

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Michael A. Hammer to [List]; re: POTUS Yeltsin call (5 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
002. email	Glyn T. Davies to Michael A. Hammer; re: POTUS Yeltsin call (3 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
003. email	Stuart J. Kaufmann to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Memos (3 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KC 09/30/2014
004. email	Carlos E. Pascual to [List]; re: Yeltsin call package (9 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1), P5 VZ 9/27/2022
005. email	George M. Chastain to [List]; re: Yeltsin call package (10 pages)	06/12/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KC 09/30/2014
006. email	Don E. Cheramie to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Talking points (4 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
007. email	Frank J. Jarosinski to Gregory L. Schulte; re: Transcripts (16 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1)
008. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Talking points (3 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
009. email	Don E. Cheramie to Andrew S. Weiss; re: Talking points (3 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
010. email	Carlos E. Pascual to Andrew S. Weiss; re: Talking points (4 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
011. email	Carlos E. Pascual to [List]; re: Talking points (4 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
012. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Talking points (4 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1), P5 KC 09/30/2014

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/12/1999 - 06/13/1999]

2006-1185-F  
ke295

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. email	Gregory L. Schulte to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Talking points (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1), P5 KC 09/30/2014
014. email	J. Sean Farver to [List]; re: Talking points (6 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/12/1999 - 06/13/1999]

2006-1185-F

ke295

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/12/99 10:51:34 AM  
 FROM Hammer, Michael A.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/12/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/12/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: POTUS-YELSTIN call ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 TO

Davies, Glyn T.  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Bartlett, L. June  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Jacobson, Tracey A.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By KE NARA, Date 10/31/19  
 2011-0892-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Murphy, Miles R.  
Payne, Raymond H.  
Porterfield Patrick C.  
Powell, Elliott  
Rickard, Robin S.  
Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
Schrader, Joel M.  
Sibley, Matthew W.  
Sigler, Ralph H.  
Smith, James A.  
Tarver, J. Sean  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Dejban, Donna D.  
Hachigian, Nina L.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
Moretz, Sheila K.  
Rice, Edward A.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.  
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
Storey, Sharon V.  
Sutphen, Mona K.  
Barnett, Cheryl E.  
Elkind, Jonathan H.  
Faranda, Regina D.  
Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Russ, Judith P.  
Segal, Jack D.  
Silva, Mary Ann T.  
Tedstrom, John E.  
Weiss, Andrew S.

**CARBON\_COPY**

Allen, Charles A.  
Baker, James E.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolan, Christopher J.  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Braden, Susan R.  
Brody, Richard J.  
Brown, Keirn C.  
Busby, Scott W.  
Butler, Lawrence E.  
Crowley, Philip J.  
Davidson, Leslie K.  
DeRosa, Mary B.

Flanagan, Stephen J.  
 Gobush, Matthew N.  
 Gordon, Philip H.  
 Gray, Wendy E.  
 Guarnieri, Valerie N.  
 Halperin, David E.  
 Hammer, Michael A.  
 Hurley, C. Michael  
 Kaufman, Stuart J.  
 Krass, Caroline D.  
 Lackey, Miles M.  
 Leavy, David C.  
 Malinowski, Tomasz P.  
 McCausland, Jeffrey D.  
 Moyn, Samuel A.  
 Naplan, Steven J.  
 Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Quinn, Mary E.  
 Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sapiro, Miriam E.  
 Schulte, Gregory L.  
 Schwartz, Eric P.  
 Segal, Jack D.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Stromseth, Jane E.  
 Tavlartides, Mark J.  
 Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)  
 vonLipsey, Roderick K.  
 Weiss, Andrew S.  
 Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)  
 Wippman, David

**TEXT\_BODY**

Unfortunately Russian TV cannot do it this evening because their correrpondent is on his way back to Moscow. Russian TV can only work it on Sunday, anytime the President is available and willing to do it up taking it live at 1p.m. est.

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies,  
Glyn T.

Sent: Saturday, June 12, 1999 10:27 AM

To: Hammer, Michael

A.; Rice, Edward A.; Schrader, Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary;

@WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor;

@RUSSIA

- Russia/Ukraine

Cc: @KOSOVO

Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN call [CONFIDENTIAL]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Have confirmed 0900 Sunday Yeltsin phone call time with Streett of Scheduling. She will remind POTUS tomorrow a.m. of requirement to do call. Spoke with DCM Tefft, Moscow, and told him he could confirm with Kremlin, which has been anxious about call.

Interview will be done either this evening or tomorrow a.m. on margins of Yeltsin call.

Mike  
H: please be the coordinator on the interview and keep me informed.  
Tx.

-----Original Message-----

From: Hammer, Michael A.  
Sent: Saturday, June 12, 1999 9:29 AM  
To: Davies, Glyn T.; Rice, Edward A.; Schrader, Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room;  
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine  
Cc: @KOSOVO  
Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

No conflict with Russian TV.  
If we decide to proceed with the Russian TV interview we could do it either immediately after the call and before the President goes to Church, or we can do it live at 1 p.m. if President is willing. Based on discussions with Lockhart last night.

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies, Glyn T.  
Sent: Saturday, June 12, 1999 8:53 AM  
To: Rice, Edward A.; Schrader, Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor;  
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine  
Cc: @KOSOVO  
Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

POTUS has agreed to do call at 0900 Sunday according to GEN Kerrick.

I will work with Scheduling to lock in.

Carlos:

where are we on Russian TV interview? Do we have a possible conflict?

-----Original Message-----

From: Rice, Edward A.

Sent: Saturday,

June 12, 1999 8:50 AM

To: Schrader, Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive

Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security  
Advisor;

@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Cc: @KOSOVO

Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN

call ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

Carlos - Will look for call package later  
today. Let me know when you have an ETA.

-----Original Message-----

From: Schrader,

Joel M.

Sent: Saturday, June 12, 1999 7:49 AM

To: @EXECSEC - Executive

Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security  
Advisor

Subject: POTUS-YELSTIN

call ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

Embassy Moscow called and reported that  
Moscow has proposed 0900 EDT tomorrow for the POTUS-YELTSIN  
call.

Sit

Room awaits further instruction.

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/12/99 11:02:10 AM  
 FROM Davies, Glyn T.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/12/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/12/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: POTUS-YELSTIN call ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
 TO Hammer, Michael A.

CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Hammer, Michael A.

Sent: Saturday,  
June 12, 1999 10:52 AMTo: Davies, Glyn T.; Rice, Edward A.; Schrader,  
Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation  
Room;

@NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Cc: @KOSOVO

Subject: RE:

POTUS-YELSTIN call ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

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Situation

Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Cc: @KOSOVO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By CV NARA, Date 10/31/19

2011-0892-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Subject: RE:  
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Michael A.  
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T.; Rice, Edward A.; Schrader, Joel M.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary;  
@WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor;  
@RUSSIA  
- Russia/Ukraine  
Cc: @KOSOVO  
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- Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security  
Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine  
Cc: @KOSOVO  
Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN  
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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June 12, 1999 8:50 AM

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Subject: RE: POTUS-YELSTIN

call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

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Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security

Advisor

Subject: POTUS-YELSTIN

call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

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Sit

Room awaits further instruction.

## Exchange Mail

**DATE-TIME** 6/12/99 6:58:28 PM  
**FROM** Pascual, Carlos E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(b)(d)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 06/12/1999  
**DECLASSIFYON** 06/12/2009  
**SUBJECT** URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package ~~[SECRET]~~  
**TO** Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean

CARBON\_COPY

Bartlett, L. June  
 Davies, Glyn T

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

VZ 2011-0892-M (1.02)  
 8/14/2014

Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Jacobson, Tracey A.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hachigian, Nina L.  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
 Moretz, Sheila K.  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
 Storey, Sharon V.  
 Sutphen, Mona K.  
 Barnett, Cheryl E.  
 Elkind, Jonathan H.  
 Faranda, Regina D.  
 Kaufman, Stuart J.  
 Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Russ, Judith P.  
 Segal, Jack D.  
 Silva, Mary Ann T.  
 Tedstrom, John E.  
 Weiss, Andrew S.  
 Brody, Richard J.  
 Saunders, Richard M.  
 Davidson, Leslie K.  
 Schulte, Gregory L.

**TEXT\_BODY**

1. SITUATION ROOM -- please secure fax this note and the attachments to Sandy, Jim and Leon Fuerth. Please page Greg Schulte and read them to him if he is not in the office.
2. Sandy, Jim, Leon,  
 Greg -- attached is the Yeltsin call package and a note to Strobe. Would appreciate your sending any comments to the Sit Room. Please call if you have questions. If you concur, I recommend that the Sit Room secure fax to Strobe the attached not to him from Sandy and the points (and NOT the memos).

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3. SITUATION ROOM -- assuming Sandy et al concur, please fax to Strobe the note from Sandy and the points once you get comments. Strobe will need these as early in his day as possible. You will see that we have asked Strobe to send back comments. If you get these, please insert in "track changes" mode. If Strobe sends a complete re-write, could you please type this into the system. Please call me once you get his comments.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc

June 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN

SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin

Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to Russian President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.

Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth (they have not yet cleared)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin

Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin

1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~ 4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 6/12/09

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc

TELEPHONE CALL WITH  
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DATE: June 13, 1999

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation in KFOR.

