BE MADE. DHA IS APPROACHING OTHER DONORS IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. TO FILL THE REQUEST, AND ALREADY HAS A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM NORWAY FOR THE GISENYI FIELD COORDINATOR POST.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

8. WE ARE AWARE THAT CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS ON PDD-25 HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE IN NEW YORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WHEN THE PACE OF THE RESPONSE TO THE RWANDA CRISIS PERMITS, WE WILL COMMENCE SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH UNHCR TO DISCUSS LONG TERM SYSTEMIC SUPPORT WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF PDD-25. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY NECESSARY GUIDANCE.
SPIEGEL
BT
#6863
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 6863
TOR: 940808054318 M1191560
DIST:
SIT: VAX NSC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Rwanda

DIST: SIT, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SARTOR, STEINBERG, SUM, SUM2, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**220640Z AUG 94

FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4311

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0839

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 002822
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, A/S MOOSE, A/S JOHN SHATTUCK
AF/C PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR RAWSON
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR A. LAKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO SENATOR PAUL SIMON
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, PREL, RW, BY
SUBJECT: NO WHITE HATS FOR THE RPF
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. TESTIMONY FROM RWANDAN REFUGEES AND REPORTS FROM WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND [1.4b, 1.4d] EMPLOYEES IN BURUNDI REVEAL THAT THE RPF IS CURRENTLY TORTURING AND KILLING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF HUTU RWANDESE CIVILIANS IN ORDER TO TAKE THEIR LANDS, HOUSES, AND POSSESSIONS TO BE GIVEN TO RWANDAN TUTSIS RETURNING FROM BURUNDI. END SUMMARY.
3. LAST WEEK I SENT A FAIRLY DETAILED 6-PAGE REPORT FROM A WESTERN DIPLOMAT SPECIFYING RECENT ATROCITIES AND KILLINGS BY RPF FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN RWANDA AND NORTHERN BURUNDI (REFTEL BUJUMBURA 02708). THIS PAST WEEK HAS BROUGHT SIMILAR REPORTS FROM 3 SOURCES: (A) [redacted] EMPLOYEES IN NORTH BURUNDI WHO DAILY INTERVIEW NEW RWANDAN REFUGEES; (B) CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN AMBASSADORS AND THEIR LOCAL EMPLOYEES; (C) DIRECT TESTIMONY FROM RWANDAN REFUGEES GIVEN TO ME IN REFUGEE CAMPS.
4. (A) ON MONDAY, AUGUST 15, I WAS ACCOMPANIED ON A TRIP TO KIRUNDO IN NORTHEAST BURUNDI BY DCM SUSAN ZELLE, ECONOFF JULIE O'REAGAN, DART MEMBER MARY LANGE, AND [redacted] WE SPOKE WITH [redacted] WHO REGULARLY, OFTEN DAILY, INTERVIEW NEWLY-ARRIVED RWANDAN REFUGEES. THEIR INTERVIEWS WITH REFUGEES FROM DIFFERENT COLLINES

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8/19/15 KBH

OR COMMUNITIES, ALMOST ALL IN SOUTHERN RWANDA, REVEALED A CONSISTENT PATTERN: RPF SOLDIERS ARE TERRORIZING HUTUS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, FORCING THEM TO ABANDON THEIR HOMES. THEIR PREFERRED METHOD OF TORTURE IS TO TIE THE HANDS OF THE VICTIM (USUALLY MALE) BEHIND HIS BACK, BEAT HIM WITH RUBBER HOSES, AND, IF DEATH IS INTENDED, TO USE A MACHETE TO DISPATCH THE VICTIM (ALTHOUGH BULLETS WILL DO ALSO). MOST (BUT NOT ALL) REFUGEES FLEE ON SHORT NOTICE AND BRING FEW POSSESSIONS TO BURUNDI. IN THE KILLINGS NEAR THE BORDER, ON BOTH SIDES, BOTH THE 1.4b, 1.4d REPRESENTATIVE AND THE OAU REGIME COMMANDANT ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS COMPLICITY BETWEEN THE RPF AND THE BURUNDI MILITARY FORCES.

(B) FOR THE SECOND TIME, I VISITED THE REFUGEE CAMP AT MAGARA, NEAR NGOZI, WHOSE 50,000-60,000 RESIDENTS COMPRISE WHAT AMOUNTS TO THE 2ND LARGEST CITY IN BURUNDI. IN SPITE OF THE SUPPOSED RESERVE OF RWANDANS AND BURUNDIANS, THE REFUGEES TALKED FREELY, EVEN IN THE PRESENCE OF A UNIFORMED OAU COMMANDANT AND A MEMBER OF THE BURUNDI ARMY. THEIR STORIES CONFORMED TO THOSE RECEIVED BY [redacted] WHEN ASKED WHY THEY LEFT RWANDA, THE ANSWER WAS SIMPLE: BECAUSE THEY WERE FLEEING THE RPF. SOME TOLD STORIES OF MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUPS WHO HAD GONE BACK FROM THE CAMP TO THEIR HOMES TO RECOVER SOME POSSESSIONS. THEY REPORTED THAT MOST NEVER RETURNED, AND THAT THOSE WHO ESCAPED TO RETURN TO THE CAMP SAID THE OTHERS WERE KILLED. UPON BEING ASKED WHEN THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN RWANDA, THEY REPLIED THAT ONLY WHEN THE RPF WAS GONE, OR A DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT WAS IN PLACE THAT WOULD NOT KILL THEM. SOME SAID THAT THEY HAVE HEARD BROADCASTS FROM RWANDA TELLING THEM TO RETURN. BUT THEY REFUSE TO DO SO BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE RPF WILL KILL THEM. I CONCLUDED THAT PERSUADING THESE REFUGEES TO RETURN WOULD BE LIKE TRYING IN THE 1930'S TO CONVINCE JEWISH REFUGEES WHO HAD ESCAPED HITLER TO RETURN TO GERMANY. REFUGEES LIKE THESE FROM SOUTHEAST RWANDA WILL BE IN BURUNDI (OR TANZANIA) FOR LONG TIME UNLESS RPF POLICIES CHANGE.

(C) CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OTHER WESTERN AMBASSADORS HERE CONFIRM EARLIER REPORTS THAT RWANDANS IN BURUNDI ARE BEING "ORDERED" TO RETURN TO RWANDA. ONE WESTERN AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT A RWANDAN TUTSI GUARD AT HIS RESIDENCE WHO HAS LIVED IN BURUNDI FOR OVER 30 YEARS SAID THIS WEEK, "MR. AMBASSADOR, I HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO RETURN TOMORROW TO RWANDA." AT THE AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, HE AGREED TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE FOR 24 HOURS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN PROMISED A HOUSE FOR HIS FAMILY. OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES, LIKE OURS, HAVE HAD RWANDAN TUTSI EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE LIVED IN BURUNDI FOR MANY YEARS RETURN TO RWANDA DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS. AND SOME, LIKE THE AMBASSADOR ABOVE, REPORT THAT THOSE RETURNING ARE PROMISED HOMES THAT

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HAVE BEEN VACATED BY (HUTU) RWANDAN REFUGEES.
5. THE PRESENCE OF THESE HUTU REFUGEES, AFRAID OF
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUJUMBURA 002822
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, A/S MOOSE, A/S JOHN SHATTUCK
AF/C PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR RAWSON
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR A. LAKE
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO SENATOR PAUL SIMON
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREF, PREL, RW, BY
SUBJECT: NO WHITE HATS FOR THE RPF
DEATH IF THEY RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, IS OBVIOUSLY
A PROBLEM FOR BOTH BURUNDI AND RWANDA, SHORT-TERM AND
LONG-TERM. SHORT-TERM, THESE HAPLESS, PENNILESS, AND
JOBLESS FAMILIES LIVING UNDER BLUE PLASTIC SHEETING
ARE POTENTIALLY SUBJECT TO INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE. IN
THE CASE OF THE CAMP AT MAGARA, A SMALL CONTINGENT OF
10 SOLDIERS HAS PROVIDED SECURITY FOR THIS REFUGEE
CITY, AND I WAS TOLD BY THE DIRECTOR OF THIS CAMP THAT
THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE AT HIS
LOCATION. NONETHELESS, THESE WILL NOT BE HAPPY
CAMPERS, AND THEY COULD BE SUBJECT TO FUTURE
TEMPTATION.
6. LONG-TERM, THE PROSPECTS FOR RWANDA ARE WORSE. THE
RAINY SEASON BEGINS NEXT WEEK. WITH THE TROPICAL
RAINS, THE DUSTY CAMPS WILL TURN TO MUD AND SLUSH.
RESENTMENTS WILL GROW AS REFUGEES REMEMBER HOME, AND
RECEIVE REPORTS OF TUTSI FARMING THEIR LANDS AND
SLEEPING IN THEIR BEDS. IF WEEKS BECOME MONTHS OR
YEARS, THE RESENTMENTS WILL ONLY GROW, AND THE URGE
WILL INCREASE TO RECLAIM THEIR HOMES, OR TO DIE
TRYING.
7. IF RWANDA IS LIKE BURUNDI, THERE ARE NO COUNTY
COURT HOUSES, NO FORMAL LAND SURVEY LINES, NO
CAREFULLY MEASURED PLOTS OF LAND WITH RECORDED DEEDS
AND TITLES. INSTEAD, OWNERSHIP RELIES ON TRADITION
AND THE MEMORIES OF ELDERS AND NEIGHBORS. WHEN THEIR
JUDGMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTED, THE DISPUTES ARE TOO OFTEN
RESOLVED BY A TORCH OR MACHETE.
8. THE MASSACRES PERPETRATED BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT
OF RWANDA WERE OF HISTORIC DIMENSION IN THEIR MINDLESS
MERCILESSNESS. THE RPF VENGEANCE NOW, AND THE REVENGE
THAT IT WILL SURELY PROVOKE, CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
MATCH THE SLAUGHTER OF RECENT MONTHS. BUT THESE SEEDS
ARE BEING PLANTED, AND IF NOT AFTER THIS RAINY SEASON,
THEN IN SOME OTHER, THE HARVEST OF RETRIBUTION WILL
SURELY COME.
9. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT OUR INFLUENCE OVER THE RPF AND
THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WILL EVER BE GREATER THAN
IT IS NOW, WHEN THEY ARE VICTORIOUS BUT WITHOUT
ELECTRICITY, WATER, CURRENCY, OR THE USUAL SINEWS OF
GOVERNMENT. FOR THE SAKE NOT ONLY OF RWANDANS, BUT
ALSO OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN SURROUNDING COUNTRIES, I
HOPE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WILL APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE,

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WHILE OUR STRENGTH IS AT ITS HEIGHT, TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND RPF TO CHANGE ITS PRACTICES.
KRUEGER
BT
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<^TOR>940822024737 M1213583
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
<^SSN>2822
<^TOR>940822024635 M1213582

FROM:
SITREPRT

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PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT

- Ghana: All Ghanaians have deployed to Rwanda. We have received a formal LOA for a ROWPU, mine detectors, binoculars and spares and have moved those items to Dover AFB. Caveated LOA (CLOA) for transport received on 16 August. CLOA received from the UN for the lease and lift of vehicles on 16 August. Did not include refurbishment. DSAA has lead. The 15 day congressional notification on the ammo for Ghana ends at 0001, 20 August. Next step is OMB completing the reob-deob. Should occur on 22 August. Upon completion DSAA will send FMS LOA to Ghana for signature. Upon receipt execute order will be sent.

- Ethiopia: Self-deploy began on 15 August and should be complete by 21 August.. USG begin to lift heavy equipment on 16 August with the schedule of 6 days to complete the movement. It will take three additional sorties to complete the movement, we are awaiting confirmation from the UN. UNAMIR Force Commander plans to deploy the Ethiopian battalion into the French zone. UN will be providing flak jackets, tents, night vision devices, mine protected vehicles and anti-malaria pills; USG to provide COMSAT (congressional notification required).

- Zambia: Dutch to provide equipment. USG airlift will begin on 23 August. Under the USG "volcano plan," Zambia would deploy into the northwest but this has not been broached with the UN. Zambia scheduled to deploy on 29 August but appear to falling behind schedule. Recce team to deploy for one week with main body to deploy one week later. No date set for deployment of recce team.

- France: The interagency has given up on the prospect of the French remaining in Operation Turquoise beyond 22 August. We are now pursuing the idea of a French presence in the UNAMIR staff.

- Tunisia: The UN has passed to the Tunisians what they consider to be a final list of equipment available (attached). USUN met with the Tunisians yesterday to ask them to be reasonable. We expect the UN to receive a response to the list soon. The UN has not requested any of the outstanding equipment from the USG. Deployment date of the Tunisians is unclear, but believed to be at the beginning of September.

- Danes: President Clinton received a letter from PM about APCs. Dick Clarke pointed out the need to speed their lift. Cannot accomplish until the UN requests lift support.

- Italy: Awaiting a signed lease from the UN. Unclear when they will receive it.

- Germany Awaiting P&A from J-4 LRC on APC lift.

15:00, 22 August 1994

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DOD SUPPORT OF UNAMIR

Ghanaian Battalion

- **Lease of 50 APCs**
  - US airlifted and signed over APCs to the UN in Entebbe on 2 July.
  - All APCs have been moved from Entebbe to Kigali.

- **Lease of water purification unit (ROWPU) and sale of airlift for the mine detectors, binoculars, ROWPU and spares**
  - 4 Aug. - LOA received. Did not included transport.
  - DSAA issued execute order on 5 Aug.
  - 15 Aug. - ROWPU at Dover AFB.
  - 16 Aug. - CLOA for transport received.
  - 20 Aug. - ROWPU in country.

- **Sale of Mine Detector, Binoculars and Spares**
  - LOA received on 9 Aug. Did not included transport. DSAA is working with USUN.
  - DSAA to issue execute order.
  - 15 Aug. - Mine Detector, Binoculars and Spares at Dover AFB.
  - 16 Aug. - CLOA for transport received.
  - 20 Aug. - in process of being lifted.

- **Lease of Vehicles (15 CUCV, 10 5T trucks, 5 ambulances, 2 shop vans, 1 water tanker, 1 fuel tanker, 2 5T tractors)** DoD pulling some vehicles from active units.
  - 16 Aug. - CLOA received from UN.
    - CLOA did not include refurbishment. DSAA working with COB 22 Aug. deadline.

- **Ammunition**
  - Congressional notification occurred on 5 August.
  - 16 Aug. - Army drafted bilateral FMS LOA.
  - Deobligation-reobligation of $.285M of FY91 and FY93 Rwanda will not occur until 23 Aug. LOA cannot be sent to Ghana until deob-reob complete. Execute order will be sent on receipt of signed FMF LOA.

Other Airlift

- **Completed Requests**
  - 31 advance personnel with equipment from Australia to Kigali (7 Aug.)
    - 1 C-141 sortie ($43,000).
  - 50 British trucks and personnel from the UK to Kigali (16 Aug).
    - 23 C-5 sorties.

- **UN Request in the execution phase**
  - Ethiopian equipment to Kigali.

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- 3 C-141 and 12 C-5 ($1.07M)
- 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
- 16 Aug. - First sortie.
- 21 Aug. - Last sortie scheduled but will take 3 additional C-141 sorties at a cost of $50,000. UN informed 19 August.

- Australian main force (311 personnel).
  - 32 C-5 ($8,650,560)
  - 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
  - 21 Aug. - 3 Sorties flown

- Dutch equipment for the Zambians to Kigali.
  - 9 C-141 and 7 C-5 ($2.17M).
  - 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
  - 23 Aug. - Dutch lift to begin.

- **Requests Awaiting UN Actions**
  - Request received for P&A of MREs from Germany to Kigali on 9 Aug.
    - P&A sent to UN on 10 Aug.
      - 5 C-141($366,630) or contract DC-8 ($280,000).
    - 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
    - 15 Aug. - Awaiting CLOA

  - Request received for P&A of APCs from Germany to Kigali on 9 Aug.
    - 13 Aug. - Authorization signed by SecDef.
    - 16 Aug. - P&A sent to the UN.
      - 28 C-141 and 3 C-5 ($3,207,325)

- **Likely Future Requests**
  - Italy - 40 APCs and trucks, for an undetermined country.

- **Requests Placed on Hold by UN**
  - South African Mombas (wheeled APCs) from Johannesburg to Kigali.
    - 9 C-5 sorties ($2.66M).
    - This request put on indefinite hold by the UN in lieu of higher priority items.

  - UN-owned MREs from Kuwait to Kigali
    - 1 C-141 sorties ($43,000).
    - This request put on indefinite hold by the UN in lieu of higher priority items.

STATUS OF MAJOR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS

France (Operation Turquoise)

- Withdrew from Rwnada on 21 August.

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- Approaching French and RPF about French Staff in UNAMIR.
- Working with France to ensure that they equip all 1000 Francophone forces.

Ghana (see above)
- Mechanized battalion (850 personnel).
- Deployment: All in Rwanda (south-west).
- Vehicles CLOA did not include refurbishment.

Ethiopia
- Motorized battalion (800 personnel).
- Deployment: All in Rwanda (south-west).
  - *US lift of Ethiopian heavy equipment will take three additional sorties.*
- *DSAA working to provide COMSAT to the Ethiopians.*

Zambia
- 800 person motorized battalion.
- Deployment: Zambians expected to deploy 29 Aug. but process appears to have slowed.
- Dutch will provide equipment.
  - *US lift of Dutch equipment to commence 23 August.*

Tunisia
- Motorized battalion (950 personnel).
- Deployment: unknown, believed to be at the beginning of September.
- 18 Aug. - UN provides Tunisia final equipment list.
- Germany has indicated a willingness to provide some equipment.

Francophone battalion
- Senegal (400), Niger (150), Guinea-Bissau (150), Mali (150), Chad (has indicated willingness to deploy up to 800 troops).
- Deployment: Those forces currently in Operation Turquoise (550) will change hats as soon as UNAMIR deploys.
- France plans to equip 500 of these troops. State believes that French will equip all of the Francophone troops.

STATUS OF MAJOR TROOP SUPPORT CONTRIBUTORS

- UK logistics battalion (600 personnel).
  - Fully deployed.

- Australian medical unit (300 personnel) and a security unit (120 personnel).
  - Advance party lifted by USG into Kigali on 7 August.
  - *Main force deploying via US lift.*

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PRESERVATION

- Canadian communications battalion and a runway repair and air traffic control team (511 personnel).
  - Fully deployed.

STATUS OF EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

- Netherlands - 50 4T trucks, 25 Land Rovers, 15 generators, 10 mobile kitchens, 2 ambulances, 2 work shop vans, 15 cargo trailers, 16 mine detectors and a cargo plane. Equipment, which will be ready for lift on 15 Aug., is scheduled for the Zambian battalion.
  - *US lift to begin 23 August.*

- France - 20 fuel/water trucks and working level (BG Faupin) assurance of intention to equip the 1,000-person composite Francophone battalion comprised of soldiers from Mali, Senegal, Chad, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau.

- Germany - 50 APCs, 2 water trucks with trailers, 5 kitchen trailers, 1 Recovery vehicle, 1 5T workshop van, 15 cargo trailers and 2 front end loaders and other equipment.
  - *US lift requested.*

- Belgium - "adopting" Malawi contingent (150 personnel).

- Italy - 40 APCs, 15 trucks for water/gas and 1 C-130.
  - *US Lift request expected.*

- Denmark - Expected to provide 40 APCs.
  - *US Lift request expected.*
  - *State to confirm with AmEmbassy when APCs will be ready and if there will be a lift request.*

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UN OPERATION PLANNING

Gen. Dallaire's Concept of Operations for UNAMIR

- UNAMIR forces will deploy in three phases. Presently Phases II.
  - Phase I: Ghana battalion equipped and deployed (approximately 2/3's of the force is presently in Kigali).
  - Phase II: Deploy two additional combat battalions, elements of the support battalion, force HQ's, and communications.
  - Phase III: Deploy remaining support units and additional infantry battalions.

- UNAMIR forces will be deployed into five Zones.
  - In Zone 4, the current French Zone, three mechanized battalions (Ghanaians, Ethiopians and Francophones) will be deployed.
    - Dellaire believes overwhelming force with a Chapter VII mandate will be necessary here because of Hutu suspicions and the presence of some Hutu militia forces.
    - He wants the UN forces to move in before the RPF and is concerned because he feels there is no way the UN will be in place before 22 August when the French are supposed to depart.
  - In the other four Zones, UNAMIR will have a minimal force that can respond quickly to local contingencies. (Under USG "volcano plan" one or two battalions would deploy to the northwest)
    - This is based upon a more permissive security environment than in the French Zone and envisions that UNAMIR forces will provide a modicum of security to various population centers.

Prepared by Michael Greenspon, (S&R) PK/PE, x52322

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Rwanda

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FM: AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3436

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0251
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0378
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0605
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//CRC/J5//
RUSNNOM/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5//
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0285
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9294
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0424
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-ME/AF//
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1150
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUFGAID/USEUCOMAIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0032
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0599
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0770

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ HARARE 009405
DEPT FOR RP/POP, AF/C, AND AF/S - JACKSON
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, FR, PREF, RW, ZI
SUBJECT: ZNA COULD DEPLOY TO RWANDA WITH US$1.2 MILLION "UP FRONT"
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT AN AUGUST 27 LUNCHEON FOR VISITING COMMANDER OF JTF SUPPORT HOPE LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL R. SCHROEDER, ZNA MAJOR GENERAL A.N.N. CHINGOMBE COMMENTED ON ZIMBABWE'S PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS TO RWANDA UNDER U.N. AUSPICES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE GOZ HAD GOTTEN VIRTUALLY NO RESPONSE FROM THE UN ASSESSMENT TEAM WHICH VISITED ZIMBABWE JULY 21 AND 22. HE SAID THE UN PROMISES OF EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT ON A

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"FIRST COME FIRST SERVE BASIS" AS TROOPS DEPLOYED IN RWANDA WERE TOO VAGUE. HE SAID ZIMBABWE IS STILL COMMITTED POLITICALLY TO CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO RWANDA AND COULD, IN FACT, DEPLOY WITH AS LITTLE AS US$1.2 MILLION UP FRONT, AS LONG AS THE UN PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THE BATALLION'S COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT AND PER DIEM NEEDS WERE PROVIDED FOR ONCE THEY REACHED RWANDA.
3. AT OUR REQUEST, CHINGOMBE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF "REQUIREMENTS FOR ZIMBATT RWANDA" ON AUGUST 22:
ITEMS TO BE SOURCED LOCALLY

(NEEDED BEFORE THE BATTALION DEPLOYS, SAID CHINGOMBE):
1. ENGINEERING EQUIP. Z$ 303,994
2. DEFENSE STORES 100,000
3. SIGNALS 146,816
4. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/DRUGS 882,335
5. ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT 281,000
6. ORDINATE STORES BRE/VET 2,327,282
7. CLOTING AND EQUIPMENT 2,170,682
8. AMMUNITION 934,100
9. ARMY HEALTH UNIT EQIP. 56,295
10. RATIONS AND WATER 1,034,640
11. FUEL, OIL, LUBRICANTS (30 DAY SUPPLY) 747,619
12 PUBLIC RELATIONS 64,000
TOTAL Z$ 9,048,763
(US$ 1,117,131)
Z$8.1 EQUALS US$1
ITEMS TO BE SECURED EXTERNALLY
---
1. ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT US$ 234,380
2. SIGNALS EQUIPMENT 6,944,350
3. ORDINANCE EQUIPMENT 421,640
4. VEHICLES AND TRAILERS 9,496,000
5. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT 247,944
TOTAL US$ 17,344,314
4. COMMENT: THESE NUMBERS REPRESENT NO MAJOR CHANGES FROM THE ZIMBABWEANS' INITIAL, SOMEWHAT INFLATED WISH LIST. HOWEVER, THE SEGREGATION INTO COSTS WHICH MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE THE ZNA CAN DEPLOY AND THOSE WHICH THE UN COULD PROVIDE LATER, DEMONSTRATES THE ZIMBABWEAN'S CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT A BATALLION TO UNAMIR OPERATIONS IN RWANDA. END COMMENT STAPLES
BT
#9405
NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>9405
<^TOR>940823101409 M1216202

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PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**231401Z AUG 94

FM: AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9709

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0038
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LUSAKA 004927
SECSTATE FOR AF/S AND AF/RA
E.0.12356: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, ZA, UN, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: ZAMBIAN DEPLOYMENT ISSUES
REFS: A) STATE 225942, B) LUSAKA 4846 AND PREVIOUS
1. PER REF A, WE SPOKE WITH ZAMBIA ARMY OPERATIONS CHIEF MUMBI ON 23 AUGUST. HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT CONTAINED IN REF A:
-- A U.N. C-130 WILL PICK UP THE ZAMBIAN DRIVERS AND RECCE TEAM ON AUGUST 25 AND TRANSPORT THEM TO KIGALI. (THIS IS CONFIRMED, MUMBI SAID.) HE PRESUMED THE U.N.'S REFERENCE TO THE RECCE TEAM DEPARTING FOR RWANDA ON 2 SEPTEMBER WAS A GARBLE. IN HIS THINKING THE RECCE TEAM, HAVING DEPLOYED WITH THE DRIVERS ON 25 AUGUST, WOULD RETURN TO ZAMBIA ABOUT 2 SEPTEMBER AND BRIEF THE MAIN BODY DURING 2-5 SEPTEMBER. MUMBI STILL SAYS THE MAIN BODY WILL MOVE ONE WEEK AFTER THE RECCE TEAM RETURNS; HE NOW FORECASTS ADVANCE ELEMENTS TRAVELLING DURING 5-6 SEPTEMBER AND THE BULK OF THE TROOPS FOLLOWING AROUND 9 SEPTEMBER.
-- HOW THE MAIN BODY WILL BE TRANSPORTED IS STILL UNCERTAIN. MUMBI HOPES THE U.N. C-130 CAN BE USED. HIS CONTACTS AT UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI HAVE ASSURED MUMBI THAT AIR TRAFFIC IN AND OUT OF KIGALI IS OPERATING SAFELY. BASED ON THESE ASSURANCES, HE HOPES ZAMBIA AIRWAYS CAN BE CONVINCED TO FLY TO KIGALI (ASSUMING THE U.N. C-130 IS NOT AVAILABLE).
-- USING THE TELEPHONE NUMBER WE GAVE HIM LAST WEEK (REF B), MUMBI HAS HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING

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BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN PROVIDING INFORMATION ON ACCOMMODATION, FOOD, AND WATER FOR THE ZAMBIANS, PARTICULARLY THE DRIVER CONTINGENT.
– MUMBI HAS LEARNED THAT WATER IS BEING RATIONED, AND HE IS CONSIDERING HAVING THE DRIVERS BRING SOME DRINKING WATER WITH THEM; FOOD (GERMAN AND FRENCH) IS AVAILABLE IN GOOD QUANTITIES, AND UNAMIR ASSURED MUMBI THAT FOOD WOULD BE ISSUED TO THE DRIVERS; INITIAL ACCOMMODATION FOR THE DRIVERS WOULD BE IN A HANGAR AT KIGALI AIRPORT.
2. COMMENT: MUMBI SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THE ASSURANCES OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR HIS DRIVERS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM UNAMIR. THE 25 AUGUST PICK-UP OF THE DRIVERS AND RECCE TEAM BY THE U.N. C-130 APPEARS TO BE FIRM. STILL TO BE WORKED OUT IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE MAIN BODY. END COMMENT.
KUCHEL
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#4927
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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>4927
<^TOR>940823101304 M1216199

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FM: AMEMBASSY HARARE

ZIMB

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3436

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0251
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0378
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0605
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6171
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2294
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//INTEL CTR//
RUCJAAS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3033
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 9917
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RUSNNOM/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5//
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0285
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9294
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0424
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-ME/AF//
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1150
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUFGAID/USEUCOMAIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0032
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0599
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0770

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HARARE 009405
DEPT FOR RP/POP, AF/C, AND AF/S - JACKSON
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, FR, PREF, RW, ZI
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TOTAL Z$ 9,048,763
(US$ 1,117,131)

Z$8.1 EQUALS US$1

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BT

#9405

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

<^SSN>9405

<^TOR>940823101409 M1216202

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PREC: PRIORITY **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**251758Z AUG 94

FM: AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7798
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0654

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1113
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 05031
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, EAID, UNHCR, RW, CG
SUBJECT: KENGO REQUESTS HELP IN MOVING EXRWANDAN ARMY FROM BORDER AREA
1. ~~CONFIDENTIA~~L -- ENTIRE TEXT
2. ZAIRIAN PRIME MINISTER KENGO WA DONDO HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED USG ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION AND CARE OF THE EX-RWANDAN ARMY ELEMENTS WHO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN ZAIRE. CHARGE USED AN APRIL 24 TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR KENGO'S PROMPT, PERSONAL REACTION TO OUR SUNDAY MORNING DEMARCHE IN SUPPORT OF THE UNHCR ON RE-OPENING THE BORDER. KENGO RESPONDED, AS HE HAS BEFORE, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO FACILITATE THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT BUT IT NEEDED INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE THINGS THAT COST MONEY.
3. SPECIFICALLY HE HAD JUST WRITTEN TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, UNDER ARTILE 11 OF THE CHARTER, TO REQUEST HELP IN MOVING THE EX-RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) 150 MILES FROM THE FRONTIER "AS REQUIRED." HIS GOVERNMENT HAS IDENTIFIED A BASE AT ITURI, AS ONE AREA OF RELOCATION. KENGO WAS NOT SURE HOW MANY OF THE ESTIMATED 20,000 EX-FAR SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES COULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT ITURI BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE MONEY. TRANSPORT WOULD BE A BIG ITEM; ALSO REPAIRS TO THE CAMP, TENTS TO LIVE IN AND CLOTHING (TO GET THE FAR OUT OF THEIR MILITARY UNIFORMS WHICH WAS ALL THEY HAD) WOULD ALL BE REQUIRED, NOT TO MENTION DAILY SUSTENANCE FOR THE REFUGEES FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. (COMMENT: WHEN HE MENTIONED ITURI, KENGO SAID "TOWARDS KISANGANI" BUT IN ACTUALITY ITURI IS A SUB REGION OF HAUT-ZAIRE PROVINCE OF WHICH KISANGANI IS THE CAPITAL. IT IS LOCATED JUST NORTH OF NORTH KIVU AND BORDERED BY UGANDA AND SUDAN. KENGO MENTIONED THE AIRPORT AT BUNIA BEING THE CLOSEST TO THE SITE UNDER CONSIDERATION).

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3. KENGO SAID HE HAD ALSO ASKED (WHETHER VIA THE SAME LETTER TO THE UNSYG OR SEPARATELY WAS NOT CLEAR) UNHCR HELP IN REMOVING ABOUT ONE HUNDRED EX-RWANDA POLITICAL LEADERS FROM THE GOMA/BUKAVU AREA AND, FIRSTRESETTLING THEM IN WESTERN ZAIRE, AND THEN FINDING THEM ASYLUM IN THIRD COUNTRIES.
4. CHARGE ACKNOWLEDGED OUR OWN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE EX-MILITARY AND EX-POLITICIANS COMINGLED WITH THE REFUGEES. THE CAPACITY FOR INTIMIDATION EFFECTIVELY COUNTERMANDED EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE THE REFUGEES AND THE VERY PRESENCE OF EX-FAR ON THE BORDER WAS UNSETTLING TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI. HE ENCOURAGED KENGO TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE MULTINATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS. AS THE LARGEST FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTOR TO THE UN FAMILY OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD END UP BEARING A MAJOR SHARE OF THE COST OF ANY PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE. CHARGE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ENTIRE REFUGEE QUESTION AND THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AFRICA WERE NOT BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH COULD BE MANAGED SOLEY BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. HOPEFULLY MULTILATERAL MACHINERY WILL BE UP TO THE TASK. KENGO TOOK THE POINT NOTING THAT HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST HAD BEEN TO THE UNSYG, BUT ALSO REJOINED THAT REALISTICALLY, WITHOUT OUR SUPPORT, THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION.
5. LATER IN THE DAY CHARGE MET WITH KAMEL MORJANE, UNHCR REGIONAL BUREAU DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, AND SPECIAL ENVOY MICHEL MOUSSALLI. MORJANE WAS EFFUSIVE IN HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE USG CONTRIBUTION TO DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE REFUGEE PROBLEM, FROM MILITARY EFFORTS IN GOMA AND KIGALI TO OUR DEMARCHING KENGO TO OPEN THE BORDER SUNDAY MORNING. HE DISCLAIMED UNHCR RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESETTLING THE 20,000 EX-FAR AND/OR EVEN THE 100 POLITICAL LEADERS IDENTIFIED BY THE GOZ TO BE REMOVED FROM THE AREA OF THE CAMPS. IT WAS, HE SAID, AGAINST THE UNHCR MANDATE. MORJANE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A RESTRICTED MEETING OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND KEY DONORS SUCH AS OURSELVES TO TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS KENGO IDENTIFIED AND PROVIDE THE ASSISTANCE HE REQUESTED.
6. COMMENT: FOR TOO LONG A TIME ZAIRE HAS BEEN UNWILLING OR INCAPABLE OF RESPONSIBLY EXERCISING ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. WITHIN HIS LIMITS, KENGO HAS RESPONDED TO OUR REQUESTS. WE DO NOT THINK IT IS WITHIN HIS LIMITS TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 KINSHASA 05031
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, EAID, UNHCR, RW, CG
SUBJECT: KENGO REQUESTS HELP IN MOVING EXRWANDAN ARMY SECURITY AT THE CAMPS AND ALONG THE BORDER AREA (ALTHOUGH WE THINK SOME OF THE REPORTING OVER-ESTIMATES THE QUANTITY OF ARMAMENTS RETAINED BY EX-FAR AND ESPECIALLY THEIR CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT CROSS BORDER RAIDING SORTIES, AT LEAST IN THE GOMA SECTOR). NOR WILL IT CONTRIBUTE TO

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RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM SIMPLY TO EXHORT ZAIRE TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; INCLUDING, OF COURSE, OUR OWN STRONG ROLE, WILL BE CRUCIAL.
YATES##
BT
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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
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<^TOR>940825140249 M1220595
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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FROM:
SITREPRT

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8/25

(1) Zaire proposes to move the FAR 250-300 km west of Goma, to a point SE of Kisangane called Ikuri (near the town of Punia).

(2) Zaire also proposes to move about 100 former govt officials (and dependents – about 1,000 total) to towns called – spelling not guaranteed – Equateur and Bazaire.

State/AF basically thinks this is a good idea, as long as it is done under UN auspices – NOT bilaterally.

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Current Threat Assessment (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ The degree of risk to US personnel involved in the Rwandan relief operation is dependent on the type of threat posed and the particular location under consideration. Generally, the threat to US personnel, including armed forces personnel, in the region is assessed as low to medium. The threat of terrorism in all locations where US forces are operating presently is judged to be low.

~~(S/NF)~~ The risk to US personnel in Goma, Zaire was ~~much~~ higher. In Goma, both Zairian Army and ex-Rwandan Army (FAR) personnel engage in criminal activity. Further, factional fighting and ethnic violence, along with the presence of disaffected military groups operating independently, pose a medium threat to US citizens in the Goma area. The security situation in the Goma area will continue to deteriorate as Western forces withdraw from this location. All US personnel redeployed from the Zairian border region by August 25.

~~(S/NF)~~ In Kigali, crime and factionalism pose a medium level of threat, while the potential threat from disaffected individuals or groups is thought to be low. In addition, there is a medium level threat from land mines in the Rwandan capital. Recently, a number of mine-related accidents have been reported. Although these reports give cause for concern, thus far no US personnel have been affected.

~~(C)~~ The new Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) maintains a strong presence in the capital, serving as a deterrent to violence there. Moreover, the RPA's command-and-control is quite good, and the organization is assessed as a cohesive fighting force, comprised mainly of members of the Tutsi ethnic group, most of whom have had training and combat experience in the Ugandan Army and in the four year Rwandan civil war. Conduct and discipline among troops in Kigali is probably better than it is in the outlying areas, and it is probably better among the older veterans.

~~(S/NF)~~ Table I displays the threat to US personnel from all categories and for all locations where US forces currently are engaged or conceivably could be engaged. The matrix is updated by the US European Command (CINCEUR) on a daily basis.

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Table I. FORCE PROTECTION THREAT ASSESSMENT

AREA	*PORT*	*TER*	*CRIM*	*FIS*	*FACT*	*MINE*	*MIL*
Entebbe, Uganda	L	L	M	M	L	L	L
Bukavu, Zaire	M	L	M	L	M	L	L
Goma, Zaire	M	L	H	L	M	L	M
Kigali, Rwanda	M	L	M	L	M	M	L

TERMINOLOGY

PORT:	Threat to aircraft/airfields and ships/ports
TER:	Terrorist threat
CRIM:	Criminal threat
FIS:	Foreign Intelligence Service threat
FACT:	Threat from Factional fighting/ethnic violence
MINE:	Mine threat
MIL:	Threat from disaffected Military members/groups operating independently
L:	Low to Negligible threat
M:	Medium Threat
H:	High Threat
C:	Critical Threat

Source: USCINCEUR **Current as of 31 August 1994**

Capabilities of the Ex-FAR (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ On 17 July 1994, the bulk (approximately 20,000) of the FAR in northwestern Rwanda fled to Goma, Zaire as intact combat units, bringing with them their heavy weapons (totals and types unknown). The primary reason given by the FAR for this retreat was a severe shortage of ammunition and heavy weapons to sustain the fight against the RPA.

~~(S/NF)~~ As the FAR crossed into Goma, about 50 percent of the troops were disarmed. Although some units retained small arms and caches of ammunition, there was practically no ammunition for crew served weapons in Zaire. Most of the FAR encampments in the Goma area are along the east-west road from Goma to Sake and at several camps north of Goma. Outside the Goma area, there are reports that elements of the ex-FAR's Paracommandos and Presidential Guard remain hidden in the National Park of the Volcanoes (Rwanda) between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in order to begin insurgency operations against the RPA.

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~~(S/NF)~~ Other less organized and less well-equipped ex-FAR troops fled to Bukavu, Zaire, including approximately 8,000 army and gendarme and up to 5,000 Hutu militia forces. During the course of the war, probably in early May, about 1,000-2,000 additional ex-FAR soldiers sought refuge along the Tanzania frontier in the vicinity of the Akagera National Park, and have launched sporadic attacks against the RPA in northeastern Rwanda. An additional group of about 3,000 ex-FAR soldiers are in the Benaco region of Tanzania. Finally, there are reports of as many as 5,000 armed Hutu elements (ex-FAR and militia) in the French Safe Zone, primarily in the Nyungwe Forest west of Gikongoro.

~~(S/NF)~~ The total number of ex-FAR in Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania is roughly 33,000-36,000, but most of these elements are assessed to be of generally low combat capability. Only about 10,000 are believed to be well disciplined and well-trained, the majority of whom are in the Goma area.

~~(S/NF)~~ The ex-FAR has no open allies or sponsors at the present. Zaire is a future possibility though probably not within the next 3 months while Goma remains the site of much international activity. The local Zairian military is sympathetic to the Hutus and, if it is not already doing so, could assist the ex-FAR. Much of the friction between the ex-FAR and the Zairian Army came from the Elite Forces, Special Presidential Division (DSP), and 31st Parachute Brigade, based outside the region. Furthermore, Zaire, with French assistance, could renew its support to the Hutus in order to force a more favorable political solution in Rwanda.

~~(C)~~ The overall combat effectiveness of the ex-FAR units in the region is judged to be low. There are reports of small-scale raids into eastern Rwanda which are probably conducted by elements in the vicinity of the Akagera National Park and Benaco refugee camp in Tanzania. These forces in all likelihood lack a significant stockpile of weapons and ammunition for lengthy insurgency and would need resupply within two to three months.

~~(C)~~ Ammunition and other supplies are the key factor degrading the ex-FAR's near-term capability. Currently, the ex-FAR has insufficient stocks to mount large-scale, sustained combat operations. Most crew-served weapons remain under the control of the Zairian armed forces (FAZ). The ultimate disposition of this equipment has not been determined, but an estimated 20-30 percent of ex-FAR and militia forces retain arms. Because the precise amount of combat equipment available to ex-FAR prior to hostilities is unknown, the amount still retained by the ex-

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FAR--and that which is under FAZ control, destroyed in conflict, or left in Rwanda--is also unknown.

Near Term Outlook (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ *Kigali.* A serious security threat is unlikely to emerge in Kigali over the near term. The Tutsi-dominated government and army are in reasonably firm control of the capital, and they are gradually consolidating their power. Their capability to ensure a safe environment for US personnel and others in and around Kigali increases daily. Tensions could mount, however, if the government alienates wide segments of the Hutu population (who constituted 85% of the pre-civil war Rwandan population), even inadvertently. Thus far, the new Government of Rwanda has steadfastly avoided taking any actions which might provoke trouble with the Hutu.

~~(S/NF)~~ *Goma.* The potential threat in the border areas, especially Goma, is likely to increase over the near term as the former Rwandan military attempts to re-group and stage a comeback. These defeated forces remain defiant and have begun to launch small-scale insurgency operations. Extremist Hutus retain their militia and village organization in the camps, providing an environment wherein hate propaganda and fear can be used to incite violence against US personnel. Moreover, many of them blame the UN~~and the US in particular~~, for their downfall, which they attribute to the UN-imposed arms embargo that denied them the means to win the war. Despite their intentions, these forces currently lack the capability to engage in sustained insurgency operations, although they may ~~will~~ conduct limited cross-border forays in the coming weeks.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Paracommando Battalion and Presidential Guard could launch limited squad or platoon-size raids and insurgent operations in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Prefectures, possibly from the Volcanoes National Park in northwest Rwanda. The Paracommando battalion may have received extensive terrorist training from French military advisors during the Civil War (1990-1993). This unit is the linchpin of the ex-FAR, and its actions most likely would serve as an indicator of what the ex-FAR would do as a whole.

~~(S/NF)~~ *Bukavu.* The forces in the Bukavu region lack organization and weapons, and thus pose little threat and are not likely to begin insurgency operations. However, the forces in the Nyungwe Forest area of the Safe Zone will continue to terrorize the local population, could interfere with UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops, and prompt the

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RPA to renew military operations in southwest Rwanda. If the RPA resumes its attacks, the local Hutu population will probably flee to Zaire.

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UN SECURITY SYSTEM IN RWANDA

Executive Summary

As of 6 September there were over 4,100 UNAMIR troops in Rwanda, about half of which are deployed in the southwest Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ, formerly the French Safe zone). Additionally, UNAMIR troops have begun to establish an operational hub in Kigali. The deployment of the remainder of UNAMIR's 5500 troops is to occur over the next month.

UNAMIR forces have been performing in the southwest both during and since the French withdrawal. While this deployment has not been of sufficient duration to assess their viability as a security force, to date the units have performed satisfactorily. UNAMIR's security presence in the rest of Rwanda remains limited. With only two-thirds of its force in place, UNAMIR has not yet established a viable security system throughout the country.

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Current UNAMIR Operations (U)

(U) The expanded United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, known as UNAMIR II, was established after the resurgence of civil war in Rwanda last April. It has multiple missions: to promote stability and security in Rwanda; to facilitate the return of the refugees; to ensure safe conditions for humanitarian relief operations; and to promote the reconciliation process. To accomplish these goals, UNAMIR II has a mandated force strength of 5500 troops. It is a Chapter VI "peacekeeping" operation under the UN Charter, as opposed to a Chapter VII "peace enforcement" operation (the latter allows forces to use whatever means necessary, including deadly force, to accomplish their mission).

~~(S/NF)~~ As of 6 September, there were ~~4016~~ 4190 troops under UNAMIR II command deployed throughout Rwanda. The southwestern portion of Rwanda, the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ), is currently the high priority area for UN operations. Because of the withdrawal of French forces, there is considerable fear among the Hutu refugees in the HPZ that the new Kigali government, dominated by Tutsis, will conduct reprisals against them. Further, ex-FAR and militia are applying pressure on Hutus to relocate into Zaire. The movement of Rwandans westward toward the Bukavu area in Zaire reflects the anxiety which has been generated among the Hutus.

~~(C)~~ The role played by extremist radio broadcasts is integral to the ex-FAR campaign to intimidate Hutus. The anti-Tutsi propaganda being broadcast reinforces ethnic hatreds, as well as the fears of Hutu refugees about the safety of returning. To some extent, this has been countered by radio campaigns conducted by the new government in Kigali and by elements of the international community. Nevertheless, the return flow of refugees has been limited, suggesting that the former government so far has been more successful in convincing--and coercing--the Hutu refugees to remain outside Rwanda.

~~(S/NF)~~ UNAMIR's focus on the HPZ has brought an increased force presence to the area which, along with the positive radio campaign being conducted by the international community, hopefully will bring about repatriation. Thus far, a Ghanaian mechanized battalion has moved into the Gikongoro area of the HPZ. An Ethiopian battalion is deploying to the Cyangugu area of the HPZ. Additionally, the African contingent of approximately 550 troops of the previous French-led multinational effort transferred to UNAMIR control after Paris withdrew its forces. A number

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of African countries have also pledged company to battalion-sized (120-800 personnel) units to UNAMIR II.

~~(S/NF)~~ UNAMIR's ability to provide adequate security is unclear at this time. Once the entire force has been deployed, the size of the security presence should be sufficient, but that only tells half the story. More than any other factor, UNAMIR's success will be measured by the extent to which the refugees' perceive they can return home without fear of reprisal.

The Role of the Government (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ While UNAMIR may attempt to bring temporary security to the Rwandan population, it is the new government which must be able and willing to sustain that protection. Although there are reports of some reprisal killings, possibly by field-officers of the RPA, there is no evidence yet of government sanction for such killings. Indeed, the government continues to condemn all such acts of reprisal.

~~(S/NF)~~ Little information is currently available about the precise size of the RPA. By piecing together a variety of un-corroborated reports, we conclude that the RPA comprises about 35,000 soldiers. Of this number, only about 13,000 troops are combat experienced, and 5,000 are administration/support troops. The RPA is organized into three sectors: the Ruhengeri Sector, the Kigali Sector, and the Butare Sector. The entire force comprises 5 brigades, with each brigade containing 4 to 6 battalions. The total force boasts 75 light infantry battalions, each battalion comprising 300-400 soldiers. Separate battalions (those not organic to a brigade) evidently serve as strategic reserve forces to reinforce sectors as required.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

~~(S/NF)~~ RPA soldiers are highly skilled in guerrilla tactics, which proved successful in Rwanda's rugged terrain against the better equipped and larger forces of the FAR. The RPA may be somewhat less capable in a more traditional role as a national army. Logistically, the RPA is highly mobile and adapted to ensure rapid resupply of ammunition and food. Special logistics troops transport supplies by truck to forward distribution sites, which are then brought by porters to the forward-deployed units. Based on its performance against the FAR, it is apparent that the RPA is a highly disciplined and cohesive fighting force with reasonably good leadership. The influx of large numbers of new recruits since the Rwandan

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Patriotic Front took control of Rwanda's government in mid-July may have caused a temporary decline in the combat capability of the RPA.

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

~~(S/NF)~~ Relatively little is known about the current disposition of RPA units throughout the country. As far as can be determined, it appears that the French Safe Zone in Rwanda's southwest is devoid of RPA units. Only three Rwandan cities are known to host RPA battalions (Ruhengeri, Kigali, and Gisenyi). RPA units have been seen in the capital in three locations: the Gendarme Camp north of downtown, an RPA camp in downtown Kigali, and Kanombe Barracks, east of downtown Kigali. RPA key training sites are located at Gabiro and Bigogwe.

Near Term Outlook (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ Not only are Rwandan Hutus generally skeptical of the UN's ability to protect them, they are aware of its limitations ~~on~~ the use of force. If necessary, they will find ways to cross over the porous border into Zaire, regardless of efforts to interdict them. Their return will depend on UNAMIR's ability ~~to offer Hutus~~ a secure environment in Rwanda and the extent to which the international community can break the control of Hutu extremists and the ex-FAR in the Zaire camps.

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to contribute to the establishment of

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~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

August 25, 1994

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TO: AF - Mr. Moose

THROUGH: AF - Prudence Bushnell

FROM: AF/C - Terence P. McCulley, Acting

SUBJECT: Relocating Rwandan Refugees - FAR Remnants and IGOR

The Problem

Security in the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire remains a major concern: the presence of armed militia members and former Rwandan government (IGOR) officials in the camps and throughout eastern Zaire, and the concentrations of rump Rwandan armed forces (FAR) along the Goma-Bukavu axis pose problems for both the international humanitarian effort and the long term stability of Rwanda. The Government of Zaire (GOZ) has made an effort to disarm the FAR, ensure security in the camps, and interdict efforts by Hutu militants to prevent refugees from returning to Rwanda. Regrettably, the Zairians have failed in most of these areas, and have now turned to the UN and the United States for assistance. Security in the camps, disarming ex-FAR and relocation of former Rwandan government officials and military are all interrelated. The Zairians have put a problem on the table which requires a bilateral or multilateral solution, and which incorporates the related issues of arrest and detention of suspected war criminals.

Zairian Plan A: IGOR Officials

The GOZ wishes to separate and remove former officials of the Rwandan regime (along with their families), and to disperse them to Bandundu, Equateur and Bas Zaire provinces. The Zairians have identified 100 key figures in the former government, and have notified them of the GOZ intent. Along with hangers-on and dependents, the GOZ wishes to relocate about 1,000 persons from the camps along the sensitive border area in eastern Zaire to points west. The ultimate goal is to engineer the exit of the former officials to third countries where they might find asylum. Zairian Prime Minister Kengo has raised this issue with the UNHCR Africa Director, and requested UN assistance to prepare camps and provide transport for the former Rwandan government officials; he passed along a similar request for U.S. help to Charge Yates Wednesday.

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The Heart of the Matter: Disarming/Relocating the FAR

The remnant FAR and militia present in eastern Zaire probably do not represent a military threat to the new RPF-led Rwandan government. They were routed on the field of battle by Kagame's troops, and are now for the most part bereft of heavy weapons and materiel. As long as the rump Rwandan army remains consolidated in camps along the Goma - Bukavu axis, however, it continues to pose a risk of destabilizing the new authorities in Kigali. In a more immediate sense, the force could also be used to intimidate refugees who wish to return to Rwanda. Disarming and relocating the FAR brings us back to the difficult issue of who will do the deed. Clearly the Zairians cannot, and the United States will not. The various bilateral and multilateral options discussed below outline some possible responses to the problem.

