
Clinton Presidential Records Mandatory Declassification Review

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/12/99 6:04:35 PM
 FROM Kaufman, Stuart J.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/12/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/12/2009
 SUBJECT Memos for POTUS call [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Pascual, Carlos E.

CARBON_COPY
 TEXT_BODY Drafts attached and saved in G:/Documents, under package no. 4523.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc

June 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN

SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin

Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to Russian President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.

Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth

RECOMMENDATION

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

That you sign the memo to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin

Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 6/12/09

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
DATE: June 13, 1999
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation in KFOR.

II. BACKGROUND

Our talks with the Russians in the last day or two have revealed a great deal of disarray in Moscow, forcing us to spend much of our time sorting through their mixed signals. Prime Minister Stepashin reaffirmed to Vice President Gore that Yeltsin did not authorize the Saturday morning deployment of Russian troops to Kosovo, but Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Prikhodko implied to the press that

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Yeltsin had. The truth may be that Yeltsin ordered preparations for the movement in a way that implied authority to go ahead but left him with "plausible deniability".

Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia is aimed at reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR model and under US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II, led on our side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for Russia's long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two tracks separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The Russians, fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as capitulation to NATO, have linked the two tracks, and are using our desire for quick agreement as leverage for achieving a better deal on the long-term structure (Track II).

Attachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin

2

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual
Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/12/99 9:46:44 PM
FROM Chastain, George M.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/12/2009
SUBJECT FW: URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package ~~[SECRET]~~
TO

Davies, Glyn T.
 Dejban, Donna D.
 Hachigian, Nina L.
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
 Moretz, Sheila K.
 Rice, Edward A.
 Rudman, Mara E.
 Sargeant, Stephen T.
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
 Storey, Sharon V.
 Sutphen, Mona K.
 Barnett, Cheryl E.
 Elkind, Jonathan H.
 Faranda, Regina D.
 Kaufman, Stuart J.
 Pascual, Carlos E.
 Russ, Judith P.
 Segal, Jack D.
 Silva, Mary Ann T.
 Tedstrom, John E.
 Weiss, Andrew S.
 Bartlett, L. June
 Davies, Glyn T.
 Dejban, Donna D.
 Hilliard, Brenda I.
 Jacobson, Tracey A.
 Joshi, M. Kay
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Powell, Elliott
 Rice, Edward A.
 Sargeant, Stephen T.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

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Brody, Richard J.
 Saunders, Richard M.
 Davidson, Leslie K.
 Schulte, Gregory L.

CARBON_COPY

Bayley, Douglas C.
 Bresnahan, Gary E.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Cheramie, Don E.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Ehrendreich, Joel
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
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 Murphy, Miles R.
 Payne, Raymond H.
 Porterfield Patrick C.
 Powell, Elliott
 Rickard, Robin S.
 Rogers, Elizabeth B.
 Schrader, Joel M.
 Sibley, Matthew W.
 Sigler, Ralph H.
 Smith, James A.
 Tarver, J. Sean

TEXT_BODY

Per Mr. Steinberg and Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Pascual made changes in the "strobe note" and the "tps" documents. The changes are now reflected in the attached documents. Also per Mr. Pascual, the Situation Room will follow the below instructions, using these altered documents.

-----Original
 Message-----
 From: Pascual, Carlos E.
 Sent: Saturday, June 12,
 1999 6:58 PM
 To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

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Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject: URGENT -- Yeltsin Call Package ~~[SECRET]~~
Importance: High

1. SITUATION ROOM -- please secure fax this note and the attachments to Sandy, Jim and Leon Fuerth. Please page Greg Schulte and read them to him if he is not in the office.
2. Sandy, Jim, Leon, Greg -- attached is the Yeltsin call package and a note to Strobe. Would appreciate your sending any comments to the Sit Room. Please call if you have questions. If you concur, I recommend that the Sit Room secure fax to Strobe the attached not to him from Sandy and the points (and NOT the memos).
3. SITUATION ROOM -- assuming Sandy et al concur, please fax to Strobe the note from Sandy and the points once you get comments. Strobe will need these as early in his day as possible. You will see that we have asked Strobe to send back comments. If you get these, please insert in "track changes" mode. If Strobe sends a complete re-write, could you please type this into the system. Please call me once you get his comments.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4523srb boris call.doc

June 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: STUART KAUFMAN

SUBJECT: Memo and Points for Phone Call with Yeltsin

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Attached are a memo and points for the President's phone call to Russian President Yeltsin on Sunday morning, June 13.

Concurrence by: Schulte, Fuerth (they have not yet cleared)

RECOMMENDATION

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Tab I Memo to the President on Phone Call with Yeltsin

Tab A Points to be Made in Phone Call with Yeltsin

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: 6/12/09

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4523presmemo boris call.doc

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN
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LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:00 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with President Yeltsin a formula for Russian participation in KFOR.