II. BACKGROUND

Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed tremendous disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting through their mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President Gore that Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of Russian troops to Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the press that Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the movement in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with "plausible deniability".

Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia is aimed at reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR model and under US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II, led on our

side by State in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for

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Russia's long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two tracks separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The Russians, fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as capitulation to NATO, may link the two tracks together. That, ironically, is Russia's worst option since it would create facts on the ground that make Russian participation all the harder to work out.

Attachment

Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin

2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 6/12/09

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT

4523tps.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

\* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Despite the difficulties we face now, it is important to remember how far Russia has come in

seven years and how far we have come in our relationship.

\* That very progress makes the current situation in Kosovo all the more serious.

It would be tragic to jeopardize all we've accomplished bilaterally and in

bringing peace to Kosovo.

\* Have to say that I'm disappointed in so many mixed signals these past days:

Russia commits not to deploy, then deploys; orders withdrawal then doesn't; says

it's a mistake, then claims it was authorized

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\* I have no interest in blaming anyone, Boris, but these conflicting signals are hurting Russia's image, and it is making people question the value of our work together.

\* But I also said that I would always offer solutions along with citing problems, and that is what I want to focus on now.

\* Here's my goal: to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia, allows it to participate in the international security force, and is consistent with

unity of command and effectiveness, on which we have all agreed.

\* Our teams worked day and night and have come up with a two-track approach. The ideas are sound, and I want to authorize our people to finalize the details and start to implement.

Track 1

\* First, let's agree on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy forces together tomorrow.

\* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.

\* Second, let's give our people instructions to find a solution as fast as

possible that meets Russia's concerns and ours for an effective security force under unified command.

Version A - Offer Neutral and U.S.-Russian Sector

\* Strobe and his team have put two options on the table, and your ministers have the details.

\* One is to create a neutral sector with a Finn commander and a Russian deputy commander. When you study this, you'll see we listened carefully to your concerns about reporting to NATO.

\* I also think that there is tremendous merit in the U.S. and Russia working together. So I'm ready to create, Boris, a joint U.S.-Russian sector.

\* There would be a Russian general and an American general, and each of our units would report up our respective chains of command.

\* You and I would work to ensure that there won't be disagreements, just as we

Always have. But if there are disputes, we won't let them paralyze us,

and we'll

work them out like we have in Bosnia.

Version B - Offer U.S.-Russian Sector

\* In this spirit, Boris, I want to suggest a joint U.S.-Russian sector where we

would go in together.

\* There would be a Russian general and an American general, and each of our units

would report up our respective chains of command.

\* You and I would work to ensure that there won't be disagreements, just as we

always have. But if there are disputes, we won't let them paralyze us, and we'll

work them out like we have in Bosnia.

Closing

\* Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the first track.

Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work side-by-side

to protect the peace.

\* The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals to agree

on the details on the basis of our conversation.

\* If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace settlement work in

Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in Cologne.

If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2

\* There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a security vacuum

to form that would jeopardize the peace.

\* We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia.

So let's use

it.

\* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on Track 2. My

bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

\* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move

together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively

side-by-side.

If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2

\* I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay focused on an

effective force with unified command and control.

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4523~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT

4523 strobe note.doc

FAX FOR STROBE TALBOTT FROM SANDY BERGER

Strobe -

I am sending you a very preliminary draft of talking points for the President's call with Yeltsin. As you discussed with Carlos, I think you should use these points to preview with Minister Ivanov what the Russians might accept on Track 1 and Track 2.

On Track 1, I know your priorities are to get commitment to move ahead with an SFOR model and to delink Track 1 from Track 2. That sounds like the right approach.

On Track 2, we have given you two models to work with: a neutral zone and a U.S.-Russia sector. As you requested, you have authority to explore both options. We'll need your advice on how to best play this issue in the President's call. While we want to move the agenda forward, we also want to avoid overloading the circuits with Yeltsin.

On process, what would be most helpful is if your team could send the Situation Room after your meeting with Ivanov either pen and ink changes or a revised draft. If that does not work, call Carlos or the Situation Room and give edits or suggestions directly to them. If we need a wholesale rethink after

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meetings, then we should talk. In any case, your report prior to the call would be most helpful. (The call is at 9:00 EST; 8:30 pre-brief.)

Regards,

Sandy  
1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 9:38:42 PM

FROM Pascual, Carlos E.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009

SUBJECT FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Bartlett, L. June  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Jacobson, Tracey A.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.

**DECLASSIFIED****PER E.O. 13526**

RDS 2011-0892-M (1.09)

4/24/2022

## CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY These were the points actually used for the call.

-----Original  
 Message-----  
 From: Cherie, Don E.  
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999  
 1:48 PM  
 To: Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
 Subject: Yeltsin  
 Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Per your request...

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT TPnotes.doc  
 TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

\* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.

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Russia has  
come a long way in seven years under your leadership -- and so has  
our  
relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be  
very proud of  
that, and I'm proud to work with you.

\* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our  
partnership.  
Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We  
kept our  
disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we  
made the  
most of our cooperation and friendship.

\* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace  
and that our  
militaries work well together on the ground.

\* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin  
yesterday, we  
have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to  
coordinate  
our roles in Kosovo.

\* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our  
goals in  
Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working  
together.

\* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of  
the use  
of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General  
Zvarzin  
(zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the  
KFOR Commander on  
the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement  
on the  
modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in  
the  
peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as  
possible  
to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the  
closest

possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

\* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

\* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.

\* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.

\* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.

\* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.

\* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.

\* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.

\* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

\* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too  
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

\* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

\* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

\* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 11:52:21 PM  
 FROM Tarver, J. Sean  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009  
 SUBJECT FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

## TO

Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hachigian, Nina L.

**DECLASSIFIED****PER E.O. 13526**

vz 2011-0892-m (1.12)

4/24/2022

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Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
Moretz, Sheila K.  
Rice, Edward A.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.  
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
Storey, Sharon V.  
Sutphen, Mona K.

**CARBON\_COPY**

Barnett, Cheryl E.  
Elkind, Jonathan H.  
Faranda, Regina D.  
Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Russ, Judith P.  
Segal, Jack D.  
Silva, Mary Ann T.  
Tedstrom, John E.  
Weiss, Andrew S.  
Schulte, Gregory L.  
Brody, Richard J.  
Saunders, Richard M.  
Davidson, Leslie K.  
Bartlett, L. June  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Dejban, Donna D.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Jacobson, Tracey A.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Powell, Elliott  
Rice, Edward A.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.

**TEXT\_BODY**

Mr. Berger's changes are reflected in the attached copy.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.

Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999

10:28 PM

To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @RUSSIA

- Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders,  
Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Subject: Draft

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TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Importance: High

SIT  
 ROOM

Please send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.

Attached  
 is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins  
 and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg  
 will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and  
 Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after  
 the VP-Stepashin call.

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT**

June 14 BNY call tps.doc  
 POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

\* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in  
 Kosovo; glad we're  
 continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.  
 No  
 issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.  
 \* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.  
 Otherwise the  
 withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict  
 in Kosovo  
 will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.  
 \* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion  
 between our  
 generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.  
 Also want  
 to address three other issues.  
 Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements  
 \* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to  
 make  
 sure Generals Jackson and Zavarsin got down to serious discussions to  
 resolve the  
 airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarsin.  
 \* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown  
 that when  
 we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good  
 for both of  
 us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken

charge of  
the issue and broken an impasse.

\* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked  
for

yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will  
cast

a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the  
meeting in

Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct  
our people to  
fix this today.

\* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers  
agreed there

would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual  
agreement. But we  
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.

\* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your  
military

intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.

\* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new  
deployments to

Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a  
confusing

signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.

\* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright  
yesterday evening.

\* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard  
to resolve

these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further  
unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made,  
Russia's

credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have  
a

serious impact on our relationship.

Track 1, Track 2

\* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for  
us to

meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals  
worked out

to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

\* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to  
mine.

\* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces  
in Kosovo.

It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it  
works; it's the

fastest way to get our Russian and American troops cooperating on the  
ground

together over the next week.

\* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to

implement the  
plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work  
together to  
implement the peace.

\* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could  
meet in  
Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need  
to give  
instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

\* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to  
us on how we  
can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.

\* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have  
a well  
defined proposal to review.

\* Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim  
proposal to  
deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense  
and foreign  
ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week -- we  
can get this  
issue under control and help make Cologne a success.  
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

\* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do  
everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary  
Cohen do, too  
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

\* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative  
proposals on how we  
can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which  
is equitable  
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

\* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition  
of  
Kosovo.
- 4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the  
possibility that  
the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of  
a KLA plot  
against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.

\* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this  
week and

present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

\* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.

\* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.

\* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

\* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

\* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are not part of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and Russian troops will become a greater target.

\* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

3

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Gregory J. Laskowski to [List]; re: Talking points (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
002. email	J. Sean Tarver to George M. Chastain; re: Talking points (6 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
003. email	George M. Chastain to Joel M. Schrader and Jenny A. McGee; re: Talking points (6 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
004. email	Cathy L. Millison to [List]; re: Talking points (4 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
005. email	Andrew S. Weiss to [List]; re: Updated talking points (5 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
006. email	Carlos E. Paseual to Mara E. Rudman; re: Talking points (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
007. email	Carlos E. Paseual to Richard J. Brody and Andrew S. Weiss; re: draft guidance (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
008. email	Nina L. Hachigan to [List]; re: Final talking points (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
009. email	Cathy L. Millison to [List]; re: Final talking points (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
010. email	Glyn T. Davie to Gregory L. Schulte; re: Transcript (1 page)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
011. email	Gerard M. Gallucci to Dale R. Avery; re: Presidential phone calls (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
012. email	Glyn T. Davies to [List]; re: Presidential phone calls (5 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/14/1999]

2006-1185-F  
ke296

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. email	Regina D. Faranda to [List]; re: Press clipping on POTUS-Yeltsin call [50 U.S.C. 430g] [partial] (1 page)	06/14/1999	P3/b(3)
014. email	Matthew W. Sibley to Jenny A. McGee; re: Presidential phone calls (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
015. email	Bonnie Broadwick to [List]; re: Transcript (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
016. email	Cathy L. Millison to Bonnie Broadwick; re: Transcript (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
017. email	Miriam E. Sapiro to Jonathan H. Elkind; re: Presidential phone calls (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
018. email	George M. Chastain to J. Sean Tarver, Frank J. Jarosinski, and Don E. Chermie; re: Presidential phone calls (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
019. email	Carlos E. Pascual to [List]; re: Presidential phone calls (3 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) KC 9/27/2022
020. email	To Carlos E. Pascual; re: Presidential phone calls (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/14/1999]

2006-1185-F  
 ke296

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Exchange Mail

---

**DATE-TIME** 6/14/99 12:09:49 AM  
**FROM** Laskowski, Gregory J.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(b)(d)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 06/13/1999  
**DECLASSIFYON** 06/13/2009  
**SUBJECT** RE: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

**TO**

Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By W NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

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Hachigian, Nina L.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
Moretz, Sheila K.  
Rice, Edward A.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.  
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
Storey, Sharon V.  
Sutphen, Mona K.

**CARBON\_COPY**

Barnett, Cheryl E.  
Elkind, Jonathan H.  
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Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Russ, Judith P.  
Segal, Jack D.  
Silva, Mary Ann T.  
Tedstrom, John E.  
Weiss, Andrew S.  
Schulte, Gregory L.  
Brody, Richard J.  
Saunders, Richard M.  
Davidson, Leslie K.  
Bartlett, L. June  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Dejban, Donna D.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Jacobson, Tracey A.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Powell, Elliott  
Rice, Edward A.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.

**TEXT\_BODY**

Points have been passed.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual,  
Carlos E.

Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM

To: @WHSR - WH

Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;

Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson,  
Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Subject: Draft TPs for  
Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
Importance: High

<< File: June 14  
BNY call tps.doc >>

SIT ROOM

Please send via secure fax  
to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.

Attached is a first draft of  
points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins and I will talk at about  
05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg will make sure to have  
the latest on the situation in Pristina and Russian reinforcements.  
We may also need to adjust quickly after the VP-Stepashin call.

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 12:17:58 AM  
 FROM Tarver, J. Sean  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009  
 SUBJECT FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Chastain, George M.

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

George

I read the Yeltsin talking points to Berger on the Stu III. He dictated the changes, which I added and e-mailed to all relevant parties (as shown below). Based on this, we did not fax a revised copy to Berger. Called Steinberg. He said he doesn't need to see the points until morning. We faxed a copy to Talbott. Berger and Steinberg will get copies in their morning take. Can't confirm if ExecSec has staffed them to the President's Staff Sec yet.

-----Original Message-----

From: Tarver, J. Sean  
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 11:52 PM  
 To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor  
 Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary  
 Subject: FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 Importance: High

Mr. Berger's changes are reflected in the attached copy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual,

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

72 7011-0892-M(1,13)

4/29/2022

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Carlos E.  
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM  
 To: @WHSR - WH  
 Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor  
 Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;  
 Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.;  
 Davidson,  
 Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary  
 Subject: Draft TPs for  
 Yeltsin Call ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~  
 Importance: High

SIT ROOM

Please  
 send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.

Attached  
 is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins  
 and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg  
 will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and  
 Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after  
 the VP-Stepashin call.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT

June 14 BNY call tps.doc  
 POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

\* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in  
 Kosovo; glad we're  
 continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.  
 No  
 issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.  
 \* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.  
 Otherwise the  
 withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict  
 in Kosovo  
 will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.  
 \* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion  
 between our  
 generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.  
 Also want  
 to address three other issues.  
 Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements  
 \* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

make  
sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions to  
resolve the  
airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.  
\* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown  
that when  
we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good  
for both of  
us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken  
charge of  
the issue and broken an impasse.  
\* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked  
for  
yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will  
cast  
a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the  
meeting in  
Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct  
our people to  
fix this today.  
\* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers  
agreed there  
would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual  
agreement. But we  
are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.  
\* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your  
military  
intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.  
\* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new  
deployments to  
Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a  
confusing  
signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.  
\* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright  
yesterday evening.  
\* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard  
to resolve  
these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further  
unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made,  
Russia's  
credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have  
a  
serious impact on our relationship.  
Track 1, Track 2  
\* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for  
us to  
meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals  
worked out  
to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.  
\* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to

mine.

\* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo.

It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our Russian and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next week.

\* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to implement the plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work together to implement the peace.

\* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could meet in Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

\* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.

\* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have a well defined proposal to review.

\* Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense and foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week -- we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success. If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

\* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too  
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

\* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable  
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

\* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of

Kosovo.

4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the possibility that the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of a KLA plot against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.

\* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

\* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.

\* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.

\* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

\* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

\* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are not part of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and Russian troops will become a greater target.

\* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

3

3

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

506

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 9:10:14 AM  
 FROM Pascual, Carlos E.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: just checking[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY

thanks

-----Original Message-----  
 From: Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sent: Monday,  
 June 14, 1999 9:07 AM  
 To: Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Subject: RE: just  
 checking[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

if there's any way i can help, let me know.  
 (even if it's just that you want to scream -- my ear's available.)

-----Original  
 Message-----  
 From: Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999  
 8:58 AM  
 To: Rudman, Mara E.  
 Subject: RE: just checking[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

thanks  
 for checking; a little rough; today could be key

-----Original  
 Message-----  
 From: Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999  
 8:30 AM  
 To: Pascual, Carlos E.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By W NARA, Date 11/05/19

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 2011-0892-M

Subject: just checking[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

How  
are you holding up?

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual,  
Carlos E.

Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM

To: @WHSR - WH

Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;

Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson,  
Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Subject: Draft TPs for

Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Importance: High

<< File: June 14  
BNY call tps.doc >>

SIT ROOM

Please send via secure fax  
to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.

Attached is a first draft of  
points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins and I will talk at about  
05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg will make sure to have  
the latest on the situation in Pristina and Russian reinforcements.  
We may also need to adjust quickly after the VP-Stepashin call.

## Exchange Mail

007

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 9:26:05 AM  
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.  
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED  
SUBJECT RE: draft guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]  
TO Brody, Richard J.  
Weiss, Andrew S.

CARBON\_COPY Kaufman, Stuart J.

## TEXT\_BODY

add if asked: did they discuss situation at airport

Reviewed  
this in context of issues of Russian participation in KFOR. No agreement reached yet, but sides still discussing. POTUS and Yeltsin will take up along with other issues on Kosovo.

-----Original Message-----

From: Brody,  
Richard J.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 9:21 AM  
To: Pascual, Carlos  
E.; Weiss, Andrew S.  
Subject: draft guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Importance: High

This  
is skeletal -- but Tom need to go on the phone in the next few minutes.  
Would like your chop asap. Thanks.

\* Followed up on yesterday's  
POTUS-Yeltsin call.

\* Stepashin about to have security council  
meeting - VP reiterated US position and reviewed issues POTUS would  
want to discuss with Yeltsin.

\* Discussed situation in Kosovo,  
particularly need to agree on arrangements for Russia and US to work  
together

\* Both agreed on the need to resolve the issues quickly.

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\* Discussed  
importance of upcoming call between the two Presidents.

\* VP stressed  
importance of a cooperative solution so that Russia, US, and other  
countries can work together to bring peace to Kosovo.

008

## Exchange Mail

**DATE-TIME** 6/14/99 9:31:47 AM  
**FROM** Hachigian, Nina L.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(d)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 06/14/1999  
**DECLASSIFYON** 06/14/2009  
**SUBJECT** FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
**TO** Bartlett, L. June  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Jacobson, Tracey A.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Barnett, Cheryl E.  
 Elkind, Jonathan H.  
 Faranda, Regina D.  
 Kaufman, Stuart J.  
 Pascual, Carlos E.  
 Russ, Judith P.  
 Segal, Jack D.  
 Silva, Mary Ann T.  
 Tedstrom, John E.  
 Weiss, Andrew S.

**CARBON\_COPY**

Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hachigian, Nina L.  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
 Moretz, Sheila K.  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
 Storey, Sharon V.

**DECLASSIFIED****PER E.O. 13526**

V2 2011-0842-M (1.17)

4/28/2022

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Sutphen, Mona K.