1) Disarming/Relocating - A Bilateral Approach

The prospects for success in convincing a third country to send its troops to disarm and move the FAR, and to assist the Zairians with security in the refugee camps seem dubious at best. Although we may wish to approach a third country (such as Israel or France) to provide troops to disarm and relocate the ex-FAR, there may be few who would be willing to take on the job. The ex-FAR remains armed (albeit lightly) with command structures intact. Although a well-disciplined third country force could likely disarm and control the ex-FAR, the risk of confrontation might deter any nation from committing troops. Additionally, such an action would ensure that the third country's troops would be widely perceived as a party to the conflict by the Hutu refugees in Zaire. Using such troops to provide security in the camps or to control the relocated ex-FAR would be problematic under these circumstances.

Given the problems related to a disarming the ex-FAR, it might be worthwhile to consider asking a third country to facilitate the relocation of the rump Rwandan army -- without disarming it -- to the camp proposed by the GOZ in far northeastern Zaire. This variation might defuse the tension which an effective move to disarm and intern the ex-FAR would engender, while removing the force from the sensitive border area. On the other hand, such an action could be expected to generate criticism from the new Rwandan government in Kigali.

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2) Disarming/Relocating - Multilateral Options:

-- Expand UNAMIR's Mandate?

A multilateral approach may be the most realistic option, but is far from the most expeditious way to resolve the problem. Expanding UNAMIR's mandate would require a new Security Council resolution, which in turn would lead directly to the question of where to find troops. Deployment of UNAMIR II has taken four months, and remains incomplete. Beyond this, disarming the ex-FAR and militia and assisting the GOZ with provision of security in the camps is a far different mandate from that of UNAMIR: countries now contributing troops to the Chapter VI operation in Rwanda can be expected to balk at a modification of the mandate which could raise the risk factor for their soldiers.

-- A New UN Force for Eastern Zaire?

The UNSYG has floated the idea of a UN "rapid reaction force," deployed in eastern Zaire, with a mandate to intervene in Burundi should fighting erupt between Tutsis and Hutus. While most on the Security Council have been decidedly tepid to this concept, we may wish to consider a new UN mandated force for the region to deal with the problem of the ex-FAR and security in the camps. The problem remains that while a Chapter VII operation could offer a UN blessing, it might find few countries willing to commit troops (for the same reasons outlined above). As with the idea of expanding UNAMIR's operation, however, obtaining a new UN mandate could be a lengthy process, and in the interim, the UNHCR and other international organizations will not move the ex-FAR while they remain under arms.

An Added Complication: The Question of War Crimes

The ex-FAR and IGOR contain people guilty of genocide, and as we move forward with a War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda we need to consider that many of those we propose to relocate may be suspected war criminals. The GOZ may have an international obligation to arrest and detain suspected war criminals, but has scant means and little will to undertake such an initiative. The bilateral or multilateral force would then face the thorny issue of whether to get involved in the detention of war criminals.

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Rwanda/Burundi SVTS Agenda

August 31, 1994 at 1100 hours

- CIA Report
- Ad Hoc Meeting - Readout
- Radios - Status of Team in Kigali
- Security in Refugee Camps

  Goma

  - Relocating Ex-FAR and IGOR
  - Providing general security through:
    - -- Bilateral Means
    - -- Multilateral Peacekeepers
    - -- Private Contractors

  Tanzania - What is the problem?

- U.S. Military Presence - Kigali
- Security in Rwanda - Status of human rights monitors and international tribunal
- Bulletin Board - General information sharing

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Rwanda Working Group

FROM: Susan Varisco

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Deployment

The following is the information on UNAMIR deployment that I promised for today's SVTS:

Tunisia: There was a misunderstanding at UN HQ over the APC issue. The Force Commander will restructure APC allocations and take 20 from the Ghanaian battalion for Tunisia. Meanwhile, the UN has asked Russia for BTRs (wheeled APCs). 1-2 Tunisian companies will deploy on 25 Sept and the remaining will deploy over the following three weeks.

India: An advance party of 1 company will deploy 30 Sept and the remainder will deploy over the following two weeks.

Airlift: The UN is still working out its lift plans, but we should expect a request for assistance at some point. No further details yet as to what and when.

Troop Ceiling: UNAMIR will be within the mandated troop strength for the next few weeks. It will start to go over in mid-October, based on the deployment schedule we have now. Once fully deployed, the force will exceed the mandated strength by 1600. The UN will probably come to the Security Council by the first week on October asking for a new troop strength--unless there is an unforseen change in the deployment schedule or other troops rotate out. In any case, we should consider whether we have objections to a larger UNAMIR.

Give me a call if you have any further questions.

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Strategy on Security in Rwandan Refugee Camps

- o The international community should assist the GOZ and GOT in moving ex-IGOR leaders and ex-FAR out of the camps and away from the border.

- o We should not allow the elements that have been moved to solidify into an organized group bent on invading Rwanda.

  - We should redouble efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal as soon as possible, so the genocidal leadership in exile can be plucked from the group that has been relocated (or from the regular refugee camps, if some remain there).

- o We need to pursue demobilization and integration of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan army or other employment:

  - We should provide occupational training to the relocated ex-FAR for demobilization and integration into the Rwandan economy.

  - We should press the GOR to accelerate and expand its program of integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new GOR army.

  - We should build on the example of UNAMIR's voluntary disarmament program in the former safe zone by encouraging the GOR to offer similar incentives (gendarme or other jobs) to ex-FAR outside the country.

  - We must work with the donor community and IFI's to help get the GOR up and running so that it can afford to integrate or offer other carrots to the ex-FAR.

- o We should press the GOZ and GOR to agree to destroy the arms that have been confiscated and, in the meantime, we should seek to ensure that the weapons are safeguarded.

- o We should press UNHCR to implement its plan to break the camps up into smaller, more manageable sub-camps to facilitate control and administration. We should offer our financial and logistical assistance.

- o Policing in the camps must be improved:

  - The international community should assist GOT and GOZ military/police (to the extent possible) in fulfilling the host country's responsibility to provide security.

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  - We should seriously consider extending UNAMIR's mandate and AOR to cover the refugee camps.

  - At the same time, we should continue to look for countries willing to provide or assist the GOZ/GOT in providing security on a bilateral basis.

- o We must keep up the pressure on the GOR to encourage repatriation through broadening its political base and ending human rights abuses. We must press for full deployment of UNAMIR and human rights monitors.

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Rwanda

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TAGS: PREF, ET, OAU, RW, UN, EAID
SUBJECT: UNHCR/OAU RWANDA SESSION

INTRODUCTION

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1. UNHCR AND OAU HELD A SPECIAL RWANDA/BURUNDI SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 9 DURING THE SEPTEMBER 8-10 UNHCR/OAU AFRICA REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN ADDIS. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER MRS. OGATA AND OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM CO-CHAIRED THE MEETING. REPRESENTING THE AFFECTED REGION WERE RWANDA'S FOREIGN MINISTER, BURUNDI'S AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA, ZAIRE'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND TANZANIA'S AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS LED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OAKLEY AND INCLUDED AF/DAS BUSHNELL, AMBASSADOR RAWSON, SCOTT FISHER (AF/RA), MELANIE MARLETT (USAID/A) AND VALERIE NEWSOM (USAID/DART). THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWEDEN, DENMARK, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND TUNISIA (AS OAU PRESIDENT) ALSO ATTENDED. THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING INCLUDED SECURITY IN RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS, REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN REFUGEES AND THE UPCOMING REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE.

2. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE MEETING'S PROCEEDINGS. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ARE LISTED IN PARA 23.

SEPARATION OF MILITIA AND CIVILIANS

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3. ALL SPECIAL SESSION PARTICIPANTS AGREED ON THE URGENT NEED TO SEPARATE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN ZAIRE CAMPS. ACCORDING TO THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA), THE PRIMARY OBSTACLES TO REPATRIATION ARE INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES BY MILITIA AND THE THREATENING PROPAGANDA OF THE EX-GOVERNMENT. MILITIA (INCLUDING BOTH ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO RWANDA. STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, STATED THE MFA, TO SEPARATE THE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. THE MFA ALSO SUGGESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE CORRIDOR FOR RETURNING REFUGEES. THE THREATENING PROPAGANDA OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT MUST ALSO BE STOPPED.

4. ACCORDING TO THE ZAIRE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (DPM), THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE (GOZ) IS COMMITTED TO DOING EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO NEUTRALIZE THOSE WHO VIOLATE ZAIRIAN LAWS AND HOSPITALITY. THE GOZ WILL NOT TOLERATE NEITHER MILITIA NOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY THAT PREVENTS THOSE WHO WISH TO RETURN HOME FROM DOING SO. AS PER THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND ZAIRE AT THE JULY 30 MAURITIUS MEETING, THE GOZ PLANS TO DIVIDE THE REFUGEE POPULATION IN ZAIRE INTO CIVILIAN CAMPS AND MILITARY CAMPS. THE GOZ HAS IDENTIFIED APPROPRIATE SITES FURTHER FROM THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR RELOCATION OF THE SOLDIERS AND IS PURSUING CONTRACTS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE THE ACTUAL MOVEMENT PROCESS. ONCE THE MILITIA ARE ENCAMPED, THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT WILL REQUIRE ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO FEED, CLOTHE (IN OTHER THAN MILITARY UNIFORM) AND OTHERWISE CARE FOR THE ENCAMPED MILITIA. LATER, SAID THE DPM, THE GOZ WILL PURSUE GENERAL DISARMAMENT (FAR SOLDIERS, STATED THE ZAIRIAN DPM, HAVE BEEN DISARMED ALTHOUGH FAR OFFICERS CONTINUE TO HAVE ACCESS TO THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS) AND ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF MILITARY OFFICERS. THE GOZ RECOGNIZES THAT SEPARATING THE INTERHAMWE FROM THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WILL PROVE DIFFICULT AS THEY ARE HARD TO IDENTIFY.

5. THE GOZ IS ALSO PLANNING TO RELOCATE FORMER RWANDAN LEADERS, CURRENTLY IN THE GOMA AREA, TO BANDUNDU AND BAS ZAIRE. THE GOZ HAS BANNED ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER AREAS.

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ASKED BY AS OAKLEY, THE ZAIRE DPM STATED THAT THERE ARE 20,000-25,000 MILITIA IN ZAIRE AND AN ESTIMATED 2 MILLION REFUGEES IN TOTAL. (NOTE: THE 2 MILLION FIGURE IS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN OFFICIAL UNHCR ESTIMATES OF ABOUT 1.3 MILLION, WHICH ARE ALSO LIKELY HIGH;
THE NUMBER OF MILITIA MAY BE CORRECT. END NOTE.)
OAKLEY ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE RWANDAN MILITIA IN ZAIRE HAD AGREED TO BE MOVED. ACCORDING TO THE ZAIRE DPM, THE ZAIRE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS CONTACTED MILITIA OFFICIALS TO ADVISE THEM OF THE EMINENT MOVEMENT/ENCAMPMENT OF MILITIA

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AND HAS NOT RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL REFUSAL TO MOVE.
7. COMMENTING ON THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, OAU/SYG SALIM SALIM AGREED THAT THE SEPARATION OF INTERHAMWE, WHILE MORE COMPLICATED THAN TROOPS, MUST ALSO BE EFFECTED TO INSURE POPULATIONS AND ASSERTED THAT THE UNHCR STANDS READY TO HELP IN THIS EFFORT. OGATA ASKED FOR A TIMELINE FOR THE COMPLETION OF THIS SEPARATION AS, SHE STATED, THE UNHCR CANNOT CONTINUE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE MIXED POPULATION FOR MORE THAN THREE MORE MONTHS WITHOUT A SERIOUS LOSS TO THE ORGANIZATION'S CREDIBILITY. OGATA ALSO STATED THAT WHILE THE SEPARATION OF INTERHAMWE ELEMENTS WOULD BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE ENCAMPMENT OF MILITARY TROOPS, REMOVAL OF THE TROOPS WILL BE A GOOD FIRST STEP TOWARDS CONTAINING INTERHAMWE ACTIVITY. REGARDING THE RWANDAN MFA'S PROPOSAL FOR SAFE CORRIDORS TO ENCOURAGE REFUGEE REPATRIATION, OGATA SAID THAT IT IS AN INTERESTING CONCEPT WHICH UNHCR WILL FURTHER EXAMINE.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

B. THE MFA STATED THAT THE SECURITY CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR REPATRIATION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) IS ACTIVELY URGING REFUGEES TO RETURN. THE GOR HAS MADE RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN THE SPIRIT OF ARUSHA BOTH INSIDE RWANDA AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THE MFA STATED THAT "THE GOR HAS KEPT THEIR DOOR AJAR FOR PEOPLE OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE NO BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS". THEY HAVE ALSO KEPT THE DOOR OPEN TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY.

9. THE MFA STATED THAT THE GOR WANTS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING A LEGAL SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR WAR CRIMINALS. HE INDICATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WILL PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO REFUGEES WHO WANT TO RETURN HOME. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT "THE BALL IS IN THEIR COURT", I.E. THAT IF THERE IS NO RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND IF THEY DO NOT ABIDE BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, THERE WILL BE MORE REFUGEES.

TANZANIA - CONTINUED INFLUXES

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10. ACCORDING TO THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA, THERE ARE CURRENTLY 500,000 REFUGEES IN KAGERA REGION WITH DAILY INFLUXES OF ANYWHERE FROM 150 TO 1,500 PEOPLE. (NOTE: UNHCR'S OFFICIAL NUMBERS FOR REFUGEES IN TANZANIA ARE CLOSER TO 450,000. END NOTE) THE GOVERNMENT OF TANZANIA (GOT) HOPES TO BREAK DOWN LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF REFUGEES (AS IN BENACO WHERE THERE ARE ABOUT 200,000) INTO

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SMALLER CAMPS. WHILE MILITIA PRESENCE WITHIN THE CAMPS IS REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL 450 TO CONTROL WEAPONS AND PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. THE GOZ HAS APPEALED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS AND HAS APPARENTLY RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE U.S. (OF WHICH WE WERE NOT AWARE).

11. THE GOT IS VERY INTERESTED IN THE TIMELY REPATRIATION OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEES IN TANZANIA AND WARNED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT THAT "WITCH HUNTING DOES NOT PROMOTE PEACE." THE GOT URGED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE AMNESTY TO THOSE RWANDANS WHO HAD COMMITTED LESSER CRIMES ("LESSER" WAS LEFT UNDEFINED) AND APPEALED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL GROUPS IN RWANDA WHICH ARE SUPPORTING RECONCILIATION AND ASSIST THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE GOVERNING STRUCTURES WHICH WOULD GIVE PEACE OF MIND TO REFUGEES THUS ENCOURAGING THEIR RETURN. THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR CITED THE NEED FOR THE COUNTRYWIDE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL (UNAMIR) FORCES AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE F
ORCES ACTUALLY ESCORT REFUGEES
RETURNING HOME. HE ALSO ASKED THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO SET A TIME LINE FOR REFUGEE REPATRIATION.

LAND TENURE AND RETURNEES

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12. THE MFA IS CONCERNED THAT RECENT REFUGEES WILL RETURN TO FIND THEIR HOMES HAVE BEEN CLAIMED BY OTHERS. MANY LONG-TIME REFUGEES (PRIMARILY TUTSI EXILES) ARE RETURNING TO RWANDA SPONTANEOUSLY AND SETTLING ON THEIR FORMER LAND (WHICH HAS BEEN OCCUPIED BY OTHERS FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS) OR OTHER PROPERTY ABANDONED BY THE RECENT REFUGEES. THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTEDLY INFORMED THE EXILES TO FOREGO THE RIGHT TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPERTY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. FOR THE MOMENT, THERE IS NOWHERE OTHER THAN HOMES PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY RECENT REFUGEES TO MOVE INTO. THE LONGER IT TAKES FOR THE RECENT REFUGEES TO RETURN, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO EVICT THE EXILES FROM THEIR LAND. BY NOT ADDRESSING THE HOUSING NEEDS OF THE EXILES WHO ARE NOW RETURNING, THE RWANDAN DELEGATION CLAIMED THAT UNHCR WAS IGNORING THEIR BASIC NEEDS.

13. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT THE UNHCR MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN LONG-TERM AND RECENT REFUGEES IN THE REPATRIATION PROCESS. REPATRIATION CURRENTLY APPEARS UNORGANIZED, STATED OGATA, BECAUSE UNHCR IS NOT CONDUCTING ORGANIZED REPATRIATION; IT IS MERELY SUPPORTING SPONTANEOUS REPATRIATION. UNHCR CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE SUPPORT LARGE SCALE ORGANIZED REPATRIATION AT THIS TIME DUE TO ONGOING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING HOUSING, LAND TENURE ISSUES, LONG-TIME REFUGEES CAN BE TAKEN ON A TEMPORARY BASIS UNTIL

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MORE PERMANENT HOUSING CAN BE LOCATED. OGATA REPORTED THAT THE WORLD BANK HAS IDENTIFIED SHELTER AS THEIR POTENTIAL AREA OF INTERVENTION AND THUS MAY BE WILLING TO ASSIST WITH LONG TERM HOUSING NEEDS.

14. COMMENT. WHILE THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT THE EXILE RETURNEES ARE WELL AWARE THAT THEY CAN ONLY TEMPORARILY OCCUPY HOUSES VACATED BY RECENT RETURNEES, MANY OF THOSE IN EXILE FOR DECADES HAVE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED THEIR FORMER HOMESTEADS AND WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISPLACE IF THERE IS A MASS RETURN OF RECENT REFUGEES. LAND TENURE WILL LIKELY BE ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE REHABILITATION PHASE. END COMMENT.

REFUGEE CAMP MANAGEMENT AND WAY STATIONS

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15. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEE CAMPS IN GOMA AND THAT COORDINATION AMONG THE ESTIMATED 50 OPERATIONAL NGOS HAS IMPROVED. UNHCR IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING A REFUGEE REGISTRATION IN GOMA (USING THE SAME COMPUTER TECHNIQUES SUCCESSFULLY UTILIZED IN NGARA) WHICH SHOULD YIELD ACCURATE NUMBERS AND IMPROVE RELIEF DISTRIBUTION PROCESSES. THERE REMAINS A NEED TO BREAK THE CAMPS DOWN INTO SMALLER SITES.

16. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM OAKLEY, UNHCR'S DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR RWANDA STATED THAT THE WAY STATIONS, ESTABLISHED IN THE NORTHWEST TO PROVIDE FOOD, MEDICAL AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO RETURNEES REMAIN A POSITIVE, VISIBLE SIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND WILL SERVE A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A MASS REPATRIATION (WHICH HAS YET TO HAPPEN).

FUNDING

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17. MRS. OGATA STATED THAT UNHCR HAD ASKED FOR $258.2 MILLION FOR THE RWANDAN CRISIS AND AS OF AUGUST 31 HAD RECEIVED PLEDGES OF $191.1 MILLION.

REGIONAL CONFERENCE

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18. OAU SYG SALIM SALIM STATED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AT THE RECENT OAU SUMMIT IN TUNIS THAT A REGIONAL THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS. SHE INDICATED THAT HER OFFICE IS COMMITTED TO PARTICIPATING IN THOSE PREPARATIONS.

19. THE AMBASSADOR OF BURUNDI STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT

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WAS WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE FULLY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE. HE INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO HOLD TWO
MEETINGS: A PREPARATORY SCIENTIFIC MEETING OF EXPERTS FOLLOWED BY A HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL MEETING. THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE TO PROVIDE AN ANALYTICAL/FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE MADE IN THE SECOND MEETING.

20. BOTH THE DPM OF ZAIRE AND THE RWANDAN MFA DID NOT SUPPORT THE IDEA OF TWO CONFERENCES. THEY AGREED THAT A HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL MEETING OR SUMMIT WAS REQUIRED. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD FOCUS NOT ONLY ON THE CURRENT REFUGEE PROBLEM BUT ALSO ON THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS, PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES, AND SOLUTIONS TO CURRENT PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION. THE TUNISIANS AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE FLOWS, INCLUDING ETHNICITY, AND THAT CRISIS PREVENTION SHOULD BE A MAJOR THEME.

21. AS OAKLEY STATED THAT SPECIFICITY NEEDED TO BE BUILT INTO THE CONFERENCE WITH A FOCUS ON: (1) IMMEDIATE-TERM ACTIONS IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PEACEKEEPING, REHABILITATION AND RECOVERY; (2) DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES; (3) MARSHALLING OF RESOURCES; AND (4) WAYS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN DO A BETTER JOB IN BOTH PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO REFUGEE SITUATIONS IN THE FUTURE. THE EU AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO QUICKLY ACHIEVE TANGIBLE RESULTS.

22. SYG SALIM SALIM CONCLUDED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE A GLOBAL AS WELL AS PRACTICAL APPROACH. HE STATED THAT A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE NEEDED TO BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY TO INCLUDE THE OAU, UNHCR, UN, RWANDA, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, TANZANIA, UGANDA, ZAMBIA, KENYA, THE GREAT LAKE ASSOCIATION, US, GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, TUNISIA, GREECE, DENMARK, AND SWEDEN. THE UNHCR AND THE OAU WILL SERVE AS COORDINATORS OF THE CONFERENCE. THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE WILL CONVENE WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS TO DECIDE THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE, THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, ETC.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

-- SEPARATE MILITIA FROM CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS. ENCAMP MILITIA FURTHER FROM BORDER.

-- DISARM MILITIA.

-- DEPLOY UNAMIR TROOPS TO RWANDA'S BORDER WITH ZAIRE, BURUNDI, AND TANZANIA, TO ENSURE SECURITY AND ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO RETURN.

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-- ESTABLISH SECURITY CORRIDORS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES. ASSESS WAYS OF USING WAY STATIONS AS PART OF SECURITY CORRIDORS.

-- IDENTIFY LANDS WITHIN RWANDA FOR TEMPORARY PLACEMENT OF RETURNED REFUGEES (BOTH EXILES AND RECENT) FOR THOSE RETURNED REFUGEES WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LAND AND HOMES UNTIL LONG-TERM SITES CAN BE FOUND.

-- DEPLOY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.

-- ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

-- IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE HATE RADIO.

-- SIGN TRIPARTITE COMMISSION AGREEMENT (UNHCR, RWANDA, AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRY) AND ESTABLISH JOINT COMMISSION (OAU, UNHCR, COUNTRIES IN REGION AND COUNTRIES THAT WERE OBSERVERS AT THE ARUSHA CONFERENCE) TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS IN RWANDA NECESSARY FOR REPATRIATION. /

-- FOLLOW-UP ON NEEDS IDENTIFIED IN BY SRSG KHAN'S RWANDA EMERGENCY NORMALIZATION PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE, SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION.

-- CONVENE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING FOR HIGH-LEVEL REGIONAL CONFERENCE.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES

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24. THE FOLLOWING OUTSTANDING ISSUE WAS BY THE US DELEGATION:

-- THE NEED TO DESIGNATE SOMEONE, LIKE SRSG KHAN, TO TAKE CHARGE OF COORDINATING HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ON THE GROUND.

25. KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HICKS
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Rwanda/Burundi SVTS Agenda
September 14 at 1100 hours

- CIA Report
- Review Status of Ad Hoc Taskings
- Security Issue
  - - Additional Comments on Revised Security Paper
- UNAMIR
  - - German APCs/Tunisians
  - - Japanese
- Radios

  Jamming
  - - What Good Stations May Be Blocked?
  - - Cost to Jam
- Next SVTS Friday, September 16 at 1100 Hours
  - - SVTS Schedule: Tuesdays at 1300 Hours and Fridays at 1100 Hours

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Rwanda Crisis: Security and Next Steps

SUMMARY

There is no single initiative or quick fix for securing the refugee camps and dealing with the ex-FAR and militias. The available options for attempting to forcefully disarm the ex-FAR and neutralize the militias are not likely to be successful in the current situation. Instead, we must whittle away at the problem by a series of coordinated steps in the security, political, relief, and economic realms. Above all, we need to focus on mitigating the problem, through moving the bad elements away from the innocents, reorganizing and breaking down the camps into more manageable sub-units, integrating some elements of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan security apparatus, the civilian refugee population, or civilian economy, and improving conditions inside Rwanda to encourage gradual repatriation of the refugee population. These incremental initiatives may help bring the situation under control and reduce the overall size of the task. The international community might then, if necessary, take a more forceful approach to deal with any remaining elements that pose a serious security threat. This multi-layered strategy is outlined below.

Security: Relocation and Demobilization

The international community should assist the GOZ and GOT in moving ex-IGOR leaders and ex-FAR (voluntarily) out of the camps and away from the border. Once moved, these elements should not be permitted to solidify into an organized group bent on invading Rwanda. Additionally, we should continue efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal as soon as possible, so the genocidal leadership in exile can be plucked from the group that has been relocated (or from the regular refugee camps, if some remain there). Finally, we should also press the GOZ and GOR to agree to destroy the arms that have been confiscated and, in the meantime, we should seek to ensure that the weapons are safeguarded.

The Belgian View:

The Belgians agree that the ex-FAR and IGOR should be relocated away from the main body of refugees, although Brussels is dubious of the Zairian proposal to move the group north to the Ugandan border. The Belgians suggest that the issue of relocation and security can best be addressed by expanding UNAMIR's mandate and Area of Responsibility (likely

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under Chapter VII). In his debrief to the Security Council, General Dallaire also argued for a robust UNAMIR move into the camps in force. The Ghanaians (expressing likely concerns of other troop contributing nations) evinced little enthusiasm for a Chapter VII expansion into Zaire.

The French View:

The French are less exercised over the ex-FAR than the US and Belgium. The French told us that most of the ex-FAR's personal arms have been confiscated, and Paris believes that the international community should focus on the issue of "progressive demobilization" of the troops, integration into the main body of refugees, and ultimate repatriation and reintegration into a new Rwandan national army. According to Zairian Justice Minister Kamanda wa Kamanda, however, the French have offered the Zairians unspecified "technical assistance" in moving the ex-FAR. We have asked Embassy Paris to confirm whether the French are indeed prepared to assist the Zairians, and in what manner.

The Khan Mission:

We understand that SYGSR Khan will recommend to the SYG that an experts committee travel to Zaire on Monday to begin a two week mission to survey sites for relocating the ex-FAR plus dependents (approximately 90,000 to 100,000 persons). The committee would include logisticians, transport experts, UNDP and UNHCR reps, and possibly the Deputy Commander of UNAMIR. The committee would then present its report to the UN Security Council. Khan believes that moving the ex-FAR and dependents requires an extension of UNAMIR's mandate, likely under Chapter VII. The SYGSR believes the UN should complete this operation by the end of the year, and that both Kengo and Mobutu support the concept.

Security: Camp Administration and the FAZ Factor

The Government of Zaire has failed woefully to fulfill its responsibility to ensure security in the camps. In many instances, the Zairian Army (FAZ) has been part of the problem in Goma and Bukavu (attacks on refugees, shakedowns, etc.). The Tanzanians have been more successful but the scope of the problem clearly exceeds the GOT's ability to respond. To the extent possible, the international community should assist GOT and GOZ military/police to improve security in the camps. This might involve technical assistance to the GOT and GOZ to upgrade the professionalism of the host country military/police. In Zaire's case at least, this is clearly a long term solution.

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In the short term, we should press UNHCR to implement its plan to break the camps up into smaller, more manageable sub-camps to facilitate control and administration. We understand that UNHCR plans to use some of the equipment donated by the US military, and that OFDA has agreed to finance additional equipment and engineering personnel. OFDA advises that the engineers are on site in Goma, and are ready to begin preparation of the sub-camps.

An additional option might be to request the US military to provide engineering personnel and equipment to assist UNHCR with site preparation.

A Political Strategy: Demobilization and After

The US and its partners need to pursue demobilization and integration of the ex-FAR into the new Rwandan army or other employment. We should provide (or fund) occupational training to the relocated ex-FAR, and as appropriate, ex-RPF for demobilization and integration into the Rwandan economy. At the same time, we should press the GOR to accelerate and expand its program of integrating elements of the ex-FAR into the new GOR army. As a model, we should build on the example of UNAMIR's voluntary disarmament program in the former safe zone by encouraging the GOR to offer similar incentives (gendarme or other jobs) to ex-FAR outside the country. We must keep up the pressure on the GOR to encourage repatriation through broadening its political base and ending human rights abuses. We must press for full deployment of UNAMIR and human rights monitors.

Similarly, we must work with the donor community and IFI's to help get the GOR up and running so that it can afford to integrate or offer other carrots to the ex-FAR. To this end, we should press forward with the notion of a "Friends of Rwanda" group, composed of countries with a clear interest in the region (US, France, Belgium, UK, Germany, and possibly Japan given its proposed deployment to the region).

Peeling the Onion: Summary of Next Steps

- We should be supportive of the Khan mission's recommendations to send an experts' committee to Zaire to assess sites, study logistics, and examine the cost of relocating and setting up new camps.

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- We should try to influence the committee's report so that the relocation site(s) selected is/are away from the border and other refugees but not deep in the interior. Too far of a move might make reintegration of ex-FAR elements back into Rwanda more difficult and would increase costs and present greater logistical difficulties

- Once the requirements are known, we should be prepared to contribute non-DoD resources (financial, logistical, transport) to assist the UN effort move the ex-FAR

- At the same time, we should press the UN (either Khan, Dillon or SYGSR to Zaire Brahimi) to engage the ex-FAR leadership to determine if the troops would relocate voluntarily. The UN mission would also emphasize the steps the international community is taking to press the new authorities in Kigali to press forward with a serious plan for repatriation/reintegration.

- Assuming the ex-FAR agrees to a voluntary move, we should seriously consider extending UNAMIR's mandate and AOR to cover the refugee camps. This would involve blue berets in the voluntary relocation effort, but would also involve an expanded UNAMIR in an active role to assure security in the camps. With the addition of the Indian battalion, UNAMIR now has troop commitments well in excess of its 5500 ceiling; the "excess" could be deployed in the camps.

- If the ex-FAR does not agree to relocate, we should explore immediately with other UNSC members the viability of Khan's recommendation that a Chapter VII UN operation undertake the task.

- We should use the "Friends of Rwanda" framework to examine incentives (primarily financial) which the international community could offer the ex-FAR to disarm, don civilian clothing, and relocate voluntarily.

- At the same time, we should continue to look for countries willing to provide or assist the GOZ/GOT in providing security on a bilateral basis.

- We might also pursue the option of a regional security effort (the immediate neighbors/the Great Lakes States organization), with OAU/UN blessing, which would provide security in the camps and might even escort volunteer refugees back and provide temporary security in Rwanda. This latter aspect (an idea floated by Tanzania) faces obvious problems (e.g., the need for GOR agreement, the need for donor financing) and assumes that, absent intimidation in the camps, a large numbers of refugees would be willing to return to Rwanda, which is a doubtful assumption at this time.

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IO/UNP:GStanton
PRM:MMcKelvey
P:LBassett
G:AJoyce
OFDA/BHR:RTooley
OSD/ISA/ME:MBittrick
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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DTG:** 160411Z SEP 94

FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4126

RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0120
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 3197
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUTAKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 3892
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0164
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7560
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0104
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 006977

GENEVA FOR RMA

KIGALI FOR DAS BUSHNELL

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, CG, TZ, UNAMIR, PREF, OAU, ET
SUBJECT: OAU THOUGHTS ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS

REF: STATE 245725

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM TOLD AF/DAS BUSHNELL HE BELIEVES ZAIRE AND TANZANIA SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY (AND ASSISTANCE) TO DISARM AND RELOCATE EX-FAR, AND CIVILIAN FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THE MILITIA. SALIM BELIEVES THIRD COUNTRY FORCES MIGHT THEN BE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE CAMPS, PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE. SALIM IS ENGAGED ON BURUNDI AND WILL VISIT BUJUMBURA FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH, OR SOONER IF EVENTS REQUIRE.

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END SUMMARY.

ZAIRE AND TANZANIA SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SECURITY

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3. OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM MET WITH VISITING AF/DAS PRUDENCE BUSHNELL ON 15 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN BURUNDI. BUSHNELL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AF/RA SCOTT FISHER AND ADDIS P/E CHIEF. BUSHNELL REVIEWED THE SIX OPTIONS (LISTED REFTEL) AND ASKED SALIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE MECHANISM TO ENSURE SECURITY FOR THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. SALIM INITIALLY SAID HE FAVORED AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR, BUT ADDED THAT ZAIRE WOULD LIKELY RESIST THIS OPTION. HE REJECTED THE NOTION OF CONTRACT SECURITY. SALIM BELIEVES THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR THE CAMPS WITHIN ITS TERRITORY, PROVIDING TANZANIA IS GIVEN ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE TASK. THE ISSUE IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WITH ZAIRE, SALIM NOTED. HE RECOUNTED A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ZAIRE'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, KAMANDA WA KAMANDA, IN WHICH SALIM WAS ASSURED THAT ZAIRE'S ARMY IS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. SALIM THOUGHT KAMANDA SINCERE IN HIS OFFER, BUT DOUBTED THAT ANYONE IN ZAIRE HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE ARMY TO MAINTAIN CAMP SECURITY OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. SALIM SAID IT IS POSSIBLE THE FAZ MIGHT BE ABLE TO DISARM AND HELP RELOCATE THE EX-FAR AND MILITIA, BUT THAT THIRD COUNTRY FORCES WOULD LIKELY BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AFTER THE INITIAL PHASE.

SENEGAL, MAURITIUS AND TUNISIA MIGHT BE APPROACHED

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4. ASKED WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT BE CALLED ON FOR THIS LATTER TASK, SALIM MENTIONED SENEGAL, MAURITIUS, AND TUNISIA AS FRANCOPHONE STATES WHICH MIGHT BE BOTH WILLING AND ACCEPTABLE TO MOBUTU. SALIM HIGHLIGHTED THE PROFESSIONAL AND IMPARTIAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE SENEGALESE FORCES IN RWANDA. THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL ADVISED AGAINST USING TROOPS FROM THE GAMBIA OR THE CAR, CITING MOBUTU'S LIKELY SENSITIVITY ABOUT RECEIVING HELP FROM "THESE SMALL NEIGHBORING STATES." SALIM ALSO NOTED THAT, WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TANZANIA COULD, WITH ADEQUATE SUPPORT, PERFORM BOTH FORCE SEPARATION AND POLICING, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO SUGGEST A THIRD COUNTRY PRESENCE IN TANZANIA AS WELL TO AVOID OFFENDING MOBUTU.

SALIM AND OAU STILL ENGAGED ON BURUNDI

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5. TURNING TO BURUNDI, SALIM ASSURED BUSHNELL THAT HE AND THE OAU REMAIN DEEPLY ENGAGED. SALIM PLANS TO VISIT BUJUMBURA LATER THIS MONTH, FOLLOWING A TRIP TO NEW YORK. SALIM
PLEDGED TO TRAVEL TO BURUNDI EARLIER IF
THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL SWEARING-IN OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. SALIM REMAINS HOPEFUL THAT A PEACEFUL

GENEVA FOR RMA

KIGALI FOR DAS BUSHNELL

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, RW, CG, TZ, UNAMIR, PREF, OAU, ET
SUBJECT: OAU THOUGHTS ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDAN
REFUGEE CAMPS

SOLUTION TO BURUNDI IS STILL POSSIBLE BUT THAT "THE CAPACITY FOR NUISANCE" IS STILL REMARKABLE ON BOTH SIDES. HE BELIEVES THE MAINSTREAM OF HUTUS AND TUTSIS STILL WANT AN AGREEMENT. SALIM CONFIRMED THE IMMINENT DISPATCH OF TEN ADDITIONAL (GUINEAN) OAU MILITARY OBSERVERS TO BURUNDI.

6. DAS BUSHNELL DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM ADDIS.

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WALKER
BT
#6977

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>6977
<^TOR>940916002719 M1255509
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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FROM:
SITREPRT

RICE

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 9/20

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake seeking your approval to withdraw the 674 remaining U.S. military personnel from the Rwanda Crisis Area by September 30. Three of the four specific UNHCR missions which were being supported by the U.S. military centered in Goma have been completed and responsibility for ongoing management has been transferred to UNHCR and NGO relief efforts. The remaining mission -- airhead management in Entebbe and Kigali -- will be completed and transferred to UNHCR by September 28. The U.S. will continue to supply airlift support on a case by case basis. State/AID have no objection to his withdrawal schedule.

[✓] Approve [ ] Discuss

John Podesta

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INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EB-01	OIGO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00
	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRM-10	PRME-01
	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/051R			

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AF/C:RFENDRICK P:LBASSETT
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PRM/AAA:MMCKELVEY IO/UNP:GSTANTON
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 255283

FOR DAS BUSHNELL AND PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, RW
SUBJECT: POINTS FOR MEETING WITH GOR ON REPORTS OF RPF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

REF: STATE 254232

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL REPORTED UNHCR INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT OF SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS BY THE RPF AND INDICATED THAT POINTS FOR MEETING BETWEEN U/S WIRTH, DAS BUSHNELL, AND AMB. RAWSON FOR USE WITH GOR WOULD FOLLOW SEPTEL. AS FURTHER BACKGROUND TO UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH GOR, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UN IS NOT SIMPLY ASSUMING THESE REPORTS ARE TRUE OR TAKING A HOSTILE APPROACH WITH THE GOR; RATHER, AT THIS POINT, THE UN IS REPORTING WHAT ITS INVESTIGATOR BELIEVES HAS HAPPENED AND IS SEEKING TO DETERMINE HOW THE GOR INTENDS TO RESPOND. THE U.S. AND UN POSITIONS ARE VERY CLOSE, AND WE SHOULD TAKE THE SAME APPROACH. THE ANNAN AND WIRTH/BUSHNELL MEETINGS WITH KAGAME LET THE GOR KNOW THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THE REPORTS AND GIVES THE GOVERNMENT THE CHANCE TO RESPOND.

3. FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE USED IN MEETINGS WITH THE GOR:

— WE UNDERSTAND THAT A UNHCR INVESTIGATIVE TEAM HAS REPORTED WIDESPREAD AND SYSTEMATIC KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY RPF SOLDIERS OVER THE PAST WEEKS AND MONTHS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE UN HAS BROUGHT THESE REPORTS TO YOUR ATTENTION.

— WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THESE REPORTS AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE. WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT DONE AND WHAT WILL IT DO TO LOOK INTO THESE REPORTS AND ADDRESS THEM AND THE UNDERSTANABLE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?

— WE URGE YOU TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO HALT ANY AND ALL ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, TO ENSURE COMPLETE DISCIPLINE OF ALL GOVERNMENT TROOPS, TO INVESTIGATE THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND TO SEE THAT THOSE WHO

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DIRECTED, LED, OR COMMITTED THE ATTACKS ARE PUNISHED.

— WE ALSO URGE YOU TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UN, UNHCR, UNAMIR, AND THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS AND UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORT TO END HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN RWANDA, BRING PROTECTION TO RWANDAN CIVILIANS, AND BRING PERPETRATORS OF ATROCITIES TO JUSTICE.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5856
INFO: ////
SUBJ: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER
TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003

DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE

E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER

REF: 118190

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL:~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: WITH THE OPENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHERE PEACEKEEPING REFORM ISSUES WILL BE A KEY USG PRIORITY, USUN HAS PREPARED AN INITIAL STATUS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE (PDD) 25 "US POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS", SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT MAY

3. IMPORTANT STEPS, AND SOME NOTABLE PROGRESS, HAVE OCCURED, INCLUDING: ADOPTION OF PDD FACTORS TO GUIDE APPROVAL OF PEACEKEEPING (PKO) MANDATES; IMPROVED COORDINATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD OPERATIONS; LAUNCHING OF THE CAMPAIGN TO REDUCE OUR PKO DUES TO 25
; ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INDEPENDENT OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES (INSPECTOR GENERAL FUNCTION); AND A MAJOR DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) STUDY ON UN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION NEEDS HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT WILL HELP ADDRESS THE PEACEKEEPING INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITMENTS IN THE PDD.

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3. WHILE WORK CONTINUES ON RESTRUCTURING THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO), WHICH WILL BENEFIT FROM THE DISA STUDY, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSISTING DPKO CAPACITY-BUILDING IN SUCH AREAS AS: CORE STAFFING; PKO TRAINING; CIVILIAN POLICE; PKO COORDINATION WITH DHA;COST CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL; AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND READINESS. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION'S INITIAL REVIEW OF PDD IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY, OTHER REPORTS WILL FOLLOW PERIODICALLY. END SUMMARY.

4. INTRODUCTION

WITH THE SIGNING OF THE PDD 25 ON PEACEKEEPING MAY 3 THE UNITED STATES ESTABLISHED A COHERENT FRAMEWORK FOR US ACTIONS TO PROMOTE STRENGTHENED UN CAPACITY TO MANAGE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND TO CLARIFY AND IMPROVE US PARTICIPATION. SECTIONS I - IV OF THE PDD RELATE, IN LARGE PART, TO THE UN SPHERE, BOTH SECURITY COUNCIL AND SECRETARIAT. SECTIONS V - VII INVOLVE US COMMAND (C2), INTER-AGENCY, AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. WHILE LARGELY WASHINGTON ISSUES, USUN HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ASPECTS OF THE LATTER, SUCH AS THE PEACEKEEPER PROTECTION ISSUE. SINCE EARLY MAY, THE MISSION HAS UNDERTAKEN A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE PDD PROPOSALS IN THOSE AREAS (CHIEFLY I - IV) WHERE USUN PLAYS A LEAD OR SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTING ROLE.

5. SUPPORTING THE RIGHT OPERATIONS (PDD SECTION I AND ANNEX I)

ON MAY 3 THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON PEACEKEEPING INCORPORATING THE "FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN VOTING ON UN PEACE OPERATIONS RESOLUTIONS" FOUND IN ANNEX I OF THE PDD. MANY OF THESE HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS THE EXERCISE ATTACHED MORE WEIGHT TO SOME - SUCH AS AVAILABLE MEANS, AND ESTIMATED TIME FRAME - AND THE WHOLE COMPOSITE HAS NEW WEIGHT AS A RESULT OF HAVING BEEN CODIFIED. THIS HAS RESULTED IN MORE RIGOROUS CONSIDERATION OF PKO PROPOSALS, AS SEEN IN THE CASES OF RWANDA, A PROPOSED "PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT" IN ZAIRE, GEORGIA, AND THE PROPOSED NEW MISSION IN ANGOLA.

6. STRENGTHENING THE UN - - DPKO REORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION (PDD SECTION IX)

ONE GOAL OF THE PDD IS TO ASSIST THE UN TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY ITS CAPABILITY TO MANAGE PEACE OPERATIONS EFFECTIVELY AND AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THE UN HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. FIRST, THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO), HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDED AND REORGANIZED TO BETTER INTEGRATE MOST MAJOR COMPONENTS OF PEACEKEEPING PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT. A POLICY AND
ANALYSIS UNIT HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE USYG'S OFFICE, AND

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TWO LARGE FUNCTIONAL OFFICES, FOR PLANNING AND SUPPORT, AND FOR OPERATIONS, HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE FIRST COMPRISES MISSION PLANNING, DE-MINING, TRAINING, AND CIVILIAN POLICE, FIELD ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, COMMUNICATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE. IN ADDITION TO THE REGIONAL OFFICES FOR EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA, ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA, THE OPERATIONS OFFICE

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DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE

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SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER

ALSO NOW INCLUDES AN ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION.

7. TO HELP THE UN BUILD UP CRITICAL KNOW-HOW AT HEADQUARTERS THE US HAS LOANED MILITARY PERSONNEL TO FILL GAPS IN MISSION PLANNING AND ELSEWHERE. IMPORTANTLY, ALL MILITARY SECONDMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN STABILIZED AS LONGER TERM ASSIGNMENTS. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, THIS WEEK AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH MET WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL RIZA TO DISCUSS LONGTERM SECONDMENTS OF US STATE DEPARTMENT, USIA AND OTHER EXPERTS TO THE OFFICE OF PLANNING AND SUPPORT. UN NEEDS ARE BEING IDENTIFIED FOR WHICH USG SECONDMENTS WOULD BE USEFUL, INCLUDING IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT. IN PARALLEL WITH THIS, THE INTER-AGENCY COMMUNITY IS DEVELOPING A LIST OF CIVILIAN AND POSSIBLY ADDITIONAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY BE OFFERED TO THE UN.

8. STRENGTHENING THE UN - - DISA STUDY (PDD SECTION IX)

ANOTHER GOAL OF THE PDD IS IMPROVING UN CAPACITY TO DEPLOY PKOS FASTER AND DIRECT DAY-TO-DAY FIELD OPERATIONS BETTER. LAST SPRING, DEFENSE SECRETARY PERRY OFFERED TO USYG FOR PEACEKEEPING KOFI ANNAN AN EXAMINATION OF DPKO'S CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND NEEDS. THIS STUDY, CARRIED OUT BY THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) WILL PRODUCE A REPORT SHORTLY THAT ADDRESSES: DPKO'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE; PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS, AND DESIRABILITY OF A NEW "TURN-KEY OPERATION"; HOW TO ACHIEVE A MODERN C3 CAPACITY, BUILDING ON THE EXISTING DPKO SITUATION ROOM; A COMPUTER NETWORK LINKING DPKO WITH A SINGLE LOGISTICS OFFICE IN EACH MEMBER STATE; WAYS TO ASSIST IN DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING A DATA BASE OF PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FROM MEMBER STATES FOR THE FULL RANGE OF PKO AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, AND OTHER AREAS. BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS REPORT, USUN INTENDS TO PROPOSE THAT WE ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL DONOR COUNTRIES TO HELP CARRY OUT THE MEASURES IDENTIFIED TO IMPROVE DPKO CAPACITY.

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9. STRENGTHENING THE UN - - CAPACITY-BUILDING (PDD SECTION IX)

CAPACITY-BUILDING EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS INCLUDE: (A) STANDBY CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE: A POSITIVE US RESPONSE TO THE UN'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES WE MAY OFFER FOR PKOS IS IMMINENT. IN THE UN'S VIEW, OUR RESPONSE WILL HAVE MAJOR PRACTICAL AND SYMBOLIC BENEFITS FOR THEIR MISSION PLANNING EFFORTS; (B) TRAINING: DOD IS CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO HELP SUPPORT PKO TRAINING CORRESPONDENCE COURSES; MISSION IS REVIEWING PROPOSALS BY THE STIMSON CENTER FOR UN TRAINING COORDINATION WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN THE 49TH UNGA; (C) INTELLIGENCE: USG INFORMATION SHARING NOW INCLUDES A REGULAR FLOW OF SANITIZED INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT PKOS IN SOMALIA, RWANDA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. PROCEDURES ARE ALSO IN PLACE FOR FAST RESPONSES TO AD HOC REQUESTS FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING INFORMATION FOR NEW OPERATIONS, TACTICAL MILITARY INFORMATION BEARING ON THE SAFETY OF PEACEKEEPERS IN SOMALIA AND BOSNIA, INFORMATION ON THE SIZE AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION OF REFUGEE FLOWS, AND OTHER CRITICAL NEEDS. RECENTLY THE US ALSO PASSED SANITIZED VERSIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND POPULATION TO INTERESTED UN PARTIES AND MEMBER STATES (THE FORMER JUST IN TIME FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE); (D) CIVILIAN POLICE: OVER THE SUMMER USUN LED A NEEDS ASSESSMENT EFFORT WITH A GROUP OF MEMBER STATES AND A DRAFT REPORT CONTAINING RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE PRESENTED SHORTLY; (E) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: GOALS INCLUDE A DEDICATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE
WITHIN DPKO, ASSURING STRONG PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MOST PKO MISSIONS, AND PROMOTING GUIDELINES FOR TRAINING DPKO OVERSEAS SPOKESMEN A GROUP OF USG EXPERTS WILL DO A NEEDS ASSESSMENT THIS MONTH, AFTER WHICH THE MISSION WILL SEEK TO ELICIT THE SUPPORT OF OTHER UN MEMBERS; (F) CIVILIAN RESERVE: AN EFFORT IS NOW UNDERWAY TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE US SOURCES FOR SKILLED PERSONNEL WILLING TO MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE FOR NON-MILITARY PKO OR HUMANITARIAN ASSIGNMENTS; MISSION IS ALSO SEEKING GUIDANCE FROM DPKO ON THE TYPE OF CIVILIAN RESERVE THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.

10. STRENGTHENING THE UN - EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (PDD SECTION IX)

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DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
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THE NEED FOR GREATER COORDINATION BETWEEN UN PKO AND

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HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANS AND ACTIVITIES WAS HIGHLIGHTED IN JUNE BY AID ADMINISTRATOR ATWOOD'S SPEECH TO THE HIGH LEVEL SESSION OF ECOSOC ON A "DIPLOMACY OF CRISIS PREVENTION". TO PROMOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NUMBER OF PDD PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA, NEWLY APPOINTED USYG FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (DHA) PETER HANSEN IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH USUN ON THE PANOPLY OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. THIS HAS STIMULATED AN INTENSIFICATION OF DPKO-DHA COORDINATION EFFORTS IN RECENT MONTHS: (A) THE HUMANITARIAN LIAISON WORKING GROUP IS NOW FUNCTIONING AS AN INFORMAL DONOR'S OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, A RECENT USUN INITIATIVE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THIS ROLE; (B) A CRISIS-NEEDS TRACKING SYSTEM WAS DESIGNED WITH OFDA ASSISTANCE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (DHA) IS SEEKING JOINT US-JAPANESE FUNDING TO IMPLEMENT IT; (C) DHA AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE WORKING JOINTLY ON PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF USG EMPLOYEES TO MEET BOTH SURGE AND LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS; (D) USYG HANSEN, WITH MISSION SUPPORT, IS VIGOROUSLY PURSUING IMPROVED HEADQUARTERS AND FIE,D COORDINATION WITH SOME EARLY SUCCESS, INCLUDING IN RWANDA-BURUNDI. HOWEVER, AGENCY RESISTANCE CONTINUES IN THE FIELD. PARTLY TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN THE CASE OF RWANDA-BURUNDI, THE SYG APPOINTED A HUMANITARIAN ENVOY (FORMER US AMBASSADOR DILLON) TO OVERSEE AND TIGHTEN UN AGENCY, NGO AND DONOR COOPERATION, ANTICIPATE FUTURE PROBLEMS AND DEVISE A REGIONAL APPROACH.

