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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

MARK FOULON
Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs

JAMES LOCHER
Senior Civilian Official; Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Attached for your information is a memorandum of conversation from the March 26, 1993, meeting between Vice President Gore and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Please control this document closely and limit its distribution within your organization.

Leon S. Fuerth
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 015 NARA, Date 10/5/11
2011-0964-m

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON
April 14, 1993

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between Vice President Gore and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The Vice President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Reginald Bartholomew, Special Envoy to the
Vance-Owen Talks
Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
Jane Holl, National Security Council Staff
Frank Pandolfe, Military Aide to the
Vice President (notetaker)

Bosnia

Alija Izetbegovic, President
Haris Silajdzic, Foreign Minister
Mohamed Sacirbey, Ambassador to the United Nations
Translator

PLACE: Vice President's West Wing Office

TIME: 10:50-11:45 a.m.

DATE: March 26, 1993

Vice President Gore: Welcome. President Clinton understands and appreciates your courage and statesmanship. I know what a difficult and decisive act it was. Events will unfold differently due to your courageous action. The key now will be to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign. Every effort will be made to make that happen, including a tightening of sanctions to increase pressure on the Serbs. We have to get Serb agreement in order to undertake implementation. In other nations, support for sanctions and diplomatically isolating the Serbs is very, very strong. All the more so now that you have signed the agreement. This is a turning point, but there is much left to be done. I know it has been a terrible burden for you to conduct negotiations while your people need relief. Your courage is helping achieve that step.

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President Izetbegovic: Our people lost confidence in the European Community. We appreciate the American commitment to backing implementation of this agreement. We know you will do your best to implement the agreement. I don't believe that Karadzic will sign. We must consider what to do if they do not sign. They should not be given much time, which they will use to continue killing and conducting massive attacks in Eastern Bosnia. These forces are coming from Serbia. Our information says that 200 tanks, troops, and training came from Serbia last month. This was to launch a new offensive. The international community must decide what it will do about this. The situation in Russia will complicate things. No one can predict what will happen there.

Bosnia is a democratic country, a democratic state. Karadzic says Serbs cannot live with other, that they must live alone in each town and village.

Vice President Gore: Our first step will be to make every effort to get Serbia to sign the agreement. But you're right that we must imagine what will happen if they don't sign. Also what will happen if they do sign. If they don't sign, we will tighten sanctions and take steps to achieve the diplomatic isolation of Serbia.

Secretary Christopher: I also wish to thank you, mister President, for your courageous decision. It is not an empty diplomatic gesture. It registered with the Russians. We will press for passage of the No Fly Zone within one week. The No Fly Zone is important symbolically; it may also help somewhat on the ground. We hope this series of steps will pay off. If not, we'll see what other steps are required. We'll increase the pressure if Serbia doesn't sign. We will consult with our allies about lifting the arms embargo. We cannot act unilaterally on this issue, however. We will commence discussions if they don't sign soon.

President Izetbegovic: We would welcome a statement from you which supports our action. People back home have doubts. We have had bad experiences with past negotiations. People who are suffering are unsure that this signature is a step towards peace. But they trust the US; they do not trust the European Community. A general statement of what you will do would be helpful and appreciated.

Vice President Gore: Secretary Christopher has already released such a statement. I will make a statement that this is a step towards peace, as well. This was the right decision, the right step. I am convinced of that.

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: I have no doubt that American diplomacy helped us reach this agreement. I thank Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Bartholomew. It's up to the international community now. Our relations with Croatia are very important at this point. Many things in the field and otherwise

depend on our relations with Croatia. Your help in this issue is crucial. Croatian leaders have a way of backing away under pressure and then coming back later.

Ambassador Bartholomew: I agree that the Bosnian-Croat relationship is crucial and that we can help.

Vice President Gore: How?

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: We have had trouble with extreme nationalist Croatian groups in Bosnia. A direct reminder to Zagreb can help.

President Izetbegovic: Cooperations with Zagreb is vital. Other than Sarajevo, no airport in Bosnia is working. All communications comes through either Serbia or Croatia. They use this to give concessions to nationalist Croatians. This could lead to a wider conflict.

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: We are in a very desperate financial situation. We would like for Arab friends to contribute. They are reluctant to interfere in Europe unless invited by the White House. This would be a very concrete way to help us. Today in Bosnia there is no production, there is no income, yet people need to eat. Also, opening your embassy in Sarajevo would be very helpful, the EC would follow.

Ambassador Bartholomew: The security dimension is what he's describing here. These moves would have the impact described.

Secretary Christopher: What cities?

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: Sarajevo.

Ambassador Bartholomew: I've been through bombardments as bad as Sarajevo. There are ways to protect our people. It would be a very helpful symbol.

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: We would like to combine implementation of the agreement with the No Fly Zone; that would give it teeth.

Secretary Christopher: I didn't want to link the No Fly Zone with something else. That could cause delay. Would you still want it if it delays the No Fly Zone by a week?

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: We can wait.

Secretary Christopher: The delay might give the Serbs a chance to sign; to come to their senses.

Ambassador Bartholomew: I feel we should press for the No Fly Zone as soon as possible.

Secretary Christopher: I like the concept.

Vice President Gore: It is a very interesting concept.

President Izetbegovic: My obsession is Eastern Bosnia. Horrible things will follow the fall of towns there. 100,000 people will flee to Croatia; to try to escape. Aggression must be stopped while we wait for the Serbs to sign. Otherwise there will be the biggest human tragedy in Europe since the Second World War. The Bosnian Army cannot fight for months without help.

Ambassador Sacirbey: The arms embargo is the problem.

President Izetbegovic: Even a partial lifting of the embargo, perhaps ammunition, would be very helpful.

Vice President Gore: We are following a sequence. First try to convince the Serbs to sign the agreement. Once they sign, the US is committed to help implement the agreement. We can turn to lifting the arms embargo after we've made efforts to get the Serbs to sign.

Ambassador Bartholomew: We've already told our allies that we will look at lifting the embargo if the Serbs don't sign.

Ambassador Sacirbey: We're preoccupied with our survival. The next step is defining the principles underlying our constitution. If the Serbs sign, we'll wish for your strong endorsement of implementing democratic principles rather than accepting a purely political document.

Foreign Minister Silajdzic: We do not want totalitarianism or nationalism. We want democracy.

President Izetbegovic: We suffered tyranny under the other system, now we want democracy.

Secretary Christopher: What is your assessment of the situation at Sarajevo and at the Tulza airport?

President Izetbegovic: Sarajevo is very dangerous; they may split the city into two parts. Several days ago there was the worst shelling since the beginning of the war. Some of our officers and soldiers believe they will try to occupy the city. But to try to take the city it would be very difficult for them and us. They would have to fight house to house. Yesterday the situation was a bit more calm.

Use of the airfield at Tulza would be very helpful. Supplies could come to us. Use of the airfield would also be a valuable sign that things are being done. Yes, we can hold it. It is not now in direct danger.

At this point President Clinton entered the room and shook hands with President Izetbegovic, after which they departed together to the Oval Office.

Prepared By: F.C. Pandolfe
F.C. Pandolfe

Approved By: Leon Fuerth
Leon Fuerth

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 9, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia & Herzegovina on September 8, 1993

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and President Izetbegovic on September 8, 1993. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to Marc Grossman.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Directive, September 11, 2006
 By *cm* NARA, Date *10/5/11*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 10, 1993

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
September 8 Meeting with Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Izetbegovic (S)

Attached for eyes only of the Secretary of State is the
memorandum of conversation from the President's September 8
meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (S)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 10/5/11

2011-0964-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Charles Redman, Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia
Jenonne Walker, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Alija Izetbegovic, President
Ejup Ganic, Vice-President
Muhammed Sacirbey, Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Dr. Nedzib Sacirbey, Personal Representative to the President
Ivan Mistic, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN
Sabina Berberovic, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: September 8, 1993, 5:00-5:30pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Izetbegovic: (beginning translation indistinct). . . important that the U.S. be ready to participate in guaranteeing an agreement if we ask with an international force. Our people believe in the United States. Unfortunately our people do not trust the Europeans and we know you cannot act without them and that (Congressional?) support is a problem. But we hope we can count on the participation of the U.S. in implementing an agreement. ~~(S)~~

As to the agreement, during the last round we defined our minimum of minimums and we cannot give that up. The problem is, if this minimum of minimums is not accepted, what happens next. We have made major concessions in agreeing to the division of Bosnia into three republics. We hoped that after that, the others would give us a fair map. We thought that the areas of the Serb republic would be made up from Serb-majority territory. But the map shows that the Serb republic would include Serb-majority territory and Muslim-majority territory that had been subject to ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Serbs are trying to keep territory taken from Muslims, around the Drina River, which were 65-70% Muslim before they were ethnically cleansed and the people killed or driven out. ~~(S)~~

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This is unacceptable morally and politically. Morally because rewarding ethnic cleansing and genocide would set a dangerous precedent for the future; practically because people waiting to return to their homes -- half a million Bosnian Muslims now are scattered in Austria, Canada, Germany, even the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere, refugees waiting to go back -- they cannot return to their homes if the territory remains controlled by Serbs. This is why Geneva broke down. (S)