**TEXT\_BODY**

APPROVED BY JS AND SRB--PLEASE TAKE TO STAFF  
SECRETARY ASAP.

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT**

Doc1\_.doc  
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

\* Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what they worked out.

\* I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general said he was only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the commander of KFOR, General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.

\* I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a good call a few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have agreed that Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree on a long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in this interim period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good arrangement, but it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions to implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do you agree?

\* Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister Sergeev getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this weekend; they can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have the airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.

\* Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached agreement with General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will instruct Cohen to meet with Sergeyev.

\* In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured us there will be no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter. I hope we can count on this.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Exchange Mail

DIO

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 12:08:58 PM  
 FROM Davies, Glyn T.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Schulte, Gregory L.

## CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY OK. I'll get SRB chop.

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte,  
 Gregory L.  
 Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:08 PM  
 To: Davies, Glyn  
 T.  
 Subject: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Glyn  
 -

Walt Slocombe has asked for a copy of the transcript of today's POTUS-Yeltsin call, since Cohen has been tasked to meet with Sergeev to follow up on it.

Would appreciate your directing SitRm to pass the transcript to Slocombe. If necessary, it can be marked "eyes only" for Cohen and Slocombe.

Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By W NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

## Exchange Mail

011

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 12:41:16 PM  
 FROM Gallucci, Gerard M.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT FW: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~  
 TO Avery, Dale R.

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

You were in some company. I guess some people know who/what is important.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Murphy, Miles R.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999

12:18 PM

To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs;  
 @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA -  
 Russia/Ukraine;

@INTERAM - Inter-American; @KOSOVO

Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Subject: PRESIDENTIAL

PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

The President

spoke to the following world leaders today, 14 June 1999:

Russian President Yeltsin from 1006-1032 EDT

Czech President Havel from 1057-1103 EDT

Bulgarian

Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112 EDT

Romanian Prime

Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT

Venezuelan President

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By C NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

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Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT  
Macedonian Prime Minister  
Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT  
Indian Prime Minister  
Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

## Exchange Mail

012

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 12:44:54 PM  
 FROM Davies, Glyn T.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

## TO

Murphy, Miles R.  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hachigian, Nina L.  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
 Moretz, Sheila K.  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Rudman, Mara E.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
 Storey, Sharon V.  
 Sutphen, Mona K.  
 Crowley, Philip J.  
 Gobush, Matthew N.  
 Hammer, Michael A.  
 Huff, Lindsey E.  
 Leavy, David C.  
 Sanborn, Daniel W.(Press)  
 Wozniak, Natalie S.  
 Bartlett, L. June  
 Davies, Glyn T.  
 Dejban, Donna D.  
 Hilliard, Brenda I.  
 Jacobson, Tracey A.  
 Joshi, M. Kay  
 Kerrick, Donald L.  
 Millison, Cathy L.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rice, Edward A.  
 Sargeant, Stephen T.  
 Allen, Charles A.

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 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By M NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

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Baker, James E.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolan, Christopher J.  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Braden, Susan R.  
Brody, Richard J.  
Brown, Keirn C.  
Busby, Scott W.  
Butler, Lawrence E.  
Crowley, Philip J.  
Davidson, Leslie K.  
DeRosa, Mary B.  
Flanagan, Stephen J.  
Gobush, Matthew N.  
Gordon, Philip H.  
Gray, Wendy E.  
Guarnieri, Valerie N.  
Halperin, David E.  
Hammer, Michael A.  
Hurley, C. Michael  
Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Krass, Caroline D.  
Lackey, Miles M.  
Leavy, David C.  
Malinowski, Tomasz P.  
McCausland, Jeffrey D.  
Moyn, Samuel A.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sapiro, Miriam E.  
Schulte, Gregory L.  
Schwartz, Eric P.  
Segal, Jack D.  
Sigler, Ralph H.  
Stromseth, Jane E.  
Tavlarides, Mark J.  
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)  
vonLipsey, Roderick K.  
Weiss, Andrew S.  
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)  
Barnett, Cheryl E.  
Elkind, Jonathan H.  
Faranda, Regina D.  
Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Russ, Judith P.

Segal, Jack D.  
Silva, Mary Ann T.  
Tedstrom, John E.  
Weiss, Andrew S.  
Armstrong, Fulton T.  
Avery, Dale R.  
Gallucci, Gerard M.  
Rice, Lillian E.  
Allen, Charles A.  
Baker, James E.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolan, Christopher J.  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Braden, Susan R.  
Brody, Richard J.  
Brown, Keirn C.  
Busby, Scott W.  
Butler, Lawrence E.  
Crowley, Philip J.  
Davidson, Leslie K.  
DeRosa, Mary B.  
Flanagan, Stephen J.  
Gobush, Matthew N.  
Gordon, Philip H.  
Gray, Wendy E.  
Guarnieri, Valerie N.  
Halperin, David E.  
Hammer, Michael A.  
Hurley, C. Michael  
Kaufman, Stuart J.  
Krass, Caroline D.  
Lackey, Miles M.  
Leavy, David C.  
Malinowski, Tomasz P.  
McCausland, Jeffrey D.  
Moyn, Samuel A.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sapiro, Miriam E.  
Schulte, Gregory L.  
Schwartz, Eric P.  
Segal, Jack D.  
Sigler, Ralph H.  
Stromseth, Jane E.  
Tavlarides, Mark J.  
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)

vonLipsey, Roderick K.  
 Weiss, Andrew S.  
 Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)

**CARBON\_COPY**

Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean  
 Williams, Robert S.

**TEXT\_BODY**

Congratulations to the Sit Room Staff for a boffo performance --  
 not just today but starting last week and especially over the weekend.

Many thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Murphy,  
 Miles R.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:18 PM

To: @NSA - Natl

Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Secretary;  
@KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @INTERAM - Inter-  
American; @KOSOVO  
Cc: @WHSR  
- WH Situation Room  
Subject: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14  
JUNE 1999 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

The President spoke to the following  
world leaders today, 14 June 1999:

Russian President  
Yeltsin from 1006-1032 EDT  
Czech President Havel from  
1057-1103 EDT  
Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112  
EDT  
Romanian Prime Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT  
  
Venezuelan President Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT  
  
Macedonian Prime Minister Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT  
  
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

## Exchange Mail

014

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 1:37:57 PM  
 FROM Sibley, Matthew W.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT FW: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO McGee, Jenny A.

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

Jenny,  
 I hope you enjoyed your day off. This doesn't include the VP-Stepashin call at 0740 that we had this morning. Needless to say, you owe me BIG for today's watch. You can rest assured, that I will hold this over your head for a long time...especially, since I had to spend the day with Joel and Miles.

Matt

-----Original  
 Message-----  
 From: Murphy, Miles R.  
 Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999  
 12:18 PM  
 To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs;  
 @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA -  
 Russia/Ukraine;  
 @INTERAM - Inter-American; @KOSOVO  
 Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
 Subject: PRESIDENTIAL  
 PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

The President  
 spoke to the following world leaders today, 14 June 1999:

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By @NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

Russian President Yeltsin from 1006-1032 EDT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Czech President Havel from 1057-1103 EDT  
Bulgarian  
Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112 EDT  
Romanian Prime  
Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT  
Venezuelan President  
Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT  
Macedonian Prime Minister  
Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT  
Indian Prime Minister  
Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

## Exchange Mail

015

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 1:39:51 PM

FROM Broadwick, Bonnie .

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009

SUBJECT RE: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Millison, Cathy L.  
 Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean  
 Williams, Robert S.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By W NARA, Date 6/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

## CARBON\_COPY

Schulte, Gregory L.  
Sutphen, Mona K.  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Dejban, Donna D.  
Hachigian, Nina L.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.  
Moretz, Sheila K.  
Rice, Edward A.  
Rudman, Mara E.  
Sargeant, Stephen T.  
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.  
Storey, Sharon V.  
Sutphen, Mona K.

## TEXT\_BODY

so done

-----Original Message-----

From: Millison, Cathy L.  
Sent: Monday,  
June 14, 1999 1:31 PM  
To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
Cc: Schulte,  
Gregory L.; Sutphen, Mona K.; Davies, Glyn T.; @NSA - Natl Security  
Advisor  
Subject: RE: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]

Can

you take care of this, please. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Sutphen,  
Mona K.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 1:24 PM  
To: Davies, Glyn T.;  
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor  
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.  
Subject: RE:  
Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [CONFIDENTIAL]

Glyn - Sandy

said ok to passing Eyes Only copies. m

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies,  
Glyn T.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:11 PM  
To: @NSA - Natl Security

Advisor  
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.  
Subject: FW: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin  
Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Sandy:

Assume it is OK to share transcript  
of Yeltsin call with DoD, Eyes Only Cohen & Slocombe?

OK \_\_\_\_\_ SRB Will Brief Cohen \_\_\_\_\_ Discuss

Thanks,  
Glyn

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.

Sent: Monday,  
June 14, 1999 12:08 PM

To: Davies, Glyn T.

Subject: Transcript  
of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Glyn -

Walt Slocombe has  
asked for a copy of the transcript of today's POTUS-Yeltsin call,  
since Cohen has been tasked to meet with Sergeyev to follow up on  
it.

Would appreciate your directing SitRm to pass the transcript  
to Slocombe. If necessary, it can be marked "eyes only" for Cohen  
and Slocombe.