11. REDUCING UN COSTS: FINANCE, BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS (PDD SECTION IX AND ANNEX III)

IN JULY, EFFORTS TO PERSUADE MEMBER STATES OF THE NECESSITY FOR BETTER UN FISCAL AND MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT PAID OFF WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES AND THE SYG'S SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF A WELL QUALIFIED GERMAN NATIONAL, KARL THEODOR PASCHKE, TO THE POST. APPOINTMENT OF PASCHKE, A UN SYSTEM OUTSIDER, IS A VICTORY FOR THE PDD'S INJUNCTION THAT A SERIOUS, INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE INSTRUMENT SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE. THE NEXT STEP WILL BE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE OFFICE'S IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AND THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THE POST.

12. A MAJOR EFFORT IS ALSO UNDERWAY TO SEEK THE INGREDIENTS OF A POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR REDUCING OUR PKO DUES FROM 31.7
TO 25
. LAST SPRING THE SYG
DISPATCHED A DELEGATION TO URGE WEALTHIER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PAY PKO DUES MORE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR CAPACITY TO PAY. ONLY CYPRUS HAS RESPONDED POSITIVELY. THE SYG ALSO CONVENED A "GROUP OF FRIENDS" (F-16) TO LOOK INTO THE ISSUE AND RELATED MATTERS. ITS REPORT SUGGESTED WELCOME CORRECTIONS IN ASSESSMENT RATES BUT DID NOT PROPOSE LOWERING US DUES TO 25
. . OUR G-7
PARTNERS ARE SYMPATHETIC BUT, EXCEPT FOR JAPAN,

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RELUCTANT TO ABSORB THE RESULTING INCREASE TO THEM. SUCCESS WILL REQUIRE STRONG PRESSURE IN CAPITALS IN ORDER TO GAIN THE NECESSARY UNGA MAJORITY. A STRATEGY TOWARD THAT END IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT IN WASHINGTON. IN THE MEANTIME MISSION WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CASE THAT 31.7
IS TOO HIGH FOR THE HEALTH OF THE UN OR FAIRNESS TO THE US TAXPAYER.

13. TO ADDRESS THE UN'S INEFFICIENCIES IN PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED AREAS, THE USG SENT A COST-CONTAINMENT TEAM TO NEW YORK WHICH HAS ALREADY PROPOSED SEVERAL COST-SAVING POLICY CHANGES AND IS CONSULTING WITH UN OFFICIALS ON IMPLEMENTATION. THE US HAS ALSO BEEN RECRUITING USG EXPERTS TO REVIEW UN FIELD OPERATIONS AND MAKE FURTHER PROPOSALS. ADDITIONALLY, A PROCUREMENT STUDY HAS BEEN COMPLETED BY A FORMER OMB OFFICIAL WITH EXTENSIVE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROCUREMENT EXPERIENCE AND HAS RESULTED IN SEVERAL PROPOSED CHANGES IN THIS AREA AS WELL. FINALLY, THE US IS HELPING THE UN STREAMLINE THE PKO BUDGET PREPARATION PROCESS.

14. PROTECTION OF PEACEKEEPERS (PDD SECTION IX)

ON PEACEKEEPER PROTECTIONS, THE USUN LEGAL DEPARTMENT HAS ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY THAT WOULD PROVIDE SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND LEGAL SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS SERVING IN PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS UNDER A UN MANDATE. IT WOULD MAKE ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS A CRIME WITH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION WITH STATES OBLIGATED TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE THOSE ACCUSED. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT DIFFICULT ISSUES OF SCOPE REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED.
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 004003

DEPARTMENT FOR IO/PHO
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 (JASON BARLOW)
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR SUSAN RICE

E.0.12356:DCL:12/31/95
TAGS: UNSC, PREL, MARR, PINS, PREF, EAID,
SUBJECT: PDD 25 USUN IMPLEMENTATION 130 DAYS LATER

15. CONCLUSION - - PROGRESS MADE, MORE NEEDED

IN EVERY IMPORTANT AREA OF THE PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM, PROGRESS HAS BEGUN, AND SOME OF IT - SUCH AS DPKO REORGANIZATION AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL-TYPE FUNCTION - IS VERY SIGNIFICANT. WE EXPECT TO OFFER US INITIATIVES IN SEVERAL KEY AREAS OF CAPACITY-BUILDING THIS FALL. YET PRESENT PROGRESS IS OVERSHADOWED BY THE ENORMITY OF CHANGES THAT LIE AHEAD IF THE UN IS TO DEVELOP THE PHYSICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT DEPTH, ORGANIZATIONAL KNOW-HOW AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES AND FUNDING TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO THE DEMANDS OF MEMBER STATES. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO THE GOAL IS ESSENTIAL TO GENERATE AND

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MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AS WELL AS THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF MEMBER STATES.
ALBRIGHT
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#4003

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DIST:
SIT: NSC RICE VAX
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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**281229Z SEP 94

FM: AMEMBASSY KIGALI

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0087

////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KIGALI 001642

FOR UNDER SECRETARY WIRTH FROM AMBASSADOR

ALSO FOR AF AND AF/C

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF: NEXT STEPS

1. INFORMED BY EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST DAYS WITH DAS BUSHNELL AND YOURSELF, I OFFER BELOW A VISION OF WHAT WE MIGHT QUICKLY DO IN RWANDA. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE GOALS OF BRINGING ALL RWANDANS BACK HOME, ESTABLISHING SECURITY AND JUSTICE, RESTORING GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE THAT HAS TRAUMATIZED THIS REGION; THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER REAFFIRMED THOSE PRINCIPLES YESTERDAY. BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL FAIL UNLESS WE HELP IT ACHIEVE ITS LAUDABLE OBJECTIVES. OUR HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS AND COMMITMENT TO JUSTICE CAUSE US TO ENGAGE IN ASSISTING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ESPECIALLY IN THESE DIFFICULT START-UP DAYS.

2. TWO FACTORS CHALLENGE AN OPTIMISTIC VISION OF RWANDA'S FUTURE: THE GERSONY INVESTIGATION, ADDING MORE WEIGHT TO SUSPICIONS OF RPA ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND, THE RESTIVENESS OF HUTU ARMY AND MILITIA ON RWANDA'S BORDERS. BOTH FACTORS SHOULD HASTEN OUR ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN DETER IT. WE CAN SAVE RWANDAN LIVES BY HELPING THE GOVERNMENT BRING TO JUSTICE OUTLAWS WHO ARE KILLING PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH EAST. WE CAN BRING STABILITY BACK TO THE REGION BY GIVING RWANDAN REFUGEES THE SECURE RIGHT TO RETURN HOME SHOULD THEY CHOOSE. I SEE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE HELP IN TWO AREAS – JUSTICE AND

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2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

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RESETTLEMENT; AND, MEDIUM-TERM ASSISTANCE IN AN ADDITIONAL THREE – GOVERNMENT REFORM, POPULATION AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. ACTIONS WE COULD UNDERTAKE IN THESE AREAS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A: JUSTICE:

1. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL: SUPPORT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS' CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WITH IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

2. INVESTIGATIONS: RECRUIT FOLLOW-ON TEAM TO PURSUE INVESTIGATION OF GENOCIDE; EXTEND MCCABE'S TOUR AS REQUESTED BY HRC BILL CLARENCE.

3. MONITORS: RECRUIT EX-PEACE CORPS RWANDA VOLUNTEERS FOR UNV/HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER MONITOR POSITIONS.

4. NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: USE AVAILABLE GOVERNANCE (DIG OR GSA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT) FUNDS TO REHABILITATE COURTS, ESTABLISH RECORD SYSTEMS AND TRAIN JURISTS.

5. POLICE: SUPPORT U/S ANNAN'S REQUEST TO TRANSFER ICITAP POLICE TRAINING FROM SOMALIA TO RWANDA. (NAIROBI 17257) THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE TOLD ME THAT HE DESPERATELY NEEDS A FORCE TRAINED IN CIVILIAN POLICE FUNCTIONS.

6. JUSTICE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: FILL USIS PAO SLOT WITH TDY JUDICIAL EXPERT WHO WOULD DEVELOP CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND RULE OF LAW.

B: RESETTLEMENT: THE ONLY HUMANE FUTURE FOR DISPLACED AND RGFUGEE RWANDANS IS REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT ON THEIR OWN HILLSIDES OR WITHIN THEIR OWN TOWNSHIPS. ACTIONS TO THIS END INCLUDE:

1. ENHANCE REFUGEE CAMP SECURITY: FAR AND MILITIA MUST BE REMOVED FROM CAMPS AND REFUGEES GIVEN SECURITY TO DECIDE WHETHER TO RETURN HOME. THIS COULD REQUIRE TEMPORARY SECURITY MEASURES BY FRENCH FORCES IN GOMA OR A UNAMIR CONTINGENT IN NGARA AND GOMA.

2. BREAK UP BENACO CAMP. BENACO IS INCREASINGLY UNTENABLE FROM A SANITATION, WATER AND HEALTH POINT OF VIEW, NOT TO MENTION THE AUGMENTED FAR MILITARY PRESENCE THERE. THE CAMP SHOULD BE BROKEN UP AS A MATTER OF FIRST PRIORITY; WE MUST ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR, NGO'S AND MONITORS TO RWANDA'S SOUTHEAST TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE BULK OF REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME.

3. REDUCE POPULATIONS IN ZONE 4. RAINS WILL MAKE MANY CAMPS AROUND GIKONGORO IN ZONE 4 INACCESSIBLE. DISPLACED WILL MOVE HOME HUNGRY, WET AND MISERABLE ON THEIR OWN, OR WITH SOME DIGNITY, ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY

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IF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELPS THEM. UN ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD
SPEED UP PROCESS OF TRANSPORTING DISPLACED BACK EAST; FUNDING FOR NGO'S SHOULD FOCUS ON RESETTLEMENT SUPPORT PACKAGES FOR BUTARE, GITARAMA AND EAST.

4. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESETTLEMENT. IF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IS TO KEEP ITS PLEDGE TO RETURN HOMES AND LANDS TO RIGHTFUL OWNERS, IT WILL NEED TECHNICAL HELP WITH ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT COMMISSION TO RESOLVE SUCH ISSUES AS LAND TENURE,

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND SURVEY. (LAND TENURE CENTER AT U. OF WISCONSIN MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP; WE MIGHT CONSIDER A HOUSING PROGRAM UNDER RHUDO).

C. GOVERNMENT REFORM. NOW THAT WE ARE STARTING WITH CARTE BLANCHE, WE MIGHT MORE READILY THAN BEFORE HELP INTRODUCE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY INTO GOVERNMENT PRACTICE. OUR GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC REFORM (BUD/SER) PACKAGE MIGHT WORK WITH THIS NEW TEAM. I RECOMMEND THAT:

1. WE REVISIT THE ELEMENTS OF THE BUD/SER PACKAGE PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND CHECK OUT ITS APPLICABILITY WITH THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION.

2. IF THIS ADMINISTRATION CAN ACCEPT THE REFORM CONDITIONALITIES OF THAT PACKAGE, WE USE BUD/SER AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL BUDGET IN THE FORM OF $2 MILLION CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD BANK ARREARAGES.

D. POPULATION. WE CANNOT BE SERIOUS ABOUT HUMANITARIAN OR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA UNLESS WE ADDRESS POPULATION ISSUES. WE SHOULD:

1. EXPAND TO CAMPS IN ZAIRE THE MODEL PSI/CARE AIDS PROGRAM BEING CARRIED OUT WITH AID (AIDSCAP) FUNDING IN BENACO CAMP.

2. REVIEW WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, ESPECIALLY WITH THE MINISTER OF HEALTH WHO IS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT POPULATION PROGRAMS, THE GOALS OF OUR RWANDA INTEGRATED MATERNAL/CHILD HEALTH (RIMS) PROJECT AND TAILOR THAT PROJECT TO RWANDA'S NEW NEEDS.

E. ENVIRONMENT. RWANDA HAS A PRECIOUS BUT ENDANGERED BIOLOGICAL HERITAGE (INCLUDING ITS OWN PEOPLE) BUT LACKS THE RESOURCES AND SKILLS TO PRESERVE IT. WE SHOULD:

1. SUPPORT DEMINING TRAINING FOR RWANDAN SECURITY FORCES AND EOD/MINES EDUCATION FOR SCHOOLS.

2. CONCERT WITH SWISS TO REVIVE SPECIES PROTECTION, PUBLIC EDUCATION AND ECO-TOURISM OF NYUNGWE FOREST.

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cc: Dick Clarke

United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520-7250

October 3, 1994

Rwanda

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY

FROM: Timothy E. Wirth TEW

SUBJECT: Rwanda and Burundi

I have just returned from a week in these small, poor and desperately over-populated countries -- a fitting climax to a month that began with the United Nations Population Conference in Cairo.

1. Rwanda - Impressions: From the air, the rich volcanic hills of Rwanda could well be China, as they are terraced right to the peak of the mountains. The mountain gorillas, like China's panda bears, are a remaining symbol of a broadly devastated environment. And wherever you find adults you find more children.

In Kigali, a stalwart U.S. mission lives with remarkable good cheer: the USIA library is a bunk room; the residence is unlivable, and the Ambassador stays in the DCM's house, where nearly every window is broken, the jagged broken glass is still in the window frames, and pieces of shrapnel are lodged in the porch furniture. But the hot water works; across the street, UNAMIR soldiers are bathing in a pan of cold water (the power is on occasionally) and most have been on hard rations for three months (mobile refrigeration units that would allow a varying of the menu have been sitting in Antwerp for weeks awaiting UN approval to be flown south). On the streets every fourth house appears to be destroyed, a pattern repeated in village after village. Burned out cars, now stripped of everything, litter nearly every street; in the country, the roads are completely empty except for the occasional long UN convoy.

Flying into Goma, the eye quickly picks out the bright blue sheets of plastic, distributed by UNHCR, and the sign of another sprawling refugee camp. In these, the ever-present Toyota Land Cruisers carry the competent and dedicated government and non-government officials in their tasks of trying to create a little order or hope for the hundreds of thousands. All watch the clock carefully, and get out of the camps or off the roads before dark, when danger and violence replace the apparent order of the day. And again, there are children everywhere -- and all expect that if the camps are still open, an explosion of the camp populations will begin in seven months (nine months

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after the camps were established). AIDS is reportedly devastating the camps, with so many unaccompanied women and mothers victims of the violence of the night.

Two hours drive from the capital, we visited two rural Catholic churches. In one, the front door was broken in, hundreds of people had been slaughtered, the ceiling was pock-marked with grenade fragments, and large pools of dried blood caked the pews. In the other, the bodies had not yet been cleaned up, and corpses, many completely decapitated, were strewn around the church amid clothing, shoes, and bibles. The stench of rotting bodies, and the pile of corpses next to the altar, on which lay a broken crucifix, reminded of the horrors of the April massacres.

Vast sections of this intensely cultivated country, with huts every few yards, are eerily empty, because so many people have left. Crops sit in so many fields, and the rainy season is underway. Planting should soon be starting, and one can't help but think that the huge relief operations will have to be around next year as well, attempting to avert starvation in the camps or among those who have returned home to uncultivated fields. (Before the war, Rwanda was largely food self-sufficient).

Will the empty countryside fill up? Probably, but exactly how is perhaps the most problematic issue in this turbulent land. The government Army (RPA) is led by Tutsi officers who have been in exile in Uganda, and who came South when their guerilla campaign began in the early 1990's. Now they are being joined by others, returning to their homeland from Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire as well as Uganda. Whose houses are they living in and whose fields are they tilling? If the majority Hutu population returns, will they find their houses occupied and land taken -- the country has no extra land anywhere. Long term, when the population doubles in the next twenty years, where will all these people go? Can the poverty get even worse, as more people share the limited economic pie?

2. <u>What are we doing in Rwanda</u>? How do we explain to the American taxpayer that to date we have spent nearly $500 million in refugee assistance, in a country of unexplained and inexplicable violence, where we have no apparent strategic or economic interests, and where the prospects for the short term and the long term are dim at best? How long can the enormous political, financial and organizational effort be maintained? And won't this little country on the other side of the globe get crowded out of the public attention span, despite the horrors of its genocide?

These cold questions have to be addressed, even if answers aren't obvious or even possible. We have to have some definition of our mission, of the possible endgames, and of the costs. Undoubtedly there will be other Rwandas in our future, and while we struggle to make sense of our current operations

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in Rwanda, we must also work to learn from our experience so we can better understand and predict future challenges.

3. Rwanda -- Next Steps

The Rwandan conflict is not over. Two million refugees remain outside the country, elements of the ex-FAR are threatening to renew fighting, the ex-interim government leadership and much of the refugee population consider the new government unacceptable, and an overall political settlement and national reconciliation are distant goals.

Under these circumstances, our first priority must be to ensure that fighting and widescale violence do not resume and that conditions are created, inside and outside Rwanda, that will lead to a lessening of tensions and a move to an overall settlement.

In line with this goal, we should focus our efforts on the following key near term goals designed to improve security in the subregion and create conditions inside Rwanda that will encourage refugee return:

- Improving Security/Confidence Inside Rwanda
  - -- Accelerated, full deployment of UNAMIR in all sectors
  - -- Accelerated deployment of human rights monitors
  - -- Expansion of NGO activities in the south and east
  - -- Foster a dialogue between the Kigali government and UNHCR

- Deterring a Resumption of Hostilities
  - -- Active pursuit of plans to move the FAR away from the refugees
  - -- Deployment of a UN force to provide security in Zaire refugee camps
  - -- Security assistance to Tanzanians
  - -- Break down large camps
  - -- UN monitoring of borders against incursion

- Removing the Bad Actors from the Scene
  - -- Expedited formation of a War Crimes tribunal/trials

- Improving Conditions Inside Rwanda
  - -- Assistance to get the Government functioning, restart judicial processes, and restore basic services
    - Pay off World Bank arrears to free up funds for GOR
    - Increase direct bilateral assistance
  - -- Assistance on resolving property disputes
  - -- Assistance to address demining, population pressures, and environmental issues
  - -- Pressure on the GOR to keep its commitment to follow the Arusha accord, with the possibility at some future point of renewed Arusha talks with "innocent" elements of the Hutu diaspora

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4. Burundi - an apparent contrast. The country next door seems peaceful by comparison. Markets are open, the airport operates, cars are on the streets, and a government of reconciliation will under present plans, come together within the next week. The President, a French-educated philosopher, speaks eloquently of the need to protect women, promote family planning, and maintain a vigorous dialogue with the West. The military leadership speak proudly of their recent human rights training in Geneva, and ask if they can have help from the U.S. in promoting broader understanding of human rights and relationships between military and civilian authorities. Can this be the same country where 100,000 people were slaughtered in a coup attempt last October, and where the tribal ratios are the same as in their deeply troubled neighbor? It was hard to remember that our security warned us away from the markets where two grenades had been exploded the previous week.

As one moves from Rwanda to Burundi, it becomes increasingly clear that the problems are regional (Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania) and common (refugees, military-civilian relations, human rights, economics, population and AIDS). Key areas to pursue for Burundi are:

- o A regional refugee conference
- o Improved civil-military relations
  - Human rights training for the military
  - Future regional conferences on civil-military relations
- o Economic/financial support and reform, through support to the World Bank/IMF Friends of Burundi donor group process
- o Action to counter hate radio broadcasts
- o Further family planning assistance

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PER E. O. 13526

2011-0263-M
8/19/15 KBH

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHCAA9485 2772307-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P R 042304Z OCT 94
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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0000
INFO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0000
SUBJ: A/S MOOSE MEETS WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN 9/27

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 269485

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, RW, SO
SUBJECT: A/S MOOSE MEETS WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN 9/27

1. SUMMARY. A/S MOOSE MET WITH USYG FOR PKO KOFI ANNAN ON THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA SEPTEMBER 27. ANNAN DESCRIBED HOW THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE RECENTLY RELEASED UNHRC REPORT LED TO THE FORMATION OF A JOINT UN-GOR INVESTIGATION AND TO A POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION OF UN OPERATIONS. HE PROMISED TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING UNAMIR DEPLOYMENT ISSUES WHEN KAHN RETURNS FROM PAKISTAN, AND AGREED THAT IF AN EXPANDED MANDATE BECAME NECESSARY, A CHAPTER 7 MANDATE WOULD NOT BE SOUGHT. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d [redacted] ON SOMALIA, ANNAN PROPOSED SETTING MARCH 1995 AS THE WITHDRAWAL DATE FOR UNOSOM-- A DATE THAT WOULD GIVE THE MILITARY UNITS TIME TO PREPARE AND ONE THAT WOULD LEVERAGE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS. END SUMMARY.

THE UNHRC REPORT

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2. ANNAN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER THE UNHRC REPORT ALLEGING RPA REPRISALS IN SOUTHEAST RWANDA. HE HAD HOPED TO USE THE REPORT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE

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DOCUMENT TO REORGANIZE UN OPERATIONS, BUT WORRIED THAT OVERREACTIONS BY SOME UN AGENCIES, NAMELY UNHCR, COULD UNDERMINE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE STRENGTH OF RWANDAN PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO THE REPORT'S FINDINGS, PARTICULARLY TWAGIRAMUNGU'S QUESTIONING OF THE METHODOLOGY USED. HE WAS REASSURED, HOWEVER, ONCE THE PM AGREED TO A JOINT UN-GOR INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS. WITH THE STAKES SO HIGH, ANNAN ADDED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS CONTINUE ITS WORK, WHILE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MISSION-- THE DEPLOYING UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND ADDITIONAL UNAMIR TROOPS-- QUICKLY BECOME FULLY OPERATIONAL.

UN CONSIDERS COMMAND RESTRUCTURING

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3. ANNAN SAID THAT MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS WILL BE REDUCED BY REORGANIZING COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES IN RWANDA. THE CAMBODIAN MODEL WILL BE USED AS A TEMPLATE. EACH ORGANIZATION WILL REMAIN IN CHARGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PORTFOLIOS, WHILE UNSYGSR KAHN WILL ACT AS THE SOLE COORDINATOR FOR UN OPERATIONS. INCIDENTS LIKE (b)(6) COMING IN WITHOUT KAHN'S KNOWLEDGE, SHOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. MOOSE AGREED THAT ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS WERE NECESSARY, AND SUGGESTED THAT A STRONG NUMBER 2 BE SOUGHT TO ASSIST KAHN.

4. ANNAN COMMENTED THAT THE REPATRIATION NUMBERS , NOW STABILIZED AT 100-200,000, SHOULD INCREASE AGAIN ONCE THE TUNISIAN AND INDIANS ARRIVE. HE ADMITTED PROBLEMS IN DEPLOYING FORCES, USING THE UN'S POOR RESPONSE TO THE ETHIOPIANS AS AN EXAMPLE (NOTE: EIGHTY PERCENT ARE STILL ON FOOT AND 700 REMAIN WITHOUT THE FLACKJACKETS PROMISED UPON THEIR ARRIVAL). MOOSE ASKED WHY THE DEPLOYMENT HAD TAKEN SO LONG, COMMENTING THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE TUNISIAN FORMIN THAT GOT WAS READY FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE UNDERSCORED THAT THE UN HAD NO CAPACITY TO RUN A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST, WITHOUT TUNISIAN TROOPS SUPPLEMENTING THE GHANAIANS. GENERAL BARIL EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE TUNISIAN DEPLOYMENT STEMMED FROM A COMBINATION OF ISSUES-- IDENTIFYING PROPER TRANSPORT, FAILURE TO PREPOSITION NECESSARY EQUIPMENT ON THE GROUND AND THE NEED TO REDEFINE THE TYPE OF ARMORED VEHICLES REQUIRED

FOR TROOP MOBILITY. ANNAN CONTINUED THAT MANY OF THESE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED SHORTLY AFTER KAHN'S RETURN FROM PAKISTAN THIS WEEK. MOOSE ASKED ANNAN TO ALSO CONSIDER WHETHER A "FRIENDS GROUP" IS NEEDED TO HELP RESOLVE THESE AND FUTURE ISSUES.

ADDRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS

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5. KAHN'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT SECURITY PROBLEMS EXTENDED BEYOND RWANDA AND ZAIRE TO BURUNDI AND TANZANIA. HE

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EXPRESSED HIS DILEMMA ABOUT WHAT TO DO WITH THE MILITIAS IF EXTRACTED FROM THE CAMPS AND HOW TO MAKE ZAIRIAN ROOPS, WHO HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN SECURITY OPERATIONS, PART OF THE SOLUTION AND NOT MORE OF THE PROBLEM. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR INTO ZAIRE WOULD NOT COMPLICATE ITS OPERATIONAL CHARACTER, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RECEIVING SUCH AN EXPANDED MANDATE FROM THE UNSC. HE ALSO QUESTIONED THE ABILITY OF UNAMIR TO DO THE JOB UNDER THE 5,500 CEILING. WHEN MOOSE RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD UNAMIR TO BE OVERSUBSCRIBED, ANNAN EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY BLIP AS TROOPS MOVE IN AND OUT. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT THE SECURITY VOID RESULTING FROM THE FRENCH DEPARTURE, ESPECIALLY AROUND GOMA AIRSTRIP, NEEDED SPECIAL ATTENTION. WITH THE JAPANESE PROVIDING ONLY MEDICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT UNAMIR CONSIDER IMMEDIATELY SUPPLANTING FRENCH TROOPS AFTER SEPTEMBER 30. MOOSE QUESTIONED THE NEED TO SEEK A CHAPTER 7 MANDATE TO PERFORM ITS NEW MISSION. ANNAN AGREED THAT THE PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS REQUIRED A STRATEGY THAT FOCUSSED ON BOTH POLITICAL ISSUES AND SECURITY.

RECONSTRUCTION/REHABILITATION

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6. ANNAN SAID THAT WHILE NGOS HAD BEEN MEETING THEIR OBJECTIVES, THE GOR LACKED THE MEANS TO ADDRESS THE IMMENSE INFRASTRUCTURAL NEEDS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN SOME NORTHERN AREAS AS MANY AS 80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE HAVE RETURNED YET THE GOR HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RESTART WATER AND ELECTRIC SERVICES. AGREEING THAT THE GOR HAD SERIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, MOOSE EXPLAINED THE DILEMMA WITH THE WORLD BANK'S SUSPENSION OF DOLLARS 250 MILLION IN PROJECTIZED FUNDS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDED TO DEVISE A WAY TO RESOLVE

THE ISSUE OF RWANDA'S DOLLARS 7 MILLION IN ARREARS, SO THAT THE BANK WOULD RELEASE THE FUNDS.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

SOMALIA

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7. ANNAN DESCRIBED HIS VISIT TO SOMALIA AND A PLAN OF ACTION WHICH CONCLUDED WITH UNOSOM'S WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF MARCH 1995. HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH REGIONAL LEADERS LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL TRY TO INSTALL AN INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BY THE END OF OCTOBER. THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ESTABLISH A POLICE FORCE WHOSE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE TO KEEP THE MILITIAS OFF THE STREETS. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

ANNAN ADDED THAT THE UN MIGHT TAKE THE "ANGOLAN APPROACH" BY FOCUSSING ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN SUSTAINING A PKO. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, MOOSE AND ANNAN WERE JOINED BY AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, NSC STAFF SUSAN RICE AND USUN STAFF MIKE SHEEHAN, WHO REITERATED THE USG VIEW THAT THE SOMALIA OPERATION SHOULD BE WOUND DOWN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#9485

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
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IO:GWARD

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DRL:JBURT-LYNN
PM:PSUTER
PRM:MMCKELVEY

USUN/W:DSCHEFFER
G:AJOYCE
AF/C:RFENDRICK
S/S: NSC:SRICE S/S-O:

IO,AF

PRIORITY KIGALI, USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY, OTTAWA PRIORITY

PRIORITY KINSHASA, DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY, BUJUMBURA, NAIROBI, GENEVA, UN SE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, BU, ZA, TZ

SUBJECT: GENERAL DALLAIRE BRIEFS DEPARTMENT ON RWANDA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FORMER UNAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE PREDICTS RENEWED WAR IN RWANDA. HE ADVOCATES EXPANSION OF UNAMIR'S MANDATE TO INCLUDE THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. UNAMIR SHOULD ENTER THE CAMPS AND ACTIVELY DISARM THE EX-FAR AND MILITIAS. HE SAID THE UN SHOULD MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION NEEDED TO GIVE UNAMIR EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY, AND PROVIDE UNAMIR WITH THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO BRING PEACE AND ATTRACT THE REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA.

3. CANADIAN MAJOR-GENERAL ROMEO DALLAIRE, FORMER COMMANDER OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA, GAVE THREE BRIEFINGS AT THE DEPARTMENT, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5. HE MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES BENNET (IO) AND SHATTUCK (DRL), ASST. ADMIN. STAFFORD (AID/AA/BHR), DAS BUSHNELL (AF/C), NSC'S RICE, JCS'S BALTIMORE, OSD'S KERN, AND OTHER RWANDAPHILES.

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THE RWANDAN SITUATION
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4. DALLAIRE SAID, "WE'RE LINING OURSELVES UP FOR ANOTHER WAR." WITH EX-GOVERNMENT FAR ARMY FORCES AND MILITIAS STILL ARMED AND ORGANIZED, DALLAIRE EXPECTS ATTACKS FROM ZAIRE, BURUNDI, AND TANZANIAN BORDERS WITHIN SIX MONTHS. HE SAID, EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d THE CAMPS ARE BECOMING SEMI-PERMANENT CITIES, BASECAMPS FOR WAR. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT (RPA) ARMY HAS NEVER BEEN PASSIVE AND WILL EVENTUALLY ATTACK THE CAMPS ACROSS THE BORDER.

UNAMIR'S MANDATE
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5. DALLAIRE SAID THE BEST WAY TO HEAD OFF THE COMING WAR AND TO ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IS TO BROADEN UNAMIR'S PEACEKEEPING MANDATE TO INCLUDE THE CAMPS, TO MANDATE DISARMAMENT OF THE EX-FAR AND MILITIAS BY FORCE, AND TO MANDATE DETENTION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO LED THE GENOCIDE. HE SUBMITTED A PLAN FOR A TOTAL UNAMIR FORCE OF 8100 TO THE UN SECRETARIAT. RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME HAS READ IT AND WILL GO ALONG.

6. DALLAIRE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A "ROBUST" CHAPTER 6 AUTHORITY MIGHT BE ENOUGH, HE RECOMMENDS CHAPTER 7 AUTHORITY SO IT IS CLEAR THAT THE POLITICAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO DISARM THE CAMPS AND ACTIVELY STOP A RENEWED WAR. (FRANCE HAS ALREADY STATED THAT UNAMIR'S CURRENT MANDATE IS NOT BROAD ENOUGH FOR THE PEACE-MAKING DALLAIRE PROPOSES.)

7. DALLAIRE BELIEVES THAT ARRESTING THE MILITIA LEADERS AND DISARMING THE CAMPS WILL FREE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO RWANDA. INDEED, HE BELIEVES REFUGEES WILL TURN AGAINST THEIR FORMER LEADERS, WHO WILL NEED DETENTION FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION. UNAMIR SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE SECURITY WITHIN RWANDA FOR REFUGEES WHO RETURN. THE GOAL MUST BE TO ATTRACT THEM TO RWANDA, RATHER THAN PROVIDING A MAGNET IN THE CAMPS. "WE SHOULD GIVE THE CAMPS THE MINIMUM, AND TELL THEM THE REAL SUPPORT IS BACK IN RWANDA."

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UN PEACEKEEPING

8. DALLAIRE SAID RWANDA TURNED FROM "A VERY HOPEFUL SCENARIO INTO THE WORST DISASTER IN RECENT TIMES. WE WERE 5 TO 6 MONTHS LATE IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. THIS DELAY PERMITTED THOSE OPPOSED TO THEM TO ORGANIZE AND UNDERMINE THE PEACE AGREEMENT."

9. DALLAIRE SAID THE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY" HAS FAILED TO SUPPORT UN PEACEKEEPING IN TWO WAYS:

-- THE UN HAS NOT MADE THE POLITICAL DECISIONS NEEDED TO AUTHORIZE PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL WHERE THEY INTERVENE.

-- THE UN DOES NOT HAVE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR RAPID RESPONSE WHEN PEACEKEEPING IS NEEDED.

10. INSTEAD, IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES, THE STATES WON'T GIVE THE UN THE ABILITY TO RESPOND PROMPTLY. "THE UN IS NO MORE THAN A COORDINATING AGENCY FOR SOVEREIGN STATES." EVERY PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IS AD HOC, DEPENDENT ON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF TROOPS AND MATERIEL BY NATIONS, WHICH ARE UNWILLING TO CONVERT THEM INTO A SECURITY FORCE. THEN WHEN THEIR TROOPS ARE ATTACKED THOSE NATIONS PULL THEM OUT, AS BELGIUM AND BANGLADESH DID IN RWANDA, FOLLOWED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION TO PULL MOST OTHERS OUT. "A LOT OF US DID PONTIUS PILATE ON RWANDA."

THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

11. WHEN ASKED WHETHER UNAMIR COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE MASSACRES, DALLAIRE SAID AN ACTIVE RESPONSE COULD HAVE LIMITED THE NUMBER KILLED. HE POINTED OUT THAT POLITICAL KILLINGS BEGAN IN KIGALI, THEN TURNED INTO SYSTEMATIC GENOCIDE. HAD THE 2500 UNAMIR TROOPS BEEN ABLE TO RESPOND WITH FORCE TO DESTROY THE BARRICADES IN KIGALI AND PREVENT MASSACRES BY MILITIAS, MANY LIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN SAVED. "IF I COULD HAVE GOTTEN MORE TROOPS IN THE FIRST FEW WEEKS THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN 100,000 BUT NOT 500,000 DEATHS." AND THE GENOCIDE WOULD NOT HAVE SPREAD TO BUTARE AND OTHER REGIONS WHICH DID NOT BECOME KILLING FIELDS UNTIL MID-MAY.

12. BUT THE UN REFUSED TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO

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STOP THE GENOCIDE. AND THE UNAMIR FORCES IN KIGALI HAD ONLY JEEPS AND RIFLES, WHEN THEY NEEDED HEAVY WEAPONS AND REINFORCEMENTS. THE ONLY WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS WERE BELGIANS, WHO WERE NEUTRALIZED WHEN RADIO MILLES COLLINES CHARGED THAT BELGIANS HAD SHOT DOWN PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S PLANE, TEN BELGIANS WERE MASSACRED, AND BELGIUM DECIDED TO PULL OUT.

13. THE COMBINATION OF LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND LACK OF RESOURCES PARALYZED UNAMIR, PREVENTING EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION TO STOP THE GENOCIDE.

THE FRENCH AND OPERATION TURQUOISE

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

THE FUTURE OF THE UN IN RWANDA

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15. DALLAIRE SAID, "WE HAVE LOST THE INITIATIVE IN RWANDA." THE UN SHOULD GIVE UNAMIR THE MANDATE AND THE RESOURCES TO REGAIN IT. "THE UN NEEDS THE PERMANENT CAPACITY TO RESPOND WHEN THE ATROCITIES START. WE NEED A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND A CONTINUOUS FIELD HEADQUARTERS. THE UN MUST BE PROACTIVE IN PEACEKEEPING. THE UN IS NOT PERFECT BUT IT IS STILL THE BEST GAME IN TOWN."

16. KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.YY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Rwanda

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PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**060019Z OCT 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:
RUEHSD/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6299-6301

ZEN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0504-06
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0689-91
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 6558-60

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 270964

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UN, RW, PHUM, MOPS
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS BY THE UN IN RWANDA AND THE REGION

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

2. (~~C~~) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS IN RWANDA, ZAIRE, TANZANIA AND BURUNDI NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED URGENTLY. USUN SHOULD PRESENT AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY THE FOLLOWING NON-PAPER TO UN DPKO (AND ALSO SHARE WITH UN DHA) AS A REFLECTION OF USG THOUGHTS ON AND QUESTIONS ABOUT OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE UN THAT THE USG HAS NOT DECIDED ON A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION, BUT WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THE UN OPTIONS WHICH WOULD CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA THAT WILL LEAD TO THE RETURN HOME OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE UN REACTIONS ASAP AND WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

--THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN RWANDA SHOULD BE TO CREATE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT SO THAT REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS CAN VOLUNTARILY REPATRIATE IN CONFIDENCE.

--THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE RELATED PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO

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ADDRESSED: SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS (INCLUDING SECURITY FOR REFUGEES, RELIEF WORKERS, AND REMOVAL/SEPARATION OF EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA); EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA INCURSIONS INTO RWANDA; AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE RPA.

–THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED THROUGH A COORDINATED STRATEGY OF CONCURRENT AND INTEGRATED STEPS THAT WILL CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: SAFE, VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.

–THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXPLORING VARIOUS IDEAS TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY ISSUES INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION OF FUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS FROM THE CAMPS IN RWANDA, ZAIRE, TANZANIA AND BURUNDI.

–AT LEAST TWO ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO REACH THE PRIMARY GOAL OF A SAFE REPATRIATION.

– –UNAMIR MUST BE FULLY DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT RWANDA.

– –UNTIL RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE IS ACHIEVED, THERE IS A NEED TO MINIMIZE SUFFERING AND EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE IN THE CAMPS. THIS MEANS PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS FROM MILITIA AND EX-FAR.

–THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS READY TO COOPERATE IN BOTH ENDEAVORS. HOWEVER, TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE MUST EXPLORE THOROUGHLY THE OPTIONS AND DEFINE EXACTLY THE MISSION.

–QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MANDATE OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR MISSION OR ANY OTHER OPTION MUST BE ADDRESSED AND THOUGHT THROUGH. THESE QUESTIONS ARE A FACT-FINDING TOOL, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY ANY PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION. WE WOULD LIKE THE UN TO ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

GENERAL QUESTIONS

– –HOW DOES THE UN INTEND TO WORK TOWARD THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE AS WE SEE IT, THAT IS TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA TO ENABLE THE SAFE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND THE RETURN TO THEIR HOMES OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS?

– –DOES THE UN INTEND TO PROPOSE AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR, OR THE CREATION OF A NEW FORCE (OR FORCES) TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS?

– –IF SO, WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THIS FORCE (AN EXPANDED UNAMIR, AN OAU FORCE, SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE FRENCH-LED OPERATION TURQUOISE, OR A COUNTRY ACTING

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BILATERALLY ARE POSSIBLE IDEAS)? WOULD THIS FORCE (OR FORCES) PROVIDE SECURITY ONLY FOR RETURNEES IN RWANDA? FOR REFUGEES IN CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA? FOR RELIEF WORKERS IN CAMPS?

-- --ASSUMING A UN-LED MISSION, IF THIS FORCE WAS BEING ASKED TO PROVIDE SOME FORM OF PROTECTION IN THE CAMPS, WOULD IT BE UNDER A CHAPTER VI MANDATE, OR WOULD A CHAPTER VII MANDATE BE REQUIRED?

-- --IF CHAPTER VI, WHO WOULD THE FORCE ASK FOR CONSENT - RWANDA, ZAIRE, TANZANIA, BURUNDI, FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS?

-- --IN GENERAL, SHOULD THERE BE A UN POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REFUGEE HUTUS, AND WHO WOULD THE UN (DILLON OR KHAN) TALK TO? WOULD THE UN TALK TO ARMED GROUPS? IF NOT, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CH VI VS. CH VII?

-- --WHAT SIZE FORCE IS ENVISIONED? WHAT IS THE PREDICTED BUDGET FOR SUCH A FORCE AND WHERE WOULD RESOURCES BE IDENTIFIED TO SUPPORT THE FORCE?

-- --WHAT WOULD BE THE UN'S STRATEGY TO RECRUIT SUFFICIENT TROOPS?

-- --WHAT WOULD BE THE PROPOSED TIMELINE OF THE OPERATION? WHAT CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND REALISTIC CRITERIA WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FOR ENDING THE OPERATION?

-- --WHAT WOULD BE THE UN.S RESPONSE IF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION DOES NOT PROGRESS AS EXPECTED?

CAMP SECURITY

-- --IT IS VITAL TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THREAT EXISTS BEFORE A MISSION TO ADDRESS THAT THREAT CAN BE FORMULATED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE THREAT VARIES FROM CAMP TO CAMP, AND FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL (I.E., A DIFFERENT THREAT EXISTS FOR TUTSI REFUGEES, HUTU REFUGEES, AND RELIEF WORKERS, ETC.).

-- --WHAT IS THE UN'S VIEW OF THE EXISTING THREAT(S) IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA?

-- --ARE YOU CONSIDERING HAVING A POTENTIAL FORCE REMOVE THE EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA FROM THE CAMPS? WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE FORCE PLAY IN DISARMING/REINTEGRATING EX-FAR FORCES? ARE THESE ACHIEVABLE GOALS THAT ARE WORTH PURSUING?
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-- --WHAT IS THE UN'S VIEW OF THE EXISTING THREAT(S) IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA?

-- --ARE YOU CONSIDERING HAVING A POTENTIAL FORCE REMOVE THE EX-FAR AND HUTU MILITIA FROM THE CAMPS? WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE FORCE PLAY IN DISARMING/REINTEGRATING EX-FAR FORCES? ARE THESE ACHIEVABLE GOALS THAT ARE WORTH PURSUING?

-- --HOW WOULD EFFORTS TOWARDS DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF THE EX-FAR AFFECT PLANNING?

BORDER INCURSIONS

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– –IS IT NECESSARY TO PLACE AN INTER-POSITIONAL FORCE ALONG RWANDA'S BORDER? IF SO SHOULD UNAMIR ASSUME THIS ROLE, OR SHOULD A SEPARATE FORCE BE FOR THIS PURPOSE?

HUMAN RIGHTS

– –WHAT SHOULD BE UNAMIR'S MANDATE CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE/HALTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES INSIDE RWANDA? WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNAMIR OR ANY NEW FORCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS?

OTHER CONCEPTS

–IN ADDITION TO THE MULTILATERAL FORCE OPTION, OTHER CONCEPTS NEED TO BE EXPLORED.

– –THE DONOR COMMUNITY SHOULD EXAMINE INCENTIVES (PRIMARILY FINANCIAL) WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD OFFER THE EX-FAR TO DISARM. DON CIVILIAN CLOTHING, AND RELOCATE VOLUNTARILY.

– –CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING TO LOOK FOR COUNTRIES WILLING TO PROVIDE OR ASSIST ZAIRE AND TANZANIA TO PROVIDE SECURITY ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS.

– –CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO PURSUING THE OPTION OF A REGIONAL SECURITY EFFORT (THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS/THE GREAT LAKES STATES ORGANIZATION), WITH OAU/UN BLESSING, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS AND MIGHT EVEN ESCORT VOLUNTEER REFUGEES BACK. THIS LATTER ASPECT (AN IDEA FLOATED BY TANZANIA) FACES OBVIOUS PROBLEMS (E.G., THE NEED FOR GOR AGREEMENT, THE NEED FOR DONOR FINANCING) AND ASSUMES THAT, ABSENT INTIMIDATION IN THE CAMPS, A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES WOULD BE WILLING TO RETURN TO RWANDA.

–ABOVE ALL, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN RWANDA BY ENCOURAGING THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN KIGALI TO ELIMINATE REPRISAL KILLINGS AND HELP THE GOR TO REESTABLISH IWFRASTRUCTURE (JUDICIAL, FINANCIAL, COMMERCIAL AND TRANSPORT) AND CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES. EFFECTIVE ACTION IS ESPECIALLY NECESSARY TO ADDRESS LAND/PROPERTY TENURE ISSUES INSIDE RWANDA IN ORDER TO ADDRESS COMPETING CLAIMS ON THE PART OF RECENTLY-DEPARTED HUTU REFUGEES AND RETURNING LONG-DURATION TUTSI REFUGEES.

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--AN ACHIEVABLE MISSION TO ADDRESS THESE URGENT PROBLEMS MUST BE CLEARLY DEFINED. WE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING YOUR VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

--WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM OF US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS FURTHER THESE ISSUES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE ISSUANCE OF UN SECRETARIAT'S NEXT REPORT ON RWANDA AND THE REGION.

END NON-PAPER.

4. MISSION SHOULD REPORT TO DEPARTMENT ON UN DPKO, DHA AND ANY OTHER SECRETARIAT THINKING ON OPTIONS FOR SECURITY IN RWANDA AND THE REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0964

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FROM:
SITREPRT

Rwanda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

Informal Notes on Meeting with DPKO on UNAMIR
10/7/94 DPKO, New York

Summary: Everything about Rwanda belongs in the too-hard basket.

US side: NSC-Clarke, Rice; USUN-Inderfurth; State-Bushnell, Loftis; OSD-Sewall, Kern; JCS-Baltimore

UN: USYG Annan, USYG Goulding, Gen. Baril

Note: one of very few meetings where UN backbenchers outnumbered US side.

Annan opened the meeting by recounting his recent trip to region. GOR is broke, cannot pay civil servants, restore basic services, repair war damage because all money going to agencies and NGO's. He is frustrated at rules requiring payment of arrears before can get new loan. (Bushnell and Clarke noted US $2 million contribution, efforts to get other donations to clear arrears).

The UNHCR report helped in openning country to UNAMIR; contingents now moving into East and Southeast. The troops will supplement the work of the human rights monitors, acting as eyes and ears.

UNAMIR facing tremendous logistical problems - wood bridges mean APC's can't be used (no comment).

UNHCR reports some 100,000 to 200,000 have returned home from Zaire. UN is looking at moving ex-FAR away from border and is talking to Zaire about moving political leaders to exile - problem is finding countries willing to accept and to keep them available for trial.

Biggest problem is what to do with militias. If they are taken from camps, can they be held for trial; if they are set free, then become bandits.

Annan dismissed the idea of private security firms for the camps.

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Clarke ran through spectrum of options for camps: daytime security for relief workers and escort of returnees to protect from harassment (about a battalion) to complete takeover of camps for protection, interpositional force, disarming ex-FAR, Hutus (5-6 battalions). Low end of the spectrum more feasible.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

Kofi noted that the government is making the right noises about reconciliation, no vengeance, broad-base government and emphasis on political solution.

UNHCR rep (didn't get name) noted that the problem is not bringing the refugees to safety but bringing safety to the region. Japanese are acting as operational partner of UNHCR (like NGO) but will run at first sign of danger.

Kofi noted the technical team returns this weekend. Wants report from them in 10 days.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

UN Legal division ran down status of tribunal. Noted that at least part of the Tribunal had to be located in Africa (not Kigali - too charged). They are setting up task force to work on administrative matters. In long term, need proper legal system for Rwanda.

Only action: to meet after report is issued, to discuss list of countries that might be approached to provide security. relationship to UN/UNAMIR left unstated.

Drafted: IO/PHO: RGLoftis
SEPKA 1024 10/7/94

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→ Haiti/
re: Rwanda

October 10, 1994

TO: EXEC - Ambassador Inderfurth

FROM: POLMIL - Susan Varisco SV

SUBJECT: Actions from 10/7 Haiti/Rwanda Meeting

HAITI

- o DOD will work with the UN to plan the movement of pledged UNMIH forces.
- o State to continue to coordinate with UN on who's going from MNF to UNMIH.
- o DOD to coordinate logistics contracts with UN so it can decide early which ones to pick up. (ongoing effort between USACOM and FALD)
- o State will convene a joint planning group periodically to augment military planning between USACOM and DPKO. Recommend monthly intervals, more frequently "on call," as necessary.
- o State will resolve variances between USG and UN contributors list for UNMIH and advise UN of results through USUN.

RWANDA:

- o UN to submit the Joint Commission report on security in the camps within 10-22 days.

Cleared:WClont
Wang #1543 Polmil

CC:

USUN	JGuerra
USUN/W	DScheffer
NSC	RClarke
	SRice
AF	PBushnell
IO/PHO	RLoftis
OSD	SSewall
JCS/J-5	PBaltimore

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Rwanda

Rice, Susan E.

From: Atkin, Timothy J.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Rice, Susan E.
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~ Rwanda
Date: Tuesday, October 18, 1994 11:20AM

Yesterday's "seminar" at state on conflicts in Rwanda was quite good, especially for my level of knowledge. . . a few personal impressions from the afternoon.

1. The divisions/strife are so deep and long standing, the contol of different factions over people so strong, and the trauma so significant that THERE IS NO REALISITIC SOLUTION TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION. . . CIVIL WAR WILL RETURN. I honestly believe the two unknowns are:
- when will it occur
- can genocide be avoided

2. The U.S. is generally seen as one of the few (if not only) states to be an honest broker.

3. The PRIMARY reason for U.S. involvement (i.e. national interest, public justification) is that there have been outrageous crimes against humanity (genocide). . . which also caused a massive humanitarian crisis (refugees). Regardless of the refugee situation, I would argue that the crimes against humanity issue would be deserving of USG involvement/interest.

In light of these impressions, I propose we target our efforts in areas that recognize the STRONG likelihood of renewed civil war and that preserve our reputation of honest broker so as to position ourselves to continue to be influential with all powers.

RECOMMEND:

Ad Hoc mtg with 5 decision/action items:

a. UNAMIR - expand CH VI mandate to protect NGOs, relocate refugees to refugee only camps (???)
b. ID jumpstart funds for the tribunal
c. ID ways to meet the HR monitors goals/placements, asap
d. Meet internal Justice system support requests fm Rwanda
e. ID funds to clear arrears, asap

WHEN CIVIL WAR ERUPTS, THERE WILL BE INTENSE SCRUTINY OF OUR ACTIONS. . .All of these actions address what I argue are our primary and secondary interests. I believe that these actions could, as a minimum, avert another genocidal episode.