II. BACKGROUND

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Meanwhile, discussions continue on two tracks. Track I in Macedonia is aimed at reaching agreement on an interim arrangement, based on the SFOR model and under US command, for troops already in place or about to arrive. Track II, led on our side by Strobe in Moscow, is to work out the overall arrangements for Russia's long-term participation in SFOR. Our preference is to keep the two tracks separate and resolve the immediate issue (Track I) quickly. The Russians, fearing that quick agreement on Track I would be portrayed as capitulation to NATO, may link the two tracks together. That, ironically, is Russia's worst option since it would create facts on the ground that make Russian participation all the harder to work out.

Attachment
Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin

2

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ 4523

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Pascual

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)
Declassify On: 6/12/09

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

4523tps.doc

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday.

Despite the difficulties we face now, it is important to remember how far Russia has come in seven years and how far we have come in our relationship.

* That very progress makes the current situation in Kosovo all the more serious.

It would be tragic to jeopardize all we've accomplished bilaterally and in

bringing peace to Kosovo.

* Have to say that I'm disappointed in so many mixed signals these past days:

Russia commits not to deploy, then deploys; orders withdrawal then doesn't; says

it's a mistake, then claims it was authorized.

* I have no interest in blaming anyone, Boris, but these conflicting signals are

hurting Russia's image, and it is making people question the value of our work

together.

* But I also said that I would always offer solutions along with citing problems,

and that is what I want to focus on now.

* Here's my goal: to achieve a solution that is satisfactory to Russia, allows

it to participate in the international security force, and is consistent with

unity of command and effectiveness, on which we have all agreed.

* Our teams worked day and night and have come up with a two-track approach. The

ideas are sound, and I want to authorize our people to finalize the details and

start to implement.

Track 1

* First, let's agree on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to

start to deploy forces together tomorrow.

* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We

know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the

ground together now.

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* Second, let's give our people instructions to find a solution as fast as

possible that meets Russia's concerns and ours for an effective security force under unified command.

Version A - Offer Neutral and U.S.-Russian Sector

* Strobe and his team have put two options on the table, and your ministers have the details.

* One is to create a neutral sector with a Finn commander and a Russian deputy commander. When you study this, you'll see we listened carefully to your concerns about reporting to NATO.

* I also think that there is tremendous merit in the U.S. and Russia working

together. So I'm ready to create, Boris, a joint U.S.-Russian sector.

* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have command of his national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to the commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.

* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree and cannot work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out differences like we have in Bosnia.

* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come up.

Version B - Offer U.S.-Russian Sector

* In this spirit, Boris, I want to suggest a joint U.S.-Russian sector where we would work together.

* We would share a sector, and each of our generals would have command of his national forces within the sector. Each of our generals would report to the commander of KFOR and to our national authorities.

* We would work together as long as we can agree. If we don't agree and cannot work it out, the operation would not be paralyzed, and we'll work out differences like we have in Bosnia.

* But you and I will work together to make sure disputes do not come up.

Closing

* Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the first track.

Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work side-by-side

to protect the peace.

* The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals to agree on the details on the basis of our conversation.

* If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace settlement work in

Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in Cologne.

If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2

* There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a security vacuum

to form that would jeopardize the peace.

* We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia. So let's use

it.

* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on Track 2. My

bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move

together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively

side-by-side.

If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2

* I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay focused on an

effective force with unified command and control.

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Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

4523 strobe note.doc

FAX FOR STROBE TALBOTT FROM JIM STEINBERG

Strobe -

I am sending you a very preliminary draft of talking points for the President's call with Yeltsin. As you discussed with Carlos, I think you should use these points to preview with Minister Ivanov what the Russians might accept on Track 1 and Track 2. Sandy still has not seen the points, so they may obviously change.

On Track 1, I know your priorities are to get commitment to move ahead with an SFOR model and to delink Track 1 from Track 2. That sounds like the right approach.

On Track 2, we have given you two models to work with: a neutral zone and a U.S.-Russia sector. As you requested, you have authority to explore both options. We'll need your advice on how to best play this issue in the President's call-whether to propose version A or B in the points, or simply another variant. While we want to move the agenda forward, we also want to avoid overloading the circuits with Yeltsin.

On process, what would be most helpful is if your team could send the Situation Room after your meeting with Ivanov either pen and ink changes or a revised draft. If that does not work, call Carlos or the Situation Room and give edits or suggestions directly to them. If we need a wholesale rethink after your meetings, then we should talk. In any case, your report prior to the call would be most helpful. (The call is at 9:00 EST; 8:30 pre-brief.)

Regards,

Jim
1

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SECRET

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 1:48:14 PM
 FROM Cheramie, Don E.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
 SUBJECT Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Pascual, Carlos E.

CARBON_COPY Bayley, Douglas C.
 Bresnahan, Gary E.
 Broadwick, Bonnie .
 Campanella, Anthony
 Chastain, George M.
 Cheramie, Don E.
 Crowder, Stevan D.
 Crowell, Thomas R.
 Ehrendreich, Joel
 Erdahl, Douglas M.
 Ford, Robert G.
 Fuchs, Joachim D.
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 Sigler, Ralph H.
 Smith, James A.
 Tarver, J. Sean

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

TEXT_BODY

Per your request...