Thanks.

016

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 2:16:48 PM  
 FROM Millison, Cathy L.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]  
 TO Broadwick, Bonnie .

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

Thanks, Bonnie.

-----Original Message-----

From: Broadwick, Bonnie

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 1:40 PM

To: Millison, Cathy L.;

@WHSR - WH Situation Room

Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.; Sutphen, Mona

K.; Davies, Glyn T.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: RE: Transcript

of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

so done

-----Original

Message-----

From: Millison, Cathy L.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999

1:31 PM

To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.;

Sutphen, Mona K.; Davies, Glyn T.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: RE:

Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Can you take care  
of this, please. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By CA NARA, Date 11/05/19

2011-0892-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

From: Sutphen,  
Mona K.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 1:24 PM  
To: Davies, Glyn T.;  
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor  
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.  
Subject: RE:  
Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Glyn - Sandy  
said ok to passing Eyes Only copies. m

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies,  
Glyn T.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:11 PM  
To: @NSA - Natl Security  
Advisor  
Cc: Schulte, Gregory L.  
Subject: FW: Transcript of POTUS-Yeltsin  
Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Sandy:

Assume it is OK to share transcript  
of Yeltsin call with DoD, Eyes Only Cohen & Slocombe?

OK \_\_\_\_\_ SRB Will Brief Cohen \_\_\_\_\_ Discuss

Thanks,  
Glyn

-----Original Message-----

From: Schulte, Gregory L.  
Sent: Monday,  
June 14, 1999 12:08 PM  
To: Davies, Glyn T.  
Subject: Transcript  
of POTUS-Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Glyn -

Walt Slocombe has  
asked for a copy of the transcript of today's POTUS-Yeltsin call,  
since Cohen has been tasked to meet with Sergeev to follow up on  
it.

Would appreciate your directing SitRm to pass the transcript

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

to Slocombe. If necessary, it can be marked "eyes only" for Cohen and Slocombe.

Thanks.

017

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 2:57:20 PM  
 FROM Sapiro, Miriam E.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
 [CONFIDENTIAL]  
 TO Elkind, Jonathan H.

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

yes. potus delivered all pts.

-----Original Message-----

From: Elkind,  
 Jonathan H.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:36 PM

To: Sapiro, Miriam  
 E.

Subject: FW: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
 [CONFIDENTIAL]

Did

Ecevit call ever happen?

-----Original Message-----

From: Murphy,  
 Miles R.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:18 PM

To: @NSA - Natl

Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive  
 Secretary;

@KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @INTERAM - Inter-  
 American; @KOSOVO

Cc: @WHSR

- WH Situation Room

Subject: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14  
 JUNE 1999 [CONFIDENTIAL]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By NARA, Date 11/05/19

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 2017-0892-M

The President spoke to the following  
world leaders today, 14 June 1999:

Russian President

Yeltsin from 1006-1032 EDT

Czech President Havel from  
1057-1103 EDT

Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112  
EDT

Romanian Prime Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT

Venezuelan President Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT

Macedonian Prime Minister Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

018

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 6:24:45 PM  
 FROM Chastain, George M.  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009  
 SUBJECT RE: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
 [CONFIDENTIAL]  
 TO Tarver, J. Sean  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Cheramie, Don E.

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

This includes the intense evening last night when we handled countless nonsecure and secure calls and conference calls. You all performed at a high level of consistent expertise, and in a poised manner. You should feel good about last night. Let's hit it again tonight. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies, Glyn T.  
 Sent: Monday,  
 June 14, 1999 12:45 PM  
 To: Murphy, Miles R.; @NSA - Natl Security  
 Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary;  
 @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @INTERAM - Inter-  
 American; @KOSOVO  
 Cc: @WHSR  
 - WH Situation Room  
 Subject: RE: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES -  
 14 JUNE 1999 [CONFIDENTIAL]

Congratulations to the Sit Room Staff  
 for a boffo performance -- not just today but starting last week  
 and especially over the weekend.

Many thanks!

-----Original  
 Message-----

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By @ NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

From: Murphy, Miles R.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999  
12:18 PM  
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs;  
@EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA -  
Russia/Ukraine;  
@INTERAM - Inter-American; @KOSOVO  
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
Subject: PRESIDENTIAL  
PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

The President  
spoke to the following world leaders today, 14 June 1999:

Russian President Yeltsin from 1006-1032 EDT

Czech President Havel from 1057-1103 EDT

Bulgarian

Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112 EDT

Romanian Prime

Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT

Venezuelan President

Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT

Macedonian Prime Minister

Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT

Indian Prime Minister

Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

## Exchange Mail

019

**DATE-TIME** 6/14/99 8:34:15 PM  
**FROM** Pascual, Carlos E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(d)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 06/14/1999  
**DECLASSIFYON** 06/14/2009  
**SUBJECT** FW: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**TO** Bayley, Douglas C.  
 Bresnahan, Gary E.  
 Broadwick, Bonnie .  
 Campanella, Anthony  
 Chastain, George M.  
 Cheramie, Don E.  
 Crowder, Stevan D.  
 Crowell, Thomas R.  
 Ehrendreich, Joel  
 Erdahl, Douglas M.  
 Ford, Robert G.  
 Fuchs, Joachim D.  
 Glick, Bonnie L.  
 Jansen, Christian P.  
 Jarosinski, Frank J.  
 Laskowski, Gregory J.  
 Manning, Michael T.  
 McClellan, Christina L.  
 McGee, Jenny A.  
 Merletti, Roger D.  
 Murphy, Miles R.  
 Payne, Raymond H.  
 Porterfield Patrick C.  
 Powell, Elliott  
 Rickard, Robin S.  
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.  
 Schrader, Joel M.  
 Sibley, Matthew W.  
 Sigler, Ralph H.  
 Smith, James A.  
 Tarver, J. Sean  
 Williams, Robert S.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By © NARA, Date 11/05/19  
 2011-0892-M

## CARBON\_COPY

## TEXT\_BODY

And a very personal thanks from me. I know how much I asked you folks to do this weekend, and I was just a small part of the world that was crashing upon you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Davies,  
Glyn T.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 12:45 PM  
To: Murphy, Miles  
R.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs;  
@EXECSEC  
- Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;  
@INTERAM  
- Inter-American; @KOSOVO  
Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room  
Subject: RE:  
PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE 1999  
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Congratulations  
to the Sit Room Staff for a boffo performance -- not just today but  
starting last week and especially over the weekend.

Many thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Murphy, Miles R.  
Sent: Monday,  
June 14, 1999 12:18 PM  
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS  
- Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @KOSOVO;  
@RUSSIA  
- Russia/Ukraine; @INTERAM - Inter-American; @KOSOVO  
Cc: @WHSR -  
WH Situation Room  
Subject: PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALL TIMES - 14 JUNE  
1999 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

The President spoke to the following world  
leaders today, 14 June 1999:

Russian President Yeltsin  
from 1006-1032 EDT  
Czech President Havel from 1057-1103  
EDT  
Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov from 1106-1112 EDT

Romanian Prime Minister Vasile from 1113-1116 EDT

Venezuelan President Chavez from 1130-1134 EDT

Macedonian Prime Minister Georgievski from 1135-1140 EDT

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee from 1147-1154 EDT

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001-email	Carlos E. Pascual to Richard J. Brody; re: draft guidance (1 page)	06/14/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/14/1999 - 06/15/1999]

2006-1185-F  
ke297

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# Exchange Mail

---

**DATE-TIME** 6/14/99 9:06:56 PM  
**FROM** Pascual, Carlos E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: draft guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Brody, Richard J.

**CARBON\_COPY**

**TEXT\_BODY** good work this morning on points, memcon, etc

-----Original Message-----

From: Brody,  
Richard J.  
Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999 9:21 AM  
To: Pascual, Carlos  
E.; Weiss, Andrew S.  
Subject: draft guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Importance: High

This  
is skeletal -- but Tom need to go on the phone in the next few minutes.  
Would like your chop asap. Thanks.

\* Followed up on yesterday's  
POTUS-Yeltsin call.

\* Stepashin about to have security council  
meeting - VP reiterated US position and reviewed issues POTUS would  
want to discuss with Yeltsin.

\* Discussed situation in Kosovo,  
particularly need to agree on arrangements for Russia and US to work  
together

\* Both agreed on the need to resolve the issues quickly.

\* Discussed  
importance of upcoming call between the two Presidents.