IS THERE ANY WAY TO ACTUALLY GET AN AD HOC MTG (in light of problems even getting a half hour sched to discuss options??????????????????)

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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:** 181847Z OCT 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9784-86
RUEHSD/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4527-29
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1051-53
ZEN/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 6836-38

RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0720-22
ZEN/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0049-51
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 6851-53
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0000
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0000
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0000
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3888-90
ZEN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4482-84
ZEN/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 2015-17
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0871-73
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 7251-53
ZEN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7009-11
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2870-72

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 282177

PARIS FOR MORAN, LONDON FOR YOUNG,

PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EFIN, EAID, PREL, RW, IBRD
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO CLEAR RWANDAN WORLD BANK ARREARS

REF: PARIS 26839 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. PLEASE SEE PARA 8 FOR ACTION REQUEST. FOR PARIS SEE ALSO PARA 9. FOR BRUSSELS AND BONN PLEASE SEE ALSO PARA 10.

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BACKGROUND
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3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE SITUATION INSIDE RWANDA IS DIFFICULT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOTHER MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IS VERY REAL. THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, BUT LACKS THE RESOURCES TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH CONCRETE ACTIONS. LACKING THE MOST BASIC ITEMS NECESSARY FOR A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT, THE NEW RWANDAN ADMINISTRATION HAS

BEEN UNABLE TO RESTORE SERVICES OR ORDER, STOP RETRIBUTIONS, OR OTHERWISE CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REFUGEES MIGHT WISH TO RETURN.

4. THIS IS A CATCH-22 SITUATION. FOR THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO BEGIN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS IT SAYS IT IS COMMITTED TO SOLVING, IT MUST RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF QUICK DISBURSING ASSISTANCE. PER REFTEL, DONORS HAVE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH SUCH ASSISTANCE BEFORE SEEING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES.

5. RECENTLY, WE HAVE HAD MORE ENCOURAGING CONTACT WITH POTENTIAL DONORS AS HAS THE WORLD BANK. THE BANK HAS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND MASSIVELY TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA A CHANCE TO BEGIN ADDRESSING ITS PROBLEMS. AT THE SEPTEMBER 27 "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MEETING IN PARIS (ATTENDED BY THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, EU, FRANCE, BELGIUM, GERMANY, JAPAN, THE IMF, AND UNDP), THE WORLD BANK TOLD DONORS THAT RWANDA WAS USD 4.43 MILLION IN ARREARS TO THE BANK (AS OF OCTOBER 15) IF THE ARREARS THROUGH JUNE 1, 1995 (TOTALLING USD 9.5 MILLION) ARE SETTLED, SAID THE BANK REPRESENTATIVES, THE BANK WOULD BE IN POSITION TO RESUME DISBURSEMENTS AND TO RESTRUCTURE PROJECTS TOTALLING APPROXIMATELY USD 250 MILLION FOR RWANDA.

6. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MEETING IN PARIS, THERE HAS BEEN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE USG'S ROLE IN POTENTIALLY SEIZING THIS OPPORTUNITY. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN AN OCTOBER 4 MEETING, NSC ADVISOR LAKE TOLD RWANDAN PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ASSIST IN THE REDUCTION OF RWANDAN ARREARS TO THE WORLD BANK WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WILL TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD -- POWER-SHARING, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW. WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF SECURING USD 2.5 MILLION TO HELP REDUCE RWANDA'S BANK ARREARS. WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO CONTRIBUTE AS WELL TO ENABLE THE WORLD BANK TO GO FORWARD WITH DISBURSEMENTS.

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7. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE OTHER DONORS WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES IN MONITORING THE BENCHMARKS WE WOULD JOINTLY EXPECT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO MEET DURING THE NEXT YEAR IN EXCHANGE FOR CLEARING ARREARS. WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO PARTICIPATE IN A "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MEETING TO BE HELD OCTOBER 27 ON THE MARGINS OF THE WORLD

BANK'S SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA (SPA) MEETING IN PARIS. AT THIS MEETING, WE CAN DISCUSS APPROPRIATE BENCHMARKS BY WHICH RWANDA'S PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS.

ACTION REQUEST
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8. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD INFORM APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS OF USG INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS RWANDAN ARREARS AND STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO ALSO BE FORTHCOMING. TALKING POINTS FOLLOW.

9. FOR PARIS. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF CABLES OUT OF PARIS CONCERNING FRENCH VIEWS ON RWANDA AND ITS ARREARS . WE WOULD, HOWEVER, APPRECIATE YOUR MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

10. FOR BRUSSELS AND BONN. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS IN BRUSSELS AND BONN ON THIS ISSUE AND RECEIVED POSITIVE FEEDBACK. PLEASE THANK THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN BOTH CAPITALS FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO DATE, REINFORCE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEARING OF ARREARS AND SHARE WITH THEM THE POINTS WE WILL BE MAKING WITH THE OTHER "FRIENDS OF RWANDA."

TALKING POINTS
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11. BEGIN TALKING POINTS - FOR POTENTIAL DONOR GOVERNMENTS.

-- FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 27 FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING IN PARIS AT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEEK A CONTRIBUTION OF USD 2.5 MILLION TO HELP CLEAR RWANDA.S ARREARS TO THE WORLD BANK. THIS CONTRIBUTION WILL BE EXPLICITLY TIED TO CONCRETE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACTIONS THAT CONFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD -- POWER-SHARING, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW.

-- AS YOU KNOW, THE WORLD BANK HAS APPROXIMATELY USD 250

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MILLION IN RESTRUCTURED PROJECTS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDITS AVAILABLE IN THE PIPELINE FOR RWANDA ONCE RWANDA'S

ARREARS ARE CLEARED.

-- ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK, AS OF OCTOBER 15 RWANDA.S ARREARS TO THE BANK TOTAL USD 4.43 MILLION. HOWEVER, THE BANK IS ASKING THAT DONORS PAY OFF RWANDAN ARREARS THROUGH JUNE 1, 1995. ARREARS AS OF THAT DATE WILL TOTAL USD 9.5 MILLION.

-- WE SHARE THE CONCERNS OF MANY DONORS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TURN ITS POLICY STATEMENTS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION INTO TANGIBLE RESULTS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL, QUICK DISBURSING ASSISTANCE, IT WILL BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENTS.

-- THE BEST AVAILABLE SOURCE OF A LARGE AND QUICK INFUSION OF ASSISTANCE IS THE WORLD BANK. WORLD BANK AID TO RWANDA WILL ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE MEANS TO MAKE GOOD ON ITS PROMISES.

-- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT WORLD BANK FUNDS FOR RWANDA COULD PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN A POSITION TO BEGIN RESTORING ORDER AND BASIC SERVICES, REBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE, HALTING RETRIBUTIONS, AND CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT THAT WILL ATTRACT REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA. THIS COULD END MISERY, SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE THE MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COSTS THAT WE ALL ARE INCURRING.

-- THEREFORE, THE USG HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE A CONTRIBUTION TO RWANDA'S WORLD BANK ARREARS. AS WE NOTED BEFORE, THIS CONTRIBUTION WILL BE EXPLICITLY LINKED TO SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE OTHER "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE A SIMILAR STEP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE THE ARREARS MOUNT FURTHER AND THE SITUATION IN RWANDA DRIFTS BACK INTO ANOTHER HUMANITARIAN DISASTER.

-- WE FURTHER ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN OCTOBER 27 "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" MEETING SCHEDULED ON THE MARGINS OF THE WORLD BANK'S SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA (SPA) MEETINGS IN PARIS. THERE, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS CAN DEFINE THE SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS AND BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOW RWANDA.S PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED.
END TALKING POINTS.

12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER
BT

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#2177

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>2177
<^TOR>941020033730 M1315085

FROM:
SITREPRT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKINS, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**200126Z OCT 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0716
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9916
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0672
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 0447
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0435

RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0264
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1273
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6065
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1418

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 004459

DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

REF: STATE 283000

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RWANDAN DELEGATION MET WITH USUN AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH AND LEGAL EXPERTS TO DISCUSS RWANDAN MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. RWANDAN DEL LEFT THE MEETING WITH MOST OF THE ISSUES RESOLVED, EXCEPT FOR THE QUESTION OF AN END DATE FOR THE PERIOD TO BE COVERED BY THE TRIBUNAL. FRANCE IS INSISTING ON AGREEMENT FROM FOUR NEIGHBORING STATES TO CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

3. RWANDAN PERM REP BAKURAMUTSA, FORMER RPF UN REP CLAUDE DUSAIDI AND AN ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT MET WITH USUN AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, USUN LEGAL ADVISER ROSENSTOCK, L'S PRINCIPAL DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER MICHAEL

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MATHESON, USUN/W SENIOR ADVISER AND COUNSEL DAVID SCHEFFER AND POLOFF SHESTACK (NOTETAKER) TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT SC RESOLUTION AND STATUTE OF THE RWANDAN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. AMB INDERFURTH LED OFF BY DELIVERING THE TALKING POINTS (REFTEL) WHICH U/S WIRTH USED IN HIS 10/19 CONVERSATION WITH RWANDAN PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU. BAKURAMUTSA INTRODUCED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT RWANDA DID WANT AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

4. DATES. THERE WAS PROTRACTED DISCUSSION ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE TIME FRAME TO BE COVERED BY THE TRIBUNAL, WITH THE RWANDANS ARGUING STRENUOUSLY FOR AN EARLIER BEGINNING DATE AND A CERTAIN END DATE. MATHESON AND ROSENSTOCK ASSURED THE RWANDANS THAT EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ACTIONS BEFORE THE BEGINNING POINT WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE IF THERE WAS A CONTINUING CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE. THEY SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND LANGUAGE CLARIFYING THIS POINT ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, BUT WARNED THAT OPENING SUCH A DEBATE MIGHT CAUSE DELAY IN THE COUNCIL. THE RWANDANS REJECTED THE NOTION THAT THIS MATTER COULD BE SPELLED OUT AND CLARIFIED BY AN ORAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION. THE RWANDANS SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE OF FIXING A STARTING DATE OF OCTOBER 1993 (SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE MASSACRES). THE U.S. THOUGHT THAT DATE MIGHT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH.

5. THE U.S. SIDE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS PREMATURE FOR THE SC TO DETERMINE AN END DATE FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S PROSECUTIONS, SINCE THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A RECURRENCE OF MASSACRES IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS- WE SUGGESTED SPECIFYING A DATE AT WHICH POINT THE COUNCIL WOULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE END DATE. RWANDANS ASKED THAT SUCH A DATE BE LINKED TO EVENTS ON THE GROUND, NOT TO PROCEDURES WITHIN THE TRIBUNAL SUCH AS ELECTION OF JUDGES. THEY PROMISED TO APPROACH THEIR GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF DATES.

6. PRIMACY. THE U.S. SIDE CLEARED UP RWANDAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ARTICLE 8, PARA 2 WHICH SAYS "THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA SHALL HAVE PRIMACY OVER NATIONAL COURTS. AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEDURE, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA MAY FORMALLY REQUEST NATIONAL COURTS TO DEFER TO ITS COMPETENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESENT STATUTE AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA." THE FIRST SENTENCE CAN BE AMENDED TO READ "... PRIMACY OVER NATIONAL COURTS OF ANY MEMBER STATE", THEREBY CLARYING THE MEANING.

7. RWANDANS QUESTIONED WHETHER THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND LOCAL RWANDAN COURTS COULD BE SPELLED OUT, SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE ABLE TO BRING ALL THE

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NUMEROUS CRIMINALS TO TRIAL. THEY ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL COULD ORDER THE ARREST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD THEN BE TURNED OVER TO THE RWANDAN COURTS FOR TRIAIL. MATHESON POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COURTS, AND THAT THE RWANDANS SHOULD MEET WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTOR SOONEST TO WORK OUT SUCH QUESTIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO TURN THEIR NATIONALS OVER TO A LOCAL COURT WITHOUT

DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

EXTRADITION TREATIES SPELLING OUT SAFEGUARDS. HE NOTED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GETTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AGREE TO TURN PERSONS OVER TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. THE ISSUE OF HOW TO EXTEND JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINALS NOW IN REFUGEE CAMPS WAS TIED IN TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CAMPS, AND WOULD NEED TO BE DEALT WITH LATER.

8. VENUE. THE RWANDANS AGREED THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE LOCATED OUTSIDE RWANDA, BUT WANTED REASSURANCE THAT TRIALS WOULD BE HELD IN RWANDA, SO THAT THE GOR COULD CONVINCE ITS CITIZENS THAT JUSTICE WAS COMING TO RWANDA. MATHESON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRACTICAL REASONS WOULD DICTATE THAT MUCH OF THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE HELD IN RWANDA, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE COULD NOT INSIST THAT ALL TRIALS BE HELD THERE. HE OFFERED TO FIND LANGUAGE NOTING THE INTENTION TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN RWANDA..

9. PARDON AND PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT. THE RWANDANS ASKED THAT ALL OF ARTICLE 27 OR AT LEAST THE FIRST SENTENCE BE DELETED. (FYI, ARTICLE 27 READS: "IF, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE LAW OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE CONVICTED PERSON IS IMPRISONED, HE OR SHE IS ELIGIBLE FOR PARDON OR COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE, THE STATE CONCERNED SHALL NOTIFY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ACCORDINGLY. THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JUDGES, SHALL DECIDE THE MATTER ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW." END FYI) ALTERNATIVELY, THE GOR WANTED TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT WHERE PEOPLE WOULD BE IMPRISONED AND WHEN THEY WOULD BE RELEASED.

10. MATHESON EXPLAINED THAT RWANDA WAS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE PLACES TO IMPRISON THE CRIMINALS, AND THAT NOT

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MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WERE LIKELY TO OFFER TO ACCEPT PRISONERS, ALSO, THE TRIBUNAL WAS NOT OBLIGED TO GRANT PAROLE JUST BECAUSE A PERSON WAS ELIGIBLE. AFTER THE TRIBUNAL WAS DISBANDED THE SC WOULD DETERMINE WHO WOULD MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT PARDON, WITH THE LIKELY RECIPIENT OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY BEING THE RWANDANS. MATHESON SUGGESTED THAT GENERALIZED LANGUAGE BE ADDED TO THE RESOLUTION INSTRUCTING THE TRIBUNAL TO CONSULT WITH THE GOR IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS FUNCTIONS.

11. FOCUS ON GENOCIDE. TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE TRIBUNAL.S PRIMARY FOCUS WILL BE ON GENOCIDE, ARTICLE 2 (WHICH DEALS WITH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION) WILL BE MOVED TO BECOME ARTICLE 4 (FOLLOWING ARTICLES ON "GENOCIDE" AND "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"). ALSO, THE ENTIRE TITLE OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION (WHICH MENTIONS ACTIONS "CONCERNING ARMED CONLICT") WILL BE ADDED TO THE ARTICLE TO AVOID ANY MISPERCEPTION THAT COMMON CRIMES WILL FALL UNDER THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION.

12. TIMING. AMB BAKURAMUTSA DID NOT THINK HE COULD GET HIS GOVERNMENT'S FINAL REACTION ON THE TRIBUNAL BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK, GIVEN DIFFICULTCOMMUNICATIONS WITH KIGALI AND THE TIME DIFFERENCE, AND ASKED THAT ACTION IN THE COUNCIL BE PUT OFF UNTIL MONDAY, OCTOBER 24.

13. FOREIGN MINISTER. ON THE SEPARATE ISSUE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO DISAPPEARED WITH THEIR MONEY, BAKURAMUTSA NOTED THAT HE WAS FROM AN OPPOSITION PARTY, THAT HE WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE LEAST DANGEROUS OF THE OPPOSITION, AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS PRESSURING THE GOR TO INCLUDE SUCH OPPOSITION MEMBERS.

14. VIEWS OF OTHER SC MEMBERS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING WITH RWANDANS, USUN CONFERRED WITH OTHER CO-SPONSORS OF THE SC RESOLUTION. NEW ZEALAND AND UK HAD NO BASIC PROBLEMS WITH THE GROUND COVERED WITH THE RWANDANS. FRANCE, HOWEVER, MAY POSSIBLY HAVE A PROBLEM WITH PUSHING THE STARTING DATE BACK TO OCTOBER 1, 1993. ALSO, FRANCE INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF ZAIRE, TANZANIA, UGANDA AND BURUNDI MUST AGREE TO ARTICLE 1 OF THE STATUTE, WHICH EXTENDS THE COMPETENCE OF THE TRIBUNAL TO ACTS CONNITTED BY RWANDAN CITIZENS IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBORING STATES. (FYI: ARTICLE 1 READS AS FOLLOWS: "THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

DEPT FOR C - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VIEWS ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

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SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO PROSECUTE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CONNITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND BY RWANDAN CITIZENS IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1994 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT STATUTE." END FYI)

15. FOR KINSHASA, BUJUMBURA, KANPALA AND DAR: USUN SUGGESTS THAT POSTS CONTACT APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO CONFIRN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRINES AND ACTS OF GENOCIDE CONNITTED IN THEIR TERRITORY BY RWANDANS. USUN BELIEVES THAT UN REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WILL NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO CONNIT THEIR GOVERNNENTS TO THIS, ALTHOUGH WE WILL APPROACH THEM ALSO IN NEW YORK .

16. MININIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT
BT
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NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SSN>4459
<^TOR>941019214631 M1314624
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SSN>4459
<^TOR>941019214735 M1314626
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03
<^SSN>4459
<^TOR>941019214749 M1314628

FROM:
SITREPRT

Rwanda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

20 October 1994

TO: Interagency Group on Rwanda

THROUGH: Michael Sheehan MS

FROM: Susan Varisco SV

SUBJECT: Rwanda: UN-Zaire Joint Working Group Report

DPKO has received a report from the working group technical team as well as the SRSG's recommendation. The report, itself, contains only the UN view. Apparently, the Zairian participants are holding off on submitting their input in an effort to be paid for more working days. A true joint report should follow soon.

Working Group Conclusions:

The report concludes that a 10,000-12,000 size force is required to separate and move the militia, leaders, and the army and contain them thereafter. It assumes violent resistence and the necessity of a Chapter VII mandate. Not surprisingly, the report recommends that the UN cannot accomplish this mandate. The only force that can do the job is a strong national force or multinational force consisting mainly of one strong state.

The report also stresses the need to start a political dialogue between refugee leaders and the Government of Rwanda as well as initiate significant social and economic reconstruction inside the country.

SRSG Recommendation:

Realizing that a large Ch VII operation is politically unrealistic, the SRSG recommends a smaller UN force (size undefined). The force would provide security for humanitarian operations and attempt to "suppress" the militia through presence.

Khan also emphasizes political dialogue and socioeconomic reconstruction as integral components of the operation.

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Next Steps:

DPKO will be meeting today to decide how to handle the report (whether or not to wait for Zairian input) and to discuss the recommendations. Eventually, the SYG will weigh in and a report will be sent to the Council. This could happen as early as next week.

Annan is expecting a second interagency visit to discuss the new report. If another visit is in order, the team should come early next week, before the SYG finalizes his recommendations.

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Rwanda

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DIST: ATKIN, DESHAZER, NSC, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DTG:**251807Z OCT 94

FM: USMISSION GENEVA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5091

RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 009140

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, PREL, RW, CG
SUBJECT: UNHCR SEEKS USG INPUT AND SUPPORT FOR RWANDA CAMP SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE.

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST (PARA 8).

3. SUMMARY. CONCERNED ABOUT THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF CAMP SECURITY IN EASTERN ZAIRE, UNHCR IS DEVELOPING A "SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE" TO QUICKLY ADDRESS THE PROBLEM AND OBTAIN DONOR SUPPORT. THE UNHCR PACKAGE CONCEPT RELIES ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES IN PROTECTING REFUGEES AND THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE WOULD BE CONSTITUTED WITH: (A) A MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT COMPOSED OF POLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (AND PERHAPS CANADA); (B) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES; AND (C) FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. A SENIOR UNHCR OFFICIAL TOLD MISSOFF THAT HIGH COMMISSIONER OGATA HAS INFORMED THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THE INITIATIVE, AND ASKED FOR INFORMAL, BUT QUICK USG INPUT WHILE THE INITIATIVE IS BEING DEVELOPED. END SUMMARY.

CAMP SECURITY PROBLEM HAS WORSENED
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4. ON OCTOBER 25, THE COORDINATOR FOR THE SPECIAL UNIT FOR RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AUGUSTINE MAHIGA, TOLD MISSOFF THAT UNHCR HAS REALIZED THAT SEPARATING THE EX-FAR FROM

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THE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE WILL NOT SOLVE WORSENING CAMP SECURITY PROBLEMS, AND THAT MORE RADICAL STEPS ARE NEEDED. MAHIGA EXPLAINED THAT UNHCR ALREADY HAS "LOST" KATALE, AND THAT QUICK ACTION IS NEEDED TO FORESTALL THE TAKEOVER OF OTHER CAMPS IN THE AREA. IN THIS REGARD, MAHIGA GAVE MISSOFF A COPY OF AN OCTOBER 24 MEMORANDUM FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER OGATA TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHICH OUTLINES THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND THE STEPS UNHCR INTENDS TO TAKE TO ADDRESS THEM (COPY FAXED TO STATE/PRM).

UNHCR PROPOSES SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE

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5. THE MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL STARTS WITH THE PREMISE THAT THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE ASYLUM COUNTRIES ARE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS. AS A RESULT, SECURITY CONDITIONS IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI, AND TANZANIA HAVE DETERIORATED STEADILY, RESULTING IN: A) A REDUCTION OF SPONTANEOUS RETURNS; B) THE DIVERSION OF RELIEF ITEMS; C) DISRUPTIONS IN DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE; D) A RESISTANCE TO THE REGISTRATION OF REFUGEES; AND, C) PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS OF CAMP LEADERS TO TAKE OVER DAY-TO-DAY RUNNING OF THE CAMPS.

6. UNHCR NOTES THAT IT IS WORKING WITH THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE TANZANIAN POLICE PRESENCE IN THE CAMPS, AND ADMITS THAT MORE NEEDS TO DONE THERE. HOWEVER, UNHCR'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION IS SECURITY IN THE ZAIRIAN CAMPS. WHILE UNHCR WELCOMES THE INITIATIVE OF SRSG KHAN TO SEPARATE THE EX-FAR FROM THE CAMPS, THIS WILL NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MILITIA AND THE OLD POLITICAL STRUCTURE, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD REMAIN AFTER THE EX-FAR WOULD DEPART. WITHIN ITS MANDATE, UNHCR WILL DEVELOP A "SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE," WHICH WOULD AIM AT QUICKLY ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM AND OBTAINING DONOR SUPPORT- THE PACKAGE AIMS AT INTRODUCING A MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE IN SUPPORT OF ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES. MAHIGA NOTED THAT ZAIRIAN PM KENGO AND THE DEPUTY PM SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE CONSTITUTED OF:

-- A
MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT (SIZE TO BE DETERMINED) COMPOSED OF POLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES (AND PERHAPS) CANADA;

-- LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES;

-- FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

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7. THE MEMORANDUM NOTES THAT UNHCR IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY DEMARCHES TO INITIATE THE OPERATION, AND THAT PRELIMINARY BUT UNNAMED CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENTS WOULD MEET WITH FAVORABLE REACTIONS. THE PLAN HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH U/SYG PETER HANSEN AND SRSG KHAN, WHO HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO IT. THE NOTE CONCLUDES THAT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS INITIATIVE BE FORMALIZED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 009140

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, PREL, RW, CG
SUBJECT: UNHCR SEEKS USG INPUT AND SUPPORT FOR RWANDA CAMP SECURITY SERVICE PACKAGE.

ACTION REQUEST
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8. MAHIGA ASKED MISSOFF FOR A QUICK USG REACTION TO AND EVENTUAL SUPPORT OF THE CONCEPT, ESPECIALLY WHILE IT IS BEING DEVELOPED. HE NOTED THAT MRS. OGATA IS AWARE OF THIS REQUEST. PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ASAP.

STATUS OF SGSR KHAN INITIATIVE TO SEPARATE EX-FAR
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9. MAHIGA ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE JOINT UN/GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE MISSION COMPLETED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELOCATING THE EX-FAR. THE MISSION ESTIMATES THAT 50,000 PEOPLE, OF WHICH ABOUT 20,000 ARE SOLDIERS, WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED TO THREE CAMPS IN EQUATORIA, SHABA, AND KIVU PROVINCES. THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE THE DEPLOYMENT 0F ONE BATTALION PER CAMP TO PROVIDE SECURITY, AND WOULD COST USDOLS 6 MILLION- ONE HALF OF THE COST WOULD COVER SITE PREPARATION, THE OTHER HALF AIR TRANSPORTATION, AS THERE ARE NO ROADS BETWEEN THE CURRENT CAMPS AND THE NEW SITES. SPIEGEL
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<^SSN>9140
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RWANDA WEEKLY REPORT
Friday, October 28, 1994

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

After three days of negotiation, the Rwandan and Zairian prime ministers and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on refugees. Zaire agreed to guarantee the voluntary nature of repatriation, to facilitate the return of the refugees and of their property, and to continue to offer asylum to those refugees who wish to remain in Zaire. Rwanda agreed to create conditions to facilitate the "safe, dignified" repatriation of the refugees, and to ensure their reintegration into Rwandan society in residences of their choice. The UNHCR is to mobilize the necessary logistical and financial resources to implement the accords. Both governments guarantee the UNHCR access to all refugees and repatriates in their respective territories. Press reports that the parties had agreed to create a UN-protected buffer zone in Rwanda turned out to be exagerated. Instead, welcome centers would be set up, with UNAMIR in the area providing security (as they are already doing).

DAS Bushnell has been speaking to the OAU and UNHCR (through our Mission in Geneva) to press for a prepatory conference to set out the agenda and lay the groundwork for the planned refugee conference in Bujumbura. The Embassy in Kigali has been in constant contact with GOR officials to facilitate passage of the War Crimes tribunal resolution in New York.

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS:

There is, at long last, modest progress to record. Monitors have finally been deployed; logisitical and coordination difficulties are getting the attention needed to sustain an effective operation. Two teams of four monitors were deployed as of Monday, with two more set to be deployed by Wednesday evening, and another when an additional vehicle come out of UNAMIR's repair shop. A report today (yet to be confirmed by Kigali) indicates that 12 additional monitors have arrived in Rwanda. Embassy Kigali will advise us shortly how we can assist in the acquisition of yet more vehicles.

We have briefed and coordinated the activities of a number of "fixers," including qualified NGO's and UN personnel en route to Geneva and Kigali. With their help, we have galvanized the UN (USYG Hansen, USYG Conner, UNHCR Ogata) sufficiently to overcome the immediate recruiting and logistical support problems. (Indeed, there is currently an embarrassment of riches, with UNHCR and UNAMIR vying for the main support role.)

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According to USUN, the draft cooperation agreement between the UN and the GOR has finally been approved by headquarters and sent back to Ayala Lasso for negotiation with and signature by the GOR.

The challenge now shifts to the longer term as we seek to assess the effectiveness of a) the administrative arrangements that are finally jelling; and b) the effectiveness and impact of the monitors program.

REFUGEE SITUATION

Concerned about the rapid deterioration of refugee camp security in eastern Zaire and the lack of UN headquarters decision-making in addressing this growing problem, UNHCR is developing a "security service package" which would rely on the introduction of a multinational police force which would support Zairian security forces in protecting refugees and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The multinational police force would be constituted by a) a multinational contingent composed of police/gendarmes from French speaking African countries (and perhaps Canada); b) logistical support in transport and equipment from non-African countries; and c) financial support from other countries. UNHCR believes (and we agree) that separating the ex-FAR forces from the camps in Zaire will not solve worsening camp security problems also caused by the presence of the militia and the old political structure. Mrs. Ogata has written to the Secretary General proposing this concept and also seeks USG views thereon (read what support we would offer). This will be discussed, along with other draft UN security concepts, by our interagency group.

On October 25, approximately 50 Rwandan refugees were killed and 12 wounded in refugee camps in northern Burundi in an attack by uniformed soldiers. The government of Burundi is investigating.

PRM is currently obligating $30 million in Emergency Funds (from the FY94 Dire Supplemental for Rwanda). These additional contributions should help carry UNHCR, IFRC, IOM and WFP through the end of the calendar year.

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ECONOMIC/BILATERAL ASSISTANCE:

World Bank Arrears:

A State/AID delegation traveled to Paris for meetings on October 27 with the World Bank and other donors to discuss payment of Rwanda's World Bank arrears. The session turned out to be more an information sharing meeting than a pledging conference. Nonetheless, about six million dollars was pledged, still shy of the $9.5 million the World Bank says it needs to raise.

We expressed our intention to contribute $2.5 million, with disbursement contingent on a commitment by the Rwandan government to grant free access throughout Rwanda to UNAMIR peacekeepers and human rights monitors. We also reviewed the political, human rights, and other benchmarks we are tracking. Belgium said it planned to contribute about $2 million, although the final figure might be lower or higher. Canada said it planned to offer 2 million Canadian dollars (about $1.5 million US). The Swiss and Dutch said they were considering contributions, but did not give any figures. (The World Bank asked them to report back with a decision within 10-12 days.) The Germans said they were providing 9 million marks for government functions (equipment, salaries, etc.) but did not plan to provide direct budget support (seemingly excluding a contribution to paying off arrears). France did not offer any assistance, and Japan was not present. (The World Bank said they would talk to the Japanese later.)

The donors expressed a willingness to help Rwanda generally but shared similar concerns about political reconciliation, human rights, security, etc, and seemed to favor progressive conditionality. Canada believed that the donors should impose the same conditions, and USAID's Carol Peasley volunteered to put together a document to circulate to the donors and then submit to the World Bank.

Other Bilateral Aid:

Our focus will be to sustain humanitarian assistance as required, revive the justice system and assist the Rehabilitation Minister with resettlement programs. The Embassy's draft work plan proposes the following near-term bilateral assistance program:

a. humanitarian: OFDA $20 million; PL480 $75 million (region-wide);

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b. justice: democracy and governance
FY94: $600,000 for commodities (e.g., computers, office materials, etc.), $3.1 million dollars institution building;
FY95: $2.5 million institution building; office of new initiatives $750.000 dollars for human rights center.

c. resettlement: aid to displaced persons,
FY94: $1.3 million
FY95: $2.5 million
for resettlement/demobilization;

d. agriculture rehabilitation: WFP PL480 monetization program in FY95-possible $30 million;

e. population: central funding for aidscap and project design on maternal child health.

We have circulated the Embassy's work plan to determine whether other bureaus might have additional funding sources to apply to these priorities or whether the other bureaus believe that other areas will also require assistance. On October 26, we held an interagency meeting to discuss in more detail possible funding mechanisms for assistance to the judiciary. Ambassador Rawson is also using his consultations to discuss this and related issues, including possible assistance in police training.

UNAMIR

Mandate:

(C) The rump Peacekeeping Core Group met on October 26 to discuss the anticipated UN options on Rwandan refugee camp security and other issues relating to Rwanda prior to the interagency team traveling to New York next week. On camp security, it was decided to recommend to the UN a concept corresponding roughly to SRSG Khan's suggestions.

Specifically, the international community would create a UN force to provide temporary security in the camps located in Zaire. It would consist of at least one battalion but probably more. The force's duties would include providing daytime security in the Zaire camps for relief workers. Simultaneously, one battalion would move from camp to camp to provide full security for relief workers, war crimes investigators while they work among refugee population and provide safe corridors/escorts for those who want to return home; conduct disarmament to the extent possible; and escort moderate Hutu ex-FAR leaders into camps to persuade ex-FAR to reintegrate into new Army.

(C) Tanzania would provide security in its own camps. We would send survey team to assess needs, then lead a tin-cup exercise to push other countries to provide the wherewithal. We would find what we could from our assets. This would be outside the UNSC rubric. (Tanzanian President Mwinyi has already asked the U.S. and UNHCR for $1.2 million in assistance for his security forces, but this amount will support operations around the camps for only three-four months.)

(C) Further discussions on this subject with UN will take place Tuesday, November 1. Prudence Bushnell (DOS), Dick Clarke & Susan Rice (NSC), Col. Perry Baltimore (JCS), Sarah Sewall & Vince Kern (OSD), Bob Loftis (IO/PHO) and Susan Varisco (USUN) will sit in for the U.S. side.

Deployment:

-- As of October 20, UNAMIR had deployed a total of 5,376 personnel (5,022 troops). Breakdown of national contingents is as follows: 303 Australians, 576 British, 364 Canadians, 800 Ethiopians, 819 Ghanaians, 166 Malawians, 200 Malians, 330 Nigerians, 43 Nigeriens, 35 Bissauans, 40 Congolese, 241 Senegalese, 130 Chadians, 101 Zambians, 826 Tunisians, 322 military observers, 48 HQ staff, 32 CIVPOL.

-- The UN has accepted the Zambian loadlist and plans to deploy the contingent on/about November 4.

-- The Indian battalion is scheduled to deploy its reconnaissance team on/about October 28, with the main body of troops moving over the subsequent two-week period.

-- The Ethiopian contingent is being issued insect repellant, flak jackets and tents; fresh rations should also have been distributed by now, according to the UN. Another item of concern to this contingent is night vision devices, which will not be available until late November due to manufacturing requirements. UNAMIR has issued the contingent two of these devices to use on patrol, with the advice that they can sign out additional sets from the limited UNAMIR stores. The shipping contract for mine-protected vehicles is currently in being concluded in New York, but UNAMIR has issued the Ethiopians two APCs (M-113) to use until two South African vehicles arrive.

Rwanda

Intelligence Assessment

INR

United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR foreign affairs brief

Entering a More Dangerous Phase in Rwanda and Burundi

There has been concern that armed Rwandan Hutu incursions into Rwanda and Burundi would heighten political instability in both countries and throughout the region. EO 13526 1.4c indicates the effect will be especially destabilizing for the fragile government in Burundi and could provoke another ethnic explosion.

* * *

Confirmation of organized insurgency

[redacted] confirm that cross-border incursions from Zaire into Rwanda and Burundi are taking place. [redacted] has reported that Rwandan Hutu militias crossed into northwestern Burundi near Bukavu to try to provoke the Tutsi-dominated Army in Burundi and rekindle the war in a bid to reclaim power in Kigali. According to [redacted] former Rwandan Government Army (FAR) soldiers have launched small commando raids into southwestern Rwanda from an island in Lake Kivu near Bukavu.

[redacted] helps to clarify sometimes contradictory claims in the press and by some UN sources during the past month of armed incursions into northwestern Burundi and southwestern Rwanda. Those claims have been variously identified as the Burundian Army fighting Burundian Hutu residents and organized Hutu extremists; Rwandan Hutu refugees and/or Rwandan Hutu infiltrators, perhaps joined by Hutu extremists from Burundi; and attacks by Rwandan Patriotic Army forces. It is beginning to appear that all of the above are true, indicating not only the complexity but also the intractability of the problem.

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Zaire supports Rwandan Hutus

EO 13526 1.4c indicate that former FAR Chief of Staff Gen. Augustin Bizimungu—located in Goma—and civilian authorities representing Hutus in exile have approved an organized insurgency operating out of eastern Zaire against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Bizimungu has appointed two sector commanders with backup staff and logistics support. [redacted] that President Mobutu's key generals and Mobutu himself favor and support the ex-FAR. It is becoming clear that neither the Zairians nor the ex-FAR will allow the army in exile to be moved from the border.

A new equation for Burundi?

The pressure is not only coming from military/militia elements. Hutu political fronts are also involved. [redacted] has linked one element of Burundi's majority and Hutu-dominated Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU) party to PALIPEHUTU extremists. They and Hutu refugees in Tanzania are connected to a new Hutu organization, the Front for Democratic Defense, which has a military wing. The reported objective of this new party is to enter Burundi from eastern Zaire and gain control of areas in the northwest. Its ultimate objective is to secure a power base from which to supplant the current, fragile power-sharing arrangement negotiated during August and September. A priority objective is to achieve Hutu parity in the military, an extremely sensitive and, from most Burundian Tutsis' point of view, unacceptable outcome.

Prognosis

The former Rwandan government and ex-FAR have gained control of the refugee camps and international humanitarian relief and are now in the initial stages of building an insurgency against the RPF and Kigali. Former government and FAR leaders apparently believe the Hutu government in exile is winning some international support. Their objective is to establish themselves militarily, win international recognition, and either topple the RPF or, more likely, move eventually to negotiations with Kigali from a position of strength. The RPF will try to defeat the insurgency and will carry the fight into eastern Zaire.

Any protracted insurgency aimed at Kigali is likely to lead to a breakdown of Burundi's fragile power-sharing pact and renewed ethnic upheaval. Rwandan Hutus and Burundi's Hutu extremists will join in a broad, two-front political and military push for the restoration of majority rule in Kigali and the overthrow of Tutsi domination in Burundi. The Tutsi, having nowhere to go, will fight.

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Rwanda

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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1366
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6381
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2322
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0451
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0166
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0745
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0320
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0697
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0465
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0056
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0885
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1586

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004820

NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-ANNAN MEETING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. U/SYG ANNAN BELIEVES THAT WE ARE ON THE WAY TO ANOTHER FAILED STATE IN RWANDA. THE DRAFT SYG REPORT IS COMPLETED AND CONTAINS A THREE PART PROPOSAL FOR SECURITY AND REPATRIATION IN THE CAMPS: OGATA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE (SHORT-TERM), A UN POLICE FORCE (LONGER-TERM), AND A 2-3 BATTALION PEACKEEPING FORCE. UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH URGED ANNAN TO CONSIDER CONTRACT POLICE, AND AGREED TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH UNHCR HEAD OGATA IN DRUMMING UP RESOURCES. END SUMMARY.

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HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS

3. UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SLOW DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. HE ASKED IF DPKO WOULD REDEPLOY THE SOMALI POLICE VEHICLES FROM MOGADISHU TO RWANDA. ANNAN DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, BUT HE SAID THAT EQUIPMENT WAS CONTINUING TO MOVE OUT OF MOGADISHU AND THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WERE RECEIVING VEHICLES.

ANOTHER FAILED STATE

4. ANNAN THEN LAUNCHED INTO A STARK ACCOUNT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN RWANDA. HE SENSED THAT THE WORLD WOULD FAIL RWANDA AGAIN. HE SAID THAT THE RWANDA SITUATION IS WORSE THAN ANYTHING WE HAS SEEN. THE GOVERNMENT IS LITERALLY WITHOUT ANY RESOURCES, THE RPF IS LOSING ITS REPUTATION AS A DISCIPLINED FORCE, THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS FOR ASSISTANCE IN BASIC INSTITUTION BUILDING SUCH AS PRISONS AND POLICE. WE ARE WITNESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANOTHER FAILED STATE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE UN CANNOT ENCOURAGE REFUGEES TO GO BACK, BUT IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY READY TO CARE FOR THIS POPULATION FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD? FINALLY, ANNAN IS WORRIED ABOUT HIS OWN PEACEKEEPERS. BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY FORCE IN RWANDA, THEY WILL BE BLAMED WHEN THINGS FALLS APART.

UN PROPOSAL

5. ANNAN ARTICULATED A THREE PART PROPOSAL THAT REPRESENTS AN ADVANCE IN DPKO THINKING FROM LAST WEEK'S INTERAGENCY MEETING (SEE REFTEL). THE FIRST PART IS THE OPERATION PROPOSED BY UNHCR HEAD OGATA--IMMEDIATE BUT TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO THE ZAIRIAN FORCES THROUGH BI-LATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION THAT WILL BE PHASED OUT ONCE THE UN FORCE IS DEPLOYED. ANNAN BELIEVES THAT THIS OPERATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER UNHCR AUTHORITY AND NEED NOT BE AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL (COMMENT: MISSION QUESTIONS WHETHER A UN AGENCY SHOULD CARRY OUT A PEACE AND SECURITY OPERATION WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL OVERSIGHT. END COMMENT.).

6. THE SECOND PART OF ANNAN'S OPERATION IS A UN VERSION OF THE USG "BUBBLE" CONCEPT. 2-3

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BATTALIONS WOULD ESTABLISH SECURE AREAS WITHIN REFUGEE CAMPS UNDER A ROBUST CHAPTER VI MANDATE. IN ADDITION, THE FORCE WOULD SECURE CROSSING POINTS AND SAFE PASSAGE FROM THE CAMPS INTO RWANDA.

7. THE THIRD PART IS A LONGER-TERM TRAINING OPERATION THAT WOULD ENTAIL THE SELECTION, TRAINING, EQUIPING, MONITORING AND SUPERVISING OF
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004820

NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-ANNAN MEETING

ZAIRIAN AND HUTU GENDARMERIE.

8. A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE DPKO SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICER FOR RWANDA CONFIRMED THAT THE 24 HOUR SECURITY FORCE WILL START WITH 1-2 CAMPS AT A TIME AND REMAIN FOR ONLY A LIMITED PERIOD (30 DAYS). UNLIKE THE USG PROPOSAL, DPKO ENVISIONS LEAVING BEHIND A CIVILIAN POLICE UNIT AS WELL AS SOME PEACEKEEPING FORCES AFTER THE "BUBBLE" MOVES ON. DPKO IS THINKING THAT THE "BUBBLE" SHOULD START WITH GOMA CAMPS. HOWEVER, THE FORCE COMMANDER HAS RECOMMENDED BUKAVU CAMPS. THE FORCE COMMANDER ALSO BELEIVES THAT A FORCE OF 4,000 WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION.

9. A DRAFT REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND WILL BE USED BY THE SYG AS A BASIS FOR HIS TUESDAY MEETING IN GENEVA. (IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE OPTIONS, THE DRAFT REPORT CONTAINS THE REJECTED OPTION FOR SEPARATING AND MOVING MILITIA AND FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS.) THE REPORT WILL BE FINALIZED AFTER THAT MEETING.

DONORS AND CONTRACT POLICE

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

12. WIRTH ASKED ABOUT THE COST OF A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR

AT ANNAN'S URGING, WIRTH AGREED THAT THE US WOULD CONSIDER TAKING THE LEAD WITH OGATA TO DRUM UP RESOURCES FOR CONTRACT POLICE.

KIGALI AND BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT
BT
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NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>4820
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Rwanda

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0535

RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0463
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0449
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0318
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0695
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1364
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1584
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6379
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0883
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2320
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0164
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0743
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0054

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004818

NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-OGATA MEETING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. UNHCR HEAD OGATA ASSURED UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH THAT UNHCR WOULD NOT PULL OUT OF THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS. AT WIRTH'S URGING, SHE WILL CONSIDER USING CONTRACT GUARDS TO EXPEDITE UNHCR'S "SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE" IN ZAIRE. MRS. OGATA HOPES TO SEND AN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO ZAIRE AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. MRS. OGATA WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE WATER SITUATION IN THE TANZANIAN CAMPS. WIRTH RAISEP THE POSSIBILITY OF USING US WATER PURIFICAIION EQUIPMENT IN KTGALI. END SUMMARY.

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2011-0263-M
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3. ON FRIDAY, 11/4, US UNDERSECRETARY FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS AND RWANDA COORDINATOR, TIM WIRTH, MET WITH UNHCR HEAD, MRS. OGATA TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF RWANDA ISSUES INCLUDING UNHCR'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE, CONTRACT GUARDS, JAPANESE TROOPS, CAMPS IN TANZANIA, AND UNHCR-GOR RELATIONS.

UNHCR'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

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4. MRS. OGATA OPENED THE MEETING BY EMPHASIZING THAT, UNLIKE THE NGO'S, UNHCR CANNOT LEAVE ZAIRE. HOWEVER, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SHE HAS ENCOUNTERED A HOST GOVERNMENT THAT HAS NO CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH REFUGEE CAMPS IN ITS TERRITORY. THIS IS WHY SHE HAS PROPOSED THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR ZAIRE.

5. SHE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL IS STILL JUST AN IDEA AND, IN ANY CASE, ENVISIONED ONLY AS A STOPGAP MEASURE THAT WILL HOPEFULLY BE COMPLIMENTED BY LARGER MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION IN DPKO. THUS FAR, NO ONE HAS OFFERED POLICE TRAINERS. NO ONE IS LIKELY TO DO SO UNLESS THE SYG FORMALLY ENDORSES THE PROPOSAL. HE WILL PROBABLY HOLD OFF ON ENDORSING THE PROPOSAL AT LEAST UNTIL THE TUESDAY MEETING IN GENEVA. MS. OGATA HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN GIVEN THE GO AHEAD TO CONSULT WITH GOVERNMENTS.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

PRIVATE SECURITY

8. UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH SUGGESTED THAT MRS. OGATA

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CONSIDER USING PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE OPERATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO ADDRESS THIS SECURITY SITUATION NOW. WIRTH SUGGESTED THAT OGATA LOOK INTO THE ISRAELI FIRM THAT HAS TRAINED MOBUTU'S SECURITY FORCE. OGATA SAID THAT SHE IS HOPING TO SEND OUT AN ASSESSMENT TEAM TOWARD THE END OF THIS WEEK. SHE HOPES THAT DPKO AND NATIONS WITH POLICE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004818

NSC FOR CLARKE
STATE FOR WIRTH

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, RW, UNSC,
SUBJECT: RWANDA: 11/4 WIRTH-OGATA MEETING

TRAINING PROGRAMS (SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES) WILL PARTICIPATE. WIRTH ASKED IF A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR MIGHT PARTICIPATE IN THE ASSESSMENT MISSION. SHE SAID IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. SHE HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH A BRITISH FIRM, BUT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXPENSE OF A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR. WIRTH RESPONDED THAT THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION CALLED FOR INVESTIGATING ALL MEANS AND THAT THE USG MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING.

OTHER INITIATIVES

JAPANESE

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

EXPANDED UNAMIR

10. WIRTH SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO A CONTRACTED POLICE FORCE, THE USG IS INTERESTED IN AN EXPANDED UNAMIR. MRS. OGATA CAUTIONED AGAINST USING FORCE TO SEPARATE SOLDIERS AND LEADERS. SHE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE LONG RUN.

TANZANIA
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11. WIRTH ASKED OGATA ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE

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Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SARTOR, STEINBERG, VAX

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~** **DTG:**090425Z NOV 94

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO:
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0061
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0621

RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 1320
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0325
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1375
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6434
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1628
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0700
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0453
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0467
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0747

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861

HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.0.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PREF, AORC, RW, UN
SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8

1. (U) SUMMARY: THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 955 ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA BY A VOTE OF 13-1(RWANDA)-1(CHINA) ON NOVEMBER 8. IN AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, RWANDA REMINDED THAT PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU HAD ASKED FOR A TRIBUNAL, ENUMERATED RWANDAN PROBLEMS WITH THE RESOLUTION, AND DID NOT/NOT STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL. CHINA AND BRAZIL VOICED RESERVATIONS, AND THE OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR JUSTICE AND GOR COOPERATION. TEXT OF RESOLUTION AND USG STATEMENT BELOW. END SUMMARY.

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3. (~~C~~) THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE TRIBUNAL RESOLUTION CONSULTED ACTIVELY AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH THE NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS, IN ORDER TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE SECONDARY CONCERNS WHICH THE RWANDANS HAD RELAYED TO THE NON-ALIGNED. ALTHOUGH NOTHING SHORT OF ALLOWING THE DEATH PENALTY COULD GAIN AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FROM RWANDA, THEY WERE WILLING TO MAKE OTHER CHANGES TO SOLIDIFY NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION. THE NON-ALIGNED HAD NO SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE RESOLUTION, BUT WERE ACTING TO MOLLIFY THE RWANDANS. MINOR CHANGES WERE MADE IN PARAGRAPHS REFERRING TO THE NUMBER OF JUDGES, PARDON FOR CONVICTED CRIMINALS, AND THE LOCALE FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S WORK. FRANCE REFUSED TO ALLOW THE STARTING DATE FOR THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION TO BE MOVED BACK.

4. (~~C~~) RWANDAN PERMREP MANZI MADE CLEAR IN COUNCIL INFORMALS 11/7 THAT HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION, PRIMARILY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A DEATH PENALTY IN THE TRIBUNAL. DURING A MEETING OF THE CO-SPONSORS, AMB. ALBRIGHT BROACHED THE IDEA OF A BILATERAL APPROACH TO THE RWANDANS ON THE DEATH PENALTY ISSUE. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d INSTEAD, AMB. ALBRIGHT INCORPORATED THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEATH PENALTY ISSUE IN HER EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

5. (U) STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY RUSSIA, FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, UK, CZECH, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PAKISTAN, CHINA, SPAIN, NIGERIA, RWANDA, OMAN AND THE U.S. RWANDAN PERMREP MANZI THANKED THE CO-SPONSORS FOR THEIR PATIENCE AND WORK. HE RAN THROUGH A BRIEF HISTORY OF MASSACRES FROM 1959 TO PRESENT, STRESSING THE SILENCE AND INACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE CREATION OF A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY. HE REMINDED THAT PRESIDENT BIZIMUNGU HAD SPOKEN TO THE UNGA OF THE URGENT NEED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WHICH WOULD AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF VENGEANCE, HAVE ACCESS TO CRIMINALS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND HELP REBUILD RWANDAN SOCIETY. HE STATED THAT THE STATUTE AND TRIBUNAL AS DRAFTED WOULD NOT BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE TO JUSTICE. HE REITERATED THE GOR'S DIFFICULTIES ON THE ISSUES RELATING TO: (1) STARTING DATE, (2) NUMBER OF JUDGES, (3) INCLUSION OF LESSER CRIMES THAN GENOCIDE, (4) JUDGES POSSIBLY COMING FROM COUNTRIES IMPLICATED IN TRAINING CRIMINALS FOR THE MASSACRES, (5) PAROLE AND IMPRISONMENT OUTSIDE RWANDA, (6) CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND (7) SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL. HE SAID THE DESIRED RWANDAN CHANGES WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE TRIBUNAL. MANZI DID NOT/NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE GOR WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL

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IN CARRYING OUT ITS WORK. USDEL HAD STRESSED TO MANZI THAT WE EXPECTED HIS EOV TO EXPLICITLY SAY RWANDA WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL, IN LIGHT OF SIMILAR STATEMENTS BY GEN KAGAME IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. MANZI, LOOKING SURPRISED, SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK WITH KAGAME BEFORE MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, SINCE HE HAD NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.

HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
DEPT FOR G - AJOYCE; L - MMATHESON; AF - A/S MOOSE
WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8

6. (U) CHINA EXPLAINED THAT ITS ABSTENTION WAS BASED ON THE LACK OF RWANDAN SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBUNAL. CHINA REITERATED ITS OPPOSITION TO INVOKING CHAPTER 7 WHEN ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL, AS IT HAD UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL. BRAZIL VOICED MANY LEGAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING THE TRIBUNAL, BUT VOTED YES AS A POLITICAL CONDEMNATION OF THE RWANDAN ATROCITIES. BRAZIL ASSERTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WENT BEYOND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE IN ESTABLISHING A COURT, AND IN INVOKING CHAPTER 7 TO DO SO. IT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A THOROUGH REVIEW IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SIXTH COMMITTEE, WHICH DEALS WITH LEGAL MATTERS.

7. (U) SEVERAL OTHER SPEAKERS VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT WITH BROADER JURISDICTION. ALL CALLED ON THE GOR TO COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL.

8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF USG STATEMENT:

-GENOCIDE OCCURRED IN RWANDA LAST SPRING. OTHER GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ALSO HAVE RAVAGED THAT STATE. THIS COUNCIL HAS BEEN SEIZED WITH THESE HORRIFIC EVENTS THROUGH MUCH OF THIS YEAR. THE COUNCIL ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN IMMUNE FROM CRITICISM. BUT TODAY MARKS THE CULMINATION OF MONTHS OF VERY HARD AND PERSISTENT WORK BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARIAT, THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS, AND THIS COUNCIL TO CREATE A NEW AD HOC TRIBUNAL FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND WAR CRIMES IN RWANDA AND BY RWANDAN CITIZENS IN STATES NEIGHBORING RWANDA.

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-WE REGRET THAT THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA CAST ITS VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. AS OTHER NEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE STATED, THE CO-SPONSORS WORKED HARD TO ACCONNODATE A NUMBER OF RWANDAN CONCERNS, BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ACCOMNODATE ALL OF THEN. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THEIR CONCERNS REGARDING SEVERAL KEY ISSUES -- INDEED ON THE DEATH PENALTY WE NIGHT EVEN AGREE -- IT WAS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET THOSE CONCERNS AND STILL MAINTAIN BROAD SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL. THEREFORE, NY GOVERNNENT BELIEVES THAT THE RIGHT CHOICE IS TO ESTABLISH THE TRIBUNAL THIS TRAGEDY DEMANDS RATHER THAN WAIT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD NEVER COME.

-NONETHELESS, WE URGE THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA TO HONOR ITS OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND THE INVESTIGATION IT MUST UNDERTAKE IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE THOSE GUILTY OF THE UNSPEAKABLE ACTS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER ATROCITIES. WE APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS LEGAL COUNSEL, HANS CORELL, TO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA IN KIGALI ABOUT THIS RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE FOR THE TRIBUNAL. OVER THE LAST FEW NONTHS, THIS COUNCIL HAS ACTED WITH DETERNINATION TO ESTABLISH THE TRIBUNAL AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

-THE PROSECUTOR WILL NEED TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNNENT OF RWANDA TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN THAT COUNTRY AND TO OPERATE FREELY IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS. MY GOVERNNENT FULLY SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHNENT OF A TRIBUNAL OFFICE IN KIGALI AND FOR A GREAT DEAL OF THE TRIBUNAL'S WORK NECESSARILY TO PROCEED IN RWANDA. WE ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL. IT IS INPERATIVE THAT THE TRIBUNAL OPERATE EFFICIENTLY, SECURELY, AND IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL DEVELOPNENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO THE VIEWS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PROSECUTOR IN OUR EVALUATION.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG;
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

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SUBJECT: RWANDA TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY SC 11/8

-AS CHIEF PROSECUTOR, JUSTICE GOLDSTONE WILL BRING TO THIS ENDEAVOR THE SANE INTEGRITY AND SKILL THAT HE ALREADY HAS INFUSED INTO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR

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THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO ASSISTING JUSTICE GOLDSTONE IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN TO FACILITATE HIS WORK ON RWANDA. WE ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO THE SELECTION OF A DEPUTY PROSECUTOR FOR RWANDA WHO WILL HAVE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS.

-THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING. ONE MAJOR CHALLENGE AHEAD OF US IS ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR THE TRIBUNAL. WE URGE ALL MEMBER STATES TO MAKE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE UNITED NATIONS MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR THESE EARLY, CRITICAL MONTHS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S WORK. WE STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE GROWING BUDGETARY NEEDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, OUR CHALLENGE WILL BE TO FINANCE BOTH AD HOC TRIBUNALS WITH ENOUGH RESOURCES TO GET THE JOB DONE.

-THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN RWANDA ALSO WILL REQUIRE MUCH REBUILDING IN ORDER TO TAKE ON THE ENORMOUS TASK OF DAILY LAW ENFORCEMENT, AS WELL AS THE PROSECUTION OF MANY OF THE SUSPECTS WHOM THE TRIBUNAL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE. MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ASSIST RWANDA IN THIS IMPORTANT TASK, AND WE ENCOURAGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.

-THE INVESTIGATION OF GENOCIDE IS INDEED VERY GRIM WORK. BUT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA CAN ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTIVE--ONE THAT THIS COUNCIL INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES: TO HOLD INDIVIDUALS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. AS EVIDENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IN RWANDA THERE IS AN EQUAL NEED TO FORGE HARMONY AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS BY BRINGING TO JUSTICE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMITTED SUCH HEINOUS CRIMES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR POSITION IN SOCIETY.

-IN CLOSING, LET ME EXPRESS MY GOVERNMENT'S HOPE THAT THE STEP WE HAVE TAKEN HERE TODAY CAN PROMOTE BOTH JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, LEST THE RWANDAN PEOPLE BE UNABLE TO ESCAPE THE MEMORY OF MADNESS AND BARBARISM THEY HAVE JUST LIVED THROUGH.

END TEXT OF EOV.

9. BEGIN TEXT OF RESOLUTION:

ARGENTINA, FRANCE, NEW ZEALAND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SPAIN, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

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REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 935 (1994 OF 1 JULY 1994 (S/1994/879 AND S/1994/906), AND HAVING TAKEN NOTE OF THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR RWANDA OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (S/1994/1157, ANNEX I AND ANNEX II),

EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 935 (1994), IN PARTICULAR ITS PRELIMINARY REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN RWANDA TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER OF 1 OCTOBER 1994 (S/1994/1125),
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861

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EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS GRAVE CONCERN AT THE REPORTS INDICATING THAT GENOCIDE AND OTHER SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RWANDA,

DETERMINING THAT THIS SITUATION CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

DETERMINED TO PUT AN END TO SUCH CRIMES AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BRING TO JUSTICE THE PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM,

CONVINCED THAT IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF RWANDA, THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WOULD ENABLE THIS AIM TO BE ACHIEVED AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE,
BELIEVING THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND THE OTHER ABOVE-MENTIONED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ENSURING THAT SUCH VIOLATIONS ARE HALTED AND EFFECTIVELY REDRESSED,

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STRESSING ALSO THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO STRENGTHEN THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF RWANDA, HAVING REGARD IN PARTICULAR TO THE NECESSITY FOR THOSE COURTS TO DEAL WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF SUSPECTS,

CONSIDERING THAT THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 935 (1994) SHOULD CONTINUE ON AN URGENT BASIS THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION RELATING TO EVIDENCE OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND SHOULD SUBMIT ITS FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY 30 NOVEMBER 1994,

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

– 1. DECIDES HEREBY, HAVING RECEIVED THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (S/1994/1115), TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PROSECUTING PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND RWANDAN CITIZENS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SUCH VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES, BETWEEN 1 JANUARY 1994 AND 31 DECEMBER 1994 AND TO THIS END TO ADOPT THE STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ANNEXED HERETO;

– 2. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY ALL STATES SHALL TAKE ANY MEASURES NECESSARY UNDER THEIR DOMESTIC LAW TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND THE STATUTE, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE OR ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER UNDER ARTICLE 28 OF THE STATUTE, AND REQUESTS STATES TO KEEP THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INFORMED OF SUCH MEASURES;

– 3. CONSIDERS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA SHOULD BE NOTIFIED PRIOR TO THE TAKING OF DECISIONS UNDER ARTICLES 26 AND 27 OF THE STATUTE;

– 4. URGES STATES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE FUNDS, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, INCLUDING THE OFFER OF EXPERT PERSPNNEL;

– 5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT THIS RESOLUTION URGENTLY AND IN PARTICULAR TO MAKE PRACTICAL
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 004861

HAGUE PLEASE PASS DAVID SCHEFFER
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ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL AS TO POSSIBLE LOCATIONS FOR THE SEAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL AT THE EARLIEST TIME AND TO REPORT PERIODICALLY TO THE COUNCIL;

– 6. DECIDES THAT THE SEAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE COUNCIL HAVING REGARD TO CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS AS WELL AS ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY, INCLUDING ACCESS TO WITNESSES, AND ECONOMY, AND SUBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE STATE OF THE SEAT, ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNCIL, HAVING REGARD TO THE FACT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL MAY MEET AWAY FROM ITS SEAT WHEN IT CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY FOR THE EFFICIENT EXERCISE OF ITS FUNCTIONS; AND DECIDES THAT AN OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND PROCEEDINGS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN RWANDA, WHERE FEASIBLE AND APPROPRIATE, SUBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF SIMILAR APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS;

– 7. DECIDES TO CONSIDER INCREASING THE NUMBER OF JUDGES AND TRIAL CHAMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY;

– 8. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT-
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ALBRIGHT
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FROM:
SITREPRT

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Rwanda

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Rwanda/Zaire Camp Security Issues/Questions

I. This "paper" does not incorporate USG thoughts on the short term problem of camp security. While PM has done some initial investigating of the types of private firms which could be approached by the UN/UNHCR, PM has not fleshed out the concept any further (PRM has developed a rough "scope of work"). Input from the DS team currently traveling in the region will be important in formulating further USG thoughts on this concept. PRM and AF should continue to take the lead. PM, IO, DS and DoD should be prepared to assist.

II. Notional Strategy for Implementing "Bubble" Concept (using draft DPKO paper as description of concept)

1. Develop lists of questions raised by the concept, both as relates to possible U.S. participation - in any form - in such an operation, and as relates to the U.S. view of the viability of the concept as described by the UN paper. (by COB 11/15/94).

2. Describe and discuss the concept with "Friends of Rwanda" during initial meeting. Feedback from the "Friends" will be critical in developing a concept of operations which can be adopted by the Security Council, as well as by potential troop contributors.

3. Address any remaining questions pertaining to the U.S. role (if any) in this operation. The Ad Hoc Committee began to address this issue, but several other issues may arise from points 1 and 2 above. While it would be preferable to have these issues clearly resolved prior to the initial "Friends" meeting, it will likely take 1-2 weeks following the meeting. (by COB 11/30/94).

4. Assuming a Security Council Resolution to authorize the "Bubble" concept, USG personnel should meet with UN officials to determine a list of contributing countries, whether it be for troops, other personnel, or support. (by 12/10/94).

5. Immediately following an initial approach by the UN to the countries targeted to participate, U.S. embassies should deliver demarches in support of the concept. Demarches from others among the "Friends" would also be encouraged. (by 12/20/94).

6. Counting time for recruitment and deployment, projected time to begin implementing the "Bubble" concept is probably no sooner than 3/1/95.

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III. Potential/Probable Questions/Issues to be Addressed on the "Bubble" concept.

1. What is the ultimate objective?
2. How long do we think it will take to achieve the objective, and how long is the mandate?
3. Who will be in charge?
4. Is this a Chapter VI or Chapter VII operation?
5. Are we expected to separate ex-FAR and/or militia from other refugees? How do we know who is who? Are we expecting to conduct disarmament? What type of resistance can be expected?
6. Will troops have arrest/detention powers? If so, under what authority?
7. What role will the U.S. play?
8. How much will this operation cost, and how will it be paid? When will troop contributors be paid?
9. What if the ex-FAR invade Rwanda? What if the RPA conduct preemptive strikes into Zaire?
10. Which countries will form this force? How will they be equipped, and who will equip them?
11. How will troops deploy? How will they deploy home at the end of the operation?
12. Who will train the troops? Where? How long will it take? Who will train Zairian gendarmes? Who will pick them?
13. What is the role of the government of Zaire? Will they be part of the international force?
14. What are the rules of engagement?
15. ~~Is this a 3-4 year commitment?~~
16. How do we know that an area of 30,000 refugees can be "secured" in 30 days? What happens if the situation reverts to poor security after the 30 day period?
17. How does this plan work in concert with the possible introduction of a private security force to provide near-term security in the camps?
18. How does this force work with UNAMIR?
19. If the operation is expected to take several years, what are the benchmarks along the way which will indicate progress, or lack thereof?
20. What conditions would cause the U.S. and/or the international community to conclude that this concept is not working, and that the mission should be shut down?

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Department of State

Rwanda INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 ARA-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 EAP-00
EUR-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-00 ADS-00 M-00
NEA-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00
PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 SA-00 PMB-00 PRME-01 DRL-09 G-00
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INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ROME
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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ USUN NEW YORK 005088

WHITEHOUSE FOR RICE;
JOINT STAFF FOR J5
SECDEF FOR RWANDA TASK FORCE
STATE FOR BUSHNELL AND BRIMS

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA/ZAIRE: RECRUITING TROOPS FOR CAMP SECURITY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ON NOVEMBER 17 POLMILOFF MET WITH LEONARD KAPUNGU, DPKO SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICER FOR RWANDA, TO DISCUSS RECRUITMENT OF TROOP RECRUITMENT FOR THE PROSPECTIVE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMP OPERATION IN ZAIRE. THE UN NEWS WAS MIXED. SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PLAYING SOME KIND OF ROLE. HOWEVER, KAPUNGU DOES NOT EXPECT ANYONE TO STEP FORWARD UNLESS THE US "FLEXES ITS MUSCLES." UNTIL THEN, THE UN IS JUST "GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS." KAPUNGU BELIEVES THAT THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP MEMBERS SHOULD BE THE FIRST NATIONS ASKED FOR TROOPS, AND HOPES THAT THIS WILL BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION ON TUESDAY. END SUMMARY.

3. THE UN HAS BEGUN SOUNDING OUT POSSIBLE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. NO ONE EXCEPT PAKISTAN (WHO WAS NOT ASKED) HAS SIGNED UP FOR THE OPERATION. AS EXPECTED, BEFORE MAKING A DECISION ALL WANT TO KNOW WHAT THE MANDATE IS AND WHO ELSE IS PARTICIPATING. HOWEVER, THE DPKO HAS RECEIVED SOME INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT.

4. SWEDEN INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT PROVIDE POLICE AND THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR THEM IF THE OPERATION WERE CONNECTED IN SOME WAY TO DEVELOPMENT. THE NETHERLANDS

ALSO INDICATED THAT IT MIGHT PROVIDE POLICE OR PAY FOR POLICE. KAPUNGU THOUGHT POLAND MIGHT ALSO PROVIDE POLICE.

5. IRELAND ALSO WANTED TO PLAY SOME KIND OF ROLE. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA, AS WELL, WERE INTERESTED BUT DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY MIGHT PROVIDE.

6. THE UN, LIKE US, BELIEVES THAT GERMANY IS READY TO PLAY SOME KIND OF A PEACEKEEPING ROLE. KAPUNGU THINKS THAT GERMANY'S FIRST PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE IN A SUPPORT ROLE SUCH AS PROVIDING A FIELD HOSTPITAL OR LOGISTICS, BUT NOT PROVIDING SOLDIERS. THE UN HOPES TO KEEP GERMANY AROUND FOR AWHILE.

7. MOROCCO WAS CONTACTED, BUT DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. INDIA SAID NO. KAPUNGU BELIEVES THAT INDIA MIGHT DECIDE DIFFERENTLY IF IT RECEIVED HIGH LEVEL PRESSURE FROM THE US.

8. IN GENERAL, KAPUNGU STRESSED THAT IF THE RECRUITING JOB IS LEFT UP TO THE UN, NO ONE BUT THE PAKISTANIS WILL SIGN UP. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE UN IS "GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS," BUT WILL NOT PRODUCE RESULTS UNLESS THE US "FLEXES ITS MUSCLES."

9. THE UN, LIKE US, HOPES TO RECRUIT TIER ONE AND TWO COUNTRIES WHO ARRIVE WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUPPED. THE UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER HAS WARNED THAT COMPOSITE BATTALIONS CANNOT DO THE JOB. TWO OR THREE COUNTRIES, AT THE MOST, SHOULD PROVIDE THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS. WHEN ASKED WHAT HIS IDEAL FORCE WOULD LOOK LIKE, KAPUNGU SAID INDIAN AND MOROCCAN INFANTRY BACKED UP BY GERMAN, AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN AND IRISH LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THE US WOULD PROVIDE OTHER TYPES OF SUPPORT LIKE LIFT, POSSIBLY EQUIPMENT, AND POLITICAL CLOUT.

10. KAPUNGU ALSO SAID THAT DPKO IS PLEASED WITH THE NEW OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP--IT WILL MAKE THE SECRETARIAT'S JOB EASIER. DPKO ALSO BELIEVES THE OPERATIONAL SU
PPORT GROUP MEMBERS SHOULD BE THE FIRST COUNTRIES THE US APPROACHES TO PROVIDE TROOPS. THEY HAVE THE GREATEST INTEREST AND THE MOST RESOURCES.

KAPUNGU HOPES THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION ON TUESDAY.

11. HE ALSO SAID THAT A/SYG KOUYATE WOULD PROBABLY NOT ATTEND THE MEETING, BUT THAT EITHER U/SYG ANNAN OR A/SYG RIZA WOULD. AS FOR SRSG KHAN, HE IS IN NAIROBI AND IS RELUCTANT TO TRAVEL SO FAR FOR A ONE DAY CONFERENCE.

12. COMMENT: IF KHAN DOES ATTEND, THERE ARE OTHER USEFUL THINGS HE COULD ACCOMPLISH IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE BRIEFED THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THEY ARE CONSIDERING THIS NEW MANDATE. HOWEVER, KHAN WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE BY SUNDAY, IF HE WERE TO BE IN WASHINGTON FOR A TUESDAY CONFERENCE. END COMMENT.

13. COMMENT: DPKO IS CLEARLY PUTTING A LOT OF WEIGHT ON OUR PREVIOUS OFFER TO ASSIST IN RECRUITING. IT IS ALSO PROBABLY RIGHT IN ITS ASSUMPTION THAT LEFT TO ITS OWN DEVICES, THE UN WILL COME UP EMPTY. END COMMENT.

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Rwanda

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FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE 0000

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LUSAKA, LUANDA FOR A/S MOOSE FROM AF/C DEPDIR FENDRICK

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS AGENDA AND AF-PREPARED BACKGROUND BRIEFERS FOR TUESDAY'S FRIENDS OF RWANDA MEETING. TO DATE, GERMANY, SWEDEN, BELGIUM, TUNISIA, CANADA, THE NETHERLANDS, UK AND THE UN HAVE ACCEPTED; JAPAN AND EU ARE ALSO EXPECTED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES; FRANCE HAS INDICATED IT WOULD NOT ATTEND EXCEPT POSSIBLY TO SEND A WASHINGTON EMBASSY NOTETAKER. AGENDA HAS BEEN APPROVED BY U/S WIRTH AND CIRCULATED TO OTHER BUREAUS. REMARKS AND BACKGROUND HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY AF AND FORWARDED TO U/S WIRTH. WE WILL FORWARD BACKGROUND FROM OTHER BUREAUS AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. ATTACHED MEMOS AND REMARKS WERE DRAFTED BY AF/C.

2. BEGIN AGENDA:

INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 22, 1994

AGENDA

1030-1100
REGISTRATION

1100-1115
OPENING REMARKS

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- TIMOTHY WIRTH, U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, "PURPOSES OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP: SUPPORT FOR A STRATEGY OF RECONCILIATION AND REPATRIATION"

1115-1245
SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, AS PART OF A LARGER REGIONAL STRATEGY

CAMP SECURITY: PRACTICAL OPTIONS

ROLE OF UNAMIR

1245-1400
WORKING LUNCH
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: UN AND BILATERAL COORDINATION

1400-1430
PREPARATIONS FORTHE REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE

1430-1515
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

EXPEDITING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORTING THE MONITORS

SUPPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL/INVESTIGATIONS

1515-1530
BREAK

1530-1600
ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT

ASSISTANCE IN THE JUDICIAL SECTOR

OTHER MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AID EFFORTS

1600-1630
EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

RESTARTING THE DIALOGUE

MILITARY INTEGRATION EFFORTS

1630-1700
BURUNDI: REINFORCING PEACE AND STABILITY

END AGENDA

3. BEGIN OPENING REMARKS:

MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
OPENING REMARKS

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GOOD MORNING. I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME YOU ALL TO THIS FIRST MEETING OF THE RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP, OR "FRIENDS OF RWANDA" AS SOME OF US REFER TO IT INFORMALLY.

I MUST SAY WE WERE EXCEEDINGLY PLEASED WITH THE ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL. WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR STRONG INTEREST AND EAGERNESS TO PARTICIPATE.

AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER OUTLINED IN HIS INITIAL LETTER OF INVITATION, WE SEE THE RWANDA OFERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP AS AN INFORMAL BODY WHICH WILL HELP COORDINATE AND SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS IN RWANDA AND THE SUBREGION.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE IMMENSE HUMAN SUFFERING BROUGHT ON BY THE CRISIS. HOWEVER, ENORMOUS EFFORT IS STILL REQUIRED ON SEVERAL FRONTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND HELP PROMOTE CONDITIONS THAT WILL ENCOURAGE REFUGEE REPATRIATION, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AND LASTING PEACE.

WHILE THE WAR IN RWANDA MAY BE OVER, THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IS NOT:
- TWO MILLION REFUGEES REMAIN OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY WITH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS MORE DISPLACED INTERNALLY;
- THE EXILED LEADERSHIP OF THE OUSTED INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THEIR SUPPORTERS CONSIDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNACCEPTABLE;
- EXTREMIST MILITIAS ALIGNED WITH THESE FORCES ARE INTIMIDATING REFUGEES WHO MAY WISH TO RETURN AND FOMENTING VIOLENCE IN THE CAMPS;
- MEANWHILE, VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED INSIDE RWANDA, RAISING FEARS AMONG REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS ABOUT THEIR SAFETY SHOULD THEY RETURN HOME;

- AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ARE DISTANT GOALS.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT FIGHTING AND WIDESCALE VIOLENCE DO NOT RESUME AND THAT CONDITIONS ARE CREATED, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RWANDA, THAT WILL LEAD TO A LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND A MOVE TO AN OVERALL RESOLUTION.

IN LINE WITH THeS GOAL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON KEY NEAR TERM GOALS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE SECURITY IN THE SUBREGION AND CREATE CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA THAT WILL PROMOTE RECONCILIATION.

WE NEED TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE INSIDE RWANDA, THROUGH FULL AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS.
WE NEED TO ENHANCE SECURITY IN THE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA.

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WE NEED TO IDENTIFY AND PUNISH THE PLANNERS OF THE GENOCIDE, THROUGH EXPEDITED ACTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

WE NEED TO HELP IMPROVE CONDITIONS INSIDE RWANDA THROUGH ASSISTANCE TO GET THE NEW GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING, RESTART JUDICIAL PROCESSES, AND RESTORE BASIC SERVICES.

WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAKES GOOD ON ITS PROMISE TO UPHOLD THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARUSHA: POWERSHARING, AN INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE, AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

THESE GOALS NEED TO BE PURSUED FROM A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE, WITH THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF RWANDA'S NEIGHBORS, AND WITH A CLOSE EYE TO THE FRAGILE CONDITION IN BURUNDI.

AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER STATED, THIS IS INDEED AN AMBITIOUS UNDERTAKING, ONE THAT CAN ONLY SUCCEED THROUGH SUSTAINED, COORDINATED SUPPORT BY RWANDA'S FRIENDS.

WE ARE INDEED HAPPY TO SEE EACH OF YOU HERE TO INITIATE WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A VERY FRUITFUL ENDEAVOR. WE KNOW YOU SHARE OUR GOALS OF PEACE AND STABILITY FOR THE REGION AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU IN THE MONTHS AHEAD TO SEE THAT THESE KEY OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED.

END REMARKS.

4. BEGIN BRIEFER ON POLITICAL RECONCILIATION:

MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
EFFORTS AT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
I. BACKGROUND

POLITICAL. THE GOR HAS REPEATEDLY STATED IT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE. ACCORDING TO THEIR LIST OF 220 "RINGLEADERS", THIS WOULD INCLUDE ALL MEMBERS OF THE EX-IGOR IN ZAIRE. IN RESPONSE TO NUMEROUS APPROACHES BY USG OFFICIALS, THE GOR HAS ALSO REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT MODERATE MRND MEMBERS HAD BEEN APPROACHED BUT HAD REFUSED CABINET POSITIONS. THE CURRENT CABINET OF 22 INCLUDES 5 PARTIES (9 RPF, 4 MDR, 3 LIBERAL PARTY, 3 SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND 2 NON-AFFILIATED). ON NOVEMBER 15, THE GOR REDISTRIBUTED TO THESE PARTIES AND THREE OTHERS ALL 19 PARLIAMENTARY SEATS RESERVED IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS FOR THE MRND AND 8 OTHER PARTIES NOW BANNED DUE TO ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE. ON THE LOCAL LEVEL, CIVILIANS ARE GRADUALLY REPLACING RPA OFFICIALS; NEARLY ALL MILITARY PREFECTS (GIKONGORO BEING A NOTABLE EXCEPTION) HAVE NOW BEEN REPLACED BY CIVILIANS. THE GOR

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HAS STATED ITS COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE OFFICIALS FROM A NUMBER OF PARTIES, ALTHOUGH NOT THE FORMER INCUMBENTS NOR ANY MRND MEMBERS, AS FAR AS WE KNOW.

MILITARY. THE RPA HAS UNDERTAKEN A LIMITED PROGRAM TO RE-INTEGRATE EX-FAR TROOPS INTO ITS RANKS. ACCORDING TO OUR LATEST INFORMATION, AT LEAST TWO THOUSAND EX-FAR HAVE BEEN SCREENED AND ARE UNDERGOING JOINT TRAINING WITH RPA SOLDIERS; TRAINING INCLUDES A HEFTY "POLITICAL EDUCATION" COMPONENT. THE RPA HAS ALLOWED RELATIVELY FREE BUT NOT UNSCHEDULED VISITS BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS (INCLUDING US EMBASSY PERSONNEL) TO THE PRINCIPAL TRAINING SITE AT GAKO, SOUTH OF KIGALI. OF COURSE, THE TEST OF RPA INTENTIONS WILL BE THE ACTUAL ASSIGNMENT OF THESE SOLDIERS, INCLUDING OFFICERS, TO ACTIVE DUTY. THE FIRST TRAINING PERIOD, SCHEDULED TO LAST UP TO THREE MONTHS, IS STILL ONGOING. TO DATE, THE RPA HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT REGARDING REASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS. EX-FAR RECRUITS ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPA ARE BOUND TO BE FEW AS LONG AS EX-IGOR/EX-FAR DEMONSTRATE INTENTIONS TO RETAKE THE COUNTRY OR TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH MILITARY PRESSURE. LIKEWISE, DEMOBILIZATION IS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE A NON-STARTER.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ADDITION TO THE CONCERN OVER THE EXTERNAL THREAT IS THE RPA'S CONVICTION THAT THE INTERAHAMWE MILITIA HAS INFILTRATED AND IS NOW CONTROLLING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED CAMPS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHWEST (FORMER FRENCH TURQUOISE ZONE). THIS HAS LED IN RECENT WEEKS TO AGGRESSIVE RPA ACTION TO DISBAND THOSE CAMPS. THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT - THE BURNING OF MUSENGE CAMP IN GIKONGORO PREFECTURE - RESULTED IN SEVEN DEATHS. THESE INCIDENTS AND CONTINUING REPORTS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE RPA OR TUTSI CIVILIANS ARE SEVERELY HAMPERING REPATRIATION/RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS, WITH OBVIOUS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

II. TALKING POINTS

O IT IS VITAL TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF GENOCIDE AND TO BEGIN TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CAMP SECURITY AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION BEFORE LASTING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION CAN BE ACHIEVED.
O WE SHOULD THEREFORE ENERGETICALLY PROMOTE THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AND THE PROPOSED REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE.
O WE SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT EFFORTS BY SRSG KHAN AND SPECIAL REGIONAL ENVOY DILLON TO FOSTER REGIONAL COOPERATION IN PROMOTING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.
O WE EXPECT THAT THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY INCLUDE POIITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOR AND EX-GOVERNMENT MODERATES, AND A RETURN TO THE ARUSHA FRAMEWORK, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY NOT THE PRECISE LETTER OF THE ACCORDS.

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O WHILE WE WOULD WELCOME THIS DIALOGUE, WE SHOULD NOT CONDITION SUPPORT FOR THE GOR ON WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT POLITICAL TALKS NOW.
O WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THE GOR TO BROADEN ITS POLITICAL BASE AT BOTH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE APPOINTING OF MODERATE MRND AND OTHER NON-RPF PARTY MEMBERS TO LOCAL POSITIONS.
O WE CAN ALSO ENCOURAGE THE RPA TO EXPAND ITS PROGRAM TO REINTEGRATE EX-FAR SOLDIERS, AND TO PUBLICIZE THIS EFFORT (JOINTLY WITH UNAMIR RADIO, ONCE OPERATIONAL).
END TEXT.

5. BEGIN BRIEFER ON BURUNDI
MEETING OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
BURUNDI: REINFORCING PEACE AND STABILITY
I. BACKGROUND
POLITICAL. WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION CRISIS RESOLVED, THE RULING HUTU-DOMINATED FRODEBU PARTY AND THE

TUTSI-DOMINATED OPPOSITION ARE NOW NEGOTIATING OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. FRODEBU THOUGHT THEY HAD THE OPPOSITION'S AGREEMENT TO ELECT FORMER FRODEBU HEALTH MINISTER JEAN MINANI AS THE ASSEMBLY'S NEW PRESIDENT; HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION IS NOW COMPLAINING THAT MINANI IS TOO HARDLINE. THE DIVISION OF POSTS WITHIN THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE A SOURCE OF CONTINUED TENSIONS. NATIONAL DEBATES ARE PLANNED IN 1995 TO DISCUSS THE BASIC PROBLEMS (ETHNIC TENSION, INSECURITY, MILITARY REFORM) THAT WERE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE POWERSHARING TALKS. WITH THE SUCCESSION ISSUE SETTLED, SRSG ABDALLAH HAS INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE ON TO ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT.

SECURITY. THE TUTSI-DOMINATED BURUNDI MILITARY HAS CARRIED OUT A PROGRAM TO DISARM (HUTU) CIVILIAN GROUPS. WHILE THE CAMPAIGN WAS ORDERED BY THE HUTU-LED GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY HAS FAILED TO SHOW RESTRAINT, LEADING TO NUMEROUS CIVILIAN DEATHS. EXILED FORMER HARDLINE FRODEBU INTERIOR MINISTER
LEONARD NYANGOMA HAS REJECTED THE HUTU MODERATES' ACCOMMODATION WITH THE TUTSI MILITARY/OPPOSITION AND HAS THREATENED TO DO BATTLE AGAINST THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT/MILITARY. HIS SUPPORTERS MAY HAVE ALREADY MADE INCURSIONS INTO NORTHERN BURUNDI FROM ZAIRE, LINKING UP WITH ARMED HARDLINE HUTU GROUPS THAT HAVE BEEN CLASHING OFF AND ON WITH THE TUTSI MILITARY. RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES HAVE ALSO CLASHED WITH THE BURUNDI MILITARY IN THE NORTH, AND POSSIBLY WITH RPA SOLDIERS CROSSING INTO BURUNDI.

REFUGEES. THERE ARE OVER 200,000 NEW RWANDAN HUTU REFUGEES IN BURUNDI, WHILE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OLD TUTSI REFUGEES HAVE RETURNED TO RWANDA SINCE THE RPF'S MILITARY VICTORY. SOME RWANDAN REFUGEES AND BURUNDI HUTUS HAVE BEEN FLEEING INTO TANZANIA, APPARENTLY AS A RESULT OF

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BURUNDI MILITARY HARASSMENT. THERE ARE OVER 300,000 NEW AND OLD BURUNDI REFUGEES LIVING PRIMARILY IN TANZANIA AND ZAIRE. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS REMAIN INTERNALLY DISPLACED FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1993 COUP ATTEMPT AND SUBSEQUENT ETHNIC MASSACRES THAT KILLED AN ESTIMATED 50,000.

U.S. AID. THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED OVER DOLLARS 60 MILLION IN RELIEF AID TO BURUNDI SINCE OCTOBER 1993. ASSISTANCE TOWARD RECONCILIATION INCLUDES: STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE SYG'S VERY EFFECTIVE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AHMEDOU ABDALLAH; DOLLARS 250,000 TO HELP THE OAU DEPLOY MILITARY OBSERVERS (40 OF 47 DEPLOYED SO FAR); DOLLARS 300,000 FOR THE UNHRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICES

PROGRAM; AND DOLLARS 5 MILLION IN FY-94 AND FY-95 FOR DEVELOPMENT AID, INCLUDING DEMOCRACY/GOVERNANCE FUNDING.

II. TALKING POINTS
ALL SIDES IN BURUNDI MUST EXERCISE MODERATION AND ACCEPT THE NEED FOR COHABITATION. ALL BURUNDIANS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ANY GROUP THAT SEEKS TO TAKE POWER BY FORCE WILL FIND ITSELF COMPLETELY ISOLATED.

WE HAVE SENT SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS TO BURUNDI. WE KNOW OTHERS HAVE DONE THE SAME; WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE CONTINUATION OF THIS PRACTICE.

UN SRSG ABDALLAH HAS DONE A VERY GOOD JOB, BUT HAS INDICATED HE MAY BE PLANNING TO MOVE ON NOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE.

THE UN NEEDS SOMEONE OF ABDALLAH'S SKILL AND EXPERIENCE IN BURUNDI.
WE ARE ALSO LOOKING AT PROPOSALS TO SEND FACILITATORS TO COMPLEMENT THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND OAU.

WE HAVE PROVIDED DOLLARS 250,000 FOR THE OAU MONITORS. WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE OAU TO FULLY DEPLOY AND HAVE ITS MONITORS PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

SPORADIC ETHNIC VIOLENCE CONTINUES, AND LOCAL HATE RADIOS ARE REPORTEDLY STILL BROADCASTING. BOTH GROUPS STILL HAVE REAL SECURITY CONCERNS. THE OAU MONITORS MAY HELP INSTILL SOME CONFIDENCE. ARE THERE OTHER INITIATIVES POSSIBLE? WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE RADIOS?

WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA AND BELIEVE THIS MAY HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT.
END TEXT.

6. LUANDA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

SPERO
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DTG:** 190314Z NOV 94

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKLD/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0000
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC 0000
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE 0000
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000

////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 312201

FOR A/S MOOSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF RWANDA BACKGROUND

REF: STATE 310789

1.
UQ FURTHER TO REFTEL, FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR THE NOVEMBER 22 RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP MEETING. ALL BUT ONE QPARA 6 HAVE BEEN
FULLY CLEARED AND FORWARDED TO U/S WIRTH'S OFFICE.

2.
UQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON REFUGEE CONFERENCE

BACKGROUND
RWANDA/BURUNDI REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE

PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE: TO FOCUS ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND PRACTICAL STEPS NEEDED TO PERMIT LARGE-SCALE REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN AND BURUNDI REFUGEES WHILE ALSO PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REGIONAL PLAYERS TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL CONTEXT QE.G., THE NEED TO AVOID RETURN TO OPEN WARFAREQ. THIS CONFERENCE WOULD BE DISTINCT FROM ANY ADDITIONAL REGIONAL SUMMITS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED.

SPECIFIC DESIRED OUTCOMES: WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CONCRETE,

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PER E.O. 13526
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8/19/15 KBH

PRAGMATIC PLANS ADOPTED FOR ADDRESSING STICKY ISSUES SUCH AS CAMP SECURITY, LAND TENURE QUESTIONS, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MECHANISMS, AND INDEMNIFICATION.

CHAIRS: UNHCR AND THE OAU HAVE AGREED TO CO-CHAIR.

TIMING: WE WANT TO SEE A PLENARY CONFERENCE HELD IN JANUARY WITH A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE TO BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF THE CALENDAR YEAR.

VENUE: THE GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI HAS AGREED TO HOST THE CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA. WE SUPPORT THIS AS A MEANS OF UNDERSCORING SUPPORT FOR THE GRB AND HELPING TO STABILIZE THE TENUOUS SITUATION THERE.

PARTICIPANTS: WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO UNHCR AND THE OAU THAT THE PREPCON INVOLVE WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS FROM THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WHO HAVE PREVIOUSLY PARTICIPATED IN SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS QRWANDA, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, TANZANIA, UGANDA, KENYA AND ZAMBIAQ; INTERESTED DONORS FROM THE FRIENDS OF RWANDA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP QUS, UK, GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, JAPAN, TUNISIA, CANADA, NETHERLANDS, THE EU, AND SWEDENQ; THE SYG'S SPECIAL ENVOY DILLON, THE SRSG KHAN, UNHCR, DHA, AND OTHER UN DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES AS THE UN SECRETARIAT DETERMINES; AND THE OAU. THE PLENARY SESSION WOULD THEN INVOLVE MINISTERIAL LEVEL OFFICIALS.

RESOURCES: AS NEITHER UNHCR NOR THE OAU HAS BUDGETED FOR SUCH A CONFERENCEQSQ, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS WILL NEED TO BE MADE BY DONORS TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT. NO COST ESTIMATES HAVE YET BEEN MADE AVAILABLE.

CURRENT STATE OF PLANNING: IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE OAU IS THINKING THAT THERE WILL BE TWO SEPARATE CONFERENCES STEMMING FROM TWO RESOLUTIONS--THE ONE PASSED AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN JUNE AND THE OTHER ONE PASSED AT UNGA. THE OAU CONFERENCE WOULD FOCUS ON REFUGEES AND TAKE PLACE IN MARCH, WHEREAS THE UN CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD COVER REFUGEES AND POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD TAKE PLACE SOMETIME IN JUNE, UNHCR HAS ASKED THE UN SECRETARIAT AND THE OAU TO SORT THIS OUT AS IT BELIEVES QAND WE AGREEQ THAT ONLY ONE REFUGEE CONFERENCE IS NEEDED. SALIM SALIM REPORTEDLY CONSIDERS THE CONFERENCE A HIGH PRIORITY AND IS PUSHING HIS STAFF TO MOVE PREPARATIONS FORWARD. THE OAU HAS ESTABLISHED A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO ORGANIZE THE CONFERENCE, BUT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MET YET. AN AIDE MEMOIRE WAS PREPARED WHICH OUTLINES A SERIES OF

OBJECTIVES, DOCUMENTATION, PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE OBJECTIVES FOCUS ON SPECIFICS SUCH AS PROTECTING REFUGEES, ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES, AND ENSURING SAFETY OF RETURNEES. WE ALSO

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SUGGESTED THAT THE OAU'S LIST OF PARTICIPANTS WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS.

TALKING POINTS -- REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE
O THE USG ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PROPOSED RWANDA/BURUNDI REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE. WE SEE THIS AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS ON THE DIPLOMATIC AND PRACTICAL STEPS NEEDED TO PERMIT LARGE-SCALE REPATRIATION OF RWANDAN AND BURUNDI REFUGEES AS WELL AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REGIONAL PLAYERS TO DISCUSS THE INESCAPABLE POLITICAL CONTEXT.

O WE ARE PUSHING THE OAU AND UNHCR TO HAVE A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND A PLENARY CONFERENCE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN JANUARY. BUJUMBURA SHOULD BE THE VENUE.

O WE WANT TO AVOID A CONFERENCE WHICH CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF SPEECHES WHICH DESCRIBE CURRENT EVENTS, THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES ON ASYLUM COUNTRIES, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.

O RATHER, WE ENVISION THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCES TO BE A DECLARATION OF A PLAN OF ACTION WHICH ENCOMPASSES PRAGMATIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOR ADDRESSING DIFFICULT ISSUES SUCH AS CAMP SECURITY, LAND TENURE QUESTIONS, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MECHANISMS, AND INDEMNIFICATION.

O WE NEED TO URGE THE OAU AND THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED TO CRAFT THE CONFERENCE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT REMAINS FOCUSED ON REALISTIC SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL REFUGEE PROBLEMS.

3.
UQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON CAMP SECURITY

BACKGROUND PAPER
SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

KEY FACTORS:
OVER TWO MILLION REFUGEES REMAIN OUTSIDE RWANDA, WITH SOME 850,000 IN THE GOMA, ZAIRE CAMPS. THE SECURITY OF REFUGEES AND OF RELIEF WORKERS AS WELL AS THE INTEGRITY OF THE RELIEF EFFORT ITSELF ARE PREOCCUPYING ISSUES.

REPATRIATION HAS BEEN HINDERED TO AN UNKOWN DEGREE BY

FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT OPERATIVES QFORMER OFFICIALS, MILITIA AND EX-FARQ.

INSECURITY AND CORRUPTION/MANIPULATION OF THE RELIEF EFFORT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE THE WORST IN ZAIRE. THE GOZ, WHICH SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH POLICING REFUGEE CAMPS AND DISARMING/CONTROLLING THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT OPERATIVES, IS CAPABLE OF NEITHER.

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THIS PROBLEM WAS HIGHLIGHTED RECENTLY BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 15 INTERNATIONAL NGOS, CITING THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF HAVING THEIR ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST REFUGEES ACTUALLY SUPPORT THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED GENOCIDE, THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE CAMPS UNLESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DOES "SOMETHING" TO BREAK THE CONTROL OF THE FORMER RWANDAN REGIME.

THE UN HAS CONSIDERED VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SECURITY, BUT HAS NOT YET COME TO A CONCLUSION ON A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION TO BE PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOR ON POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SOME KIND OF FORCE.

AMONG THE OPTIONS BEING CONSIDERED: 1
EXPAND UNAMIR'S
MANDATE SO TROOPS COULD OPERATE IN THE CAMPS QI.E.,
OUTSIDE RWANDA'S BORDERS; 2
AUTHORIZE A SEPARATE UN FORCE
WITH A SPECIFIC MANDATE; 3
ESTABLISH A UN RAPID
DEPLOYMENT FORCE; 4
UNHCR CONTRACTS FOR A PRIVATE GUARD
FORCE; AND 5
UNHCR'S IDEA OF FIELDING A COALITION OF
AFRICAN/WESTERN POLICE FORCES TO TRAIN, SUPERVISE AND WORK CLOSELY WITH ZAIRIAN POLICE.

UNHCR'S PLAN

-- UNHCR'S PLAN INVOLVES THE INTRODUCTION OF A MULTINATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD COME IN SUPPORT OF THE ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES. THE CONTINGENT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF POLICE/GENDARMES FROM FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT WOULD BE SOLICITED FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

-- WE SEE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ONE BEING THE TIME INVOLVED TO RECRUIT AND EQUIP MULTILATERAL POLICE AND THEN TRAIN ZAIRIAN POLICE. SUCH AN EFFORT NO DOUBT WOULD BE EQUIVALENT IN DIFFICULTY AND SLOWNESS TO TRYING TO OBTAIN

PEACE-KEEPING TROOPS FROM OTHER NATIONS. ANOTHER CONCERN IS THE ZAIRIAN POLICE AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CORRUPTION AND HARAVSMENT OF REFUGEES. IT IS ALSO NOT CLEAR UNDER WHAT AUTHORITIES SUCH A POLICE FORCE WOULD OPERATE.

USG PLAN QMAY NOT HAVE FULL UN SUPPORTQ

STEP ONE: CONTRACT GUARD FORCE

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WE BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE GROWING IMPATIENCE WITH MANIPULATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS THAT COULD SPARK MORE VIOLENCE, AND THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL AND/OR UN ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER CONTRACTING FOR COMMERCIAL GUARD SERVICES.

A CONTRACT GUARD FORCE, UNDER UNHCR'S DIRECTION, WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WORKERS; ENSURE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES; AND THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE REDUCE INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES WITHIN A COMPARATIVELY SHORT TIME-FRAME AND UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A UN GUARD OR ADDITIONAL/EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING FORCE COULD BE FIELDED.

SUCH A GUARD FORCE WOULD BE FUNDED BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR. THE FORCE WOULD COORDINATE ITS EFFORTS WITH THE ZAIRIAN POLICE WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARREST, DETENTION AND PROSECUTION.

STEP 2: UN BUBBLE FORCE

WHILE THE CONTRACT FORCE IS BEING HIRED AND PUT IN PLACE, EFFORTS SHOULD BEGIN TO HAVE A UN PEACE-KEEPING/GUARD FORCE AUTHORIZED AND STOOD UP.

A UN FORCE WOULD HAVE A BROADER MANDATE THAN THAT OF THE CONTRACT FORCE. IN ADDITION TO PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS, THE UN FORCE WOULD ALSO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS, ADDRESS DISARMAMENT, AND FACILITATE REPATRIATION. ARREST/DETENTION POWERS MAY ALSO BE NEEDED.

THE "BUBBLE" FORCE CONCEPT IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED; SEVERAL QUESTIONS STILL NEED TO BE ANSWERED, IT IS DESIGNED TO INSERT A MINIMUM OF 2-3 WELL TRAINED BATTALIONS, DEPLOYED FROM UN MEMBER STATES, INTO THE REFUGEE CAMP, TO SEPARATE THE EX-FAR AND MILITIA ELEMENTS FROM REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO RWANDA. THE FORCE WOULD ENSURE "SAFE PASSAGE" INTO RWANDA, WITH THE GOR AND

UNAMIR RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THEIR SAFETY ONCE REPATRIATED. THE "BUBBLE" WOULD COVER LIMITED AREAS AT A TIME, LEAVING ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES IN CHARGE BEHIND THEM.

THE U.S. HAS CONSULTED WITH UN OFFICIALS ON THIS, AND IS IN THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATING WITH SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS TO GAUGE RECEPTIVENESS TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT, AS WELL AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN SUCH AN EFFORT.

THE BELGIAN PLAN
THE BELGIANS WILL LIKELY RAISE THEIR CONCEPT FOR PROMOTING THE STABILIZATION OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI, AS PRESENTED TO A/S MOOSE. WHILE THE BELGIAN PLAN MENTIONS SECURITY IN THE CAMPS, IT PRIMARILY FOCUSES ON THE LONGER TERM NEED TO

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GET THE GOR TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE EX-FAR.

TALKING POINTS -- CAMP SECURITY

O WE ALL AGREE THAT THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, PARTICULARLY IN ZAIRE, IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SEE PEACE RESTORED TO RWANDA.

O THE UNSYG HAS YET TO PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF SEVERAL IDEAS BEING CONSIDERED.

O OUR VIEW IS THAT WE MUST ACT QUICKLY TO FORESTALL FURTHER VIOLENCE AND A RETURN TO OPEN WARFARE. WE NEED TO AGREE ON A PLANT GET IT ADOPTED BY THE UN AND IMPLEMENT IT.

O OUR IDEA INVOLVES TWO STEPS. THE FIRST STEP IS FOR UNHCR TO HIRE A CONTRACT GUARD FORCE WHICH COULD BE FIELDED QUICKLY--HOPEFULLY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THIS CONTRACT FORCE WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WORKERS; ENSURE EQUITABLE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES; ASSIST UNHCR IN CONDUCTING A REFUGEE REGISTRATION; AND THROUGH ITS PRESENCE REDUCE INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES.

O THE SECOND STEP IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE A NEW MANDATE -- EITHER BY EXPANDING UNAMIR'S MANDATE OR AUTHORIZING A SEPARATE MANDATE -- WITH, AT THE MINIMUM, ROBUST CHAPTER VI RULES. WE PROPOSE A "BUBBLE" CONCEPT, COMPRISED OF AT LEAST 2-3 COMPETENT BATTALIONS, WHEREBY ONE BATTALION WOULD PROVIDE DAYTIME SECURITY TO REFUGEES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF WORKERS, WHILE ANOTHER BATTALION QOR SEVERALQ WOULD MOVE FROM CAMP TO CAMP TO

PROVIDE FULL, 24-HOUR SECURITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD TO ALLOW REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO DEPART FREE OF INTIMIDATION FROM ANY EX-FAR OR MILITIA IN THE CAMP.

O BY PROVIDING SUCH A FORCE AND HOPEFULLY REDUCING THE INTIMIDATION OF THE EX-FAR, MILITIAS AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TEST THE AS-YET UNPROVEN HYPOTHESIS THAT THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES WOULD RETURN HOME IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE OVERWHELMING INTIMIDATION. OBVIOUSLY, DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS TO MORE LOCATIONS INSIDE RWANDA AND CONCRETE GOR STEPS TO ADDRESS LAND CLAIMS MUST BE PART OF THIS EFFORT.

O IF THIS PLAN IS TO WORK -- AND THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT IT WILL -- WE WILL NEED TO EXPAND ON IT QUICKLY, AND MOVE BOLDLY TO IMPLEMENT IT. IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BE IT GOVERNMENT OR NGO, IS INTERESTED IN MOVING RWANDA TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND PEACE, WE MUST SHOW IT BY OUR ACTIONS,

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4.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON UN COORDINATION

BACKGROUND: UN COORDINATION

I OBJECTIVE

DISCUSS THE UN'S ORGANIZATION OF ITS VARIOUS PROGRAMS IN RWANDA: HOW THE LINES OF AUTHORITY RUN, HOW THE MECHANISMS FOR CFRDINATION ARE MANAGED.