It would be useful if the U.S. in the meantime put pressure on Serbia on these issues and on the Croats on an exit to the Adriatic. This is our second demand. Bosnia-Herzegovina has an exit to the sea; it has been reduced year by year to 29 kilometers. We are asking for 10-14 kilometers. Without that, the Republic of Bosnia cannot function. So we need pressure on the Croats. (S)

The people negotiating with us who are responsible for the war crimes must be brought to justice. I am not making judgments. People are innocent until proven guilty; that is for the Courts to decide. But if they are guilty they should not be redeemed by accepting negotiations. This is very important. As important as it was after World War II to punish Nazi war criminals. It is very important to prevent further events of this sort because war crimes continue and many hope that because they are negotiating with us they will not be judged and punished. This is one reason we refused to negotiate at the same table with them. It must be clear that those responsible for war crimes will be punished, even if they are Bosnian Muslims. I do not doubt that the U.S. will support us in asking for this because American politics still has retained certain morals. (S)

I have discussed with the U.S. Secretary of State about protected zones. Sarajevo is one. It is still under siege. We would be very grateful if the U.S. would consider measures to stop the siege. I do not expect an answer, but please consider what could be done. One way would be for the Security Council to make decisions on how to implement Resolution 836. It was passed five months ago but nothing has been done. It is just a proclamation, a piece of paper, while Sarajevo remains under siege. The U.S. would do a lot to help if it could contribute to lifting the siege. I understand that the U.S. cannot do it alone but can you contribute to solving this? (S)

The President: As I told you early this year, I believe the U.S. should participate in helping keep the peace if you reach an agreement that is fair, do it willingly, and if you want us to do it. For me there are two conditions. It must be done by NATO rather than the UN because I never want to be in a position like before, when we wanted to lift the arms embargo and the Russians, British, and French objected. The British and French also are in NATO but the U.S. can lead NATO. Second, I cannot do it unless Congress will support it and provide the money. It was very important for you to say publicly that you want us to, because so many in Congress do not want us to. Those who never wanted us to do anything in Bosnia, and now those who supported lift and

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strike but because that was not possible now fear that no agreement will be enforceable, will bring peace. So what you said is very important. ~~(S)~~

As to territory, we believe you should have some access to the Adriatic and the largest possible territory. We have done what we could to push the Serbs and Croats. But I do not believe there will be any military intervention to secure more. So the most leverage we have is now, when they worry whether I will be able to persuade others if they resume fighting. They know that we have a slightly better position with NATO rather than with the UN in this. ~~(S)~~

But I am very worried about the winter because I never can be certain what the UK, France, and Russia will do. So I do not believe there will be any use of force from outside to change the situation at the negotiating table. So my strong recommendation is to get the best agreement you can, knowing that the U.S. will do what it can to push the Serbs and Croats. ~~(S)~~

As to war crimes, we support your proposal. ~~(S)~~

About airpower to lift the siege of Sarajevo. We will continue what we said, but you should remember that even under the NATO agreement our allies worry about their soldiers on the ground. I know we can trigger airpower if the Serbs resume what they were doing, but we are unlikely to be able to respond to what they are doing now. ~~(S)~~

This whole business is difficult for me. I never understood why they would not vote to lift the arms embargo. That was when John Major told me his government would fall. I thought that was just crazy. ~~(S)~~

But the best thing I can do for you and to be your friend is to tell you I have no reason to believe we can lift the arms embargo or offer you more on air strikes than NATO's present position. The best thing would be to get Congress to let me help implement an agreement. I will do all I can. I will be there for you.

~~(S)~~

(At this point, Ambassador Sacirbey gave the President a map showing the Owen-Stoltenberg proposals and additional territory wanted by the Bosnian government.) ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic (pointing to the map): these are the areas that have been ethnically cleansed. ~~(S)~~

President Izetbegovic: Areas in which the heaviest genocide has taken place. ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic: The problem is, if they do not accept our minimum of minimums, who will support us. This (again pointing to the map) is the minimum we can sell our people. We had hoped other Muslim areas would be put under the UN. But if they do not

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accept our minimum, and just continue to take more territory, someone has to tell them to stop the offensive. ~~(S)~~

Ambassador Sacirbey: In the East some Muslim enclaves would be completely isolated; economically and socially inviable. They would have to be welfare state. I do not know who would protect them. It is not just a matter of fairness to the Bosnians but also a problem of who would keep the peace and how. ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic: And if we sign, we would need to know that the international community will support and implement an agreement. Because we would have given up so much. We would be a tiny country between two more powerful ones. So our signature would have value only if the international community would implement the agreement because we would have given up our national and legal identity. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Christopher: You could sign but condition your signature on whether there would be implementation. ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic: The ethnic cleansing, introduced by Belgrade, is like fascism in 1939, because they also achieved most of the territory by ethnic cleansing. If the international community accepts it in Bosnia, it will spread everywhere. So this is an historic moment for the international community. Perhaps I am being undiplomatic. But everyone in Bosnia sees the U.S. as friendly. We identify with another multiethnic community. But we have few exchanges with you. To have the CIA or others just to give them information. Germany is close to Croatia, Russia to Serbia, the UK and France somewhat close to Serbia. We Bosnians are alone, and as a multiethnic country we want to cooperate with the U.S. in any way that would be useful to you. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Christopher: If there is an agreement and we help implement it, it would be our intent for U.S. forces to be primarily in the Muslim areas. So that would make us very close to you. ~~(S)~~

Mr. Lake: That has been the basis of NATO planning. ~~(S)~~

The President: And beyond military implementation, there will be a big rebuilding job to do and we want to be helpful. About Germany, it is the only European country that stood by me in trying to lift the arms embargo. While Kohl feels close to the Croatian people he trusts your leadership. So I think we can put together building blocks, not only military security but rebuilding. There is a feeling among many countries that what happened to you was wrong. ~~(S)~~

Ambassador Sacirbey: It is especially important for the U.S. to administer Sarajevo. It risks being divided. U.S. leadership in the city would help ensure that there will be no more Berlins in Europe. It would be a clear signal that there is a change. The people would feel there is a new peace. ~~(S)~~

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Mr. Lake: The French also feel strongly about Sarajevo and will wish to participate in some way but we can work out something to share in some way. We want to make sure they stay engaged in some way. ~~(S)~~

The President: I understand and think we can work something out. ~~(S)~~

Ambassador Sacirbey: The siege of Sarajevo has not been lifted. The Serbs have in fact tightened their grip. It is not so visible because they are not squeezing very hard yet but when winter comes if they squeeze just a little tighter. . . .so you must be very sensitive that it is not just a matter of shelling but cutting of the gas, electricity, not enough humanitarian supplies getting in can cause slow strangulation. ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic: They use the slow strangulation tactic to prolong our death and avoid NATO air strikes but the end result is the same. ~~(S)~~

President Izetbegovic: They are in all the mountains around Sarajevo. I insisted to Karadjic in Geneva that they withdraw and he said they would someday but not now. If we only had some munitions we could resolve the problem because our people are ready to fight. But we have a shortage of munitions and ammunition because all the roads are cut. We have resisted for 17 months and I do not know what will happen if our Army collapses. ~~(S)~~

Vice President Ganic: And we are asking just for one grenade or rocket for each Serbian tank. For rifles. Not to make advances but just to defend ourselves. We are unable to defend ourselves in the heart of Europe. ~~(S)~~

Milosevic has created greater Serbia through ethnic cleansing. Now they are blackmailing us on this. Milosevic is telling his opposition that he got the territory they wanted. They are suffering from sanctions but things will even out in the end and they will keep the territory. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Christopher: The unfortunate reality is that a reasonable settlement is your best hope. Even if you avoid strangulation, that is not a long-term solution. I have sent cables to the Serbs, Croats, all our NATO allies. We are doing all we can but the time is now. You may not be stronger in the future. When winter comes, I am afraid that your bargaining position will be less strong. All the other things we have been talking about are past wrongs, but the issue now is the negotiating table. ~~(S)~~

The President: We will see what we can do on the map. Maybe we can influence it a little more and we will try. But negotiations are your best hope. And I will do all I can to see that the Americans are where you want them in implementation. ~~(S)~~

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Ambassador Sacirbey: Within this Bosnian republic will be over half a million non-Muslims. So 50% of the population is expected to live on 29% of the territory, which has little agriculture and its industry and cities have been destroyed. The areas that may not be put in the hands of the Bosnian government should be taken from the Serbs who conducted ethnic cleansing. Refugees would have no confidence in going home if Serbs controlled the territory. I have discussed with Ambassador Redman international control of those territories so refugees can go back to their homes and the issue of sovereignty can be resolved later. ~~(S)~~

President Izetbegovic: It is important than refugees have the confidence to return home. ~~(S)~~

Thank you for your time Mr. President. (U)

The President: Thank you and good luck. (U)

(General handshakes and goodbyes)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on September 25, 1994

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and President Izetbegovic on September 25, 1994. We suggest that the Memorandum be provided to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal memo to State.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
September 25 Meeting with Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Izetbegovic (S)

Attached for the information of the Secretary of State is the
memorandum of conversation from the President's September 25
meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (S)


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Madeleine Albright, Ambassador to the UN
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

President Alija Izetbegovic
Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic
Defense Minister Jadranko Prlic
Sven Alkalaj, Ambassador to the U.S.
Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador to the UN (also serving as interpreter)
Dr. Begic, Political Adviser to the President