\* VP stressed  
importance of a cooperative solution so that Russia, US, and other  
countries can work together to bring peace to Kosovo.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (7 pages)	07/08/1999	P1/b(1) KC 09/30/2014
002. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (11 pages)	07/12/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
003. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (2 pages)	07/12/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 620000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/15/1999 - 07/12/1999]

2006-1185-F  
ke298

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Exchange Mail

**DATE-TIME** 7/12/99 5:01:28 PM  
**FROM** Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(d)  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 07/12/1999  
**DECLASSIFYON** 07/12/2009  
**SUBJECT** pls put in final. thanks. {SECRET}  
**TO** Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
 V2 2015-0782-M-2 (1.35)  
 3/13/2018

**CARBON\_COPY**  
**TEXT\_BODY** Know you're swamped. Your help on this appreciated once you have a chance.

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT** 5271memcon.doc

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT:** Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

**PARTICIPANTS:** The President  
President Yeltsin

**INTERPRETER:** Nikolai Sorokin  
**Notetakers:** Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy, and Doug Bayley

**DATE, TIME AND PLACE:**

June 13, 1999, 9:07 - 10:05 a.m.  
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking my phone call. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The President: I think that we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership in Kosovo. We now have to work very hard to get a just and lasting peace there and for our militaries work well together on the ground. I know that Al Gore talked with Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday about the difficulties in the last two days and our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo. We need to take charge of the situation, both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together. (S)

I understand that we have agreed on a short-term proposal to deploy forces together as soon as possible. This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know how that works and it is the fastest way to get Russian and U.S. troops on the ground. Second, I know that Foreign Minister Ivanov has been working with Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott about some promising ideas to use next week to deal with the important and urgent outstanding challenges of solving our long term problems in Kosovo. If we can get these ideas developed next week, we could have a very good meeting in Cologne, a week from today. (S)

I believe we should instruct our foreign ministers and ministers of defense to meet as soon as possible and work out these arrangements and show that Russia and the U.S. can cooperate in Kosovo and play our respective roles to make this essential peace work. (S)

There is one more matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the airport at Pristina as soon as possible. I hope you will give orders to General Zavarzin to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander. Otherwise, the story of the airport will overshadow everything we are doing to

bring peace to Kosovo and to protect the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. It will become the whole story and could possibly undermine what we are doing there and the chance for Russia and the G-8 to have a great success in Cologne. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I think that all three questions you have raised are only to be discussed among the two presidents. Namely, you and me. So we have the preliminary discussions among us, then we elaborate on this scheme. After we do that, we can give instructions to the group of generals. We can give instructions in the short term to elaborate on the final scheme, not the final scheme, but the one to be approved by us. Only when we approve that one will it become the final one. (S)

The President: Yes. As I understand it, I think we agree. As I understand it, our generals have worked out a short-term scheme to get us through the next few days, based on our operation in Bosnia. Then our ministers of defense will have to come up with a long-term plan, which we will approve. But we must have this short-term plan implemented immediately because we don't want a security vacuum to develop in Kosovo, especially because we have given our word that we will not let the KLA move in and take over any areas and frighten the Serbs who live there. It is important for me, Boris, as I know it is for you, to keep our word to the world community and protect all the citizens of Kosovo. We will have our ministers of defense and foreign ministers work on the short-term solution and bring it back to us for approval. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I have one more option. It is for us two to meet in some hiding place. Well, it is for you and I to meet either on a boat or some submarine or some island so not a single person will disturb us, so you will not be agitated by anyone, and I will not be agitated by anyone or any

person. (S)

The President: But Boris, my impression is our people have to work this out. We can meet, you and I, but we have to have some idea of where we are going first. We've got to have this short-term solution worked out and the airport issue. Otherwise, if we meet, the world will think there's some major crisis between the two of us, not just that we are meeting about Kosovo. (S)

President Yeltsin: When you and I meet, nobody will think anything of it. People trust us. And that is why I think that this option is quite attractive and beautiful and very trustworthy for the world. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. Since I have to leave the day after tomorrow to go to Europe anyway, let's tell our people, the generals, to have already worked out a short-term solution, based on our partnership in Bosnia, for the next 11 days, so there will not be a vacuum in Kosovo. Let's give them the orders to implement the agreement on the short-term solution. Let's tell them to work out the airport solution. (S)

You and I can go somewhere in the vicinity of Cologne, around the G-8, because you are leaving Russia, and anyway, I will be there. Otherwise, I will have to cancel something on this European trip and that will look like some big crisis to the world. So let's tell the generals to work out the short-term issue, the airport, and then you and I will meet on the long-term plan. We can go off from Cologne somewhere and do that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, but this is not a very clear plan. We have to elaborate on this and have an absolutely clear, detailed plan, like the first item, the second item, the seventh item, the tenth item. (S)

The President: Yes, but we have to have a plan to deliberate on. That is why I think it is important for our ministers to meet and come up with a

plan. We  
can't just make it up as we go along. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you see, all we need is to have just one  
assistant for  
both of us. Not more than that, not the whole bulk of 20 people. Only  
one or  
two assistants and those have to be very smart professional people  
who know the  
case and should be the people who trust us and whom we trust. (S)

The President: Boris, let me be as clear as I can. I am prepared to  
meet, but I  
am not prepared to meet as long as we have this impasse at the airport  
and no  
short-term solution for the next ten days. I will not wreck all that we  
have  
worked for in Kosovo and create a security vacuum where the KLA  
can come back in,  
and meet under those circumstances. (S)

The whole world thinks something crazy is going on. We have got to  
work out  
these two things. Before this happened, Russia was the toast of the  
world.  
People were saying Russia is back, peace has been solved, and Russia  
played a  
major role. Now the view of Kosovo may be: we can't get KFOR in,  
what is the  
KLA going to do, and there is a standoff at the airport. I have no  
intention of  
meeting under these circumstances. It is not good. All the credit  
Russia got is  
at risk of being lost, and we will have a disaster at Cologne, instead of  
a  
triumph for Russia. (S)

We have to solve this first and then meet on the long-term issues. It is  
very  
important that Russia be seen as playing a major role in the  
peacekeeping  
operation. I have always done what I can to enhance the role of  
Russia. I have  
worked hard. I can't come to a meeting with these two issues  
outstanding, where  
it looks like we put peace in Kosovo on hold. It is not acceptable, and  
it is  
wrong. I am proposing three things. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you and I, it is not for me to make

arrangements.

Without us nobody will make such arrangements, so let us agree we need to do something anyway whether you propose or let me propose, and you will agree, and then we need to have a discussion to narrow the gap and bring each other closer.

~~(S)~~

The President: Boris, we can work out the long-term issue, but here is what it looks like to the rest of the world. Russia worked on a peace agreement with Ahtisaari. You and I were behind it. We made a peace agreement, and the UN endorsed it. The UN specifically provided for the introduction of the KFOR force and for implementation of this within the spirit of Rambouillet. That is what the UN said. Now it looks like, without any reference to that, Russia goes in and occupies the airport at Pristina and says, "We will stop the whole thing the UN said, and we are going to, even if it creates a vacuum and the KLA comes back in, instead of what we promised to do, we will move troops in immediately because we don't have everything worked out." ~~(S)~~

Russia is going to stop this and wreck the peace. We were about to have at Cologne a celebration of Russia in the peace operation. Instead, we face day after day, international embarrassment that Kosovo will be wrecked. Our generals have already agreed on a short-term solution along the lines of our cooperation in Bosnia. We just need to get the operation up and going within Kosovo, and we need to work out this airport thing, and then you and I can meet in Europe and work out this long-term involvement of Russia. ~~(S)~~

I want you to have involvement because it is important to give confidence to the Serbs in Kosovo. But if we go off and meet now and put this on hold, the whole world news will be about how Russia wrecked this, and the refugees can't come back, and you occupy the airport in Pristina. I don't think it is good for

you,  
and it is not good for what we are trying to achieve, and it will be seen  
by the  
KLA as an open invitation to move into Kosovo and stir up trouble.  
They will  
completely lose and confidence that the world community wants to  
bring the  
refugees back. (S)

First, we need to tell our generals on the spot to resolve the airport,  
and  
second, resolve what is going to happen over the next ten days, based  
on what we  
did in Bosnia, and third, we ought to meet and work out the issue of  
the  
leadership of Russia during the peacekeeping operations. Otherwise,  
we are going  
to be in a terrible mess, which will destroy the credibility of the peace  
operation and do enormous damage to you and me. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, Bill, it will not work that way because we will  
find the  
people responsible and guilty of doing this. We will find those who  
initiated  
this whole thing. There is not such a person in the presidency, and we  
will find  
the one in the military who initiated this. Well, I propose for us to do  
the  
following, since the two of us are good friends and have always had  
very good  
relations. Let us take a day for a time out, a day for rest, and then on  
the  
basis of our conversation today, we will connect and talk tomorrow.  
We can  
arrange the particular time. We should arrange a phone conversation  
and continue  
our work, but in a more precise and concrete perspective. (S)

The President: Well, I would be happy to talk tomorrow. You know  
how much  
regard I have for you and how convinced I am we can always work  
out our  
differences, but I also believe it would be a good thing if our military  
commanders in Pristina can try to work out this airport issue because  
it is  
reaching the point where instead of the triumph of our peace in  
Kosovo, the whole  
story is what is happening at the airport, and this is more about the  
problems of  
great countries than restoration of peace and the return of people to

their  
homes. If today at least you can ask your general to meet with our  
general to  
work out this airport thing, I think that is very important. Otherwise,  
we can  
talk tomorrow about the other matters. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Are your generals there? (S)

The President: General Jackson, the British general on the site is the  
one we  
want to talk about it. General Zavarzin and General Jackson. (S)

President Yeltsin: Could you repeat the name of the general? (S)

The President: General Michael Jackson, the KFOR commander, and  
your commander  
there, General Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Jackson. General Jackson. Can you repeat it and  
spell it  
out? (S)

The President: Jackson is our KFOR commander there and I believe  
your general is  
Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: What is his name? Bill, could you repeat the last  
name of  
our general? (S)