II. BACKGROUND

THE U.S. AND OTHER MAJOR DONOR-NATIONS HAVE BEEN QUIETLY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT A PERCEIVED LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG THE NUMEROUS UN PROGRAMS NOW OPERATING IN RWANDA. WE HAVE INQUIRED ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN'S LINES OF AUTHORITY IN-COUNTRY. THE ANSWERS HAVE BEEN PATCHY, WHICH IS ESPECIALLY DISTURBING IN LIGHT OF RISING TENSIONS IN THE CAMPS AND WITHIN RWANDA.

THIS MAY PROVE TO BE A PROBLEM AS THE UN EXPANDS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA. UN SPECIAL ENVOY TO RWANDA ROBERT DILLON QU.S.A.
CONFIDED HIS CONCERNS ON THIS TOPIC DURING A MEETING IN THE DEPARTMENT TWO WEEKS AGO. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE MET IN GENEVA WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SRSG KHAN, AND LATER WITH AMBASSADOR SPIEGEL. WE HAVE HEARD INFORMALLY THAT THE CLEAR MESSAGE EMERGING FROM THOSE CONSULTATIONS IS THAT BOUTROS-GHALI IS LOOKING TO THE SRSG

TO TAKE CHARGE OF UN PROGRAMS IN RWANDA, INCLUDING THE CONVENING OF VARIOUS CONFERENCES ON REGIONAL ISSUES TOUCHING RWANDA,

WE HAVE ALSO HEARD INFORMALLY THAT THE NEW UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR, RANDOLPH KENT QU.S.A.
, IS MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN PORTFOLIO AND MAY BE PLANNING TO INCLUDE SUCH NASCENT UN PROGRAMS AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS. DURING A RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, KENT EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY OF HIS OWN IN REGARD TO THE UN LINES OF AUTHORITY. HE ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY HIS RELATIONSHIP TO KHAN PRIOR TO DEPARTING; HE WAS TOLD IN NEW YORK THAT HE ANSWERS TO KHAN, BUT WAS CHOSEN BY AND WORKS FOR PETER HANSEN QDENMARKQ, UN UNDER SECRETARY FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. HANSEN IS ALSO IN CHARGE OF THE UN INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FOR RWANDA, WHICH IS INTENDED TO SUPPORT KHAN'S WORK FROM NEW YORK.

THOUGH WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES – AND POLITICAL CAPITAL – EXPENDED BY THE UN IN RWANDA AND THE REGION ARE WISELY AND EFFECTIVELY

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USED, WE SHOULD NOT FOCUS TOO NARROWLY ON THE COORDINATION ISSUE TO THE POSSIBLE DETRIMENT OF MORE SUBSTANTIVE ONES. AS THIS TOPIC IS INTENDED FOR A WORKING LUNCH, THE ATTACHED TALKING POINTS ARE COUCHED IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS INTENDED TO GENERATE DISCUSSION.

TALKING POINTS

O WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY IN AN OPERATION AS COMPLEX AS THE UN'S IN RWANDA.
O DO LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS QPARTICULARLY THE UN REPRESENTATIVE/SQ KNOW:
WHO HAS OVERARCHING AUTHORITY FOR UN PROGRAMS IN RWANDA?
WHO IS THE PRINCIPAL CONTACT IN NEW YORK?
WHAT IS THE THINKING BEHIND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TASK FORCE?
WHAT IS SPECIAL ENVOY ROBERT DILLON'S ROLE IN THE REGION, AS COMPARED TO SRSG KHAN'S?
WHAT UN ELEMENTS IN RWANDA WILL RANDOLPH KENT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR?
WILL THE SRSG HAVE DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERSIGHT OF THE PROGRAMS? OR WILL HE HAVE DEPUTIES FOR DETAILED MANAGEMENT?
DOES UNAMIR'S FORCE COMMANDER ANSWER DIRECTLY TO THE SRSG?
TO WHOM DOES RANDOLPH KENT REPORT?
O THIS MEETING IS INTENDED TO FACILITATE COORDINATION TO

BACK-STOP THE UN'S EFFORTS IN RWANDA.
0 ARE THERE CONCRETE WAYS IN WHICH WE, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, CAN ACT TO FURTHER OUR GOALS FOR THE UN?

5.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON THE ROLE OF UNAMIR.

BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUED ROLE OF UNAMIR
I. OBJECTIVES

DISCUSS TIMING OF THE UPCOMING UNAMIR MANDATE RENEWAL; ELICIT PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS ON POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR THE RENEWAL RESOLUTION.

II. BACKGROUND

THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA QUNAMIRQ IS NOW AT FULL STRENGTH, WITH 5,599 TROOPS AND HQ STAFF, 344 MILITARY OBSERVERS AND 80 CIVPOL. TWENTY-SIX COUNTRIES ARE REPRESENTED; THE U.S. DOES NOT PARTICIPATE. THE TROOPS AND MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH THE RPA WERE FOR A TIME INCREASINGLY CONFRONTATIONAL, BUT A SERIOUS INCIDENT BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT AND THE RPA CAUSED SOME REFLECTION ON THE NEED FOR UNAMIR TROOPS TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DISCRETION. THE RELATIONSHIP IS

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SOMEWHAT LESS TENSE NOW. SEVERAL OF THE NATIONAL CONTINGENTS MADE SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF SUPPORT, BUT THE UN HAS SOLVED OR IS SOLVING MANY OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS. THE U.S. HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR FULL DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS, AND HAS SUPPORTED THE OPERATION DIRECTLY BY PROVIDING AIRLIFT AND EQUIPMENT. THE BRITISH CONTINGENT WILL DEPART ON/ABOUT DECEMBER 1, WITH THE AUSTRALIANS AND CANADIANS FOLLOWING SHORTLY. UNAMIR WILL REMAIN AT FULL STRENGTH, HOWEVER, AS OTHER NATIONAL CONTINGENTS TAKE THEIR PLACE.

UNAMIR'S MANDATQ EXPIRES DECEMBER 9. HOWEVER, THE U.S. WILL PUSH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REVIEW THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S FORTHCOMING REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND ADDRESS THIS ISSUE EARLIER. WE EXPECT TO TABLE AND CALL TO VOTE A RESOLUTION ON RENEWAL NO LATER THAN NOVEMBER 30, WHICH IS THE LAST DAY THE U.S. PERMREP IS COUNCIL PRESIDENT. OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL PROPOSE EITHER EXPANDING UNAMIR TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNDER THE "BUBBLE" CONCEPT QSEE SEPARATE BACKGROUND PAPERQ FOR REFUGEE CAMP SECURITY, OR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. ON DECEMBER 1, RWANDA ITSELF BEGINS ITS MONTH AS SC PRESIDENT, POSTPONED FROM LAST SEPTEMBER.

WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT, I7 SEEMS HI6HLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE PERMREP OF A COUNTRY SO GREATLY AFFECTED BY A RESOLUTION TO LEAD THE DISCUSSION AND VOTING ON IT. THE NEED FOR EXPEDITIOUS ACTION TO ADDRESS CAMP SECURITY PROBLEMS IS ANOTHER REASON TO ACT ON THE EXTENSION AND REVISION OF THE MANDATE EARLY.

THE COUNCIL WILL MOST LIKELY RENEW THE MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS. AS WELL, THE SC MAY HAVE TO RAISE UNAMIR'S TROOP CEILING FROM FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF 5,500. AT MINIMUM, THE CEILING MUST BE RAISED TO 6,500 TO ACCOMMODATE LENGTHY PERIODS WHEN THE NUMBERS INCREASE FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS. WE MAY ALSO HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE THE EXPANSION OF UNAMIR BY ROUGHLY 2,500 TROOPS, IF THE COUNCIL CHOOSES THE "BUBBLE" CONCEPT AND IF AN EXPANSION OF UNAMIR IS THE METHOD BY WHICH THESE NEW PEACEKEEPERS WILL BE DEPLOYED. THE RESOLUTION WILL ENGENDER SOME CONTROVERSY MOVING THROUGH THE USG AND IN THE COUNCIL, AS WE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE FORCED TO ADDRESS IN CONCRETE WAYS THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF CAMP SECURITY.

WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT UNAMIR IS FULLY AND EFFECTIVELY DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT RWANDA, AS THIS IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF WHATEVER SECURITY OPERATION IS CHOSEN FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS. IN THIS REGARD, THE OPERATION'S LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR OTHER KEY OPERATIONS, SUCH AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, IS CRITICAL.

TALKING POINTS

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O UNAMIR'S MANDATE EXPIRES DECEMBER 9; THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THAT DATE TO REVIEW, REVISE AND EXTEND THE MANDATE.
O THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE REFUGEE AND DISPLACED-PERSON CAMPS IS RISING.
O WE NEED TO CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY THE PROPOSALS THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL SHORTLY PRESENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
O THE U.S. FAVORS THE IDEA OF TWO BATTALIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS QNOT NECESSARILY ATTACHED TO UNAMIRQ PROVIDING COMPLETE SECURITY TEMPORARILY AT VARIOUS CAMP LOCATIONS, ALLOWING REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS TO LEAVE WITHOUT INTIMIDATION BY THE EX-FAR OR HUTU MILITIA ELEMENTS NOW IN CONTROL.
O WE HOPE TO PRESENT A RESOLUTION ON THESE ISSUES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL NEXT WEEK,
O WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF THIS GATHERING.
O WE BELIEVE THAT FULL AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR

INSIDE RWANDA IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF WHATEVER SECURITY OPERATION IS UNDERTAKEN IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
O IN THIS REGARD, WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT UNAMIR IS FULLY DEPLOYED WITHIN RWANDA, AND IS PROVIDING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO SUCH KEY PROGRAMS AS THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS.
O OUR PERCEPTION IS THAT THE LEVEL OF TENSION BETWEEN UNAMIR TROOPS AND THE RPA HAS ABATED SOMEWHAT, MUCH TO THE CREDIT OF UNAMIR'S LEADERSHIP.
O DO OTHERS SHARE THAT PERCEPTION?

6.
CQ BEGIN BRIEFER ON RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE QDRAFT ONLY014PRECEDENCE = O038CLASS = ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 015OSRI = RUEHC 020DTG = 190314Z NOV 94

BACKGROUND: RWANDA RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE

REBUILDING THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM IS A LONG-TERM PROCESS; IT WILL TAKE YEARS TO GET THE LAW SCHOOL FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, TO TRAIN THE LAWYERS, MAGISTRATES AND LEGAL OFFICIALS NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF A FAIR LEGAL SYSTEM AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, TO FIT THE LEGAL SYSTEM INTO A FUNCTIONING AND RESPECTED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. SATISFYING THESE LONG-TERM, DEMOCRACY-BUILDING OBJECTIVES WILL REQUIRE A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

HOWEVER, THE GOR FACES IMMEDIATE NEEDS IN GETTING ITS LEGAL SYSTEM UP AND RUNNING. AT ONE LEVEL, THE RWANDAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE NEEDS THE PHYSICAL TOOLS – DESKS, PAPER, COMPUTERS, ETC. – NECESSARY FOR ITS MOST BASIC FUNCTIONS. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, THE GOR FACES THREE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES TO ITS DEVASTATED LEGAL SYSTEM:
1

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TRYING AND PUNISHING OR FREEING MOST OF THE APPROXIMATELY 5000 PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING THE CIVIL WAR QTHE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL WILL ONLY PROSECUTE A SMALL FRACTION OF THESE CASESQ;
2
RESOLVING THE PROPERTY DISPUTES THAT WILL ARISE BETWEEN RETURNING "NEW" REFUGEES AND REPATRIATING "OLD" REFUGEES; AND Q3
DEALING WITH THE DAILY CRIME AND VIOLENCE ENDEMIC TO ANY SOCIETY. THE GOR'S MOST PRESSING NEED IN ADDRESSING EACH OF THESE CHALLENGES IS LOCATING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ADEQUATELY TRAINED MAGISTRATES TO HANDLE THE CONSTANTLY RISING CASELOAD.

DONOR PLANS TO ADDRESS LEGAL SYSTEM NEED

THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD INTEREST AMONG THE DONORS IN

ASSISTING THE GOR REBUILD ITS LEGAL SYSTEM. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S., THE BELGIANS, SWISS, THE U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE U.S, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS HAVE ALL EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO HELP THE RWANDANS IN THIS EFFORT. BEFORE PROVIDING ANY LEGAL REFORM ASSISTANCE, THESE POTENTIAL DONORS INTEND TO ASSESS THE STATUS AND NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM. BETWEEN NOW AND CHRISTMAS, EACH DONOR, EXCEPT THE U.S., HAS PLANS TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT TRIP TO RWANDA. AN INITIAL OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE INFORMATION FROM THESE ASSESSMENTS AND BEGIN TO COORDINATE THE DONORS' LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS WILL OCCUR AT THE UNDP'S NEXT RWANDA ROUNDTABLE MEETING IN GENEVA ON DECEMBER 14-15.

U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE

THE U.S. IS WORKING TO ADDRESS BOTH THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF REESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA. THE USAID MISSION IN KIGALI IS PRESENTLY USING DOLLARS 600,000 OF EXISTING FUNDS QFY94??
TO PURCHASE THE HARDWARE, DESKS AND MATERIAL NECESSARY TO GET THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE UP AND RUNNING. RATHER THAN SENDING OUT AN ADDITIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM ASSESSMENT TEAM, USAID HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO PLACE SOMEONE ON THE UNDP'S ASSESSMENT TEAM WHICH WILL BE IN RWANDA FROM NOVEMBER 22 TO DECEMBER 2 AND IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A REPORT PREPARED BY THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER. IN THE INTERIM, USAID IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING FOREIGN JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES TO WORK IN RWANDA AND HELP ALLEVIATE THE BACKLOG OF CASES, TO ADDRESS THE RISING TIDE OF PROPERTY DISPUTES, UNDP'S ASSESSMENT WILL TEST THE POSSIBILITY OF USING ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN THE SHORT TERM, AND USAID IS EXPLORING

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MORE LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS SUCH AS ENGAGING THE WISCONSIN LAND TENURE CENTER IN DEVELOPING A LAND REGISTRY SYSTEM FOR RWANDA.

TALKING POINTS:
O THE U.S. HAS MADE REBUILDING THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM A PRIORITY FOR ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA. IF THE REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS ARE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES, THE GOR MUST SHOW THAT IT IS OPERATING UNDER THE RULE OF LAW, WHERE CONFLICTS CAN BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY IN A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM.

O WE ARE PRESENTLY PURCHASING MATERIAL NECESSARY TO GET THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE UP AND RUNNING. WE ARE ALSO

EXPLORING WAYS TO HELP THE RWANDANS FIND A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION FOR TRYING THE MANY PRISONERS ACCUSED OF CRIMES DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND DEALING WITH THE MORE ROUTINE PROBLEM OF CRIME IN THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, WE ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF LAND TENURE DISPUTES.

O I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS LEGAL SYSTEM ASSESSMENT TRIPS PLANNED OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. RATHER THAN ADD TO THHS, THE U.S. HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNDP'S ASSESSMENT VISIT WHICH STARTS TOMORROW.

O THESE ASSESSMENT TRIPS WILL PLACE A PREMIUM ON COORDINATING OUR ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. OUR COORDINATION MUST GO BEYOND SIMPLY TELLING EACH OTHER WHAT PROGRAMS WE INTEND TO FUND. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE NEEDS OF THE RWANDAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THEN DETERMINE HOW, AS A GROUP, WE CAN BEST MEET THESE NEEDS. THIS CAN BE DONE EITHER HERE AT FUTURE SUPPORT GROUP MEETINGS OR AT THE UNDP ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS.

BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS: RWANDAN RULE OF LAW

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED,

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Rwanda

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG

PREC: ROUTINE **CLASS:** ~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~ **DTG:**231259Z NOV 94

FM: AMEMBASSY KIGALI

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0495

RUEHLGB/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 002299

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, SCUL, PREF, KDEM, MOPS, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA'S TUTSIS: A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE LOOKING GLASS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE RETURF OF THE TUTSI DIASPORA HAS NOT CREATED A HOMOGENOUS MASS. THE RETURNEES BEAR THE LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STAMP OF THEIR MOST RECENT COUNTRY OF SOJOURN, AND THIS HAS CREATED STRAINS AMONG THEM AND GENERATED NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES. THESE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES ARE BALANCED AGAINST THE CENTRIPETAL FACT OF THE GENOCIDE. THE DEEPLY TRAUMATIZED TUTSI POPULATION HAS IN REACTION ASSEMBLED IN DISCRETE ENCLAVES, A PROCESS SUPPORTED BY HARDLINERS BUT NOT OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED BY EITHER THE GOR OR THE RPF. THE MOST EXTREME ELEMENTS MAY DREAM OF A NEW TUTSILAND, BUT THE MORE PRAGMATIC MAJORITY REALIZES THAT NUMBERS AND ECONOMIC REALITIES MILITATE AGAINST THIS. THE TUTSIS ARE DETERMINED NOT TO FALL UNDER HUTU DOMINATION AND THE RENEWED THREAT OF ETHNIC EXTERMINATION AGAIN; THE HUTU COMMUNITY IS EQUALLY OPPOSED TO RENEWED TUTSI PRIMACY. EACH SIDE SEES ITSELF AS THE HISTORICAL VICTIM AND SEEKS REDRESS AND INTERNATIONAL APPROBATION. THIS ATTITUDE LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR MEANINGFUL RECONCILIATION. END SUMMARY.

3. THE DIASPORA COMES HOME

THE TUTSIS WHO FLED ABROAD IN THE VIOLENT UPHEAVALS OF 1959, 1968, AND 1972-1973 AND THEIR OFFSPRING ARE BACK IN FORCE. THE AUTHOR HAS CHANCED UPON OLD ACQUAINTANCES FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE STREETS OF KIGALI: (b)(6)

THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EVEN GREATER VOLUME

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WHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ANGLOPHONE EAST AFRICA. THERE ARE CONFLICTING FIGURES FOR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF "OLD" RETURNEES, BUT A SAFE ESTIMATE LIES BETWEEN 400,00 AND 600,000.

4. THE TOWER OF BABEL SYNDROME

THE HOMECOMING HAS NOT CREATED A SEAMLESS TUTSI FRONT. RETURNEES, ESPECIALLY THOSE BORN OR RAISED ABROAD, HAVE BROUGHT BACK DIFFERENT MINDSETS, HABITS AND VALUES. THE MOST GLARING DIVIDE IS LINGUISTIC, CENTERED UPON THE ANGLOPHONE-FRANCOPHONE RIFT. ON THE SURFACE, THIS MANIFESTS ITSELF IN PUBLIC EVENTS WHERE FIFTY PER CENT OF THE AUDIENCE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IT BEING SAID AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THE BRIDGING LANGUAGE, KINYARWANDA, WORKS FOR INTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS CABINET MEETINGS BUT AT PUBLIC OCCASIONS LEAVES FOREIGNERS IN THE DARK. ADD TO THIS STEW A SMATTERING OF SWAHILI AND YOU HAVE RADIO KIGALI, A POLYGLOT'S FEAST.

5. A LINGUISTIC MINORITY, THE ANGLOPHONES NONETHELESS ENJOY DISPROPORTIONATE POLITICAL POWER. A FAIR NUMBER OF RPF LEADERS ARE BILINGUAL IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH, BUT SENIOR RPF/RPA ANGLOPHONES COMPRISE A VIRTUAL WHO'S WHO OF THE POLICY APPARATUS: KAGAME, INYUMBA, KAREMERA, MAZIMHAKA, ET AL. KAGAME IN PARTICULAR IS SENSITIVE TO THE LINGUISTIC PROBLEM AND HAS GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO TELL BELGIAN FRANCOPHONE OFFICIALS THAT HE INTENDS TO LEARN FRENCH AND SCHOOL HIS CHILDREN IN THE LANGUAGE.

6. THE LINGUISTIC FISSURE SPLITS ALONG SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND IDEOLOGICAL LINES AS WELL. MANY FRANCOPHONE TUTSIS WERE SALARIED CITY DWELLERS: BUSINESSMEN, EDUCATORS, THE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS. UGANDAN ANGLOPHONE TUTSIS WERE WELL REPRESENTED IN THE PROFESSIONS, BUT MANY OF THEM FOLLOWED OLD PASTORALIST TRADITIONS, A TRAIT COMMON TO THE TUTSIS OF RUTSHURU AND MASISI IN NORTH KIVU AND IN THE RWANDAN COLLINES.

7. RELIGION IS ANOTHER CLEAR DIVIDE. FRANCOPHONE TUTSIS ARE OVERWHELMINGLY CATHOLIC IN BELIEF AND PRACTICE. THE RELIGION DID NOT FOLLOW THE DIASPORA NORTH INTO UGANDA; AS A RESULT, PROTESTANT AND LIMITED MUSLIM INFLUENCES SPREAD AMONG THIS GROUP. THERE ARE ALSO MANY NON-BELIEVERS, A RARE PHENOMENON IN RWANDA.

8. THE DIFFERENT NATIONAL BACKGROUNDS CAN ALSO BE CHARTED THROUGH DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL VALUES. THE ANGLOPHONE 59ERS HAVE PROMOTED THE NOTION OF "THE BANYARWANDA PEOPLE" WITHOUT DISTINCTION TO ETHNIC BACKGROUND, A DIVISIVE PRACTICE THAT THEY BLAME ON COLONIAL POLITICS. THE ZAIRE AND BURUNDI 73ERS – THE LATTER ESPECIALLY, HAVING LIVED THROUGH THE RECENT ETHNIC FLARE-UPS IN THAT COUNTRY – ARE VISIBLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE RPF PARTY LINE. THE SURVIVING RWANDAN TUTSIS WE HAVE SPOKEN

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WITH DO NOT COUNTENANCE IT AT ALL.

9. THIS WELTER OF LANGUAGES, CUSTOMS AND ATTITUDES HAS CREATED CONFUSION, FRICTION, AND FERTILE GROUND FOR STEREOTYPES. TUTSI SURVIVORS COMPLAIN THAT THEY PAID FOR THE RPF VICTORY WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR FAMILIES AND GOODS; THEY RESENT INSINUATIONS FROM HARDLINE RETURNEES THAT MANY OF THEM SURVIVED THROUGH COLLABORATION. THE BURUNDIANS, WHO HELPED FINANCE THE RPF MILITARY CAMPAIGN< HAVE RUSHED IN TO SET UP BUSINESSES AND SEIZE LAND AND PROPERTY. THEY ARE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 002299

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VIEWED BY "NATIVE" RWANDANS – BOTH HUTU AND TUTSI – AS AGGRESSIVE CARPETBAGGERS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT ZAIRE HAS HAD A DELETERIOUS EFFECT UPON THE BUSINESS ETHICS OF TUTSIS RETURNED FROM THERE. THE CATHOLIC FRANCOPHONES COMPLIMENT THE GOOD MANNERS OF UGANDAN RETURNEES BUT FREQUENTLY LABEL THEM – ESPECIALLY THE RPF – "ATHEISTS", LEFTIST IDEOLOGUES, AND ANTI-FEMINIST THROWBACKS TO AN EARLIER TIME. WE HAVE HEARD NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FROM FRANCOPHONE TUTSI WOMEN ABOUT THE NEGATIVE ANGLOPHONE ATTITUDES TOWARD SHORT SKIRTS AND THE FRENCH-INSPIRED HABIT OF EXCHANGING KISSES IN GREETING.

10. CIRCLE THE WAGONS ANYWAY

AN ANECDOTE WILL SERVE THE POINT. A TUTSI WOMAN WHO HAS NEVER LIVED OUTSIDE OF RWANDA (AND WHO LOST EVERY MEMBER OF HER IMMEDIATE NATAL FAMILY IN THE GENOCIDE) RECENTLY DESCRIBED THE SITUATION WHEN SHE RETURNED TO KIGALI FROM BYUMBA, WHERE SHE HAD SOUGHT REFUGE BEHIND RPA LINES DURING THE APRIL TO JUNE PERIOD. (b)(6) WAS LIVING IN HER HOUSE, WHICH HAD BEEN PARTIALLY LOOTED. WHEN SHE EXPLAINED HER PLIGHT, THE LIEUTENANT OFFERED TO MOVE OUT AND GIVE HER ALL THE FURNITURE IN THE HOUSE, MUCH OF WHICH HAD BEEN LOOTED ELSEWHERE. SHE SAID THAT (b)(6) A MUSLIM, WAS DEEPLY OFFENDED AT THE HOUSE "REWARMING" DINNER IN HIS HONOR BECAUSE UNBEKNOWNST TO HIM, SHE HAD PUT PORK IN THE POT OF BEANS, A TRADITIONAL RWANDAN RECIPE.

(b)(6)

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12. BITTER THOUGH THEY MAY BE, SUCH DIVISIONS ARE OVERSHADOWED BY THE FACT OF THE GENOCIDE AND THE EMOTION IT ENGENDERS IN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY. FEAR AND LOATHING IS NOT TOO STRONG A TERM. TUTSI AND TO A LESSER DEGREE MODERATE HUTU FACTIONAL DIFFERENCES ARE IMMEDIATELY LAID ASIDE WHEN THE GENOCIDE WORD IS SPOKEN. THE FLOODGATES OF ANECDOTAL ATROCITY OPEN; THE LIST OF DEAD FAMILY AND FRIEND REELS OUT. THERE IS OUTRAGE AND IMMEDIATE SOLIDARITY ON THE NEED TO METE OUT JUSTICE TO THOSE WHO PLANNED AND DROVE THE KILLING. AN UNSPOKEN CURRENT OF REVENGE UNDERLIES.

13. THE FEAR WITHIN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY MATCHES ITS ANGER. FOR MODERATE HUTUS, WHO FEAR HARM FROM BOTH HUTU AND TUTSI EXTREMES, THE FEAR PREVAILS.

14. THE QUESTION OF GREATER TUTSILAND

AS THE TUTSIS RETURN, THERE IS THE ENIGMA OF WHAT THESE RETICENT PEOPLE ACTUALLY INTEND. OUR CONVERSATIONS HAVE REVEALED A CONFUSING DIVERGENCE OF VIEW. THE EXTREMIST FRINGE OF THE RPF/RPA CLEARLY DESIRES TUTSI DOMINATION OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. MO
RE MODERATE ELEMENTS CALL FOR POWER-
SHARING WITH MODERATE HUTUS AND A NATIONWIDE RECONCILIATION AT SOME STILL UNDEFINED LEVEL. NO TUTSI WE HAVE SPOKEN TO – AND FEW HUTU – SUPPORTS THE PARTICIPATION OF HUTU HARDLINERS AT ANY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT.

15. THE EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THE GROUPING OF RETURNING TUTSIS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AND IN URBAN AREAS. KIGALI IS OVERFLOWING WITH NEWLY ARRIVED TUTSIS, AS IS BUTARE. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF TUTSIS CONGREGATING AROUND KIBUNGO AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST. A LARGE NUMBER OF TUTSIS PASTORALISTS HAVE GATHERED IN THE OPEN SAVANNAH AREAS NEAR THE AKAGERA PARK IN THE NORTHEAST. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS IS PART OF A LARGER PLAN TO CARVE OUT A GREATER "TUTSILAND".

16. CERTAIN EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS OUTCOME, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY PRESENTLY CONTROL EITHER GOR OR RPF POLICY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT (b)(6) NUMBERS AMONG THESE. HE ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED THE RAPID MOVEMENT OF LARGE NUMBER OF RWANDAN TUTSIS CIRCA 1959 AND 1973 FROM BUJUMBURA TO THE AREA AROUND BUTARE, THE TUTSI HEARTLAND IN THE COLONIAL AND PRECOLONIAL ERAS. WE ARE CERTAIN – ALTHOUGH WE CAN OFFER NO HARD PROOF – THAT THE RPF APPROVED IF NOT ORCHESTRATED THE RAPID RETURN OF THE DIASPORA TO REBUILT ITS TUTSI CONSTITUENCY, WHICH HAD BEEN DECIMATED BY THE GENOCIDE.

17. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE RPF, AND CERTAINLY NOT THE GOR AT LARGE, HAS SET OUT TO DRIVE THE HUTU POPULATION INTO EXILE. MORE LIKELY EXPLANATIONS OF THE

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GROUPING PHENOMENON ARE VOCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, PREFERENCE FOR URBAN ENVIRONMENTS, AND STRENGTH IN NUMBERS. A VISIT TO THE VAST, ROLLING GRASSLANDS OF THE AKAGERA SUFFICES TO

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EXPLAIN THE ASSEMBLAGE OF TUTSI PASTORALISTS FROM UGANDA AND THEIR ANKOLE HERDS. BUJUMBURA AND KINSHASA RETURNEES CAME TO KIGALI AND BUTARE BECAUSE THEY ARE URBANITES FROM YOUTH, NOT FARMERS OR HERDERS, AND HAVE NO SKILLS FOR SURVIVING IN THE COLLINES. THERE IS FINALLY THE PHENOMENON OF SECURITY IN NUMBERS. SEVERAL OF OUR "NATIVE RWANDAN" TUTSI INTERLOCUTORS ADMIT THAT THEY ARE AFRAID TO LIVE AS A MINORITY AMONG HUTUS IN OUTLYING AREAS AND FOR NOW WILL NOT RETURN TO THEIR FORMER ABODES.

18. OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR GOR AND RPF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS REVEAL UNDERLYING POLITICAL REALISM. MOST ARE AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN GOVERN ONLY WITH SOME LEVEL OF COOPERATION FROM THE MAJORITY HUTU POPULATION, WHICH MEANS MORE THAN TOKEN HUTU PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNANCE PROCESS. THE RPF FORMED THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WITH THIS IN MIND, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW MUCH POWER THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER NON-RPF HUTU ELEMENTS REALLY WIELD. ON PAPER, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THAT WILL CONVENE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON NOVEMBER 25 COULD YIELD A MAJORITY OPPOSITION COALITION AND A HUTU ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. ON ANOTHER LEVEL, TUTSI TECHNOCRATS IN GOR MINISTRIES UNDERSTAND THAT RWANDA'S AGRARIAN-BASED ECONOMY CANNOT RECOVER UNLESS THE HUTU FARMERS RETURN TO THEIR FIELDS. EVERYONE REALIZES THAT SECURITY AND STABILITY WILL REMAIN BEYOND REACH UNTIL THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON THE BORDERS IS SOMEHOW RESOLVED.

19. DOMINATION AND VICTIMIZATION, RECONCILIATION AND GUILT

THE RPF LEADERSHIP MAY REALIZE THE NEED TO BRING THE HUTUS INTO THE PROCESS, BUT WE DO NOT THINK THAT THEY INTEND FOR THE HUTU TO RUN IT. QUERIES TO TUTSI LEADERSHIP ABOUT EVENTUAL POPULAR ELECTIONS INEVITABLY ELICITS EVASION, CAUTIONS ABOUT MOVING DELIBERATELY AND WAITING UNTIL JUSTICE HAS BEEN SERVED AND THE MOMENT IS RIPE. TUTSI CONTACTS OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT ARE LESS NUANCED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY DO NOT EVER AGAIN INTEND TO FIND THEMSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE THE HUTU MAJORITY CAN DOMINATE THEM AND EXTERMINATE THEM IF IT SO CHOOSES. THE MOST VOCAL CLAIM THEY ARE PREPARED TO PAY THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST
S
OF KEEPING THE HUTU REFUGEES OUTSIDE OF RWANDA, IF THE CONDITIONS OF RETURN ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE.

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20. OUR SOUNDINGS OF THE HUTU POPULATION HAVE BEEN LESS DEEP LARGELY BECAUSE SO MUCH OF THE LEADERSHIP IS IN IDP CAMPS OR ABROAD. HOWEVER, CONVERSATIONS WITH MODERATE HUTUS HERE IN KIGALI HAVE TAPPED A DEEP WELL OF RESENTMENT AT WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE HARDLINE TUTSI DETERMINATION TO DOMINATE. AMPLE REPORTING FROM THE OUTSIDE CAMPS INDICATE THAT FEELINGS RUN EVEN STRONGER THERE: THE EXTREMISTS IN PARTICULAR PREFER EXILE AND EVENTUAL RENEWED WARFARE TO LIFE IN RWANDA UNDER TUTSIS AND THE RPF.

21. UNDERPINNING THIS IS THE WIDESPREAD REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE AND, IN MANY CASES, INDIVIDUAL GUILT. WHEN ONE MENTIONSHAT THE RPF INVASION IN 1990 LAUNCHED THE MOST RECENT CYCLE OF VIOLENCE, TUTSI HACKLES TEND TO RISE. THEY PORTRAY THE INVASION AS A NECESSARY MEASURE TO REDRESS THREE DECADES OF HUTU INTIMIDATION AND DISCRIMINATION, CITE THE GOOD FAITH SHOWN BY THE RPF AT THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND DECLARE THEMSELVES BLAMELESS. MODERATE HUTUS, ALMOST ALL OF WHOM SUFFERED LOSSES IN THE GENOCIDE AND WAR, CLAIM TO BE THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF BOTH EXTREMES. REPORTING FROM THE CAMPS INDICATES THAT THE ELEMENTS THERE WHO PERPETRATED THE GENOCIDE SHOW LITTLE REMORSE FOR THEIR MISDEEDS AND MUCH ANGER AT THE TUTSIS/RPF, WHOM THEY ACCUSE OF UNJUSTLY DRIVING THEM INTO A HARSH EXILE. HEALING WILL BE HARD TO BROKER UNTIL SUCH ATTITUDES CHANGE. IN A WORLD OF VICTIMS WITHOUT VICTIMIZERS AND WRONGDOING WITHOUT GUILT, RECONCILIATION IS A WISHFUL WORD.

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DATE-TIME 13 December 94 19:40

FROM Rice, Susan E.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~ My paper

TO Andricos, George M.
Blinken, Antony J.
Danvers, William C.
Funches, Christina L.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

[[104PKO.DOC : 4936 in 104PKO.DOC]]
Give comments to Randy asap, pls.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 13 December 94 19:39

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 104PKO.DOC

Deputies Committee Discussion Paper
Peacekeeping Policy and the 104th Congress

The Deputies will discuss the financial, policy and political challenges the Adminis
tration faces in trying to maintain
support for UN peacekeeping during the Republican-controlled 104th Congress as well
as appropriate next steps.

I. The New Legislative Landscape

The Ghost of Congress Past: The UN and peacekeeping proved highly contentious issu
es in the 103rd
Congress. The Administration faced sustained, often bipartisan criticism for its ma
nagement of crises in
Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti. The GOP, sensing the Administration's increasing vulnera
bility, worked to transform
support for the UN into a partisan issue, despite President Bush's record of strong support for the UN and his

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decisions to initiate the bulk of the new missions that led to the rapid growth in p eacekeeping costs. Additionally,
members of both parties joined forces to protest soaring peacekeeping costs and impo
se UN financial and
management reforms.

From the latter months of 1993 through the Spring of 1994, the Administration fought
numerous amendments to
restrict participation of U.S. forces in UN missions and limit funding for peacekee
ping. On mainly party-line
votes, the Administration defeated or diluted the most detrimental initiatives, incl uding the Nickles amendment on
command and control, much of the Dole Peace Powers Act, and the Michel/Gingrich/Hyde
/Gilman/Spence
amendment that would have effectively prohibited payments of all future UN peacekeep
ing assessments.

Following release of PDD-25, the intensity of opposition in Congress subsided somewh
at, enabling the
Administration to obtain an authorization and full appropriation of its FY 95 peacek
eeping request and a $670
million FY 94 supplemental. Yet, despite an affirmative vote in the Senate (with ei
ght Republicans supporting), the
Administration failed to obtain Congressional support even for a modified version of
shared responsibility. The
Armed Services committees merely agreed to revisit the issue in the next Congress.

Peacekeeping in the 104th Congress: The substantially partisan pattern of voting i n 1993-1994, coupled with the
Republicans' sustained rhetorical campaign, are bad omens for peacekeeping in the co
ming Congress. We no
longer have the votes to defeat restrictive amendments. We are unlikely to muster s
ignificant bipartisan support
to defeat GOP leadership-sponsored legislation; hence, we will either have to modera
te crippling amendments,
accept them, or veto the bills to which they are attached. The GOP Contract With Am

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erica (described below)
reveals the Republicans' determination to force us to make such tough choices.

Moreover, the Republican members who will hold leadership positions and chair key co
mmittees and
subcommittees are among the most strident opponents of the UN and peacekeeping. Sen
ator Dole and
Speaker-designate Gingrich both sponsored highly restrictive, anti-peacekeeping legi
slation in the last Congress.
Apart from Senator Hatfield, incoming chair of the Appropriations Committee and a UN
supporter, we can expect
little cooperation from influential Chairmen. Senators Helms, Thurmond, Pressler, M
cConnell, and Domenici are
all key chairmen who are likely to oppose sustained support for the UN. In the Hous
e, Representatives Livingston
(Appropriations Chair), Rogers, Spence and possibly Gilman are likely to remain form
idable opponents of
peacekeeping.

Taken together, these factors indicate we will have a far more difficult time in the new Congress in obtaining UN
funding, fending-off hostile legislation, sustaining support for current UN missions
and building support for
potential new missions.

II. Our Immediate Challenges

Funding Forecast and Implications

As soon as Congress begins consideration of the budget, we face challenges to our pe
acekeeping funding requests.

Arrears: By the end of this fiscal year, State estimates we will have accumulated a
pproximately $800 million in
peacekeeping arrears. (The paper at Tab __ outlines the current and projected statu
s of U.S. payments to the
UN.) Given the difficulty we experienced in funding our arrears last year, plus th
e absence of any "budget
headroom" this year and the growing perception that peacekeeping is effectively

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an
Executive branch entitlement
program, the chances of obtaining any funds to pay our arrears are almost nil. Neve
rtheless, we must try hard.

FY 96 Budget Request: Congress is unlikely to appropriate funds to cover our total
projected requirements in FY
96. While it is crucial that the Administration fulfill our treaty obligations and request full funding, we must

anticipate that Congress will under-fund our FY 96 requirement, perhaps substantiall
y, thereby compounding
our arrears problem. Moreover, assuming we not be able to negotiate within the UN
for a reduction of our
peacekeeping assessment to 25%, our legal (if unacknowledged) arrears will grow by m
ore than $200 million
annually starting in FY 96 when Congress imposes the mandated 25% cap.

Shared Responsibility: As a necessary first step in implementing the President's po
licy, the Administration has
decided to budget in FY 96 according to the Nunn version of shared responsibility, w
herein DOD would pay
assessments only for those missions involving U.S. combat forces (i.e. Haiti and Mac
edonia at present). DOD
has committed to fund contingencies in this category up to $600 million per annum.
While we did obtain
bipartisan support in the Senate for shared responsibility last year, we failed even to carry a majority of
Democrats on the House Armed Services Committee. In fact, the House passed legislat
ion prohibiting use of any
DOD funds for UN assessments. We face a serious uphill battle to reconstitute suppo
rt in the Senate as well as to
build support in the House this session for shared responsibility.

If we cannot pay our arrears during the next two years and Congress under-funds our
FY 96 requirement, U.S.
indebtedness will force the UN into a veritable cash flow crisis at some point over

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the next two years, most likely
in the Spring of 1996. The only way to avert this outcome is radical cost savings m
easures, which are discussed
below. The political and practical ramifications of an impending cash flow crisis a
re severe:

ù UN peacekeeping missions may grind to a halt. As its cash dwindles, the UN will c
ease payments in
roughly the following order:

1. Troop Contributors: who eventually will refuse to participate in new missions, as
happened in
FY 94, and/or withdraw from existing missions.
2. UN Services: i.e. cuts in utilities and specialized services like translation.
3. Reimbursements to Countries that have provided the UN goods and services. (As a m
ajor
supplier to the UN, the U.S. would suffer directly.)
4. Payments to Commercial Contractors for food, fuel, transport etc. will be delayed
or not
made at all. When this occurs, some or all missions could no longer function effect
ively.
(N.B.: U.S. companies provide over 27% of the goods and services purchased commercia
lly
by UN HQ.)

ù Pressure will build to avoid UN peacekeeping through resort to MNFs. The Secretar
y General has
already signaled his growing preference for utilizing ad hoc multinational forces fo
r missions that
the UN cannot assume without adequate funds or troops. The SYG has sought to shift
the burden
from the UN to wealthier member states like the U.S. in Haiti and France in Rwanda,
and NATO in
Bosnia. To the extent that the U.S. is expected to shoulder part of such burdens, o
ur costs will grow
and the utility of the UN as a burden-sharing mechanism will diminish. We also risk
acquiescing in

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the resurgence of regional and post-colonial hegemony.

ù Pressure May Build to Shut-down UNPROFOR prematurely, which accounts for more than half the entire UN peacekeeping budget. This would entail obvious risks and costs to the U.S., including those associated with UNPROFOR extraction and lifting of the arms embargo.

ù The U.S. may have difficulty gaining UNSC support for U.S. priorities. As our status as a serious and potentially permanent debtor sinks in, other member states, led by our Western allies, may seek to build their influence at our expense. Specifically, we may find it hard to build support for U.S. objectives in Haiti as well as elsewhere.

ù The U.S. will risk losing all potential support for negotiating a reduction in our peacekeeping assessment to 25%. We have had very little success in negotiating a reduction of our peacekeeping assessment at the UN. (See Tab __ for summary of U.S. efforts to date). The likelihood of eventual success is slim, as this is a zero-sum game. Our allies and others resent U.S. unilateralism on this and other UN issues and have elicited little interest in assuming a greater financial burden.

Policy Pressures

The GOP Contract with America contains the major policy challenges at hand. We expect the House to begin marking up the Contract during the week of January 9. We need to prepare for votes on the Contract in its entirety as well as on pieces of it during consideration of various pieces of legislation, such as the DOD supplemental, the State and DOD authorization bills, and various appropriations bill. An NSC-led Legislative Affairs subgroup of the Peacekeeping Core Group is working with friendly Hill staffers to craft a viable legislative strategy.

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The Contract itself incorporates and tightens many of the defeated provisions in the
Dole Peace Powers bill, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994, and other restrictive but unsuccessful
amendments offered in 1994.

A detailed summary of the Contract's peacekeeping provisions is at Tab __. Most n
otably, the Contract would:

ù Prohibit the payment of all U.S. peacekeeping assessments unless the total amount
we owe exceeds the cost to
the U.S. of support we provide voluntarily pursuant to UN resolutions. The total co
st of our voluntary support
(including NATO air support, sanctions enforcement, Provide Comfort, and our troops
in South Korea) is
likely always to exceed our assessments. Thus, this provision would force us wither
to cease such
activities or prevent us from paying any more peacekeeping assessments.

ù Prohibit funding for any U.S. personnel (individuals or units) placed under foreig
n operational control in any
multilateral operation (seemingly including NATO) unless the President certifies in
advance to Congress that it
is in our vital national interests to do so. This provision has no emergency waiver
. Thus it would preclude
commanders making real-time decisions in the field to subordinate U.S. forces to for
eign operational control,
as we did in Desert Storm. Due to the vital national interest threshold, this provi
sion would also chill our
ability to detail individual officers to the UN to assist the UN with planning or ot
her functions or serve to
as observers in UN missions.

ù Prohibit participation of U.S. personnel in UN missions unless Congress has specif
ically authorized and
appropriated funds for this purpose. By barring expenditure of DOD funds on incremen
tal costs of
participation in UN missions without prior Congressional action, the Contract

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would
infringe on the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.

ù Require 15 days advance notification to Congress for any provision of goods or ser
vices to the UN on a
reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, regardless of its value. Although this prov
ision can be waived until
48 hours after, if the President declares an emergency, its effect will be to elimin
ate all but the most substantial
contributions to the UN. The U.S. constantly supports the UN (almost always on a re
imbursable basis) in
myriad ways that are difficult to track or precisely quantify. Since there is no do
llar threshold, this provision
would substantially curtail U.S. assistance to the UN.

ù Require 15 days advance notification to Congress before any vote in the UNSC on vi
rtually any matter
pertaining to a UN peacekeeping mission, sanctions regime, or "other action", unless
the President certifies
an emergency (then 48 hours after). This appears to represent an infringement on th
e President's
constitutional powers and would hamstring the UN Security Council.

ù Annually withhold 50% of our peacekeeping assessments pending certifications on th
e role and performance
of the UN Inspector General. This provision substantially raises the bar, requirin
g certifications that go well
beyond the requirements of current law. It will be very difficult for the U.S. to m
ake the certifications
envisioned in the Contract.

III. Issues for Discussion

In anticipation of the challenges described above, the interagency Peacekeeping Core
Group (PCG) met on
December 2 to consider potential remedies and next steps. (The Summary of Conclusion
s of this meeting is at Tab
__). The PCG identified discussed several issues that merit Deputies' attention.

1) Should the Administration decide now not to support any additional

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peacekeeping
missions or should we
deliberately amass debt that we cannot reasonably expect to repay?

The choice presented is stark but not unrealistic. If we continue supporting new mi
ssions, we will exacerbate and
accelerate the UN's cash flow crisis and face all the potential consequences outline
d above. On the other hand, if
we suddenly cease to support all new missions, we will miss important opportunities
to contain or resolve regional
crises that directly or indirectly affect U.S. interests, e.g. Haiti, Angola, and in
vite serious confrontations with our
Security Council partners.

However, to delay and/or avert the UN's cash flow crisis, the U.S. and the UN must m
ake very difficult choices
that we have been reluctant to make thus far. Specifically:

-- We will have to be extremely circumspect in approving new missions -- possibly t
o the extent of seeking
Congressional agreement (at least in principle) to support as well as fund any new c
ommitments. A summary of
potential new missions is at Tab __.

-- We must terminate and/or substantially scale-back existing missions to reduce th
e aggregate costs of
peacekeeping. At least three UN missions are expected to close in 1995 (See Tab __
). To reap cost savings,
however, we will have to close others. By far the most expensive UN mission is UNPR
OFOR, costing a total of
approximately $1.5 mill./year.

-- We must set internal USG priorities and encourage UNSC members to try to do the
same. Not all UN missions

are created equal; some serve U.S. interests more directly than others. The Deputi
es should consider consciously
prioritizing existing missions, weighing the cost against their utility, and evaluat
ing new missions in light of their
relative place in our hierarchy of interests.

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2) What cost-saving opportunities should the Administration pursue both inside and
outside the UN?

In addition to doing less, we must do everything more economically. This means iden
tifying, championing and
implementing radical cost saving opportunities. The Deputies could provide useful g
uidance on the cost savings
ideas considered by the PCG and summarized at Tab __. These ideas include:

ù Reducing the amount paid to troop contributors, presently $988/man/month. UN reim
bursement rates
are excessive -- substantially more than most countries' incremental costs of provid
ing a soldier to the
UN. (U.S. incremental costs in UN missions are $200-$250/man/month). Most countrie
s are
profiting from peacekeeping. Yet, countries that are rational actors would decide t
o participate if
only their incremental costs plus a small risk premium plus a marginal incentive wer
e provided. Some
countries that claim they maintain certain forces solely for peacekeeping and thus h
ave higher
incremental costs would resist a reduced payment, as would certain poor countries.
OECD
countries could, however, individually or collectively offer lower income countries
training, excess
equipment or other support as incentives to participate in UN missions.

ù G-7 Compact. A substantial portion of our UN assessments go to pay reimbursements
to our G-7
partners who participate in peacekeeping. In effect, we are engaged in large, circu
lar transfer
payments among the world's richest countries. We could try to gain agreement among
our G-7
partners to voluntarily waive reimbursement for our troop contributions to the UN or
to limit them
to a lower level to cover incremental costs. Such a move would significantly

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reduce
aggregate UN
costs.

ù Section 607. The U.S. could consider more extensive use of Section 607 FAA in con
tracts between
the U.S. and the UN. Through this authority, the U.S. may be able to supply some of
the goods and
services that the UN will require over the coming months. The UN would reimburse th
e U.S. when
funds became available.

ù Reducing excessive UN per diems and other compensation paid to civilians and milit
ary observers in
UN missions. This would require complicated negotiations with the UN but would redu
ce costs
noticeably.

3) How can the Administration Improve Consultations with Congress on Peacekeeping I
ssues?

The Administration initiated, and Congress has since mandated, monthly staff consult
ations on new and on-going
peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, part of congressional frustration with the size and cost of peacekeeping
missions remains many Member's sense that the Administration incurs new obligations
without Congressional
approval or even adequate consultation. If we are to have any success in forging c onsensus with Congress on
peacekeeping issues, we must do more and better consultations with Congress on a reg
ular basis and especially
before we vote for new or expanded UN missions.

The paper at Tab ___ outlines three options for Congressional consultations:

i) status quo;
ii) elevate the monthly briefings to the Member/Deputy or Principal level or conduc
t quarterly briefings
with Members and staff while maintaining other monthly briefings for staff only;
iii) establish an ad hoc bipartisan consultative group of members to discuss

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peaceke
eping policy issues.

Recommendation: That the Deputies agree to elevate the monthly briefings to the Mem
ber-level once a quarter,
starting in January and led by a senior Administration official. In addition, that we explore with Congressional
leaders the possibility of establishing an ad hoc consultative group.

4) How should the Administration convey to the UN and our allies the new constraint
s on U.S. support for new
and existing UN missions?

While the UN has undoubtedly gleaned the significance of the changes brought about b
y the elections, we may
wish to consider a frank discussion with key players at the UN that details the diff icult challenges we now face.
The conversations, possibly to be conducted by senior representatives from Washingto
n and USUN representatives
with Undersecretaries General Connor and Annan, would set the stage for many of the
tough choices we face and
specify the implications for the UN of long-term and substantial U.S. indebtedness.

Recommendation: That the Deputies endorse appropriate officials discussing with sen
ior UN officials the specific

implications of the new constraints on U.S. policy and task State to recommend whet
her and how to conduct
similar discussions with key allies.

5) How can the Administration effectively marshal public opinion in support of its
peacekeeping policy?