DATE, TIME, and PLACE: September 25, 1994, 4:35-5:10 p.m., Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York

The President: Congratulations on getting out of Sarajevo. I've been following events closely and have been very disturbed by developments -- especially by events in Sarajevo. I understand Prime Minister Silajdzic and Secretary Christopher spoke a couple of days ago about your idea for going to the Security Council for a postponement of lifting the arms embargo by four to six months. I believe it's a good idea. I'm not sure what the British, French and Russians will say. But I would like to discuss the details of how to do it and what else we can do to help. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: They have no reason for leaving because of the coming of weapons. But I must tell you that a major motive behind our proposal is the maintenance of UNPROFOR within the country. If they will not stay, then there is no reason to proceed with a delay measure. It seems to us that we should await their response before I express our support publicly. We would expect them to support the UN Security Council resolution. We are making a

concession to gain their acceptance so we would not be satisfied with opposition or even abstention. We need to get nine votes for the resolution. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Silajdzic: This is a very important issue. We must be very clear about terminology. This is not a postponement of lift, but only of the operational side. The embargo would technically be lifted, with the operational side pushed down the road. There should be a commitment by your allies to lift the embargo through a Security Council resolution passed two weeks after October 15. The embargo would be technically lifted, with the effective date delayed. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: We believe that the formal lifting of the arms embargo and the actual delivery of arms or the implementation of lift could be separated by four to six months. Just to make things clear: the arms embargo needs to be lifted today. But in fact, implementation can be six months off. This is our idea. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: Now that we've heard from President Izetbegovic, I will contact Hurd and Juppe promptly to work out an understanding with them. What President Izetbegovic has said today is consistent with what I discussed with Prime Minister Silajdzic on Friday. ~~(C)~~

The President: Can we get an answer from Hurd and Juppe today? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: Maybe by early tomorrow morning. ~~(C)~~

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke: We can definitely get a commitment that they will stay in UNPROFOR. It is less clear cut whether we can get a commitment to vote for a UN Security Council resolution whose words have not yet been worked out. At a minimum, the Secretary can get a commitment not to oppose. Then we'll have to move forward from there. On the key point -- will they stay -- the Secretary will be able to get this before close of business tomorrow, and we can then make it public after your speech. If we don't get this commitment, then what you have suggested falls apart. So a public commitment to stay is achievable; the other point is going to be harder. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: We will start working on the wording of the resolution promptly. The British and French will be relieved and view your proposal positively. I don't think they want to withdraw their forces -- they feel an

obligation to stay. But they see lifting o the arms embargo as providing them no choice in the matter. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: I would like to remind you of the other measures that the Contact Group committed to. There was the issue of enforcing and extending the exclusion zones, but in fact nothing has happened on this. Can we expect more active behavior by the United States on this?

~~(C)~~

There is also the question of Sarajevo. In fact, a point in NATO's February 9 decision seems to have been forgotten. Point four spoke of the need to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and declared that NATO was ready to use air strikes to prevent strangulation. Radical measures are needed to open the roads and free the city from the siege. In a few days people will be dying. The situation is the worst ever in Sarajevo. Of course, we have the basis for action in the NATO communiqué -- there was a consensus on this point. So we are just asking why NATO has not acted. ~~(C)~~

One of the ways the strangulation can be relieved would be to open an access road to Sarajevo. A five-kilometer demilitarized area could be established. We would be prepared to pull back our forces if the Serbs also pulled back. In fact, discussions have been going on for a long time about the demilitarization of the whole of Sarajevo, but these have gone slowly and without any results. Now we are focusing on the idea of a belt, five kilometers wide, to facilitate supplies. In this way, the situation can be eased. Of course, this is not a final solution or the salvation of Sarajevo, but it would allow some time for the situation to be improved. We need your support. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: When I contact the French and British foreign ministers regarding your plan regarding the arms embargo, I am going to ask for their commitment to enforce the exclusion zones -- which they haven't done so far. I will also be in touch with the Germans. The President just met with Boutros-Ghali and pressed him very hard for firmer enforcement. ~~(C)~~

The President: I told Boutros-Ghali that we are very upset about the situation, especially in Sarajevo. Every day our pilots are ready to go. It's terrible that we haven't been more aggressive so far. Boutros-Ghali said the French and British always stop him. I believe their troops are in more danger when we don't retaliate. So I agree entirely. Secretary Christopher will talk to the other foreign ministers. Boutros-Ghali said he won't object to being more

aggressive if we can bring the others around. In the next few days, we will exert a considerable effort. I will raise this with Yeltsin as well. So far the Russians have been less of a problem than the British and French. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: I would suggest that you propose to them the idea of the demilitarization of Sarajevo. They may be harder to convince on the use of force than on demilitarization. The Serbs will more easily accept an idea when we have to make concessions too. We are prepared to make concessions to get this demilitarized area. ~~(C)~~

The President: Okay. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Of course, when talking of exclusion zones and Sarajevo, it is essential that the safe areas be expanded in accordance with the Contact Group communiqué. That was point six of the Contact Group plan [Note: reference is to the July 30 Geneva Contact Group communiqué]. I believe I have mentioned this point in the context of asking for greater U.S. involvement. ~~(C)~~

There is also the question of sanctions against Serbia. We regard the last stage as a clear victory for Milosevic. He received two benefits: first he avoided tighter sanctions, which the Contact Group had indicated would be imposed if the Serbs rejected the map; in fact, Milosevic didn't get a tightening, but a lightening of sanctions. But that's over with. The question is whether you have real control over the border. If you do, then the concession may have been worthwhile. We would have voted for it if the border were truly closed. But if the border is, in fact, not closed, then it will be a disaster for Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the image of this country for the international community. I hope and expect you can firmly monitor the border. 100-plus people will not be enough to do the job. ~~(C)~~

The President: When are our people going to join the monitors? ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: Very soon. They should have been there already, but I think they will be there in a couple of days. ~~(C)~~

Ambassador Albright: The Security Council resolution has a series of break points that allow us to pull the plug on the whole operation. If there is any breach in the border closure, the suspension of sanctions can be ended within five days. The whole thing is subject to review every 30 days, and the suspension is in effect for only 90 days in

total. The United States worked hard to include these control mechanisms so that we would not have to trust Milosevic. We assumed you would want this. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: You should not allow any other easing of sanctions until Serbia recognizes the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and also Croatia. This will be the only real proof that Milosevic has changed, and that it's not just a tactic. I want to clearly appeal to you not to do more without recognition. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. We have supported the effort you have made with Croatia. They should have the same position. We will work with you on that. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Finally, I want you to know that we are trying to do everything we can to implement the Federation. You have provided some financial aid, and I want to thank you very much for that. In this context, I would like to propose that a Commission be established that would include one Bosniac, one Croat, one American and one German to help implement the Federation idea. ~~(C)~~

The President: What do you think of that, Chris? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: I think it has merit. We'll work on it. Filling out the Federation is very important. It needs content. If we can help, we would like to do that. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake: We want to help support the Federation especially at the local level. ~~(C)~~

The President: We'll work on the idea; give us some time. Regarding aid, we have come up with a total of 30 million dollars, including 10 million more for refugees. I hope we're doing all we can for your people. I'm very worried about the children, about the human dimension of the situation. ~~(C)~~

We will go to the British and French. We want to clear up the lift question. We will tell them that we need their forces there, but that if Sarajevo is destroyed, then their purpose for being there has been destroyed too. The political and psychological impact on the world would be devastating. We need to get them to take a more aggressive posture. We want to be sure that our aid and NATO's actions are doing the most to help your people. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: I couldn't travel from Sarajevo airport yesterday. I had to leave through the tunnel and go

over the mountains. The road I took is always under Serb fire. The airport is closed. The roads are closed. There is no gas, electricity or water. Things are the worst since the beginning of the war. The Serbs have decided to suffocate the city. Something needs to be done. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: Regarding the aid, what the President described is 10 million dollars more than when Prime Minister Silajdzic and I spoke on Friday. There is 10 million dollars from fiscal year 1994, and 30 million dollars in fiscal year 1995. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Silajdzic: Good. Let me mention one small detail with respect to Sarajevo. We can provide immediate help by putting in an electrical cable through the tunnel. This would run 20 or 30 kilometers, so that Sarajevo could get electricity from the outside. We will work to get you the details. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: Let us know. ~~(C)~~

The President: Please give us a proposal. Let's look at the situation in the worst possible light, if we do everything we have discussed: We pass the lift resolution, with four-to-six months until the embargo is lifted. Then we somehow make conditions better in Sarajevo in the short run either by the proposal you made for demilitarization or by the willingness of the UK and France to be stronger in enforcing the exclusion zones. Even then, we still have to assume the worst -- that the Serbs won't accept the Contact Group plan and that you will have to fight on. In those circumstances, we should think about an independent electrical system that will give you more control over the situation. So please identify what the international community needs to do to speed up the mechanics to guard against the day when we, God forbid might fail. I would think it would take six months to lay the cable. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Silajdzic: We could do it in two months. ~~(C)~~

The President: Give us a proposal. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: The journalists are waiting to hear about the meeting. What should we say we have agreed? ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: We can announce the 30 million dollars in additional aid. If you like, we can out forward your proposal regarding lifting the arms embargo with a

deferred date -- although I understand you would like to hear about the British and French attitude first.