The President: I don't care who. That is your choice, but I believe your  
general on the spot in Pristina is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, now I have here what you are talking about.  
So today  
we instruct them to work today, part of the night and part of the day  
tomorrow,  
and then they meet to report to us on the phone, let's say about five  
o'clock in  
the evening. (S)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: I didn't hear that, Bill. (U)

The President: Yes, that is fine. We should ask them to work today  
and report  
back to us in a few hours. (U)

President Yeltsin: So okay. Tomorrow at five o'clock in the evening  
your  
general reports to you, my general reports to me, then one hour later  
we call  
each other and then decide on how our positions coincide. (S)

The President: Five o'clock your time. That is okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: Did we agree? (U)

The President: That is fine. I accept that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, and we will tell the press we will continue  
our  
telephone conversation tomorrow. (U)

The President: Yes, that is good. (U)

President Yeltsin: Is it okay? (U)

The President: That is fine. Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, then I am waiting. (U)

The President: Thanks, Boris. I will talk to you tomorrow. We will  
work this  
out. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we will. We will anyway. (U)

The President: Goodbye. I will talk to you tomorrow. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

7

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 5271

~~SECRET~~

Classified by:  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 7/12/09

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT

5271srb.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian  
President Yeltsin,  
June 13, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 13  
telephone  
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.  
Due to the  
sensitivity of our discussions with the Russians prior to the Cologne  
Summit,  
which were treated as close-hold, we believe that no further  
distribution is  
required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

1

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET 5271

SECRET cc: Vice President  
Classified by: Chief of Staff  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 7/12/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/12/99 5:31:46 PM  
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/12/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 07/12/2009  
 SUBJECT Oops! [~~SECRET~~]  
 TO Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By VZ NARA, Date 4/24/2022  
 2011-0597-02

CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY Delete other version. Sorry.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 5271srb\_.doc

July 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW WEISS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian  
 President Yeltsin,  
 June 13, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 13  
 telephone  
 conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.  
 Due to the  
 sensitivity of our discussions with the Russians prior to the Cologne  
 Summit,  
 which were treated as close-hold, we believe that no further  
 distribution is

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required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by:

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/7/09

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Carlos E. Pascual; re: Talking points (3 pages)	06/13/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
002. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (7 pages)	07/08/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
003. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (11 pages)	07/12/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022
004. email	Andrew S. Weiss to Mary Ann T. Silva; re: Telecon (2 pages)	07/12/1999	P1/b(1) VZ 9/27/2022

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Emails  
 Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Yeltsin])  
 OA/Box Number: 630000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[06/13/1999 - 07/12/1999]

2006-1185-F  
ke299

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

## Exchange Mail

**DATE-TIME** 6/13/99 8:07:13 PM  
**FROM** Weiss, Andrew S.  
**CLASSIFICATION** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DECLASSIFIED**  
**CLASSIFICATIONREASON** 1.5(d) **PER E.O. 13526**  
**DATECLASSIFIEDON** 06/13/1999 *VL 2011-0847-41 (1.21)*  
**DECLASSIFYON** 06/13/2009 *4/29/2022*  
**SUBJECT** Yeltsin TPs ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~  
**TO** Pascual, Carlos E.  
**CARBON\_COPY**  
**TEXT\_BODY** I need to add fireproofers from today's call.

**TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT** June 14 BNY call tps.doc  
 POINTS TO BE MADE FOR  
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH  
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- \* Pleased to talk again after our good conversation yesterday. Our hard work together brought an end to conflict in Kosovo. We made the most of our cooperation and friendship and kept our disagreements from spoiling everything.
- \* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground in Kosovo. Know that's important to both of us.
- \* We agreed yesterday that we'd talk again today to review today's discussion between our generals inside Kosovo on how they're going to cooperate. Also want to address two other issues.
- \* We contacted all necessary people on our side, glad their meeting was productive and resolved situation at the airport in Pristina. Minister Ivanov told us instructions had been given to Zvarzin.
- \* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Glad our people got this

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issue

fixed. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken charge of

the issue and broken an impasse.

\* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked for

yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. Boris, this is a really serious

problem. We need to instruct our people to get this done today.

\* Want to come back to the other part of our conversation yesterday.

You made

proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal that we need to resolve the shorter-term issue of cooperation with the Russian troops already inside Kosovo.

\* I would like us to say yes to both proposals. On the Russian contingent

already in Kosovo, key step now is to fold these forces into KFOR under unified

command.

\* Foreign Minister Ivanov has told us that this approach is acceptable and that

appropriate orders have been issued. We need to instruct key military officials

to move forward and implement these proposals.

\* Regarding our meeting, I'm looking forward to seeing you on Sunday in Cologne,

or outskirts of Cologne. For that meeting to be a success, I think it would be

useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

\* Let's have them meet in next day or two to talk things over and make some

concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over

the longer-term.

\* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By the time of our meeting in Cologne,

confident that we will have a well defined proposal to review.

2

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Reason: 1.5b,d  
Declassify On: 6/12/99

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/8/99 1:14:02 PM  
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/08/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 07/08/2009  
 SUBJECT pls put in final. thanks. ~~{SECRET}~~  
 TO Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

CARBON\_COPY  
 TEXT\_BODY

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 5128memcon.doc

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
 VZ 2511-0892-m (1.22)  
 4/29/2022

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin  
~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin  
 Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel  
 Ehrendreich, Roger  
 Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.  
 AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to  
 instruct our  
 generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport  
 and report  
 back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed -- ~~(S)~~

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President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this group, in the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula. (S)

The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the personnel of the Russian contingent. (S)

I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for the joint operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of clear-cut use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. However, in this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. (S)

And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me before the meeting in Cologne. (S)

In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at the latest, the day after tomorrow, at a place

acceptable for  
them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minister of Defense  
Sergeyev would be  
prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. (S)

I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such  
agreements on the  
matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should  
enable us  
not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that  
event, we  
would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American  
cooperation in  
other important areas. (S)

I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another  
problem.  
If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could  
be in  
danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions  
of the  
so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the  
other  
members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted  
to  
materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo  
could and  
would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities.

Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with  
the  
Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the  
peacemakers  
in Kosovo, in fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of  
that,  
when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the  
Russian  
peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats  
are  
translated into reality. Madam Albright assured Ivanov that  
appropriate work has  
been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I  
should like to  
ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This  
is all  
I wanted to say. (S)

The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo  
Liberation  
Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we

would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. (S)

Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what you have said to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. (S)

President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the agreement should be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions. (S)

The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on this, let me go through the points, and see if we have agreement. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)

The President: I would like to -- (U)

President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)

The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I might.

First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agree to do it, so I think they should meet there. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions. (U)

The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I will work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia in this united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in Bosnia, and I have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work through this so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I think it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this mission will succeed. (S)

Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and capacity to contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need you there. It is very important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to share with me? (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I will issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be fully carried into affect. (U)

The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing

you in  
Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have  
elected  
such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner.  
(U)

The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

4

~~SECRET~~ 5128

~~SECRET~~  
Classified by:  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 7/7/09

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 5128srb.doc

July 6, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian  
President Yeltsin,  
June 14, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14  
telephone  
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ XXXX

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: XXXX

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/7/09

## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/12/99 5:01:28 PM  
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/12/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 07/12/2009  
 SUBJECT pls put in final. thanks. ~~SECRET~~  
 TO Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**

VZ 2015-0782-M-2(1.39)  
 4/21/2022

## CARBON\_COPY

TEXT\_BODY Know you're swamped. Your help on this appreciated once you have a chance.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 5271memcon.doc

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin  
 Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy, and Doug Bayley

## DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

June 13, 1999, 9:07 - 10:05 a.m.  
 Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking my phone call. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

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The President: I think that we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership in Kosovo. We now have to work very hard to get a just and lasting peace there and for our militaries work well together on the ground. I know that Al Gore talked with Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday about the difficulties in the last two days and our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo. We need to take charge of the situation, both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together. (S)

I understand that we have agreed on a short-term proposal to deploy forces together as soon as possible. This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know how that works and it is the fastest way to get Russian and U.S. troops on the ground. Second, I know that Foreign Minister Ivanov has been working with Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott about some promising ideas to use next week to deal with the important and urgent outstanding challenges of solving our long term problems in Kosovo. If we can get these ideas developed next week, we could have a very good meeting in Cologne, a week from today. (S)

I believe we should instruct our foreign ministers and ministers of defense to meet as soon as possible and work out these arrangements and show that Russia and the U.S. can cooperate in Kosovo and play our respective roles to make this essential peace work. (S)

There is one more matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the airport at Pristina as soon as possible. I hope you will give orders to General Zavarzin to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander. Otherwise, the story of the airport will overshadow everything we are doing to

bring peace to Kosovo and to protect the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. It will become the whole story and could possibly undermine what we are doing there and the chance for Russia and the G-8 to have a great success in Cologne. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I think that all three questions you have raised are only to be discussed among the two presidents. Namely, you and me. So we have the preliminary discussions among us, then we elaborate on this scheme. After we do that, we can give instructions to the group of generals. We can give instructions in the short term to elaborate on the final scheme, not the final scheme, but the one to be approved by us. Only when we approve that one will it become the final one. (S)