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

TPnotes.doc

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way in seven years under your leadership -- and so has our relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm proud to work with you.

* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.

* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.

* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.

* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.

* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have

worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We

know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.

* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign

Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the

next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.

* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.

* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it

would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.

* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make

some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and

cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.

* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems -

which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.

* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 8:07:13 PM

FROM Weiss, Andrew S.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009

SUBJECT Yeltsin TPs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Pascual, Carlos E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY I need to add fireproofers from today's call.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT June 14 BNY call tps.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Pleased to talk again after our good conversation yesterday. Our hard work together brought an end to conflict in Kosovo. We made the most of our cooperation and friendship and kept our disagreements from spoiling everything.

* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground in Kosovo. Know that's important to both of us.

* We agreed yesterday that we'd talk again today to review today's discussion between our generals inside Kosovo on how they're going to cooperate. Also want to address two other issues.

* We contacted all necessary people on our side, glad their meeting was productive and resolved situation at the airport in Pristina. Minister Ivanov told us instructions had been given to Zvarzin.

* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Glad our people got this

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issue

fixed. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken charge of

the issue and broken an impasse.

* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked for

yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. Boris, this is a really serious

problem. We need to instruct our people to get this done today.

* Want to come back to the other part of our conversation yesterday. You made

proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal that we need to resolve the shorter-term issue of cooperation with the Russian troops already inside Kosovo.

* I would like us to say yes to both proposals. On the Russian contingent

already in Kosovo, key step now is to fold these forces into KFOR under unified

command.

* Foreign Minister Ivanov has told us that this approach is acceptable and that

appropriate orders have been issued. We need to instruct key military officials

to move forward and implement these proposals.

* Regarding our meeting, I'm looking forward to seeing you on Sunday in Cologne,

or outskirts of Cologne. For that meeting to be a success, I think it would be

useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

* Let's have them meet in next day or two to talk things over and make some

concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over

the longer-term.

* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By the time of our meeting in Cologne,

confident that we will have a well defined proposal to review.

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2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 8:43:56 PM
 FROM Cheramie, Don E.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(b)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
 SUBJECT TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS-YELTSIN CALL (6/13)
 [CONFIDENTIAL]
 TO Weiss, Andrew S.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

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* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.

* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.

* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.

* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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- * This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.
- * Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
- * These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.
- * While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
- * Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.

* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.

* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

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* Boris,
I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

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 FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
 SUBJECT FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Weiss, Andrew S.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY fyi

-----Original Message-----

From: Cheramie, Don E.
 Sent: Sunday,
 June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
 To: Pascual, Carlos E.
 Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation
 Room
 Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Per your request...

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT TPnotes.doc
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* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We

kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.

* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.

* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.

* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.

* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our

generals have

worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We

know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the

ground together now.

* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign

Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the

next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.

* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good

meeting in Cologne one week from today.

* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it

would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.

* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make

some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and

cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.

* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems -

which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.

* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on

arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work

under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too

- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on

how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is

equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 9:50:41 PM
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
 SUBJECT FW: Points for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Pascual, Carlos E.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Some suggestions. I hate to be a nudge, but I think the tone is a little too negative. I've tried to soften. Unless there's sugar-coating, we risk enraging Yeltsin who's already stirred up about anything Kosovo-related.

Also, we cannot have the President do technical issues or even technical terms that don't translate well into Russian with this guy. It won't work. He'll check out of the call and we'll get nothing.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos
 E.
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 9:30 PM
 To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte,
 Gregory L.
 Subject: Points for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 Importance: High

AW -- made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires to adjust based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.

Greg --
 would appreciate your clearance.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT June 14 BNY call tps_.doc

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- * Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in Kosovo; glad we're continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far. No issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.
- * As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion between our generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport. Also want to address three other issues.
Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements
- * Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to make sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions to resolve the airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.
- * [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown that when we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good for both of us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken charge of the issue and broken an impasse.
- * [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked for yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will cast a negative tone over the meeting in Cologne. We must instruct our people to fix this today.
- * Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers agreed there would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual agreement. But we are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.
- * Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new deployments to Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a confusing signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.
Track 1, Track 2
- * Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to mine.

* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deal with the Russian forces already in Kosovo. It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia.

We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our troops cooperating on the ground together.

* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement the plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work together to implement the peace.

* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could meet in Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.

* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have a well defined proposal to review.

* Boris, if we can move on all these fronts, we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too

- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable

- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this

week and
present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on
Russia's
overall role in KFOR

* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo
into KFOR
because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would
jeopardize the
peace.

* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this
problem fixed
quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and
make it
work.

* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on
the command
arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are

effectiveness and unity of command and control.

* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can
move
together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work
effectively
side-by-side.