President Izetbegovic: That's right. ~~(c)~~

Secretary Christopher: We will work on that between now and tomorrow. ~~(c)~~

The President: We can say we have discussed the conditions around Sarajevo, and that you made a suggestion that I've agreed to raise with the other Contact Group members, and that we will get back to you in 24 hours. ~~(c)~~

Secretary Christopher: We can say we are asking Boutros-Ghali and the British and French for firmer enforcement of the exclusion zones. ~~(c)~~

President Izetbegovic: I will say I suggested the demilitarization of a five-kilometer zone and that you supported the idea. ~~(c)~~

The President: Yes, anything you want to say on those lines. ~~(c)~~

Prime Minister Silajdzic: We can say that there will be no further suspension of sanctions unless Belgrade recognizes Bosnia and Croatia. ~~(c)~~

Anthony Lake: Let us first pursue that diplomatically with other Contact Group members. ~~(c)~~

The President: Yes, please wait. If you announce that, I'll spend the first 30 minutes of my next conversation with John Major explaining it. ~~(c)~~

Secretary Christopher: We're not thinking about any other sanctions relief in any case. ~~(c)~~

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke: I would add the President's strong statement of support for enforcing existing mandates. We have spent all of the last two weeks on NATO air strikes. We only got one. If we had our way, there would have been a strike every day. We are the Contact Group member that is trying the hardest. So you can mention this, plus the 30 million, plus your own positions. Tomorrow's story will be that there will be a lift resolution after October 15 per the President's letter to Senator Nunn, but with activation in the spring. ~~(c)~~

One last point, if I might, Mr. President. It is important that the U.S. public and Congress understand that the proposal for deferral originated with your government and is supported by ours. ~~(e)~~

President Izetbegovic: I think, going back, that we should say that we recommended to the U.S. that there be no further easing of sanctions unless Serbia recognizes Bosnia and Croatia. Can we also say that both sides recalled the fourth point in NATO's February 9 decision regarding air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo? ~~(c)~~

The President: I hope you will do that. We will have to have discussions with the UK and France, even regarding the nature of their UNPROFOR deployments in order to enforce the existing resolutions. Things have gotten absurd around Sarajevo, in the fact that there have not been several air strikes. The others have people there, but there has to be a solution that allows us to be more aggressive. We'll take this up with them. Your language is fine. ~~(c)~~

Ambassador Albright: You should also say that we will be watching the border very carefully and we will be sending people there. ~~(e)~~

The President: Yes, we want to send people there. ~~(e)~~

Anthony Lake: We have done a press release on the aid for the Federation. I would be careful about pinning things on the UK and France in public right now. Just say we are pressing for stronger enforcement. ~~(e)~~

The President: We want them to vote with us on the UN Security Council resolution, so don't hit them too hard today. ~~(e)~~

Ambassador Sacirbey: Can I raise another point regarding the training of Bosnian forces in the context of a lifting the arms embargo. ~~(c)~~

Secretary Christopher: That's down the road a bit. Let's not complicate the situation now. ~~(e)~~

The President: Thank you for coming. ~~(e)~~

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
Meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and President Tudjman of Croatia on
December 5, 1994

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and
President Izetbetgovic and President Tudjman be provided for the
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) level. (C)



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (h)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: [Signature] NARA, Date 10/5/11
2011-0964-m

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Tudjman of Croatia

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Sam Brown, U.S. Representative to CSCE
Victor Jackovich, Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Bosnia
Alija Izetbegovic, President
Irfan Ljubijankic, Foreign Minister
Muhamed Sacirbey, Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mahir Hadziakmetovic, Ambassador to CSCE

Croatia
Franjo Tudjman, President
Mato Granic, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Miomir Zuzul, Ambassador of Croatia to the UN at Geneva
Zeljko Matic, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser
Dr. Begic, Political Adviser to the President
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 5, 1994, 1:25 - 1:40PM
AND PLACE: Budapest, Hungary

The President: I am glad to see you. Thank you for coming to this meeting. I wanted to meet so that we could hear your views on the current situation. I asked to see you here together because the integrity of the Federation is very important in maintaining the support of the whole international community for

a just result. I wanted to assure you, President Izetbegovic, that the U.S. has not changed its policy. We are still opposed to any confederation between the Bosnia Serbs and Serbia. We are still ready for NATO to do what it is permitted to do by the United Nations. We still want to be as cooperative and helpful as we can be in bringing about a settlement. I would like to hear from you on your thinking about what is most important. How do you feel about UNPROFOR? Then I would like to hear President Tudjman's views as well. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: With regard to UNPROFOR, its mission has eroded so much that we are left without UNPROFOR and without weapons to defend ourselves. As you know, we had a choice between maintaining UNPROFOR and receiving weapons (through a lifting of the arms embargo). For the time being, we chose UNPROFOR, but its mission is being degraded. It would be helpful if UNPROFOR could be made more effective. We are looking for UNPROFOR to fulfill its mandate, and nothing more. The paralysis is something that we cannot understand -- first in the behavior of UNPROFOR, and subsequently in the behavior of NATO. The issue is UNPROFOR. We ask that this paralysis be lifted. If this were done, the situation would improve as a consequence. Of course, there would be increased risks for UNPROFOR, but these should be acceptable given the potential benefits. ~~(C)~~

With regard to the situation in Bosnia, we ask that the Serbs accept the Contact Group plan. There are two other ideas which are dependent on a cease-fire. First, a cease-fire throughout Bosnia for a limited period of time could be agreed upon under two conditions: an immediate cease-fire in the Bihac area; and the withdrawal from the Bihac area of the so-called Krajina Serbs. These forces have come to our country from the UN Protected Areas, which are supposed to be demilitarized. Second, if there is a cease-fire in fact, this will normalize the humanitarian aid situation in Bosnia. So far, however, the Serbs have rejected a cease-fire. I just met with British Foreign Secretary Hurd who had met the previous evening with Serbian President Milosevic. Hurd said Milosevic supports these ideas but claimed that he didn't have enough influence on Karadzic. When we talk about Milosevic's influence, it is important that there be no further easing of sanctions, since the only way to get him to act positively is through sanctions. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: We have signed an agreement with the Knin Serbs as the second step toward reintegration of the UNPAs. We will now have to see whether this agreement is implemented. If the Knin Serbs fail to implement it, we will not extend UNPROFOR's mandate. Milosevic has the Knin Serbs in his hands. As for the Bosnian Serbs, he does not quite have Karadzic in his hands, but military supplies are still coming into Bosnia from

Serbia. We would therefore appreciate that you not lift sanctions until we see practical achievements, and not just paper agreements, leading to the solution of the occupied areas and to a political solution in Bosnia. ~~(C)~~

The priority issue is the conflict in Bosnia, but here too the key rests in Serb hands. If a firmer line is taken, the Serbs will be forced to accept the Contact Group plan. If the Contact Group took more determined action, such as convening a summit, the West could present a united front to show that Bosnia-Herzegovina exists for the three peoples who live there. This would enable you to avoid a conflict between the West and Russia and also avoid the involvement of Islamic countries, which would have undesirable consequences in terms of increased loss of life and in other ways. Russia obviously wants to preserve its influence in Europe. We should consider this as not a Muslim-Croat, Muslim-Serb, or Croat-Serb problem, but as one of civilization. Any solution involving only UNPROFOR will not work. The Contact Group plan must be carried out to the end and NATO engaged to enforce a settlement. UNPROFOR, with the countries that now form it, has no prospect of success. Therefore, you need to push for a settlement and engage NATO. I would favor increased involvement of NATO at the expense of reducing the number of UNPROFOR troops. ~~(C)~~

The President: President Izetbegovic, you are for a three-month country-wide cease-fire? ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Yes, on the condition that there is a cease-fire in Bihac and withdrawal of the forces of Krajina Serb leader Martic. ~~(C)~~

The President: During the three months, we will do all we can to support the Contact Group plan. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: You need to have contacts with the Serbs in the meantime. President Milosevic believes that time is working in his favor. He wants more time to convince Karadzic to accept. But we feel that the Russian presence is behind the latest dangerous Serb actions. Some in the West have concluded that the Russian threat has disappeared, but we in Bosnia still feel it, especially through the presence of surface-to-air missiles. ~~(C)~~

The President: We heard a little of that here today in Budapest. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's July 20
Conversation with Bosnian President Izetbegovic

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President Izetbegovic on July 20, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *Doh* Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to State
- Tab A Memcon with President Izetbegovic


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 21, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with
President Izetbegovic (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and
President Izetbegovic is provided for the information of the
Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels
and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may
also be sent to our embassy in Bosnia for the Chargé only. (C)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with President Izetbegovic

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with Bosnian President Izetbegovic

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Bosnian President Izetbegovic

NOTETAKERS: Kenneth Baldwin, Katherine O'Loughlin, John Schmidt and Matt Miller

DATE, TIME July 20, 1995, 1:47 p.m. - 2:02 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello? (U)

President Izetbegovic: Hello, Mr. President. Thank you for calling, and thank you for your time. I have a lady with me who will help me continue in my language if that is all right with you. (U)

President Clinton: Yes, that is fine with me. (U)