The President: Yes. As I understand it, I think we agree. As I understand it, our generals have worked out a short-term scheme to get us through the next few days, based on our operation in Bosnia. Then our ministers of defense will have to come up with a long-term plan, which we will approve. But we must have this short-term plan implemented immediately because we don't want a security vacuum to develop in Kosovo, especially because we have given our word that we will not let the KLA move in and take over any areas and frighten the Serbs who live there. It is important for me, Boris, as I know it is for you, to keep our word to the world community and protect all the citizens of Kosovo. We will have our ministers of defense and foreign ministers work on the short-term solution and bring it back to us for approval. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I have one more option. It is for us two to meet in some hiding place. Well, it is for you and I to meet either on a boat or some submarine or some island so not a single person will disturb us, so you will not be agitated by anyone, and I will not be agitated by anyone or any

person. (S)

The President: But Boris, my impression is our people have to work this out. We can meet, you and I, but we have to have some idea of where we are going first. We've got to have this short-term solution worked out and the airport issue. Otherwise, if we meet, the world will think there's some major crisis between the two of us, not just that we are meeting about Kosovo. (S)

President Yeltsin: When you and I meet, nobody will think anything of it. People trust us. And that is why I think that this option is quite attractive and beautiful and very trustworthy for the world. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. Since I have to leave the day after tomorrow to go to Europe anyway, let's tell our people, the generals, to have already worked out a short-term solution, based on our partnership in Bosnia, for the next 11 days, so there will not be a vacuum in Kosovo. Let's give them the orders to implement the agreement on the short-term solution. Let's tell them to work out the airport solution. (S)

You and I can go somewhere in the vicinity of Cologne, around the G-8, because you are leaving Russia, and anyway, I will be there. Otherwise, I will have to cancel something on this European trip and that will look like some big crisis to the world. So let's tell the generals to work out the short-term issue, the airport, and then you and I will meet on the long-term plan. We can go off from Cologne somewhere and do that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, but this is not a very clear plan. We have to elaborate on this and have an absolutely clear, detailed plan, like the first item, the second item, the seventh item, the tenth item. (S)

The President: Yes, but we have to have a plan to deliberate on. That is why I think it is important for our ministers to meet and come up with a

plan. We  
can't just make it up as we go along. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you see, all we need is to have just one  
assistant for  
both of us. Not more than that, not the whole bulk of 20 people. Only  
one or  
two assistants and those have to be very smart professional people  
who know the  
case and should be the people who trust us and whom we trust. (S)

The President: Boris, let me be as clear as I can. I am prepared to  
meet, but I  
am not prepared to meet as long as we have this impasse at the airport  
and no  
short-term solution for the next ten days. I will not wreck all that we  
have  
worked for in Kosovo and create a security vacuum where the KLA  
can come back in,  
and meet under those circumstances. (S)

The whole world thinks something crazy is going on. We have got to  
work out  
these two things. Before this happened, Russia was the toast of the  
world.  
People were saying Russia is back, peace has been solved, and Russia  
played a  
major role. Now the view of Kosovo may be: we can't get KFOR in,  
what is the  
KLA going to do, and there is a standoff at the airport. I have no  
intention of  
meeting under these circumstances. It is not good. All the credit  
Russia got is  
at risk of being lost, and we will have a disaster at Cologne, instead of  
a  
triumph for Russia. (S)

We have to solve this first and then meet on the long-term issues. It is  
very  
important that Russia be seen as playing a major role in the  
peacekeeping  
operation. I have always done what I can to enhance the role of  
Russia. I have  
worked hard. I can't come to a meeting with these two issues  
outstanding, where  
it looks like we put peace in Kosovo on hold. It is not acceptable, and  
it is  
wrong. I am proposing three things. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you and I, it is not for me to make

arrangements.

Without us nobody will make such arrangements, so let us agree we need to do something anyway whether you propose or let me propose, and you will agree, and then we need to have a discussion to narrow the gap and bring each other closer.

(S)

The President: Boris, we can work out the long-term issue, but here is what it looks like to the rest of the world. Russia worked on a peace agreement with Ahtisaari. You and I were behind it. We made a peace agreement, and the UN endorsed it. The UN specifically provided for the introduction of the KFOR force and for implementation of this within the spirit of Rambouillet. That is what the UN said. Now it looks like, without any reference to that, Russia goes in and occupies the airport at Pristina and says, "We will stop the whole thing the UN said, and we are going to, even if it creates a vacuum and the KLA comes back in, instead of what we promised to do, we will move troops in immediately because we don't have everything worked out." (S)

Russia is going to stop this and wreck the peace. We were about to have at Cologne a celebration of Russia in the peace operation. Instead, we face day after day, international embarrassment that Kosovo will be wrecked. Our generals have already agreed on a short-term solution along the lines of our cooperation in Bosnia. We just need to get the operation up and going within Kosovo, and we need to work out this airport thing, and then you and I can meet in Europe and work out this long-term involvement of Russia. (S)

I want you to have involvement because it is important to give confidence to the Serbs in Kosovo. But if we go off and meet now and put this on hold, the whole world news will be about how Russia wrecked this, and the refugees can't come back, and you occupy the airport in Pristina. I don't think it is good for

you,  
and it is not good for what we are trying to achieve, and it will be seen  
by the  
KLA as an open invitation to move into Kosovo and stir up trouble.  
They will  
completely lose and confidence that the world community wants to  
bring the  
refugees back. (S)

First, we need to tell our generals on the spot to resolve the airport,  
and  
second, resolve what is going to happen over the next ten days, based  
on what we  
did in Bosnia, and third, we ought to meet and work out the issue of  
the  
leadership of Russia during the peacekeeping operations. Otherwise,  
we are going  
to be in a terrible mess, which will destroy the credibility of the peace  
operation and do enormous damage to you and me. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, Bill, it will not work that way because we will  
find the  
people responsible and guilty of doing this. We will find those who  
initiated  
this whole thing. There is not such a person in the presidency, and we  
will find  
the one in the military who initiated this. Well, I propose for us to do  
the  
following, since the two of us are good friends and have always had  
very good  
relations. Let us take a day for a time out, a day for rest, and then on  
the  
basis of our conversation today, we will connect and talk tomorrow.  
We can  
arrange the particular time. We should arrange a phone conversation  
and continue  
our work, but in a more precise and concrete perspective. (S)

The President: Well, I would be happy to talk tomorrow. You know  
how much  
regard I have for you and how convinced I am we can always work  
out our  
differences, but I also believe it would be a good thing if our military  
commanders in Pristina can try to work out this airport issue because  
it is  
reaching the point where instead of the triumph of our peace in  
Kosovo, the whole  
story is what is happening at the airport, and this is more about the  
problems of  
great countries than restoration of peace and the return of people to

their  
homes. If today at least you can ask your general to meet with our  
general to  
work out this airport thing, I think that is very important. Otherwise,  
we can  
talk tomorrow about the other matters. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Are your generals there? (S)

The President: General Jackson, the British general on the site is the  
one we  
want to talk about it. General Zavarzin and General Jackson. (S)

President Yeltsin: Could you repeat the name of the general? (S)

The President: General Michael Jackson, the KFOR commander, and  
your commander  
there, General Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Jackson. General Jackson. Can you repeat it and  
spell it  
out? (S)

The President: Jackson is our KFOR commander there and I believe  
your general is  
Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: What is his name? Bill, could you repeat the last  
name of  
our general? (S)

The President: I don't care who. That is your choice, but I believe your  
general on the spot in Pristina is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, now I have here what you are talking about.  
So today  
we instruct them to work today, part of the night and part of the day  
tomorrow,  
and then they meet to report to us on the phone, let's say about five  
o'clock in  
the evening. (S)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: I didn't hear that, Bill. (U)

The President: Yes, that is fine. We should ask them to work today  
and report  
back to us in a few hours. (U)

President Yeltsin: So okay. Tomorrow at five o'clock in the evening your general reports to you, my general reports to me, then one hour later we call each other and then decide on how our positions coincide. (S)

The President: Five o'clock your time. That is okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: Did we agree? (U)

The President: That is fine. I accept that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, and we will tell the press we will continue our telephone conversation tomorrow. (U)

The President: Yes, that is good. (U)

President Yeltsin: Is it okay? (U)

The President: That is fine. Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, then I am waiting. (U)

The President: Thanks, Boris. I will talk to you tomorrow. We will work this out. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we will. We will anyway. (U)

The President: Goodbye. I will talk to you tomorrow. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian  
President Yeltsin,  
June 13, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 13  
telephone  
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.  
Due to the  
sensitivity of our discussions with the Russians prior to the Cologne  
Summit,  
which were treated as close-hold, we believe that no further  
distribution is  
required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

1  
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~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President  
Classified by: Chief of Staff  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 7/12/09

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## Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/12/99 5:31:46 PM  
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)  
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~  
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)  
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/12/1999  
 DECLASSIFYON 07/12/2009  
 SUBJECT Oops! [~~SECRET~~]  
 TO Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526  
 White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
 By VZ NARA, Date 4/24/2022  
 2011-0892-m

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TEXT\_BODY Delete other version. Sorry.

TRANSLATED\_ATTACHMENT 5271srb\_.doc

July 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW WEISS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian  
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required.

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That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

2

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Classified by:

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/7/09