Polls consistently show that the Congress is far more hostile to the UN and peacekee
ping than the average
American. In fact, a recent USA TODAY poll showed that the prohibition on placing U
.S. forces under foreign
operational control is the least popular portion of the Contract with America -- 41%

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in favor.

However, the Administration has largely failed to make a convincing case to Congress
or the American people for
continued U.S. support for the UN. Clearly, we must clarify and deliver our message
more effectively. The first
annual mandated report to Congress on peacekeeping is due when we submit the budget.
This report offers the
opportunity to make a compelling case in a reader-friendly fashion. In addition, as
part of a broader strategy, the
Deputies should consider whether the President should touch briefly on UN/peacekeepi
ng reform in the State of the
Union address.

IV. Next Steps

At its December 2 meeting, the PCG established a Legislative/Policy Sub-Group to dev
ise and implement
congressional strategies on peacekeeping for use in the coming months. This Sub-Gro
up met on December 8.
The Summary of Conclusions at Tab ___ outlines the steps to be taken in the near ter
m to prepare for the opening
of the new Congress.

The Deputies should task any additional actions they deem appropriate.

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TO: AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SUBJ: RWANDAN VP KAGAME MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 341035

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PHUM, PGOV, EAID, US, RW
SUBJECT: RWANDAN VP KAGAME MEETS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LAKE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING WITH NSA LAKE ON DECEMBER 13, RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER PAUL KAGAME ASKED THAT MORE U.S. AID BE DIRECTED INSIDE RWANDA. NSA LAKE ASSURED KAGAME THAT AID TO THE GOR IS A HIGH PRIORITY. IN TURN, HE STRESSED THE NEED TO SEE PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE NAMING OF A POINT PERSON ON HUMAN RIGHTS. KAGAME POINTED TO THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF UNAMIR TROOPS AND THE EVENTUALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS IN EVERY COMMUNE AND SAID ANYONE WHO WANTED TO COME AND OBSERVE THE5SITUATION WAS WELCOME. HE THOUGHT SOME KIND OF FORCE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THE CRIMINALS IN THE CAMPS WHO ARE HOLDING REFUGEES HOSTAGE. ON LAND TENURE, KAGAME SAID LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS AND A NATIONAL COMMISSION ARE WORKING TO RESOLVE LAND DISPUTES, BUT THE GOR WILL NEED RESOURCES TO MOVE SQUATTERS TO OTHER PROPERTIES. END SUMMARY

3. KAGAME, WHO VISITED WASHINGTON FROM DECEMBER 9-14 AT THE INVITATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEALTH MINISTER JOSEPH KAREMERA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT CHARLES MURIGANDE, RWANDAN CHARGE JOSEPH MUTABOBA, AND AN AIDE. NSA LAKE WAS JOINED BY STATE/AF DAS BUSHNELL, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA DON STEINBERG, NSC DIRECTOR FOR GLOBAL ISSUES SUSAN RICE, AND OSD AFRICA DIRECTOR VINCE KERN. STATE RWANDA DESKOFF AISTON ALSO ATTENDED.

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USG ASSISTANCE AND GOR COMMITMENTS

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4. NSA LAKE STRESSED THAT THE USG HAS WORKED HARD TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF RWANDA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOR LACKS MANY BASIC NECESSITIES AND WE INTEND TO HELP ADDRESS THAT PROBLEM. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO DELIVER ON OUR COMMITMENTS, BUT IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR US TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO PROGRESS TOWARD RECONCILIATION AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. NSA LAKE SAID WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE GOR'S COMMITMENTS IN THESE AREAS AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GOR TO NAME THE POINT PERSON ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO SEE UNAMIR AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR PROGRAM OPERATING SUCCESSFULLY.

5. KAGAME EXPRESSED THE GOR'S GRATITUDE FOR THE USG'S ASSISTANCE SO FAR, AND ASKED THAT MORE AID BE DIRECTED INSIDE RWANDA' WHERE MOST RWANDANS ARE LOCATED. KAGAME SAID THIS WILL HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND HELP THE GOR TO GOVERN, WHICH IN TURN WILL HELP SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. KAGAME STRESSED THAT RWANDANS MUST BE HELPED TO HELP THEMSELVES. NSA LAKE AGREED AND SAID THIS IS WHY OUR DOLLARS 9 MILLION AID PROGRAM IS AIMED AT ASSISTANCE TO KEY MINISTRIES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. HE ASSURED KAGAME THAT WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING USAID TO GIVE VERY HIGH PRIORITY TO AID TO RWANDA. NSA LAKE NOTED THAT OUR DOLLARS 2.5 MILLION CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD BANK ARREARS WAS IMMINENT AND WOULD HELP MAKE AVAILABLE DOLLARS 50 MILLION IN CREDITS FROM THE BANK. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT IF PROGRESS IS NOT MADE BOTH ON OUR SIDE AND THE GOR'S SIDE, THE SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE AND IT COULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR A SECOND CRISIS. FOR THESE REASONS, WE NEED TO KEEP PUSHING.

LAND TENURE

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6. NSA LAKE RAISED THE LAND TENURE ISSUE. KAGAME SAID THAT SQUATTERS TOOK OVER LANDS DURING A PERIOD OF TURBULENCE WHEN THE GOR WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. THE PROBLEM REQUIRED THE GOR TO ACCOMMODATE TWO COMPETING INTERESTS: ASSURING RESPECT FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ASSURING SHELTER FOR ALL THOSE WITHIN RWANDA. LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS ARE HANDLING DISPUTES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE GOR HAS ALSO SET UP A NATIONAL COMMISSION, WHICH WOULD TEMPORARILY TAKE OWNERSHIP OF DISPUTED LANDS AND THEN HAND THEM OVER TO THE RIGHTFUL OWNER. KAGAME STRESSED THE GOR WILL NEED RESOURCES TO MOVE THE SQUATTERS TO OTHER PROPERTIES. HEALTH MINISTER KAREMERA ADDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OFTEN IGNORED THE PLIGHT OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OLD REFUGEES WHO HAVE RETURNED (AND WHOSE NUMBERS KAREMERA CLAIMED EXCEEDED THOSE OF THE NEW REFUGEES). THIS GROUP HAS SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND LACKS SCHOOLS, HEALTH

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FACILITIES, AND OTHER BASICS.

7. NSA LAKE STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GOR TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE WORLD BANK ON PLANNING TO MAKE SURE THE BANK UNDERSTANDS THE GOR'S PRIORITIES. KAGAME SAID THE BANK HAD A LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE AND SENT DELEGATIONS, BUT HE LAMENTED THE BANK'S SLOW PACE.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

AF DAS BUSHNELL SAID WE WOULD PRESS OTHER DONORS ON THE ARREARS AT THE DEC. 16 FRIENDS MEETING.

HUMAN RIGHTS

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8. NSA LAKE RETURNED TO THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON A HUMAN RIGHTS POINT PERSON. HE SAID THERE WERE THOSE WHO WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WITHIN RWANDA; THE MORE FACTS WE HAVE THE EASIER IT WILL BE TO RESOLVE THESE DOUBTS. KAGAME REPLIED THAT THERE ARE OVER 5000 UNAMIR TROOPS INSIDE RWANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS PLANNED FOR EVERY COMMUNE; HE WELCOMED ANYONE WHO WANTS TO COME AND MONITOR THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE QUESTIONED WHETHER NAMING ONE PERSON WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE; IT IS REALLY THE GOVERNMENT OVERALL WHICH MUST ASSURE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

CAMP SECURITY AND REPATRIATION

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9. NSA LAKE ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR REFUGEE RETURN. KAGAME SAID THERE WAS NOT MUCH THE GOR COULD DO. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD DO A GREAT DEAL, HOWEVER, TO PRESS ZAIRE TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS. HE SAID THE GOR WANTS THE REFUGEES TO RETURN AND WILL COOPERATE WITH SUCH EFFORTS.

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EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

10. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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RWANDA WEEKLY REPORT
Thursday, December 29, 1994

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

Amb. Rawson demarched the GOR December 23 to urge the government to cooperate with the UN on its plan to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes ("Operation Retour"). We were concerned in particular that forced closures of the IDP camps in southwest Rwanda could lead to a significant outflow of refugees to or through Burundi, which has been particularly fragile in recent weeks. The GOR has confirmed Kagame's assurances that the Government has not set any deadline for closure of the camps, and Amb. Rawson reports that UNAMIR is happy with the GOR's cooperation and with the preparations for "Operation Retour", which is set to begin on December 29.

Presidents Mobutu and Mwinyi have called for a regional heads of state summit in Nairobi on January 7. President Moi has agreed to host, and the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda are also being invited, although it is not known whether they have accepted. The U.S. and other interested countries will be invited as observers. We believe the regional refugee conference prepcom will be held January 9 in Addis Ababa and are awaiting confirmation from UNHCR and/or the OAU. Attendees are expected to be the entire OAU membership and the forty-five nation executive board of UNHCR. The next Friends of Rwanda meeting is set for the afternoon of January 17 in Geneva, with the UNDP roundtable on January 18 and 19.

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BILATERAL AID

The GOR completed the necessary AID paperwork for the $2.5 million arrears contribution and named Emmanuel Munyagishali as its coordinator for human rights issues. (Amb. Rawson does not know him and is trying to get relevant biographic information.) With these preconditions finally met, AID disbursed our $2.5 million contribution to the World Bank's Federal Reserve account on December 27.

HUMAN RIGHTS

International Tribunal

Judge Goldstone went to Kigali on December 19-21 and apparently had a successful trip. He said the GOR pledged full cooperation and he held a joint press conference with Justice Minister Nkubito and Interior Minister Sendashonga to that effect. The four-member USG team sent to assist Goldstone apparently was quite helpful. The Tribunal is seeking to move into the former UNICEF building initially and then ultimately to have office space (and perhaps some housing) constructed in the UNAMIR compound. The Tribunal staff is concerned about the preservation of documents, and we are considering whether to send a team in January to continue with document collection.

REFUGEE SITUATION

Camp Security: According to UNHCR in Geneva, the UN held an internal meeting on December 22 in New York to review the results of the recent DPKO/UNHCR assessment mission to Zaire.

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The meeting concluded that establishing a UN peacekeeping force in Zaire is not possible as not one out of 60 countries polled was willing to commit troops. Therefore, the UN is pursuing the idea of establishing a force of 3,000 local Zairian troops who would be trained by some 150-200 civilian and "police expert" trainers from other countries. SRSG Khan was to have travelled to Zaire yesterday or today to discuss this plan with the GOZ. According to UNHCR, the trainers could be funded from assessed PKO contributions (sic), but the Zairian troops would have to be paid from voluntary contributions pledged to UNHCR (sic). Deputy High Commissioner Walzer has discussed this with A/S Oakley and hopes that the USG (i.e., PRM) will contribute to this effort.

EO 13526 1.4d

Fundraising to support it is a likely agenda item for the next Friends of Rwanda meeting in Geneva.

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Safe Havens: President Mwinyi of Tanzania recently met with President Mobutu to discuss the idea of establishing UN safe havens inside Rwanda to which refugees could return. The GOT is feeling increased pressure from Tanzanians unhappy with the influx of refugees and believes it must do "something" given the upcoming elections in 1995. Mwinyi, Moi and Mobutu have agreed to a regional heads of state summit in Nairobi on January 7 to promote this idea of safe havens.

EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

Goma: Zairian military continue to force refugees in Goma town to clear out and move to refugee camps. Since the end of November, some 200,000 refugees have moved into Goma camps. On December 13/14, and for the first time since early September, UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation of 780 refugees from Goma to Rwanda.

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UNAMIR

Deployment: As of December 13, there were 5,863 personnel deployed with UNAMIR,,including 322 military observers, 69 headquarters personnel, 80 CIVPOL and 5,392 troops from fifteen countries.

Mandate: As part of its mandate to protect returning refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians, the UN reports that UNAMIR has "cleaned up" an internally displaced persons camp in the southwest, in order to stop "disruptive elements." The UNAMIR presence was welcomed by the refugees. Screening of the refugees and the camps with metal detectors turned up caches of spears, machetes and hand grenades. Twenty-three "troublemakers" were taken into custody. The RPF set up its perimeter several kilometers away from the camps, to ensure that its troops did not interfere with UNAMIR. UNAMIR did not take any casualties.

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 000754 0401052 SHC4455
ORIGIN IO-16

INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	ARA-00	CIAE-00	SNEC-00
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	ADS-00	M-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00
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APPROVED BY: IO:GWARD
AF/C:ARENDER IO/UNP:AKORKY AF/E:SKSPRIGG/CMCMULLEN
L:MMATHESON PM/ISP:RWHARTON USUN/W:JOBRIEN PRM:MMCKELVEY
P:EBRIMMER DRL:JROSENBLATT IO/PHO:GSTETTENBAUER
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, RW, ZA, TZ, BU, UG, PREF, PHUM
SUBJECT: RWANDA -- UNSC RESOLUTION ON WAR CRIMINALS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAS. 8 AND 9. DEPARTMENT PLANS TO PROPOSE A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AND REQUESTING MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS IN THEIR TERRITORIES. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POSTS IN STATES BORDERING RWANDA TO CONSULT HOST GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THEIR VIEWS ON DETENTION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS. END SUMMARY.

3. CONSISTENT WITH OUR SUPPORT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE DETENTION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RWANDA' AS WELL AS CITIZENS OF RWANDA WHO HAVE COMMITTED SUCH CRIMES IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBORING STATES DURING 1994.

4. MANY REPORTS INDICATE THAT LEADERS OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND INTERAHAMWE MILITIAS ARE NOW

TERRORIZING REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA AND HINDERING VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION TO RWANDA. SOME PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1994 GENOCIDE HAVE FLED TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND EUROPE.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL

EXPEL SUCH PERSONS FROM CAMPS IN ZAIRE, BUT HAS NOT YET ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL ARREST THEM AND HOLD THEM FOR TRIAL IN ZAIRE OR BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. A PRIME SUSPECT IN THE GENOCIDE WAS EXPELLED FROM SWITZERLAND, EVADING ARREST, AND THE DIRECTOR OF RADIO-TELEVISION DES MILLES COLLINES, WHICH INCITED GENOCIDE, IS NOW IN CAMEROON, WHICH HAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY WITH RWANDA.

6. TANZANIA PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IT WOULD WAIT UNTIL AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS ESTABLISHED TO ARREST THOSE ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES IN RWANDA. OTHER STATES HAVE SAID THEY LACK LEGAL AUTHORITY UNDER THEIR NATIONAL LAWS TO MAKE ARRESTS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED OUTSIDE THEIR TERRITORY BY NON-CITIZENS. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH ARRESTS.

7. WE HAVE PREPARED A DRAFT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AND REQUESTING THAT MEMBER STATES DETAIN THOSE AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUCH CRIMES (TEXT PARA. 10 BELOW). WE HAVE NOT YET SHARED THE TEXT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. BEFORE PROPOSING IT, WE WANT TO SOUND OUT GOVERNMENTS OF STATES BORDERING RWANDA ON THEIR VIEWS ON DETENTION OF RWANDAN WAR CRIMES SUSPECTS.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: ACTION POSTS SHOULD APPROACH COUNTERPARTS AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO INFORM THEM THAT WE PLAN TO PROPOSE A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING DETENTION OF SUSPECTED RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS. POSTS SHOULD NOT/NOT SHARE THE TEXT OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. IT IS PROVIDED FOR POSTS' INFORMATION ONLY. WE HAVE NOT YET SHARED THE TEXT

WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR THEM TO RECEIVE A COPY FROM OTHER SOURCES.

9. POSTS SHOULD ASK HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHETHER THEIR GOVERNMENTS COULD COMPLY WITH A UN RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THEM TO DETAIN RWANDANS IN THEIR TERRITORIES AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE OR WAR CRIMES. WOULD THEIR NATIONAL LAWS PERMIT COMPLIANCE, AND IF SO, WOULD THEY HAVE THE POLICE RESOURCES AND POLITICAL WILL TO CARRY OUT SUCH ARRESTS?

ALSO ASK THEM IF THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD ARREST RWANDANS IN THEIR TERRITORIES WHO ARE TERRORIZING REFUGEES AND CONDUCTING PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. INFORM THEM THAT WE BELIEVE THIS MATTER SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

10. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ALL ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA, IN PARTICULAR ITS RESOLUTIONS 925 (1994), 935 (1994), 955 (1994), AND 965 (1994),

EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN ITS GRAVE CONCERN AT THE REPORTS INDICATING THAT SYSTEMATIC, WIDESPREAD AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING ACTS OF GENOCIDE, HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN RWANDA,

NOTING THAT THESE REPORTS WERE CONFIRMED IN THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 935 (1994) (S/1994/1425),

HAVING ADOPTED RESOLUTION 955 (1994), CREATING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,

DETERMINED TO PUT AN END TO SUCH CRIMES AND TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BRING TO JUSTICE THE PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM,

CONCERNED BY THE CONDITIONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA, INCLUDING REPORTS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST

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OUTGOING
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Department of State

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 000754 0401852 SHC4455

REFUGEES WHO VOLUNTARILY WISH TO RETURN TO RWANDA.

NOTING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS OF 18 NOVEMBER 1994 (S/1994/1398).

DETERMINING THAT THIS SITUATION CONTINUES TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. AUTHORIZES AND REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN PERSONS FOUND WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF

GENOCIDE OR OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA;

2. CONDEMNS ALL ATTACKS AGAINST PERSONS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS NEAR THE BORDERS OF RWANDA, AND DEMANDS THAT SUCH ATTACKS IMMEDIATELY CEASE, AND CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH ATTACKS;

3. AUTHORIZES AND REQUESTS MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN PERSONS FOUND WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE INCITED OR PARTICIPATED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN STATES NEIGHBORING RWANDA, OR WHO ARE CONSPIRING TO INCITE OR PARTICIPATE IN SERIOUS ACTS OF VIOLENCE, INCLUDING PREPARATION FOR WAR, OR WHO ENGAGE IN VIOLENT INTIMIDATION OF REFUGEES INTENDED TO PREVENT THEM FROM RETURNING TO RWANDA;

4. REQUESTS THAT STATES DETAIN PERSONS PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 ABOVE, PENDING PROSECUTION OF SUCH PERSONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA OR BY THE APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES;

5. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES DETAINING PERSONS FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 SHALL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS DETAINED, THE NATURE OF THE CRIMES BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, THE EVIDENCE PROVIDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE DETENTIONS, THE DATE WHEN THE PERSONS WERE DETAINED, AND THE PLACE OF DETENTION;

6. CALLS UPON ALL STATES DETAINING PERSONS FOR THE

REASONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 TO ALLOW UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THEM BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, AS WELL AS BY INVESTIGATORS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA;

7. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT OF DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CHRISTOPHER

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ACTION

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUJUMB 00060 051520Z SHC3336
ACTION IO-16

INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DODE-00	EB-00
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INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BUJUMBURA 000060

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PHUM, UNSE, RW, ZA, BY
SUBJECT: RWANDA-UNSC RESOLUTION ON WAR CRIMINALS

REF: STATE 000754

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE RAISED THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL WITH TWO HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI COULD, IN

PRINCIPLE, COMPLY WITH A UN RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THEM TO DETAIN RWANDANS IN BURUNDI AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE OR WAR CRIMES, AND THAT BURUNDI LAW WOULD PERMIT COMPLIANCE. BURUNDI, SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD THE POLITICAL WILL TO CARRY OUT SUCH ARRESTS, BUT MIGHT NOT HAVE THE POLICE RESOURCES TO DO SO.

3. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD COMPLY WITH SUCH A RESOLUTION THROUGH USE OF THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN RWANDA AND BURUNDI UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WOULD ASK THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDVUALS BE EXTRADICTED. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT BURUNDI HAD THE RESOURCES AND POLITICAL WILL TO ARREST A SMALL NUMBER OF CRIMINALS, BUT COULD NOT ARREST "HUNDREDS," PARTLY BECAUSE THEIR BURUNDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS NOT FUNCTIONING WELL. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ARRESTING RWANDANS WHO TERRORIZE REFUGEES AND CONDUCT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, HE SAID THAT THE MAINLY TUTSI BURUNDI ARMY WOULD BE WILLING TO ARREST SUCH INDIVIDUALS.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

KRUEGER

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RWANDA WEEKLY REPORT
Friday, January 6, 1995

SUMMARY

Regional heads-of-state will meet in Nairobi on January 7 when Tanzania and Zaire are expected to press for the creation of "safe zones" inside Rwanda. The next "Friends of Rwanda" meeting, which will be co-chaired by Assistant Secretary Moose and Ambassador Spiegel, will take place in Geneva on January 17. UNAMIR reports multiple insurgency activity in northwest and southwest Rwanda, Amb. Rawson has been requested to further report on an attack on an orphanage near Cyangugu. This week the GOR started the process of replacing old currency with new. This, suggests Amembassy Kigali, will undercut the power structure of the refugee camps. AID will send specialists to Kigali to help implement a two-phase "rapid response program" to re-establish Rwanda's justice system. However, for fear of being entangled in political issues, AID is reluctant to provide judges for criminal cases, or technical assistance for the national commission charged with performing triage on thousands of criminal cases.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

The regional heads-of-state are scheduled to meet in Nairobi January 7. It is expected that Tanzania and Zaire will press for the creation of "safe zones" inside Rwanda into which refugees could be moved. While this achieves the neighbors' goal of getting the refugees out of their countries, it presents security and sovereignty concerns for the GOR, which might view it as another Operation Turquoise-type situation.

We are preparing for the next Friends meeting in Geneva January 17, which A/S Moose and Amb. Spiegel will co-chair. AID Assistant Administrator for Africa John Hicks will also attend, and will lead the U.S. delegation to the UNDP roundtable on January 18 and 19.

UNAMIR

Internal Political/Security Developments: UNAMIR informed our DATT in Kigali that there have been multiple reports of insurgency activity in northwest and southwest Rwanda, with reports of troops operating at night with virtual freedom of movement. So far, the attackers have avoided direct contact with the RPA, focusing instead on civilian and economic targets. The UN provided no details on incidents, but the DATT learned that in the early hours of January 4, a raiding party attacked an orphanage near Cyangugu, spraying it with small arms fire and throwing at least one grenade inside. At least one child was killed and several others wounded. The RPA responded to the attack with heavy machine gun fire throughout most of the day. The DATT sees this as the beginning of an organized guerrilla campaign; we have asked Ambassador Rawson to provide us with further information on this issue.

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The other major internal development this week was the GOR's operation to replace all old currency with new notes. UNAMIR assisted in providing security for transport of the new notes, but poor coordination and money shortages have delayed the operation. The GOR closed the border at Goma, Zaire, in order to forestall any effort by the refugee population -- particularly those in the power structure -- from attempting to smuggle old bank notes back for changing before they are declared worthless. Embassy Kigali reports that the money changing operation will undoubtedly undercut the power structure of the refugee camps, but the question remains whether innocent refugees who decide to return permanently to Rwanda after the operation is over will be allowed to exchange some amount of old notes.

STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Rwanda Rule of Law Assistance: On Tuesday DRL met with AID/AFR to discuss AID's proposal for a "rapid response program" to help Rwanda re-establish its justice system. The AID program will: (1) provide technical assistance to the Rwandan MoJ; (2) provide foreign jurists to help handle civil cases; and (3) explore the possibility of establishing pilot alternative dispute programs, primarily for land disputes.

AID intends to hire a contractor to send 5 specialists to Kigali for approximately one month (starting possibly before the UNDP Roundtable (Jan. 18-19)) to develop specific, detailed work programs in these three areas. In the second phase, AID will supply long-term (approximately one year) specialists to work with the MoJ, identify and fund as many as 20 foreign jurists, and supply a six-person team to begin alternative dispute programs in Rwanda.

AID was reluctant to provide judges for criminal cases or technical assistance for the national commission charged with performing triage on the 10,000+ criminal cases. AID felt that providing assistance here would entangle the U.S. in political issues and get them too involved with the Rwandan government. We noted that the need to show progress in meting out justice in criminal matters was a most pressing need in Rwanda. DRL agreed to work with AID in developing more information on the national triage commission so that AID could add this to its assistance package.

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[redacted] Kwanda Detentions Zaire response

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01 KINSHA 00107 071046Z SHC3063
ACTION IO-16

INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
UNSECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KINSHASA 00107

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PREF, PHUM, RW, ZA, TZ, BY, UG, CG,
SUBJECT: RWANDA--UNSC RESOLUTION ON WAR CRIMINALS

REF: STATE 00754

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS REQUESTED REFTEL, EMBOFF MET WITH VICE PRIME MINISTER OF JUSTICE, KAMANDA WA KAMANDA, TO INFORM THE GOZ OF THE US PLAN TO PROPOSE A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING DETENTION OF SUSPECTED RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS. KAMANDA SAID THAT THE GOZ WOULD FULLY COMPLY WITH A UNSC RESOLUTION CALLING UPON UN MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN RWANDANS ON THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST WHOM THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GEROCIDE OR WAR CRIMES.

3. KAMANDA SAID THAT SUCH A UN RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH ZAIRIAN LAW SO LONG AS THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE SAID THAT WAR CRIME ARRESTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE ZAIRIAN "GUARD CIVILE" AND/OR THE "GENDARMERIE" BUT ZAIRE WOULD NEED LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UN OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CARRY OUT SUCH ARRESTS SAFELY. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER EXTRA FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE ZAIRIAN PEOPLE AND IT COMES AT A TIME WHEN NATIONAL FINANCES ARE BADLY NEEDED ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE GOZ WILLING TO ARREST RWANDANS TERRORIZING REFUGEES IN CAMPS, KAMANDA SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT ZAIRE WOULD ARREST SUCH INDIVIDUALS. KAMANDA RECALLED THAT ZAIRE HAD ALREADY ARRESTED AND DEPORTED 37 REFUGEES SUSPECTED OF CARRYING OUT TERRORISM IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. HE SAID THAT THE GOZ ALSO HAD STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE GROUPS CONDUCTING PREPARATIONS FOR WAR ON ITS SOIL NOR THE FORMATION OF A RWANDAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE ON ITS

TERRITORY TO CARRY OUT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE PRESENT RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. YATES**

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PAGE 01 DAR ES 00258 101159Z SHC2499
ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	ARA-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
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INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAR ES SALAAM 000258

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSE, PREF, PHUM, RW, TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIAN PRIME MINISTER ASSERTS GOT PREPARED TO DETAIN RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS UNDER UNSC AUTHORITY

REF: STATE 754

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY CALL ON NEWLY-APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER CLEOPA MSUYA, AMBASSADOR RAISED THE USG'S PLAN TO PROPOSE A UNSC RESOLUTION ON DETAINING RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS (REF). AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD AUTHORIZE MEMBER STATES TO DETAIN SUSPECTED RWANDAN WAR CRIMINALS BOTH FOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN RWANDA AND INSIDE REFUGEE CAMPS. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE GOT WOULD BE WILLING TO HOLD SUCH PERSONS. ALSO, WOULD THE TANZANIAN POLICE HAVE THE POWER AND RESOURCES TO DO SO.

3. MSUYA REPLIED THAT THE GOT WOULD TREAT CRIMES COMMITTED WITHIN TANZANIA AS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. "WITH OR WITHOUT THE UN," IF RWANDANS BROKE TANZANIAN LAWS, "WE WILL HANDLE THEM."

4. AS FOR THOSE WHO COMMITTED ATROCITIES WITHIN RWANDA, MSUYA DID NOT FORESEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH OPERATING UNDER A UN ARRANGEMENT TO APPREHEND CULPRITS. HE DID CAUTION THAT HE STILL NEEDED TO CHECK THIS WITH THE GOT'S LEGAL EXPERTS. IF THEY INFORMED HIM THAT SUCH ACTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, HE WOULD GET BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR.

5 MSUYA QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE HOPED SUCH DETENTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE LEADERSHIP AND NOT AFFECT LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES. IF MORE WERE TARGETED (AS THE GOR ITSELF WANTED), PROBLEMS WOULD BE MULTIPLIED.

6. MSUYA CONFIRMED THAT THE GOT BELIEVED THE TANZANIAN POLICE COULD HANDLE THESE ARRESTS. BUT THE POLICE WOULD PROBABLY NEED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, SUCH AS EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS ANOTHER MATTER MSUYA SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO.

ANDERSON

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DECL: OADR

TO: G - Mr. Wirth

FROM: AF - George E. Moose

SUBJECT: NSC Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda, Friday, Feb. 2
Agenda Item: IMET for Rwanda

I. PURPOSE

- To state our support for resuming an IMET program focused on respect for human rights and civilian authority, and to support repeal (if possible) of the FY95 legislative restriction.

II. KEY POINTS

Legal Restrictions

- The FY95 Foreign Operations Appropriations act prohibits IMET funding to Rwanda. This provision applies only to FY95; however, it could be carried over into next year's appropriations bill unless the Administration ensures that it is not included.

- These restrictions were enacted in response to the genocidal violence and warfare that broke out in April 1994. The measures were not directed at the new government, but the restrictions remained in effect after the new government took power in July 1994.

The RPA's Request and Department Decisions

- During his December 1994 visit to Washington, Kagame said he would like the U.S. to resume IMET training. Secretary Perry told him that "we were seeking legislative relief to re-initiate IMET in FY95." DoD is pressing for action to repeal or waive the IMET restriction so FY95 IMET funds might be reprogrammed for Rwanda.

- In December, U/S Davis endorsed efforts to ensure that the statutory prohibition is not carried over into FY96 so that we would be able to reprogram FY96 IMET funds for Rwanda. (She decided against including Rwanda IMET in the FY96 budget submission for reasons of Congressional strategy.) The issue of possible FY95 IMET was not raised at that time.

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Reasons We Support IMET

- o We agree with DoD that IMET should resume. State has already approved reprogramming IMET in FY96, assuming the legal restrictions are no longer in place. We believe that FY95 IMET is worth pursuing, if it is possible at this late stage. Up to $50,000 in funds is still available.

- o We believe that an IMET program tailored to promoting professionalism and respect for civilian authority and human rights would be beneficial in Rwanda.

  -- We have urged the GOR and RPA to prevent RPA soldiers from engaging in or allowing reprisals, and a carefully crafted IMET program should help the Rwandans meet this commitment.

  -- When PM Twagiramungu visited Washington, he asked us privately for help with ensuring civilian supremacy over the military. IMET could help in this area.

- o We recognize that too close an association with the RPA could suggest USG endorsement of RPA behavior or cause political problems if RPA discipline deteriorates seriously; however, we believe the benefits outweigh the risks and that IMET could help reduce the likelihood of an increase in RPA indiscipline.

Hill View and Possible Waiver or Repeal

- o Initial consultations with Africa policy makers on the Hill revealed no resistance to the lifting of the FY95 IMET prohibition. Hill contacts recognized that the prohibition was enacted under a very different set of circumstances which no longer apply.

- o We will try to tack a repeal provision onto some suitable legislative vehicle, if available. An appropriate vehicle may not be available for several months and could be defeated for reasons unrelated to Rwanda, given current Congressional realities. Nonetheless, we will make our best effort.

- o While Sec. 614 or 451 waivers of the FY95 statutory prohibition are possible options, Congress thinks these provisions are overused and views them with disfavor. To maintain good Congressional relations and not prejudice other, larger issues, we oppose attempting a waiver.

Attachment:
Talking Points

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DECL: OADR

TALKING POINTS ON IMET

-- We believe that an IMET program tailored to promoting professionalism and respect for civilian authority and human rights would be beneficial in Rwanda.

-- We have urged the GOR and RPA to prevent RPA soldiers from engaging in or allowing reprisals. A carefully crafted IMET program should help the Rwandans meet this commitment.

-- When PM Twagiramungu visited Washington, he asked us privately for help with ensuring civilian supremacy over the military. IMET could help in this area, as well.

-- We recognize that too close an association with the RPA could suggest USG endorsement of RPA behavior or cause political problems if RPA discipline deteriorates seriously. However, we believe the benefits outweigh the risks and that IMET could help reduce the likelihood of an increase in RPA indiscipline.

-- We fully agree that Rwanda should receive IMET in FY96 and support reprogramming of FY96 funds for that purpose, assuming legal restrictions are no longer in place. We did not include Rwanda IMET in the FY96 budget for reasons of Congressional strategy; we will work to see that the current restrictions are not carried over into FY96.

-- We believe that FY95 IMET is worth pursuing, if it is possible at this late stage. Up to $50,000 in funds is still available.

-- Initial consultations with Africa policy makers on the Hill revealed no resistance to the lifting of the FY95 IMET prohibition. Hill contacts recognized that the prohibition was enacted under a very different set of circumstances which no longer apply.

-- We will try to tack a repeal provision onto some suitable legislative vehicle, if available. An appropriate vehicle may not be available for several months and could be defeated for reasons unrelated to Rwanda, given current Congressional realities. Nonetheless, we will make our best effort.

-- While Sec. 614 or 451 waivers of the FY95 statutory prohibition are possible options, Congress thinks these provisions are overused and views them with disfavor. To maintain good Congressional relations and not prejudice other, larger issues, we oppose attempting a waiver.

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DECL: OADR

TO: G - Mr. Wirth

FROM: AF - George E. Moose

SUBJECT: NSC Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda, Friday, Feb. 2
Agenda Item: UN Arms Embargo

I. PURPOSE

- To state our view that the time is not right for lifting or modifying the arms embargo.

II. KEY POINTS

DoD Support for RPA Request to Lift Embargo

- The May 17, 1994 UN Security Council arms embargo prohibits "the sale or supply to Rwanda ... of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment ...."

- Kagame has called for the lifting of the embargo and implementing regulations so the RPA might receive (essentially non-lethal) equipment, such as communications gear and vehicles. He argues the embargo was directed at ending the killing and was not intended to punish the new government, and that the new government has the sovereign right to obtain military equipment for national defense.

- DoD favors lifting/modifying the embargo so the RPA would at least be able to obtain the equipment Kagame mentioned. DoD thinks communications gear could improve command and control and might thereby help reduce RPA indiscipline.

Our View: Leave Embargo in Place

- We should not pursue lifting or modifying the arms embargo at this time.

- We do not want to encourage the Rwandans to resolve their differences through more fighting. Lifting the arms embargo just as incursions are making the news would definitely send the wrong signal.

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- The RPA does not need the embargo lifted in order to defend itself or prevent another genocide. Moreover, the GOR/RPA have very limited resources and much better ways to spend their money.

- Both the Belgians and the UK oppose lifting the embargo, and we have heard no one (other than the Rwandans) speak in favor of this move. The Belgians added that they saw no support for lifting the embargo in the Security Council.

- Of course, the time may come when moving to lift or relax the embargo would be appropriate; indeed, we could even use it as a carrot with the GOR; however, that time would not appear to be in the immediate future.

What Equipment Then?

- Even with the embargo in place, we can still supply NGOs and civilian authorities (but not the RPA) with excess DoD humanitarian materials, such as school and hospital supplies. Several requests for such aid have already been forwarded from PM to DoD for action.

- As for the items mentioned by Kagame, excess DoD vehicles and communications gear would almost certainly be covered by the embargo, which applies broadly and does not depend on whether the equipment is "lethal." Generally speaking, U.S. interests are served by adhering to, and advocating, broad interpretation of UNSC arms embargos.

- Regardless of the scope of the embargo and our implementation of it, we do not believe that we should become a military equipment supplier for the new government when we were not traditionally a supplier to previous governments.

  -- In this regard, we note that prior to the resumption of the civil war, we gave IMET assistance to the Rwandan military but generally did not provide military equipment (except for some engineering and biodiversity assistance).

- If, however, it can be shown that a piece of equipment will have a positive impact on RPA discipline and can be supplied without modifying the embargo, we are willing to consider exploring supply of such equipment to the GOR/RPA.

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DECL: OADR

TALKING POINTS ON UN EMBARGO

-- We should not pursue lifting or modifying the arms embargo at this time.

-- We do not want to encourage the Rwandans to resolve their differences through more fighting. Lifting the arms embargo just as incursions are making the news would definitely send the wrong signal.

-- The RPA does not need the embargo lifted in order to defend itself or prevent another genocide.

-- The GOR/RPA have very limited resources and much better ways to spend their money.

-- Both the Belgians and the UK oppose lifting the embargo, and we have heard no one (other than the Rwandans) speak in favor of this move. The Belgians added that they saw no support for lifting the embargo in the Security Council.

-- Of course, the time may come when moving to lift the embargo would be appropriate; indeed, we could even use it as a carrot with the GOR; however, that time would not appear to be in the immediate future.

-- Even with the embargo in place, we can still supply NGOs and civilian authorities (but not the RPA) with excess DoD humanitarian materials, such as school and hospital supplies. Several requests for such aid have already been forwarded from PM to DoD for action.

-- As for the military equipment mentioned by Kagame, we believe excess DoD vehicles and communications gear would most probably be covered by the embargo.

-- Regardless of the scope of the embargo, we do not believe that we should become a military equipment supplier for the new government when we were not traditionally a supplier to previous governments.

-- In this regard, we note that prior to the resumption of the civil war, we gave IMET assistance to the Rwandan military but generally did not provide military equipment (except for some engineering and biodiversity assistance).

-- If, however, it can be shown that a piece of equipment will have a positive impact on RPA discipline and can be supplied without modifying the embargo, we are willing to consider exploring supply of such equipment to the GOR/RPA.

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IO's Recommended Option: Under the Volcano

Accelerate planning for repatriation from Zaire as directly as possible to refugees' former homes in Rwanda. Prepare logistics, resettlement supply centers (where returning refugees would get supplies but not be allowed to stay), and UNAMIR mobilization to provide security for the returning refugees. Increase security in the Zaire camps with UNHCR trained and directed Zaire police, to provide orderly departure protection for refugees. Warn people of the impending eruption, and step up the psyop program to persuade people to return to Rwanda.

Pros

--Will provide short-term preparation for quick response when the volcanoes erupt. Even if refugees wait to return until the eruption, relief will be ready when they come.

--Provides a pro-active response to the impending catastrophe. This time the world will be prepared, rather than hoping the disaster doesn't happen, as it did in Goma in July.

--Reduces the probability of long-term civil war organized from refugee camps outside Rwanda.

--Will contribute to long-term resolution of the Rwandan refugee crisis.

--Will result in much lower long-term expeditures for relief to refugees.

--Will likely be supported by both Zaire and Rwandan governments.

Cons

--Requires establishment of real security for returning refugees, possibly beyond the capacity of current UNAMIR troop levels, unless the RPA can be a disciplined, protective army.

--Will be resisted by former Rwandan leaders, who need the refugee population in Zaire as a political base.

--Refugees will be slow to move back to Rwanda, resulting in a massive outflow when the volcano erupts.

--Placing more supplies in Rwanda would require either redirection of supplies into Rwanda from the camps, or a temporary increase in the total quantity to allow stockpiling in Rwanda.

--May require more vehicles than are now in Rwanda to provide transportation for the weak and infirm, to reduce deaths during repatriation.

--Resettlement centers could become new refugee camps. Unless returning refugees feel secure, they will prefer to stay in resettlement centers. Security in Rwanda is crucial.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

Summary of Conclusions of
Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda

DATE: Wednesday, February 8, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the Ad Hoc Meeting on Rwanda (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Vice President
Leon Fuerth
Mark Thomas

STATE
George Moose
Townsend Friedman
Phyllis Oakley

AID
Brian Atwood

OSD
Walter Slocombe
Vincent Kern

USUN
David Scheffer

OMB
Gordon Adams

CIA
(b)(3)

JCS
David McIlvoy
Wayne Young

JUSTICE
Jamie Gorelick

The White House
Anthony Lake
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Don Steinberg
Susan Rice
Mac DeShazer

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

Camp Security

-- State/RPM will provide at least $3.5-5 million to the UNHCR security program for the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. (~~C~~)

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Threat from Volcanoes

-- During the refugee conference next week in Bujumbura, State will press UNHCR to prepare concrete, viable contingency plans to respond to the potential eruption of one or both volcanoes. ~~(C)~~

-- Beginning immediately, senior State Department officials will use our substantial leverage with UNHCR to urge Mrs. Ogata to take the opportunity of the threat from the volcanoes to encourage refugees to return home to Rwanda. If necessary, State will apply earmarks to UNHCR funds to ensure that its efforts in Zaire are focused primarily on repatriation. ~~(C)~~

-- By COB February 15, State will prepare cost estimates of the various options for moving the refugees to new camps outside the Goma area, including to locations further north in Zaire. (U)

Assistance to Rwandan Government and War Crimes Tribunal

-- AID will continue disbursement of programmed funds to Rwanda as swiftly as possible, particularly the $4 million in the pipeline to support government ministries. (U)

-- AID will take immediate steps to ensure that funds are made available to support the National Triage Commission. ~~(C)~~

-- The Department of Justice will provide four experts (possibly retirees) to assist the Rwandan Wars Crimes Tribunal. USUN will ensure that the Prosecutor's Office of the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal promptly fulfills its commitment to reimburse the USG for the cost of providing four individuals (two prosecutors and two investigators) for a year. (U)

-- USUN will provide DOJ with an analysis of the January 12 Mansfield field report by February 13. (U)

-- USUN will explore with Treasury the possibility of securing several detailees for the Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal from its law enforcement divisions. (U)

Military Issues

-- USUN will initiate consultations in New York to build the case for a partial lift of the UN arms embargo against Rwanda in order to enable provision to the GOR of non-lethal military equipment (e.g. vehicles, parts, communications equipment, etc.) ~~(S)~~

-- State will instruct Embassy Kigali to approach the GOR to ask if the GOR wants USG assistance

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Embassy Kigali will ensure the GOR understands we can by no means guarantee the success of such efforts. ~~(C)~~

-- Starting the week of February 13, State will consult with key members of Congress and relevant committees on the Administration's intention to resume the IMET program for Rwanda in FY95. State will solicit congressional views as to how to remove the existing legal barriers, while stressing our preference for using a Presidential waiver to speed resumption of the program. Based on congressional reaction, State will proceed either with the waiver or with legislation. (U)

Burundi

-- State will continue its efforts to promote stability in Burundi. The White House will pursue the possibility of taping a one minute Presidential radio address urging calm. (U)

VUTGVING TELEGRAM

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3 ___ 4 ____ 5 ____
6 ___ 7 ____ 8 ____

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AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
02/14/95 647-3139 SECC 5808
AF:GMOOSE

AF/C:ARENDER AF/C:TMCCULLEY
PM/ISP:PSUTER IO/UNP:GSTANTON OSD: JCS:
G:AJOYCE P:LBASSETT NSCS:
S/S: S/S-O:

PRIORITY KIGALI, BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

PRIORITY KINSHASA, RWAND

BUJUMBURA FOR AMBS. RAWSON AND FRIEDMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, RW, CG

SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF EX-FAR EQUIPMENT IN ZAIRE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAS 6 - 8.

3. THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT SEIZED EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT THE TIME THE EX-FAR CROSSED OVER INTO ZAIRE LAST YEAR; HOWEVER, THE GOZ'S ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO PREVENT EX-FAR USE OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS OPEN TO QUESTION. WHILE EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN PLACED IN CANTONMENT SITES UNDER OSTENSIBLE GOZ CONTROL, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE EX-FAR HAS ACCESS TO, AND IS EVEN MAINTAINING/SERVICING, THIS EQUIPMENT. SOME APC'S MAY HAVE ALREADY LEFT THE CANTONMENT SITES FOR POINTS UNKNOWN. GIVEN THE RECENT INCURSIONS INTO RWANDA AND REGULAR REPORTS OF EX-FAR/MILITIA TRAINING IN ZAIRE, EX-FAR ACCESS TO AND POSSIBLE USE OF "SEIZED" EQUIPMENT IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN AND MAY POSE A SECURITY THREAT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA.

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4. THE EX-FAR EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MATERIALS AND MONEY CARRIED OVER INTO ZAIRE HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOR AND GOZ. WHILE THE GOR HAS GENERALLY BEEN PRESSING FOR THE RETURN OF RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND RWANDAN MILITARY ASSETS, THE SEIZED MILITARY EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AND THUS COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THE GOR UNLESS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED OR MODIFIED. WHILE THE USG HAS BEGUN DISCRETE CONSULTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK (FOR REASONS UNRELATED TO THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE) (DISCUSSED SEPTEL), IT IS LIKELY THAT AN EMBARGO OF SOME KIND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST SOME PERIOD. MOREOVER, THE GOZ HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET ON RETURNING RWANDAN ASSETS NOT SUBJECT TO THE EMBARGO. THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMINENT RETURN OF EX-FAR EQUIPMENT TO THE GOR IS REMOTE.

5. DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTRUCTION OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE APC'S. THIS WOULD DENY THE EX-FAR THE USE OF THE MATERIEL AND REDUCE THE SECURITY THREAT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES ANY EFFORT BY FORMER GOVERNMENT FORCES TO RESUME THE WAR AGAINST THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RECOGNIZES AND IS SUPPORTING.

6. EMBASSY KIGALI SHOULD APPROACH THE GOR (EITHER IN KIGALI OR ON THE MARGINS OF THE BUJUMBURA REFUGEE CONFERENCE, AS APPROPRIATE) TO ASK IF THE GOR WANTS USG ASSISTANCE TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO DESTROY IN PLACE EX-FAR APC'S (AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT, IF THE GOR WISHES) IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR USE FOR FUTURE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. EMBASSY KIGALI SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOR UNDERSTANDS THAT, EVEN IF THE GOR CONCURS IN THIS PROPOSAL, WE CAN IN NO WAY GUARANTEE THAT THE GOZ WILL AGREE TO THE REQUEST.

7. IN MAKING THIS DEMARCHE, POST MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO SEIZE AND HOLD EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE EX-FAR OR MILITIAS MIGHT REGAIN CONTROL IN ORDER TO USE THE EQUIPMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

-- GIVEN THE RECENT INCURSIONS INTO RWANDA AND REGULAR REPORTS OF EX-FAR/MILITIA TRAINING IN ZAIRE, EX-FAR ACCESS TO AND POSSIBLE USE OF "SEIZED" APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY

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EQUIPMENT IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN.

-- WE KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE DISPOSITION OF RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND RWANDAN MILITARY ASSETS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE.

-- HAVE YOU CONSIDERED HAVING THE EX-FAR APC'S {OR OTHER EQUIPMENT} DESTROYED? DESTRUCTION WOULD DENY THE EX-FAR THE USE OF THE MATERIEL AND WOULD REDUCE THE SECURITY THREAT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES ANY EFFORT BY FORMER GOVERNMENT FORCES TO RESUME THE WAR AGAINST YOU.

-- WOULD YOU LIKE OUR ASSISTANCE IN TRYING TO CONVINCE THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TO DESTROY IN PLACE THE REMAINING RWANDAN APC'S IN ZAIRIAN CUSTODY SO THEY CANNOT BE USED BY THE EX-FAR OR MILITIAS? IS THERE OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT THAT MIGHT ALSO BE DESTROYED?

-- IF YOU WOULD LIKE OUR ASSISTANCE, WE ARE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE ZAIRIANS TO URGE THEM TO PROCEED WITH DESTRUCTION IN PLACE OF THE EQUIPMENT.

-- WE WOULD CAUTION, HOWEVER, THAT OUR LEVERAGE WITH THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT IS LIMITED, AND EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT IN KINSHASA AGREES TO SUCH A REQUEST, IT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY IT OUT. NONETHELESS, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE OUR BEST EFFORT.

{IF THE GOR SAYS IT WOULD PREFER RETURN OF THE EQUIPMENT, POST MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:}

-- THE APC'S AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBJECT TO THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AND THUS COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THE GOR UNLESS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED OR MODIFIED.

-- FOLLOWING THE REQUEST MADE BY VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME DURING HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. LAST DECEMBER, WE HAVE BEGUN DISCRETE CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK ON THE ISSUE OF MODIFYING THE EMBARGO, AT LEAST TO ENABLE PROVISION OF NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

-- THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE IN THEIR EARLIEST STAGES, AND IT IS LIKELY THAT AN EMBARGO OF SOME KIND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST SOME PERIOD.

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-- MOREOVER, AS YOU WELL KNOW, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL ON RETURN OF RWANDAN ASSETS BROUGHT INTO ZAIRE.

-- THUS, THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMINENT RETURN OF EX-FAR EQUIPMENT TO THE GOR IS REMOTE, AND DESTRUCTION WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR TO BE THE BEST OPTION.

(NOTE FOR KIGALI: SEPTEL FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS ON SEPARATE ISSUE OF USG EFFORTS TO CONSULT ON MODIFYING ARMS EMBARGO.)

8. FOR BUJUMBURA: PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO AMB. FRIEDMAN AND AMB. RAWSON (ASSUMING THE LATTER ATTENDS REFUGEE CONFERENCE). NO OTHER ACTION IS REQUESTED FROM POST. YY

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6 ___ 7 ____ 8 ____

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AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
02/14/95 647-3139 SECC 5810
AF:GMOOSE

AF/C:ARENDER/TMCCULLEY G:AJOYCE IO/UNP:GSTANTON G:AJOYCE
PM/ISP:PSUTER P:LBASSETT PRM/AAA:ANELSON DRL/AAA:RPOWERS
JCS: OSD: NSCS:
S/S: S/S-O:

PRIORITY KIGALI, USUN PRIORITY

ROUTINE RWAND

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, RW, UN

SUBJECT: CONSULTATION ON MODIFICATION OF ARMS EMBARGO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. KIGALI SEE PARAS 6-7. USUN SEE PARA 5.

3. THE MAY 17, 1994 UN SECURITY COUNCIL ARMS EMBARGO PROHIBITS "THE SALE OR SUPPLY TO RWANDA ... OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT ...." DURING HIS DECEMBER 1994 VISIT TO WASHINGTON, VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME SOUGHT SUPPORT FOR LIFTING OR MODIFYING THE EMBARGO AND IMPLEMENTING USG REGULATIONS SO THE RPA MIGHT RECEIVE {ESSENTIALLY NON-LETHAL} EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS GEAR AND VEHICLES. HE ARGUED THE EMBARGO WAS ENACTED WHEN THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WAS IN POWER AND WAS DIRECTED AT ENDING THE KILLING; IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO PUNISH THE NEW GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, HE STRESSED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO OBTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE.