President Izetbegovic: Mr. Clinton, the situation in Bosnia is a very difficult one because of the latest attacks on the safe areas, especially in Zepa. Right now in Zepa 6,000 women and children are in grave danger. We have offered direct negotiations to the Serbs to save the women and children, but we do not have an answer from them and now have asked the UN to mediate. We have also offered that the civilian population, that the women and children, should leave Zepa. However, without your pressure and help of the U.S. and the international community, we will not be able to do that. Therefore, we ask that you see what can be done for these people, bearing in mind the recent tragedy that occurred in Srebrenica. According to UNPROFOR, at least 3,000 people have been killed in the past several days. We fear that the figure is bigger. ~~(C)~~

We feel the U.S. should now lead the initiative to save the safe areas, especially those people in Zepa. Otherwise, there will be a growing feeling both in Europe and Bosnia of a lack of American leadership that will further damage the situation. So I plead to you, in the interests of the U.S. and the world, that the U.S. be more active in resolving this situation. Please do not give up

on the use of force in protecting these safe areas and the civilians. I refer to more robust airstrikes against the attackers who have shown inhumanity in Srebrenica. Please do not allow the UN to paralyze us by continuing to use the dual key. Also, when talking of relations with Serbia, please do not give up too cheaply on the lifting of sanctions. We are not interested in just any recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are being offered recognition of a phantom Bosnia -- a Bosnia that does not exist. I fear that the Contact Group states are ready to pay a very cheap price for such recognition. Mr. President, the sanctions are the only weapon we can use against Serbia. If we give them up, we will have none. And in the end, I would like to convince you that we are devoted to the principle of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. ~~(C)~~

Thank you very much for calling me, Mr. President. I have another favor to ask -- if you could pass on my views to the meeting in London tomorrow and do all you can to influence the participants. ~~(C)~~

President Clinton: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me say that we will do what we can for the people of Zepa as you have asked. We certainly will not bargain away the sanctions against Milosevic and Serbia cheaply, and I will not allow the lifting of the embargo for weak recognition. Most importantly, I have told our allies, and we will say the same thing in London, that the UN operation cannot continue unless we are prepared to use strong air power -- by that I mean disproportionate air strikes without the dual key, so that the Serbs know we mean business. I understand why the UN forces fear being taken hostage, but as a practical matter, it seems to me that often UNPROFOR troops, while delivering humanitarian aid, also help the Serbs in their larger designs because of their fear of being taken hostage, which keeps us from using air power for the larger objectives. ~~(C)~~

Now as you know, the French believe it is a mistake just to use stronger air power. They want us to airlift an additional 1,000 soldiers into Goradze. The problem is that 1,000 more soldiers may not make a difference in helping you hold the town. But if the Serbs know the damage we can do with strong airstrikes, that might stop them, just as our threat did last February when we first established the safe areas and collection points, but which the UN has since kept from working. ~~(C)~~

As you know, I would hate to see the UN mission collapse, but if it's going to stay, it must be more effective. That is where we are and what we're working for. It's all I'm working on right now. I am glad we had a chance to talk. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to point out again the importance of air power against the violations of the safe areas established by the UN. The relative peace which we had last year, for about six months in Sarajevo, is proof we can maintain some kind of peace under a threat of airstrikes. We in Bosnia are interested in peace, not in war, and, therefore, we are interested in a political settlement. We have accepted the Contact Group plan and before that the Vance/Owen plan. I assure you we want peace. This is our option; not war. ~~(c)~~

President Clinton: Thank you. Let me say you did accept the Contact Group and Vance-Owen plan, and if I can prevail in the next few days with the allies and get a serious air threat up there, I think we can stabilize the situation. But we still need serious peace negotiations. This matter has to be settled. Thank you very much. ~~(c)~~

President Izetbegovic: Thank you, Mr. President. Good bye. (U)

President Clinton: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

October 27, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR *Anthony Calce* ~~ANDREW D. SENS~~

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman on October 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be field for the record.

Approve *AV* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


7820

October 30, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
Meeting with Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (C)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)(g)
Declassify On: 10/27/03

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: NARA, Date 10/5/11

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

2011-0914-M

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Bosnia-Herzegovina
President Alija Izetbegovic
Muhammed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister
Nedzib Sacirbey, Ambassador-at-large
Mr. Ivan Misic, Ambassador to the UN
Mr. Bakir Sadovic, President's Private Secretary
Mr. Amela Sapcanin, Second Secretary

Croatia
President Franjo Tudjman
Mate Granic, Deputy Foreign Minister
Miomir Zuzul, Special Envoy
Petar Sarcevic, Ambassador to the U.S.
Zeljko Matic

DATE, TIME: October 24, 1995 1:35 - 2:15PM
AND PLACE: Waldorf Astoria Hotel
New York, New York

The President: First, let me say how pleased I am to have all of you together in one room, especially the two presidents. Let me add how profoundly appreciative I am that you are going to Dayton in a few days to take part in the proximity talks. We need to do everything we can to make these talks a success. It is important not to take any positions or say anything that would short-

circuit the talks before they even begin. We are committed to an honorable resolution that will preserve the integrity of Bosnia, which would protect the rights of all of its citizens, and which would support the Federation. I want to do everything I can to ensure success, but I urge you to create the proper atmosphere that will produce a success in Dayton. ~~(C)~~

We have seen things in the last few years that we never expected to see: Israel and the PLO sitting down after 30 years of fighting; the IRA laying down its arms, at least for a year, after 25 years of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But what the world wants more than anything else is for a resolution of the war in Bosnia. Only you can provide it, and President Milosevic has responsibilities as well. If an agreement is made, I will ensure that a strong, disciplined and coordinated force is there to implement it. The United States will play a major role, and we will also work aggressively to rebuild war-torn areas and to open up economic opportunities for both your countries. The Europeans will take the lead on the economic side, but we will do our share and then some. So we are at a hopeful, positive moment, yet we are also aware of the dire consequences if we fail. ~~(C)~~

The only other statement that I wanted to make is that you did a great thing when you created the Federation. It has changed the military situation. The significant strengthening of the Croatian and Bosnian armies has helped make a decent peace possible. Without that I am not sure that the NATO bombing or Dick Holbrooke's diplomacy would have worked; the differences might have still been too great. I have nothing but admiration, but you both must work hard to make the Federation a reality on the ground. There are still many tensions and problems, and we should not let the Serbs or any other adversaries exploit your differences. Only you can help. You need to strengthen the Federation in the lives, minds and hearts of your people. They are the ones who need to make it work. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Thank you for receiving us. We have great expectations for the peace negotiations. We are entering the talks with the best of will. Our people want peace. The war has gone on for 44 months, which is much too long. You should believe in our sincerity; we want peace. We are afraid that the position of the Serb side is still very far from ours in the negotiations. I could summarize by saying that we want to preserve an integral Bosnia and we want to discuss common institutions and functions. We ask for your support in accomplishing this during the negotiations. The American side has made very positive statements and now we need to convince the Serbs to accept. In sum, the question of constitutional principles is more important for us than the map. I feel that it

is essential that we have a constitutional solution that preserves Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without this, we cannot have peace. ~~(C)~~

Regarding the Federation, all the parties present here support the Federation in words. No one is against it, but on the ground, the process of implementation has not taken place as it should have. We cannot even speak of freedom of movement in some areas. Mostar is a special problem. The return of refugees is another. Of course the Croatian side has its own view of these problems and President Tudjman will give you his perspective. We are asking for total freedom of movement. We want refugees to be able to return, especially to areas that have recently been freed, where there are empty houses. But they are being prevented from returning. The case in point is Jajce, a city that was half and half, Croatian and Muslim, before the war. Jajce was liberated by the Croatian side and the Croatian population has returned, but the Bosniac people have not been permitted to come back. This is absurd. Fifteen to twenty days ago we supervised the return of Croatian people to their land in the town of Bugojno. We have received a positive response from the Croatian side in Bugojno, but when the Bosniac people want to return, the Croatian side has rejected this right. ~~(C)~~

Yesterday and today, we had talks in Madrid among the Friends of the Federation. The U.S. Representative proposed two papers regarding Mostar and the Federation as a whole. I am ready to sign them regardless of what the papers say, because they were proposed by a third party. The EU has also written a paper and I am prepared to sign that. I hope the Croatian side will also accept these papers. The EU is prepared to do positive things for both sides and it could help solve all of our problems very quickly. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: Thank you Mr. President for seeing us and thank you for the role that the U.S. and you personally have played in order to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. I also want to thank Richard Holbrooke for his enormous efforts, including his physical efforts, that have made the meeting in Ohio possible. I would like to explain not only what we hope to achieve but what is necessary for peace. Ohio should not just be a step forward, but a solution to the conflict. I certainly welcome the idea of having the representatives of the three countries meeting until peace is achieved. But if the talks fail, taking into account the experience of this conflict and of earlier history, I would suggest that the United States and the international community impose a peace on those who are not willing to accept it. I think that the idea of involving NATO and U.S. forces can be achieved. Once we have a real agreement, I don't think anyone can oppose NATO's role in enforcing it.