2

3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5b,d
Declassify On: 6/12/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/13/99 9:52:25 PM
FROM Schulte, Gregory L.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
SUBJECT FW: Points for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Pascual, Carlos E.

CARBON_COPY Weiss, Andrew S.

TEXT_BODY Pls see some suggested toughening up. I'll trust you to de-toughen, if you think my additions would be counterproductive. But I think we need to tell Boris that what Russia is doing could wreak the peace, and put his own soldiers at risk. We might also need to add hints that he needs to get his military under control.

-----Original
 Message-----
 From: Pascual, Carlos E.
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999
 9:30 PM
 To: Weiss, Andrew S.; Schulte, Gregory L.
 Subject: Points
 for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 Importance: High

AW --
 made some changes. See if this still makes sense. Tires to adjust
 based on comments SRB and POTUS made today.

Greg -- would appreciate
 your clearance.

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT June 14 BNY call tps_.doc
 POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in Kosovo; glad we're continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far. No

issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.

* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.

Otherwise the

withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict in Kosovo

will quickly re-ignite - with our forces in the middle.

* There were already report of the KLA preparing to attack Russian forces, since

the KLA thought that your forces had come in to protect Serb forces. We've made

clear to the Albanians that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but

this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN

mandate.

* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion between our

generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport. Also want

to address three other issues.

Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements

* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to make

sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions to resolve the

airport problem. Minister Ivanov told us you gave instructions to Zavarzin.

* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown that when

we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good for both of

us. Just like with the UN Security Council resolution, we've taken charge of the

issue and broken an impasse.

* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked for

yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious and potentially

dangerous. It's already cast a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it

could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We

must instruct our people to fix this today.

* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers

agreed there

would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo until we agree on a plan. But

every day there are more reports on reinforcements.

* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your military

intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo. I know

that you wouldn't let your military do this - it would be an act tantamount to

war.

* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new deployments to

Kosovo. This can really set us at odds, and it is damaging Russia's credibility.

Track 1, Track 2

* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for us to

meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals worked out

to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to mine.

* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo

based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the

fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together.

* Now let's get it done. Let agree to instruct our generals to implement the

plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work together to

implement the peace.

* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could meet in

Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need to give

instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to us on how we

can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.

* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have a well

defined proposal to review.

* Boris, if we can move on both these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal

to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense and

foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next

week -- we can
get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.
If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links progress on interim arrangements to agreement on Russia's overall role in KFOR

* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.

* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.

* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively

side-by-side.

2

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 12:24:04 AM
 FROM Chastain, George M.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
 SUBJECT FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Schrader, Joel M.
 McGee, Jenny A.

CARBON_COPY Chastain, George M.

TEXT_BODY

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Tarver, J. Sean
 Sent: Monday,
 June 14, 1999 12:18 AM
 To: Chastain, George M.
 Subject: FW: Draft
 TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 Importance: High

George

I

read the Yeltsin talking points to Berger on the Stu III. He dictated the changes, which I added and e-mailed to all relevenat parties (as shown below). Based on this, and the late hour, we did not fax a revised copy to Berger. Called Steinberg. He said he doesn't need to see the points until morning. We faxed a copy to Talbott. Berger and Steinberg will get copies in their morning take. Can't confirm if ExecSec has staffed them to the President's Staff Sec yet.

-----Original Message-----

From: Tarver, J. Sean
 Sent: Sunday,
 June 13, 1999 11:52 PM

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
 Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
 Subject: FW: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 Importance: High

Mr. Berger's changes are reflected in the attached copy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 10:28 PM
 To: @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
 Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Schulte, Gregory L.; Brody, Richard J.; Saunders, Richard M.; Davidson, Leslie K.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
 Subject: Draft TPs for Yeltsin Call [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 Importance: High

SIT ROOM

Please send via secure fax to Sandy, Jim and Strobe Talbott.

Attached is a first draft of points for the Monday Yeltsin call. Collins and I will talk at about 05:00 EST to assess relevant updates. Greg will make sure to have the latest on the situation in Pristina and Russian reinforcements. We may also need to adjust quickly after the VP-Stepashin call.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT June 14 BNY call tps.doc
 POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
 PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in Kosovo; glad we're continuing to work on this today. Our perseverance has paid off so far.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

No

issue is more important to sustain our cooperation and friendship.

* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes.

Otherwise the

withdrawals will slow, the KLA will resume fighting, and the conflict in Kosovo

will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.

* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion between our

generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problems at Pristina airport.

Also want

to address three other issues.

Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements

* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to make

sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions to resolve the

airport problem. I'm sure you got your instructions to Zavarzin.

* [If the situation at the airport is resolved] Once again we've shown that when

we work together, we can resolve tough problems in a way that's good for both of

us. As with the UN Security Council resolution last week, we've taken charge of

the issue and broken an impasse.

* [If the situation at the airport is not resolved] Despite what we asked for

yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed. This is serious. It will cast

a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the meeting in

Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct our people to

fix this today.

* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Our ministers agreed there

would be no new Russian deployments to Kosovo without mutual agreement. But we

are seeing credible reports on reinforcements.

* Some of our partners in the region are increasingly worried that your military

intends to violate their airspace to send additional troops to Kosovo.

* Boris, I have to ask you to instruct your military to halt new deployments to

Kosovo. This can really become a big stumbling block and will send a confusing

signal about Russia's goals and intentions in Kosovo.

* Foreign Minister Ivanov repeated this to Secretary Albright yesterday evening.

* We accept the Foreign Minister's word on this. He has worked hard

to resolve these issues. However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made, Russia's credibility in the free world will be greatly diminished and it will have a serious impact on our relationship.

Track 1, Track 2

* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for us to meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* I want to suggest how we might say yes to your proposal and to mine.

* Our generals agreed, Boris, on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo.

It is based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our Russian and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next week.

* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to implement the plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work together to implement the peace.

* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could meet in Cologne or on the outskirts. For that meeting to be a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

* Let's have them meet urgently to make concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term.

* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, we could have a well defined proposal to review.

* Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our defense and foreign ministers prepare for a meeting between you and me next week -- we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success. If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too

- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable

- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:

1) The operation must be militarily effective;

2) We must ensure unity of command;

3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the possibility that the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of a KLA plot against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.

* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.

* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.

* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

* We learned of a plot against Russia but, Boris, if Russian troops are not part

of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and

Russian troops will become a greater target.

* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but

this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

3

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 8:19:41 AM
FROM Millison, Cathy L.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/13/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/13/2009
SUBJECT FW: June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Darnes, Victoria J.
 Ficklin, John W.
 Kaplan, Dean M.
 Konrad, Elizabeth M.
 Marsh, Thomas S
 Porter, Pete
 Sanborn, Daniel R. K.(Records)
 Starks, Tali T.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E.
 Sent: Sunday,
 June 13, 1999 9:39 PM
 To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
 Subject: FW:
 June 13 Yeltsin Talking Points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

These were the points
 actually used for the call.

-----Original Message-----

From: Cheramie,
 Don E.
 Sent: Sunday, June 13, 1999 1:48 PM
 To: Pascual, Carlos
 E.
 Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room
 Subject: Yeltsin Talking Points
 [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Per your request...

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

TPnotes.doc

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

* Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way in seven years under your leadership -- and so has our relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm proud to work with you.

* I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.

* We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.

* As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.

* We need to take charge of the situation - both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.

* There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to the problem - and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

* First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.

* Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.

* These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.

* While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.

* Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.

* With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems - which matter a lot to both of us - by the time we meet.

* At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about three things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.

* We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 9:02:17 AM
FROM Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)(x6)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999
DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2024
SUBJECT Updated Yeltsin TPs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
 Dejban, Donna D.
 Hachigian, Nina L.
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J.
 Moretz, Sheila K.
 Rice, Edward A.
 Rudman, Mara E.
 Sargeant, Stephen T.
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
 Storey, Sharon V.
 Sutphen, Mona K.

CARBON_COPY

Barnett, Cheryl E.
 Elkind, Jonathan H.
 Faranda, Regina D.
 Kaufman, Stuart J.
 Pascual, Carlos E.
 Russ, Judith P.
 Segal, Jack D.
 Silva, Mary Ann T.
 Tedstrom, John E.
 Weiss, Andrew S.
 Davidson, Leslie K.
 Hurley, C. Michael
 Moyn, Samuel A.
 Quinn, Mary E.
 Schulte, Gregory L.
 Segal, Jack D.
 Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
 Saunders, Richard M.
 Brody, Richard J.
 Davidson, Leslie K.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

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TEXT_BODY

PLEASE PASS ASAP TO SANDY AND JIM

Below version incorporates Jim's fixes as well as VP-Stepashin call. Strobe has cleared.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

June 14 BNY call tps_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Boris, we agreed yesterday to work hard to keep the peace in Kosovo; glad we're continuing to work on this today. Vice President and Stepashin had good call this morning. Clearly, no issue is more important than Kosovo to sustaining our cooperation and friendship.

* We must be seen as working together, not at cross purposes. Otherwise the withdrawals will slow, the KLA will not be under control or demilitarize, and the conflict in Kosovo will quickly re-ignite, with our forces in the middle.

* As we discussed yesterday, want to review today's discussion between our generals in Kosovo on how to resolve the problem at Pristina airport. Also want to address three other issues.

Airport Issue, Russian Troop Reinforcements

* Right after our call, we contacted all necessary people on our side to make sure Generals Jackson and Zavarzin got down to serious discussions to resolve the airport problem.

* Your representatives have told us that instructions were given to the Russian military to reach agreement on procedures for the airport.

* Despite what we asked for yesterday, problem at airport still isn't fixed.

This is serious. General Zavarzin said today he was not there to work things

out, only to listen. And he insisted on Russian control of airport.