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4. IN LIGHT OF THE GOR'S POSITIONS AND OUR GENERAL POLICY OF SUPPORT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WE BELIEVE IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSULT IN NEW YORK ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA IN ORDER TO ENABLE PROVISION TO THE GOR OF NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WE NOTE THAT SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT (E.G., COMMUNICATIONS GEAR) COULD ALSO IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL AND MIGHT THEREBY HELP REDUCE RPA INDISCIPLINE.

5. FOR USUN: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO INITIATE CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK TO BUILD THE CASE FOR A PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA IN ORDER TO ENABLE PROVISION TO THE GOR/RPA OF NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT (E.G., VEHICLES, PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, ETC.) MISSION MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN ITS CONSULTATIONS:

-- THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST RWANDA WAS ENACTED IN MAY 1994, DURING THE HORRENDOUS PERIOD OF MASSACRES AND GENOCIDE WHEN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS STILL IN POWER AND WHILE THE CIVIL WAR WAS STILL RAGING.

-- THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY SINCE THAT TIME. THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT LINKED TO THE GENOCIDE WAS DEFEATED AND FLED THE COUNTRY LAST JULY, AND A NEW MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED WHICH HAS STATED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARUSHA.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS RECOGNIZED THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND IS HELPING IT RECOVER FROM THE WAR AND RETURN RWANDA TO NORMALCY. THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS APPARENT AT THE JANUARY UNDP ROUND TABLE, WHICH PRODUCED NEARLY DOLLARS 600 MILLION IN PLEDGES.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, THE SITUATION REMAINS FRAGILE. INCURSIONS INTO RWANDA FROM ZAIRE HAVE BEGUN, AND EX-FAR AND MILITIA HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ENGAGED IN MILITARY TRAINING IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

-- THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO, AT LEAST TO ALLOW IT TO PROCURE ESSENTIAL BUT NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS GEAR.

-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF A POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE UN ARMS EMBARGO TO ALLOW PROVISION OF NON-LETHAL

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MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY FORCES.

-- SUCH A MOVE WOULD SIGNAL CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND A DESIRE TO SEE RWANDA RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY OF SOVEREIGN AND RESPONSIBLE NATIONS.

-- CERTAIN EQUIPMENT (E.G., COMMUNICATIONS GEAR) COULD ALSO IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL AND MIGHT THEREBY IMPROVE OVERALL DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S ARMY.

-- THE PARTIAL LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WOULD HELP THE FLEDGLING GOVERNMENT DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST RECENT INCURSIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE TO EXILED FORMER INTERIM GOVERNMENT FORCES AND SUPPORTERS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OPPOSES ANY EFFORT BY EXILED FORCES TO RESUME THE WAR.

6. FOR KIGALI: POST IS REQUESTED TO INFORM THE GOR OF OUR EFFORTS ON ITS BEHALF IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND MAY SHARE TALKING POINTS WE ARE USING IN OUR CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK. POST SHOULD CAUTION THE GOR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS COULD BE AN UPHILL BATTLE. EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] WITHOUT SHARING THE SOURCE OF THESE VIEWS, POST SHOULD BRING THEM TO THE GOR'S ATTENTION SO THE GOR IS AWARE OF THE OPPOSITION THE PROPOSAL FACES.

EO 13526 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4d

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
UK Commitment — NZ → all demurrers

50 days

Rogers — reprogramming FY-95

FY-96 - Earmarked

Next day — Recruiting



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em Subject: NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA

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3JECT: NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA

NSC DIRECTOR TIM ATKIN MET UP WITH INCOMING USAID
WDA/BURUWDI DESK OFFICER MALAIKA STOLL IN BUJUMBURA
) SPENT ONE WEEK IN AND AROUND KIGALI WITH A DAY TRIP
REFUGEE CAMPS IN TANZANIA. IN BURUWDI ATKIN MET
H EMBASSY POLITICAL/ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICER JULIE
EAGAN, UNSR POLITICAL ADVISOR HANY ABDUZ AZIZ, OAU
ITARY COMMANDANT LTCOL BEN ALI, AS WELL AS
TRACTORS WORKING FOR USAID ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
DEMOCRACY INITIATIVES. IN KIGALI ATKIN MET WITH US
ASSADOR DAVID RAWSON, USAID MISSION DIRECTOR MYRON
DEN, JUSTICE MINISTER ALPHONSE MARIE NKUBITO, UNHCR
EGATE ROMAIN URASA, UNHCHR INVESTIGATOR ANDREAS
ESS, AND UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL TOUSIGNANT.
IN ALSO TRAVELED TO NYAMATA/NTARAMA, VISITED WITH A
NDAN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR IN BUTARE, TOURED KIGALI
TRAL PRISON WITH UNICEF AND NGO REPRESENTATIVES AND
ITED THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN NGARA, TANZANIA WITH UNHCR
IECTION OFFICER GREGORY GARRAS AND AMEMB DAR ES
AAM VICE COUNSEL GEORGE HOGEMAN. ATKIN MET WITH THE
DELEGATION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FROM KIGALI FOR
BUJUMBURA REFUGEE CONFERENCE. FOLLOWING ARE HIS
EFAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE TRIP. A MORE DETAILED
ORT WILL FOLLOW UPON RETURN.

'ALL

SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA IS VERY GOOD.
TARY PRESENCE WAS BARELY NOTICEABLE ON THE TRIP TO
ANIA. IN KIGALI IN PARTICULAR, BEGINNING THIS WEEK
E ARE NO LONGER MILITARY ROAD CHECK POINTS AND MANY
TARY MEMBERS NO LONGER CARRY WEAPONS. UNAMIR ACCESS
BEEN REGARDED AS UNLIMITED THROUGHOUT RWANDA.
E THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RESTRICTIONS FROM TIME TO
, THEY DO NO APPEAR SYSTEMATIC IN ANY AREA AND
AR TO BE RELATED TO SPECIFIC COUNTERINSURGENCY
RTS. ACCESS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS WAS
RIBED AS "ASTONISHINGLY UNLIMITED." COORDINATION
G DONOR COUNTRIES IS IMPROVING AND THE INCREASE IN
RCES AT THE USAID MISSION WAS A CRITICAL STEP.

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UATION BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE GOR IN ALL EFFORTS
NERAL AND IN THE CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS IN
CULAR IS QUITE GOOD. THE COMPOSITION OF UNAMIR
S SHOULD BEGIN TO CHANGE TO MATCH THE CHANGES
N RWANDA. AN INCREASE IN CIVILIAN POLICE AND
ORS, OFFSET BY A DECREASE IN MILITARY TROOPS
D BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNAMIR HAS TRAINED
100 CIVILIAN POLICE, HAS 400 MORE IN TRAINING AND HAS BEGUN DEVELOPING RWANDAN TRAINERS. THE ETHIOPIAN CONTINGENT REPORTEDLY STILL INTENDS TO DEPART WITHOUT REPLACEMENT LATER THIS MONTH. THE EXACT AMOUNT AND TYPE OF SECURITY SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCLEAR. GENERAL TOUSIGNANT PLANNED TO DEDICATE A COMPANY BUT WAS TOLD BY THE UN THAT ONE OR TWO PEOPLE IN FRONT OF THE TRIBUNAL OFFICES WOULD BE ADEQUATE; THIS IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH ANTICIPATED SUPPORT.

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS

THE UNHCHR PROGRAM -- HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE -- NEEDS SERIOUS ATTENTION IF IT IS TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WELL COORDINATED; THE ROLE OF THE MONITORS REMAINS UNDEFINED AND IS AT ODDS WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE WORK OF THE INVESTIGATIONS SECTION IS BEING TURNED OVER TO THE TRIBUNAL. THERE ARE PRESENTLY 50 MONITORS IN THE FIBLD, 10 SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS, AND 8 MEMBERS IN THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNIT. AROUND 35 TO 40 MONITORS MAY ARRIVE FROM THE EU BY THE END OF THE MONTN (THIS HAS BEEN THE STATUS FOR 3 MONTHS THOUGH); DELAYS ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE RESULT OF THE LACK OF COORDINATION AND MISSION DEFINITION. AN ABSENCE OF A CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY EXACERBATES THE PROBLEMS. WITH TIME, THIS PROGRAM WILL ONLY BECOME MORE IMPORTANT TO RECONCILIATION AND REPATRIATION.

BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRIES IS PRIMARILY DUE TO AN ABSENCE OF A STAFF IN KIGALI AND

SECONDARILY DUE TO PRODUCT AVAILABILITY IN THE REGION. WITHIN THE LAST WEEK USAID MISSION BURUNDI/RWANDA HAS ADDED TO THE FSN STAFF AT THE KIGALI OFFICE A FULL-TIME DEPUTY, EXO, DG AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OFFICERS, AND TWO MORE POSITIONS (USAID DART CLOSES 15 FEB). THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN A VEHICLE; MORE ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WITHIN THE NEXT 4 WEEKS. A TEAM FROM USAID ARRIVES LATER THIS MONTH TO BEGIN TO PROVIDE PLANNING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. USAID FINALIZED A CONTRACT TODAY WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO PROVIDE COMMUNE ADMINISTRATIONS WITH THE FORMS NECESSARY TO GOVERN (REGISTRATION FOR BIRTHS, DEATHS, PROPERTY, BUSINESSES, ETC). DOD HAS A TDY RESERVIST AT USEMB KIGALI ASSISTING WITH THE ARRIVAL OF DOD PROVIDED HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT (MEDICAL AND SCHOOL SUPPLIES) WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO MINISTRIES FOR DISTRIBUTION OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

:em Subject: NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA

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IULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

AT A MEETING THIS WEEK WITH IMF AND WORLD BANK OFFICIALS IN KIGALI, THE WORLD BANK INDICATED THE USD 50 MILLION WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER FOUR TO SEVEN WEEKS; ITS AVAILABILITY WAS DEPENDENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL PROCUREMENT OFFICE IN 'ANDA. THIS NEW CAVEAT HAS NEVER BEEN FLAGGED BEFORE TME BANK. THIS IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE NORS HAVE BEEN TOLD WOULD OCCUR WHEN THEIR NTRIBUTIONS CLEARED RWANDA'S ARREARS.

FUGEE REPATRIATION/CAMP SECURITY

THE NGARA CAMPS IN TANZANIA, THE AMOUNT OF WATER AILABLE IS APPROXIMATELY 25-PERCENT OF THE LEVEL IPULATED IN UNHCR GUIDELINES AND IT IS ESTIMATED ERE WILL BE A FOOD SHORTAGE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO NTHS. A COORDINATED EFFORT BY UNHCR AND NGOS APPEARS AT IT WILL ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE FOOD SHORTAGE. TIL RECENTLY, REPATRIATION HAS BARELY BEEN DISCUSSED THE TANZANIAN CAMPS BECAUSE OF ONGOING INTIMIDATION THOSE INTERESTED IN RETURNING AND NGO WORKERS. THE HCR PROTECTION OFFICER INDICATED THERE IS INCREASING LK BY THOSE IN THE CAMPS, INCLUDING MODERATE ADERSHIP, OF REPATRIATING. SOME PEOPLE ARE PAYING HERS TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO INVESTIGATE THE SECURITY TUATION AND IN GENERAL THE REPORTS MAKING IT BACK TO E CAMPS ARE GOOD. INTERVIEWS WITH THOSE REPATRIATING DICATE APPROXIMATELY 60 TO 70-PERCENT OF THE SIDENTS OF THE CAMPS IN THE NGARA REGION WOULD LIKE RETURN TO RWANDA. THE CAMP LEADERSHIP'S POWER IS CLINING; THE CHANGE IN CURRENCY HAS UNDERMINED THEIR NANCING; THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL HAS GNALED INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE; THE LEADERSHIP'S OPAGANDA STORIES OF MASS KILLINGS OCCURRING IN RWANDA THE GOR ARE INCONSISTENT WITH WORD GETTING BACK TO E CAMPS BY OTHER S
RCES. UNHCR FELT STRONGLY THAT
E TANZANIAN OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF POLICE FOR CAMP CURITY SHOULD REMAIN BEYOND HIS THREE MONTH ROTATION ASKED US EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM TO ASSIST IN MAKING IS HAPPEN. THE PROTECTION OFFICER BELIEVED PUBLIC LEASE OF THE LIST OF THOSE PEOPLE TARGETED FOR VESTIGATION BY THE TRIBUNAL (PRIMARY ORGANIZERS) ULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT IN TME CAMPS. NGO FICIALS INDICATE THEY PLAN ON SETTING UP AND ERATING A RADIO FOR THE NGARA CAMPS; IT WOULD RELAY NERAL INFORMATION. WHEN ASKED IF THE RADIO WOULD AY FACTUAL INFORMATION SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE) REPATRIATED, THE ANSWER WAS NO/NO -- THAT WOULD BE CRCIVE.

NEXT STEPS

THERE IS A REAL SENSE THAT THE OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS A CRITICAL, TIME URGENT MATTER. WHILE IT IS NOT THE SOLE ANSWER TO THE COMPLEX INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE, REPATRIATION, AND RECONCILIATION, IT IS A TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF GENOCIDE AND ENABLING THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TO MOVE FORWARD. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE GOR TO PROCEED MORE RAPIDLY WITH JUSTICE FOR THOSE IN PRISON WHEN THE MORE SIGNIFICANT PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE REMAIN AT LARGE. ALONG WITH EFFORTS TO SPEED UP THE OPENING OF THE TRIBUNAL, A COORDINATED EFFORT IS NEEDED BETWEEN THREE KEY PROGRAMS: HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN POLICE

FORCE, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUSTICE PROGRAM WITH EMPHASIS ON PREFECTURE AND COMMUNE LEVEL EFFORTS.
RAWSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PTP1059

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 00477 00 OF 03 131636Z

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Item Subject: NSC ATKIN VISIT TO RWANDA

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KIGALI 000477

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AID - GLENN SLOCUM

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PREL, RW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rwanda

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: ATKIN, BEERS, CLARKER, DESHAZER, NSC, RICE, SCHWARTZ, STEINBERG

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:171527Z FEB 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5290

RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000774

FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANDA AND US

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE GOMA AND RWANDA PORTIONS OF OUR TRIP.

CAMP SECURITY

3. THE CONDITION OF THE REFUGEES HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED SINCE PHYLLIS VISITED LAST AUGUST. GOMA TOWN HAS BEEN CLEARED. WELL CARED FOR REFUGEES LIVE IN BUSTLING CAMPS. THERE ARE MANY YOUNG MEN IN MILITARY BOOTS AND PANTS SWAGGERING ABOUT. INDEED, MANY OBSERVERS COMMENTED ABOUT THE TOTAL LACK OF REMORSE AMONG THE REFUGEES. THE LIVELY CAMP COMMERCE, THE CONTINUED USE OF THE OLD CURRENCY, THE OLD GOR'S AUTHORITY, AN ARMY AND MILITIA MAKE THE GOMA AREA HOME NOT TO A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE BUT A STATE PREPARING TO RETURN HOME, NO MATTER HOW UNLIKELY THAT PROSPECT APPEARS TO OTHERS, INCLUDING US.

4. THE NGOS VIEW IS THAT THE OLD GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY HAS BECOME FIRMER THAN EVER. NGO'S REPEATEDLY TOLD US THAT THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO INTIMIDATION AT THE WILL OF THE LOCAL CAMP CHIEFS. THE ONLY IMPROVEMENT IS THAT THE RANDOM CRIMINALITY OF LAST YEAR HAS ENDED AS THE MACHINE BOSSES HAVE TAKEN HOLD. THE NGO'S DARK ASSESSMENT, FOR WHICH THEY HAVE VIVID EXAMPLES, IS SHARED BY THE THE GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI WHICH NOTED TO US THAT THE OLD LEADERSHIP

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2011-0263-M
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CONDUCTED AND WON ELECTIONS IN THE CAMPS EARLIER THIS YEAR. REPULSED AT SERVING UNREPENTANT MURDERERS,

EO 13526 1.4d

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNHCR IS VERY UPBEAT ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION AND PROUD OF WHAT IT HAS DONE TO WEAKEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE OLD LEADERSHIP. THEY POINT TO LESSENED INSTANCES OF INTIMIDATION AND THE INCREASED RATE OF REPATRIATION. THEY EXPECT ORGANIZED REPATRIATION WILL REACH 1000 PER DAY THIS WEEK AND WILL SOON MOVE TO 2000.

MRS. OGATA'S ARMY

7. ONE IMPORTANT VARIABLE WILL BE THE UNHCR'S ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCE WHICH WAS JUST SETTING UP WHEN WE ARRIVED. THE UNHCR UNDERSTANDS AND IS ATTEMPTING TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS OF THIS OPERATION. NONE OF THE CONCERNS WE OR OTHERS HAVE EXPRESSED WERE NEW TO THEM. THEY FEEL IT CAN WORK, CITING SUCCESSFUL PILOT OPERATIONS IN THE AREA WITH SEVERAL ZAIRIAN UNITS. THEY ALSO HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE LIAISON GROUP LEADER WHO ARRIVED THIS WEEK AND ON WHOM SO MUCH WILL DEPEND. MRS. OGATA'S ANSWER TO HER CRITICS IS TO SAY WAIT AND SEE IF IT WORKS AND IN THE MEANTIME GIVE ME YOUR SUPPORT. WE AGREE WITH HER. (MISTAKES WILL BE MADE, AS THEY SAY.

NO PALESTINIANS THESE

8. EVERYBODY FAMILIAR WITH THE RWANDAN REFUGEES BELIEVES THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THE MOZAMBICAN EXAMPLE OF REFUGEES RETURNING AS SOON AS THEY FEEL SAFE. THE ATTRACTION OF HOME AND LAND IS VERY STRONG. RETURNEES NOW ARE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPOSED OF PEASANTS WHOSE TIES TO PLACE ARE STRONGEST AND WHO ARE WILLING TO RUN MORE RISKS TO GET BACK HOME. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE SIMPLE

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THREAT THAT THEY MIGHT BE MOVED FURTHER INTO ZAIRE
BECAUSE OF TEH VOLCANOS MADE MANY REFUGEES FEAR THAT (#)
EXILE WOULD BECOME (#)
LEADERS'
PROMISES TO TAKE THEM BACK SEEMED HOLLOW. THEY
PREFERRED TO RUN THE RISKS OF RETURN NOW.


9. IF THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS PROPELLING THE REFUGEES
BACK TO RWANDA ARE IN CO
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000774

FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANDA AND US

SPONTANEOUS RETURN WILL EVENTUALLY OUTSTRIP THE
ORGANIZED VARIETY. WHETHER RWANDA HAS THE CARRYING
CAPACITY TO ACCEPT A MASSIVE RETURN IS SOMETHING ON THE
MINDS OF ALL, INCLUDING THE GOR. BETTING IS THAT ROOM
WILL BE FOUND FOR ALL WHO COME --BUT THE PROCESS WILL
BE ROCKY AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS.

10. BUT IN ANY CASE, SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS WILL OPT NOT
TO RETURN, BARRING A TOTAL HUTU VICTORY. HOW MANY
WILL CHOOSE EXILE IS ANYBODY'S GUESS. THOSE THAT DO
GUESS PUT THE FIGURE AS HIGH AS 50&. THE UNHCR IS
ALREADY PLANNING FOR MOVING THIS RESIDUE AWAY FROM THE
BORDERS INTO ZAIRE AND TANZANIA. MRS. OGATA POINTS OUT
THAT SUCH RELOCATION IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND AFRICAN PRACTICE. IT IS
ALSO ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY GIVEN THE OLD REGIME'S
MILITARY REVANCHISM AND THE GOR'S CLEAR RESERVATION OF
THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE CAMPS SHOULD THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE HOST COUNTRIES PROVE
INCAPABLE OF HALTING SUCH ACTIVITIES.
DIALOGUE



12. THE GOR ITSELF SEEMS TO BE OF SEVERAL MINDS ON
THIS SUBJECT. OUR MEETINGS IN KIGALI LEFT US WITH AN
ENHANCED APPRECIATION THAT THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT IS A

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COALITION OF VIEWS AS WELL AS OF FORCES

EO 13526 1.4d

IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT IN A COUNTRY WHERE SPOILS ARE LIMITED AND THE SENSE OF VICTIMIZATION STRONG (AND VALID) THERE IS A RELUCTANCE TO INVITE OTHERS TO THE TABLE. AS WE SEEK TO HELP THE GOR IT WILL REQUIRE GREAT SKILL TO ENCOURAGE MODERATION WITHOUT EMBOLDENING THE GOR7 IRRECONCILABLES.

13. BUT NOTHING IS SIMPLE OUT HERE. IN THE FACE OF EVIDENCE CALLING INTO DOUBT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS AND/OR CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT RECONCILIATION AND REPATRIATION COME MANY OTHER HOPEFUL SIGNS. THUS, SOME 10,000 TUTSI 1959 RETURNEES WHO HAD RECENTLY OCCUPIED EMPTY HOMES AND FARMS IN THE GISENYI AREA ARE NOW IN UNHCR CAMPS. THEY WERE MOVED OUT OF THE PROPERTIES BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHEN THE FORMER HUTU OWNERS RETURNED AND WERE DEEMED THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS. THIS MAY BE A LOCAL PHENOMENON ---- BUT IT IS A POSITIVE SIGN, IN ANY CASE.

THE VOLCANOS

14. THE UNHCR IS ACTING ON NEW INFORMATION DEVELOPED THE PREVIOUS WEEK THAT PORTRAYS THE VOLCANO THREAT AS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED OVER WHAT HAD BEEN THOUGHT. WE DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO A GAME OF "CHOOSE THE EXPERT", FEELING THIS TASK WAS BEST LEFT TO THE UN, ESPECIALLY AS WE HAVE NO COMPETING OPINION THAT MAY BE MORE VALID. THUS, RATHER THAN PRESSING THE UNHCR ON THIS POINT WE FELT IT BEST TO DROP IT, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. MOREOVER, THE UNHCR SEEMS TO BE VERY MUCH COMMITTED TO GETTING THE CAMPS CLOSED OUT ASAP, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY SHARE THE NGOS DISTASTE FOR THESE CLIENTS AND KNOW RESOURCES ARE LIMITED..

FOOD

15. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE LOOMING FOOD CRISIS IN THIS AREA. JADED EXPERTS DON'T RECALL ANYTHING OF THIS PROPORTION, EVER. HELPING GET THIS ONE SOLVED HAS TO BE A MAJOR PRIORITY. WE NEED TO SEE WHAT MORE WE CAN DO AND HELP MOBILIZE OTHER DONORS. THOUGH NUMBERS ARE ALWAYS A PROBLEM IN REFUGEE CAMPS, THE LOOMING SHORTAGE HERE AND COMPETING NEEDS ELSEWHERE MAKE ACCURATE NUMBERS AN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. THE WFP ASKED IF THE USG MIGT BE ABLE TO TO HELP WITH OVERHEAD, A METHOD WHICH THE WFP BELIEVES WOULD BE MORE ACCURATE THAN REGISTRATION. IF TRUE, WE THINK WE SHOULD STEP FORWARD.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000774

FOR UNDERSECRETARY WIRTH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
FROM OAKLEY AND FRIEDMAN

E.O. 12356: DEQADR
TAGS: PREF, BY, RW
SUBJECT: GOMA, RWANQD US

(THERE HQEN MUCH CRITQ OF THE UNHCR REGISTRATION EFFORT IN GOMA. IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT MISPLACED. THE NGOS TOLD US THAT THE MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE CENSUS, WAS 5-10 PERCENT, CERTAINLY NOT ENOUGH TO INVALIDATE IT. EO 13526 1.4d

A FINAL WORD

16. THIS TRIP CONFIRMED ONE THING YOU ALREADY KNOW: THERE ARE NO GOOD, EASY SOLUTIONS TO THE MESS OUT HERE --JUST UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISES WITH AN INTRACTABLE REALITY AND UNHAPPY CHOICES BETWEEN COMPETING OBJECTIVES. RISKS AND DOWNSIDES ARE EASIER TO IDENTIFY THAN WORKABLE SOLUTIONS. AND WE OPERATE IN A SEA OF RUMOR AND MISINFORMATION. (WE BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT DAVE RAWSON BE GIVEN THE KIND OF STAFF THAT CAN HELP HIM IN WHAT HE IS ALREADY DOING AS WELL AS ANY SINGLE PERSON COULD--SORTING OUT THE FACT FROM THE FICTION AND REPORTING. WASHINGTON IS WORKING ON THIS ONE BUT IT NEEDS TO DONE QUICKLY.)

17. WHAT IMPRESSED US THE MOST ARE PEOPLE DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING UNHCR STAFF. THE NGOS ARE VIRTUALLY ALL TOP NOTCH. SO IS OUR KIGALI MISSION. EVERYBODY IS PLAYING A RUM HAND. BUT WE ALL MUST PLAY ON.

18. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

KRUEGER
BT
#0774

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FROM:
SITREPRT

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Rwanda War Crime

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

February 17, 1995

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

TO: DOJ - Ms. Gorelick

FROM: USUN/W - David J. Scheffer DS

SUBJECT: Security of U.S. Personnel Contributed to the International Tribunal for Rwanda

This memorandum follows our discussion at the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Rwanda (February 8) and the tasking to provide you with an analysis of (b)(6) January 12 report (Tab 1).

In addition to the information I provide below, I urge you to read the other report prepared for DOJ on the events described in the January 12 report (Tab 2). It is consistent with that report but more positive.

We should also review reports from the many U.S. and U.N. experts who have visited Rwanda over the last several months. In particular, (b)(6) describes the security situation in Rwanda as "very good" and stresses that human rights monitors, who would face security threats similar to those confronting Tribunal personnel, have "astonishingly unlimited" access throughout Rwanda (Tab 3).

The information below tracks that provided to (b)(6) on his visit to the Tribunal last week. I look forward to seeing (b)(6) comments about the size of the Yugoslav Tribunal as soon as possible. As he may have mentioned to you, the U.N. budget approval process for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals started this week. His views could be useful in our efforts to reduce the administrative and support costs of both Tribunals. The Yugoslav Tribunal's essential investigative and trial tasks depend largely on personnel contributed by DOJ and other agencies; this week's twenty-one indictments are a mark of the important role those contributed personnel play.

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2011-0263-M
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Stationing Tribunal Personnel in Kigali

After the December trip, State and USUN concluded that Kigali lacks the infrastructure to support a large prosecutor's office. The Secretary General of the United Nations has agreed (paragraph 38(a) of his report, at Tab 4).

We understand that the Prosecutor has decided since January 12 not to station people in Kigali permanently. The Prosecutor anticipates that he will rotate investigators and analysts (not prosecutors) to Kigali for periods of about three weeks; prosecutors will not be stationed in or rotated through Kigali, although it is possible that they will go on short visits like those (b)(6) has made. The Prosecutor would thus have a permanent presence in Kigali, although the individuals would change. This approach matches (b)(6) recommendation (p.5 of his January 12 report).

The regional headquarters of the office will be outside Rwanda. The Secretary General has recommended Arusha, Tanzania. Security problems there will be minimal, the United Nations has concluded, and a large international conference center already exists. The final decision on the headquarters will be made by the Security Council, where we will play a leading role, ensuring that our concerns are met.

With (b)(6) at Justice (who is making recommendations for the Tribunal's litigation support system), we have worked to suggest a Kigali base for the Prosecutor that will both permit the Tribunal to maintain a high profile in Kigali and acknowledge the real logistical limitations to operating in Kigali.

We understand that the Prosecutor is now considering a plan of investigations that would place nearly all his assets in Europe for the next several months. This will enable him to concentrate on high-ranking suspects who have fled there. The time it provides (perhaps three months or more) will permit the infrastructure in Kigali to develop. Should he continue along these lines, we will press him to explain how he will simultaneously maintain a presence in Kigali adequate to reassure the parties that he is vigorously pursuing the investigation of genocide and other atrocities.

Security

As (b)(6) UNAMIR is fully committed to providing the Tribunal's security as required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 965 (Tab 5). (The Secretary General also emphasizes UNAMIR's commitment (paragraph 27 of his report at Tab 4). We understand that

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UNAMIR will provide round-the-clock protection for each Tribunal person in Rwanda. Due to its own personnel limitations, UNAMIR recommends that no more than fifteen (15) Tribunal staff be present in Rwanda simultaneously. (As I mentioned above, that staff is not expected to include prosecutors.) The Prosecutor intends to abide by that recommendation.

As I noted, (b)(6) describes the security situation in Rwanda as "very good." The State Department is stationing personnel in Kigali, an indication that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has concluded that safety concerns can be met. The State Department has an evacuation plan, which is under review; as U.S. officials, any DOJ personnel would be included in the U.S. evacuation plan. We expect to have time to review the situation again before the U.S. personnel reach Rwanda and to evaluate whether the situation is likely to deteriorate.

Office Space and Accommodations

These concerns are less pressing than in early January, given the lower Tribunal presence anticipated in Kigali. The United Nations has obtained temporary office space in the former UNICEF Building (paragraph 26 of the Secretary General's Report at Tab 4), and premises in the UNAMIR compound have been identified as a possible permanent location. This tracks the recommendation of both (b)(6) and DOJ's contractor (Tab 2). The former UNICEF building is guarded by UNAMIR.

The Department of State is actively working to provide the former Ambassador's residence for Tribunal personnel. If that proves unavailable, the UNAMIR officers' compound has been offered for Tribunal personnel. If necessary, a floor of the Hotel Meridian (suitably rehabilitated) is available; UNAMIR has determined that this arrangement would be secure. Wherever the U.S. personnel lodge, they will be together, and they will have security. We will work with the United Nations to ensure that lodgings are suitable and safe.

In addition, a full-service Belgian hospital, staffed by western doctors, has been offered for the use of Tribunal personnel (provided they have medical insurance). The Prosecutor's office has found these facilities to be adequate.

Conclusion

The developments in the Prosecutor's plans indicate that he is addressing difficulties with operating in Rwanda in an open, reasonable way. We will continue to work closely with the Prosecutor and UNAMIR on security and accommodations before any

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U.S. personnel begin work in Rwanda. Because our personnel will probably begin work outside Rwanda, I hope that they are able to start soon.

The U.S. Government has strongly supported the Tribunal and has encouraged the Rwandan Government to cooperate closely with international investigators. I appreciate your willingness at last week's meeting to begin identifying DOJ personnel for the Tribunal so that they can begin work as soon as possible. They will play an important role in establishing individual accountability for genocide and in promoting national reconciliation.

Attachments

Tab 1 - (b)(6) Report (January 12, 1995);
Tab 2 - Report: Advance Planning for Litigation Support (January 4, 1995);
Tab 3 - Kigali 477 (Atkin Report) (February 13, 1995);
Tab 4 - Secretary General Report (February 13, 1995);
Tab 5 - U.N. Security Council Resolution 965.

cc: Anthony Lake; Mark Richard

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Printed By: Kevin C. Aiston

ACTION AF-01

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	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SS-00	STR-01
	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KIGALI 000596

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, RW, US
SUBJECT: INITIAL RWANDAN RESPONSE TO ARMS AND EMBARGO PROPOSALS

REFS: (A) STATE 045524 (B) STATE 045527

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. I DISCUSSED PROPOSALS CONTAINED REFTELS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GASANA AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MURIGANDE ON FEBRUARY 23 AND 25 RESPECTIVELY. THOUGH THEY COME FROM VERY DIFFERENT PARTS OF RWANDA'S POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND HAVE OFTEN OPPOSING INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTIES, THE OFFICIALS' RESPONSE WAS REMARKABLY SIMILAR.

3. RWANDAN ARMS IN ZAIRE. RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE WERE STALLED. EFFORTS TO MEET AT MINISTERIAL AND SUB-MINISTERIAL LEVEL HAVE BEEN ABORTED BY ZAIRIAN NO-SHOWS. EXCHANGES AT THE BUJUMBURA CONFERENCE WERE CIVIL BUT DID NOT LEAD TO ANY IMPROVED UNDERSTANDINGS. RWANDA WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE; IT STILL HOPED TRAT SOMEDAY ZAIRE WOULD RETURN RWANDAN VEHICLES, MONEY AND ARMS. FOR ZAIRE TO KEEP RWANDAN ARMS WAS PORCED DISARMAMENT, NOT IMPOSITION OF AN EMBARGO. THE ARMS DID POSE A POTENTIAL DANGER. IF THERE WERE NO HOPE OF GETTING THEM BACK, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT AOREE TO THEIR DESTRUCTION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WONDERED IF THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT SERVE AS CONVENER OF A MEETING AT WHICH RWANDAN-ZAIRIAN ISSUES INCLUDING ARMS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. I SUGGESTED THAT RWANDA AND ZAIRE DID NOT NEED THE UNITED STATES TO CALL A MEETING. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO MOVE THE RELATIONSHIP FORWARD.

4. MODIFYING THE EMBARGO. BOTH INTERLOCUTORS CONSIDERED THE CURRENT EMBARGO AN INFRINGEMENT ON RWANDA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE, BUT BOTH AGREED THAT GETTING THE EMBARGO LIFTED ON THAT GROUNDS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. SOME MODIFICATION OF THE EMBARGO ALLOWING RWANDA TO HAVE NECESSARY COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE THE BEST IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE. I POINTED OUT THAT A MORE OPEN POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AT HOME AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS WERE ESSENTIAL IF THE EMBARGO WERE TO BE MODIFIED. RWANDA COULD NOT EXPECT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE EMBARGO ABSENT A CHANGE IN POLITICAL TENSIONS AT HOME AND STRAINED RELATIONS ON THE BORDERS. THE RWANDAN OFFICIALS PROTESTED THEIR GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS

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WITH NEIGHBORS AND TO SECURE AN OPEN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AT HOME. OUTSIDERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE TREMENDOUS CHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED WITHIN RWANDA WITHIN A FEW MONTHS. A THIRD OF THE REFUGEES HAD ALRRADY RETURNED HOME PEACEFULLY: A RECORD WITHOUT PRECEDENT. I ADMITTED THE PROGRESS BUT URGED THAT THE PROCESS CONTINUE AND HAVE MORE CONCRETE EXPRESSIONS AS IN THE RECENT INTEGRATION WITHIN THE ARMY.

5. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE ARE A LONG WAY FROM GETTING RWANDAN CONSENT TO SPIKING THEIR ARMS IN ZAIRE. THEY WILL WORK ENERGETICALLY WITH US ON THE EMBARGO ISSUE. TOP RWANDAN OFFICIALS REMAIN SENSITIVE TO DEMANDS ON RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE, ESPECIALLY TYING THESE POLITICAL GOALS TO ASSISTANCE PROMISES OR CONCESSIONS ON THE ARMS EMBARGO. THE DIALOGUE ON THESE TWO ISSUES MUST BE PURSUED TO MOVE THEM TO FRUITION. RAWSON

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Zaire and Paris

BACKGROUND

The French can be expected to be far more bullish on Kengo (and Mobutu) than our Belgian partners. Paris may consider a resumption of assistance, although this will be limited at least initially to expanding humanitarian aid. It is likely that Paris will phase out the visa sanction, and it would be useful to probe the French on how far they plan to go in the de facto rehabilitation of Mobutu. You may also wish to query de la Sabliere on whether and for how long the French intend to stay in eastern Zaire following their withdrawal from Rwanda, and on his views of security for the refugee camps in Zaire.

POINTS

- We view favorably Kengo's moves to establish committees to draft legislation on an electoral calendar and budget, and to identify and free political prisoners. Plans to draft a realistic government budget and reform provincial administration are also positive signs.

- In conjunction with his trip to the U.S. for UNGA, Kengo will meet at the Assistant Secretary and U/S Tarnoff level. We have urged him to meet with the IMF and the Bank.

- Brooke Amendment and other constraints prevent a renewal of bilateral aid for the present. The U.S. will continue and expand our humanitarian assistance, and we have not excluded electoral assistance (working through NGOs or the UN). Discussions within the USG are at a very preliminary stage. The visa sanction will remain in place, but we will employ it on a case-by-case basis.

- We will bolster Kengo through public support for his program. We are working closely with the Kengo government to facilitate our humanitarian mission in eastern Zaire, including on security issues. If Kengo continues to govern effectively and move his agenada forward, we may revisit the question of an Ambassador in Kinshasa.

- The Moroccans refused to send a contingent to assist the Zairians, and security in the refugee camps remains a concern. What are GOF views on the most suitable means of providing training for the FAZ? Which country might be best-suited to assist the Zairians with the task of disarming the former Rwandan army and militia, and of assuring the security of refugees and relief workers?

- How long do the French intend to remain in eastern Zaire following withdrawal from Rwanda?

- It would be useful if France could raise with the GOZ the critical importance of disarming the Rwandans, of ensuring that Zairian territory not be used to stage attacks on the new authorities in Kigali, and of ending the inflammatory broadcasts by Hutu extremists.

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MEETING WITH FRENCH
Rwanda/Burundi

Transition from Turquoise to UNAMIR

- We should continue to push the French to provide support to UNAMIR by **leaving equipment behind** for, and facilitating deployment of, additional francophone UNAMIR contingents. (Senegal, in particular, had planned to send troops to supplement its Turquoise contingent.)

- We may want to raise the idea of the French **providing a few staffers for UNAMIR** headquarters to reassure the Hutus.

- What are French **plans for staying on in Eastern Zaire**?

- What are French views on enhancing **security in the refugee camps** in Zaire? How do we handle disarmament?

Encouraging Repatriation/Reconciliation

- Where are the **hate radio broadcasts** emanating from now? What can be done to suppress or counter them? (We have demarched the Burundi and Zaire governments on this.)

- We need to push deployment of **human rights monitors.** (We plan to contribute $750,000, and the French have indicated a willingness to provide funding, as well.)

- We will continue to monitor the **behavior of the new GOR** and encourage them to broaden its base and respect human rights.

Accountability

- We need to speed up establishment of a **war crimes tribunal.** (The French support a UN tribunal but have not yet agreed with our proposal to expand the jurisdiction of the current Yugoslav tribunal to cover Rwanda.)

- We need to move to **detain suspects.** We are considering a UN resolution giving member states the authority to do so.

Burundi

- We must continue to push Burundians to **install a President.**

- We should encourage the French to follow our lead and send **high level visitors.**

- We should press the idea of a **refugee conference** in Bujumbura. (The French have not yet answered us.)

- We are supporting the UNHRC's **human rights advisory services** plan ($300,000 contribution) and pressing the OAU to make better use of its monitors? What **other initiatives** should the international community consider?

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* Foster a broad-based government that respects rule of law and transparent governance.

* Avoid the creation on Rwanda's borders of a permanent, hostile Hutu diaspora.

* Save lives in refugee and displaced person camps and stabilize camp environments.

* Ensure the successful conclusion and hand-off of Operation Support Hope in both its humanitarian and political/military aspects.

* Help to stem any further large scale exodus into surrounding countries.

* Foster conditions for the safe return and ultimate reconciliation of Rwandan refugees and internally displaced and encourage voluntary repatriation once conditions are ripe.

* Help establish credible national and international systems for identifying, apprehending, trying and punishing those guilty of atrocities, including genocide.

* Help re-establish basic economic and social service infrastructure so that Rwanda can become largely self-reliant.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO MEET THESE GOALS:

- Continue to press the Government of Rwanda to ensure the protection and respect for the human rights of all Rwandans.

- Continue to press for rapid deployment of UNAMIR.

- Deploy human rights monitors as a confidence building measure and to help avert further outflows of refugees.

- Press for establishment of a functional war crimes tribunal and collect evidence for prosecution of persons who committed atrocities, including genocide

- Establish mechanisms for the detention of persons suspected of atrocities, including genocide, and assist frontline states in efforts to detain such suspects.

- Press for disarmament and demobilization of the former Rwandan army and integration of appropriate elements into a broadly-based national Rwandan army.

- Work to shut down/counter hate-mongering radios, working with UNAMIR or other organizations.

- Assist frontline states to maintain security in refugee areas.

- Reinforce efforts to re-establish structures of government and civil society within Rwanda.

- Create and coordinate an appropriate assistance strategy.

- Help UNHCR implement a strategy to repatriate refugees.

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Rwanda

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Potential/Probable questions regarding an expanded UNAMIR mandate.

1. What is the ultimate objective?

The objective is to provide a safe and secure environment in the refugee camps for a fixed period of time and safe passage back to Rwanda. Right now refugees are being intimidate from leaving the camps.

2. How long do we think it will take to achieve the objective, and how long is the mandate?

Anticipate targeting approximately 30,000 refugees over a 30 day period, allowing as many as want to the ability to return, and then moving on to another camp or portion of a camp. To reach all of the refugees would take around 30 months.

The troops you provide could be dedicated for a fixed period of time, i.e. 6 months or so, which would hopefully provide 180,000 refugees with the opportunity to return home. It is not necessary that you dedicate your troops to complete the entire mandate.

3. Who will be in charge?

The UNAMIR force commander will be in charge.

4. Is this a Chapter VI or Chapter VII operation?

It is viewed as a robust Chapter VI mandate.

5. Are we expected to separate ex-FAR and/or militia from other refugees? How do we know who is who? Are we expecting to conduct disarmament? What type of resistance can be expected?

We are not looking for a separation of ex-FAR and/or militia from refugees. Disarmament would be voluntary in that those refugees who move into a protected zone of the camp prior to moving home would need to enter without weapons. With an organized military presence we would expect limited resistance.

6. Will troops have arrest/detention powers? If so, under what authority?

The troops will have the authority to assist the Government of Zaire in carrying out its responsibility to arrest and detain people as necessary.

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7. What role will the U.S. play?

This is a UN operation and the U.S. will pay its assessed contribution. The U.S. will not be committing troops due to our commitments already in other UN sponsored operations, however, as requested we would expect to provide needed logistical and lift support as requested by the UN.

8. How much will this operation cost, and how will it be paid? When will troop contributors be paid?

The UN will provide cost estimates and the mission will be paid for in the normal UN method with regular assessments. Troops will be paid by the normal UN procedures as well.

[ASK IO TO PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF AN EXPANDED UNAMIR WITH TROOP STRENGTH OF 2500]

9. What if the ex-FAR invade Rwanda? What if the RPA conduct preemptive strikes into Zaire?

The UN mission will not have a mandate to stop ex-FAR or RPA incursions. If these occurred the role of UN forces would be to protect humanitarian assistance workers and civilians.

10. Which countries will form this force? How will they be equipped, and who will equip them?

We are in the process of looking for countries, like yours, with well equipped and capable troops to augment the UN troops already in the Rwanda crisis area. We would expect them to have their own normal equipment and the UN would provide additional equipment as needed.

11. How will troops deploy? How will they deploy home at the end of the operation?

Deployment will be at the discretion of the UN and countries donating troops.

12. Who will train the troops? Where? How long will it take? Who will train Zairian gendarmes? Who will pick them?

The troops should already be trained, capable troops. We anticipate the Zairian gendarmes to be trained by agencies contracted by UNHCR.

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13. What is the role of the government of Zaire? Will they be a part of the international force?

No, Zaire will not be part of the international force. As the host country they will consent to and cooperate with the expanded UN force.

14. What are the rules of engagement?

Rules of engagement will be robust. Specific ROE are to be determined by the UNSC in consultation with troop contributing countries.

15. Is this a 3-4 year commitment?

For the overall mandate, it is estimated at 30 months (2.5 years) however, no single nations force is necessarily engaged for that duration as the mission is envisioned in 30 day increments.

16. How do we know that an area of 30,000 refugees can be secured in 30 days? What happens if the situation reverts to poor security after the 30 day period?

The mandate is to provide a window of opportunity for refugees to repatriate. For those who remain in the camps, the UN is anticipating it may leave a company of troops behind for daytime security for the humanitarian assistance workers.

17. How does this plan work in concert with the possible introduction of a private security force to provide near-term security in the camps?

These elements are not mutually exclusive. Private security could be on the ground more quickly and would provide longer term assistance after the bulk of UN troops move on to another camp.

18. How does this force work with UNAMIR?

The force would be under the same command as UNAMIR and once refugees reenter Rwanda UNAMIR would ensure safe corridors for return home.

19. If the operation is expected to take several years, what are the benchmarks along the way which will indicate progress, or lack thereof?

Progress will be marked with each portion of a camp that is provided the chance to return free from intimidation. For any refugees to be able to return, free from intimidation, will be

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successful beyond the present conditions. Clearly the larger number of repatriations the more successful the operation.

20. What conditions would cause the U.S. and/or the international community to conclude that this concept is not working, and that the mission should be shut down?

For the expanded portion: if they are incapable of facilitating reform or if war resumes and impedes the mandate.

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Rwanda (

GOAL. Assist in the movement of refugees and drawdown of camps during a defined time period as part of an international community change in focus from one of long term humanitarian aid to the camps to more proactive assistance to the new Rwandan goverment and its people in dealing with their humanitarian needs. Goal is to lead (with a carrot, not a stick) the GOR to a more open, representative structure through provision of aid and assistance, and a drawing back of refugees through provision of security and humanitarian aid within Rwanda.

Key need to change focus. DON'T LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN.

Use of UNAMIR to assist in movement of refugees is key to:

- showing UN commitment to stability of new government
- working the problem on the ground to keep camps from solidifying
- improving flow of humanitarian assistance through Kigali to all of Rwanda, vice camps
- bringing the spotlight onto the GOR and its internal problems vice the camps
- working with GOR to repatriate a large number of refugees
- speed the process of dealing with genocide
- provide immediate assistance to governments of Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire in decreasing permanent refugee camps inside their borders
- working with the GOR to deal with return of land policy
- allow UN/USG to influence GOR to deal with tough issue of expanding government, infrastructure to deal with Hutus
- bypass establishment of large refugee camps inside Rwanda (buffer zone) which RPA will likely see as additional security concerns, threats to their forces on the border.

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MISSION: To provide a defined period of time in which refugees will be offered safe passage back to their homes in Rwanda, with humanitarian assistance guaranteed by the UN and protection guaranteed by UNAMIR (current mandate authorizes protection of displaced Rwandans).

END STATE: The intent is that a majority of all refugees would return to their homes in Rwanda. After this time, (assuming UNHCR, UN, international community agreement) refugee camps could continue to be operated inside Rwandan borders (buffer zones) with the approval of the GOR. Additional refugee camps might also have to be operated in surrounding countries.

FORCE SIZE: One battalion minimum, more likely two battalions (a force size available under current UNAMIR projected force build up). Force would be augmented with police and troops from border countries in which UNAMIR was operating. Force capable of self protection and presence missions, and of seizing crew served weapons visible to contingent. NGOs would be responsible for transportation of refugees back into Rwanda with UNAMIR escort.

Tough nut.

ROE: Provide security for refugees, NGOs, investigators. Escort NGO humanitarian convoys, provide security for distribution of food by NGOs, provide security through presence with troops prepared and authorized to disarm if necessary. Individuals accused of crimes would be turned over to government troops/police for judgment. Force would not serve as a police force.

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TIMEFRAME: 30-60 days per country, after which time UNAMIR force will be withdrawn and remaining refugees will be told that camps are now inside Rwandan borders.

ASSUMPTIONS:

- UNAMIR contingent countries accept mission outside Rwandan borders as part of its mission.
- GOR and bordering government agree to presence of UNAMIR forces for purpose of assisting in the return of refugees.
- Refugees want to return, but are being threatened by ex-FAR and militia.
- GOR willing to deal with steady stream of refugees, provide solution to land return problems, allow UNAMIR unimpeded access to areas where refugees will be returning.
- RPA will accept return of Hutu refugees to their homes. RPA is believed to be strongly opposed to building of large buffer zones inside Rwandan borders for these refugees.

SALES PITCH. Mission will be preceded by period of intensive negotiations between GOR, RPA, UNAMIR, NGOs, UNHCR, and bordering governments.

UNAMIR goes into the camps one country at a time. Camps incorporate the basic leadership infrastructure formerly present in their Rwandan villages, will be a slow, hit-and-miss process to gain leaders' agreement to "take their people home". Must deal with Hutu leaders. Send high ranking GOR Hutu leaders to be part of negotiating teams, press Hutu refugees to return and become part of a new Rwanda. Threat must be implicit that current refugee camps will become even less hospitable after UNAMIR departs with those refugees willing to leave. This point must be made clear throughout the camps, along with counterpoint that bordering governments want them to leave, and NGOs will now shift their focus to refugees returning to Rwanda.

Team Sales pitch.

Best UNAMIR can hope for is to offer a fixed time period of guaranteed security, humanitarian support and (possibly) transportation for refugee return. The GOR will retain the right to screen at the border, but only for the purposes of denying entry, not for the purposes of seizing individuals. Once inside the country, refugees must be guaranteed safe passage to their former domiciles, unimpeded by RPA checkpoints. A given time period will be set, with a definite start and end point so as not to unduly tie down UNAMIR forces or Tanzanian, Burundian, or Zairian forces. Security for NGOs will be guaranteed during this time period, as well the security of investigators looking into accusations of genocide. Key to refugee return is not so much presence of UNAMIR, but its ties to guarantees by UNAMIR and GOR of security (and amnesty by GOR) for those who cross the border, international community and GOR agreement to provide humanitarian assistance once they return home.

Fixed UNAMIR commitment.

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Link up with host nation forces to separate (disarm is another matter) ex-FAR and Hutu militas that refuse repatriation. Government and UNAMIR would announce repatriation, UNAMIR and GOR officials would guarantee safety of refugee return, access to tools, food, and return to former villages with a process of arbitration for those who find others on their land.

Gotta deal w/ Hutu leaders in the camps.

DANGER OF ANY MOVE INTO THE CAMPS. Intell community assesses that entire villages are present in the camps, along with their strongly partisan, politically motivated Hutu leadership. These leaders would see no reason to return if they believe that at a future time they can return to Rwanda as part of a vanquishing Hutu army. They will also see no reason to urge their people to return if they feel their own lives are in danger from militia or ex-FAR. They will see no reason to return if they are the targets of accusations of genocide and therefore subject to imprisonment or execution once they cross the border. They may well urge their people to resist movement and spread rumors that the UNAMIR force is there to forceably repatriate refugees.

NEEDED. UNAMIR forces must be preceded by some sort of PSYOPs campaign and come equipped with self-contained PSYOPs units to strongly counter these rumors.