This would represent a way out of the problem, a way out of a catastrophic situation, and NATO would be necessary to creating a new international order in our part of the world. ~~(C)~~

Mr. President I have told your representatives a number of times that along with the Bosnian issue, the agenda in Ohio also needs to address the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-occupied area of Croatia. Although Croatian public opinion is bitter over the delay in solving this issue -- and there are still 125,000 displaced persons from Eastern Slavonia -- I have made a commitment not to interfere with the peace process, and not to take any other step while the peace talks are underway and before the UNCRO mandate expires. It is with pleasure that I would like to praise the involvement of the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia in the negotiations between the government of Croatia and the local Serbs. There was a meeting yesterday and talks will continue later in the week. These talks provide grounds for optimism that a peaceful solution can be achieved. But if these talks fail, then the issue of Eastern Slavonia should be included in the Ohio talks. ~~(C)~~

As for the Federation, let me remind everyone of your role and that of your government in establishing the Federation. We can be satisfied with the results so far. We have stopped the hostilities to a degree greater than one sees in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. I don't want to go into the details that President Izetbegovic has raised regarding problems in implementing the Federation Agreements. But I believe that first and foremost, this is a problem for the Muslim and Croat leaders within Bosnia. In this regard, it is surprising that there are no Bosnian Croat representatives here. Croatia, for strategic reasons and as a friend of Europe and the United States, will do everything to implement the Federation in deeds as well as in words. ~~(C)~~

The President: I appreciate what you have said about Eastern Slavonia. I agree that the issue should be resolved in the peace talks. It is very important that you have agreed to exercise restraint while the peace talks are taking place. With respect to the disputes within the Federation and relations between the Bosnians and the Bosnian Croats, this just illustrates my point. We need more personal contacts between your representatives in order to make the Federation work on the ground. Getting a settlement will depend on the two of you having trust. Strength lies in genuine unity. Please do all you can to achieve a peace settlement. We cannot resolve all the specific issues here, but I want a good and honorable agreement. To get that, you two will have to be moving together, and you should do everything you can to produce a success. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: It is very important that this meeting is taking place. It would be very desirable for the two Presidents to make the progress you mentioned regarding the Federation. The United States will have a role, through our arbitration and mediation, but the parties themselves must make the Federation work. ~~(C)~~

The President's time is limited and I know he wants to meet with the two presidents alone. ~~(C)~~

Richard Holbrooke: Let me make a few points in brief. We don't know how long the Dayton talks will last. We understand that President Tudjman will go back to Zagreb after a few days, but leaving a team led by Foreign Minister Granic with full authority to make decisions. Otherwise we are sticking with our original program. We will hopefully eliminate the sparring and daily contact with the press. Our delegation will be in daily contact with Secretary Christopher and Tony Lake. We are looking forward to working as a team. On to Dayton! ~~(C)~~

(At this point the President pulled Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic aside for a private conversation)

The President: I had a good conversation with President Yeltsin about Bosnia at Hyde Park. Yeltsin can help a little with the Serbs. Milosevic believes that there are too many independent contacts between the Russians and the Bosnian Serbs. We also want to show that if we achieve an agreement, Russia won't mess it up in a destructive way. Getting Russia more involved in the peace process could do a lot to smooth the way toward implementation. This is why Yeltsin had the idea that all three Balkan Presidents would go to Russia for a brief meeting -- little more than a photo opportunity -- just before the proximity talks in Dayton. ~~(C)~~

Now I know that you, President Tudjman, need to return to Zagreb because of your elections; and that you, President Izetbegovic had intended to stay in the United States up until the start of the Ohio talks. But if we proceeded as planned, with no meeting in Moscow before the Dayton talks, then it would be advisable to go to Moscow at some point before the first week of December. If we had an agreement at that time, it would not be a problem, it would largely be a formality. But if the proximity talks had adjourned without an agreement -- something which we hope will not happen -- a trip to Moscow could be more complicated. (C)

President Izetbegovic: Does President Yeltsin insist that we come before the Dayton talks? ~~(C)~~

The President: No. But he does have a political need for a visit at some point before the Duma elections. Let me add that I had a very good talk with Yeltsin. He has great respect for the two of you and believes that Russia has not done enough to pressure Milosevic. But he is also under pressure at home over the NATO issue and because of your recent gains on the battlefield. To help him strengthen his political base and make sure his opponents don't interfere with the peace process and with implementation, Yeltsin proposes to hold this meeting in Moscow. He is very supportive of the peace process. ~~(C)~~

Here is what we need. If the three Presidents could go to Moscow for just three hours before Dayton, the downside would be that the first pictures of the peace process would be coming from Russia. But nothing substantive could be discussed in such a short time and the Russians could not interfere with what happens afterwards. In short, we don't think anything bad could happen and the Russian people could see that Yeltsin is part of the peace process. In sum, I think it is safer to go now, even though I know it is hard on you, President Tudjman, and much harder on you, President Izetbegovic. For President Izetbegovic, we could give you a nice military plane that could take you to Moscow and then directly to Ohio. There could be a doctor, and the plane would not need to refuel or to make any other stops. Given the risks of doing it later, I think it would be best to get the Moscow visit over with. If it is too politically difficult for you, we can put it off until a later date. But if we do not go before the Duma elections -- that is, before the first week of December -- we could be inviting the Russians to screw up the peace process or the implementation of a settlement. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: I agree with you that it would be better to go to Moscow before Dayton. It could help influence the Serb side and encourage the Russians to be more constructive. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Should we leave on the 30th, given the Croatian elections? ~~(C)~~

The President: We might need to start the Dayton talks on November 1 or 2. Richard Holbrooke has a lot of credibility and can explain a short delay. We would say that we wanted to have Yeltsin tell the Serbs to make peace. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: That is the only reason for the Moscow meeting. ~~(C)~~

The President: It is for that reason and also to ensure that the Russians do not get into our way on implementation. Let me repeat that Yeltsin was very honest with me. We have a good

relationship. But there are bad guys in Russia who want us to get into a fight with the Serbs. We don't want those forces to win the Duma elections on December 17. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: Yes, recently Zhirinovskiy was in Belgrade. He was campaigning against peace and for the defense of the Orthodox world. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: When are the Duma elections? ~~(C)~~

The President: December 17. Doing the Moscow meeting after December 4 will be too late, because its political purposes would be too obvious. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: It is possible for me to go to Moscow on the 30th. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: The 31st would be better for me. ~~(C)~~

The President: This would mean that you would arrive in Dayton late on the 31st or November 1st. We will fly you there so that there are no stops for refueling. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic: Okay. ~~(C)~~

The President: The faster we can do it, the better. ~~(C)~~

(The President then asked Richard Holbrooke to join the discussion)

Richard Holbrooke: We need to understand that this meeting in Moscow is not a Contact Group meeting. The U.S. representative will be Ambassador Pickering. Any other representation would turn it into a negotiation session. Secondly, there will be no joint declaration or joint statement. The Russians may make a unilateral statement of 2 or 3 sentences, but this would not be subject to any protracted negotiations. ~~(C)~~

The President: We don't need a declaration because the purpose of the meeting is to enable Yeltsin to send a signal to the Serbs and for Russia to be seen to be involved in the process. ~~(C)~~

Richard Holbrooke: The Moscow meeting will significantly improve Russian support both for the Dayton talks and for the implementation force. The only thing is how to set things in motion. I will call Milosevic. If he says no, then it's a new ball game. If he says yes, then we will proceed with a Moscow meeting on October 31. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


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December 29, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. MARISA R. LINO
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation from the Quadrilateral Meeting and the President's Pull-Aside Meetings with President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia, President Alija Izetbegovic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia

The attached Memoranda of Conversation from the December 14, 1995 Quadrilateral Meeting and the pull-aside meetings with President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia, President Alija Izetbegovic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia are provided for the information of the Secretary of State. They must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level.



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Quadrilateral Meeting
- Tab B Pull-aside with President Tudjman
- Tab C Pull-aside with President Izetbegovic
- Tab D Pull-aside with President Milosevic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 12/28/05

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By MI NARA, Date 10/5/04

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation from the Quadrilateral Meeting and the President's Pull-Aside Meetings with President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia, President Alija Izetbegovic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia

Attached at Tabs A through D are the Memoranda of Conversation from the December 14, 1995 Quadrilateral Meeting and the President's Pull-Aside Meetings with President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia, President Alija Izetbegovic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memoranda of Conversation of the meetings to the Department of State.

That the attached Memoranda of Conversation of the meetings be filed for the record.