* That won't do. Both the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement and UNSCR

specifically call for unity of command. It will be impossible to go on to other

questions while this issue is pending.

* This problem will cast a negative tone over all we've done on Kosovo; it could ruin the meeting in Cologne; it could cause the peace to break down. We must instruct our people to fix this today.

[pause for response]

* Have to raise another matter of utmost urgency. Vice President and Albright

have been told by counterparts that there will be no new Russian deployments to

Kosovo without mutual agreement. Let me underscore continuing importance of this

issue. We also believe sending Russian forces to Serbia would be [provocative

move][very serious matter].

* * Boris, this issue can really become a big stumbling block and will send a

confusing signal about Russia's goals in Kosovo.

* Appreciate PM Stepashin's and FM Ivanov's assurances on this issue, even in

past few hours. They have worked hard to resolve these issues.

* However, Boris, I must tell you that if there are further unilateral deployments to Kosovo before an agreement is made, Russia's credibility in the

free world will be greatly diminished and it will have a serious impact on our

relationship.

[pause for response]

Track 1, Track 2

* Want to return to yesterday's conversation. You made a proposal for us to

meet. I made a proposal to agree on the short-term plan our generals worked out

to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

* I think we can say yes to your proposal and to mine.

* Both Vice President and Stepashin and Albright and Ivanov have agreed, Boris,

on an interim approach to deploy forces in Kosovo. It is based on what you and I

worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get our Russian

and American troops cooperating on the ground together over the next week.

* Now let's get it done. Let's agree to instruct our generals to implement the

plan and develop real facts on the ground that show we can work together to

implement the peace.

* Regarding your proposal for a meeting, I said yesterday we could meet in Cologne later this week. For that meeting to be a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

* Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your people and mine have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting there.

Let's have our defense ministers meet there.

* Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams could present to you and me a well defined proposal to review.

* Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams meet to prepare for our meeting -- we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

* Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too
- and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.

* Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable
- and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.

* At the same time, we must be careful about four things:

- 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
- 2) We must ensure unity of command;
- 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
- 4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the possibility that the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of a KLA plot against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.

* We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and

present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

* There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.

* Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.

* You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.

* But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

* We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not part of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and Russian troops will become a greater target.

* We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

3

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b,d

Declassify On: 6/12/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/14/99 9:41:46 AM

FROM Millison, Cathy L.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/14/1999

DECLASSIFYON 06/14/2009

SUBJECT FW: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Bartlett, L. June
Dejban, Donna D.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Taken care of. Saved to G:/EXECSEC as Yeltsin Jun 14.doc

-----Original

Message-----

From: Hachigian, Nina L.

Sent: Monday, June 14, 1999

9:32 AM

To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Cc: @NSA

- Natl Security Advisor

Subject: FNAL YELTSIN POINTS [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

APPROVED BY JS AND SRB--PLEASE TAKE TO STAFF
SECRETARY ASAP.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Doc1_.doc
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

* Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet
and resolve
the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what
they worked

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out.

* I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general said he was only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the commander of KFOR, General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.

* I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a good call a few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have agreed that Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree on a long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in this interim period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good arrangement, but it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions to implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do you agree?

* Stepashin and Al also discussed the idea of Sec Cohen and Minister Sergeyev getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this weekend; they can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have the airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.

* Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached agreement with General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will instruct Cohen to meet with Sergeyev.

* In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured us there will be no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter. I hope we can count on this.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/8/99 1:14:02 PM
 FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
 CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
 DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/08/1999
 DECLASSIFYON 07/08/2009
 SUBJECT pls put in final. thanks. [~~SECRET~~]
 TO Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5128memcon.doc

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin
 (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
 Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel
 Ehrendreich, Roger
 Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
 AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to
 instruct our
 generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport
 and report
 back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed -- (~~S~~)

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President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this group, in the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula. (S)

The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the personnel of the Russian contingent. (S)

I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for the joint operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of clear-cut use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. However, in this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. (S)

And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me before the meeting in Cologne. (S)

In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at the latest, the day after tomorrow, at a place

acceptable for them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minister of Defense Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. (S)

I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such agreements on the matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should enable us not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that event, we would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American cooperation in other important areas. (S)

I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities.

Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that, when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats are translated into reality. Madam Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This is all I wanted to say. (S)

The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we

would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. (S)

Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what you have said to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. (S)

President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the agreement should be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions. (S)

The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on this, let me go through the points, and see if we have agreement. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)

The President: I would like to -- (U)

President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)

The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I might.
First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agree to do it, so I think they should meet there. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions. (U)

The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I will work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia in this united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in Bosnia, and I have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work through this so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I think it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this mission will succeed. (S)

Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and capacity to contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need you there. It is very important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to share with me? (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I will issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be fully carried into affect. (U)

The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing

you in
Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have
elected
such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner.
(U)

The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

4

~~SECRET~~ 5128

~~SECRET~~

Classified by:

Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify On: 7/7/09

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5128srb.doc

July 6, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: ANDREW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin,
June 14, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14
telephone
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

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RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ XXXX

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: XXXX
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/7/09

~~SECRET~~

6/13

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN

- Let me first congratulate you on Russia's national day yesterday. Russia has come a long way in seven years under your leadership -- and so has our relationship, including through some tough times. We can both be very proud of that, and I'm proud to work with you.
- I believe we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership. Our hard work together brought an end to the conflict in Kosovo. We kept our disagreements, serious as they were, from ruining everything, and we made the most of our cooperation and friendship.
- We must now work equally hard to ensure a lasting and just peace and that our militaries work well together on the ground.
- As Vice President Gore made clear to Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday, we have had some difficult moments in the last two days in our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo.
- We need to take charge of the situation -- both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together.
- There is one matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the use of the airport at Pristina. I hope you will give orders to General Zvarzin (zuh-VAR-ZIN) to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander on the basis of unity of command.

We expect Yeltsin will respond with the following points:

This situation arose because, until now, we didn't have an agreement on the modalities and conditions for the equitable participation of Russia in the peacekeeping operation.

As President, we should give instructions to find a solution as soon as possible to the problem -- and thus, to create the necessary conditions for the closest possible cooperation of our forces in the interest of peace in Kosovo.

We are counting on you to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation in this situation. This will allow us to erase any misunderstanding and to make sure the implementation of the peace is in strict accordance with the UN Security Council resolution.

- First, I understand we've agreed on the short-term proposal our generals have worked out to start to deploy forces together as soon as possible.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- This is an *interim* approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know it works; it's the fastest way to get Russian and American troops on the ground together now.
- Second, Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott have been working with Foreign Minister Ivanov on what I regard as some promising ideas on how we should use the next week to solve important, even urgent, outstanding challenges.
- These ideas and proposals, if promptly developed, could guarantee us a good meeting in Cologne one week from today.
- While Madeleine and Minister Ivanov should intensify their efforts, I think it would be useful to give some instructions to our Ministers of Defense as well.
- Let's have them meet urgently, in the coming days, to talk things over and make some concrete recommendations to us on how Russia and the U.S. can coordinate and cooperate in Kosovo and how we can resolve other organizational issues.
- With the right guidance from us, Boris, I think we can resolve these problems – which matter a lot to both of us – by the time we meet.
- At Cologne, I suggest we also issue a strong public statement on next steps on arms control and announce that our binational commission will resume its work under Vice President Gore and PM Stepashin in July.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander:

- Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can – and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too – and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
- Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made a number of creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable – and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
- At the same time, we must be careful about three things:
 - 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
 - 2) We must ensure unity of command;
 - 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
- We need to ask our Defense Ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

CLINTON ~~SECRET~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I commit ⁶⁻¹⁴⁻⁹⁹ to you
to ensure an
equitable & responsible
role for Russia
worthy of its interests
its contribution &
its prestige"

[WARNING: "joint *
command" — not
good.] P. This should
say "unified command
with equitable & responsible
role for Russia"

Helsinki, Butter

Ahtiskari has
agreed. ~~As~~ One
people ~~had~~ have
discussed.

Goal - let's
decided on 2nd
stage by time you &
I meet at weekend.

Next step: Get
Marshall Sergeyev &
Secretary Cohen to Helsinki
Wednesday to work out
long-term solution for time
for our meeting in Cologne

~~Sub~~ (BACKGROUND)
"Joint Command"
means "split
command," "Russian
sector," "dilution of
NAC political control."

(*) What Yeltsin
saying is
good -
but Zavarzin
must have
some instructions
today.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4540

Impasse at
~~Your presence~~ at airport
has prevented us from
taking action to protect others
and gives KLA an excuse
to act ~~independtly~~ independtly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Boris, let me summarize points I believe we agreed:

- ① There will be an interim deployment using the Bosnia model that will fold in the Russia contingent at the airport.
- ② The impasse at the airport will be resolved using this model, recognizing that Russia's troops at the airport will stay there. There will be no more deployments until we agree.
- ③ Our Defense Ministers will meet urgently, let's say in Helsinki, to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR.

Can we announce that we've agreed on this course of action?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT WAS SEEN

6-14-99

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH 6/14
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

- Boris, you and I agreed yesterday to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport, and report back to us on what they worked out.
- I was very disappointed and concerned to learn that your general said he was only there to listen and refused to work out a plan with the commander of KFOR, General Jackson. This is a serious situation which must be resolved.
- I was encouraged to hear from Al Gore that he and Stepashin had a good call a few hours ago on this subject. Stepashin told Gore that you have agreed that Bosnia rules will apply in Kosovo in the interim until you and I agree on a long-term arrangement, and that the arrangements for your forces in this interim period will be worked out with General Jackson. This is a good arrangement, but it is essential that we give our generals clear and decisive instructions to implement this today. Let's both do it as soon as we finish this call. Do you agree?
- Stepashin and Al also discussed the ^{in Helsinki} idea of Sec Cohen and Minister Sergeyev getting together to prepare for the meeting between you and I this weekend; they can make a joint proposal to us on the long-term arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. I think this is a good idea, but only if we have the airport issue and the interim arrangements in place.
- Once we have heard that your General in Pristina has reached agreement with General Jackson on the Bosnia model for the interim period, I will instruct Cohen to meet with Sergeyev.
- In the meantime, both PM Stepashin and FM Ivanov have assured us there will be no further deployments to Kosovo until you and I resolve this matter. I hope we can count on this.