Approve AVS Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Quadrilateral Meeting
- Tab B Pull-aside with President Tudjman
- Tab C Pull-aside with President Izetbegovic
- Tab D Pull-aside with President Milosevic

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *MS* *Added, date 10/5/11*

TAB A

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Quadrilateral Meeting with Presidents Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Samuel R. Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia
Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Slobodan Milosevic. President of Serbia

DATE, TIME December 14, 1995, 9:20-9:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's Residence, Paris, France

The President: Welcome. You have all taken significant risks in getting to today's peace agreement, and there are serious risks still ahead. We are prepared to share those risks, not only in our military involvement, but in doing our part in the reconstruction effort. I would like to hear your views, but first let me make a few points. ~~(C)~~

First, it is important that we stay with this agreement. There can be flexibility in implementation, but we should not change the terms of the Dayton agreement. Genuine freedom of movement needs to be guaranteed as soon as possible. The elections need to be carried out. The removal of all foreign forces is very important. It is important that all of you believe that IFOR is doing the job that you agreed it should do in an evenhanded way. Let me say to each of you personally that I have great personal

confidence in General Joulwan and Admiral Smith. They are both very good men. But if any of you believes that they are not doing their job in an evenhanded way, let me know directly. The implementation force will make the agreement you created at Dayton a reality. Our troops are trained and ready to do just that. ~~(C)~~

Second, I want to stress how important I regard the letter that you wrote to me expressing your commitment to ensure the safety of U.S. and Allied troops. This letter helped greatly with the American people. Other things that are also important to me and to the American people include: the right of refugees to return; the protection of the human rights of every ethnic group, wherever they live; and the ability of the work of the War Crimes Tribunal to go forward and be respected. I also believe that any step that you can take to symbolize the benefits of peace would be very important. I encourage you to move toward mutual recognition and to consider visiting one another's capitals. Symbolic actions can have a major impact on your own people and the rest of the world. ~~(C)~~

What you have done in reaching this peace agreement is very important; it truly matters to people throughout the world. We will do all we can to make it succeed. You need to work in an open atmosphere in order to increase mutual trust. The United States will be true to its word -- to each and all of you. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: The strongest guarantee of success is the fact that all the people are for peace. The Serbs, Muslims and Croats -- or at least a big majority -- all want peace. That is why I'm an optimist. No one can say there won't be any problems. There is a rough road ahead, but there is no doubt in my mind that success is guaranteed. The main key to success is the evenhanded implementation of the agreement. ~~(C)~~

The President: One thing that all of you should think about, in addition to reconstruction, is how to find ways to demonstrate to the people who live in the region and throughout the world that ordinary people want peace. The media don't do that. They paid great attention when people were dying, when ordinary people were suffering. But since you agreed to a ceasefire and to the peace agreement, the only publicity is focused on the points of trouble. You need to find ways to show the world and the people inside Bosnia that the majority of the population wants peace. A big problem that we had with members of Congress is the fact that, from the minute the fighting stopped, they have been focusing only on the bad things. There will always be problems, but we need to do a better job in highlighting the good news. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: You can be sure, Mr. President, that we will do everything necessary for the implementation of the peace agreement. I would like to stress one point that is of great importance: implementation of the settlement in Eastern Slavonia. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. I want to discuss that with you. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: The common people in Bosnia want peace. I'm not sure about some groups, however. We expect that President Milosevic will calm those groups. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: With your help. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: We will cooperate in this regard. The proof that the people want peace is that the ceasefire has been maintained without any serious incidents, and the small incidents have been very rare. People are tired of war. It is very important that all the parts of the peace agreement be implemented, especially those on human rights and the right of refugees to return. Perhaps the most important provisions of all are those concerning elections. This is a problem for the international community -- for international organizations, the OSCE. Help on elections is as important as your troops, since it is the prerequisite to removing those who created the hatred from power, and thereby creating an opportunity for Bosnia and the region to achieve a better future. Let me assure you that your troops are welcome in Bosnia. I believe they will have no problems. ~~(C)~~

The President: The elections are important not only to eliminating those who may not run for office from political life (as you agreed at Dayton), but to show every ethnic group that they can be represented, that their voices will be heard. I will emphasize the elections when I speak to the conference this morning. We will do all we can to make sure that the agreement you designed can work. One of the missions of IFOR is to create a secure environment so that the elections can be held. We want the IFOR mission to be terminated in an appropriate way. We can't do that unless free elections are a fact. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: After the first elections, I'm convinced that we will be able to define the situation as normal. Elections will be a turning point. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: It is important that the elections be held in normal conditions -- that is, terror must have been removed, and most people must have been returned to their homes. Without such conditions, in areas where radical ethnic cleansing occurred and terror now rules, there will not be a possibility of

free and fair elections. So we must first create the conditions for elections before the elections can take place. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: It is also important that all three constituent peoples be equal during and after the elections. This is important for Bosnia's future peace. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: All three Presidents worked hard to maximize the chances for successful elections, in terms of the allocation of offices and provisions for voting. The main thing is to implement the terms you so carefully worked out in Dayton. Now I suggest that the President meet for a few minutes individually with each leader. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me make one more comment. The confidence you have expressed in this conversation needs to be communicated to the people on the ground. You can change the psychology of the situation. I was just in Northern Ireland, where they fought each other for 25 years. Now we have had over 15 months without fighting. It is unthinkable for most people that they could go back. With the growth in confidence, the whole situation has changed. In the face of skepticism about the peace in Bosnia, you need to voice confidence in your public statements. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

TAB B

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Pull-Aside Meeting with President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Croatia
Franjo Tudjman, President
Mate Granic, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gojko Susak, Minister of Defense
Ambassador Miomir Zuzul, Special Envoy
Other Advisors

DATE, TIME December 14, 1995, 9:45-9:55 a.m.
AND PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's Residence, Paris, France

The President: I know how important implementation of the Eastern Slavonia settlement is for you. Let me say that if you hadn't shown restraint, the whole peace agreement would not have happened. We want to help on Eastern Slavonia. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: Mr. President, the report by Boutros-Ghali is terrible. He is playing games in proposing 9300-11,000 troops and stretching implementation over six months. It is important that you have appointed a retired General as civilian administrator. He can go ahead and begin the process now. ~~(C)~~

The President: He's a good man. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: You should try to get the Nordics to join the Belgian forces. ~~(C)~~

Richard Holbrooke: We agree that Boutros-Ghali's troop numbers are crazy. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: And six months is too long. ~~(C)~~

The President: I will work on this today. I will try to speak with Boutros-Ghali and get him to move. We can't wait. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: If new troops are needed, the Nordic battalion can be redeployed to Eastern Slavonia from Tuzla now that U.S. forces have arrived. That would only take a couple of days. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: We also wanted to exchange views with you on the importance that we and our Congress attach to the Federation. ~~(C)~~

The President: We won a big vote in the Senate yesterday. We managed to get a group of Republicans to vote with me. Many in Congress are saying that they are worried that the Federation will break up. I ask you to make sure that the Croats in the Federation work hard to strengthen the Federation. We will work to ensure that they are treated fairly. ~~(C)~~

President Tudjman: I am sure the Croats will do all they can to make the Federation work. You need to convince the Muslim leadership. For example, there need to be more Croats representing the Federation abroad. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

TAB C

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Pull-Aside Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Alija Izetbegovic, President
Kresimir Zubak, President of the Federation
Muhamed Sacirbey, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hasan Muratovic, Minister for Relations with the UN
Other Advisors

DATE, TIME December 14, 1995, 9:55-10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's Residence, Paris, France

The President: You are absolutely right about the importance of the elections. They are an important measure of success for us as well. We can't leave honorably if the elections aren't done right. We will do all we can. I will emphasize the importance of the elections with the Europeans today. I will also announce some reconstruction funds. ~~(C)~~

One of the greatest concerns we faced in seeking Congressional support, and an issue that we have raised with you before, is the safety of our troops in the event the Mujahedin do not leave and if you do not end your military and operational intelligence cooperation with Iran. Our people are vulnerable. If any action were taken by these forces against our troops, it could shatter the whole operation. It could jeopardize our ability to equip and train your forces. As you know, I told the Congress that we will equip and train your forces -- this is something we must do

or else there will not be a lasting peace. I am strongly committed to this. But if we were to lose a couple of soldiers to forces connected to Iran, it could wreck the whole thing. So I want to do what I promised to do, but this is the one area that could undermine my commitment. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: As I told you earlier, your troops will be completely safe. The units of the Mujahedin have been dismantled. In the days to come, we will give you more details. The majority of these forces have already left. But there are small numbers that do not have any place to go. They are political opponents in their home countries, and many have families in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as military units, they have ceased to exist. I understand your concern on this. There will be individuals who stay, but it will be as civilians and in parts of the country in which they will be under complete control. We don't know what to do with them as persons, but they are not soldiers anymore, and they have given a solemn promise that they will not deal with anything military. We will watch them. It is in our interest not to create any problems in this regard. If you provide us with evidence that people are terrorists, we will take action. But the Mujahedin units do not exist. ~~(C)~~

The President: I understand why they came. You needed help wherever you could find it. Those were desperate times. But we are your friends. We want to help -- to make the Federation work, to make Bosnia a unified state in every respect. But this problem could destroy the public base of support in the U.S. for IFOR. We will work with you and tell you what we know, but this is still a potentially serious problem. We are doing what we can to guard against this danger. We will take you at your word.

~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: Let me say a few words about the importance of making a success of the Federation. We heard considerable worry from the Congress about the Federation's future. Providing a real role for the Croats is going to be very important. In this regard, we are pleased that President Zubak is here. I know you will do your part. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: We are doing everything in our power to ensure that the Federation functions. Three days ago, we had a meeting of the Federation parliament. Things are moving forward. Between December 20 and 22, some very sensitive laws should be passed -- on defense and formation of a joint army and joint police force. Judging by what I have seen, therefore, things are improving. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: You also signed a good agreement in Dayton which needs to be filled out. ~~(C)~~

The President: What about the Serbs in the suburbs of Sarajevo? Can you do more to discourage them from leaving and to make them feel that they will be treated fairly? ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: Yesterday I had a meeting on this subject with Milosevic that lasted nearly two hours. I told him -- and I will repeat this in my speech -- that the Serbs in Sarajevo will be given a choice as to whether to leave or stay. We are calling on them to stay. We are trying to establish contact; we have sent delegations to speak with them, but they don't dare to see us. I even asked the German Ambassador to go to those suburbs where Farben had a factory to encourage them to remain. ~~(C)~~

Richard Holbrooke: The Serbs will talk with you after Admiral Smith and his forces arrive. ~~(C)~~

President Izetbegovic: That is possible. Once the forces of Karadzic leave, there will be a period when no army is in those areas. Then we will have a better opportunity to contact the Serbs. We are interested in seeing them stay. We want to maintain a cosmopolitan picture in Sarajevo. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Pull-Aside Meeting with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia
Momir Bulatovic, President of Montenegro
Milan Milutinovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Goran Milinovic, Chief of Cabinet to President Milosevic
Other Advisors

DATE, TIME December 14, 1995, 10:05-10:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's Residence, Paris, France

The President: I just wanted to say that I know that this agreement would not have been possible without you. Whatever our differences in the past, you made Dayton possible. Now it is important to make it work. I want to personally ask that you work with Admiral Smith. He's a good man and committed to his mission. If you cooperate, I think we can make it happen. We are depending on you to keep the radicals among the Bosnian Serbs from derailing the agreement. On Sarajevo, I know you had a long discussion with President Izetbegovic. He needs to make the Serbs who stay in the Federation -- and we hope that many of them will stay -- believe that they will be treated fairly and have their voices heard. ~~(c)~~

President Milosevic: The only dangerous spot is Sarajevo. This is not because of a direct material threat, but because of the psychology of the situation. If there is an understanding on an implementation plan -- a transition period that makes the Serbs feel that they have a real choice -- then things will calm down. I explained this to Admiral Smith when I met him together with Ambassador Harriman. We have time to work this out. ~~(C)~~

The keys to solving all problems are in the Dayton agreement. The force commander is authorized to extend the transition period if, in his personal judgment, an extension is needed. So he can use the possibility he has under the agreement. Please encourage Izetbegovic to understand this now. The winter is not adequate for the transition period; it must be extended in order to calm the situation. ~~(C)~~

You know, I asked Izetbegovic if he wants to keep the Serbs in Sarajevo or not. You must understand that he would like them to go and stay at the same time -- he wants enough Serbs to stay as are needed to maintain his international image. That is the reality. Sarajevo was a big wound for Europe at the beginning of this century; it led to the start of World War I. It would be better not to prolong the existence of this wound. People must have a choice. Under the Dayton agreement, people are free to choose their place of residence. This is more important than the statistics of how many Serbs and how many Muslims there are in Sarajevo. Let's ensure freedom of movement and individual freedom and then let people decide. We need a transition period to move to a new situation. There will need to be a new cultural center in the eastern part of the Republika Srpska -- for a university, academy of sciences, museums, national theater -- but this will be in the same neighborhood as Sarajevo, that is, in Pale and Lukavica. So this will be manageable if there is an understanding on implementation. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: I want to thank President Milosevic for his cooperation with the recent Congressional delegations. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: Some of them said they would like you to see so many Congressmen in such a short time, Mr. President! ~~(C)~~

Secretary Christopher: You and I had some difficult sessions in Dayton, but you have done what you said you would. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: Without your help, Mr. Christopher, we would not have achieved the result. You were the key at critical moments. ~~(C)~~

The President: I understand you were a big hit at the shopping mall. (U)

Secretary Christopher: And at the Officer's Club. (U)

President Milosevic: We had a good time there. (U)

The President: Although things have been calm since the ceasefire, the press is always looking for something bad to report. ~~(C)~~

President Milosevic: For the press, only bad news is good news. Mr. President, may I ask you to think of full normalization of relations with Federal Yugoslavia. We have been allies throughout our history. Few countries have had such close relations for so long with the United States. We stood shoulder to shoulder in two world wars. The spoiling of our relations was over a third issue and the result of a distorted picture on the part of your public opinion. We need full normalization -- we are the central factor in the Balkans. ~~(C)~~

The President: We've established that. (U)

President Milosevic: I don't see any reason not to have full normalization. (U)

Secretary Christopher: You've taken a big step today. ~~(C)~~

Richard Holbrooke: Mr. President, we can't keep President Chirac waiting. (U)

The President: Dick has done well so far, hasn't he? (U)

President Milosevic: He's a lucky man. Now the rest of you have to implement his agreement. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
January 23, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, January 13, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with President Izetbegovic on January 13, 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *Doh* Disapprove _____

Attachments


- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

January 23, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President
and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and
President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is provided for the
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) level. (C)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia-Herzegovina

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Menzies, U.S. Ambassador to Sarajevo
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gallucci, Ambassador-at-Large
Brian J. Atwood, Administrator, USAID
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

President Alija Izetbegovic
Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey
Minister for Relations with IFOR Hasan Muratovic
Federation President Kresimir Zubak
Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic
Federation Prime Minister Kapetanovic
Presidency Member Lasovic
Ambassador to U.S. Sven Alkalaj

DATE, TIME January 13, 1996, 3:52 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Vocal, Tuzla Air Force Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina

President Izetbegovic: I know we have limited time, so I will go straight to the point. Our assessment is that implementation of the Peace Agreement is going well overall. In some areas, it is going very well and U.S. forces, in our opinion, should be congratulated for their very successful work. We congratulate them in particular for their rapid construction of the pontoon bridge, which the people of Bosnia followed with admiration. Implementation has been going very well despite the difficult weather conditions and the difficult terrain. We all felt the weather today. There are, however, certain difficulties. You

have heard of the problems around Mostar. Fortunately, there are signs that the situation is calming down today, and I hope there will not be any more violence. ~~(C)~~

I would like to tell you personally our diagnosis of the problem in Mostar. The tensions there are not a problem of borders, frontiers or municipalities but a result of the lack of basic human rights there. There is no religious or political freedom, no freedom of movement. It is a sad situation with which the world must deal. If the problem of human rights is resolved, the problem of Mostar will be resolved as well. I understand that tonight you will be meeting with President Tudjman. I plead with you to have this in mind when you meet. He can change the situation there in a day. That is my opinion, although perhaps not that of every member of my delegation. Without progress in Mostar, we cannot implement the program for the Federation. ~~(C)~~

We have also had certain difficulties with respect to Sarajevo. You know that we have proclaimed an amnesty with the aim of helping to resolve the issues there. There are already signs that this was the right decision, although it is too early to judge since the amnesty is only four days old. However, there is one aspect that disturbs our people in Sarajevo. All the time the international community talks about the right of Serbs to stay in their homes. We accept this, but no one ever speaks of the right of those who were forcibly expelled three or four years ago to return to their homes. As for the four suburbs around Sarajevo that are coming back to the Federation, it is not without reason that Milosevic handed these over. The four are in fact not Serb areas: according to the 1991 census, none of them were originally Serb; all were majority non-Serb. All the non-Serb population was killed or forcibly expelled. Therefore, it is important to speak of several rights in Sarajevo: the right of Serbs to stay in their homes; the right of non-Serbs to go back to their homes; and the right of war criminals to be punished for what they did. If these three rights are put into effect, then we will find a solution for Sarajevo. In any case, let me assure you that our government will cooperate in the best way to ease your mission in Sarajevo. ~~(C)~~

There is still another problem that the United States should know about. I refer to one of the articles in the Peace Agreement about the exchange of prisoners and missing persons. The Serb side has submitted a list of only 120-130 prisoners, even though we have more than 20,000 who are missing. This creates a serious problem. Recently, Americans discovered a new mass grave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are asking that the grave sites be checked and that the missing from Srebrenica be accounted for.

~~(C)~~

Let me repeat that we thank you for coming to Bosnia, and we also thank the American people and the American government for your engagement in solving the conflict. It is our belief that your effort will not be in vain. ~~(C)~~

The President: I appreciate your effort in coming here today. I know how difficult it was. The weather is deteriorating, and I will have to be brief in order to make my departure but let me make a few points. First, with respect to Mostar, we are very concerned about the situation, and I will have a very clear conversation with President Tudjman tonight on this subject. We cannot let that situation endanger the integrity of the Federation. For the Peace Agreement to work out, we must preserve the Federation and human rights within the Federation. ~~(C)~~

Second, on Sarajevo, we are very concerned about the attacks on innocent civilians. I'm pleased that, despite those incidents, you went ahead with your amnesty. In doing this, you did the right thing. These kinds of confidence-building measures will be well received. But I also agree that we have not done a good job in saying not only that the Serbs have the right to stay but that other groups have the right to come back. We will try to do a better job of this in the future. Meanwhile, anything else you can do in the direction of building confidence -- for example, establishing a multi-ethnic police force -- would be very good. I am relying heavily on Ambassador Menzies and Ambassador Gallucci. They will be working very hard on these issues. We will also be supporting Carl Bildt in the reconstruction effort. ~~(C)~~

Let me raise one more issue relating to the equip and train program. I understand you have met with Jim Pardew, who is already doing a lot to assess your needs and to identify possible sources for meeting those needs. As we have discussed before, we remain concerned about the question of the Mujahedin. While it is hard to determine who is in and who is out, it is very important for us that the Iranians go and that the terms of the Dayton Agreement be honored. We want our people to help to build a stable democratic society. Therefore, I want to reaffirm our strong position on Iran. You know how strongly we feel about this. ~~(C)~~

Mr. President, if we don't stop the meeting now, my plane will not be able to get out. Thank you very much. (U)

President Izetbegovic: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

-- End of Conversation --