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a success, we need to give instructions to our Ministers of Defense.

- Let's have them meet urgently to develop concrete recommendations to us on how we can cooperate together in Kosovo over the longer-term. Your people and mine have discussed Helsinki. I support that. You and I had a good meeting there. Let's have our defense ministers meet there.
- Our foreign ministers would follow-up. By Cologne, our teams could present to you and me a well defined proposal to review.
- Boris, if we can move on these fronts -- implementing the interim proposal to deploy our forces in the short-term, and agreeing to have our teams meet to prepare for our meeting -- we can get this issue under control and help make Cologne a success.

If Yeltsin pushes for a Russian sector/commander

- Boris, I think I understand your needs and interests. I'm going to do everything I can - and will make sure that Madeleine and Secretary Cohen do, too - and go as far as we possibly can in accommodating you.
- Strobe's team that was just in Moscow made some creative proposals on how we can ensure that Russia has an area of responsibility in Kosovo which is equitable - and that is worthy of Russia's role and interests.
- At the same time, we must be careful about four things:
 - 1) The operation must be militarily effective;
 - 2) We must ensure unity of command;
 - 3) We must not allow either the perception or the reality of a partition of Kosovo.
 - 4) Russia must be fully integrated into KFOR to minimize the possibility that the KLA will see the Russian troops as a target. We became aware of a KLA plot against Russian troops yesterday, which we were able to head off.
- We need to ask our defense ministers to develop these ideas this week and present us with solutions.

If Yeltsin links Track 1 and Track 2

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- There is a real urgency about getting the Russians already in Kosovo fully integrated into KFOR because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.
- Our people have agreed on an interim model that will get this problem fixed quickly. We're using a similar approach in Bosnia. So let's use it and make it work.
- You also have my commitment to move as quickly as possible on the longer-term command arrangements for Russian participation in KFOR. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
- But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

* If Yeltsin says the KLA is going to provoke Russian forces

- We learned of a plot against Russia. Boris, if Russian troops are not part of KFOR, the KLA will believe they came into Kosovo to protect Serb forces, and Russian troops will become a greater target.
- We've made clear that we would not tolerate any attacks on your forces, but this illustrates the importance of your forces coming fully into KFOR with its UN mandate.

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

- Boris, I hope at a minimum we can agree now to go ahead with the first track. Time is precious, and we need to show again that our troops can work side-by-side to protect the peace.
- The second track is more complicated, but let's instruct our generals to agree on the details on the basis of our conversation.
- If we can do these things, not only can we make the peace settlement work in Kosovo, we will have the basis for a real celebration when we meet in Cologne.

~~**If Boris links Track 1 to agreement on Track 2**~~

- There is a real urgency about Track 1 because we cannot allow a security vacuum to form that would jeopardize the peace.
- We know the interim model works. We're making it work in Bosnia. So let's use it.
- You also have my commitment to move as quickly as Russia can on Track 2. My bottom lines are effectiveness and unity of command and control.
- But let's not link these two tracks together, especially when we can move together now and get facts on the ground that show that we can work effectively side-by-side.

~~**If Boris suggest a one-week deadline on Track 2**~~

- I am committed to move as quickly as Russia as long as we stay focused on an effective force with unified command and control.

PHOTOCOPY
OF HANDWRITING

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel Ehrendreich, Roger Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport and report back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed -- (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this group, in the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula. (S)

The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the personnel of the Russian contingent. (S)

I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for the joint operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of clear-cut use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. However, in this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. (S)

And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me before the meeting in Cologne. (S)

In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at the latest the day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minister of Defense Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. (S)

I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such agreements on the matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should enable us not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that event, we would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American cooperation in other important areas. (S)

I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that, when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats are translated into reality. Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This is all I wanted to say. (S)

The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia,

and we told them we would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. (S)

Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what you have said to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. (S)

President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the agreement should be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions. (S)

The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on this, let me go through the points, and see if we have agreement. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)

The President: I would like to -- (U)

President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)

The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they should meet there. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions. (U)

The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I will work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia in this united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in Bosnia, and I have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work through this so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I think it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this mission will succeed. (S)

Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and capacity to contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need you there. It is very important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to share with me? (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I will issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be fully carried into effect. (U)

The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing you in Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have elected such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner. (U)

The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

W.H.

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy,
Matt Sibley, Joel Ehrendreich, Roger
Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
Oval Office

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